



Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

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July-August 1983

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Always ready . . . then, now and forever, I am the Infantry!
FOLLOW ME! (From the epic poem, I AM THE INFANTRY.)



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
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Commandant's NOTE



MAJOR GENERAL SAM WETZEL
Chief of Infantry

A REPORT TO THE INFANTRY COMMUNITY

This is my last column as Chief of Infantry.

Historically, Fort Benning's goal has been to turn out the world's finest Infantrymen. Today, more than ever, it cannot do less, for never before in our history has the United States Infantry faced so many changes in its equipment, doctrine, force structure, and training. And as the most flexible, adaptable, and strategically deployable of the combat arms, the Infantry must be prepared to respond to the demands of present and future military operations anywhere in the world.

My predecessors began a number of innovative and far-reaching programs that had a tremendous effect on all Infantrymen. During the past two years, as we continued to build on those programs, we also began developing others to meet our ever-changing needs. Here is a short wrap-up of how we stand today:

Proponency

- Commandant, USAIS now Chief of Infantry with proponency for all Infantry matters.
- Infantry strategic plan developed.
- CMF 11 being restructured.
- Infantry Professional Development Special Text (7-1) being produced.
- The Infantry Association re-established.

BIFV

- Bradley fielded at Fort Hood in March, to be fielded in Germany in September.
- IOAC now getting Bradley tactics instruction; IOBC, IPCC, and ANCOC getting hands-on orientation.
- New Equipment Training (NET) for Bradley under way at Fort Hood.
- First Bradley Gunner, Commander, and Master Gunner Courses in session.
- Revised Gunnery Manual, FM 23-1, fielded.
- Bradley crewmen (11M) being trained at USAITC.
- Four dedicated ranges for Bradley operational at Fort Benning.

Infantry Recruit Training

- Reception station at USAITC operational in August.
- Bayonet training being conducted.
- Pugil stick training introduced.
- More than 36,000 Infantry soldiers to be trained this year.

USAIS

- Desert phase with live fire added to Ranger training (at Fort Bliss).

- Live fire added to Florida phase of Ranger training.
- Increased emphasis on water operations in Ranger training.
- Combat critical tasks being standardized at USAIS.
- NCO exchange program with Airborne and Ranger units implemented.
- Airborne training consolidated under one battalion.
- Dialogue 82 and 83 TV tapes fielded for transitioning to Bradley and Division 86.
- Division 86 transition manuals fielded for mechanized units.
- MOUT training facility under construction (German village).
- 11H track established in BNCOC; 11M track being established.
- New EIB program fielded.
- Training drills — crew, battle, and situational — ready for field validation.
- Five training texts and an ARTEP (HTLB TEP 7-999B) produced and fielded in support of High Technology Light Division at Fort Lewis.
- Comprehensive communications skills program instituted for IOAC.
- IOBC extended to 16 weeks with 80% of time spent in the field.
- AirLand Battle instruction implemented in IOAC.
- AirLand Battle 2000 concept development initiated.
- Task Force Combat Service Support Operations "How to Support" manual under development.
- Interactive video discs tested for inclusion in land navigation, MOUT, and leadership training.
- Infantry liaison teams visit NTC and divisions to validate, clarify, and develop "How to Fight" doctrine and to get feedback on our products.

We have a good dialogue with the field. Keep it up. Fort Benning continues to turn out a great product — from private soldier on up. The Infantry is, in my opinion, in great shape and getting better every day. We must never forget the noblest of all men — the aggressive and tough fighting Infantryman, with rifle and bayonet. He is what the Soviets fear the most. Never let him down.

Thanks for your help; I hope you will give Major General Jim Lindsay the same great help.

Practice combined arms — Make It Happen.

INFANTRY NEWS



THE ARMY TRAINING EXTENSION COURSE (TEC) has begun distributing TEC audiovisual and audio-only lessons with Student/Supervisor Instructions (SSI), pre-test, post-test, and answers all in one package. This new process is gradually replacing the original Student Instruction Sheet (SIS) and Lesson Administrative Instructions (LAI).

The SSI is contained in a small booklet that fits inside the front cover of the TEC kit. Although it has been designed to be permanent, it is not fastened to the kit. The SSI can be reproduced on an office copier and distributed to students. The original SSI should not be written on.


Because the SSI is brand new, it will take some time before all of the old material in the existing TEC lessons has been rewritten. In the meantime, LAIs and SISs should be kept in TEC libraries for the lessons that have not been issued in the new format.

If you have any questions about the SSI, please call AUTOVON 927-2141/3728 or commercial (804) 878-2141/3728.

ARMY AVIATION has been approved as a new Army branch. The new branch's headquarters will be at the Army's Aviation Center, Fort Rucker.

The decision to create a separate branch resulted from a study of Army aviation requirements by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. That study showed that the new battle doctrine has broadened aviation's role as a combat maneuver element. Personnel management considerations also played a part in determining that aviation should be a separate branch.

THE FIRST SHIPMENT of Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles arrived in Germany in March and were immediately transported to the Seventh Army Training Command at Vilseck. The 17 vehicles in this shipment are being used for transition training. Maintenance personnel from the infantry battalions that are scheduled to receive the BIFV began



their transition training in June; unit transition training for those same units will begin in September.


The BIFV fielding complements the European introduction of the Abrams tank, which took place more than a year ago. Five tank battalions have now been trained and equipped with the Abrams in a process that will go on into the 1990s.

THE ARMY'S Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command has awarded a contract to a commercial firm for the design and fabrication of prototypes of a new assault bridge for the Army's light infantry divisions.

The new assault bridge will be 25 meters long and of a double-fold

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The 1982 index to INFANTRY has been prepared separately and is available to anyone who requests a copy. Please address your request to: Editor, INFANTRY Magazine, PO Box 2005, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905.



scissors type that can support 30 tons. Constructed of aluminum, it will weigh approximately 8,000 pounds. It will be mounted on and launched from a trailer that can be towed behind any standard vehicle with a 15,000-pound towing capacity.

The first prototype is scheduled for delivery in June 1984.

THE ARMY RECENTLY APPROVED the acquisition of M16A2 rifles, and it is expected that the first of the new rifles will be issued to Army units in the mid-1980s.


The M16A2 rifle, an improved version of the 5.56mm weapon, has several new features that improve its range, durability, and handling. It has been designed to fire the new NATO 5.56mm round, the same the recently adopted SAW weapon fires. With a 30-round magazine, it weighs 8.2 pounds, compared with the M16A1's 7.9 pounds.

The rifling of the barrel has been changed from one turn in twelve inches to one turn in seven inches; a burst control device limits automatic fire to three rounds; a muzzle brake compensator replaces the flash suppressor; there are new front and rear sights; there is a heavier and more rugged barrel; a deflector near the ejector port has been added to assist left-handed firers; and there are several stronger plastic components.

With the new round and barrel, the effective range of the rifle has been increased to 800 meters.

THE ARMY HAS AWARDED a contract to the Emerson Electric Company for 80 prototype Fast Attack Vehicles (FAVs). The vehicles will undergo extensive testing by the 9th Infantry Division's High Technology Test Bed (HTTB).

The FAV, which is based on a world class off-road racing vehicle, can travel at more than 80 miles per



hour. It will be equipped with a weapon station, and it meets the HTTB's requirement for an armed vehicle that can be quickly and easily transported by helicopter or airplane.

Possible weapons for the FAV include the TOW missile, a 30mm cannon, a .50 caliber machinegun, and an MK 19 grenade launcher.


THE CURRENT FALL-AND-ROLL technique taught to infantrymen has been used for several decades. It works well on soft ground, but it is certainly not suited for hard terrain or built-up areas where the infantryman stands to damage not only his weapon but his body as well.

Here is a new technique that protects both the infantryman and his weapon, and if it is assumed at a moderate or slow forward speed, it places the infantryman in a prone position quickly and safely. It does, of course, forfeit forward momentum to gain position.

The infantryman assumes the position by grasping his rifle with his firing hand and holding it parallel to the

ground. He then, simultaneously, accomplishes the following actions: He extends his non-firing arm, palm down, and squats and thrusts his legs to the rear much as if he were conducting a "squat-thrust" exercise. He then lowers his body to the ground as quickly as possible by bending his extended arm while keeping his weapon close to his body with his firing hand. If necessary, he can roll to one side or the other before he takes up a correct prone firing position. (*This item was submitted by Captain Edwin L. Kennedy, Jr.*)

BRADLEY INFANTRY FIGHTING VEHICLE (BIFV) crews tested the BIFV this past winter at the Army's Cold Regions Test Center, Fort Greely, Alaska, to see how the vehicle and its various systems would



perform in arctic and subarctic conditions.

The BIFV testing program included cold starts, mobility, and weapon firing, which included the vehicle's 25mm cannon, 7.62mm machinegun, firing port weapons, and smoke grenades.

THE NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM had the grand opening of its renovated third floor on 1 July, and with this additional space, it plans to offer a number of new displays in the months to come.

The Third Annual National Infantry Museum Run will be held in October, and a good turnout is

expected. Individuals and teams from other installations are invited and encouraged to take part. The Director of the Museum will furnish more information about the race to anyone who is interested in participating. He can be reached at AUTOVON 835-2958 or commercial (404) 545-2958.

The Museum also continues to add interesting and important pieces to its collection. For example, it has received a number of artifacts related to Colonel Ray M. O'Day's internment as a prisoner of war in the Philippines. Colonel O'Day, now deceased, was captured on Bataan in 1942.

Retired Colonel Maurice Shapiro has donated a large number of World War II items that he acquired during his service in Europe. Among them is a piece of brown Italian marble that had been part of a large table that stood near Adolf Hitler's desk in the New Reich Chancellery building in Berlin. The table had been broken up by the Russians, and Colonel Shapiro, who was then serving with the 2d U.S. Armored Division in Berlin, managed to get this piece of it.

The Museum has also recently acquired by donation a Civil War period percussion musket that is in exceptionally good condition, together with its history.

A ceremony commemorating General Henry Lewis Benning's birthdate was held in April, and this was followed by a tea honoring the United Daughters of the Confederacy. One thousand tulip bulbs had been planted earlier for blooming by that date.

The Museum also prepared a number of special exhibits: one marked the Treaty of Paris and the 200th anniversary of the end of hostilities in the Revolutionary War. Others honored the Infantry School, INFANTRY Magazine, Black History Week, and George Washington.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is \$2.00

for a one-year membership, or \$10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, GA 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958 or commercial (404) 545-2958.

THE INFANTRY BOARD has submitted the following news items:

- Extended Cold/Wet Clothing System. Part of the mission of the 9th Infantry Division is to organize and equip one of its brigades by 1985 as the nucleus for a High Technology Light Division. To do this, the Division is conducting experiments with new organizations, tactics, equipment, concepts, and doctrine.

One objective of the Division's experiments with new equipment is to find cold weather clothing that weighs less and is less bulky than the clothing now used but that also provides equal or greater protection against the cold. The Infantry Board, in support of these experiments, was given the task of testing the military utility of four extended cold/wet clothing systems (ECWC). One is a modified Standard A cold weather system, while the other three consist of state-of-the-art, commercial cold weather clothing.

The U.S. Marine Corps has also been looking for an improved individual combat clothing and equipment system to support its Marines in amphibious and cold weather operations and in operations in the mountains. In fact, the Corps had contracted with the Army's Natick Laboratories and the Army's Human Engineering Laboratories to procure and test a cold/wet clothing system at the Corps' mountain warfare training center in Pickel Meadows, California, in January 1983.

In September 1982, representatives from the Infantry Board, the Marine Corps, Natick Laboratories, and the Human Engineering Laboratories met and agreed to combine the testing and also agreed that the Infantry


Board would serve as lead test agency.

The test was conducted at Pickel Meadows, as scheduled, in January 1983. It consisted of four 72-hour scenarios during which the members of four test squads alternated wearing the four systems. The test personnel were 24 Army infantrymen and 24 Marines.

Test directorate personnel used forms, questionnaires, and interviews to collect information pertaining to human factors, safety, and performance throughout the test program.

The Infantry School and the Marine Corps will use the test results to recommend candidate items for further testing.

- LAV-25(A). The Operational Test IIA (OT IIA) of the Light Armored Vehicle-25 (LAV 25(A)) was a non-comparative test conducted by the Board at Fort Benning from 15 February through 13 March 1983. (See INFANTRY, January-February 1983, Page 5.) It was conducted to



provide data on certain unresolved issues that had surfaced during the combined Army and Marine Corps OT II conducted at Twentynine Palms, California, from 1 December 1981 through 28 May 1982. The data from OT IIA will be used to support a decision concerning the vehicle's production and production rate.

The LAV program is a multiservice, accelerated procurement effort that is designed to provide an immediate solution to mobility and firepower deficiencies that now exist in the light division.

The vehicle itself is an eight-wheeled combat vehicle with a two-man turret. Its primary weapon is the

electrically-powered M242 25mm gun. The stabilized turret also has a coaxially mounted M240 7.62mm machinegun. The crew consists of a driver, a gunner, and a vehicle commander. Its specifications state that it will have a maximum forward speed of 62.5 miles per hour and a maximum operating range of 437 miles.

The OT IIA included live fire and representative tactical missions. It focused on the stabilized firing abilities of the weapon systems — both from stationary positions and while on the move — and on the vehicle's response to various tactical situations. Limited NBC and hostile EW situations were also presented during the tactical exercises.

Each test crew consisted of an Army vehicle commander, an Army driver, and an experienced Marine gunner. Player personnel also included Army automotive and turret mechanics.

A SERIES OF supply training workshops for Active and Reserve Component soldiers will be going to the units beginning in September.

The program consists of three coordinated workshops, each requiring about 16 hours to complete. The workshops will be held for individuals ranging from the holder of the sub-hand receipts to the battalion commander.

Called the Organizational Supply Management System (OSMS), the workshops have been modeled on the successful Battalion Training Management System (BTMS).

Each workshop was designed and developed by the Quartermaster School to meet the Total Army's supply training requirements. The Primary Supply Managers Workshop is intended for property users and first-line supervisors. The Supervisory Supply Managers Workshop is designed for company commanders and unit supply personnel (property book level). The Command Supply Managers Workshop is provided for battalion commanders and selected staff officers.

FORUM & FEATURES



The BIFV and Communications

CAPTAIN GREGORY J. PREMO

Slowly but surely, long promised high technology equipment is being integrated into the units of the Active Army. Of primary interest to the infantry soldier is the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) and the firepower and mobility it brings to the battlefield. This product of modern technology, more than ten years in development, is going to bring about some radical changes in the tactics and the combat philosophy of the units fortunate enough to get it.

The fielding of new technology has always meant that a wave of inconsistencies and incompatibilities had to be identified between the new system and the old. The differences in speed, maneuverability, firepower, and survivability between the Bradley and the M113, for example, will definitely affect the tactics of any unit that happens to have a mix of these two combat vehicles. Another of these inconsistencies involves communications equipment. The integration of current and future communication equipment into the Bradley will involve some consideration of the following points:

- The Bradley's communication

station is just large enough to accept two VRC-12 family radios and two VINSON family communications security (COMSEC) devices. The old NESTOR COMSEC equipment is not projected for use in the Bradley. But if the NESTOR equipment should be used in the Bradley, there is room enough for just one VRC-12 radio and one NESTOR device.

- There is no room for the addition of an R442 auxiliary receiver in the Bradley if two VRC-12 radios with VINSON devices are installed.

- The addition of more than two antennas would require major and very expensive turret redesign or the local installation of a less survivable "jury rigged" antenna system (even if three current family radios could be squeezed into the turret).

- The troop compartment of the Bradley is designed to accept only the electronic components designed into it at the factory. Electronic testing procedures and other considerations make the installation of extraneous electronic components in the troop compartment difficult and would result in expensive modifications.

- Even if a radio were mounted in the troop compartment, there is no

place on the hull to mount an antenna and no way to bring an antenna cable into the Bradley without drilling through the hull. Any antenna mounted on the hull would interfere with or be damaged or destroyed by the cannon and could possibly run afoul of TOW guidance wires.

- It is also impossible to transfer RF (radio frequency) energy from a radio in the troop compartment through the turret slip ring to an antenna on the turret.

- The troop compartment of the Bradley is designed to accept only the electronic components designed into it at the factory. Electronic testing procedures and other considerations make the installation of extraneous electronic components in the troop compartment difficult and would result in expensive modifications.

These limitations in communication system design in the Bradley could cause some commanders, who now mount three or more radios such as the GRC-160 and the VRC-47 in their M113s, to alter their way of doing business significantly once they get the Bradley. For example, some commanders like to keep their fire support officer (FSO) in their "hip

pocket," so to speak, by having him ride in the commander's vehicle. In the Bradley, these commanders will have to provide the FSO with one of their own two radios or let the FSO ride "blind." No longer will the FSO be able to plug his radio into an "extra" mount in the back of the vehicle.

Future communication equipment will certainly reduce the physical size of the radio itself. Theoretically, four radios of the scaled down SINC-GARS family could fit in the Bradley. Of course, an antenna multi-coupler (allowing two or more radios to use one antenna) would be needed to stay

within the current turret design limitation of two antenna blisters. But the proposed inclusion of PLARS (Position Location and Reporting System, SNAP (Steerable Null Antenna Processor), anti-jam devices, and other developmental devices in the communication station of a commander's Bradley could use up the space saved by smaller radios, once again limiting the commander to two radios.

As advanced weapon systems are integrated into our combat units, writers of tactical doctrine should be aware that the products of modern

technology will affect their tactical studies. Limiting a commander in the Bradley to two radios may not be a real problem, but any agency that is involved in developing tactics for this highly effective weapon system at least has to take it into consideration.

CAPTAIN GREGORY J. PREMO, a Signal officer, is branch advisor to the U.S. Army Readiness Group, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. His former assignments include one as assistant S-3 of the 126th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, and one as chief of the Tactical Communications Branch, U.S. Army Infantry School. He is a graduate of the University of Georgia and has completed the Signal Officers Advanced Course.

Where's the Commander?

CAPTAIN BARRY E. WILLEY

Much has been written about where in a formation the company commander should be when leading his unit, in training or in combat. The consensus among Infantry officers is that the commander should be where he can control his company. But just exactly where is that?

Field Manual 71-1 offers some sound principles to guide the mechanized infantry commander in most situations — mounted and dismounted, while moving and when in contact. But these general principles need to be translated into concrete examples on the ground.

Perhaps some examples from my own experiences as a mechanized infantry company commander in Panama will help. Sometimes I made the right decision, sometimes the wrong one, and sometimes I made a decision that was wrong by the book

but right for the particular situation. (There aren't many textbook cases for the jungles of Panama, where mechanized infantry terrain is scarce.)

A commander's boldness and decisiveness in training will carry over into combat. But he must always remember that boldness and brash heroics are distinctly different things.

Controlling a mounted or dismounted formation rarely calls for heroics, but it does call for spontaneous, sound judgments and orders. In my first training exercise, when the lead platoon came under fire, my first instinct was to dismount

with my RTO and move to the action, .45 caliber pistol in hand. So that is what I did, and I was promptly "killed" by a nearby controller. It was an embarrassing moment, but I learned a valuable lesson.

Of course, the situation may sometimes make it necessary for a company commander to be at a bottleneck, but he should not step in until his subordinate leader at the scene has tried to solve the problem. Even then, it may not be necessary for him to show up. He can send calm and deliberate instructions by radio, land line, or messenger to the unit in contact, which should allow him to stay where he can control the big picture — near his radio to higher headquarters and to his other subordinate elements. In other words, it is better for him to be in control of the action than *in* the action.

In a mounted movement, the key location for a company commander is where observation and communication are best — where he has good observation of the terrain and excellent communications with his subordinate elements and with his higher command support elements. If he can find such a location, he should not have too much trouble controlling his unit.

For example, during a conventional ARTEP in the only suitable mechanized infantry terrain in Panama, my company was moving to contact using traveling overwatch. The lead platoon encountered a deliberate minefield that was covered by enemy fire and could not be bypassed.

I knew that the platoon leader on the scene, though new, was well-trained and self-confident. Still, I itched to go to his location and speed the process of clearing the minefield and rounding up the enemy resistance. I held back, though, for what seemed like an eternity, keeping my command track in defilade with my overwatch platoon and in radio contact with all my other elements, including my fire support.

The platoon leader was extremely competent in the actions he took, and before long the company was moving again. As it turned out, a little restraint and common sense had kept my track from an antitank ambush, and at the same time the subordinate leader had gained some valuable experience.

Another incident involved 18 APCs moving in column trying to penetrate a dismounted enemy position. Because navigation was critical, I placed my command track, not in the lead, but directly behind the lead track. When the company made contact with the enemy position at his weakest point, my lead track was knocked out by a hasty ambush. Our speed and resultant shock action carried us through the enemy lines for an eventual envelopment, but if my command track had led, the attack probably would have foundered.

My choice of even a second-place

position in the formation for my track was certainly questionable. But if I had been much farther back, accurate navigation and sensitivity to the enemy situation would have been jeopardized. If I had been facing real Sappers and a real enemy, though, I probably would have thought twice about that location in the formation. Still, artificialities in training are ever present and must be dealt with judiciously, and boldness and decisiveness in training will carry over into combat. But we must always remember that boldness and brash heroics are distinctly different things.

DISMOUNTED

The usual mechanized infantry dismounted movement was difficult to practice in Panama because of the terrain. Dismounted movement for my company consisted primarily of single-file, unconventional movement techniques.

Our mission one evening was to conduct a company dismounted night attack. We entered the jungle at 1900 in a 90-man file. I chose to move with my headquarters behind the lead platoon, about 25 men back from the lead man. I designated my most competent squad leader as compassman and gave him explicit instructions on when to change azimuths. Being so far back, though, I was unable to adequately check the movement of the front of the column, and the compassman missed the azimuth change. We marched about five hours off course before we detected the problem and changed course. We eventually hit the objective, but by that time the men were much the worse for wear after 11 hours of jungle movement. If I had been closer to the front, and if both the lead platoon leader and I had verified the compass readings, the company would have been more fit to fight at the objective and beyond.

The final mission in that ARTEP proved very instructional. A week of sustained operations with little sleep was taking its toll. Our mission was to

conduct another dismounted attack close to midnight, over fairly open terrain. Enemy contact was not likely except at the objective. My manpower had been depleted through "casualties," and I also had to secure our vehicles during our attack.

While giving the operations order, I found myself and my platoon leaders nodding off every few minutes. Realizing that few of us were alert enough for any kind of complicated maneuvers, I decided to run the attack like a ranger patrol, and except for point security, I chose to lead the patrol.

I was later criticized for exposing myself in this way, but I knew that the condition of my men and the nature of our mission allowed no time for reconnaissance. Although we never found the opposing force (*it* was lost), I am convinced that I did the right thing under the circumstances, and I would do the same thing again under similar circumstances.

As always, the mission, the terrain, and the specific circumstances dictates a company commander's location, but that is not always where the action is hottest. Rather, it should be where he can communicate with and control his elements. Choosing a location may require him to take calculated risks, and he may have to exercise restraint when he feels a strong urge to jump in with both boots.

Perhaps the most effective way a company commander can learn these lessons is through trial and error. Sometimes, though, the experiences of others can help future company commanders weather those trials in training before the crucial test of combat eliminates any second chances they might have had. I hope that mine do just that.

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A Fitness Badge

CAPTAIN MICHAEL T. MCEWEN

In spite of a few sore muscles and joints, most soldiers seem to feel that the Army's increasing emphasis on physical fitness is a positive move. They are also smart enough to realize that they, as individuals, benefit immensely — in terms of personal health and well-being — from reaching and maintaining a basic level of physical fitness.

Now that these grass-root attitudes have developed, it is time the Army went one step farther and adopted a fitness-related military badge, one that would have a high degree of glamour associated with it and enough prestige to merit wide-spread interest and acceptance.

This proposed Combat Fitness Badge (CFB) would be given to soldiers who demonstrated a continued level of individual fitness in the physical skills their particular specialties would require of them in actual combat. It would have to be recertified annually, and a soldier's right to wear the badge would be dependent on that recertification.

It might be argued here that the requirements for a number of the Army's present badges include a high level of physical fitness — the airborne wings and the air assault and expert infantryman badges, for example — and the soldiers who earn these badges wear them with pride. But obviously not all soldiers in the Army can (or should) receive the training that would earn them one of these badges, and those who do earn them do not have to maintain their high level of fitness to continue wearing

them (although many do, of course).

What, then, should a CFB program contain? Here is one possible program:

First, the present Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) would be a key part; it is already well integrated into our current training programs and is considered the basic tool for assessing an individual's strength and fitness. For CFB purposes, though, a soldier would have to score at least 75 points in each event instead of the minimum standard of 60 in each event. (Several performance levels are shown in Figure 1.)

Then, because a soldier in combat could reasonably be expected to face water obstacles or water hazards, this CFB program would also include a water performance test. The combat

water survival test, which is now required of all Ranger and Special Forces trainees, could be used; it is a good performance indicator, it has been standardized, and it is already integrated with other training.

The third requirement would center on weapon qualification. The Army's basic standard for weapon qualification today is the lowest score a soldier needs to qualify as a marksman with his individual weapon. This score, of course, is different for each weapon and for each qualification course. To earn the CFB, using today's standards, a soldier would have to qualify as a sharpshooter or better with his individual weapon. This should not be beyond the capability of many soldiers, particularly those who are willing to work hard to improve or to

APRT PERFORMANCE LEVELS AND PROPOSED CFB STANDARDS					
AGE GROUP		17-25	26-30	31-35	36-39
	SCORES				
		Pushups (Men/Women)			
APRT Minimum	60	40/16	38/15	33/14	32/13
CFB Minimum	75	55/27	53/25	48/21	47/20
APRT Maximum	100	68/40	66/38	61/34	60/30
		Situps (Men/Women)			
APRT Minimum	60	40/27	38/25	36/23	34/21
CFB Minimum	75	55/42	53/38	51/28	49/25
APRT Maximum	100	69/61	67/51	65/41	63/31
		Two-Mile Run (Men/Women, Time in Minutes)			
APRT Minimum	60	17:55/22:14	18:30/22:29	19:10/24:04	19:35/25:34
CFB Minimum	75	16:06/19:23	16:28/19:48	16:50/22:29	17:04/23:50
APRT Maximum	100	13:05/17:10	13:40/17:25	14:20/19:00	15:05/20:30

NOTE: Ages 40-60 have maximum times only.

Figure 1.

FIVE-MILE ENDURANCE RUN STANDARDS FOR PROPOSED CFB				
MAXIMUM TIME IN MINUTES (Men/Women)				
AGE GROUP (17-39)	17-25	26-30	31-35	36-39
	44:50/53:35	46:15/56:15	47:55/60:10	48:55/63:55
AGE GROUP (40-60)	40-45	46-50	51-55	56-60
	50:00/65:00	52:30/67:30	55:00/70:00	57:30/72:30

Figure 2.

maintain their proficiency.

Finally, this CFB program would have a separate endurance test — a five-mile run. Using the present APRT standards for the two-mile run, it would be simple to construct a performance table for a five-mile run. (A proposed table is shown in Figure 2.)

This particular CFB program would be easy to administer and could be done within the time now allocated for physical training and for weapons proficiency training in most units. It would be an excellent morale

booster for all soldiers, combat arms or otherwise. The badge itself would also be an important new indicator in personnel evaluation because it would indicate continuing performance rather than a one-time accomplishment.

Other CFB programs could be devised as well. In all, though, the CFB standards should not be set so high that they could not be reached by most soldiers who were really interested. And the selected tasks should be easy to administer and should not require special facilities or

a great deal of equipment.

The badge's design should be a distinctive one. One possibility is a winged foot within a wreath in an oval design similar to that of the airborne wings or the air assault badge. Another would be a short sword or dagger on a rectangular badge similar to the EIB.

If a CFB program such as this one could draw strong command support, it would give soldiers a good incentive to exceed the minimum standards that have been established for their physical fitness. Thus, it would also become an important factor in increasing a unit's basic combat readiness.



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Relief in Place

CAPTAIN JONATHAN P. CHASE

A relief in place is a complex operation and one that is designed for a specific purpose — to replace one unit with another on the battlefield. Often a relief is conducted to replace a unit that has suffered heavily, but it can also be used to strengthen a sector, to remove a unit for action elsewhere, or even to replace a unit from another country within a combined area of operation. For any of these purposes, a relief in place

operation requires a great deal of planning, coordination, and preparation before its execution phase even begins, and the latter phase alone has been known to take as long as ten days.

Unfortunately, though, a relief in place is often confused with a delay, a withdrawal, or a passage of lines. As a result, it is largely taken for granted and receives far less training emphasis than it should. Commanders at all

levels need to understand it better and see that it is included in their exercises whenever possible, because commanders at all levels become involved in the entire process.

Once a decision has been made — for whatever reason — to conduct a relief in place, the higher headquarters must publish warning orders as early as possible so that subordinate commands down to platoon level will have enough time to prepare

sketches, issue instructions, and coordinate everything effectively.

The idea, of course, is to conduct the relief without its being detected by the opposing force, and to do this commanders must carefully choose the best time for it to take place. Although limited visibility makes the entire operation easier to carry out, it also requires even more planning and coordination. But no matter when a relief in place is conducted, it should be executed on a man for man, weapon for weapon basis within the forward sectors.

In the case of an infantry company, the first decision the outgoing company commander has to make is what sequence his unit will follow in being relieved. He must decide whether to move his entire company at one time or to start the relief either from a flank or from its center. In making this decision, he must consider the location and the availability of covered and concealed routes to and from the rear, traffic control points, and unit assembly areas. These control measures become especially critical at night, and he should consider increasing the number and location of his guides and checkpoints and augmenting his quartering parties. (If the relief is to take place at night, his subordinate leaders should be given time to walk their routes carefully during the daylight hours.) He must also keep in mind the likelihood of an enemy attack and the critical avenues of approach into the forward sector during the relief operation.

Once the sequence of the relief has been determined and once orders have been published, subordinate leaders from both the outgoing and the incoming units can begin their preparations and any coordination they need.

Detailed coordination, which is essential to any military operation, becomes even more critical during a relief in place. For this reason, during the coordination and preparation phase, liaison officers should be exchanged. The company executive officers operate well in this capacity

since they know the strength and disposition of both their combat elements and their support elements. The company commanders of the two units should also meet, if possible, to discuss and confirm the plan.

During this phase, routes, assembly areas, link-up points, start and release points (SPs and RPs), and time schedules have to be confirmed, and units have to be organized to facilitate the operation. At the very least, guides and quartering parties must conduct a detailed reconnaissance of their primary routes and must see that all routes and assembly areas are adequately marked before the main body departs.

The incoming commander must plan to accept the outgoing unit's defensive orientation, estimate of the situation, and fire plans and must not alter them until the relief has been completed. Positions for any additional soldiers the incoming unit may have must not be prepared, although they should be planned for and briefed, to be executed later on order.

PINPOINT

During their preparations for the relief, the incoming unit's leaders should pinpoint the exact locations of individual positions, weapon systems, tracked vehicles, GSR teams, communication and indirect fire elements, and command posts within their specific forward sectors. The outgoing elements must be sure to update and confirm all of their target reference points, range cards, sector sketches, barrier plans, minefield records, and any other data that the incoming units will need to establish an effective defense.

Every detail of the relief operation must be thoroughly coordinated — the failure to confirm a time schedule, a traffic control point, or a weapon location in advance may find the incoming units fighting for a once friendly position on the front line.

As a final step in the planning and coordination process, a time must be set for the exchange of responsibility

for the forward sector and for the items of equipment the outgoing unit plans to leave behind. Normally, the outgoing commander will retain responsibility for the forward sector until two-thirds of his forces have been relieved. This two-thirds figure does not mean, however, that the incoming commander cannot establish himself within the forward area before the time comes for the changeover.

The relief itself and the incoming units' initial defense of the forward sector will work better if the outgoing units leave behind their machinegun tripods, with traversing and elevating mechanisms still attached, and also their mortar baseplates if they have already settled in.

These units might leave behind other things as well, such as range cards and sector sketches, individual aiming stakes and claymores, if possible, along with communication wire, which is usually used throughout a relief operation as the primary means of communication. The outgoing unit might also consider leaving behind ammunition, STANO devices, pyrotechnics, fuel, repair parts, and any other equipment they can do without in their subsequent operations. Whatever is decided, specific details for the exchange of this materiel and equipment must be coordinated and disseminated.

With the coordination and preparation complete, the incoming company can then establish its forward assembly areas and prepare to conduct the relief itself.

There is no set sequence for the movement of vehicles and personnel. Generally, during the execution of a relief in place, units will move over designated routes, under the control of guides and quartering parties, to previously established release points and assembly areas, following the sequence established by the operations order. Ideally, a detailed sequence of events should be strictly adhered to. But experience with relief in place operations, as well as other such operations, demonstrates that the true test of a unit's leadership is its

ability to react to unexpected problems. This means that flexibility must be a part of the plan, especially during night operations.

In any case, liaison officers must plan to remain until the last element has been relieved to help sort out any problems.

Wire should be the primary means of communication during the operation, but normal radio traffic should be continued too so that the enemy will not become suspicious. (Training can help eliminate the problems of two units operating over the same wire.) And with adequate planning and a detailed timetable, it should be possible to limit communications to reports of units crossing checkpoints. Even then, codewords should be used to keep any possible enemy monitoring of the land line from affecting the operation.

Fire support units should remain fully operational throughout the relief, and screening elements should not be replaced until the incoming unit has assumed responsibility for the forward sector.

If properly coordinated, the execution of a relief in place can be as successful as that of any other tactical

operation. But a lot depends on the training that the units involved have had in the entire process. Shortcomings in such an operation usually result from a leader's lack of practical exposure to it or from a duplication of effort.

It is up to company commanders to prepare their subordinates to conduct a relief operation. For example, they should consider discussing it during professional development periods, officers' calls, and TEWTs. These discussions should stress, for example, preparing unit SOPs and checklists in advance.

The relief in place should be practiced in all kinds of field exercises. It is an excellent battalion level ARTEP mission, because it tests a unit's ability to staff, coordinate, and execute an operation that it is likely to have occasion to use on any future battlefield.

These exercises should not neglect the details of the relief. For example, in a peacetime training environment the exchange of equipment and supplies is often neglected, because it becomes tedious for the units involved. Senior commanders might instruct their subordinates to leave

behind items that would realistically remain with the incoming unit. But if this has not been considered in advance, when the outgoing unit is back in garrison it will spend an unnecessary amount of time trying to recover its accountable items. If security arrangements and recovery procedures are considered well in advance, the exchange should not become a major obstacle to the total success of the relief.

This training, then, should take into account all the various details of planning, coordinating, and executing a relief in place. Only through this added emphasis will our units be prepared to conduct a relief in place when the time comes, either as an outgoing unit or as an incoming one.



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Misusing the TOW

LIEUTENANT KONRAD TRAUTMAN

In an armor-rich situation, a light infantry division's most important weapon is the TOW. Unfortunately, though, there is a major problem with this weapon. The problem is not with the training or the technical expertise

of the 11H members of the TOW squads; they are well trained in the tactical and technical use of the TOW, despite its sophistication. The problem is not with maintenance either; a TOW is rarely "down" for

more than 48 hours. The problem with the TOW is that some commanders repeatedly misuse it, apparently because they don't understand how to use it properly.

In my experience with TOW pla-

toons (I have served with one and evaluated others on ARTEPs), I have seen commanders make several common mistakes in the employment of the TOW. (Although all my experience, I admit, has been in one division, I suspect that there are similar problems in other light divisions.)

The most critical mistake commanders make is to employ a TOW platoon in a non-antiarmor role. I have seen commanders order TOW platoons into screening or reconnaissance missions, for example. Some of them even mounted 11H soldiers on tanks to spearhead attacks.

The dangers in this practice are two-fold. First, 11H soldiers are not trained in these missions and cannot be expected to accomplish them well. The second danger is that in such missions 11H personnel are likely to become casualties. And the TOW system is not like an M60 machinegun; its gunners, if lost, cannot be replaced by 11B soldiers. This means that for every four 11H soldiers who become casualties, one TOW cannot be manned during the next engagement. TOW gunners, therefore, must be used wisely and in 11H jobs, not in 11B jobs.

A second major mistake some commanders make is to employ the TOW as an assault weapon. In one instance, a rifle company commander on a battalion movement to contact with his company as the lead element moved his attached TOWs within his dismounted company formation. The TOWs moved cross-country sometimes behind the lead platoon, sometimes in the rear, but almost always spread throughout the dismounted formation. Because of the terrain, no TOW shots were available. The TOWs in that situation were at best worthless and at worst, probable casualties.

The TOW, unlike a tank, is not an assault weapon. Especially when mounted on a quarter-ton jeep, it has little crew protection, and it has a slow rate of fire and a limited number of rounds. The TOWs in a movement to contact mission are better used to

overwatch the lead element from a point some 1,000 meters behind the formation. This still gives the TOWs a 2,000-meter stand-off range but helps ensure their survival. In places where the terrain does not allow that kind of overwatch, the TOWs should be detached from the company, moved to the rear, and brought forward only after the company has reached its objective. Or they should be attached to another element that can use them.

A third common mistake I saw commanders make was to designate exact TOW firing positions themselves instead of leaving that decision to the TOW personnel, who are better trained to position their weapons.

The problem with the TOW is that some commanders repeatedly misuse it, apparently because they don't understand how to use it properly.

(They know that they need to exploit the TOW's range, that they need at least 300 meters between positions, that they need mutual support, and that they want to try to get flank and rear shots if they can.)

One commander, to cover a kill zone, positioned the attached TOW platoon entirely in one 500-meter area, giving the TOW platoon no choice in the matter. From that one area, it could not cover the kill zone. A better solution would have been for him simply to instruct the TOW platoon leader to cover the kill zone with his TOWs. This would have been enough of a mission statement for the TOW platoon leader to act upon.

With those instructions, the platoon leader, with his section sergeants, would have conducted a reconnaissance on the zone to decide on sectors of fire for the sections and on the general locations of the sections. Then he would have let his section sergeants

and squad leaders determine the exact positions of the TOWs and report them back through him to the commander.


The typical rebuttal I receive to arguments such as these is that since most terrain hinders TOW shots, TOWs cannot always be used "by the book." While this may be true to some extent, poor terrain is really an excuse; the real reason commanders misuse their TOWs is that they don't really think about where these weapons can be used to their best advantage. Normally, changing a unit's task organization whenever its mission changes will solve that problem.

For example, a TOW platoon may be attached to a rifle company for a defense mission. If that rifle company then receives an order to lead the battalion on a movement to contact over terrain that is not suited to TOW shots, the TOWs should normally be detached from that company and attached to another unit. With that unit the TOW platoon can either overwatch the movement of the lead company or provide general support to the units in the rear. Too often, though, commanders issue orders without any thought of reassigning the TOWs from units that cannot use them to units that can.

Early in their training, second lieutenants are drilled on the proper use of the M60 machinegun. Commanders of light infantry units need to be given similar training on the proper use of the TOW, because when a light infantry unit deploys to fight an enemy armored threat, the TOWs will be its most important weapons. TOW gunners are trained to kill tanks; their leaders must see that they get the opportunity to do so.



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infantry
IN ACTION

Deception on the Shuri Line

CAPTAIN EDMUND G. LOVE

EDITOR'S NOTE: During the past several years, the United States Infantryman has been the target of a good deal of criticism from all kinds of writers. Too often, he has been pictured as incompetent, poorly trained, and poorly led, and his heroism and fighting ability in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam have been seriously questioned.

We disagree with this assessment. We think the U.S.

Infantryman was then and is now one of the best fighting men in the world. We intend to show just how good he was in the past in this new series of articles — INFANTRY IN ACTION.

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It is a generally accepted theory that everyone has a bit of the thespian in him somewhere. But the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, comprised the best group of actors in the United States Army, in or out of grease paint, according to observers who saw their performance on Okinawa during 12 to 19 April 1945. Their remarkable show was carried out without a rehearsal. Yet not one man missed his cue.

The 27th Division had been committed in South Okinawa on 12 April and the first unit to go into the line was this veteran battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Almerin O. O'Hara, more familiarly known as "Buzz." At the time the 2d Battalion took over, from elements of the 26th Division, activity in its zone was more or less subdued. The rifle companies settled down in the vicinity of a little hill that rose about 150 yards from the East China Sea. This eminence later came to be called, in the somewhat irreverent manner of infantrymen, "O'Hara's Knob" (See map). It wasn't much of a hill, as hills go. There was a much better one facing it, directly across the Machinato Inlet. This second one rose seventy-five feet straight up on two sides in sheer cliffs. One cliff faced northwest, toward the Americans; the other faced north toward the sea. Atop this eminence was ensconced something between a platoon and a company of Japanese. They didn't bother anyone as long as they weren't bothered. They were there to take the view, to see what the Americans were up to all along the line on the north. They had admirable scenery and they must have felt sorry for Colonel O'Hara and his boys on their little knob. O'Hara couldn't see a thing. In fact he couldn't make a move if the Japanese didn't want him to. All they had to do was to throw a few machinegun rounds across the 500-foot estuary and they'd have the colonel and his lads pinned to the earth. But they seemed content to exist by sort of a gentlemen's agreement as long as they were

free to report the movements of the Americans to their superiors.

Behind Machinato Bluff, about a mile away, stood the Urasoe Mura Escarpment, an imposing cliff barrier that formed the outer works of the famous Shuri Line. Lieutenant General J.R. Hodge wanted very badly to get up on that ridge and General Hodge was the Corps Commander. Major General G.W. Griner also had a yen and he was the 27th Division Commander. Naturally, such yens are usually translated into action. The 96th Division had tried vainly for eight days to get up there, but it couldn't get by the village of Kakazu. The 27th was to have the same trouble later. All that stood in the way of Buzz O'Hara was the 500-foot estuary, the 75-foot bluff, a village named Machinato, a mile hike over open and exposed ground, and a roadblock that filled a 30-foot cut in the rim and was protected by antitank guns, machine guns, and a new little number from the Japanese, but which one member of the 27th dubbed a "boxcar launcher." The shells were that big, and the holes they made, filled with water, were deep enough to float a car ferry.

Because of these obstacles it was not deemed wise for Buzz O'Hara have the honor of capturing the Urasoe Mura Escarpment. Instead he was placed out on O'Hara's Knob with orders to keep the Japanese from making any counterattack down the road. Eventually, when the escarpment was taken, maybe he could go up there and get a good view of Shuri. But life on O'Hara's Knob was conducive to brooding, and as the battalion commander sat on his stump of a hill and looked across the water at his counterparts on the larger hill, he began to get delusions of grandeur. He *could* capture that hill. Not only that, but he could capture the escarpment, if they'd let him! Major Jacob H. Herzog, assistant division G-2, came by one day and helped him brood. Soon


the assistant division commander, Brigadier General William B. Bradford, came by and lent an ear. Major Herzog suggested the night part, the general helped to list a cast of characters, but the battalion commander wrote the play. The division commander, General Griner, agreed to produce it.

Act I

It was a play in four acts. The first act was preparation. The 2d Battalion was perched way out on a flank. The only road that led anywhere near O'Hara's Knob had been commandeered by the Imperial Army as an impact area for artillery fire. For days jeeps came bounding over plowed fields to the battalion positions, dumped their supplies on the edge of some rice paddies and scurried back out of sight over a hill before General Ushijima's

be built right across the swampy area. But you couldn't bring in a lot of dirt and a bulldozer in broad daylight and do the job. The Japanese across the inlet had accepted the fact that the men on O'Hara's Knob weren't going to do anything. If a lot of activity broke out they might suspect something and do a little preparing on their own hook. The platoon or company over there might turn into a battalion.

The first scene in the play, therefore, occurred one afternoon when a jeep came blooming over the field, stopped on the edge of the rice paddies, then with great bravado, tried to swim across. No matter what the other virtues of a jeep may be, it can't double as a beaver or an otter. Within ten feet it was stuck and stuck good. An hour later, as if in answer to a hurry-up call, a bulldozer came rumbling across the fields, hitched on to the jeep and yanked it out of the mud. Long after the impertinent little vehicle had unloaded and rushed off, the bulldozer



artillerymen got the range. A small trail came into being, but by no stretch of the imagination could it be called a road. The rice paddies were about fifty yards across and, like most paddies, these appeared to be bottomless. Infantrymen picked their way from the shelter of O'Hara's Knob, gathered up the boxes dropped by the jeeps and tripped back along the little pathways that ran between the paddies. Now the fourth act of the play that Colonel O'Hara was writing called for a lot of traffic over these fields and across the rice paddies. A road would have to


operator hung around, smoothing out tracks and shoving a little dirt into the paddies where the jeep had gone down. A little later in the afternoon, another jeep got stuck. When nightfall came, the second jeep had been pulled out amid much arguing between the operator of the bulldozer and the jeep jockey. This argument was conducted with many gestures and the two men left little doubt in the minds of the Japanese that the operator of the bulldozer thought very little of a damn fool who waited until he got to Okinawa to find out that mud was

soft. Of course, after the second helping hand, the engineer tinkered around, trying to spread some dirt over the rice paddies so that the next jeep wouldn't get stuck. Then night came and a blanket of darkness settled down over the scene. That's when the bulldozer went to work. By morning the engineers had a sturdy causeway halfway across the paddies. Only a close inspection could show the difference between the dirt that the bulldozer had pushed into the water on the afternoon before and the relatively firm roadbed that now existed.

The second day was a repetition of the first, with a few added touches. Infantrymen of the 2d Battalion, obviously the luckless carriers who had to go across the paddies and carry back the supplies, became very lazy. They dared the jeeps to come on across. They argued with the bulldozer operator, trying to convince him that he could save them a lot of work by finishing the roadway. He agreed to try. He pushed more dirt in the hole. The first jeep to try got stuck. He pulled it out, then pushed more dirt in. It was plain to see that he was disgusted with the whole futile job. Once or twice during the day he pulled his dozer over in the shade of a tree and took a nap. But during the second night the causeway was pushed out a little farther. There remained only about ten minutes'

work to fill in the last little gap. Most of this was accomplished the next day, in broad daylight. Any Japanese who might have been watching would have been quite impressed with the indolence of the American soldiery.

The building of the road was not all that took place during this period. Colonel O'Hara's men had been snooping. Day patrols, night patrols, and reconnaissances in force were in order. One young man, Lieutenant Robert Monnett, almost staked out citizenship in the village of Machinato. He went over in the nighttime and he went over in the daytime. Twice he became involved in scraps and once he became so mad he requested permission to stay and wipe out the Japanese lookouts across the estuary. Colonel O'Hara forbade this, however. He didn't want the garrison wiped out, thus inviting strong reinforcement. So Monnett had to pull back, leaving three dead behind him. He did bring with him a rather complete knowledge of the Japanese. He knew where they were, what they could see, and mapped out pretty carefully just where they would have to be hit to remove them noiselessly and efficiently. He reported the absence of minefields on the main street of the village and even conducted Buzz O'Hara, O'Hara's



executive officer, Major William Foxen, and Lieutenant Colonel Harold P. Gormsen, commanding the 102d Engineers, on a sightseeing trip across the estuary one morning. The whole affair was rapidly becoming a ridiculous show, like the "phony war" at the Maginot Line. But that's what Buzz O'Hara and General Bradford and General Griner wanted.

Still another part of the drama was being conducted a mile and a half behind the lines. The 102d Engineers had won a bridge-building contest during the 1941 Arkansas-Louisiana maneuvers, but they hadn't touched a bridge since. The fighting on Makin, Eniwetok, and Saipan had been bitter enough, but the only water the division had crossed was the Pacific Ocean and not being overly ambitious it had let the Navy carry it. Most of the engineers had seen nothing but movies of a Bailey bridge. So a young lieutenant named Irving Golden, just out of OCS, who had built Baileys in the States, took a company back behind the hills and went to work. Morning, noon, and night, for three days, they built, tore down, built, and tore down again. Other companies of engineers worked like beavers gathering materials. Not one stick of it ever appeared near O'Hara's Knob, however. It was all loaded carefully on DUKWs, trucks, jeeps, anything with wheels on it, then tucked away in coral cuts on the reverse slopes of hills. Thus loaded were two Bailey bridges, comprising 60 feet of span, and one footbridge, to be laid on assault boats. This was 478 feet long. A 500-foot rubber pontoon bridge was also loaded.

Darkness came at approximately 1920 on 18 April. The trucks carrying this equipment were to converge on O'Hara's Knob, beginning at 1930. One of the engineer companies was to build the two Bailey bridges before midnight, working in the dark. They were to cover two blown-out bridges in a causeway which carried the main highway across the estuary. The footbridge was to be thrown across the inlet almost directly between the knob and the bluffs. The pontoon bridge was to be constructed about fifty yards seaward of the footbridge. It was considered probable that the Bailey bridges would be easily knocked out by Japanese artillery that was unquestionably checked in on the sites. However, if the building went according to schedule, enough supporting tanks and heavy vehicles to carry the attack forward would be across the stream before daylight. All troops would use the footbridge, while the pontoons would carry supplies and the evacuation load in quarter-ton vehicles in the event the Baileys were knocked out early.

The troops of the 2d Battalion gave no indication that anything was afoot for the whole three days. The enemy expected the vigorous patrolling and carried out similar activities themselves. However, Monnett and 2d Battalion patrols had accurately located the Japanese patrol routes and the enemy was usually allowed to proceed unmolested as long as he didn't approach the rear of O'Hara's Knob where preparations were going forward during the night. Most of the 2d Battalion took their ease in and around the bivouac area, hanging laundry out to

dry, writing letters, and even playing a game or two. Now and then the Japanese artillery would pepper the area, but the concentrations had little rhyme or reason. Few casualties resulted and as long as the men were careful and didn't thumb their noses too flagrantly at the Japanese across the inlet, the whole situation was allowed to develop without serious attention.

Act II

This was the first act in Colonel O'Hara's little play. The second came on the afternoon of 18 April. XXIV Corps had been building up toward a general offensive since 10 April. The big push was to come on the morning of the 19th. All across the Corps front each division had its objective. It had been Major Herzog's deduction that the Japanese certainly would not expect any kind of a night movement against their stronghold. This had been confirmed by captured Japanese documents. Colonel O'Hara had seized upon it as the solution to his whole problem.

Preliminary to any surprise, however, was the elimination of the Japanese detachment on the bluffs opposite O'Hara's Knob. This presented something of a problem because any large-scale assault on the position would certainly alert the enemy high command that something was afoot. So the task had to be done delicately. Part of the plans to accomplish this was the many patrols. By the afternoon of 18 April the American probing in and around the village of Machinato had evidently come to be accepted as routine. One more large-scale patrol would probably be accepted as just that. Furthermore, for four or five days the bluffs across the way had been hit daily by air strikes from carrier planes. Beginning at 1000 on the 18th, American planes gave the village of Machinato a thorough going over. Particular attention was given to the strongpoints that Monnett had located. The planes did a good deal of damage but there was no attempt on the part of the Japanese to strengthen their now weary and battered lookout group. They evidently still thought the air strike was routine.

At approximately 1500, Colonel O'Hara's Company G men took in their laundry, strapped on bandoliers, slung rifles, and started out at a leisurely pace toward the estuary. Lieutenant Monnett was in the lead. The men were not brazenly open about the whole thing. They took necessary precautions to keep from being shot and they weren't altogether carefree. But Japanese observers certainly could not expect anything more than one of the routine American patrols that came over to bother them every afternoon. Lieutenant Clarence Stokely, commanding the company, was careful not to let the enemy see his whole strength. If they saw anything at all, it was not more than a platoon.

Elsewhere on O'Hara's Knob there was carefully hidden activity. The heavy machineguns of Company H, for instance, were moved to points where they could cover

Stokely's company by firing across the inlet. However, the actors carried this move out with finesse. A bare-headed, barefoot sergeant in his undershirt came up to one machinegun crew which was lolling around its gun in a defensive position. After a few moments of conversation, he bawled the men out for something, waved his arms toward the northeast bank of the estuary and then led off down the forward slope of the hill. The crew lazily picked up the gun and followed. When it reached a covered position behind the sea wall which overlooked the principal Japanese strongpoints, the sergeant stood up in plain sight, his hands on his hips, discussing something with the crew, then the gunner would turn, squeeze off a few shots, and throw up his hands at some criticism the sergeant made. They were obviously engaged in some sort of practice firing. Of course, some of the Japanese strongpoints happened to be directly in line with the fire, but accidents will happen in the best regulated of phony wars. Not an enemy bullet was fired in return. All over the knob, similar scenes were being enacted, not simultaneously but with just enough casualness to make it seem as though the whole thing had been ordered by higher-ups to get the insolent men on O'Hara's Knob off their lazy rear ends.

At 1550 a lone smoke shell landed about a hundred yards up Kakazu Valley from the inlet. A minute or two later another landed near by. Then more. Smoke began to waft lazily downstream toward the sea. For days, O'Hara's patrols had been studying the normal wind drift within this area. He knew, barring any sudden wind shift, just about how much smoke to lay down and how long it would last. At 1600, the upper end of the estuary was covered with a thick screen. Monnett, who had been hiding in the bushes on the northeast side of the estuary, got to his feet and tightroped across fifty feet of water pipe to the southwest shore. A sergeant followed him, then the whole company, one by one, quietly and rapidly. By the time the smoke lifted, all of Stokely's men were out of sight in caves and beneath the overhang of the bluffs. The Japanese could not possibly have known that a whole company, reinforced by one rifle platoon, had crossed the estuary.

Act III

Until 1600 nothing had happened to mar the reading of O'Hara's script. The only incident that threatened to give the show away was not of the battalion's doing. Word had gotten around the division, naturally, as to what was going on. About two hours before the show started, people all over the 27th, 96th, and Corps zones began piling into jeeps to go up and see the fun. Roads leading to O'Hara's Knob were jammed by 1500. Every jeep seemed to contain an observer of one sort or another. Luckily, Colonel A.K. Stebbins, regimental commander of the 106th, discovered the crowd before more than a handful of the guests had infiltrated forward, and an MP was stationed a mile to the rear to stop the movement.

Lieutenant Stokely's mission was to get rid of the Japanese observers atop the bluffs at Machinato and to eliminate any other enemy that might be in a position to discover and report on Act IV, which was to follow. As soon as Company G had assembled on the south side of the estuary, the rifle platoons split. Monnett and one platoon headed straight up the highway into the village. Moving from building to building and through the ditches along the highway, they soon arrived at the western limits of Machinato Village. They had found one small culvert mined and had experienced no fire. Reaching the edge of the building line, they swung north and built up a defensive line between the highway and the cliffs above the sea. The Japanese observation post was now effectively cut off from the main defensive line a mile farther to the southwest. Any telephone wires that were found were cut.

A second platoon of Company G had followed Monnett up the sharp hill which carried the highway into Machinato Village and to the ground above the cliffs. Instead of moving on west, however, it cut north as soon as it reached the eastern outskirts of the village and skirted back along the cliff top. Its mission was to knock out the enemy's main points of observation and listening posts, also to take the command post and strongpoint under fire with mortars and small arms. These two Japanese nerve centers were located in two small hillocks that jutted up out of the northern cliff like turrets in a Tudor fortress. Lieutenant Stokely was with this platoon.

Two other rifle platoons had the difficult mission of scaling the cliffs on the sea side and coming up to the top directly under the two turrets. One of these platoons was an attachment from Company L under Lieutenant Pitts. This platoon bore the brunt of the fighting in the early evening. Pitts was wounded almost as soon as he led his men into the open over the rim. From shortly after 1700 until 2100 this platoon and the third rifle platoon of Company G, working together on the strongpoints, with the support of Stokely and the Company H mortars, which the company commander directed from across the estuary by radio, managed to clean out thoroughly the eyes of the Japanese in Machinato. There was no longer anyone there who could report on the doings below.

Act IV

Exactly at 1930, ten minutes after darkness fell, long lines of trucks moved out of hiding places all over the central part of the Okinawan countryside. There were vehicles of every description and each one carried some part of the four bridges that were to be constructed. The 102d Engineers moved with them. Quietly and in complete darkness the men went to work. The span most essential to the success of Colonel O'Hara's play was the footbridge. General Griner, the division commander, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Gormsen to have this ready for use at midnight. The last section was tied into place at 1135. Shortly after midnight Company F, 106th Infantry,

filed out onto the narrow little bridges. It was followed by the rest of the 2d Battalion. Before 0300 the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, was moving on across the inlet and by daylight the 3d Battalion was following.

The Bailey bridges went somewhat slower, but were in place by 0330. A platoon of tanks moved up to the causeway, ready to skitter across the two spans at dawn.

Only in one place did the actors go up in their lines. The pontoon bridge across the mouth of the estuary, scheduled for completion by 0300, was not completed until almost noon the next day and much of the traffic that was supposed to have supported troops on the southwest side of the inlet was thus kept from completing its mission. Supplies and evacuation had to be carried out by carrying parties across the thin life line of the footbridge. Much of the trouble at the pontoon bridge occurred when the drift line on one section broke and the ebb tide carried the pontoons out to sea.

Colonel O'Hara and the balance of his 2d Battalion moved swiftly around Company G once they were across the estuary. Using the low, flat, coastal strip underneath the Machinato bluffs, they moved northwest along the shore to a point several hundred yards west of the village. Here the cliffs gave way to a gradual inland slope and the men of the battalion moved silently up this hill in the night, assembling near the main highway at approximately 0330. After a brief reorganization, Company F moved south along the road. By 0445 this unit was at the escarpment ridge, facing the roadblock. Then, still according to the script, Lieutenant Robert J. Hyland, Jr., led out a platoon to the right. It crept up the slopes of the steep ridge a hundred yards north of the roadblock. Shortly after 0500 it was atop the hill and creeping toward the roadblock which was now directly to its left. By 0530 Buck Hyland had deployed his men. Ahead of them they could see the glow of a campfire or two and hear voices singing. As the men crawled onto the brink of the road cut they saw a strange sight. Lolling around a series of little campfires a full company of Japanese was eating breakfast and singing songs. Rifles were stacked in neat piles several feet away. There was not the slightest indication that callers were expected. No lookouts were posted and no anxiety showed on any of the soldiers' faces. After all, the Americans were a mile or more away on the little knob across the estuary!


At 0545 Buck Hyland signaled his men. BARs, M1s, a light machinegun, carbines, all swung carefully into place. Then big Buck stepped forward. One tremendous volley rattled out, then another. Fully seventy-five Japanese went down for keeps in that first burst of fire. Others, panic stricken, tried to reach their rifles. They

were cut down by the machinegun and the BARs. Within ten minutes those of the enemy who could had taken to their heels. Over a hundred lay dead. Buck Hyland signaled down to the rest of the battalion below. Company F rushed up over the roadblock, followed by Company E. The 2d Battalion formed a defensive perimeter around the newly won position while the 1st Battalion poured through the gap and started down the ridge to the south. By nightfall on 19 April the entire Urasoe Mura Escarpment in the zone of the 106th Infantry was in American hands.

Epilogue

What General Hodge had predicted would be a bloody struggle had turned out to be a comparatively simple skirmish. The Japanese fought back grimly in the next twelve days to retake this key piece of terrain, but the battle was over before they had begun to fight. Although the 27th incurred over 3,500 casualties in this short period, the initial advantage gained by Colonel O'Hara's maneuver served well, for the division not only held but extended its gains for another two miles in the next week. When it retired with its companies at less than quarter strength, it was with the knowledge that it had been more than successful. General Ushijima, the Japanese commander, had taken note of the achievement on 22 April in his order of the day, one of the few times he had ever admitted that the Americans were threatening part of his line. To meet the threat he shifted his entire troop disposition and committed a fresh division in the line, something that he could ill afford to do.

Yet this important gain had been accomplished with only seven casualties. All of them were incurred by Company G in the fighting at Machinato Village on the afternoon of the 18th in the preliminary move. Credit for the achievement must go to every man who took part in the preparation. With an entire battalion in on the secret not a single man by any deed or word ever tipped his hand. And to Colonel O'Hara, General Bradford, and Colonel Gormsen of the Engineers, must go credit for conceiving and supervising a plan that was perfect down to the most minute detail. In his commendation to the 27th when the division was relieved from the line, General Buckner, the Tenth Army Commander, took particular note of the achievement. "Particularly brilliant," he said, "was the night attack of the 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, on 18 April. Infantry commanders everywhere would do well to study the planning that went into this maneuver and the care with which it was executed."



WHO'S

ON
FIRST

???



GEORGE G. EDDY

A running feud is going on in the military services today. But because it is not being waged on the usual battlefield, some infantrymen may not be aware of it. It is the continuing, and sometimes strident, debate between management advocates and leadership advocates. A truly strenuous effort is being made to convince everyone that managers and leaders really are different in significant ways — that management and leadership are, in fact, two distinct functions.

The background for the present struggle for "supremacy" between the concepts of management and leadership dates from World War II when both the scale of military operations and the number of complex weapon and communication systems increased dramatically. Back then, specialists, technicians, and

analysts of all types flocked to Washington in great numbers to help manage the effort. In a relatively short time, they became permanent fixtures. Many, of course, were integrated into the armed forces, and the era of the technologist began with a bang.

Then — just when we thought we had eradicated villainy on an international scale — the Cold War started and it soon became apparent that we could match the growing Soviet military forces only by striving for technological superiority, not by depending on sheer numbers of troops. As a consequence, we placed renewed emphasis on ever newer, better, and more sophisticated weapons and weapon systems. Together with his brother, the technocrat, the technologist became the new hero.

Meanwhile, the leader of grunts was reduced to near

plebian status and was made almost an object of ridicule, certainly of condescension. The new elite, ushered in as the famous "whiz kids," solidified its position with tremendous vigor and dash. This elite had little interest in the supervisors of foxhole-digging or of up-the-hill chargers. The junior leaders were not the only ones relegated to second-class status; their seniors also were shouldered aside. Almost before we knew it, we were inundated by operations researchers and system analysts, and programmers, and budgeters, all working feverishly under the banner of cost effectiveness.

Little wonder, then, that attention was so concentrated on the virtue — nay, the necessity — of the corporate manager in this new world environment where obeisance was made daily before the altar of sophistication. Now and henceforth, it was proclaimed, decisions were to be made on the basis of engineering and economic variables. The human factor was much too uncertain and unstable to use as a variable in the organizational effectiveness equation. Thus, as the appeal of the cold, logical approach proved irresistible, emphasis shifted from the largely unmeasurable human being to the quantifiable object. Even today, this is the primary basis for allocating the resources with which to churn out tanks, guns, ships, aircraft, missiles, and all the rest of the



military hardware and accoutrements that the Army needs.

Accordingly, no modern, top level *manager* can now afford to shun the rational, numbers-crunching approach to decision-making. Consequently, an ambitious officer who aspires to promotion and to important positions in such an environment cannot help being strongly influenced by this significant and unmistakable trend to be a *manager*, a truly modern, top level manager.

VITAL SKILLS

Yet it is not the top level manager who slogs in the cold, muddy fields, urging his men forward through the trauma of battle while the world explodes in smoke and flame. It is not the programmer, the systems analyst, or the comptroller who leads others to seize and hold critical terrain. Is there really any serious argument that, ultimately, someone on the ground still has to perform these vital functions? Should we not, therefore, spend more thought and effort on developing the skills of that man?

But what do we develop him into? A manager or leader? More to the point: What's the difference?

Those who claim that a manager is not a leader and a leader is not a manager buttress their arguments with the following:

- Managers and leaders differ in their motivation, in their personal history, and in how they think and act.
- Managers and leaders have different functions: Management is oriented to the individual; leadership is interested chiefly in the group — the collective.
- Management is coldly rational, quantitative, stable; leadership is volatile, chaotic, emotional, even unstable.
- Large organizations, historically, tend to develop managers, not leaders. If a leader emerges, it is by chance.

So what does this argument have to do with the military services? Well, the Army, for example, is a large organization; therefore, to some people, what the Army develops is managers. Any leaders it may have will develop only occasionally and quite unintentionally.

Personally, I think the entire debate is a specious, pettifogging one, designed particularly so that academics can engage in publishing presumably learned pieces to prolong the controversy (and add to their publication credits toward promotion). Unfortunately, though, this absurdity is no longer confined to academia; the practice has also invaded the military services. Now military officers can play this game, too, presumably forever.

DEFINITION

In the articles that I have read on the controversy, there is no clear-cut definition of terms that positively differentiates the concept of leadership from the concept of management. In fact, in most of these articles leadership



and management are frequently described in terms of each other.

So let's be straightforward about it. Anyone who is in charge of someone else is a leader and is responsible for using all of the resources in his control in the most effective manner. Anyone who is *not* in control of someone else is clearly not a leader, but he could be a manager of resources.

We all can agree that the most important resource is people but that other resources are also needed to get the job done: money, of course, and equipment, tools, facilities, inventory, and the like. The neglect of one or the other of these resources usually spells trouble. Of course, we do not say that we lead inventory, or equipment, but we damn well better manage these resources properly. If we do not, the combat mission may be impaired or even jeopardized.

To utilize these "things," these inanimate objects, effectively, we need to develop procedures, methods, systems, and mechanisms of one sort or another, including sophisticated computers and computer networks for communicating and processing data as well as for controlling and directing operations. If we take these means away from a leader because they carry the taint of

the unheroic word "manager," have we not cut him in half, emasculated him?

A leader is clearly responsible for people and things, and in the process he must inspire his followers and create methods that are suited to his objectives. He must, in other words, accomplish his varied administrative tasks properly and concurrently (even if he is really excited only about the inspiring part, and perhaps resigned to the methods part). This is just another way of saying he leads other individuals and manages his other resources at the same time.

I do not contend that all leaders can do all that is required equally well. Most informed observers, for example, would agree that General George S. Patton was a superb combat leader but a poor logistics manager. And we certainly have managers who are not leaders; the most common example is the staff specialist who is responsible for developing a communications network, or a plan for nuclear defenses, or an intelligence estimate, or the design of new military hardware.

But since any leader functions in an organizational environment of some sort, it is preposterous to claim that a leader does not also perform as a manager. It is even more preposterous to suggest that we need two individuals for every key job, one an astute manager who waits until an administrative task is required and then rushes forward to take the baton from an Audie Murphy or a Terry Allen, who must now wait idly by until the next charge has to be mounted.

So, enough is enough. Let us stop trying to cut this poor man in half, one half labelled *leader* and the other *manager*. The two terms are, for all practical purposes, synonymous. So let us end this absurd debate and do away with the confusion caused by the labels and their false implications. Let us take heed of the marvelous advice of the King in *Alice in Wonderland*, who sagely observed, "If there's no meaning in it, it saves a world of bother, for we needn't have to look for any."

Let us instead get on with the really serious task of developing leaders. First we must identify potential leaders and educate them about the profession of leadership. Then we must place them under mentors who appreciate the importance of developing their latent ability to recognize the proper relationship between the personal example of leadership and the impersonal managerial aspects of leadership. Yes, let us give them to mentors who will test and stress them, and who, ideally, will inspire them to progress to their fullest.



GEORGE G. EDDY, a retired Army colonel, is on the faculty of the University of Texas at Austin, from which he earned a doctorate in 1974. He has written numerous articles on leadership and management topics and a book on small businesses. His active military service included tours in Korea and Vietnam and one as a maintenance battalion commander in the 4th Armored Division.



Wonju and Chipyeong-ni

RAYMOND T. CASSIDY

Wonju and Chipyeong-ni must be held "at all costs." This was General Matthew B. Ridgway's resolute order as five Chinese divisions bore down from the north on the two Korean towns in early February 1951.

The two towns marked the center of an unstable, erratic Eighth Army front that stretched across the Korean peninsula just below the 38th parallel. A five-road junction and a terminal on the railroad line that ran south to Pusan made Wonju a critical communications center. Twenty miles to the northwest, Chipyeong-ni, nestled in a long, three-mile wide valley, controlling any access

westerly to Yangpyong, southerly to Soju, and easterly to Wonju. Both towns were key points, and whoever held them controlled central Korea (see Map 1).

But the numerical odds against the United Nations forces that held Wonju and Chipyong-ni were great — at least five to one. And Eighth Army had not been able to cope with such large numbers of Communist Chinese in North Korea three months earlier in spite of the sophisticated weaponry upon which it had become so dependent. A successful defense of the twin towns, therefore, appeared to hinge upon whether Eighth Army had finally learned to offset the enemy's manpower advantage by effectively employing that weaponry against him. Clearly, the United Nations forces now faced a crucial test of arms, the results of which would determine their continued presence in Korea and ultimately the fate of South Korea.

During the preceding weeks, Eighth Army had done some serious soul-searching. Its calamitous retreat from North Korea had shown that its units needed more training and better leadership at the company and battalion levels. Accordingly, Eighth Army had launched an extensive retraining program. Its field artillery units underwent intensive drills in the rapid deployment of their guns, and fire direction centers plotted and replotted mock fire missions.

Gun crewmen interchanged positions until each man knew every job. Mortar sections underwent the same rigorous training, while in the line companies, riflemen, cooks, and truck drivers drilled and drilled until they were proficient with every infantry weapon. Since close-quarter fighting favored the numerically superior enemy, all the infantry units also received intensive bayonet training.

And now the 2d ("Indianhead") United States Infantry Division occupied Wonju and Chipyong-ni, straddling the southward course of the enemy offensive. Thousands of Chinese troops were known to be moving south on the main road leading to Wonju, and friendly agents returning from the outlying areas reported numerous hidden, enemy pre-assault troop concentrations.


The men of the division had learned well the lessons of the past few months and now readied themselves to meet the onslaught. On 12 February Brigadier General George C. Stewart, the division's assistant commander, arrived at Wonju to take charge of the defense. He brought with him General Ridgway's order that there would be "no withdrawal, no evacuation." Everyone would stay.

Defensive positions were established on the high ground surrounding both towns. The 37th Field Artillery Battalion shifted its eighteen 105mm howitzers from Wonju to Chipyong-ni to support the 23d Infantry Regiment and its attached French Battalion, while the long-range guns of an alerted IX Corps poured fire into the suspected enemy concentration areas. At both Wonju and Chipyong-ni, ammunition and medical supplies were feverishly stockpiled for the test that they all knew would come.


While the 2d Division prepared itself to meet the threat, Eighth Army ordered continuous surveillance flights, and air observers warned that the main enemy force had split into two columns — one aiming south along the Som River toward Wonju, the second veering west toward Chipyong-ni.

As night fell on 12 February, the temperatures dropped to minus 10 degrees Fahrenheit. In the brittle-cold darkness at Chipyong-ni, the 23d Infantry and its

Map 1



BATTLE OF CHIPYONG



Map 2

attached French Battalion — four battalions in all — settled into their defensive positions (see Map 2). At Wonju, the 38th Infantry, its attached Netherlands Detachment, and units from the 9th Infantry — five battalions in all — dug into the frozen ground along the ridgelines.

SURROUNDED

Late in the afternoon of 13 February, the Wonju front fell strangely silent. Although poised before Wonju, the enemy suddenly — and inexplicably — shifted his attention to Chipyong-ni. Under cover of darkness, the Chinese infiltrated to the east and west of the town, cutting roads and surrounding the garrison

They reached Chipyong-ni near midnight, and the de-

fenders there were subjected to an intense barrage from Chinese 120mm mortars and 76mm self-propelled guns. All along the perimeter shells whined down, blasting up frozen clods of earth and sending shrapnel into the darkness. Infantrymen pressed tighter to their bunker walls or deeper into their foxholes, bracing against the concussion of each explosion. In the valley below, the 37th Field Artillery's cannoneers hugged their gun-pit walls.

Everywhere, officers and NCOs darted from bunker to foxhole to gun emplacement, risking exposure to check on their men, to admonish them where needed for not taking better cover, or to direct medical assistance for any wounded.

Then, as suddenly as it had started, the bombardment stopped. In the pall of silence that followed, officers

shouted for their men to get ready. Along the entire ridgeline, American and French infantrymen scurried to man their blasted parapets while in the valley cannoners jumped to their howitzers.

All along the perimeter, infantrymen watched red and green signal flares arch into the arctic-like night. They listened apprehensively to the enemy's shouts and bugles in the distant darkness and waited tensely for the attacking waves of Chinese that each man knew would follow.

Suddenly, from the west, north, and east, hordes of screaming Chinese soldiers swept across the snow-patched, frozen ground toward Chipyong-ni's defenses. But the Chinese soon found that much had changed since their intervention three months earlier. Their tactic of a sudden, human-wave assault under cover of darkness — the element of terror upon which they had relied so heavily and used so successfully — failed this time. Instead of falling upon road-bound columns of leaderless, panic-stricken troops, the Chinese soldiers charged headlong into the defenders' disciplined, waiting guns.


Clusters of American star shells flashed in the darkness above the advancing Chinese, and soon the attackers were engulfed in a thunderous holocaust of artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire that blew ragged

holes in their packed ranks and shot away the force of their attack. Only a handful managed to come within a few yards of the perimeter before they, too, fell under the fire from the infantrymen's rifles.

Although forced to retreat, the Chinese maintained heavy pressure on the garrison with continuous probing attacks around the entire perimeter.

A second, furious attack slammed against the perimeter on the southwest, hitting the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry. Again, the attackers met a bristling wall of disciplined fire that chewed their attack to pieces. Before dawn, a third, frenzied assault from the south rushed at the French Battalion. For a third time, waves of attacking Chinese were cut down by the defenders' fire; for a third time, the line held.

The fighting at Chipyong-ni eased with the first light of 14 February. The enemy's interest shifted to Wonju. Fully prepared to meet the threat, every piece of American artillery within range raked the enemy with devastating fires. Eventually, under the merciless pounding of the guns, the enemy's once-massed ranks were shattered, and leaderless groups streamed northward, trying to escape the devastating artillery fire. Air Force ground-support aircraft took over to strike incessantly at



the fleeing survivors. The "Wonju Shoot" cost the Chinese more than ten thousand casualties.

Chipyong-ni, though, still lay under siege. Even as the Chinese were being repulsed at Wonju, the defenders quickly repaired the damage to their positions caused by the frenzied attacks of the night before. Parachute drops supplied the garrison with ammunition, medical supplies, and rations. Helicopters fitted with litters flew in and out of the tight perimeter like giant dragonflies, braving enemy ground fire along their route to evacuate the more seriously wounded. The less serious casualties had to stay, and they were made as safe and comfortable as possible.

But as a combined relief force from the 27th British Brigade and the 5th U.S. Cavalry Regiment mounted an attempt to break through from the south, another threat to Chipyong-ni materialized. Weather conditions worsened. An intermittent overcast and a patchy ground fog made supply drops inside the perimeter more difficult. When conditions became such that much-needed supplies fell outside the perimeter, further parachute resupply had to be suspended.

VENGEANCE

Their assault on Wonju smashed, the Chinese turned on Chipyong-ni with added vengeance. Near midnight, 14 February, they launched several hammering attacks against the 2d and 3d Battalions, 23d Infantry. Forward observers on the ridgelines frantically called for "walking" barrages to pace the advancing enemy, and 37th Field Artillery radios crackled with urgent calls for fire missions.

Disciplined artillery and automatic weapons fire tore great holes in the Chinese formations. Where one of the enemy fell, another took his place; where ten fell, ten more took their place; where a line was blown away, another took its place. Seemingly mindless of their heavy losses, the Chinese pressed the attack until, at 0200 on the 15th, they overran Company I, 23d Infantry, to make their first major penetration of the perimeter. Led by their surviving officers, an immediate counterattack by Company L and the survivors of Company I managed to cut out the penetration at bayonet point.

An hour later, hordes of Chinese overran Company G in a second, deeper penetration. Overwhelmed after the most savage bayonet fighting yet seen, Company G's soldiers had to withdraw. This time, efforts to regain the lost ground failed. The counterattacking force was driven to the ground by steady enemy fire from the newly-captured positions.

Doubts now arose that the battered perimeter could withstand the pressure of any more heavy attacks. The

defenders were exhausted and their last reserves had been committed. Ammunition was pitifully low. Fewer than 100 rounds of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition remained and only 90 rounds of 81mm. Small arms ammunition could be counted by the number of clips that remained in the infantrymen's bandoliers. Artillery batteries were ordered not to fire on any target unless they could be seen and were in a position to be hit. And to the south, meeting fanatical enemy resistance in its drive northward, the anxiously awaited relief force was still more than five miles from the perimeter.

Early in the afternoon of 15 February, the overcast that had prevented supply drops and supporting air strikes began to clear. Circling flights of P-51 aircraft came through the parting clouds with their wing guns rattling above the cheers of the exhausted infantrymen. As more flights arrived over the perimeter, they had to be stacked by ground observers to wait their turn to strike.

The first napalm air strikes hit the enemy's penetration of the perimeter. It was too much. Burned and screaming Chinese fled the captured positions. The counterattacking force that had been pinned down leaped up and, firing from the hip, charged forward to recapture the lost ground.

As the weather continued to clear, planeload after planeload of ammunition and supplies parachuted down to the waiting defenders. Embattled garrison troops risked heavy enemy mortar fire to retrieve the bundles, and resupplied mortars and artillery once again were able to pour fire onto the faltering Chinese.

At about 1600, the southern outposts jubilantly reported spotting the relief column's lead tanks. Two hours later, 20 tanks and the point elements of the 27th British Brigade rolled into the perimeter. As if acknowledging defeat, the Chinese abandoned the siege and fled north. Artillery fires and aircraft strikes followed them.

The siege officially ended late on the night of 15 February. The Chinese had been stopped, their winter offensive shattered.

For the officers and men of the 2d Division, they had proved that they had learned their earlier lessons well. Perhaps General S.L.A. Marshall said it best when he wrote: "Americans do not like being knocked down, and they have a characteristic which these men of Korea readily displayed — of getting up wiser, tougher, and more determined."



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TRAINING NOTES



Bradley NET

CAPTAIN NICHOLAS F. ALTOMARE

The Bradley Fighting Vehicle represents the single most challenging weapon system the Infantry has ever fielded. It has a two-man, stabilized turret that serves as the platform for its three weapon systems — a 25mm Bushmaster chain gun, a 7.62mm M240C coaxial machinegun, and a two-tube TOW launcher.

In addition to its greatly increased firepower, the Bradley is also superior to its predecessor, the M113, in mobility and armor protection. All of these differences work together to make the Bradley a true fighting vehicle for its squad, which consists of a squad leader (Bradley commander), a gunner, a driver, and a seven-man dismount team. And this, in turn, presents a training challenge to the Infantry squad leader, who must now think in terms of both squad training and weapon system proficiency.

To help a unit make the transition from the M113 to the Bradley, an eight-week company new equipment training (NET) program has been established. A NET team will provide transition training in vehicle hardware, gunnery, and tactics to all units that are being equipped with the Bradley.

On 28 March 1983, the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, 2d Armored Division, became the first unit to undergo NET on the Bradley, and other units will follow as they receive their vehicles. There are many things that these units can do in advance to prepare for NET and make it more efficient.

In planning its preparatory training, a unit must realize that it faces a training management problem never before experienced by an Infantry squad. In addition to training the squad as a whole, the unit has to devise a training program that will provide training for the seven-man dismount team while maintaining the gunnery skills of the commander and the gunner. The squad leader, too, must be trained in two roles: besides maintaining proficiency in his traditional role, he also must be trained to assume the duties and responsibilities of commanding a highly sophisticated vehicle.

Critics have suggested that these dual roles could threaten squad integrity. To the contrary, it might be suggested that this situation provides an opportunity to develop the assistant squad leader into both a Bradley

commander and a dismount team leader. On the battlefield, the squad leader will often be forced to decide which of his roles he must play at any given time. This means that the assistant squad leader has to be cross-trained to take over the remaining position, whichever it may be.

SQUAD LEADER

In addition to the many leadership skills a mechanized infantry squad leader must have, a Bradley vehicle commander must be proficient in land navigation, mounted formations, range estimation, target identification, fire commands, and tactics. And because the squad leader commands the Bradley from his position in the turret, he must perfect his gunnery skills right along with the gunner. Therefore, he must practice target discipline to make the vehicle's weapons as effective as possible, and he must practice fire discipline as well to control the rapid fire of the 25mm main gun and to conserve the limited number of TOW missiles aboard the Bradley.

TEWTs and CPXs conducted ac-

According to standard NATO threat scenarios can be used to sharpen the squad leader's skills. Again, any training the squad leader receives, the assistant squad leader should also receive.

THE GUNNER

It is not easy to select gunners to operate a weapon system that in no way resembles any other weapon system used by U.S. Infantrymen. But a common sense approach to the selection process is to use some of the same indicators leaders have always

Potential gunners and commanders should become familiar with this manual before NET starts.

Target identification, range estimation, and Threat vehicle identification are some of the critical gunnery skills that will be taught during NET.

THE DRIVER

Driver selection should not be a problem from a technical standpoint. Soldiers who have been trained as M113 drivers can quickly become proficient on the Bradley because it is easier to drive than the M113. It must


members of the squad, trainers must also consider training for the unit as a whole.

Several months before the start of NET, the NET team will provide the unit with a diagnostic test that has been designed to identify any weaknesses the soldiers might have in performing the 11B tasks that will be used during NET. These include such tasks as Threat vehicle identification, radio procedures, visual signals, and range estimation. The tests should be administered early enough to allow the normal BTMS cycle to schedule training to correct the weak areas before NET starts.

During the dismounted phases of NET, the Bradley squad will carry its TOE squad weapons aboard the Bradley and will employ them during dismounted operations. Accordingly, any training on squad weapons and dismounted techniques that the soldiers can be given beforehand will be valuable.

In addition to FM 23-1, other basic references for the NET program are FM 7-7J, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (BIFV); FM 7-11M/TG (Draft), Trainer's Guide; and FMs 11M10, 20, 30, 40, Soldier's Manuals. Trainers should become familiar with all of these manuals before NET.

Units that take this advice and prepare themselves accordingly should be ready for their NET when the time comes. The NET team will coordinate its activities closely with each unit well in advance to make sure that its training and its transition to the Bradley go smoothly.



used to recommend a soldier for increased responsibility or for promotion — skill qualification scores, physical conditioning, GT scores, and EIB awards.

Farther along in the selection process, it might be helpful to arrange some turret time for the Bradley gunner candidates with a sister tank battalion. A soldier's performance on turret manipulation exercises can give a trainer an indication of his potential for gunnery.

Well in advance of NET, each unit will receive FM 23-1, Infantry and Cavalry Fighting Vehicle Gunnery, the primary reference used by NET trainers during gunnery training.

be noted, though, that the Bradley driver, as an integral part of the vehicle team, must also be a thinker — always looking ahead for defilade positions and covered routes. In short, he is a valuable member of the team, and his actions (or indications) may well determine the squad's success.

Because a Bradley driver has to know how to use terrain properly, it is important for him to sharpen his terrain driving skills before NET.

THE UNIT

After considering these individual



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Unit Battle Drills

CAPTAIN JOHN F. ANTAL

Units, not individuals, win battles. But to be effective in combat, a unit must have been trained as a team so that it can react quickly and decisively to any enemy contact. This action-reaction cycle is, in fact, the essence of combat; to survive and win, a unit must be able to react to the changing conditions of battle faster than the opposing unit does. But each reaction must be the correct one; reaction without prior training can lead to disaster.

Battle drills are one way for a unit to get this training. Unfortunately, these drills now seem to be almost a lost art, although they proved effective for units in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It is past time for this concept to be returned to the training schedule.

Designed for platoons and smaller units, unit battle drills consist of chronological sequences of tasks that a unit must do instantly when faced with particular battlefield situations. The drills are based on the assumption that most battle situations have one correct sequence of responses. Thus, by planning and rehearsing these responses, a unit can prepare itself to respond positively and aggressively to enemy action with little loss of time.

In the process, the unit also learns to reduce its exposure time, which, in turn, reduces its casualties. The actions a unit must take, for example, when receiving incoming artillery fire, when occupying a battle posi-

tion, or when breaching a hasty minefield, must be accomplished quickly and efficiently if casualties are to be kept down. In combat, once a unit begins receiving hostile fire, or once one of its tanks or APCs hits a mine, the chaos of battle leaves precious little time for its commander to influence the battle's action-reaction cycle. But if his unit has been well trained in battle drills, the leader can decrease its reaction time by issuing short coded signals that everyone will understand and quickly act upon.

EXAMPLE

As an example, the following battle drill can be used to train a mechanized infantry unit to react decisively when it encounters an enemy minefield while acting as the forward element in a movement to contact. The drill consists of a series of actions that the platoon performs in order:

- In areas where mines are expected, the lead element moves 100-150 meters in front of the platoon.

- Upon contact with a minefield, the lead vehicle activates its smoke projector and plasters the area to the front and flanks of the mined area with machinegun and main gun fire. (Most minefields are also covered by fire.)

- The platoon moves to hull-down firing positions that offer visibility and clear fields of fire of likely enemy

direct fire ambush positions on the far side of the mined area.

- The platoon leader calls for artillery or mortar support to provide immediate suppression and continuous smoke on the far side of the minefield; then he reports to the commander.

- The platoon attempts to bypass the minefield, but if it cannot, it conducts a hasty breach. Under the cover of smoke and the suppression of its direct fire weapons, the platoon dismounts a four-man breaching team to detect and mark the mines using mine detectors or non-metallic probes. (No attempt should be made to remove the mines; the team should mark them with white crosses made from engineer tape and destroy them in place using demolitions, Claymore mines, or white phosphorus grenades.)

- The platoon covers the breaching team with fire and supplemental artillery fires or mortar smoke screens as required.

- The breaching team clears two lanes that are wide enough to allow the platoon's vehicles to cross safely to the far side and marks the lanes with engineer tape.

- Once the lanes have been cleared, the platoon moves quickly through the minefield and adjusts artillery or mortar support as necessary.

Battle drills such as this one lend structure to the chaos of combat because, by giving the unit repetitive training in carefully thought-out bat-

- PROPOSED UNIT BATTLE DRILLS**
- Reacting to enemy contact.
 - Conducting a hasty attack.
 - Occupying a battle position (same for assembly area).
 - Clearing a hasty point minefield.
 - Laying a point minefield.
 - Reacting to a Sagger attack.
 - Reacting to an artillery attack.
 - Securing a bridge or ford.
 - Conducting a passage of lines.
 - Reacting to an enemy air attack.
 - Reacting to a strikewarn message.
 - Performing hasty decontamination of vehicles following a chemical attack.
 - Practicing the actions of survey and monitoring teams.
 - Practicing the actions of chemical detection teams.
 - Resupplying ammunition and fuel.
 - Crossing a contaminated area.

tle responses, they give the unit both tactical expertise and confidence.

The Army Training Board at Fort

Eustis, Virginia, has recognized the value of unit battle drills and is in the process of developing a standard manual of combat battle drills. In the meantime, units can develop their own drills using ARTEP 71-2 and the approved Soldier's Manuals as guides. (Some proposed battle drills are shown in the accompanying chart.)

Each unit should select the drills most appropriate for it and then thoroughly research and wargame each to produce the best possible tactical response. The next step for a unit is to practice these drills until they become second nature to the squads or platoons that will have to execute them under combat conditions. (With relatively few well-learned drills, any unit can increase

its efficiency dramatically.)

No unit leader will be able to win the action-reaction race against his opponent on the battlefield of the future if he has not trained his unit to respond automatically and correctly to his opponent's specific actions. In short, unit battle drills are vital to a unit's success in combat, and it is up to its leader to see that it is ready.



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Training Lieutenants

MAJOR JAMES W. TOWNSEND

The Infantry Officer Basic Course gives new infantry lieutenants an excellent tactical and technical background, but it certainly does not complete their training, nor is it intended to do so. The lieutenants master the knowledge they need to survive and win on the modern battlefield only through further training in their units, and that training requires time and a good deal of effort on the part of their company commanders.

With all the other challenges he faces, this is no easy task for a commander. But there are some principles that can guide him in the training of his new lieutenants. He must

- Establish clear objectives.

- Emphasize technical and tactical proficiency.
- Demand the time to train.
- Set the example.

Clear objectives are essential, and they must be supported by a simple, well thought-out training plan. In its simplest form this plan is nothing more than a list of tasks and a schedule of events he will use to train his lieutenants.

Along with the training plan the commander must set clear standards for technical and tactical proficiency so that his lieutenants will know what to study and practice. Every unit event offers an opportunity for learning, and he must demonstrate to his

lieutenants through personal involvement the hard work and study it takes to achieve technical and tactical proficiency.

To do this he will have to spend a considerable amount of time observing, talking, and listening to his lieutenants, and he must take the time to do so. He must be bold and stick to his plan, briefing his battalion commander on it and keeping him informed of its progress.

Finally, and most important, the company commander has to set the example. Lieutenants tend to mirror the actions of their commander — as he wants the lieutenants to be, so he must be. If he wants his lieutenants to

study, he must study. If he wants them to be in shape, he must be in shape. If he wants them to be enthusiastic, he must be enthusiastic.

TECHNIQUES

The specific techniques a commander uses in implementing his training plan will depend on his individual leadership style and also on the capabilities of his subordinates. But there are certain guidelines that he can follow.

First, the lieutenants' training should be performance oriented and should include action and as much realism as possible. For a field training exercise (FTX), he should involve his lieutenants in the entire process of planning, preparing, executing, and evaluating it.

Before each FTX, he should have them plan and prepare their platoon training objectives along with a scenario and then brief him on the plan. The briefing should include the initial operation order, a tactical sketch or overlay, a time schedule, an evaluation plan, and support requirements, such as blank ammunition, field manuals, and training aids.

During the FTX the commander should observe the execution of the planned training and demand that the lieutenants be prepared to brief him on both their accomplishments and their failures. After the FTX he should have them brief him in specific detail on the lessons they have learned from it.

For training in garrison, the commander should plan one day each month for a terrain walk with his lieutenants and put it on the training schedule. (The first sergeant and the other NCOs can conduct the company training for that day.)

He should give the lieutenants an operation order for the terrain walk and some time to conduct a reconnaissance. During their reconnaissance, the lieutenants should stake positions for their squads, their armored personnel carriers, and their crew-served weapons. Then the com-

mander should have them write operation orders, brief him on their plans, and then walk him through their areas, position by position. Finally, he should have each lieutenant evaluate the others' plans.

If time is short, the commander can use a terrain model to drive home the same lessons, using a box indoors or the ground outdoors. Later, he should have the lieutenants use such terrain models, too, to present operations orders to their platoons during their normal FTXs.

Maintenance is another important part of the lieutenants' training, and the key to good maintenance is knowledge of the preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) for each piece of equipment. One way for a commander to train a new lieu-



tenant in PMCS for his platoon's vehicles is to perform the PMCS with him, with the commander serving as the supervisor. After a couple of sessions, he should reverse these roles so that the lieutenant acts as the supervisor. This works for all systems including armored vehicles, guided missiles, radios, machineguns, and chemical protective masks. (Here again, the NCOs can run things while the commander trains the lieutenants.)

In all his association with his lieutenants, the commander should encourage them to read and study leadership and tactics on their own. He might assign them a military history book to read and then discuss its main points with them a couple of weeks later — over lunch, perhaps. Any time he is with his lieutenants, he should question them about tactical lessons and draw out their ideas. He

should try to be friendly and relaxed but should stress the need for them to think, study, and learn.

There are many other important matters as well that the lieutenants need to know about, such as military justice, awards, and efficiency reports. In these matters, practical experience is the best teacher. The commander should therefore involve them at an early stage, having them write letters, awards, and reports. With respect to military justice, he should ask them to recommend what they would do in a given case if they were the company commander.

ADDITIONAL DUTIES

As a part of his practical experience process, he should assign the lieutenants additional company duties. There are two reasons for this — by doing these duties the lieutenants can help make the company operate better, and the additional duties will expand their technical knowledge as well. The key aspects of these additional duties are study, inspection, reports, and supervision.

At the same time, the commander should work with the lieutenants on time management so that they do not lose sight of their platoons' needs. He must insist that they set goals and develop a plan in each of their additional duty areas, tying this to weekly briefings and regular inspections of each of their additional duty areas.

Throughout this training process, the commander should remember, too, the value of evaluation and feedback, the key to which is knowledge of the standards. He should observe his lieutenants, evaluate their performance, and let them know where they stand — good and bad. He should also encourage them to evaluate themselves, questioning them to draw out their ideas and to see if they understand what he wants. He should not limit this to sessions in his office. He should talk to them, and get them to talk to him, in the motor pool, in the field, in the dining hall, and anywhere else he finds them. But he

should not always expect agreement or good news during these talks — some of it will be bad. And if he overreacts to the bad news he may shut off the flow of information.

Finally, the company commander should encourage his lieutenants to seek the counsel of the first sergeant, because he can play a vital role in their training. Through experience and training, he has become a knowl-

edgeable observer and usually has some good ideas and good advice to give them.

There is no doubt that well-trained lieutenants improve the combat readiness of a unit. And any commander can have well-trained lieutenants if he will develop a plan for training them, insist on the time he needs to implement that plan, and, above all else, set the example for them to follow.



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Forced March and Live Fire

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM O. ODOM

ARTEP 7-15 includes a forced march/live fire event in which a squad is trained and evaluated on its defensive skills — specifically, on fire control and distribution techniques and on individual marksmanship — under simulated combat conditions. Because of this ARTEP requirement, most installations now have ranges that are dedicated to this event.

The ARTEP requirements for the layout of a forced march/live fire range are straightforward and relatively simple: The range must contain an array of 30 personnel targets and two armor targets at distances varying from 25 to 300 meters. The squad sector, or firing line, must be about 100 meters wide. (Although some of the dedicated ranges at installations are equipped with the vastly inferior "E" and "F" type staked silhouettes, most installations are now equipped with controlled pop-up targets.)

Such a range has far-reaching potential for squad training — potential, unfortunately, that is not being fully tapped. With a little imagination and initiative, though, squad trainers

can make this range more realistic and more efficient. They can add some special effects to the basic ARTEP scenario, modify the range (with some support), and vary the ARTEP itself.

SPECIAL EFFECTS

Various special effects can be used without affecting the ARTEP test conditions. For example, the trainers can easily create the effect of the "dirty battlefield" complete with enemy dead, obscurants, and noises. They can stuff worn fatigue uniforms and boots with newspaper to simulate the dead, adding aggressor helmets and small arms and moulage kits with splashes of simulated blood for the finishing touches. They can also incorporate pre-arranged friendly "casualties" into all of the actions to give training in first aid and medical evacuation skills.

To provide the battlefield obscurants — smoke, smell, and haze — trainers can burn worn tires and con-

taminated POL products and employ smoke-generating devices (smoke pots are best). To simulate enemy artillery, they can use electrically-primed TNT blocks, and to create a rolling barrage, they can "walk" the explosions up to within 25 meters of the firing line and then throw artillery simulators behind the firers. (These explosions also contribute to the battlefield haze by producing small dust clouds.)

To improve the enemy's "attack," they can add Hoffman devices to the armor targets, place machinegun simulators down range, dress pop-up targets in fatigue shirts, and, if desired, play tapes of battlefield noise.

All the materials needed to produce these special effects are available at installation Training Aids Support Centers, Property Disposal Offices, and Range Supply Sections.

The range modifications are considerably more involved than these special effects, and they may require a major effort and even engineer support. But they are neither impossible

nor impractical to construct; in fact, some ranges have already incorporated them.

Perhaps the most critical modification needed is the installation of an underground conduit system for 220-volt alternating current. Such a system will do away with the need for batteries, radios, and makeshift targetry, thus reducing preparation time and instances of electrical failure. It will also reduce the amount of exposed demolition wire, which is prone to destruction by live fire. Another advantage is that the propane-oxygen machinegun and artillery simulator devices operate best with a 200-volt power source, as do most of the other electrically-powered training aids.

Demolition pits offer several advantages, too, and can be constructed along with the underground electrical system. Demolitions in pits, as opposed to on the surface, can use larger amounts of explosives, and the pits decrease the misfire hazard by protecting both the charge and the demolition wire from small arms fire.

Armor hulls and buildings can also be added. The hulls should be placed both down range and around the firing line; they are ideal furnaces for the burning of oil, worn tires, and smoke pots to represent destroyed vehicles. They can be used for targets, too, if armor pop-up silhouettes are not available.

The buildings should be placed down range to give the squads an opportunity to engage targets in windows with both 40mm practice rounds and small arms fire. They also provide excellent locations for machinegun simulators and sniper targets.

A moving target beyond 300 meters can be added, too. The exact distance to this target can vary with the depth of the range but should not exceed 600 meters so that it can be engaged by both the 90mm recoilless rifle and the Dragon.

Finally, a helicopter silhouette and target mechanism can be placed on a tower in a nearby treeline to simulate an attack by a helicopter gunship.

In addition to the special effects

and these various range modifications, some variations on the ARTEP itself are in order.

First, the scoring is difficult under the current system. When staked "E" and "F" silhouettes are being used, for instance, trainers confirm hits by locating bullet holes and subsequently applying pasters before the next exercise. This method is unnecessarily tiresome and slow.

Today's pop-up targets, if manipulated with the limited exposure times directed in the ARTEP, also pose several difficulties. The target operator is required to control each target's exposure time, which becomes complicated when targets in more than one zone are exposed at varying time intervals. This means that at least two dedicated scorers are needed, and even then an accurate count requires sending hole counter and paster details down range.

A better scoring technique would be to expose the targets by zone from farthest to nearest without regard to exposure time. Once exposed, the target would stay up until "killed." At the end of a timed firing period, the squad would be scored on the number of "kills" or downed targets. This technique would eliminate the need for hole counter and paster details, eliminate the confusion as to whether a target had been "killed" or dropped by a control mechanism, and greatly simplify scoring. It could also

be used to teach ammunition conservation and distribution of fire techniques.

The recommended total exposure time in the ARTEP is three minutes. This time is derived by multiplying the total number of targets in each zone by the minimum exposure time for an individual target. (Zone I — 3 seconds times 10 targets equals 30 seconds; Zone II — 5 seconds times 10 targets equals 50 seconds; and Zone III — 8 seconds times 10 targets equals 80 seconds; this amounts to a total of 160 seconds or 2 minutes, 40 seconds. The remaining 20 seconds are arbitrarily added to allow for armor target engagements and to provide a round figure for the time limit.)

Further, although a squad forced march/live fire ARTEP event tests a squad's ability to march, to shoot, and to occupy a hasty defensive position, it does not include many intermediate tasks such as camouflage, assembly area procedures, fragmentary orders, movement techniques, leader control, and reorganization following enemy contact. Although most of these tasks are handled in other ARTEP events, there is no reason not to incorporate them into this event as well.

Many other tasks can also be included: Fire support requests can be answered by company mortars firing sabot rounds; tanks can direct their



fires at long-range targets; and mechanized squads can direct .50 caliber machinegun fires at appropriate targets. Dragon engagements also add exciting possibilities, and 90mm antipersonnel rounds can be used to supplement the HEAT rounds.

Trainers can also further develop the NBC scenario suggested in the ARTEP by placing CS powder in the smoke pots and in the demolition pits. At the same time, they can place Soviet contamination markers near the assembly area to signal the NBC threat, thereby testing a squad's ability to recognize and respond to the warning signs. They can also simulate NBC casualties and conduct

the entire exercise under MOPP-4 conditions.

Other minor variations can be used for units that have special needs. For example, a Ranger unit might increase the weight of each man's rucksack by adding a basic load of ammunition and by raising the ARTEP standard for hits; an airborne unit might begin its exercise by jumping into the area.

Finally, the basic ARTEP event and all of its variations might also be conducted at night. Such a night exercise would give the squads an opportunity to train with night vision devices, using limited visibility firing techniques and battlefield illumination by company mortars, hand

flares, searchlights, and infrared light sources.

The need for squad proficiency is unquestioned, and the squad forced march/live fire range has limitless potential for squad training. In a single exercise, a squad can be trained in the most difficult aspects of squad operations. The range, along with these suggested modifications, deserves the trainers' attention.

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Indoor TOW Training

STAFF SERGEANT ALEXANDER F. BARNES


Often in trying to carry out a TOW training schedule, an instructor will find that elements beyond his control can destroy his most carefully laid plans. For example, a snowstorm can wipe out his target acquisition classes, or rain can interfere with his target board tracking. Sometimes he has only a limited amount of time or space for his training.

In any unit, the loss of a training day is bad news. To a Reserve or National Guard unit, it can be a catastrophe. The solution, therefore, is to move some of the outdoor TOW training inside.

This is not as difficult as it sounds. All it takes is some imagination, for the materials needed are cheap and easy to obtain. Such commonplace things as a G.I. blanket, a flashlight,

a stack of old magazines, and some index cards are the basic ingredients.

The blanket, with some books or wooden blocks placed under it, can



be used as a sandtable or a terrain board for a class on preparing range cards. Roads can be made from toilet tissue, and small plastic houses and

trees can be added to supply landmarks and reference points.

The instructor needs only to give the TOW crewmen magnetic north, an idea of the distances involved, and their own location on the board. Then, by using two different gun positions, the crewmen can become more aware of a TOW section's deployment and of the importance of interlocking and support fires.

Each soldier should then be required to explain what he placed on his range card and why. This process, and the instructor's critique, should lead each soldier to a better understanding of the intricacies of range card construction.

The different scale models of modern military vehicles that are usually available to a unit can be used

on the blanket terrain board. These vehicles, viewed through the TOW daysight tracker, can provide a useful tool for determining target engageability and also for reinforcing vehicle identification training.

With the books or blocks, the blanket can be molded to any shape and the models can then be placed in any number of positions or in any desired combinations to represent good and bad attack possibilities.

Where indoor space limitations preclude the use of a TOW system, some training can still be conducted. The instructor can darken the room, sweep the terrain board with a flashlight, and have the soldiers point out engageable targets and identify vehicles as "friend or foe."

Vehicle recognition training can always be conducted indoors, of course, but it can be made more effective. All too often, tank identification training consists of passing out a few decks of "Tank I.D." cards and putting some posters of Threat vehicles up on the walls in the arms

room. Although these cards provide a good starting point, their use becomes stale quickly, usually because of the sterility of their presentation.

But a section sergeant can correct this problem by making his own set of cards from pictures that he finds in various publications, such as old (and new) national news magazines or military journals. Such magazines sometimes contain full color pictures of NATO and Warsaw Pact armor in various "poses" — three-quarter view, half hidden by dust or smoke, or in multiple groupings. In addition, these vehicles often show their national markings.

Another valuable source of pictures is the catalogs put out by the companies that make the plastic vehicle models. Easily obtained from any hobby store, these catalogs are packed with full-color shots of T-62s, Chieftains, Leopards, and M-60s.

By cutting out a variety of pictures and taping them to index cards, the instructor can create a collection of cards that will challenge the soldiers

to use all their knowledge of vehicles to identify them. At the same time, the soldiers will receive a much more realistic picture of the vehicles they are studying.

These are just three of the ways in which realism can be added to indoor training. No doubt, there are many others that trainers themselves can devise. These suggestions are not intended to replace outdoor training but to present some alternate ways of conducting more realistic indoor classes when time or weather interfere with the training schedule. Once the initial effort has been made to gather the materials needed, these methods can be used again and again. More important, they can be set up and readied for use at any time with little advance notice.

STAFF SERGEANT ALEXANDER F. BARNES is a National Guardsman with the 116th Infantry Brigade in Virginia. He is a graduate of the State University of New York and formerly served with the U.S. Marine Corps and as a TOW section sergeant with the 108th Infantry in the New York Army National Guard.

CALFEX Range Safety

CAPTAIN CHARLES J. WINN

Commanders and other training managers will benefit more from combined arms live fire exercises (CALFEX) if they consider range safety as an integral part of their training. Some of these firing exercises fail, even though months of planning have gone into them, because the training managers did not pay enough attention, or did not pay attention early enough, to range

safety. Training managers, therefore, must familiarize themselves with Army and local range safety regulations and take these into consideration from the beginning of their operational training.

Army Regulation 385-63, which is the final authority on firing safety, is an indispensable tool for CALFEX planners. It mandates precautions and restrictions that are intended to

reduce the risk of property damage and personnel injury, and it also gives training managers a foundation in the technical aspects of range safety.

One of the technical skills managers learn from the regulation is how to construct a safety diagram for a surface danger zone. This device enables them to identify any restrictions that might limit the weapon systems they can employ in a

CALFEX while there is still time for them to develop plans for using such realistic alternatives as subcaliber or simulation devices.

Training managers should realize that the safety restrictions given in AR 385-63 are not always absolute; in some instances, a waiver can be justified. But the criteria are strict, and the authority for granting waivers under this regulation is held at the general officer command level and cannot be delegated. The key determinants are the degree of control, the effectiveness of safety communications, and the level of training in a unit. Training managers who know range safety procedures will recognize which standards the CALFEX players and controllers must meet to justify a waiver.

Many of the safety requirements and precautions in preparing for a CALFEX are no more than simple common sense or restatements of tactical doctrine:

- Individuals and crews must be well qualified on the weapons involved in the exercise.
- The weapons used in overhead firing must be test-fired, and operational maintenance checks must be conducted.
- The effects of weather must be considered, particularly in situations involving the use of smoke or chemical munitions.
- Final coordination lines must be established that can be easily identified by both maneuver and fire support elements.

- The leaders participating in the exercise must select the weapon positions, but only after the safety planners have eliminated unsafe locations from consideration.

- The units that are firing must be aware of the location of adjacent units.

- A dry run of the exercise must always be conducted before the live firing begins.

These measures, all of which are either stated or implied in the regulation, are valid training guidelines as well as valid safety standards.

RESTRICTIONS

Sometimes the proximity of an exercise area to a post boundary, an inhabited area, or a post activity will place restrictions on the firing of certain weapon systems or for certain schemes of maneuver that cannot be waived. At first glance these restrictions may seem to be barriers to any kind of meaningful training in that terrain, particularly if simulation or subcaliber devices cannot be used. But the imaginative training manager should see how he can use these restrictions to his advantage, because rarely will an actual enemy establish a defensive position that gives the attacker the advantage in the use of terrain.

International boundaries and strategic or political considerations will undoubtedly limit commanders' options for maneuvers and fire sup-


port employment as they have in past wars, and so will the possibilities of nuclear, biological, or radiological contamination. The obvious solution is for trainers to write realistic, unwaivable restrictions into their tactical scenarios.

Range safety planning for a CALFEX is a challenging way of achieving training objectives. If restrictions are identified early, realistic alternatives can be selected. Restrictions can also lead to the development of new techniques in the employment of subcaliber devices and simulations. At the same time, the members of the CALFEX planning staff can exercise and develop their own individual and collective planning skills, thereby becoming better staff officers in the process.

Rehearsals, particularly when waivers are involved, improve the effectiveness of collective tactical training. When restrictions must be absolute, realistic scenarios result, and the equipment maintenance and operational checks dictated by range safety may even improve materiel readiness.

Commanders who view range safety as an integral part of their training program will strengthen their training program and improve their units' overall readiness as well.

CAPTAIN CHARLES J. WINN was commissioned from the Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning in 1969, after which he served in Vietnam. Since then, he has served in several Army Reserve and National Guard assignments. He is now range control officer at Camp Edwards in Massachusetts.



ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM

The Army's new manning system is expected to increase combat effectiveness by reducing turbulence and improving cohesion in small combat units and by developing a greater sense of esprit and belonging among all soldiers. This system, which is based on the precepts of personnel stabilization and unit replacement, operates within the framework of the new U.S. Army Regimental System.

Called the COHORT concept, this stabilization and unit replacement process calls for forming companies by organizing a cadre around a group of first term soldiers. The cadre and the soldiers are then stabilized for a three-year unit life cycle. The unit serves a portion of its life cycle in the continental United States and then deploys overseas.

To meet long-tour overseas requirements, units will spend 18 months in the U.S. and 18 months overseas (Europe, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii). Korea-bound units will spend 24 months in the U.S. and 12 months in Korea. Stateside and overseas battalions are linked for the purpose of deploying COHORT companies from the stateside battalion to its linked overseas battalion on a recurring schedule. At the end of a COHORT unit's life cycle overseas, it is replaced by another unit.

These COHORT units are not additions to the force structure. They are existing units that are stabilized and deployed under the policies of the new manning system.

The U.S. Army Regimental System provides for the career-long affiliation of a soldier with a specific regiment. The goal is to enable a combat arms soldier to serve all of his troop duty in one of the units of the regiment. When the soldier is not serving

in his regiment, he will be serving in a variety of nontactical assignments such as ROTC instructor, drill sergeant, or recruiter, just as he does today.

A regiment is defined as a group of battalions, usually four, with like organizations and equipment. These battalions are then redesignated so that the COHORT-linked units in the battalions bear the same regimental colors. Soldiers then receive recurring stabilized assignments to units of their regiment.

In short, the regimental system is just a grouping of existing battalions with a common designation; it is not a change to the present brigade-based tactical force structure. Its application to combat support and combat service support soldiers is still under study.

The new manning system is currently being implemented in conjunction with a fix-as-you-go evaluation focused on sustainability, affordability, manageability, and troop acceptability. Presently, 42 company-sized COHORT units are in existence, seven of which have deployed to Europe and one to Korea. By Fiscal Year 1986 that number will grow to about 110 units.

While it is too early to assess the effects of the regimental system, initial results of the COHORT concept appear favorable.

AIRBORNE SLOTS

The Army is looking for soldiers in MOSs 13F, 16R, and 16S in the ranks of PV1 through SSG to volunteer for airborne training and subsequent assignment.

Upon completion of airborne training, the soldiers accepted will be assigned to airborne positions at Fort

Bragg or at another post with airborne slots.

The incentives offered to soldiers on jump status include jump pay of \$83 per month and 100 additional administrative points for promotion to SGT — 50 additional points for promotion to SSG — if they are qualified and serving in an airborne duty position.

Soldiers who are interested must comply with Procedure 3-19 in DA Pamphlet 600-8 and meet the qualifications outlined in Chapter 6, AR 614-200.

More information is available from MSG Farley at AUTOVON 221-8051 or from MSG Scott at AUTOVON 221-8052.

OCS SCHEDULE

The following is a schedule of Officer Candidate School classes through Fiscal Year 1984:

CLASS	REPORT EARLIER THAN	REPORT NOT LATER THAN
5-83	16 Sep 83	18 Sep 83
1-84	21 Oct 83	23 Oct 83
2-84	20 Jan 84	22 Jan 84
3-84	24 Feb 84	26 Feb 84
4-84	4 May 84	6 May 84
5-84	24 Aug 84	26 Aug 84

ENLISTED AIDES

Certain general officers are authorized to have enlisted aides on their staffs. These aides perform duties that are related to the officers' military and official responsibilities and that serve a necessary military purpose.

Normally, soldiers in PMOS 94B volunteer and are assigned as enlisted aides, but volunteers in other MOSs may also be assigned if they are

qualified. Currently, there are world-wide vacancies.

Additional information concerning this program can be found in Chapter 8, AR 614-200, Selection of Enlisted Soldiers for Training and Assignment.

Interested NCOs in the ranks of SGT through SGM/CSM should write to SFC Bussell at the MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPZ-E, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314, or call AUTOVON 221-8398 or 221-8399.

APRT ENTRY ON EER

Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) data and height and weight data will now be recorded on the enlisted evaluation reports of active duty personnel.

The rater enters this information as part of his evaluation in Part III, on Line C, DA Form 2166-6. For example, the entry on that line might read "PASS, 8306, 72/180, YES," meaning that the soldier passed the APRT in June 1983, that he is 72 inches tall and weighs 180 pounds. The "YES" means he does show military bearing and appearance.

The rater then forwards the EER to the indorser, who completes his portion and reviews the completed evaluation, including the APRT data, with the rated soldier, who then signs the EER.

DLI TEST SCORING

New procedures for awarding the skill levels on the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) differ from the previous procedures in two ways. First, soldiers may now earn "plus" skill levels — 0+, 1+, 2+, 3+, and 4+. Second, soldiers may no longer earn skill levels higher than 3 on the basis of experience, background, or residence in a foreign country.

Soldiers who receive an "L" (listening) rating of 3 may request a telephone interview with a trained interviewer at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, to try

for a higher rating. But these interviews can be conducted only in languages for which the new calibrated conversion tables are in use — Russian, Korean, and Chinese-Mandarin.

Arrangements for telephone interviews can be made only by test control officers. The point of contact at DLIFLC for these interviews is ATFL-TE-TCO, AUTOVON 929-8106.

The interviewer can assign "L" and "S" (speaking) ratings of 3+, 4, 4+, or 5 on the basis of the interview. Currently there is no procedure for awarding "R" (reading) ratings higher than 3 on the basis of the test interview.

More information is available from Ms. Yvonne Summer at DAPC-EPT-L, AUTOVON 221-0640 or 221-8415.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

The MILPO Assistance Branch in MILPERCEN's Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate has implemented a problem resolution tasking (PRT) system to help solve personnel management problems at the Department of the Army level. The system is used to follow up on problems that the DA Personnel Management Assistance Systems (PERMAS) team identifies.

Once a problem has been identified, MILPO Assistance Branch creates a PRT to spell out details of the problem and require the proponent office or agency to develop a solution.

As a recent example, soldiers in isolated areas were not learning of selection board dates far enough in advance to make the necessary personal request for copies of their official military personnel files. Now, as a result of a PRT, MILPOs that serve soldiers in these remote areas can request the OMPFs for them and have these records sent directly to the soldiers.

Anyone who knows of specific personnel management problems that have a worldwide effect on MILPOs

and whose resolution would require DA action should submit them to HQDA, DAPC-EPH-MS, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332, or call Mrs. Smith or MAJ Feuge at AUTOVON 221-0593 or 221-0594. After duty hours, calls should be placed to a Code-A-Phone, AUTOVON 221-8696, which will record the message for later response.

ATTENTION MILPOs

Students continue to arrive at training sites to attend courses for which they do not have the qualifications. Students frequently report, for example, without enough time remaining on their enlistments to satisfy the training prerequisites, particularly "pay-back" time.

In addition, some of these students are not eligible to reenlist or extend because they have not qualified with a weapon, taken the Army Physical Readiness Test, or had a current physical examination. Students sometimes refuse to reenlist or to extend when advised of course obligations.

It is up to local Military Personnel Offices (MILPOs) to correct this problem. Losing MILPOs should follow the procedures outlined in DA Pamphlet 600-8, DA Pamphlet 600-8-10, and AR 614-200. This will ensure that departing soldiers are fully qualified for their next assignments, particularly for any schools they may be attending.

More information is available from MAJ Carrell, DAPC-EPH-MD, AUTOVON 221-9218 or 221-8946.

IRR OBLIGATION EXTENDED

All USAR and Active Army soldiers who reenlist in the future will incur a two-year Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) service obligation at the conclusion of their reenlistment periods. This new policy, which is designed to boost IRR strength, will take effect on 1 October 1983.

This new policy will be included in a forthcoming change to AR 140-111.

OFFICERS CAREER NOTES



BRANCH CHIEF'S NOTES

We try hard here at Infantry Branch to put out the truth about career management matters for Infantrymen. But OPMS is a dynamic system designed to respond to Army requirements, which means that from time to time "the truth" changes and we have to put out new information. Some of that new information is included here in INFANTRY.

First, officers who are preparing to meet selection boards this year should get copies of their current P-fiche and of their Officer Record Briefs. Infantry Branch stands ready to help them make any needed corrections to these files.

All promotion boards now use hard-copy photographs. Each officer should see that Branch has a photo that is current to within four years or his last promotion, whichever is most recent. This official photo is important and should be in accordance with AR 640-30. Some of the things that should not appear in the photo are the Infantry cord, the fourragere, leadership tabs, branch brass with unit designation added, jump boots, and general staff brass.

Although it is an officer's right to send a letter to the president of the selection board that is considering him, normally we recommend against it because it may not always serve the intended purpose. We advise officers to discuss their intentions first with their assignment officers. If the decision is to send such a letter, it should be addressed to President of the _____ Board, ATTN: DAPC-MSB, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.

Some clarifications may be needed in connection with the implementation of the regimental system and its effect on assignments. Although regi-

mental affiliation is the close and continuous association or identification of an officer with one regiment throughout his career, affiliation does not mean that all the assignments in an officer's career will be to elements of that regiment. Regimental assignments are defined as being to battalion level or below.

Five approved Infantry regiments have been identified thus far: The 9th, with battalions at Fort Ord and in Korea, the 16th at Fort Riley and in Europe, the 23d at Fort Lewis and in Korea, the 327th at Fort Campbell and in Alaska, and the 325th at Fort Bragg and in Italy.

Affiliation currently pertains only to officers who serve in these units after the dates of their regimental designation. In 1984 a program will begin for affiliating each Infantryman with one of the 26 Infantry regiments that have been targeted for eventual designation. These affiliation assignments will probably be made by Infantry Branch on the basis of officer assignment histories and preferences.

Another recent change is the activation of the 1st Special Operations Command (Provisional), which resulted in the development of a new career field, Specialty 18, for special operations personnel. The Army Staff and the major commands have been developing manning plans, amending the appropriate regulations, and formulating professional development programs for this new career field. We will have more information on SC 18 later.

Meanwhile, to keep up with these and other changes, all Infantry officers should communicate with us in some fashion — by writing, telephoning, or visiting. We need this input to do our job effectively and especially urge that preference statements be

used to tell us specifically what each officer would like to do.

Included in these notes are discussions of the professional development and assignment policies for captains and lieutenants. In the next issue, we will include similar notes for lieutenant colonels and majors.

LTC JOHN F. CONNOLLY

FOR CAPTAINS

Assignments for captains are taking on a new look — all captains and promotable first lieutenants who have not had the opportunity to command will be assigned, if at all possible, to positions that give them that opportunity. In this connection, perhaps the most dramatic change will be in the opportunity for a second command. Given the current and projected strengths and the desired command tour of 18 months (plus or minus 6 months), the number of available companies does not support more than one command. Infantry branch will therefore continue to discourage second commands so that each captain can have the opportunity to command once.

Whatever his assignment, an Infantry captain need not concern himself with how it will look on his career record; his concern should be with how well he performs in that assignment. For example, the general perception that a TRADOC command assignment is less desirable, and that it adversely affects a captain's chances for selection to major or for future commands, is totally unsubstantiated. How well a captain performs in each assignment is also one of the best indicators of success in selection for promotion and advanced military and civil schooling.

Conversely, failure to achieve the desired results in caring for his soldiers or in setting and maintaining high standards is just as damaging in a TOE unit as in a TDA unit.

The requirements for branch qualification remain unchanged. The successful completion of an advanced course and a successful command tour will qualify an Infantry captain in his initial specialty.

Following this branch qualification, captains can look forward to either a nominative assignment (USAREC, ARMR, ROTC, USMA) or an additional specialty assignment. Some who have already commanded will also be assigned to TRADOC centers, particularly Fort Benning, where the experience gained in command can be used to the fullest.

An officer's assignments in his additional specialty will be comparable to those given officers who hold that specialty as their initial one. Military schooling in support of the additional specialty will be scheduled, when applicable, to give an Infantry captain every opportunity to become qualified in his additional specialty. Again, each officer must learn as much as possible about his additional specialty and at the same time keep abreast of the latest developments in the Infantry. Most officers can expect to spend a number of their field grade years in their additional specialty and, therefore, need to give it their thoughtful attention.

Normally, an officer's additional specialty is designated in his eighth year of service, but he can also receive this designation early, as detailed in the March-April 1983 issue of *INFANTRY*, page 44.

Full implementation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) is expected in Fiscal Year 1985. Infantry Branch is now scheduling courses for FY 1984. All the officers now being scheduled to attend these courses must have completed a nonresident phase before attending the nine-week resident phase at Fort Leavenworth.

Only officers in Year Group 77 and later are now being scheduled for

CAS³, with YG 77 as the first year group to have a goal of 100 percent attendance. To be eligible, an officer must have completed an officer advanced course. Officers will automatically be scheduled to attend the resident phase between their sixth and ninth years of service on the basis of their dates of availability.

Today's Infantry captains should accept the challenge and do well in each position. Success will follow.

FOR LIEUTENANTS

The typical assignment patterns for Infantry lieutenants are as follows.

If initial assignment is to CONUS or to a long tour overseas:

MONTHS	OBC/ABN/RGR
0-6	First tour
6-42	OAC
42-48	Second tour
48-60	

If initial assignment is to a short tour overseas:

MONTHS	OBC/ABN/RGR
0-6	Short tour
6-18	CONUS tour
18-54	OAC
54-60	

Either of these patterns will include a variety of challenging jobs, and lieutenants should consider each job important enough to do well. We must point out again, too, that an Infantry lieutenant who is assigned to a TRADOC training center and does his job well, as reflected on his OER, is just as competitive professionally as his peer who is assigned to a TOE Infantry battalion and does his job well.

It is the goal of Infantry Branch to have each Infantry lieutenant serve in a TOE assignment before he attends an officer advanced course. The purpose of this goal is to develop each officer's ability to integrate the combined arms team concept successfully.

A lieutenant may be moved from a TDA assignment after 12 to 18 months on station to obtain TOE experience and to meet critical Army requirements, such as in Germany and Korea. It is currently Infantry

Branch policy that the officer who does not serve as a lieutenant in a TOE unit will be assigned to a TOE unit as a captain.

The major task for lieutenants from their day of commissioning until the day they start IOAC is to develop their initial specialty of Infantry. Specific professional development objectives for Infantry lieutenants include platoon level experience in light or mechanized Infantry units and other training such as the Ranger course. Infantry Branch is committed to the task of providing this opportunity to each Infantry lieutenant, within the needs of the Army, of course.

LIEUTENANTS' ASSIGNMENTS

Infantry Branch often receives calls from lieutenants who want to volunteer for duty with Ranger battalions, Special Forces, or the Old Guard. Applications for Ranger duty and for the Old Guard should be made on DA Form 4187 and routed through the volunteer's chain of command to DA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPE-I (LT Assignment Officer), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332. Volunteers for Special Forces duty should submit a written application in accordance with AR 614-162 and must include an updated preference statement with the application. (The Special Forces Qualification Course is 16 weeks long.)

As prerequisites for these assignments, a lieutenant must:

- Have performed successfully in leadership positions.
- Have demonstrated his ability to perform in unique, demanding assignments.
- Have at least 12 months remaining as a lieutenant.
- Be Airborne and Ranger qualified or volunteer for these courses.
- Be at least 5 feet 10 inches tall (for the Old Guard only).

Because stabilization rules directly affect an officer's availability for

assignment, officers overseas will be considered for these assignments only upon their return from overseas. Officers in CONUS may not move before they have spent one year on station, and even then they have to be granted a stabilization break by MILPERCEN.

INFANTRY OFFICER BASIC COURSE

The Infantry Officer Basic Course, now 16 weeks in length, emphasizes leadership, tactics, maintenance, and weapon instruction, to enable new lieutenants to take the latest doctrine to the units in the field. Following their basic courses, about 95 percent of these officers receive additional training in such courses as Airborne, Ranger, Improved TOW Vehicle, Mortar Platoon, Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and Pathfinder. The average Infantry lieutenant spends 21 weeks in training at Fort Benning before reporting to his first unit of assignment.

The following is the schedule of courses through Fiscal Year 1984:

No.	Start	End
8-83	17 Jul 83	8 Nov 83
9-83	14 Aug 83	12 Dec 83
10-83	25 Sep 83	3 Feb 84
1-84	30 Oct 83	12 Mar 84
2-84	8 Jan 84	30 Apr 84
3-84	12 Feb 84	5 Jun 84
4-84	15 Apr 84	8 Aug 84
5-84	20 May 84	13 Sep 84

OER CHANGES

An officer's OER must now include his most recent Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) performance and his height and weight.

The rated officer types this data in during his administrative review and then signs and dates the report before forwarding it to the rater. The rated officer's signature verifies the accuracy of all entries on the report.

These new entries are recorded in Part IV of the OER (DA Form 67-8). In Block A, Item 3, "Maintains Appropriate Level of Physical Fitness," should be followed by the word

"PASS," "FAIL," or "PROFILE," and the year and month of the officer's most recent APRT or the date the profile was awarded. For example, "PASS 8306."

The officer's height and weight as of the date he signs the report should be entered in Block A, following Item 12, "Possesses Military Bearing and Appearance." This data should be followed by either "YES" or "NO" as to military bearing and appearance — for example, "71/215 NO."

Detailed instructions on these changes are included in a letter along with the OER packets.

ALTERNATE LIST

Officers on the alternate command list are now activated during the fiscal year for which they have alternate command list status. Those who have not been activated by the start of the next fiscal year's command selection board process are reconsidered if they are still eligible. But this policy is being changed.

In the future, the current fiscal year's alternate command list will be superseded as soon as the next fiscal year's alternate list is approved.

This procedure will become effective with the Fiscal Year 1985 selection list, which means the alternate list for Fiscal Year 1984 will expire as soon as the new list is approved. This new list is expected to be approved during December 1983.

More information is available from MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPC-P, AUTOVON 221-7873.

NEW ARTILLERY BASIC COURSE

The U.S. Army Field Artillery School has implemented a new Field Artillery Basic Course for Reserve Component soldiers.

Only officers with prior service (OCS graduates or prior service direct appointees) may attend.

Although the new course consists of five phases, only Phase 1B requires

residence. The eight-week resident phase will be taught at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Upon completion of the entire course, officers will have received training equivalent to that of the full-time resident course.

Eligible officers who are interested in enrolling should contact their unit training officers, if assigned to a USAR unit, or their Personnel Management officers at RCPAC, if assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve.

APPLYING FOR SCHOOL

Officers currently in the USAR Management Program are eligible to apply for resident military schooling in advance courses and in some functional courses in accordance with DA Circular 140-14.

If selected to attend a resident course of more than 140 days, an officer will be moved on a permanent change of station (PCS) and carried in the USAR AGR Management Officer schools account while attending the course. For courses that do not require a PCS, the officer will be sent to the school in a TDY status.

AGR officers who cannot attend resident military schools are encouraged and expected to further their military education through the Army Correspondence Course Program or through USAR schools.

Qualified Reservists will be notified in writing whether a quota is obtained. The agency to which the Reservist is assigned will be expected to provide the DA Form 1610 travel orders and to fund the TDY for the period of the school.

This information does not apply, however, to the Command and General Staff College and other than Professional Educational Development schools (covered by AR 140-12, DA Pamphlet 140-12, and DA Circular 140-83-1).

Those who are qualified to attend a resident phase of a military education program must request a slot through command channels to the appropriate Army Headquarters.

BOOK REVIEWS



We have received a number of excellent reference books during the past several months:

• **TANKS OF THE WORLD**, 1983. Edited by General F.M. von Senger und Etterlin (Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1983. 900 Pages. \$49.95). This is the sixth edition — and the first edition to be printed in English — of the well-known and authoritative *Taschenbuch der Panzer*, which was last published in 1976. It includes information on all armored land vehicles, which are grouped by country of development and then by classes and groups according to their roles.

The editor commands NATO's Central Command (CINCENT) and is one of the world's foremost experts on armored vehicles and armored warfare. In that respect, he follows in the footsteps of his father, who was one of Germany's outstanding armor commanders during World War II.

This edition has 731 drawings and 603 photographs, plus 12 appendixes, an excellent section on "development trends," and 13 tables. It is an absolutely essential reference book for the military professional.

• **BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES**. First Edition. A Keesing's Reference Publication edited by Alan J. Day (Gale Research Company, 1982. 406 Pages. \$75.00). This book gives information on nearly 80 disputes and includes for each its historical origins, development, and present status. The material is arranged in five geographic sections, and each dispute is illustrated with a map of the area. The book also contains detailed subject and name indexes and a selected bibliography.

• **WAR MAPS: GREAT LAND, SEA, AND AIR BATTLES OF WORLD WAR II**. By Simon Good-

enough (St. Martin's Press, 1983. 192 Pages. \$18.95). Although this book contains 232 full-color maps, it also has numerous photographs, brief battle commentaries, and profiles of the principal military and naval leaders, all of which complement the maps beautifully. It has been divided into six sections, each representing a major combat theater, and each section is complete in itself. There is also a short bibliography and a longer index. This book is an excellent companion volume to Peter Young's **ATLAS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR**, which was published in 1974.

• **U.S. MILITARY WHEELED VEHICLES**. By Fred W. Crismon (Crestline Publishing, 1983. 472 Pages. \$34.95). Using thousands of photographs, detailed captions, and brief chapter introductions, the author, a serving U.S. Army officer, discusses all of the wheeled motor transport vehicles owned or tested for use by the U.S. armed forces, or built by private firms for use by the U.S. military services. The book is outstanding in every respect; it has 18 chapters, each devoted to a particular class of vehicle, a bibliography, and a page of technical notes. The author plans to publish a companion volume on tracked vehicles.

• **ATLAS OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL WARFARE**. By Arthur Banks (Hippocrene Books, 1982. 185 Pages. \$25.00). This is a reprint of an atlas that was first published in 1973 under the title *A World Atlas of Military History: Volume One — to 1500*. There are no major differences, other than the title pages, between the two

volumes. The maps cover the entire world known within its time span, with particular attention being paid to events in China, Japan, and central Asia.

• **ATLAS OF THE 20th CENTURY**. Maps by Richard Natkiel. Text by Donald Somerville and John N. Westwood (Facts on File, 1982. 256 Pages. \$29.95). Richard Natkiel is the head of the cartographic department of one of England's leading newspapers. He prepared the maps for Peter Young's atlas, which is mentioned above, and is recognized as one of England's foremost military and historical cartographers. This book, with more than 200 of his maps, shows why. At the same time, almost every map is complemented by an explanatory text and photographs. The combination is a winning one.

• **ARMS AND UNIFORMS: THE AGE OF CHIVALRY**. Three volumes. By Liliane and Fred Funcken (Prentice-Hall, 1983. Volume I, 102 Pages; Volume II, 109 Pages; Volume III, 104 Pages. Each Volume, Softbound, \$8.95). In these profusely illustrated books, the authors detail the development of the arms, uniforms, and methods of war the fighting men of Europe used between the 8th and the 15th centuries. Among their subjects are helmets and mail, bows and crossbows, tournaments and heraldic bearings, castles and forts, and Renaissance infantry and cavalry. Most of the illustrations are in full color. There is no other modern work that compares with this one; it is authoritative and useful to the collector and to the student of military history.

• **THE WARSAW PACT: ARMS, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY**. Edited by William J. Lewis (McGraw-Hill, 1982. 471 Pages. \$29.95). This book was published

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

under the auspices of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and carries a laudatory preface by U.S. Senator Sam Nunn. It is similar to *THE WARSAW PACT ARMIES*, an Austrian publication, which the editor worked on in years past and which has been issued to many U.S. Army units in Europe. It covers in detail the Warsaw Pact's land order-of-battle and reviews the Pact's arms and equipment. Of considerable interest, too, is the book's chapter on a "Model Land Campaign in Central Europe." The book is a useful work and should be known to all military professionals.

• **SOVIET MILITARY POWER**, Second Edition, 1983. A Department of Defense Publication, 107 Pages, Softbound (For sale by the U.S. Superintendent of Documents). This is an updated version of the 1981 edition, which received a good deal of publicity at the time it appeared, for it presented some material that had been considered, at one time or another, highly classified. Apparently, the same holds true for this version — until recently, some of the material it contains was classified. The Department of Defense decided to bring out this updated book to show that since 1981 the Soviet Union "has pushed ahead with force modernization, expansion and forward deployment on a scale even larger than before" and that the Soviet Union's "strategic defense force is the most massive in the world." It is divided into six chapters, with each chapter devoted to a particular subject such as strategic forces, theater forces (including general naval forces and Warsaw Pact forces), and space systems. Numerous tables, charts, maps, and photographs supplement the narrative.

BOARDING PARTY: THE LAST ACTION OF THE CALCUTTA LIGHT HORSE, by James Leasor (Houghton Mifflin, 1979. 204 Pages. \$8.95). Reviewed by Rear Admiral George L. Phillips, United States Navy, Retired.

In the early months of 1943, four Axis merchant vessels — three German, one Italian — lay interned in the Portugese enclave of Goa, on the western flank of India. It was a neutral harbor and the vessels appeared idle and harmless. But Allied intelligence monitors had identified the four vessels as the sources of German language radio broadcasts to the U-boats that lurked offshore. In fact, they were sending such accurate reports of Allied ship movements that 12 Allied vessels were sunk during the first 11 days of March.

This is the story of a deed of high adventure in the best tradition of Francis Drake. It was initiated in the Admiralty in London, implemented by the cloak-and-dagger Special Operations Executive, and carried out by two British regular officers aided by a random collection of 18 over-aged, paunchy, and physically handicapped British businessmen from Calcutta. These men — planters, merchants, accountants, insurance executives — were united in membership in the Calcutta Light Horse and the Calcutta Scottish, fun-loving and semi-military units whose activities, other than one annual ceremonial parade, were seemingly confined to club dinners, parties, cocktail hours and paper chases. This was the group that planned and executed a raid on the four Axis ships in Goa.

The raid itself, after a harrowing series of narrow escapes by the members of the raiding party, was overwhelmingly successful. That it was was due to elaborate preparations, judicious bribery, and diversionary tactics. All of the Axis ships were sunk during a brisk midnight action, while the boarding party quietly faded away into the night with but minor injuries and with no hint of a neutrality violation.

Two days later, the British businessmen were back at their desks, while their wives wondered where they had acquired such sunburns.

James Leasor, an author well known for his suspense yarns, has, in this truly exciting historical account, fully matched his fictional success.

RAID: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PATTON'S SECRET MISSION. By Richard Barton (Putnam's, 1982. 283 Pages. \$12.95). Reviewed by Colonel Robert G. Clarke, Headquarters CINCPAC.

During the closing days of World War II in Europe, General George S. Patton, Jr., ordered one of his most controversial actions — he directed the 4th Armored Division to send a task force more than 50 miles behind the German lines to free the Allied prisoners-of-war at the Hammelburg POW camp. His son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John K. Waters, was thought to be in that camp.

The task force, drawn largely from the 10th Armored Infantry, was led by Captain Abe Baum, an experienced and very capable combat commander. Baum's force consisted of an armored infantry company, a medium tank company, a light tank platoon, an assault gun platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon, some 300 men, all told.

Unfortunately, Baum had little time to plan or to prepare his troops for what appeared to be an impossible mission. Too, he had little intelligence about the camp and did not even know exactly where in Hammelburg the camp was located. Finally, he was told that he could expect to find 300 prisoners in the camp and that he was to bring them out with him. As it turned out, when the task force finally reached the camp, there were 1,500 prisoners and Baum had to waste valuable time trying to sort out which 300 men would go out with the task force on its return trip.

This is a fast-paced book that reads like a novel, and it does capture the essence of this suicidal mission. The author was one of the prisoners at the Hammelburg camp, and he leaves his readers wondering just a little about General Patton's true motives. He does conclude, though, that those motives were honorable and that the mission was worth the costs, particularly when it is placed in the context of the overall Third Army effort.

All Infantry officers should find this book interesting as well as

informative, and they might think of how they would have handled the situation, given the conditions that Abe Baum had to face.

THE ROAD TO CONFRONTATION. By William Whitney Stueck, Jr. (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1981. 326 Pages. \$20.00). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel C.T. Guthrie, United States Army.

In his book, the author analyzes United States policy towards China and Korea between 1947 and 1950. He points out that in 1947 United States policy makers did not view South Korea as an area that was of vital strategic importance to the United States. But because the U.S. was concerned with maintaining some sort of world-wide credibility, those same people felt that a military withdrawal from South Korea was unacceptable. Such a withdrawal, they believed, would indicate to the world a lack of U.S. resolve to sustain its commitment to world peace. Therefore, the U.S. decided to maintain a military presence in South Korea, which, according to the author, represented a major step toward war with China.

In contrast, U.S. policy makers during the same period, including Secretary of State George C. Marshall, were not concerned that the events in China represented a threat to U.S. credibility. A communist takeover in China was never viewed as being detrimental to U.S. goals in northeast Asia.

Given these basic views towards Korea and China, the author then analyzes exactly how the U.S. became involved in a war with China on the Asian mainland. He uses a wealth of source material that he supplements with interviews, oral histories, and unpublished secondary works. And he paints a comprehensive picture of the differing personalities and ideologies that came into conflict with each other during this important period of U.S. diplomatic history.

This book surely deserves a place in

a historian's library, and it certainly merits the attention of all military readers.

AUDIE MURPHY: AMERICAN SOLDIER. By Harold B. Simpson (Alcor Publishing Company, 1982. 466 Pages. \$17.95). Reviewed by Captain Michael E. Long, United States Army.

Once in a while a book is published that deserves more than just a passing glance by both reviewer and reader. This lavishly illustrated volume about America's most decorated soldier, Audie Murphy, is a fitting tribute to him. The author has done a fine job of assembling family photographs, career highlights, and post-World War II memorabilia relating to Murphy's military and acting careers.

Murphy was a true leader in every sense of the word and a credit to the Army in which he served, both on active duty during World War II and following that conflict as a member of the Texas National Guard. Murphy spent almost 400 days in combat and earned himself a battlefield commission. He garnered 33 military awards, including the Medal of Honor and every other medal for valor given by the United States. His tragic death in 1971 left this country with a legacy that will not be soon forgotten.

This is a well-written and authoritative biography as well as a handsome addition to any library.

NOVEMBER 1918. By Gordon Brook-Shepherd (Little, Brown, 1982. 448 Pages). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel D.A. Rolston, United States Army.

Shrouded by an early morning mist on 8 August 1918, Allied forces launched an attack against the Amiens salient. The attack met with unexpected success, the Germans being taken by surprise while in the process of rotating front-line units. The Germans not only lost miles of front, they also suffered thousands of casualties.

The real significance of this action for the Germans lay not in the loss of ground or men but in the immediate effect it had on the morale of the German leaders. What should have been only a military setback was soon transformed into a decisive political event by Ludendorff's declaration that 8 August was the "black day" of the German Army.

The author selects the Allied attack on the Amiens salient as the starting point for his narrative for two reasons. The first is the effect it had on the German high command. The second is that it serves as a convenient measuring point from which to begin an examination of the final one hundred days of World War I.

His stated purpose is to provide a panorama of the end of the war. He does this by covering the four major battlefields: the Western Front, the Balkans, Italy, and Palestine. Not only does he cover the military events in just the right degree of detail, he weaves in the diplomatic activities that were taking place and the effects the war had on Europe's ruling families.

What makes the book particularly fascinating is the author's use of many first-hand accounts gleaned from letters, journals, autobiographies, and interviews. It is recommended to all students of World War I.

THE MILITARY: THE THEORY OF LAND WARFARE AS BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE. By Harry Holbert Turney-High (Christopher Publishing House, 1981. 336 Pages. \$12.00). Reviewed by Major John C. Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

As its jacket indicates, this book is a study of the military institution as behavioral science. The author, a professor emeritus of anthropology and a long-serving member of the Army Reserve, has drawn from various social science disciplines for his analysis and methodology.

For this reviewer, though, it was difficult to determine whether the

book is intended for the lay reader or for the serious scholar. If for the latter, the book has significant shortcomings. Too frequently, for example, the author makes certain assumptions, cites certain examples, but fails to provide any documentation for them. Other errors abound as well, particularly when the author discusses military personnel and military organizations.

Still, it is an interesting and innovative idea to analyze the principles of war in terms of anthropology, economics, and human psychology. The author's anthropological approach to the military as an institution is well-taken. The author observes that "men start wars. Men fight wars. Men win or lose, and it is men who suffer." One definition of anthropology, of course, is "The science of man and his works." And above all else, the author does write in an interesting and varied style.

A GENERAL'S LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair (Simon and Schuster, 1983. 752 Pages. \$24.95). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel William A. dePalo, Jr., United States Army.

This superb book is, in reality, an authorized biography of General Omar N. Bradley rather than a bona fide autobiography.

General Bradley began work on this volume in 1971 but died after only one-sixth of it had been completed. Clay Blair, a former military editor for *TIME* and *LIFE* magazines and Bradley's collaborator in the endeavor, undertook the task of completing the book. He used the first person pronoun throughout as though Bradley himself were writing the entire text. The result is a remarkably smooth-flowing account of the life of one of this country's most distinguished military leaders.

This is not simply a rehash of Bradley's earlier memoirs, *A Soldier's Story*. Rather, it is the story of the General's life from his school-boy days in Missouri to his chairmanship

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Too, for the portion of the book concerned with World War II, Blair had access to newly declassified documents that had not been previously available for public use. Also in this portion, Bradley and Blair have focused less on the details of the campaigns in which the General was involved and more on the personalities of the Allied commanders who most influenced the ultimate victories in Africa and Europe.

Bradley's candid appraisals of his superiors, subordinates, and peers, notably Patton, Montgomery, Eisenhower, Simpson, and Hodges, make fascinating reading. His interminable squabbles with "Monty" and the British press over Allied strategy and over the relative contributions of the various Allied powers are treated in detail and with admirable objectivity.

The account of Bradley's service after World War II is equally well done, although it lacks the on-the-scene brilliance of his war-time experiences. Much of the story is told through the messages and correspondence that flowed between Bradley, the Army staff, and the commanders in the field. Again, Bradley pulls few punches when he describes the effectiveness of those military commanders he admired (Ridgway and Van Fleet) and those he did not (MacArthur and Walker). Bradley's view of the Korean War from his perspective as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is particularly interesting.

On the whole, this is a first-rate addition to the growing number of biographies of prominent World War II military personalities. Besides being eminently enjoyable reading for casual consumption, it is of significant value to the student of military history.

FIGHT FOR THE FALKLANDS, by John Laffin (St. Martin's Press, 1982. \$5.59, Softbound).

WAR IN THE FALKLANDS: THE FULL STORY, by the *Sunday Times* Insight Team (Harper and Row, 1982. \$14.95). Both books

reviewed by Leroy Thompson, Festus, Missouri.

Quite often, the books that are rushed into print after a historic event are a bit scant on scholarship and detail, being geared to the popular market. To some extent this is true of both of these works on the South Atlantic war, though each has some redeeming characteristics.

The second of the two listed books, for example, is especially strong on the behind-the-scenes "combat" undertaken by the British ambassadors to the United Nations, to the United States, and to the European Economic Community. John Laffin's book, on the other hand, brings the author's sound knowledge of military subjects to his discussions of the conflict's principal battles. Laffin's book also has an interesting discussion of the use of propaganda in war and a thought-provoking analysis of Britain's future options in the Falklands.

Unfortunately, neither book has a thorough operational history of the war. Perhaps that will have to wait for the memoirs of some of the participants. Naval and air operations are covered only superficially, leaving this reviewer, at least, craving more information about the performance of many weapon systems never before tried in combat.

Both books are well worth reading, though, because they offer good overviews of the war, including the logistical and political as well as the military aspects. Both also do a reasonably good job of acquainting the reader with the historical background to the conflict. They are recommended as the best reading matter so far available on the recent war, but with the understanding that the definitive work has yet to be written.

FIRE OVER ENGLAND, by H.G. Castle (David and Charles, 1982. 254 Pages. \$22.50). Reviewed by Lieutenant Roy P. Houchin II, United States Air Force.

Aerial bombardment during World War I is a seldom addressed subject,

so this book is of considerable interest. It is enjoyable, comprehensive, and enlightening; it covers not only the German raids carried out over England but also the British reaction, both political and military, to those raids.

The author discusses the German high command's decisions and subsequent policies and emphasizes their results. His book does suffer from a lack of footnotes, even though several long quotations are documented and reference is made to a number of primary sources. There are simply too many not-so-common facts that need documentation. Unfortunately, this causes the reader to be quite cautious about the author's facts, or opinions, whatever they may be.

Still, for the reader who is interested in early aviation bombardment and in the defensive measures used against that action, both anti-aircraft weaponry and aircraft, this is a good source.

The numerous photographs, drawings, and maps and an extensive appendix are welcome additions to an interesting and flowing narrative.

U.S. DEFENSE PLANNING: A CRITIQUE, by John M. Collins (Westview Press, 1982. 337 Pages. \$30.00). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, United States Army, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States.

This book grew out of Congressional concern for this country's defense planning apparatus and out of the need to "thoroughly examine the procedures and structures for U.S. strategic policy and planning." It shows how policy inputs, domestic and foreign, from the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department affect defense planning, as does Congressional participation. It also discusses in detail the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the abilities of the incumbents to produce sound military strategies.

The author, a retired Army officer, is a senior specialist in national

defense at the Congressional Research Service. He cautions the reader that his critique does not dwell on the strengths of the defense planning system but explores problems with an eye to pursuing improvements in that system.

Contrary to many studies in which the authors define the problem but offer no solutions, Collins provides a number of specific corrective actions that would improve defense planning. Some of these, he suggests, could be accomplished in a simple and timely fashion and with little fanfare.

Because of the comments that have been made recently regarding the reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the increased awareness and concern that the American public has expressed on major defense issues, this is a timely and informative book. It should appeal to the policymaker, the serious student of national security, and the general reader.

"BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION": THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903, by Stuart C. Miller (Yale University Press, 1982. 340 Pages. \$25.00). Reviewed by Benjamin F. Gilbert, Professor of History, San Jose State University.

The cession of the Philippines to the United States by Spain in 1898 disappointed native expectations for immediate independence. Accordingly, Filipino insurrectionists proclaimed a republic, and eventual friction between them and U.S. military authorities culminated in open hostilities on 4 February 1899.

Regular and Volunteer troops under Generals T.M. Anderson, Wesley Merritt, Arthur MacArthur, Elwell S. Otis, Lloyd Wheaton, and Henry Lawton defeated the insurgents and drove them into northern Luzon. The Filipino capital, Malolos, fell on 31 March and the native government under Emilio Aguinaldo withdrew to Tarlac.

In November, Tarlac was captured and the insurgent forces then disintegrated. Aguinaldo fled to an almost

inaccessible area of northeastern Luzon but was captured by General Frederick Funston in March 1901. In Samar an entire company of American Regulars was surprised and massacred at Balangiga. Besides Aguinaldo, the principal insurgent leaders were Gregorio del Pilar and Antonio Luna. Their troops, undisciplined and poorly armed, were easily defeated, but they could easily fade into the countryside and then fight again.

Guerrilla warfare continued throughout the archipelago until April 1902, when the last important chieftain surrendered.

United States military leaders had difficulties in ending the guerrilla warfare, and opposition to the war itself developed on the home front. In a lively style the author portrays the frustration of the American people during an undeclared war. A professor of history and social science at San Francisco State University, he used such primary sources as the imperialist and anti-imperialist collections in the Widener Library of Harvard University, and the papers of Admiral George Dewey, Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and William Howard Taft, all in the Library of Congress. He also relied on the papers of the soldiers and the regiments that served in the Philippines that are in the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks and on many contemporary newspaper and periodical accounts.

The book is a searching study of the nation's reaction to its first major overseas involvement in Asia. The military aspects of the war are not emphasized, but the book stresses how the generals, the common soldiers, and the public reacted to the war.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

IRAQ AND IRAN: ROOTS OF CONFLICT. By Tareq Y. Ismael. Syracuse University Press, 1982. 226 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.
CHANGING U.S. MILITARY MANPOWER REALITIES. Edited by Franklin D. Margiotta, James Brown, and Michael J. Collins. Westview Press, 1983. 267 Pages. \$25.00.

INFANTRY LETTERS



TRAIN REALISTICALLY

I read your January-February 1983 issue with great interest. One article in particular caught my eye — the one by Major Timothy P. Maroney. While I think I understand what he is trying to say, I don't agree with the way "Train to be Miserable" (page 9) says it.

First, I think a better title, and a better approach, would have been "Train Realistically." I happen to be one of the small unit leaders he mentions who honestly believe that "you don't have to train to be miserable." But I am a firm believer in realistic training that is limited only by safety, cost, and initiative.

Our training objectives should be to develop our soldiers' proficiency, not their misery. No one can argue that misery is not part of a grunt's lot, but a "misery escalation planning schedule" is not necessary or even desirable. Running long range patrols in the rain because that is tactically sound makes more sense than running them because the unit needs to get out in the rain to increase its misery level!

Now let's look at it from the troops' point of view. While today's young Americans lead a more comfortable life, they are also better educated and more motivated. They really enjoy good hard training, but there is no reason to create artificial misery for its own sake and then justify it as improved training. Good hard training leads to proficiency; artificial misery leads to morale problems, because the leader cannot clearly explain to the troops what he is trying to accomplish.

In summary, well trained troops should face realistic training that is challenging but not impossible. Creating artificial misery will cause

morale problems more often than it will increase the soldiers' proficiency. So let's train to be proficient, not miserable.

D. BILINOVICH
SSgt., USMC
Norfolk, Virginia

MORTAR FIRE CONTROL

We have read the article "Deflection Scale Board," by Major Mark S. Flusche, in the January-February 1983 issue of INFANTRY (page 38), and have a few comments. These comments are based on our 18 years of experience in mechanized, airborne, Ranger, and straight-leg mortar platoons and on our present jobs as mortar instructors in the Infantry School.

First, we agree that on an AirLand battlefield the observed firing chart will be used extensively in controlling fire using only a direction and a distance to the target, the technique known as hipshooting. In such a situation, mobility will be essential, as will speed in engaging targets.

The leader of a mortar squad must be capable of accurate land navigation in such an environment; the accuracy of the fires will depend on how accurately the mortar position is plotted in relation to the target. Along with mastering the M-2 compass, they will also have to be able to lay a mortar quickly and accurately for direction with the compass.

Major Flusche says that the M-16 plotting board is slow to use and hard for soldiers to understand, but we have found that the main problem lies not with the soldiers, but with the higher echelons — platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, section sergeants, squad leaders — who do not know

how to use the M-16 plotting board and therefore cannot teach their computers to use it effectively either. Land navigation skills are also lacking in the platoons, which compounds the problem of making an accurate plot from the guns to the target (determining the direction and the distance).

Another problem with the article is that the author takes for granted that the materials to construct the deflection scale board are easily obtainable. In canvassing platoon leaders and platoon sergeants of 4.2-inch mortar platoons who have come through the courses we teach — along with some former 4.2-inch mortar platoon leaders — we failed to find anyone who would have let one of his two authorized GFFs (graphic firing fans) go on "loan" for very long. Most said they would not let them go at all.

Although the deflection scale board can be made and used as described, its use is limited to observed chart missions and does not lend itself to firing as a modified observed chart or a surveyed chart. By contrast, in our experience, the M-16 plotting board is a more versatile system. Besides, the M-16 board is already in the inventory and it includes its own carrying case. After scrounging the materials and constructing a deflection scale board, it would carry the additional disadvantage of adding an extra and unnecessary piece of equipment to a mortar platoon's FDC.

We should not try to solve a problem with a system by putting it aside and trying a different system. Instead we should identify its problems and correct its deficiencies.

If we go to war tomorrow we will be using the M-16 plotting board, so we should train our men today to use it. At the same time, we must teach

them how to read a map and use an M-2 compass so that when we hit the AirLand battlefield our troops will know what to do to win.

SSG JOHN E. FOLEY
SSG ARTHUR L. LACEWELL
Fort Benning, Georgia

ABILITY AND ATTITUDE

I hope you will publish more articles by Dandridge Malone, for he always seems to have something worthwhile to say. A case in point is his article "Able and Willing" (March-April 1983, page 9) — short, concise, and most practical.

It certainly is true that a combination of ability and attitude determines performance. And, of course, the most difficult of these to deal with is attitude, for it decides whether ability is to be applied. There are two critical questions involved: Can he do it? (ability) and Will he do it? (attitude).

Consequently, the most challenging task for the leader is to positively influence attitude; a unit made up of the truly willing is a joy to lead. We've all had our fill, I believe, of the competent but contentious, the able but cantankerous — in short, the troublemakers.

I don't know the Program of Instruction at the Infantry School, but if it isn't concentrating on identifying, interpreting, and influencing attitude, the School is overlooking the critical ingredient in the leadership process.

GEORGE EDDY
Austin, Texas

PATHETICALLY VULNERABLE

I want to commend Captain William B. Crews ("Mortars in Cities," March-April 1983, page 13) for his practical insights into one of the key problems faced by those fighting in cities. His emphasis on the need for indirect fire in MOUT and his identification of the technical problems involved in the use of mor-

tars in urban terrain are right on target.

There is another problem, however, with indirect fire in MOUT: Those who will have to defend themselves *behind* the main battle area don't have any mortars! With the unlikely exception of a dedicated rear area combat force or transient maneuver units, forces fighting the threats to the rear area have nothing heavier than M203s. The same is true in the area of antiarmor weapons.

Until we equip and train our Military Police and support troops to deal with Soviet BMDs in urban combat, our forces in the main battle area will be pathetically vulnerable to the cutting of their lines of communication.

EDWARD M. McCLURE
CPT, MI
Apex, North Carolina

LET'S KEEP LAWS LIGHT

I have been reading in the various military journals about the current controversy over light antiarmor weapons (LAWs), and I am concerned. LAWs are critical to the survival of infantrymen on the battlefield (both Army infantrymen and Marines), and I believe I may have a solution.

The argument is that because the Viper cannot pierce the frontal armor of a Soviet main battle tank, we should scrap it and buy a European LAW. But none of the European LAWs are truly light antitank weapons; they are *heavy*. With that much weight, each infantryman might as well carry a Dragon. And even after he carries all that weight he still may not be able to hit the target with it. He may waste dozens of rockets trying to knock out one tank with volley shots and eventually run out of weapons and get overrun anyway.

Besides, penetration is not the real problem. The problem is accuracy without the weight and expense of a guided rocket such as the Dragon or the TOW. And LAWs are, of course,

unguided rockets — one chance, one shot. If he is off just a little the soldier misses entirely, unless he fires at point blank range, which is what we are all trying to avoid.

But we must not give up on a true LAW; this would leave our unsupported troops naked to tanks. What I propose is to keep the Viper and make it 100 percent accurate by combining it with an M16A1 rifle in a system I call the rifle tracer antitank rocket sighting system (or RATS, for short). The idea is for the gunner to use his rifle to fire tracers to verify his aim before firing the rocket. This way, even a Viper could knock out a Soviet tank, because hits that in the past have been considered merely "lucky," such as in the tank treads, would be the usual result.

The RATS would be superior even to the British LAW 80, which has a spotting rifle built in for the same purpose, because it would be lighter and would not be limited to five rounds to achieve sighting. At the same time, the gunner would have self-protection from his M16 while aiming the Viper.

The Viper would be strapped directly to the carrying handle of the M16 and secured by a nut and bolt at the point where the issue scope is usually attached. (The total weight would be about 11 pounds.) The Viper would rest on top of the gunner's right shoulder, and the M16 would be held under his armpit supported by the assault sling. The gunner would aim through the Viper's sights as he fired his M16 tracer bullets. When satisfied that he was on target, he would fire the Viper with either hand using a rubber-covered trigger button. (Conceivably, an electronic switch could be used to fire the Viper from the M16's pistol grip, but this would increase the system's cost and complexity and would call for a redesign.) Once he had fired the Viper, the gunner would disconnect it from the M16 and throw it away, either reloading another Viper or continuing with other missions.

It might be argued that the tracers from the M16 would be hard to see in

bad weather, but if a gunner couldn't see a tracer, he couldn't see the tank either, so nothing would be lost by spotting with the M16. And the Viper could still be fired conventionally, of course.

It can be argued, too, that with proper training and more live firing our troops could overcome the accuracy problem with the Viper. But the fact is that we are never going to be able to give our troops enough LAW firings; we simply do not have the time or the money to turn millions of soldiers into Annie Oakleys.

If a European weapon is purchased (except for the LAW 80), our troops are going to be carrying around heavier weapons that are just as inaccurate as the Viper, and they will be so expensive that training may have to be curtailed even further to make up the difference. If all we're going to do is fire volley shots anyway, I'd rather have three light shots than one heavy one; I think I'd have a better chance of doing some damage.

In short, the Viper program does not have to be scrapped. With a system such as RATS, it can give the infantryman the tank-killing ability he needs without a lot of added weight.

But if the final decision is to scrap the Viper and get a heavy antitank

rocket, we had better be sure to get something out of all that weight by also getting a spotting rifle, at least. I believe the choices are clear.

MIKE SPARKS
Lance Corporal, USMCR
Madison, Wisconsin

GENERAL WALTER KRUEGER


I was glad to see INFANTRY publish General Arthur Collins' article on General Walter Krueger (January-February 1983, page 14). It not only paid tribute to a distinguished infantryman but recalled memories of my own service in his headquarters. In his conclusion General Collins states that "Walter Krueger had a selfless sense of dedication to duty." I believe all who seek to excel as leaders want to possess that same trait, but only in a select few does the desire for it burn with the same intensity as it did in this stalwart soldier from his first day of service until his last.

Colonel Red White served as a junior officer under Krueger, then a colonel, at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and later commanded with distinction a regiment of the 37th Division under Krueger on Luzon. During a conversation with Lieu-

tenant White, Colonel Krueger told how one evening early in his career he was preparing for bed after inspecting the post guard. One shoe was off and he was about to drop the other when he realized that he had failed to inspect one post. He never dropped that shoe but went out again on a cold blustery night so that he could fully complete an assigned duty.

Years later in Japan he demonstrated that same sense of commitment. Shortly after our arrival there, I was detailed by the G-3, General Eddleman, to accompany General Krueger on his private train from Kyoto to Nagoya to inspect the Sixth Army Replacement Depot, which had just been established to process the thousands who were being demobilized. The tour was to start with the Special Services facilities, but General Krueger quickly vetoed that. "All that is OK," he said, "but it doesn't mean a thing if the soldiers don't have a warm place to sleep, good food and good shower and toilet facilities plus adequate medical care." He then proceeded on a gruelling tour of every building in the place, which, as I recall, at that time held about 11,000 men.

The replacement battalion was a veteran outfit redeployed from Europe, but it was having problems.



Its assigned engineer support changed daily as personnel who were qualified for shipment home departed, and many of the needed supplies, such as stoves, were bottom loaded on ships which had been scheduled for the later phases of the invasion of Kyushu, originally planned for 1 November 1945. At the end of the inspection General Krueger asked the depot commander if he had all the help he needed. The commander started to explain that everyone was doing his best under the circumstances, but General Krueger cut him short: "Colonel, I didn't ask you that. I asked if you had enough help. Do you?" The commander admitted that he could use more.

Following another lengthy inspection of the supporting hospital facilities, General Krueger dispatched his aide back to Kyoto with a long list of actions the staff was to take, leaving me in the unfamiliar and uncomfortable role of temporary aide and sole confidant. The two of us ate dinner alone on the train that evening without a word being spoken until the meal was finished. Then he said, "Gray, I am shocked by what I saw today, really shocked." This surprised me; I thought the operation was going fairly well, considering the

short time it had been in existence. But it didn't satisfy General Krueger. In the next few days section chiefs came and went, ships were found and unloaded, more engineer troops were assigned, and General Krueger stayed right there until he was satisfied that the depot met his standards.

His career was almost over then. He could have delegated the task, but, as General Collins so clearly indicates, General Krueger felt a deep and abiding responsibility toward the troops who had fought so well under his command. During the next few hectic months when demobilization was in full swing there were letters almost daily in the *Stars and Stripes* complaining about the other two depots located in Japan, but there was not a single letter complaining about the Sixth Army Depot.

MG DAVID W. GRAY
Golden Beach, Florida

CANADIANS IN VIETNAM

I am researching a book describing Canadian participation and perspectives of the Vietnam war, which is to be based on oral recollections and on written and pictorial memorabilia.

I have established a contact list of

more than 200 persons who toiled "in country" in the U.S. and Australian armed forces with Canadian contingents in the series of international control commissions, medical personnel, correspondents, mission workers, and diplomatic missions.

The early response has been encouraging and I am now expanding my interview zone and hope for some help from your readers. Anyone who has information or advice to offer may write to me at 7 Douglas Cres., Fergus, Ontario, CANADA, N1M 1C1, or call (519) 843-4019.


DOUG CLARK

OCS HALL OF FAME

I am preparing a history of the Infantry OCS Hall of Fame and would like to hear from anyone who has any information concerning its founding in 1957-58. I am particularly interested in documents, photographs, letters, and the like.

Anyone who has such information may write to me at 5221 Yorkshire, Detroit, Michigan 48224, or call 313/885-6896.

WALDRON J. WINTER
Colonel, USA (Retired)



From The Editor

From time to time we need to use this page to provide information on a variety of subjects. This is one of those times.

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MDB

OUTSIDE BACK COVER:

Moving the Liberty Bell in the Rain, Philadelphia, 1976, by John Roach. (United States Army Art Collection)

