

MAY-JUNE 1983

Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM



Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

A Department of the Army Publication

May-June 1983

Volume 73, Number 3

63d Year

Editor

CPT Michael D. Bollinger

Deputy Editor

Albert N. Garland

Associate Editor

Marie B. Edgerton

Editorial Assistant

Mary H. Wolstenholm

Business Manager

M. Lena Biskup

Contributing Artists

Mary Ann Norton

Charles Willis

Jeanette Heller

Robert Hunter



ARTICLES

- 18 **TAKING COMMAND**
George G. Eddy
- 21 **BATTALION OE TEAM**
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas S. Thornblom
- 24 **THE GERMAN ARMORED COMBAT TROOPS**
- 28 **THE BATTLE FOR THE ALAMO**
Bob Boyd

FORUM AND FEATURES

- 6 **TEAMWORK**
Dandridge M. Malone
- 8 **GENERALSHIP**
General Bruce C. Clarke, USA (Retired)
- 9 **THE HHC COMMANDER**
Captain Walter J. Sutterlin
- 10 **THE HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT**
Captain Kim Stenson
- 13 **MAINTENANCE FLOW CHART**
Captain Robert R. Leonhard
- 15 **PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**
Command Sergeant Major Roy C. Owens

TRAINING NOTES

- 33 **ROTC RANGERS**
Edward G. Burley
- 34 **MORTAR TRAINING STANDARDS**
Sergeant First Class Steve L. Overholser
- 36 **COMBAT CROSS-COUNTRY COURSE**
Lieutenant Colonel George A. Fisher
- 37 **RESUPPLY BY RAPPEL**
Master Sergeant Dave Goldie
- 39 **OPFOR TRAINING**
Captain John H. Perry

DEPARTMENTS

- 2 **COMMANDANT'S NOTE**
- 3 **INFANTRY NEWS**
- 41 **ENLISTED CAREER NOTES**
- 43 **OFFICERS CAREER NOTES**
- 45 **BOOK REVIEWS**
- 49 **LETTERS**

FRONT COVER

An army can have the most efficient command and control organization, the most brilliant staffs, and the most magnificent logistic services, but only elite Infantry can make it an elite army.

USAIS

Commandant
MG Robert L. Wetzel

Assistant Commandant
BG Kenneth C. Leuer

Deputy Assistant Commandant
COL Ronald O. Mullenix

Command Sergeant Major
CSM Joseph C.R. Gagnon

DEPARTMENTS

Command, Tactics, and Doctrine
COL Michael J. Morin

Ranger
COL Robert A. Turner

Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance
COL Neal R. Christensen

DIRECTORATES

Combat Developments
COL Stanley T. Skaife

Evaluation and Standardization
Mr. Jan Chervenak

Training
COL Daniel S. Rickard

Training Developments
COL Robert H. Edwards

INFANTRY PROPONENCY OFFICE
MAJ(P) William W. Moffitt

THE SCHOOL BRIGADE
COL Robert S. Rose

NCO Academy
CSM Willie W. Snow



INFANTRY: Published bimonthly at the United States Army Infantry School, it provides current information on infantry organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, and techniques. It also includes relevant historical articles and serves as a forum for professional ideas. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. The use of funds for printing INFANTRY was approved 10 September 1982 by Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr., Secretary. Official distribution, three copies to each infantry and infantry related unit and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools.


SUBSCRIPTIONS: One year, \$10.00; two years, \$19.00 Single copy, \$2.50 A foreign (non APO) subscriber must add \$3.00 per year for postage on each subscription. Payment must be made either by United States currency, by international money order, or by a check or draft drawn on a bank in the United States. One year subscriptions are not refundable. Two-year subscriptions are refundable, but service and handling charges will be deducted. The expiration date of a subscription is shown in the first four-digit number on the address label's first line (the first two digits indicate the month, the last two digits, the year). Please notify your postmaster and INFANTRY promptly of any change of address.

CORRESPONDENCE: Address all correspondence to Editor, INFANTRY Magazine, Box 2005, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905. Please furnish complete return address. Queries are answered promptly. Manuscripts are acknowledged within 30 days. Telephone: Editorial Office - 404/544-4951 (AUTOVON 784 4951); Business Office - 404/545-5997 (AUTOVON 835-5997).

POSTMASTER: Second-class postage paid at Columbus, Georgia and at Pensacola, Florida. Send Form 3579 to Circulation Department, INFANTRY Magazine, Box 2005, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905. For forwarding to a member of the U.S. military services, see Section 158.4, Postal Service Manual. U.S. Postal Service Publication Number: 370830. ISSN: 0019-9532.



Commandant's NOTE



MAJOR GENERAL SAM WETZEL
Chief of Infantry

SIMULATIONS AT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

For more than a decade, the Infantry School has participated in many of the Army's simulation projects. During that time, the School has emphasized the design and use of simulations to support specific training and analytical objectives. Many of these are gaming simulations, in which the motivational aspects of a competitive game are combined with a physical, symbolic, or procedural representation of a real-world situation.

The reasons for using these and other simulations today are even better than they were when we began these projects. Not only do we have fewer resources than we had then, there is an ever-increasing demand on the ones that we do have — resources in manpower, equipment, ammunition, and POL, as well as in travel and training time. And all of these resources ultimately translate into money.

Another reason for using simulations is the difficulty and danger of conducting exercises using some of our weapon systems. Most of our antiarmor weapons, for example, are not only expensive to use in training, they also require large training areas and elaborate safety measures.

At the same time, simulations provide the students with realistic training, and the more realistic their training can be the more likely they are to retain it and transfer it to an actual battlefield environment should the need arise.

These are the primary reasons the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) has proved so valuable and the reasons we are now using it in our Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC). MILES, through its system of laser transmitters and detectors, allows complete two-sided battle engagement simulation and authentic, realistic casualty and damage assessment. An after-action review of the training gives the students an insight into the consequences of overlooking details or of failing to apply sound combat techniques under the pressures of simulated combat.

In addition to these field simulations, the School also uses several classroom wargame-based simulations in its Combined Arms Simulations Center. Some of these are played manually and others, including the Computer Assisted Map Maneuver Simulation (CAMMS), with computer support. These various simulations are now used to train students in tactical operations from platoon through battalion level.

The School is planning an exciting new computerized simulation called the Combined Arms AirLand Battle System (CAABS) and expects to have it in operation at the Center by

the end of the year. CAABS is an improvement over CAMMS and is designed specifically to meet the needs of institutional training, including AirLand Battle doctrine and force modernization.

Its computer system can run up to 11 separate exercises from company to task force or brigade level. The program modules determine combat results on the basis of such factors as range, terrain, tactical situation, and integration of fires. CAABS modules have been completed for direct and indirect fires, minefields, close air support, air defense, and logistics. Nuclear and chemical modules will be completed shortly.

Tactical movement can take place either on maps or on two new large-scale three-dimensional terrain boards that have been added to the Simulations Center. The students will use actual opposing force vehicles to make all movements on the terrain boards and will use specially designed periscopes that will simulate actual fields of observation and fire. Battlefield assessment of engagements will be fed back quickly from the computer, and the status of all action relayed through actual communication gear to the TOC where the staff and the commander can react to it.

Recently, the School also began using interactive videodisc technology in its IOBC leadership training. These videodisc programs place individuals in leadership situations that require them to make decisions and carry them out. The programs allow them to experience the outcome of their decisions, good or bad.

We have begun to exploit interactive videodisc technology even further to provide realistic decision-oriented training in military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT) and in mounted land navigation subjects. Film crews are now in Germany, in fact, filming scenes for use in these two simulations.

Still other exciting high technology simulation developments are under way that will eventually be incorporated into our training. We fully intend to participate in and influence those developments to ensure that the end products meet our needs. The School, after all, is the primary source of Infantry doctrine and of accepted Infantry combat techniques.

In the future, our training and evaluation techniques will continue to move away from having the students passively receive information; it will move closer to having them participate in dynamic relevant training that is presented in the context of real-world situations.

Practice combined arms!

INFANTRY NEWS



THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS are from the Infantry School's Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department:

• **Infantry Mortar Platoon Course.** The prerequisites for attendance at the infantry mortar platoon course (IMPC) are listed in DA Pamphlet 351-4. The duty uniform for soldiers attending the course is the BDU or the fatigue uniform. Any needed load-bearing equipment will be issued to the soldiers at Fort Benning.

IMPC is a demanding course, and commanders are invited to give prospective IMPC students the IMPC mathematics diagnostic test. They can get copies of that test by calling AUTOVON 784-1193 or commercial 404/544-1193, or by writing to the Director, WGMD, ATTN: Mortar Division, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905.

• **Requests for Firing Tables.** DA Pamphlet 310-10-2 has the complete instructions for obtaining all mortar firing tables. WGMD, USAIS, does not provide that service.

Mortar firing tables can be obtained from the Baltimore Publications Center. For further information, interested persons are asked to call AUTOVON 584-3521, FTS 922-7246, or commercial 301/962-7246, or they can write to the U.S. Army AG Publication Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, Maryland 21220.

FROM THE NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM comes the following news item:

The National Infantry Museum supported a recent trade fair of industry and commerce in downtown Columbus by designing and building a booth that detailed Fort Benning's history and gave some highlights

from the history of the United States Army. The exhibit featured 50 foreign decorations that were recently donated to the Museum by General William B. Rosson.

The Museum also prepared a special exhibit honoring the 555th Parachute Battalion as part of its recognition of Black History Month. Former members of that unit are erecting a monument on the Museum grounds that will serve as a permanent reminder of the contribution black soldiers have made to the airborne infantry.

Two historically important flags have been acquired by the Museum and are being restored to a condition that will make their display possible. One is a U.S. standard 35-star flag that was carried during the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, while the other is the regimental flag of the Army's Second Regiment of Colored Troops.

The renovation of the third floor of the Museum, which will add 6,000 square feet of exhibit space, is proceeding on schedule. The new area will house the Museum's extensive foreign infantry collection and will permit the Museum to display many rare infantry fighting weapons. There will also be a visitor's lounge area dedicated to the memory of Brigadier General William Ross Bond, who was killed in action in Vietnam on 1 April 1970. The lounge will provide a pleasant panoramic view of the main post area that is most memorable when seen from the symbolic "high ground."

The National Infantry Museum Society was formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support. The Society, for example, is giving the Museum the money it needs to furnish the new visitor's lounge area. Membership in the

Society — \$2.00 for one year, \$10.00 for a lifetime membership — is open to anyone who is interested in joining.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning Georgia 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

THE CONDUCT OF FIRE TRAINER (COFT) for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) can provide basic and sustainment gunnery training for the vehicle's crewmen, because it can be used to simulate a wide variety of situations and tactical engagements.

The COFT consists of three major components — a mock-up BIFV turret, a general purpose computer, and an instructor/operator station (IOS). (See also INFANTRY, January-February 1983, page 4.)

The turret mock-up reproduces the appearance and the functions of the Bradley's operating controls, indicators, and weapon sights. Characteristics such as appropriate diopter adjustment, optical transmission properties, field of view, magnification selection, and sight reticles are all realistically simulated. Sound effects include engine and drive train whine and all the sounds related to gun firing and TOW launching.

The 32-bit computer has a disc memory, a CRT terminal, and a keyboard. Real-time operational software, test and maintenance software, and support software make up the computer program system. This computer system controls the data flow and the moving targets, diagnoses training performance, calculates ballistic equations and aimpoint errors, and monitors crew responses. It

also performs such training management functions as recommending exercise sequences, preparing hard copy performance records, and maintaining complete historical files on each crew.

The COFT uses computer-generated images to produce the scenes the crew members view, including full color daylight and nighttime scenes with various terrain and topographical backgrounds, man-made structures, moving targets, shell trajectories, tracers, and other special effects. Together, these images and effects allow fighting vehicle crews to develop their gunnery proficiency across a broad range of simulated battle conditions. Correct visual perspectives are instantaneously computed and maintained.

The simulated Bradley can move freely in an exercise area that covers 10,000 by 7,000 meters, thus allowing for countless different engagement scenarios. During these exercises, the computer can simulate the BIFV's 25mm cannon, its 240C machinegun, and its TOW missile system.

The third major component, the IOS, provides full color video displays that allow an instructor to see the same scenes that are being presented to the track commander and the gunner. It not only incorporates a keyboard terminal and display system to initiate, control, and monitor the activities of the crew, it also measures and displays crew performance, principally the crew's accuracy and response time. In addition, an intercom system allows the instructor to simulate radio transmissions to the crew.

A library of programmed exercises can be loaded into the system. There are now more than 200 such exercises, some in as many as four different versions. The exercises are ranked in order of difficulty and are scored for difficulty of target acquisition, systems management, and reticle aiming.

The COFT now comes in two configurations — the unit or U-COFT, and the institutional or I-COFT. The principal difference between them is

the shelter system for the U-COFT, which makes it self-contained, requiring only the addition of a concrete pad and an electrical power source.

The U-COFT will be used to provide sustainment training for field units equipped with the Bradley. The I-COFT, which will be housed in a building at each installation where it is located, will be used in resident course training at the Infantry School for the gunners course, the vehicle commanders course, and the master gunners course.

When compared to live fire training with full caliber weapons, these devices allow frequent firing at significantly less cost. When it is used in conjunction with unit live fire gunnery programs, the COFT can help give the Bradley gunner and track commander the confidence they will need to match any enemy force in any future war.

THE DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING DEVELOPMENTS, USAIS, has given us the following items of information that should be of interest to the Infantry community:

- **Simulated Tank and Antiarmor Gunnery System (STAGS).** A contract was recently let for the building of a STAGS prototype, which will be sent to the Infantry School for testing during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1984.

STAGS meets the Army and Marine Corps requirement for a training system that can be readily adapted to a variety of weapons. It was originally designed for Dragon training, and some of its original features included realistic Dragon launch effects and target engagement from the initial target sighting to striking that target, real-time training effectiveness feedback on two interchangeable instructor monitors, government-proved software, and packaging into eight, rugged, two-man portable modules designed for rapid set-up and operation.

- **M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW).** The SAW is a lightweight,

one-man portable automatic weapon (5.56mm machinegun) that is capable of delivering a large volume of sustained, accurate, and lethal fire on a target. It is scheduled to replace the automatic rifleman's M16 weapon, and will provide additional support for typical infantry squad and platoon missions. (See also INFANTRY, July-August 1982, pages 4-5.)

The SAW will be sent to the field sometime during the second quarter of Fiscal Year 1984. Before that time, two video tapes will be distributed. One will discuss the maintenance, care, cleaning, and assembly and disassembly of the weapon, the other will discuss institution and unit programs of instruction and will incorporate such subjects as zeroing techniques, transition firing, and field firing.

In addition to the video tapes, a field manual in test format will be provided.

Collective training requirements during force-on-force scenarios will be accomplished using the MILES device. Both the MILES transmitter and the blank fire adapter will be fielded with the system. The MILES used with the SAW is the first in the MILES family that will be zeroed to the individual's zero on his weapon.

Other items of equipment that will be fielded with the system are load-carrying pouches for SAW ammunition, and new zero (10-meter) transition fire targets. Weapon racks for the SAW are under development and will be fielded about 18 months after they have been funded.

THE ARMY'S Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command (MERADCOM) recently let a contract for the design and fabrication of a prototype microclimate cooling system for crews of the Bradley infantry and cavalry fighting vehicles.

The unit consists of a freon air conditioning system that cools water, which is then pumped through vests worn by the crew members. Designed to protect soldiers from heat exhaus-

tion even when temperatures inside the vehicle reach as high as 140 degrees Fahrenheit, it will be worn under the soldiers' protective clothing. The prototype unit is scheduled for delivery in late 1983.

ARMY RESERVE COMMANDERS should insure that any active component or Active Duty Guard-Reserve (AGR) full-time personnel who join their units get the training they need to perform their jobs.

The U.S. Army Reserve Readiness Training Center (ARRTC) at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, is the Army's only school that provides formal instruction for the Army Reserve's full-time unit support (FTUS) force. It offers 26 courses that are tailored to meet management, administrative, logistic, or training needs at every level in the Army Reserve structure.

The complete ARRTC program of instruction and the Fiscal Year 1983 course schedule may be found in FORSCOM Circular 140-82-3. The circular also contains descriptions and prerequisites for each course.

Anyone who wants to attend classes at the ARRTC should apply through normal command channels. Personnel who would like more information should call AUTOVON 280-4147 or commercial 608/388-4147.

AMONG ARMY RESERVISTS, there have been some misconceptions about the participation of unit members who are more than 40 years old in physical fitness programs.

Although Reservists who are over 40 are not required to take part in organized periods of unit physical training, they must participate in a personal fitness program. AR 600-9, The Army Physical Fitness and Weight Control Program, requires this.

Even if a Reservist is over 40 years of age, he is held responsible for maintaining his fitness at a level that would enable him to perform his

assigned duties effectively in a combat environment.

PLANS ARE UNDER WAY to increase the number of Army Reserve units in Europe whose members are paid for attending monthly meetings.

The three inactive duty training (IDT) Reserve units now in Europe will be increased to eight. The number of drilling Army Reservists in Germany will increase to about 300, up from the present 125.

Reservists for the new units will come from Americans who are employed either by the U.S. Government or by civilian companies in Europe. They will be authorized 48 periods of IDT each year plus two weeks of annual training.

ARMY RESERVE UNIT COMMANDERS are cautioned that stress testing should not be conducted during inactive duty for training (IDT). Such testing is permitted only during Annual Training (AT) or Active Duty for Training (ADT).

The reason for this is a simple one: Reservists who suffer cardiac emergencies while undergoing stress testing or as a result of such testing while on IDT are not entitled to military hospitalization. And if death occurs, their survivors would not be entitled to benefits.

Stress testing can be hazardous, especially for Reservists who are more than 40 years old.

APPROXIMATELY 1,500 Active Duty Guard-Reserve (AGR) soldiers will join the Army Reserve full-time unit support (FTUS) force during Fiscal Year 1983.

The Army also has assigned more than 500 active component USAR advisors to FTUS positions. The additional AGR and active component full-timers will increase the FTUS force to more than 11,000. This will include 3,588 AGR members, more than 1,200 active component full-timers, and more than 6,700 civilians

serving in Army Reserve technician positions.

ARMY RESERVE aviation units should look for changes in some aviation standardization evaluations.

The Army's evaluations will now involve a scenario with the unit operations officer being given a mission for tactical employment. The operations officer then will be expected to plan the mission, conduct the mission briefing, and select the crews.


The DES evaluator, who will ride along as co-pilot, will check pilot performance and look for other factors such as the availability and use of mission equipment.

THE ARMY RECENTLY CONTRACTED for 21 tactical water distribution sets for the U.S. Central Command.

Each set consists of a ten-mile segment of six-inch hoseline, a 600-gallon per minute pump, and fabric tanks that can store up to 20,000 gallons of water. In operation, they will be used to deliver potable water to remote locations.

Delivery of the first set is scheduled for March 1983.

THE NBC TRAINING PACKET published by the Readiness Group, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, is no longer being published. The packet was originally published in 1980 and is no longer valid. The NBC NCO at the Readiness Group is available to assist in answering any question that might arise in the NBC area, or questions may be directed to the NBC School at Fort McClellan, Alabama.



FORUM & FEATURES



Teamwork

DANDRIDGE M. MALONE

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the last in Colonel Malone's series of ten articles on military leadership. The first appeared in our November-December 1981 issue.

About a hundred thousand years ago, when war was first invented, soldiering was pretty simple. Armies were small — maybe ten men. There was one officer, who was usually the biggest, meanest, and hairiest man. There was one uniform: a piece of animal skin; one weapon: a club; one MOS: 11B; one tactic: hand-to-hand, man-to-man. In those days, if the numbers on each side were about equal, what won on that battlefield was SKILL and WILL.

Ten thousand years later, things had changed. Armies were bigger: 100 men now, organized into ten groups of ten men each. There was a chain of command and eleven officers — one leader for each group of ten, plus one (the biggest and meanest) leader of the leaders. There were two more uniform items — foot gear and shields — and two new kinds of weapons — bows and arrows, and long spears carried by men on horses. There were two new MOSs: 13E and 19B.

Tactics were more complicated. The infantrymen still did just about what they had done before, but the cavalrymen, with their long spears and horses, had to coordinate their faster speed with the movement of the



slower infantrymen. And the artillerymen had to learn to shoot their arrows before their infantry and cavalry buddies got going with their clubs and spears in the hand-to-hand business. With that, the two basics of all combat teamwork were born: fire and maneuver.

What won on this newer battlefield was still SKILL and WILL, but with

an added factor — TEAMWORK. And it was discovered, on countless battlefields, that an army of 100 men who could work together as a combined arms team could whip the daylight out of an army of 1,000 men who couldn't.

Ever since that time, as war and weapons have become more complex, TEAMWORK has become more and more the deciding factor on the battlefield. Military history points this out time and time again. That's why, ever since you started learning to be a soldier, someone has stressed how important it is for you, as a leader, to work to build SKILL, WILL, and TEAMWORK. That's why the tenth principle of leadership, which carries with it the wisdom of war, says you must "train your men as a team."

In this discussion on building teamwork, we're going to develop that tenth principle in detail, more than it's ever been developed before in any Army leadership manual. The complexity of the battlefield for which you are preparing, coupled with the fact that you must fight and win outnumbered, make TEAMWORK more important for Army leadership today than it has ever been. For it is in teamwork that we can find that

something extra we will need to win.

Suppose that, through some military magic and a mighty individual training effort, the leadership of your unit had been able to develop, to standards, every single one of the 1,500 individual skills that the unit needs. What would you have? You'd have 169 individuals you could be proud of, but that's about all. If individual skills were the only kind of skills you had, then the company, the unit, would not survive on a battlefield. These individual skills have to be put together.

The business of putting things together is basically what teamwork is. Putting together is the responsibility of the leaders of a unit. Fire team leaders, for instance, put together the individual skills of their soldiers and build a team. Squad leaders put together two fire teams to build a larger team called a squad. Platoon leaders put together four squads and build a larger team called a platoon. And a company commander puts platoons together to build the basic fighting team of the United States Army. That deadly "thing" on the battlefield that we call the company is a combat team. All the parts are put together, functioning smoothly as a whole, as a team, and working at the deadly business of delivering steel.

There are three different kinds of teamwork. What makes the difference is how much the individuals in the teams have to depend on each other, and how much the leaders have to control the actions of the individuals.

The first and simplest kind of teamwork is like a bowling team. Each individual, by himself, does the best he can, then individual scores are added up to determine how well the team did. But there's not much real teamwork involved. The individual bowlers are not dependent on each other, and the team captain has little to do in the way of coordinating and controlling their actions. His main task in this case is to train and motivate individuals. When a unit fires on a rifle range, it functions basically as this kind of a team.

Things get a little more complicated with a relay team in a track meet. Individual skill (speed) is critical, but now each team member must do his task right before the next man can start to do his. Leaders still work to fire up individual performances, but now they concentrate on a specific part of the action and the specific point where the individuals must depend on each other — the handoff of the baton. And if one runner drops the stick, the team loses. There are many examples of this kind of teamwork in a military unit. The mechanic down in the motor pool, for instance,

And it was discovered, on countless battlefields, that an army of 100 men who could work together as a combined arms team could whip the daylights out of an army of 1,000 men who couldn't.

must get the commander's quarter-ton running before the commander can get to the field to coordinate and control training.

The third and most complex kind of teamwork is the kind you find on a football team. Every individual is dependent on everyone else. If one soldier, like the center, or one fire team, like the defensive backfield, fails to do the right things at the right time, then that can cause the team as a whole to lose. The leader of this most complex kind of team is also concerned with motivation, but he is more concerned with coordinating and controlling the actions of every single individual. To win, the team as a whole must get it all together. War is not a game, but the best military example of this most complex kind of teamwork takes place on the battlefield. There, the leaders of the unit — the captain, the lieutenants, and the sergeants — put the whole thing together, and it fights.

You have seen, in these three ex-

amples, a common sense principle that you already know: "Different strokes for different folks." This means that you, as a leader, must do different things according to the kind of teamwork involved. If the requirement is for excellence of individual performance, then you should build and control the team by carefully explaining and closely supervising individual training and individual motivation. If the teamwork requirement calls for a sequence of actions to be performed by different individuals, one after the other, then you should build and control the team by concentrating on the specific times and places where one man hands off to the next. Finally, if the teamwork requirement is the one where everyone is dependent on everyone else — and this is the battlefield kind of teamwork — then there is only one way to build and control the team. And you already have a pretty good idea of what this is, don't you?

Your requirement as a leader in this most complicated of the three kinds of teamwork is to control each action of each man so that all the pieces of the action fit together right. To do this, you must control what each man does, how he does it, and when he does it. If you're a squad leader or higher, you've got to be controlling not subordinate individual soldiers, but subordinate teams — what they do, how they do it, and when they do it. And you do this through the chain — through your subordinate leaders. Clear, uncomplicated orders and clear, uncomplicated communications will help; but even with these, there is no way you can watch over and control, constantly, what every man or team does, or how they do it, or when they do it.

There's only one way you can build the kind of control essential for battlefield teamwork, and that is to build that control into the individuals and the teams themselves — internal control. And there's only one way to do that. You do it the same way the football coach does it — DRILL. Practice and critique, practice and critique, practice and critique, over

and over, until individuals and teams learn to control themselves, until they learn where, when, and how they are dependent on one another, and until the individuals and teams learn what each individual and each team must do in order to "get it all together."

Football coaches call these drills scrimmages, and they write them down in play books. Army leaders call these drills collective tasks or battle drills, and they write them down in ARTEP manuals. Coaches who win on the playing field and leaders who

win on the battlefield will tell you the same thing: you must start with good, basic individual skills as a foundation. Coaches say, "run, block, and tackle." Battle leaders say, "move, shoot, and communicate." After that, it's DRILL and DRILL and DRILL, until working together becomes instinctive. Practice does not make perfect. What makes perfect is perfect practice. DRILL.

Basic individual skills, the will to work to get ready, and teamwork drills — that's the only road that

leads to winning teams. Finally, we can lay out another one of those simple, basic formulas of leadership arithmetic: SKILL X WILL X DRILL = KILL.

DANDRIDGE M. MALONE, a retired Infantry colonel, has published numerous articles, books, and technical reports. He holds a master's degree in social psychology from Purdue University and has completed several military schools, including the Armed Forces Staff College. In addition to his Infantry leadership assignments, he also served in either staff or faculty assignments at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Army War College.

Generalship

GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE, USA (RETIRED)

The most brilliant generalship is not enough if the people at home and the soldiers in the field do not support it. The battlefield of the next war will be under the daily scrutiny of newspaper and television reporters. The Battle of the Bulge, in which we suffered 80,000 casualties in six weeks, was our last major battle to have escaped that scrutiny.

This means that commanders of all echelons will have to pay attention to how their actions will appear on the television news. Public relations officers will take on a new importance to their commanders. The effect of publicity is demonstrated by the following scene from the Battle of the Bulge:

During the most critical day in the defense of St. Vith in December 1944, I visited several infantry companies at the front. One had lost all of its officers and about 100 of its men. The hard-pressed first sergeant was in command, and I tried to think of

something cheerful to say to him. I am sure I needed someone to say something cheerful to me, too. Finally, I said, "Sergeant, I have good news. General Patton's Third Army has turned toward us and is attacking in our direction."

The first sergeant looked at me and smiled. Then he said, "General, if Georgie is coming, we've got it made." I left with renewed confidence in my men and myself.

I've thought about that for more than 35 years. Why did the mention of Patton promote such confidence in a first sergeant whose situation was even more critical than he knew? What did "Georgie" have that other generals lacked to one degree or another? How many other senior generals in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge could have struck such a spark in the mind of a first sergeant when his name was mentioned on the battlefield? At least part of the explanation is that to that first

sergeant and others like him, Patton had a face — a reputation.

There will be far fewer faceless generals in the next war. Fewer poor actions will be covered up but, at the same time, fewer good actions on the small unit level will be left unnoticed.

Reports of gains, losses, and reversals will be heard daily at home. No longer will a unit have to take heavy losses to obtain a Presidential Unit Citation. Thus, the general who performs important missions with a minimum of casualties will be the "Georgie" of the next war.

This kind of visibility will add a new dimension to generalship. And it is not too early for officers at all levels to plan for it.

GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE, a 1925 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, retired in 1962. While on active duty, he commanded one company, two battalions, four brigades or combat commands, two divisions, two corps, one army, and an army group — in peace and in two wars.

The HHC Commander

CAPTAIN WALTER J. SUTTERLIN

Commanding the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of an infantry battalion is a job that most infantry officers seem to try to avoid, feeling perhaps that it is not a *real* command. But it is one of the most demanding jobs they can have in today's Army.

An infantry HHC commander, like any other company commander, is charged with the overall development of his soldiers. But unlike the others, he is also responsible for providing various types of support to the battalion — command, staff, communications, administration, and logistics (mess, supply, medical, maintenance, and transportation).

Another difference is that he must provide all of this support with only his immediate headquarters personnel to handle the administrative work and the other necessary company functions. He does not directly supervise the majority of his soldiers — they spend most of their time working in their individual sections and platoons. In fact, the chain of command in a headquarters company is such that the commander does not even rate most of his soldiers. His enlisted soldiers are usually rated by the officers and non-commissioned officers in their staff sections or respective platoons, and his officers are rated by members of the battalion staff.

Somehow, he must pull together all of his diverse elements so that they can accomplish the company's most important mission — providing day-to-

day support to all the battalion's operating units. And even though he does not have rating power over his enlisted soldiers, he does have three ways of exerting control over them:

- He decides who will be promoted in the first four ranks, who will be recommended for promotion in the next four, and who will be allowed to reenlist. (His decisions, of course, are usually based on the recommendations of the various platoons and sections in which these soldiers work.)

- He uses the powers given him by the UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) to instill proper discipline in his unit.

- He writes the training schedule.

But in using these powers he must strike a tenuous balance between being a concerned counsellor and a stern disciplinarian. He must also work closely with the battalion staff to see that the resources are available to meet not only the battalion's support requirements but also the company's daily training requirements. (It is a little like being an ambassador to the United Nations: success depends to a large extent on mutual agreement and cooperation.)

The HHC commander must recognize the difficulty of trying to implement a formal training program in his unit. Seldom will he be able to concentrate all of his resources to accomplish a single training objective. (He must also keep in mind that battalion support comes first, maintenance second, and training, unfortunately, last.)

Therefore, he must realistically

tailor his training program so that his soldiers will have at least a fair chance of succeeding on their SQTs. It will help him immeasurably if his battalion commander will set clear priorities and reduce the "ash and trash" details that often fall on the headquarters company. Even then, because of daily support requirements, most of the company's training classes will probably have to be scheduled two or three times each to train all of the company's soldiers.

A low density MOS (Military Occupation Specialty) training program is absolutely essential. The HHC commander must concern himself with about 20 different MOSs and SQTs. Accordingly, he must manage his training program by using short range training plans that are compatible with his continuous support requirements. Giving his soldiers the best possible opportunity to prepare themselves for their SQTs will benefit not only them but also the battalion. (The battalion's learning center can help in this effort.)

To do his job properly, considering the competing missions that his company is given, the HHC commander must use every means at his disposal to keep himself informed on all of the battalion's missions and the corresponding support requirements. In carrying out these missions, he must not forget his NCO chain of command; he should rely on the experience and knowledge of these men to help him do his job better. And although ARTEP missions are accomplished by the individual sec-

tions or platoons, the HHC commander is responsible for leading the battalion's quartering party during these exercises, for selecting the exact location of the battalion's command post, and for supporting it after it has been established.

One of the most difficult tasks any HHC commander has to do is to find a way to instill in his soldiers a desire to provide the best possible professional support to the battalion. Because they often operate separately, he cannot supervise their actions closely. Unfortunately, his soldiers get little recognition or thanks for the support they pro-

vide; too often it seems that no one notices what they do until something goes wrong. He must let his soldiers know that their actions have a profound effect on the overall morale of the battalion and on its success or failure. His reward, if there is one, comes from watching his soldiers perform, develop, learn, and mature while providing the best possible support to the battalion.

The job of a HHC commander is demanding, both professionally and personally, and carries with it the requirements for a professional understanding of how all of the in-

dividual assets of the battalion fit together to produce a proficient unit. This understanding gives an officer a broad educational base upon which to build the rest of his career.



CAPTAIN WALTER J. SUTTERLIN is assigned to the G-1 division of the Berlin Brigade, where he previously served as commander of the HHC, 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry. A 1976 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, he has also served as a rifle company commander and a TOW platoon leader.

The Headquarters Commandant

CAPTAIN KIM STENSON

One of the toughest problems confronting the commander of a mechanized infantry battalion headquarters company is the question of exactly what his responsibilities are when his battalion moves to the field and he becomes the headquarters commandant.

Once the battalion is committed tactically, the headquarters company's assets are split into three distinct sub-units: the battalion's tactical operations center (TOC), the combat trains, and the field trains. The combat trains are usually supervised by the battalion S-4, while the field trains operate under the control of the battalion motor officer and the support platoon leader. The headquarters commander is responsible for the TOC — he must select a site

for it and provide for its movement, its security, and its logistical support and maintenance.

But Army doctrine on the subject of what all this means is sadly lacking, and what doctrine there is is misleading and seldom followed. What, then, really happens when the HHC commander moves out the gate on a combat exercise and becomes the headquarters commandant? And what does he have to work with?

His personnel assets include a first sergeant, a supply sergeant, a supply clerk/armorer, a driver, and a two-man maintenance team. This group is sometimes augmented by an executive officer, an NBC NCO, and a full-time armorer. (This augmentation depends upon the particular infantry battalion and the company's

strength.) With these people, the HHC commandant must ensure that the TOC has the logistical and administrative support it needs to operate.

Transportation for the group consists of an M561 and an M35 with trailer. The first sergeant and the supply sergeant double up with the M35 and the HHC commandant uses the M561. Neither the commandant nor the first sergeant is authorized any communications equipment.

The actual components of a battalion TOC are, at least, the following:

- The battalion command group (one M113 and one M151).
- The S-2 (one M577).
- The S-3 (one M577, one M113, and one M151).

- The fire support officer (FSO) (one M577).
- The battalion communications officer (two M577s, one M561, and one M151).
- HHC (one M561 and one M35).
- HHC maintenance (one M561).
- An air liaison officer (ALO) (one M113).
- The Redeye section (one M151).

In addition, air defense and engineer units may be attached. The number of people involved ranges from 45 to 60.

Normally, the S-3 selects at least two general areas where he would like the TOC located. The headquarters commandant must then conduct a reconnaissance of those areas and select the one that is most suitable. The perfect TOC location, if he can find it, is at the center of the battalion's sector, on flat, high ground, and with good routes both in and out. Ideally, it should also be on a rear slope with just the right amount of vegetation — not enough to restrict movement or the placement of vehicles, but enough to provide concealment. Normally, the TOC is located two to five kilometers behind the battalion's front lines, but this is not as important as the other criteria.

Sometimes, many of these considerations have to be subordinated to the battalion's communications needs, for without good communications, the TOC simply cannot fill its tactical role.

Built-up areas should always be considered, too, in selecting a TOC location, although these are often overlooked. Villages and towns usually offer good roads, cover and concealment, and a signature-hiding capability.

The headquarters commandant should conduct a thorough map reconnaissance before he does the actual reconnaissance on the ground. He can save valuable time by carefully selecting the most likely positions in advance. If he has the time, though, he should examine as many possible positions in the sector as he can, keeping in mind the TOC's need for lateral as well as forward and

rearward movement.

Once a command post has been selected, a security team should be placed on location until the main body arrives. A wire team is good for this role — while it is securing the area, its members can also be wiring the location. The security team can also act as the quartering party for the vehicles when they arrive.

MOVING


Movement to the new location should be by echelon whenever possible. One echelon should be moving enroute while the other functions as the TOC until both are in place. During movement each vehicle should have a map with the destination plotted on it in the event of a break in column. Routes should be carefully selected for both ease of movement

and cover from enemy fire. The TOC is most vulnerable while on the move, so a careful reconnaissance of the route is always essential. Air guards should be posted.

TOC personnel should be trained to react to enemy contact during movement. All the normal rules for mechanized infantry movement apply.

Once moved, the actual operations group, consisting of the S-2, the S-3, and the FSO, should be at the center of the area with the various other vehicles placed around it in a type of "wagon train" formation (see illustration). The security team must know the exact location for every vehicle and must guide them to the appropriate positions quickly.

Both an inner and an outer perimeter must be established. The inner perimeter should encompass the S-2/S-3/FSO complex, and a barrier



consisting of double strength concertina wire should be erected. The barrier should be at least 35 meters from the operations center. (To have enough concertina on hand, each combat vehicle must carry at least two rolls.) A guard must be posted at the entrance to this complex, and a TOC pass or access roster system must be implemented. Additionally, a walking guard is required on the inside of the perimeter, and correct challenge and password procedures are essential.

The outer perimeter should be formed using the remainder of the TOC elements. Each TOC section should be allocated a sector so that a 360° defense can be provided. Combat vehicles such as armored personnel carriers should be located along the armor avenues of approach leading into the TOC complex. The jump TOC elements, which consist of at least the battalion commander's and the S-3's armored personnel carriers, must be integrated into the overall defense plan, but care must be exercised in their placement because those vehicles will move frequently.

BARRIERS

One road must be designated the primary entrance and exit for the TOC complex. One-way traffic through the TOC area is best. Barriers should be erected or guards posted on all other roads to prevent intrusion. A movable barrier such as a log or a roll of concertina is required at the primary entrance. At that position a dismount point should be established and rigidly adhered to. The only vehicles moving in and out of the TOC should be those belonging to the actual TOC elements. An exception to this would be the support vehicles required for distributing Class I and Class III supplies.

Security forces are drawn from either internal sources — TOC personnel — or external sources — a rifle squad, for example, from one of the rifle companies.

If only internal sources are used,

usually soldiers from the S-2/S-3/FSO complex are detailed to man the TOC entrance and to furnish the walking guard around the inside perimeter. Enough drivers and clerks are assigned to these three sections to allow this detail, which the S-2 NCOIC normally handles.

The communications section takes care of the guard post at the dismount point and any other guard positions that must be manned around the clock. Its NCOIC is made responsible for seeing that these various posts are manned.

If a rifle squad is made available, its leader sees that the various guard posts are taken care of in accordance with the headquarters commandant's plans.

In either case, the headquarters commandant must make checking the TOC guard posts an important part of his duties.

The dismount point guard post and the TOC guard posts (both the entrance and the walking posts) should be manned at all times regardless of the tactical situation. The number of other soldiers actually performing TOC defensive duties at any one time is governed by the tactical situation. If the enemy situation warrants it, the headquarters commandant should see that the entire TOC perimeter is manned continuously. Fortunately, this should not be the case most of the time, although consideration should be given to increasing the TOC's security during the hours of darkness.

Crew-served weapons should be dismounted if the situation allows, and range cards and sector sketches prepared. Claymores, mines, and especially trip wires can all be used to improve the TOC's chances of surviving. Every soldier in the TOC should have a position to man in the event of an attack. Fighting positions must be constructed and consideration should be given to digging-in the TOC vehicles whenever possible. An alert system must be implemented and should be tested frequently. (An airhorn is ideal for this.)

In order to avoid detection, both manmade and natural camouflage is

essential. Camouflage nets must be erected immediately after arrival at each new location, and antennas must be removed from the actual site to avoid pinpointing the TOC's location. Noise and light discipline is especially important.

MAINTENANCE

Equipment maintenance is usually handled by a two-man contact team from the HHC maintenance section. Although most of the HHC maintenance personnel and equipment are located with the combat trains, a two-man contact team should travel with the TOC at all times to handle its maintenance problems. (This two-man team — ideally a vehicle mechanic and a generator mechanic — normally moves in an M561.)

Class I and Class III supply is managed by the HHC's first sergeant. Class I distribution is handled as usual using the M35 as transport. The normal procedures, including five-meter intervals, weapons at the ready, and full equipment, all apply.

Class III distribution requires some special considerations. If at all possible, the TOC should be refueled just before it moves to a new location. This type of "service station" operation works the best, but it is not always feasible. If the TOC is already positioned, it is best to bring the POL truck to the TOC. Still, it is sometimes impossible to get the POL truck close enough to refuel the TOC's vehicles. At this point, a choice must be made either to break the TOC down and send the vehicles to a refueling point or to refuel using five-gallon cans.

Of great concern to the HHC commandant is the shortage of personnel. During fluid maneuver situations, the HHC's first sergeant is often away from the TOC solving maintenance and logistical problems. This means the HHC commandant has to conduct the reconnaissance on the possible new positions, prepare the TOC for movement, and move the TOC himself.

Another problem involves communications and transportation. Both the HHC commandant and his first sergeant need communications equipment that works efficiently. The need for this in reconnaissance and movement is obvious, and it is also obvious that the HHC commandant needs a vehicle other than an M561. The M561 was designed to fulfill a cargo role — not a reconnaissance or control role. A faster, more maneuverable vehicle that is capable of mounting a radio — an M151, for example — would be more appropriate.

But even if all of these other problems could be solved for him, the headquarters company commandant would still have one major difficulty with his role as commandant — he rarely has an opportunity to train the TOC as a unit. The staff sections have their various duties to perform

within the battalion, and some elements, such as the fire support officer and the air liaison officer, are located in different units. When the TOC does train during a battalion exercise, it is sometimes difficult for its elements to practice such techniques as remoting antenna systems, improving fighting positions, or preparing range cards.

A plausible solution to this would be for the battalion to allocate one day a quarter for TOC training. For 24 hours the TOC elements would belong entirely to the HHC commandant for training purposes. One day a quarter would not be overly ambitious, and having the battalion staff “down” for one full day would be no more than an inconvenience at most — and it could make a real difference in the long run.

But because of the necessary coordination

both inside and outside the battalion, this solution can be achieved only if there is close cooperation between the battalion commander and the HHC commandant. If the battalion commander can be sold on the idea, though, he will soon realize that this exercise will further improve his entire unit’s combat readiness. And that is a worthwhile goal.



CAPTAIN KIM STENSON, formerly a company commander in the 2d Basic Training Brigade at Fort Jackson, is now executive officer of the 8th battalion of the 2d Brigade. Previously, he served as a platoon leader, a rifle company commander, and a headquarters company commander with the 1st Armored Division.

Maintenance Flow Chart

CAPTAIN ROBERT R. LEONHARD

Company motor officers have their problems.

Their drivers complain about the volume of DA Forms 2404 they have to prepare every week, usually in triplicate — each describing the same old faults over and over again. The vehicles may have enough new seat cushions to supply the entire battalion but never get the new track shoes they need. The old 2404s can be found piled up in “in” boxes, stuffed under seats, crammed in logbooks, and scattered over desk-tops.

Many motor officers confront these problems daily but can find no “textbook” solutions to them. While many different sources and schools




explain the uses and purposes of the various maintenance forms and records, few, if any, explain how to tie them all together in a daily set of procedures.

The first thing a motor officer needs to do to solve this problem is to get a detail of men together and send them through the motor pool to collect and burn all those old 2404s. Then he should sit down and establish a definite system for handling the 2404s and then a flow chart to make the system work. (Once he announces his system, it becomes his primary duty to enforce it, even if it tends to slow down operations at first, as it surely will. But as his system catches

on, the drivers will spend less time writing and will soon have vehicles that operate better.)

The flow chart that I recommend is one I have used in my company shop operations. The crucial part of this system is the series of initials that are written by various individuals across the top of a 2404 as it flows from the driver, through the chain of command, through the shop office, and back to the driver. Each person in the chain should look for the proper initials as the form is passed to him, and he should not accept it if those initials are not there. This serves to see that each man does his job, and it quickly identifies problems.

FLOW CHART



The flow chart shown here defines the procedures to be followed as the drivers find new faults. It concentrates on the corrective actions needed, and it is in compliance with TM 38-750. It does not, however, deal with procedures to be followed when due-in parts are received, for example, or when vehicles return from direct support. Each of these areas in turn will have to be developed, but this is a good starting point.

The first part of the flow chart deals with the driver, his chain of command, the motor officer, and the motor sergeant. The technique of scheduling, mentioned twice, is one that will make the operation active rather than reactive. (I use a modified DA Form 2405 to schedule jobs and assign a company job order number to each.)

Part 2 of the flow chart, which

deals exclusively with the repair parts specialist, is an abbreviated version of his normal routine. A good clerk should know the more detailed aspects of requisitioning, but if he does not, the flow chart will have to be modified accordingly.

The third part of the flow chart completes the routing through the TAMMS clerk, the motor sergeant, and the platoon sergeant, and it details the final disposition of the 2404.

Two techniques will help a unit make this flow chart work. First, the motor officer should insist on making the complete system turn around in three days. This will keep any corrective actions current. Secondly, the unit's leaders should check periodically to see that the annotated 2404s are in the vehicles' pamphlet bags. Their emphasis will help ensure a

strong effort for efficiency throughout the unit, and it will certainly help the motor officer manage better.

Under this system, a 2404 for any given fault will be prepared only once; enough, but not too many, parts will be ordered; and all of the 2404s will be where they belong instead of being scattered over the company area.



CAPTAIN ROBERT R. LEONHARD recently completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and is now in a degree-completion program at Columbus College in Georgia. He previously served as leader of a rifle platoon and a weapons platoon, as a company executive officer, and as a battalion motor officer.

Professional Development

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR ROY C. OWENS

One of the most important things a battalion can do is to develop and maintain genuine, dedicated, professional noncommissioned officers who thoroughly understand their roles and responsibilities. NCOs of this description are better able to provide for the care, training, and motivation of the individual soldiers they are responsible for. With this idea in mind, the senior noncommissioned officers of the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, have come up with their own Individual Training and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Program.

The program is really four programs in one. It includes an NCO


professional development program (NCOPDP), a skill qualification test (SQT) program, a Training Proficiency Test (TPT) program, and an individual training program. The overall program is managed by the battalion's command sergeant major, who meets every month with his first sergeants to discuss the specific details of the program and to plan future activities. (These meetings serve several other purposes as well. They help bring a new first sergeant on board more quickly, and they keep all the first sergeants informed of the battalion commander's standards for particular areas.)

THE NCOPDP portion includes

several specific professional development efforts at both company and battalion level.

First, a diagnostic examination, which is given to all newly assigned NCOs and to soldiers who are newly promoted into the NCO ranks, helps the first sergeants decide who needs additional training. Those who fail to achieve a score of 70 percent (and anyone else who, in the opinion of the first sergeant, needs extra help) are placed in the battalion's Train To Lead Program. It lasts five days, with each day beginning at 0530 and ending at 2030.

These NCOs receive instruction in such subjects as map reading, per-



formance-oriented training, physical training, and maintaining forms and records. These subjects are farmed out to the first sergeants, who are then held responsible for presenting the material assigned to them. The command sergeant major reviews the instructors during the week before a course is to begin and assigns a staff NCO to supervise and to serve as course evaluator.

Additionally, as part of the PDP each first sergeant submits an evaluation of his new NCOs as soon as they have completed 90 days of duty with the battalion. Then, at company level, all junior NCOs are given at least four hours of professional development training each month. In addition, at battalion level, first sergeant seminars, NCO calls, and hail and farewell gatherings are conducted either monthly or bimonthly.

The monthly first sergeant seminar is a four-hour session that all NCOs in the top three grades are required to attend. The seminar focuses almost exclusively on a first sergeant's duties and responsibilities and on how he can best go about carrying out those duties and meeting those respon-

sibilities. In general terms this instruction includes company administration, training and development methods, how to conduct maintenance inspections, and how to be advisors.

The specific points to be discussed in each seminar are usually prepared beforehand and made available to all the NCOs. Of course, other topics may be discussed, too, if they are considered important enough to present to such a group as this.

During the monthly NCO call, particular problems are aired. All of the battalion's NCOs are given a chance to present their views on these problems and on any others they want to bring up.

Finally, as part of the PDP, the battalion hosts a hail and farewell gathering for its NCOs every other month. All new NCOs and their spouses are introduced, and farewells are said to all of the departing NCOs and their spouses. This gathering helps provide a kind of unity and cohesion among the NCOs and their families that is practically impossible to achieve by any other means.

The SQT portion of the program

owes its overall success to the involvement of the first sergeants, who manage and supervise it. Battalion headquarters itself plays only a supporting role: it procures and distributes whatever publications are needed and, of course, conducts the first sergeant seminar.

The battalion uses a number of informal tools to control its SQT program. One of the tools is a small chart that each first sergeant keeps in a notebinder. One side of the chart contains a description of the proper sequence in which each action should take place in order to have a sound, dependable SQT program. It contains such information as the MOSs to be tested, the number of soldiers by skill level, the status of needed publications, and the evaluation dates. Each first sergeant maintains one of these charts for each MOS in his unit.

The other side of the chart shows the scores from the previous tests and contains detailed information on the weak areas with task numbers and degrees of weakness. The chart, therefore, serves as a complete ready reference for subjects to be used as opportunity, or "hip pocket," SQT

training. In fact, the information on the chart is frequently used in training meetings.

Another tool the first sergeants use is a list that shows each task a soldier must accomplish before he is to be tested. The list also shows each soldier's name, with a space under each task for a rating entry. The first sergeants make up their lists as soon as they receive an SQT notice.

Depending on the MOS, a written test is prepared, either by one company or by all the companies working together, and this test becomes an added requirement for which each soldier must receive a "go" rating. The soldiers' immediate supervisors conduct the training for this test as the opportunities present themselves or even integrate them into the unit training schedules. Under no circumstances does the battalion block out periods of time solely for the purpose of preparing soldiers for their SQTs. Instead, a soldier's immediate supervisor is given a suspense date for all training verification requirements, and it is up to him to see that the soldier meets those requirements. That is the extent of the battalion's training for SQTs.

While the first sergeants keep only temporary records of SQT training

preparations, their platoon sergeants maintain permanent lists of all individual tasks that show when each soldier needs to renew each of his skills. This list, which helps tremendously in planning unit training programs, is reviewed monthly by the platoon sergeants for both evaluation and training.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROGRAM


A year-round individual training program parallels the SQT program. This calls for adding at least two common skills training tasks and additional MOS-specific tasks to the battalion's weekly training schedule. The soldiers' immediate supervisors must cover the listed tasks sometime during that week in opportunity training periods. The training itself is monitored largely through personal observation and through comments from the soldiers and their supervisors.

The battalion also uses a training proficiency test (TPT) to evaluate individual skills as they relate to all individual training requirements. This test, which is administered quarterly, focuses on individual ground defense


plan tasks. A flexible and powerful tool, the TPT is managed by the first sergeants in much the same manner as the Train To Lead Program.


To supplement the battalion's training and development efforts, military and civilian schools are used extensively. The S-3 controls attendance at the military schools, while the first sergeants take care of the civilian schools and their various programs. Attendance at all of the courses is strictly planned, implemented, controlled, and supervised.

The battalion's noncommissioned officers plan and carry out the complete program, but their commanders all the way up the chain supervise and fully support them. It could not work in any other way. As a result, the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry stands ready to fight — and to win!



COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR ROY C. OWENS is command sergeant major of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 87th Infantry, 8th Infantry Division. He previously served in several other command sergeant major assignments, the latest being with the Combat Developments Experimentation Command.





GEORGE G. EDDY

TAKING COMMAND

In the "good old days" of the wild, wild west, whenever a new man rode into a town and looked as if he might be a gunfighter, the folks in the community usually reacted in a variety of ways. Some were outright fearful, dreading what they thought might be the prelude to bloodshed. Others tightened up their gun belts and debated whether it might be a good idea to challenge the stranger. Still others wondered if he was there to settle a grudge or to take sides in the current conflicts over water rights and access to the best ranges.

There was more than enough speculation to go around the town several times, and the stories that were concocted seldom bore much resemblance to the truth. The stranger was usually described, in vivid terms, as either a hero who would rescue the town from difficult circumstances or a villain who surely would make life even more miserable for the luckless inhabitants. So the tales spread

like wildfire, and everyone in town held his breath in anticipation of what was to come.

So it is, or frequently seems to be, when an officer appears in the compound to take command of a unit. There is always some apprehension and anxiety — sometimes even hope — in the unit. Who is this stranger? What will he do? Will he be a godsend or a curse? A hero or a villain?

Knowing that these kinds of reactions are normal, a newly assigned commander who is wise will proceed with some caution in his plans to take over the unit, unless, of course, he becomes convinced that a shock treatment is needed. (Readers familiar with the history of World War II in North Africa will recall General George Patton's dramatic entrance and "seizure" of the distraught II Corps, which had just been battered and traumatized by its first major engagement against the Germans.)

The commander should be aware that, unless he is a complete unknown, some advance information about him will precede his arrival in the unit. Regardless of the accuracy of this intelligence, it sometimes creates an atmosphere in which it will be most difficult for the new commander to develop the rapport he needs for a sound and productive relationship. On the other hand, if he is a complete unknown, he can expect to arrive with a clean slate upon which much will ultimately be written. But known or unknown, the new commander will have to prove himself, usually quite rapidly, and he cannot afford to make any big mistakes at the outset or to act rashly or prematurely. While he must make his presence felt soon, he certainly does not want to fall on his own sword.

All this means that before he actually takes over the unit he must develop some sort of plan of action, even though it may be quite tentative at the start. Whatever he can learn about the unit beforehand will be helpful, but he does need to verify his sources of information as best he can. Above all, he does not want to jump into deep water based on unverified assumptions or premature conclusions. In other words, he should come with as much objectivity as he can muster, not with any firm, tightly-held preconceptions. "Where is the truth?" should be his fundamental question.

When I learned that I was to take over the command of a maintenance battalion in an armored division in Europe several years ago — my first major troop leadership position in some time — I was delighted. My initial pleasure was dampened severely, though, when my boss, the Support Command commander, told me in my first meeting with him that the battalion was jaded, or worse.

The five-company battalion was spread out over many miles of West German landscape. Only one company was co-located with my battalion headquarters, which meant that a visit to my farthest company was a two- to three-hour drive one way over crowded, narrow, and heavily traveled roads. And because any move of a married officer or senior NCO was considered a permanent change of station, I did not have the authority to order such moves on a large scale. This meant that I would have to live with the people who were already there.

Accordingly, I had to find out quickly what was going on, the major problems and their causes, and the best course of action I could take to solve those problems. And I had to find out something about my key personnel.


ADVICE

So, what initial advice might be offered to one fortunate enough to be given the opportunity to command a unit? First of all, I believe that a leader must become a perceptive observer and a master at asking critical questions. And he must temper these through listening exceptionally well. He needs self-disciplined training and a good measure of sensible patience. He should also resist

drawing premature conclusions or making premature judgments. Above all, he must watch out for unwarranted assumptions — probably the biggest trap of all. His motto ought to be: Verify! Verify! And without delay! One of the quickest ways for him to destroy his credibility and undermine any respect his subordinates may have for him is to place the blame for a certain event on the wrong person, or on someone who, on his own, could not control certain critical conditions or resources.

His questions, of course, should go hand in hand with his observations. Here are a number of typical questions he might ask, but some of them only to himself:

- Does this area always look this way? Is there anything artificial or rigged about it? Is it just too clean, too neat, too arranged? If it looks pretty unkempt, what is the probable reason?
- Does the equipment really function as it should, or does it only look good? How about a demonstration?
- Given its present momentum, where does this outfit seem to be headed? Is that good or bad? Based on what? What should be done? What *can* be done? When? How? With what resources?
- If others outside the unit have criticized it, is their judgment correct? Upon what is it based? What are the facts? What are their possible motives? What do they have at stake? How much, in other words, is the criticism either self-serving or apparently justified?



He might also ask himself if something seems to be missing in the various explanations or briefings he receives. How much is trivia? Is anything being withheld or concealed? Is the briefer or speaker really well informed? What seems to have been memorized? How does the briefer react to what-if questions? How does the briefing compare to my own interpretations of the critical features of the unit's mission?

He might ask a briefer what he thinks the major problems are, and to suggest possible remedies. How many of the problems can be solved internally? How long have they existed? What has been tried and with what results? He should be blunt: What's wrong with this outfit? If the answer is, "Nothing, sir!" he probably has discovered either a dunce or a liar. Then he might turn the coin over and ask, "What help do you need from me?"

Finally, he might ask himself, What will it take for me to assert my authority in a way that will be readily understood, accepted, and supported? What anxieties and fears will I have to identify and overcome, and what incentives might be appropriate?

SORT OUT

The commander will have to ask some of these same questions of many individuals in the unit, and then try to sort out the responses right away. Not only will he usually discover some important things about the organization, he will probably learn a great deal about the unit's key individuals and about all of its officers, NCOs, and men.

He should remember in all of his questioning that most individuals have a fundamental reluctance to be the bearers of bad news. In times past, messengers who brought news of defeat and disaster were executed. Today, while we do not shoot the messengers who bring us unpleasant news, we frequently do berate them for upsetting us. Thus, it is typically considered far safer to downplay or slightly shade the news, or even to suppress undesirable performances or results. Usually, there is the faint hope — a childish one, of course — that the bad news or event will somehow disappear if one only waits long enough. If the boss just cannot take bad news and has a tantrum and heaps torrents of abuse on the bearer of such tidings, nobody will tell him any bad news until it is too late for him to act on it effectively.

So, when a new commander appears and asks for the "whole" picture, who knows whether his reactions will be intemperate? There is something to be said for the cultivation of a "poker face."

Before the new commander can get anything started, he must get the attention of all concerned — and it should not be by wielding a big club. (Yes, it may be necessary to knock a few heads, but surely not everybody's!) Thus, the commander has to have something to say that is perceived to be sensible and necessary, perhaps even urgent. This can come only from his assessment of the organization based on the information he has obtained through personal observations, asking good questions, and being a good listener.

To summarize, then:

- A new commander should not introduce change just for its sake alone. He should have a specific objective in mind and try to score at least a small success early.

- If he feels he needs to "shake up the troops," he should make sure it is for something really worthwhile and something they will easily recognize as being worthwhile. It should not be done merely to flaunt his own authority.

- He should keep what is good or replace what is bad — and do it quickly. He should not drag things out endlessly.


- He should act boldly and vigorously and grab the initiative. Everyone is waiting to see what he is going to do, and some will test him, either subtly or crudely.

- If he wants respect for his decisions and actions, he has to earn it — and he must give it, too, to those who deserve it.

No one can run an outfit alone. The new commander will need some help, but he should try to get it willingly, enthusiastically, and not grudgingly or out of fear.



GEORGE G. EDDY, a retired Army colonel, is on the faculty of the University of Texas at Austin, from which he earned a doctorate in 1974. He has written numerous articles on leadership and management topics and a book on small businesses. His active military service included tours in Korea and Vietnam and one as a maintenance battalion commander in the 4th Armored Division.



BATTALION OE TEAM

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS S. THORNBLOM

What organizational effectiveness is, and what it is not, is still a subject of considerable discussion in the Army. OE consultants (OECs) are sometimes regarded as meddlers or spies or worse. And, admittedly, the OE sessions that most of us in the Army have been exposed to have varied greatly in type, style, purpose, and quality. Some have been excellent and others almost useless, especially during the mid-1970s when OE was just getting started.


When "having an OE session" becomes an end in itself with no clear purpose or goal, the session is sure to fail, and the participants will leave convinced that it has been a complete waste of time. Similarly, when OECs indulge in pedantic oratory or try to run the session as if they were psychologists conducting a group encounter, then the participants will tune out, roll their eyes, and start mumbling about "touchy-feely stuff." (That's one

reason why "workshop" is a better term than "session" and a more descriptive one.)

Commanders, too, sometimes resist the idea. Some of them seem to think that having an OE workshop will be admitting to their superiors that there are problems in their units that they cannot handle themselves. Overcoming this attitude is an educational process, but commanders at all levels should realize that OE in the Army is here to stay and should accept it as another tool that they can use to make a good unit even better. OECs don't try to take away a commander's prerogatives; rather, like his other staff officers, they are simply there to help the commander exercise his command.

The key to avoiding negative results from a workshop, therefore, is planning, and the battalion OE team — the commander and the OECs — must work closely in this effort from the beginning to the end.





The commander must first determine whether there is a need for such a workshop. For example, he may be an incoming commander who would like to identify the issues, goals, problems, and personalities of his new unit. Or, if he has been in command for some time, he may perceive a problem in his unit that needs to be solved — poor morale, NCO discontent, lack of communication, or unclear responsibilities. Or he may simply want to develop a sense of command purpose among the leaders of the unit.

In any case, the battalion commander must ask himself three basic questions: Where are we now? Where do we want to be? and How do we get there from here? Sometimes the answers to the first two questions are not clear, and answering them can become the purpose of having an OE workshop — especially when it is a transition workshop for a new commander. The answer to the third ques-

tion then becomes the plan or process that the commander and the OECs will use during a workshop.

After identifying the need for a workshop, the commander should sit down with his OECs to develop and refine the overall purpose and the goals of the workshop and then the process to be used to achieve these goals. This is the critical and most difficult step; it is here that the commander must be open to the ideas of the OECs and have confidence in their knowledge and experience. While he should listen to their ideas, they should listen to his, too. He usually knows his unit and his men best — which methods will work with them and which will not. If the OECs are professionals, they will accept the rejection of their ideas and then try another way to accomplish the given objective. Conversely, if the commander is a professional, he will be receptive to the OEC's ideas and will

give them the benefit of any doubts. In other words, they must work as a team without egotism, power plays, emotionalism, or defensiveness.

GUIDELINES

As part of the planning process, this group must decide who will attend the OE workshop — officers only, commanders and staff officers only, senior NCOs only, or a mixture of key officers and NCOs. This decision depends to a large extent on the purpose and the goals of the workshop, and each situation is different. But there are certain guidelines.

First, the total number of participants should be limited. In a battalion, a group of fewer than six is probably too small to be effective, and a group of more than 20 or 25 is probably too large and unwieldy. Second, since any problems in a battalion must be solved through a cooperative effort that will involve both officers and NCOs, it is usually best to have some of each participate in the workshop. This will get the entire leadership structure of the battalion together and will facilitate the implementation of the workshop's conclusions later.

The next step is to conduct a briefing for the participants before the workshop to let them know the purpose and the goals, to tell them when and where it is to be held, and to issue them any pre-workshop assignments. It can also serve to promote the idea of the OE workshop, for there will undoubtedly be some who are still skeptical about OE and particularly about their own participation in it.

The workshop itself will be better and will include more open and honest participation if it is held off-post with everyone in civilian clothes. The group needs to get away from the unit with its usual interruptions from visitors and telephone calls. And although everyone knows who the boss is, and what rank everyone else has, the civilian clothes seem to be less inhibiting. (OMA funds can be used for food, lodging, and travel expenses.)

Certain ground rules must be established ahead of time by the OECs and the commander, and these rules must be made known at the beginning of the workshop. Some of the more common ones are that everyone should be open and honest, but should remember that the boss is still boss; that all information presented will be confidential and will not go outside the unit; and finally, that they should relax and have fun. The commander should set the tone of the workshop in his opening remarks. It is important for him to encourage the participants to speak freely without fear of retribution and to show them that he is sincerely interested in their comments and ideas.

During the workshop, the battalion OE team must continue to cooperate. If something is obviously not working, the commander should step in and correct it in a positive manner. If nonproductive verbal conflicts or altercations arise, he must use his authority to intervene

and defuse the situation. If the OECs see a need to branch off or expand into certain areas, they should recommend this to the commander. The point here is that flexibility must be considered an important part of the plan.

(A word of warning to commanders: When in doubt, trust the process. The OECs are more experienced in the methodology of OE workshops, and what may appear initially to be irrelevant may in fact be critical in developing a certain point later on.)

If an OE workshop is planned and conducted right, it can do a number of things for a commander. The following are representative:

- It can either solve or point the way toward solving specific problems such as lack of communication (laterally as well as upward and downward) within the unit, discontent among officers or NCOs, and unclear goals, missions, or responsibilities.
- It can serve as a team-building process to increase cohesion, cooperation, and understanding within the unit.
- It can serve as a planning process for such upcoming special events as annual general inspections and off-post tactical exercises.
- It can be used to analyze and improve individual leadership styles.
- It can increase the morale of leaders at all levels by allowing them to express their ideas and opinions and to participate more fully in the planning and implementation of the way in which the battalion conducts its business.
- It can give the commander information about the current status of his unit and about the quality and personality of the unit's leaders.
- It can set goals, procedures, and tasks for the future.
- It can demonstrate that the commander is truly interested in his people and that he is willing to listen to his subordinates' ideas, problems, recommendations, and opinions.

A transition workshop, particularly, when he assumes command, can put a commander two or three months ahead in understanding his new unit's mission, problems, and people. Any workshops held later can help him keep informed of the climate of leadership within the battalion, solve specific problems, and, more important, prevent certain issues from becoming problems.

OE is not a cure-all. But a battalion OE team is a useful tool that commanders should take advantage of whenever the need arises. The end result will be a more unified, smoother operating, better unit. And that is what commanding is all about.



LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS S. THORNBLOM, a 1966 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, is commander of the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 31st Infantry at Fort Sill. Among other assignments, he has been an instructor at the Military Academy, an advisor in Vietnam, and a brigade S-3. He has completed the Command and General Staff College course.



the
GERMAN
ARMORED
COMBAT
TROOPS



EDITOR'S NOTE: This report is a translation of a briefing given by the German Army Armor School; it was sent to us by LTC Peter F. Dauber, TRADOC Liaison Officer to the German Army Armor School/Mechanized Infantry School. The purpose of the briefing is to describe the concept and operational principles of the German Army's armored combat troops. It is hoped that this article may make a small contribution to the further strengthening of relations between the U.S. Army and the

German Army.

The information contained in this report does not necessarily represent the official view or position of the German General Army Office or subordinate schools. Questions, comments, or requests for additional information should be addressed to: LTC Peter F. Dauber, TRADOC Liaison Office KTS-2, c/o 25th Artillery Detachment, APO New York 09069.

At the beginning of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, the initiative in terms of space, time, and force employment lies with the enemy. During the crucial early phase, decision-makers at all levels must react quickly. Units must take the initiative using their high agility and firepower to move out of their defensive positions to regain the freedom of operational-tactical action.

The superior strength of the enemy will require a rapid shifting of forces to create and change points of main effort with the help of fire and units. At the same time, a high degree of agility ensures that friendly forces avoid enemy artillery and air superiority.

One distinct advantage for NATO forces is that the enemy, despite his technical superiority and his efforts to achieve mobile combined arms operations, will, as a result of his ideological system, conduct highly planned and centralized actions, the essential characteristic of which is to plan in such detail that disruptions of any kind lead to time-consuming delays. Allied operating principles, technical equipment, agility of operations, and high state of troop readiness must be used to upset these plans through tactically offensive counteractions. This demands from commanders a high degree of mental flexibility and the ability to conduct operations rapidly in conjunction with different weapon systems.

TERRAIN AND TROOPS AVAILABLE

The terrain is an important factor in determining the appropriate mix of armored combat troops. Therefore, it is imperative in built-up areas to provide for a component capable of conducting typical infantry missions while ensuring a mix of direct fire weapons and missiles.

Armored combat troops must be mutually supporting and organized in such a manner that different components complement each other during ever-changing combat situations. However, all components should have one thing in common: the ability to independently fight enemy tanks.

Armored combat troops provide the bulk of the combat troops of the German Field Army. Within the 17 armored and 15 mechanized infantry brigades, they influence considerably the brigades' command and control capability. This also applies to the newly reorganized and strengthened German Territorial Army.

Each branch of the armored combat troops has its own characteristics. The tank is the central weapon system, around which the major effort at every level of command is built. Tanks are employed primarily against enemy tanks.

Tank units fight in all types of combat. In the attack, they form the nucleus of offensive combat. Tanks develop the momentum necessary to penetrate enemy defenses through their firepower and agility. In the defense and during delaying operations, tank units can concentrate firepower very quickly, halt the enemy by sudden fire, or hit him with quick counter-strokes. In this manner, even superior enemy forces can be defeated or at least worn down.

Mechanized infantry is usually employed in broken or covered terrain. During offensive and delaying operations, mechanized infantry usually fights mounted in their IFVs. In defense, the Panzergrenadiers invariably fight dismounted from fortified positions. Whenever possible, all dismounted infantry in a company should be consolidated into one position, with a width of 500 meters. The MARDERS, using their mobility, fight initially in front of and later on the flanks of the fortified positions. The dismounted Panzergrenadiers and the MARDERS do not conduct separate operations; they operate as an entity.

Tank destroyer vehicles of the antitank units are equipped with antitank guided missile systems. With these long-range weapons, the JAGUAR (an antitank tracked vehicle armed with two HOT missiles) will be able to defeat enemy tanks at ranges up to 4,000 meters. Tank destroyers are normally employed in close coordination with tanks in all types of combat operations. This cooperation is characterized by a clear "division of responsibilities," i.e., missile-equipped tank destroyers engage enemy tanks in depth, while friendly tanks engage the leading tanks. Depending upon the terrain, missile-equipped tank destroyers are usually employed as platoon entities, each platoon having three missile-equipped tank destroyers.

The armored reconnaissance forces can conduct deep reconnaissance using light recon/recce elements — two LUCHS (a six-wheeled scout vehicle). Heavy reconnaissance patrols are formed by three LEOPARD tanks; patrols may be mixed. The German Army under its wartime organization has the following equipment available in the Divisional Recon/Recce Battalion:

Five light recon/rece patrols or 10 LUCHS; 10 heavy recon/rece patrols or 30 LEOPARD tanks; one recon/rece company or 9 TPz (transport panzer) FUCHS (an eight-wheeled armored vehicle for transporting personnel); one radar platoon or nine FUCHS-mounted radars.

The divisional recon/rece battalion can be tasked to perform the usual spectrum of recon/rece operations and, in exceptional cases, can be employed in defensive and offensive operations. Therefore, the recon/rece battalion is a unit that can be employed in most phases of war and even as an emergency divisional reserve.


CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The individual characteristics of armor, antitank, mechanized infantry, and armored reconnaissance elements do not result in independent employment on the battlefield; rather, the branch elements fight together in close coordination as a team. They are one system.

To ensure this close coordination, German brigades are organized to include all the branches of the armored combat troops. In addition, the combat support elements of artillery and engineers, together with the usual logistics units, are integral to each brigade. To ensure close coordination, the brigade often "task organizes" battalions. In this manner, mixed armored forces are formed, which are tailored according to mission and terrain. This ensures a high combat effectiveness of all units. Even though the basic rule is to retain the companies unchanged under their parent unit commanders, the principle remains to mix or reinforce at the lowest level if the mission demands it (as in reconnaissance and security operations, which demand cross-attachment or reinforcement down to and including individual combat vehicles).

From this it can be concluded that officers and NCOs should be able to lead units and platoons of other branches. They must master the principles of employment and know the weapons and equipment characteristics of the other armored combat troops. That is why in Munster the German Army has one school and one doctrine for the leaders of their four armored combat troop branches.

Although task forces are flexible and suited for employment in all types of combat, they do require additional support by combat support troops on the battlefield. This encompasses artillery — to include the multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), which can rapidly emplace mine barriers against enemy tanks — engineer, air defense, and antitank helicopters. Thus, these elements of armored combat troops and combat support troops are combined into what is called a combined arms operation. It is the brigade commander's task to conduct these combined arms operations. However, because of the multitude of weapon systems and their availability on the battlefield, battalion commanders, and often company and platoon leaders, are forced to master this task.



The Marder is an infantry combat vehicle.

"BEWEGLICHKEIT"

Successful employment of armored combat troops is characterized by what is called *Beweglichkeit*, which means mobility of armored troops on the battlefield and flexibility of the leaders at all levels in command and control.

The achievement of *Beweglichkeit* depends on various factors. It is essential that all combat vehicles of the armored combat troops have an equal degree of agility and cross-country mobility. This requirement for agility places great demands on logistic support in terms of rapid resupply of bulk material, continuous maintenance, and medical services. *Beweglichkeit* is equally valid for all types of combat: defense, delay, and offensive operations. It does not mean just speed, or the technical ability to move quickly on the battlefield; speed is only one of the prerequisites for agility.

Beweglichkeit above all means flexible command and control. In terms of command and control within a brigade, it can be said that a combat operation is only an operational goal, for example, to gain time — operational delay or to hold an area; operational defense or to defeat the enemy and seize key terrain — operational attack. The conduct of battle below brigade level is also marked with a high degree of *Beweglichkeit*. This means that the employment of subordinate units under the operational goal of the brigade is characterized by continuous rapid changes between the different types of combat — from delay to defense or attack, and vice versa.

The flexibility of a command and control system is best exemplified by delay operations against a superior enemy. It is characterized by sudden fire from unexpected directions as well as by quick counterattacks. Delay operations are conducted in a similar way to the parry and thrust in fencing, where the fencer rapidly changes from giving up ground to attacking. Original ideas, cunning, deception, and above all, activity in spite of numerical inferiority are demanded from all leaders.

The enemy is weakened at every opportunity. To gain time, the operational goal is not the concern of platoon and company commanders; rather, this is the responsibility of the brigade commander. As a result of constant attrition of his leading elements across the whole front, the enemy will be forced to alter his plans, to reorganize his forces, to expose his main thrust lines, and to commit his reserves earlier.

In the defense, the armored combat troops of the brigades and battalions must be controlled by using the depth of their positions in such a way that the enemy is constantly confronted with locally superior firepower. This idea becomes the keyword of a successful defense. The defender cannot be equally strong in all places. The courage to form main points of effort in order to be strong at the decisive point at the right moment forces one to accept weak areas. Only flexible command and control makes it possible to accomplish local and timely limited superiority. This does not mean that fighting from prepared positions is not done. It would be wrong, however, to rely solely on such positions. It is the mark of flexible command and control to disengage forces that are not fully committed and to concentrate them rapidly at the decisive point. Therefore, flexible command and control in defense consists of the rapid change between fire and movement as opposed to rigid positional defense. This demands leaders who are capable of thinking ahead. It is also essential that the combat support troops fully complement the effectiveness of the armored combat troops.

The attack requires the destruction of the enemy and the seizure of objectives. Only armored combat troops are able to develop the necessary shock effect to penetrate and exploit success. Here the hallmarks are rapid action and rigorously pushing forward toward the objective. This does not mean that the shortest, most direct route to the objective guarantees success. The will to bring superior firepower to bear on the enemy from unexpected places and from varying directions forces the enemy to diversify his fire. The speed of action and the frequency of quick and independent decisions made by thinking leaders make the attack the best example for the principle of command and control by mission-type tactics.

Beweglichkeit in command and control at brigade level means quick changes of missions for the battalion, rapidly shifting the main effort by concentrating forces and fire, employing reserves and disengaged troops when the situation is favorable, and re-establishing reserves as soon as possible. It also means quick changes of the type of combat and task organization. The key to the command and control tasks of battalion and company commanders is to follow the command and control measures of the brigade during combat. Company commanders

and platoon leaders must transform *Beweglichkeit* in command and control into rapid and effective action. This requires the will for independent action, the courage to take risks, the ability to commit disengaged forces, to withdraw unengaged forces, and to concentrate at the main point of effort to defeat the enemy.

The application of all this requires a particular style of leadership. It can only be practiced by subordinate leaders if they are granted freedom of action. In that regard, education is required for those who issue orders and also for those who execute them. *Beweglichkeit* only requires the setting of operational objectives, formulation of the mission, and making available the means necessary to accomplish the mission. The execution of the mission, the choice of the route to the objective, and in general, "how to do it" is left to the next lower level of command. Subordinate leaders must be allowed freedom of action. This style of command and control is called *Auftragstaktik*, or "mission type tactics." It is vital in leading armored combat troops, and it is an indispensable element of German tradition.

SUMMARY

Units of the armored combat troops form the nucleus of the German field army. Armor, panzergrenadiers, antitank, and armored reconnaissance elements employed in close coordination with combat support elements provide the brigades with a high degree of firepower and mobility, hence, great combat effectiveness.

With the introduction of such newly developed weapon systems as antitank guided missiles and new main battle tanks, the capability of armored combat troops to defeat enemy tanks is continuously improved.

The German Army attempts to compensate for the quantitative superiority of the enemy by investing in the development of technically superior equipment. This approach, however, cannot be overestimated, since budget limitations often force a compromise with only intermediate solutions. Hence, in another effort to balance the enemy's quantitative superiority, the weapon of *Beweglichkeit* is employed, which requires highly skilled leaders.

Beweglichkeit, the ability to quickly switch from one type of combat to another, is the outstanding characteristic of armored combat troops. But it can only fully develop in concert with other weapons, including close cooperation with the Air Force. That means armored combat troops and combat support troops are totally interdependent.

It is in this spirit that the units of the armored combat troops must be trained and led. They must conduct operations based on the operational goals of the brigade.



THE
BATTLE
FOR
THE

BOB BOYD

ALAMO



It has been said that in time of need a nation draws its strength from heroic stories of its past military accomplishments and that such stories should therefore be preserved and passed on to future generations. The defense of the Alamo by a small group of volunteers in 1836 is one of these stories.

The settlers of Texas, then a province of Mexico, had been denied statehood in September 1835 and were now seeking independence instead. A garrison numbering less than 200 men at the abandoned Spanish mission in San Antonio held off a Mexican army of several thousand for 13 days before they met their deaths. In so doing they gave General Sam Houston, in command of the Texas regulars, the time he needed to prepare to meet that same Mexican army. Theirs is a story of great courage and sacrifice.

Although it is a fairly familiar story, the purely military aspects of the battle have been generally neglected by the various historians who have written about it in the past. To make matters worse, revisionist historians on both sides of the border are now steadily slicing away at the Texans' accomplishments. They would reduce the number of Mexican casualties from more than 2,000 to between 300 and 600, and they even call into question the wisdom of defending the Alamo in the first place.

If, in fact, the Mexican casualty count had been so low, such a question would be quite appropriate. With his striking force scarcely scratched, Mexican General (and dictator) Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna would have run down Houston's army before that hard-pressed commander had had time to whip together a fighting force from raw volunteers.

But these figures, along with many of the other ideas about events during the siege, are not borne out by the facts.

The best Alamo historians still insist that the half-dozen, first-hand accounts of Mexican casualties from figures of authority are accurate, and these accounts put the toll at between 2,000 and 2,500. (Almost forgotten are the 200 to 300 Mexicans killed in forays and ambushes during the 12 days of siege before the final battle.)

As for the wisdom of defending the Alamo, recently released findings, together with some purely military research, reveal that the decision to fight there was not an ill-considered one.

Historians schooled in the politics and personalities of the time think that the mission had become a symbol — one that Santa Anna could ignore only at his own political peril. But in command of the Alamo garrison were Jim Bowie and South Carolina militia officer Colonel William Barret Travis, both no-nonsense men who would not have asked their men to die for a mere symbol.

These two men clearly saw San Antonio as the key to the battle in Texas. In fact, each of them, on separate occasions in recent months, had been ordered to blow up the Alamo and to remove its guns to Goliad, which lay to the east. Both had ignored the orders, and the Alamo still stood.

Bowie and Travis and the volunteers with them probably decided to stay and defend the Alamo simply be-

cause they believed that they could hold off any attack until reinforcements could arrive. (They had no way of knowing that those reinforcements would never come.)

They had several reasons for their confidence. First, the Alamo was easily the best fortified position in the Southwest. In addition, the Texans were well armed — not only with the best artillery battery and the best rifles, but also with a comprehensive battle plan.

Most of the garrison had been quartered at the old mission since December 1835 when 300 Texans had forced 1,400 Mexican soldiers under General Martin Perfecto de Cos (Santa Anna's brother-in-law) to surrender. That battle, which had raged in the houses and streets of old San Antonio for five days before ending up at the Alamo, had given the Texans an enormous store of munitions and cannon. Only two Texans had been killed in the fighting, while about 200 of Cos's garrison had been killed and the others (including Cos) sent back across the Rio Grande on parole.


Few Texans had really expected the terms of that parole to be honored. Most believed that Santa Anna, in outrage at the defeat, would throw the biggest and best army he could field at the Alamo, and then at the East Texas settlements, as soon as the spring grasses were abundant enough to provide fodder for the horses. As it turned out, Santa Anna marched earlier than they expected.

ARTILLERY

Even so, there was still plenty of time to turn the garrison's quick-witted frontiersmen into first-rate artillerymen. Led by Almeron Dickinson and James Bonham, a solid cadre of trained gunners welded together one of the truly crack artillery units of the 19th century. These men and others had been trained either by the Regular Army or by the Southern militias in the United States, and they knew their business. Finding 30 cannon at the Alamo in a sorry state of disrepair, they were able to return at least 18 and possibly as many as 22 of them to first-rate condition. The battery was larger than any other from New Orleans to Monterrey, Mexico. By comparison, no more than two field pieces were used by either side in any other battle of the Texas revolution.

The guns ranged from several 4-pounders to a huge 18-pounder, but most of them were the deadly 12-pounder smoothbore cannon. These 12-pounders were ideally suited for firing the homemade brand of shrapnel the Texans had made from chopped-up horseshoes, nails, iron slugs, and other such material. (It can be argued that, with all this artillery, the Alamo *had* to be defended; the cannon could not have been moved anywhere else with the available transport.)

The Texans were also armed with Kentucky long rifles, which were deadly at 300 yards, and most of these men were sure-shots. By comparison, the Mexicans had only Brown Bess-type muskets, which could hurl a ball only 70 yards and then with no claim of accuracy. (They fired in volleys and tried to achieve the same type of firepower as



Map of the abandoned mission San Antonio de Valera, better known as the Alamo, in 1836, showing the five defensive perimeters. Cannons were mounted on the first, second, fourth, and fifth perimeters. Troops on the outer walls retreated from No. 1 to No. 4, making their last stand in the long barracks. The chapel force fought there during the entire battle. (The chapel, having been reconstructed, is the portion that stands today).

an automatic weapon — with no pretense of individual accuracy.)

In addition to six or seven of these long rifles each, the Texans had hundreds of captured muskets, which had been made into shotguns for close-in firing. The loaded rifles and shotguns lined the walls and redoubts, and there were other weapons as well — pistols, swords, and tomahawks in abundance. More important, for close-in fighting they also had Bowie knives and the quick reflexes to use them effectively, while the Mexican soldiers had only bayonets and little or no training in using them.

Just as important as all of their arms — perhaps even more important — was their battle plan. Although no such plan exists today, a reconstruction of the events of 6 March 1836 leads to the inevitable conclusion that there was one and that it had been thoroughly communicated to the entire garrison. This battle plan undoubtedly stressed the need to gut the elite assault battalions that Santa Anna would throw against them.

The plan would have had two parts. First, the garrison would stop the Mexicans at the walls if it could. With sharpshooters able to fire six or more times without reloading and with double-loaded shrapnel in every cannon, any attacking force would have to be willing to sacrifice a great many soldiers to get over the wall. The Mexicans had not impressed the Texans with their courage under fire before, and there was every reason to believe that the assaulting troops would break.

If the Mexicans did get over the walls in force, it meant certain death for everyone in the garrison. They all knew that. The second part of the plan, then, would have been

to inflict as much damage as possible on the attackers. This second part of the plan called for a number of collapsing perimeters that would always give the defenders a sizable edge when first attacked. Like a deflating balloon, the Alamo's fortifications would literally take the air out of the best troops in the Mexican Army.

To work as well as it did, this plan must have been known by every man in the garrison, and its execution entrusted to every officer and noncommissioned officer; during the battle, there would be no way for a shouted command to be heard and the garrison had no buglers.

So, for all of these valid reasons, the Texans decided to stay in the mission and fight for it, and ultimately for an independent Texas. But their perceptions of their enemy also had to have some bearing on their decision. Certainly the Mexicans had shown no stomach for real bloodletting the few times they had been engaged. If 300 Texans could rout a garrison of nearly five times as many Mexican regulars and force them to surrender the very fortress in which the Texans were now housed, what could well-armed and strongly entrenched Texans do to the next batch of Mexicans thrown against them?

FORTIFICATIONS

As the garrison prepared to meet the inevitable all-out assault, a long-forgotten genius of military engineering, Captain Green Jameson, came forth to supervise the construction of the fortifications. Jameson took the rubble and the crumbling walls of the old mission and, using the

materials at hand, turned it into a surprisingly sturdy fortress that fit in perfectly with the battle plans.

The accompanying map, published in 1980 after years of research by the long-time curator of the Alamo Museum, Charles Long (and aided by some lucky digs in downtown San Antonio), illustrates the fortifications and the collapsing perimeter principle.

The discovery of an outer fortification ditch puts to rest the criticism that no defensive measures were taken outside the walls. The deep fosse shown on the map covers the entire south wall and is probably the main reason the supposed "soft spot" of the fortress, the 75-foot stretch of open ground between the chapel and the low barracks, was not taken by storm. Jameson had built up earthworks to cover the ground, and Travis placed Davy Crockett's Tennesseans at this point. He added an artillery unit with four 4-pounders.

Long's research also rebuffs the long-held theory that the 12-foot limestone and adobe walls that protected most of the mission were manned by troops firing from a shoulder-high earthwork two feet in diameter. The finding that the walls were flat gives an entirely different picture of the first stages of the battle. Sharpshooters were not exposed, as had been previously assumed, but were in prone positions atop the walls.

Besides the six or more loaded long rifles each marksman would have had by his side, each also would have had a shotgun. These marksmen could fire into the inevitable masses of troops who, having reached the safety of the wall overhang, would no longer be threatened by cannon firing from the mounts cut out of the wall or from the elaborate inner earthworks 10 feet from the walls. Of course, any Texan who stood to unload his shotgun would be an easy target for massed musketry, but he could take three or four attackers with him with a double-load blast.



The main battery of three 12-pounders was located on the roofless second story of the chapel. The pick of the garrison's marksmen also manned this last citadel.

It has been said that the Alamo was too big (six and one-half acres) for so few men to defend, but events proved that statement inaccurate — thanks, partly, to Santa Anna himself.

Santa Anna was obsessed with Napoleon's tactics, but, more a politician than a general, he lacked any real understanding of the methods behind the tactics he copied. He drew up meticulous battle orders, which called for four attacking columns, one from each side. He dictated the number of ladders, axes, picks, bullets, and other gear for each column of about 800 men. A fifth assault battalion marched into battle in true column style behind one of the front columns.

Against such an attack the Texans could use every cannon in the fortress along with enfilading rifle fire. A mass lunge at one wall would have reduced the defenders' initial firepower by at least two-thirds, but Santa Anna could not grasp the simplicity of the tactical situation. Napoleon would have realized that the Texans were in what amounted to a British square and would never have allowed a four-pronged attack on a standing square. Instead, he would have hit it with everything he had at its weakest point — a corner.

But true to what he thought Napoleon would have done, Santa Anna massed his five columns 40 men per rank, 20 ranks deep. Only the first two ranks could use their weapons, and nearly one-third of them were carrying implements with which to scale or break through the walls.

He deployed his cavalry behind the infantry, and it literally sword-whipped many reluctant warriors into the firestorm. After a few initial shots, Santa Anna would make no use of his light artillery, which is crucial to a column advance.

On the day of the final assault Santa Anna further injured his cause by ordering his men to be in position at 0100 and to lie on the freezing ground for three hours before he gave the signal to attack. As a result, reflexes that should have been at their best in the coming fury were numbed before the attack began.

Thus, incredibly, the finest army Mexico had ever fielded would attack a dug-in enemy whom it outnumbered 30 to 1, but whose firepower was greater than the whole that the attacking army could bring to bear (at least while its officers held their men in rigid column formation). In a five-hour battle, Santa Anna would throw away the best bargaining chip the Mexican nation had — the elite of its army.

During the 12 days of siege before the final assault, the first barrier the Mexicans had to cross was the river. Although it was quite narrow for the most part, it was also quite close to the walls at many points. When the Mexicans tried daylight crossings — either by fording or by crossing a bridge south of the Alamo — the Texans could pick them off easily. After taking many losses, they chose to cross at night instead. Then they either dug in or took cover behind some small huts that the Texans had neglected to destroy while they had a chance.

The assault finally came at 0400, 6 March 1836. The Texans held their fire until their cannon could hit the columns at point-blank range. Riflemen poured down a hot and incredibly accurate fire, and few shots missed their mark. (Mexican officers said after the battle that most of the soldiers killed before the walls were shot in the head.)

A second charge met with only slightly more success for the Mexicans. A number of them made it to the wall overhand before withdrawing. The officers and NCOs even formed the troops for a third charge, but it was nearly 0800 before they were ready. Again, some troops made it to the wall, and a number of Texans were killed while firing into them. Travis, the garrison's commander, was mortally wounded in this manner. Shot in the head, he fell back, gathered his final ounce of strength, picked up his sword, and held his ground. A Mexican colonel appeared at a breach in the north wall at this time and plunged his sword into Travis. The dying garrison commander replied in kind, and the two men died together. But Travis' battle plan was just unfolding.

Now painfully aware that this Mexican army was made of sterner stuff than they had expected, the Texans fought frantically to hold the walls. The east and west columns had merged with the north attacking force and created, by confusion, what should have been Santa Anna's plan from the start. Now massed, his troops poured through the breach in the wall. Worse, they wiped out the few defenders at the northwest corner and scaled the wall there, getting in behind that wall's defenders. The Texans began retiring to the earthworks (the second perimeter). Their cannon raked the attackers on the walls, but there was no time to reload. The Mexicans quickly stormed the earthworks and forced the garrison into its third perimeter.

The defenders now formed a huge U-shaped line in the large plaza with the open end pointing toward the long barracks. For 45 minutes the Texans fought with Bowie knives against bayonets. Like the Romans against the massed spears of a phalanx, the frontiersmen again proved the worth of dispersal, speed, and fighting spirit. They dived under the awkwardly thrust bayonets and gutted their opponents or deftly stood aside from the thrust to cut a jugular vein. The Texans kept up this butchery until the number of enemy troops in the plaza became overpowering.

Once again the battle plan worked to perfection as the remaining defenders dashed to the long barracks. The plaza was now packed with Mexican soldiers who were greeted by the most brilliant part of the Alamo inner-defense plan.

A 12-pounder placed on the roof of the long barracks for just this moment pointed down at the mass of infantry and fired two double-load blasts of shrapnel before its three gunners were shot down. One or two other cannon still in the Texans' hands also fired. Although none got off more than two rounds, these inflicted considerable damage. Mexican dead lay everywhere, and dozens more dropped with every volley from the now concentrated fire from the barracks.

The barracks had a number of separate rooms and had been sandbagged, loopholed, and made ready for use as a

redoubt. But the Texans had no monopoly on fighting ability. Several Mexican officers manhandled the captured cannon into position to blast down every door of the barracks. Then each room was taken by bayonet. (Although these barracks had always been thought of as being two stories high, Long's discoveries prove that the famed place where the bitterest last stand took place was only one story high.)

The chapel still defied the assault and its three 12-pounders cut down the first wave of troops directly attacking it. Hundreds of muskets soon found the gunners. The sharpshooters supported the few men who gathered to contest the door to this last bastion. A few shouts, shots, curses, and then silence.

But one more item remained — an old Indian-fighter trick. The last marksman alive on the chapel's second floor played possum — faked death — on the narrow ledge.

With the firing almost over, Santa Anna and his entourage had moved forward. When they were about 500 yards from the walls, a single shot whistled just above the commander-in-chief's head, sending him galloping to the rear. Although the marksman's Kentucky long rifle was deadly at 300 yards, a hit at 500 yards would have been adding a good deal of luck to the outcome. But it was a fitting ending and in keeping with the spirit of the garrison.

Only when their battalions were reformed did the senior Mexican officers realize what the Texans had done. Carefully picking their targets, they had killed every noncommissioned officer they spotted. One unit lost four times as many sergeants as officers, even though there were almost as many officers in the fight. Not that the Texans didn't also kill more than a few officers, but their aim was clearly to gut the army. And the best way to gut an infantry unit is to eliminate almost every corporal and sergeant in sight. There was no way of replacing those experienced men and no time to rebuild the shattered formations.

When next the main Mexican army faced a force of Texans with their blood up, the Mexicans stood for only 18 minutes despite a numerical superiority of two to one. The Mexican soldiers who marched with Santa Anna had seen one slaughterhouse and survived. They had no stomach to face another, 1,500 miles from home, in a swamp called San Jacinto. And it was there six weeks later that they met Houston's force and were defeated — all either killed or taken prisoner.

The battle cry in that final contest for Texas independence was "Remember the Alamo." Remembering no doubt gave the Texans strength in their time of need. We should remember, too — remember and preserve for future generations this and other stories of courage and valor and self-sacrifice.

BOB BOYD, a journalist with a lifelong interest in military history, is now a freelance writer working on a novel about a family on the Texas frontier. He has been managing editor of two Texas daily newspapers and has won several state writing awards. His work has also been published in several regional and national magazines

TRAINING NOTES



ROTC Rangers

EDWARD G. BURLEY

Ranger students can be described as gruff, unshaven, camouflaged men — dirty, tired, and very hungry. ROTC cadets, on the other hand, can be described (generally) as polite, clean-cut, hopeful officer candidates — well-scrubbed, well-rested, and very well-fed. Mutually exclusive categories? Not necessarily.

Each year, though, someone in authority questions the wisdom of sending ROTC students to Ranger School instead of to the usual ROTC advanced camp. But this training is a valuable asset to the ROTC program, and I believe the other 74 cadets who attended the course last summer would agree with me.

By then a Ranger class designed to train only cadets was a thing of the past; the cadets who were enrolled in the Ranger course were integrated with the Active Army officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted men in the course. They were just Ranger students, subject to the same trials, confidence tests, and evaluation standards as the others.

To be accepted for the course, each cadet had to meet the usual basic requirements and pass the physical prerequisites. Each had to submit a current physical examination, a state-

ment as to why he wanted to attend, and comments from his Professor of Military Science. It helped, too, if he had collegiate extracurricular activities, prior military service, or Reserve duty on his record, as well as training in land navigation skills and field exercises. Previous military schools, such as airborne, air assault, and northern warfare, in particular,

In the Ranger course, the principles and traits of leadership that are taught in ROTC classrooms crystallize into day-to-day survival.

also weighed in a cadet's favor, because they indicated that he would be both physically and mentally prepared for the rigors of the Ranger course.

A week before the 1982 class began, the cadets who had been selected reported to Fort Benning for precamp training. This training was designed to give the ROTC cadets some of the instruction they would have received at the ROTC advanced

camp but which is not included in the Ranger course: weapon firing, barracks life, and garrison leadership positions. They also received instruction in land navigation and patrolling from the Rogers Team of the Ranger Department of the Infantry School, and they took part in morning PT sessions.

The Ranger course itself needs no further description, having been covered at length in *INFANTRY* (September-October 1980, page 16). But the training is especially challenging, and a cadet does take several risks in deciding to attend. If he does not complete the first phase of training — the Benning Phase — for whatever reason, he does not get credit for the ROTC advanced camp and, therefore, cannot be commissioned on schedule. Any serious injury he may suffer is not fully medically covered, and he may not be commissioned if he is hurt. In addition, he receives only the basic cadet pay throughout the course — no TDY pay and no jump pay. (But nobody goes through the Ranger course for money — they couldn't pay you enough!)

So why go to Ranger School as a cadet instead of waiting until after commissioning? For one thing, I

believe that the benefits in leadership training and self-knowledge more than outweigh any of the risks.

The Ranger School teaches leadership, *real* leadership, and allows its students to practice that leadership in a simulated combat environment. It is often said that "you can't *manage* a platoon of men to take a hill under fire," but ROTC cadets rarely get a chance to *lead*. In the Ranger course, the principles and traits of leadership that are taught in ROTC classrooms crystallize into day-to-day survival.

Throughout the course, the students (or "studs," as they are called by the instructors) are rotated through such graded leadership positions as patrol leader and assistant patrol leader. As patrol leader, the Ranger student learns what it's like to plan and accomplish a mission while leading tired, dirty, and hungry men who often don't even know their own names. The assistant patrol leader has to push these men to accomplish the patrol leader's mission, constantly accounting for personnel and equipment.

Without food and sleep and under the stress of passing the course, the student leader must pull himself and his unit together in order to succeed. No amount of classroom instruction or practice in drill and ceremonies can teach the importance of quick decisions and sound leadership practices in combat. Only such stressful training as that given in the Ranger course can build competent, confident

leaders. Trust others, obey orders, and stop complaining: the Ranger must do all this to earn his tab.

The Ranger learns to be a good follower as well. Working as a fire team leader, carrying a heavy rucksack, or humping a PRC-77 radio or an M60 machinegun up and down mountains gives the student an understanding of and a respect for the men who normally do these tasks in a unit.

The cadet who attends Ranger training learns these lessons. And when he is commissioned, he will enter on active duty a step ahead of his ROTC classmates who have not been in an Active Army environment before. He will understand how his radio telephone operator feels, for example; he will have greater respect for his troops; and he will know what his men can do if they are given the proper leadership.

The Army's present Ranger policy is primarily designed to integrate Ranger-qualified individuals into regular units. These men, trained in small-unit leadership and tactics, can then instruct and aid their fellow soldiers in these skills.

When each ROTC cadet returns to his college, he, too, brings the benefits of Ranger training back to the other cadets. Thus, the pride, motivation, and leadership skills of one will influence many. He is particularly well-suited to help the other cadets prepare for the tactical exercise lanes, for the military skills test, and for the leadership positions that most

of them will have when they attend their advanced camps.

In addition, the self-knowledge the cadet gains from the course helps him to mature greatly as an individual. He sees himself and others under stress, and it is usually an eye-opening experience. Personal faults and limitations come to the surface, and the cadet must learn to overcome them to earn the coveted Ranger tab.

Balanced against the possibility of suffering an injury or a setback that could result from not getting credit for the advanced ROTC camp, the benefits of leadership training far outweigh the risks. I know that the proudest moment of my life was when the Ranger tab was pinned to the shoulder of my uniform. If "leaders are made and not born," Ranger School is one of the places where they are made. The man who wears the Ranger tab is a true leader, whether on a college campus or in the heat of battle.

Although the school is not for every ROTC cadet, the qualified cadets who do attend and graduate will benefit immeasurably from the training they have received. This, in turn, will make them better officers when they are commissioned, and they will help make a better officer corps.

EDWARD G. BURLEY is a senior ROTC cadet at the University of Notre Dame. A Distinguished Military Student, he will be commissioned an Infantry officer in May 1983. In addition to the Ranger course, he has also completed the airborne and air assault courses.

Mortar Training Standards

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS STEVE L. OVERHOLSER

A new mortar platoon leader usually has a good basic knowledge of mortar gunnery techniques when he takes over his platoon, particularly

if he has just completed the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course. But he usually lacks the experience to place that knowledge in the proper perspec-

tive. Just by watching his platoon's performance he can usually determine whether a task is being performed right, but the time standards

for the completion of these tasks may be confusing.

For example, he may find that, even though his platoon is at full strength and high in morale and discipline, it scored an "unsatisfactory" on its most recent ARTEP. The evaluators of that ARTEP may have indicated that the platoon members' knowledge of individual and collective tasks was excellent, but that they failed to meet the prescribed time standards.

The ARTEP time standards are different from those in the 11C Soldier's Manual, which the platoon uses in training (Table 1). This means that a platoon, by training to meet the minimum standards in the Soldier's Manual, risks failing virtually every ARTEP mission. And this is not what a platoon leader normally wants to do.

But can a platoon leader set his own standards — standards that are considerably different from the ones that have been published? Certainly, he can. The only question is, What should those standards be? Table 2 shows some recommended standards along with the established standards for comparison.

At first glance, these recommended standards may seem too high — the recommended times may seem too low. But they are attainable, although the platoon's leaders, once the standards have been set, may have to prove it to a group of skeptical squad leaders.

A good platoon sergeant can put on a convincing demonstration — show off a little — using the "show and tell" method in a kind of training clinic. These are the techniques he should demonstrate:

First, as we all know, 10 mils of change in deflection is equal to one turn of the traversing crank. Once the gunner cross-levels he will be within two mils. But to simplify this operation, he needs to think in these terms: The deflection micrometer knob and the traversing crank work in opposite directions. An increase in deflection moves the micrometer knob clockwise, thus forcing the traversing

(FOR 81MM) TYPICAL ADJUST MISSION	SOLDIER'S MANUAL	CUMULATIVE TOTAL	ARTEP 7-15	CUMULATIVE TOTAL
Initial call for fire	3:00	3:00	2:00	2:00
FDC Order	2:00	5:00		
FDC Corrections	1:00	6:00	2:00	4:00
Charge Setting	1:00			
Large Deflection Change	1:00	7:00*	1:00	5:00
1st FO Correction	:30	7:30	:15	5:15
FDC Correction	1:00	8:30	:30	5:45
Charge Setting	1:00			
Small Deflection Change	:35	9:30	1:00	6:45
2nd FO Correction	:30	10:00	:15	7:00
FDC Correction	1:00	11:00	:30	7:30
Charge Setting	1:00			
Small Deflection Change	:35	12:00	1:00	8:30
3rd FO Correction	:30	12:30	:15	8:45
FDC Correction	1:00	13:30	:30	9:15
Charge Setting	1:00			
Small Deflection Change	:35	14:30	1:00	10:15

*The charge setting and small deflection change are performed simultaneously; therefore, cumulative time is derived from that which requires the most time (the charge setting).

Table 1.

crank to move counterclockwise. For example, if the gunner starts at 2800 and receives a deflection of 2840, indexing clockwise, he traverses four complete turns counterclockwise, levels up, and, without even looking through the sight, he's "up."

But while deflection turns work in opposite directions, elevation moves in the same direction — clockwise with the elevation micrometer knob, clockwise with the elevation crank, and vice versa. The ratio is the same — 10 mils equals one turn.

After a good demonstration, the squad leaders should be allowed to practice the technique themselves for a few minutes. Most of them will be able to hit the 10-second mark. Even those who can't quite hit that standard will still be within the 15 seconds required for the gunner's exam and

considerably within the 35 seconds required on the SQT.

There is also a simple procedure for making large deflection changes, which the platoon sergeant can also demonstrate:

Starting at deflection 2800, if a change of 100 mils is indicated, the bipod needs to be shifted only about 3½ inches, or the length of a cigarette package. The assistant gunner is the key to this operation. In moving the bipod, he must remember the rule "increase right, decrease left." To help in this matter he can measure off 3½-inch increments from the bipod legs going both left and right. Then when the gunner indexes a new deflection of 2900, which is an increase of 100 mils, the assistant gunner simultaneously shifts the bipod 3½ inches to the right. The gunner

	ARTEP	SQT	GUNNER'S EXAM*	PLATOON'S STANDARDS
Small Deflection	1:00	:35	:15	:10
Large Deflection	1:00	1:00	:35	:15
Refer/Re-align	—	1:15	1:00	:45
Mounting	—	1:30	1:05	:45
Reciprocal Lay	—	1:55	1:05	:45
Traversing Fire	—	1:20	:50	:40
Emplacement (Mount/Lay)	7:00	—	—	2:00
Initial FDC Data	2:00	1:00	—	:20
Subsequent Data	:30	1:00	—	:10

*Represents time for earning maximum points on the gunner's exam.

Table 2.

then levels up and checks his sight picture. If he is a little off, say 11 mils, he has to make only a small deflection change of one turn of the knob.

Practice and competition should be encouraged at this point among the squad leaders. Once convinced, their next task will be to give their squad members a similar demonstration to convince them that the standards are attainable. The particular techniques

they use are not as important as the competitive spirit and shooting for a challenging time standard.

All gunnery hinges on small and large deflection changes — manipulating the sight and the mortar. Once these have been mastered, the other tasks — reciprocal lay, traversing fire, and refer/re-align — will also improve.

The squads will be as good as their leaders require them to be, and they

will pass their next ARHP without any trouble.



SERGEANT FIRST CLASS STEVE L. OVERHOLSER has served as platoon sergeant of a 4.2-inch mortar platoon and a weapons platoon and as a drill sergeant at Fort Knox. He has completed the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course and is now assigned to Readiness Group Selfridge in Michigan.


Combat Cross-Country Course

LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE A. FISHER

Individual conditioning, fighting skills, and attitude are all important in keeping soldiers prepared to do their jobs, and so is unit teamwork. Incorporating activities that

strengthen these attributes into unit training schedules either on a daily basis or periodically is one way to keep the soldiers prepared. A combat cross-country competition is one

technique that has proved successful for trainers in the 7th Infantry Division's 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry. (This is not an original concept; variations on it have been used in the



Berlin Brigade and in other units as well.)

The 3d Battalion's combat cross-country course is basically a timed squad competition, with 8, 9, or 10 men to a squad, depending on unit strength. It includes a four-mile run and a skills station (see illustration). Each squad runs the course as a team in full battle gear (LBE, weapon, mask, soft cap), and each must carry one PRC-77 radio and one M16/M203; all other squad members carry their individual M16 rifles.

The squads cross the starting line at five-minute intervals and run two miles cross-country to the skills area. The squad must enter the area as a unit. The members first put on their gas masks, then negotiate a wire obstacle, throw hand grenades, and engage targets with their M16 rifles using live fire. (The hand grenade throw is scored, as is the 10-round live fire exercise; each is worth 25 percent of the total score. The overall squad completion time accounts for the other 50 percent.)

The time clock runs the whole time the soldiers are in the skills area. When they have completed the live fire exercise, the squad members are allowed to unmask after which they complete the last two miles of the run. During this last run, the faster runners can proceed at their own pace and thereby improve the squad's overall time, which is computed as an average of all the individual times.

The top-scoring squads are recognized with medals and trophies given in appropriate ceremonies. Without exception, the soldiers who have participated say that they have learned a lot about themselves and their units in the course of this physically demanding training.

Many aspects of this cross-country course can easily be modified to fit local situations. Smoke, CS, and overhead fire (with blanks) can be used to add realism to the skills area. The area itself can include other challenges as well, such as obstacles, slides, RTO procedures, and SQT or ARTEP tasks.

The entire event can end with a squad in an assembly area receiving an operations order for a squad live fire assault. This would be an excellent test of a unit's ability to survive great stress and physical exertion and still be prepared to fight. The scoring of the competition can also be modified to stress any skill that is included.

Events of this nature, incorporated into a comprehensive training program, can help keep units ready to go around the clock. What may be more important — the soldiers will know that they are ready and will take great pride in their readiness.



LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE A. FISHER, a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, is commander of the 3d Battalion, 32d Infantry at Fort Ord. He holds a master's degree from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and has completed the Command and General Staff College course.

Resupply By Rappel

MASTER SERGEANT DAVE GOLDIE


Any combat or combat support unit that conducts sustained operations in a jungle environment eventually needs a resupply of water. This is particularly true of the units that come to Panama for training at the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC), because their soldiers drink more water while becoming acclimatized to the heat.

For years these units have been frustrated by the terrain and the "enemy"

actions that make flying water into a landing zone (LZ) a difficult procedure. They have tried numerous alternatives, but always without much success: When they used parachute drops, they couldn't find the supplies on the ground. When they tried kicking rubber bladders out of low-flying helicopters, the bladders burst on impact. When they moved the unit to an LZ and delivered water in five-gallon cans by

helicopter, they always seemed to encounter the opposing forces.

Searching for a quick, reliable, and practical method of resupplying these units with water, the Jungle Warfare Branch of the JOTC hit upon a system that is virtually foolproof and that has numerous other applications as well. The system incorporates some ingenious uses of readily available equipment with an innovative reorganiza-



tion of rappelling procedures. It permits a unit to deliver supplies of all kinds anywhere in the jungle, even through a triple canopy if necessary, thus reducing exposure to enemy fire.

Using a standard basic-issue duffel bag, two collapsible, plastic five-gallon water bottles, a Swiss seat, and one extra snaplink, the JOTC instructors devised a method of packaging water, food, or ammunition for delivery from a helicopter. By using their reverse belay system, one man in a helicopter can lower more than 400 pounds easily and with total control over the load's rate of descent. Needless to say, a heavy load must be rigged so that there is no chance that any part of it can fall while it is being lowered.

EQUIPMENT

The equipment needed for this type of resupply mission includes:

- A duffel bag (with sling ropes or A7A straps and D-rings to secure larger loads, such as engineer boxes, and to provide a fixed sling point).
- Several snaplinks to attach the rappel ropes to the load and to use in lowering the load.
- A donut ring (as described in Change 1, FM 57-38, Pathfinder

Operations Manual).

- One climbing rope for loads weighing less than 100 pounds (two for loads over 100 pounds).

- Leather work gloves for the belayman and a rope deployment bag (see article in INFANTRY, November-December 1982, p. 31).

After the load is properly rigged, the climbing rope is attached to the load at the sling point, which should be directly over the center of gravity when the load is placed in the position in which it is to land. (For details on how to prepare the duffel bag load for water resupply, see the accompanying sketch).

The rappel ropes are run through a snaplink attached to a donut ring on the same side of the aircraft from which the load is to be lowered. The ropes are routed through this snaplink in the same manner as a rappeller would be hooked up (an extra turn of the rope can be added for loads over 250 pounds).

The ropes are then run through to a snaplink on the opposite side of the donut ring, around the belayman's back, to a rope deployment bag on the floor of the aircraft opposite the load.

The belayman sits on the floor in the center of the aircraft as far forward as he can get and facing the rear of the air-

craft. He is held in place by seatbelts. The rope runs from the second snaplink around the belayman's back, then to the hand closest to the load. The hand farthest from the load is used to break the load's fall, using the chest belay.

The rope deployment bag, fastened to the floor of the aircraft near the belayman's brake hand, contains all the excess rope and prevents the loose rope from becoming a safety hazard.

When the helicopter is over the correct location, the rappel master first ensures that nobody is under the load. Then he and his assistant, who are fastened into the aircraft, pull enough slack in the rope to allow the load to be pushed slowly outside the aircraft. Once the load is outside, the belayman follows the hand and arm signals of the rappel master, who watches the load to see that it is lowered safely to the ground.

Two or more loads can be lowered, but only one at a time. The helicopter crew must be kept informed of when each load is going to be moved outside the aircraft, as it will cause a shift in the helicopter's center of gravity.

ROPES

If the ropes must be retrieved, the rappel master and his assistant pull them back inside the aircraft while the belayman stores them in a laundry or sand bag. In case of emergency, the ropes should be cut immediately and allowed to fall to the ground.

This duffel bag method is particularly useful for combat units; once the bag is on the ground, a squad member can retrieve it and move out quickly, if enemy action dictates, using the bag's shoulder straps to carry the load on his back.

The system is also a particular boon to engineer parties sent in to clear LZs. They can now be flown to the exact location of the proposed LZ, rappel in, and have their equipment belayed in right behind them.

Other units that are being taught these methods are also impressed. In fact, the 82d Airborne Division took

the JOTC's innovation a step further, substituting five-quart plastic water bottles from Air Force survival kits for the five-gallon collapsible jugs. This means that once a duffel bag is on the ground a squad member can pick it up and move from position to position, issuing water to the soldiers without the delay and spillage of transferring it to individual canteens.

While the JOTC recognizes that this resupply system may not be logical to use in some terrain, it feels the system is worthy of consideration by any unit that moves in the field.

The JOTC also welcomes any suggestions from units serving anywhere in the world that would make fighting in the jungle easier for the soldier on the ground.



MASTER SERGEANT DAVE GOLDIE is assigned to the Public Affairs Office of the 193d Infantry Brigade in Panama. He has previously served with the 19th ADA Brigade and as director of public relations for the Golden Knights, the Army's parachute team.

OPFOR Training

CAPTAIN JOHN H. PERRY

The opposing forces (OPFOR) program, formally initiated in 1978, is a great improvement over the old aggressor program, which it replaced.

The aggressor program called for a unit to represent an adversary, but an imaginary one and one that used its usual U.S.-style maneuver, formations, and equipment. Under the OPFOR program, by contrast, the unit designated to act as the OPFOR is more realistic: It is trained to use the tactics, formations, and doctrine of a potentially real adversary (usually the Soviet Union or North Korea) in maneuvers against U.S. units in training.

The U.S. Army FORSCOM OPFOR Training Detachment (RED THRUST) at Fort Hood, Texas, has the mission of training OPFOR units throughout the FORSCOM area, including Alaska and Panama. Unfortunately, though, this program has not progressed as rapidly as it should have. In fact, with the exception of the OPFOR units at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, which was trained by a RED THRUST team in late 1981, no organized OPFOR maneuver units

were being used at the various installations in the Army at the time this article was written.

Although many of these installations do have an OPFOR cadre to monitor the program and to conduct limited training, in most cases this training includes little more than Threat awareness. A week-long training session, for example, might feature as its main elements a day in the life of Ivan — consisting of Soviet style meals, PT, indoctrination, and training and discipline; familiarization firing with or demonstration of Soviet weapons; driving or riding in Soviet combat vehicles; and classes on Soviet tactics and capabilities.

Real OPFOR training includes much more: Classes on Soviet tactics, formations, signals and radio procedures; terrain board exercises with models; and full-scale practice in applying what has been learned in class. These practical applications include walk-throughs with drivers and vehicle commanders practicing the formations and signals; vehicle-mounted motorized rifle company (MRC) formations and tactics; an MRC defense (strongpoint); and basic motorized

rifle battalion (MRB) offensive formations and tactics combining three MRCs under a central commander. The value of this kind of training has been proved at the NTC.

In 24 training days, a 12-man team of instructors from RED THRUST trained an armor battalion and a mechanized infantry battalion to act as an OPFOR against units that would later rotate through the NTC for training. Units of these two battalions were trained to act as three MRBs, a tank battalion, an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance company, an antitank guided missile battery, a ZSU-23/4 section of an air defense battery, and an organic motorized rifle regiment (MRR) engineer unit.

These units perform their missions with doctrinally correct tactics and formations and with a speed and aggressiveness that usually surprises the units in training. In the process, they have convinced both the participants and the observers that there is a vital need for OPFOR training back at their home stations. They know that without it their soldiers will not be properly prepared to face the speed, the aggressiveness, or the

dirty battlefield that they may face in a war in Europe.

In many of the initial meetings between the rotational U.S. maneuver units and the NTC OPFOR, in both offensive and defensive actions, the U.S. maneuver units were unsuccessful. In subsequent encounters, though, the rotational units, more familiar with what to expect, began to do much better.

Why, then, don't units use OPFOR in training at their home stations?

Basically, the reasons fit into four general categories, as expressed by the leaders arriving at the NTC:

- "My people can't even execute U.S. tactics and formations. How can I teach them Soviet tactics and formations?"

- "If I spend the time on OPFOR training, I will lose valuable U.S. training time and probably confuse my people."

- "I don't have the time or the equipment to conduct OPFOR training."

- "I don't have anyone in my unit who knows Soviet tactics well enough to do the training. And I can't afford to lose my trainers for the length of time required to research and develop an OPFOR training plan."


These all sound like pretty good reasons, but none of them are really valid. They reflect a misunderstanding of what OPFOR is and what it can do for a unit.

The OPFOR training plan developed in Field Manual 34-75 and the plan developed and proved by RED THRUST can effectively train anyone to create a Soviet-type OPFOR in a short time. The training is also easy to retain. The NTC OPFOR units, for example, went 35 days between the completion of their RED THRUST training and their first employment against a rotational unit without any additional training. Yet their performance after this break was just as good — in some respects, better.

Neither do soldiers lose their U.S. training while training as an OPFOR; in fact, they may gain from that training, because they not only get an op-

portunity to observe and learn from the good and bad practices of the opposing U.S. unit, they also develop a better appreciation for the combined arms concept. Besides, when they act as a potential adversary, they concentrate only on those actions, formations, and tactics that will give visual cues to the unit they oppose. Unobservable actions such as leadership techniques and common skills can still be taught according to U.S. doctrine. And no confusion between the two should result, because the basic formations and tactics of Soviet style doctrine are quite distinct.

As for having time to train, time is something that is always available for any training that the commander really wants to conduct. Eliminating the



prolonged Threat training that some units call OPFOR and substituting real OPFOR training is one way of finding the time.

Equipment is not a key issue in OPFOR training. While real equipment or visual modifications do contribute to the appearance of the OPFOR unit, the meat of the OPFOR's effectiveness is its proficiency in training — not its appearance. Besides, except for a light infantry unit, every maneuver battalion in the Army has more than enough equipment to create an OPFOR unit. An MRC, for example, requires ten BMPs (APCs), an MRB only 31. A mechanized infantry battalion has far more than 31 APCs, and other types of units are similarly equipped. A number of inexpensive devices can be used to differentiate the OPFOR unit, including hanging a red flag from each vehicle's antenna.

People with knowledge of the

Soviet tactics needed to conduct OPFOR training may be easier to find than a commander might think. Someone who likes war games, for example, often knows quite a bit about Soviet tactics and formations and might like to teach them. If there is no wargamer, most major units have an OPFOR cadre that is ready to put together a training program to do the training for smaller units.

Finally, a unit can ask RED THRUST to send a mobile training team to conduct this kind of training. This team will train a unit's OPFOR cadre and give them the lessons and materials they need to maintain an effective training plan for the unit. (For units overseas, these training materials can be obtained from RED THRUST through OPFOR points of contact at the major commands.)

There are no really valid reasons for a unit not to use OPFOR in its training plan. The means are available, if a commander will schedule time for OPFOR training, if he will use his organic equipment imaginatively, and if he will seek any outside assistance he may need. Then, when an OPFOR has been trained, it should be used realistically in the unit's FTXs and ARTEPs.

In a peacetime army the heart of its training effort is to prepare its soldiers and leaders so that in combat they will have the best chance to survive and to win. In 1968, a sign hung at the entrance to a training area at Fort Benning read, "More sweat in training, less blood in combat." It was, and is, an excellent thought. But if that sweat in training is spent on unrealistic or otherwise inappropriate training, all a trainer develops is a group of dead-tired soldiers. To be ready for the next war, then, we should concentrate on proving that more realism in training can mean less blood in combat.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. PERRY, an Infantry officer, formerly served with the RED THRUST training detachment at Fort Hood, researching, writing, and presenting OPFOR training. He was chief instructor for training the OPFOR units at the NTC. He is now assigned to the Doctrinal Literature Division of the Infantry School.

ENLISTED CAREER NOTES



BRANCH CHIEF'S NOTES

We usually direct our advice in INFANTRY toward the soldier who "leans forward in the foxhole" to make himself more proficient and more professional.

This note, by contrast, is directed toward the soldier who has ignored all advice about his career progression and has chosen instead to allow his career to take its own course with little or no concern for professional development. For the soldier who falls into this category, the following guidelines are offered for his consideration:

Commandments for the Unprofessional

- Be overweight or physically unfit.
- Get relieved from an assignment for inefficiency or conduct unbecoming a noncommissioned officer.
- Establish and maintain a low EERWA.
- Continually seek assignments outside your own career management field (CMF).
- Don't strive for leadership positions with increased responsibility.
- Never order a copy of your Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) to check for current entries.
- Decline attendance at military service schools.
- Don't attend civilian educational courses or college courses.
- Don't review your DA Forms 2 and 2-1 before forwarding a packet for boards considering promotion or service school attendance.
- Have an outdated photograph in your OMPF or one with uniform discrepancies.
- Fail to verify your MOS when tested.

• Don't be supportive of your chain of command when you receive unpopular instructions.

• Be a complainer, not a doer.

Anyone who follows this advice won't have to worry about being proficient or professional. He probably won't have to worry about being promoted either.

LTC RICHARD C. PAHLAND

ASI MANAGEMENT

Additional skill identifiers serve two purposes: They identify soldiers with special skills gained from formal training, and they also identify TOE and TDA positions that require those skills because of new equipment they have received. The ASI extends the basic MOS, which is a grouping of related duty positions that include career progression.

The ASI is used for skills, qualifications, or requirements that are in addition to those of the basic MOS. But an ASI is no longer thought of as "additional"; it is a part of the MOS code. Each ASI has a constant and distinct meaning that does not change with different MOSs.

This nine-digit code includes MOS, skill level, special qualifications identifier (SQI), additional skill identifier (ASI), and language identity code (LIC), and it is central to all enlisted personnel management systems.

Timely documentation of ASIs is the key to MILPERCEN's ability to acquire, train, and distribute soldiers for ASI requirements. Personnel, logistics, and operations elements must share information at all levels and must meet deadlines for entering ASI data into The Army Authorization Documents System. (AR 611-201 gives guidelines for establishing new

ASIs. Requests are forwarded through the MACOM to the Soldier Support Center — National Capital Region.)

While many of the ASI management initiatives in recent years are matters of policy, others affect MILPOs and have already been implemented or are now in the process of being implemented:

• Requisitions with special requirements (ASI, SQI, LIC, security clearances) must be given priority. MILPERCEN fills these requisitions first.

• The utilization of ASI-trained soldiers following formal training is mandatory. The period of utilization depends on the length of the course. (This information can be found in paragraph 4-6, AR 614-200.)

• Commanders who conduct training are responsible for awarding ASIs through SIDPERS no later than the midpoint of the formal instruction. Commanders should place particular emphasis on awarding force modernization ASIs that soldiers acquire through civilian contractor training, new equipment training (NET), or on-the-job training.

• Gaining commands must have procedures for identifying incoming ASI-trained soldiers and must see that these soldiers are assigned to the requirement for which they were requisitioned. An ASI-qualified soldier who is not serving in an ASI requirement is not being used properly.

• Until the present system is modified, MILPOs must delete ASIs from SIDPERS through local procedures and submit a request to DAPC-EPT-F to delete an ASI from the soldier's enlisted master file (EMF). (At present, only the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate can delete an ASI from the EMF.)

• A complete MOS code (contain-

ing all nine characters) will be shown on all PCS orders following the PMOS lead line. Zeros should be used to indicate the absence of ASI or language qualifications.

The Assignment Procedures Branch, EPMD, is the ASI management office for MILPERCEN. For more information, contact DAPC-EPA-P, AUTOVON 221-8090.

PHYSICAL ACTIVITY SPECIALISTS

A new seven-week training course for soldiers in MOS 03C (Physical Activities Specialist) is now being offered at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana.

The course is designed to give 03C soldiers the skills they need to advise other soldiers and commanders on their exercise and sports program and to offer better assistance in the management of recreational facilities. Plans include the development of advanced individual training and schooling under the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

The new program of instruction includes training in physical conditioning and testing, diet and nutrition, weight control, physiology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, weight training, injury prevention, exercise prescription, and recreation management.

In addition, mental and physical profile standards for entry and retention in MOS 03C have been set at a skills technical test score of at least 105. Holders of the MOS also must have a physical profile of all "ones" except for vision, which may be profiled at "two." If a person fails to meet the revised aptitude area score but otherwise qualifies, a waiver may

be granted by the appropriate reclassification authority. (Change 19 to AR 611-201, effective 1 March 1983, includes these changes.)

MILPERCEN is now screening the records of all soldiers who have 03C as a primary specialty to determine which ones meet the required standards. Those who do not should take action immediately to verify their physical profile and revalidate their ST scores.

More information about the training course and the new mental and physical standards is available from MSG Mosley, HQDA (DAPE-NPD-RT), AUTOVON 225-7485.

RETIREMENT/PROMOTION POLICY

A soldier whose retirement is approved before the date a promotion board convenes is not eligible for consideration. Personnel qualification records (DA Forms 2 and 2-1) for these soldiers should not be forwarded to promotion boards.

If a soldier is erroneously considered and selected for promotion, the servicing MILPO must notify MILPERCEN (DAPC-MSP-E), in accordance with AR 600-200. Without any further action by the board, MILPERCEN will delete the name of that soldier from the recommended list. If the soldier has been erroneously promoted, orders will be revoked.

If the retirement was approved before the date on which the promotion board convened, MILPERCEN will not withdraw the approved retirement so that the soldier can accept promotion. There are no exceptions to this policy.

MILPERCEN may withdraw an

approved retirement on the basis of the needs of the service or an extreme hardship, but this withdrawal will not validate an erroneous promotion or reinstate the soldier on the promotion list.

A soldier whose retirement is approved on or after the convening date of a promotion board will remain on the list (if selected) in a non-promotable status unless withdrawal of his retirement is approved by MILPERCEN (DAPC-EPA-AR).

For more information on retirement policies, anyone who is interested may call SGM Chizek or Mrs. Boyle, DAPC-EPA-AR, AUTOVON 221-8410; on promotion policies, SGM Carmona, DAPC-MSP-E, AUTOVON 221-9020.

USAR AIT RULES

Before reporting for Phase II (AIT) of their alternating (split) training, Reservists should check their Military Personnel Records Jackets (MPRJ) to see that TRADOC Form 578-R (Individual Training Record) is enclosed. Members who report without these forms may have to repeat some of the training they completed the summer before.

Besides taking along their complete MPRJs, it is important for USAR members to take their finance and military medical records with them when they report. They should also have their complete clothing issue. Without these necessary items, a soldier's training placement may be jeopardized.

In addition, Army Reserve commanders should inform Initial Entry Training Reservists about the length of Phase II for their MOSs, because, for some MOSs, it may be longer than a "summer" school break.



OFFICERS CAREER NOTES



COUNSELING PROCESS

The Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD) of the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) has expanded its formal counseling procedures for officers who are not selected for promotion to the ranks of captain through colonel and for warrant officers who are not selected for promotion to CWO 3 and CWO 4.

Either MILPERCEN or unit commanders will counsel non-selected officers on request. MILPERCEN will also prepare, at an officer's request, individual file summaries and interview sheets to be forwarded to his commander for counseling purposes. Counseling will be made available as soon as possible after a promotion list is released.

Infantry officers who want MILPERCEN counseling or who would like for MILPERCEN interview sheets to be provided to their commanders should contact their career managers at Infantry Branch.

Commanders and MILPERCEN career managers have always provided counseling to officers and will continue to do so. These procedures are designed to assist commanders in their counseling role.

OFFICER EDUCATION

Each year the Army selects about 750 commissioned and warrant officers to complete undergraduate and graduate degrees at civilian universities as full-time, on-duty students. The Army provides these officers with an educational opportunity and then assigns them to positions that call for that education periodically throughout the rest of their careers.

The Army has two general cate-

gories of full-time, on-duty educational programs — fully funded and partially funded. Under the fully funded program, the Army provides a permanent change of station (PCS) move, full pay and allowances, tuition, and up to \$200 per year toward textbooks and supplies. The partially funded program is similar, but the officer must pay for his or her own tuition (many have used veterans benefits), textbooks, and supplies. Under either program, an officer incurs an active duty service obligation, computed as three days for each day in school, up to a maximum of six years.

In addition, the Army offers a variety of special programs, including the Funded Legal Education Program; fellowships, scholarships and grants, such as White House Fellows; and the Training with Industry program.

Officers who are approved for an associate or baccalaureate degree program must study in a field that is of functional value to the Army. The degree should support the officers' specialties or MOSs. The full-time, on-duty programs require that officers study in a discipline for which the Army has AERB positions in certain specialties. The same requirements apply to off-duty programs in which the Army bears part of the expense through tuition assistance.

The Army does not restrict the field of study for an officer who pursues an advanced degree on his own time and at his own expense. But it is still wise for each officer to study in a field that supports one of his specialties.

Infantry officers who are interested in being assigned as full-time students at civilian universities should read AR 621-1; telephone or write their profes-

sional development officers to determine an appropriate program; photocopy DA Form 1618-R from the back of AR 621-1, fill it out, have it indorsed, and mail it to Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPE-D, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.

Professional development sections at MILPERCEN consider officers for civil schooling on the basis of the following general criteria: company grade professional development, such as advanced course and company command completed; availability for PCS; top notch evaluation reports; and academic records that indicate a likelihood of success in undergraduate degree completion or graduate school.

An officer can improve his chances for selection by planning ahead. He should talk to his professional development officer, find out what degrees will support Army requirements, and take the appropriate tests, such as the Graduate Record Examination or the Graduate Management Aptitude Test.

UPDATE ORBs

An officer's Officer Record Brief (ORB) is important to his career in several ways. Commanders and supervisors use it to get an impression of his qualifications for a duty position; DA selection boards use it to assess his potential for promotion, schooling, or command; and assignment officers use it as an aid in making assignments and other important professional development decisions.

Over the years, officers have criticized the ORB system because of the difficulty they have encountered in getting changes made. But there is evidence that many officers neglect

updating their ORBs until a problem arises or until it is time for their records to go before a board. Keeping an ORB up to date takes personal involvement and follow-up.

DA sends a copy of an officer's most recent ORB to his local military personnel office (MILPO) three times a year, including an audit copy in his birth month. The officer's signature on the audit ORB attests that the data on it is correct, or that he has indicated any changes that need to be submitted by the MILPO. The other two ORBs, which come at four-month intervals following the audit ORB, should be checked to make sure these changes have been made.

But an officer does not have to wait until he receives an ORB to make corrections; changes can be made through MILPOs any time during the year. (DA Pamphlet 600-8, Procedure 5-1, contains all the information he needs. Copies should be available in unit personnel administration centers (PACs) or MILPOs.)

Some officers are under the impression that their assignment officers are the only ones who can get changes made on their ORBs. This is a myth that needs to be dispelled. Some of the items on the ORB can be updated only by DA, others only through SIDPERS transactions.

If an item needs to be updated by DA, an officer should have his local MILPO send a letter to the appropriate agency as shown in the pamphlet, making sure he has provided MILPO with enough information to validate the requested change. This is better than sending the request for change directly to DA, because if there is a change in procedure, the MILPO is more likely to know about it and can help get the problem corrected.

Although each item on the ORB is important, the items that are most often found to be inaccurate by selection boards are height and weight data, military and civilian education levels, and assignment history.

Height and weight must be entered accurately, with height in inches and weight in pounds. There is a big dif-

ference, for example, between 63 inches in height and 6 feet 3 inches, which is sometimes entered the same way — 63. If an officer's photograph makes him appear overweight but his ORB says that he is not, the board will ask for verification of height and weight from his commander.

Data on military education level (MEL) for schooling at command and staff college (MEL 4) and senior service college (MEL 1) level is entered at DA. So is civilian education for master's and doctor's level schooling. All other school data is entered in the field. Officers who complete non-resident programs for MEL 1 and MEL 4 schools must forward appropriate documents through their MILPOs to DA for update. Appropriate degrees and transcripts must also be forwarded to DA before an officer can be credited with completing graduate work.

Another problem is that assignment history is not entered accurately; sometimes organization and duty titles are so abbreviated that they are not clear. Organization titles can be no longer than 19 characters with four additional characters available for unit number, while duty titles can be no longer than 24 characters. But the problem is that often an officer does not even use all of these spaces, and this often results in indecipherable abbreviations. If abbreviations are necessary, they should comply with AR 310-50.

Above all, each officer must get involved in keeping his own ORB up to date. If a change is not made on the first try, he should follow it up and resubmit it, getting his commander involved if he has to. If he is getting close to a selection board and has not succeeded in getting changes made that he considers important, he should write to his assignment officer or call, if time is short.

The assignment officer will change the items that are DA changeable, and he will post the ORB that goes before the selection board with the handwritten changes the officer has requested. At the same time, though, these changes should be submitted

through the MILPO once more.

An officer who follows these guidelines and the advice in the pamphlet should be more successful in keeping his ORB current.

ORSA GRADUATE PROGRAM

The Florida Institute of Technology (FIT), in conjunction with the U.S. Army Logistics Management Center (ALMC) at Fort Lee, Virginia, has recently initiated a Master of Science Degree program in Operations Research at ALMC.

Officers who want to pursue this degree must first complete the 12-week Operations Research Systems Analysis Military Applications Course 1 (ORSA MAC I) at ALMC, for which they receive six graduate quarter hours with FIT. Then they complete the remaining 42 credits over the course of one year for a total time of 15 months at Fort Lee.

FIT has a resident ORSA director for the program and carefully screens and selects instructors who are both academically and professionally qualified in operations research. Classes are scheduled during the day or evening with the ALMC library and computer facility available to students.

The degree program is a cooperative program that requires student officers to pay tuition costs, but VA Educational Benefits can be used to pay these costs.

For information on the program, anyone who is interested should write or call the following: Mr. William Creed, Resident Director, ALMC, FIT Office, Fort Lee, VA 23801; AUTOVON 687-2722 or Mr. Jose Antunes, ORSA Committee, ALMC, ATTN: DRXMC-LS-S, Fort Lee, VA 23801; AUTOVON 687-2386.

Interested officers who have degrees in science, engineering, or mathematics are encouraged to discuss the program with their respective professional branches at MILPERCEN.

BOOK REVIEWS



We are pleased to announce that our 1967 publication, *INFANTRY IN VIETNAM*, which was recently reprinted by The Battery Press of Nashville, Tennessee, has been selected by the Military Book Club as one of a dual main selection for June 1983.

We are also happy to announce that our 1971 book, *A DISTANT CHALLENGE*, which was a follow-on volume to *INFANTRY IN VIETNAM*, is now being reprinted by The Battery Press, and we expect that it will be available for purchase sometime after 1 June 1983. *A DISTANT CHALLENGE* contains accounts of small unit Infantry combat actions that occurred in Vietnam between 1967 and the end of 1970. A concluding chapter has been added to cover the highlights of 1971, 1972, and the early part of 1973, when the last U.S. ground combat unit was withdrawn from Vietnam, and to list some of the lessons that were learned during the almost seven years of fighting.

We are also very pleased to note that the U.S. Marine Corps Association has reprinted the long out-of-print book, *INFANTRY IN BATTLE*. The original manuscript for that book, which is a classic on infantry tactics, was put together in 1934 by the Military History and Publications Section of The Infantry School under the direction of Colonel George C. Marshall. The first edition was printed that same year. A second edition was published in 1939 by *The Infantry Journal*, which is no longer in existence and which was the official magazine of The United States Infantry Association; the latter merged with other military associations in the 1950s to form the Association of the United States Army. The reprinted edition, which sells for \$9.95, can be ordered from The

Marine Corps Association, Box 1775, Quantico, Virginia 22134. The Association's telephone number is commercial 703/640-6161. We recommend this book most highly to all of our readers.

In our last issue, we mentioned a few of the excellent books we have recently received that we think all Infantrymen should know about. Here are more:

• **LONG ENDURE: THE CIVIL WAR PERIOD, 1852-1867, Volume III of Military Uniforms in America.** From the series produced by The Company of Military Historians. Edited by John R. Elting and Michael J. McAfee (Presidio Press, 1982. 147 Pages. \$35.00). Sixty-four military units are represented in this volume, their battle histories written by 20 authors, their uniforms, in full color, depicted by 19 artists. There are U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and militia units; Confederate units; and representative units from the French military services that took part in the French invasion and occupation of Mexico in the 1860s. A glossary of uniform and weapon terms and an index complete this very fine reference work.

• **THE U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY.** By Boyd L. Dastrup (Sunflower University Press, 1982. 157 Pages. \$40.00). A large number of old and new photographs complement a factual, down-to-earth account of one of the Army's long-serving schools. The College has had its ups and downs since its founding in May 1881 as the School of Application for Infantry and Cavalry, and its mission has changed countless times, sometimes seemingly without sound reasons. Today, few Army officers who have not completed the College's

resident or non-resident course can expect to advance in rank. We have only one objection to this book: The author fails to mention the important role the College's monthly magazine, *Military Review*, has played in advancing the College's professional image.

• **YOURS TO REASON WHY: DECISION IN BATTLE.** By William Seymour (St. Martin's Press, 1982. 338 Pages. \$17.95). This is a most interesting and novel approach to military history, and it is one that would make an excellent teaching vehicle. The author writes about ten military campaigns — from Hastings to Anzio — and at appropriate points stops the action and asks the reader to pretend he is one of the commanders and to select an appropriate course of action from a number of options, each of which is shown on an accompanying map. He then resumes his narrative, telling which option was selected, and gives his opinion of that selection. The author is quite knowledgeable in the field, and his writing style, which is easy-going but correct, makes reading his book a pleasure.

• **JANE'S MILITARY REVIEW: SECOND YEAR OF ISSUE.** Edited by Ian V. Hogg (Jane's, 1982. 160 Pages). Ian Hogg has put together a fine selection of articles on a variety of contemporary military subjects — the Falklands, Afghanistan, optronics, NATO, infantry fighting vehicles, and air power, among others. (The articles were current as of mid-1982.) Of particular interest to Infantrymen is Richard Simpkin's "The Roles of Infantry in the Maneuver Battle." Simpkin has written on this subject before, and in this essay he continued his attack on "mechanized infantry" and its functions in any future war. To Simpkin, "mech-

anized infantry . . . stands for an idea which lacks both a doctrine and a cult object and is thus open to truly Orwellian levels of doublethink and doublespeak." He holds firmly to one thought: the Infantry exists only to get the tanks forward. Therefore, the only kind of Infantry that will be needed in an all-out war in a European environment will be "in-house" Infantry, foot-soldiers who belong to and are trained by tankers and who know their real place in the pecking order — at the bottom. He also has some ideas about a seven-man squad and a new kind of IFV.

• **BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF WORLD WAR I.** By Holger H. Herwig and Neil M. Heyman (Greenwood Press, 1982. 424 Pages. \$49.95). This is an outstanding reference book and one that should be received with open arms by all students of World War I. Not only is it a complete guide to the major figures of that era, it contains an excellent introductory essay that covers the war's major events, maps of the major fronts, a complete chronology, and a bibliography of works in six languages.

• **LOUIS L. SNYDER'S GUIDE TO WORLD WAR II.** By Louis L. Snyder (Greenwood Press, 1982. 838 Pages. \$39.95). This is another outstanding reference book. The author has written extensively on World War II and is a recognized authority on nationalism and on modern German history. He examines all aspects of the war, using an alphabetical approach. Many of his entries have bibliographies for those who want to pursue the subjects in greater depth. The book also has a chronology of the war, a list of the "ten basic books on World War II," and a detailed index.

TO WIN A WAR: 1918, THE YEAR OF VICTORY, by John Terraine (Doubleday, 1981. 268 Pages. \$14.95).

The author is a well-known British military historian who writes well and has an almost encyclopedic knowl-

edge of World War I. In fact, this is his eighth book about the events of that war.

Therefore, it is easy to say that the book contains a good deal of useful information, even if it does display a definite British bias. Unfortunately, though, as several recent authors have done when writing about the events of 1918, Terraine concentrates far too much on the high level political and military machinations and far too little on the exploits of the Allied armies.

He gives short shrift to the roles played by the French and American armies and to their leaders during the last six months of the war, and believes quite strongly that never did the British Army show to better advantage than during the "last 100 days."

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: COHESION, STRESS, AND THE VOLUNTEER MILITARY, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian (Sage Publications, 1980. 305 Pages). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Rinaldo, Fort Eustis, Virginia.

With interest in Army Cohesion and Stability (ARCOST) initiatives at a high level, this collection of well reasoned and balanced scholarly articles should draw widespread interest, the more so because it relates to the concept of voluntary service and the numerous changes that concept has brought to the American military system.

Though divided into three parts — the dimensions of combat effectiveness, society and the profession, and leaders and soldiers — the collection weaves a common thread of concern about the current ways of looking at combat effectiveness within the military services. Lewis Sorley's essay, "Prevailing Criteria: A Critique," is especially provocative in this respect. Sorley, a highly respected scholar and a West Point graduate, asserts that we need "an accurate quantitative assessment complemented by informal professional judgment, both unadulter-

ated by considerations of career prospects."

While Sorley focuses on how we might measure combat effectiveness, Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder integrate history, sociology, and even art and literature in their review of the concepts. Concerning cohesion, they conclude that the "soldiers' battle" indicates "that unit integrity is not a *sine qua non* to combat effectiveness." They point to the Battle of the Bulge in 1944 when cooks, drivers, and clerks "without common unit identification and marginally proficient in their use of weaponry, nevertheless soaked up the attack of five German panzer armies."

Other essays by familiar experts such as Colonel William Hauser and Major Stephen Wesbrook, both of whom are experienced in infantry matters, reinforce the idea of the importance of an underpinning of support for and a recognition of the need and value of service to the Nation.

Again and again, in various guises, the moral factor of war and overall national support is stressed in this collection. For example, in an essay on "The American Experience in Vietnam," Guenter Lewy tells us that "in the final analysis then, military cohesion is a consequence of the cohesion of the political and social fabric and of the willingness of that society to support its military."

Notwithstanding a possible dearth of community and national support, Colonel Hauser feels that the Army must do a lot of in-house reforming to prepare itself morally and psychologically for war. Indeed, some of his recommendations have already been adopted.

Much, of course, remains to be done. This book will assist all military men to make considered judgments based on solid research and sound professional scholarship.

INFILTRATION, by Albert Speer (Macmillan, 1981. 384 Pages. \$15.95). Reviewed by Alexander S. Birkos, Mount Shasta, California.

This book, published shortly before the author's death in September 1981, stands as a major addition to the literature of the Nazi era and of World War II. Speer, in vivid detail, examines the process by which Heinrich Himmler plotted to establish a separate SS industrial empire. At the same time, though, he lays bare his own soul for the world to examine.

After more than three decades, the former German Minister of Armaments and War Production was still haunted by the fact that he had ignored the terrible plight of the concentration camp prisoners, many of whom had been forced to work in his war factories. It had been too easy for Speer to look the other way.

Speer's central theme is both fascinating and astonishing: At a time when the German armed forces were fighting desperately for survival, let alone victory, and was literally starved for new weapons and equipment, Himmler made the work of Speer's ministry a nightmare by his intrigues, interferences, and hare-brained schemes. He constantly coopted industrialists and plant managers by making them honorary SS officers, thereby forcing them to work at cross-purposes to Speer's production plans. Time and time again he made Speer waste valuable time and effort to unravel the conspiratorial webs the SS continually created.

While this book does offer an intimate view of what went on in the higher German circles during the last years of the war, it also provides lessons for us in our own time. Anyone who is in the least concerned with managing America's military-industrial complex should heed these lessons. In a future general war, there may not be the luxury of time to undo the harm caused by petty, self-seeking, empire builders.

**A MATTER OF HOURS: TREA-
SON AT HARPER'S FERRY**, by
Paul H. Teetor (Fairleigh Dickinson
University, 1982. 309 Pages. \$29.50).
Reviewed by Professor Benjamin F.
Gilbert, San Jose State University.

Harper's Ferry, located in the Blue Ridge Mountains at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers, functioned as an important military base during the Civil War. In September 1862, General Robert E. Lee decided to invade the North with his ragged Confederate army in an attempt to conquer Maryland. Crossing the Potomac near Leesburg on 5 September, Lee occupied Frederick, Maryland, two days later.

Lee thought that because of his move the Union garrison at Harper's Ferry would evacuate it. When this did not take place, Lee took a serious risk and divided his army in the face of a superior enemy force. He sent General "Stonewall" Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry while he led the other part of his army towards Hagerstown.

Harper's Ferry was then commanded by Colonel Dixon S. Miles, and this book briefly covers his military career up to that time and examines in detail his actions that led up to the surrender of his 10,000-man force. During the three-day siege conducted by Jackson, Miles made numerous mistakes. He also disobeyed orders relating to the defense of Maryland Heights and purposely kept the southern sector of Bolivar Heights relatively undefended. Miles even permitted paroled prisoners-of-war to return to their lines without wearing blindfolds and through sparsely defended areas. He surrendered to a force not much larger than his own and without waiting for an infantry assault by Jackson's men.

General David Hunter presided over a commission that inquired into the loss of Harper's Ferry. The commission found Miles was "unfit" to defend the post and referred to his "criminal neglect" and his "incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility." The author contends that Miles was a traitor and agrees with the historian of the 115th New York

NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

Regiment, James H. Clark, who in 1865 called Miles the "Benedict Arnold" of the Civil War.

The book has detailed notes and a substantial bibliography. An appendix reproduces the report of the Harper's Ferry Commission of 3 November 1862. With only a few photographs and maps, the book seems over-priced. But it should appeal both to Civil War scholars and to those interested in the study of military justice.

**VIETNAM TRACKS: ARMOR
IN BATTLE, 1945-75**, by Simon
Dunstan (Oprey Publishing Limited,
191 Pages. \$15.92). Reviewed by
Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Jones,
Jr., United States Army Reserve.

With extensive research, Simon Dunstan has scrutinized and visually reviewed the armor experience in Vietnam between 1945 and 1975. At first glance, this book appears to be only a noteworthy collection of largely unpublished photographs of armored fighting vehicles (AFVs). But as Major General George S. Patton, United States Army, Retired, states in his foreword, the author's "effort must be considered not only contributory to the study of armor in the Vietnam War, but also — and perhaps more importantly — to its capabilities and limitations in a counter-guerrilla environment which those who practice the profession of arms may well come to experience again."

The photographs in this book not only reveal the rich historical record of the AFVs used in the Vietnam War, they also point out the important modifications to them that paid dividends in the area's environment.

Almost to the point of redundancy, Dunstan (as does General Patton) stresses the enemy's effective use of mines. Hopefully, the lessons learned then will not be lost to the U.S. Army. Throughout his text, too, the author emphasizes armor's logistical requirements and stresses the fact that armor could be used effectively in Vietnam.

The book offers much useful information of practical application. But, sadly, it lacks a recapitulation, a solid overview of tactical operations, and a clear definition of the armor concept. Further, the author fails to provide an index, which would have improved the book's usefulness as a reference. I do recommend this book to those who may need its practical information on the employment of AFVs in an unconventional war scenario.

TRACKS OF THE BEAR: SOVIET IMPRINTS IN THE SEVENTIES. By Edgar O'Ballance (Presidio Press, 1982. 240 Pages. \$14.95). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council of the United States.

This book focuses on Soviet activities during the 1970s. Its main theme is that short of waging open war to achieve global hegemony, Soviet leaders have preferred to conduct a "peace strategy" using non-violent means to accomplish their ends. Such means have included fighting proxy wars, supporting liberation movements, providing aid to terrorist groups, and using negotiations, propaganda, misinformation, trade agreements, and espionage.

In ten very succinct chapters, the author retraces, on a regional basis, the major events of the decade and shows how the Soviets used particular events to increase their global influence. He writes that "the outstanding lesson of the seventies is that the Soviets do not react to gestures of goodwill, kindness, or consideration."

The message conveyed by O'Ballance is two-fold: the United States must deal with the Soviets from a position of strength, and the West must not expect the Russians to think as the West does or to follow their declared policies.

The book itself provides the general reader a good understanding of the Soviet threat to world peace.

MIRACLE AT MIDWAY. By

Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon (McGraw-Hill, 1982. \$19.95). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel William A. DePalo, Jr., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This book is a sequel to *At Dawn We Slept*, the late Gordon Prange's splendid account of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and its aftermath. It picks up the action in the Pacific following the inconclusive Coral Sea engagement and carries it through 6 June 1942, the final day of combat on and around Midway Island. Completed by two of Prange's capable associates, it is based on the same exhaustive primary source research and the same incisive analysis that characterized the Pearl Harbor volume.

The battle of Midway, which was the turning point for the United States in the Pacific war, is a classic study of an inferior force defeating a superior enemy through a combination of initiative, bold offensive action, and a good deal of plain luck. The battle also vividly illustrates the value of timely intelligence to commanders who are astute enough to act upon it.

Most of all, though, Midway is a case study of the emerging dominance of aerial over surface warfare at sea. Carrier-based air power decided the outcome at Midway, not firepower from surface vessels. The all out naval battle that the Japanese had been seeking in the Pacific simply did not materialize.

Fundamentally, as the authors point out, it was over-confidence and contempt for their enemy that doomed this Japanese campaign to failure. The operation itself showed none of the meticulous planning that had preceded the successful attack on Pearl Harbor. Flushed with an unbroken string of victories, the Japanese had become infatuated with their own apparent invincibility and had ignored the precautions that would be necessary to insure further successes.

By sheer weight of numbers the

Japanese should have been able to win this engagement and to win it decisively. But certain intangibles, such as the breaking of the Japanese JN25 code, inadequate air reconnaissance, and poor judgment by Admiral Chuichi Nagumo at a crucial point in the battle turned the tide and gave the Americans a resounding victory.

The authors conclude that "had Nimitz, his various staffs, and sea commanders not taken positive, intelligent and imaginative steps, the Japanese might have won the battle of Midway in spite of themselves."

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

THE BIG DROP: THE GUNS OF MERVILLE, JUNE 1944. By John Golley. Jane's, 1982. 174 Pages. \$19.95.

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: A STUDY. By Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Retired). United States Strategic Institute, 1983. 141 Pages. \$8.00, Softbound.

THE ERA OF THE CIVIL WAR, 1820-1876. 1982 Edition. By Louise Arnold, with accompanying essays by Richard Sommers and Michael Winey. Special Bibliography 11. United States Army Military History Institute, 1982. 704 Pages, Softbound.

BEFORE ENDEAVOURS FADE. By Rose E.B. Coombs. Completely Revised and Enlarged Edition. After the Battle Magazine, 1983. 160 Pages, Softbound.

BATTLES IN VIETNAM, 1967-1975. By Perry Moore. Weapons and Warfare Special No. 7. International Graphics Corporation, 1982. 34 Pages. \$3.50, Softbound.

DEATH BEFORE DISHONOUR. By Trevor Boyle. St. Martin's Press, 1983. 176 Pages. \$14.95.

THE WORLD WAR II QUIZ AND FACT BOOK. By Timothy B. Benford. Harper and Row, 1982. 230 Pages. \$7.95, Softbound.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE WILDERNESS YEARS. By Martin Gilbert. Houghton Mifflin, 1982. 280 Pages. \$16.95.

UNITED STATES MARINES IN VIETNAM: AN EXPANDING WAR, 1966. By Jack Shullimson. History and Museum Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1982. 390 Pages. \$9.00.

THE U.S. MARINE CORPS STORY. By J. Robert Moskin. Revised Edition. McGraw-Hill, 1983. 807 Pages. \$12.95, Softbound.

THIS IS THE SAS: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL AIR SERVICE REGIMENT. By Tony Geraghty. Arco Publishing, 1983. 156 Pages. \$16.95.

DUST OFF: ARMY AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN VIETNAM. By Peter Dorland and James Nanney. Center of Military History, United States Army, 1982. 134 Pages. \$5.50, Softbound.

INFANTRY LETTERS



SUCCESS, NOT MISERY

Major Timothy P. Maroney's article "Train to be Miserable" (INFANTRY, January-February 1983, page 9) made me wonder. What's the point in being miserable?

If I want to be miserable, all I have to do is leave the house in a rainstorm and go sit in a ditch, alone, uncovered, and wait for the misery to come. Then I can appreciate it in all its degradation for a while. But how long do I have to sit there to achieve the Level 1 misery that Major Maroney is striving for?

The author has a good point — training must be more demanding and more challenging — but he has carried it too far. Our goal should not be to be miserable but to learn how to overcome adversity. Individual soldiers and teams must rise above any situation in which they find themselves and accomplish their mission. They can do this by hardening themselves and by improving their resolve. But I suggest they focus not on training to be miserable but on training to be successful, regardless

of the conditions. There's a big difference.

If we do not know where we are going, we usually end up somewhere else. And failing would make us *really* miserable.

RAY L. TOWLE
CPT, Infantry
Fort Benning, Georgia

COMBAT OLYMPICS

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Angsten ("Prepared to Fight," INFANTRY, January-February 1983, page 8) makes a good point about our soldiers being physically prepared to fight, but I suggest that it be carried further. I advocate that units develop "combat olympics" in which the best aspects of PT, SQT, crew drill, ARTEP, and FTX are combined to increase training realism, participation, and motivation.

The idea is not so unusual. Civilians compete in things like the National Survival Game (squad tactics with paint pistols), orienteering

(fitness and map skills), and the biathlon (fitness and marksmanship). And innovative units such as the 25th Infantry Division have initiated training excellence competitions (TOW crew, rifle squad, and such), a similar concept.

The crux of the issue is that the Army has little need for physical fitness; what it needs is *combat* fitness (mission-related physical strength, stamina, and suppleness and mental readiness). An Army-wide analysis of fitness several years ago identified six levels of fitness by MOS, but then stumbled over its own complicated administration. The point remains, however, that PT alone is inadequate to prepare soldiers for combat just as it was in World War II. The "experts" with combat experience back then initiated the log and sandbag drills, a practice the Marine Corps maintains. And if we look at infantry combat assault requirements, the relevance of the run, dodge, and jump is apparent.

Combat olympics, then, focused on combat fitness, would do all the things Colonel Angsten suggests but would add to them training and competition. A commander might, for example, have a Dragon crew move from station to station (from ambush scenario to combat assault to first aid to reacting to an ambush), all with MILES equipment, with five miles between stations and only a map with which to find the stations. And he might consider having them eat a lunch of C-rations on the way or holding the unit fund beer bust at the end. (If they don't finish, they don't drink.) The crew that has the best score and speed could be rewarded with a three-day pass or special award.

And for psychological readiness, the commander should dig out those

mouflage kits, or volunteer his unit to work in a slaughterhouse for a charity event. Or he might rotate his medics through the hospital's emergency room, surgical unit, and morgue. He might hold unit sick call in a tent using his unit medic. He might also lay some smoke mines on the route of march and schedule some OPFOR model plane air attacks.

In short, with some planning and imagination, any unit can begin to integrate combat fitness with its training and, in the process, to improve readiness and morale with the added challenge and competition.

Along these same lines, Major Maroney's "Train to be Miserable" (January-February 1983, page 9) has some admirable goals (increasing levels of difficulty), but the wording of the goal (being miserable) is questionable. We should be training for success and for the confidence and competence that result from it. Lots of folks are already miserable — troops learn more effectively when warm, dry, and successful. Misery doesn't take much practice.

JAMES E. LARSEN
Hampton, Virginia

REVIEW "A BIT MUCH"

Since the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute was the official sponsor of Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr.'s *On Strategy*, Dr. Joe P. Dunn's review in your January-February 1983 issue (page 47) was read here with some interest. I must say that I found his charge that the Army War College had sponsored "a mediocre study" with "superficial analysis and shoddy scholarship" a bit much, even for a critical review.

Professor Dunn's dyspeptic views did not come as a complete surprise; along with others in the military and academic community, he reviewed the draft manuscript before its publication. While critical then as now, he began his earlier evaluation with a revealing disclaimer: "I make no claims as a strategist," he wrote in

1981. "I am definitely a historian rather than a political scientist, strategist or analyst. Clausewitz, Jomini, Fuller, Hart, etc., leave me cold. I believe the study of the principles of war has some value in provoking thought, but I question any specific applications.... I have some question whether principles of war are strategic issues."

As Major General Jack N. Merritt (then Army War College Commandant) said in his Foreword to *On Strategy*, "It is important for the reader to understand what this book is and what it is not. It is not, nor was it intended to be, a history of the Vietnam war... What was intended was a narrow focus on the war in the area of major concern to the Army War College — the application of military science to the national defense... [u]sing Clausewitzian theory and the classic principles of war...."

Professor Dunn is certainly entitled to his views in regard to *On Strategy*, views with which your readers may or may not agree. But for the sake of our future battlefield success, I hope they do *not* share his view that there is no need to understand and apply the principles of war and "Clausewitz, Jomini, Fuller, Hart, etc."

KEITH A. BARLOW
Colonel, Infantry
Director, Strategic
Studies Institute

DR. DUNN REPLIES: In regard to Colonel Barlow's letter, honorable men may differ, as apparently we do about Colonel Summers' book. I am more interested here in addressing the quotations excerpted from my January 1981 personal letter to Colonel Summers.

Colonel Summers sent me galley proofs of his book just before its original publication and requested any comments that I might have. Since the book was obviously in its final stages and whatever I said could have little effect, I did not consider my remarks a formal review. I

responded merely as a courtesy in an informal, personal manner. Since many of my assessments were harsh, I attempted to soften the tone by a purposefully over-stated disclaimer. Had I known that my private letter would become public property, I would have been more formal, precise, and expansive and less off-the-cuff.

It is interesting to note that the most salient point of my opening remarks — that too many amateur students of theory tend to read their prejudices back into the classical tomes instead of honestly evaluating how classical theory speaks to the contemporary situation — was deleted from Colonel Barlow's quotations.

I have already stated my views on the book as scholarship both in my review and in a longer personal letter to Colonel Summers at the time the review appeared. I hope that I won't have to re-read excerpts of that letter in print in the future. Henceforth, greater caution will be my practice.

One point about the book does merit re-emphasis. My largest criticism was not the argument but the rather amateurish means of presenting it. I would hope that this consideration is as important in the military community as it is in academia. I am willing to defer to Colonel Barlow's obviously correct assessment of the role of strategy. If Colonel Summers' book plays a significant role in reassessing Vietnam strategy, then I may be more kindly disposed in the future. For the moment, I remain skeptical and will stand by my present evaluation.

11TH AIRBORNE MEMORIAL

Plans have been unveiled recently by members of the 11th Airborne Division Association to build a memorial to honor the men of that great division who served so valiantly during the 1940s and 1950s.

These plans call for the memorial to be placed at Arlington Cemetery if enough money can be raised. It will depict an 11th Airborne trooper with

his rifle raised triumphantly over his head in victory.

Anyone who would like to contribute to this fund is encouraged to send their checks or money orders (payable to 11th Airborne Memorial) to P.O. Box 1391, Peoria, Illinois 61654.

We will appreciate any help and will send a receipt by return mail.

LESTER E. LONG, Chairman
Memorial Committee

MARKSMANSHIP BADGES

Ever since it fired the first shot heard 'round the world, the American soldier's individual weapon has been his most important piece of equipment — whether it was a musket, a Kentucky rifle, a Springfield, a Carbine, or an M1, M14, or M16.

For that reason, soldiers over the years have worn their weapons qualification badges with pride and distinction. But in recent years these badges seem to have lost their place on our uniforms. For example, our senior noncommissioned officers and our officers as well usually do not wear them in official photographs.

This may be responsible for the fact that the soldiers do not wear them either. The officers and NCOs are saying, in effect, that the marksmanship badge is not important.

We, the infantry, must lead the way and set the example by returning to the policy of wearing this badge of distinction and professionalism. Commanders need to encourage and even require that all infantrymen wear their badges on all appropriate uniforms prescribed by AR 670-1.

Let's strengthen the bond between leaders and followers by wearing our badges of professionalism and distinction. Let's return to the proud tradition of wearing our weapons qualification badges.

JAMES W. ENGLISH
2LT, Infantry, USAR
Bakersfield, California


ON MORALE

I served throughout World War II with the 3d Infantry Division, and I still remember the importance of morale in a unit — a subject that I believe is now often neglected. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his *Crusade in Europe*, called morale

“the greatest single factor in successful war” and went on to discuss how morale can be achieved. Some of his comments are worth our renewed attention:

Endurable comparisons with the enemy in other essential factors — leadership, discipline, technique, numbers, equipment, mobility, supply, and maintenance — are prerequisite to the existence of morale. It breeds most readily upon success; but under good leaders it will be maintained among troops even during periods of adversity. The methods employed by successful leaders in developing morale differ so widely as to defy any attempt to establish rules. One observation, however, always applies: In any long and bitter campaign morale will suffer unless all ranks thoroughly believe that their commanders are concerned first and always with the welfare of the troops who do the fighting. A human understanding and a natural ability to mingle with all men on a basis of equality are more important than any degree of technical skill. . . .

Morale of the combat troops had always to be carefully watched. The capacity of soldiers for absorbing punishment and enduring privations is almost inexhaustible so long as they



believe they are getting a square deal, that their commanders are looking out for them, and that their own accomplishments are understood and appreciated. Any intimation that they are victims of unfair treatment understandably arouses their anger and resentment, and the feeling can sweep through a command like wildfire. . . .

Soldiers like to see the men who are directing operations. They properly resent any indication of neglect or indifference to them on the part of their commanders and invariably interpret a visit, even a brief one, as evidence of their commander's concern for them. Diffidence or modesty must never blind the commander to his duty of showing himself to his men, of speaking to them, of mingling with them to the extent of physical limitations. It pays big dividends in terms of morale, [which] given rough equality in other things, is supreme on the battlefield.

Commanders might remember, too, that morale is also important in a peacetime unit and that the same basic methods of attaining it apply in garrison operations and in field training.

A.C. HANSON
Bellflower, California

MORTARS IN DIVISION 86

I wholeheartedly agree with Lieutenant Mark L. Torrey's premise (INFANTRY, January-February 1983, page 12) that the Division 86 organization is inadequate, but I believe that its inadequacy lies not in the platoon's proposed organization or equipment, but in the concept itself.

On the modern battlefield, most of our field artillery fires will be directed against counterbattery or pre-planned targets. Thus, mortars will be the infantry commander's most responsive — if not his only — means of bringing indirect fire on immediate suppression targets and targets of opportunity. Consolidating all mortars at the battalion level takes away that responsiveness from the individual who needs it most — the rifle company commander.

Under the Division 86 concept, the rifle company commander will be forced to compete for mortar fires with the other company commanders of the battalion. No longer will he

We welcome letters to the Editor on any subject that has been treated in our magazine as well as on issues of general interest to our readers. All letters are subject to editing and possible abridgment.

have an indirect fire weapon system that is responsive solely to his needs. Hence, while the rifle company's flexibility and maneuverability may be increased by the establishment of a battalion consolidated mortar platoon, the advantages gained are far outweighed by the corresponding disadvantage in the combat power available to the rifle company commander.

JEFFREY A. JACOBS
1LT, Infantry
Fort Sill, Oklahoma

SEEKING MEMBERS

The National Order of Battlefield Commissions, a relatively new organization, is still looking for many of the people who are eligible to join. Membership is open to any past or present member of the armed forces of the United States who received a battlefield commission.

Anyone who is eligible or who would like additional information is invited to write to me at 4396 Stemen St., Rt. #1, Lima, Ohio 45807.

DANIEL S. EBELING

Infantry

1 YEAR 2 YEARS
 3 YEARS 4 YEARS

CASH BILL ME
 NEW RENEWAL
 CHANGE OF ADDRESS

NAME _____
 ADDRESS _____
 CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

PRINTED AND BOUND BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983-646-070/3

From The Editor

NEW SERIES

During the past several years, the United States Infantryman has been the target of a good deal of criticism from all kinds of writers. Too often, he has been pictured as incompetent, poorly trained, and poorly led, and his heroism and fighting ability in World War II, in Korea, and in Vietnam have been seriously questioned.

We disagree with this assessment. We think the United States Infantryman was then and is now one of the best fighting men in the world. We intend to show just how good he was in a new series of articles — a series we are calling **INFANTRY IN ACTION** — which we plan to start in our July-August 1983 issue.

We will use accounts from various sources of platoon and company actions that will demonstrate our belief in the ability of our Infantrymen. At the same time, we believe, by presenting graphic examples of a wide range of situations, these accounts will hold valuable lessons for today's small unit Infantry leaders.

We hope you will find the articles useful as well as informative, and we will welcome your comments and suggestions on this new series.

MDB

OUTSIDE BACK COVER

Chemical Mortarmen, Italy, 1945, by Savo Padulovic.
(United States Army Art Collection)

