Infantry
July-August 1995

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COVER: This issue's cover of combined arms operations against the Japanese is based upon film found in the camera of First Lieutenant Robert Fields, who had been killed in action shortly after taking the picture, on Panay Island in the Philippines on March 18, 1945.

* INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9537) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. * Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. * Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. * Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. * Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-2005. * Telephones: Editorial, (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951; DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; Subscriptions, (706) 545-3626; DSN 835-3626. * Second-class postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and additional mailing offices. * POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-2005. * USPS Publication No. 370630.
COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS—LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

In my last two Commandant’s Notes, I have discussed Infantry Force XXI and the Warrior Focus Advanced Warfighter Experiment, which will enable us to design and field the force we need to meet our national commitments out to and beyond the year 2000. In this note, I want to provide an update on five of the systems that, along with the Land Warrior and 21st Century Land Warrior integrated soldier warfighting systems, will give that force the punch to remain a credible deterrent, and—if necessary—to swiftly maneuver and place accurate, devastating fires against an aggressor.

Infantrymen have long relied upon the mortar for its ability to deliver responsive, high-angle fires in support of ground forces, and the 120mm mortar now being fielded represents a significant improvement over the 4.2 inch (107mm) mortar we have used up to now, in terms of range, lethality, smoke obscuration, and illumination. The system will be fielded in both towed and carrier-mounted configurations. An operational requirements document (ORD) has been approved for a mortar fire control system (MFCS), which will reduce the time needed to process calls for fire, while increasing the lethality, maneuverability, and survivability of the mortar and its crew. The MFCS will also employ a computer interface to link the mortar digitally with the advanced field artillery tactical data system, allowing better dispersion and integration of all fire support assets on the future battlefield.

The Javelin advanced antitank weapon system—medium (AAWS-M) will replace the Dragon missile system beginning in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1996 in infantry and combat engineer battalions, and in mounted scout platoons. The Infantry School considers Javelin the number one procurement priority for both light and mechanized forces because of its advantages over the Dragon in lethality, range, and survivability. With its true fire-and-forget technology, all-weather target acquisition, top or direct attack capability, and the ability to be fired from enclosures, Javelin will enable the infantryman to engage and defeat any armored target at ranges out to 2,000 meters.

To train soldiers in the employment of the Javelin, three training devices are in parallel development with the missile itself. These three—the basic skills trainer (BST), the field tactical trainer (FTT), and the missile simulation round (MSR)—will be fielded concurrently with the Javelin.

Another weapon that supports the urgent need for a man-portable system—to replace the M72 LAW, the AT4, and the bunker defeat munition (BDM)—is the multipurpose individual munition/short range assault weapon (MPIM/SRAW). Experience in Panama, Operation DESERT STORM, and Somalia identified the requirements for such a weapon, and this joint Army and Marine Corps program is the result. The system will increase soldier lethality through the use of a multipurpose warhead that is effective against both structures and armor. It will also enhance soldier survivability by its soft launch, which allows for firing from the prone position and from enclosures such as buildings and bunkers. The MPIM/SRAW can be employed from 17 to 200 meters, and the munition will defeat earth and timber bunkers, reinforced masonry walls, and light armored vehicles, killing or incapacitating the enemy through the effects of a penetrating grenade.

In the March-April 1995 issue of INFANTRY, I
stressed the need to enhance the lethality and survivability of the light infantry, and the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS) is a step in the right direction. ITAS, the number two antitank procurement priority, following Javelin, will go a long way toward improving the light force's TOW HMMWV capability. It will replace that weapon's current target acquisition/fire control system and is a pre-planned product improvement that also reflects the requirements for a heavy antitank weapon to execute light infantry missions in the year 2000 and beyond.

Requirements for ITAS include an integrated night sight with second-generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) and a day sight with direct view optics, an aided target tracker that can track two targets simultaneously, and a biocular display. Other improvements are an eyesafe laser rangefinder, an automatic boresight, a built-in test and test equipment that afford a self-diagnostic capability, and embedded training to develop and sustain soldier proficiency on the weapon system.

The final system I want to talk about is the future infantry fighting vehicle (FIFV). Fielding of the M2A3/M3A3 Bradley is scheduled for completion in Fiscal Year 2010, with these models expected to remain in service and beyond the year 2020. By that time some of the approximately 1,900 earliest models, the A0s, will have been in service for as long as 28 years. In the meantime, potential adversaries will have continued to develop armor and weapon systems that may challenge the lethality and survivability of those existing Bradleys. We therefore need to think ahead if we are to remain competitive and offer a credible deterrent to aggression. We will need to implement a developmental program to field an FIFV that can meet the most advanced threat into the first two decades of the next century. Once Force Package 1 units get these vehicles, their A3 Bradleys and those that have been modified to meet requirements identified during Operation DESERT STORM (ODS) can be reissued so that the A0 Bradleys can be phased out of service.

What will the new FIFV look like, and what will we expect it to do? First, it will perform essentially the same mission as the current Bradley fighting vehicle, but with the enhanced lethality and survivability to deal effectively with the targets and weapons it will encounter on the future battlefield. This will require an upgraded gun and missile system, with armor protection afforded by new lightweight materials that will reduce the vehicle's weight, or at least hold it to a minimum commensurate with maneuverability and survivability requirements.

To further insure crew survivability and reduce vehicle combat losses, the FIFV will also incorporate the latest technology in vehicle defense systems. We anticipate that the FIFV will carry more dismounts than the present configuration allows, probably on the order of a nine-man squad. When you add state-of-the-art digital communications, fire control systems, and FLIR, the FIFV will have increased range and lethality that will ensure a standoff advantage over threat weapon systems. U.S. and coalition forces had such an advantage in DESERT STORM, and it is an edge we cannot afford to lose.

Finally, recognizing the imperative for combined arms operations, the FIFV must draw upon the latest automotive technology to ensure that its mobility is equal to or greater than that of the main battle tank that will support the infantry force.

Given the number of potential adversaries that have taken advantage of the flood of high-tech materiel available since the collapse of the Soviet Union, few would argue against the need for continued military readiness by the United States and her allies. Our global mission may well require commitment of U.S. forces in scenarios that range from operations other than war to armed intervention. Whatever form that involvement may take, our commitments will probably continue to rely heavily upon infantry forces, and we must be ready when called upon.

These five systems represent key elements of the U.S. Army's effort to upgrade its indirect fire, antiarmor, and maneuver capabilities to meet the demands of the next century. Their fielding will ensure that a deployed U.S. force will still be able to meet the best the enemy has to offer, fight the close, tough fight, and emerge victorious.
INFORMATION SOUGHT ON ZEROING M16A2 RIFLE

The 2d Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, in conjunction with the Army Research Institute (ARI), has begun a study to determine whether the M16A2 zeroing procedures outlined in Field Manual (FM) 23-9, M16A1 and M16A2 Rifle Marksmanship, are in need of revision. Preliminary results indicate that an M16A2 rifle, when zeroed at 25 meters in accordance with the manual, will shoot high on a 300-meter target when aimed center of mass.

We would appreciate any information INFANTRY readers may have on the subject. The following are specific topics of interest:

- Information on why the 25-meter zero standard was adopted for the M16A2.
- Any modifications to the FM 23-9 zeroing procedures being used in the field to address the tendency of a properly zeroed M16A2 to shoot high at the 300-meter target when aimed center of mass.
- Studies concerning the trajectory of the M16A2 round.
- Studies concerning the most common engagement ranges in recent U.S. combat operations.
- Problems with the rifle’s rear sight.
- Comparisons between U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps M16A2 zeroing procedures.

Anyone with information that may be of value to this study is invited to call the 2d Battalion, 29th Infantry, at DSN 784-6922 or commercial (706) 544-6922. Points of contact are MAJ Dougherty and MSG Sump.

MICHAEL A. PHILLIPS
LTC, Infantry
Commanding Officer

RESEARCHING SOLDIERS OF “SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE”

I am conducting research on the 141 U.S. prisoners of war who were held in Arbeitskommando 557 in Dresden, Germany, in early 1945. These were American soldiers from the 106th Infantry Division who had been captured during the Battle of the Bulge and subsequently transferred to Stalag IV before being assigned to Arbeitskommando 557. This Arbeitskommando was made famous in the book Slaughterhouse Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. These soldiers were present in the meat locker during the bombing of Dresden in February 1945 and were subsequently forced to search for and dispose of the dead following the raids.

We have located approximately 60 of the 141 soldiers and would like to hear from anyone who has knowledge of any survivors, or any documentation or photographs of Dresden, either shortly before the bombing or in the aftermath.

We are also interested in finding anyone who may have conducted interviews of, or investigations into, the returning prisoners. Two of the group did not come back: Edward Crone, Jr., died of malnutrition in a prison camp, and Michael D. Palaia was executed for stealing a can of food. I would greatly appreciate it if anyone having knowledge of these two men, or any of the others from “Slaughterhouse Five” would contact me at S76 W2280 Knoll Drive, Big Bend, WI 53103; telephone (414) 662-4547.

FRANK J. IDZIKOWSKI

SHAEF/ETOUSA VETERANS ASSOCIATION REUNION

The 11th National Reunion of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) will be held in Chicago, Illinois, 6-9 October 1995.

For additional information, write to me at 2301 Broadway, San Francisco, CA 94115; telephone or FAX (415) 921-8322.

ALAN F. REEVES

EDITOR’S CORRECTION

In the article “Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia,” by Lieutenant William A. Kendrick (May-June 1995, page 31), the author’s biographical data was inaccurate. During the deployment to Somalia, Lieutenant Kendrick led a platoon in Company D, 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry, and is now the battalion’s signal officer.

Our apologies to Lieutenant Kendrick for the confusion.
THE SOLDIER ENHANCEMENT Program (SEP) invites soldiers to submit common-sense ideas for improving their lethality, mobility, and survivability on the battlefield. The purpose of SEP is to accelerate the acquisition of lighter, more lethal weapons and improved “soldier items of equipment,” and to get that new equipment in the hands of soldiers in three years or less.

The Army has allocated funds each year to purchase, test, and type-classify off-the-shelf equipment based on recommendations from soldiers and commanders in the field. Funds are then budgeted to purchase and field those non-developmental items of equipment that pass rigorous technical and operational testing. Some items are type-classified, placed in Common Tables of Allowance publications or General Services Administration (GSA) catalogs and can be purchased by the unit commander for his soldiers using his operational funds. Other items may be fielded at no cost to the unit.

Since its inception in 1990, SEP has approved 139 projects and completed 49 of them, fielding such items as combat ration improvements, a flameless ration heater, intermediate cold/wet gloves, penlights/flashlights, the M249 assault pack, sniper optics, desert BDUs (battle dress uniforms), desert boots, the mat-tex, laser/ballistic eye protection, a soldier ground insulator, common rail mounts, an AT4 night sight bracket, the laser target pointer, intermediate cold/wet boots, an individual tactical load-bearing vest, the extended cold/wet boots, and many others.

When ideas are received, they are screened to ensure that they meet the minimum criteria for an SEP proposal. SEP candidates are then forwarded to the Army Materiel Command (AMC) for a technical risk assessment. Propo-

ment schools of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) then evaluate them to determine whether an operational need or requirement exists. Ideas that meet the criteria, are low to moderate technical risk, and solve a battlefield deficiency or need, are then placed in priority for funding as “new starts” for the next fiscal year.

The Army will soon begin accepting new start candidates for the Fiscal Year 1997 program. SEP candidates must meet the following criteria: must be a soldier system item (an item of equipment worn, carried, or consumed by the soldier for his or her individual use in a tactical environment); must be commercially available (off-the-shelf with little or no modification for field military use); and must satisfy an operational need or battlefield deficiency. If it makes the soldier more effective or efficient on the battlefield, reduces his load (in either weight or bulk), enhances lethality, survivability, command and control, sustainment, mobility, safety, training, or quality of life, or if soldiers are spending their own money to buy it, then it may well be a strong SEP candidate.

The SEP is not an incentive award program. No monetary awards will be given for proposals that are adopted for use and result in a cost saving to the government.

Anyone who would like to submit a Soldier Enhancement Program proposal may obtain a submission form by contacting the TRADOC System Manager-Soldier, ATTN: ATZB-TS, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000; telephone commercial (706) 545-1189/6047, DSN 835-1189/6047, FAX 835-1377.

A WEAPON TO REPLACE the M72 light antitank weapon (LAW) and the M136 (AT4) is being developed in a joint effort between the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army Infantry School’s Directorate of Combat Developments.

The Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM)/Short Range Assault Weapon (SRAW) is a true multipurpose weapon system specifically designed for today’s light infantrymen. It will enable both soldiers and marines to defeat a broad spectrum of targets on the modern battlefield.

The MPIM/SRAW is a lightweight man-portable system capable of destroying or disabling targets with direct fire. Through the use of follow-through technology, the missile is capable of introducing a grenade about three-fourths the size of the standard hand grenade into an opening created by the initial penetrating blast. This ability enables the weapon to destroy or disable a target by killing or incapacitating enemy personnel inside or behind enclosures such as bunkers or buildings.

A fire-and-forget missile, the weapon’s internal guidance, which is built into the missile itself, eliminates the need for wires, extensive tracking, and lead time for moving targets. The built-in guidance capability also gives the infantry soldier a higher probability of a first-round hit, given a single shot, and the dual functioning warhead ensures high lethality and destructive effects against personnel and other targets.

The MPIM/SRAW is 35 inches long and will weigh less than 20 pounds. This is shorter and about six pounds heavier than the AT4, but it is more versatile and tailored to the infantry. The weapon system was developed to meet the needs of the individual soldier, with heavy consideration for urban opera-

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tions, deliberate defense, and defense against light armored vehicles. Current night vision sight technology is compatible and effective out to a range of at least 300 meters.

The system has a soft launch capability that enables the gunner to fire the weapon safely from within enclosures and from the prone position without concern for the injuries normally associated with backblast. This soft launch increases the soldier’s survivability by reducing the launch signature and by allowing him to take full advantage of available cover and concealment.

The MPIM-SRAW will be procured as a round of ammunition and will be issued on the basis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). Initial unit densities will closely parallel those of the AT4. Training, also expected to be similar to that for the AT4, will be easier because of the elimination of lead compensation for moving targets.

The development of the weapon is unique in that the Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal is developing the warhead, and the U.S. Marine Corps is developing the missile. The integration of the two will begin in Fiscal Year 1996, and fielding is scheduled to begin in Fiscal Year 2001.

Meanwhile, the Infantry School is looking for a new name for the MPIM/SRAW—a weapon that significantly improves the infantryman’s ability to close with and destroy the enemy. (The Marine Corps version is called “Predator.”)

If you have a suggestion for a name or would like to see a video of the MPIM/SRAW in action, write to Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-CDF, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5400.

THE M2HB .50 CALIBER machineguns now in units may have two different kinds of barrels—lined and unlined—and the difference can be important.

The .50 caliber machinegun (NSN 1005-00-322-9715) has been in the inventory for many years and continues to be the Army’s primary heavy machinegun, partly because of upgrades and improvements made over the years. One such improvement is the lined barrel (NSN 1005-00-726-6131, part number 7266131). Manufacturers install liners, using Stellite 21 (MIL-C-13358), as an effective means of moderating barrel erosion. The liner is hardened to resist abrasion, has good thermal properties to resist heat, and is chemically inert to retain its original physical properties. This improvement makes the lined barrel more durable than the unlined barrel.

Although the unlined barrel (NSN 1005-00-652-8269, part number 6528269) is no longer in production, it may still exist in some units. This barrel is fully operational and will fire current M17 and M33 .50 caliber ammunition. Units should be aware, however, that the newly developed XM903 and XM962 sabotted light armor penetrator (SLAP) ammunition performs poorly when fired from an unlined barrel.

A visual check can be used to identify barrels with and without liners: Hold the barrel to a light source and look inside. In a lined barrel, you will see a gap in the lining eight to ten inches from the breach end. This gap allows for expansion between the lining and the parent metal of the barrel. In an unlined barrel, you will see no such gap.

The U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) and the Armament and Chemical Acquisition and Logistics Agency (ACALA) recommend that unlined barrels be used during training only. Lined barrels should be used for weapons qualification and during conflicts.

The points of contact are CPT John Hodge, at USAIC, DSN 835-5013, commercial (706) 545-5013; and Mr. Bill Jensen, at ACALA, DSN 793-3677, commercial (309) 782-3677.

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Understanding People
The Key to Successful Leadership
LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERIC L. BORCH

The late General Creighton Abrams defined a key element of leadership when he said, "The Army isn’t made up of people; the Army is people." Throughout history, successful leaders have applied this philosophy in a variety of ways, and the one common denominator in their success has been knowing their soldiers and understanding the factors that motivate them.

Motivation is a term that can mean many things to many people; to some, it is a function of positive reinforcement and is achieved through praise, rewards, or the prestige that comes with increased responsibility. To others, the fear of punishment or other forms of negative reinforcement will motivate a soldier to do his best. History offers countless examples of both approaches to motivation and of the success or failure that resulted from each.

Psychologist Abraham H. Maslow argued that human needs could be categorized within five levels. They are, in descending order: the need for self-actualization, ego needs, social needs, safety needs, and physiological needs. Self-actualization—the desire to achieve the full potential of one’s energies and talents—includes personal development and growth, creativity, and self-realization. The ego needs include self-esteem and the esteem of others; the former includes perceptions of one’s own competence, adequacy, and power, while the latter relates to such things as one’s status within society, the extent to which one is respected, and the prestige and recognition one enjoys.

According to Maslow, the social needs relate to acceptance and include such intangible factors as love, friendship, and a sense of belonging to a group or team. Those categorized as safety needs include not only safety from injury and violence but also financial security. Finally, the physiological needs address such issues as food, water, shelter, sleep, and even sexual fulfillment. Obviously, the perceived importance of these needs may differ from one person to another; in some individuals, one need—the need for companionship, for example—may be of very low importance, and may be supplanted by greater emphasis on another need, but the needs that motivate us as humans generally fall within these categories.

If Maslow’s hierarchy defines some of the factors that influence human behavior, how can a leader apply this information to the improvement of his unit? Given this list of needs, what will motivate men and women to excel in peace and war? Those who strive to become better leaders will immediately see that the Army makes it fairly easy to meet at least some of a soldier’s social, safety, and physiological needs, since soldiers are members of a team, receive regular paychecks and recognition, and are generally well sheltered, get adequate sleep, and eat well. It remains, therefore, to address the needs of self-actualization and esteem as the dominant motivators of those in uniform. But how do we do that?

If followed, a number of guidelines (see box) will enable a leader to gain the support of soldiers and provide the motivation needed to ensure mission accomplishment.

First, demand the best of your soldiers at all times. Setting high standards provides the direction that any unit needs, and it gives soldiers the opportunity to meet or exceed those standards. Make sure the men and women of the unit understand that their best ef-
GUIDELINES

• Set and enforce high standards, and ensure that soldiers know you expect their best effort on each and every task.
• Give soldiers responsibility; they thrive on it.
• Treat everyone with the same dignity and respect that you expect others to exercise when dealing with you.
• Gain your soldiers' respect and confidence by being proficient in your job and showing by your actions that you are concerned for their welfare.
• Remember that leading and commanding are not necessarily the same thing; both work best when applied together.

For instance, respect is good enough, but you must set clear, unequivocal goals against which effort can be measured. The late Major General Aubrey S. Newman said, "A man's best is good enough for me." This is a good philosophy so long as all concerned agree on the definition of best. If the soldier knows that best efforts are what is most important, and that a leader values this effort above all else, this encourages personal growth and self-respect, and will earn the esteem of others.

Second, almost all soldiers thrive on responsibility; give it to them, and watch the results. The knowledge that you expect their best, coupled with the responsibility to do the job their way, will encourage initiative, creativity, and personal growth. As General George S.

"Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity."

General George Patton

Patton put it: "Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity." Allowing soldiers to use their own abilities and talents in this way will enable them to realize their potential and allow them to enjoy the self-esteem,

respect of others, and even the positive recognition—in the form of promotion and awards—that come from a job well done.

A third principle is that a leader must take a personal interest in the welfare and safety of every soldier, both on and off duty. A soldier who is treated with the dignity and respect he deserves will respond with loyalty to the unit and its commander. Likewise, a leader who is proficient in his job will have taken a long step toward earning the trust of the members of the unit; this is one of the most powerful of motivating factors, because it means that the soldiers in his care are likely to subordinate their own needs and desires to those of the organization. Once they have become team players, the goals of the team become the priority, and that is what mission accomplishment is all about.

In the hierarchy of needs, trust and confidence promote the self-esteem and the self-actualization that are necessary for the tremendous sacrifices that soldiers are often called upon to make, even risking life and limb for the sake of mission accomplishment. Trust and confidence are instilled by competent and capable leaders, and no soldier trusts a leader who doesn't know his job. Assuming, however, that a leader is technically proficient, what is that elusive quality that engenders trust among subordinates? More than anything, I believe it is a genuine liking for people that the leader communicates by word and—most important—deed that will earn their trust. Men and women know instinctively whether someone likes them or not, and they can also spot a phony a mile away. The most genuinely caring leaders are often those who do not make a great show of their concern, but who amply demonstrate it by taking an interest in their soldiers' careers, families, problems, health, and welfare.

An important element of the leader's concern is the example he sets. Leading by example is certainly not a new concept, but it is as relevant today as it was at Valley Forge. A leader whose decisions are based upon selfless motives will have the credibility that is essential to success. He must be willing to suffer the same privations and undergo the same hardships as his men, and he must be willing to forego popularity, choosing instead to do what is right. An example of this is tough, realistic training; a commander may be tempted to lower training standards, thinking such a measure will improve morale, when in fact the opposite result is more likely. Soldiers know when they—and you—are cutting corners, and they also realize the consequences of going into combat unprepared. A leader who succumbs to temptation and adopts such a policy is not taking care of his men.

General Newman wrote in 1967: "Leadership is the art of inspiring a desire in men's hearts to do what you want them to do; command is the knack of making them do what you want them to do." The keys to successful leadership are understanding what motivates people, setting and enforcing high standards, and taking care of your soldiers. It may have taken a psychologist to define the five categories of human needs, but the intuitive understanding of motivation has guided successful leaders for centuries, and has often decided the fate of nations.

Lieutenant Colonel Frederic L. Borch is assigned to the Office of the Judge Advocate General in Washington. He previously served at the Judge Advocate General's School, in the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, the 21st Support Command in Germany, and in the 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry in Italy. He is a 1976 ROTC graduate of Davidson College (North Carolina) and holds law degrees from the University of North Carolina School of Law, the University of Brussels, Belgium, and the Judge Advocate General's School.

"Leadership is the art of inspiring a desire in men's hearts to do what you want them to do; command is the knack of making them do what you want them to do."

Major General
Aubrey S. Newman

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Cordon and Search Operations

MAJOR CHRISTOPHER HUGHES
MAJOR THOMAS G. ZIEK, JR.

An operations other than war (OOTW) scenario adds new wrinkles to the traditional Army missions, and the cordon and search is no exception. During Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti in 1994, we had an opportunity to observe cordon and search missions and talk with some of the participants. That operation illustrated that to succeed in such an environment, infantry commanders at all levels must be able to adapt doctrinal missions to apply to situations that are often ambiguous.

The mission of the 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in Haiti was to provide a stable and secure environment in which ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide could safely return to the country. In that uncertain situation, this translated into attempting to “de-fang” members of three predominant groups operating as the law: the FRAPH, a political and paramilitary organization designed to enforce the whims of the party in power; the FADH, the military/police force designed to keep the peace in the country; and the Attachés, the true mercenaries of the three groups.

The 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT)—which operated in a portion of the capital city of Port-au-Prince—consisted of an infantry battalion and an armor battalion (minus), along with attachments of psychological operations (PSYOPs), counterintelligence (CI), military police (MP), engineers, and forward support battalion personnel. The brigade conducted active patrolling and cordon and search operations to keep the senior FRAPH leaders off balance and to get weapons off the streets.

The environment in Haiti differed vastly from that in Somalia. Although the entry of U.S. military units into Haiti was supposedly peaceful, nobody was sure of the reception they would get. The fact that most Haitians had been supportive of U.S. operations on the ground required certain guidelines that hindered traditional wartime military operations. Because of this ambiguity, the units operated under extremely tight rules of engagement designed to control the use of deadly force. The command instituted policies that forbade the destruction of private property and hindered the search of adjacent areas. In addition, regardless of what the military situation might have dictated, the news media had free rein in the area. The troops therefore had to take a cautious approach to searching, for fear their actions might be misinterpreted.

These constraints made operations more difficult to conduct. The commanders at company, battalion, and brigade levels had to alter their traditional military missions to fit the environment. A case in point was the cordon and search missions assigned to the infantry teams, which were aimed at suspected weapon cache sites and command and control nodes.

On the basis of our observations and discussions with the 1st BCT, along with our collective experience, we want to share the following recommendations to help units conduct cordon and search operations. Although many of these ideas are not new, they may reduce the need to relearn tactical lessons when attempting new missions.

First, knowing the enemy from a cultural standpoint helps a unit plan its operations. In the case of Haiti, helpful information included the following:

- Most of the people are poor and uneducated.
- Many of them are superstitious and believe in a mix of Voodoo and Christianity.
- It is a male-dominated society.
- The division between rich and poor is extreme, and wealth and power are flaunted by those who have them.
- Haiti has a history of violence and revolution that appears, paradoxically, alongside a naive trust of people. This translates into two seemingly opposite trends—vigilantism and respect for authority.

Knowing such facts as these before setting foot in a country allows a leader to evaluate some of the tools at his disposal. Several items come to mind in planning operations: The people may be susceptible to PSYOPs missions with simple and direct messages. They may be easily awed, and hence controlled, by such things as night leaflet drops or speakers and searchlights mounted on high-flying C-130 or UH-60 aircraft, or on HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles). And because of the role of women in many societies, the emphasis in searching and detaining should be placed more upon the men than the women.

Since the United Nations had placed an embargo on Haiti in 1991, much of the country’s infrastructure had deteriorated. Much of the threat that
U.S. forces faced would therefore be from unsophisticated weapon systems and command and control assets. In addition, because few people could afford to buy gasoline, those in powerful positions would obtain it through extortion or force. This information could be an area to keep on: Who has a car that operates? Where is it kept? Where does it go?

Finally, developing a rapport with the people when there is no threat can go a long way toward defusing potentially dangerous situations. It is also a way of obtaining human intelligence (HUMINT). In Haiti, 70 percent of the population supported Aristide in the 1990 elections, and since that time, these people had been repressed. Retaining the good will of the people therefore required a measured and careful use of force. This, in turn, allowed U.S. forces to tap into a potential wealth of HUMINT.

Because of the great division between the Haves and the Have Nots, care must be taken in using HUMINT information. The poor might conceivably feed our forces bad intelligence just to “get even,” either with their enemies or just with people in a higher socio-economic status.

The cordon and search mission in Haiti was directed against suspected weapon cache sites. Due to the nature of the environment, most of these sites were small and easily moved, and therefore difficult to find. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process was crucial to success. Doctrinally, the identification of suspected cache sites could be either a top-down process or a bottom-up process, and both approaches were used.

Using electronic, signal, and HUMINT assets, the task force targeting cell established target priorities daily and passed the information to the maneuver elements on the ground. The 1st Brigade commander used more of a bottom-up approach. With CI teams and mounted and dismounted patrols, the BCT was able to saturate an area with assets.

This saturation did several things: It allowed for a visible U.S. presence that fostered security; enabled the 1st BCT staff to identify and evaluate a target; and gave the troops on the ground a feel for the neighborhood. At times, the information gathered during this process forced slight adjustments on the target location (a certain house as opposed to another one). In an OOTW environ-

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detectors and an explosives kit can open doors and search both the people and the ground in the target area.

The company itself should be task-organized into three teams: a cordon team, a security team, and a search team. (A recommended team task organization, including equipment, is shown in the accompanying box.)

**Cordon Team.** The mission of the cordon team is to set up the outer cordon along the major avenues of approach around the target area, using checkpoints. These soldiers stop and search all vehicles and personnel entering and leaving the area of operations. Due to the nature of the environment, U.S. forces cannot keep people from moving about in the outer cordon area, but all should be searched and control maintained. The staff judge advocate (SJA) representative should have definitive guidance published beforehand so the ground commander will know his legal limitations. The company executive officer should be with this team, because the vehicles will be positioned in this area, and because this is the area in which the news media will first come into contact with U.S. forces.

**Security Team.** The security team controls the inner cordon around the specific target area and the target itself by providing 360-degree security. This area should be much more tightly controlled, with elements securing as many avenues of approach as possible. This team secures the site itself before the search team begins its search. Any personnel found in the inner security zone, and between the security zone and the outer cordon, should be detained, searched, and questioned before being moved to a holding area, where they are then treated in accordance with standing operating procedures (SOPs) for detainee handling.

The security team is also responsible for controlling access into the target itself. Since this is the area that has the highest potential for action, company medics should be attached to the team. The security team is also responsible for crowd control as people move toward the target. The company first sergeant should travel with the team to help the platoon leader.

**Search Team.** The search team should be relatively small, should consist only of experienced soldiers whenever possible, and should carry specialized equipment. To avoid confusion, this team should be the only element to enter the target area. The company commander should accompany the team to provide command and control and to make decisions concerning search procedures.

Experience with MPs indicates, by and large, that the docile population found in this OOTW scenario will abide by the limits defined by engineer tape. The MPs are extremely good with crowd control, and their experience in this area is invaluable in defusing potentially damaging situations.

Because of the permissive environment, care must be taken not to destroy or deface property unnecessarily. Chalk, since it is non-permanent, should be used to mark items already searched, including people. Mine detectors can be used to search people and areas where weapons might be buried. Several Series 200 locks must be brought along, because each lock that is cut off must be replaced to prevent looters from ransacking the area once U.S. forces pull out. (In OOTW, this is a consideration that cannot be ignored.)

The search team should ground—and secure—their load-bearing vests (LBV) and flak vests during the search so it can be conducted quickly and efficiently. This is obviously determined by an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). In Haiti, the situation suggested that the benefits of this decision outweighed the risks involved in having soldiers take off their flak vests. No anti-handling devices had been discovered, and troops conducting searches in full battle gear would tire out quickly in the high heat and humidity.

The ideal sequence of events is to conduct detailed rehearsals and a comprehensive pre-combat inspection before an operation. During the actual operation, surveillance units that have been left to watch the target should be attached to either the cordon team or the security team. The sequence of movement to the target should be cordon team first, followed by the headquarters section, the security team, and the search team. Thus, the operation can progress sequentially, and the commander will have the flexibility to alter the planned sequence in response to unexpected events.

The company team is sufficiently large to allow the commander the option of enlarging the search on the basis of new information collected by the interpreters and the CI team during the operation. The person giving the information should be taken along on the search. This allows military intelligence personnel to check future information from this person on the basis of a proven record of reliability. This was SOP in the Ist BCT.

Although most infantry platoons are good at conducting combat operations, most soldiers do not know how to search a room, unless there are combat veterans from Somalia or Vietnam in the company. The following is one technique for searching a room:

Once the sniffer dog has gone through, begin the search. Starting with the bottom floor and working up is a good method. First, move all of the furniture to one side of the room and examine the floor for cracks, dirt,
discoloration. Once this is done, move the furniture to the other side of the room and repeat the process. Then check all the walls the same way. Remove pictures, wall hangings, and rugs to check for holes. Look at the ceiling for openings to an attic or crawl space, and check these areas. Look for things that appear out of the ordinary. Once this is done, check the furniture, looking for false bottoms, ripped and resewn areas in upholstery, and the like. Repeat these steps in each room of the target area. Take care not to dump items all over the place. This pollutes the area and makes it harder to search, and you might miss something or destroy property needlessly.

In some cases, the intimidation of the owner will lead him to "assist" you with the search. The MP dogs are good for this, as is finding the individual's most prized possessions and threatening to handle them roughly. Sometimes this is all it takes for the owner to show soldiers any hidden items.

When questioning individuals, know what you're looking for, and keep repeating the questions. Many Third World economies are based on a barter system in which transactions are conducted through involved conversations, and it should be no different in questioning a suspect. Although none existed in Haiti, sewer systems should not be overlooked in other countries.

Once the search is complete and all suspected individuals have been questioned or detained, U.S. forces should make every effort to return the location to the condition in which they found it. This includes replacing locks that have been cut. Because there is a potential power vacuum in OOTW situations, the interpreters and the PSYOPs team should warn the crowd not to take any action against the site owner's family and property. In these situations, our forces should cultivate as much good will as possible.

In many cases, a company team commander will not have all these assets available and will have to reshuffle the basic task organization to accomplish the mission. If there is only one mine detector, it should stay with the cordon team. If there is only one interpreter, he should remain with the security team, as should the CI team. If the company is lucky enough to have a sniper team attached, that team should be task organized with the security team. METT-T will dictate the best way to make up for any shortage of assets.

There is one other area that must be planned for: the news media. Positive control must be maintained so that their presence does not adversely affect the mission. Guidance from the SJA and the joint task force commander should help the team commander with this issue.

OOTW offers some interesting changes to the traditional cordon and search mission. The information we offer here can be used as a start point for commanders with no experience in this type of operation. Each commander can then modify it on the basis of his own IPB and analysis of METT-T.

In operations other than war, guidance from higher headquarters concerning the political and social situation should also guide the conduct of the operation. In Haiti, the mission was to promote a stable and secure environment, and properly conducted cordon and search missions did just that.

Major Christopher Hughes was one of the officers from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, who observed infantry operations in Haiti. He previously served at the Joint Readiness Training Center in the opposing force unit and as an observer-controller and commanded a company in the 101st Airborne Division. He is a 1983 ROTC graduate of Northwest Missouri State University and holds a master's degree from Webster University.

Major Thomas G. Ziek Jr., a history instructor at the United States Military Academy, was attached to the Joint History Team covering the operations in Haiti. He previously served in the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, and commanded a company in the 2d Battalion, 505th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. He is a 1983 graduate of the Academy and holds a master's degree from Texas A and M University.

Convoy Security Using a Light Infantry Antiarmor Platoon

CAPTAIN JAMES SIEMORE

The current emphasis on operations other than war (OOTW) is appropriate. Convoy operations in OOTW has also attracted attention. (See "Convoy Planning," by Major Jeffrey J. Gudmens, and "Convoy Security Operations," by Major Martin N. Stanton in INFANTRY, January-February 1994.) The need to transport food stuffs, medicines, and basic subsistence items safely has always been important, especially in a light battalion, where the
sustained. Soldiers live off what they can carry and can’t carry much.

To sustain the force, it is critical that supplies reach front-line units at least every three days. On today’s battlefield, a light infantry battalion or brigade is often called upon to resupply itself from support areas well in the rear. In many units, the use of the antiaircraft platoon in the convoy escort and security role has become the standard for resupply missions.

Unfortunately, the planning manual for platoon and company antitank operations—ARTEP 7-91-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Antiaircraft Company/Platoon/Section—does not offer any guidance for convoy security operations. After looking through several field manuals, I have identified a number of basic considerations for the conduct of such operations:

Upon receipt of the mission, the antiaircraft platoon leader needs to conduct a mission analysis and task organize his platoon. The planning and preparation for the mission need to be approached in the same manner as for any other combat mission.

The number of vehicles in your platoon or company must also be considered. In my battalion, each antiaircraft platoon has six vehicles with four M-966 armored or hardshell HMMWVs (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and two M-998 cargo HMMWVs. The two cargo vehicles—the platoon leader and platoon sergeant vehicles—mount MK 19 automatic grenade launchers, while the four hardshell HMMWVs are broken down into two sections, with two of them mounting the M-2 .50 caliber machinegun and two mounting the TOW 2B missile launcher system with an M249 machinegun for support. Each section has one vehicle in each configuration.

The nature or type of the convoy you are assigned to secure, as well as the internal defense capabilities that the convoy may already have, will shape your plan for the mission. The standing operating procedure in my company has platoons broken down into three elements—the advance element, the lead element, and the trail element. In an attempt to cross-load the firepower to support the convoy, platoons should be further broken down as follows:

The advance element is composed of one .50 caliber vehicle and one supporting TOW vehicle. It travels one to two minutes in front of the lead element to provide early warning. In this arrangement, the advance element has maximum firepower against a light or heavy armored threat. Although the TOW missile cannot always be fired accurately from a moving vehicle, the fact that a missile has been fired will distract the enemy and give the convoy time to maneuver to an alternate route if necessary.

The lead element, just in front of the first vehicle of the convoy, includes the platoon leader’s vehicle with a MK 19 and the second vehicle with a .50 caliber machinegun. The lead element is mainly interested in navigating for the convoy and in defending the convoy against a dismounted threat. If the advance element detects enemy activity or makes contact, the lead element maneuvers the convoy to an alternate route.

The trail element of the convoy is made up of the platoon sergeant’s vehicle, mounting a MK 19, and the second TOW vehicle. This configuration enables the rear element to stall an armored or dismounted threat.

The next task after organizing the platoon is to conduct a route reconnaissance of the intended avenue of movement. The platoon leader designates a section (two vehicles) to conduct the reconnaissance. First, the platoon leader, with the assistance of his section leaders, conducts a map reconnaissance of tentative primary and alternate routes. During this map reconnaissance, he briefs the section leader on control measures, including checkpoints, phase lines, and planned indirect fires. Possible ambush sites at bottleneck points along the route (such as road and stream intersections) are also identified for inspection during the route reconnaissance. Any minefields or suspected minefields are marked and bypassed by the reconnaissance section. Alternate routes are also identified, marked, and briefed to the platoon leader when the reconnaissance element returns. Once the section leader has been briefed and all his questions have

![The HMMWV's ability to mount a variety of weapons makes it an excellent convoy security asset.](image-url)
been answered, he is released to brief his element and conduct the reconnaissance.

As the designated reconnaissance section prepares for its mission, the platoon leader can move the rest of the platoon to the pickup point for the convoy. It is here that the platoon leader can brief the rest of his platoon on the mission.

At the pickup point, the platoon leader should coordinate with the releasing unit commander and the convoy commander (often the support platoon leader or sergeant). The platoon leader briefs the tentative route (not yet confirmed by the route reconnaissance section), the march speed, the interval between vehicles, indirect fires available, actions on contact (including ambushes, indirect fire, and air attack), actions at planned and unplanned halts, and the communications plan (frequencies or fills to be used, or simple hand-and-arm signals when radio communications are not available).

When the reconnaissance element returns from its mission, the section leader and the platoon leader confirm or change the route, phase lines, checkpoints, and planned rally points. While on the reconnaissance, the reconnaissance section also identifies any road obstructions, possible ambush sites, suspected and confirmed mined areas, and an estimated driving time between pickup and release points. Any changes to the planned route are identified and briefed to the convoy commander. Time also needs to be allocated for dissemination to the convoy drivers.

If time permits, a rehearsal of actions at halts and upon contact should be conducted on the way to the release point. A final radio check should also be made during this period.

As the convoy moves out, the advance party (usually the reconnaissance section) should move out as planned. The distance this element moves depends upon an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). Even with the firepower the advance element has, it needs to maintain a position close enough to the main body to allow mutual supporting fires from other vehicles in the escort platoon, if necessary.

During movement, the advance party needs to be prepared to identify and mark any minefields that may have been emplaced since the reconnaissance element went through the area. All minefields need to be marked, their locations radioed to the convoy main body, and then by-passed (an antiarmor platoon is not equipped or trained to breach a minefield). The security of the convoy is the platoon's primary concern.

If the advance element encounters a minefield, the element needs to establish a by-pass route and identify it to the main body of the convoy. Once the minefield has been confirmed, the platoon leader must notify his chain of command of its location, size, and composition.

Once the convoy has begun moving, the platoon leader, at the head of the convoy, sets the march speed. He also monitors the distance between the lead element and the advance element, using checkpoints and phase lines.

It is the platoon leader's responsibility to keep higher headquarters informed of the status and position of the convoy. Checkpoints and phase lines need to be radioed to headquarters, just as a rifle company reports its movement.

The platoon sergeant, at the rear of the convoy, maintains accountability for vehicles during movement. He is also responsible for ensuring that a proper interval is maintained between convoy vehicles and for the rear security of the convoy during movement. At all scheduled and unscheduled halts, the platoon sergeant makes sure that the escort element is maintaining overall security and that convoy vehicle drivers are maintaining local security. The platoon sergeant is also responsible for coordinating vehicle recovery operations with the dispatching convoy commander, if the assets are available.

As the convoy nears its destination, the platoon leader calls ahead to ensure that the receiving unit is alerted to the convoy's impending arrival. Once the convoy has arrived at the release point, the platoon leader coordinates with the receiving unit and either sets up a planned security halt to displace cargo or turns over control of the convoy to the receiving unit representative.

Two other considerations will assist in the security and protection of a convoy: One is to conduct resupply convoys only at night. While this increases the stress on the drivers, who may not have worked together at night, it will increase the security for the move. The second consideration is to sandbag the floorboards of the vehicles. If a vehicle hits a mine, it will be damaged to some extent, but the crew is likely to sustain less serious injuries, depending on the type of mine.

Several manuals give a basic overview of convoy operations, including ARTEP 7-94-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the HHC and CS/CSS Platoons, page 5-9; ARTEP 19-77-30-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Military Police Company, page 5-61; and Field Manual 19-4, Military Police Battlefield Circulation Control, Area Security, and Enemy Prisoner of War Operations, pages 33, 48, 62, 70, and 139-145. But these manuals do not give a security element specified tasks for conducting such an operation.

ARTEP 7-91-MTP contains no mission plan at all for convoy security operations. This appears to me to be a major deficiency in the antiarmor MTP, considering the extent to which a light infantry battalion calls upon its antiarmor assets to conduct these operations. Overall, ARTEP 7-94-MTP gives the best outline for the antiarmor platoon to follow in conducting convoy security operations, and with proper, timely planning, supply convoys can receive the degree of security necessary to let them accomplish their mission.

Captain James Sisemore led a rifle platoon and an antiarmor platoon in the 82d Airborne Division and is now assigned to the division's 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry. He is a 1990 ROTC graduate of Southwest Missouri State University, from which he also holds a master's degree.
The Support Platoon Leader
In A Light Infantry Battalion

CAPTAIN JIMMY M. BRADFORD

The most challenging and demanding job for a lieutenant may be that of support platoon leader. As a young officer, you focus on tactical operations and use Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, as your reference guide. But it’s not until the battalion commander tells you you’re going to be the next support platoon leader that you even begin to realize the importance of this position within the battalion and on tactical operations.

Previous articles have outlined some of the jobs and duty descriptions of the light infantry support platoon leader. This one is intended to help the incoming platoon leader with some of the problems associated with the job, to help him organize his platoon, and to point him in the right direction.

According to FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, the support platoon leader is the assistant S-4 but is supervised by the headquarters and headquarters (HHC) company commander and is located in the brigade support area (BSA). When the battalion is operating as part of the brigade, the battalion field trains are located in the BSA. The support platoon headquarters and a section of the platoon are located in the BSA, while several of the platoon vehicles are in the combat trains under the control of the support platoon sergeant.

The support platoon leader is the one person designated by the battalion commander to resupply the battalion during combat operations. This resupply includes all classes of supply and the transportation of units to the battlefield to continue the fight or refit for another mission. The support platoon leader must have good time management and organizational skills and a high degree of initiative.

As with any new job, you need to immerse yourself in it and learn as much about it as you can. Some of the key organizations you will be working with outside your unit are the movement control office (MCO), the division ammunition office (DAO), and the division’s troop issue subsistence activity (TISA). If you will set up appointments with these representatives, you can learn the biggest headache for support platoons is that it has more missions and taskings than it has soldiers, equipment, or resources to accomplish them.

Most of the local regulations, some of the areas that are constant problems, and people to call in case you have problems or questions.

Some of the key personnel within your unit are the battalion executive officer (XO), the battalion S-4 (usually your boss), the HHC commander and XO, your unit motor officer, the battalion S-3 Air, and, of course, the outgoing support platoon leader. You will get most of your guidance from the battalion XO and the S-4, so make sure you get as detailed a briefing as possible from them before you assume responsibility for the platoon. Keep in mind that some of these officers were probably support platoon leaders themselves. If you talk with them during the transition phase, you will be better prepared for the difficult job ahead.

During the transition phase, you will need to do an inventory of your platoon’s equipment, which amounts to more than most officers realize. Vehicles, fuel blivets, and air delivery systems are only a few of the items for which the platoon is responsible. Set aside a couple of days to do a complete change-of-command inventory with all parties involved. After you do the inventory, give the outgoing platoon leader a couple of days to resolve any problems that may have come up. Then reinspect and sign your platoon’s hand receipts with the HHC supply sergeant. It is a good idea to have your section leaders present at that time so you can sign appropriate items of equipment over to them. Make sure all the equipment you have just signed for is properly hand-receipted to the appropriate user and marked accordingly.

One of the first things you must do as the new platoon leader is to review the platoon’s internal organization, as prescribed by the modified table of organization and equipment (Table 1). Look at this organization and determine how best to use your assets to accomplish the missions assigned.

When I was a battalion support platoon leader, the platoon was organized as shown in Table 2. I found this organization an effective way to use the platoon’s resources to accomplish the
assigned missions. When the unit is deployed, your platoon is split between the field trains and the combat trains, and this platoon organization maintains section integrity. The mess and ammunition sections are in the BSA with the platoon leader, and the transportation section is in the combat trains with the platoon sergeant. All the soldiers in the platoon need to be cross-trained so they understand how your platoon supports the battalion.

The biggest headache for most support platoons is that it has more missions and tasksing than it has soldiers, equipment, or resources to accomplish them. If you conduct a detailed mission analysis and then task organize the platoon, you will have accomplished the hardest part of your mission. The next step is to rank order the missions and tasking to meet the battalion’s priorities. This can be done in a number of ways, including first-come, first-served, or by order of complexity, but neither of these methods addresses the battalion’s missions. The best and safest way to do the missions effectively and efficiently is to sit down with the battalion S-4 and XO and tell them your plan for completing the work. You will be surprised at first with the guidance they give you. Take that guidance and apply it to the next set of circumstances. You will find that the people you work for will have more confidence in you and be less directive in the future. Eventually, you will come to understand the commander’s intent and priorities and will be able to operate with much less guidance and oversight.

The internal administration of the platoon will be one of the hardest areas to balance while trying to accomplish the platoon’s many assigned tasks. It is generally recognized that the support platoons works longer hours than almost any other organization in the battalion. One way to get a handle on your platoon is by direct, effective counseling of your NCOs and section leaders concerning their mission and goals. Table 3 outlines some of the direct jobs for which the NCOs of my platoon were responsible. You can focus your section leaders’ efforts by giving them specific guidance.

To put this in perspective, when I was a support platoon leader, my platoon sergeant was responsible for the maintenance of the platoon. Each day he updated me on all maintenance that needed to be completed and on future maintenance problems. Although the ammunition section had three vehicles, I held the platoon sergeant responsible...
for their maintenance, not the ammunition NCO. Likewise, the transportation NCO was responsible for driver training; if I had a question concerning a driver’s license, I called him, not the platoon sergeant.

The support platoon may be the most difficult and challenging job in a light infantry battalion. Most officers do not realize how important the job is until they are responsible for or associated with the platoon. The challenges of operating the support platoon are ever-present. You must be able to maintain the focus of supplying the battalion’s needs so its soldiers can survive on the battlefield.

Your job is vastly different from any other job in the light infantry battalion. But by keeping the lines of communication open in all directions and advising all leaders of upcoming problems and solutions, you will be better prepared to accomplish the battalion’s logistical mission.

Captain Jimmy M. Bradford served as support platoon leader, HHC executive officer, and S-4 in the 4th Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and is now attending the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He was commissioned through the ROTC program at New Mexico Military Institute and holds a degree from the University of Texas.

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Light Infantry Weapons Platoon

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARTIN N. STANTON

In the past decade or so, the U.S. Army’s light infantry battalions have been operating under the J-series tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). One of the organizations deleted from the old H-series TOE to save slots was the company weapons platoon.

With the restructuring of the Army, many of the reasons that drove the designers of the 10,000-man light division and the J-series TOE to drop the weapons platoon organization (unit end strength restrictions, space restrictions) are no longer valid. The question of a weapons platoon organization at company level should therefore be reexamined.

The weapons platoon in the H-series light infantry consisted of a mortar section and an antitank section. The mortar section had three 81mm mortars, with their prime movers and fire direction center (FDC) or ammunition vehicles, and the antitank section had two TOW antitank systems. The platoon headquarters had a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant with a radiotelephone operator and a driver. Although the new TOE did away with the platoon and its headquarters slots in the company, it retained both the mortar and the antitank sections, although in dismounted form.

The most glaring inadequacy in the new TOE is the manning of the mortar section. At full strength, the section has only six men for two 60mm mortars, and the new M224 mortar is heavier than the previous 60mm mortar, the World War II-vintage M19. An M19 squad was authorized five men to carry and serve a single weapon. Yet today we are asking three soldiers to operate a heavier system.

I have spent six years (four as a light infantry controller at the National Training Center and two as a light infantry battalion S-3) watching mortar sections and company commanders struggle with this issue, and the six-man mortar section simply does not work.

The most common solution for light company commanders is to take only one mortar along on anything but extremely short-range offensive operations. The only time both mortars are used is in the defense.

The antitank section is rarely employed as a section in its primary function of antiarmor warfare. Instead, the six Dragon teams are usually attached down to the rifle platoons. Little doctrine is available for the employment of the Dragon section in an environment where there is no armor threat. (The fielding of the Javelin should not change the basic 13-man structure of the antitank section; each company will still have six two-man teams.)

What I propose is a return to the weapons platoon, along with the addition of eight personnel slots in each company. These slots would consist of platoon leader, platoon sergeant, mortar section sergeant, and one RTO for the platoon headquarters as well as two additional members for each mortar squad. The antitank section would stay the same. (The organization would look something like that shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3.)

Each mortar section would be organized into two squads, each with squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner, and two ammunition bearers. The platoon sergeant (MOS 11C) would be
attached to the section for field operations.

The proposed organization would have enough men to carry the M224 systems for long distances without exhausting their crews. The mortar section could also sustain a few casualties and keep going. (If you take two casualties in the present organization, you've got one tube out of action.)

During operations, the platoon sergeant would travel with the mortar section and be in tactical control of it. Once the section was emplaced, it would work a two-man FDC (computer and check computer) under the section sergeant, with the weapons platoon sergeant and section sergeant monitoring the forward observer and company command nets, respectively. Each mortar would actually be manned by three soldiers. Although the extra personnel would allow the section to carry a few more ready rounds, the rifle platoons or the AT section (in a no-armor-threat environment) would still need to be required to carry additional mortar rounds.

The change that needs to be made for the antitank section is not one of size but of function. In its primary role, the antitank section's purpose would be the same—to defeat enemy armored threats. In this role, its soldiers normally fight as cross attachments to the line platoons. But when the armor threat does not exist, the soldiers of the section are used as a security squad for the company headquarters, as a reconnaissance squad for the company commander, or as ammunition bearers for the mortars. These roles are useful, but I suggest a fourth.

In a LIC scenario, I propose that the AT section become a company machinegun section, armed with three M60 machineguns (or their equivalent replacements in the future). The allocation of one machinegun for each four-man Dragon squad would divide the weapon and its equipment among four soldiers instead of the present three. This would allow each squad to carry enough extra ammunition for sustained fire.

Under the control of the weapons platoon leader, the machineguns would be a formidable addition to the company's base-of-fire element. Three more machineguns in a LIC scenario would greatly increase the company's automatic weapon firepower, especially
when concentrated under the direction of a single section leader.

When the tactical situation calls for the AT section to be used in its primary function, the three machineguns would have no trouble finding useful employment in other hands; for example, they could be allocated to the platoons or given to the company headquarters and trains.

The only real drawbacks to this proposal would be the requirement for the soldiers of the AT section to train on another system, in addition to their Dragon or Javelin and their personal weapons. But I believe these difficulties would be minor when compared to the company’s gains in firepower and command and control.

Finally, with a weapons platoon, the company would have a single platoon chain-of-command responsible for planning and scheduling training; the executive officer or company commander would no longer have to plan training for each section separately.

We have been floundering around with this problem for too long. We need to give our light infantry companies a better chance to employ their organic weapons, and there’s an easy fix that is also inexpensive in both personnel and equipment resources: We need to bring back the company weapons platoon.

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Eight Steps To Creating Quality Presentation Slides

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS MARK D. KAUNDER

Any soldier who has been around a company or battalion headquarters for more than a few days knows that a briefing or training class using butcher paper with felt-tip pens just won’t do any more. These are the days of computers, and we are expected to know our way around a computer. It is therefore in our interest to know how to create quality presentation slides.

While it is true that gaudy presentation slides can detract from the information being presented, it is equally true that poorly designed slides will lose you your audience. Fortunately, there is a middle ground, and that is what I hope to present here.

A tasteful and creative presentation can take some work but generally no more work than the old butcher paper and felt-tips. The payoff is that you get your message across more effectively, your audience will retain more of the message, and they just might enjoy it enough to pay attention.

There are eight basic steps to creating quality presentation slides:

**Step One: Define your subject.** This is usually the easiest part of the process for most of us, because it is usually tasked. For example, the commander may say, “Give me a briefing on your company’s performance in the most recent ARTEP.” The key here is to limit your presentation to the subject and not get side-tracked onto other issues.

**Step Two: Define your audience.** Before creating slides, it is important to consider who it is you will be talking to. Is the audience an individual or a group? Is it the commanding general or a group of privates? What is the knowledge base of the audience on this subject? What will be the setting of the briefing, deskside or auditorium?

If you’re giving instruction to a large group of soldiers, tailor the information to the soldier with the least knowledge on the subject, and risk boring the more advanced soldier. If the briefing is to the general and his staff, tailor it to him, regardless of the knowledge base of the staff.

The size and location of the audience will determine the medium used for your slides. If it will be a deskside briefing, consider using a small flip chart or a computer screen presentation. If you’re briefing a large group, consider either overhead projection (view graphs) or 35mm film projection.

**Step Three: Organize your information.** Sit down and write an outline of what you are going to say. If you’re a subject-matter expert and will be speaking off the top of your head, at least write out the salient points. Create bullet statements of points you want the audience to remember.

**Step Four: Enter your text.** Type out the information. Put it in bullet format, keeping it short—six to eight words per bullet, six to eight bullets per slide. Anything more than that is too hard to read. Remember that you are not put-
ting your entire presentation on slides, just the important points. The slides are not the presentation; they are just an aid to it. If you're putting out a lot of information that the audience needs to remember, hand out a printed supplement.

Don't print everything in capital letters. All caps is the written equivalent of shouting, and studies have shown that it is much harder for your audience to read. Save caps, bold text, italics, and underlining for points of emphasis. Use no more than one or two different type faces throughout the presentation.

Be consistent in the size of the type from one slide to another, especially the titles. A small variation in the size of type in the body of the slide is okay. Type needs to be large enough for the person in the back of the auditorium to read. Generally, if you can read the type easily at arm's length, it will be okay. If you stick to six to eight words per bullet, this should be no problem.

Keep the titles to one line. Subtitles should be two lines at most, but still six to eight words.

Step Five: Edit text content of the slide. Take the time to make sure that the slides say what you want them to say, that they aid the presentation, and that they don't say more than you are going to say. Keep it short and simple. Think bullets, not sentences.

As often as not, most of us are not creating our presentation alone and, most likely, we are creating it for someone else. I often help create slides that will be presented by my commander at post or major command level. This means it must be staffed through the S-1, S-3, S-4, XO, and the like. After creating the initial draft, you can save yourself a lot of trouble by staffing it through everyone. If at all possible, send only one copy so that each successive staff section sees the proposed changes that the others have made. Always ensure that the final approving authority sees it last.

If there is a large number of slides, print each draft slide with the file name and a date/time group at the bottom. This will save time when you have to edit them. If possible, save the older versions of slides as they are edited. (How many times have you made a change, only to have the boss decide that he liked it better the other way?) Give successive versions file names with the addition of -a, -b, -c.

Step Six: Enter your graphics. Do your initial draft in black and white without any graphics or charts. Wait until you've finalized the contents of the slide bullets before dressing it up with graphics and charts. Make sure that any graphic or chart added to a slide adds to the presentation's content, or clarifies a difficult point, and is not merely a distraction. But don't be afraid to throw in an occasional attention-getting slide—mostly graphics—to wake up your audience.

Step Seven: Edit, refine, organize, and polish your charts. Use "builds." Builds are a series of slides in which each slide adds one new bullet to the previous one. This focuses the viewers' attention on the point at hand and keeps them from going on to the next point before you do.

If you have access to color output (plotter or printer), use colored text to emphasize a point, but don't get carried away with it. It will only confuse and distract the audience. If you use color, use cool colors (blue, green) for the background and hot colors (yellow, red, orange) for the text. For most presentations, keep the same color scheme throughout, but consider reversing the colors to emphasize a certain slide's importance.

Step Eight: Print your finished presentation, speaker's notes, and handouts. Finally, print your slides. While you're at it, print a smaller version of each slide on a piece of paper with your notes for that slide. This will keep your presentation on track, and keep you from having to look constantly from your audience to your slide and back. You, not the slide, should be presenting the information.

If you're presenting a lot of information, give out supplemental handouts, or copies of the slides. But remember to hand them out after the presentation so that the audience is not distracted by them during the presentation. If you're giving the presentation to a small group, you might consider making copies of your slides, notes, and supplemental information on diskettes to give to members of the audience. This allows them to review the information at their leisure and can be less expensive than making a high volume of paper copies.

What kind of software and hardware do you need? Most units in the Army today have at least an old IBM XT computer and Harvard Graphics version 2.3, and perfectly acceptable presentation slides can be created on this type of system. Of course, it's much better if you have access to a faster computer using one of the newer presentation software packages (Harvard Graphics, PowerPoint, Freelance, Corel Draw 3.0). These new packages make the process relatively painless, and most of them now have automated advice, displayed as you create a slide, on how to make better slides.

Finally, the key to quality slides is the quality of the output device. It is possible to make decent slides by printing your slide on a dot-matrix printer, making a copy of it on a copying machine, then heat transferring it onto transparency material. Sometimes, however, slides made by this method don't lie flat on the overhead projector, and the text is hard to read. You will get much better results by buying transparency material that will go through your copying machine so that you can copy directly onto it. Better yet, have a laser printer that prints directly to the transparency material.

Whatever kind of equipment you have for making slides, the important thing is that they be legible and that they support your presentation. A properly prepared and presented briefing will ensure that you communicate what you want to say the first time, every time.

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Between 31 January and 25 February 1968, a task force composed mainly of the 1st and 5th Marine Regiments, 1st U.S. Marine Division, fought to regain control of the city of Hue, the ancient imperial capital of Vietnam (Map 1), after the city was captured by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces in the Tet offensive. The task force succeeded, in spite of some shortcomings, and its success was due primarily to its use of overwhelming combat power.

The story of the battle for Hue and the lessons learned from it are well worth studying. Given the world situation, these lessons may prove applicable the next time infantrymen—whether Marine Corps or Army—are called upon to clear an objective in urban terrain.

By the end of 1967, the United States had become polarized by the general situation in Vietnam. One reason was that the strategic bombing campaign had not accomplished its intended goals, and General William C. Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, believed that he had to find a way to halt North Vietnamese infiltration. Toward this end, planners in the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) hoped to place the forces of NVA General Vo Nguyen Giap into a position where they could be destroyed by U.S. artillery and air superiority. U.S. forces would then attack west from Khe Sanh into Laos and interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the vital supply route for North Vietnamese operations in the south.

Meanwhile, however, the North Vietnamese had also planned an operation for the spring of 1968. The first phase of that operation, to take place in the fall of 1967, was a series of probing attacks designed to test the chain of command. The second phase, commonly referred to as the Tet Offensive, was planned to be conducted in the spring of 1968 in conjunction with the Tet holiday, the Vietnamese lunar new year. Immediately following the offensive would be the third and final phase, known as the “Second Wave.” These last two phases would combine to create the conditions known as the General Offensive and the General Uprising, which the North Vietnamese believed would collapse the United States’
support for the conflict from within its own ranks.

In late December 1967, MACV set into motion a sequence of moves designed to realign units within the I Corps tactical area of responsibility (Map 2). A Korean marine brigade was to displace from Chu Lai to Hoi An, allowing battalions of the 1st U.S. Marine Division to begin advancing north. The division’s 1st Marine Regiment was given responsibility for the area from the Hai Van Pass to the I Corps northern boundary. It would have the additional missions of protecting the base camp at Phu Bai, screening western approach routes to Hue, and keeping Route 1 open between the Hai Van Pass and Hue.

The city of Hue was divided in the middle by the Perfume River. To the north of the river was the Citadel, a walled fortress that once served as the seat of ancient emperors and that in 1968 was the headquarters for the forces of the 1st Army (ARVN). To the south were a former French colonial compound, Hue University, and the MACV compound (Map 3).

Logistically, Hue was a transportation center for supplies and materiel. Route 1 and a railroad line passed through the city, connecting Da Nang and the demilitarized zone. The Perfume River, which connected the city with the Gulf of Tonkin, had multiple loading and unloading points that would make it important in the event land routes became impassable.

The Tet offensive began on the evening of 29 January 1968, when North Vietnamese forces launched attacks in many areas of South Vietnam, breaking a holiday truce that had gone into effect only a few hours earlier. Fortunately, Hue was not one of the areas first attacked, and the delay allowed General Ngo Quang Triu, 1st ARVN commander, to place his forces on 100 percent alert on the morning of the 30th. This security measure helped prevent the NVA battalions from overrunning the entire city of Hue when the attack came, at 0340 on the 31st.

The NVA had two major objectives in Hue—the 1st ARVN Headquarters and the MACV compound—and planned to attack these sites with up to ten battalions of infantry from the 4th and 6th NVA Regiments. The 802d NVA Battalion was to seize the 1st ARVN Headquarters, and the 800th NVA Battalion planned to occupy the southern portion of the Citadel. Meanwhile, the 806th Battalion was to establish a blocking position northwest of the Citadel along Route 1. Across the river, the 804th Battalion was ordered to attack the MACV compound while the NVA K4B Battalion would occupy the remainder of the city south of the river. To the south on Route 1, the 1st NVA Battalion would occupy a blocking position to prevent reinforcement from Phu Bai, while the 810th NVA Battalion would do the same along the northeastern avenue of approach (Map 4).

As reports of the attack on Hue reached Task Force X-RAY (the 1st Marine Division’s forward headquarters) at Phu Bai, a reaction force was dispatched to reinforce the MACV compound. Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, loaded onto trucks and convoyed up Route 1 to Hue. As the soldiers of the company neared the city, they were joined by four M-48 tanks from the 3d Battalion, 3d
Marine Regiment. Just south of the Phu Cam canal, the convoy came under fire from the 1st NVA Battalion’s blocking force, became stalled, and radioed the situation back to Phu Bai. TF X-RAY then directed the 1st Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Gravel, his battalion staff, and Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, north to relieve the convoy and continue to the MACV compound. Once they came upon the staggered column of vehicles, Gravel worked his way to the front and ordered the elements to push ahead to the compound and not to become decisively engaged with the enemy. The convoy, plus Gravel’s force, made another mounted assault and finally arrived at the compound in midafternoon.

Once inside the compound, the marines reorganized their defenses and evacuated the wounded. Not long after the marines’ arrival, TF X-RAY ordered Gravel and his companies to cross the Perfume River and link up with General Truong at the ARVN Headquarters. Gravel’s plan had Company A of his battalion remaining in the compound, the tank platoon providing suppressive fire from the south side of the Perfume River, and Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, crossing the Nguyen Hoang Bridge enroute to the Citadel.

Halfway across, Company G came under intense machinegun fire but managed to secure the bridge. Realizing that this was as far as the company could go without suffering heavy casualties, Gravel ordered everyone back to the MACV compound. The first day of fighting was over.

After the initial assault, the NVA forces realized that they were not going to seize all of the city in one day as they had planned. Instead, the NVA brought in five more infantry battalions, raising the total troop strength to nearly 6,000, and began preparing defensive positions. At the same time, the U.S. Marines were desperately trying to reinforce the beleaguered MACV compound. On 1 February, TF X-RAY sent Companies F and H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, to Hue. This was just the beginning of the marine reinforcement that was to follow:

By the afternoon of 3 February, the order of battle was: Companies F, G, and H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Cheatham; Company A, Headquarters Platoon, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Gravel; and 3d Battalion, 3d Marine Regiment, and some quad 50s (a cluster of four .50 caliber machineguns mounted on a truck) from an artillery
battalion, under control of the Hue City Task Force.

The Hue City Task Force was now under the command of Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, who had recently arrived from Phu Bai to take charge and regain control of the city. He called Cheatham and Gravel to his command post in the MACV Officer's Club and issued his operation order. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, was to clear Route 1 south from the MACV compound to the Phu Cam Canal, thus allowing resupply and reinforcement. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, would attack west along Le Loi Street until it reached the Phu Cam Canal. Once there, it would turn south along the canal and clear the buildings until it linked up with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (Map 5).

The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, kicked off its attack on the afternoon of 3 February but did not come close to reaching its intermediate objectives, the treasury building and adjacent post office. Instead, it occupied defensive positions and planned to resume its attack in the morning. Cheatham radioed his company commanders and gave them instructions for the upcoming morning attack. Company F would assault the treasury building and post office. Company H would seize the health building on the right and occupy a support-by-fire position. Company G, at half strength, would be the reserve.

Company H broke the silence on 4 February as it fought its way to the health building and began supporting the main effort. Company F's attack had withered in the face of heavy mortar and machinegun fire. Something had to be done. Observing the company's predicament, Major Ralph J. Salvati, the battalion executive officer, scrounged some E-8 tear gas launchers, set them up facing the treasury building, and fired them himself. The NVA, not having any gas masks, dispersed immediately, and within a few minutes the battalion occupied its first objective. The battalion continued to attack west along Le Loi Street until the library, power plant, and capital building all fell to the marines. By 11 February, Company F had secured the apartment complex, along its western boundary, and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, was now poised to move south and link up with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines.

Colonel Gravel's element of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, did not go on the offensive until 4 February. Its first objective was the Joan of Arc School, approximately 100 yards from the compound. The marines, using LAW antiaircraft weapons and C-4 explosives, blasted holes in buildings and courtyards enroute to the school. Although its progress was slow, the battalion secured the school in the face of stiff resistance. Later in the day, it was reinforced by Company B and part of Company A, which had arrived from their positions in the Quang Tri province. The following morning, the Companies A and B began clearing houses along the rice paddy but met heavy machinegun fire. Company A called up a nearby M-48 tank, which silenced the defenders with its 90mm main gun. The battalion had gained 75 yards.
The battalion kept pushing south toward the canal. The marines fought house-to-house, block-to-block, and then consolidated in a defensive perimeter just before darkness fell. Daylight brought the next house and more NVA fire, and this continued until 10 February, when elements from the two battalions linked up. The south side was now clear.

In the north, the 1st ARVN forces were having problems recapturing the Citadel. Finally, on 9 February, General Truong radioed Phu Bai and requested U.S. assistance. The following day the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, was committed to the battle, and its Companies A, C, and D began convoying toward Hue. The companies set up around the MACV compound and awaited their marching orders. Major R.H. Thompson, the battalion commander, was ordered to take Companies A and C and link up with Company B, which was waiting for them in the ARVN Headquarters. Together, the companies would attack south, forcing the NVA to withdraw or be trapped against the Perfume River. Also, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, was to retain control over 1st Battalion's Company D.

Later that night, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (minus), and a platoon of M-48s boarded landing craft and moved along the river up to Bao Vinh Quay, where it disembarked without incident. These units moved out to the ARVN Headquarters and linked up with General Truong. Thompson was then instructed to secure the northeast wall with his companies. His operation order had Company A on the left, B on the right, and C in reserve. H-hour was 0800 on 13 February.

As soon as 1st Battalion crossed its line of departure, it came under tremendous fire from enemy machineguns, mortars, and B-40 rockets. Thompson committed the reserve, but with little success. Eventually, the battalion was forced to withdraw to its line of departure to reorganize and prepare for an alternate attack.

When news of these developments reached Colonel Hughes, he ordered Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, up to the ARVN Headquarters. Although the battalion made no progress on the 14th, and Company D arrived too late to make a difference, these units would later play a decisive role.

On 15 February, artillery rumbled and F-4s pounded the enemy as Company D readied itself for the attack. The preparatory fires lifted, and the attack was under way. The company made it all the way to its objective, the tower, and consolidated around it before dark. The following day the marines kept pushing south. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, succeeded in gaining some ground, but the price was high. Because ammunition and food were critically low, Major Thompson halted the attack on 17 February for rest and resupply. The resupply did not come, however, and the battalion was losing its momentum.

Realizing that his unit's will to fight was also suffering, Thompson came up with a plan for a night raid and briefed it to his commanders on the evening of the 20th. One company would seize a two-story administration building.
300 yards away, and the rest of the battalion would use the building as a launching point for a predawn attack. The raid was a success and the attack enabled the battalion to secure the northeast wall.

The only remaining objective was now the southeast wall. With the newly attached Company L, 3d Battalion, 5th Regiment, Thompson set out to secure that wall on 22 February. Reinforced by three tanks, the company began its advance just after sunup. By 1300 it had reached its objective against strong enemy resistance and, the next morning, resumed its attack toward the Imperial Palace. By the 24th the battalion was poised to seize the Citadel, its final objective. Politics came into play, however, and Company L watched as the ARVN Hoc Bao (Black Panther) Company, reinforced by the ARVN 2d Battalion, 3d Regiment, assaulted and seized the Citadel. The north side was liberated.

Analysis

The success of the Hue City Task Force in regaining control of the city can be attributed to many factors. One of these was its ability to apply maximum combat power as a result of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. An analysis of each of these elements illustrates why the task force was successful:

Maneuver—the movement of forces to gain a positional advantage in order to deliver both direct and indirect fire. Urban terrain naturally restricts maneuver and forces units to find alternate movement techniques. The marines quickly realized that forces moving along streets were extremely vulnerable, and they resorted to using LAWs and C-4 explosives to create their own avenues of approach to get into a position to defeat the enemy. Tall buildings are also key terrain in urban combat. These vantage points allow the occupants to observe and suppress movement with amazing effectiveness. During the action in the Citadel, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, used tall buildings as support-by-fire positions to reach its primary objectives. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, used explosives and LAWs to strike its objectives instead of solely using street maneuver. In both cases, however, maneuver played an important role in getting on or near the objective. Because the marines improvised and adapted, casualties were reduced, as well as the length of the battle.

Firepower—the amount of fire delivered by a position, unit, or weapon designed to defeat the enemy’s will to fight. The Task Force at Hue delivered overwhelming firepower through various means. Tanks, close air support, quad-50s, mortars, and individual soldiers systematically destroyed enemy forces by concentrating fire on their positions. This superior firepower not only reduced the NVA’s own fighting force but also combined with the psychological effect to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, successfully used close air support at the end of the battle only after weather and political considerations allowed it. Likewise, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, employed the M-48 in an overwatch role as they moved through the southern portion of the city. As the tanks encountered B-40 rockets or were called up by the infantrymen, their 90mm main guns usually silenced enemy positions or forced a withdrawal. Firepower enabled the marines to destroy the enemy, even when they may not have had a positional advantage, or to prevent casualties when they became trapped. Overall, the enemy’s will to stay and defend the city withered in the face of superior firepower.

Protection—the conservation of a force’s fighting potential. The marines tried to protect their soldiers in a number of ways. Specifically, the Task Force prevented fratricide by consolidating into defensive perimeters during the night. In addition to being a control measure, this reduced movement, and the marines knew that anyone who was moving outside the perimeter probably was not friendly. Major Thompson delayed his battalion’s attack for a few days because his soldiers were receiving inadequate resupply of food and ammunition. Finally, he risked a night raid to put his soldiers in a place from which they could control the battle.

Although often overlooked and disregarded, protection is important in achieving a unit’s fighting potential. Needless accidents or sickness reduce the number of infantrymen out on the perimeter. The commanders within the task force did a good job of reducing non-battle casualties and fratricide, thus ensuring that their units would not have to be withdrawn because they had become combat ineffective.

Leadership—the ability to inspire the will to win. Leadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power. Leaders provide purpose, motivation, and direction during combat. The Hue City Task Force was fortunate to have excellent leadership, and casualty rates among the officers can attest to it. Leaders fired tear gas launchers, directed squads into buildings, were out front where their troops could see them, and accepted the same risks as their subordinates. In addition, commanders motivated their subordinates to keep pushing toward the objective, even if it was difficult. They came up with orders that provided direction, which allowed subordinates to use their own initiative and ideas. As a result, the Task Force was successful in regaining control of the city, even though combat in urban terrain is supposed to be decentralized.

The success of the Hue City Task Force in regaining control of the city was a result of overwhelming combat power. The marines brought all the elements together and prevented the enemy from responding with effective resistance. Although many of the enemy soldiers escaped back into the jungle, the marines overcame numerous obstacles, casualties, and political pitfalls to seize the city after 25 days of tough, close fighting and prevented the enemy from controlling the major cultural, political, and transportation center of Hue.

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Prepáring a Battalion for Combat: Marksmanship

Lieutenant Colonel William C. David

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is the second in a series of four. The author commanded the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), in Somalia in late-1993, and wrote the series at the encouragement of the division commander.

The first article in the series, on physical fitness and mental toughness, appeared in the May-June 1995 issue of INFANTRY; the two remaining articles, on maneuver live fire training and leadership lessons learned, will appear in subsequent issues.

Marksmanship is linked to the very essence of a light infantry battalion; it is the most fundamentally important individual combat skill for light infantrymen. When soldiers lack confidence in their buddies' ability to provide them with accurate covering fire, there is no fire and movement. And without fire and movement, the effectiveness of the scheme of maneuver also begins to disintegrate. No matter how well-conceived a plan may be, or how well it is coordinated and rehearsed, mission success depends upon solid marksmanship skills at the point of attack.

Close combat continues to be a fight that is won or lost at squad and platoon level, where the impetus for fire and movement is found in the acts of individuals. Skill in marksmanship—and the confidence in one's weapon that comes with it—is the enabling tool that overrides a soldier's natural inclination to go to ground under fire. It can transform a group of otherwise passive individuals into aggressive squads and Platoons with the skill and will to win.

To win this close fight, light infantrymen must be consistently able to acquire and hit difficult targets that are partially exposed or camouflaged, stationary or moving, day or night. They must be cross-trained on all platoon weapons so that they will have the confidence to man key systems in the event of crew casualties.

Confidence in marksmanship is also the most important mental ingredient commanders can give soldiers for overcoming their personal fear in combat. In close combat,
Close combat continues to be a fight that is won or lost at squad and platoon level. To win this fight, light infantrymen must be consistently able to acquire and hit difficult targets.

Training Guidance

Every division uses weapon qualification statistics as one of its primary tools for assessing combat readiness. Without question, qualification is important, but a soldier has to master the fundamentals of marksmanship before he can qualify with an individual or crew-served weapon. Then, qualification tables will provide a consistent standard against which to evaluate performance and measure progress.

Standard weapon qualification provides the start point for the development of combat marksmanship skills. To kill efficiently and effectively in combat, however, a light infantryman has to be a better shot than the marksmanship tables require him to be.

Weapon qualification is conducted on fixed ranges with clear fields of fire, with targets that only move up and down and are usually clearly visible. Qualification isn’t conducted as part of fire and movement and, except for the noise of the firing line, there are no distractions, such as indirect fires, smoke, or attack helicopters. Most often, weapons are fired from the prone position only, and qualification may not be conducted frequently enough to keep skills truly sharp.

Against many competing demands for time and resources, units sometimes tend to be overwhelmed by the crush of events. Unless they are careful, units may discover that they’re spending most of their time on the range just keeping up with reportable weapon qualification requirements.

Marksmanship should be one of our major strengths, and focusing on weapon qualification alone won’t develop high performance in combat marksmanship. To reach this high level, units must do more in their training.

To duplicate what the soldier will find on the battlefield, commanders must make conditions more challenging and realistic. And to provide soldiers with opportunities for steady improvement in their marksmanship skills, firing must be more frequent. These two steps will develop combat marksmanship, giving soldiers both the skill and the will to overcome their natural fear in combat and to kill a determined enemy.

Getting the Ten-Percent Difference

After assuming command and making an initial assessment, I discovered that the battalion’s marksmanship was in pretty good shape. The units had achieved basic weapon proficiency across the board, and all training management standards had been met. Nevertheless, I knew this was no guarantee that we would be able to perform at peak levels in combat; like any unit, we had room for improvement. This core performance area therefore became a focus of attention.

Combat marksmanship is the area in which we sought to gain our ten-percent improvement. We wanted to hone a variety of important battlefield shooting skills to a high level. Doing this would give our soldiers the skills they needed to overcome their natural fears in combat and kill the enemy.

Any unit can make dramatic improvements in marksmanship. No hard-sell is required. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers fully understand that their survival in combat is directly tied to their ability to shoot. This is one combat skill in which they want to excel.

My personal role in this process was simple. First, I made targetry and feedback on marksmanship a priority in all collective training, whether it was force-on-force or live-fire. Second, I gave company commanders the freedom to use their initiative in conducting nonstandard marksmanship training on the range. These two fine-tune adjustments were all that was required to put a series of actions into motion to give us the ten-percent improvement we wanted.

For all maneuver live-fire exercises, targetry was always a key item of interest to me. For live-fire exercises conducted at company level and below, it was one of the areas that required my personal approval during the company commander’s pre-execution briefing. I wanted to be sure that target arrays were realistic and that they accurately depicted enemy situational
templates appropriate to the training scenario. The targets on
the range had to be laid out as briefed. Problems that could
be fixed were fixed on the spot.

The same rules applied to any maneuver live-fire range run
by the battalion. The S-3 had to get my personal approval on
the target plan at the concept briefing. Before execution,
I walked the ground with either the S-3 or the assistant S-3
to confirm the plan and make any adjustments that might be
needed. It didn’t take the battalion long to figure out that I
had a real interest in targetry. If they didn’t have a good plan,
they would be sent back to the drawing board, along with an
impromptu class on the relationship between targetry and
training realism.

Eventually, our targetry became more sophisticated. We
gradually replaced silhouettes with target mannequins (in the
style of those at the Joint Readiness Training Center),
constructed within the battalion. The battalion S-4 coor-
dinated with the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
for expendable uniforms and equipment to make our targets
and objectives as lifelike as possible. One ambitious company
commander did the battalion staff one better and rigged
moving dummy targets on a squad react-to-contact live-fire
range.

We got started in the right direction and, after a while,
momentum took over. Enhancing realism on the range
became an area of constructive competition within the
battalion, and the payoff was higher quality training for the
soldiers.

Target hits were always counted on maneuver live-fire
situational training exercises to grade marksmanship.
Soldiers were allowed to see the effects of their weapons by
walking over the objective as part of the after-action review.
Seeing a splintered mannequin whose uniform their fire had
just torn to shreds helped them appreciate the deadly power
they had at their fingertips.

Without exception, all force-on-force training was
conducted with the soldiers wearing MILES (multiple-
integrated laser engagement system) gear. While MILES is
far from perfect, it helps get soldiers accustomed to shooting

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at company level and below. These efforts made marksmas-
ship challenging and, at the same time, sustained the soldiers’
enthusiasm by making training fun.

The following are a few of the techniques our units
employed:
• To give soldiers practice at hitting moving targets, units
constructed simple frames from 2x4s and hung plastic bottles
or balloons from the cross-members. The wind alone was
enough to cause movement in the targets.
• In Somalia, one company took target practice on water
bottles in the ocean, allowing natural wave action to move
the targets. At night, chemical lights were put inside the bottles

Skill in marksmanship is the enabling tool
that overrides a soldier’s natural inclination
to go to ground under fire.

to aid in identification, and the soldiers received immediate
feedback on their hits.
• The same company ran timed squad marksmanship
competitions in which each squad was issued identical loads
of ammunition. Each squad trained its weapons on a vertical
4x4 post planted in the ground, the object being to determine
which squad could cut its post in half the fastest. Ties were
settled on the basis of the fewest rounds expended.
• Another company drilled fire teams and squads on
marksmanship as part of fire and movement by creating live-
fire lanes where targets were randomly changed between
iterations. The fire teams or squads with the most target hits
were appropriately rewarded.

Because I wanted members of the chain of command to
use imagination in seeking better ways to train, I did not
standardize combat marksmanship training into a formal
program. Instead, units shared information on training

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use imagination in seeking better ways to train, I did not
standardize combat marksmanship training into a formal
program. Instead, units shared information on training
techniques that worked well—and those that didn’t—at
weekly training meetings. I saw it as a perfectly legitimate use
of time and resources for platoons to go out to the range and
shoot, without turning it into a standard qualification range.
I didn’t have to sell its importance to anyone.

It was relatively easy to get the ten-percent improvement
in marksmanship. Two fine-tune adjustments did the trick:
• First, we made marksmanship a consistent priority in all
collective training and established simple internal feedback
mechanisms to assess our progress.
• Second, to improve individual combat marksmanship
skills, I left it to the chain of command to figure out the best
way to get the desired results.

Once they knew they were free to experiment, the noncom-
misioned officers really took over and ran the show, and the
payoffs were dramatic. The soldiers developed exceptional
marksmanship skills and became extremely confident with
their weapons. When the battalion did conduct weapon
qualification, about 75 percent of the soldiers scored Expert.
The 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, became a high-performing unit that could flat-out shoot; the proof of this was demonstrated in all the battalion's later combat operations in Somalia.

**Payoffs in Combat**

The focus on combat marksmanship enabled the battalion to deliver well-aimed, accurate fire during urban combat operations in Mogadishu. After squeezing the trigger, a soldier could see the enemy drop. If fire was received from the dark recesses of a room, that fire was soon followed by silence after a 40mm round or a burst of machinegun fire went through the window.

Soldiers discovered they had the tools to beat the enemy in his own back yard. It quickly became clear to them which side had the better force. Once a unit was in contact, the paralysis of fear never had a chance to take hold. In its place were confident soldiers, doing their jobs the way they had been trained.

The soldiers made each round count. From their training, they were familiar with shooting at moving and partially exposed targets from a variety of firing positions. On the basis of post-battle reports from UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) headquarters by both the International Committee for the Red Cross and human intelligence sources, enemy casualties in each of the task force's engagements exceeded friendly casualties by factors of 10 to 20.

This helped make the ammunition-intensive nature of urban fighting less operationally restrictive. During engagements ranging from five to seven hours, our companies never ran out of ammunition. This meant we never had to conduct an ammunition resupply under fire—the importance of which cannot be overstated. The soldiers had the discipline to shoot only at targets they could clearly identify. The repetition in training had given them confidence in their ability to use well-aimed shots instead of a heavy volume of poorly aimed fire.

Because marksmanship is a core performance area and the essence of light infantry operations, this was an area in which I felt a ten-percent improvement would give us a decided edge, and combat proved that it did. All battalions, if committed to the effort, have the resources to achieve results that are just as good. Doing two simple things consistently in all training did the trick for us:

First, marksmanship was an area of constant command attention in all collective training conducted in the battalion, whether live fire or force-on-force.

Second, the companies were given the freedom to use their initiative in implementing nonstandard instructional techniques designed to improve marksmanship skills.

Marksmanship is a task in which soldiers and leaders truly want to achieve excellence; no outside help is required, and its payoff in combat cannot be overstated.

**Lieutenant Colonel William C. David** served as deputy chief of staff of the 10th Mountain Division after completing his assignment as commander of 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and is now assigned to the U.S. Southern Command. He previously served in the 82d Airborne Division and the 9th Infantry Division and served as a battalion executive officer in the 101st Airborne Division during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He is a 1975 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds masters degrees from the University of Southern California and the University of South Carolina.
FIFTY YEARS AGO IN WORLD WAR II
July-August 1945

By the midsummer of 1945, U.S. and Allied forces in Europe were transitioning to the challenging tasks of occupation duty as they sought to restore order out of chaos. Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia met in Potsdam, near Berlin, to discuss the military and political issues tied to the cessation of hostilities in Europe. Meanwhile, the full military might of the Allies could now be turned upon Japan; bombing of the home islands intensified as the destruction of the remnants of the Imperial air force allowed U.S. bombers to roam virtually at will. The U.S. Third Fleet destroyed remaining Japanese naval and air forces around the Philippine Islands in early July, and then began staging strikes against Japan itself.

These and other highlights of World War II are excerpted from Bud Hanning's excellent chronology, A Portrait of the Stars and Stripes, Volume II, still available for only $50.00 from Seniram Publishing, Inc., P.O. Box 432, Glenside, PA 19038.

5 July General Douglas MacArthur proclaims the liberation of the Philippine Islands.

12 July The U.S. 6th and 32d Infantry Divisions join the 24th Infantry Division to eliminate remaining Japanese pockets of resistance on Luzon.

16 July The atomic bomb is successfully detonated at Los Alamos, New Mexico. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decide that its use against Japan will prevent enormous casualties and bring the war to an early end.

26 July The cruiser U.S.S. Indianapolis delivers an atomic bomb to Tinian Island, in the Marianas, base of a special B-29 bomber unit.

6 August The Enola Gay, accompanied by two observer aircraft, drops the bomb on Hiroshima at 0815 hours, from an altitude of more than 31,000 feet.

8 August The Soviet Union declares war on Japan.

9 August A second atomic bomb is dropped, on Nagasaki, Japan, while carrier aircraft pound airfields and shipping in northern Honshu and Hokkaido. On the same day, Soviet troops storm into Manchuria.

14 August President Truman announces that a cease-fire is in effect and that the war with Japan is over.

30 August The 11th Airborne Division lands at Atsugi Airfield to formally begin the occupation of Japan, while an amphibious force—composed of the 4th Marines, 6th Marine Division, American and British sailors, and Royal Marine Commandos—lands at Yokosuka Naval Base.
Convoy Live-Fire Exercises

LIEUTENANT TOD A. LANGLEY
LIEUTENANT DONALD J. MAHONEY

As disheartening as it is to read stories about units failing at the training centers, it is much worse to hear about units suffering casualties in combat. As the Army focuses more of its attention on operations other than war (OOTW), combat, combat support, and combat service support units are having to concentrate more of their training time on peace enforcement missions such as convoy security, route reconnaissance, and casualty evacuation operations. Such operations as those in Somalia and Bosnia provide just two examples of the possible roles for the Army on the battlefields of the future.

To prepare for these future roles, soldiers from all types of specialties, from infantryman to driver, will have to be ready to react and fight the enemy at any time and place. And no other type of training better prepares soldiers for combat than realistic live-fire exercises. To prepare our platoons for this future and for an upcoming deployment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), we developed a convoy live-fire exercise (LFX). This LFX was designed to familiarize the antiarmor platoon with reacting to contact during convoy operations while the support platoon and soldiers from the 225th Forward Support Battalion developed the skills they needed to execute battle drills associated with convoy operations. The LFX was also designed to increase coordination and training with units that did not usually perform standard combat operations (convoys must always be considered combat operations). Convoy live-fire exercises are designed to intergrate soldiers from both combat arms and combat service support units, and also to prepare soldiers and leaders to execute successful operations together in combat.

Soldiers and leaders often complain that our LFXs are “canned.” Because of safety and range control requirements, many of the things leaders want to train on in an LFX format seem to be forbidden. But realistic LFXs are not impossible, as the following discussion will illustrate.

The intent of our convoy LFX was to train soldiers on convoy battle drills to the point where they could execute those drills without hesitation every time. To accomplish this, we had an old 5.56mm record-fire range on which fires from M16 rifles, M203 grenade launchers, and M249 machineguns were allowed.

To win approval to conduct the LFX, we had to submit a packet that described the overall tactical scenario and the necessary procedures for running the range. This packet also included a range sketch (Figure 1), showing the range of vehicles and the limit of advance for the dismounted troops that would assault downrange.

One major limitation imposed by range control was that only two vehicles could fire at the same time. Initially, we thought this would take away from the realism of the range. But after establishing two fixed firing fans (at Firing Points 4 and 9), we found we could have any type of convoy drive through the range and initiate contact on the vehicles we chose. To make this easier, we issued a convoy brief before each iteration, specifically instructing vehicles to stay a specific distance (50 meters) from each other. By initiating an ambush as a certain vehicle passed Firing Point 9A, a convoy could react to contact at the front, middle, or rear of the column.

Another condition of the range was that the M203s had to fire at specially built targets to ensure that the gunners did not damage the electronics on 5.56mm targets. For added safety, an observer-controller (OC) was put with each vehicle that would be firing during the iteration. This OC would make on-the-spot corrections of safety violations and assess casualties to see how the unit
would react.

Along with the packet, we included a detailed risk assessment that we hoped would convince anyone concerned about safety that every possible risk had been considered. The goal was to keep training as realistic as possible without violating safety requirements. This was reflected in the first part of our risk assessment, which listed all possible hazards and their effects on training when no safety controls were applied. The resulting factor showed a risk level too high to be considered worth the training value. The second part of the risk assessment listed all possible hazards and the controls that would be applied to reduce the risk factor. The greatly reduced factor now proved that the LFX could be very realistic and still be considered safe. This detailed format later became important in justifying the night-fire portion of the exercise.

Some of the training enhancements we used to increase realism included pneumatic machineguns and additional targets designed to simulate crew-served weapons, and a pneumatic artillery simulator controlled by the target operator from the range tower. SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment) reports and situation reports radioed to the officer in charge from the convoy commander, along with convoy briefs and fragmentary orders, were used to enhance leadership training. The ammunition point and convoy route were also designed to keep LFX participants from seeing the range before they were actually on it (Figure 2).

In all, there were five convoy operation scenarios: React to near ambush, conduct casualty evacuation, execute vehicle recovery, encounter and reduce obstacle, and break contact. All of these were based on reacting to enemy fire while the convoy was performing some task.

For example, in the first scenario, the lead vehicle drove past Firing Point 9, and three targets popped up at 50 meters. A pneumatic machinegun and an artillery simulator went off at the same time to simulate an ambush. Simultaneously, two groups of three targets appeared on Lanes 4 and 5, and another pneumatic machinegun went off. The convoy leader, having determined that he could not get his vehicles out of the kill zone, ordered the lead vehicle to open fire while the rest of the troops dismounted to clear the ambush line. The lead vehicle reacted by initiating a herringbone movement and laying down suppressive fire toward the targets directly in front of him, while the rest of the convoy went through dismount drills.

An infantry platoon assaulted past the 50-meter targets on Lanes 4 and 5 to clear the ambush and establish security on the far side. The convoy leader then
sent his situation report to higher headquarters while his leaders continued to consolidate and reorganize.

Then the enemy counterattack started. Targets popped up to simulate the enemy's gradually moving closer, starting at 300 meters and working their way in toward 50 meters. The convoy leader had the lead vehicle continue suppressing the targets while everyone else remounted the trucks. Once the convoy was ready to move, they broke contact and moved out of the kill zone while continuing to fire at targets until all of the vehicles were safely out.

The other four scenarios were variations of this react to near ambush drill. The convoy mission, however, was altered to include move to and conduct a casualty evacuation, or move to and conduct a vehicle recovery. In each situation, they encountered an on-site ambush. The other two scenarios we incorporated were conducting convoy operations and encountering an obstacle/minesfield and then being engaged by enemy overwatching the obstacle, which required a breaching operation. The final scenario was reacting to an ambush and conducting a break contact drill.

Once the vehicles were off the range, the NCOIC directed all vehicles to halt and have all personnel disembark. Safety NCOs then supervised the clearing of all weapons and conducted a brass and ammunition check. Once all personnel, weapons, and vehicles had been inspected for live ammunition, the NCOIC directed the vehicles to move to the parking area. From there, all personnel involved in the iteration moved to the AAR site, where the major lessons learned were reviewed. These lessons then became the focus for the next iteration.

At the end of the LFX, key leaders assembled for a discussion and recommendation meeting, which dealt with all the things that could make the range better and more realistic.

From this final AAR, we learned five major lessons:

- Planning for an event of this size should include several in-process reviews (IPRs) at least six weeks ahead to inform each participant of his role in the exercise.
- For special range set-ups, a whole day is needed to work out all of the bugs.
- A way of recording the iteration's marksmanship accuracy should be developed so that soldiers and leaders alike can see whether they are improving throughout the day.
- The crawl, walk, run training technique must be used with blank ammunition before conducting a live iteration. This should start with squad leaders training their men on battle drills, dismounting techniques, and individual movement techniques, and conclude with the convoy leaders supervising a full run-through of an iteration with blank ammunition.
- Many other things can be incorporated into a convoy LFX to add realism and improve training. These may include calls for fire, close air support requests, better operations orders, and fire support planning.

The convoy live-fire exercise, the first ever to take place at Schofield Barracks, tested the mettle of every soldier involved. The leaders were able to see how difficult it actually is to train soldiers on battle drills in a live-fire exercise as well as how important these drills are in keeping soldiers alive in combat.

Unit leaders also saw how important cross-level training is among several different specialties, from infantryman to medics to drivers to mechanics. Indeed, we all realized that, unless LFXs are conducted to train soldiers of various specialties to operate with each other in combat, neither units nor individual soldiers will be prepared for the confusion and stress of war.

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Platoon Attack
Role of the Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Leader

MAJOR KEITH P. ANTONIA

During a platoon attack, the unit's top two leaders must work together. A platoon sergeant and a platoon leader who are in the right places at the right times, doing the right things will directly improve their platoon's force protection, increase the survivability of individual soldiers within the platoon, and improve the entire unit's chances of succeeding.

The effective use of the platoon sergeant can free the platoon leader to

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use and control all the assets available to him and remain aware of the enemy situation on and around the objective.

Too often, platoon leaders become too fixed on the objective during the attack, and concentrate only on that immediate fight. Some tend to forget about their forward observers, fail to consider enemy avenues of approach into the objective area, and are late during consolidation and reorganization in positioning key weapons, developing contingency plans, and confirming the fire support plan that was developed in the attack position, patrol base, or assembly area based on map or leader's reconnaissances. These deficiencies are not due to a lack of initiative. Rifle platoon leaders today are excellent. But they do get too involved in what I'll call the analogous "close" fight.

Generally, platoon leaders think that leading from the front means moving with the lead squad, directing traffic, or being personally involved in the close fight. But leading from the front does not necessarily mean these things. It means that the platoon leader is with his platoon and positioned where he can best command and control the entire platoon and employ fire support and key weapons to bring maximum combat power to bear upon the enemy at the decisive point to defeat or destroy the enemy while also protecting his platoon. I contend that the platoon's "deep" fight belongs to the platoon leader, and that the platoon's "close" fight belongs to the platoon sergeant and squad leaders.

Platoon sergeants should be up front influencing the action, especially when a squad reaches a point where it needs motivation or leadership to continue the momentum of the attack. The platoon sergeant has a sense of what is happening in the fight because of knowledge and experience that the platoon leader may not yet have.

To illustrate this point, I'll use an experience I had as a Ranger rifle company commander:

The company was executing a difficult night attack in the rain. The platoon with the main effort was bogged down while breaching an obstacle, taking heavy casualties. The platoon's momentum of attack had stalled, and additional casualties were likely. Through my night observation device from a distance, I watched as a Ranger (who, I later found out, was the platoon sergeant) without hesitation aggressively moved into the breach, organized the remaining infantrymen, redirected close-in suppressive fires, breached the obstacle, and opened the way for the company main effort. He did not hold back at the rear of the platoon collecting casualties or direct supporting fires from the support position.

This platoon sergeant had trained the platoon medic to supervise and manage casualty evacuation at platoon level. The weapons squad leader controlled supporting fires from the support position. The platoon sergeant got involved in the close fight and was able to influence the outcome of the battle.

Although the platoon sergeant is responsible for medical evacuation, he does not directly supervise. He should train the platoon medic to supervise the platoon aid and litter team and the combat lifesavers. When appropriate, the platoon sergeant should move to the platoon leader to provide advice on the tactical situation and help the platoon leader make the best possible tactical decisions.

During consolidation and reorganization, the platoon sergeant should get the assessment of combat effectiveness reports and send enemy information to the company command post. This will free the platoon leader to evaluate observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA) or potential enemy sniper or forward observer positions, position key weapons, confirm the fire support plan, and see that the squad's sectors are tied in. After this is done, the platoon sergeant briefs the platoon leader on ACE and intelligence and can also help the platoon leader position key weapons.

An additional point to consider with regard to the platoon leader's position during the attack is his survivability, which is directly tied to the platoon's survivability, force protection, and combat power, and the company's mission accomplishment. If a platoon leader is killed or wounded, a large portion of the platoon's command and control is degraded, and the platoon is likely to lose its ability to fight the deep battle. The platoon's overall effectiveness is diminished. For these reasons, the platoon leader should allow his squad leaders and platoon sergeant to fight the close battle.

It is not my intent to portray the platoon leader as a man who never becomes personally involved in the fight. There are instances in which he must display the courage and resolve to move to the front, but he must calculate the risk to the entire platoon and make sure the benefit outweighs that risk.

In brief, the platoon sergeant should fight the close battle. The platoon leader must concentrate on the deep battle and constantly think of how he can employ his assets and those of higher units to fight that battle. This will help protect the platoon, increase survivability, and improve the chances of mission success.

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The Light Infantry Attack
Letting Go of the 90-Degree COA

MAJOR KEVIN J. DOUGHERTY

For most of us, Ranger School is a pretty profound experience, and the lessons we learn there tend to stick with us for a while. One lesson that many of my peers and I learned (and admittedly things may be different now) is that the maneuver plan for a typical Ranger School attack looks something like the sketch in Figure 1.

The attack begins with the support force “suppressing the objective!” At some magical time (too early leaves the assault hanging and too late risks friendly casualties) the support force shifts fires, and the assault force “sweeps across the objective!” So that the support force can fire at more of the objective for a longer period of time, it is usually positioned about 90 degrees from the assault force. I will therefore call this course of action “the 90-degree” COA.

As a small-group instructor in the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, I have observed that many of my students seem to have learned this same lesson somewhere. In fact, this is the first COA that comes to mind for most of my students—and for most of the company grade officers I’ve met.

While the factors of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time) may make the 90-degree COA a viable option in some cases, this viability depends upon the existence of most of these five conditions:

- There must be grazing fire from the support position to the objective.
- The support position must be at least 400 meters from the objective to get the benefit of the machinegun’s range. (My rationale for these first two points is Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, p. 5-29, which states that “Machine gunners should always attempt to engage at their maximum effective range and should strive for grazing fire”)

Over the course of this 400 meters, there must be clear observation and fields of fire, and there must be cover and concealment at the support position.

- The support position must facilitate the fire distribution and control measures necessary to engage the enemy and shift fires as the assault force advances. (The origin of the third and fourth requirements is FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, p. 4-34, which says, “Each weapon in the support element should be assigned a specific enemy position or sector of responsibility”)

- If the support force’s task is to suppress, then it must be suppressing an enemy that would otherwise be interfering with the breach force or the assault force passing through the breach. (Support for this requirement is abundant; in fact, it is the entire basis for my argument. Among other sources, FM 7-10, p. 4-31, describes the S in S0S-R—suppression, obscuration, security, and reduction—as being “suppress the enemy covering the obstacle/breach site”)

I contend that most times when we use the 90-degree COA, few if any of these five conditions exist.

The solution, I think, is to reduce the angle between the support force and the breach. As a general rule, I’d say the closer the support force is to the breach the better. Thus, I suggest that the form of maneuver in most cases is going to look more like a penetration and less like an envelopment. This idea certainly is not original. I was first exposed to it in an article called “Night Attack,” by then Lieutenant Colonel Lynn D. Moore (INFANTRY, May-June 1990, pages 39-41). Colonel Moore’s technique has since been incorporated in Student Handout 7-45, Fire Planning Handbook, pages 3-8 through 3-10. Even more important, this idea is depicted in FMs 7-10 and 7-20, The Infantry Battalion. (Incidentally, all my remarks are intended to apply to light infantry
attacks only, but I'm not sure they have to.) I began by saying that we learned the 90-degree COA somewhere and that for me that was in Ranger School. All I know is that no one learned the technique from FM 7-10 or 7-20.

After reconnaissance and movement, FM 7-10 says, the next step in a deliberate attack of a strongpoint is to "isolate the objective" (p. 4-29). Note the use of the all-encompassing term "objective." FM 7-10 is even broader in its requirement that the support force "isolate the battlefield" (p. 3-11). In either case, the emphasis is on forming a "protective umbrella" that stops both escape from and reinforcement into the objective. If, as both manuals state, the attack is organized into assault, support, and breach forces, this overall isolation obviously falls under the responsibility of the support force and may look something like Figure 2.

Once this large-scale isolation is complete, we can turn our attention to a more local isolation. FM 7-10 (p. 4-31) is specific about this:

Once the isolation of the objective area is complete, the CO focuses on isolation at the breach point or the point of attack. This isolation is to prevent enemy reinforcement at the breach site and also to suppress enemy weapons and positions that have observation of the breach site. The support element is assigned the main responsibility for this isolation.

Likewise, FM 7-20 says that the support force must "suppress enemy fires covering the obstacle" (p. 3-11) and provide "suppressive fire on enemy elements adjacent to the point of the breach" (p. 3-29). Note that the emphasis is on the breach, not 90 degrees away from it. This is important, because the support force has a lot to do. At a minimum, it must isolate the objective, probably with more than one blocking position or ambush. Asking it to suppress positions at the breach as well—frittering away combat power against an enemy 90 degrees from the breach without inflicting casualties—would be folly.

Consider Figure 3 as an illustration. The enemy has established a typical defense in which every position has a sector of fire. The enemy the support force is suppressing has a sector from say two o'clock to four o'clock. The breach and assault are at six o'clock. Therefore, it really doesn't matter whether the support force suppresses this enemy or not, because he has no fields of fire toward the breach anyway. The only thing this support force is suppressing is fires directed at itself, and if it weren't there those fires wouldn't have started! But there is an enemy responsible for a sector from four o'clock to eight o'clock. Since that is where our breach and assault forces are, if we really want to help them out, that enemy force is the one our support force should be suppressing.

In some cases, the enemy's most probable COA may be to reposition forces from other locations to reinforce at the breach site. If that is truly the case, and if the S-2 has examined all available intelligence and committed to it, then the 90-degree COA makes a little more sense. Then, however, the task for the support force should probably be to fix instead of suppress. Given the defender's advantage of interior lines, terrain masking, and supplementary positions, the fix task will be difficult from a support-by-fire position several hundred meters away. Such support-by-fire positions are generally out of range of the M16s, so if the enemy has planned to reposition, he probably can. To improve chances of success, the control measure for the support force should probably be an axis of attack with a limit of advance outside the wire instead of a stationary support-by-fire position. This allows the support force to close with the enemy, decisively engage him, and therefore restrict his freedom to reposition.

My question is that, if we really believe the enemy is going to reposition to wherever we breach, why would we want to persist in attacking into his strength? A better COA might be to have a feint attack to cause the enemy to reposition and then have the main effort assault into the vacated portion of his defense. I don't think the enemy, in most cases, plans to abandon his hard-dug positions at the drop of a hat and fight above ground; generally, defenders try to fight from their primary positions.

So unless we come up against that rare case in which the enemy's most probable COA is to reposition to the breach site, we can consider something other than the 90-degree COA. I suggest that this new COA focus on the FM 7-10 injunction to "mass all available combat power at the initial penetration or breach point" (p. 4-31). Because FM 7-10 tells us "the support element provides effective suppression for the breach" (p. 4-34), we are justified in reducing the angle between the support
force and the breach. This COA may look like Figure 4. This configuration allows the support force to truly suppress the breach (the area, in fact) that needs suppressing. Because it is closer to the breach command and control is easier, which makes the shift-fire decision easier to execute.

The decision that now must be made is where the close-in support element, a part of the breach force (as shown in Figure 5), stops and the actual support force begins (see FM 7-20, p. 3-29). The close-in support element works directly for the breach force, as opposed to supporting it. If the obstacle is lightly defended or the area is very restrictive, a close-in support element may be all that is needed. If so, the support force, or a large part of it, can concentrate on isolating the objective as a whole. FM 7-10 recognizes that in some cases external units may be adequately supporting the attack and that a company support element is optional, depending on the conditions of METT-T.

My suggestion (Figure 5) is a COA that shows ambushes to isolate the objective, and a support position adjacent to the breach. Nonetheless, the 90-degree COA persists in IOAC and elsewhere. In my opinion, a better COA is right under our noses in FM 7-10. I recommend we change our mindset to consider concentrating our combat power at the breach instead of diffusing it elsewhere, and limit the 90-degree COA to those conditions under which it is the only viable course of action.

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Bradley Gunnery Standardization Yields Stability

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROY H. ADAMS, JR.
CAPTAIN CLARENCE E. BRIGGS, III

A Bradley gunnery crew is most effective when each member knows precisely what his job is in relation to the jobs of the others. Conventional wisdom with respect to Bradley gunnery assumes that the only way to achieve a high level of crew proficiency is to stabilize members by keeping them together for as long as possible—in short, battle rostering.

Battle rostering is one way to achieve crew stability, and most would argue that stability leads to killer crews and successful gunneries. To achieve stability, a commander must match the permanent change of station dates of the Bradley commander (BC), gunner, and driver. But circumstances beyond the control of commanders often prohibit crew stabilization. In peacetime, an unforeseen levy, injury, or emergency leave can have commanders scrambling to put crews together. In wartime, what happens when a crew member is injured or killed? Can the unit capitalize on the experience of the remaining crew members without a resource-intensive train-up period? If all the crews in the task force have been trained exactly the same way, the answer is “Yes.”

Since January 1993, the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, has fired three gunneries—the first two on the multipurpose range complex at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the third on Carmouche Range at Fort Benning. The battalion average was more than 900 points for all three gunneries, under both adverse and favorable weather conditions. External Bradley crew evaluations (BCEs) and computer scoring were used in all of these gunneries, and all the crews in the battalion were trained using the same gunnery program. In short, it was standardized.

The argument for standardization is an old one. Soldiers trained to the same standard with respect to scanning techniques, target acquisition, crew checks, and the like, can attain peak proficiency because a common standard for coaching and evaluation is created. Initially, no two crews are alike, but a common gunnery program...
enables unit commanders to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of particular
crews against a common standard. New
gunners may need more work on the
Bradley Gunnery Skills Test (BGST).
More experienced crews may need only
to focus on crew coordination. In the
final analysis, a standard or common
structure of expectations must be
created within the crew. Each crew
member knows his job and is able to
achieve proficiency because every com-
mmander, platoon leader, and section
sergeant also knows his job and can
ensure that that crewman is trained to a
clearly defined standard.

Crew stabilization can be defined as a
well-integrated team consisting of a BC,
gunner, and driver who have qualified
on Bradley Table VIII within the past six
months, and who are capable of coordi-
nated action toward a common objec-
tive. The objective in this case is to kill
the enemy or, in gunnery terms, destroy
the target within the prescribed time
using the allocated ammunition without
any crew cuts. How well a unit stabilizes
Bradley crews, keeps them stabilized,
and adjusts to unforeseen turbulence is
a training management issue that is con-
tingent on standardization. We are con-
cerned here with adjusting to unfore-
seen turbulence. We want to reduce the
amount of training needed when we are
forced to reconfigure crews.

Standardization can be defined as the
performance criteria a crew must
achieve to execute a task successfully.
The gunnery standards must be clear,
practical, realistic, uniformly known
and understood, and enforced.

It follows, then, that both a qual-
itive and a quantitative increase in
crew training standardization should
result in a proportional decrease in the
amount of time and resources it takes to
train and stabilize a crew. The need for
stabilization is based on the assumption
that the longer the crew works together
the better they will be at killing the
enemy. This assumption may be true,
but how true?

In early 1994, the 1St Battalion, 18th
Infantry, set out to test the stan-
dardization-stabilization hypothesis.
Four crews were randomly selected from
four different companies and ordered to
show up on the range prepared to shoot
Bradley Table VIII. All four crews had
just completed the table the previous
week, and their scores ranged from 944
points for one company to 1,000 points
each for the other three. Twenty minutes
before firing, the gunners, BCs, and
drivers were randomly slotted to form
composite crews. There was no time for
train-up or for crew stabilization in the
classic sense. The crews were to go down
range and shoot the table "as is,"
replacing the crews of two unfamiliar
vehicles.

Although disaster and chaos could
have resulted under ordinary circum-
stances, the results of this test seem to
indicate that a standardized battalion
gunnery program has merit. The final
results were that two crews scored 1,000
points each, one 826 points, and the
fourth 850 points. The original crews
averaged 986 points, while the com-
posite crews averaged 919 points, or
about a seven percent decrease.

The composite crews were asked
several questions after finishing their
Bradley Table VIII. It is interesting to
note that within each crew, the gunner
controlled the ammunition selection
while the BCs supervised. All the gun-
ners initially had problems adjusting to
their drivers, particularly the way they
started and stopped during offensive
engagements. Platform stability seemed
to be a consistent problem. All but 50 of
the points lost were during offensive
engagements at night. Additionally, the
reason the targets were missed in all
cases was that the crews came off the
target too early. On two occasions, two
of the crews experienced misfires. Both
times, the crews applied immediate
action and successfully engaged the
targets. In all instances, the crews said
that they felt comfortable with each
other and that each crew member knew
exactly what was expected of him. All
but one of the crew members said he
felt comfortable going into combat with
his composite crew "as is" with no
train-up.

From this test, we cannot make a
definitive generalization concerning
how much standardization affects a
crew's ability to acquire and engage
targets. Other factors, such as weather
and the crews' familiarity with the
range, would need to be isolated and
considered. Neither is it possible to
cover the battalion's gunnery program
in detail. Nevertheless, the following
tips may prove useful:

**Crew Checks.** If crew checks are done
before each engagement, such crew-
induced errors as ammunition and
range selection can be prevented. These
checks emphasize who is responsible
for what within the crew. A list of crew
checks should be pasted inside the
urrets and driver compartments.

**Command Emphasis.** This emphasis
is critical to a successful gunnery,
because no two crews are alike. Com-
manders must assess the strengths
and weaknesses of particular crews and
tailor training to improve those
weaknesses. New gunners require more
emphasis on BGST training. The more
experienced and stable crews may need
only to focus on crew coordination, and
they can be used to assist the less
experienced crews.

**BGST.** The BGST requires at least
five days to conduct properly—three
days for train-up and one day for the
test. A retest day should also be
scheduled. Master gunners should be
consolidated at company level to ensure
standardization. Additionally, each
platoon should have a "priority day"
when it is the focus of all the company
master gunners. BGST should be con-
ducted within a 30-day window before
gunnery. It is important to "peak" in
BGST so the hands-on skills are fresh
before hitting the range.

**Instructor-Operator (IO) and BCE
Courses.** These courses need to be con-
ducted at least 60 days before gunnery.
Qualified dismounts and alternate crew
members are useful in this respect.
Numerous IO and BCE qualified per-
sonnel are needed during preliminary
gunnery. Using the same personnel over
and over causes burn-out and reduces
the effectiveness of training evaluation.

**Conduct-of-Fire Trainer (COFT).**
The COFT is a seven-day-a-week,
24-hour-a-day effort. The foundation
for a successful gunnery is Reticle Aim

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A SIMNET Training Program

CAPTAIN JONATHAN D. THOMPSON

As training budgets shrink, commanders are having to find innovative ways to train their units to combat readiness. They must train smarter and use all of the available resources.

One such resource is simulators, which allow units to train without the expense of fuel, spare parts, and ammunition. Tank and Bradley crews have long used unit conduct-of-fire trainers (UCOFTs) to train crews for gunnery. The Army has these simulators available to use in training collective tasks. One key device for platoons, companies, and battalions is the Simulation Network, or SIMNET.

As a Bradley company commander in the 3d Infantry Division, I always
looked forward to using the SIMNET. As with any complex equipment, however, we had to develop a training program for the crews to become proficient before we did any tactical training. We developed a program that accelerated the results from our use of the SIMNET.

A SIMNET site consists of several vehicle simulators hooked together into a single computer system. Our home-station facility in Germany contained 14 Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) simulators and 14 Abrams tank simulators, which allowed a Bradley company and a tank company to train at the same time.

The simulators replicate actual vehicles, and crews must perform many of the same tasks in operating them as they would the actual vehicles. As crew members look through the vision blocks, they see a computer-generated landscape that corresponds to their map. They can see other vehicles on the ground and can even roll their own vehicle if they try to negotiate a slope that is too steep.

Each SIMNET facility has a stealth station and control monitor, through which someone can monitor everything on the simulated battlefield. The stealth mode enables this person to link up with any one of the vehicles and follow its progress. Another monitor shows icons that represent friendly and enemy vehicles and their locations on the map. It also shows when each vehicle fires and identifies the target.

SIMNET site managers can create semi-automated forces (SAFs) representing other vehicles, which can be either friendly or enemy. The controller can adjust the SAFs' accuracy of fire and probability of hit. The controller also gives them attack orders on another computer screen. Threat SAFs may include T-72 tanks, BMPs, artillery, attack helicopters, and attack planes.

The SIMNET has other target devices called "paper targets," which are vehicles that appear on the ground when the controller turns them on, much like stationary targets on a gunnery range. With these, we could develop scenarios similar to the target scenarios platoons would face during Bradley Table XII, Platoon Qualification.

My coordination for training in the SIMNET began when the S-3 allocated the company time in the facility. Because of the complexity of the simulators, I always tried to get at least two consecutive days, preferably three. After receiving my allocation, I would talk to the site manager and discuss my concept of the training. I would go back to the manager no later than 72 hours before the training and give him an overlay and starting locations for all vehicles.

The first goal was always to train crews and platoons on land navigation. If they did not have this critical skill before we began a tactical exercise, we would waste time chasing vehicles around the screen. Thus, the company developed platoon land navigation courses. Each platoon received a route with several legs that covered different types of terrain. Initially, the route went through easily identifiable terrain so the crews could get used to reading the SIMNET map. The controller placed friendly and enemy vehicles along the route so the platoon would have to practice spot reports and battle drills.

As the platoons ran the courses, either my executive officer (XO) or I would monitor the stealth station, which allowed us to stop a platoon or vehicle that was lost. If the crews had recently been in the SIMNET, it usually took three to four hours for them to become proficient enough in navigating.

Our next step depended on the chosen training focus. If we were preparing for gunnery, the platoons would execute a Bradley Table XII scenario. We used the paper targets in arrays similar to those the crews might see on the qualification range. Again, either the XO or I would monitor a platoon's progress at the stealth station. We listened to the platoon net, heard the platoon leader's fire commands, and watched the fire patterns. When the platoon was finished, we conducted an after-action review (AAR) and, if time allowed, did another run. Usually, three to four hours of training permitted each platoon to run the scenario two or three times.

If we were training to go to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), or if the training focus was on company or team collective tasks, we would go directly from the land navigation course to company or team missions. Whenever possible, the company's cross-attached tank platoon and the company fire support team joined us for training.

With participation by the battalion S-2, I would give the site manager a threat scenario that we might face at the CMTC. For example, if we were conducting a defense, the scenario might include combat reconnaissance patrols, forward security elements, and an advance guard main body.

The site manager would position each platoon in an assembly area as depicted on the overlay. We would then move out along designated routes according to my operations order. During company missions, the XO would monitor the stealth station while I was in a simulator, which permitted me to command and control in conditions similar to those at the CMTC.

Again, it took three to four hours to conduct two iterations of a company mission, with an AAR after each run. Since a CMTC rotation usually included a defense, an attack, and a movement to contact, it took at least two days for the company to get through each mission.

We also trained as a battalion task force, as this was one of the few places that permitted the key parts of the bat-
talion to work together. To support this training, the main command post (CP), the combat trains CP, the mortar platoon fire direction centers, and the field trains CP would set up and tie into the SIMNET site with wire and radio. Since our facility did not have enough simulators for every crew, we would only go down to platoon leader level. Then the site manager would attach SAF vehicles to fill out the company ranks.

The SIMNET could train more than just maneuver forces. I often started vehicles out with less than 100 percent of fuel or ammunition and then practiced a refuel/resupply-on-the-move site. The facility also had a fire support station, a close air support station, an engineer station, and a combat service support station. We put the company fire support officer in a simulator and had him direct fire support while one of his forward observers ran the fire support station.

To make the SIMNET more realistic, I always started with an operations order and then a sand table rehearsal. This allowed me to exercise my troop-leading procedures.

The SIMNET did have limitations:

- It could not replace actual field training, maneuvering, and shooting. Indeed, there is no substitution for these.
- It could not fully exercise the dismounted infantry. The facility's one dismount station represented only one infantry squad.
- Vehicles could not dig in. We had to position them in tree lines or on reverse slopes, exposing a vehicle as it moved to fire.

Despite these limitations, I found the SIMNET an excellent training device. With a well-thought-out program, good coordination, and a clear idea of what the SIMNET could do for us, we used it effectively. The key benefit was better command and control. The platoons improved fire control and distribution and battle drill execution. In turn, the company's crews and platoons were much better when they actually deployed to the field.

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Getting More Out of the Bradley Platoon Gunnery Trainer

CAPTAIN CRAIG A. COLLIER

The Bradley platoon gunnery trainer (PGT) consists of four conduct-of-fire trainer (COFT) systems linked together with two image generators and a platoon communication system. The Bradley PGT, designed to train platoon gunnery with an emphasis on fire control and distribution, is currently available only in Europe, where I encountered it in the 1st Armored Division.

The PGT combines the precision gunnery training of the COFT with the exercise playback, after-action review (AAR) capability, and computer graphics of the simulations network (SIMNET). Unlike SIMNET, however, in the PGT the enemy cannot fire back, and the exercise playback, though useful, is limited to a VCR tape of color-coded Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) icons along with the platoon's recorded conversation.

Like the COFT, the PGT provides a variety of offensive and defensive exercises in several types of terrain and visibility conditions. The PGT in the division had added a desert database, improved graphics, and the ability to separate into four COFTs, complete with the COFT matrix.

The best part of the PGT, however, is that it enables the trainer to modify existing programs or create completely new ones to fit his training needs. When the platoon gunnery trainer arrived in the division, the infantry company commanders quickly realized it was the best and most cost-effective method of teaching platoon fire control and distribution, short of Bradley Tables (BTs) XI and XII. In fact, the original intent was to use the PGT as a "gate" before a platoon's BT XI.

My goal was to train my platoons on our standard platoon fire control and distribution standing operating procedures (SOPs), using realistic exercises with enemy formations. Our platoon fire control SOP has each BFV responsible for the destruction of a portion of an enemy vehicle formation: The wingmen fire at vehicles from the outside to the inside and from far to near of the formation; the platoon leader and platoon sergeant fire at vehicles from inside to outside and from near to far. This arrangement is easy to control if everyone understands his part and the enemy formation consists of the same...
type of vehicles, such as BMPs, but it becomes more difficult for the platoon leader to control when tanks, Hind-D helicopters, or troops are included in the formation.

Some of the PGT's limitations became apparent, however, after a few rotations through it. These included its small selection of exercises (it comes with only 16) and lack of realistic scenarios. For example, the primary defensive exercise consists of eight distinct situations in which the platoon engages enemy tanks, BMPs, squads, and RPG teams at ranges between 300 and 3,000 meters, then squads and RPG teams at 300 to 500 meters. Yet none of the vehicles are in any type of formation; they simply appear at once all over the battlefield—like COFT targets—and either are destroyed or disappear into woodlines and ravines. Some of the vehicles even cross in front of each other while moving to opposite sides of the battlefield. Also, the platoon sergeant’s wingman misses most of the action, because few enemy vehicles enter his sector.

After the platoons went through this exercise two or three times, the crews began to anticipate when and where the enemy would attack and then ambush him as soon as he appeared. They killed more enemy vehicles, of course, but not because of any improvement in fire control and distribution.

I approached the service administrator of the post PGT about creating several new scenarios to make the training more realistic and challenging. With only a diagram, my commander’s intent, and some details, he created eight new exercises in a few weeks.

The PGT system can hold up to 14 targets at once. The selection includes enemy targets such as T-72 tanks, BTRs, BMPs, BRDMs, ZSU-23, and Hind-Ds, and friendly vehicles such as M1 and M60 tanks, M2 BFVs, and Apache helicopters. The system can also change vehicle speeds and formations. Since the enemy cannot react to friendly fire, this is particularly useful in adding realism to the exercise. For example, an enemy column moving toward the platoon at 20 miles per hour can change to battle formation and increase its speed to 40 miles per hour after 15 seconds (about the time an enemy commander would see fires coming into his formation).

Using the crawl, walk, run approach, the first situations in the exercise were easy and became gradually more difficult and challenging. The last situation—the run part—separated the good platoons from the great ones. One of these “expert runs” consisted of 10 BMPs and three T-72s in column at about 1,500 meters, moving from right to left at 30 miles per hour. Only a well-trained and disciplined platoon could destroy every enemy vehicle in that formation before it could get away.

The major improvement in the exercises was that the enemy attacked in doctrinally correct formations, either directly at the platoon, oblique to it, or right-to-left across its front. The first few situations consisted of BMPs but later included a mix of tanks, APCs, Hind-Ds, and dismounted troops. In addition, each BFV could engage the enemy across the entire platoon front.

We reviewed each of the exercises in the PGT to make sure they worked. The major problems were ensuring that the enemy vehicles were not masked by terrain and that they did not move too fast. An enemy vehicle speed of 20 miles per hour starting at 2,500 meters out worked best. After some minor adjustments, we brought in the platoons.

A platoon knew it had failed the exercise when the soldiers either killed the last few vehicles within 1,000 meters or were actually overrun by whatever enemy vehicles remained. Members of the next platoon in line, watching the show on television screens in the monitoring room, usually howled with laughter as the platoon in the simulators was overrun. Needless to say, peer pressure played a significant role in motivating the platoons to improve their performance.

The new exercises did a much better job of training the platoon on the SOPs.
The exercise playback tape the platoon watched in the AAR room clearly showed which crew fired at enemy vehicles out of its sector and which enemy vehicles were engaged by two or more Bradleys, as shown in the accompanying box. These figures are a simple version of what the platoon sees on the exercise playback tape in the AAR room. The lines represent BFV engagements. The enemy vehicle icons turn from red to black when killed. The top panel (Figure 1a-1c) shows a successful platoon whose crews understand the platoon fire control and distribution SOP. The bottom panel (Figures 2a-2c) shows a platoon whose crews tend to fire at the nearest target. The result is an overrun platoon, or at least three enemy vehicles destroyed within 1,000 meters. From the playback, the platoon leader could easily identify which of his crews had not understood the SOPs and needed additional training.

After a few rotations through the new exercises, the platoons' fire control and distribution were improved remarkably. The crews viewed the exercises as a challenge and realized that they had to adhere to the platoon SOP to succeed or suffer the embarrassment of being overrun. They could see the effects of a well rehearsed and understood fire control plan. The platoon leaders learned that they had to be able to give quick, concise fire commands when tanks, troops, or Hind-Ds appeared in the enemy formation. Not surprisingly, the platoon's radio discipline and reporting procedures also improved.

Another benefit from the exercises was practice in the application of intelligence on enemy doctrine and tactics. On one exercise, the platoon faced an attacking enemy complete with regimental reconnaissance, combat reconnaissance patrol, forward patrol, forward security element, and two MRCs from the main body's advance guard. The platoons learned what formations and types of vehicles to expect in a movement-to-contact as they practiced the fire control SOP.

A third exercise consisted of BT XII tasks. It contained the same number of targets, type of vehicles, ammunition breakdown, and order of engagement as the table. The platoon leaders could identify problem areas before ever firing a live round on BT XII.

The most important result of the new exercises came during platoon qualification less than a month later. In previous BT XII runs, one of the major problems was ammunition conservation. Frequently, enemy vehicle targets went unengaged because the crews ran out of ammunition before the end of the table. This time, the crews "double-tapped" far fewer enemy targets, conserved ammunition, and were able to engage every enemy vehicle target. Each of the platoon's gunnery scores increased as a result. Afterwards, all of the crews said the new exercises in the platoon gunnery trainer were the best preparation for BT XII they had received, short of live firing.

I considered the Bradley PGT the best simulator for training platoon fire control and distribution. With a little imagination and some help from a PGT service administrator, each company commander can have the trainer tailored to train platoons on his specific platoon fire control SOP.

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At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), defensive battles are sometimes lost before the first shot is fired. The reason is that, during the preparation phase, units fail to manage time and perform the tasks necessary for a successful defense. On the basis of our experience at the JRTC, we would like to identify some ways in which rotational units mismanage time and to offer some possible remedies.

Ironically, the tasks most often sacrificed for time during the defense are those that are essential to defeating a determined enemy:

- Courses of action are developed in haste, resulting in an incomplete plan and no operations order (OPORD).
- Units do not conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the sector, and there is rarely an occupation plan that provides a smooth transition into the defense. As a result, soldiers must be repositioned after combat positions have been prepared, and combat power is not concentrated at the decisive time and place.
- The duties of the first sergeant and the executive officer (XO) are not defined to help the commander prepare the defense.
- Priorities of work are either not established or do not follow the unit's own standing operating procedures (SOPs).

A unit's actions from the time the commander receives the warning order or operations order up to the actual occupation of the defense should be like a battle drill. Once the commander receives the order, he should immediately call back to his command post (CP) with the message that the unit is preparing to defend. The more information he can provide in that transmission, the better, but the mission to defend should be enough to generate several events that facilitate preparation:

The XO should gather the orders group—which should include the first sergeant, the platoon leaders, the mortar section sergeant, the communications sergeant, the nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) NCO, and the fire support NCO. If the area of operations is known, the orders group can construct a terrain model. If the task mission is known, the XO should attempt to coordinate the movement of the attachments to the CP. Also, classes of supply and mission essential equipment should be coordinated with the S-4 and the company supply sergeant.

When the commander arrives at the CP, he should issue a warning order and begin developing courses of action (COAs). COA development must start immediately upon receipt of the warning order. Ideally, the unit should receive its mission and area of operations, which are enough to begin the planning process. It is critical that as much information as possible be disseminated to subordinate leaders to allow concurrent planning. Effective concurrent planning is best achieved when the platoon leaders participate in the COA development. Too often, the commander conducts his planning alone while the platoon leaders idly wait for guidance. If the platoon leaders help in the planning process, they will already understand the concept and their mission when the OPORD is issued. This allows them to focus during their planning while the commander completes the order. Concurrent planning allows a degree of COA analysis and wargaming that rarely occurs during the commander’s estimate because of a lack of time.

Determining the decisive point or points is central to COA development. A thorough map reconnaissance will help identify terrain that offers an advantage to the defender while exploiting the weakness of an attacking force. From the terrain analysis and identification of likely enemy avenues of approach, a tentative plan for the employment of reinforcing obstacles and indirect fire targets can be developed. Since the main effort and the supporting effort should be arrayed around the decisive point, their tentative locations can be pinpointed. To provide focus for his reconnaissance, the commander should mark on his map the locations of subunits, the decisive point, target reference points (TRPs), indirect fire targets, and obstacle locations.

Complete OPORDs are rarely given in the defense at the JRTC. Instead, several fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) are issued as the plan develops. The danger is that the plan will never be fully integrated. A confirming order needs
to be issued that ties all the pieces together and resolves any issues that remain. "Fill-in-the-blank" formats save time and help ensure that all critical information is provided. These formats should be laminated and issued down to squad level.

Although the reconnaissance and occupation of the defense are separate plans, they are closely linked during the execution of a mission. Unfortunately, the occupation often precedes the reconnaissance, and time is wasted shifting forces later when the concept changes. Also, the reconnaissance is usually conducted as a part of COA development rather than for the purpose of confirming or denying information in a plan that is already complete. Several events pertaining to both reconnaissance and occupation should occur simultaneously, but the unit should not occupy its positions until the reconnaissance is complete.

The reconnaissance is the most critical event because it should be conducted during daylight; all effort must therefore be made to begin the reconnaissance as soon as possible. Although transportation support is not always available in a light infantry unit, a vehicle greatly helps time management during the reconnaissance. If a support high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) cannot be obtained, the fire support vehicle or an attachment’s TOW HMMWV, tank, or Bradley can be used. It is also important that the appropriate personnel be taken on the reconnaissance and that the task organization be effective immediately to ensure that the necessary attachments are present.

The following personnel should participate in the reconnaissance—company commander and radiotelephone operators, all platoon leaders and attachment leaders, the fire support officer (FSO), and the mortar section sergeant. If transportation allows, additional personnel can be included to provide security and guide the company into the assembly area. The FSO should have a global positioning system (GPS) to plot unit locations, targets, and obstacles. In addition, the unit should bring the following aids to facilitate the reconnaissance and the eventual occupation of the defense: engineer tape, spray paint, VS-17 panels, chemical lights, long pickets, and MRE (meals, ready to eat) boxes.

The reconnaissance plan should include a precise sequence of events and a timeline, and these must be strictly followed. The reconnaissance should begin at the decisive point where the leaders observe this critical area from both the friendly and the enemy perspectives. Once the decision point is confirmed, a picket marked with engineer tape or a VS-17 panel should be placed there as a reference for the rest of the reconnaissance. This point should be confirmed by the GPS and may be designated as TRP 1. Any reinforcing obstacles to be employed at this location may be marked in a similar manner.

The next step is to confirm or deny the location of the main and supporting efforts. A concurrent reconnaissance may take place while the commander and the main effort leader conduct their reconnaissance. After the main effort position is verified, the commander moves to the supporting efforts. The commander should verify that the positions meet his intent, and the positions of key weapons should be designated. Engineer tape can be used to outline the positions of M60s, TOWs, and Dragons, and spray paint may depict sectors and the orientation of fires. The platoon leaders may designate tentative squad locations, which will be verified with the squad leaders once they link up with the company. Platoon assembly areas should also be identified to make the occupation easier.

While the platoon leaders are completing their reconnaissance, the commander and mortar section sergeant reconnoiter the mortar firing position. In addition, sites are designated for the CP and for casually and enemy prisoner of war collection points. The FSO can plot indirect fire targets and establish TRPs on the basis of the commander’s guidance. If time allows, man-made TRPs can be made and emplaced to ease direct-fire planning.

While the reconnaissance is being conducted, the first sergeant should be moving the rest of the company to the assembly area by either foot march or vehicle convoy. An element may be sent forward under the NBC or communications NCO to quarter the assembly area. Once the leader’s reconnaissance is complete and the company has occupied the area, the platoon and squad leaders should conduct their reconnaissance and the rest of their elements should move to platoon assembly areas. Squad leaders should mark fighting position locations with spray paint or engineer tape, and sector stakes may be emplaced. Before the soldiers move forward, the commander should make one more walk-through to verify the company trace and platoon locations.

During the reconnaissance and occupation, the XO should be coordinating for classes of supply and engineer assets. He should have verified logistic release points (LRPs) for class IV and V and pioneer tools. Once these supplies are on station, he should personally see that they are dropped off at the appropriate location. Preconfigured Class IV and pioneer packages save a great deal of time in preparing the defense. At the least, the supply sergeant, who is usually located at the field trains, can assemble pioneer packages and other related defense items such as water cans, MOPP gear, M-8 alarms, platoon early warning devices, Dragon antiairor weapons, and water cans. These packages should be configured at the lowest possible level.

In addition to assisting the commander during the initial preparation
of the defense, the XO and first sergeant are also needed during the final phases of the preparation. Once the SEE (small emplacement excavator) or dozer is on site, the first sergeant can be used to ensure that these assets are used as efficiently as possible. Once he gets the engineer vehicle, he should stay with it until the work is complete or the allotted time for its use has expired. The first sergeant should direct the vehicle from one location to another and ensure that the positions are dug to standard. He should arrange for the operator to eat while the vehicle is being refueled. Once the work is done, he should see that the vehicle links up with the next company.

After the XO has ensured that Class IV and V supplies have been dropped off at the appropriate locations and all supply issues are resolved, he can become responsible for the emplacement and construction of obstacles and man-made TRPs. If an obstacle is being emplaced in the company's sector, the XO should link up with the engineer in charge and see that the obstacle meets the intent of the battalion or company commander. He should also supervise and inspect the construction of company level obstacles, including the emplacement of protective, tactical, and supplemental wire and hasty protective minefields.

The priority of work most often neglected due to time constraints is the rehearsal of the engagements and contingency plans. Unfortunately, commanders at the JRTC rarely use any of the three types of rehearsals—backbriefs, reduced force, and full force. When time is short, the backbrief can be a very effective technique if it is used as a synchronization tool. The commander can gather his subordinate leaders and verbally fight the battle by asking, "What happens when...?" questions to stimulate the unit to take the appropriate action. He can also accomplish this using a terrain model or the company fire plan sketch. If the leaders cannot be gathered at one location, a similar rehearsal can be conducted by radio.

Units that rotate through the JRTC usually have SOPs for conducting the defense. These SOPs generally outline priorities of work and provide examples of range cards and sector sketches. But they do not address timelines for accomplishing the tasks or a division of labor for the best use of the time available. Since most of the tasks during the preparation phase of the defense require a very limited decision-making process, the preparation of a defense can be made into a battle drill. An execution check list is an excellent way to outline the steps of the drill. Then, like all SOPs or battle drills, it must be practiced.

If time is not used wisely in the defense, it can be as great an enemy as the attacking force. When time is used to the fullest during the preparation of the defense, more effort can be dedicated to rehearsing and resting soldiers for the upcoming fight.

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**SWAP SHOP**

**Protect Your Ear Protection**

The Army issues you a pair of ear plugs, inside a carrying case. But what good will they be if, within moments after use, they pop out and are lost in the woods? What if you want to remove them briefly to listen for sounds of the enemy? You don't want to fumble with—or worse, search for—tiny rubber ear plugs in the dark in deep vegetation.

Many commercial ear plugs have built-in cords to catch them when they fall out. And the U.S. Army Soldiers Integrated Protective Ensemble (SIPE) has a corded ear plug/radio receiver that will let you go to normal hearing quickly and listen for sounds of the enemy.

But you don't have to buy commercial plugs or wait for SIPE gear. You can dummy cord your own issue ear plugs:

- Take about 12 inches of 550 parachute cord, and remove one of the seven inner strands.
- Thread the strand on a large sewing needle.
- Run each end of the cord through an ear-plug handle, and tie an overhand knot to secure the ends.

You can wear the plugs with the cord loose, stored in the issue carrying case, or at the back of your head; if the plugs pop out, they will stop at your neck instead of falling loose on the ground. Or you can wear them tied by a girth hitch to the inside of the helmet or BDU cap for more secure carry and storage out of the way, inside your head gear.

Either way, your ear protection will be protected.

*(Contributed by Mike Sparks, U.S. Army National Guard, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.)*

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SNIPER SCHOOL NEEDS NCOs

The U.S. Army Sniper School, at Fort Benning, is looking for sniper-qualified noncommissioned officers in the rank of sergeant and above, MOS 11B or 11M, to serve as instructors. The Sniper School point of contact is SFC Ellis, DSN 784-6006/6985 or commercial (706) 544-6006/6985.

BATTLE STAFF NCO COURSE

The Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course (BSNCOC) trains NCOs to serve as integral members of a battle staff and manage the day-to-day operations of brigade and battalion command posts. The course is offered by the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) at Fort Bliss, Texas.

NCOs in the course learn their specific staff duties and also become familiar with the duties of other staff sections. The course is realistic, fast-paced, scenario-driven, and performance oriented.

The command post exercise enables NCOs using the Maneuver Control System and the Battalion (or Brigade) Battle Simulation to receive a performance evaluation to validate their staff proficiency.

Units are responsible for seeing that the NCOs who attend the course meet all qualifications. Soldiers who do not meet the standards will be returned to their units, and the units may face liability for the reimbursement of all travel-related costs.

All soldiers attending the course must meet the weight and physical fitness standards listed in Army Regulations 600-9 and 350-14. Army Physical Fitness Test scores and height and weight data must be shown in Block 16 of DD Form 1610. Soldiers who fail to meet these standards will not be enrolled.

Potential students should have a reading and comprehension level of at least 10.1 on the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE). Some of the failures in the course result from low reading and comprehension levels.

Students are expected to have a good solid background in graphics and overlays before they report for the course. The exam on graphics and overlays is the most exact test of attention to detail an NCO is likely to face. More than 20 hours of classroom and off-duty time will go into training them to depict the battlefield graphically.

About 40 percent of the students fail the first exam. Then about 15 percent fail the retest and are dropped from the course.

Students in each class have problems in the following basic areas: understanding the basic operations order and graphically depicting the commander's intent on a map; plotting six-digit grid coordinates; labeling symbols; and drawing boundaries.

Reading Field Manual 101-5-1 is the best way to learn. There are some mistakes in FM 101-5-1, however, and it is recommended that potential candidates for the Battle Staff Course be enrolled in the following correspondence subcourses:

- Table 5-12, Field Artillery School, Subcourse FA8015, Overlay Techniques.
- Table 5-17, Intelligence School, Subcourse IT0588, Prepare and Maintain Intelligence Situation Map and Associated Overlays.
- Table 5-28, Signal School, Subcourse SS0529, Prepare Overlays.

Course descriptions and enrollment information for these subcourses are found in DA Pamphlet 351-4. Since these subcourses should be completed before the Battle Staff Course begins, students should be enrolled in them at least six months earlier.

The best way to prepare soldiers for the Battle Staff Course is to assign a graduate of the course, or another well qualified NCO, to train and mentor them. There are several steps in this process:

First, assess the soldiers' basic map reading skills by common task test standards. Next, have them enroll in the subcourses. Then have them read FM 101-5-1 and draw all of the 300 or so symbols in the book. Finally, take an old operations order from the unit's last combat training center rotation, and have them draw the overlays in four hours or less, which is the standard for students during the BSNCOC test.

To obtain additional information about the Battle Staff NCO Course, use your communications program to access the USASMA Bulletin Board at DSN 978-8277 or commercial (915) 568-8277.

(This item was submitted by SGM Charles C. Hayhurst, who was formerly assigned to the Sergeants Major Academy.)

USAR CGSOC CORRESPONDENCE OPTION

Eligible students enrolled in the correspondence option of the Command and General Staff Officers Course through the School of Corresponding Studies at Fort Leavenworth may now get Phases III and IV of the four-phase course.

According to SOCS officials, nearly 200 officers have completed Phases I and II of the correspondence option and are eligible to take Phases III and
IV. The time limit for completing the entire course is 36 months.

Since the revised four-phase course was introduced to the field in late 1993, more than 3,500 students have enrolled in the correspondence option, and 2,000 have completed at least two phases through the U.S. Army Reserve Forces schools option.

Students with questions concerning their academic records or the availability of material should contact their SOCS academic counselors.

LAW CHANGES USAR MANDATORY REMOVAL DATE

New changes to the law affect the way the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) handles the mandatory removal of Reserve officers from Active status.

Although most provisions of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) are slated to take effect 1 October 1996, the part of the act that governs the mandatory removal of officers was enacted into law on 5 October 1994 with the passage of the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act.

Specifically, age will no longer be a decisive factor in removing officers. The law removes age 53 for officers in the ranks of first lieutenant through lieutenant colonel and age 55 for colonels from the criteria for determining maximum years of service.

This should not be confused with removal for maximum age. The change affects officers commissioned after age 25. It does not affect that part of Title 10, U.S. Code, that addresses the age 60 separation or transfer provision.

Removal for maximum years of service is now based solely on 28 years of commissioned service for officers in the ranks of first lieutenant through lieutenant colonel and 30 years of commissioned service for colonels. The Army Reserve previously used an officer's commissioning age along with length of service to determine his mandatory removal date (MRD).

Officers who were removed erroneously between 5 October 1994 and 23 January 1995 have the option of using administrative redress to correct their premature removal.

To find out your adjusted MRD, contact your unit administrator if you are assigned to a troop program unit or your personnel management officer at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) if you are assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve or as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Active Guard Reserve officers should contact the Full Time Support Management Center at ARPERCEN.

During the days between Christmas and the new year, Civil War armies were usually found safely quartered in their winter camps, waiting for the spring to arrive before resuming active campaigning. In 1862, however, this was not the case for the Union army of General William Rosecrans and the Confederate army of General Braxton Bragg. Instead of huddling around campfires in an attempt to keep warm, these armies were to experience three hard days of combat in some of the harshest weather winter could provide.

The two armies had met briefly two months earlier in the rolling countryside of central Kentucky at the inconclusive battle of Perryville. Following that sharp fight, Bragg had retreated south out of Kentucky, giving up the hope that numerous Kentuckians would rally to the Confederacy’s call to arms. While Bragg retained his army command, the Union commander who had opposed him was replaced by Rosecrans. Late December found Rosecrans finally ready to move against Bragg near the small Tennessee town of Murfreesboro and Stones River, the two key landmarks that gave the subsequent battle its name in North and South, respectively.

The battle of Stones River in late December and early January nearly ended in a catastrophic Northern defeat as Bragg’s troops literally bent the Union army battle line back into the shape of a U. Strong Union resistance near the Round Forest, however, prevented what appeared to be inevitable. In the three days of hard fighting, more than 20,000 casualties fell on both sides.

Peter Cozzens, a foreign service officer with the State Department, has written what is certainly one of the best narrative histories of this battle. He has done an excellent job of researching the official records as well as personal accounts and unit histories. Among the book’s outstanding features are the many excellent maps that trace unit locations and movements from the larger scale down to smaller portions of the wintertime battlefield, something that seems to be missing from so many contemporary military histories.

This book is definitely worthwhile reading.

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Although it was the biggest military action of the Vietnam War, the Spring Offensive of 1972, known as the Easter Offensive, has not been thoroughly treated by historians. Most accounts of the war give it brief coverage, often focusing on one aspect or another.

With the exception of a small cadre of advisors still working diligently with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States by this time had essentially forsaken the Vietnam crusade and, long before the final negotiations, was trying to forget the experience. To most Americans, this offensive was an inconvenient last hurrah before complete extrication. The focus of scholarship echoes this attitude as it concentrates on the height of the war, not the denouement.

Thus, this excellent piece of military history—the first detailed comprehensive study of the entire offensive—is a significant contribution, and it is fascinating reading. Dale Andrade’s previous book, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (1990), exhibited his thorough and judicious research and fine writing, and so does this one.

Andrade argues that the pacification effort had been successful by the beginning of 1972. Viet Cong strength and activity were significantly reduced, and most of the country was relatively secure. Less than four percent of South Vietnam’s population lived under communist control, and the southernmost region, IV Corps, was almost totally pacified. Although the North Vietnamese suffered tremendous losses and did not achieve their objective in the offensive, neither were they totally unsuccessful. By July 1972 almost ten percent of the population in the south was under communist control, and confidence in the South Vietnamese government was shaken. In the wake of the invasion, President Thieu retreated from the democratic process and took authoritarian measures.

Finally, the offensive pointed up the problems with Vietnamization. The South Vietnamese military forces were among the best-equipped in the world, but in many ways little progress had been made during the long years of U.S. involvement. Despite some heroic South Vietnamese efforts and the dedication and courage of the American advisors, the ARVN still had severe problems in leadership and morale. The salient fact was that the Easter Offensive was repelled not by the South Vietnamese military, but by American air power and ground-based firepower and by the strategic and tactical errors of the North Vietnamese.

This book is an outstanding contribution. Even-handed, detailed, and forthright, it captures the blend of the heroic, inept, banal, and brilliant that characterized the effort in the Easter Offensive as well as the entire war.

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This is not a book about the United States Military Academy or about war, but rather a fine collection of shared experiences among 34 West Point classmates. John C. Waugh has taken the time to walk the reader instructively along with these young leaders and their families from the Mexican War through the Civil War and into the twilight of their lives. The shared experiences, the common bonds of friendship, family, and dedication to life—with all its successes and challenges—are carefully woven into this well-written “class biography.”

This book offers military leaders many occasions to appreciate the values gained from lasting friendships and the personal strengths developed from combat. Another...
insight to be gained from this stimulating work is that of the challenges facing the Army wife. I recommend that all professional military leaders take the time to share the chapter "Our Men at Sumter" with their wives. In that chapter, Waugh recounts, in detail, the invaluable service and dedication of Army wives to their men at the fall of Fort Sumter in 1861. The old Army adage "Two for the price of one" has never been made more pointedly than at Sumter. These short visits into the personal side of such leaders as Jackson, McClellan, Hill, and their classmates make the book informative and easy to read.

The Class of 1846 should not be read as a definitive work on the Mexican War or the Civil War. Readers who have some understanding of the various campaigns in these conflicts will get the most from it. Those who have a fair knowledge of U.S. military history during this period will have a better vision of the author's purpose and intent. But any reader, whatever his military background, will find value in this book. The author gives enough detail to understand the conditions facing these military leaders at various milestones in their lives without becoming pedantic.

I highly recommend this book.

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To my knowledge, there isn't another military historian in the United States with better credentials to tackle the main subject of this book, which is "the relationship between special intelligence and the campaigns of General Douglas MacArthur" in the latter's Southwest Pacific Area Command (SWPA) during World War II.

Author Edward Drea earned a master's degree in history from Sophia University in Tokyo and his doctorate in history from the University of Kansas. He lived and studied in Japan for six years, during which time he became quite familiar with the World War II Japanese military archives located in the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. His service in the U.S. Air Force included tours of duty in Japan and Vietnam. He is a Japanese linguist, and his work in Japan enabled him to develop the Japanese view of and reaction to MacArthur's campaigns. He has been with the Army's Center of Military History for a number of years and is chief of the Center's Research and Analysis Division.

In a way, this book can be considered an expansion of Part I of Drea's February 1984 Combat Studies Institute Paper Number 9, Defending the Driniumor. Early in the book, he discusses the Japanese Army's code systems and explains how MacArthur's intelligence establishment, represented by the Central Bureau, was eventually able to break those codes and deliver to MacArthur's staff huge amounts of material on the foe. He touches only lightly on our MAGIC (or PURPLE) effort, and the U.S. Navy's success against the Japanese naval codes, and then only when the information gathered from those sources played a part in SWPA's operations. Actually, for much of 1942 and 1943, SWPA depended heavily on information gathered by MAGIC and the naval establishment. It was not until March 1944 that the Central Bureau was able to break the main Japanese Army codes and earn its keep. The bureau worked closely with the Military Intelligence Service at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, although there were times during the war when relations between the two agencies were strained.

Drea traces the bureau's increasing successes and growing importance to SWPA and particularly to Major General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, who, Drea feels, did not always use the special intelligence, or ULTRA, properly. It is interesting to note that the Japanese never suspected that their various codes had been broken.

But the center of this study is MacArthur and his use of ULTRA. In brief, Drea believes MacArthur used ULTRA information only when it supported his operational preferences and relied just as often on intuition and luck.

Of particular importance in light of the recent dispute caused by the Smithsonian Institution's Enola Gay presentation and the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan is Drea's next-to-last chapter. In that chapter, he discusses the good work the various ULTRA organizations did in identifying the huge number of Japanese military personnel on the island of Kyushu, the first U.S. objective. This information undoubtedly played a major role in causing U.S. leaders to drop the bomb on Hiroshima.

Was ULTRA in SWPA important or not? Drea says that ULTRA's "impact on the air and sea dimensions of the war profoundly affected the conduct of operations," and that "Allied ability to read Japanese army radio messages definitely shortened the ground war in the Pacific."

But Drea also says: MacArthur's generalship, and to an even greater degree his personal leadership, suffered because of ULTRA's disclosures. He pressured his subordinates unmercifully to pull off victories when ULTRA made plain that the Japanese were present in greater numbers than MacArthur was willing to accept. MacArthur's carefully constructed persona as a daring gambler was diminished because ULTRA showed that as often as not he was betting on a sure thing. . . . In most showdowns with the Japanese, he held the winning cards. MacArthur was perhaps not as daring as he may have wished others to believe, but he was willing to take risks . . . to achieve the overriding strategic goal.

Still, Drea concludes that "although certain of his personality traits may have been distasteful, Douglas MacArthur was an aggressive, brilliant leader and surely one of the top two or three military commanders of World War II."

I cannot recommend this book too highly to all infantrymen, past and present. It contains any number of lessons that are as valid today as they were in the 1940s. Drea deserves our deepest thanks for reminding us of them.

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The "process" of strategy is the central theme of this interesting study. By "process," the editors mean precisely how rulers and states have made strategy and gone to war. The Making of Strategy is thus an attempt to discover why politics can never be far from the battlefield. Hence, this book is for serious study, not casual reading.

This book originated as a series of lectures in the United States Naval War College's course on strategy and policy. It consists of 17 case studies ranging from the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 B.C.) to the Cold War, plus introductory and concluding essays. In all, 19 different authors probe the strategic process using as their common interpretative framework five factors: governmental systems, geography, history, culture, and economics. The introduction emphasizes the constants of strategy in a rapidly shifting world, while the conclusion tries to understand the forces that have transformed strategy since 400 B.C. and that seem likely to continue transforming it in the future.
These studies address the greatest armies the world has known, their commanders, the politicians who crafted policy, and the soldiers who fought the wars. Although the essays are somewhat uneven in style and quality, this may be due to the "process" of analyzing different societies and cultures in similar terms. But this is always a problem with such a work.

Nevertheless, each of the essays is worth reading. Of particular note are the studies by Donald Kagan ("Athenian Strategy in the Peloponnesian War"); Peter Maslowski ("To the Edge of Greatness: The United States, 1783-1865"); John Gooch ("The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890-1918"); and Robert Doughty ("The Illusion of Security: France, 1919-1940"). These essays are in a class by themselves.

The editors have put together a fine book devoted to a critical subject of our times. This anthology provides a solid framework on the way strategy is made (or ought to be made), whether one begins from the front or back or skips from one essay to another. For anyone interested in studying the history of how societies go to war, The Making of Strategy is a good place to begin.


The May 1941 Battle of Crete witnessed the first large-scale use of paratroopers and glider-borne troops in military history. It was also one of the first battles in which the enemy's plans and intentions, as a result of ULTRA intercepts, were known before the firing began. Yet the outcome of the battle was far different from the one expected.

The leadership and conduct of the battle remain controversial today, with at least four books on the subjects having been written during the past five years. Author Anthony Beevor, a former British Army regular officer, contends that New Zealand Major General Bernard Freyberg, commander of "Crete Force," misinterpreted critical ULTRA messages. As a result, instead of positioning his forces to deny the Germans control of the airfields, especially at Maleme, Freyberg was fixated on defending against airborne reinforcements, which never arrived.

While the book focuses on the Battle of Crete, it also covers in admirable detail the battle for Greece that led up to it, and especially the subsequent Cretan resistance.

_Beevor conducted numerous interviews with participants on all sides in the battle, and his documentary research also reveals the experiences of the soldiers at the tactical level of war. His vivid descriptions of German paratroopers and New Zealand infantrymen engaged in hand-to-hand combat in Crete's olive groves and stone villages are enough to make this narrative worth reading. Indeed, the fighting was so ferocious that the Germans lost more men on Crete than the total they had lost since the war began._

Seven well-drawn maps and 20 photographs enhance this book, and source notes and bibliography are generally adequate. Of special interest are the appendices, which include an explanation of the secret organizations that led the Cretan resistance, the British and German orders of battle, and the texts of relevant ULTRA signals.

The 1941 Battle of Crete is an interesting case study of military leadership. What should have been a foreordained British victory was allowed to slip away, due primarily to a misreading of vital ULTRA messages and the complacency, inflexibility, and lack of imagination of senior force commanders. It is a tale worth reading by all who aspire to command, because it reveals in detail the human dimensions of leadership and soldiering.


In the late summer of 1864, Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee were deadlocked around the city of Petersburg, Virginia. Sherman was making his way toward Atlanta and on through Georgia. But in the famous Shenandoah Valley, the Confederacy was still obtaining a great deal of its food supplies, and still contending with some warwise military forces. In fact, the Confederate forces under General Jubal A. Early had earlier gone to the very gates of Washington, D.C.

This small collection of essays is an excellent examination of this somewhat neglected period of the Civil War—the Union and Confederate campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley during late 1864. The two armies facing each other there were under the command of Generals Philip Sheridan and Jubal Early, respectively. Overall, this is a concise and well-written look at the last Valley campaign.

Editor Gary Gallagher, head of the history department at Pennsylvania State University and author of several excellent Civil War histories, provides a good survey of the situation that prompted the efforts in the Valley and of the battles that took place there. His introduction is followed by two chapters that examine the Confederate leadership in the Shenandoah under Early and the Union generalship during the campaign. (The Confederate analysis is written by Jeffrey D. Wert, a Civil War historian, and the Union analysis by A. Wilson Greene, director of a Civil War battlefield preservation organization.)

The last two chapters cover two different aspects of the role Southern cavalry played during the Valley struggle. Robert Krick, author of eight previous volumes on Confederate history, looks at the undisciplined Confederate cavalry, which Jubal Early called "the cause of all my disasters"; and Dennis Frye, historian at Harpers Ferry National Historic Site, writes about John S. Mosby and his part in the 1864 Valley efforts.

Gallagher concludes the book with an excellent bibliographic note on other books an interested reader might want to consult. _Struggle for the Shenandoah_ will provide an excellent evening of military history reading and an opportunity to consider the insights the essayists offer.


_Winston Churchill is best remembered as the cigar-chomping, pugnacious, "V" for "Victory" gesturing Prime Minister who led the British during "their finest hour" in the titanic struggle of World War II. But he began laying the foundation of his political career half a century earlier, as a soldier and even more so as a journalist, and these formative experiences are the subject of this most interesting book._

Churchill was commissioned into the 4th Hussars in 1895, in the waning days of Queen Victoria's long reign and the "Pax Britannica." Motivated by an intense desire to experience war—and gain recognition—he traveled to Cuba that same year, where an insurrection against the Spanish was in progress. To help finance the trip, he arranged to send letters back to England for publication in a newspaper. From that time and for the following five years, he also served either as an officer or a cor-
respondent, or both, on the North West Frontier of India (1897), the Sudan (1898), and South Africa (1899-1900).

In this splendid volume, Churchill's dispatches from these four campaigns have been edited and published together for the first time. These witty, lucid, often passionate, and sometimes critical articles were frequently written from the battlefield and therefore convey a sense of immediacy and realism. They are not only read for what he but—more important—helped establish a name and reputation for him that greatly assisted his election to Parliament at the turn of the century and began his political career.

The illuminating foreword is written by Churchill's grandson and namesake (also a Member of Parliament and a sometime war correspondent). Editor Frederick Woods has done a remarkable job of researching and chronicling the background to Churchill's dispatches and the true motivation behind them. Eleven maps illustrate the scenes of his exploits.

Anyone reading this excellent book will gain a much greater appreciation of Queen Victoria's "little wars," the masterful use of the English language, and especially the development of the personality of the young Winston Churchill. Once this book is opened, it is difficult to put down, and one cannot expect more than that.

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