


Infantry

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Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL PAUL D. EATON Chief of Infantry

THE SOLDIER ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM A Paradigm for Transformation

The Army Transformation will succeed because of our commitment to fielding a force of greater lethality, survivability, deployability, and maneuverability. As we complete the transformation to the Objective Force, we will hone our ability to respond to the challenges we will face as we execute the war on terrorism, conduct peacekeeping and stability operations, and meet other—as yet unforeseen—future demands. The commitment to accomplish this exists at all levels within the infantry force, and must continue to guide our decisions and actions even as we undergo the ever-present personnel turbulence within our staff and command structures. The Army Transformation will ensure that we meet tomorrow's challenges with the best-trained, best-equipped, and most competently led infantrymen our nation has ever sent forth in her defense. No longer will we have to face the prospect of fighting solely with the weapons and techniques of an earlier century.

Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the benefits of this commitment to Transformation than the Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP), an initiative that has been quietly transforming soldiers' battlefield capabilities, their quality of life, and their weapons and equipment for more than 13 years. Few programs can claim that degree of longevity, and I want to tell you about the SEP.

This program began in 1989 and received Congressional funding "to enhance the effectiveness of foot soldiers." The Army expanded the scope of

SEP in 1992 to include all categories of soldiers, and today SEP is coordinated with the Marine Enhancement Program and is funded by Department of the Army. The impetus for SEP, which was the forerunner to later acquisition reform, came from the recognition that soldiers were purchasing for field use some commercial off-the-shelf items already available on the civilian market.

The SEP was not intended to be an incentive awards program or to fund lengthy development programs, nor was it intended to procure large numbers of major items for use. Rather, its intent is to evaluate, test, and type-classify selected commercial off-the-shelf items in 36 months or less with a view toward issuing them to soldiers. The purpose of SEP was—and still is—to increase the soldier's combat effectiveness through the fielding of lighter, more lethal weapons; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence assets; and personal equipment. The emphasis continues to be on those types of items that are worn, carried, or consumed for individual use in a tactical environment.


Let me cite a few examples of SEP successes, and then tell you how to make use of this program. The present desert battle dress uniform (BDU), the hot-weather BDU, ration improvements, the flameless ration heater, the desert boot, the modular sleep system, knee and elbow pads, improved personal flotation devices, and the lightweight chemical/biological protective garment, all owe

their existence to the SEP, but it is not limited to personal comfort items. The M24 sniper optic, M4 carbine, M240B medium machinegun, the M16A4 rifle, the 5.56mm and 7.62mm armor piercing rounds now in service in Afghanistan, and the sniper night sight and accessory kit are among the more than 55 contributions the SEP has made to the lethality and survivability of the U.S. infantryman.


We are also looking at more than a dozen SEP programs being carried over into FY 03, with six new start programs for the year. The former include the M84 reloadable fuze, an M9 pistol aiming light module, a collapsible buttstock M249 machinegun, a tactical cartridge long-range sniper rifle, and an integrated laser/white-light pointer. Our soldiers committed to the MOUT fight will be aided by the launched grapnel hook and midsized riot control disperser—already in service as earlier SEP successes—and by the infantryman's wall breaching kit, an FY 03 new-start program. Our role in peacekeeping missions is supported by work on the 12-gauge peacekeeping round, the family of restraint systems, and the handheld irritant sprayer. I won't go into the many other important and useful items that are either already fielded or under consideration as SEP projects, but let me tell you that this is an ongoing program that owes its continuation and contributions to leaders who have recognized its value and committed themselves to its sustainment.

But how can you, the leaders of the 21st Century, have a voice in the selection process of the SEP? Commanders or soldiers at any level who are interested in participating in the program may obtain specific details on the program at www.pmsoldiersystems.army.mil, or by writing the TRADOC System Manager-Soldier (TSM-S), at: Commander, USAIC, ATTN: ATZB-TS, Fort Benning, Georgia, 31905-5405. Inquiries may be submitted by fax to TSM-S at (706) 545-1377, or DSN 835-1377. This is a superb program, and one that deserves our continued support because of its direct impact on soldiers.

Over the years, we have all seen programs evolve as a result of command emphasis, only to wither on the vine in the wake of key personnel changes, because those who remained lacked the commitment to sustain them. Fortunately, this has not been the case with the Soldier Enhancement Program, and we need to sustain it as a vital adjunct to the Army Transformation. The SEP is a paradigm for Transformation, and it will continue to improve the capabilities that will enhance the Objective Force. It is up to us to sustain the commitment that can best give us a fighting chance against the formidable adversaries who lie in wait, and whom—even now—we are systematically engaged in tracking down and killing or capturing by close combat, fire, and maneuver. And that, gentlemen, is the mission and purpose of the Infantry.



INFANTRY LETTERS



INFANTRY MORTAR LEADERS

The Spring 2002 issue of *Infantry* includes an excellent article on mortar indirect distributive fires by Lieutenant Gerard Acosta and Sergeant First Class Christopher Menton (pages 11-12). What the authors did not mention was the effort required to get their training events resourced and executed. Any of the 360-degree shoots they describe required sole-use access to and closure of almost the entire Fort Lewis artillery impact area. Impossible? Not to leaders who bother to learn how the range scheduling system can work to their advantage.

Over a period of nearly three years, I was privileged to watch one of the best mortar platoon sergeants I have ever known—along with a series of bold and aggressive mortar platoon leaders, as they developed, briefed, gained support for, resourced, and executed a run of great mortar live fire training events.

Far too often, mortarmen in infantry battalions seem to be peripherals. But over the past several years in 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, they have been as fully engaged as their 11B brothers in creative, tough, realistic, exhausting, and memorable dry and live-fire training events.

Kudos to these mortar leaders and their chain of command for making this outstanding training come to life. The payoff is immediate—in terms of trained and ready mortarmen—and long-term, as these 11C soldiers carry the memory and the message through their time in the Army. They did what they joined the Army to do, and they've seen what "right" looks like. I look forward to having some of them return as mortar platoon sergeants and platoon leaders, wanting to continue the fight.

As a Field Artilleryman, I'm trained to be suspicious of things that seem to

work without numbers, but I always learn something from *Infantry Magazine*. Keep up the fire.

JOHN WELLER
Fort Lewis Range Officer

MORE ON INTERPRETERS

Major Paul J. Schmitt's article "Effectively Using Interpreters" (*Infantry*, Spring 2002, pages 22-27) is an excellent summary of the proper employment of linguists for small-unit commanders. Commanders should know a bit more, however, about the options for military linguists available to them, since (as Major Schmitt notes) there are a number of problems associated with the use of civilians as interpreters.

First of all, there is no dedicated MOS for Military Interpreter. The two most common linguistic MOSs are 97E, Interrogator, and 98G, Voice Interceptor/Transcriber. Of these two, the 97Es might more easily cross-train to act as interpreters, as their MOS involves the use of speech in a target language. But both MOSs could be adapted for interpreter duties if properly trained.

Unless they are enlisted with linguistic capability, both 97E and 98G receive linguistic training through military language programs, usually at the Defense Language Institute and Foreign Language Center. While the DLIFLC is rightly lauded for swiftly developing reading and listening skills in target languages, speaking ability is tested only once in the initial Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT). Thereafter, annual DLPTs test only reading and listening comprehension ability. As a result, speaking is an under-trained skill in most military linguists, particularly in more difficult languages such as Mandarin Chinese or Arabic.

In addition, as Major Schmitt notes, a good interpreter needs access to current cultural training as well as target language training. There is not yet a standard way of providing cultural training to military linguists. While some linguists are fortunate enough to spend time in countries where the target language is spoken, cultural expertise is often rudimentary among military linguists.

These issues are beyond the scope of the small-unit commander, but he does have an opportunity to overcome these deficiencies by providing training within his own unit. All too often, linguists in tactical assignments are under-valued and receive just enough annual language training to pass the DLPT at the minimum 2/2 standard. Just as infantrymen who go to the range but once a year cannot be effective in combat, military linguists need more training to be effective force multipliers. More training does not necessarily mean more expense—plenty of low-cost training materials and opportunities are available, both military and civilian. What the military linguist does need is a comprehensive training program that integrates him or her with small-unit operations and tests ability to translate under tactical conditions.

Appropriate scenarios can be included in field training exercises to provide these training opportunities. In addition, regular and frequent training in reading, listening, and speaking ability should be provided, preferably at least once a week. Training time for military linguists should focus on target languages. There are plenty of senior NCOs in the ranks of military linguists—and even a few officers—who will be happy to help design appropriate training programs for the tactical linguist.

As the current conflict shows, lin-

guistic ability is a critical, yet often under-valued, skill in the U.S. military services. It is high time commanders took deliberate steps to correct this problem and turned their military linguists into true force multipliers.

Christian De Leon-Horton
Officer Candidate
Officer Candidate School

LET'S PREPARE FOR THE RIGORS OF COMBAT

This letter is in response to Major William Shaw's letter in the Spring 2002 issue of *Infantry*. Kudos to Major Shaw! Outstanding point that is often overlooked and overshadowed in today's Army of run, run, run: Although I think there are flaws in his theory of scrapping the entire current APFT for a mere four-mile foot march in 50 minutes, I personally like to run, but running is not the end-all to fitness. What is often overlooked in the debate on the APFT and the best way to measure a unit's fitness is that the APFT is a mere guideline—a base line, if you will—to measure a soldier's total fitness level and his physical ability to perform his mission in combat. It is our responsibility as leaders to train our soldiers for the rigors of combat—not for the APFT.

As an Infantry company commander at Fort Hood, I have a well-structured PT program that everyone in the company participates in, including my commo, supply, and mechanics as well as my infantrymen. Every week, we conduct a foot march, gradually increasing the weight and the distance, ending each session with combatives training, culminating monthly in a 12-mile foot march with 45 pounds, and combatives certification. Each quarter, I evaluate company fitness by conducting numerous events that cover the entire spectrum of physical events that prepare them for the rigors of combat:

- Current APFT with chin-ups (minimum of 6).
- 12-mile foot march with 45 pounds (standard, under 3 hours).
- A five-mile run (standard, 40 minutes or less).

- Combat Water Survival Test (pass).
- Combatives Certification (each soldier conducts drills and is required to do an instruction type of walk/talk-through of a chosen drill).

The standards are: 290 or better in the APFT five-mile run in 38 minutes or less; strong swimmer in CWST, and the 12-mile road march in less than 3 hours. The soldiers who exceed these standards receive an award and special privileges in accordance with the company PT policy, and also act as emissaries throughout the post—helping other units administer the CWST and instruct combatives.

Rifle PT, bayonet training, combat runs in boots and BDUs, and guerilla and grass drills round out our PT program. I established the policy, my NCOs enforce it, and our APFT pass rates and scores have skyrocketed, along with morale—not to mention that the goal has been met: We are physically prepared as infantrymen for whatever rigors we may face in combat.

Maybe we could incorporate Major Shaw's idea into the current APFT, and make the four-mile foot march in 50 minutes the fourth event, thus making the APFT a four-event test, worth 25 percent each.

I agree with Major Shaw that General Stilwell's walk out of Burma provides an important lesson from history—especially as infantrymen. But let's not forget that the fitness of infantrymen also includes strength, endurance, and the ability to fight and survive the four levels of warfare: bombs, bullets, blades, and bodies!

Good walking, Infantrymen!

MARK S. LESLIE
CPT
Fort Hood, Texas

WEIGHING THE GENERALS IN THE KOREA WAR

I am writing to comment on the Expert Infantryman Badge item in the Career Notes section (*Infantry*, Spring 2002, page 48) and the book reviews on General Douglas MacArthur (page 49).

During World War II, I served in

combat as a first scout of a rifle squad of Company E in the 376th Infantry Regiment, 94th Infantry Division, XX Corps (commanded by General Walton Walker). The 376th was the first regiment in which all soldiers qualified for the EIB. At that time, the EIB required a 25-mile road march and a "forced march" of nine miles in two hours in full field gear. Today it is 12 miles instead of 25 and no mention of a forced march for the EIB. Is this badge still for males only?

After World War II, I went back to school and graduated from college in 1950. When the war in Korea started two weeks later, I re-enlisted for Infantry OCS and was commissioned. When the war started, General Walker commanded the ground troops, until he was killed in an accident the following December.


I served in combat under General Walker, and my opinion of him is far superior to that of historian Stanley Weintraub. I realize that hot and negative things like hero-bashing sell books. But in my opinion, Weintraub has gone too far in bashing Walker and MacArthur (and too far in praising General Matthew Ridgway).

In Korea, MacArthur and Walker stopped the advance of the North Korean Army and then defeated it. When the Chinese Army came over the Yalu, MacArthur and Walker slowed it down and stopped it at about the 38th parallel. They did those things with a relatively small fraction of the total losses in Korea.

The vast majority of the American lives lost in Korea occurred while General Ridgway was in command. This puts Ridgway at the bottom of my list of all the generals who ever wore an American uniform. And yes, I had been a rifleman under General Patton. Patton had about half the losses other commanding generals had in Europe (on the basis of losses per 1,000 men, per day of combat, FM 100 series).

ROBERT P. KINGSBURY
LTC, Infantry
USAR, Retired
Laconia, New Hampshire

INFANTRY NEWS



THE OBJECTIVE FORCE WARRIOR (OFW) Science and Technology (S&T) program got under way recently when two companies were selected as lead technology integrators (LTIs) for the concept development phase.

OFW is an Army flagship program that is focused on providing the future soldier and small team similar combat-overmatch and skip-a-generation capabilities that future combat systems bring to the Objective Force.

The OFW program seeks dramatic improvements in individual soldier lethality, survivability, and agility, while reducing combat loads from 100 pounds today to less than 50 pounds by 2008. The OFW applies system of systems solutions in concepts, designs, and technology demonstrations that are available only in platforms today. The OFW S&T program seeks to demonstrate technologies for lightweight protective combat ensembles with integrated multi-function sensors, networked communications, collaborative situational awareness, enhanced positioning navigation, networked fires, collaborative embedded training, medical status monitoring, and unmanned air and ground sub-systems.

The OFW S&T program will be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two competing LTI teams will work closely with the Army to develop the OFW concept design and system of systems architecture. In Phase II, the Army will down-select to a single team that will complete preliminary and detailed OFW designs. Then it will integrate component technologies and sub-systems into the OFW system of systems. This LTI approach in the S&T phase of the OFW program seeks to develop technologies faster and to a higher level of maturity in S&T to shorten the time needed in the System Development and Demonstration phase. This phase will reduce the total time

needed to develop, test, and field OFW by the end of this decade.

For more information contact Major Amy Hannah at Army Public Affairs at 703-697-4314; Jerry Whitaker at U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, 508-233-5340/5945; or access the OFW Web site: <http://www.natick.army.mil/soldierwsit/index.htm>.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORIES throughout the country have suffered from a severe shortage of unheated storage space. When guardsmen are not mobilized, their supplies must be stored—from tents, fatigues, sleeping bags, and medical equipment to trucks, tires, petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Ten years ago, the New Jersey National Guard (NJNG) began renting metal cargo containers, but these flat-roofed containers had serious drawbacks. With no ventilation and no drainage, the containers began to rust out, and the materials in them were water damaged.

To save supplies and equipment from further damage, the NJNG decided to expand unheated storage space immediately, but also to see that the solution was lasting and affordable. Investigation determined that prefabricated buildings with structure, sheeting, and rigid insulation pre-installed in modular panels offered the best combination of speed, function, value, and expandability.

A contract was let for 25 buildings across the state in a first round of construction. The contractor turned to a manufacturer for pre-engineered metal buildings that assemble “out of the box” at one-third the cost of brick and mortar structures. The manufacturer sent a representative to train the construction team and oversee quality control on the first building they erected.

At each site, one team leveled the

ground and poured a concrete foundation, while another team bolted building sections together, stood them up, and fastened them together as soon as the concrete was dry. The erection of the 30x30-foot buildings took just four days per site, thanks to the structure, sheeting, and insulation pre-installed in modular panels, along with doors, windows, and ventilation.

Compared to brick and mortar, the pre-engineered buildings saved about \$50,000 per building in labor costs. Each pre-hung door alone may have saved a day’s labor at each site, and pre-set anchor bolts for the foundation may have saved another two days.

The NJNG estimates that it saved about seven months in start-to-finish time, and at least \$10 million in equipment that would have been ruined if not stored in the old pre-engineered buildings.

For further information, visit www.kellyklosure.com.

FIBER OPTIC GYROS (FOGs) have been selected for two military turret stabilization applications. Turret stabilization is a large and growing market as military forces require greater accuracy and durability than is offered by existing mechanical gyros. There is great potential for FOGs within these applications, as both new equipment purchases and upgrades to gyros that are already in the field.

Under the terms of the first of two orders, single-axis gyros will be supplied for use in an upgrade of turrets aboard main battle tanks. The second order includes dual-axis gyros for integration within a new turret designed for use aboard armored combat vehicles. In each case, the onboard FOG will stabilize the gun turret while the vehicle is aiming and firing.

Gyros will enhance the capabilities of

mobile forces on the battlefield by combining accurate positioning, fire-power stabilization, and hardware durability. With low purchase and maintenance costs, the long-lasting gyros can be installed both as new equipment and as form, fit, and function-ready upgrades for existing, costly mechanical gyros.

THE INTEGRATED UNIT SIMULATION System (IUSS) at the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center will emerge, beginning this fall, with an innovative design that brings groundbreaking modeling and analysis capabilities to help the Army transform to the Objective Force.

The IUSS is a constructive force-on-force model for assessing the combat worth of systems and subsystems for both individual and small-unit dismounted warriors in high-resolution combat operations.

For more than a decade, analysts have used this system, which has a computer-based software that offers the primary ability to model lethality and survivability, and a more limited ability to model command, control, and communications; mobility; sustainability; and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). It is acknowledged as the optimal tool for highly detailed research, development, and acquisition analyses of individual warrior systems.

IUSS will soon boast advanced cognitive models that will allow computer-generated forces to behave more like real soldiers—within combat vignettes developed by the analyst. They will move, shoot, and communicate more independently than ever before. They will also sense their environment, drawing critical cues from visual and auditory algorithms, and then make decisions based on their perceived ground truth.

Current combat simulations have to be scripted for the most part. Analysts predetermine the path computer-generated forces must take to their objective and “hardwire” certain tasks to

be performed along the way. The new IUSS will enable the forces to operate autonomously and choose their path and actions based on a dynamic battlefield.

FUTURE WARRIOR SYSTEMS include heads-up displays, global positioning systems, combat identification sensors, chemical detectors, electronically controlled weapons and physiological status monitors connected to the warfighter’s computer for instant information access.

A manufacturing technology program at the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center (Natick) is exploring ways to integrate electric wires and fiber optics into textile materials that will enable future warfighters to use sophisticated battlefield capabilities without the current weight and bulk.

Cooperation between Natick Soldier Center’s Individual Protection Directorate and the Objective Force Warrior Technology Program Office, Communications and Electronics Command at Fort Monmouth, N.J., and several other military, academic, and industrial groups are involved with various textile-based projects to make it possible.

One option to eliminate the antenna that troops now carry is a multi-frequency antenna vest. The antenna will provide coverage in the 30-500 MHz and 300-2,000 MHz frequencies, using an ultra-wideband antenna with no visual signature.

Similarly, a prototype to replace the antenna for the low-frequency band SINCGARS radio was built into a fabric vest. Manufacturing technology examined the fabrication and feasibility of building transmission lines and radiation elements for the wearable textile-based antenna.

The existing round plug-ins for the cables on the Land Warrior’s computer are bulky, costly, and prone to failure because of the fragile pin-and-socket connection. Natick is working to upgrade the network cables and manufacture a flat, pinless connector with recessed contacts.

One way of removing external wires and creating a more distributed network of sensors and electronics is to weave the wires right into the fabric. A laboratory in Philadelphia has a contract to develop manufacturing processes for integrating optical fibers and traditional wires into woven and knitted textiles. With these technologies, conductors and optical-electronic systems could be woven into soldier’s uniforms during large-scale manufacturing.

Another way of incorporating electrical networks into soldier clothing is through stitchless seam technologies that were first developed by Clemson University with prior Natick Mantech funds. The technique entraps fiber optics and conductors either on top of the fabric or along the seams. Clemson Apparel Research is investigating combinations of wires to form the electrical characteristics of commercial cables, available connectors, and garment-to-garment and undergarment-to-garment mechanisms.

Clemson is considering the specific network needed for Land Warrior laser sensors on the helmet cover and a general network for the battle dress uniform (BDU) top. The first samples of fabric containing electrical wires and a helmet cover network have been provided.

In a move to eliminate bulky and heavy gear, such as Land Warrior’s soldier control unit, a laboratory in the United Kingdom has been contracted to develop a soft switch fabric with the sensitivity to be operational on the sleeve of a BDU and seamless incorporation into the garment.

One goal is to produce a keypad on the sleeve that can interface as the soldier control unit with specific military functions. Another goal is a textile data bus (a set of conductors) and the necessary connectivity to transport the signal from the keyboard to the control electronics.

For more information about the Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command or the Soldier Systems Center, please visit our web site at <http://www.sbccom.army.mil>.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM



Russian Snipers In the Mountains and Cities of Chechnya

LESTER W. GRAU
CHARLES Q. CUTSHAW

During the evolution of modern combat, the maximum effective range of most weapons has increased dramatically. Howitzers accurately fire in excess of 28 kilometers, tanks kill out to four kilometers, helicopter gunship missiles kill out to eight kilometers. The maximum range of infantry small arms engagements, however, has shrunk significantly over the past century. Some of the standard infantry rifles of World Wars I and II had sights that ranged out to more than 2,000 yards (1800 meters), and infantry soldiers trained to engage area targets even out to those ranges. But with the adoption of the smaller caliber, higher velocity .223 bullet as the infantry standard for many nations, the maximum training—and hence effective—range of infantry small arms has dropped off to 300 meters or less.

Furthermore, while the infantry rifles of the World Wars were bolt action or semiautomatic, today's assault rifles are all capable of automatic fire. The bulk of small arms rounds fired in modern combat suppress rather than kill. Various sources estimate that 20,000 to 50,000 rounds are issued for each casualty produced in modern warfare. However, there are still riflemen who engage the enemy at 1,000 meters and beyond, and who produce a casualty for every one or two rounds expended. These soldiers are specially trained and

equipped snipers, and their impact on modern combat is increasing. The Russian military recently demonstrated the value and impact of snipers on the contemporary battlefield.

A Quick Bit of History

Sniper is a term of excellence in the Russian Army. As in Western Armies, snipers are expert marksmen who hunt their prey and have special weapons and training to conduct long-range killing.

The Russian and Soviet Armies used snipers extensively in combat. During World War I, conscripted Siberian hunters—prized for their field craft—were selected for sniper duty.

The sniper tradition goes far back in Russian military lore. The Russian patron sniper was a resident of Moscow named Adam. On 24 August 1382, Tartar Mongol forces surrounded the Kremlin walls but were careful to stay out of Russian arrow range (200 paces). Adam, a cloth-maker, took his crossbow and climbed up a tower by the Frolov gate. He took careful aim, fired, and watched his bolt fatally penetrate the chain mail armor of a Tartar com-

mander—one of the sons of the Tartar Khan. The Tartar had stayed out of the 200-pace range, but the Russian heavy crossbow of that day could fire out to 650 paces (445 meters).

The Russian and Soviet Armies used snipers extensively in combat. During World War I, conscripted Siberian hunters—prized for their field craft, patience, and accuracy—were selected for sniper duty. In 1924, the Red Army founded a series of sniper schools across the Soviet Union to teach sport and combat shooting to civilians and military alike. The best shots were sent on to regional, district, and ultimately national schools, where the top graduates received “Sniper-Instructor” diplomas. The Red Army entered World War II with a number of quality snipers.

At the start of the war, there were two types of Russian snipers—snipers who were part of the Reserves of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) and snipers who were part of standard infantry units. The RVGK snipers were organized into separate brigades—such as the RVGK sniper brigade made up of women. Entire platoons, companies, and even battalions of RVGK snipers were assigned to fronts and armies to support critical sectors. Snipers were also an important element of TO&E infantry combat power during World War II, particularly on static battlefields

such as Stalingrad. Divisions began the war with a squad of TO&E snipers but expanded their numbers with division sniper schools during the war. By war's end, there were 18 snipers per battalion, or two per rifle platoon.

Red Army snipers hunted in pairs, one spotting and one firing. Both were armed with the Mosin-Nagant 1891/1930 sniper rifle that fires a 7.62x54mm rimmed round. Although the rifle's four-power scope mount also allowed the sniper to use the standard open sights for closer-in shots, both snipers also carried PPSH 7.62mm submachine guns as insurance. The spotter used his scoped rifle to back up the fire and to fire immediately at the target if the firer should miss.

The employment of Soviet snipers in World War II reflected an earlier peacetime propaganda campaign. During the first five-year plan, Soviet workers who exceeded their production quotas were designated as "shock workers" [*udarniki*] and given special incentives and awards. In 1935 Alexis Stakhanov exceeded his quota for digging coal in the Donetz basin by some 1400 percent. The shock worker campaign propagandists latched on to his achievement, and soon the shock workers became known as Stakhanovites. The Stakhanov campaign was ill conceived however.

Soviet factories were kept in competition with one another and the success of the factory Stakhanovite was important to factory managers and their careers. Therefore, the entire resources of the factory backed the efforts of the Stakhanovite. As the Stakhanovite exceeded his quota, the quotas for all the rest of the workers were raised. In the meantime, the resources that were backing the Stakhanovite were unavailable to the average worker, who now had to accomplish more with less. This uniquely Soviet approach was transferred to the war effort in 1942. Red Army propagandists and political officers began the "sniper movement." Snipers were encouraged to participate in a macabre competition by killing more fascists than the snipers in neighboring divisions. Forty kills netted a "For Bravery" medal and the title "noble sniper." Socialist competition

thus extended to the battlefield where division commanders lavished scarce resources on their snipers in order to exceed quotas. The average soldiers were exhorted to follow the example of the snipers and to kill more fascists using fewer resources. The sniper movement peaked with the widely circulated tale of the duel to the death between Senior Sergeant Zaitsev and Major Koenig in the ruins of Stalingrad. Eventually, Zaitsev was credited with 149 kills. The highest scorer was named Zikan, who had 224 kills. Sergeant Passar of the 21st Army had 103 kills while "Noble Sniper" and Political Commissar Ilin had 185 kills.

As noted, there was a significant growth in the number of Soviet snipers deployed in army units between 1943

Red Army snipers hunted in pairs, one spotting and one firing. Both were armed with the Mosin-Nagant 1891/1930 sniper rifle that fires a 7.62x54mm rimmed round.

and 1945. The increase in the number of snipers to 18 per infantry battalion did not reflect the growing role of snipers as much as it reflected the rearmament of the Red Army. Up to 1943, Soviet infantry was primarily armed with the bolt-action 1891/1930 Mosin-Nagant rifle with iron sights. It was accurate to 400 meters. The scoped Mosin-Nagant sniper rifle was accurate to 800 meters.

During the war, the Soviet Union replaced the infantry Mosin-Nagant rifles with submachine guns. These provided excellent suppressive fire but were seldom accurate beyond 100 meters when fired on long burst or 200 meters when fired on short burst. Red Army assaults depended on the effect of machinegun and sub-machinegun automatic fire suppressing the enemy during the advance. Battalion commanders, however, now lacked the ability to engage deeper enemy targets. Consequently, sniper rifles were issued to platoon marksmen to give infantry combat the necessary depth. These

personnel were called snipers, but they were not really used as snipers. In an earlier time, they would have been called skirmishers. The separate sniper units of the RVGK maintained the true hunter-snipers.

In 1952, the Soviet Union closed its national system of sniper schools, although basic marksmanship continued to be taught to the citizenry through the Young Pioneers, mandatory grade school and high school classes and the widespread DOSAAF (Voluntary Organization for the Support of the Soviet Army, Air Force, and Navy) civilian sports clubs. "Sniper training" was limited to conscripts in the ground forces, interior forces, and KGB, but this was really advanced marksmanship training. The ground forces continued to stress the importance of suppressive automatic fire (with its consequent shorter effective ranges). The need for longer-range small arms fire was still recognized, and a "sniper" was part of every motorized rifle platoon. A spotter, who was one of the platoon's riflemen, assisted this conscript sniper or skirmisher.

After 1963, Soviet snipers began training on the new 7.62x54mm Dragunov semiautomatic sniper rifle (SVD). This 10-shot sniper rifle mounts a four-power PSO-1 scope and is calibrated out to 1,300 meters but is not very effective over 800 meters. The SVD is nowhere near as rugged or as soldier-friendly as the Kalashnikov family of small arms. Like many Western small arms, it requires careful cleaning and will easily jam when dirt or sand gets into the mechanism. Like the old Mosin-Nagant, the SVD scope is also mounted so that the firer has the immediate option of using open sights for a close-in shot.

Up until 1984, sniper (expert marksman) training was conducted at regimental level by regimental officers who were competent shots. They taught that the main sniper targets were enemy officers; forward observers; television cameramen; crews for antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), recoilless rifles, machineguns; tank crews from damaged tanks; and low-flying helicopters.

Snipers were selected from conscripts

who were physically fit, intelligent, had good eyesight and hearing, and quick reactions. Candidates had to be consistent in hitting a 300-meter target with iron sights. Sniper candidates normally trained to observe a sector 200x1000 meters. Regimental sniper schools conducted refresher training every six to eight weeks. In the early 1970s, the refresher training could last for five or six days. These short refresher courses covered the basics and often served as the primary sniper course as well.

The standards 1974 Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) sniper refresher course included the following:

Usually such a program produced some excellent marksmen but not the seasoned, field-wise snipers of the World War II sniper battalions. These “snipers” did not have a true sniper mission. Other regiments developed more extensive sniper training programs, such as the 24-day sniper course.

Such courses as the 24-day course were the exception, and most Soviet snipers were really marksmen with a fancy, but not particularly effective, weapon. The war in Afghanistan emphasized the need for well-trained snipers and exposed the mediocrity of many regimental sniper schools. In 1984, military sniper schools were consolidated at army level, and in 1987 further consolidated at military district level. These usually lasted for a month. Snipers drew some lessons from the war in Afghanistan and incorporated field craft and equipment from that war. For example as a result of the war, snipers often used the bipod from an RPK light machinegun to steady their SVDs.

The Chechen Wars

The wars in Chechnya emphasized the value of snipers. The Chechens met the Russians in urban combat in Grozny and soon Chechen snipers took a toll on Russian forces. The stationary combat fought from ruined buildings resembled the fighting at Stalingrad. This time, however, the Russian “snipers” were at a disadvantage. They were trained to fight as part of an attacking combined

GSFG SNIPER RERESHER COURSE	
	HOURS
Observation and field craft	1
Sniper team actions in the offense and defense	6
Firing on stationary targets	6
Firing on fleeting targets	7
Firing on moving targets	7
Firing during limited visibility	6
Practical exercise	3
Selecting, preparing, and camouflaging a firing position	2
Map reading, moving along an azimuth, route and point reconnaissance	2
24-DAY SNIPER COURSE	
	HOURS
Political instruction	16
Observation and field craft	4
Sniper team actions in the offense	6
Sniper team actions in the defense	4
Firing on stationary targets	23
Firing on fleeting targets	23
Firing on moving targets	22
Firing during limited visibility	16
Firing on moving and fleeting targets	17
Selecting and preparing field positions, map reading, and NBC	30

arms team that would advance rapidly against a conventional defending force. The Russian snipers were not prepared to hunt in the ruins and to lie in ambush for days on end. The Chechens, on the other hand, knew the territory and had plenty of sniper weapons.

The Russian Army left 533 SVD sniper rifles behind when they withdrew from Chechnya in 1992. Some of the Chechens and their allies who were armed with SVDs deployed as actual snipers, while others joined three- or four-man fighting cells consisting of an RPG gunner, a machinegunner and an SVD marksman, and perhaps an ammunition bearer armed with a Kalashnikov assault rifle. These cells were quite effective as antiarmor hunter-killer teams. The SVD and machinegun fire would pin down supporting infantry while the RPG would engage the armored vehicle. Often four or five cells would work together against a single armored vehicle. Once the fighting moved beyond the cities and into the mountains, Chechen snipers attempted to engage Russian forces at long distances—900 to 1,000 meters away, although terrain and vegetation often limited their engagement ranges. Away from the cities, a Chechen sniper usually operated as part of a team—the sniper plus a four-man support element

armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles. The support element usually positioned itself some 500 meters behind the sniper. The sniper would fire one or two shots at the Russians and then change firing positions. Should the Russians fire at the sniper, the support element would open fire at random to draw fire on itself and allow the sniper to escape.

The Russian military had SVD-equipped marksmen but few actual snipers available for the first Chechen War. They relied on MVD (Ministry of the Interior) and FSB (successor to the KGB) snipers from their special operations units. These snipers were well trained but used to operating in a city against SWAT-type targets. They were not well trained in site camouflage, sniping in the mountains, or sniping in the countryside.

They clearly were not trained to snipe where the other side was conducting countersniper actions or where artillery and mortar rounds were falling.

In the summer of 1999, the Russian Army reestablished a true sniper school. The army conducted an All-Army shooting competition for officers and conscripts. The army selected 12 firers from the top 52 for its initial sniper class. The course stressed marksmanship, field craft, and map reading and ended with a month-long live-fire exercise in Chechnya working in the mountains around Bamut. The average shot that the Russian snipers were making was around 400 meters, but the new sniper school had not solved the army sniper problem. Casualties had to be replaced. Three of the first graduating class of 12 men were killed in action. Four snipers of the second class were hospitalized with wounds. Most of the snipers were two-year conscripts who had, at most, a year’s service remaining by the time they were selected and trained.

The first Chechen War ended badly for the Russians in 1996, and they returned in 1999 for another effort. The Russians took a page from the Chechens’ notebook and began forming their own two- or three-man hunter-killer detachments. Various combinations of a machinegunner, RPG-7 gun-

ner, SVD marksman, and assault rifleman formed hunter-killer detachments that would move together with other detachments to combat Chechens. The movement of these detachments had to be controlled and coordinated to provide mutual support and synchronized action.

Aside from the TO&E military snipers who were employed as marksmen, the war in Chechnya saw the return of the elite sniper who was part of the government special reserves and hunted Chechens. These snipers avoid carrying their weapons in public since they do not want the locals to identify them as part of the sniper elite force. The sniper works as part of a team—two snipers plus a five-man security element armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles. The snipers go into position at night and leave at night. They usually are led into the area by scouts who know the area. The snipers select their positions at night but prepare them during the day. Preparation includes digging in, camouflaging the position, clearing lanes of fire, and improving the position. Unlike World War II, the pair of snipers do not occupy the same position but are some distance apart where they can see each other and the ambush area. They set up some 200 to 300 meters from the ambush area, while the support group sets up some 200 meters to the rear of the snipers and some 500 meters to the side. The sniper team will remain in position for one or two nights.

The sniper carries his sniper rifle as well as an assault rifle or machine pistol for close-in fighting. He also carries a night-observation device, dry rations, hard candy, a flare pistol with a red flare, a grenade, two shelter halves, and a shovel. Sometimes he also carries a radio. In the mountains, he carries a ski pole to help him climb. He wears a mask to hide his skin tone. Snipers do not intend to be captured. If the support group fails to cover the sniper's withdrawal, the red flare will bring artillery fire down on his position, and the grenade will deal with the sniper and his attackers simultaneously.

Elite snipers are not MVD or FSB conscripts but extended-service contract personnel and company-grade officers.

Boris K. is a senior sergeant who served as a sniper for two years while with the airborne in Afghanistan. He graduated from airborne sniper school and was awarded the "Order of the Red Star" and the "Medal for Merit in Combat" for service in Afghanistan. Although he worked alone in Afghanistan, he always works with another professional sniper in Chechnya. He has also selected the personnel of his support group and, depending on the mission, the size of the support group may sometimes expand to 16. Professional snipers are rotated out of combat frequently to keep them fresh.

Elite (professional) MVD and FSB snipers are trained at the Water Transport Special Police Detachment facilities near Moscow. Famed special units such as the FSB's Alfa Detachment and

In the 1999 War, the Russians took a page from the Chechens' 1996 notebook and began forming their own two- or three-man hunter-killer detachments.

the MVD's Vypel detachment also regularly train here. The school and its graduates get the latest sniper gear to field test, but most stick with the SVD with a silencer. The professional snipers in Chechnya work on the principle of killing the most dangerous enemy first. This is usually an enemy sniper or RPO-A flame-thrower gunner. RPG-7 gunners and machinegunners are usually next, followed by riflemen. A professional sniper is usually equipped with a camouflage (ghillie) suit, a scoped sniper rifle, a machine pistol, binoculars, a radio, a multifunctional knife, an entrenching tool, a load-carrying combat vest, and a backpack. A laser range finder and a periscope are also recommended.

There is a lot of activity in developing and fielding new Russian sniper rifles. The impetus for this development was the Soviet-Afghan War, and the development has continued to the present day. The Russians consider the 7.62x54mmR sniper round effective and

lethal to 600 meters while the 12.7mm (.50 caliber) is effective and lethal out to two kilometers. Recently, the 9mm (9x39mm cartridge with the 16.2 gram subsonic bullet) has become popular. There is even work on .22 Long Rifle silenced weapons for close work. Instead of trying to produce an optimum sniper weapon that will work equally well on all terrain and various ranges, the Russians are developing a family of sniper weapons for different terrain and situations. Most of the sniper weapons have silencers.

Western Sniper Issues

Recent Russian experience shows that the role of the sniper is increasing on the modern battlefield. With the increased demand are questions on proper training equipment, tactics, force structure, and employment. These are also concerns in the Western military services.

The right place for snipers on the contemporary battlefield remains a topic of debate. In many Western armies, there are sniper weapons in the arms room but no TO&E snipers. If a company or battalion commander wants some snipers at his disposal, he has to come up with the training funds and send his sniper candidates off to a lengthy course. Once the snipers return, they have to continue training at home station. Home station training requires additional resources, a separate training schedule, and a 1,000-meter range. Older military posts might have 1,000-meter ranges, but newer posts have much shorter ranges, and what older ranges there are, are often poorly maintained. Once the sniper rotates, a new sniper must be trained in his stead. Since *sniper* is not a recognized specialty in many armies, there are no promotion advantages for a distinguished sniper, and promotion usually ends his career. The United States Marine Corps has addressed this problem by making snipers part of the reconnaissance platoon and creating a scout/sniper military occupational specialty (MOS).

The Soviet/Russian approach was to have a TO&E sniper in each platoon, but he was normally trained locally

within the regiment. Sniper shortcomings in Afghanistan promoted the need for centralized sniper schools, but quality sniper training did not appear until 1999. Most Soviet and Russian ground-gaining units did not need snipers as much as they needed marksmen. The prime question is where should snipers be assigned—in battalions or in a central reserve, or both?

Sniper tactics are an issue. Many Western armies deploy a sniper and an observer together. The observer carries an assault rifle to protect the sniper. The Soviets and Russians tried this approach with their snipers who were organic to motorized rifle platoons. This did not work effectively for them in either Afghanistan or Chechnya. The platoon sniper eventually ended up as part of a two- or three-man hunter killer team that employed the sniper as a marksman. Elite (professional) snipers worked in pairs with a security team backing them up. Many Western armies use the single sniper with a single security assistant approach.

The ideal sniper rifle is another issue. Deer hunters who hunt with a scoped rifle often miss close-in shots because they cannot acquire the animal quickly in the scope, and there are no open sights under the scope. The Soviets and

Russians have consistently designed sniper weapons with open sights readily usable under the scope. Many Western sniper weapons lack this elementary characteristic. Even with open sights, Russian snipers carry an automatic weapon (assault rifle or machine pistol) as emergency backup. The Russian penchant for semi-automatic (and automatic) weapons extends to sniper weapons. Only recently have they explored the inherent accuracy of bolt-action sniper weapons, but the army has yet to buy any. The ideal caliber and characteristics of a sniper rifle continue as a matter of debate in the Russian Army and others.

Western and Russian snipers have access to the same types of equipment (laser range finders, binoculars, radios, and so on). The field periscope, which was very valuable for Soviet snipers during World War II, disappeared but quickly reappeared after the initial fighting in Grozny, since snipers often need to scout the battlefield without exposing their heads and hands.

Sniping is once again a hot topic in the U.S. Army. During Operation Anaconda in the mountainous Sharikot valley of Afghanistan, Canadian Snipers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry

Regiment, destroyed enemy targets at ranges well beyond the capability of the U.S. assault rifles. The Canadian .50 caliber rifles proved quite effective and created a demand for .50 caliber rifles in the hands of U.S. troops in that region. As the U.S. Army reexamines the mission and role of snipers in its infantry units, the Russian experience, and the recent Canadian experience, should certainly shape the debate.

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Charlie Q. Cutshaw served as a U.S. Army infantry, ordnance, and military intelligence officer. He is a Vietnam veteran, associate editor of *Jane's Infantry Weapons*, editor of *Jane's Ammunition Handbook*, and small-arms editor of *International Defense Review*. He is author of *Legends and Reality of the AK: A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the History, Design, and Impact of the Kalashnikov Family of Weapons* and *The New World of Russian Small Arms and Ammo*.

Lock and Load

Reengineering RC Marksmanship Training



DR. JOSEPH D. HAGMAN
MASTER SERGEANT DONALD RILEY

Commanders of Reserve Component (RC) units often have to make do with less when it comes to rifle marksmanship training. Time and other resource constraints often lead to compromises. But relief is on the way. The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) has been working with the U.S. Army Reserve Command's marksmanship executive agent—the 84th Division (Institutional Training)—to find a better way to train

and evaluate marksmanship using training devices. The goal of this work is to field a home station program of sustainment-oriented instruction (PSOI) that will produce shooter proficiency

levels that meet or exceed unit readiness requirements while keeping the resources needed to a minimum.

The development of the rifle program of instruction (POI) is now all but com-



plete. It relies on the use of the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS), a laser-emitting device that lets shooters engage targets without firing live ammunition. Its major components include a battery-powered laser transmitter, a metal rod (mandrel) to which the transmitter is attached (Figure 1), a variety of laser-sensitive targets (Figure 2), and a laptop computer. With one end of the rod holding the transmitter and the other end slipped into the muzzle of the rifle, LMTS lets soldiers fire their own weapons while providing feedback on both point of aim and point of impact. With a few exceptions, the same equipment configuration will be used to support training for all direct-fire small arms.

Exercises are fired according to the delivery strategy shown in the flow chart (next page).

Because the strategy is based on proficiency, shooters first demonstrate their current level of marksmanship proficiency while firing an LMTS-based pre-test. Scores on the pre-test are then used to identify shooters who need sustainment training—those who are unlikely to qualify on the first run on the live-fire range. After training, shooters are administered a post-test (a repeat of the pre-test) to make sure they have mastered the necessary fundamentals to support a good chance of live-fire qualification.

During pre-testing, all soldiers fire the electronic simulated ALT C target with LMTS. Their scores are then plugged into the LMTS Prediction Table (shown here) to find each soldier's predicted average live-fire score and associated chances of first-run, live-fire qualification. (Prediction table values were calculated using the automated prediction tool described in the article "Using Devices to Predict Live Fire: A Tool for the Marksmanship Trainer," by J.D. Hagman, *Infantry Magazine*, September-December 2000, pages 10-12.)

A soldier who fires 30 on the pre-test (Column 1), for example, would be predicted to fire

LMTS Score	Predicted Average Record Fire Score	Chances (%) of Firing an ALT C Live-Fire Score ...		
		≥ 26 (Marksman)	≥ 33 (Sharpshooter)	≥ 38 (Expert)
3	19	10	--	--
8	21	20	--	--
13	23	30	--	--
16	25	40	--	--
18	25	--	10	--
19	26	50	--	--
23	28	60	--	--
24	28	--	20	--
26	29	70	--	--
28	30	--	30	--
29	30	--	--	10
30	31	80	--	--
31	31	--	40	--
34	33	--	--	20
35	33	--	50	--
36	34	90	--	--
38	35	--	60	--
39	35	--	--	30


LMTS Prediction Table

an average score of 31 on the range (Column 2) and have an 80 percent chance of qualifying Marksman (Column 3), a 30 to 40 percent chance of qualifying Sharpshooter (Column 4), and a 10 to 20 percent chance of qualifying Expert (Column 5). Depending on the overall standard set for unit qualification, say 80 percent, some soldiers will "Go" the pre-test and be rated device-qualified, whereas others will "NoGo" the pre-test and be rated device-unqualified. Accordingly, only the latter group will need sustainment training and follow-up post-testing.

So, what can you do with the new POI that you were not able to do without it? For starters, you can train your soldiers to be better shooters while saving time and ammunition in the process. (Historically, RC units are not resourced with live rounds to support

marksmanship training. All of their allocations are used for grouping, zeroing, and qualification firing. In addition, soldiers who fail to meet standards are not given the additional time and ammunition needed for remedial training.) Just how much better your soldiers will shoot and how much savings you can expect have yet to be nailed down. But a recent Fort Benning-sponsored comparison test of LMTS-based against current Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) training has shown comparable record fire qualification scores under the two approaches, with LMTS-trained soldiers needing 20 percent fewer rounds to group and zero. In addition, soldiers who have had LMTS-based training hit 14 percent more targets and fired a 37 percent higher "Go" rate during known-distance firing in preparation for record fire.

These benefits are encouraging for *initial* training, but they should be even greater for *sustainment* training where marksmanship-proficient soldiers can "test out." For example, by using the LMTS prediction table to support both pre-testing and post-testing, training can be scheduled more efficiently by targeting only the soldiers in need of remediation, and these will receive only as much remediation as is necessary. This should save considerable training



time, as well as time and ammunition later on the range. In support of this notion, sustainment data collected recently by the 84th Division showed that LMTS-trained soldiers from the 100th Battalion, 442d Infantry (the USAR's only infantry unit) took 50 percent less time and ammunition than normal to group and zero, and also raised their first-run qualification rate from a historical 60–80 percent to 98 percent. As a result of these positive findings for both initial and sustainment training, the Infantry School's device-based marksmanship training strategy now endorses the use of LMTS.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the delivery strategy's prediction table provides a reliable set of live-fire qualification probabilities (Columns 3–5 in the prediction table) that can be used to set record fire standards on LMTS in the form of cutoff scores (Column 1 of the table). A soldier would have to achieve 30 hits on LMTS, for example, to ensure an 80 percent chance of first-run, live-fire qualification. Thus, when adequate range facilities are not readily available, LMTS scores fired at home station can be used in place of scores fired on the range for purposes of yearly qualification or validation. Of course, the notion of shooting record fire on a device instead of on the range is still controversial. But when the time comes for its adoption Army-wide, the RC will have already laid the groundwork,

thereby saving time and ammunition without compromising the intent and outcome of the marksmanship qualification process.

Although the POI is now far enough along for implementation purposes, we still have a few things to do to make it even better. One of these is to add the option for shooters to engage pop-up targets and to practice fire on a simulated Remote Electronic Targeting System (RETS) range in preparation for standard qualification firing. Right now, the POI benefits technically extend to stationary, known-distance target engagements fired on ALT C. Recently, however, a pop-up target engagement capability and a mini-RETS qualification course have been developed. We have not yet developed the LMTS prediction table that needs to go with it to support pre-testing and post-testing.

Assuming that the option to conduct qualification fire on LMTS is just around the corner, we need to determine how often soldiers need to qualify on the range as opposed to on the device. Should device-based qualification be allowed every year, every other year, every third year, or what? Over the next year, we plan to gather the data needed to answer this question, as well as to develop the table for predicting pop-up target qualification. We'll keep you informed of our progress.

In the meantime, the USAR is plan-

ning distribution to all reserve centers, and the 84th Division already has an instructor certification course in place. So unbox your LMTS equipment and POI support package as soon as they arrive; get your instructors certified on the LMTS; and start down the road to more effective and efficient rifle marksmanship training and evaluation—without ever leaving home station.

Any questions or comments about the research conducted to support the development of this POI can be directed to the Army Research Institute field office in Boise, Idaho, by telephone (208) 334-9390, or e-mail jhaman2@email.boisestate.edu. Questions about LMTS fielding plans and instructor certification training should be directed to MSG Donald Riley at (414) 535-5850 or rileydo@usarc-emh2.army.mil.

Dr. Joseph D. Hagman is a senior research psychologist at the U.S. Army Research Institute's field office at Gowen Field, Idaho. Since earning a Ph.D. in engineering psychology from New Mexico State University in 1975, he has focused his research interests on human learning and memory, and more recently, on soldier performance on marksmanship-related simulation and training devices.

Master Sergeant Donald Riley is the Weapons Training Strategy Coordinator for the U.S. Army Reserve. He is an Active-Guard-Reserve soldier assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, at the 84th Division (Institutional Training) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He has been involved in soldier training since 1970.

AC/RC Battalion Command

A Superb Opportunity

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEVIN J. DOUGHERTY

I am getting toward the end of a two-year tour as commander of the 2nd Battalion (TS) (IN), 393d Regiment at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and can say that this has been one of the best assignments in my career. I also think that these Active

Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) battalion commands are among the best-kept secrets in the Army. So this article is designed to provide some information about the job. It's certainly not intended to be a "how

I did it" war story—just an effort to share what I think is a really good deal.

Background. The AC/RC program stems from the difficulties experienced during the Persian Gulf War in deploying the Army National Guard's "round-

out brigades” and high-priority combat arms units. The old methods and criteria for reporting readiness showed that the units were combat ready, but when the units arrived at their mobilization stations, their readiness reports were viewed with suspicion, and some units were put through an extensive train-up period that included National Training Center rotations. Three of the National Guard’s combat brigades—designed to go to war with active Army combat divisions—were mobilized and trained, but were never deployed to the Persian Gulf War. The entire mobilization and train-up process revealed numerous problems with the units’ readiness, readiness tracking and reporting, and AC interaction with the RC.

These experiences led Congress to push for a new system of training and evaluating RC units. In 1995, the Army responded to Congressional legislation by developing the Ground Forces Readiness Enhancement (GFRE) program, which dedicates extensive personnel and material resources to ensure that RC units can adequately train and prepare for deployment. The program directed the realignment of the AC support to the RC with a focus on selected high-priority RC units, principally the 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs). The Congressional legislation and subsequent GFRE program resulted in the dedication of 5,000 experienced AC soldiers to train and evaluate RC units. Although AC/RC embraces the Reserve Components as a whole, my experience has been primarily with the National Guard rather than the Army Reserve, and my comments here are based solely on that part of the program.

The program consists of centrally located AC observer controller/trainer (OC/T) battalions such as the one here at Fort Chaffee, and resident trainer battalions made up of AC officers and NCOs who live and work at the armories with selected priority units every day. The OC/T and resident trainer battalions work together as a team in improving RC readiness. I really didn’t know the difference between the two when I signed up for the job, but I’m glad I ended up with an OC/T battalion. All my soldiers are with me here at Fort

Chaffee, while the resident training battalion is spread out in armories all over the state. I’m sure someone else might tell you the resident trainer battalion is the better assignment, but I like the tactical focus, OC/T emphasis, and command and control environment of the OC/T battalion.

A Chance to Command. Of course most of us would prefer to be centrally selected (CSL) battalion commanders, and an AC/RC battalion is not a “real” battalion command in that sense. However, a limited number of CSL commands are available, and for those of us who are ready to command, these AC/RC battalions are a good opportu-

The GFRE program directed the realignment of the AC support to the RC with a focus on selected high-priority RC units, principally the 15 Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESBs).

nity to make a contribution to the Army.

The AC/RC battalion commander has almost all the things his CSL counterpart has—UCMJ authority, a staff, a budget, a mission essential task list (METL), personnel issues—albeit in more manageable and less demanding doses. The AC/RC battalion commander will issue training guidance, develop a training strategy, make decisions at training and command and staff meetings, counsel and mentor younger officers, and reward and punish behavior. Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying an AC/RC battalion command is identical to a CSL battalion command or that the jobs are in all respects equal. All I’m saying is that if you are looking for an alternative to a staff assignment and want the responsibilities and challenges of command, being an AC/RC battalion commander is a viable option.

Autonomy. I am stationed at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and my brigade commander is stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. He has responsibility for 13 battalions—infantry, armor, field artillery, engineer, resident trainer, and CSS (which consists of Army Reservists)—spread out over four states. He

stays on the road quite a bit in order to maintain a command presence, and of course we keep in touch by phone and e-mail, but the reality of the situation is that the factors of geography and multiple demands make it essential for the brigade commander to trust his battalion commanders and empower them to do their jobs without a lot of supervision. That was a welcome change from my previous assignment as one of the cast of thousands on a joint headquarters staff.

Of course the flip side to being away from the flagpole is that you are isolated from the usual post support structure. Things like personnel actions take longer because of time and distance, and there was some mission degradation involved with not having direct access to the brigade staff and a post support structure. Then again, we didn’t have many post taskings either.

The biggest impact for me was on my family. When given the chance, we’ve always lived on post, and in many AC/RC battalions there is no post. (Fort Chaffee is an Army National Guard post without a whole lot of structure, except for a very small post exchange.)

It certainly wasn’t a big deal, but you should know (and your wife should too) that you will have to deal with the vagaries of TRICARE, the hassles of buying or renting a house, and your children being among a very small group of new kids at the local school, etc. That was a bigger adjustment for us than I had anticipated, but then again we’re not the most adventuresome of families. Others might find the total immersion in the civilian community welcome. Just know that it comes with the job in many cases.

Mission and Men. One of the really great things about the assignment is that there is seldom a conflict between accomplishing the mission and taking care of the men. Because the mission is focused on the National Guard, the calendar revolves around the National Guard’s yearly planning cycle. Because of this long-term planning requirement, it’s all fairly predictable and steady. Seldom, if ever, do you get “jerked around” by some unanticipated re-

quirement or last-minute change. We did do some short-notice mobilization assistance as a result of September 11, but even that was entirely manageable.

Relatively speaking, the summers are fairly busy supporting annual training (AT), but no busier than any other time a battalion goes to the field and, for being in the field, an OC/T's standard of living is pretty high. Our support to weekend drills was much less often than I expected and frequently did not involve the entire battalion. I'd say we had an average of maybe one weekend activity of some sort each month.

The job is truly what you make of it. If you have a rather minimalist interpretation and think your mission is only in effect when you are in direct contact with the National Guard, you're going to find yourself with a lot of extra time on your hands. We tried to be a little more proactive; using a *push* versus *pull* method of providing support and spending a fair amount of effort on our internal professional development, but still time available was never a constraint in our operational tempo.

One of the best things from a soldier care standpoint was that any officer or NCO who wanted to attend college could do so—sometimes even during the duty day for the NCOs. There was plenty of family time, and we had a generous compensatory time policy when we did work on weekends.

I will say that this novel luxury of time presented the biggest challenge to my finite leadership abilities. Many members of the battalion favored the minimalist interpretation of the mission, and I was constantly fending off accusations of "making work." The demographics of the battalion (all staff sergeants and up) are such that many NCOs will retire out of this assignment. A certain number of soldiers had made a premature transition to a retirement mentality. There was a disappointing attitude of entitlement, even among those who were still several years short of retirement ("I've worked hard in all my other assignments and the Army owes me a break here."). That was the sole disappointment of my tour, and combating that phenomenon was my biggest challenge and involved my

greatest expenditure of energy. My experience was that mission-type orders only go so far in an AC/RC battalion. I'm willing to entertain the notion, however, that other commanders might not have that problem. I only report what was my particular experience.

Peers. I was very impressed with the other battalion commanders in the brigade. In and of itself, AC/RC battalion command is not a dead-end job. There were nine AC battalions in the brigade. One of the OC/T battalion commanders had previously been a CSL battalion commander, and he was selected for colonel and the War College after his

An AC/RC commander gets to make recommendations in regard to training objectives, scheduling, and the tactics, techniques, and procedure to use, but in the final analysis, the National Guard chain of command makes the decisions, and that's the way it should be.

assignment here. One resident trainer battalion commander was selected for a CSL battalion command, and another made the alternate command list. These three were infantrymen. The engineer OC/T battalion commander was selected for colonel. The armor OC/T battalion commander was selected below-the-zone. It was an honor for me to work with such a quality group, and I really enjoyed their company.

Working with the National Guard. The OC/T battalion is called a Training Support battalion, and that is important to remember. It is our job to support the National Guard. At the end of the day, you have the final say in that you give the evaluation, but in most other aspects the National Guard battalion you are supporting makes the decisions, including what to do with your evaluation. You make your money by unity of effort, consensus building, and cooperation. You get to make recommendations with regard to training objectives; scheduling; and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to use, but in the final analysis, the National Guard chain

of command makes the decisions and that's the way it should be. You are there to assist the chain of command, not to be the chain of command.

Consequently, the job requires a certain amount of people skills. The biggest mistake you can possibly make is to come across with a superior attitude. For me that wasn't a problem, because I never felt superior to my counterparts. They were all hard-working, talented, dedicated, patriotic, and eager to learn. If I had any advantage over them it was that I had more time to devote to the military profession—I had only one job and they had two. I was very impressed with my counterparts and enjoyed every minute we spent together.

Because the National Guard is so constrained in the time available, it is very important to focus the training objectives in order to get the most bang for the buck. The battalions I worked with tended to be fairly ambitious in what they tried to accomplish during a given drill. One of the biggest contributions an AC/RC battalion commander can make is to encourage the National Guard to pick a few high-payoff training objectives and then teach, coach, and mentor them to a "T" status in those focus areas instead of paying lip-service to a laundry list of training objectives.

Job Satisfaction. Working closely with the National Guard and being able to share TTPs with them was a great experience. We tried to use a very hands-on approach in our battalion that included making sure the standard was understood and modeling the desired outcome. For example, instead of just saying "do targeting meetings," we taught our counterpart battalion how to do one, modeled a sample for them, led them through their first iteration, and actively taught, coached, and mentored them as they ran their own. As good fortune would have it, the battalion's first attempt at a targeting meeting during an AT search-and-attack mission resulted in the destruction of an enemy mortar squad. It was great to see the unit master this task, and of course the fortuitous combination of the unit's first targeting meeting attempt and immediate tactical success solidified OC/T credibility with the unit and validated trust

trust they had given us. Such moments of direct teaching, coaching, and mentoring were the most rewarding parts of the job.

Another rewarding experience was helping units mobilize for Operation *Desert Spring*—the Patriot guard mission in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. We had put a lot of effort into the mission, translating guidance into measurable training objectives and creating a Mission Training Plan we could use to evaluate the lane training. The unit really seemed to appreciate our efforts, and we still get e-mails from the soldiers thanking us for the training and telling us they are putting it to good use

in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Such sincere appreciation was a common strength among the National Guardsmen we worked with and really made us feel good about what we were doing.

A word of caution is necessary, however. The success of the AC/RC program has been built on time. Don't expect instant gratification. You might not feel that you see a lot of results on your watch, but in the long run, the program has greatly improved National Guard's readiness.

Give It A Try. I really didn't know what I was getting into when I signed up for the job. I had been an O/C when the JRTC was at Fort Chaffee, so I

knew I would like the area. I knew the job title was battalion commander, and I knew that couldn't be all bad. Beyond that, I figured there had to be a catch. There wasn't. I can't think of anything else I would rather have done for the past two years. I'll bet that you would like it too.

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin J. Dougherty previously served at the Joint Readiness Training Center, in the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, the 101st Airborne Division, and the U.S. European Command, and is now Professor of Military Science at the University of Southern Mississippi. He is a 1983 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Ammunition Management/Resupply For the Light Infantry Mortar

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS BRIAN A. HAMM

The integration and effectiveness of the light mortar is only as good as the ammunition plan, management, and resupply procedures. The amount of ammunition available is an important consideration in the attack of targets. When this is low, missions should be limited to those that contribute to mission accomplishment. When the controlled supply rate (CSR) is high, missions fired may include targets that require the massing of fires without adjustment. The CSR is designed to limit the number of rounds per weapon per day.

CSRs are imposed for two reasons—to conserve ammunition and to avoid a shortage for a tactical operation. During the fire support planning, ammunition requirements must be considered. Thus, it is very important for the mortar section leader to be present to recommend the types and amounts of ammunition that will be required. Combat

experiences in World War II and Korea have shown that an on-hand mix of 70 percent HE, 20 percent WP or smoke, and 10 percent illumination ammunition is the most flexible. The basic load of a light infantry company should be approximately 245 HE, 60 WP, and 45

The basic load of a light infantry company should be approximately 245 HE, 60 WP, and 45 illumination, for a total of 350 rounds, which can be in any combination to best support the mission.

illumination, for a total of 350 rounds, which can be in any combination to best support the mission. The percentage of ammunition used by the unit should be modified by the commander on the basis of the mission. The expenditure of mortar ammunition must be based on

the tactical priorities and ammunition availability.

How do we manage 60mm ammunition at company level (that is, How do we know what we have on the ground at any one time.)?

It is difficult for the commander to keep track of the availability of on-hand mortar ammunition. The primary responsibility should fall on that section sergeant and the FSO/FSNCO for knowing exactly how many rounds are currently carried by the company, where in the company, and what type of rounds. To make it easier for the commander to know what is on the ground, recommended ammunition breakout is as follows: 1st and 2nd squads carry HE pure (2 rounds per man = 36 HE per platoon), and 3rd squad carries illumination and WP (A Team illumination [8 rounds], B Team WP [8 rounds]). This amounts to a basic load of 60mm—not carried by the mortar section—as 108

round HE, 24 rounds illumination and WP. Using a very basic tracking card updated by the FSO/FSNCO, the commander can keep track of the availability of 60mm ammunition within the company and realistically plan future operations.

AMMUNITION RESUPPLY

Even as good as it sounds by doctrine, we know a light infantry company cannot carry a basic load of 350 rounds of mortar ammunition. Companies at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) routinely begin rotations with as few as 40 to 60 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition and almost never get a resupply. When executing the defense, it is with a very small amount of ammunition. To keep the company resupplied with mortar rounds, the company executive officer (XO) and the first sergeant and mortar section sergeant must work together on a daily basis. They must forecast the appropriate number of rounds to be fired daily and make it a standard part of logistics. If the number resupplied is more than the number fired, the ammunition can be kept in the combat trains or carried in the company vehicle until needed. This allows the company to maintain its initial load of ammunition on the basis of the SOP or the current tactical mission. When defense sectors are identified, another basic load can be brought forward.

Although units generally manage to get mortar ammunition onto the battlefield, getting it to the mortar firing positions has been the problem. The fix to ammunition management and resupply must be obtained through a detailed company level control procedure (SOP) for the distribution, drop-off, and retrieval of mortar ammunition. Target suppression is a common task for the mortars. Field Manual (FM) 7-90, *Tactical Employment of Mortars*, recommends firing five rounds from each tube against a platoon-size enemy element, which should inflict 20 percent casualties. This means that the fire for effect (FFE) should never be less than 10 rounds and will often require much more. This is only one example for one mission. A 60mm mortar section can fire 350 rounds in approximately 9 to 10

minutes at a sustained rate of fire.

How do we get the ammunition to the mortar section?

- **Line squads drop when called for ammunition:** Using his quick reference card, the mortar section sergeant and the FSO/FSNCO can call for the squads or teams that carry the required ammunition to be dropped off at the mortar firing point location. This works well in the defense, as well as air assaults and airborne assaults as units require time to assemble and thus will have time to drop ammunition with the mortars. This can be chaotic if the landing plans are changed.

- **Co-locate ruck drops with mortar firing point:** The most success I saw at the JRTC was when in the attack, co-locating the company (or a platoon) ruck drop with the mortars. This allows

Co-locating the company (or a platoon) ruck drop with the mortars allows the mortars direct access to the ammunition they might require.

the mortars direct access to the ammunition they might require. It works very well when mortars are supporting an attack from an established company tactical assembly area, where platoon ruck drops can be established. Thus, mortars have three mortar round caches, in effect. This allows them to shoot, then displace to the next ruck drop, which in most cases would be 150 to 250 meters away from the last firing point. This gives the mortars greater flexibility in supporting the attack. The driving constraint in this method is the maximum range of the 60mm mortar, especially if older, non-ballistically matched lots are issued, where WP and illumination have a maximum range of 950-1500 meters. This method can also succeed when the mortars are task organized under a platoon for security purposes, and establish a mortar firing position in the vicinity of that platoon's objective release point (ORP).

- **Gator-based:** The final method is a gator-based mortar section. Most units in the Army now have two gators per rifle company. These gators support

the installation of a power conditioner, power-amp, low profile antennae, and ASIP/SINCGARS radios. Depending on the enemy situational template, gators allow the mortars to carry more ammunition (in my experience, up to 90 additional rounds) than their rucks would normally allow them to carry on their person. Using gators for this purpose also has the benefit of true basic load, as the platoons would still carry their breakdown as listed above, plus the additional 90 or so rounds carried on the gators. Putting a CVC on the head of more responsive fires as his ears are tuned to the company command net or the fires net waiting for the call.

Once our ammunition is dropped with the mortars and is not used, how do we get it together and move it again?

A few ideas on this one when time and situation do not allow the company's sub-units to move back and pick up their ammunition:

- **Each team leader, in addition to the two rounds of 60mm ammunition he is carrying, also carries an aviator's kit bag, which is dropped off with the mortar section when that element drops its ammunition.** This allows three things: The ammunition for that sub-unit can be collected together, and two men (maybe one) can pick them up in a single bag to move back to the parent element; allows for ease in cache; and aviator's kit bags can easily be hung on the front rack of a gator or HMMWV, or thrown in the back. And the type and number of rounds can be annotated by attaching a toe tag to the handle; this enables the section sergeant/FSO/FSNCO to update their reference cards quickly.

- **Mortars carry a poleless litter:** This allows up to 25 rounds of 60mm ammunition to be laid within the litter, strap the litter closed, and two men within the mortar section (with some extra effort) can move the rounds that had been dropped but not fired back to the parent element.

- **In any case:** Locating the mortar firing point with a unit's ruck drop alleviates many of these problems.

One of the greatest challenges for the company commander is planning and

integrating indirect mortar fires. To succeed, the mortar section sergeant must be present during all planning, orders, and rehearsals. The company commander must use the expertise of the mortar section sergeant, who in return must understand the tactical employment of the mortar to best support the company's mission. The mortar section sergeant can advise the commander on the one-half to two-thirds range criteria, mortar location, and decide whether hand-held or conventional

mode will best suit the mission. The mortar section sergeant will also recommend the amount and type of ammunition the company and platoons should carry, based on METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time). All of this information should help the company commander develop courses of action and wargaming to integrate the mortars to their fullest capability.

In summary, ammunition management, resupply techniques and integration must be exercised routinely during

all field training exercises. Through careful planning and a thorough knowledge of the 60mm mortar, it will remain the most effective, efficient, and flexible weapon provided to the light infantry, air assault, airborne, and ranger battalions on the battlefield.

Sergeant First Class Brian A. Hamm has served as a mortar section sergeant, a mortar platoon sergeant, and a mortar observer-controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center.

Tactical Decision Game #2-01

SUBMITTED BY MAJOR FRANK W. BREWSTER II

The passage of a river by a main force, against an enterprising and active enemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest difficulty, and not infrequently accompanied with the most bloody results.

Lieutenant Henry W. Halleck, 1846

Situation—You are the commander of B/2-8 IN (M) consisting of two mechanized rifle platoons, an armor platoon, a headquarters element, and an attached engineer platoon. You are an M2A2/M1A2 equipped company/team and are 100% on personnel and equipment. You have had 24 hours to prepare your positions.

The 241st motorized rifle regiment (MRR) has been attacking as a part of the 4th motorized rifle division (MRD). They have had good success, but are now under pressure to conduct a deliberate river crossing and continue their attack in support of 5th MRD, the Corps' main effort. The 241st attacked in advanced guard formation, with the 54th motorized rifle battalion (MRB) acting as a supporting effort in the North vic Buttertown to fix elements west of the town to facilitate the cross-

ing of 56th MRB south of Jackson Lake. The 54th is a BMP-2/T-72 equipped unit, and is currently estimated at 85% strength on personnel and equipment.


Your battalion had hastily moved forward to deny enemy crossing of the Barksdale River. You are a supporting effort with a task of blocking enemy movement westward along the mobility corridors exiting Buttertown in order to prevent Team C, the TF main effort, from being enveloped from the north. Alpha Company is arrayed to the south of Team C, to prevent the main effort's envelopment from the south. The brigade commander intends to destroy breaching assets, retain key terrain, and disrupt crossing attempts.

It is early December, and the temperature inversions have created a good deal of fog along the river and low-lying areas. This early morning fog hampered your target acquisition and enabled the 54th MRB to push some combat power across the river and establish far side security. Your 2nd platoon sustained casualties in the process of defending forward in Buttertown. They report one M2 destroyed, one M2 mobility down, and nine assorted WIAs.

They reported destroying three BMP-2s and one T-72. They are currently enroute to their prepared positions on Lookout Hill.

Your commander now believes that the enemy intends to use the 54th to secure a bridgehead over the Barksdale River vic Buttertown in order to pass the 56th westward. The TF commander tells you he is sending you the reserve platoon for employment (3/A/2-8 IN (M)). He also lets you know you now have priority of fires (FA) within the TF. They have near 100% of their basic load of HE but are capable of effecting only 30 minutes of smoke. The TF commander has authorized you to nominate a FASCAM target to be fired by a GS Arty BN as well. His intent is to disrupt enemy breaching operations, retain key terrain, and block enemy penetrations. The reserve platoon will be at your location in 11 minutes.

REQUIREMENT—Take 15 minutes to develop the orders you would pass to your subordinates. Make sure you include guidance for supporting arms and a sketch of your plan. Then provide a brief explanation.



DEFINING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE:

Working Toward the Use of a Deadly Force Appendix to The Standing Rules of Engagement for The Department of Defense

Major David Bolgiano, Maryland Air National Guard

Captain Mark Leach, United States Air Force

Major Stephanie Smith, United States Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel John Taylor, United States Army

(An abstract of the authors' legal analysis published in the Spring 2002, 31 University Baltimore Law. Review 157.)

When we send fine young Americans into harm's way, we have a moral and legal obligation to provide them with Rules of Engagement (ROEs) that protect their right of self-defense. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines must expect ROEs that best ensure their safe return, to the maximum extent possible consistent with the mission parameters. Indeed, this is the stated policy of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Standing Rules of Engagement (SROEs).¹ The SROEs are silent, however, concerning that ultimate and maximum exercise of self-defense—the use of deadly force. Simply stated, the SROEs fail to answer, clearly and unequivocally, the foremost question of those at the tip of the spear: “When can I pull the trigger?”

Silence at the strategic level regarding the use of deadly force level has resulted in the confusing and potentially life-threatening absence of operationally specific guidance at the tactical level.² As recently as March 25, 2001, the rules of engagement in place for soldiers serving in the peacekeeping action in Kosovo gave specious guidance on the use of deadly force that required them to “shoot to wound.”³ This order should not be surprising considering the restrictive guidelines given in Bosnia for NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR): “If you have to open fire, you must: Fire only aimed shots, and fire no more rounds than necessary and . . . stop firing as soon as the situation permits.”⁴ Further, warning shots were permitted, even encouraged, and the use of

deadly force against assailants fleeing an attack was not even covered. These rules remained the same for the Peace Stabilization Force (SFOR), as well.⁵ More disturbingly, many commanders have imposed “no rounds in the chamber” rules for perimeter security and patrols.⁶

It would be an understatement to say that confusion exists among commanders and judge advocates as to what constitutes a reasonable use of deadly force by U.S. forces and when that force is authorized.⁷ It is no wonder that commanders are left with insufficient legal guidance and *ad hoc* methods for training their troops on when and how to use deadly force. The United States military forces, whose mission was once described as “to kill people and break things” has a 300-page regulation on the issuance of I.D. cards,⁸ but lacks any specific guidance on the use of deadly force for its soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines on world-wide deployments.⁹ After having examined some sources upon which to base that guidance, this article concludes with a proposed appendix to the SROEs on the use of deadly force as the benchmark mechanism with which to provide that specific guidance. In light of the recent terrorist activity in this country, the need for clear and robust guidance is essential.

International law, as well as the common law of the United States, provides ample support for the establishment

⁵ *Id.* at 104-05.

⁶ U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, STUDENT TEXT 27-1: MILITARY LAW ¶ 3.3.III (1997), available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/nrs/publications/STs/ST27-1_97/welcome_ST27-1.html (noting that the ROE required to be utilized and understood by all U.S. service members of a Multi-national Force stated that “[w]hen on post, mobile, or foot patrol, keep a loaded magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe with no rounds in the chamber”).

⁷ Mark S. Martins, *Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of Training, Not Lawyering*, 143 MIL. L. REV. 3, 53 (1994) (“Commanders wrestled with the question of whether and how to impose the most restrictive form of ROE: orders dictating which soldiers are armed and have live ammunition and when they may chamber rounds.”).

⁸ See AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 36-2907.

⁹ Parks, *supra* note 4, at 34. (“[T]he JCS SROE is a poor document for assisting an in-port ship commander or a ground force commander in informing individuals when they may use deadly force to protect themselves and others.”); see also *supra* note 3 and accompanying text.

¹ CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. FORCES (15 Jan. 2000) [hereinafter SROE]; see also *infra* note 19 and accompanying text.

² W. Hays Parks, *Deadly Force is Authorized*, U.S. NAVAL INST. PROC. (January 2001), at 34. (“Overly restrictive and unsuitable rules of engagement handicap and endanger U.S. forces, especially ground troops on peace-support missions. Individual marines, sailors, and soldiers need to know when they may resort to deadly force to protect their lives.”).

³ Thomas E. Ricks, *U.S. Military Police Embrace Kosovo Role*, WASH. POST Mar. 25 2001, at A21 (quoting Staff Sergeant Jimmy Stogner about how the use of deadly force has been reduced to “the five S’s[.] . . . [s]hout, shove, show your weapon, shoot to wound, then shoot at the ‘center of mass’”).

⁴ See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 2001 TJAGSA, Chapter 5, app. B, 102-03 (providing sample ROE cards).

of vigorous guidelines concerning the use of deadly force. As discussed later in this article, every relevant legal system in the free world makes aggression a crime and protects the right of self-defense. This right is often referred to as an “inherent right” or a “divine right.” Our own federal common law, as well as many latter-day constitutional law cases concerning this right, strongly defines and permits a rigorous force protection stance. Judge advocates and commanders crafting rules of engagement have ignored this rich source of law favorable to a vigorous defensive posture.

Incorporation of federal constitutional law and common law into the development of enhanced force protection and self-defense rules will only enhance our forces’ ability to accomplish their missions. From humanitarian assistance to force-on-force conflicts, if potential opponents believe our forces vulnerable, the mission is compromised. Recurrent, hands-on tactical exercises that provide service members an opportunity to viscerally experience the psychological and physiological dynamics of tactical encounters recognized by the law is a critical requirement for effective training. Those so trained however, need clear and concise legal guidance demonstrating that both legal and political support is present if deadly force is used.

The Present SROE Use Of Deadly Force Policy

“The purpose of these SROE is to provide implementation guidance on the application of force for mission accomplishment and the exercise of the inherent right and obligation of self-defense.”¹⁰ So begins the unclassified Enclosure A to *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01A* and yet, this purpose is not being served. The policy appearing on virtually every page of the SROE states that the Rules “do not limit a commander’s inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander’s unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.” The use of deadly force, however, is not accompanied by any implementation guidance. In fact, the words “use of deadly force” never appear in the SROEs, which begs the question—Is it any wonder that confusing, confounding and dangerous tactical rules of engagement (ROEs) exist? While cognizant of the fact that some of this confusion stems from improper training, without clear and unhindered rules, we may have fumbled before the kickoff.

The SROEs do provide some limited guidance on the use of force in general. It takes the form of a three-step process: When feasible give a warning; defend with proportionate force; and attack when it “is the only prudent means.”¹¹ The first step, giving a warning when feasible, is one that is common to existing federal policies as appears below and ultimately appears in this article’s proposed appendix. Similarly, the second step, proportionality, although arguably

¹⁰ SROE, *supra* note 2, encl. A, ¶ 1.a; see also *id.* ¶ 7 (“Enclosure A, minus appendices, is UNCLASSIFIED and intended to be used as a coordination tool with US allies for the development of combined or multinational ROE consistent with these SROE.”).

¹¹ SROE, *supra* note 2, encl. A, ¶ 8.a.

misplaced in a ROE document,¹² is a bedrock principle of self-defense under both domestic and international law. The third step, an attempt to define when the use of force is prudent, is the concern of this article and therefore will be examined in greater detail.

Again, the SROEs never actually address the use of deadly force. Instead, the third step is concerned only with limiting when to “attack to disable or destroy.” Such an attack is permitted when it “is the only prudent means by which a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent can be prevented or terminated.” As the section on the existing Executive Branch policies regarding use of deadly force will discuss, this “last resort” notion permeates all policies on when to exercise self-defense. Moreover, as the probable root cause for “shoot to wound” and “no rounds chambered” policies seen at the tactical level, this “last resort” concept flies in the face of tactical realities and is inherently dangerous without a clearly defined use of deadly force policy. This unreasonably risky guidance should be eliminated from the SROE. Further, in the critical arena of self-defense, the SROE only concerns itself with “when” to attack to destroy, but not with “how,” again leaving many commanders to focus on the last resort language.

Finally, regarding pursuit, the SROEs state that “[s]elf-defense includes the authority to pursue and engage hostile forces that continue to commit hostile acts or exhibit hostile intent.”¹³ The definition of a “hostile act” or “intent” is one that is drafted to cover U.S. forces only.¹⁴ Compared with what is permissible under customary international law, the common law, and existing Department of Justice policies, this SROE language presents an unreasonable limitation on the use of deadly force in self-defense in pursuit situations against a “continuing threat.” At a basic tactical level, it allows a group or individual that has recently demonstrated either a hostile act or intent to seek cover or a tactical advantage without fear of attack. An example of a recently demonstrated hostile act or intent occurred to an SFOR unit in

¹² Parks, *supra* note 3, at 36. (“Minimum deadly force” is an oxymoron, as is “proportionate deadly force.”).

¹³ SROE, *supra* note 2, encl. A, ¶ 8.b. As defined at 5.i., a hostile force is one that has “committed a hostile act, exhibited hostile intent, or has been declared hostile by appropriate US authority.” *Id.* ¶ 5.i. This use of “hostile force” is confounding in that once a force is declared hostile, as per paragraph 6, “US units need not observe a hostile act or a demonstration of hostile, [sic] intent before engaging that force.” *Id.* ¶ 6. The repeated use of the term “hostile force” adds to the confusion in the definition. Specifically, if a force is declared hostile, it is always a target. *Id.* Moreover, the notion of pursuit is not limited by a hostile force’s demonstration of a hostile act or intent. *Id.* ¶ 5.i. The SROE also makes any force that demonstrates a hostile act or intent an undeclared hostile force. *Id.* This distinction of hostile force by actions, and hostile force by declaration is unnecessarily confusing and frustrates the purpose of the SROE of serving as guidance and training. This terminology should be changed to clear up any potential confusion. “Hostile force” should be reserved for declared hostile forces and all other forces who demonstrate hostile act or intent should be addressed precisely that way, as a force who demonstrates hostile act or intent.

¹⁴ *Id.* ¶ 5.g-h. There are provisions for extending the right of self-defense beyond U.S. forces to include U.S. nationals, U.S. property, and even foreign nationals, but each of these decisions are specific to the theater or mission, whereas the protection of U.S. forces may not be altered. *Id.* ¶ 8.c(1-5).

Mostar, Bosnia. in early 1997.¹⁵ At a checkpoint, individuals in a car fired two rocket-propelled grenades at a Spanish armored personnel carrier. The hostile actors then fled the scene by driving down a straight, unoccupied road. Despite having a clear shot with their .50 caliber machine gun, the Spanish unit did not fire because they thought the rules of engagement would no longer characterize the subjects as a threat.

Nevertheless, the SROEs do provide some very fundamental guidance on self-defense. Some claim that by providing only basic information, the SROEs allow for the mission-specific tailoring of rules for each mission. Despite the simplicity and generic nature of the SROEs, they are often the only promulgated rules of engagement for deployed forces, with very little mission-specific tailoring at the subordinate level as to how and when to apply force in self-defense.¹⁶ As eloquently stated by Lieutenant Colonel Mark S. Martins, much of this problem has to do with proper leadership and training.¹⁷ However, the failure of the SROEs to squarely address the use of deadly force in self-defense can lead to conflicting and dangerous restrictions on this inherent right. Moreover, it places an onus on commanders without the proper legal guidance by which to operate.

The charge is put to commanders under the SROEs that they “have the obligation to ensure that individuals within their respective units understand and are trained on when and how to use force in self-defense.” As demonstrated by the confusion at the tactical level, this obligation is not being met. An appendix to the SROEs codifying the inherent right of self-defense would help end this confusion and enable our commanders to ensure that their troops retain their inherent right to self-defense, instead of issuing specific ROE that unnecessarily abridge that inherent right. Perhaps more importantly, clear and supportive guidance would give junior enlisted American military personnel—those who actually have to apply deadly force—the critical tools necessary to do that job correctly and protect themselves from the potential adverse consequences associated with an improper use of deadly force. The following are sources for such an appendix:

SOURCES OF LAW

International Recognition of the Inherent Right to Self-Defense. The most relevant and recognized view of self-defense in international law resides in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,¹⁸ which states that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the *inherent right* of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has

taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” It is important to note that Article 51 does not create the right of self-defense in international law. Rather, it codifies a pre-existing and more universal right.

Historically, the right of self-defense has been viewed as a divine right in international law.¹⁹ The right of self-defense in criminal law is one deeply rooted in the legal traditions of England, the source of most American common law. Almost a half millennium ago, the right of self-defense was expressed in the statutes of King Henry VIII,²⁰ as a complete defense to civil and criminal prosecutions. The inherent nature of the right of self-defense was also addressed in *Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England*,²¹ as such, “[s]elf-defense . . . is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be . . . taken away by the law of society.” Thus, the SROEs are entirely correct in proclaiming the right of self-defense as an inherent right.

Customary international law recognizes this right as well. The application of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-defense and the maxim of a person’s inherent right to self-defense were firmly established in the *Caroline* incident. In 1837, the British were fighting a counter-insurgency war along the Niagara River in Canada. The steamer *Caroline* was being used by the insurgents on both the American and British sides of the river. On the evening of December 29, 1837, British combatants crossed onto the American side of the river and destroyed the *Caroline* while it was docked in Schlosser, New York. The Americans protested, but the British responded that they were merely exercising their inherent right of self-defense. American Secretary of State Daniel Webster agreed. This incident is a widely cited authority dealing with anticipatory self-defense, and holds that states may resort to force even when not actually under attack if there is “a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”²² Secondly, to be appropriate, self-defense must be proportional, not “unreasonable or excessive.”²³

Some prominent Judge Advocates consider the *Caroline* incident an important milestone in the recognition of the common law right of self-defense as it relates to international law.²⁴ Lieutenant Commander Dale Stephens wrote:

The ‘*Caroline*’ correspondence indicates, however, that the authors themselves drew upon natural law concepts and combined them with municipal notions of self defense as then understood in Anglo-American criminal law. In this regard, the authors were acknowledging the personal and instinctive nature of self defense. Lord Ashburton plainly stated in his response to Mr. Webster of 28 July 1842, that self defense “is

¹⁵ Interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Taylor, USA, in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, May 17, 2001 (noting that these facts were based on co-author Lieutenant Colonel Taylor’s firsthand account at SFOR).

¹⁶ Parks, *supra* note 3, at 35. (“By and large, ROEs produced by the most lawyer-heavy military in the world are cut-and-paste, copycat products lacking original thought or analysis and unsuitable for current missions.”).

¹⁷ Martins, *supra* note 41, at 16.

¹⁸ U.N. CHARTER art. 51.

¹⁹ Mark B. Baker, *Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (a Call to Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter)*, 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 31-32 (1987). See also, 30 Corpus Juris Homicide 207 (1923)

²⁰ 24 Hen. 8, ch.5 (1532) (Eng.).

²¹ 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 1.

²² 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1840-41) (quoting Daniel Webster, concerning the *Caroline* incident).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ Lieutenant Commander Dale Stephens, *Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self-Defense*, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 126, 134 (1998).

the first law of our nature, and it must be recognized by every code which professes to regulate the conditions and relations of man.” Further, Lord Ashburton was plainly aware of the novel nature of the American proposition that international actions may be justified by a combination of the established principle of necessity and the national legal concept of self defense. Lord Ashburton specifically noted the ‘ingenious’ suggestion by Mr. Webster that the legitimacy of British actions should be assessed by reference to this modified concept of self defense under international law. Thus, the British suddenly found themselves defending their Captain’s actions on the basis of a principle narrower than self-preservation. Further, Lord Ashburton accepted the challenge and consistently described his justification of British actions in terms analogous to personal self defense.

Thus, international law has long recognized the right of nations to engage in acts—even anticipatory acts—of self-defense. A military unit, as an extension or arm of sovereign power, has this right. This long recognized right of self-defense is also strongly enunciated in our common law.

American Common Law. The inherent right of self-defense has been a tenet of American law since its beginning,²⁵ and it has been perpetuated throughout the case law history. Regarding American citizens not in the employ of any police enforcement activity, *New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad Co. v. Jopes*,²⁶ stood for the idea that “the rules which determine what is self-defence [sic] are of universal application, and are not [diminished] by the character of the employment in which the [shooter] is engaged.” Further, the common law did not call upon a man to flee rather than fight to defend himself, as illustrated in the case of *Beard v. United States*.²⁷ In *Beard*, the court stated:

[I]f the accused . . . had at the time reasonable grounds to believe and in good faith believed, that the deceased intended to take his life or do him great bodily harm, *he was not obliged to retreat, nor to consider whether he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground* and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly weapon, in such a way and with such force as, under all the circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or to protect himself from great bodily injury.

The right or privilege of self-defense also belongs to federal agents, not only civilian criminal defendants. This right

²⁵ See U.S. CONST. amend II; see also Ronald S. Resnick, *Private Arms as the Palladium of Liberty: The Meaning of the Second Amendment*, 77 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1, 14 n.27 (1999) (citing several of the Founding Fathers for their view that the Second Amendment stands for the right to private self-defense).

²⁶ 142 U.S. 18 (1891) (noting that the plaintiff, a passenger on the train, was shot and injured when he approached and threatened the conductor by wielding an open knife).

²⁷ 158 U.S. 550, 563-64 (1895) (noting that the plaintiff’s land was trespassed by three armed men who sought to steal a cow and take plaintiff’s life, and in an attempt to protect himself, the plaintiff struck one man across his head with his rifle, causing a mortal wound).

exists for federal agents, because it is necessary for them to protect themselves *so they can accomplish their missions*.²⁸ As said in *Maryland v. Soper*:²⁹ “Such acts of defense are really part of the exercise of [an Agent’s] official authority. They are necessary to make the enforcement effective.” Similarly, U.S. military forces abroad are not only unreasonably put in jeopardy, but are unnecessarily hamstrung in accomplishing their missions if not allowed to adequately defend themselves.

Common law does not require one to delay in considering non-lethal responses to an immediate threat of deadly force. Nor is one required to shoot to wound or give warning. In light of the clarity of the law of self-defense on this point, it is astounding that many judge advocates write into operational unit ROE, or incorporate into training requirements, that service members must consider or exhaust lesser alternatives when confronted with deadly force.³⁰ The words of the United States Supreme Court in *Brown v. United States*,³¹ are particularly persuasive on this point:

Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition of immunity that one in that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant[, or to consider other alternatives,] rather than to kill him.³²

This leaves one to wonder why many commanders and judge advocates expect detached reflection when soldiers are confronted with an upraised AK-47. Or a hostile rabble armed with clubs.

Lastly, concerning the use of deadly force, the Supreme Court has levied its judgment on the criteria for analyzing an officer’s decision to use deadly force. In *Graham v. Connor*,³³ utilizing a Fourth Amendment analysis³⁴, the Court

²⁸ See, e.g., *In re Neagle*, 135 U.S. 1, 72 (1890); *Reed v. Madden*, 87 F.2d 846, 852 (8th Cir. 1937); *West Virginia v. Laing*, 133 F. 887, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1904); *Kelly v. Georgia*, 68 F. 652 (S.D. Ga. 1895); *Ramsey v. Jailer*, 20 F. Cas. 214 (D. Ky. 1879); *Roberts v. Jailer*, 26 F. Cas. 571, 576 (D. Ky. 1867).

²⁹ 270 U.S. 9 (1926) (noting that this case concerned a petition for a writ of mandamus to remand an indictment for the murder of four probation agents).

³⁰ MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION, *GUIDEBOOK FOR MARINES* 74-75 (17th ed. 1997) (“Application of deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and only as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed.”).

³¹ 256 U.S. 335 (1921) (noting that defendant shot and killed assailant, who had repeatedly struck defendant with a knife).

³² *Id.* at 343; see also *Silas v. Bowen*, 277 F. Supp. 314, 318 (D. S.C. 1967) (stating that use of deadly weapon as self-defense is justified if a reasonable person would anticipate serious bodily harm); *United States v. Peterson*, 483 F.2d 1222, 1236 (D.C. App. 1973) (recognizing that there is no duty to retreat from an assault producing imminent danger); *Glashen v. Godshall*, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17698, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1999); *Marche v. Parrachak*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14804, *13 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2000); *United States v. Yabut*, 43 C.M.R. 233, 234 (CMA 1971).

³³ 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (noting that police officers violently arrested the plaintiff, not knowing that plaintiff was suffering a diabetic attack).

³⁴ A Fourth Amendment analysis is utilized because the Court is looking at the overall appropriateness of the law enforcement seizure rather than self-defense only.

ruled that “[t]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officer’s actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Further, the Court stated:

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

Some advocates may assert that the common law, as well as latter-day Fourth Amendment cases, has no relevance to the analysis of the use of deadly force in the military.³⁵ However, the common law already has relevance in the application of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In fact, the instructions found in Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-9, *The Military Judge’s Benchbook*, concerning the use of deadly force in self-defense, mirror the common law.³⁶

Existing Policy in the Executive Branch. On October 16, 1995 the Departments of Justice and Treasury issued new policies on the use of deadly force. Revelations from the congressional hearings on the Ruby Ridge shootings, where federal agents were under special orders that snipers “could and should” fire at any armed adult male spotted outside Randy Weaver’s cabin, spurred the new policy. The policy brought under its purview the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Secret Service and the Customs Service, and remains in effect today. Considering the often analogous situation between federal agents and service members conducting peace enforcement, peace keeping, humanitarian intervention, and non-combatant evacuation operations, the rules under which the other federal officers operate, while not binding, certainly offer one source from which to craft a use-of-deadly-force appendix to the SROE.

Unfortunately, the DoD has ignored both federal common law and constitutional decisions concerning the use of deadly force in its development of the SROE and tactical ROE. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Commentary to their deadly force policy *expressly* acknowledges such case law in developing policy for officers.³⁷ Indeed, the DOJ

states in the introduction to the commentary that, “[i]n developing the policy, it became apparent that decisional law provides only limited guidance regarding the use of deadly force. In addition, as a matter of principle, the Department deliberately did not formulate this policy to authorize force up to constitutional or other legal limits.”³⁸ The DOJ has therefore opted for a more restrictive authority based on its judgment of what a prudent policy should instruct.

The commentary to the policy establishes that “the touchstone of the Department’s policy regarding the use of deadly force is necessity.” As the policy, commentary, and the FBI’s Training Guide to the Deadly Force Policy explain, the necessity to use deadly force hinges on two factors: (1) “[t]he presence of an imminent danger” of death or serious physical injury to the agents or others, and (2) no safe alternative to using such force exist.³⁹ The criteria for evaluating an officer’s judgment of what constitutes necessity is based explicitly on *Graham v. Connor*, which is common to the policies of DoD law enforcement agencies as well.

There may be situations in which a soldier, sailor, airman, or marine may be constrained by policy not to fire on an otherwise dangerous subject.⁴⁰ Such situations, however, should be the tactical exception rather than the rule, and should be solely within the unfettered purview of leaders at the absolute lowest levels. Moreover, the constraining policy imposed should not result in an unnecessary risk to the service member. This is not, as some suggest, a usurpation of military authority.⁴¹ It should be remembered that military leaders have the authority to order subordinates to “take that hill,” but not the right to order them to charge with fixed bayonets when machine guns are available.

Safe alternatives are considered when determining whether deadly force should be utilized, and the DOJ has outlined their parameters very clearly. Unlike the mandatory “*Stani Ili Pucam!*” (Stop or I will fire), in the IFOR and SFOR ROEs, verbal warnings are not required where they would pose a risk to the officer or others. Yet another concern is the availability of cover: deadly force may still be necessary where the felon can find or is seeking tactical cover. A dangerous individual can represent a continuing

³⁸ *Id.* (footnotes omitted). The commentary continues:

Courts would step outside their proper role if they formulated detailed policies with respect to the procedures governing deadly force; in contrast, the Department has the discretion to determine what the policy should be and to provide guidance to its employees with regard to these solemn issues. Cases arise in procedural postures—typically civil tort or civil rights actions, or motions to dismiss or overturn criminal charges or convictions—in which a wrongful act on the part of the government may not lead to recovery or sanctions. As a result the court often does not reach the question of whether the use of force was wrongful.

³⁹ See JOHN C. HALL, FBI TRAINING ON THE NEW FEDERAL DEADLY FORCE POLICY ¶ III.B (April 1996) (noting that Mr. Hall, who teaches in the FBI Academy’s Legal Instruction Unit, is regarded as a leading expert on the law relating to deadly force).

⁴⁰ e.g., if an armed subject is hiding among a crowd of unarmed non-combatants, or if to return fire would provoke a more dangerous response. Just as in civilian law enforcement settings, the authority to fire does not mean a service member *must* fire.

⁴¹ Public discussion generated at the XVIII Airborne Corps’ Joint Rules of Engagement Conference, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, May 17-18, 2001.

³⁵ Parks, *supra* note 3, at 35. (“Military and DoD civilian lawyers have eschewed federal case law relating to law enforcement use of deadly force because of the natural (and correct) reluctance to involve the military in domestic law enforcement, failing to distinguish between applying it and using its resources for assistance.”).

³⁶ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-9, MILITARY JUDGE’S BENCHBOOK, 5-2-1, *et seq* (stating that there must be “a reasonable belief that death or grievous bodily harm was about to be inflicted . . .”).

³⁷ U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE COMMENTARY REGARDING THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE IN NON-CUSTODIAL SITUATIONS, fn. 1 (Oct. 17, 1995).

threat, despite the seemingly non-threatening actions of a subject fleeing the scene.

The DOJ policy boldly prohibits two commonly, but improperly, accepted alternatives: warning shots and shooting to wound. The policy states that “[w]arning shots are not permitted outside of the prison context.” As the commentary explains, “[d]ischarge of a firearm is usually considered to be permissible only under the same circumstances when deadly force may be used—that is, only when necessary to prevent loss of life or serious physical injury. Warning shots themselves may pose dangers to the officer or others.” As for the propriety of shooting to disable or shooting to wound, the commentary flatly bans such a practice: “[a]ttempts to shoot to wound or to injure are unrealistic and, because of high miss rates and poor stopping effectiveness, can prove dangerous for the officer and others. Therefore, shooting merely to disable is strongly discouraged.” Although federal law enforcement agencies have already recognized and banned the practice of shooting to wound, this ineffective and dangerous practice is perpetuated by the orders given to our troops in the Balkans. More disturbing, are rules requiring servicemen deployed in hostile fire or hazardous duty zones to patrol with unloaded side arms. This practice flows from commanders’ misunderstanding of the level of force allowed by the law, inadequate training, and an irrational fear that shooting someone, even if justified, will somehow lead to a perception of mission failure.

Once an individual has made the decision to open fire, the next question is for how long can he continue to fire. Again, in contrast to IFOR and SFOR ROEs, a federal agent is not required to shoot once and then stop. Instead, he is to continue firing until the subject surrenders or no longer poses an imminent threat. This determination, rather than the number of rounds fired, is a more accurate measure of proportionality. Further, under the stressful conditions of a deadly force encounter, it is unrealistic and tactically unsound to require the counting of rounds.

Use of Deadly Force According to DoD. Somewhat surprisingly, a DoD policy does exist on the use of deadly force. Unfortunately, it only relates to the performance of law enforcement and related security duties rather than to ROEs for the force as a whole. Originating in 1992, it evolved in 1997, and matured to its most recent version as of November 2001: *Department of Defense Directive 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DoD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties*.

This Directive authorizes DoD personnel to carry firearms while engaged in law enforcement or security duties; while protecting personnel or vital government assets; or guarding prisoners. The recent changes to this Directive, in the wake of September 11, 2001, set forth rules for armed travel aboard commercial aircraft. To its credit, the new policy attempts to better comport with DOJ Deadly Force Policy, as well as specifically barring the use of warning shots. Unfortunately, the new DODD 5210.56 retains some confusing language concerning what constitutes “serious bodily harm.”

Serious bodily harm is “not . . . a black eye or a bloody nose, but [it] does include fractured or dislocated bones, deep cuts, torn members of the body, serious damage to the internal organs, and other life-threatening injuries.”⁴² While attempting to illustrate what constitutes “necessity,” such language may actually place DoD law enforcement personnel in danger by giving them the mistaken belief that they must first suffer less than “serious physical harm” before resorting to the use of deadly force against an otherwise dangerous subject.

In a tactical military setting, this issue becomes more apparent. Anyone who attacks an openly armed soldier becomes a *de facto* and *de jure* threat, and deadly force is authorized. A physical attack against an armed service member in which that service member’s weapon may be taken by the attacker and used with deadly effect against either the service member or his/her fellow service members is, in effect, a use of deadly force. One refusing to recognize this fact is either uneducable or silently stating that the assailant’s life is more important than the uniformed service member’s life.

There are many other activities, such as manning traffic control points or guarding a ship in port, when the carrying of loaded side arms would be prudent and warranted. Usually, this would occur in a deployed environment. Therein lies the impotence and irrelevance of DODD 5210.56, for it does not apply, “to DoD personnel engaged in military operations and subject to authorized rules of engagement.”⁴³ It is precisely in such situations where most DoD personnel will need such guidance and where such guidance is lacking.

Lastly, among judge advocates and commanders, there is great confusion over what “use proportionate force” means. DODD 5210.56 adds to this confusion by stating that “[i]n such cases where the use of force is warranted, DoD personnel shall use the *minimum* amount of force necessary to reach their objective.” The requirement to use “minimum force” does not appear in the SROE. Further, the Law of Armed Conflict (or the Law of War) only requires proportional force to be used. Yet troops are regularly briefed that this is how they are to defend themselves—not with *proportionate* force, not to eliminate the threat, but with *minimum* force. In addition to the political pressures for no conflict or casualties, this language is briefed perhaps due to commanders’ or judge advocates’ underestimation of troops’ capacity to appreciate proportionality. In other words, troops are briefed to use “minimum force” in self-defense as a shorthand measure in an effort to preclude “excessive force.” However, as Colonel (Ret.) W. Hays Parks has quite accurately, proclaimed: “Minimum deadly force is an oxymoron.”⁴⁴ The proposed appendix seeks to eradicate this potentially life-threatening advice for troops operating under the SROE.

⁴² *Id.* This is the same language found in the Manual for Courts-Martial (2000), paragraph 54.c.(4)(a), for its definition of grievous bodily harm.

⁴³ DODD 5210.56, ¶ 2.3.

⁴⁴ Parks, *supra* note 3, at 36.

APPENDIX D TO ENCLOSURE A
SELF-DEFENSE POLICY AND PROCEDURES ON THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

1. Purpose and Scope

a. This appendix establishes policies and procedures and provides SROE (additional to those in Enclosure A) governing the use of deadly force by US forces to defend the United States, US forces, US nationals and their property, US commercial assets, and designated non-US forces against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. To provide uniform training and planning capabilities, this document is authorized for distribution to commanders at all levels and is to be used as fundamental guidance for training and directing their forces.

b. Except as augmented by supplemental ROE for specific operations, missions, or projects, the policies and procedures established herein remain in effect until rescinded.

c. U.S. forces operating with multinational forces: U.S. forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force, including the use of deadly force, for unit and individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

d. Commanders of U.S. forces subject to international agreements governing their presence in foreign countries (e.g., Status of Forces Agreements) retain the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all appropriate actions, including the use of deadly force, for unit self-defense.

e. U.S. forces in support of operations not under OPCON or TACON of a U.S. CINC or that are performing missions under direct control of the NCA, Military Departments, or other-USG departments or agencies (e.g., Marine Security Guards, certain special security forces) retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions, including the use of deadly force, in unit self-defense in accordance with this appendix to these SROE.

f. DoD units operating under USCG OPCON or TACON retain the authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate actions, including the use of deadly force, in unit self-defense in accordance with this appendix to these SROE.

2. **Policy. As established in Enclosure A and this appendix, these rules do not limit a commander's inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means and to take all appropriate actions, including the use of deadly force, in self-defense of the commander's unit and other U.S. forces in the vicinity.**

3. Definitions

a. Deadly Force. The use of any force that a person knows or should know would create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.

b. Reasonable Belief. Facts and circumstances, including the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, known to the person at the time of the use of deadly force, that would cause a reasonable person to conclude that probable cause exists to take immediate action. The reasonableness of a belief or decision must be viewed from the perspective of the person on the scene, who may often be forced to make split-second decision in circumstances that are tense, unpredictable, and rapidly evolving. Reasonableness is not to be viewed from the calm vantage point of hindsight.

c. Imminent. Involving a period of time dependent on the circumstances of an individual situation, rather than the fixed point of time implicit in the concept of "immediate" or "instantaneous." Thus, a subject may pose an imminent danger even if he or she is not, at that very moment, pointing a weapon at an U.S. unit or service member. For example, if a subject who has demonstrated a hostile act or intent has a weapon

within reach, or is running for cover carrying a weapon, or is running to a place where the U.S. service member has reason to believe a weapon is available, that subject may pose an imminent threat.

4. Authority to Use Deadly Force. Deadly force may be employed under one or more of these circumstances:

a. Self-defense and Defense of Others. Individuals may use deadly force, when the individual reasonably believes himself or other U.S. personnel, units, or friendly forces in the vicinity to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical harm.

b. Assets Involving National Security. When it appears reasonably necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as "vital to national security" only when their loss, damage or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted areas containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.

c. Assets Not Involving National Security But Inherently Dangerous to Others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial threat of death or serious physical harm to others. Examples include high-risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, including individual or crew served small arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.

5. Action in Use of Deadly Force

a. Means of Self-Defense. All necessary means available and all appropriate actions may be used when employing deadly force for self-defense. The following apply for individual, unit, national, or collective self-defense:

1) Verbal Warning. If feasible and if doing so would not increase the danger to the individual or U.S. personnel, units or other friendly forces in the vicinity, give a verbal warning prior to the use of deadly force. Failure to heed a verbal warning may be considered as a threat indicator.

2) Warning Shots. General Rule: Warning shots by *ground forces* are prohibited. Exception: A ground commander, at any level of command, may, on a case-by-case basis, order the use of warning shots if such use does not place members of his command at greater risk of death or serious physical harm, and to do so would not place innocent bystanders, at greater risk of death or serious physical harm

3) Discharge of a Firearm. When a firearm is discharged, it will be fired with the intent of rendering the individual or group posing a threat of death or serious physical harm incapable of continuing to do so. In other words the intent will be to stop the conduct that poses a threat of death or serious physical injury. Orders to "shoot to wound," or words to that effect, are prohibited.

b. Pursuit of Hostile Forces. Pursuit and use of deadly force is authorized when it reasonably appears necessary to detain or prevent the escape of a person who is believed to have posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to U.S. personnel, units, or other friendly forces in the vicinity (as defined in para 4a), stolen or attempted to steal National Security Assets (as defined in para 4b), or stolen or attempted to steal assets inherently dangerous to others (as defined in para 4c), and it reasonably appears that the individual poses an imminent or continuing threat of death or serious physical injury to U.S. personnel, units, or other friendly forces in the vicinity.

Proposed

Use-Of-Deadly-Force Appendix To The SROE

While this proposed appendix has its roots in the U.S. Constitution and American common law, it is also consistent with customary international law and the underpinnings of the UN Charter. Both the DOJ Deadly Force Policy and DODD 5210.56 are similarly based on federal case law. Since it is the Constitution of the United States to which servicemen take an oath of allegiance, such roots are not misplaced.

The trigger for the use of deadly force is necessity. The legal criterion by which the service member's decision to open fire will be evaluated is that of "objective reasonableness" as explained by *Graham v. Connor*.

The term "imminent" retains the elastic definition found in the commentary to the DOJ policy. It includes the situation where the individual suspected of threatening or in fact inflicting serious bodily harm remains a valid target for self-defense if he is heading for cover or where a weapon may reasonably be available to him.

The requirement of a verbal warning is maintained at the "feasible" level: One is only required if it does not endanger the service member or others. Further, the evaluation of the assailant's reaction as discussed in the FBI's Training Guide is also adopted: compliance, and no shot is allowed; resistance or ignoring the warning, and shots are still authorized. This concept of allowing for a verbal warning must remain in proper perspective. It should not be a requirement, but only a desirable attempt, if feasible. The IFOR/SFOR ROE requirement to warn in the host nation's languages would be altered to include the words "if feasible." The absurdity of making verbal warnings a requirement—speaking a foreign language clearly enough to be understood in a high stress and noisy environment—merely increases the exposure of our young service members to more Monday morning quarterbacking.

Hopefully, the confusion on warning shots and "shoot to wound" will be put to rest by the Appendix since both are expressly prohibited for most ground force applications. As the case law, DOJ policy, and DODD 5210.56 all recognize, these practices violate the governing principle of the SROE, to wit: Commanders should not diminish their troops' right of self-defense. Tactical and law enforcement experience has shown that these practices only serve to endanger officers and service members, and they should rightly be banned. The Appendix also addresses these issues.

During the past decade, the U.S. military has changed its mission from one of "killing people and breaking things" to "healing people and building things, but be prepared to kill people and break things, too." Prior to September 11, 2001, these recent missions caused uncertainty among commanders as to what levels of force may be used in self-defense. Now, new and clarified rules are required. If and when forces are declared hostile, there is no concern for when a serviceman fires, how long or how often he fires, so long as it is directed at the enemy. But in today's world, the "enemy" is not such a clear-cut target. Instead, our troops are deployed on

counter-terrorist, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and security assistance missions. What decisions are we to expect of our service members when no armed conflict exists, yet they are threatened and attacked by hostile host nationals either pointing firearms or attacking with clubs? Our troops need proper guidance and training so that they are not further endangered by the SROEs and their progeny found in tactical ROE and ROE cards. The Use of Deadly Force Appendix proposed by this article provides that guidance. It will clear up the confusion, give commanders the political support they deserve, and protect our troops' right of self-defense.

When confronted with the proposal of adding a deadly force policy to our SROEs that is similar to the DOJ policy, many have voiced a concern that this will impair our war-fighting capability by causing young troops to hesitate when ordered to fire at a declared combatant in a traditional force on force environment. This argument is without merit for two reasons: First, it assumes that personnel are incapable of following orders to switch from one rule to another (an assumption belied by both practical experience and the routine use of phased ROEs in battle planning). Secondly, the alternative as it now stands—commanders prohibiting individuals to lock and load magazines for fear of unintended discharges or, as happens throughout the SFOR theater, sending Army CID personnel to investigate every discharge of a firearm—in no way can be viewed as inculcating a warrior mentality.

The authors recognize the inherent tension that exists between operators and policy makers. Too often, just as in law enforcement bureaucracies, policy makers are more concerned about liability and not enough about survivability. Uniformed judge advocates, however, should concern themselves with enhancing our commands' survivability within the parameters of the law.

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Lessons Learned From A Light Infantry Company During Operation *Anaconda*

CAPTAIN NELSON G. KRAFT

On 26 February 2002, I received an operations order from the Task Force 1-87 (TF Rakkasan) staff to conduct combat operations in the Sahi-Kot Valley of southeastern Afghanistan. This article is written to benefit the company grade commissioned and noncommissioned officers who may be called upon to lead their soldiers in combat in our country's war on terrorism. Although many after-action reports have surfaced since we entered this war, most have focused at echelons well above the company level. Infantry squads and platoons also fight and win battles, and this article is for them.

As the task force main effort, my company was to establish platoon-blocking positions (BPs) Heather and Ginger, south of the village of Marzak, along likely enemy exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep.

The big picture of this operation was for the Rakkasans—3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)—to establish blocking positions along the eastern and southern ridges of the Sahi-Kot Valley to block escaping Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, while Anti-Taliban Forces (ATFs) and Special Operations Forces moved from Gardez and cleared the Sahi-Kot Valley, which contained the villages of Serkhankhel, Babulkhel, and Marzak.

The weather was supposed to be good for the air assault, and the enemy had the advantage of terrain. The enemy situation was described as minimal. As we set up our blocking positions, along with the rest of the task force, it was anticipated that Afghan civilians and mixed Al Qaeda and Taliban forces would try to evacuate the Sahi-Kot Valley through our blocking positions.

The company mission was as follows:


H-Hour, D-Day, C/1-87 IN air assaults into AO Cobra to block Al Qaeda withdrawal along exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep in order to enable their destruction of Anti-

Taliban Forces. The key tasks of my intent were to conduct a successful air assault, quickly establish the blocking position, block the enemy exfiltration routes, protect the force, and destroy the enemy.

My desired end state was to block exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep, Al Qaeda vicinity Objective Remington destroyed and C/1-87 IN positioned for follow-on operations. My decisive point was the destruction of Al Qaeda on route Chrysler. I chose this decisive point because I believed it was the most trafficable route out of the Sahi-Kot Valley.

My plan to mass overwhelming combat power at the decisive point was to place the effects of my most combat-experienced platoon at that location. 1st Platoon had priority of everything and was tasked to destroy Al Qaeda forces on route Chrysler with the purpose of facilitating the Al Qaeda's destruction by Anti-Taliban forces.

2nd Platoon, supporting effort #1, was tasked with blocking Al Qaeda forces on route Jeep to allow their destruction on route Chrysler by the company main effort.



3rd Platoon, supporting effort #2, was tasked to block enemy forces to prevent the envelopment of the company main effort from the south. The purpose of fires was to disrupt enemy movement along route Chrysler.

After numerous rehearsals at both task force and company levels, the company felt well prepared for this mission. On 012300Z March 2002, Lift 1, consisting of 1st and 2nd Platoons and the company headquarters, were in PSS posture.

At 020048Z March 2002, Lift 1 departed FOB Bagram enroute to LZ 13A and 13. Approximately an hour later, we landed, exited the aircraft, and started movement to establish blocking positions (BPs) Heather and Ginger. Almost immediately after the CH-47s departed, we came under enemy direct fire from a ridgeline to the east. The company command post (CP) and the battalion tactical command post (BN TAC) were accompanying 1st Platoon, the company main effort. 1st Platoon continued movement to establish Heather, and the command and control elements from both battalion and the company followed.

After a minute or two, the enemy's fire increased, and they engaged with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). 1st Platoon took immediate action by suppressing the enemy, while the rest of Lift 1 took cover. We quickly moved out and established the CP in a draw approximately 75 meters away from the BN TAC.

While 1st Platoon continued to bound back and suppress, 2d Platoon established communications from LZ 13. They too were under heavy enemy direct and RPG fire. Also at 2nd Platoon's location was the battalion mortar platoon. I ordered 2nd Platoon to return fire, seek cover, and look for a route to establish blocking position Ginger. Meanwhile, 1st Platoon established Heather and began receiving direct fire from a ridgeline in the west. I reported to the BN TAC that Heather was established and that unless the enemy was destroyed in the east, it would be difficult to set up Ginger. The platoon forward observers from 1st and 2nd Platoon were calling for both indirect fires and CAS as their respective platoons moved into position.

We began to receive heavy enemy mortar fire at both locations. The enemy accurately adjusted the indirect fire and one round impacted directly on BP Heather, injuring the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, forward observer, and radio-telephone operator. The remainder of 1st Platoon was able to collect casualties and start movement to the company casualty collection point (CCP). While 1st Platoon moved to the CCP, another round impacted, resulting in more casualties.

Our strongpoint was established with darkness about five hours away. Although Heather and Ginger were not established, the strongpoint was in such a location that we were



The CH-47 Chinook proved to be the workhorse of the operation, airlifting soldiers and supplies where they were needed.

able to accomplish our mission of blocking enemy exfiltration routes Chrysler and Jeep.

We continued to receive enemy fire from the north, west, and east for the remainder of daylight. We engaged the enemy with everything we had—small arms, M203 HE, M240, 120mm mortars, CAS, and Apaches.

Although the enemy owned the high ground and surrounded us on three sides, the battle during daylight was at a stalemate. Once darkness fell, we dominated the fight. After 30 minutes of no enemy contact, the MEDEVAC helicopters were called in to evacuate our casualties. As the helicopters started to land, the enemy began to fire again. We immediately returned fire, and the aircraft safely departed.

For the next few hours, we used AC-130s and rendered the enemy ineffective. The AC-130s departed to rearm and refuel. Upon their return, we had approximately one hour to sweep the LZs, recover our equipment, and prepare for extraction.

The firefight lasted 18 hours and, although Company C sustained 19 casualties, the enemy was defeated. Numerous company level lessons were learned and confirmed from previous battles during this operation:

Ensure that everyone in your unit is trained to assume the next higher duty position. In our battalion, the battalion command sergeant major rigidly enforces the training of the “fall-out-one drill.” This is a drill where a leader or holder of a key position is wounded or killed, and the soldier next in line steps up and assumes those duties. This training could not have proved more valuable than on 2 March 2002. Shortly after setting up their platoon blocking position, 1st Platoon was hit with two 82mm mortar rounds, wounding the platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Without hesitation, the 3rd Squad leader assumed command of the platoon and flawlessly led it through the rest of the firefight. Nothing surprised this young staff sergeant, because he had trained for this scenario on numerous occasions.

Every soldier in the unit must be combat lifesaver qualified. During this 18-hour firefight, Company C sus-

tained 19 casualties. At this writing, every one of those casualties is back at work. Although the medical personnel attached to the company for this operation did an excellent job, it was the combat lifesaver who made the difference. Before Operation *Anaconda*, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, combat lifesaver certified every soldier in the battalion. There were no delays in delivering immediate treatment to every casualty sustained.

Having your higher headquarters co-located with you during an operation can be useful. The battalion TAC was co-located with Company C during this first firefight, and the leaders could not have asked for a better command relationship. There were no delays in any requests for guidance, and the experience alone that the members of the TAC brought to the fight was superb. The actions and demeanor of the battalion commander, command sergeant major, and operations officer set the example for the less experienced company leadership to follow.

Light infantry units must stay light. Our soldiers went into Operation *Anaconda* with two standard uniforms and one standard load. When we were moving or the weather was warm, we wore Gortex pants and the Army PT T-shirt under our Gortex jacket. This uniform worked well. The Army PT T-shirt is the only short-sleeved shirt in the Army's inventory that wicks the moisture away from the body. When we were static and it was cold, we wore polypropylene tops and bottoms with our Gortex. For both uniforms, we wore the issued "Matterhorn type" cold weather boots. The rucksack load was very simple—ammunition, batteries, water, chow, and warming gear (chiefly for casualties). Every ounce counts.

Full dress rehearsals are critical. The only aircraft Company C used for troop transport was the CH-47, loading on both the seats and the floor. This was something completely new for our troops. Not only had we never used CH-47s in training back at home station, we never used aircraft without everyone sitting in a seat. Although this did not pose a serious issue, with soldiers entering combat for the first time, it is important to employ any measures that can be

taken to reduce the number of new procedures for the soldiers. Knowing the soldiers' inexperience with CH-47s and floor loading, the chain of command scheduled a full-dress flyaway air assault rehearsal, which paid huge dividends and helped remove any uncertainty from the soldiers' minds.

When operating at high altitudes with extreme changes in temperatures, soldiers must have some sort of heating source or agent available to warm beverages. This is by no means a showstopper, but it does improve the soldiers' motivation, which in turn improves the soldiers' combat performance. Company C used heat tablets and stoves that the United Kingdom was more than happy to share with us. I am not sure whether the Army has such an item in its supply inventory, but if it does, I've never seen it. Whatever the case, if you find that you are about to lead your soldiers in a similar environment, order or purchase some sort of heat source for your soldiers.

Leaders must retain the decision authority of whether rucksacks are dropped during enemy contact. When an infantry unit makes enemy contact, the element in contact drops rucksacks, seeks cover, and returns fire, while the elements not in contact maneuver to an assault position, drop rucksacks, and destroy the enemy. What about when your entire unit is in contact with an enemy that has you surrounded from three directions on higher ground? As Company C came under enemy fire after exiting the aircraft, many rucksacks were dropped and the unit sought cover to return fire. This decision did not affect the battle until approximately the sixth hour, after casualties had been sustained, the temperature dropped, and resupply was needed. Never did we imagine that the battle would last for 18 hours. Company C was able to recover many of the rucksacks and needed supplies without any further casualties, but having a plan in place for the worst case scenario could have made the situation much easier to deal with. There is no cookie cutter solution to this issue, but the next time my unit is faced with a similar situation, there will be a load plan where one or two members of each squad or fire team will be packed for the worst and under no circumstances will drop their loads.

Sensitive items must always be kept on the soldier, not in an assault pack or rucksack. One lesson learned in Somalia was that no matter what time of day, when going into an operation, all soldiers must have their sensitive items, such as night vision devices. Company C followed this lesson learned, but now it needs to be taken to the next level. Where should night vision devices be stored? Do your soldiers sight out their night vision when they are going out to the local training for daylight battle drill training? They should. Many units carry their night vision devices around their necks at all times, but all too often, the equipment gets banged up or broken when the soldiers conduct individual movement techniques. The same goes when it is stored in a butt pack. Then there's



USAF air support was timely and accurate.

the assault pack. These work great for storing sensitive items when training at home station, but the truth of the matter is—unless you are on a QRF mission or part of a unit that is going to blaze into battle quickly and exit the same—the ruck sack is needed to carry the infantryman combat load. Maybe the new MOLLE (Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment) system will solve our problem. Although I have not used this system, I've been told that you can drop your main load and keep the assault pack on your back. When Company C landed in the Sahi-Kot Valley on 2 March 2002, the sun had just come up. Night vision equipment was not going to be needed for at least 12 hours after landing. Some of the company stored their night vision equipment in their rucksacks. Because the company was forced to drop rucksacks early or in the firefight, many soldiers were forced to move under enemy fire to retrieve their night vision devices. No matter what time of the day it is when a unit is operating in a combat area, all sensitive items must be kept on the soldier at all times.

Infantrymen must remain flexible and prepared to execute any type of mission that surfaces. Prior to Operation *Anaconda*, apart from securing valuable airfields, the missions Company C took part in were very far from the norm for which we had trained for back at Fort Drum. 1st Platoon was selected to be the QRF for Special Operations Forces conducting missions in Afghanistan. Training for this mission was facilitated through the battalion leaders' former experiences in SOF and Ranger assignments. 1st Platoon's first test of its QRF training came with a prison uprising in Qala-I Jangi, Afghanistan. The platoon performed magnificently. Within days of 1st Platoon's success, a second QRF mission came down: 3d Platoon flew into Mazar-e-sharif, Afghanistan, to secure a landing zone and evacuate casualties. Again, another superb execution. The final mission the company executed prior to Operation *Anaconda* was a detainee-screening mission at an Anti-Taliban Forces prison in Sherberghan, Afghanistan. The concept for this operation consisted of Company C securing the prison and routes to and from the detainee extraction point and a company of military police screening the detainees. Again, a mission



The only aircraft Company C used for troop transport was the CH-47.

that has never come close to making the company's mission essential task list was executed flawlessly. How do you train your unit to prepare for these unusual missions? Continue to focus on the basics. An infantry unit that is expert at physical training, marksmanship, combat lifesaving and battle drills can adapt and execute any mission as well as it can close with and destroy the enemy.

The U.S. Army noncommissioned officer and soldier are the best in the world. When a company is faced with a numerically superior enemy that holds dominating, key terrain, the success of the unit is in the hands of its NCOs and soldiers. The Company C NCO and soldier performance during this first firefight of Operation *Anaconda* was beyond anyone's expectations. All of the things that were continually stressed in training came together. From fire commands, conserving ammunition, repositioning key weapons, treating casualties, redistributing supplies, and maintaining the initiative, all were executed better than could have been imagined. Train your NCOs and soldiers and let them act—you'll be amazed.

Captain Nelson G. Kraft commanded Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, for 18 months and currently commands headquarters and headquarters company, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Previous assignments include rifle platoon leader and executive officer, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, and executive officer, 2d Battalion, 54th Infantry. He is a 1994 ROTC graduate of Bowling Green State University.

TRAINING NOTES



Combatting Terrorism at Home Mobilization for Stability and Support Operations

CAPTAIN T. A. STARKOSKI, JR.

With the tragic events of September 11, 2001, many U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) units were activated in support of Contingency Operation *Noble Eagle*. (Both will be referred to here as RC units.) This mobilization was directed to increase the protection of vital assets within the United States, including airports, utilities, ports, and military platforms for the projection of forces in support of Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

There were multiple types of missions, both state and federal. The state missions required the mobilization of Army National Guard units to supplement security forces within the state boundaries. Most of these missions remained under the control of the State Area Commands to establish an increased security presence to facilitate worldwide commerce and control of local utilities. Infantry forces were activated to supplement security forces at federal installations and conduct force protection/anti-terrorism (FP/AT) missions. These forces were assigned to various commands that do not normally host combat arms units. Units deployed within the United States under contingency operations face additional challenges in comparison to traditional deployment scenarios.

The intent of this summary is to help

light infantry company commanders plan for potential mobilizations, as well as to help gaining units understand the challenges faced by gaining a combat arms unit instead of a military police unit for a force protection mission.

Traditionally, an infantry company works as part of a battalion organization that provides support through staff sections, direct support assets, and equip-

During a contingency operation, the company may be assigned to a U.S. Army garrison. In this case, the leaders should be assigned additional duties to resolve administrative issues.

ment. In operational environments, the infantry company is attached to the battalion or under the battalion's operational control to provide this support. As part of a garrison, an infantry company may be able to use the administrative clerks of the headquarters company, but it will have to coordinate most S-1, S-3, and S-4 functions, including the maintenance of vehicles and weapons.

A reserve component infantry company activated under a contingency mission in the continental United States (CONUS) faces multiple challenges that

include pre-deployment training, alert, mobilization, garrison life, and stability and support operations (SAS).

Pre-deployment Training. Regardless of the type of mission, critical to the success of the infantry unit's deployment is continued focus on infantry mission essential task training in accordance with ARTEP 7-10 MTP. With the limited time that an RC unit can concentrate on mission essential tasks, a minimum of six months should be directed to those tasks, culminating in a collective training event or an external evaluation. Use of the combat training centers is essential in rehearsing critical tasks, soldier readiness, and team building.

On September 8, 2001, my company returned from a rotation at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. Only a few months earlier, several of the same soldiers had completed training at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk. These training scenarios proved essential in the mobilization process because of the pre-deployment records review before departure. During the rotation, the unit was able to integrate into a regular Army unit and conduct both combat and security force missions.

Although the Army's CTCs are primarily designed for combat mission training, they provide the operational

realism associated with any of the missions for which an infantry unit can be mobilized. The combat focus is necessary if a unit is to respond to a real-world terrorist incident that it may encounter during contingency deployments. This focus also works to hone the "warrior ethos" (FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*) and strengthen the command climate. During the training at CMTC, I had an opportunity to supervise and coach leaders in applying tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) from previous training events and to refine them during operations, all of which applied during the mobilization and SASO.

One of the challenges RC soldiers face is professional development training. They must maintain physical fitness without the benefit of daily scheduled unit PT as conducted by Active Army units. This is crucial to their individual readiness to attend U.S. Army schools and participate in missions. The units manage fitness by frequent fitness testing, bayonet PT, combatives, and road march training. Throughout the year, most soldiers continue their professional development by using such resources as Army Knowledge Online (AKO), Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), and distance education centers that are sponsored by Army National Guard units. Many RC soldiers use their home station libraries throughout the month to study and prepare for the monthly unit training period. This training is conducted primarily on a volunteer basis and is in addition to the soldier's civilian employment.

Prior to deployment, the company established an Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) training program to sustain the basic soldier skills as well as increase opportunities for soldiers to test for and earn the EIB. Tied with an aggressive weapon training program, this enabled the company to be prepared for deployment. The remaining months of training should be focused on other training opportunities such as combat lifesaver programs, records reviews, mobilization planning, and family readiness events.

Family Readiness Groups (FRGs) in

the reserve components are fundamentally challenged by the distance of the members from the unit. In the RC, these groups are primarily designed for the brief family introductions and to recognize them for their support throughout the year. Units find it difficult to schedule time to organize the families unless it becomes a part of the training schedule. Before deployment, our unit scheduled at least one family readiness or morale, welfare, recreation (MWR) event quarterly. The unit must meet the requirements outlined in AR 600-20 and DA PAM 608-47, but it should not over-plan family readiness activities or groups. The FRGs are a support mechanism for the families and should not become regimented.

Unlike the Active Army, RC Family Readiness Groups often do not have the same exposure to the Army. The fami-

Active Guard Reserve AGR soldiers are key to managing this complex organization. The relationship between the command group and the AGR soldiers is critical in keeping track of all information.

lies can live at great distances from the unit's home station, and rarely have the same exposure to the Army way of life and the shared experiences of other families. Prior to mobilization and deployment, only about 60 percent of our unit's soldiers and families had previous active duty experience. Although identification cards are an inspection item for soldiers, many RC families do not have these and have not been included in DEERS. The unit must obtain specific information about benefits for family members and how to enroll them during the absence of the soldier.

All soldiers are critical to the success of an RC unit. Unlike an Active Army unit, an RC light infantry company must make the most of its flexibility through the qualifications and skills the soldiers have gained from their civilian employment. Although the soldiers have individual military qualifications that match those of their Active Army peers (airborne, air assault, pathfinder, ranger,

and sniper), the unit often relies also on the master electricians, carpenters, engineers, and computer programmers to complete the mission. Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers are key to managing this complex organization. The relationship between the command group and the AGR soldiers is critical in keeping track of all information. Some leaders over-task these AGR soldiers and over-rely on them. Each commander should keep in mind that these AGR soldiers are part of the support channels, but that a strong chain of command must be maintained to develop a proper command climate.

Alert. The unit leadership maintains accountability for soldiers throughout the month with frequent calls and e-mail correspondence. It is essential that the leaders update the unit alert roster monthly and conduct periodic test alerts to verify its accuracy. Unlike Active Army soldiers, reservists frequently change residential and civilian employment, which often makes it difficult to maintain accurate contact information. If a unit does not closely monitor this information, it may not be able to alert the soldiers rapidly enough.

Minutes after the first attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, several soldiers automatically contacted the unit to get information on unit status. Within a few hours, several soldiers volunteered to provide local security until the extent of the attacks could be determined. Many of these soldiers remained on duty in a force protection role until the entire unit was put on alert.

Initially, the company was put on alert for possible participation in an airport security mission. At this point, a unit commander is faced with the challenges of managing the force protection of the unit, managing local media contacts, and addressing the concerns of families and community leaders. Approximately 65 percent of the soldiers live and work in the local community. Strong relations with Employer Support of Guard and Reserve (ESGR) and the American Red Cross are important in the civilian employment status of the soldiers as well as emergency notification from the families.

Information is critical at all command levels. Once the airport mission was cancelled, the eventuality of a federal deployment became obvious. Although it appeared federal activation was inevitable, no information came directly to the activated companies. Units must maintain operations security (OPSEC) of the deployment mission, but it is critical to soldier preparation to notify the unit as soon as possible. Prior to the official distribution of the alert, training support battalion (TSB) personnel began to contact the company about reporting requirements to the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The TSB team may not be branch qualified or trained on the task that it will assume during a unit mission. The TSB as a mobilization assist team is designed primarily to document the unit's progress through the mobilization for FORSCOM. Only a few days before the alert, the company received notification of activation, but nothing about the final destination. Then the company issued an alert notification, and all soldiers were called in for mobilization. The actual alert process took only a few days, rather than weeks.

Leaders should encourage the soldiers to maintain detailed and current family care plans, wills, legal and medical powers of attorney, and financial plans. The financial plans should consider the difference between the cost of living on a military installation and that in a civilian community. These plans should also consider the decrease in pay that many mobilized soldiers will have, compared to that of their civilian employment.

Mobilization. During the initial mobilization, the company did not obtain any official written orders of deployment; these were secured later at the mobilization center. Before leaving for the mobilization center, the unit conducted soldier readiness processing. This internal pre-deployment check helped soldiers gather the correct documents to take with them to the mobilization center. Many soldiers' files had been updated before the deployment to CMTC. Unfortunately, about 35 percent of the mobilizing soldiers did not have the benefit of these records

checks because they were assigned to the unit after the alert. Several soldiers had recently joined the Active Army unit as part of their in-service enlistment. Others were assigned to augment the company to meet the required manning numbers for the mission. Some soldiers were initially disqualified for the mission because their terms of service were scheduled to end, while others had only recently enlisted and had not completed one-station unit training. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORMDEPS, Volume III, is an important tool in understanding the requirements in preparing the soldiers for mobilization.

The unit will not leave the mobilization station without completing common task testing. Even though we were

During the initial mobilization, the company did not obtain any official written orders of deployment; these were secured later at the mobilization center.

current, we started the process over and were 100 percent complete prior to movement. A unit should also review NBC training. It will most likely go through all tasks of NBC training and testing as a separate event during the mobilization. This testing will include using an NBC chamber. Company personnel should be familiar with ammunition forecasting as well as the submission of ammunition request documents which will be required during the process and normally submitted by the S-4 section of a battalion.

For a number of reasons, the unit experienced major difficulties with the administration of personnel records. Each component maintains a separate personal data and finance system. Even after activation from a Title 32 status to a Title 10 status, the Active Army is unable to correct errors and gaps in the personnel records due to the differences in systems. In addition to the fundamental differences in records management, a light infantry company does not have soldiers assigned who have the personnel data management experience. In some instances, security clearance

requirements within the RCs differ from those of the Active Army. Leaders must rapidly identify the requirements for security clearances and have the appropriate personnel submit the necessary information through the security division.

Our company quickly conducted consolidation and re-organization to battle-roster the soldiers in accordance with ARTEP 7-10 MTP. This created some dissention among the soldiers, some of whom had come from other units. My goal was to re-establish the chain of command and the general military authority (FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*) of the leaders; this was difficult because several soldiers were assigned in excess. As a light infantry company (minus) we needed to establish three platoons. Instead of having nine squad leaders, we were forced to battle-roster 16 staff sergeants into various positions throughout the company, including positions as team leaders and riflemen. Upon arrival at the unit of assignment, the battle roster allowed the company to occupy assigned missions rapidly and to account for and maintain assigned equipment. Prior to the company's arrival, the gaining installation was using borrowed military manpower (BMM) from tenant units on the installation to conduct force protection missions. The BMM provided manpower but were untrained on FP/AT and had no task organization, which made it difficult to conduct consistent security force operations.

The unit deployed to the mobilization station with minimal organizational equipment. By regulation and direction of the higher headquarters, the company transferred organizational equipment back to the originating unit. The light infantry company's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) does not authorize vehicles or computers, which hampered the unit's mobilization and deployment. Fortunately, the company was able to obtain authorization for limited equipment at the mobilization station.

At the station, the unit validated on FP/HD (force protection/homeland defense) (Stability and Support Operations-SASO). The mobilization station

had worked quickly to design training documentation and construct training areas. Although the training scenarios were primarily geared to "worst case," the unit was well prepared for both a combat deployment and an FP/AT mission. The unit completed a variety of pre-deployment checks, including equipment, issue of cold weather equipment, and conducted final deployment preparations.

During the initial screening at the home station, 20 percent of the unit did not meet Army dental readiness standards in accordance with AR 40-501. The failure to meet this standard was largely attributable to a lack of preventive medicine and in some cases the lack of civilian insurance. The critical dental deficiencies were corrected before movement. Having coordinated with the gaining installation, we obtained approval to continue movement without completing the dental work. The gaining installation worked with the local medical and dental clinics to spread out the appointments instead of incapacitating such a large percentage of the unit at one time.

Garrison Life. While the combat training centers help train the soldiers on the "warrior ethos," they do not help develop an understanding of how an Army garrison works. The main challenge is to keep the soldiers focused on the mission, since the greatest threats are complacency and boredom. RC soldiers largely train on their combat skills but not on the other responsibilities of being members of an Army Community. In today's Army, many RC soldiers are not familiar with programs such as MWR, Army Continuing Education System (ACES), and Better Opportunities for Single Soldiers (BOSS), while others are not familiar with duties such as post clean-up and staff duty NCO. The challenge of integrating a true citizen-soldier into an AC environment has been documented for hundreds of years; the leaders are challenged with implementing steps to acclimatize them quickly without losing focus on the mission.

Our first challenge at the gaining installation was completing a mission analysis followed by implementation.

The key to victory for a light infantry company is unity of command. Maintaining accountability and responsibility is extremely important. Although all Army branches have the same basic organization, some task their soldiers independently. Upon our arrival, the installation (which does not normally have combat arms units assigned) wanted to break up the company to schedule each individual soldier to maximize coverage. With a good mission analysis and the support of the garrison chain of command, the company was able to maintain its chain of command to complete the assigned missions as a unit.

The soldiers are challenged daily, simply because of their component affiliation. In several cases, situations have been unnecessarily escalated due to the failure of some personnel to recognize the regulations that govern the mission completion and the soldiers charged with completing it. Although FM 1 defines the complex roles and the intense dedication it takes to serve in the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, such soldiers are often stigmatized by false perceptions of readiness and standards. History has proved that RC soldiers and units have served proudly in every major conflict and are currently participating in a variety of roles in today's operational Army.

In traditional deployment scenarios, units are mobilized and deployed to theaters of operation or to CTCs to prepare for deployment. In the current operation, the units are sometimes deployed within hours of their homes. This creates additional stress on the soldiers by putting them close to the daily stresses of home life but not close enough to do anything about them. Although the proximity to home gives the unit an opportunity to allow the soldiers to take time off with their families, it strains the mission focus and sometimes works against the order and discipline of the unit. In several instances, family members and the units from which the soldiers were assigned have taken basic soldier issues out of context, causing disruption in unit operations. Although the home-station units have the soldiers' best interests in mind,

some problem soldiers use this relationship to take the focus off their need for retraining. Combined with the frequent distractions of media and visitors, this causes major distractions from mission readiness.

For several months, the unit continued to manage with limited logistical assets. Critical during this period was the ability to obtain vehicle and computer support. In some instances, the unit members resorted to using personal assets to complete mission essential tasks. While deployed in an installation in CONUS, the unit was tasked to complete traditional binders, policy letters, and training schedules with minimal computer assets. The unit obtained a few transportation motor pool vehicles to help with daily operations. With the confusion of multiple personnel, logistic, and support systems, the deployment orders should be improved to specify the roles and responsibilities of the gaining and losing command authorities. Ongoing dialogue between the different command groups is essential in keeping personnel management and finance operations separate from operational control.

Stability and Support Operations. SASO is defined as "the use of military capabilities for any purpose other than war" (FM 101-5-1, *Operations Terms and Graphics*). This includes force protection and anti-terrorism missions. With security force operations as a core competency of a light infantry company, the unit is perfectly designed to take on additional missions to supplement security forces and, in some cases, to operate as an infantry/military police company.

The standard MTOE of the light infantry company does not allow for rapid integration into a CONUS-based installation security mission. Communications equipment is critical to the successful completion of the mission. Generally, either military police or Department of Defense civilian police secure host installations. These units often use commercially purchased communications equipment that is not compatible with Infantry tactical communications systems. The unit must obtain the necessary communication

equipment and schedule training before the occupation of the mission.

For an SASO mission, the gaining command must specify the legal and tactical responsibilities of the light infantry company. In traditional infantry missions, the unit briefs specific rules of engagement for combat engagement and disengagement. For security force operations, within the rules of use of force (RUF), the soldiers remain engaged with increasing levels of force until the situation is resolved. Soldiers must use the minimum force necessary and proportional to the threat, with deadly force being the last resort. The steps can be categorized by the following (TRADOC Command Guidance AR 190-1):

SHOUT: Verbal warnings to halt.

SHOVE: Non-lethal physical force.

SPRAY: OC Spray (when trained and certified).

SHOW: Intent to use weapon.

SHOOT: Deliberately aim shots until threat no longer exists. (Warning shots are not permitted.)

FM 3-90, *Tactics*, defines a reaction force as “offensive in nature and conducted as either spoiling attacks or counterattacks.” These guidelines do not necessarily apply to a reaction force in SASO. The reaction force may be activated to respond to critical situations

that have already escalated beyond the initial RUF stages. In CONUS, the reaction force can be used primarily to supplement the existing forces of the perimeter defense, but cannot be employed on the attack. A reaction force commander must move cautiously to pursue, detain, or become involved in an escalation of the RUF. Many of these roles and reactions must be defined by local authorities. A relationship with the Staff Judge Advocate is essential in ensuring that the activation of the reaction force does not violate the rule of law.

To reinforce vigilance and defeat complacency, the infantry company must develop a plan to sustain the company on both its SASO mission and its mission essential tasks. For sustainment on security force missions, the unit must be creative in designing an area that allows for training on the daily mission tasks as well as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive reaction drills. For leaders, this training should include intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) from various sources to include open media sources, which help develop the tone and realism of the training. A commander can schedule these rehearsals and training events in a variety of areas, including traditional situational training

exercise lanes. Local fire, rescue training centers, and civilian police training areas are excellent in reinforcing the SASO skills without requiring modification.

To prepare for the mobilization and employment of a light infantry company in a SASO environment, leaders must design specific plans to reduce the confusion associated with deployment in an unconventional environment. The integration of the unit into the daily operations of a garrison is critical to maintaining high morale and mission focus. Effective combat units must maintain balance between the traditional roles of an infantryman with those of a peacekeeper and a citizen. As a citizen of the country patrolled, the soldier must remain vigilant to all threats to ensure the protection of vital U.S. assets, while ensuring that the laws of the country are enforced so that basic civil rights are protected within the area of operation.

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Modernizing to the M2A3 Bradley

CAPTAIN MICHAEL DANE ACORD

In the midst of the Army Transformation, the heavy force has been the object of some criticism. With the introduction of the future combat system and proposed full fielding by Fiscal Year 2010, one might think the M2A3 Bradley is a waste of taxpayer's dollars. I disagree.

I do agree with one goal of the Objective Force to maintain the lethality of the Legacy Force while increasing strategic responsiveness, but during the

transformation, the Legacy Force is responsible for handling emerging threats. The M2A3 brings a combat vehicle that provides increased lethality and survivability to meet those threats.

Before I begin, I must disclose some information and explain the limits of my experience. My opinions are based on my experience as a company commander from January 2000 to May 2001. During those months, I commanded the first company to field the

M2A3. I participated in the initial operational testing and evaluation (IOT&E) of the M2A3, during which it was tested against the M2A2 Operation *Desert Storm* (ODS) version. Additionally, I took the company to the division capstone exercise (DCX) at the National Training Center (NTC) from 1 March 2001 to 1 May 2001. I have completed new equipment training (NET) and the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2) training. I have

spent an inordinate amount of time testing the functions of the M2A3 and employing them in training.

The M2A2 ODS and the M2A3 are similar in their employment. For example, the M2A3 is still employed best as a support-by-fire vehicle for the decisive force, the infantry squads. But this is not a discussion of vehicle capabilities, but rather a synopsis of the benefits that make the M2A3 worth the cost. I want to highlight two major capabilities, the sights and FBCB2, and provide some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to enhance the training and employment of future M2A3 company commanders.

The second-generation FLIR (forward looking infrared) gives the M2A3 precision gunnery capabilities. I conducted two gunneries with the M2A3. In my opinion, the sight capabilities of the M2A3 are vastly improved over earlier models. During our first gunnery, we struggled to overcome habits and TTPs that had been used on earlier BFVs. Only four crews qualified as distinguished. Gunners were frustrated with new concepts such as new sight capabilities (2x and 4x digital zoom) and kinematic lead (the adjustments the ballistic computer uses to fire at a moving target so that you don't have to lead the target using the stadia lines). During the after-action reviews, I recorded new M2A3-specific TTPs and TTPs successfully used by gunners that still applied from earlier models:

On our second gunnery, 100 percent of primary crews shot *Distinguished*. The primary crews hit all but two targets. The results were amazing, but understandable, for two reasons:

First, we replaced most of our Legacy gunners. We found that young soldiers had good hand-and-eye coordination and aptitude for using the gunner's hand station. Additionally, the young soldiers had no "old" habits that had to be broken. They embraced the new system because they didn't know any other.

Second, during the practice tables, we focused our Bradley crew evaluators (BCEs) on the application of the lessons learned. M2A3 BCEs ride in the crew compartment and evaluate the crew using the squad leader's display (SLD).

M2A3-Specific TTPs

Run a screening range similar to tank gunnery. Just as before, boresighting improves precision, but M2A3 boresighting is a more in-depth process. It requires more time and additional resources. Avoid the temptation of throughput using M2A2 boresighting time allocations and devote a day to boresighting. Although the M2A3 is still a suppression system, a target that is dead is suppressed.

Let the gun settle. If the reticle moves while firing, gunners induce kinematic lead. To avert this, pause briefly at the top before firing or re-engage from the firing position (by releasing the palm grips, re-lasing the target, then firing).

The reticle must remain steady while lasing the target. If it moves even slightly, you risk inducing kinematic lead. Use the previous TTP to correct this problem. If the reticle will not remain steady—(moves more than 1 mil every 10 seconds)—null the drift.

When lasing, use 2x and 4x to obtain a more accurate lase. Former M2A2 gunners would use sensing rounds and burst-on-target techniques while shooting in low power. Although gunners can lase in lower powers, we found that those who used the zoom obtained more first-round hits. With accurate lasing and using the sights, I was able to see the strikes of the rounds enter the target and the heat signatures of the holes they made after passing through.

M2A2 TTPs Still Used

Set battle sight ammo and range before every engagement. Maintain good habits for degraded firing.

Practice berm drills. The driver still plays a major role in the crew's success.

From there, they see exactly what the gunner sees (the SLD is slaved to the gunner's and commander's sights) and can better give the gunner feedback on proper firing techniques. NOTE: With the new sights and a spotter vehicle, there was *no question* whether the target was hit or missed. The results were excellent.

The M2A3—with its enhanced sights (Improved Bradley Acquisition Sights or IBAS and FBCB2)—is the premier night fighting system. During the IOT&E, my company (Company B, 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry) was extremely successful during the day. There were numerous other theories for this, but this is mine: Although my crews had been stabilized since the beginning of my new equipment training (March to October), the company's crews had been together longer. Because 1st Cav-

alry Division periodically is designated the Division Ready Force, I believe their crews on the average had been together longer and were better trained. The familiar thermal patterns that our gunners had become accustomed to during gunnery were not as easy to identify during the day. Although we still used our enhanced sights, limited ranges, reduced temperature differences between the vehicles and surrounding terrain, and the proficiency of their crews to acquire targets using additional assets available to them during the day mitigated our technical advantages. The company, using their organic sights, and binoculars, were able to acquire, discriminate, and engage targets to the maximum range of their weapons systems. But during the night, our *technical* advantage exceeded their *tactical* advantage. The company had difficulties acquiring and discriminating targets beyond 2.5km with the ISU on the M2A2. To them, we looked like "little red dots." For our gunners, we could clearly see and engage the enemy at our maximum range. We could acquire our adversaries more quickly because the temperature disparity between the vehicle and surrounding terrain was greater. Additionally, the improved sights allowed us to clearly discriminate and engage him before they could fire a shot. In addition to our technical advantage, my battalion commander and I invested a lot of time and resources in night vision (such as helmet mounts for Bradley commanders and focused night training). The IOT&E allowed me to develop TTPs for offensive and defensive missions that would pay off during the upcoming NTC ~~rotation~~ of our IOT&E experience, we tried to fight primarily at night during the DCX. We saw the night as the principle condition that mitigated the OPFOR's advantages in knowledge of the terrain. During offensive missions, typically my company was tasked to destroy the enemy recon along the route, and then suppress the enemy at the point of penetration.

I used the following TTPs: First, I would use the line-of-sight (LOS) tool imbedded in FBCB2 to determine what the OPFOR could see on the approach,

and from what point. Then I would develop a plan that would keep me out of their direct fire range at night (~2.5km based on lessons learned from the IOT&E). We would maneuver slowly and deliberately toward the enemy (most battles took all night). Once we acquired their positions (usually 7-9km), we would use our laser range-finder and FBCB2 to create a SPOT report that provided a 10-digit grid and an icon on the digital map. My fire support officer (FSO), who also received the SPOT report, would ask if I wanted to engage the target with indirect fire. If I said yes, he would forward the request to the task force FSO. The TF FSO would confirm the report and then process the call for fire. All this occurred in about the same amount of time it takes to complete a voice call for fire. All participants, including the mortars and field artillery, had the exact information. Additionally, the laser range finder provided very accurate

calls for fire and excellent effects. Finally, when necessary, we would attack the OPFOR with direct fire.

During the defense, we employed similar TTPs. This time, I used the LOS tool to determine the best locations to position my systems to engage the enemy at maximum range. Also, the commander's independent viewer (CIV) enabled the commander to supplement the gunner or observe a different sector of fire. This decreased target acquisition time and increased our ability to observe a sector of fire. This increased ability to acquire targets also brought challenges. One of our major challenges was the discrimination of targets beyond 7km. The NTC OPFOR used deception well to mitigate our capabilities. At 7km, their actual vehicles and deception positions looked very similar. Although we destroyed both the deception positions and their reconnaissance, we were delayed beyond BMNT (beginning, morning nautical twilight).

When the sun came up, the OPFOR defeated us in a manner for which they are famous. To prevent any recurrence of our mistakes, I would recommend further training in long-range vehicle identification.

The M2A3 is an excellent modernization to the Bradley family of vehicles. It provides distinctive advantages to the Infantry and to the Army. By using the TTPs that we used and by developing TTPs of their own, M2A3 company commanders can better employ their units during both offensive and defensive operations. As the Army transforms, the M2A3 is ready now to meet emerging threats.

Captain Michael Dane Acord led antitank and rifle platoons and served as a company XO in the 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, and is now a small-group instructor for the Infantry Captains Career Course. He is a 1993 ROTC graduate of North Georgia College.

Working With the “Light Fighters” Tips for Mechanized Company Commanders

CAPTAIN KEITH A. MCKINLEY

When I was assigned to the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, on the Korean peninsula, I learned a lot about the integration of light and heavy forces. Many of the lessons were painful, as I sat through many “humbling” after-action reviews in which every mistake I made was brought to light.

The *Strike Brigade* was permanently organized with two air assault battalions—1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry—and one mechanized infantry battalion—1st Battalion, 9th Infantry (Mechanized). As doctrine indicates, the brigade conducted operations as a cohesive fighting unit on the Korean battlefield in which light and mechanized forces worked

together. Company commanders had to fully understand the capabilities of both heavy and light forces to succeed in such an integrated brigade combat team.

I want to share some tips and techniques that I found useful during my time as a mechanized company commander within a light infantry brigade combat team.

Understanding of heavy/light link-up operations. The typical fight on the Korean peninsula is the classic defile fight. Normally, the two light battalions conducted air assault operations and seized high ground overwatching a defile. This allowed the mechanized force to clear the defile or low ground. To eliminate confusion on the battlefield, a battle hand-over line was established,

and the mechanized unit conducted linkup operations with the light forces in the area before moving through. This is usually conducted at battalion level with minimal difficulties. At company level, we often neglected the several small-unit linkups that needed to occur.

A mechanized company commander needs to realize that after his battalion conducts the initial linkup, he will probably conduct his own linkup with his light infantry counterpart. This is necessary because it will reduce the likelihood of fratricide and give the company commander a better picture of what is to his front. The best way to do this is to have the light commander climb up onto the mechanized commander's turret and exchange informa-

tion face-to-face. This gives the light commander a chance to orient the mechanized commander to the terrain, enemy, and disposition of his light infantry force.

Another concern that must be addressed early in the planning process is a marking SOP. The biggest threat to a mechanized commander on the Korean battlefield is enemy infantry equipped with antitank weapons. When a mechanized force enters an area with friendly infantry, both light and mechanized soldiers get a little apprehensive. Clear marking signals and an established fire control status understood by all will reduce the chance of casualties by friendly fire and can dispel much apprehension. If soldiers on the ground have a clear understanding of friendly unit locations and marking SOPs, they will be more comfortable fighting side by side and will work better with each other. This in turn will increase the aggressiveness of the entire combat team.

Building a relationship with the light battalion's antitank (AT) platoon or company. During a brigade fight, there may be times when light infantry AT units will be working with mechanized forces in some capacity. This works well when the two have previously established a working relationship and understand each other's strengths, weaknesses, and SOPs. These units have similar abilities and work best when synchronized.

Light antitank and mechanized units work well together and complement each other's capabilities. The small size and quick mobility makes the HMMWV the vehicle of choice when moving along small, steep trails. These highly mobile and quick vehicles can get to places a Bradley cannot. These forces work especially well in the Korean terrain.

When no trail networks are available, however, and the enemy has strong indirect fire assets at his disposal, the Bradley fighting vehicle is the better-suited platform. Even though the vehicle does not have the same armor protection as an M1 tank, the Bradley is well protected for its given weight and can take a beating if required.

Understand the light infantry's tactical mission. Light and mechanized leaders and staff members are encouraged to attend each other's rehearsals and orders. This helps integrate both forces. If a mechanized commander fully understands the light company's mission and concept, he can further conduct coordinations between the light company commanders and have them assist in his mission; for example, providing guides, marking obstacles, or providing intelligence updates. Coordination with these adjacent light commanders helps keep the mechanized commander from wasting limited combat power.

Combining the combat service support (CSS) effort. The CSS plan is crucial for both forces to continue operations and sustain the force. In order to maximize logistical efforts, both light and mechanized forces need to combine their efforts whenever possible. Trans-

Mechanized forces are in a better position to help in the CSS plan. For example, once a light force seizes key terrain, the mechanized force can drop off much-needed supplies before continuing the assault forward.

portation of soldiers is another way mechanized forces can help light units. Mechanized units can "shuttle" light forces upon the consolidation and reorganization phase of a mission or assist in linkup operations.

Another effort that can be combined is the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) plan. Using the same example as before, when the light fighters seize terrain, mechanized forces can escort wheeled ambulances forward and drop them off at a designated location before pushing forward. An FAS (forward aid station) and an MAS (main aid station) should be established as far forward as possible to enhance medical treatment. This consolidation of effort and resource will expedite CASEVAC and conserve limited medical assets.

It is important for all logistical players within the brigade to work together

early in the planning phase and not as separate units. The brigade S-4 has to work closely in synchronizing the brigade plan and maximizing efforts for both battalions. All logistical planners need to understand the strengths and limitations of both light and mechanized CSS needs and requirements.

Tap into the light unit's intelligence assets. The intelligence collection effort should be combined and consolidated at brigade level. To make this a reality, light and mechanized commanders need to cross-talk and constantly update the enemy situational template. This can be done over FM or, if possible, face to face using a map.

Each force has different collection assets that can help the other. Mechanized units have a mounted scout platoon that can be more mobile and have better optical assets (thermals or AN/TAS-5s). But mechanized scouts have difficulties traveling over restricted or severely restricted terrain. This is where the light scout platoon can help. Even though the platoon's speed is limited, it can observe places where mechanized scouts cannot go. Also, the insertion process is easier with light forces.

Another force at a light battalion commander's disposal is his antitank platoon or company. This element has almost the same capabilities as the mechanized scout platoon and can fulfill the same missions. When these forces combine their intelligence assets with mechanized and light scout units, commanders can have a much better picture of the battlefield.

Exploit successes and compensate for failures. To maintain tempo on the battlefield, both forces need to understand each other's strengths and limitations. This will enable leaders to shift forces quickly to exploit success or compensate for failures. The integration of both forces is key in minimizing losses and keeping the enemy off balance. If light and mech company commanders understand each other's capabilities, they can easily modify the current plan on the move and capitalize on enemy errors.

To achieve a mutual understanding of both forces, company commanders

should consider conducting combined officer professional development sessions, focusing on equipment capabilities and unit SOPs. Also, brigade level FTXs where both units are working together or against each other in a realistic force-on-force environment, will greatly enhance mutual understanding of unit capabilities.

Conduct heavy/light combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs). The best way for light and mechanized infantry units to learn more about each other's capabilities and limitations is to conduct them together. These exercises allow leaders to incorporate different weapon systems and equipment not normally under their MTO&Es into mission planning. Light and heavy units also learn how to employ each other's assets and maximize combat power.

Live-fires teach weapon capabilities, showing exactly what different systems can or cannot kill. The more realistic and innovative the live fire, the better. All available ammunition and weapon

systems need to be employed. They teach the control measures that are key in controlling fires. In addition, leaders learn the support requirements (Class III, V, IX) to sustain the readiness of various systems. Light and mechanized leaders will also learn each other's internal SOPs and valuable tactics, techniques, and procedures.

It is important for both company commanders to work together to create a heavy/light live-fire concept. This will allow each to incorporate his specific capabilities into the live fire and achieve pre-determined training objectives for both. The S-3 sections should conduct the initial planning, but the detailed planning should be left to the company commanders. Battalion commanders will need to provide guidance to ensure that the CALFEX meets his intent.

In summary, heavy/light operations sound great in a classroom but are virtually useless unless company commanders train together and understand each other's capabilities. An under-

standing of heavy/light operations should not remain at higher levels of command, but should be common knowledge to the leaders who are actually on the ground. A properly task organized unit that can work in synchronization is a powerful force that can overcome any obstacle on today's battlefield. Heavy/light operations are the future of our profession. Company commanders who have a clear understanding of how to integrate the two infantry forces will succeed on the future battlefield, where they will be able to move fast, strike hard, and seize the day.

Captain Keith A. McKinley commanded a headquarters company and a rifle company in 9th Infantry. Prior to command, he served as the assistant operations officer for the UNCSB-JSA (Pan Mun Jom). He was also a platoon leader and an antiarmor executive officer in 3d Brigade, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. He was commissioned through the ROTC program at Chicago State University and holds a degree from Indiana University Northwest.

Leadership Training In Tomorrow's Army

MAJOR KEITH Q. MCGUIRE

Our national security strategy entrusts the Army with global responsibilities that can be met only through force projection. Yet force projection remains caught in the classic dilemma of force design—light, heavy, or mixed? America's threats range from asymmetrical to heavy conventional forces backed up by weapons of mass destruction. We can deploy light forces quickly but possibly without significant maneuver and firepower. Or we can take months to deploy heavy forces, with the necessary logistics arriving too late to influence geopolitical events accelerated by telecommunications and reactions gener-

ated by media coverage.

The Army leadership has long struggled with this issue. For smaller interventions such as Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, these compromises have proved acceptable. We should be thankful that Saddam Hussein is a dysfunctional military leader; otherwise our light divisions on the ground might have sustained serious losses in the summer of 1990. Gratefully, his strategic myopia allowed us to bluff him into taking that fateful five-month pause in the deserts of Kuwait. But such past success does not guarantee the same for the future; a more sophisticated opponent using con-

ventional heavier forces in an unconventional manner could lead to disaster for light forces. An unconventional mob relying on relatively simple technology and small arms inflicted such losses on Task Force Ranger in Somalia. That tactical bloody nose led directly to a strategic defeat that has affected American policymaking ever since. That fact is not lost on the potential enemies of the United States. We can assume the U.S. will not forego superpower status. The Army will continue to seek a balance that marries rapid deployability and the ability to fight a sustained operation. The latest

should consider conducting combined officer professional development sessions, focusing on equipment capabilities and unit SOPs. Also, brigade level FTXs where both units are working together or against each other in a realistic force-on-force environment, will greatly enhance mutual understanding of unit capabilities.

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Our national security strategy entrusts the Army with global responsibilities that can be met only through force projection. Yet force projection remains caught in the classic dilemma of force design—light, heavy, or mixed? America's threats range from asymmetrical to heavy conventional forces backed up by weapons of mass destruction. We can deploy light forces quickly but possibly without significant maneuver and firepower. Or we can take months to deploy heavy forces, with the necessary logistics arriving too late to influence geopolitical events accelerated by telecommunications and reactions gener-

ated by media coverage.

The Army leadership has long struggled with this issue. For smaller interventions such as Grenada, Panama, and Haiti, these compromises have proved acceptable. We should be thankful that Saddam Hussein is a dysfunctional military leader; otherwise our light divisions on the ground might have sustained serious losses in the summer of 1990. Gratefully, his strategic myopia allowed us to bluff him into taking that fateful five-month pause in the deserts of Kuwait. But such past success does not guarantee the same for the future; a more sophisticated opponent using con-

ventional heavier forces in an unconventional manner could lead to disaster for light forces. An unconventional mob relying on relatively simple technology and small arms inflicted such losses on Task Force Ranger in Somalia. That tactical bloody nose led directly to a strategic defeat that has affected American policymaking ever since. That fact is not lost on the potential enemies of the United States. We can assume the U.S. will not forego superpower status. The Army will continue to seek a balance that marries rapid deployability and the ability to fight a sustained operation. The latest

effort in this search is called the Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), but this is largely a technical and doctrinal answer to what is a more holistic military problem. If the SBCT is to become a world class unit, it will need world class leaders.

Army doctrine in the form of Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Military Leadership*, defines leadership as the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation. The success of a combined arms leader should be judged by how well he can combine those three things to accomplish his mission, whatever it may be. In today's "peacetime" Army, that mission can be broad indeed, and it is easy to concentrate on the periphery rather than the core. We must examine how we train our leaders to succeed on an ever-changing battlefield. The goal is to produce thinking warriors who can meet the wide challenges that future missions might offer. Tomorrow's junior leaders will be required to make decisions that will have more political ramifications than ever before. That means leaders who embrace both a warrior's spirit and a warrior's intellect. Artificial divisions between fighters and thinkers are a luxury of the past. In a force projection military service, there is no time to replace one with the other.

The most lethal weapon on the battlefield is a thinking human being. Technology is there to enhance that lethality. If our military is to survive and grow stronger, I believe that the warrior ideal has to be brought into the forefront of military training. In Vietnam, we saw our complex technology and weaponry beaten by an enemy who relied on small unit tactics, simplicity, and the intangibles of esprit, dedication, and cohesion, summed up in the modern sports term as *heart*. The other half of that equation is the intellect required to make that heart work. General Omar Bradley is quoted as saying, "Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designated can replace it." That axiom is even more true today in the information age. Leadership is the most essential element of combat power because it focuses our will and ability to fight. With the synergy of maneuver, fire-

power, and protection, we can effectively dominate the battlefield if we have the leadership to guide that synergy.

Leaders are now developed around three pillars—experience, schooling, and self-development. In today's Army of reduced manning, reduced training time, and reduced training dollars, experience is hard to come by. Today's junior officer may get out to the field three or four times a year in the Army's schedule of three six-week cycles devoted to collective training, individual training, and support. All too often, support requirements replace the six weeks individual training. With other constraints, units may spend more than two thirds of their time out of training for their mission essential task list. The lack of experience and training shows at

Tomorrow's junior leaders will be required to make decisions that will have more political ramifications than ever before. That means leaders who embrace both a warrior's spirit and a warrior's intellect.

the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) where too many combat leaders fail to meet the expected standards. These deficiencies manifest themselves in decreasing skill in planning and conducting sustained operations under duress. A baton of tactical ignorance is also being passed on to junior leaders. Many of these future commanders simply do not know the right way of doing things because no one has ever taken the time to show them. The military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site at the JRTC provides a prime example. Time and again, junior leaders fail to set the conditions or plan direct fire control measures encompassing the city. Those measures are the thinking portion of MOUT, the magic that effective leadership provides. Others include failure to properly place and use the M240 machinegun, the platoon's greatest casualty producing weapon, during the defense or how to properly plan and conduct rehearsals.

One incident of failed leadership ob-

served on the JRTC battlefield was the unilateral surrender of a platoon leader in the brigade combat team to the opposing force (OPFOR) at Shughart-Gordon. The reason was the lieutenant was cold and wet. In another situation, a platoon leader, after having several of his troops wounded in a firefight, was pressed by his command to continue the mission. Under this simulated duress, he committed simulated murder, deciding the most efficient way to handle his casualties and get on with the mission was to kill them. Fortunately, the chain of command did the right thing. He was arrested for obvious breach of military conduct. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to observe young platoon leaders who literally cry and later on confess that they did not expect the JRTC, being a platoon leader, or combat leadership to be this difficult. These leadership failures could be addressed through training focused on expected standards coupled with demonstrations of what right looks like.

That kind of training is not happening and the consequent decline in warfighting ability is obvious. Units and leaders do not train with the battle-focus and necessary frequency to sustain full combat readiness. More important, leaders are not effectively training their subordinate leaders first, the basis for the Train as We Fight ideology. Senior leaders must take more of a hands-on approach to training subordinates so junior officers are taught the "How To" of fighting. Lieutenants spend minimal time as platoon leaders before they are moved to executive officer or staff positions. FM 101-5 says that tactics are battlefield problem-solving. Try solving a problem when you have never seen a correct solution—and do it in a hurry. That is the training dynamic of today. Only commanders who take a personal interest in training their junior leaders can alter that trend. To do that, the commanders must have the benefit of their own experiences.

Army doctrine states that leading and following are an integral part of being a soldier. But we have produced leaders who have not suffered through the same hardships that face their soldiers. After all, pain shared is pain divided. The

Army wants leaders to be dynamic and bold. That requires taking risks in the tactical realm. But such risks should not threaten the military careers of those leaders. Otherwise, officers remain cautious, worrying too much about what their superiors think instead of about doing what is right. Achieving great goals often means taking greater risks. Instead we reward mediocre performance rather than excellent failure. The trend does not encourage the “thinking outside the box” that is needed to meet the threats in today’s world.

Even when training takes place, we put too many artificial restrictions upon how it is conducted. There is no “kinder, gentler enemy” on the battlefield. Sensitivity training, consideration of others, and other similar programs do not prepare soldiers for the streets of Mogadishu. Doing that means challenging leaders and soldiers with training that is mentally and physically demanding. They need to be pushed almost to the point of breaking, and then pushed a little bit more. Something is wrong in our society when a high school football coach is allowed to be harder on his players than a drill sergeant is allowed to be on his soldiers in basic training. Stress in training is necessary for both players and soldiers. Stress plays a role in both child development and team building. Yet the Army—an organization whose mission requires it to kill—is not allowed to admonish his soldiers, verbally or physically, to motivate them in teaching the skills that will save their lives.

There is an old saying that practice doesn’t make perfect; perfect practice makes perfect. And like everything else in life, even the lessons once learned as a leader are perishable skills. Leadership is like muscle. In order to grow bigger and stronger we must apply stress, fatigue, and a little discomfort, which yields scar tissue. And through that rebuilding process the muscle will become bigger, stronger, and able to do more with less effort. Now-retired Major General David Grange understood that dynamic. He used a lesson from the past to incorporate that process in training today’s leaders. The Magundai was the leader of 13th century warlord

PHASES OF THE OPERATION

- Phase I
 - Officer Professional Development
- Phase II
 - Preparation for Combat
 - A. Instruction
 - B. Planning
 - C. Troop Leading Procedures
 - D. Rehearsals
- Phase III
 - Combat Operations
 - A. Training Area I
 - Insertion
 - React to Contact
 - Assault Objective
 - Defeat Counterattack
 - B. Training Area II
 - Air Assault
 - Combat Search and Rescue
 - React to Contact
 - Casualty Evacuation
 - Assault MOUT
- Phase IV
 - Recovery/After-Action Review

Genghis Khan’s elite forces. The Magundai would take his troops out into the wilderness for several days, deprive them of food and sleep to wear down their bodies and their brains, and then present them with physical and mental challenges. He could then observe how those possible leaders adapted to stress. General Grange put his officers into a similarly unexpected training environment, with little sleep and even less food, stressing them by having them experience the hardships their soldiers faced. “Just because you’ve done it once 15 or 20 years ago doesn’t mean you remember how hard it was,” said a battalion commander under Grange’s tutelage.

The training focus for a Magundai program is to enhance the skills, willpower, and teamwork of all leaders to fight on any battlefield. The exercise also strengthens the leaders’ understanding of basic battle drills. An example is shown in the accompanying box:

Most leaders lament the shortage of good hard training routinely provided. General Grange’s Magundai-trained leaders were introduced to an art that is hard, and sometimes painful to master. The entire point of the program is to test a leader’s mettle and simulate “operations outside the box” as a means for improving that leader, the unit, and the Army. Unfortunately, too many offi-

cers—senior and junior—fear the damage that such an unvarnished view of their abilities under stress might do to their careers, for the Magundai methodology does focus on fatigue and physical duress. Exacting execution is not as important as placing the officer under the worst, most extreme conditions. General Grange used this training model to create friction during execution of multiple daily operations. Other successful commanders have also used the technique, notably Brigadier General McChrystal and Colonel Keen as 75th Ranger Regiment commanders. Both have used the program as an effective training and evaluation tool within their conventional and unconventional organization.

There are alternatives to the Magundai. One is the “Omega,” or TACOPD (tactical officer professional development), in use within Colonel Hon Lehr’s 1st Battalion, 327th Airborne (Assault). Now-retired Colonel W.C. Ohl started the program within his first battalion in the early 1980s. He used the rifle platoon as the training vehicle for officers. With Colonel Ohl as platoon leader and now-Major General Vines as the platoon sergeant, the platoon conducted a series of missions such as the point ambush and the classic linear defense. Lieutenants served as squad leaders and team leaders. Company commanders carried the crew-served weapons. A mission cycle usually began early on the first day, with the battalion commander leading officer physical training. Immediately following personal hygiene and breakfast chow, the battalion commander briefed the perfect platoon operations order, followed by a confirmation brief. Afterwards, the platoon sergeant inspected equipment and began to prepare the rehearsal site. Using the *crawl-walk-run* methodology, the platoon then rehearsed the prioritized tasks in daylight. The remainder of the day was spent in a back brief rehearsal and final inspection. After the evening meal, the platoon ran a full-force, full-speed rehearsal before going into a couple of hours of rest. Late the same night, they would be inserted and execute the mission. Afterwards, they always con-

ducted either an escape and evasion course or a foot march of moderate length—4 to 10 miles. The difference between the Omega methodology and the Magundai was the Omega's focus on exacting execution. Although the amount of physical duress was at the medium level, mistakes were not taken lightly.

Another great leadership training program was established by the 7th Infantry Division, which mandated that all soldiers in the ranks of noncommissioned officers and above attend a leader's course before assuming any leadership position. The Combat Leadership Course and the Light Fighters Infantryman Course were excellent programs that established a division standard for its leaders. The courses reacquainted them with the hardship and stress that their soldiers endure. These programs should be Army-wide. Magundai, Omega, or Light Fighter programs that challenge soldiers produce more-satisfied soldiers than those who

answer to politically sensitive issues. The best demonstration of a commander's concern for his soldiers is in the quality of their training. The best force protection method is better training.

Leaders must constantly practice their art. For emerging doctrine and technology to succeed on the new battlefield, we have to focus on leadership development by encouraging free thinking outside the boundaries of the absurd. Commanders need to seize every opportunity to develop subordinates, teaching them *how* to think instead of *what* to think. For example, as a commander receives brief backs from subordinates, he should use the process to add mental rigor, forcing these junior leaders to address unforeseen problems. This not only addresses the individual problems, but also teaches the leader how to mentally wargame a plan.

The Army does not get to choose its missions, but it is expected to defeat an enemy in battle or conduct peacekeep-

ing humanitarian operations. It should, however, be able to develop leaders who can meet those challenges—and guide our soldiers through them. The soldiers remain the ultimate guarantors of American interests. The infantryman cannot be a policeman one minute and locked in mortar combat the next, unless we bear the cost of preparing him. Only effective leadership can offset that cost. Soldiers are not pawns; they are America's sons and daughters. Mentally and physically rigorous training will help bring them home. Diamonds are made from the application of intense pressure over long periods of time, and so are effective combat leaders.

Major Keith Q. McGuire served as a company observer-controller at the JRTC and previously commanded a company in the 502nd Infantry at Fort Campbell and weapons platoon leader, Company B, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. He is a 1990 ROTC graduate of San Jose State University and is currently attending graduate school at Florida Technological University.

The Cadre Platoon

Turning a Challenge Into an Opportunity

LIEUTENANT DANIEL SCHEERINGA

The Army, at its core, is a group of people with a job to do. Everyone's job gets harder when the Army doesn't have enough people to do all the work. During the past several years, the Army, both active and reserve components, has struggled with the challenges caused by low recruiting and retention.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 178th Infantry of the Illinois National Guard was no exception. Recruiting was suffering. A booming economy with numerous job opportunities made the monthly drill check seem less attractive. Retention was also difficult. While high school graduates joined the National Guard for the attractive educational benefits, relatively few stayed

after their initial enlistments. All of this left the unit with a shortage of privates and with serious turnover at corpo-

Many capable, motivated young soldiers worked for years to become team leaders, only to find themselves with no teams to lead.

ral/specialist and sergeant levels.

Many junior NCOs decided not to pursue military careers after their initial enlistments. Many more, who did not want to be career NCOs, left when faced with the frustration of having no troops to lead. Many capable, moti-

vated young soldiers worked for years to become team leaders, only to find themselves with no teams to lead. Young squad leaders would look to their left and see only a fire team's worth of troops.

It was part of the company's command philosophy to delegate as much responsibility as possible to these junior NCOs, including training. But there were still limits to what they could do. These corporals/specialists and sergeants were well prepared to train soldiers on battle drills and other tasks. Squad leaders and platoon sergeants still needed to prepare and conduct this training. Senior NCOs needed to take great responsibility for training and for

overseeing the training conducted by these junior NCOs. They faced serious overwork as these training responsibilities combined with the already heavy responsibility of caring for their troops.

Another challenge, no doubt familiar to many readers, was the unrealistic tactical training that resulted from low strength. Company B often deployed to the field with rifle squads of four or five men and fire teams of one or two. During our Annual Training periods, the company often had to consolidate into one platoon. While this may often reflect real-world conditions, junior leader training suffered as squad leaders led fire teams and platoon leaders led over-strength squads. Lack of strength also hurt training through an insufficient or sometimes nonexistent opposing force (OPFOR). Without OPFOR, what should have been realistic combat training began to seem like pointless walks in the woods. A true infantry soldier wants nothing more than to take the field and engage the enemy. When he is unable to do this, morale and retention will suffer.

To sum all this up, Company B had a wealth of experienced NCOs and a core of motivated enlisted men, but it didn't have enough soldiers to man three rifle platoons.

The Solution

With authorization from battalion, Company B's leaders tried an experimental solution. They looked for a way to make maximum use of their strengths (experienced NCOs) and minimize their weaknesses (lack of enlisted men and underutilized junior NCOs).

The company consolidated its three rifle platoons into two. This consolidation formed two platoons at or near authorized MTOE levels. This, of course, meant the elimination of some leadership positions. The small group of NCOs left out of leadership positions became the company's full-time trainers. Company B took some of its best NCOs—many with active duty experience—and put them under an experienced platoon sergeant. Under his leadership, they became the unit's schoolteachers.

It is important to note here that these trainers were carefully selected for their new jobs. They were not the losers of a bureaucratic game of musical chairs, nor were they rejects whom no one wanted leading troops. They were some of the company's finest noncommissioned officers. This cadre platoon consisted not only of more senior staff sergeants but promising corporal/specialists and sergeants as well.

In the new 3rd platoon (cadre), these junior NCOs gain valuable teaching experience before they rotate back to the line platoons for their next level of responsibility. 3rd platoon is by no means a permanent resting place. Instead, it is an assignment where capable NCOs can teach and learn before going back out to lead troops. This teaching experience serves them well, both in their formal professional education and

The freedom to concentrate solely on training gives 3rd platoon the time to research and prepare training for tasks the company has rarely or never trained on before.

in the line platoons.

In addition to training the troops in a garrison setting, 3rd platoon also addresses the lack of OPFOR. This platoon has enough personnel to provide a wily and experienced force to challenge both rifle platoons in the field.

The leaders of 3rd platoon can coordinate all elements of training, assigning training modules to individual instructors, then supervising and mentoring these instructors. The freedom to concentrate solely on training gives 3rd platoon the time to research and prepare training for tasks the company has rarely or never trained on before.

In response to changing times, and with authorization from the battalion commander, Company B decided to devote an entire drill weekend to training in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). Since the company had never trained on this, there was a relatively small base of knowledge to draw upon. It is unlikely that line NCOs

would have had time to do adequate research and preparation for this training. But 3rd platoon was able to take the time to research all areas of MOUT training relevant to an air assault infantry company, searching both official and unofficial publications. (See "Let's Replace Battle Drill 6," by Captain Drew R. Meyerowich, *INFANTRY*, May-August 1998, pages 11-15.)

On the basis of their research, 3rd platoon's trainers planned an entire drill weekend of MOUT training. The 3rd platoon's platoon sergeant personally taught room clearing. The platoon used ponchos to build simulated rooms on the drill floor for room clearing drills. They invited a guest speaker, a member of a nearby police department's SWAT team. The platoon provided OPFOR for the platoon-level MOUT situational training exercise (STX) that capped off the weekend. During the STX, a 3rd platoon trainer videotaped the platoon going through their lanes, to facilitate their after-action reviews. The end result of all this hard work was a weekend of challenging and realistic training that left the troops with a solid base of knowledge the company could build on later.

Another prominent example of 3rd platoon's contribution was in August 2000. The company's leaders had identified land navigation as a key skill deficiency. Since Company B's nearest training facility, Joliet Training Area (JTA), lacked a precision compass course, Company B decided to build one. On the first day of a field drill in JTA, during platoon and squad time, 3rd platoon members designed a compass course from scratch and emplaced its stakes, guided by GPS—an all-day task. This is another example of training preparation that would have been difficult, if not impossible, for conventional line NCOs.

Company B is constantly seeking to improve its company training. In 2000, Company B and 3rd platoon shifted their focus from collective task training to individual skill training. Through the Junior Leaders' Program, 3rd Platoon will work to improve proficiency at Skill Level 1 and 2 tasks at the corporal/specialist and sergeant levels. They

will teach small-unit leadership through battle drills and patrols. The program will also teach young leaders how OPFORs fight, to further enhance their combat effectiveness.

My intent is not to suggest that all units immediately carry out a reorganization such as this one. Instead, I seek to share the insights Company B has

gained from this experiment and offer an option to commanders who face the small challenges of recruitment and retention that our commander faced. The problem of strength is not likely to go away any time soon; meanwhile, commanders must find innovative solutions to keep their troops combat- in spite of this challenge.

Lieutenant Daniel Scheeringa led a rifle platoon in Company B, 1st Battalion, 178th Infantry, Illinois Army National Guard, at the time of this writing. He is currently the battalion's S-2. He has also served as an antiarmor platoon leader and a support platoon leader. He is an ROTC graduate of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

The Basics Keep You Alive

FIRST SERGEANT JASON SILSBY

One of the biggest mistakes leaders and soldiers make when their units rotate to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) is that they forget the little things they were taught as young soldiers. As a young soldier coming into the Army back in the 1980s, I vividly remember my uncle, who had served two tours in Vietnam, telling me, "Stick to the basics and keep your head down because the enemy knows how to shoot, too." I have never forgotten these words. Hopefully, in this article I can tell you about a few things that may help your platoons and squads survive—and learn—at the JRTC.

The opposing force (OPFOR) is made up of soldiers just like you and me. There is no magic in the JRTC's OPFOR; they focus on the same small-unit tactics that your platoons and squads are taught. The OPFOR units work off the commander's intent and use a lot of initiative. This is what makes them so successful. Usually, they move in teams of three to five men, with the senior man being a corporal or sergeant. They live out of caches during the low intensity conflict phase. One piece of equipment they use that you cannot use is the Motorola radio. This is their main means of communicating with their teams. Since these radios are not secure, the OPFOR uses

brevity codes a lot to confuse the rotating units. Every OPFOR soldier knows how to call a basic indirect fire mission and adjust fire. OPFOR soldiers mainly use the roads and villages as boundaries for their control measures. Company commanders searching for the enemy should keep that in mind.

Marksmanship is another thing our Army could do a little better. We have been given extra items to add to our rifles when most of us don't shoot that

One of the biggest contributors I have seen is the M68 sight. I know batteries are a big problem and hope the Army will come up with a way to keep the sight from coming on prematurely.

well even with iron sights. Next time you're on a rifle range back at home station, try doing some training using your iron sights along with all the other attachments. It will pay off.

One of the biggest contributors I have seen is the M68 sight. I know batteries are a big problem and hope the Army will come up with a way to keep the sight from coming on prematurely. Also, do some home station training with soldiers engaging other soldiers

wearing MILES gear and using individual movement techniques. This is what the OPFOR does between rotations. You will be surprised how well soldiers will learn to engage a moving target. At the JRTC you'll see the OPFOR kneeling or standing behind trees most of the time while engaging your troops, because they have learned through trial and error that they don't get as many kills from the prone position. This goes against a lot of things you were taught as a soldier. Getting into a position that allows you to engage a target effectively is also important, but you should understand and exploit the realities of the MILES battlefield just as the OPFOR does.

Pulling security was probably one of the most boring things I did as a young soldier. I now realize it is also one of the most important things. Too many times I have been out there with my counterparts and seen their units surprised by the OPFOR. A lot of times we fail to realize how a good security plan helps us in the long run. When putting out observation posts or conducting reconnaissance and security (R&S) patrols, you have to apply some common sense. Don't finger drill it. Training units have a habit of going in thinking they're going to find the OPFOR at night. Not once have we found

TRAINING NOTES

the OPFOR at night since I have been an observer controller (OC). I recommend moving during the day and resting at night. Just be sure to conduct small R&S patrols around your defensive perimeter. Don't let your guard down, because the minute you do, all hell will break loose.

Land navigation is a skill soldiers have lost. The precise laser GPS receiver (PLGR) is a great tool that we all wish could be a little smaller. But don't just add in waypoints and start walking. And don't forget that GPS can be jammed as well. Use all the other assets available to you, such as your map, your compass, and soldiers who have been there before. The map you use does not show all the trails and unimproved roads, as some special OC maps do. There are a lot more trails actually on the ground than you might think. It wasn't long ago that this was mechanized infantry country. As a company commander or platoon leader, you will get out of it what you put into it, so put a good team leader in charge of planning your routes, and I guarantee you won't go wrong. Allow enough time to plan your route, just as you do for the tactical plan.

Battle drills are something I consider very important, especially at squad


level. If squads can do them, platoons will have no problem. Commanders and first sergeants, you have to be firm when it comes to making platoons and squads rehearse their battle drills. Too many times I have seen platoons and squads come to the JRTC and have to relearn battle drills all over again. I think squad leaders are looking for a picture perfect drill every time, which they are probably not going to find. In addition, we as leaders do not put real-world stressors on them such as they get here from the OPFOR. Squad leaders, if you cut corners now, you will pay later. You have to be hard on your team leaders and soldiers; it will save lives. It has been proved time and time again. Knowing when to transition from one drill to another is also a tough decision to make. It can happen in a matter of seconds. The OPFOR soldiers are good at battle drills, and you have to master drills too if you want to beat them on their own turf.

Planning at the platoon and squad level is critical to mission success. As a platoon leader or squad leader, you often find yourself conducting condensed troop-leading procedures (TLPs) while you're at the JRTC. It's tough sometimes. Ask your OC to help you out when it comes time to plan a mission,

especially when you're still in the initial staging base. I had the opportunity to go to the Combat Leaders Course while I was a Ranger Instructor. This helped me understand the orders process better than I had realized. Platoon sergeant, don't assume your young platoon leader is totally competent in giving operation orders. You need to get involved. If both of you are struggling, ask the company commander. He just came from a school that taught him all about planning, so pick his brain. Carry those leader graphic training aid (GTA) cards in your pocket. They will help you through the TLPs.

Hopefully, the things I have discussed here will help your companies, platoons, and squads survive while they are deployed at the JRTC. Remember the basic things you were taught when you were a soldier. Leaders, you will realize some day, long after your company or platoon leaves the "box," how important this training experience really was to you and how much good, useful training you took home with you.

First Sergeant Jason C. Silsby, when he wrote this article, was Senior NCO observer-controller, Company B, Task Force 2, at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He is now assigned to Fort Drum.



INFANTRY CAREER NOTES



JOINT TASK FORCE CREDIT EXPANSION

More officers will be given credit for temporary Joint Task Force (JTF) deployments as a result of a credit expansion.

The JTF credit rule, approved upon release of the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act on December 28, 2001, was expanded to include operations conducted in an environment where an extremely fragile state of peace and a high potential for hostilities co-exist. Previously, the rule granted JTF credit only for service in a combat area of operations.

Officers eligible for credit must have served at least 90 consecutive days on the JTF headquarters staff (not in subordinate organizations or service components), be in the rank of captain, filling a major billet or above, and be on the "active duty list" affected by joint officer management legislation and policy. Reserve component members and "professional" specialties are excluded.

Joint duty credit is not automatically awarded, but it may be recommended for officers who meet the criteria.

Eligible officers should submit a credit nomination package with a memo and enclosure noting service data. The memo should include a summary recommendation for cumulative Joint Duty Assignment credit, identify nominee(s) by name and grade, dates of JTF service, number of days served, and name of specific JTF.

Officers should also provide an enclosure detailing nominees' service data and position identification. The officer's personal and position identification information, grade at the time of the JTF assignment, career specialty, JTF headquarters arrival and departure dates, duty location and contact information, as well as source documenta-

tion are essential to the processing of the nomination package.

Source documentation includes the officer record brief, award citation, and travel orders and vouchers. Multiple officer requests may be consolidated into a single submission; however, each request must contain a separate summary in the prescribed format.

Retroactive joint service credit for duty applies to the following operations during the respective time periods:

- Operation Northern Watch**
Aug. 1, 1992 – To Be Determined
- Operation Southern Watch**
Aug. 27, 1992 – TBD
- Operation Able Sentry**
June 26, 1993 – Feb. 28, 1999
- Operation Joint Endeavor**
Dec. 25, 1995 – Dec. 19, 1996
- Operation Joint Guard**
Dec. 20, 1996 – June 20, 1998

Nomination packages must be received at the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) no later than November 1, 2002. The memo should be addressed to the CDR, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-OPB-J (MAJ Leven Pressley-Sanders); 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411.

Army officers are advised to contact MAJ Pressley-Sanders, joint policy officer, at DSN 221-8129 or (703) 325-8129, or email presslel@hoffman.army.mil for further information about the process.

ALL BNCOC GRADUATES NOW GET 40 PROMOTION POINTS

Soldiers who successfully completed the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) are now awarded 40 promotion points, effective August 1, 2002.

Soldiers will no longer receive four

promotion points for each week of BNCOC. This change reduces administrative mistakes and levels the playing field for BNCOC graduates with similar military occupational specialties (MOSSs).

Under the previous system, when soldiers completed both phases of BNCOC—common-core and MOS-specific—they submitted two forms of the Department of the Army 1059 to their Personnel Support Branch for points. Then the PSB clerk decided how many points a soldier got. For example, if phase one was five weeks and three days and phase two was two weeks and two days, one clerk might give 32 points for eight weeks, while another might give 28 points for seven weeks. Implementing a 40-point standard means there is no room for interpretation.

Some soldiers may have the perception that they are going to lose points because their particular BNCOC is longer than 10 weeks, but that is not true. The point system applies to every soldier in the MOS, and the cut-off score reflects that. Soldiers will still be competing against others in their MOS, and everyone in that MOS will have 40 points.

The soldiers most affected are those who are in MOSs that have merged, such as some in the medical field, and others that are planned to merge under the implementation of ADS XXI initiatives. The latter implementation was designed to consolidate MOSs with similar functions. Last year several medical skills were combined under the 91W umbrella. After the merger, some soldiers had promotion points based on a 12-week BNCOC class while others had points based on an eight-week course. Other potential mergers include Personnel Administrative Specialists (75B) and Personnel Services Special-

ists (75H) who would be redesignated 42A.

Merging light-wheel vehicle mechanics (63S) and wheel-vehicle repairers (63W) has been proposed. While the wheel-vehicle repairers would lose 43 points if the merger goes through, each of the soldiers—who would be competing with one another for promotion—would receive the same number of promotion points for BNCOC completion. This would eliminate inequities based solely on their BNCOC length. With BNCOC being treated as an equal element, similar MOSs are merged, and no one is at a disadvantage.

In July 2002 all personnel support battalions began converting the BNCOC points and adjusting promotion points. Soldiers will not have to do anything.

ASSIGNMENTS ON LINE

Effective July 1, 2002, Army officers can now submit their assignment preference statements on the Internet by accessing the U.S. Army Personnel Command homepage. The online preference statement will enable officers to view open valid requisitions that assignment managers are working to fill.

In the past, officers have only been able to see open assignments on various branch web sites. Now they will have a broader view of the positions available and to evaluate the special requirements before making a choice.

Branch, grade, and area of concentration are the considerations governing the information that is shown on the preference statement. Officers can make selections specifically by valid and open requisitions, by location or by specific duty such as joint, ROTC, or recruiting. The assignment manager will then be able to see this information as he walks through the decision proc-

ess for filling a requisition.

With the preference statement, officers can better participate in the decisions that affect their careers, and help streamline and improve the responsiveness of the officer assignment process.

Officers can select their preferences on the PERSCOM homepage by clicking on the officer preference statement dog tag.

VEAP CONVERTS TO GI BILL MAY LOSE BENEFITS

Soldiers who converted from the Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) to the Montgomery GI Bill are at risk of forfeiting their contributions and losing their benefits if they fail to make their payments.

Soldiers have 18 months from the time they signed the Montgomery GI Bill, Department of Defense Form 2366, to pay the mandatory contribution of \$2,700.

Many of the 5,000 soldiers who signed up for the program may have already missed their deadlines, according to officials at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command Program participants need to contact their finance offices and make sure the contribution will be paid within the 18-month deadline.

If soldiers are not able to pay the \$2,700 in time by using monthly allotments, they have the option of combining the allotment with a lump sum, or they can make a single lump sum payment.

The law states that if participants don't pay the contribution in full within the allotted time, they forfeit anything they contributed to VEAP and will not be eligible for any education benefits through the Veterans Administration.

It is imperative that soldiers look at the date they signed their DD Form

2366 and make sure they have the contribution paid in full within 18 months of that date. To date, the VA has not made any exceptions to the deadline.

VEAP was first enacted by Congress for post Vietnam-era soldiers. It was designed to attract high quality men and women to the all-volunteer Armed Forces. Congress signed the VEAP conversion law on October 30, 2000, making it the second conversion opportunity since October 1996. (Submitted by Tesia Williams, PERSCOM Public Affairs Office.)

"DIGITAL SENDERS" SPEEDING ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

Processing awards and other personnel records in faraway places is getting easier with the help of "digital senders," according to personnel officials supporting Operation *Enduring Freedom*.

A digital sender from Fort Bragg is up and running in Uzbekistan, and two have been set up in Afghanistan. The number of digital senders should increase to 100 by the end of the year.

A digital sender looks like a fax machine and acts similarly in sending awards, evaluations, and other documents directly to a soldier's official military personnel file. A personnel section can send a Bronze Star award citation from the field one day and see it online the following day.

There are now 30 digital senders at Fort Lewis, Fort Bragg, Korea, Germany, and Afghanistan. A sender from Germany arrived recently in Kosovo to support 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, soldiers deployed there from Schweinfurt. And another is enroute to Kuwait to support soldiers there. The number of senders in the Army should reach 100 by the end of the year.

BOOK REVIEWS



***Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II.* By Martin Blumenson. Cooper Square Press, 2001. 644 Pages. \$32.00, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Colonel Cole C. Kingseed, U.S. Army, Retired.

Few military historians have placed a greater personal impact on our study of World War II than Martin Blumenson. Blumenson is no stranger to the readers of *Infantry*. A former staff historian of Patton's Third Army, he is the distinguished editor of *The Patton Papers* and numerous books on the 20th century's greatest conflict. He remains the country's leading expert on George S. Patton and has been a frequent lecturer on combat leadership.

In *Heroes Never Die*, Blumenson adds to his legacy as one of this country's leading military historians. This latest work is a compendium of 50 essays never before assembled in a single volume. Each of the essays focuses on a particular aspect of World War II and attempts to revive and restore our images of it. What makes this book so provocative is the author's ability to challenge traditional interpretations of the war's various commanders and decisions. Though some observers may seek in vain to find current relevancy in the study of World War II, Blumenson accurately argues that one standard is ever important: Heroism is never out of date.

At the center of *Heroes Never Die* are the commanders of the U.S. Army who waged global war from 1941-1945. Eisenhower, MacArthur, Bradley, Patton, Ridgway, and a host of lesser known leaders are all present. Readers will enjoy Blumenson's analysis of the professional relationship between World War II's "Odd Couple," Omar Bradley and George Patton. They will also be enthralled by the essay "A Short List of Giants," in which Blumenson examines the contributions of America's adversaries and the American commanders in the Navy and Army Air Forces. Two German field marshals, Erwin Rommel and Gerd von Rundstedt, command Blumenson's respect. But only Rommel joins the ranks as a great captain, because von Rundstedt allowed his personal loyalty to Hitler to override his other soldierly obligations. Blumenson lists

Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov and Field Marshal William J. Slim as the outstanding warriors for the Soviet Union and Great Britain respectively. With respect to the Army's sister services, the author cites Admiral Chester Nimitz of the Navy, General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold of the Army Air Forces, and General Holland M. Smith of the Marine Corps as top officers who have not received their just due from historians.

Blumenson's favorite general is undoubtedly Patton, who continues to intrigue him. In examining Patton's career, Blumenson discusses his subject's relationship with the press, his student days at Fort Leavenworth and the War College, the end of the European war, and the tragic automobile accident that led to Patton's untimely demise in December 1945. Blumenson's Patton is a dedicated professional who spent a lifetime preparing for battlefield command. If there is a lesson for today's officers and noncommissioned officers in Blumenson's study of Patton, it is "to reach for the best that is in us, and a little beyond." Small wonder why Patton emerged from the war as Eisenhower's most indispensable operational commander.

In addition to examining the significance of numerous battles and campaigns, including Kasserine Pass, Monte Cassino, and the Falaise Gap, Blumenson makes another significant contribution in his assessment of generalship and the art of command. According to Blumenson, command requires the utmost professional skill and personal concentration, factors that make the exercise of successful command seem effortless.

Readers will also find Blumenson's essay entitled "Measuring Generalship" especially informative. In this chapter, he assesses numerous commanders from World War II to the present and concludes that even among the frictions of war, in the final analysis, devotion to duty is its own reward.

Heroes Never Die is destined to be a collector's item of superb prose and insightful analysis, set against the background of this nation's greatest conflict. As the dust jacket indicates, some readers may disagree with Blumenson's interpretations, but none will doubt his thoroughness or his ability to

evoke a response from his audience. In addition to providing sterling examples of heroism under fire, this book confirms Blumenson's status as the dean of American military historians.

***Anzio: The Gamble that Failed.* By Martin Blumenson. Cooper Square Press, 2001 (Second Edition). 212 Pages, Maps. \$17.95, Softbound.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo.

Thirty-eight years after its initial publication in 1963, *Anzio: The Gamble That Failed* by esteemed historian Martin Blumenson, once again hits the presses. By the end of 1943, the Allied campaign in Italy had become a stalemate as German forces stopped the Allied advance cold at Cassino.

In a country where the fighting front was limited by the 80-mile width of the Italian peninsula—and in a region where rugged mountains impeded maneuver and favored the defense—prospects for a swift and decisive victory were slim. What seemed to be a methodical beach assault and a push north to relieve the Cassino line and eventually to seize Rome and beyond became a five-month casualty-generating struggle.

This timeless account of the VI U.S. Army Corps beach landing and lodgment expansion of *Anzio* is a classic rendition of the ill-fated Allied attempt to "conduct linkup" and push north in an effort to draw Axis forces away from the Eastern Front.

The divergent interests of Great Britain and the United States, and their continuing lack of consensus on the question of how to conduct the war in Europe prompted the decision to strike at Anzio. The controversial Major General John Lucas led the assault that resulted in a four-month battle that some consider one of the most ill-conceived operations of the war, and by others as one of the notorious lost opportunities of the Allied war effort.

Blumenson describes in detail the events of the battle as it unfolds and, more importantly, he gives a first-rate account of the personalities and attitudes of the players involved. Most notably is his in-depth analysis of the interaction between the British and Theater Commander, Sir Harold

Alexander, and the American leadership under the guise of Generals Mark Clark, John Lucas, and Lucian Truscott.

Blumenson rightly identifies the complex issues associated with the uncertainties and contributing factors that affected the outcome of the battle. He captures in remarkable form the essence behind the failed gamble as he meticulously analyzes the major figures involved. The Allied leaders in Italy at the time were "bedeviled by cross purposes and misunderstandings." Blumenson presents their characters here so clearly that what was at the time a most confusing situation emerges with embarrassing lucidity.

This is not just another chronological depiction of a failed World War II battle. It is a classic model of leadership and the angst that leaders experience when the decision-making is at its hardest. *Anzio: The Gamble that Failed* is full of lessons learned, from the strategic level down to the tactical. It should be required reading for military leaders at all levels.

***The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam. They Did Everything but Learn from It.* By David M. Toczek. Greenwood Press, 2001. 224 Pages. \$62.00.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

The Battle of Ap Bac on January 2, 1963 was a minor engagement in the long war. The combatants were less than a regiment of ARVN soldiers with a few helicopters and armored personnel carriers against a battalion of Viet Cong guerrillas. The results of the isolated incident that lasted less than a day were ambiguous, interpretation subject to the spin doctors of both adversaries. However, this seemingly marginal event took on a larger consequence both at the time and in retrospect.

The Viet Cong proclaimed their dubious success as a great victory over the enemy. General Paul Harkins, the commanding officer of the Military Assistance Command—Vietnam, and Ambassador Frederick Nolting downplayed the performance of the ARVN in what they dismissed as an insignificant engagement. American military junior officers working directly with the ARVN believed that Ap Bac indicated the extensive American training effort was not producing adequate results.

The small American press corps covering Vietnam echoed the junior officer's concerns, and some commentators, even at this early stage, magnified the battle as a metaphor of the war. This perspective would grow as America sank deeper into the con-

flict of the years to come.

Toczek, an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, dispassionately avoids the histrionics and exaggerations on both sides of the question as he calls Ap Bac "an interesting historical paradox," and says that "its greatest importance lies in its perceived unimportance by American policy makers." He continues that American senior leadership missed the warning signal of the failed military policy that Ap Bac indicated. He makes a very good case.

The author provides a very detailed account of all aspects of the battle, certainly the most comprehensive treatment of the conflict in print. Frankly, this rendering is a bit dry for most readers. The most interesting parts of the book are the two introductory chapters, "The Background" and "The Belligerents," which trace the development of the ARVN, the American advisory effort in the 1950s and early 1960s, and the military strategies of both the U.S./ARVN and the Viet Cong. Ronald Spector's *Advice and Support: The Early Years of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, 1941-1960*; James Collins's *The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army*; and other sources cover this period in exhaustive detail, but Toczek offers a very handy, brief capsule for the general reader.

Although this sound and judicious study is not groundbreaking or particularly exciting, it is a worthy contribution to the literature on the war.

***British Campaign Furniture: Elegance under Canvas, 1740-1914.* By Nicholas A. Brawer. Harry N. Abrams Inc., 2001. 232 Pages. \$45.00.** Reviewed by Kerry Bowling, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Writing on a subject previously neglected in the study of military artifacts, Nicholas A. Brawer explores the "life under canvas" that made British gentlemen-officers "go to great expense to maintain their prestige, rank, and station in life, as well as the comforts of their permanent homes, while on military service abroad." Through a collection of 275 photographs depicting the collapsible furniture in both assembled and disassembled stages, Brawer meticulously describes the evolution of campaign furniture during the Georgian, Victorian, and Edwardian eras of Great Britain.

Beginning with the first section, British Campaign Furniture, the book goes beyond the fold-up furnishings, delving into the social status and imperial influence that the British brought with them on the march.

Scattered throughout the text are extensive footnotes that significantly contribute to the reader's understanding and several quotes, mainly from Army and Navy officers who reflect on the necessity of the campaign furniture, or the absurdity of carrying such luxury in times of war. As the unknown author of *The Navy "At Home"* noted, *In short, all was of the most refined elegance, of the most approved taste, of the most exquisite delicacy, and of the richest description, side by side, with the instruments of stern and instant destruction...not Cleopatra herself, in her gilded and silken galley, knew an equal luxury.* In fact, the more portable the furniture became, the more the officers ordered, so as to make living abroad the exact life they lived in London.

An especially opulent period was during the British Raj in India where it took "60 horses, 140 elephants, two or three hundred baggage camels and bullock carts without end" to transport the Governor-General and his two sisters "up the country" from Calcutta. For as Brawer puts it rather eloquently, "the Empire was indeed portable, so long as it was borne on the backs and heads of men."

The second section, *Elegance Abroad: A Portfolio*, consists of 35 pages of photographs in both color and black and white, encompassing all varieties of campaign furniture along with footnotes containing manufacturer information and the purpose of each particular piece. Among the many examples are a portable billiard table and folding chess board for the "gentleman at ease," and a portable shower as a part of one's personal kit.

As the 19th century drew to a close and more companies began to produce campaign furniture, the style changed dramatically from the large, lavish pieces designed by Chippendale and Sheraton and became more utilitarian and compact in style. The violent and deadly Boer War (1899-1902) proved that mobility had to take precedence over luxury, giving rise to the era of modern day campaign furniture. This time period also saw the population of England double, which led to the incorporation of collapsible furniture in domestic homes as an alternative to cramped urban dwelling. Campaign furniture was no longer exclusive to the military.

Included at the end of the text is a Directory of British Campaign Furniture Makers, Outfitters, and Patentees, for those interested in the more collectable aspect of this furniture, as this book is geared towards the collector. Though the book's historical social context is both well researched and fascinat-

ing in its presentation, today's professional military officer might have difficulty relating to the lavishness, due to today's emphasis on lightness of load and deployability.

The extensive collection of photographs and amusing stories make this book an interesting read, though at times the text is bogged down with information relevant only to those seeking to study this particular topic. The military reader will find only a scant amount of military historical value in *British Campaign Furniture*. It is reasonably priced, however, and offers intriguing insight into a previously unresearched aspect of past British warfare.

100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present: The World's Major Battles and How They Shaped History. By Paul K. Davis. Oxford University Press, 1999. 462 Pages, Maps. \$18.95, Softbound. Reviewed by Colonel Christopher B. Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

You've got to hand it to a guy who starts with Megiddo in 1479 B.C. and ends up with Desert Storm in 1991 A.D., and identifies 98 historic, decisive battles in between. Now historians, military men, and armchair generals will always argue as to which battles in history were truly "decisive" and with the exception of perhaps a dozen—among them Zama, Waterloo, Gettysburg, Verdun, and Normandy—there will always be disagreement as to which other famous contests should be included in any list deemed decisive.

Professor Davis anticipates objections to his inclusions (and exclusions) with very convincing criteria. Specifically, a battle, to be considered decisive, must meet three conditions: 1) The outcome of the battle brought about a major political or social change (Hastings, 1066); 2) Had the outcome of the battle been reversed, major social or political changes would have ensued (Trenton, 1776); and 3) The battle must mark a major change in warfare (Adrianople 378, where Goths defeated Roman infantry largely through the use of cavalry).

It is difficult to argue with these standards. Further, Davis does not restrict himself to battles fought in Europe and North America (Seikgahara 1600, and Hsiang-Yang 1268-73, are discussed at length), nor does he neglect to mention famous sea battles (the Spanish Armada, 1588, and Midway, 1942, make the list as does Tsushima Straits, 1905). American readers may wonder what happened to the Little Big Horn (1876); Brits may be put off because Rorke's Drift (1879) is nowhere mentioned.

But recall Professor Davis's criteria and you will understand why. Political or social change did not come about as a result of these engagements, nor were any new tactics or weapons employed.

This book is truly enjoyable. The narrative is clean and focused. We do not read unnecessary and distracting data—for example, that Cervantes, the Spanish poet and author, lost his left hand at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Historical context is always given and, most of the time, there are maps to help the reader follow the battle. There are a few typos that someone should have caught, however. The most egregious is in the discussion of the Tet Offensive in 1968: Lyndon Johnson's bombing campaign against North Vietnam, known as Rolling Thunder, was commenced in February of 1965, not 1985. But these are minor gaffes and, thankfully, do not detract from the scholarship or readability of the work.

The Sicily Campaign: Recollections of an Infantry Company Commander, July-August 1943. By Major General (Retired) Albert H. Smith, Jr., USA. Society of the First Infantry Division, 2001. 291 Pages. \$21.50, Softbound. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

The author, who served with the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division throughout World War II, has had a long-standing and personal interest in the Sicily campaign, Operation *Husky*, an oft-forgotten Allied military operation of the war.

This is understandable, considering that he commanded a rifle company (Company L, 3d Battalion) of the 16th Infantry in Sicily and gave us his earlier recollections in a two-part article published in 1993 in *Infantry Magazine*. (Both parts are reproduced in this book.)

He has done a fine job in taking material from a variety of sources and presenting it in a well-thought-out and well-designed final product that recalls for all of his readers, and particularly for past and present members of the 1st Division, the outstanding role that division played in the campaign from its initial landings in early July 1943 to the end in mid-August of the same year.

As co-author of the official U.S. Army history of the Sicily campaign and the surrender of Italy—parts of which are also reproduced here—I can vouch for the author's knowledge of the campaign. He has also taken material from various 1st Division sources that bear directly on *Husky*.

He has seasoned all of this with several excellent photo essays, and wraps up his efforts with an afterword and four appendices. In the afterword, Martin Blumenson, an outstanding military historian, details his reasons for believing *Husky* was so meaningful (p. 208).

General Smith has prepared, essentially, two books in one—the first, a discussion of the campaign itself, and the second, a history of the 1st Division's participation in the operation. Perhaps the second part is the most important, for as the publisher puts it, the "book honors our beloved Division's achievements in a tough combat campaign over awesome terrain."

Providence Their Guide: The Long Range Desert Group, 1940-45. By David Lloyd Owen. Originally published in 1980. Reprint, Leo Cooper, 2000. 238 Pages. \$30.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Raugh, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired.

The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) was one of the first and most effective special forces units formed during World War II. The members were specialists in deep, strategic reconnaissance, as contrasted with the Special Air Service, or SAS, which conducted raids and other combat patrols. This well-written and interesting book succeeds admirably in recounting the LRDG's contributions to victory.

Italy declared war on Great Britain on 10 June 1940. Less than two weeks later, the British, whose troops were facing the Italians at the Libyan-Egyptian border in North Africa, authorized the formation of the LRDG (originally called the Long Range Patrols) under the command of eminent desert explorer Major Ralph Bagnold. The unit, initially composed of soldiers from Great Britain, New Zealand, and Rhodesia, was trained by Bagnold to peak proficiency. The numerous and difficult challenges facing the LRDG—in addition to possible enemy detection and capture—were daunting.

Each patrol (generally two officers, 30 soldiers, and 11 vehicles) had to be self-sufficient and mobile. Each vehicle had to be able to carry, in addition to its crew, food, water, ammunition, and fuel for three weeks—the latter alone amounting to 350 gallons. Moreover, each vehicle had to be capable, during each patrol, of traveling some 2,000 miles over unmapped, inhospitable terrain, and scorching, shifting sands. After intensive training and vehicle modifications, the LRDG was prepared by the end of August 1940 to begin patrolling behind

enemy lines.

Author David Lloyd Owen joined the LRDG in 1941 and, as a 26-year-old officer, assumed command of the group in late 1943 (and subsequently retired as a decorated major general). He was a dynamic and innovative leader, and his unique knowledge and perspective of events, as a patrol leader on many missions in North Africa and as Group commander in Italy, the Aegean, and the Balkans, add credibility and insight to his narrative. Owen's descriptions of the colorful personalities of the LRDG and their operations (albeit frequently with unreferenced conversations) are vivid and shrewd. This is an enthralling saga of indefatigable men and modified machines on difficult wartime missions.

This book, republished from the original 1980 edition, contains the same meaningful Foreword by General Sir John Hackett, as well as a new Introduction by Sir John Keegan. A worthwhile visual dimension is provided by almost three dozen photographs and three superb maps. An excellent "Chronological Table of Events," short "Select Bibliography," and index augment and add value to the narrative.

Providence Their Guide is part memoir, part unit history, and a total record of professionalism, proficiency, courage, and sacrifice. This fast-paced action-filled book is also a primer on unorthodox small unit leadership and tactical operations as conducted by Great Britain's Long Range Desert Group during World War II. A superb tribute to the officers and men of the LRDG, this excellent book merits a wide readership by contemporary soldiers and military historians.

***Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit.* By Eric L. Haney. Delacorte Press, 2002. 325 Pages, photographs. \$25.95, Hardcover.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dille.

"Speed, surprise, and violence of action. Those were the keys to success and survival, those and the ability to shoot what we intended to shoot and nothing else. We were not just going in harm's way, we were going to charge down harm's throat, grab a handful of his guts, and turn him inside out."

This graphic paragraph, tucked into a description of the Operators Training Course (OTC), gets to the heart of the mission of 1st Special Forces Detachment-Delta, popularly referred to as Delta Force. Eric Haney was an early member of Delta, completing selection in 1978 and enrolled in the third iteration of the OTC. Haney's book, *Inside*

Delta Force, describes his and Delta's journey through about 1986. It describes the selection process, training, and early missions. Haney tells his story in a straightforward narrative, managing to give the reader the broad outlines and some details without exposing any sensitive sources or methods.

As many are aware, Delta was the U.S. Army's response to the growing tide of terrorist activity (bombings, hijackings, kidnappings, and murders) of the early and mid-1970's. Formed at Fort Bragg under the command of Colonel Charlie Beckwith, Delta does not officially exist. Now it would be difficult to assert that its existence is classified, but it is not acknowledged officially. Haney, however, shows us that Delta does indeed exist and is very good at what it does. At least half of the book covers the selection process and the OTC as they were when Haney went through them.

Trite as it sounds, it is still true that not much is available concerning Delta in open-source material. This is only the fourth book of which I am aware that deals with Delta, and one of the other three deals with operations of former members of Delta who rescue kidnapped children. *Inside Delta Force* is the only one that tells the story from the perspective of the operator. That makes the book interesting, but readers will discover that Haney's writing style will grab their interest and hold it.

Students of special operations will be pleased that Haney discusses what else Delta did, at least while he was in the unit, besides rescue operations. This includes training foreign counterterrorist units (although this training is apparently no longer conducted); executive protection advice, training, and missions for U.S. ambassadors abroad (in support of State Department requests for assistance); on-the-spot advice to foreign rescue efforts; and a variety of other missions. In the section covering the OTC, Haney goes to great lengths to show that many other Government agencies provided training to new Delta operators. This training was both comprehensive in presentation and broad in scope. All of the missions and training are mixed in with constant weapons training, both individual and in teams. Haney stresses throughout that Delta's operators are not the cowboys that many people think they are. They are dedicated, thoughtful professionals who have one of the toughest jobs in the U.S. Army.

The best part of this book is Haney's description of the final exercise of the OTC. The most surprising thing in the book deals with a mission that was scrubbed twice between 1981 and 1983—to go into Laos to

rescue Americans still being held in prison camps sponsored by the North Vietnamese. This is a subject about which more should be known, but it will probably remain classified and compartmented long after most of us are gone. Perhaps the most vivid scene in the book describes what Haney saw, heard, and felt when he sat for the first time as a hostage in the Shooting House and was "rescued."

I highly recommend *Inside Delta Force* to military history students, especially those who concentrate on special mission units, to soldiers across the board within the U.S. Army, and even to the civilian public. This book is well written, difficult to put down, and should inspire further research by any reader.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

***Patriot Hearts: An Anthology of American Patriotism.* By William T. Coffey, Jr. Purple Mountain Publishing (P.O. Box 77019, Colorado Springs, CO 80970-7019), 2002. 444 Pages. \$16.95, Softbound.**

***Command Legacy: A Tactical Primer for Junior Leaders of Infantry Units.* By Lt. Col. Raymond A. Millen. Brassey's, 2002. 408 Pages. \$24.95.**

***The 1863 U.S. Infantry Tactics: Infantry of the Line, Light Infantry, and Riflemen.* 2nd Edition. U.S. War Department, 1863. Stackpole, 2002. 592 Pages, Drawings, (3½ x 5). \$21.95, Hardcover.**

***The 1865 Customs of Service for Officers of the Army: A Handbook of the Duties of Each Grade Lieutenant to Lieut.-General.* By August V. Kautz. Stackpole, 2002. 398 Pages (3½ x 5). \$15.95, Hardcover.**

***Fire Mission: American Cannoneers Defeating the German Army in World War II.* By Donald T. Peck. Sunflower University Press, 2001. 230 Pages. \$15.95, Softbound.**

***Fatal Voyage: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis.* By Dan Kurtzman. Originally published in 1990. Broadway Books, 2001. 415 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.**

***Throwing Fire: A History of Projectile Technology.* By Alfred W. Crosby. Cambridge University Press, 2002. 220 Pages. \$26.00.**

***West Point: A Bicentennial History.* By Theodore J. Crackel. University Press of Kansas, 2002. 384 Pages. \$34.95.**

***Tent Pegs and 2nd Lieutenants: Memoirs and Stories of the Korean War.* By John W. Harper. Conversation Press, 2002. 128 Pages. \$13.95, Softbound.**

***America's Commandos: U.S. Special Operations Forces of World War II and Korea.* By Leroy Thompson. Stackpole, 2001. 72 Pages. \$14.95, Softbound.**

***The Greenhill Dictionary of Guns and Gun-Makers: From Colt's First Patent to the Present Day, 1836-2001.* By John Walter. 576 Pages. \$59.95, Hardcover.**

***Counter-terrorism Equipment.* Revised Edition. By Ian V. Hogg. First published 1997. Stackpole, 2001. 144 Pages. \$24.00, Hardcover.**

SOLUTION.. Tactical Decision Game #2-01

CAPTAIN JASON DICKERMAN

"Guidons," "This is Bandit 6...FRAGO to follow; prepare to copy."

Mission: B/2-8 IN (M) defends in sector NLT _____ in order to block enemy movement westward along the mobility corridors exiting Buttertown in order to prevent Team C, the TF main effort, from being enveloped from the north.

Intent:

- Retain key terrain west of Buttertown.
- Use fires to fix enemy in the open west of Buttertown.
- Block enemy penetrations west of Buttertown.
- Prevent civilian casualties and collateral damage through strict fire control measures.

We will accomplish this by conducting a defense in sector, platoons in battle positions.

Decisive Point is the destruction of two MRCs in EA KILL. This is decisive because it will prevent the enemy from massing combat power against the Co main effort and against the TF ME in the south.

SOM:

ME: 1/C Tank **T:** Destroy **P:** Prevent Team C, the TF main effort, from being enveloped from the north.

SE 1: 1st PLT **T:** Block **P:** Prevent the envelopment of the ME from the south.

SE 2: 3/A Mech **T:** Fix **P:** Allow the ME to destroy enemy in EA KILL

2nd PLT, you will become the CO/TM **reserve** with planning priorities of reinforcing the ME, then reinforcing SE 2, then counterattack into EA KILL. You will be collocated with the HQ element vic CP 1.


Purpose of Artillery Fires is to fix enemy formations in order to allow the ME to destroy enemy in EA KILL.

Purpose of Mortar Fires is to destroy enemy engineers and dismounts attempting to breach tactical obstacles.

Purpose of Engineers is countermobility, then survivability. ENG PL, First, I need to work with the FSO and work up two possible FASCAM locations. I am looking in EA KILL West of Buttertown and also south of Buttertown. Second, I need you to emplace an MOPMS (modular packed mine system) on the two bridges being overwatched by 1st platoon. I need you other squads to continue to improve on the protective obstacles in each BP; ensure that each platoon is emplacing all C-M assets as they should be.

Gentlemen, integrating our fires will be critical to our success in this operation. We have established group target 1C1 west of Buttertown. 3/A will be the firer and observer of this target; alt will be 1/C. Trigger will be the second enemy platoon identified in EA KILL. (6 more vehicles) This target is an HE/smoke mix. We will then fire FASCAM west of Buttertown, in EA Kill North. The intent is to separate the lead enemy MRC from follow-on forces to prevent them from massing on the ME. This will allow us to destroy the lead company as the second enemy MRC is being fixed by the minefield. Additionally, each platoon will be allotted one priority target. Priority of fires is the 1/C, then 1st platoon, then 3/A.

As enemy vehicles maneuver into EA KILL we will engage first with TOWs and Javelins, then M1s, and then 25mm. Ensure that you are firing by section and far-to-near with Tanks and near-to-far with BFVs. 1st platoon, you will orient between TRPs 1 & 3 in EA KILL South. You will be responsible for calling TGTs AB 1000 and 1001. 3/A, you will orient between TRPs 2 & 4 in the EA and will call TGT 1C2. 1/C, you will focus in EA Kill central and on TRP 4. Ensure that all gunners are using thermals to acquire targets and that there is cross talk between platoons to avoid target overkill. Men, positively ID targets before engaging; focus on engagements in the EA and not on the edge of the town.



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