


# Infantry

July-August 2005



## Training the Force

**Kinetic Targeting in Iraq at the Battalion Task Force Level:  
From Target to Detainee (Page 30)**

**Manipulating Your Battle Space to Win (Page 34)**

**The First Army IED Training Methodology (Page 43)**


**MG BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY**  
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**FRONT COVER:**



Soldiers from A Company, 3rd Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, Texas Army National Guard, extract wounded personnel during a quick reaction force exercise near Bagram, Afghanistan, June 10, 2005. (Photo by Specialist Harold Fields)

**BACK COVER:**

A Soldier from the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment from Fort Richardson, Alaska, participates in a simulated night attack on an enemy position during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2005 in Australia. (Photo by Corporal Bernard Pearson, Australian Army)

This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:  
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# Infantry

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# Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL BENJAMIN C. FREAKLEY

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## FORT BENNING - A TRADITION OF TRAINING

After having been privileged to serve for two years as Chief of Infantry, I feel a deep sense of pride in the Soldiers who live and train at Fort Benning, in the units that have deployed to join the fight against global extremism, and in the civilian and military workforce that truly makes Fort Benning the home of the Infantry. We are a nation and an Army at war, and Fort Benning shows her support for this war in everything we do. We show it in how we train, deploy, and sustain our warriors; in the reachback support for deployed units; in the way we capture, examine, and disseminate combat experience; and in the way we care for our loyal, dedicated, family members who await their Soldiers' return.



Today's infantryman is the best trained, best equipped, and best supported Soldier this great nation has ever fielded, and our Army's successes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and in other troubled areas of the world have clearly shown that we are on the right track. Army initiatives in the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles; in the fielding of new or improved weapons, vehicles, and other equipment; in our training of marksmen and snipers; in our training and technological advances in detecting and neutralizing improvised explosive devices and other ongoing programs have all had a direct, measurable impact on how we fight and win. At the home of the Infantry we train warriors, all those superb Soldiers who have stepped forward when America needed them, and who have committed themselves to the defense of our homeland.

In this, my final Commandant's Note as Chief of Infantry, I want to talk about some ongoing initiatives that will continue to bolster the lethality, sustainability, and survivability of the entire force: combat arms, combat support, and combat service support alike. First and foremost among these is marksmanship, because as our warriors close with the enemy it is our accurate, massed small arms fire that will thin his ranks, destroy his will to fight, and break his resistance. Nowhere is this more evident than in the training we offer for squad designated marksman (SDM). The SDM program trains Soldiers to engage and consistently hit targets in the gaps and in terrain not otherwise covered by riflemen, and

complements the coverage provided by snipers, or when the latter are otherwise engaged. The M16 and M4 series weapons are both effective out to at least 500 meters, and SDM takes advantage of this to train Soldiers to kill the enemy at maximum range.

The warrior's individual weapon is his tool in trade, and the warrior must be one with the weapon. To achieve this, we are training Soldiers in reflexive firing techniques and battle drills that develop and reinforce quick, reflexive reactions against an asymmetric, cunning enemy. Marksmanship is clearly the warrior's edge, and

it is as important to our combat service support Soldiers' training as it is to an infantryman. We train our Soldiers in collective live fire exercises that enable them to deliver massed, accurate firepower against any adversary. A well-armed, confident, aggressive Soldier will fight his or her way out of an ambush or attack and continue to accomplish the mission, something that has been demonstrated in after-action reports out of the combat zones. As we continue to infuse the warrior ethos throughout the force, our enemies have come to realize that they face Americans who have both the means and the will to destroy them.

The contemporary operational environment is a complex, uncertain, and violent one, and we can only dominate it with leaders such as the superb junior officers and noncommissioned officers who are the point of the spear in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are confident, competent, flexible, and highly adaptable, traits that can all be developed, trained, and reinforced. We can best develop and sustain flexibility and adaptability through doctrine, professional education, and career management policies that encourage adaptability. Our doctrine is sound, and it provides a common language and way of thinking. It also offers a framework for the exercise of initiative and development of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that our young leaders are developing and successfully employing across the globe. Other leaders and units are quickly adapting these same TTPs to the circumstances in their own environments, and are in turn sharing their own experience-based knowledge. The enduring TTPs and lessons learned will in turn take root in the deliberations that

yield doctrinal manuals and lesson plans. But the doctrinal effort is only one aspect of training adaptable leaders and units.

We are complementing our doctrinal production and dissemination effort with professional education programs to encourage and sustain adaptability in our Soldiers and leaders. We do this by confronting students with as many tactical dilemmas as possible while they are completing resident and nonresident professional development courses. Adaptability has always been deeply ingrained in the American military tradition, and we must continue to reward innovation, valor, and quick, decisive responses to the unexpected. The doctrinal and professional education efforts must continue to be complemented with a diverse pattern of assignments that exposes Soldiers and their leaders to a broad range of units, geographic areas, and climates. Through this, they will soon develop the confidence and adaptability to rapidly acclimate to any operational environment and execute their assigned missions.

Adaptability arises from knowledge, and observations and comments from the combat zones have revealed a need for more comprehensive cultural awareness training and education. The immediacy of the present war demands urgency, and the Infantry School has already taken steps to meet that requirement. We are laying the foundation for cultural awareness training in the Infantry Captains' Career Course, the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. Our near-term effort is focused on the threat presented by radical Islamic fundamentalism, and our cultural awareness training concentrates on specific geographical areas of current interest. The 29th Infantry Regiment has already published country handbooks for 11 regional nations and has begun disseminating CD's to units. Infantry Magazine has been running a cultural awareness feature in every issue since January 2005, and will continue to do so. All personnel departing Fort Benning, either as part of Benning-based unit deployments or through the CONUS Replacement Center, will receive cultural awareness training as well. Cultural awareness will remain an integral part of the USAIS curriculum because it is too important to be left to chance, and because we cannot overlook this combat multiplier.

Those of us committed to the profession of arms see the defense of our nation, her people, and her institutions as paramount, and nowhere is that noble goal more exemplified than at Fort Benning. The Experimental Force first manned by the 29th Infantry Regiment in the spring of 2004 links doctrine, training, and technology in conjunction with the Soldier Battle Lab to evaluate new weapons; equipment; concepts; organizations; and tactics, techniques, and procedures before they are fielded or implemented. We have addressed and aggressively supported the Army Transformation using a full-spectrum approach to overcome a doctrinal deficit that would hamper progress. This includes a comprehensive assessment of the challenges to training the commanders of our modular brigade combat teams, and we are examining the changed role of installations as trainers, maintainers, and readiness reporters when one or more of their units deploys and others remain at home station.

Indirect fire support remains a top priority for the Infantry as

well. The Infantry Center recognizes that organic fires are an indispensable element of the infantry combined arms team, and insists that the combination of joint and organic fires will ensure that infantrymen can always put steel on target when and where it is needed. Infantrymen have never gone into battle without supporting mortars and cannons, and they never will.

The Infantry School has long been recognized for its contribution to the lethality, survivability, and sustainability of the combined arms force, and the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC II) clearly meets those three goals. The course trains lieutenants of all branches in order to develop competent, confident, and adaptable leaders, grounded in warrior tasks, and able to lead Soldiers in the contemporary operational environment. A graduate of BOLC II is trained in both the warrior tasks and the warrior battle drills, will not accept defeat and will never quit, and demonstrates the characteristics of an Army leader. We graduate officers who live the Army Values and embody the warrior ethos, and who leave Fort Benning to lead still other warriors in the fight against global extremism. Tom Brokaw hailed those who went forth to defend America in World War II as The Great Generation; today the call for America's warriors has gone out again, and once more her sons and daughters have stepped forward to defend our homeland. They are ready to serve, and Fort Benning is proud to receive and train them.

Follow me!

## WOJDAKOWSKI ASSUMES DUTIES AS CHIEF OF INFANTRY

Major General Benjamin C. Freakley handed command of the U.S. Army Infantry Center over to Major General Walter Wojdakowski August 12 at Fort Benning.

Major General Wojdakowski's first Commandant's Note as Chief of Infantry will appear in the September-October issue of *Infantry Magazine*.

Major General Wojdakowski is a 1972 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. His most recent assignment was as the U.S. Army Europe and 7th Army Acting Deputy Commanding General. He also previously served as the Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, and as the Deputy Commanding General, Combined Task Force Seven, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Baghdad, Iraq.

Major General Wojdakowski had also served as the Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School from January 1997 until September 1998.

Major General Freakley will next serve as the commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York.

# INFANTRY NEWS




## ELECTRONIC TABULAR FIRING TABLES ON AKO

ANDREW E. GRABER

In response to the many requests from the artillery, infantry and armor communities, electronic tabular firing tables (TFTs) are now available online.

The U.S. Army's Armaments, Research, Development, and Engineering Center's (ARDEC) Firing Tables and Ballistics Division (FTaB) recently announced the availability of artillery and mortar TFTs online via the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) FTaB organizational site Knowledge Collaboration Center (KCC). The KCC is organized by branch currently with artillery and infantry (mortar) and the addition of armor and infantry small arms in the near future. Each branch is further refined to weapon system and projectile making it easy for Soldiers and Marines to find the most current, official TFTs



U.S. Army  
ARDEC



quickly. TFTs found on other websites cannot be guaranteed current.

Access to the KCC is controlled utilizing the AKO security tool set and querying the individual requesting subscription to the KCC to determine if mission needs warrant access to the TFTs. Once access is granted, the individual has access to the TFTs from around the globe 24 hours a day for the remainder of the calendar year. At the end of the calendar year, the subscription is terminated and submission

for a new subscription is required if further access is needed.

When new or updated TFTs are available announcements will be posted via the AKO system and the respective branch journal publication. Further, the KCC is set up such that, if a new document is added, an update notification is automatically sent to the subscriber.

FTaB can be found on AKO by clicking the site map under Army Organizations and then the Organizational Sites tab. Expand the MACOM directory path as shown MACOMS\AMC\RDECOM\ARDEC\AETC\FCST\FTaB. Links to FTaB are also on the AKO Fires Knowledge Network and Product Manager Mortar Web site.

*(Andrew E. Graber works in the Firing Tables and Ballistics Division, ARDEC.)*

## INFANTRY LETTERS

### COUNTERINSURGENCY WORK A RECOMMENDED READ

In reply to Lieutenant Colonel Daly's letter in the March-April 2005 issue, I have a recommendation that I have passed up through my chain of command. A current, very thorough work on counterinsurgency is *Resisting Rebellion — The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* by Anthony James Joes.

As a member of the Professional Development Tiger Team at my battalion, tasked with recommending additions to the Infantry library, I have done so with the above volume and would recommend it to anyone seeking a greater understanding and historical perspective of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and worldwide examples and analysis of both successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operations throughout history.

— **FIRST SERGEANT DAVID R. PORTER**  
A Co., 2nd Bn., 58th Inf. Reg.,  
Fort Benning, Georgia

## Infantryman Wins Gold

SARA GREENLEE

An infantryman assigned to the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit at Fort Benning can now be called a world champion.

Private Joshua M. Richmond of Hills Grove, Pennsylvania, won the first Gold Medal for the United States at the 2005 International Shooting Sport Federation World Shotgun Championships in Junior Men's Double Trap May 31. Richmond, 19, also led the USA to the medal stand for a second time in the Junior Men's Team event. Richmond, Matthew Drexler, and Cory Sidorek won the Team Bronze Medal with a 366 total team performance.

Richmond joined the Army in October and was assigned to the Army Marksmanship Unit after he completed Basic and Infantry Training at Fort Benning.

For more information on the ISSF World Shotgun Championships, visit [www.issf-shooting.org](http://www.issf-shooting.org). For more information on the U.S. Shotgun Team, log on to [www.usashooting.org](http://www.usashooting.org). *(Sara Greenlee writes for USA Shooting.)*



Richmond

# ARMY TESTS NEW EYE PROTECTION

MELISSA HOUSE

About 400 Infantry trainees and cadre at Fort Benning are testing several different types of combat eye protection that might eventually be issued to all Soldiers.

Colonel Chuck Adams, the senior optometry consultant for the Army's Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), said the goal is to achieve a "culture change" from vision correction for some Soldiers, to eye protection for all.

"We're talking about putting eyewear on half a million Soldiers," Adams said. "And it's not so much about which product we choose, but the training. Combat eye protection is embraced for deployed Soldiers. We need to embrace it for all Soldiers."

Eye injuries represent almost 16 percent of all injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan since March 2003, according to statistics from the Office of the Surgeon General.

As part of the Military Combat Eye Protection Program (MCEPP), the OTSG and the team from PEO-Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, are hoping the Soldiers in B Company, 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry Regiment, and D Company, 1st Battalion, 329th Infantry Regiment, will have some good feedback on three sets of spectacles.

"Eye injuries hit the radar post-1972 and the Arab-Israeli Wars," said Lieutenant Colonel Emery Fehl, chief of optometry at Martin Army Community Hospital and the post's MCEPP liaison. In subsequent years, the Army researched and developed spectacles and goggles designed to combat a laser threat by blocking certain wavelengths. That, he said, is where the Army's current offerings, with their multiple lenses, came in. But the eyewear adopted in 1994 and issued in 1998 didn't pass muster with Soldiers.

Sarah Morgan-Clyborne, who has been working the eyewear issues with PEO-Soldier for about 12 years said the second generation items, intended to provide spectacles and goggles that would share lenses, provide ballistic protection and support prescription lenses, were unsuccessful.

"We did not design a frame that was acceptable to Soldiers," Morgan-Clyborne



Courtesy photo

*Privates First Class Matthew Brugeman, left, and Michael Brock move off the range wearing the clear lenses in their new Combat Eye Protection. Brock also has prescription inserts.*

said. "Protection was important, but not a motivating factor."

The missing factor? "It was a great product," Adams said, "but it doesn't look like an Oakley and doesn't look cool."

So the Army entered the formal contracting process with several commercial vendors, Morgan-Clyborne said, and also receives unsolicited proposals.

"We evaluate (the eyewear) for industry safety standards and ballistic fragmentation protection, then rank the products and place them on an authorized protective eyewear list," she said.

Individual commanders can select eyewear for their unit from that list.

Right now, the ballistic protection piece is more important than the laser threat, Fehl said. Of the 345 eye injuries evacuated from Iraq and Afghanistan after March 2003, three Soldiers are totally blind and 44 have total loss of vision in one eye.

But eye injuries aren't limited to combat operations. Adams said one of his first patients as a young doctor in Germany was a sergeant with a prosthetic eye because of an accident on a range.

"We want to protect Soldiers' vision," Adams said, and one of the ways to do that is by issuing CEP to every Soldier.

Fort Benning is the only installation conducting the CEP test, and Fehl said the end number of around 400 makes this

test more valid.

"This is the right place to do this testing," Fehl said. On April 8 and 9, the two companies received a mass issue of the first set of CEP, the UVEX XC. Soldiers wore them during field training for two weeks, then critiqued them.

In May, Soldiers from B Co., 1st Bn., 50th Inf. Regt. put the second set — ESS ICE 2 spectacles — through the paces on the range.

One of the company's drill sergeants, Staff Sergeant Jefferson Negus, said the Soldiers, and some of the cadre, have been putting the CEP on every time they don their Kevlar and equipment.

"The glasses are getting a full set of abuse," Negus said. "We've had breakage, but we haven't seen a pattern.

They seem to be fitting the durability standard." He said he felt much more protected and the two glasses he's tried are light enough not to bother him. Negus, a combat veteran who served with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Mosul, said his unit had eye protection, but it was a personal choice whether or not to wear it.

"That's what we're trying to change," Adams said. "We want to instill the feeling that something's missing when they walk outside (without eyewear). Soldiers are willing to walk around garrison with a little bit of blur, but out in the desert, they want the best possible vision. They must train as they fight."

Training as they fight means Soldiers would be issued CEP, frame of choice and protective mask inserts for those Soldiers needing corrective lenses, and CEP for those without a need. The Army currently only issues S-9 glasses to initial entry Soldiers who need vision correction.

While the CEP will cost between and average of \$16 to \$40 per Soldier, Adams said it will be partially offset by no longer issuing the S-9 glasses Soldiers don't like.

"It's tough to talk numbers," Adams said. "But the important point is — if you lose one eye, the Army pays a Soldier upwards of \$1 million for disability."

(Melissa House writes for *The Bayonet* newspaper at Fort Benning.)

# 2005 DOUGHBOY AWARD RECIPIENTS NAMED

The Home of the Infantry is proud to announce that Retired General Gary E. Luck and Retired Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates are the honored recipients of the 2005 Doughboy Award in recognition of their many contributions to the Infantry. Both recipients will receive the Doughboy Award September 13.

General Luck retired in 1996 after a career of more than 36 years of service. He served overseas tours in Vietnam, Germany, Korea, and Saudi Arabia. He commanded the 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, XVIII Airborne Corps, and his last assignment prior to retirement was as the Commander in Chief, United Nations

Command Combined Forces Command/United States Forces Korea. He is a proven master trainer, planner, and a most distinguished infantryman.

Gates served as Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) from 1987-1991. He served multiple overseas tours in Vietnam and Germany. During his tenure as SMA, training remained the Army's most critical issue. He assisted with the success of the "Year of Training" and the "Year of the NCO," and worked on several doctrinal publications for the force. He was a firm believer that a strong NCO corps was critical for a strong Army. He retired in 1991 with over 33 years of distinguished service.

## CULTURAL AWARENESS CORNER

### Professional Relationships

The key to establishing good working relations with an Arab is to establish a good personal relationship. In professional settings, Arabs operate by personal relations more than by time constraints, mission requirements, or professional skills. Initial business meetings are usually social and rarely include objective analysis, pragmatic application, or frank exchange. Protocol is emphasized through polite conversation and refreshments. Business may be addressed at a subsequent meeting or at a dinner.

Criticism, even if offered constructively, can threaten or damage an Arab's honor and may be taken as a personal insult.

Attempting to protect himself and his honor from criticism, an Arab may flatly deny facts or reinterpret them. Westerners should obscure any corrective remarks and praise good points.

(Taken from the Department of Defense's *Iraq Country Handbook*.)

# Army Provides Soldiers With New Tourniquet

SPECIALIST JEREMY D. CRISP

The Army is now providing troops with a new tool designed to save life and limb. The Special Operations Forces Tactical Tourniquet (SOFTT), the Army's newest medical device, is being issued to Soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Designed for one-handed application, the SOFTT allows a Soldier to apply a tourniquet himself, replacing the Army's field-expedient method in which Soldiers used a bandage and a stick to stop blood flow from a wound.

The field-expedient method worked, "but the SOFTT is better," said Sergeant First Class Michael C. Klemowski, serving with the Multi-National Force-Iraq personnel section.

"Having this issued to Soldiers will cut down on casualties because it is a time-saving device," said Klemowski, a former drill sergeant. "The less time that is wasted, the better chance there is of saving someone's life."

The entire process of applying the tourniquet, on average, takes under 15 seconds, according to [www.vikingtactics.com](http://www.vikingtactics.com). Along with saving time, the new tourniquet is suitable for hard to reach injuries. The SOFTT's strap can be released completely through the web clamp and then re-threaded, allowing for application to trapped limbs.

Working on the same principles as all tourniquets, "(The SOFTT) is used to stop the bleeding from an extremity and to prevent shock," said Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Brennan, Multi-National Corps-Iraq surgeon cell NCOIC.

The SOFTT has two latches used to secure the metal handle. While only one latch is required for the tourniquet to be effective, the extra latch provides extra securing ability, depending on the



Specialist Jeremy D. Crisp

*Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Brennan applies the Special Operations Forces Tactical Tourniquet to a Soldier during an instructional class in Iraq.*

handle's position after tightening.

To apply the tourniquet, one slides it over the limb and pulls the tail quickly. Once the slack is removed, twist the handle until bleeding is controlled and secure the latch. Finally, to prevent accidental loosening, tighten the screw on the belt. The SOFTT is used as a last resort to treat a wound, Brennan said.

"Try to stop the bleeding with a bandage," Brennan said to a class of Soldiers learning how to use the new tourniquet. "After using a pressure dressing for five minutes, if the bleeding persists, use the tourniquet."

Once the tourniquet has been applied, check the pulse on either the hand or foot where the injury is.

"No pulse means the tourniquet is working," Brennan said.

# Army Unveils Active BCT Stationing Plan

CHERYL BOUJNIDA

As part of its largest restructuring since World War II, the Army announced its plan July 27 for stationing its active component modular brigade combat teams.

The plan includes new organizations being formed and other units being returned from overseas locations. The return of the overseas units adds up to 50,000 Soldiers and 150,000 family members being brought back to bases in the United States.

In the end state, the number of active modular BCTs will increase from 33 to 43, enhancing the active Army's combat power by 30 percent.

The Army selected locations for the modular BCTs based on existing and potential capacities, available training space, and current locations of similar and supporting units.

While the modular brigade combat teams follow historic division and brigade unit naming conventions, these units are of a completely different design than their predecessors. The essence of this transformational design is a new force that can be deployed singularly or in groups — ready for employment in a variety of designs as self-contained modules over a dispersed area. Essential to the success of this force will be the use of Army's installations as platforms from which to rapidly mobilize and deploy military power.

The Army modular force initiative involves the total redesign of the operational Army into a larger, more powerful, more flexible and more rapidly deployable force. It moves away from a division-centric structure to one built around the Army's new modular combat team.

Additionally, modularity — in combination with rebalancing the type of units — will significantly reduce the stress on the force because of a more predictable rotational cycle, coupled with much longer dwell times at home station.

This commitment to minimizing the turbulence for Soldiers

and families remains a top priority for the Army senior leadership. To reinforce this commitment, during the stationing of BCTs and relocation of units, Soldiers will move with their families and family moves will not be scheduled until the Soldier redeploys.

Active Brigade Combat Teams Posture:

- Fort Benning, Georgia — 1 Brigade Combat Team
- Fort Bliss, Texas — 4 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Bragg, North Carolina — 4 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Campbell, Kentucky — 4 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Carson, Colorado — 4 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Drum, New York — 3 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Hood, Texas — 5 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Knox, Kentucky — 1 Brigade Combat Team
- Fort Lewis, Washington — 3 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Polk, Louisiana — 1 Brigade Combat Team
- Fort Richardson, Alaska — 1 Brigade Combat Team
- Fort Riley, Kansas — 3 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Stewart, Georgia — 3 Brigade Combat Teams
- Fort Wainwright, Alaska — 1 Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- Schofield Barracks, Hawaii — 1 Brigade Combat Team, Stryker

Brigade Combat Team

• Fort Irwin (National Training Center), Calif. — 1 Brigade Combat Team (minus)

- Korea — 1 Brigade Combat Team
- Germany — 1 Stryker Brigade Combat Team
- Italy — 1 Brigade Combat Team

The number of Soldiers in a BCT varies between 3,500 and 3,900 depending upon whether it is a Light, Heavy or Stryker BCT.

More information on the BCT stationing plan can be found online at [www.army.mil/modularforces/](http://www.army.mil/modularforces/).

## Submit Your Articles, Ideas, Comments to *INFANTRY*

**H**ave you read something in our magazine that you agree or disagree with? Share your thoughts with the infantry community by writing a letter to the editor. The views presented in our articles are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. Army Infantry School, Department of the Army, etc. One of our missions is to provide a forum for progressive ideas and create discussion. We are also in need of feature and short articles! Topics can include lessons learned during a deployment, training exercise, or other event as well as information on organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques or procedures.

A complete Writer's Guide can be found on our website at <https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine>. (Will require AKO login and password.) All of our issues back to 1982 are also posted on this site.

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# TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

## LEADER CONVERSION: STRYKER STYLE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAY MACKLIN  
MAJOR JEROME SIBAYAN

In October 1999, Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki announced that the Army would develop two full spectrum, wheeled combat brigades that utilized technology gained from Force XXI units. These two units were subsequently named Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) and were intended to deploy rapidly due to the smaller footprint associated with the unit. Initial O&O (operational and organizational) requirements placed on the designers of these units were that the organizations were to be deployable within 96 hours anywhere in the world. This lethal, modular force would maximize technology with a new type of agile and adaptive leaders manning the formation.

The first IBCT O&O specification for the new Stryker leader was: “A leader who can influence people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation – while operating in a complex, dynamic environment of uncertainty and ambiguity to accomplish the mission and

improving the organization.”

The new Stryker leader had to be drawn from existing formations and taught how to think and act differently. Thus, the concept of Leader Conversion was born.

As each Stryker Brigade Combat Team goes through initial transformation, TRADOC provides leader conversion support. The importance and meaning of leader conversion are critical to the success of the entire transformation process. Conversion (the adoption of a new way of doing things) should not be confused with development (the growth of a professional officer).

Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey recently shared his new vision of “Relevant and Ready Land Power in Service to the Nation” to an audience of cadets. He said the vision is comprised of three pillars: innovative and adaptive leaders who are experts in the art and science of the profession of arms, the Modular Force, and the institutional base of the Army which develops proud and disciplined Soldiers and leaders committed to Army values and living the Warrior Ethos.

### WHO WE ARE ...

Even though the Leader Conversion Training Program (LCTP) has its genesis with the Brigade Coordinate Cell, which coordinated assistance to the first three SBCT transformations, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC’s) focus remains unchanged. The LCTP is now coordinated by the SBCT Transformation Team (STT) located at the Infantry Center at Fort Benning.

The STT is composed of a chief (LTC), five majors, and two captains who are responsible for coordinating and synchronizing TRADOC’s efforts in transforming non-modular brigades into Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The STT is branched into Doctrine, Training & Organization, and Command, Control, Communications and Computers branches. The STT is also a combined arms team with members ably representing the Infantry, Armor, Aviation, Engineer and Signal Corps.

In addition to the STT, there are TRADOC Forward Cells (TFC) co-located with the transforming brigades – coordinating and synchronizing LCTP events. The TFC is where the TRADOC rubber meets the Forces Command (FORSCOM) road. The STT and TFCs execute the LCTP in conjunction with the TRADOC proponent schools and centers; specifically the Infantry Center, Armor Center, Artillery School & Center; Maneuver Support Center, Intelligence Center, Combined Arms Support Command, Signal School, and the Medical Department Center & School.



“Leaders are absolutely key to achieving this vision,” Harvey said. “For the uncertain 21st century operating environment, we need leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally astute, effective communicators and dedicated to lifelong learning.”

The Army is reorganizing itself to field smaller, more capable brigade-sized units, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker said, that can be deployed much more quickly and perform more tasks than legacy forces under the old-style division system. The Army’s Stryker-armored-vehicle-equipped Brigade Combat Teams embody this transformational thinking.

At the heart of transformational thinking is the *Quality of Firsts: See First, Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively*. The Stryker formation is a true system of systems structured to enable leaders to thrive in chaotic and uncertain situations and conditions. Aside from being able to visualize, describe and direct forces as never before, the underlying strength of the Stryker formation is that every Soldier is a leader. It is a Soldier-centric formation capable of capitalizing on information technology to defeat the enemy. TRADOC supports this development of agile and adaptive leaders.

The Stryker Brigade Leader Conversion Training Program provides the TRADOC supported framework for leaders at all levels from brigade commander to squad leader. The LCTP events:

- 1) Provide doctrinal based information,
- 2) Are performance based, and
- 3) Focus on building sufficient knowledge to help Stryker leaders understand and how to employ Stryker Brigade Combat Team capabilities to include digital enablers.

The LCTP consists of three leader-focused training events: Stryker University, Senior Leaders Course, and Tactical Leaders Course. Each transforming unit will receive these courses in order as they progress through transformation, but typically prior to any New Equipment Training (NET). Each training event focuses on different leadership levels of the brigade and is usually the unit’s first encounter with Stryker brigade information. Throughout the process, TRADOC instructors from the BOS or proponent institutions maintain the doctrinal high ground and generally don’t delve into tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Each event is based on a core curriculum and each course has a complete course description. SBCT commanders preparing for the Stryker Brigade LCTP will be able to adjust the focus of their training event by selecting ‘elective’ courses to include in their LCTP event.

### Stryker University

Stryker University is a three-day information, orientation, and education event. The program of instruction consists of a series of both chain of command and TRADOC SBCT overview classes. University provides an overarching view of what is unique to an SBCT, focusing on doctrine, organization, capabilities and limitations, logistics, communications, and overarching “how to fight.” Stryker University also provides a venue for the SBCT’s senior leadership to establish their goals and objectives for the transforming unit. University may serve as an opportunity for the materiel community to review the materiel fielding process and facilities. The target audience for university events is brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs.

## STRYKER UNIVERSITY

- \* Welcome by Corps or Division CG (0.5 hr)
- \* Welcome by USAIC CG (0.5 hr)
- \* Welcome by SBCT Commander (0.5 hr)
- \* Transformation Overview (1.5 hr)
- \* Unit Set Fielding (0.5 hr)
- \* Stryker Vehicle Capabilities (0.5 hr)
- \* Nature of War (1.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Overview (3.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Infantry Battalion Overview (3.0 hr)
- \* RSTA Overview (2.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Intel Overview (2.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Fires and Effects (1.0 hr)
- \* SBCT CSS Organization Overview (2.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Maneuver Support Overview (2.0 hr)
- \* Signal Company Overview (2.0 hr)
- \* ABCS Introduction (1.5 hr)
- \* Leader Conversion (1.0 hr)
- \* Battle Command (1.0 hr)

## SENIOR LEADERS COURSE

- \* Welcome by TSM Stryker-Bradley (0.5 hr)
- \* Welcome by SBCT Commander (0.5 hr)
- \* SBCT Overview and Discussion (1.5 hr)
- \* SBCT Infantry Battalion and Company Discussion and PE (2.0 hr)
- \* ABCS Overview and Lower TI Discussion (1.0 hr)
- \* FBCB2 Familiarization (3.0 hr)
- \* MCS-L Familiarization (3.0 hr)
- \* Stryker Vehicle Capabilities and Manning Issues (3.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Intel Capabilities, Urban IPB and PE (3.0 hr)
- \* RSTA Squadron and Troop Discussion (1.0 hr)
- \* ISR Planning and Preparation (1.5 hr)
- \* The Reconnaissance Fight and PE (1.0 hr)
- \* Urban Operations TTP (2.0 hr)
- \* Maneuver Support Discussion and PE (2.0 hr)
- \* Information Operations at Battalion and Company with PE (3.0 hr)
- \* Effects Based Operations (1.5 hr)
- \* SBCT CSS Operations at Battalion and Company with PE (2.0 hr)

## TACTICAL LEADERS COURSE

- \* Welcome by Battalion Commander (0.5 hr)
- \* SBCT Overview (1.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Infantry Battalion Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)
- \* Maneuver Support Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)
- \* SBCT Intelligence Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)
- \* RSTA Organization and Capabilities (1.0 hr)
- \* Fires and Effects Overview to include FA Battalion (2.0 hr)
- \* Brigade Support Battalion Operations (1.0 hr)
- \* Center for Army Leadership (CAL) (4.0 hr)
- \* Center for Enhanced Performance (CEP) (4.0 hr)

## Senior Leaders Course

The Senior Leaders Course is a 10-day course broken into a Doctrinal Week and a Digital Week. TRADOC-led instruction consists of a series of briefings, seminars, and performance-oriented training focusing on doctrine, operational lessons learned, and Army Battle Command System (ABCS) integration into the military decision-making process (MDMP). The SLC's culminating exercise is a digital simulation exercise at the Mission Support Training Facility (MSTF) on Fort Lewis, Washington. The series of digital exercises focus on current operational environment tasks, such as sustainment or cordon & search. These digital exercises enable the students to experience how analog, centralized planning fits together with digital, decentralized execution.

SLC supports the SBCT commander's leader development program focused on the brigade and battalion staffs. The focus of this training is on "how to employ" the SBCT and subordinate organizations, leveraging its capabilities and organization, while mitigating limitations. A second, but equally important focus is to provide an understanding of ABCS integration for enhancing the SBCTs command and control processes.

The target audience for SLC events is brigade and battalion commanders and command sergeants major, (select) primary staff, and company commanders.

During Doctrinal Week, instructors will incorporate in-class practical exercises that emphasize doctrinal learning points, provide an analog planning environment, and are directly related to the digital PE scenario the students will encounter during the digital simulation exercise.

Digital Week is the primary venue for the commanders and their staffs to learn 'how to employ' their units using enabling technology. The second week of SLC occurs at the MSTF at Fort Lewis. The first two days are spent becoming familiar with the ABCS and what it can do for the commanders and staffs.

Digital Week wraps up with four digital practical exercises focusing on the unit leveraging digital common operating picture and digital reports to command and control intelligence collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination. The practical exercises also emphasize maneuver operations, fires and effects, and sustainment operations. Unit-led after action reviews (AARs) are conducted at the conclusion of each practical exercise.

## Tactical Leaders Course

The Tactical Leaders Course (TLC) is a seven-day event designed to teach the junior SBCT leadership how the SBCT units (platoon and squad) fight and to provide the battalions' leadership an opportunity to demonstrate proficiency in applying basic concepts of Stryker brigade doctrine to solve tactical problems. TLC supports the SBCT and battalion commanders' leader development program focused on leaders from squad/section through company level.

The training facilitates the development of tactical SOPs, the understanding of commander's intent, and provides an understanding of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures at all small unit echelons. The first two days are TRADOC-led core doctrinal courses that address Stryker doctrine at the company

**2CR TLC I Schedule (1)**

ALL 42 12 92

31 JUL SUN	1 AUG MON	2 AUG TUE	3 AUG WED	4 AUG THU	5 AUG FRI	6 AUG SAT
2CR Core Training		1/2CR(-): CAL	1/2CR(-): Infantry Proponent Training			3 of 4 Troops
		4/2CR(-): Armor Prop Trng	4/2CR(-): CAL	4/2CR(-): Armor Proponent Training		3 of 5 Troops
		5/2CR: FA Proponent Training	5/2CR: CAL	5/2CR: FA Prop Trng		

Army Transformation Team - Washington TRADOC Forward Cell - W4

**2CR TLC I Schedule (2)**

ALL 42 16 12 92 6M 6M

7 AUG SUN	8 AUG MON	9 AUG TUE	10 AUG WED	11 AUG THU	12 AUG FRI	13 AUG SAT
	1/2CR(-): Infantry Prop Trng	1/2CR(-): CAR/ TEWT	1/2CR(-): Crucible			
	4/2CR(-): Armor Prop Trng	4/2CR(-): CAR/ TEWT	4/2CR(-): Crucible			
	5/2CR: FA Prop Trng		5/2CR: CAR/ TEWT	5/2CR: Crucible		
				M: Crucible		
				SIG: Crucible		

Army Transformation Team - Washington TRADOC Forward Cell - W4

Sample Tactical Leaders Course Schedules

level and below. The target audience for TLC events is company commanders to squad leaders.

Days 3 through 7 focus on courses presented by unit leadership and supported by tactical decision exercises supported by TRADOC.

**Day 3** — Round robin instruction on SBCT infantry squad through battalion organization, capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations presented by unit leadership; tactical decision exercise facilitated by TRADOC in a small group format; and company collaborative planning presented by unit leadership.

**Day 4** — Company collaborative planning presented by unit NCO leadership; tactical decision exercise on Conduct a Tactical Control Point; and company collaborative planning brief to battalion and company commanders.

**Day 5** — Tactical decision exercise on Conduct a Cordon and Search and company collaborative planning presented by company leadership.

**Day 6** — Practical exercises or tactical decision making games

based on plans and orders developed during the Tactical Leaders Course and based on the SLC order and vignettes.

**Day 7** — Nine-hour simulation exercise in a battle simulation center, mission support training facility, or CAPEX/JANUS-type training environment. The intent is to execute the battalion operations order (OPORD) developed during the preceding SLC event.

#### Providing Valuable Training to the Force

The LCTP provides SBCT commanders with TRADOC delivered leader conversion events that are doctrine-based and transformation-focused. As most Soldiers assigned to transforming SBCTs have little or no experience with Stryker formations, the LCTP is a prime opportunity for Soldiers to begin establishing a solid foundation of knowledge from which to continue to adopt new ways of doing business.

The Leader Conversion Training Program is the ideal venue for unit leaders to begin to take charge of their own unit's training. Stryker University, which is taught by TRADOC instructors, builds the knowledge base for the entire unit leadership. The Senior Leaders Course, combining doctrinal instruction with scenario-based exercises, creates an outstanding environment for leaders to learn how to employ the SBCT and its subordinate units. Finally, the Tactical Leaders Course, taught primarily by unit leaders and supported by TRADOC instructors, helps units assess SOPs and TTPs — building initial unit proficiency.

#### Relevance to IBCT and HBCT formations

The Stryker Brigade Leader Conversion Training Program is easily applicable to the conversion of non-modular unit leaders to other modular formations or Units of Action. In terms of the three-course format and the supporting course curriculum, the entire LCTP requires minimal revision to meet the needs of a UA commander.

Albert Einstein said that, "Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything." Leader Conversion is all about changing the way leaders think — starting down the road of rewiring their brains to solve problems in new and innovative ways. LCTP is not a destination, but rather the first step in a different direction. After TRADOC's LCTP, leaders at all levels are better equipped to train their units and to employ their Stryker formations efficiently and effectively.

**Lieutenant Colonel Jay Macklin** is currently serving as Chief of the SBCT Transformation Team at Fort Benning. He was previously assigned to the 12th Aviation Brigade, V Corps, in Germany.

**Major Jerome Sibayan** is currently serving as the doctrine officer of the SBCT Transformation Team. His previous assignments include serving with the 3rd Armored Division and 1st Cavalry Division.



# RANGER NOTES

**New Requirement** — As of 8 July 05, all students reporting to Ranger School must bring a copy of their DD93/SGLI and a copy of their ORB (officer record brief) or ERB (enlisted record brief).

**Questions about Ranger School** — Packing lists, graduation dates and other information can be found on the Ranger Training Brigade's website at <http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb>.

**Rangers Induct 19 into Hall of Fame** — The Ranger Training Brigade inducted 19 Rangers into the Ranger Hall of Fame in a ceremony July 13 on Fort Benning.

The following individuals were inducted during this year's ceremony:

**1st Lieutenant B.G. Burkett**  
**Command Sergeant Major Frederick Weekley, Jr.**  
**General Henry Hugh Shelton**  
**Colonel Rodney J. Wijas**  
**1st Sergeant Tom Wilburn**  
**Chief Warrant Officer Cleveland Valrey**  
**Captain Sidney A. Salomon**  
**Sergeant Thomas C. Robison**  
**Master Sergeant Harold L. Rinard**  
**Colonel William T. Palmer**  
**Captain John Francis Murphy**  
**Command Sergeant Major Jesse G. Laye**  
**1st Lieutenant Jack L. Knight**  
**Major James V. Kimsey**  
**Colonel John T. Keneally**  
**Staff Sergeant Danny L. Jacks**  
**Colonel Robert L. Howard**  
**Major General David L. Grange**  
**Technician 4th Grade Ulysses G. Auger**



**Ranger School now open to CS/CSS Soldiers** — The Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker has approved combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) Soldier attendance in Ranger School within the combat arms exclusion policy. All CS/CSS personnel requesting to go to Ranger School need to contact their schools NCO and go through Human Resources Command, who manages Ranger School slots. Successful completion of a Pre-Ranger program is essential for CS/CSS success in Ranger School. CS and CSS Soldiers should reference the following DA message for attendance standards, online at <http://www.benning.army.mil/rtb/>

# PROFESSIONAL FORUM



## NCO-FOCUSED AARs: HOW TO MAKE THE UNIT BETTER

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR WALTER E. RAKOW

*“The American Soldier is a proud one and he demands professional competence in his leaders. In battle, he wants to know that the job is going to be done right, with no unnecessary casualties. The noncommissioned officer wearing the chevron is supposed to be the best Soldier in the platoon and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him. The American Soldier expects his sergeant to be able to teach him how to do his job. And he expects even more from his officers.”*

— General of the Army Omar N. Bradley

The Noncommissioned Officer Corps of the United States Army is the best in the world. It has become so because of the professional development requirements that the Army has established for the NCO Corps. A vital element our Army’s organizational and individual professional development system with respect to training is the after action review (AAR) process. Including the AAR process in any training program or event is an excellent way to improve the competence and professionalism of an organization and its Soldiers, especially the organization’s NCO Corps. Yet, our Army does not habitually conduct “NCO-focused” AARs during many, if any training events that NCOs conduct or in which they participate.

With this in mind, the First U.S. Army recently integrated NCO-focused after action reviews throughout its post-mobilization training programs at its seven power projection or power support platforms. These focused AARs have been invaluable to the hundreds of Reserve component units and thousands of NCOs that have executed First Army’s demanding, rigorous, and theater-focused pre-deployment training regimen. The NCO-focused AAR process helps mobilizing units form into cohesive organizations. This is especially true of those units into which the Army has cross-leveled a good percentage of deployable manpower just prior to, or soon after, their arrival at the power projection or support platform. However useful the NCO-focused AAR is for Reserve component units executing pre-deployment training, it is a valuable tool that NCOs can

use in any unit and for any mission.

Field Manual 7-22.7, *The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide*, paragraph 4-47 states that “after action reviews are one of the best learning tools we have ... AARs must be a two-way communication between the NCO and their Soldiers. They are not lectures.” After action reviews that focus on the conduct and performance of NCOs during training will ensure that the NCOs are a competent and productive element of a unit’s combat readiness. From September to December 2004, the NCO-focused AAR was part of the training regimen that all Reserve component units executed as they conducted pre-deployment activities at First U.S. Army’s power projection platform at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. The 2nd Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support), the organization responsible for the conduct of pre-deployment training at Fort McCoy, used NCO-focused AARs to hone NCO execution of their unit’s pre-deployment operations with an emphasis on that unit’s post-mobilization training. We did this with the understanding that AARs are not just for units and Soldiers, but as FM 7-22.7 states, leaders use them to enhance the performance and conduct of the unit’s primary trainer — the NCO. Unit-level AARs are still important, but adding NCO-focused AARs as a systemic and habitual element of all training events will produce better trainers,



and thus better trained units.

2nd Brigade facilitated three NCO-focused AARs for each unit conducting pre-deployment operations while at Fort McCoy. The first AAR was an exploratory session of the unit and its own self-assessment of the NCO Corps in that unit. Subsequent AARs built upon the first AAR. The 2nd Brigade's six command sergeants major served as AAR facilitators, and they focused discussion on learning as opposed to "finger-pointing." This was important given the constant team-building that units were experiencing throughout their time at their home station soon after mobilizing and at Fort McCoy for post-mobilization, pre-deployment training. The first AAR is less an AAR than it is a discussion on the basic expectations and responsibilities of NCOs with respect to training. This AAR served as a session in which the unit's NCOs review and discuss their duties and responsibilities within the unit. The NCOs and the facilitator also discuss and confirm their understanding of the necessary professional relationship that must exist between the unit's NCOs and officers. We did this because of the perception we sometimes encounter in the Army that there is "officer business" and "NCO business" and that the responsibilities encompassed in each do not overlap. We teach and reinforce throughout the pre-deployment training the concept of "leader business" with an NCO and officer "focus." By covering this topic the NCOs are collectively able to affirm as a group the proper relationship between NCOs and officers and thus avoid any unnecessary future conflict between the two. It is the junior Soldier who suffers when NCOs and officers conduct their relationships improperly, and this session helps to dissuade this conflict.

**Crossing the Line of Departure - Establishing the Baseline Expectations of the Unit's NCOs**

The primary duty and responsibility of an NCO is the enforcement of standards and the assurance that all Soldiers in the unit adhere to them — all standards!

Noncommissioned officers must ensure all Soldiers, leaders, and units have



U.S. Army photo

*Being a Soldier means being part of a team — this attitude is essential for success in battle and is a tenet that the group of NCOs explores during the NCO-focused after action reviews.*

individual, leader, and unit discipline in areas ranging from appearance, behavior, conduct, and training proficiency. A lack of discipline at any of level, individual Soldier to unit, will in most cases eventually lead to unit failure. A failure to operate at all times within Army standards invites trouble. Lack of individual, leader, or unit competence and confidence can often be overcome by solid discipline. A lack of discipline will always overwhelm even the highest degree of individual, leader, or unit competence and confidence.

During the first NCO AAR, the facilitator leads the NCOs through a discussion of the need for all Soldiers, leaders, and units to be experts in the Five Warrior Skills:

- Physical Fitness,
- Weapons Skills,
- Medical Skills,
- Crew Proficiency, and
- Battle Drills.

Fitness is the ability to perform one's combat tasks in full combat gear for 72 continuous hours with minimal degradation in ability. The facilitator leads the discussion on weapons skills, reinforcing

the value of these skills in combat and the reason why all Soldiers should qualify as an "expert" on their weapon. The facilitator and NCOs also discuss the need to execute continuous weapons training that mitigates the degradation of marksmanship skills over time, a real threat that the unit will face while deployed. The NCOs explore the critical need for training on medical skills, and establish the training and certification of as many of the unit's Soldiers as possible as combat lifesavers as a key pre-deployment goal. The group talks about crew skills and how to ensure that the individual and crew-related training must result in an expert crew. Lastly, the facilitator and NCOs discuss the need for everyone to be well-trained on battle drills, most critically the react to contact battle drill. The group then talks about the process by which they prioritize the level of training on additional battle drills. This discussion during this AAR is tied into the Warrior Ethos, the Soldier's Creed, and the NCO Creed. We do this to ensure they understand that in order to be good leader of a team, one must also be a good follower.

Being a Soldier means being part of a team — this attitude is essential for success

in battle and is a tenet that the group of NCOs explores during the NCO-focused after action reviews. Discipline, competence, and confidence are essential elements of team operations. NCOs serve as the commander's means to ensure Soldiers are disciplined, competent, and confident. They do this through enforcement of standards in conduct, appearance, behavior, and training. Noncommissioned officers train their Soldiers to be experts in their individual Warrior Skills and small unit collective tasks. The NCO builds a Warrior Team by demanding discipline from Soldiers in all of their training.

The actions of noncommissioned officers are concentrated in the execution phase of any kind of operational plan. NCO participation in planning is relevant if and only if the unit has attained expertise in all individual and small unit skills necessary to ensure mission success at the collective level. If a unit has not met these requirements, then the NCOs' focus needs to be on the drills and rehearsals that occur concurrent with planning. Once the commander issues the plan, the NCOs then ensure that rehearsals take on a more focused relevance.

Essential elements of a unit's preparation for combat operations are pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and pre-combat checks (PCCs). NCOs must be ruthless in the execution of proper PCIs and PCCs so that Soldiers and units have the correct equipment at the right place and time to ensure combat success. Operational risk is unnecessarily increased and compounded if noncommissioned officers do not do this correctly.

During the first NCO-focused AAR, the group also discusses in some detail the need for NCOs to ensure the proper conduct and performance of good maintenance, especially preventive maintenance checks and services, and how maintenance is key to preparing for combat. The intent of this part of the AAR is to ensure that the unit's NCOs fully understand their duty and responsibility to have their Soldiers at the right place, at the correct time, in the proper uniform, and properly trained and ready to perform their tasks in any operation.

At the end of the first AAR, the facilitator leads the unit's NCOs through a

**NCOs must be ruthless in the execution of proper PCIs and PCCs so that Soldiers and units have the correct equipment at the right place and time to ensure combat success.**

series of slides that highlight lessons learned by previously deploying and redeployed unit leaders. The focus of these lessons learned is on the most critical aspects of training that the deploying leaders gleaned from their pre-deployment training. We also survey many redeploying unit leaders to solicit their views on the tasks that were most relevant during their mission and on which they will focus during their upcoming post-deployment annual training plan. The facilitator covers these lessons with the NCOs to let them know what their predecessors have said about their training. This information helps the NCOs better prepare for the pre-deployment training in which they are about to participate.

The endstate of the initial, baseline NCO AAR at First Army's mobilization stations is the assurance that a unit's NCOs are conditioned for success. By the end of the AAR, they will fully understand their responsibilities and duties with respect to performance and conduct as they vigorously execute their post-mobilization process and prepare to deploy to a combat theater of operations.

### **Azimuth check — the Interim NCO After Action Review**

The training support brigade conducts an interim NCO-focused AAR once a mobilized unit completes all pre-deployment individual training and its first collective training event. The purpose of this AAR is to facilitate the NCOs' evaluation of their performance and conduct against the baseline expectations they explored in the initial after action review. They also conduct a self-assessment of their current strengths and weaknesses. The training support brigade NCO AAR team facilitates the NCOs' discussion of

how they are going to maintain their strengths. The group fixes responsibility on those leaders in the NCO Corps who are chiefly responsible for maintaining their strengths. The facilitator also leads the group to realize their own weak areas, once again assigning responsibility to the unit's leaders who will lead their collective improvement and how they will improve themselves. The NCOs discuss how they are doing in the performance of their Warrior Tasks and how well they are living and enforcing the Soldier's Creed during their training. This dialogue serves well to reinforce the inculcation of the Warrior spirit in each noncommissioned officer.

The facilitator limits discussion during the interim AAR to one strength and one weak area upon which all of the NCOs must agree. This serves to focus the AAR discussion and prevents the NCOs from simply restating "training war stories." By this point the training support brigade has facilitated several other AARs focused on specific training events and there is no need to revisit these lessons in this forum. The intent of the interim AAR is to focus the NCOs on high value-high payoff lessons learned to maximize future success in training and preparation for combat operations.

The last item the group covers in this AAR is an improvement plan. The facilitator requires the group to identify their top three issues they can work to immediately fix, and how to prioritize the rest for improvement later. This requirement provides the NCOs with a game plan that they all must agree on and that they can begin to immediately implement in their subsequent training events. The group concludes its AAR with a discussion about training for combat. The group revisits the need to conduct all training to an exacting standard and under the most arduous conditions that they can possibly replicate. This is the goal of every NCO's duty to prepare Soldiers for battle.

### **Seizing the Interim Objective — The Final Post-Mobilization Station After Action Review**

The training support brigade facilitates a third and final AAR at the mobilization station upon completion of a unit's pre-

deployment training. This AAR encompasses the period from arrival at the mobilization station to completion of all training. Using the same model as the interim NCO AAR, the facilitator limits discussion primarily to one group strength and one area for improvement; all of the NCOs in the unit must agree to these assessments. As with the interim NCO-focused AAR, the intent of this session is to focus discussion on strengths to sustain and areas to improve. The precious time that the unit devotes to this AAR is not to rekindle training “war stories.” This session continues the learning process of the unit’s NCO Corps.

The discussion of the final NCO AAR builds on the previous two sessions. The NCOs assess their progress against the baseline expectations that they forged during the initial AAR in accordance with the tenets of the Warrior Ethos and the Soldier’s Creed.

They also determine if they are making progress in sustaining their strengths and improving their weaknesses that they collectively identified in the interim NCO-focused after action review. As with the interim NCO-focused AAR, the group determines three specific duties or responsibilities that it should immediately “fix,” how they will make the corrections, and who will lead this process. Identifying these specific areas for sustainment and improvement provides the NCOs the purpose and direction they require to sustain their collective strengths and improve their collective weaknesses.

The facilitator closes the final AAR with a discussion of how the NCOs can get the most value from their training and what training they should continue to execute to sustain their combat skills while deployed in their theater of operations. The group discusses the means and mechanisms that are available to them as they sustain their training while engaged in daily combat operations. This is a fundamental responsibility of the unit’s NCO Corps, yet it is a responsibility that NCOs in forward deployed units sometimes overlook as they become consumed by the tempo of combat operations.

However busy the unit becomes, it is the duty and responsibility of the NCO Corps to sustain the unit’s basic individual



Sergeant Jeremiah Johnson

*The intent of the NCO AAR is to make the NCO Corps of a unit better so that the unit is better at what it does.*

Soldier’s skills and its small unit collective tasks. This portion of the AAR process serves as a key reminder of NCOs’ responsibility to constantly hone their Soldiers’ perishable skills.

The final NCO-focused AAR is only an “interim objective” that the NCOs seize in their learning process. The reason for this is obvious — the NCOs will continue to learn and improve as a group while they execute the strategy that they developed during their three NCO-focused AARs at the mobilization station. This process serves as a means to pull them together, often a critical need for units that are the result of significant cross-leveling of Soldiers and leaders. It provides a forum for the NCOs to focus on their duties and responsibilities, and to discuss them as a group. Only the strongest of unit command sergeants major or first sergeants would think of the need to assemble their NCOs for this purpose.

The training support brigade at the mobilization station provides this forum and the time on the training schedule that allows the NCOs to re-explore their duties, identify their strengths and weaknesses, and to develop a strategy to sustain or improve themselves as a collective corps of noncommissioned officers. The three

facilitated NCO-focused AARs also provide an example of how a unit can continue this process while it is deployed in its theater of operations. The NCO-focused AAR is a tool that all units can use in garrison, in training, and while deployed. The intent of the NCO AAR is to make the NCO Corps of a unit better so that the unit is better at what it does.

*An NCO must know what right looks like and must prepare. As NCOs we never stop learning and must seek guidance from manuals and our leaders to ensure we know the standard.*

— **Command Sergeant Major Mary Sutherland**

FM 7-22.7 - The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide

**Command Sergeant Major Walter E. Rakow** is currently serving as the brigade command sergeant major for the 2nd Brigade, 85th Division (Training Support) at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. In his 29 years of military service, Rakow has served in every leadership position in the Infantry from rifle team leader to command sergeant major. His previous assignments include serving with the 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry, Republic of Panama, and the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia. Rakow also served at the regimental command sergeant major for the 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Benning, Georgia.

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# WARRIOR ETHOS:

## Soldiers Selflessly Committed to Army, Unit, Fellow Soldiers

MASTER SERGEANT NICHOLAS B. CASTILLO

**F**M 7-0, *Training the Force*, defines the Warrior Ethos as "...the Soldier's selfless commitment to the nation, mission, unit, and fellow Soldiers. It is the professional attitude that inspires every American Soldier. The Warrior Ethos is grounded in refusal to accept failure. It is developed and sustained through discipline, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army's heritage."

We can no longer rely on fighting our nation's wars on a linear battlefield, where we can easily differentiate between friendly and enemy lines. The enemy's face has changed, as must our way of fighting. The mind-set we must assume in fighting that enemy must also change. We can no longer rely on just our Combat Arms brethren to defeat the enemy. The unique realities of the modern battlefield mandate that ALL Soldiers assume the mind-set and tenacity of the infantryman, and should they be called upon, take the fight to the enemy. Current military operations in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have seen cooks transformed into SAW gunners during convoy operations and field artillerymen performing cordon searches throughout the heart of Baghdad. They assumed these roles with no complaint, and with little or no formal training. The thread common to these Soldiers is their selfless

commitment to the nation, the mission, the unit, and fellow Soldiers. They refuse to accept defeat. This state of mind has remained prevalent throughout our nation's 229-year history.

The Warrior Ethos should not be a new concept to anyone present today. The NCO Creed, The Ranger's Creed, Von Steuben's "Blue Book," the Code of Conduct, and most recently, the Soldier's Creed, have all emphasized the heart of what the Warrior Ethos represents. These beliefs and convictions have been the cornerstone of our profession of arms since the Army's birth in 1775. The focal point of these remarkable documents focuses on discipline, professionalism, and selfless service to our nation and our fellow Soldiers. The Warrior Ethos is merely a synopsis of what these historic documents and credos represent. As senior NCOs and leaders of Soldiers, it is OUR duty to ensure that we instill these principles into everything our Soldiers do on a daily basis. We must ensure that our Soldiers possess the mental and physical toughness to sustain themselves during the chaos of combat. It is our responsibility to teach ALL Soldiers that courage is not the absence of fear, but the ability to control that fear and continue on with the mission. All noncommissioned officers must instill in their Soldiers that integrity and honor



must NEVER be compromised, regardless of the situation in which they may find themselves. Without either of these character traits, they will never learn to trust each other in combat. The Warrior Ethos, simply stated, is a moral and professional standard that we must hold our Soldiers accountable to. However, in order to do this, we must first be able to hold ourselves accountable to that standard. Leaders must continuously immerse themselves in the history of those who have fought before them and adopt their leadership qualities into their own styles of leadership. We must continuously be seeking ways to improve the way in which we take care of our Soldiers. We should ask ourselves, "Are our Soldiers mentally and physically prepared to endure the rigors of battle? Are they proficient in their MOS? Are our Soldiers proficient in basic combat Soldier skills?" The answer to these questions rests first and foremost with every Soldier that wears the rank of the NCO. The Warrior Ethos must be the daily guidepost that all NCOs adhere to. As NCOs, we are the vehicle that will provide the next generation of Soldiers the means to become proficient in their chosen profession and survive on the battlefield.

As the deployment rate for all components of the United States Army (Active, Reserve, and National Guard) increases, the depth in which we train our Soldiers has never been more crucial. Sergeant First Class Gallagher, an IET trainer stationed at Fort Benning, said, "We don't have the luxury of time right now. We graduate Soldiers, and a short time later they are deploying ... When Soldiers arrive in Baghdad and get off the planes and into HMMWVs, they are immediately thrust into combat operations ... They have to go in with a mind-set that they will engage and kill the enemy on their first day in country."

This is an excellent example of why we must instill the Warrior Ethos into our Soldiers NOW. Leaders cannot afford to wait until arrival in a combat zone to realize that their Soldiers are not prepared to fight. As soon as they step off that airplane, Soldiers must be confident in their ability to perform their wartime mission, take care of their comrades, and return safely home. The Warrior Ethos gives us the ideals that we must teach our Soldiers to accomplish this.

Failure to teach our Soldiers to survive in combat is not an option. We are at the crossroads of one of the most critical periods in the Army's history. A quote from Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth O. Preston's swearing in ceremony relates closely to this essay. He said, "Our entire Army is at war and not just the infantryman or tanker. We are an Army of Warfighters and EVERY Soldier is a rifleman first. I have seen the Warrior Ethos alive and well in the souls of all our Soldiers, Active, Guard, and Reserve. We must continue to instill the warrior spirit in the souls of all our 1.3 million members."

We cannot, and MUST NOT, fail in this endeavor.

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**Master Sergeant Nicholas B. Castillo** is currently serving as the training NCO for the Army Reserve's 395th Ordnance Company in Appleton, Wisconsin.

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## SOLDIER'S CREED

I am an American Soldier.  
 I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.  
 I will always place the mission first.  
 I will never accept defeat.  
 I will never quit.  
 I will never leave a fallen comrade.  
 I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.  
 I am an expert and I am a professional.  
 I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.  
 I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.  
 I am an American Soldier.



*"We are, have been, and will remain a values based institution. Our values will not change and they are non-negotiable. Our Soldiers are Warriors of character. They exemplify these values every day and are the epitome of our American spirit. They are the heart of the Army."*  
**— General Peter J. Schoomaker**  
*Chief of Staff of the Army*

## WARRIOR ETHOS

"Embedded in the Soldier's Creed is the Warrior Ethos — the very essence of what it means to be a Soldier:

- I will always place the mission first.
- I will never accept defeat.
- I will never quit.
- I will never leave a fallen comrade.

The Warrior Ethos describes the frame of mind of the professional Soldier. It proclaims the selfless commitment to the Nation, mission, unit, and fellow Soldiers that all Soldiers espouse. When internalized, it produces the will to win ...

At its core, the Warrior Ethos is the refusal to accept failure and instead overcome all obstacles with honor. The Warrior Ethos moves Soldiers to fight through all conditions to victory, no matter how long it takes and how much effort is required. Army leaders develop and sustain it through discipline, realistic training, commitment to the Army Values, and pride in the Army's heritage."

**— Field Manual 1, The U.S. Army**

## Northeast Korea — Luke's Castle — Winter 1953

# Three U.S. Tanks and ROK Rifle Company in Mountain Defense

NIMROD T. FRAZER

### Relief

The three M46s crawled into the rocky bed of the shallow Soyang River. It was a cold night. The tanks had traveled since dawn, taking two stops to refuel and one for a breakdown. They turned north into the swift current, each one causing a wave that reached almost to the driver's hatch. Mufflers glowed cherry red in the dark and sizzled when hit by water. Tank commanders hung on outside the turrets, calling corrections to the right or left. Counting the medic, mechanic and me, we were 17 men.

Moving north in the riverbed we reached the turn off going to Hill 812 and Luke's Castle, a key position defended by a South Korean rifle company. An American sergeant signaled us with a flashlight. The convoy turned out of the water to the trail. A guide was there to lead us to the three Sherman M4s being replaced by our three M46s.

The column moved in the dark up the narrow winding road for about two miles. The approach to the hill was slick with ice. Sergeant Bill Harbin of C Company, 245th Tank Battalion commanded the section being relieved. One of Harbin's three M4s had inverted grousers that dug into the frozen trail and got traction. He used it as a tow tank and attached cables to each of our M46s. It dragged us over the last hump of iced road to the top of Hill 812. Harbin and some of his men had been at Luke's Castle for 78 days. Four lieutenants had come and gone during that time but Sergeant Harbin had sole command at the relief.

### The Position

At first light our guys saw a white sheet spread out on the enemy side of the hill. It was a message of welcome to us from the North Koreans. A ROK (Republic of Korea) soldier interpreted the oriental characters into English. One round of our 90mm destroyed the banner. The North Koreans and we were to try to kill each other until April when we were replaced. The position would be lost in June but not by us.

Some of our group had been with B Company a long time. I had been there three months. All had experience with the Chinese but in modest operations. Lieutenant James F. Brady, B Company commander, explained that the North Koreans on 812 were apt to be more dangerous. It was our battalion's first experience against



Courtesy photo

*The author and his platoon spent 41 days defending Hill 812 in 1953.*

North Koreans. This hill was the most threatened place on the 12th ROK Division's part of the United Nation's Main Line of Resistance. It was high ground, important to the control of the region, and both sides wanted it. The ROKs now in possession had replaced U.S. Marines. North Koreans flanked the hill on three sides. We would see them every day. Their troops were part of the experienced 45th NK Infantry Division, which was in reality the North Korean Army reorganized after its defeat.

Our tankers had spent all of January training at Dodge Range, the 10th Corps tank facility north of Chunchon. Our vehicles were in fair shape. The small unit was experienced and had worked together long enough for us to know each other. We shot a lot of gunnery practice at Dodge. On the move to Luke's Castle we were confident but anxious. I was a second lieutenant, but was considered experienced.

None of us had seen Luke's Castle. Lieutenant Brady had been alone when he reconnoitered for the relief. A mustang, Brady had served as an enlisted infantryman before being commissioned at OCS. He wrote standing operating procedures for 812 and went over them with us in detail. Slightly built, he wore steel rim Army issue glasses and talked through clenched teeth. His briefing was thorough. Our relationship was professional, not personal. I was not to see much of him after we went to the position, which suited me fine.

Our mission was to give maximum support to the ROK unit defending the hill but to depend on ourselves for protection. We had authority for target selection. The American officer we saw every week or so was Major Sowa, K MAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) adviser to 37th ROK Regiment. He came there to check on 7th Company but provided me with welcome guidance.

There were about 150 South Korean soldiers on the hill. Captain Yul was in command. A wizened over-age-in grade officer,

Yul told us he had hunted and killed guerillas in the south. His company had three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon. He also had an American forward observer from a U.S. 105mm howitzer battalion and could call on a squad of Republic of Korea combat engineers when he wanted them. The artillery was invaluable, and the engineers were helpful in many ways. They improved firing positions for our tanks by dynamiting out slots in the ridgelines. It was the only way to dig into the frozen ground.

The forward slope of Hill 812 was strewn with naked bodies of North Koreans left after a recent assault. ROKs had stripped the dead and thrown them outside the lines. Cold weather kept them from decomposing. Sergeant Harbin told me his tanks had fired every round of ammo for the tank's guns in that fight and had not withdrawn from the position. A counterattack by Korean riflemen saved the day.

Chicken wire was strung over infantry positions to catch hand grenades before they exploded in the trenches. ROK soldiers stayed in their fighting positions.

### The Set Up

We placed the command tank, number 36, next to ROK Lieutenant Lee's weapons platoon. The "poof" of mortar fire was our signal that something was going on. Lee had been to college, spoke English and was good about keeping us posted. He would put up parachute flares when tanks wanted battlefield illumination. I always paid him the compliment of saluting first. He was soon greeting me as, "Friend and Brother."

The command tank had a field of fire to the east that included an enemy strong point rarely occupied by day. It was about four hundred yards away, down a gentle, open slope. The approach to us from that position was well covered by ROK and U.S. fire plans. We watched the outpost for movement and sometimes fired the 90mm and .50 cal. machine gun into it.

We placed another tank on the crest of the hill to the immediate front. It had an unobstructed view and was a natural place to look for targets. The enemy avenue of approach from the west was in its field of fire. That was where the earlier breakthrough had taken place and where

the fatal breakthrough came when the position fell in June. That tank slot had a good view of "The Rock" of Luke's Castle as well as the steep approaches from the river to the north. The sheer drop in elevation made assault of our position from the north very difficult, though some North Koreans were to successfully scale the hill when they took the position in June.

Our third tank was placed three hundred yards southwest at an azimuth of about 220 degrees from the command tank. It was on the southwest finger of 812. There was a log bunker for the crew and a ROK rifle squad spread out on each side of the firing slot. An enemy strong point about a thousand yards to the west provided good target prospects but the position was not easy to defend. The enemy approach to it was concealed by the steepness of the hill. Our men needed to be in close touch with the covering ROK infantry and that was not easy to maintain. Language difficulties were always a problem.

The supply Jeep from B Company was our lifeblood, bringing up .30 cal. and .50 cal. machine gun ammunition as well as mail, food, and water. The Jeep was exposed to enemy observation in places and sometimes fired on. Periodically, a full tracked armored personnel carrier (APC) with a loud and smoky radial engine would come up with ammo for our big guns. The APC was a bigger and higher priority target than the Jeep. Its driver had a handlebar mustache and a risky job. We were to welcome that guy called "California" many more times through the winter as well as during the July fighting at Hill 755.

Neither the APC nor the Jeep could get up to our positions when there was snow and ice in the winter or during the spring rains. Then we had to hand carry the ammunition, gas, C rations, and drinking water up the slippery slopes. A round of 90mm weighed about 85 pounds. Excuses were not accepted so everybody helped with the exhausting work. We got thoroughly soaked with sweat on those climbs no matter how cold the weather.

### Dusk

Moving around on 812 at night was dangerous, so dusk was a tense

and busy time. Everybody, Koreans and Americans, stayed jumpy. Guns were checked as darkness fell. I wore a white armband for identification. We never used flashlights, but our guys did not have to be told about light discipline. Smoking was not allowed on the tanks. The GIs were as worried about being mistaken for enemy by Americans as they were of walking into a North Korean or a trigger-happy ROK soldier in the dark.

Standing operating procedure called for tanks to be in firing position at dusk. Range cards had to be updated every night. Some cards held as many as 20 plotted concentrations, each setting out elevation and deflection at which the guns should be set for specific targets. The cards were essential for night firing. Enemy avenues of approach and routes for friendly patrols were given names and numbers. Some plots were also made for firing close in and around other tanks in the event we were overrun. Range Cards were usually drawn on C ration cartons and were quickly prepared by good gunners. This work had to be accurate and the settings on the card changed every time the tank was moved.

We had a hot meal and mail call in late afternoon, going a few at a time to the always welcome supply Jeep. Spreading out gave the illusion of safety. The Jeep driver always brought gossip. He would tell about new people, those going home, who was getting rest and recuperation leave, which positions were taking casualties, and what was happening throughout the battalion. After meals each man observed the Army ritual of washing his aluminum mess kit in boiling water.

### Night

Each tank kept two men in the turret during darkness. Duty was two hours on and four off until dawn. Punctuality was enforced. Someone showing up 10 minutes late for a change of watch could provoke strong words and create grudges. From time to time I would take the place of one of the men for all or part of his watch. It was the best way for me to know what was going on.

Standing procedures called for me to visit each of the three vehicles all night at irregular times. It was scary work with a lot of slipping and sliding over frozen

terrain, but the inspections were essential.

On the first round I would examine the range cards and verify that each vehicle had a five-gallon can of water and extra C rations. Lieutenant Brady had insisted that each tank be self-contained and provisioned in the event the hill was attacked and overrun. Survival might depend of it. We sometimes talked among ourselves about the possibility of enemy assault.

Heaters never worked and Little Joes (gasoline powered generators for the tanks) and radios were not reliable. SOP called for one operable transmitter and two working receivers on each tank. We considered ourselves lucky to even make a net with the company command post (CP) at the beginning of each night. Our equipment was old, and Company B had only one radio repairman. He worked for the company exec and did not get his orders from me. All were quick to blame him when radios were down, which was most of the time. Because telephones were reliable, the commo man was also expected to find and repair breaks in wire strung on top of the ground. Most of his checking for blown out wire was done alone and at night. Everybody bitched at the poor guy. He must have felt like Job.

Our bunkers were well enough constructed to withstand direct hits from big mortars. My CP bunker was hit one day by what must have been a 120mm mortar. Several of us were in it. My ears rang for a couple of days, but the bunker held up. Though small, it held six crude bunks. They made for good sleeping with our rubber air mattresses and down-filled sleeping bags. A big rat once awakened me by crawling over my face. After that I slept with my face to the light of our Coleman lantern which was kept going all the time.

It was important to stay as clean as possible. From time to time the APC would bring up a bundle of clean long johns, socks, and canvas combat fatigues to be worn over our regular wool olive drab pants. There would be much sorting through garments looking for a fit. Our filthy clothes were then returned to the company for washing by a Korean civilian. Every person was expected to shave and wash his feet every day. We kept two five-gallon water cans in each bunker and washed out of a helmet or a small pan. No one was allowed off the hill to visit a shower point during my 40-day stay there.

We had a little CP table for maps, the hand cranked telephone, and a battery-powered portable radio for news and music. It was the only recreational radio in the company, and our little unit on 812 was complimented by having it. Everybody knew we had the toughest job. Truck mounted radio stations Gypsy and Rambler had smooth talking announcers broadcasting around the clock. The radio was always played quietly and usually only at night. Our bunkers were for safety, sleeping, washing, and warming. Soldiers respected that and spoke in quiet voices. For music we listened to the mournful *My Baby is Coming Home* and the silly *How Much is the Doggie in the Window?* On 5 March 1953 we learned from the radio that USSR Premier Joseph Stalin had died. All hoped that would speed up the peace talks at Panmunjon but

**Our job was to shoot North Koreans and we did it every day, sometimes morning and afternoon, and many nights. Target selection and shooting was hard work and took time.**

none believed it.

The medic and mechanic took turns all night on phone watch. In addition to a line to company CP, we had a sound powered telephone linked into all the ROK positions. Chatter on those lines told us about threats both real and perceived.

### The Guns

Shooting was dangerous. We expected sniper fire every time we pulled a tank into a firing position and often got it.

It was always a challenge to improve gunnery. Aiming mechanisms of the old guns had a lot of play or looseness in them. Kentucky windage, or cheating on the sight reticle, was necessary in laying the tube. Every gun had a personality, and each gunner had to know how much the crosshairs were off. First-round hits were rare.

Earlier in the war, our M46s had belonged to the 6th Tank Battalion. Those vehicles were battle worn veterans. Gun Book entries were hopelessly out of date. Some of our tanks had been in Task Force Crombez at Chipyeong-ni. Tanks played a significant role there in routing Chinese surrounding the 23rd Regiment of the 2nd Division. It was Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgeway's first victory in Korea, and it turned the tide of the war from the Chinese to the U.S.

Our job was to shoot North Koreans and we did it every day, sometimes morning and afternoon, and many nights. Target selection and shooting was hard work and took time. We searched with the glasses for movement and patterns of activity before pulling the tanks up to fire. All weapons were cleaned after each firing and the 90mm had to be swabbed. Soldiers who were already bone tired, all the time, did that cold, dirty but necessary work.

It was easy to make excuses for not shooting and to put off shooting. When we didn't shoot, the enemy usually didn't shoot. If we didn't shoot, the men didn't have to clean guns. Life was not as dangerous. Executing a tank defense by firepower created work, and there was no way to tell a man that shooting was not putting him in greater danger. People bitched about it. We got counterfire often. None liked that.

### Counterfire

The first soldier killed with us occurred during counterfire after an exchange I started with Tank 36. He was a likable Korean, a KATUSA (Korean Augmentation United States Army) working with our artillery. I knew him rather well and losing him grieved me. It still does.

We shot aggressively and believed we were hurting the North Koreans. But they always came back in effective, sometimes surprising, ways. Once, at enormous risk, the North Koreans deployed a large flat trajectory recoilless rifle very close by. It was probably not more than 200 yards west of 36's firing slot. I had checked the area with binoculars but completely missed the camouflaged emplacement. They shot us just as we began firing in another direction. The tank commander's hatch and the loader's hatch were open. It was not possible to follow outgoing rounds or

to accurately sense hits with the hatches shut. I could not tell where the enemy fire was coming from. The first rounds to hit us made a lot of noise but no fragments came into the fighting compartment. It is a mystery why the North Koreans never used armor piercing ammo. With it they would have killed us all that morning.

I told the driver to back the tank to a position of hull defilade, in the lee of a knoll in our immediate rear. He gunned the engine but the tank did not move. The driver told me the left track and suspension system were disabled. I made a decision to abandon the tank and told the four crewmembers exactly how we would evacuate. The driver and bow gunner would leave through their escape hatches underneath the tank. The loader, gunner, and I would go out the big hatch on top. We would use the same dive on the lee side as used in the past to dodge snipers. I would go first, immediately after the next round came in. The others were to follow after other rounds hit. Just like in parachute training at Fort Benning, it took less nerve to lead the stick than to follow. I bailed out OK, hit the ground running and got safely behind the knoll. Everyone got out and joined me. We helplessly watched the tank receive a large number of hits. Everything outside the tank was shot up, the 50-caliber machine gun, the sponson boxes, mufflers, and radio antenna, but the tank did not burn.

Battalion maintenance sent up a recovery vehicle to pull the vehicle out and take it away. A couple of days later maintenance returned with a "brand new rebuilt" M46 from Japan. A dream comes true. Everything about it was perfect, down to a gun mount that had no slack and radios that worked. We used it to put massive fire on the ridge from which the recoilless rifle had caught us. We even spent days bushwhacking snipers with the 90mm gun, sometimes using all of the high explosive (HE) and white phosphorus (WP) rounds in the ready rack. We worked over every commo trench and bunker in sight and enemy activity slowed. Then we spent hours with the glasses looking for more distant targets. The area near the ford, 2,000 yards in front of us, and on the mountain above it were treeless and target rich. In addition to bunker busting, we often shot enemy soldiers with the 90 as they ran off the mountain (Papa San) and approached the ford.

The North Koreans retaliated by bringing another big gun into action. It was at about a 030-degree azimuth (northeast) from Hill 812 on a hill beyond the Soyang River. It was a flat trajectory weapon firing from a bunker. Logs covering the aperture would be removed when firing started and replaced afterwards. We could not knock it out.

### **Close Air Support**

Air war was foreign to us but we knew the North Koreans had machine guns capable of bringing down aircraft. The remains of a U.S. artillery observation plane were lodged in a tree near our position. Shot down by a machine gun, the pilot and observer had somehow managed to land in the treetop and get out alive. Aside from that wreck we had never seen an airplane in our skies, friendly or otherwise. We took air superiority for granted.

I asked Major Sowa, the KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) advisor to 37th Regiment, for an air strike to help with the troublesome bunker across the Soyang. Word came back that

on the next day we would, indeed, get a strike, but we would have to mark the targets with WP rounds. No ground controller was available.

Six gull winged U.S. Navy F4Us from the aircraft carrier *Philippine Sea* showed up as promised. They circled overhead at about 6,000 feet while we used Willie Peter (WP) ammunition to mark the principal target and alternates. We did not have radio communication with the planes. The planes peeled off one at a time. Each made his dive; shooting machine guns to the point of releasing a bomb, then pulling out. North Korean machine guns rattled at the Navy planes on each pass. Our GIs loved it. They were yelling and whooping. I was worried that an F4U would be shot down. The planes made good targets for the NK machine guns we heard firing nearby. The Navy pilots worked for a long time, releasing one bomb at a time. Some were more aggressive than others, pulling out of dives only after going well below our ridgeline. Others let their bombs go from higher altitudes. After one of the higher drops, a GI yelled, "There goes a married one!"

We were filled with admiration for the flyers, even the careful ones. The bombs tore up the bunker that started all this, hit everything else we marked, and the flyers left without losing anyone. Our guys joked about how those pilots would get a shot of whiskey on returning to the ship, eat with silver, dine on white table cloths, and sleep between sheets on mattresses that night.

### **Friendly Fire**

One night the mail Jeep brought news that an officer who knew me had joined the battalion. It was 2nd Lieutenant Sam Steiger. We had been in the same OCS Company at Fort Knox. He was assigned to a position on Hill 854. It was east of us on the opposite side of the Soyang Gang where the river passed from North Korea through the Main Line of Resistance to South Korea. The position was several thousand yards away.

The very next morning my driver Corporal Fordham and I were sitting on the hillside enjoying the good weather. We were about 30 yards from tank 36. A big round came screaming in and hit just above us. I told Fordham that it sounded like a 120. It was definitely bigger than what we were accustomed to. Another round came in after about a minute, hitting just downhill from us. There was a bracket on tank 36. I looked at Corporal Fordham and said one of us had to move the tank. He said that he would do it if I would let him wait until after the next round came in. I was happy to agree. The next round came in short, with fragments hitting the tank like rocks hitting a washtub. He sprinted to the tank, started the engine in a split second and gunned backwards down the hill. His superior driving saved the tank.

After Fordham put 36 into defilade, the firing shifted to ROK infantry positions downhill on the east and stopped after a few more rounds. I got a phone call from Company CP. Had we received any incoming? I said we had and thought it was North Korean 120s. An American major that I did not know came up soon. He said our incoming was friendly fire from Hill 854. A new officer had misread his map. It was Lieutenant Steiger. The next day Steiger came to Luke's Castle and shook hands all around. He was graceful, humble, and apologetic. Initially relieved from duty as a platoon leader and assigned to a ration breakdown detail,

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Sam was later redeemed by participating in the rescue of tankers from 812 when it fell. He was awarded a Silver Star and a Purple Heart. I attended a welcome home party for him in the fall of 1953 at his parent's apartment in New York City and told his Dad about the incident. Sam later served several terms in Congress as a representative from Arizona.

### Changes in Command

Captain George Patton joined the 140th as commander of Company A, replacing Captain Kenneth O. West. One of Patton's platoons supported a ROK rifle company west and south of us. He called a meeting of his leadership as well as those from units joining the A Company positions. First Lieutenant Orrin Sharp, the executive officer of Company B, picked me up in a Jeep at Luke's Castle, and we went to a bunker in the rear for the Patton meeting. I knew Patton from Fort Knox where he had taken the advanced course. He and Major John Eisenhower attended my OCS graduating class's commissioning ceremony and reception.

It was an honor for me to be serving in the war with the son of one of our nation's great heroes. I was also to serve with him in the summer fighting for Hill 755. That time away for the Patton meeting was my only absence from Luke's Castle between 12 February and 31 March.

Major Dumas, formerly executive officer of the 140th, became battalion commander. The logistics and support at 812 were much better than during our earlier tour on the northwest corner of the Punchbowl. We got the latest model Nylon flak jackets, fur hooded parkas, pile caps for warmth under steel helmets, leather palmed trigger-finger mittens that came to the elbow, and down-filled canvas covered sleeping bags.

### Accident

A disaster of our own making came when fire destroyed everything in one of the bunkers. A flambeau used for lighting started it. We had one Coleman lantern for our three bunkers and had devised flambeaus, bottles of gasoline with cloth wicks, for lighting in the other two. One got kicked over and the gasoline exploded into fire.

Everybody got out safely but our loss included most sleeping bags and parkas. For several weeks all of us shared the equipment we had left. When a man came off watch he gave his parka to his replacement before going to the replacement's bunk and getting into that sleeping bag. The close and dirty living was hard on dispositions and dignity. We paid a big price for the kicked over flambeau. A dangerous form of lighting, I should never have allowed it to be used. We had candles.

### Serving with the Koreans

We fell into a comfortable way of working with the ROKs and joked about going native. I wore a camouflage fishnet over my sandbag helmet cover, just like the ROKs. With a 12th

ROK Division patch sewn to one side and a 37th ROK Regiment patch on the other, I thought we fit right in. Their soldiers had hammered the unit crests out of beer cans. Many of us had come to identify with 7th Company, and we were certainly dependent on them, as they were on us. We all knew many of the ROK officers and soldiers, knew some Korean words and I met with Captain Yul in his bunker most days. We helped them in every way possible. Their wounded usually walked off the hill but our Jeep evacuated ROK soldiers unable to walk, including Captain Yul's interpreter when he got hit in the buttocks. He left 812 laughing as he lay on his stomach on the stretcher on the back of our supply jeep.

### Long Range Ambush Patrol


Good weather never lasted. An especially heavy snow shut down 7th Company's regular patrolling, but Captain Yul's Regimental Headquarters put out an order for prisoners. A patrol leader and seven men were picked and issued white camouflage covers to be worn over helmets and clothing. They were briefed and rehearsed.

We put Tank 36 into firing position and plotted concentrations along the route to the patrol objective, an ambush site near an underwater bridge crossing the Soyang. The patrol leader borrowed my M1 Carbine, a model that fired full automatic. He led the men out of our lines in deep snow at dark with his last man reeling out telephone wire behind. They were gone that night, all day the next day and returned just before dawn of the second day, in deep snow all the time. We knew from called in reports that they failed to take a prisoner. On returning to our lines, cold, worn out and dejected, the patrol lined up for debriefing. Captain Yul came out of his bunker. First he slapped the helmet of the officer, and chewed him out for failing. Then he did the same with each soldier. My Korean friend, the weapons platoon leader

Lieutenant Lee, and I stood together and cringed with embarrassment over the incident. It hurt to see Captain Yul beating up his people, something that would never, ever have happened with Americans. Our tankers from B Company were now living with another Army with other values.

### The Cost of Carelessness

Clear weather brought out lots of enemy. Tank 36 took its 72-round basic load into position to fire. I picked the first target and gave the gunner a command to traverse left. He tried to traverse but got no movement. Corporal Fred Fordham was in the driver's seat and looking up saw the trouble through his open hatch. A sandbag had been accidentally left on the outside turret ring, stopping the traverse of the tube. The reach from the driver's seat to the sandbag could not be made without Fordham's exposing his body. We were observed in that firing position and expected sniper fire. Fordham told me he would drop out the escape hatch under the driver's seat, crawl underneath the tank to the rear, and then crawl to the front of the vehicle on the side toward the sniper. The plan was for him to



stand up quickly by the driver's hatch and remove the obstructing sandbag. It seemed reasonable and I approved with the admonition to be careful.

Fordham crawled through the escape hatch. We waited for a few minutes. Nothing happened; we did not hear a sound. Without exposing myself I yelled for Fordham out of the open tank commander's hatch. There was no answer. I told the crew that I would go out and check on him. Knowing that I was apt to be fired on, I crouched on the tank commander's seat before diving out on the side of the turret away from the sniper, catching handholds to break my fall down the side of the tank. I heard the sniper's rounds pass overhead. Then I crawled around the back of the tank to the other side, the exposed west side. Fordham was slumped with his head down into the front idler wheel. I called him and got no answer. I crawled to where I could reach the collar of his flak jacket and dragged him out to a rise that shielded us from the sniper. I thought Corporal Fordham was dead and was relieved to hear a slight moan. He had taken a shot in the neck that entered in the front and exited in the back.

The medic had a hard time finding a vein. Fordham showed pain every time the needle hit. Someone brought a stretcher. Fortunately a Jeep was on the hill. The trip to the battalion aid station was about five miles over the rough tank trail. He was sent by ambulance from there to a MASH (Mobile Army Surgical Hospital) hospital at Jade, 10th Corps Headquarters, near Inje, another 20 miles over the dirt main supply route.

Corporal Fordham wrote me later that he was OK after having been unable to speak for a long, frightening time. Hospitalized in Japan, he wrote that he was ready to come back to the platoon. I wrote back that he had done more than his part and should try to get to the States with that wound. We missed Fordham's quick courage and will to work. He was a splendid soldier from upstate New York. I felt responsible for his having been shot and he barely missed being killed.

Our soldiers routinely took life-threatening risks. I am very proud of that, one of the best characteristics of American soldiers, but it was often foolish. All believed that nothing bad would happen to them. It was that way with every man.

### Psychological Warfare

Psychological Warfare briefly flourished on our hill. For several clear nights a team of ROKs set up a gasoline powered generator and loudspeaker to broadcast propaganda across the line. Our ROKs would invite the NKs to surrender, making promises of a good life. Some would sing between announcements. Not one of the enemy surrendered. The North Koreans responded in a day or two by mortaring leaflets for the ROK soldiers on 812. They had narrative messages in Korean with crude, cartoon-like drawings, some with an ugly, grasping Uncle Sam.

### Treachery

We all needed haircuts and as a morale builder, the company sent up a barber to cut hair and give marvelous hot water shaves. He made several visits before being discovered with drawings showing of our tank emplacements. I saw the drawings. National Police executed the guy as a North Korean Agent.

**Psychological Warfare briefly flourished on our hill. For several clear nights a team of ROKs set up a gasoline powered generator and loudspeaker to broadcast propaganda across the line. Our ROKs would invite the NKs to surrender, making promises of a good life ... The North Koreans responded in a day or two by mortaring leaflets for the ROK soldiers on 812.**

### Incoming Rounds and Raids

Procedure required a telephone report of incoming rounds. We called in the amount, size, and time of incoming. We always figured that heavy fire was in preparation for an assault. We got heavy fire from time to time but never got an assault. We believed that our regular output of 90mm and machine gun fire was a big factor in discouraging attacks.

Something ugly was always happening on our hill. Just as the Army had eliminated all-black units, it broke up the all Puerto Rican regiment in Korea while we were at 812. The unit originally served with distinction, but had become plagued with bug-outs, unauthorized retreats. An infantry private was sent to us when the Puerto Ricans were dispersed throughout Eighth Army. Arriving on the chow Jeep, he knew no English. I assigned him to Corporal Michaelson, who commanded the tank on our dangerous west flank.

The position was raided in a squad-sized attack on the Puerto Rican replacement's first night. North Koreans got to Michaelson's tank with a shaped charge weighing about 20 pounds. They were driven off, leaving the anti-tank explosive unused on the ground. Michaelson told us that during the fight the new guy lay moaning on the floor of the fighting compartment, doing nothing. Michaelson didn't appreciate my having assigned the untrained and confused soldier to him.

### People

Corporal Michaelson was another of those quiet people in the Army who could always be counted on to perform well. I relied heavily on him. On the other hand, I had taken a marginal master sergeant with us when we went to 812. Because of his rank he was made TC (tank commander). Even though the senior enlisted man on the hill, he just didn't work out. He curried favor with the men and overlooked sloppy work. Perhaps I did a poor job of bringing out his best. In any case, I put the sergeant on the chow Jeep one night and sent him back to the company. I told company to do what they wanted with him and to send me any replacement. I then called the men together and explained that the ranking enlisted man on that hill would be Corporal Michaelson. He was to be treated as if he were a master sergeant, though his pay and rank were that of corporal. On that hill we all observed military courtesy by saluting once a day but none of us wore rank anyhow. I had given Michaelson a brevet promotion, which is giving someone the responsibility without giving them the pay or rank, but he was legitimately promoted to sergeant before we left the

hill.

We had few visitors to 812. Our guys, probably out of envy for those in safer jobs, spoke of them derisively as tourists. A welcome visitor, however, was Chaplain Speiker, a New England Unitarian, who came up to pray and counsel.

### Good Times and Bad Times

Our latrine was a wooden ammunition box with a hole knocked in the top. Visiting it and taking down three layers of clothes to squat on the icy hillside could be quite a thrill, especially when a round came in. Someone took a picture of one of our most popular guys, Corporal Emillio C. Rodriquez, on that ammo box with his pants down. He was the funniest man in the outfit, always getting a laugh out of every situation. The picture was passed around after he was killed when the hill fell. In it he was laughing as always.

A tanker on 812 never, ever got much sleep or rest. Our duty schedule never let up. For me it was the responsibility for everything around the clock. We were constantly shooting, cleaning guns and pulling maintenance on the vehicles. Hand carrying gas and ammo in bad weather and reloading the heavy 90mm rounds after shoots was physically and mentally grinding for all. The pressure was constant. For me the worst of it was being scared by incoming fire and in making the rounds at night. Any of us might have several hours in which to sleep but be so wired we were unable to sleep. Then we might be plagued with sleepiness at a time when going to sleep was out of the question. All were subject to getting to the wit's end. The men had each other in ways I could not share.

I was mentally and physically exhausted when a savior arrived. Sergeant Bill Squires, the first sergeant of Company B, did not usually figure into my life. We hardly knew each other, strung out as the company was. He did not answer to platoon leaders. His duty was at the company CP, and he answered to the Exec and the CO. We were literally miles apart and seldom spoke on the phone. I had not laid eyes on him since arriving at Luke's Castle. He had no responsibility to me nor did I have any to him. That was the Army way. But Squires showed up on the chow Jeep one evening and told me to get in the sack and rest. He told me he would run things for a while. I do not know who told him I needed help or how he came to that conclusion on his own, but he was there. I needed the rest and I completely trusted him with my responsibility for 24 hours. I slept all that night and into the morning; then I



Courtesy photo

*The author, Lieutenant Frazer, (left) and Captain Dougherty stand outside the command post for B Company, 140th Tank Battalion in April 1953.*

heated water and bathed all over, before sleeping some more.

### End of the Tour

Spring rains set in. It was cold, wet and muddy. In our misery we continued to faithfully follow the SOPs, made new range cards every night, kept up the firing, covered infantry patrols, cleaned weapons, all of it. I continued inspections at night all around the perimeter and into the shadow of "The Rock" that was between our position and the enemy's. I knew which ROK trenches and fighting bunkers were vulnerable and closest to the North Koreans. I knew all of Captain Yul's positions; on some you could hear enemy voices. Sometimes I threw small stones into enemy positions to hear them tumble down on their side of 812. Their soldiers would chatter.

There was always the question of dealing with the next serious assault on our hill. We believed tanks could make a major contribution to the defense of 812. We had done it.

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**Nimrod T. Frazer** entered active duty as a private first class with the Alabama National Guard when it was mobilized in December of 1950. Commissioned a second lieutenant after completing OCS, he volunteered for Korea. He was recognized by the 37th ROK Infantry Regiment for the tour on Hill 812 described in this paper. In June of 1953 he was awarded The Silver Star for action at Hill 755. His unit, The 140th Tank Battalion was awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation.

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*CJTF 635: Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands*

# AN AUSTRALIAN ARMY UNIT'S QUICK RESPONSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRIS FIELD,  
AUSTRALIAN ARMY

*"May this memorial endure the ravages of time until the wind, rain and tropical storms wear away its face, but never its memories."*

Guadalcanal American Memorial, in Honiara, Solomon Islands

In the early hours of 22 December 2004, an Australian Federal Police Protective Services officer was murdered by sniper fire in Honiara, Guadalcanal, while conducting a vehicle patrol with the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In response, the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, A Company Ready Company Group (1 RAR RCG), was alerted that same day. Within 18 hours of the Australian government's decision to support RAMSI, about 100 men, vehicles, and equipment arrived by three Royal Australian Air Force C130 aircraft in the Solomon Islands to reinforce the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) portion of RAMSI known as Operation Anode.

The A Company 1 RAR RCG rapid deployment demonstrated the inherent utility and flexibility of light infantry by:

- Rapidly deploying forces into an unfamiliar and complex environment;
- Assuming command of a five-nation coalition joint task force;
- Working in support of an 11-nation participating police force (PPF); and
- Quickly demonstrating the Australian government's resolve to support the continued success of RAMSI.

This article aims to provide a brief background to RAMSI and Operation Anode; discuss high readiness as a culture within the Townsville-based Ready Deployment Force; and describe operations conducted by the 1 RAR RCG between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 while deployed to the Solomon Islands.

## Background to the Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

The Solomon Islands are located almost 1,900 kilometers northeast of Australia, and consist of a chain of mountainous



Photos courtesy of the Australian Department of Defence

*Privates Chris Harris and Kris Buck from the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, prepare to go on a patrol through the streets of Honiara on Christmas Eve 2004 in the Solomon Islands.*

islands and hundreds of coral atolls. The nation stretches almost 1,500 kilometers from the northwest, where it borders the Papua New Guinea province of Bougainville, to the southwest, where the Coral Sea meets the Pacific Ocean.

The Solomon Islands have an essentially Christian population of approximately 500,000. English is widely spoken in the main population centers. The government is democratically elected and the country is divided into nine provinces. The main population centers are found on the island of Guadalcanal, where the capital Honiara is located, and on the island of Malaita. The two key ethnic groupings, the Guadalcanal people, known as Gwales, and the Malaitans hail from these islands.

Europeans had visited the Solomon Islands sporadically since the 16th century, until Britain assumed a protectorate over the islands in the 1890s.



In May 1942, Admiral Yamamoto had hoped to bring the United States carrier force to a decisive battle in the central Pacific, but instead, agreed to support an assault on Port Moresby, New Guinea. The port would be a launch site for Japan's thrust into Australia. The United States Navy, thanks to American code-breaking efforts, had been warned of the approaching Japanese landing forces, and attacked first. The ensuing Battle of the Coral Sea, on 7 and 8 May 1942, marked the first Japanese naval defeat of the war.

Frustrated in their attempts to capture Port Moresby, and suffering the loss of the light carrier *Shoho* and damage to two larger carriers, the Japanese took a different approach to the capture of Port Moresby. Troops were landed on the Solomon Islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi to establish airfield and seaplane bases.

The Allies responded to these Japanese moves and, in what was the first amphibious operation undertaken by the United States forces in World War II, the Americans landed at Guadalcanal and Tulagi in order to commence the six-month struggle for a foothold in the Solomon Islands, which was dubbed Operation Watchtower. As a consequence of World War II operations, the prewar Solomon Islands administrative center at Tulagi was destroyed, and the capital shifted to Honiara — following the establishment of a large American base nearby on Guadalcanal.

The Solomon Islands were granted independence from Britain in 1978, and remained largely peaceful until significant ethnic-based violence erupted in late 1998. The underlying cause of ethnic unrest between the Gwales and the Malaitans emerged during World War II when a large number of Malaitans moved to the new capital. Honiara became Malaitan dominated and the southern coast of Guadalcanal, the Weathercoast, became the cultural heartland of the Gwales. Consequently, although Malaitans comprised only a quarter of the total Solomon Island population, they dominated political and ethnic affairs, which led to strong resentment among the Gwales.

By late 1998, this resentment had erupted into armed conflict as Gwales militants forced approximately 20,000 Malaitans from their homes in



Guadalcanal. A rival Malaitan militant force emerged in early 2000, which raided police armories and staged an armed coup in mid-2000. At that time, Australia and New Zealand assisted a cease-fire that led to the signing of the Townsville Peace Accords, or TPA, in October 2000 and the deployment of an unarmed International Peace Monitoring Team until June 2002. Although the TPA stemmed high level violence, some former militants continued to operate personal fiefdoms with armed followers, and others engaged in internecine conflict and criminal activity. Notably, the Solomon Islands do not have a defense force, and the Solomon Island's government relies on the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) force for law and order tasks.

In 2003, the RSIP were unable to contain rising lawlessness, which was underscored when the former Police Commissioner and National Peace Councillor, Sir Fred Soaki, was assassinated in February 2003. In July 2003, the Solomon Islands Prime Minister requested assistance from the Australian Prime Minister and a 'strengthened assistance' mission was planned.

On 24 July 2003, Coalition Joint Task Force 635 (CJTF 635) was established in the Solomon Islands, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Frewen, commanding officer of the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. CJTF 635


was established as the Australian Defence Force Operation Anode and was Australia's commitment to the regional 'strengthened assistance' mission Operation Helpem Fren. The overall force of civilians, police, and military was named RAMSI. This represented a new and unique model of regional intervention using the full complement of diplomatic, informational, economic, and military assets in a coordinated 'whole-of-government' approach. The aim of RAMSI was to prevent the Solomon Islands from descending into a 'failed state' without appearing neocolonialist.

At the height of RAMSI, there were nearly 1,800 joint and coalition military members from five nations (Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and Tonga) deployed. Significantly, although military members made up the largest contingent, they were only the supporting agency to the 11-nation PPF.

By December 2004, Operation Anode had been reduced in size, and CJTF 635 consisted of the CJTF headquarters and a platoon of infantry soldiers from New Zealand.

### **High Readiness as a Culture within the Townsville-based Ready Deployment Force**

The 1 RAR RCG deployment in December 2004, represented the



**Figure 1 — The Key Elements of the Ready Battalion Group/Ready Company Group**

culmination of almost 25 years of training, development, rehearsals, and sweat from thousands of soldiers who have served in the Townsville-based 3rd Brigade, home of the ADF's Ready Deployment Force (RDF). It was the vision of the Australian government, in 1981, when the 3rd Brigade was designated the Operational Deployment Force (the name was changed to Ready Deployment Force in 1995) that the Australian Army should maintain a high readiness formation. For a quarter of a century, the 3rd Brigade has fostered a culture of high readiness for the brigade's soldiers. Such a culture enabled the rapid deployment of the 1 RAR RCG to the Solomon Islands on 23 December 2004.

High readiness units in the 3rd Brigade must be:

- Agile in command relationships being able to quickly task organize in combined arms, joint, or coalition environments;
- Flexible in deployment options from the land, air, or sea;
- Highly competent in warfighting skills required in complex environments from the jungle, the littorals, open country, and the urban battlespace; and
- 'Spartan' in ethos, through training within resource constraints, and maintaining combat equipment that is light and air-portable.

These high readiness skills and attributes are maintained and rehearsed through an extensive 3rd Brigade training program that includes combined arms, joint, and coalition exercises, as well as jungle, urban, amphibious, air-mobile, and parachute training. Integral to the 3rd Brigade training program is annual training with the Australian Army's Combat Training Center, Combined Arms Battle Wing and Jungle Training Wing, Tully, which provide mission rehearsal exercises for the Ready Battalion Group (RBG).

The RBG, comprises soldiers from all but two of the Australian Army's corps (aviation and education corps), and is responsible for providing two capabilities for the ADF. Firstly, the RBG, at a permanently short notice to move, conducts infantry battalion group land operations in order to defeat the enemy in close combat, through maintaining high level proficiencies in complex terrain operations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and evacuation operations. Secondly, the RBG provides a sub-element of combat power, in the form of the Ready Company Group (RCG), at a notice to move that is significantly less than the RBG, again to conduct infantry company group/combat team land operations in

order to defeat the enemy in close combat. The key elements of the RBG/RCG, command and control, combat maneuver, combat service support, and offensive fire support (Figure 1), are task organized according to missions assigned.

In December 2004, the 1 RAR Battalion Group was providing the ADF's RBG capability, and A Company, 1 RAR Group was providing the core of the RCG. For A Company, 1 RAR RCG to deploy to the Solomon Islands within 18 hours of the Australian government's decision to support RAMSI, significant training was required during 2004. This training included: 1 RAR's assumption of Ready

Battalion Group status in April 2004; RBG call-out and assessment, Exercise Eveready Blue, August 2004; 3rd Brigade amphibious and airborne, Exercise Swift Eagle, September 2004; and, the A Company RCG call-out and embarking on HMAS Kanimbla in early December 2004. The A Company RCG continued to train during the Christmas 2004 3rd Brigade reduced tempo period, enabling rapid recall and readiness currency, especially with regards to shooting skills.

High readiness is expensive in terms of maintaining Soldier individual competencies, fitness, health, family support, and conditions of service. The baseline readiness within the 3rd Brigade is monitored closely by all elements of the chain of command, from corporal to brigadier, to ensure that the RCG, and the larger RBG, are supported through logistic, resource, and personnel policies that ensure these groups are always ready to deploy within designated notice to move.

### **Operations conducted by the 1 RAR RCG between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005**

The mission of the 1 RAR RCG was to provide military security support to the PPF in order to reinforce the maintenance of law and order in the Solomon Islands.

#### **Three Interrelated Premises**

Operations by the 1 RAR RCG in the Solomon Islands between 22 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 were based on three interrelated premises:

- (1) The existing Operation Anode CJTF 635 was to be reinforced in order to strengthen the ADF's support to RAMSI;
- (2) The security environment in the Solomon Islands was to be rapidly and professionally enhanced; and
- (3) The 1 RAR RCG deployment was to be effects-based, and measures were to be immediately developed in order to assess the impact the deployment was having in the Solomon Islands.

#### **Premise One: Reinforcement of RAMSI**

The three interrelated premises required two comprehensive actions by the 1 RAR RCG. First, the command and control of CJTF 635 needed to be firmly arranged to account for a triple



*Private Shaun Dwyer from the 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, conducts a patrol with a Royal Solomon Islands police officer on December 24, 2004.*

increase of in-theatre troop numbers. Secondly, the 1 RAR RCG required the amendment of CJTF 635 procedures with regards to: intelligence targeting and collection; methods of movement and maneuver throughout the Solomon Islands; logistics arrangements within the CJTF and between the CJTF and RAMSI; and, significant enhancements to CJTF force protection.

CJTF 635 had been commanded, prior to the arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, by an Australian Army major, who was the CJTF commander and military adviser to the special coordinator of RAMSI, James Batley. Upon the arrival in the Solomon Islands of the commanding officer of the 1RAR (CO 1 RAR), a lieutenant colonel, the Australian major assumed the sole role of military adviser to RAMSI, while CO 1 RAR assumed command of CJTF 635.

CJTF 635 has, from the inception of RAMSI, developed a *supporting/supported* relationship with the participating police force, which in addition to Australia was comprised of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. In December 2004, the chief of the PPF was Australian Federal Police Commissioner Sandi Peisley. Fortunately, during 2004 1RAR had extensively rehearsed the operation of *supporting/supported* command and control relationships with the Royal Australian Navy's Amphibious Task Group, during numerous amphibious training exercises. In essence, *supporting/supported* command and control relationships require "special emphasis ... to task grouping, economy, and coordination between parallel chains of command," according to the Australian Defence Force doctrine publication *Operations Series, Amphibious Operations*. The 1 RAR RCG quickly understood the requirement to be the *supporting* element of RAMSI in order to ensure that the PPF produced the most credible effect in the Solomon Islands in the wake of the murder of an Australian police officer.

The deputy commander of CJTF 635 was a New Zealand

captain, who remained as the deputy CJTF commander upon assumption of command by CO 1 RAR. The CJTF 635 staff who were serving in the Solomon Islands upon the arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, continued to be commanded directly by the New Zealand captain, while being responsive to the operational requirements of the 1 RAR RCG. The CJTF 635 staff included personnel from the Defence Forces of Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tongan, as well as personnel from the Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force.

CJTF 635's maneuver and security element prior to the arrival of the 1 RAR RCG was a platoon from 2nd/1st Battalion, The Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (2/1 RNZIR). This platoon was assigned under operational control to the 1 RAR RCG upon arrival of the 1 RAR RCG in the Solomon Islands. This command relationship provided the 1 RAR RCG

company commander, an Australian Army major, with 12 sections, each of approximately nine men, to support RAMSI operations throughout the Solomon Islands. This increase in CJTF 635 sections enabled the development of a broad, and immediately successful, patrolling program in support of RAMSI throughout the islands of Malaita and Guadalcanal.

### **Premise Two: Rapid and Professional Enhancement of the Security Environment**

With command and control measures in place the 1 RAR RCG, combined with the New Zealand platoon from 2/1 RNZIR, commenced increasing the tempo of patrolling in the Solomon Islands.

This was a corporal's operation and the 12 section commanders, with their well-trained soldiers, displayed their calm professionalism and superb patrolling skills during the 34-day deployment. It were the corporals from Australia and New Zealand who commanded all of the patrols in support of the RAMSI PPF. The corporals performed more than 300 tasks in support of the PPF including: foot and mobile patrols; supporting special response and investigative operations; conducting provincial patrols; and providing a quick response to assist any high value search operations. The corporals allowed the CJTF to accurately target intelligence and collection assets. The corporals used their warfighting patrolling skills in a peace supporting manner in order to dominate the battle space so that criminal elements in the Solomon Islands either went to ground, or were arrested. The corporals made the logistics arrangements, which have always been complicated by the harsh terrain and climate of the Solomon Islands, work every day, with few complaints, and zero failures. The corporals continued to train their soldiers, especially in shooting skills, in order to maintain the operational edge for the 1 RAR RCG. It

were the corporals who integrated new ADF technologies, such as the outstanding Personal Role Radio into a new, complex, and demanding operating environment. It were the corporals who ensured that previous failures in CJTF 635 force protection methods were not repeated. The corporals supported and shepherded their PPF charges in accordance with the police patrolling needs in an absolutely professional and faultless manner.

The section commanders of CJTF 635 assumed their tasks in support of RAMSI with gusto. Around 70 percent of the 1 RAR RCG had previous operational experience, mostly from East Timor, although experience from Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland was also present amongst the RCG members. Supporting RAMSI was not a mission for which the 1 RAR RCG had specifically trained. On the contrary, the 1 RAR RCG had trained for complex warfighting throughout 2004, particularly warfighting in littoral, jungle, and urban environments. However, the foundation of the 1 RAR RCG's success in

the Solomon Islands was based on:

- Leadership, not only from personnel with rank, but from every senior soldier in the RCG;

- Exceptional soldier skills;

- Comprehensive training and evaluation in complex environments, particularly the littoral, jungle and urban battlespaces;

- A culture of high readiness that allowed soldiers to concentrate on operations and not be distracted by getting ready for operations; and,

- A huge pool of operational experience for soldiers from multiple theatres inherent in the RCG, and indeed in the RBG.

The 1 RAR RCG's exceptional leadership was not limited to personnel with rank, but also from every senior soldier in the RCG. This fact is of significance when thinking about future war within complex environments. Within 1 RAR, the average length of service in the Army for Private soldiers is five years. That means

the soldiers joined the Australian Army in approximately mid-2000. In most cases such soldiers have deployed, with 1 RAR, to East Timor in 2003. Now many have also deployed to the Solomon Islands. Most importantly, 1 RAR's soldiers have only ever served in an Australian Defence Force that is constantly deployed on operations.

In between operational deployments, the soldiers have undertaken Combat Training Centre, Combined Arms Battle Wing and Jungle Training Wing, Tully, exercises plus they have participated in numerous military skills competitions, and Company, Battalion, Brigade, and Multi-National Exercises. Such experience creates a warfighter who is battle smart, battle fit, a battle shot, and, a battle leader. Such a warfighter stands, within the high readiness culture of the RBG, ready to deploy in order to seek out and close with the enemy, to kill or capture him, to seize and hold ground and repel attack, by day or night, into complex environments regardless of season, weather, or terrain.



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### **Premise Three: The 1 RAR RCG deployment as an Effects-Based Operation**

Effects-based operations for the 1 RAR RCG and CJTF 635, were supported by a daily Joint Targeting Board (JTB) which was implemented by CO 1 RAR upon arrival in the Solomon Islands. The daily JTB fused intelligence gained by the CJTF with PPF intelligence in order to target areas for CJTF/PPF patrolling. Upon arrival of the 1 RAR RCG, every CJTF patrol was in support of the PPF, and every CJTF patrol was against targets developed by the JTB. The CJTF's 12 sections were not sufficient to allow wasted, or misdirected, patrol efforts. As a result activities such as "shopping" and "tourist" patrols and patrols not in support of the PPF were immediately banned by CO 1 RAR.

The daily JTB allowed CJTF 635 to synchronize operations in support of the PPF. The PPF campaign plan, following the deployment of the RCG, was to quickly eliminate the need for additional military support to RAMSI, and return RAMSI to pre-22 December 2004 levels of force protection. In addition, the PPF had the longer term goal of turning police operations in the Solomon Islands over to the Royal Solomon Island Police (RSIP) in order to ensure that law and order in the Solomon Islands was controlled by the Solomon Island people. The daily JTB allowed CJTF 635 to quickly tailor tactical operations to support PPF campaign goals. The daily JTB ensured excellent communications between the PPF tactical operators and the CJTF tactical operators, particularly the police and soldiers on patrol. Special mention is given to Superintendent Tony Donne who, as a key member of the daily JTB, provided an outstanding contribution the success of the 1 RAR RCG, and RAMSI, mission.

Most importantly the daily JTB enabled the following tactics, techniques, and procedures to be developed between the PPF and CJTF 635: developing a joint-patrol roster; pairing CJTF 635 Section Commanders with PPF Shift Supervisors; aligning the CJTF 635 patrol timings with PPF patrol shifts; supporting all RAMSI patrolling with intelligence assets; and, aligning PPF/CJTF community relations tasks with the operational need.

The daily JTB soon paid dividends with the capture of three significant anti-RAMSI personnel in support of the RSIP. Apart from the aforementioned results the JTB and the 1 RAR RCG developed other measures of effectiveness (MOE) for the 1 RAR RCG in order to assess the impact the deployment was having in the Solomon Islands in support of RAMSI. These MOE were a challenge for the 1 RAR RCG and the JTB to develop. The existing CJTF 635 was without MOE, and therefore an inaugural set was developed, using the Joint Military Appreciation Process, and presented to the Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral R.E. Shalders, on 26 December 2004, less than 48-hours after the arrival of the RCG in the Solomon Islands.

### **Conclusion**

The A Company 1 RAR, Ready Company Group (RCG), deployment in support of the Regional Mission to the Solomon Islands, represented a significant achievement for the Australian Defence Force. The RCG was directed to reinforce Australia's and the Pacific Region's efforts, in support of the government of the Solomon Islands, and this reinforcement occurred with speed,



*The rapid deployment of A Company, 1 RAR, represented a significant achievement for the Australian Defence Force.*

professional acumen, supported by an effects-based campaign plan. As this article is written, RAMSI is continuing as a most successful regional peacekeeping effort.

A Company, 1 RAR RCG returned to Australia on 25 January 2005. 2005 marks two significant milestones for 1 RAR, The Big Blue One. These milestones include 1 RAR's 60th Birthday, 12 October 1945, and 1 RAR's deployment as the lead Australian infantry Battalion in Vietnam in June 1965. There is no doubt, that when 1 RAR Soldiers deploy on operations they do so with the weight of 1 RAR expectations on their shoulders; both from soldiers serving and soldiers past. The A Company 1 RAR RCG deployment to reinforce Operation Anode in the Solomon Islands, once again proved that 1 RAR is the force of choice in operations that involve rapid deployment, complex environments, and professional execution.

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# Kinetic Targeting in Iraq at the Battalion Task Force Level: *FROM TARGET TO DETAINEE*

CAPTAIN JEREMIAH PRAY

The Iraqi Theater of Operations is a very complex and diverse environment. As battalion task forces are employed across the country, each faces unique struggles with equally unique ways to deal with them. The following are observations and techniques to kinetically target the enemy that I have developed in the last seven months as a battalion task force S-2 (intelligence officer) in Tikrit, Iraq.

“Targeting” in the broad sense of the word at the battalion task force level involves incorporating lethal and nonlethal resources and methods to destroy/influence not only the enemy but the civilian populace with the intended end-state of defeating enemy activities and denying sanctuary. The task force S-2 plays a key role in targeting by analyzing past enemy activities, identifying trends, determining enemy intent, and making recommendations to best target the individuals or events. “Kinetic targeting,” however, is primarily the responsibility of the task force S-2. This process involves identifying individual targets, creating targeting packets on them, capturing them, and detaining them. In order to do this process you must understand who the enemy is and what motivates him, how his cell network is constructed, how to create a targeting packet, how to plan and coordinate the raid, and what the detention process is.

## Who Is The Enemy And What Motivates Him?

In the Task Force 1-18 area of operations the enemy is defined in two categories: leaders and active kinetic fighters. Tikrit, with its strong ties to the Ba’ath Party, represents the heart of the former regime. Located in the Salah Ad Din Province (the Sunni Triangle), Tikrit has several former regime leaders (FRLs) associated with it (Saddam Hussein, Izzat Al Duri [BL#6], and Mohammed Al Hadoushi [BL#167] to name a few), and they will naturally come back to their families and tribes. Saddam Hussein never left Salah Ad Din because his family and tribe provided him sanctuary.

Although many of these FRLs do not conduct direct attacks against Coalition forces, they have the financial means to pay others to conduct attacks, and they also represent Coalition force defiance.


The active kinetic fighters are the vast majority of captured targets. These men are made up of the unemployed, uninformed, anti-U.S., recently released detainees, and Islamic fundamentalists. The major motivation for these men to conduct attacks on Coalition forces is their feeling of denial of basic essential needs; in other words, they feel that the existing power or government is not adequately providing for them. Essential needs are defined as power, water, sewage, and sanitation. Another motivation Iraqis have to join the insurgency is unemployment. The unemployment rate in the major cities of Iraq, to include Tikrit, has been estimated at around 50 percent, but this is not unusual. Many of these men do not seek employment because they have always seemed to get by, but as the free market economy in Iraq grows, so does the need to have money. Those who cannot afford to pay for essential needs and to support their families are potential recruits for enemy leadership to pay to conduct attacks on U.S. forces.

In addition to normal unemployment, just north of Tikrit was the headquarters of the Iraqi Republican Guard and the National Iraqi Armor School. A suburb of Northern Tikrit (Cadasia) grew from this military complex to house the many soldiers and officers that worked there. With the fall of the former regime’s military, many of these men are now unemployed and militarily trained

which makes for a dangerous combination.

Islamic fundamentalists make up a small group of the active kinetic fighters in Tikrit. They are typically foreign fighters from countries like Syria and Iran seeking to bring the fight to the Americans in the name of Muslim “jihad.” These Islamic fundamentalists are more frequently drawn to places like Fallujah and Samarra where they feel they have sanctuary. In Tikrit (99.9-percent Sunni Muslim) foreigners “stand out” and have a difficult time finding

Figure 1 — Insurgent Cell Role Requirements



sanctuary. The key indicator that foreign fighters are operating in the area is simply an increase in attacks in places where attacks have not been before. The number of attacks in the area of operations will suddenly increase and then suddenly stop. Typically, by the time you receive information that “outsiders” are conducting attacks in your area they have already left.

### **How Is His Cell Network Constructed?**

The anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) cell is a group who works together to plan and conduct independent attacks and operations with the aim of destroying and undermining the current Iraqi government supported by Coalition forces. A doctrinal template of an insurgent cell can logically be constructed because any insurgent cell of this nature has certain role requirements (see Figure 1). The cell must have a leader (commonly referred to as the “organizer”) and he is usually, but not always, also the financier. The leader will meet with up to four individuals at a predetermined location. These meeting places can be: the leader’s house, business, other safe house, café/restaurant, mosque, or by telephone. The leader may or may not meet with all of these men at the same time. These men will be the only personnel that deal directly with the cell leader.

These four men represent: intelligence collection, operations, logistics, and recruiting. The intelligence collection representative is responsible for identifying locations and times of when to best conduct attacks. He will have a group of observers, “scouts” (very low level AIF) that may do nothing more than observe and report when Coalition or Iraqi Security Forces pass by. The operations representative is responsible for planning the attacks and training the attackers. He will either meet directly with the intelligence collection representative or meet with the cell leader and intelligence person at the same time. The logistics representative is responsible for providing the weapons and resources for the cell to conduct an attack. He will have access to multiple weapon caches and dealers. He will deal directly with the financier of the cell to pay for these supplies. The recruiter will also deal directly with the financier in order to pay for recruits that are financially motivated.

The recruiter will target specific types of recruits in specific locations. He will recruit Islamic fundamentalists at religious gatherings, like mosques; often a religious leader, such as an Imam, will be the recruiter in this case. He will recruit the unemployed from the low-income neighborhoods as they often gather on the city streets looking for employment. He can recruit former military through a network of their former military associates. Outsiders (foreign fighters) will typically have preestablished lodging to use as a base of operations, possibly the recruiters’ home. The last source of recruiting for cell operatives, and possibly the most common, is young members of the immediate family. In the Iraqi culture family loyalty is their greatest security against cell members providing information to Coalition forces and ISF.

No matter the source of recruitment, all of the operatives will have to meet at a predetermined location (safe house) to receive the mission and collect the necessary supplies. The operations representative and the recruiter are the only members of the cell required to be there with the operatives. From this point the operatives are able to conduct the attack. The operations representative may or may not participate in the attack based on

the level of sophistication of the attack and the experience of the operatives. In Tikrit these cells are typically small (3-6 man groups) that are family related in some way to one another. It is very important to note that one person may assume multiple roles in the cell. The leader may also be responsible for intelligence, operations, logistics, and recruiting. It is possible that the leader may be responsible for all four duties.

### **How To Create A Targeting Packet**

At battalion task force level, the S-2 will create the majority of the targeting packets. Occasionally a target will come from “higher,” but these make up only about 10 percent of your total targets. This is because no one will understand the area better than the task force that owns it; and more importantly, no one deals with an area’s population more than that task force. The key to the targeting process is human intelligence (HUMINT) sources or tactical informants. The overwhelming majority of all planned raids conducted are driven by human information.

The Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) can be an incredibly useful resource at the battalion task force level. THTs are not typically assigned directly to a battalion task force, but it is at that level where they are most useful. At the battalion task force level the THT can participate in targeting meetings and the maneuver companies can help move them throughout the sector to meet with sources. Often the reports the THT generate are the only evidence that the task force has on a targeted individual. Maneuver company commanders know that it is through the THT reports that they receive information for future raids.

So, where do HUMINT sources come from? HUMINT sources primarily come from three places: “walk-ins,” detainees, and ISF. Walk-in sources are those individuals who come to the gate of any forward operating base (FOB) claiming they know something. The typical procedure is an intelligence representative will pick them up and question them. These HUMINT sources typically are motivated by the thought that if they provide useful information to Coalition forces they will be rewarded either through money or contracts. Occasionally, these sources will provide information that will lead directly to a target. Mostly, however, these sources will have information on small munitions caches or potential “bad” individuals but tend to lack specifics on names, places, and even offenses.

Detainees typically provide better information than “walk-in” sources, but in order to exploit these sources the battalion task force must be very proactive. The targeting process does not end after the detainee is pushed to the detention facility. The task force must work directly with the interrogators to help in explaining the significance of the individual, what information led to his capture, and what further information you are trying to gain from him. The THT can assist and “sit in” on the interrogations to help direct the line of questioning.

The best and most reliable sources come from the ISF. With a good working relationship of information sharing and providing needed resources, ISF can provide excellent information for potential targets. Just as with any aspect of human intelligence the right personality is the key to collecting information. I arranged a meeting with my Iraqi National Guard (ING) S-2 counterpart at his workplace where I created a presentation showing the reasons why I felt enemy activity was going to increase in the near future (see Figure 2).




Figure 2 — Possible Increases in Insurgent Activity

I explained to him my commanders' intent of dealing with the increase in enemy activity through denying sanctuary with an increase in intelligence driven raids. I provided him with a list of task force targets we had developed that I carefully "vetted" in order to not reveal my sources so they would be protected. After my ING counterpart completely understood my commanders' intent and understood my desire to work together with him, he became a great asset to the kinetic targeting process. By providing targets through his sources and intelligence collectors, the AIF started to target him and members of his S-2 shop. This is a typical problem with Iraqis that help Coalition forces, but we were able to counter it by providing him and other outstanding members of the ING with 24-hour "bodyguards" provided by ING soldiers. In Iraqi culture "bodyguards" are a status symbol and by providing that to him, he was even more willing to work with us.

The ING has become so proactive that now it is not uncommon for a group of ING to capture a target (of a time sensitive nature) and turn him into us where together we generate the detention paperwork. My THT and I meet with the ING S-2 once a week (in what I call my indigenous targeting meeting) to share information, refocus targeting, further develop targets, and gather more information on captured targets.

Although HUMINT intelligence is the primary method for collecting targeting information, it is not the only means of collection. Other collection assets such as SIGINT offer excellent tools and resources but are often so removed from tactical planning (division and above asset) that they are not utilized effectively. A solution we developed to better focus and share intelligence is the Kinetic Targeting Meeting. This is a meeting held once every week with an audience of: Battalion S-2, THT, ODA intelligence representatives, division SIGINT representatives, and occasionally interrogators from the detention facility. It is in this forum (led by the TF S-2) where we discuss recent indicators on our task force high value target (HVT) list, new developing targeting information, and target focus for the next week. It is also an opportunity to discuss task force operations with the division SIGINT representatives so they will understand the tactical phases of an operation and can develop a plan to best overwatch the targeted area with signal intercept assets. The information shared in this meeting can be vetted and used in the indigenous targeting meeting. Ultimately what is gained in the Kinetic Targeting Meeting is sharing of intelligence with all the key intelligence resources in the battalion task force sector, and it is through this open sharing and discussion that many targets are further developed.

## The Raid

Kinetically, the raid is one of the most effective task force level operations. It serves the obvious purpose to capture suspected enemy personal, but also serves the purpose to deny enemy sanctuary through "information operations" (IO). Even if the intended target is not captured, the IO message that "if you are a bad guy Coalition forces will come and take you from your house in the middle of the night" is spread throughout the city. The majority of raids we conduct are "cordon and knocks" for two reasons:

- 1) The enemy threat level typically indicates that he will not resist; and
- 2) The intelligence is not always exact and the targeted individual may be a few houses to the left or right.

If the wrong house is raided but no harm is done and the occupants are treated with dignity and respect, they will often lead you to the right house. Operationally, raids are the safest kinetic missions we do in the task force. We have never sustained a casualty and the enemy has never fired a single round on a raid due to the U.S. dominance during limited visibility. Raids, for the most part, are conducted between 0001-0300 (after curfew begins and with enough time to be complete before curfew ends).

To conduct a raid you need two things: a target and a location. The target is typically gained through the targeting process and during that process you have to determine the best way to identify his location for the raiding element. The three most common ways to identify a target location (from least to most preferred) are: the source provides a hand drawn map/map recon, the source obtains the grid with a GPS, and the source leads the raiding element on a recon or to the raid. The problem with hand drawn maps and source map recons is most Iraqis do not often deal with maps and can not exactly pinpoint the target location. Conceptualizing the city from above on a map is very unfamiliar to them. The FalconView imagery program can be used to help identify target locations and can be used when constructing operational plans. If the source is unwilling to do the recon with the raiding element, this may be the best information you will have, but be prepared to expand your search and cordon several houses/blocks to the left and right. The hand-held GPS is a valuable tool in the targeting

process. If possible the battalion task force should purchase several “easy to use” units for their sources to obtain grids. The only problem with this technique is the source needs to be trained in manipulating the GPS unit and understand that he needs to be as close to the target location as possible. He should also obtain a detailed description of the house to assist the raiding element in identifying the target location. By far, the best way to identify target locations is with a source led recon. Obviously, the source’s identity needs to be protected so he is given a disguise (DCUs, neck gaiter to cover his face, sunglasses, and DCU hat). If the source is willing to lead you to the target, there is a greater chance that his information is credible.

### The Detention Process

Once the target is captured, he will be taken back to the FOB for the detention processing. To detain an individual his detention packet must have a picture of the detainee (preferably taken with any evidence he was captured with), a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) form, and three DA Form 2823s “sworn statements” completed by soldiers that participated on the raid (at least one of which should be a leader). Other items that may be added to the detention packets include DA Form 4137 (evidence/property custody document) and all the information compiled in his targeting packet, i.e. THT reports. Once the detainee(s) is brought back to the FOB the S-2 shop will surge on the paperwork for the detention packet.

The soldiers who are completing the “sworn statements” need to be very specific in who, what, where, when, and why they captured an individual. It helps if, before they start writing, they agree on the name of the target with the same spelling, what evidence came from the target house, the grid location, at exactly what time the raid was conducted, and what the target is suspected of doing. This will prevent inconsistencies in the statements. Detainees are pushed as soon as possible (typically within four hours from capture) to the detention facility. This allows the capturing unit to continue with their tactical missions. Any further questioning of the detainee can be done through coordination with the detention facility in a controlled environment.

After a raid (or series of raids) is conducted, it is important to gain an assessment of the effects on the insurgents and the community. Often a raid target is focused at a specific individual or enemy event (suspected 21 JUN RPG shooter or suspected 15 AUG improvised explosive device maker). If that TTP for attacks stops completely, than there is a good chance the perpetrator was captured or someone close enough to the perpetrator was captured (same cell) which has the same effect of stopping that type of attack. It is important to assess the reaction of the community as well. If the raid target is completely innocent, the “innocent” members of the community will feel that Coalition forces indiscriminately target people and detain them for no reason. The community will begin to look to the insurgency for security. By engaging the local community leader (sheik) who, after the target is detained, will often feel more comfortable talking about what or who he was involved with. Sometimes, the sheik will “vouch” for an individual who has been detained. If the evidence on that detainee is weak, it may be more beneficial to release him to the sheik. The sheik will then be responsible for the target’s actions.

The Iraqi Theater of Operations is a fluid, constantly changing



Staff Sergeant Klaus Baesu

*Specialist Shawn McKenzie of Task Force 1-18 provides security in downtown Tikrit, Iraq, November 1, 2004.*

environment. The observations and TTPs I have developed work well for me in my task force in Tikrit, but that is because certain conditions have been set. Our sister ING battalion has grown into a credible and reliable organization, our battalion operates from in the city and not from a distant FOB, and we have access to certain division assets because we are co-located on the same FOB. The basic fundamentals of understanding who the enemy is and what motivates him, how his cell network is constructed, how to create a targeting packet, what is required for a raid, and how to detain a target once he is captured are what the task force S-2s have to develop. What works here may not work well in other areas, but for task force S-2s preparing to deploy these TTPs will give a good “start point” for preparing for their mission.

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# MANIPULATING YOUR BATTLE SPACE TO WIN

DAN SMITH

## Defensive Posture

For many units the current focus seems to be on defensive tactics. These units often conduct mounted patrols depending on material solutions such as armor to get them safely past the enemy improvised explosive device (IED) ambush. This defensive posture allows the enemy to survive and learn, change tactics, improve explosives, and garner more popular support with his activities. The solution to the enemy activity is not to just survive the attack. The solution is to kill or capture the enemy. Killing the enemy not only stops his actions, it deters future actions and hinders recruiting efforts. It also undermines popular support when the fighters are seen as ineffective.

## Presence Patrols

The phrase “presence patrol” is often used to indicate a patrol that actually has no mission. Frequently when I ask for the patrol’s mission I get the response that it is a “presence patrol.” The patrol has no clearly defined goal. Soldiers/Marines often realize this and develop the attitude that they are just riding around until they get blown up. Every patrol should have a mission.

## Hesitant to Dismount

Many units appear hesitant to dismount Soldiers and end up riding the roads an inordinate amount of time. The road is a kill zone. Bunching your troops in a vehicle and riding the roads just makes them a high value target for an enemy IED ambush. These rolling patrols only secure their immediate area. As such they only secure a piece of terrain for the eight seconds or so it takes to drive by that location. This allows the enemy



*A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade, pulls security in Shah Wali Ko, Afghanistan.*

Specialist Jerry T. Combes

a lot of freedom of movement within your area of operations (AO). Mobility and firepower are the main strengths of the mounted patrol and are useful tools. But having a dismounted presence is important if you want to control your AO. Dismounted activities such as patrols, observation posts (OPs), and ambushes will allow you to kill the enemy.

### **Manipulate Your Battle Space**

The enemy's strengths derive from his ability to hide within the populace. This allows him to select the time and place to engage you with his IED and small arms fire (SAF) ambushes. In this way, he avoids your superior firepower and controls your battle space. You must address his strengths with your tactics. Utilize a coordinated effort of overt and covert activities to manipulate your battle space to get the enemy to show up at a time and place of your choosing so that you can kill him.

Identify the various sites in your AO where the enemy frequently chooses to fight you with IEDs. From this list select the site that offers your unit the best combination of concealment and firing positions for a "killer team." Then conduct overt activities to deny the enemy the other likely IED ambush sites, luring them into the ambush site where you have covertly positioned a killer team. This method was recently used by a Marine unit and resulted in the killing of two IED emplacement teams. This is not a sniper mission. Although snipers have the skills and mind-set for this type operation, any Marine fire team or Army infantry squad should be able to work as a killer team. On numerous occasions sniper teams have had an opportunity to engage an IED installation team. The sniper shoots one man, and the rest jump in the vehicle and get away. You need a killer team with a machine gun in ambush. If you have a sniper or designated marksman, he has one purpose — shoot the driver. If the driver gets out of the vehicle, you should still shoot him first. You want to prevent the rest of the enemy IED team from being able to utilize the vehicle for escape. As soon as the designated marksman engages, the machine gunner and any other riflemen able to do so engage the rest of the enemy IED team. If the enemy runs to the vehicle, then you

also engage the vehicle with gunfire until they are all dead or they escape your AO. Your killer teams need to be mutually supportive. You need to utilize multiple positions that are spread out along the enemy's probable path of travel. (Linear ambush in depth) Ideally they should have overlapping fields of view and good communications is a must. If the enemy IED team escapes from the first killer team, they call ahead to the next position with a good vehicle description so that the next killer team can identify and engage the vehicle as it comes into their kill zone.

### **Be Creative**

The technique of manipulating your battle space can be utilized at all levels from platoon to company level to battalion. It seems to work best when a whole battalion works to coordinate their overt and covert activities to drive the enemy to the killer teams. The enemy is using your whole AO and so should you. The enemy frequently sets a pattern with his operations that you can exploit. Be creative! Think hunting. Many units are using OPs and snipers but not in a coordinated way. If a deer hunter goes into the woods before daylight, takes a stand and waits, he might occasionally bag a buck just through luck. If he scouts first, finds a place the deer like to go and puts his stand there, the odds are much higher of a kill. If he puts corn and salt at the place the deer like to go and then has his buddies go walk around in the other areas the deer like to go, his odds of bagging a buck go way up. Do the same thing to bag the enemy. Check the intel and find a place with a lot of enemy IED activity. Identify good hiding sites in that area. When possible, infil your killer teams before daylight. Then actively push patrols in the other areas to ensure that the enemy goes to the sweet spot you left for them.

### **Success**

Recently, I was working with a Marine battalion. Upon arrival, I briefed the "Manipulate Your Battle Space" concept with a liberal dose of deer hunting analogies. The battalion commander immediately grasped the concept and spread the word. They were already using sniper teams and OPs so they were on the right track. Marine light infantry are

tremendous fighters and possess the skills and mind-set required. They achieved immediate results. Over the following week, they killed two installer teams of two men each in the same section of a main supply route (MSR) during daylight hours. They also fired up two other installer teams that managed to get into their vehicles and get away. The vehicles were later recovered with lots of blood but no bodies. These killer teams did not have mutually supportive killer teams in place and that allowed the enemy to escape. In both cases terrain made it difficult to emplace another team in support.

The battalion that was in the AO prior to this unit did not get any kills during their rotation. This battalion got several in a week by coordinating their covert and overt activities. In one instance, the killer team could observe a vehicle from their hidden position. It was stopped but they were unable to visually determine what the enemy was doing. Finally, one member of the killer team had to move out of cover to get a visual. The IED installers saw the Marine, and in their attempt to disarm the IED and escape they set the IED off inside their vehicle, killing both of the occupants. The killer team achieved their objective without firing a shot.

In the second situation, a Combined Anti-Armor Team (CAAT) platoon moved into a hide site behind some berms before daylight along a four-lane MSR. Four-man fire teams deployed east and west along the MSR to take up hide sites leaving a main force in the center. They were overlooking a Tier One IED site. Other elements of the battalion were patrolling hard in other areas to deny the enemy that terrain. The only spot left open was one that they liked to use anyway. At 1330 hrs, the eastern most killer team spotted a vehicle that stopped on the shoulder of the highway. The emplacement went quickly, and the IED installers jumped back into their vehicle to go. The killer team engaged the front of the truck with an M240 machine gun. The vehicle accelerated, so the machine gunner engaged the cab, wounding at least one of the occupants. We heard the firing at our main position in the center. The eastern killer team immediately called on the radio with a vehicle description. They were located about 1,500 meters to our east. We had a visual on the truck immediately, and when it entered the kill zone it was engaged

successfully, killing both occupants and setting the vehicle on fire, burning the bodies extensively.

It is important to note that the morale of the Soldiers/Marines on the ground goes up when they are actively pursuing the enemy. Even the units patrolling to deny terrain and drive the enemy to another location were happy because the mission had a purpose.

### Other Specific Suggestions

If you have an IED site that has no good hide sites, use your overt actions (OPs and patrols) to deny the enemy access to that location. Have your covert team at the next best location in a good hide awaiting the enemies' arrival.

Use very active overt actions (patrols, traffic control points [TCPs], etc) in two locations with a dead space in the middle where you have a covert killer team hidden in ambush. The enemy will often try to take advantage of the dead space in the middle.

Have a mounted patrol move through your covert site. The enemy often falls in behind a mounted patrol and sets the IED out after the overt patrol has passed. They assume that they have a block of safe time just after the patrol has passed. They will move in behind IED sweep operations and hasty TCPs for the same reason.

Have some signs painted in English and Arabic that say "Caution, U.S. Military Crossing Point Ahead." Find a good section of road with IED potential and a good hide site. Emplace a covert killer team in overwatch. Put your signs out and drive across the main road a couple of times to make tracks. You can even run patrols across this "military crossing" as long as you have it under observation. This will present a wonderful spot for an IED emplacement. When the enemy IED team shows up to take advantage of your "stupid mistake," you are already waiting on them.

Insert two killer teams. Come back later and exfil one leaving one in place. The enemy will think you took the team out and

might show himself. This is especially useful in an area where your teams are frequently compromised.

### Reverse Ambush

I used this technique with my Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) in Afghanistan. The enemy would ambush small units on a regular basis in one area. They utilized one location frequently setting a pattern. They did not hang out lying in the sun all day. They would have an outpost watching for U.S. forces that would give them a call when they saw a unit coming. Then the enemy forces would move into place for the ambush. I took a small team and did a night infil and foot movement to the enemy's favorite ambush location. I set up in his position and waited. The next day a section of the team moved through the area on patrol. When the enemy ran to their positions, we were already waiting on them.

If you have to go down a dead end route to a village or town, this forces you to come back out the same way you went in. The enemy often places IEDs on this route after you go in knowing you will have to come back out the same way. Emplace covert killer teams along the route to secure your six and possibly kill the enemy.

The enemy likes to use wrecked vehicles along the main roads as IED sites. They know that we often come and move the wreckage and they can get a kill. Instead of moving the vehicle immediately, place a killer team in overwatch and try to kill the enemy. You might even want to move your own wrecked vehicle out to a roadside location with a good hide site in overwatch.

### Killing Vehicles

I have been through training where we did both driving training and vehicle kills. I have seen vehicles shot full of holes, all the oil and fluids drained out, and we race them around for well over an hour before the motors finally seize up. The good guys stop immediately if you fire into the front of the vehicle. The bad guys do not. The only sure way to stop a vehicle with gun fire is to fire 18 inches behind the steering wheel.

These are only tactical suggestions. You have to be creative and develop tactics that work in your AO. But remember to utilize both overt and covert tactics to manipulate your battle space to gain control. Bait the trap and they will come. Good hunting!



Staff Sergeant Suzanne M. Day, U.S. Air Force

*Specialist Mike Villareal from the 2nd Battalion, 142nd Infantry Regiment, scans the area during a mission in Nasiriya, Iraq, July 17, 2005.*

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# LESSONS FROM THE PAST

## Successful British Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya 1948-1960

FIRST LIEUTENANT THOMAS E. WILLIS II

At the conclusion of World War II, the world saw a new struggle emerge between communism and those opposed to it. It spread across much of Asia and into the British colonial territory of Malaya. The victory achieved by the British over the communist insurgents in Malaya still stands today as an exemplary model of effective counterinsurgency techniques. From 1948 to 1960, the British defeated communist insurgents in Malaya in order to prevent the spread of communism and maintain control over the civilian population. The British accomplished through effective application of the five fundamental conditions necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations.

### Background

Prior to World War II, Great Britain had maintained colonial control over the Malay Peninsula since the signing of treaties of protection with local Malay rulers in 1874. Several of the Malay states were aggregated in 1896 to form the Federated Malay States, commonly referred to as Malaya. Strategically, the British were interested in Malaya because it was one of the world's largest raw material producing territories, supplying one-third of the world's rubber and tin. Later, Malaya would become strategic as a battleground to keep communism from spreading west towards the Indian Ocean. The British maintained dominion over Malaya until World War II, during which time the Japanese seized and occupied Malaya.

In 1948, Malaya's geography made it ideal for a guerrilla insurgency. Approximately the size of Alabama, some 80 percent of the country was covered in dense jungle, largely impenetrable except by animal tracks or through man-made paths. Mobility was further limited by a 6,000-foot mountain range running north to south down the center of the country.

### Evolution of the Malaya Communist Party

In 1945, the British regained control of Malaya from the Japanese; however, during the course of the war, a new threat to British colonial rule had arisen. That new threat was the Malaya Communist Party (MCP), which had gained legitimacy fighting a guerilla war against the Japanese occupiers. Within 10 days of the Japanese attack, the British colonial government accepted an offer of assistance from the MCP. The MCP

proceeded to form the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), which received training and logistical support from the British throughout the war. Although the MPAJA showed few military successes against the Japanese, by the end of the war they possessed a cadre of experienced guerilla fighters as well as stockpiles of hoarded supplies that the British had supplied to them during the Japanese occupation. Perhaps their greatest asset, however, were the strong ties the MCP had established with the rural Chinese community, particularly the squatters on the jungle fringes. The number of Chinese squatters resorting to subsistence farming on the jungle fringes had risen dramatically during World War II due to fear of the Japanese, food shortages, and unemployment in the urban centers. By 1945, the total number of squatters was estimated at 400,000.

Having allied with the MCP during World War II, the British initially granted the MCP legal status in 1945. The MCP used this status to prepare its efforts to subvert the Malayan government. From 1945 through 1948, the MCP organized mass strikes, attacked several local planters, infiltrated the Trade Unions, and intimidated officials and laborers. Furthermore, the MCP established cells in each Malayan village and wherever possible conducted Communist indoctrination, cajoling participation by force where necessary.

By 1947, many of the Malay ethnic Chinese felt disenfranchised over perceived failure by the British to live up to promises to provide an easier path to full Malayan citizenship. Subsequently, the MCP accused the British of attempting to exclude them from power as the British organized the Federation of Malaya in 1947 in a plan for the future independence of the Malay states. The MCP used these perceived slights to call for immediate armed



revolt, and the open insurgency began with the killing of three British rubber planters on June 18, 1948. Within two days, the British had declared the “Emergency.”


During this time, the armed wing of the MCP was called the Anti-British Army; however, in 1949, the MCP changed the name to the Malay Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in an attempt to conjure feelings of nationalistic sentiment amongst the population. The MCP and the MRLA were led and dominated by ethnic Chinese communists. Support for the MRLA came mostly from approximately 500,000 of the 3.12 million ethnic Chinese in Malay at the time. At the outset of the Emergency in 1948, ethnic Chinese constituted 39 percent of the Malay population, while the remainder of the population consisted of 49 percent Malays and 10 percent Indians and Ceylonese. Apart from the ethnic Chinese, the MCP found little enthusiasm for its goal of replacing the existing government with a communist regime.

### MCP Organization and Tactics

At the operational level, the MCP organization consisted of an elaborate structure of committees and military units. The Central Committee was the head of the organization, and subsidiary units were divided geographically into the Regional Bureaus, State Committees, District Committees, and Branch Committees. The Branch Committees were responsible for controlling the Min Yuen, or “the Masses,” which had to be organized to supply the logistical needs of the insurgency. The Min Yuen consisted of local ethnic Chinese who voluntarily or involuntarily supplied the MRLA with food, money, intelligence, recruits, and couriers.

As the military arm of the MCP, the MRLA had a strength of 6,000 to 8,000 personnel. This force was divided into regimental size units of 200 to 400 personnel, and in the early stages of the insurgency, the MRLA generally operated in detachments of 100 to 200 men. This size force was sufficiently large enough to strike and overwhelm isolated police outposts and other outlying static defenses. Additionally, the MRLA also almost always had the element of surprise on its side.

On the tactical level, the MRLA initially had great success against government forces and against the infrastructure of the country. The MRLA engaged in a full-scale



European Colonialism in Southeast Asia

guerilla insurgency against the British and Malayan authorities, killing a total of 400 civilians in the first year, and torturing many others. Using hideouts in the inaccessible jungle, the MRLA conducted ambushes, sabotaged infrastructure, attacked rubber farms, extorted civilians for money and supplies, and destroyed transportation in a deliberate terror campaign designed to cause the populace to lose faith in the government. The MRLA’s terror activities did not extend into the urban centers with their Malay majorities, but the rubber plantations, tin mines, smaller villages, and railway stations quickly became the focal point of the conflict.

### 1948-1950

During the first two years of the Emergency, there was no integrated counterinsurgency strategy, although the police and armed forces were rapidly enlarged. The British brought in an infantry battalion from Hong Kong and an additional brigade from Great Britain. Additionally, a series of regulations came into effect that would prove effective counterinsurgency tools as the conflict progressed. One such regulation was the right of the government to detain or deport without trial anyone suspected of aiding the communists. Other regulations made it punishable by death to be found in possession of weapons or supplies intended

for the MRLA guerrillas. Additionally, one regulation required that the entire population over the age of 12 register with the local police, who issued identity cards with photographs. Nevertheless, the British officers from World War II facing this new enemy were unfamiliar with the type of warfare in which they were now involved. For instance, they had not seen an enemy that would target “soft targets” or withdraw in the face of fire to jungle retreats.

Into 1949, neither side of the conflict had made great strides against the other. The MCP was somewhat discouraged that the Malayan populace did not embrace its message of revolution, and escalated government military patrols were increasingly placing the MRLA on the defensive. On the British side, although the communists had been prevented from seizing and retaining any population centers for any significant amount of time, British and Malayan forces were unable to effectively protect the local population from infiltration, intimidation, and control by the MCP. There was no one person in charge of handling the Emergency as a whole, and thus police, military, and civil efforts were disjointed and uncoordinated instead of being joined under a single effective policy. Command and control overlapping police and military geographic areas was severely lacking, with no clear division of responsibility. The British had also learned the frustrating lesson of the futility of

running search and destroy operations in an effort to overcome a lack of actionable intelligence from local sources.

### **Advent of the Briggs Plan**

With the introduction into the conflict of retired army officer Lieutenant General Harold Briggs in March 1949, the tide was about to turn in favor of the British. By June 1950, Briggs had developed a counterinsurgency plan that would become known as the Briggs Plan. The fundamental theme of the Briggs Plan was to deny the MRLA access to their principal source of supplies and information, which was the civilian population. To accomplish this goal, Briggs placed new emphasis on the efforts of the police and reinforced the enforcement and intelligence capabilities of the police force particularly in the populated areas. Eventually, the police force was augmented to 75,000 personnel, up from the approximately 10,000 police in Malaya at the outset of the Emergency. On the military side, the Briggs Plan called for troops to establish secure bases in the villages. From these bases, the military was to conduct patrols within a radius of approximately five hours travel. This caused the dispersion and deterrence of the MRLA, which was further exacerbated by the military's simultaneous efforts to conduct deep-jungle patrols and air raids which further harassed the retreating insurgents, destroyed their camps, and captured or destroyed their food caches.

A further prong of the Briggs Plan was a policy of "food denial." Although increased police efforts in the villages denied the MRLA many of its previous logistical support assets, it proved impossible to prevent the MRLA from obtaining supplies from the squatters at the jungle's edge. Often the squatters were forced or intimidated by the MRLA into providing supplies, information, and recruits. Because of their geographic dispersion, it was logistically not feasible for the British and Malay authorities to provide security to those on the outer fringes. To address this problem, Briggs developed a resettlement plan for the squatters.

Under the Briggs Plan resettlement initiative, approximately 400,000 squatters on the jungle fringes were forcibly resettled into approximately 500 villages. This measure not only provided security for the squatters, but, because of the foresight and tact with which the operation was conducted, it earned the government the loyalty of many squatters who had up to that point been unsure of which side would win the conflict. The government gave each squatter family actual ownership of its own parcel of productive farmland in addition to five months worth of provisions to get started. On each parcel of land, the government built a hut frame and left the supplies to finish the walls for each squatter family to finish constructing themselves, thereby giving the squatters an immediate sense of ownership. To provide security along the perimeter of the villages, government forces installed wire obstacles, and each village saw the introduction of a police presence. Additionally, the government established potable water supplies, schools, shops, medical clinics, and eventually electricity. Through efforts such as these, the British earned the support of the squatter population and managed to severely reduce the MRLA's ability to use the squatters as logistical assets. This further isolated the insurgents and provided the populace with a degree of security that was unavailable until then.

Another essential element to the Briggs Plan was the notion that the civil and military authorities must proceed hand in hand.

Toward this end, Briggs instituted a system of committees, which included the local civil authorities and the local military and police commanders. These committees were set up at three levels. In order of descending geographic breadth, they were the State War Executive Committee (SWEC) at the state level, the Circle Executive War Council (CWEC) at the circle level, and the District War Executive Council (DWEC) at the district level. The local brigade commander would represent the army at the SWEC, and the battalion commander and company commander would represent the army at the CWEC and DWEC levels, respectively. Elected civilian authorities presided over these meetings, and representatives from the planting community were also invited to attend. At these meetings, decisions were made on how best to win the struggle with the communists both on a military level and in the hearts and minds of the populace. Routinely, these meetings addressed such items as food control, resettlement, curfew restrictions, labor troubles, coordination of police and military actions, and other issues. The civilian leaders of the SWECs and DWECs also had the power to prevent security forces from carrying out a proposed mission if the cost in the goodwill of the local populace would outweigh the planned military victory.

The Briggs Plan showed early successes as insurgent activity diminished into late 1950. However, the MCP regrouped and changed their tactics, which led to a rise in insurgent activity to a high point of 606 incidents during June 1951. The insurgents, it was determined, now were infiltrating the workforces on the estates and among the remaining squatters and still were successfully extorting food and supplies. To counter this development, Briggs further augmented his food denial program by conducting Operation Starvation. This plan was aimed at cutting off the insurgents from all food and medical supplies. All areas from which food or supplies could be had were labeled "controlled areas," and the taking of food and supplies from these areas was strictly regulated and enforced. Shopkeepers were required to keep detailed records of sales receipts, and rice rations were delivered already cooked, so that it remained edible for only two to three days after delivery. Additionally, Briggs developed the Home Guard as part of Operation Starvation, which enrolled the local populace to aid police patrolling in the effort to defeat the insurgents logistics and free up the police force.

Despite the continuing effectiveness of the Briggs Plan, the MRLA scored a major psychological victory in October 1951, when it managed to assassinate the acting British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney. Furthermore, in November 1951, Briggs left Malaya at the end of his appointment. These events proved a pyrrhic victory for the MCP because they brought a new sense of urgency to the British counterinsurgency efforts. They also brought to Malaya General Sir Gerald Templer in January of 1952, who would energetically implement and improve upon the Briggs Plan.

### **The Time of Templer**

Templer's effectiveness at implementing the Briggs Plan and improving upon it would prove to mark the beginning of the end for the MCP insurgency. As one of his first moves, Templer made an official promise of Malayan independence upon elimination of the communist threat. This eliminated a platform of communist nationalist propaganda, and no longer could the MCP effectively recruit based on an anti-colonial stance. Templer also emphasized

that the conduct of the counterinsurgency and the conduct of normal civil government affairs were completely interrelated and would be handled as one problem under a single, unified chain of command. Templer streamlined and integrated the command and control structure of the police, military, and civil aspects of the government. Additionally, Templer emphasized that the entire Malayan population must play its part in fighting the communists.

Templer took several steps to further increase the security of the Malayan population. He provided new impetus for the until-then struggling Home Guard forces by providing one in three of them with weapons and enlarging their ranks to 200,000 by 1954. An all volunteer force, Home Guard citizens reported to the local police stations where they were issued shotguns for the duration of their assigned patrols. As individuals became thoroughly screened, they were trusted to have shotguns in their homes for immediate action against infiltrators and for defense of the village perimeter. Templer mandated that, as an entire Home Guard unit proved itself trustworthy, they would become responsible for the security of the entire village, thereby relieving the police forces for further action. Although considered risky at the time, the gambit paid off when the Home Guard proved a critical link between the populace and the security forces, especially as attachments on military patrols. This link provided much useful information that allowed security forces to effectively focus their efforts based on the intelligence provided instead of spending hours patrolling through the jungle in search of insurgents. This derivation of local intelligence would prove a great force multiplier because it was estimated that non-intelligence based patrolling required 1,800 man-hours of jungle patrols for each contact to be had. The Home Guard isolated the MRLA insurgents both physically and psychologically in the villages and rubber plantations and made a concerted effort to stamp out extortion and intimidation. By 1954, 150 new squatter villages had become responsible for their own security.

In addition to the Home Guard, Templer also began to build up a national Malay army with a vision toward eventual Malaya independence. Templer also maintained the pressure on the food supply of the

**The results of Templer's tenure were clearly positive. There was a decrease in the number of incidents from 6,100 in 1951, to 4,700 in 1952, to only 1,100 in 1953.**

MRLA, the effectiveness of which was attested to by captured MRLA soldiers. Police intelligence had also by this time infiltrated agents and informants into the Min Yuen, and many communist smugglers were captured as a result. Additionally, British and Malayan security forces were at the highest levels of strength yet seen. There were 40,000 British troops in the theater, along with 40,000 police forces. Through the constant harassment and pursuit of insurgents with whom contact had been made, the morale of the MCP was quickly plummeting. Further, the lenient treatment and offer of employment and financial reward to insurgents wishing to switch sides proved a valuable source of intelligence. Overall, the increased security for the populace and the emphasis on local efforts produced an improvement in the flow of intelligence and information to the security forces.

By March 1952, Templer, however, was not yet satisfied with the results and took several additional measures at the local level to ensure cooperation with the government as opposed to with the communists. For instance, Templer saw to it that security forces enforced strict 22-hour curfews on villages suspected of aiding insurgents until the populace provided the desired intelligence. To protect informers, security forces provided a system where every citizen was required to fill out an anonymous, confidential information card. Due to the security it provided the informant, this technique proved very effective. Additionally, the security forces under Templer conducted extensive psychological operations against the insurgents, including the dropping of leaflets encouraging surrender, the distribution of some 93 million anti-communist pamphlets, and broadcasts relating the relative comfort of captivity and working for the government as opposed to hacking out an existence in the jungle.

Templer took several steps to encourage and facilitate participation in the local government at the grass roots level as well. Although village committees were elected under the Briggs Plan, they had no financial authority and served only in an advisory role. Templer granted these village committees statutory authority and made them responsible for collecting rates and license fees. The village committees also were given the responsibility to oversee the use of public funds for such local improvements as schools, medical facilities, and community halls. To further facilitate involvement in local governance, Templer instituted the Civics Course, which brought citizens together for one full week's worth of training on democratic governance. By 1954, the government hosted 130 such courses. Additionally, in late 1953, Templer introduced the policy of labeling districts that had proven themselves to be actively opposed to the communist insurgents "white areas." By achieving this sought after award, a district acquired freedom from most of the irksome restrictions imposed by the Briggs Plan on the remainder of the country, such as curfews, limited shopping hours, food control, and prying patrols. To the first district vested with this honor, Templer made clear that it was now up to the local population to "keep the Communists out and see that they never come back."

The results of Templer's tenure were clearly positive. There was a decrease in the number of incidents from 6,100 in 1951, to 4,700 in 1952, to only 1,100 in 1953. Further, through constant police and military patrolling, in addition to the other measures taken, the insurgents were now on the defensive. The monthly total of police losses fell from 100 per month in 1951 to 20 per month by the middle of 1952, never to rise above that figure again. Similarly, the number of civilian deaths at insurgent hands fell from 90 per month in 1951 to 15 per month in 1952, also never to rise above that figure again.

After Templer left Malaya in 1954, his policies and those of Briggs were continually enforced with success against the insurgents. Although it took until 1960 for the Malayan government to officially declare the Emergency ended, victory over the communist insurgents was clear when Malaya gained its independence in 1957 and saw a new government form without a

single seat going to a communist or communist supporter.

### **Analysis of Application of Counterinsurgency Doctrine**

The British counterinsurgency against the MCP was effective because it successfully established the five conditions of an effective counterinsurgency campaign. Under current United States Army doctrine, the five fundamental conditions necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations are as follows:

- 1) A secure populace,
- 2) Established local political institutions,
- 3) Contributing local government,
- 4) Neutralizing insurgent capabilities, and
- 5) Information flow from local sources.

Each of these five conditions contains some degree of nuance. Under the first condition, a secure populace means security from the influence of insurgents initially, moving to a situation where the host nation population is mobilized, armed, and trained to protect itself. Effective security allows local political and administrative institutions to operate freely and local commerce to flourish.

Under the second prong, establishing local political institutions includes establishing conditions favorable for the development of host nation governmental institutions, including law enforcement, public information, health care, schools, and public works.

Under the third condition, contributing local government is both tangible and psychological, and local security forces must reinforce and be integrated into the plan. This local integration must be constantly emphasized with the local and host nation police, civil, and military leadership, as well as with the populace at large. Psychologically, in order to mitigate the impact of insurgent propaganda, the populace must constantly be reassured that conditions are improving. Counterinsurgency operations must establish conditions that contribute to host nation and local government effectiveness.

To neutralize insurgent capabilities under the fourth prong, counterinsurgent efforts must work to exploit insurgent grievances and work with local authorities and leaders to resolve issues of local

concern thereby legitimizing governmental institutions.

Under the fifth prong, to foster information flow from local sources, counterinsurgent efforts must facilitate and use intelligence obtained from local sources to gain access to the insurgent's economic and social base of support, order of battle, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The British effectively secured the populace during the Emergency. The resettlement of the squatters under the Briggs plan proved to be an effective security measure. Though it displaced some 400,000 persons from the life they then knew, the resettlement eventually provided security to the squatters by placing them in defensible villages with a security perimeter. Furthermore, the improved living conditions and new property ownership the squatters enjoyed made it so the former squatters now had something more to defend. Briggs and Templer both rightly emphasized the efforts of the Home Guard, which progressively formed into a viable, trained, and armed local security force. This not only bolstered local village security but security on an operational level as well due to the fact that security forces, until then posted on static guard duties, were freed to conduct other offensive

operations against the insurgents. Finally, Templer's implementation of the "white areas" proved to be the final successful push of security from a nationally led effort down to a locally led effort. The Briggs Plan and Templer's additions to it enabled Malayan locales to achieve free operation of commerce and of local political and administrative institutions.

During the Emergency, the British effectively established local political institutions. One of the first prongs of the Briggs Plan was to establish locally elected councils, and later, Templer further bolstered this local government tool by adding to each council's legal authorities. These actions gave the local populace a stake in their own future, particularly when Templer gave the local councils authority to oversee the implementation of public funds for community improvements such as schools, electricity, running water, and health care facilities. Further, the introduction of the "white areas" by Templer accelerated the country towards victory over the insurgents. In effect, the British had set up a clear reward system to encourage local governments to proactively assume the fight against the insurgents. The effectiveness of this plan was clear when those areas that won the "white area"



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*During the Malayan Emergency in 1956, members of Britain's 25th Regiment Royal Artillery engage suspected bandit positions from their firebase.*



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*During the Malayan Emergency in 1956, gunners with Britain's 25th Regiment Royal Artillery tend to their 25 pounder gun/howitzer on their base camp in Malaya.*

label took pride not only in their newfound freedoms, but also in their new "status." Thus, the British established conditions favorable for local host nation government institutions.

The British effectively fostered a contributing local government. The SWECs and DWECs Briggs organized provided the mechanism for integration of the elected civilian leadership, the military and police forces called for by United States Army doctrine. The British also fostered local government contributions by empowering the elected civilian leadership to oversee and approve any military or police actions in their jurisdictions. This real grant of power gave the local governing authorities the necessary sense of ownership in their own destiny necessary to ensure their energetic, proactive contributions to their own welfare and security. Additionally, Briggs and Templar effectively emphasized the need for local government to work hard for the populace in the continuing effort to win hearts and minds. The British did well to realize that the Malayan populace was looking not only at military successes, but also at whether the government they currently lived under was better than what was being offered by the communists. This emphasis on local government service was effective in producing tangible results, in the form of improved living standards, and psychological results, in the form of loyalties won in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the populace.

The British effectively neutralized insurgent capabilities. The efforts by Briggs and Templar to eliminate the sources of food, recruits, and supplies for the insurgents proved effective. By forming the new squatter villages, creating accountability for retailers of food and medical supplies, and controlling the population's rice rationing, the British effectively began to starve the MRLA troops. Combined with increased military, police, and Home Guard patrolling, made all the more effective through the use of intelligence from locals, the MRLA was forced deeper and deeper into the jungle and away from the populace. This allowed British psychological operations to exploit insurgent grievances through offers of food and comfortable living conditions advertised in pamphlets and fliers. Those insurgents who surrendered were treated well and then employed to work

against their former comrades, which dealt a further blow to the MRLA and MCP. Thus, the British effectively neutralized insurgent capabilities on all fronts simultaneously.

The British effectively fostered information flow from local sources. As the British learned prior to implementation of the Briggs Plan, it took many hundreds, even thousands, of long hours of tedious jungle patrolling to produce the fruit of just one reliable intelligence tip from informed local sources. To their credit, the British through Briggs and Templar, realized that in order to obtain intelligence from the local populace, the populace had to feel secure from retribution from the violent and indiscriminating insurgents. The British did well then to substantially augment the military and police forces in order to convince the populace that they intended to win the struggle with the communists.

These forces also helped to provide the security necessary for the free flow of intelligence to the government. However, it was the Home Guard that provided the most effective conduit to information flow from local sources. The Home Guard brought with it the double-advantage of increasing security and fostering intelligence flows, both from the Home Guard citizens themselves and from the local populace they secured. This movement gained momentum throughout application of the Briggs Plan, culminating in the advent of Templar's "white areas." Thus, the insurgent's economic and social bases of support were effectively eviscerated when information from local sources eliminated their ability to covertly operate amongst the populace.

## Conclusion

The British victory over the communists in Malaya has become a textbook example of effective counterinsurgent techniques due to the effective application by the British of the five fundamentals of a counterinsurgency. Detractors from the British efforts may point out that Malaya did not share a border with a hostile communist nation and that the insurgents thus were not as well supported as those in other world conflicts. Additionally, even though the British defeated the communist insurgents in Malaya, the process took over a decade at an enormous cost in lives, manpower, and funds. However, the talent of men like Briggs and Templar cannot be overstated. They derived and applied novel techniques and methods of battling an elusive and adaptive enemy. As a testament to the efficacy of the British techniques, the methods for conducting a counterinsurgency developed by the British in Malaya still serve today as the basis for modern military counterinsurgent doctrine.

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# TRAINING NOTES



## THE FIRST ARMY IED TRAINING METHODOLOGY



COLONEL DANIEL L. ZAJAC — MAJOR BRIAN A. BISSONNETTE — CAPTAIN JOHN F. CARSON, JR

*“IEDs are the enemy’s precision guided weapons which allows them to conduct violent attacks at a time and place of their choosing.”*

– Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré  
First Army Commanding General

A ground assault convoy moves along a dirt road as Soldiers scan the environment around them, constantly searching for anything out of the ordinary. A Soldier is in the gunner’s hatch of the lead vehicle armed with a .50 cal machine gun. He is the first to see it, a pile of trash with a barely visible blue wire

protruding from it. He quickly warns his vehicle commander, but he is too late. It explodes less than 15 meters from his position. The driver of the vehicle instinctively speeds up to get out of the kill zone. The following two vehicles do the same and drive through the blast area of the improvised explosive device (IED). The Soldier then hears a second explosion followed by small arms fire. He quickly scans to his rear and sees that a portion of the convoy is stopped and firing .50 cal machine guns and MK-19 grenade

launchers at the enemy. The Soldier begins to return fire as his vehicle commander takes charge of the three-vehicle element that made it out of the ambush. They move off road and begin to flank the enemy. Soon after, the enemy breaks contact, and the unit begins to reorganize, secure the area, and call up a spot report to its higher headquarters.

This incident didn’t happen in the desert of Iraq, it happened in the Desoto National Forest training area of Camp Shelby, Mississippi, where trainers of the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (Training Support) have perfected the art of theater immersion



training. Currently, 3rd Brigade Soldiers have trained more than 17,000 Soldiers from four Army National Guard brigades, and training for elements of a fifth brigade is ongoing. Numerous smaller units have been trained for deployment during this same time period.

### Theater Immersion

When training Soldiers to deal with IEDs, the number one killer on the battlefield, theater immersion is extremely effective. The purpose of theater immersion is to rapidly build combat-ready formations, manned by battle-proofed Soldiers, inculcated with the Warrior Ethos and led by competent and confident leaders, who see first, understand first, and act first. The theater immersion training concept accomplishes this by placing leaders, Soldiers, and units — as rapidly as possible — into an environment analogous to what they will encounter in combat. At the Soldier level, training is tough, realistic, hands-on, and repetitive, designed to provide Soldiers and small tactical units the tools necessary to respond to any threat they may encounter on the battlefield. This training environment replicates conditions in a multi-echeloned approach that thrusts formations into a theater analog soon after arrival at the mobilization station and stresses the organization from the individual to brigade level. Essentially, theater immersion is a Combat Training Center (CTC)-like experience that replicates conditions in theater, while training individual through brigade-level collective tasks.

The most obvious manifestation of theater immersion is the physical design of the training sites. Camp Shelby currently has four fully functional forward operating bases (FOB) — FOB Hit, FOB Arrowhead, FOB Hurricane Point, and FOB Blue Diamond. These FOBs have the capacity to accommodate at least a battalion-sized combat formation. Additionally, four populated villages — Al Jaffah, Trebil, Al Asad, and Al Qaim — are located in the training area and two more are being developed — Safwan and Al Kut. To populate these villages, 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) were hired, to include 80 Iraqi-Americans or 80 Afghan-Americans (depending on the unit's future area of operations). A highway overpass was constructed, and local roads were lined with guardrails. The villages have



Photos by Major Arthur Sharpe

*Camp Shelby's theater-like training area is the perfect setting to conduct realistic, hands-on improvised explosive device training.*

mosques, offices for civil authorities, markets, walled residences, tunnel complexes, as well as traffic circles and low-hanging telephone and electric cables that are typical of Iraqi and Afghanistan villages. Camp Shelby's theater-like training area is the perfect setting to conduct realistic, hands-on IED training.

The integration of IEDs into theater immersion focuses on a variety of areas to include interdicting an IED far in advance of its use; force protection measures to keep Soldiers protected; cultural immersion to readily gain valuable intelligence; pattern analysis to identify areas and times of risk; methods to reestablish control and shape the battlefield; and battle drills to close with and destroy the enemy after an attack is launched. Theater immersion achieves all of these goals.

### Tenants of the Counter-IED Training Methodology

The counter-IED training methodology begins with the First U.S. Army tenants of counter-IED operations — Deter, Detect, Defeat, Prevent, and Respond. These tenants guide all counter-IED training the 3rd Brigade conducts. Additionally, collaboration with other Army agencies further enhances our IED training at Camp Shelby. The First U.S. Army regularly shares information with the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDDTF), U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, and U.S. Army Engineer Center and School. For example, the U.S.

Army Engineer Center's IED defeat tenants — Predict, Detect, Prevent, Neutralize, and Mitigate — are closely related to and complement the counter-IED tenants developed by First U.S. Army. This Army-wide collaborative effort ensures that IED training at Camp Shelby remains relevant and battle-focused.

### Deter

In order to deter IEDs, it is imperative that a unit maintains situational awareness and establishes an aggressive posture. Units are trained to gain the initiative by targeting the enemy relentlessly through lethal and nonlethal methods. During training, units conduct aggressive and irregular combat patrols, both mounted and dismounted. They are trained to conduct surveillance on named areas of interest. Units are trained to establish beneficial relationships with the local leadership and population by conducting activities such as civil affair projects, providing medical assistance, and respecting the local customs and traditions. Force protection is also a deterrence-training objective and is accomplished by training units to conduct effective route reconnaissance operations continuously throughout the training model. Training on this basic tenant enables the unit to seize the initiative and keep the enemy off balance.

### Detect

Training on the second tenant, detect, primarily resides in the training of staff and military intelligence elements. Because the

IED threat is ubiquitous, situational awareness and understanding must occur in all Soldiers and at all levels. The key to training this tenant resides in IBOS (Intelligence Battlefield Operating System) gunnery (a two-week block of intense Military Intelligence training), battalion ARTEPs (Army Training and Evaluation Programs), and brigade CPXs/MRXs (command post exercises/mission rehearsal exercises). It starts with effective pattern analysis, collection management and aggressive intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance planning. Pattern analysis training consists of developing analytical skills in MI Soldiers to predict when and where emplacing of IEDs will occur and how the enemy will utilize IEDs. Once a unit has effectively conducted training on developing enemy patterns, they must create a collection management plan that allows them to focus their limited assets on detecting IEDs. Detecting IEDs attempts to find the IED prior to it being employed. This includes identifying the bomb makers, the individuals who emplace them, and the caches which hide the components to make IEDs. The next step is to develop an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) plan to actively pursue IEDs and their makers. During ISR training, units are taught that every Soldier is a sensor. This means that whenever any unit moves outside of the FOB, they are collectors and are given pre-briefs highlighting potential indicators of intelligence value. They also receive debriefs upon their return to collect the battlefield information acquired. Units also receive training on how to conduct aggressive and unpredictable reconnaissance planning and how to use various intelligence systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), signal intelligence (SIGINT) assets, and tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) Teams (THTs). THTs are a key source of intelligence in theater, and they train relentlessly to effectively collect intelligence information from the local populace.

### Defeat

The defeat tenant brings technology to the battlefield. While Soldiers are trained on emerging counter-IED technologies, they are also taught not to forget that the most effective tool to defeat

IEDs is the American Soldier. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) training is integrated into ground assault convoy training. Leaders learn to employ ECM systems during movement, and Soldiers are familiarized on the operation of ECM systems. However, in order to defeat IEDs, units must defeat the enemy. Constant training on aggressive battle drills is necessary to ensure that Soldiers can destroy the enemy once an IED ambush is initiated.

### Prevent

The focus of the prevent tenant is to instruct units to vigilantly maintain situational awareness of their surroundings. Changes in the environment are indicators of possible IED activity. This is reinforced through the numerous IED events that occur during training. Units are trained to vary convoy times and routes to keep the enemy off balance. Conducting cordon and search operations is also a key to preventing IED attacks. Confiscating bomb-making materials before they are turned into IEDs prevents future IED attacks.

### Respond

The final tenant is respond, which focuses units on how to react if an IED attack occurs. Constant repetition on battle drills is key. Training is structured to instruct Soldiers on the variety of battle drills and responses that may be utilized. This ensures that Soldiers are adaptive, flexible, and thinking. Each IED attack that is replicated in training requires the unit to respond by executing their battle drills. The battle drills are designed to protect the force and to destroy the enemy when feasible. Training on fire support planning and execution is provided to teach how to support a unit in contact. Also, units must have a combat lifesaver capability. Soldiers receive combat lifesaver training while at Camp Shelby. The unit must also be capable of conducting casualty evacuation operations, detainee operations, and vehicle recovery operations to save lives and salvage equipment after an IED attack occurs.

### Mission Training Plan

To capture the above tenants into a task, condition, and standards training model, 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) developed an IED mission training plan (MTP) that was adopted by First U.S. Army. This MTP is used to augment various training venues to facilitate hands-on training as it relates to IEDs. This MTP has become the cornerstone of IED training at Camp Shelby. Furthermore, First United States Army has shared this MTP with numerous other Army agencies to include Forces Command, JIEDDTF, and the Engineer Center and School. This collaborative process has enabled the various Army agencies involved in counter-IED training to improve their training philosophies.

### IED Training Execution

*“We train Soldiers the way they will fight, and the standard comes from theater. We are constantly adjusting our training based on current conditions down range. The theater*



*Soldiers must learn how to react to an IED attack. Constant repetition of battle drills is key.*



*immersion concept provides the flexibility to do that in near real time.”*

— **Colonel Daniel L. Zajac**

Commander, 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS)

Theater immersion IED training starts with all Soldiers receiving classroom training based on their future area of operation. This training focuses on the most recent TTPs in use by the enemy and lessons learned from theater. This develops a situational understanding of the environment in which they will be operating. Each Soldier also receives the DA G3 JIEDDTF level I brief, which is given by 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) Soldiers who are DA G3 JIEDDTF level I/II qualified. Also, the DA G3 JIEDDTF provides brigade and battalion commanders and staff's level II and level III training that focuses on the holistic approach to defeating IEDs in theater.

Once this baseline of knowledge is established, the theater immersion concept comes to the forefront. Due to the ubiquitous IED threat in theater, there is no single, discrete IED training event at Camp Shelby. IEDs are nested in all events ranging from land navigation and weapons qualification to battalion ARTEPs, brigade CPXs, and brigade MRXs.

For example, during brigade MRXs and battalion ARTEPs, brigades/battalions conduct a rigorous field training exercise involving missions such as FOB defense, cordon and search, raids, hostage rescue, and ground assault convoys. Villages, such as Trebil, Al Qaim, Al Jaffah, and Al Asad, are populated with civilians on the battlefield, to include Arabic speakers. These COBs perform roles such as mayors, police chiefs, merchants, blacklisted insurgents, etc. IEDs are emplaced on routes throughout the training area. The brigade/battalion operates in a scenario

with actual patterns of IED emplacement and indirect and direct attacks. OPFOR operates as insurgents, and civilians in the villages may be pro-Coalition, anti-Coalition or neutral. Blacklisted insurgents are present and may be detained if identified and caught. Village residents are more willing to provide information on insurgent attacks, such as IEDs, if the U.S. units treat them with respect and attempt to assist the local population. The success of the brigade/battalion battle staff to apply the tenants of IED defeat is exercised during these exercises.

This training method requires units to react to IEDs in any environment at anytime. It is repetitious and deliberate, which continuously allows units to reinforce lessons from classroom training and the continued study of lessons learned from theater. Soldiers not only learn battle drills to counter-IEDs, but they gain a comprehensive understanding of the overall IED threat. This allows Soldiers and their leaders to understand that different battle drills and counter-IED techniques may be brought to bear for different circumstances. As a result, thinking, agile, and adaptive Soldiers are developed. This approach is designed to create a training environment where every Soldier encounters a minimum of 30 IED events during post mobilization training. This training technique establishes a mentality in Soldiers that IEDs are the enemy's precision guided weapons and can occur at any time and any place.

### IED Master Gunners

The final element to IED training at Camp Shelby is the IED master gunner concept. The commander, 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) has given the role of brigade IED master gunners to the brigade

intelligence officers. The role of these master gunners is to ensure recent, relevant enemy IED tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are incorporated into Camp Shelby's various training events. The master gunners data-mine NIPRNET and SIPRNET sites to track new trends in TTPs to insure training remains relevant and up to date. They relay this information to battalion IED master gunners. The brigade IED master gunners also manage the MTP and ensure new lessons learned from theater are incorporated into the MTP. The battalion IED master gunners take this updated intelligence on our enemy and execute current, relevant, battle-focused IED training. The battalion IED master gunners are also responsible for coaching, teaching, and mentoring mobilized unit leaders as they continually train on counter-IED tactics and techniques.

The 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) has established this theater immersion counter-IED training methodology to create a realistic and interactive environment that trains every Soldier on the most updated enemy IED TTPs. This provides the best possible training to deploying Soldiers in order to defeat the enemy and save lives.

*We have a nonnegotiable contract with the American people to prepare her sons and daughters for war. We must use imagination and innovation to do this better than we ever have before. We can not, we will not fail in this task.”*

— **Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré**

First Army Commanding General

The Soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS) take the First U.S. Army commander's training philosophy to heart, and we will not fail.

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**Colonel Daniel L. Zajac** is currently serving as commander of the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (Training Support). He is a graduate of the Army War College and Advanced Strategic Arts Program. His previous assignments include serving as commander of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) and executive officer of the 1st Brigade, 3rd ID. Zajac is a 1981 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

**Major Brian A. Bissonnette** is currently serving as an intelligence officer (S2) for the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS). He was commissioned in the Military Intelligence Corps in 1991 after graduating from Bowling Green State University in Ohio.

**Captain John F. Carson, Jr.** currently serves as an intelligence officer for the 3rd Brigade, 87th Division (TS). His previous assignments include serving as the NGIC Operations Officer (LNO) to Multi-National Corps-Iraq (III Corps), Baghdad, Iraq.

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# THE ROE TACTICAL TRAINING SEMINAR

## Combining Rules of Engagement and Marksmanship With Judgment-Based Training

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES C. LARSEN

The replacement of sterile, garrison-based, end-of-phase critical task testing in Basic Combat Training (BCT) with realistic and relevant situational training exercises (STX) that contain embedded individual tasks has highlighted an unforeseen problem — Soldiers are having significant challenges quickly and accurately identifying threats and knowing when to apply deadly force. While the newly-implemented STX-based training initiatives provide Soldiers more experience prior to assignment to their unit — a unit most likely deploying or already deployed to combat — they have not necessarily departed the training base with the right lessons learned vis-à-vis making intuitive life or death decisions in the heat of battle. While the new BCT program of instruction (POI) includes rules of engagement (ROE) instruction, advanced rifle marksmanship, and STXs that seek to combine previous instruction into realistic scenarios, Soldiers in BCT continue to make inappropriate decisions with regard to threat identification and the application of deadly force during the STXs and during their final field training exercise (FTX).

When we began to peel the onion back, we found that many drill sergeants, even our combat veterans, were misinformed as to use of the ROE and when it's appropriate to use deadly force. Some of our veterans had commanders in combat that issued overly restricted ROE, while others had commanders who were much more receptive and supportive on the use of deadly force. All had problems with trying to apply complex and wordy ROE in the fraction of a second that tense and rapidly evolving situations allow. If this is a problem for our combat-seasoned drill sergeants, then it's a significant hurdle for those drill sergeants who have yet to deploy.



U.S. Army photos

*By integrating realistic and relevant situational training exercises into basic combat training, Soldiers are more prepared than ever before to immediately contribute to their units in combat.*

And if the cadre is unsure about when it's okay to kill bad guys, then the Soldiers surely will be. The following problems were routinely observed during STXs, until we fixed the problem with effective cadre training:

❑ Soldiers unjustifiably engaging civilians, while others were so hesitant to engage insurgents dressed in civilian clothes that they became casualties;

❑ Soldiers engaging critically wounded insurgents who posed no further threat; and, perhaps most importantly,

❑ Drill sergeants who lacked the requisite combination of legal knowledge and tactical skills to facilitate an after action review that thoroughly examines why the decisions were made.

As we have discovered over the past two years in our efforts to increase the tactical proficiency of the drill sergeants (regardless of their MOS), cadre training was the

answer. Though we did not have the expertise internally to train the cadre, we found a team of dedicated and extraordinarily competent professionals comprised of Judge Advocates (JAs) with combat, shooting, and special operations experience, federal law enforcement agents, local/state law enforcement personnel with extensive special operations (Special Weapons and Tactics [SWAT]) backgrounds and experience, Special Operations service members, and civilian self-defense instructors, to train the BCT and One Station Unit Training (OSUT) cadre at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on ROE and rules for the use of force.

What makes this training so unique is that it is the only structured training program in the armed services that combines ROE instruction with advanced pistol and rifle marksmanship, and judgment-based training. It begins with



*After training on quick fire techniques with live ammunition, Soldiers face unpredictable shoot/no shoot situations using Simunitions.*

extremely thought-provoking lectures on the tactical and legal applications of the use of force and use of force law; it then progresses to shoot/no-shoot situations using the engagement skills trainer, whereby the decisions are moderated by a tactically knowledgeable JA, and tactical pistol instruction. Tactically knowledgeable JAs with a background in close quarters shooting and strong shooting skills are essential to this program. Without this knowledge/skill base, the legal instruction will take on an academic and sterile flavor that is unhelpful to understanding decision-making in a dynamic close quarters tactical environment while under the threat of imminent death.

Building on this training, the team trains advanced rifle and pistol marksmanship using live ammunition to prepare the students for close quarters combat. The goal of this live-fire training is twofold:

- (1) To bring all students to a skill level that will enable them to benefit from the upcoming scenario-based Simunitions training, while at the same time ensuring safe, competent weapons handling in a close quarters environment; and
- (2) To place them in the correct mind-set to achieve the maximum benefit from the scenario-based Simunitions training. Because a Soldier's mindset changes once live ammunition is locked and loaded into their weapon, moving from a live fire range to the Simunitions training helps preserve that mentality, which exponentially increases the realism of the scenarios.

Once students have mastered marksmanship, they are prepared for the force-on-force, judgment-based training with Simunitions. Use of the Simunitions allows for realistic shoot/no-shoot decisions to be made with immediate feedback. The final phase of the

training is team and squad STXs in a shoot house and on a traffic control point using Simunitions. JAs facilitate the AAR for all Simunitions training, providing legal opinion on the shooter's decision as to when to use deadly force. Simply put, this is the best training I've had in 25 years of combat arms service.

Over four, two-and-a-half day iterations, the team trained nearly 100 instructors and drill sergeants, and the results were immediate. The cadre educated their peers, and the BCT and OSUT Soldiers are now making far more appropriate decisions during their STXs and during their final FTX. The ROE instruction has significantly improved, the AARs have improved, and the Soldiers are more prepared than ever before to leave BCT/OSUT to immediately and meaningfully contribute to their unit in combat.



*Building on their marksmanship and shoot/no shoot training, Soldiers conduct STXs with Simunitions in a shoot house during traffic control point operations.*

If you're interested in achieving the same positive impact on your unit, contact the ROE/RUF Tactical Training Seminar Course Director, Major Bolgiano (USAF), at [airbornerobocop@aol.com](mailto:airbornerobocop@aol.com) or DSN 243-6464.

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**Lieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen** recently served as the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (Basic Combat Training) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and is currently assigned to the J3, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a 1986 OCS graduate who has served in a variety of Ranger, mechanized, and air assault infantry assignments. He is a veteran of operations Just Cause, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom; and has deployed in support of operations Uphold Democracy and Joint Endeavor (SFOR-8).

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# OVERHAULING THE PLATOON

## NIGHT LIVE-FIRE DEFENSE IN IET

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES C. LARSEN

The Army has made great strides in preparing Soldiers for combat over the past two years. Using a foundation of 39 core warrior tasks and nine core warrior battle drills, it recently instituted a new program of instruction (POI) for Basic Combat Training that adds urban and convoy operations, crew-served weapons familiarization, advanced rifle marksmanship, reaction to improvised explosive devices/unexploded ordnance (IED/UO), interaction with news media, and increased the length of time spent in the field. Gone are the days of sterile end-of-phase testing, which have been replaced with realistic and relevant situational training exercises with embedding critical individual tasks. Unfortunately, one critical event that was in desperate need to be revamped due to the very same lack of relevancy and realism, was overlooked — the platoon night live-fire defense from prepared fighting positions. The purpose of this article is to lobby for a low cost change to the recently released POI that enables the same range to be adapted to safely train Soldiers on core warrior battle drills and tasks under the most realistic and relevant conditions — before they deploy to combat.

Though each Army Training Center (ATC) has a slightly different range, the concept is the same and has been since the height of the Cold War and the advent of pop-up targets: occupy a prepared fighting position, engage “advancing” and then “retreating” targets from 300 meters to 25 meters and back to 300 meters again. At night, the only difference is that parachute flares are launched so the Soldiers can see their targets. Recently, some ATCs have added noncombatants to the mix of targetry; however, because Soldiers have no night vision equipment or laser aiming devices, not only can they not get target feedback, they can’t identify friend from foe. The Army is working quickly to address the lack of equipment, but this won’t solve the problem of relevancy: Soldiers in combat today are rarely engaging the enemy from prepared fighting positions.

According to the POI

that was approved by the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on 15 November 2004, the terminal learning objective (TLO) for the platoon defensive live fire during daylight is Employ Mutually Supporting Fires, and there are four supporting enabling learning objectives (ELOs):

- Provide security as part of a perimeter or assembly area;
- Move tactically from a perimeter to a prepared fighting position;
- Engage targets in a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environment; and
- Employ mutually supporting fires.

The TLO for the night portion is Conduct Night Live-Fire Defensive Exercise, and it has one ELO: Participate in night live-fire defensive exercise. The poorly worded TLOs and ELOs notwithstanding, there is little nesting with the 39 core warrior tasks and nine core warrior drills. As the Training Support Package (TSP) currently reads, only three core warrior tasks are taught or reinforced, but not one core warrior drill:

- Correct malfunctions with assigned weapon;
- Use visual signaling techniques; and
- React to a chemical or biological hazard.



To vastly improve relevancy and realism, and train or reinforce more of the core warrior tasks and drills, Fort Knox is piloting a



Courtesy photo

*Soldiers in combat today are rarely engaging the enemy from prepared fighting positions like those used during Basic Combat Training.*

new concept using the existing range (See Figures 1 and 2), changing the TLO from Employ Mutually Supportive Fires to React to Far Ambush (day and night). Under this concept, Soldiers are conducting a presence patrol along a road beginning on an adjacent range with two squads (section) in a staggered column — a typical foot march formation — paralleling the “firing line” with their weapons at the low ready. To mitigate risk, drill sergeants perform as squad leaders, all Soldiers wear Improved Body Armor, live magazines in their ammunition pouches, but no magazines are in the weapon.



(We will continue to work with Post Safety to gain approval for Soldiers to move in an “amber status” [live ammunition in magazines, but no round chambered]). Once the lead members of the section approach the end of the “road” that has replaced the old prepared fighting positions, grenade simulators in demolition pits are simultaneously command detonated near the lead and trail Soldiers, thus simulating a blocked ambush. All Soldiers immediately drop and move to the nearest covered and concealed position, insert the live magazine, and destroy the threat.

To prevent assaulting through the kill zone, as would be the drill for reacting to a near ambush, the closest targets to appear initially are between 50 and 100 meters. Noncombatant targets are presented in the scenario. Once the threat is destroyed, the section performs consolidation and reorganization, and continues their patrol off of the range. At night, the scenario is the same, but Soldiers wear PVS-7 or PVS-14 Night Vision Devices and their rifles are equipped with PAQ-4 or PEQ-2 Laser Aiming Devices. Also to mitigate risk and increase Soldier proficiency, following a demonstration at the beginning of the training, each section performs a day and night dry rehearsal (no ammunition), a day blank rehearsal prior to conducting its live-fire iterations. Prerequisite training includes advanced rifle marksmanship (engage targets, night-aided) and night tactical movement with night vision devices. A 220-Soldier company, maximum for the BCT POI, can conduct the day and night dry, blank, and live-fire iterations in about eight hours, which adds no more time to the schedule than what is currently allocated.

Below are the proposed TLOs and ELOs to support this concept:

TLO: React to Far Ambush during Daylight

- ELO A: Provide security as part of a perimeter.
- ELO B: Move as a member of a presence patrol.
- ELO C: Engage targets from a temporary fighting position, employing mutually supportive fires.

TLO: React to Far Ambush at Night (Aided)

- ELO A: Provide security as part of a perimeter.
- ELO B: Move as a member of a presence patrol.
- ELO C: Engage targets (aided) from a temporary fighting position, employing mutually supportive fires.

**Note:** The previous ELO, Engage Targets in an NBC

Environment, can easily be performed during advanced rifle marksmanship training, as it requires only 30 minutes of instruction and application.

Using this new concept, Soldiers would train or reinforce six core warrior tasks and two core warrior drills:

- Correct malfunctions with assigned weapon;
- Use visual signaling techniques;
- Engage targets using aiming light AN/PEQ-2;
- Engage targets using aiming light AN/PAQ-4;
- React to direct fire (dismounted);
- Move under direct fire (dismounted);
- Select temporary fighting position;
- React to contact; and
- React to ambush (blocked).

Fort Knox has successfully conducted three pilots of this new concept to date, two with cadre and one with BCT Soldiers. It has proven to be a significantly more realistic and relevant experience that can be done safely without increased time. If this concept is approved by the U.S. Army Infantry Center, the proponent for the BCT POI, the existing bunkers would be bulldozed, producing an unimproved road, and without the need to maintain the prepared fighting positions, range maintenance costs would actually be lower than they currently are. More importantly, we would be sending Soldiers to combat who are immediately ready to go on a dismounted patrol in combat at night, trained on the equipment they will use, under the conditions they will fight, and on a task that is relevant to the contemporary operating environment.

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**Lieutenant Colonel James C. Larsen** recently served as the battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry (Basic Combat Training) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and is currently assigned to the J3, Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is a 1986 OCS graduate who has served in a variety of Ranger, mechanized, and air assault infantry assignments. He is a veteran of operations Just Cause, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom; and has deployed in support of operations Uphold Democracy and Joint Endeavor (SFOR-8).

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# BOOK REVIEWS



*The U.S. Army: A Complete History*  
Edited by Colonel Raymond K. Blum,  
Jr., U.S. Army, Retired. Army Historical  
Foundation, Hugh Lauter Levin  
Associations, Inc., 2004. 960 pages, \$75.  
Reviewed by Z. Frank Hanner.

In its 960 pages and illustrations, this book outlines North American military history from 1607 until 2004. It is a unique reference source that offers the reader with a single volume source chronology of dates and events that have not only helped to form our Army but also have created our nation. The volume contains hundreds of black and white and color images, vignettes, and biographical information on important military leaders and the events they influenced. The book helps the reader understand the story of how the U.S. Army evolved from colonial militia forces formed for defense of the Thirteen Colonies, and tells how this institution in time become the most important catalyst for establishing and sustaining the United States of America. It is an epic story of the "...embattled farmers..." at Concord Bridge and our shop keepers and their fellow citizens banding together to form an army that would grow to become the most powerful land force in the history of warfare.

The book includes the work of many contributors on a wide array of subjects, and a bibliography showing these authors' sources would have been most helpful to historians, students of military history, or just for the history buff wanting to know more about our Army's past. Unfortunately, no such bibliography or footnotes were included. Likewise, no sources are provided as to where the information came from for writing the chronology. These omissions, along with a number of historical errors, make the book hard to recommend as a scholarly reference source, but as a coffee table book it is an ideal gift. I can, however, highly recommend it as a source for what

military artwork is available; it has a wealth of excellent works rendered by some of the best military artists in our country. Because of a number of errors on dates and typographical errors, it is a book that you should use more for its entertainment value than as a definitive source. A great deal of work went into creating the book, and it is unfortunate that it is not as the title claims *The Complete History of the U.S. Army*. It barely scratches the service of what would take many more volumes to even come close to having a complete story of one of our nation's oldest institutions. I was, for example, surprised that the establishment of the Infantry School at Columbus, Georgia, in October 1918 was not mentioned in a text that claims to be the complete history of the Army.

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*Beyond Baghdad: Postmodern War and Peace.* By Ralph Peters. Stackpole Books, 2003. 337 Pages, \$22.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Command Sergeant Major James Clifford.

*Beyond Baghdad* is an anthology of Ralph Peters' published columns and essays spanning the period from before September 11th until just after major combat operations in Iraq ceased. Peters is a well-known former Army military intelligence officer-turned-writer. His columns are seen in newspapers and magazines across the country, and he's appeared on numerous television news programs. The tenor of his columns is supportive of our goals in fighting terrorism and spreading freedom. Although he frequently takes issue with specific actions of the current administration, especially those of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, he is rock solid behind the military.

His columns lecture liberals and the uneducated about the history, tactics, and strategy of Islamic terrorism. He cuts

through side issues and focuses on the critical aspects of the global war on terrorism. His previously published essays reveal his ability to foresee events and his depth of understanding of the issues.

Peters takes issue with those who suggest that we somehow brought the terrorist attacks on ourselves. He educates readers on the nature of Islam and the Arabic culture, explaining exactly why these cultures will continue to clash with the Judeo-Christian Western culture until they find a way to overcome their basic fear of women. His premise that Western equal treatment of women threatens Muslims and Arabs so greatly that they can find no response other than terrorism will likely find opponents. He sees explanations rooted in perceived economic injustices as simply excuses for what boils down to a backward religion and culture.

His support for our war in Iraq is unshakeable. While pundits were predicting defeat for our forces prior to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he was confident of victory. As others wrung their hands in despair over every minor development, he kept his eye on the ultimate goals, recognizing that in war bad things do happen but defeat only comes when one gives up. His one serious criticism of the Iraq War is that he feels the Defense Secretary has tried to fight the war on the cheap. He frequently mentions that we should have had more troops deployed before invading Iraq and claims that military commanders' requests were rebuffed by him. Like all good Soldiers he's appreciative of airpower, but he understands that you can't win a war without a massive ground commitment. He takes issue with the massive expenditure of funds to develop aircraft and ships while ground troops suffered comparatively.

Regardless of our activities in the Persian Gulf region and Afghanistan, he sees an even greater challenge looming in

other locations. Pakistan is of particular concern to Peters, along with parts of India. He also warns that one day Europe could reemerge as a reflection of their war prone past. His message is that while we battle terrorists in the Persian Gulf region, we must be on the watch and be ready to go wherever the threat takes us.

He doesn't limit his writing to America's wars; a few of his essays address the unrest in Palestine. He sees the contention between Palestinians and Israelis as being an extension of our problems with Islamic terrorists.

*Beyond Baghdad* closes with an essay published in Germany's *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. In *Au Revoir, Marianne...Aug Wiedersehen, Lili Marleen*, he lectures Germans and Frenchmen on the serious mistakes and miscalculations they've made by opposing America in Iraq. Europeans may not get the message, but Americans reading this essay will surely gain a new understanding on why President Bush stood up to European pressure and did what he knew was right in Iraq.

Many of these essays seem negative, but the overall message of this book is anything but. Under each essay is a subtle tone of optimism, faith, and admiration for the American Soldier, American citizen, and the American way of life. Only in reading these essays consecutively is the reader likely to pick up on that. His are messages of deep faith in America and its future, messages that aren't often found in the media today. For that reason alone, *Beyond Baghdad* is highly recommended.

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***The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies by Elie Kedourie.* First published by Prager, New York in 1970. Paperback edition published in 2004 by Ivan R. Dee Publishers, Chicago. 488 pages.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, U.S. Navy.

The late Iraqi scholar Elie Kedourie spent a lifetime teaching, explaining, and expanding our understanding of modern Middle East political history. Most of his career was spent at the London School of Economics, and he began his academic career with some controversy. While

pursuing his doctoral studies at Oxford, his dissertation involved going back into the British archives to learn the mistakes of British policies in the Middle East. His central argument was that the abrupt dismantling of the Ottoman Empire left millions of Arabs and Muslims vulnerable to self-appointed and despotic leaders. In the England of the 1950s, that kind of exploration and criticism of colonial policy was not tolerated and he withdrew his doctoral dissertation from Oxford and published it as a book entitled, *England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*. Not to say Ottoman administration was not dictatorial, but he dissects British policies for those who grapple with the problems of the region to understand how to manage a collapsing state towards stability and self-governance. Kedourie has edited and published a dozen books on the Middle East, but *The Chatham House Version* is perhaps the most important for members of the U.S. military wanting to expand their understanding of the region. Chatham House is a nonprofit British center for the study of international relations that was established in 1920 in the former home of three British Prime Ministers in London. It mirrors in concept to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. An ulterior motive for highlighting this book is to draw attention to Chatham House and encourage the potential exchange of U.S. military and government officials to this organization. The first paperback edition of this book was published in 2004 and is essential reading for serious students of Islamic militancy and Middle East affairs.

The first chapter is a rationalization of how sedition, treason, and civil war is common throughout Middle East history, but only in the current century as people from the region cope with failures and defeats has revolution been glorified as part of the political process. He writes that violence is beneficent and treason a sacred obligation. Add to this the interposition of two doctrines in the Arab world that has emerged in competition with other ideologies to explain the decline of Islamic civilization. One is Arab Nationalism and the second Islamic radicalism. Both, the author argues, are subversive to international stability. Islamic militancy recognizes only war or subjugation of the

infidel (to include Muslims that disagree with their world vision), and Arab Nationalism can be seen as the occult of victimization and the glorification of displacing blame on colonialism, Israel, the United States, the Mongols, and the list from history goes on.

The book continues with what was called in World War I, "The Arab Question." This chapter examines infamous figures of Middle East policy, such as Sir Henry McMahon, Sherief Hussein of Mecca, Sir Reginald Wingate and Lord Cromer. From 1915 to 1918 several competing policy issues plagued the great powers of England and France. It included the granting of self-rule to Arabs after the defeat of the Ottoman-German alliance, independence for Egypt, the status of the Sudan, debates of Israel as a Jewish homeland, the next Caliph after the Ottoman Sultan, and the status of the Levant vis-à-vis France. Readers will learn that London had overpromised to those who sought answers to these questions. In 1918, the British government made a Declaration to the Seven, declaring that London would recognize the independence of Arab lands liberated from Ottomans by Arabs. What really occurred was the eviction of Prince Feisal from Damascus by French forces, in an Alamo-like battle at Maysaloon in 1920. What can be determined from reading the book, is that different sectors of the British government controlled Middle East policy; they included the War Ministry, the India Office, the Home Office (in charge of British colonial affairs), the Royal Navy, the British High Commissioner in Egypt among others. Each not knowing what the other departments or agencies had already promised.

Chapters 5-7 provide an excellent overview of how the British attempted to maintain control of Egypt and the Suez Canal. What is important for readers of today to glean from these chapters is that the father of Egypt's independence movement Sa'ad Zaghlul was not an Islamic radical, nor did he use religion to justify freedom for Egypt. Instead he relied on arguments of democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and a check against absolute colonial or monarchic power. Zaghlul is an interesting figure in Egyptian history and is still revered by Egyptians; he rose to Prime Minister, was exiled to Malta, and

returned to a Prime Ministership once again after fierce public protest.

Another valued chapter in the book is the 1923 debates that framed the Egyptian constitution. The debates center on the role of the King and the Parliament, the author also highlights British meddling that assured oversight of Egyptian defense and foreign policy.

If there is one chapter to read, it is Chapter 7 entitled "Egypt and the Caliphate," a debate that lasted from 1915 to 1952. At its height in 1924 until the death of Egypt's King Fuad in 1936, books and articles were produced debating the whole concept of the Caliphate. The caliph was the successor to Prophet Mohammed and was abolished in 1924 when Kemal Attaturk deposed the Ottoman Sultan. Reestablishing the caliphate is a core justification of Islamic militants today. One of the most important books de-emphasized in Islamic education and Arab schools is the 1925 book *Islam and the Foundations of Authority* by Islamic judge Ali Abdal Raziq. In his book, Abdal Raziq makes a compelling historical thesis that as Prophet Muhammad did not leave clear guidance on how Muslims should govern themselves after his death, early Muslims resorted to the pre-Islamic form of governing urban centers and that was the selection of a caliph by the different tribes. In essence, the caliphate is a pre-Islamic concept of government adopted by Muslims after the death of Muhammad and is not a religious obligation or an ordained form of government in the Quran (Islamic book of divine revelation) or Hadith (prophet's sayings). This caused a firestorm of debate at the time and sadly Abdal Raziq was stripped of his judicial position. The clerical establishment in Egypt represented by the Al-Azhar institution attacked him. King Fuad who coveted being named the next caliph also attacked him. This unconventional exploration of Islam today would bring Abdal Raziq a death sentence by Islamic militants. A revival of such discussion is necessary in the struggle to win the ideological aspects of the current war on terrorism.

Kedourie continues his essays on discussing the creation of modern Iraq, pan-Arabism and much more. This is an exceptional grouping of 12 essays that is a must read for those involved in Middle East intelligence analysis, Middle East Foreign Area Officers, and those civil affairs personnel working in the region.



Specialist Elizabeth Erste

*Soldiers from the 28th Infantry Division out of Pennsylvania head towards the site of where a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated in Baiji, Iraq, January 17, 2005.*

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