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“These Are My Credentials” *(Page 1)*

**The Leadership Imperative:
A Case Study in Mission Command** *(Page 26)*


**Trust: A Decisive Point In
COIN Operations** *(Page 38)*



COL ROBERT E. CHOPPA
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FRONT COVER:

A U.S. Soldier with Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment "Strike Force," 101st Airborne Division, leads his team during a night patrol in Parwan Province, Afghanistan, on 31 March 2014. (Photo by PFC Nikayla Shodeen)

BACK COVER:

A Soldier with the 503rd Infantry Regiment, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), signifies to his fellow squad members to halt during a live-fire exercise while conducting bounding and react-to-fire scenarios at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area in Germany on 24 March 2014. (Photo by SPC Franklin R. Moore)

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Volume 103, Number 1

FEATURES

- 26 **THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE: A CASE STUDY IN MISSION COMMAND**
CPT Thomas E. Meyer
- 34 **LEFT BEHIND: A REAR-D COMMANDER'S EXPERIENCE**
CPT Marcus B. Forrester
- 38 **TRUST: A DECISIVE POINT IN COIN OPERATIONS**
LTC Aaron A. Bazin

DEPARTMENTS

- 1 **COMMANDANT'S NOTE**
- 2 **INFANTRY NEWS**
- 7 **PROFESSIONAL FORUM**
 - 7 **DNNE FUSES INFANTRYMEN'S CAPABILITIES WITH TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS**
MAJ Jason D. Bohannon
 - 10 **BRADLEY FAMILY OF VEHICLES TO RECEIVE UPGRADES**
MAJ Nayari Cameron
 - 12 **TTPS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF BRIGADE AND TASK FORCE ENGINEERS**
COL Jason L. Smallfield
 - 15 **INSIDER ATTACKS: REPAIRING A DAMAGED PARTNERSHIP**
CPT Seth Hildebrand
 - 19 **TALK MORE SUSTAINMENT, LESS TACTICS WITH AFGHAN FORCES**
CPT Kyle Wolfley
 - 22 **MISSION COMMAND AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL: OPERATION DEADSTICK**
CPT W. Paul Hill
- 43 **TRAINING NOTES**
 - 43 **WELCOME (BACK) TO THE JUNGLE**
COL Brian S. Eifler
 - 46 **TROOP TAKES TRAINING UNDERGROUND**
1LT Brian E. Wildey
 - 48 **MEKONG DELTA 1968: COUNTERINSURGENCY THEN AND NOW**
Russell A. Eno
- 52 **BOOK REVIEWS**



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Commandant's Note

COL ROBERT E. CHOPPA

“THESE ARE MY CREDENTIALS”

Some of the most bitter fighting of World War II in France centered on the city of Brest, whose port facilities were essential to sustaining our invading armies. Barely two months after the Allied landings at Normandy, General George Patton's Third U.S. Army isolated German forces on the Brittany peninsula, and the U.S. VIII Corps was diverted to there to secure the port before the Germans could destroy the harbor facilities as they had at Cherbourg. After prolonged house-to-house fighting, elements of the U.S. 8th Infantry Division captured the headquarters of German Lieutenant General Hermann-Bernhard Ramcke. The Assistant 8th Infantry Division Commander BG Charles D.W. Canham confronted Ramcke to demand his surrender. Stalling for time as his last report from Fortress Brest was being wired to Berlin from an adjacent room, Ramcke demanded that BG Canham show him some credentials as a condition of the surrender. Gesturing toward the well-armed and grimly determined U.S. Infantrymen who had accompanied him, Canham simply replied: “These are my credentials.” Fortress Brest had fallen. The *New York Times* reported an account of the event, and BG Canham's superb tribute to the U.S. Infantryman later became the motto of the 8th Infantry Division.

Credentials may take many forms, but the bottom line is that they offer evidence which attests to one's authority, confidence, or credit. To members of our profession, the most common and earliest credential to be attained is a copy of one's enlistment orders, an academic degree, or a commission in the armed forces of our nation. Qualification badges, certificates of professional training, assignment and promotion orders, and other proofs of achievement reinforce the bearer's credibility among peers, superiors, subordinates, and adversaries alike. They tell people who we are and what we are made of. The credentials of the Army have been hard-won, often at staggering cost, but the nations we have liberated, defended, and in many cases rebuilt can attest to the reliability of this nation, our people, and the U.S. Infantryman. But it is not enough to establish credentials; we must continually revalidate them because the challenges to our way of life are continually changing in response to enemies' doctrine, technological advances, and motives. The phenomenon we hail as globalization carries with it yet newer opportunities for international crime, identity theft, human trafficking, spread of diseases such as Ebola, the MERS virus now in the U.S. for the first time, and uncontrolled immigration by groups and cultures whose values are incompatible with our own.

Today, we are examining a number of ways to instill in our agile, adaptive leaders the knowledge, skills, abilities, and attributes to win on battlefields that we can only begin to envision. One of these will be underground, and the

subterranean fight may well be in the subway tunnels, sewers, and passages of urban areas such as we saw in Berlin and Stalingrad during World War II. We are already fielding initiatives to prepare for the subterranean fight, and the database we have assembled includes material as diverse as the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1529, tunneling operations during our own Civil War and in World War I, Vietcong tunnel complexes, North Korean excavations to move men and materiel, and drug-related tunneling along the Mexican border.

We are the best Army in the world because of the initiative, professionalism, and selfless service of our NCO Corps, and one way we prepare our Soldiers and leaders for the new challenges of future wars is by increasing the rigor of courses at the Infantry School. Demolitions and combatives training are again part of the Ranger School program of instruction (POI), Officer Candidate School will include tougher physical training standards, Advanced Situational Awareness (ASA) is now part of a number of courses (including Sniper School and the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course), and ASA, already taught by largely civilian cadre, is evolving to where the course will develop Soldier instructors and facilitate ASA principles across the force. We are examining ways to improve marksmanship by considering the possibility of integrating some form of robotic human-type targetry into our small arms training that will include a diverse array of target scenarios. We need to create more realistic and challenging scenarios that include moving targets at varying speeds and simulated enemy fire teams in engagements. We have also not forgotten the conditioning and bonding potential of the long-used bayonet assault course and are reexamining the bayonet training that was integral to how we trained Infantrymen from World War I through Vietnam and well into the Cold War.

The challenge is great: continue to defend the nation, our people, and our interests at home and abroad against an adaptable and implacable enemy at a time of increasingly constrained resources. Things are tough all over: our allies in the European Union and other regions have their own problems, but one thing is certain, when the wolf is at the door, they will turn to the United States as they always have. They turn to us because our credentials are — and must remain — impeccable.

One force, one fight! Follow me!





CROWS OPTION BOOSTS SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

PEO SOLDIER

When SPC Zachary Cline found himself in a Taliban ambush last summer, he was operating the .50 caliber M2 mounted on a Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS) from the back of his commander's mine-resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV). His unit instantly began to fight its way out.

In the first moments of the ensuing chaos, Cline guided the crosshairs on the CROWS' fire control screen on what appeared to be a legitimate target. He paused, then cross-checked with his seasoned troop commander (TC) in the front seat who was able to see Cline's sight picture on his own Driver's Visual Enhancement (DVE) screen. Check fire.

"The order was given not to fire, which in this theater is as important as firing sometimes," said Cline, an Infantryman who was on his first tour in a combat zone. "My TC saw it on the screen and, between the two of us, we determined that it wasn't a threat. If it had just been me, I probably would've made the same decision that we made together, but I might not have."

Cline's unit, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT), 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, piloted an enhancement to their CROWS system that leverages a simple cable to great advantage. The hardened cable patches the CROWS fire control unit video out to the DVE unit mounted in the front of the vehicle. This enables key personnel such as the TC to see the same CROWS sensor suite data and imagery that previously only the gunner could see from his position in the back of the vehicle. The enhanced situational awareness provided by the second screen delivers immediate tactical advantages with significant strategic implications.

"Seconds matter when you are talking about identifying a potential threat that could be catastrophic to your crew or your vehicle," said 1SG Christopher Williams, HHT, 6-8 Cavalry. "But, if you pull that trigger and it's not a threat, the strategic implications that could arise are very serious. Strategically, you could set yourself back weeks, months, or even years if you mistakenly engage."

Williams had been working with Product Manager Crew Served Weapons and the Rapid Equipping Force to secure the cables and additional DVEs he needed to outfit his unit's CROWS with second screen capability. The upgrade leverages existing items within the Army's inventory to connect the two systems. The new configuration allows more senior crew members typically situated in the front of a vehicle to lend their judgment to a gunner who may only



PEO Soldier photo

Assistant Product Manager MAJ Curtis Brooker and CROWS Engineer Matthew Moeller demonstrate the second screen option.

have a year or two of experience under his belt.

Additionally, the second screen gives the commander the ability to reconnoiter potential targets out in sector far more effectively than he could with a pair of binoculars thanks to the 27-power daytime camera, thermal optics, and laser rangefinder of the CROWS.

When it comes to the rules of engagement and positive identification requirements, the second screen is of tremendous value.

"It reduces the burden of the gunner to have the TC be able to confirm the target with absolute certainty," said Cline. "It reduces the time that would've elapsed between identifying a target and engaging it. It reduces the burden on the gunner to verbally describe what he is seeing."

For Williams, the CROWS second screen option is something he would like to see live past deployment. Ideally, units train as they fight, which is why Williams would like to see TCs and CROWS gunners become proficient at identifying threat and non-threat targets to engage on a gunnery range before units are deployed into a theater of operations. Such training would make the verbal exchanges between the gunner and the TC a proficient battle drill.

"The second screen needs to be in absolutely every single vehicle because of the amazing amount of situational awareness it provides," said Williams. "It is essential to have a piece of equipment that makes every second count to ensure you are doing the right thing."

ARMY INTRODUCES NEW MOUNTAINEERING KITS

DOUG GRAHAM

Soldiers at the Army Mountain Warfare School in Jericho, Vt., are slated to receive new equipment designed to improve their performance and give them “Spiderman-like” abilities. The equipment is part of the improved Army Mountaineering Kit (AMK).

The new kit, developed by Project Manager Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment, will help Soldiers traverse cliffs and mountain faces, and cross snow and ice. The AMK will help Soldiers function more effectively in harsh, high-altitude environments similar to that of the mountains in Afghanistan.

The AMK will be fielded in four kits tailored to meet different mission requirements. These kits will replace the mix of older Army-issued equipment and commercially available mountain gear currently being used by most units.

“Mountain combat is unforgiving. In addition to fighting a determined enemy, you are dealing with high altitudes, rocky and often dangerous terrain, and extreme temperatures,” said MAJ Laverne Stanley, assistant product manager for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) and Load Carriage Equipment. “The AMK gives our Soldiers the equipment they need to take and keep that vital high ground and complete their missions at peak levels of performance.

“The AMK will also provide Soldiers with proven standardized gear which will simplify both training and logistics for units that specialize in mountaineering,” Stanley added.

Darren Bean, a former sergeant major and Army Mountain

Warfare School chief instructor, said the new kits for Soldiers contain about 80 percent of the same equipment that the Marine Corps presently uses. The similarity in kits should prove beneficial to joint operations.

Bean, who was heavily involved in the development of the AMK, said the effort began in earnest in 2006. It was then the Army increased operations in the eastern part of Afghanistan. In that part of the country, mountains tower from 10,000 to 14,000 feet and require mountain-climbing expertise.

“You always want to fight from the high ground,” said Bean, adding that high vantage points are also necessary for observation points and sniper positions.

“Getting to those locations by helicopter is not always a good idea because of the high altitude, high winds and rocky terrain,” Bean noted. “Therefore, Soldiers have to be able to climb.

“We identified a need for a new kit because the old Special Operations Forces Mountaineering Kit that had been supplied to units was outdated. Much of the equipment did not meet the standards set by the UIAA,” said Bean, referring to the Union Internationale des Associations d’Alpinisme (International Mountaineering and Climbing Federation).

Read more on the new kits at http://www.army.mil/article/120699/Army_introduces_four_new_mountaineering__climbing_kits/.

(Doug Graham works in Program Executive Office [PEO] Soldier’s Public Affairs Office.)



PEO Soldier photo

‘MA DEUCE’ GETS NEW STAND

In November 2013, the 1st Armored Division became the first Army division to be fielded the new M205 Lightweight Tripod for Heavy Machine Guns, which is replacing the currently used M3 tripod for the M2/M2A1 and MK19 machine guns. The new tripod provides a strong, stable firing platform at significantly reduced weight. At 34 pounds, the M205 weighs 16 pounds less than the 50-pound M3 tripod, which represents significant progress in lightening the Soldier’s load. The tripod also has a new traverse and elevation mechanism that allows faster, more accurate target engagement.

MORTAR REDESIGN HELPS INFANTRYMEN BECOME MORE LETHAL, SAFE

JOHN B. SNYDER

The U.S. Infantry has some of the finest mortar systems in the world. They are lightweight, have great range, and provide a significant amount of lethal and destructive fire to close-range combat. And so, why would anyone think about tweaking something that has already been proven very capable in training and in combat?

"It is all about our troops maintaining the competitive edge over potential adversaries," said Wayland Barber, chief of the Mortars and Recoilless Rifle Branch at Benét Laboratories. "Even without funding for new weapons research, Army scientists and engineers are always seeking opportunities to improve weapons systems that are in the field."

"No sooner than we field a new mortar system, our customers demand that we make it better in regards to extended range, increased lethality or capability, and reduced weight," said Barber. "This triggers the entire Army research community, from those who improve the lethality of ammunition to those who design the delivery system, to work on parallel and converging fields of science to achieve a common goal."

Barber supervises a team of 14 Department of the Army civilian engineers and technicians who not only design and build prototypes of future mortar and recoilless systems, they also design product improvements of what has already been fielded. Given today's fiscal challenges due to sequestration, and the lack of any major orders for new weapon systems, improving what the U.S. military currently has fielded drives Barber and his team's near-term focus.

Some of the latest work at Benét Labs transcends all fielded mortar systems in the U.S. inventory, from 60mm to 81mm to 120mm mortars.

"The current 120mm mortar system has good range, is reliable, and the

troops like it," said Bob Cooley, a Benét Labs Integrated Process team leader. "But as good as that system is, we have several product improvements that we are currently working that may improve Soldiers' safety, increase range by up to 25 percent, and reduce the system's weight by nearly 16 percent."

"One of the major upgrades to the 120mm system is with its bipod," Cooley said. "Our bipod redesign will improve the accuracy of the system because it moves the fire control system from the tube to the bipod."

According to Cooley, the fire control system, or FCS, is currently attached to the tube, which in turn places a significant amount of stress and movement on the FCS during a fire mission. By moving the FCS to the bipod, there will be less force exerted on the system, which in turn will improve accuracy.

Another design improvement for the 120mm mortar system includes a new baseplate that will not only provide more

stability for extended range munitions, it will save U.S. taxpayers money. If and when the redesigned baseplate goes into full production, the cost of the baseplate will be reduced by nearly 50 percent over the current legacy system. The qualification test was recently completed with the firing of 3,000 rounds without incident.

The final piece to the redesigned 120mm mortar system is an improved cannon tube. When extended range ammunition is developed, the tube must also be modified to withstand higher tube pressure, heat, and muzzle velocity.

Benét Labs plans to conduct a full-quality testing of the redesigned 120mm mortar system in fiscal year 2015, and Barber's team is also doing research and design work on the 60mm and the 81mm mortar systems. News of those potential product improvements will be covered in a future article.

(John B. Snyder works for the Watervliet Arsenal Public Affairs Office.)



Photo by John B. Snyder

Bob Cooley, a Benét Labs Integrated Process team leader, adjusts the newly redesigned 120mm mortar bipod in the product development laboratory at Watervliet Arsenal, N.Y.

'LIVE SYNTHETIC' ARMY'S NEXT GENERATION OF SIMULATION

DAVID VERGUN

Soldiers from a brigade combat team (BCT) are at a combat training site doing a routine live-fire exercise. Well, maybe not so routine.

Suddenly enemy jets pop out of the clouds streaking toward them. The Soldiers scramble for cover as missiles rain down. They hear the explosions from the missiles impacting all around them, see the flames and debris, and smell the smoke. But this is where it gets a little bit eerie. Those enemy jets are being piloted a thousand miles away by fellow BCT Soldiers, some in aircraft simulators and others on computer gaming stations. The Soldiers see the visual recreations of those jets in real-time through special glasses that allow them to see the real world around them while simultaneously viewing the simulations.

Data from the simulations stream into the Soldiers' glasses from satellites and ground relay stations. In turn, the pilots in simulators and those using gaming stations see what Soldiers are doing in the live environment by satellite and unmanned aircraft video feeds and sensors on the Soldiers that transmit precise locations and activities. Sounds of the battle are generated through special earpieces that harmonize with the visuals and the smells are pumped in through special odor machines.

Pipe dream? Not really, said COL John Janiszewski, director of the National Simulation Center (NSC), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

"We're now looking at a concept called the Future Holistic Training Environment Live Synthetic" that will eventually do this and much more, he said. "We're now documenting the requirements."

By next year, Janiszewski plans to define the specific requirements for live synthetic and hopes to begin fielding systems by fiscal year (FY) 2022 and have them in place Army-wide by FY 2025.

In the meantime, the NSC is having discussions with industry and experts in the science and technology community to "close some of those gaps" in capability.

Although simulators have been around for decades, the problem is that most were designed to be used in isolation. Live synthetic fuses them all seamlessly. There are four basic types of simulations that will need to be fused to make the



Photo illustration by Peggy Frierson

vision a reality. They go by the acronym LVC-G — live, virtual, constructive - gaming.

Live Simulation (LS)

This is "real people operating real systems in the field," Janiszewski said. Soldiers have been doing this since the dawn of warfare. Janiszewski said live simulations have improved significantly since he joined the Army 26 years ago.

The sounds and smells mentioned in the setup scenario have already been added to LS in mock towns at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. Marines at nearby Camp Pendleton are using animatronics in their LS. Animatronics are computer-generated images of people or even animals that appear to be physically present — some are friendly, some not.

Another improvement is that Soldiers' movements today can be tracked through radio frequency identifiers attached to their bodies, a quantum leap from the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) introduced in the 1980s, which didn't track movement, only hits from weaponry.

Although LS has seen significant improvements, "we're not there yet," he said, meaning the Army doesn't have the glasses that would permit the use of "augmented reality." Cloud computing capability will also likely play a role in this.

As troops draw down from Afghanistan, more and more Soldiers are doing LS at combat training centers and at installations. Commanders didn't have a lot of responsibility planning and executing training over the last 12 years of war since it was done for them, Janiszewski pointed out. Now, it's their responsibility. Mobile training teams from the CAC are helping them out with this, he said. "When we're at peace, we're an Army of preparation."

Virtual Simulation (VS)

"This is real people operating simulation systems," he said. "Like your child driving the racing car at the video arcade. The child believes he's in a real vehicle with steering, gas, brakes, and a display."

VS is what most people think of when they think of simulation. The Army has had them around for decades now: tanks, trucks, helicopters, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and more. Tank crews and aircraft crews operate in separate simulators but can share a common picture of the training exercise.

These systems are already sophisticated with verisimilitude displays, motion, tactile, and auditory feedback, he continued, adding that he's not seen any significant leap forward in virtual simulation since it's pretty realistic already.

Constructive Simulation (CS)

This is simulated people and equipment operating in a simulated environment, he said.

In a typical constructive simulation, operators are looking at a computer screen watching contours on a map and icons representing friendlies and enemy, along with their weapons, vehicles, aircraft, and materiel. Operators can move objects around using their mouse.

Over the last decades, Janiszewski said CS has gotten more realistic, meaning the representations on the screen are more sophisticated and movements are more precise and closer to real time. Also, terrain mapping has gotten more detailed. Entire, large-scale organizations can be represented this way, and while not as exciting as being in a virtual simulation, it is just as effective, he pointed out. In fact, Janiszewski said his unit in Germany in 2002 and 2003, rehearsed the Iraq invasion and the roll up to Baghdad using CS.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) uses CS for analytical and experimentation purposes as well as gaming future scenarios.

Gaming Simulation (GS)

This is similar to CS but instead of icons and contour lines on a map, the view on the computer screen looks real. Think of the popular "Call to Duty" or "Halo" video games.

Janiszewski said gaming is the simulation that by far has had the most advances, especially in the last few years. GS is so new, in fact, that his office has yet to add gaming to its current acronym LVC-IA (live, virtual, constructive-integrative architecture), which describes the Army's current efforts to integrate training systems across the simulations realm. Gaming is not yet officially part of the Army's simulation syllabus — but he expects it to be soon.

"Gaming is probably the most prevalent and popular capability we now have," he said. That's because one, it's realistic and engaging; two, you don't need a bulky, expensive piece of equipment like a virtual simulator; and three, there is a plentiful supply of computers.

Forging Ahead

Besides adding gaming to the mix and fusing the four simulations together, there are a few other challenges to get to live synthetic.

For one, NSC doesn't have the accreditation that would allow it to operate simulations over the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). Obtaining the certification and accreditation "is critical if we want to train the way we

fight," he said. A successful SIPRNet workaround for now is the NSC's use of the Global Simulation Capability Network (GSC Net), which "is a training network that allows the NSC to distribute constructive simulations from Fort Leavenworth to home-station training locations in support of division and corps training events," he said.

GSC Net also allows units that are strung out over several states, as is often the case with the National Guard and Reserve, to use the existing Defense Information Systems Agency operational network, he said. For example, NSC at Fort Leavenworth recently pushed out a training simulation via the GSC Net successfully to Soldiers at Fort Bragg, N.C., he said.

Another issue in getting to live synthetic is funding.

"I worry about the budget every day," he admitted. "I try to articulate why we need the resources, [and] try to show the positive effects [of simulation on] training and readiness of the Army."

Janiszewski said he "doesn't like to use the cost factor of why we want to do this, but in truth, it's cheaper to train in a simulator" than live. For instance, he pointed to a study that showed it cost about \$3,500 to fly a real attack helicopter per hour while an attack helicopter simulator cost around \$500.

The cost curve can also be lowered by simulating instructors and tutors on the simulators, he said. Scripts or even robots could mentor Soldiers doing the tasks. This would cut down on the need to hire more contractors.

Another benefit simulation provides in cost, as well as time savings, is that simulations can be delivered right to the installation. Fort Hood, Texas, was the first to use LVC-IA in 2012, he said. Soldiers from a 1st Cavalry Division BCT used the three simulation components successfully in a feasibility assessment exercise to determine if LVC-IA could be rolled out Army-wide. It wasn't true "live fusion" as envisioned for the future, but it nonetheless demonstrated that the three types of simulation could be used successfully in an exercise.

Then, Soldiers at Fort Drum, N.Y., used CS to train on logistics while interacting with Soldiers at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La., who were doing LS. Data was transmitted back and forth live via a mission command information system which gave them a common operating picture, he said.

Along with Forts Drum and Hood, LVC-IA systems have been delivered to Fort Riley, Kan.; Fort Stewart, Ga.; Fort Bliss, Texas; and Fort Campbell, Ky. Fifteen more sites will get deliveries between now and FY 2016. The Guard and Reserve will be included in all simulation training, Janiszewski added.

In addition to that effort, it's standard practice now at combat training centers for Soldiers to use CS as part of their leader development program prior to going to the live environment. This type of "progressive training strategy increases proficiency during the follow-on live event," he noted.

Besides simulation efforts within the Army, Janiszewski said sister services and allies are sharing simulation ideas and interconnectivity since "training together is critical for the U.S. in the future."

(David Vergun writes for the Army News Service.)



DNNE FUSES INFANTRYMEN'S CAPABILITIES WITH TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS

MAJ JASON D. BOHANNON

To a Soldier in the field, it may seem that new equipment just shows up. In reality, it is only through extensive work and collaborative actions between the combat and materiel development enterprise that the latest capabilities get into the hands of Soldiers. Discussions within the Maneuver Center of Excellence's (MCoE) Soldier Requirement Division determined there was a need to enhance the nine-man Infantry squad in a dismounted, non-networked environment. Thus, the Dismounted, Non-Networked Enabled Exercise (DNNE) was born and stands as a prime example of the fusing of Infantrymen's capabilities with materiel developers' technological advancements. This partnership puts innovative, reliable, and proven technology into warfighters' hands in the most effective and expedient manner and provides an opportunity to get Soldier feedback. The exercise, held at Fort Benning, Ga., required the partnership of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, MCoE, and multiple project management offices including Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CCS).

Future squads will conduct missions across the range of military operations from full-scale war and counterinsurgency operations to peacekeeping support and reconstruction operations. For squads to accomplish their missions successfully, existing and future capabilities must be integrated into a family of systems and weapons and synchronized with those of higher units. The evolving operational environment and emerging threats to national security will require continuous assessment for the Army modernization of the squad and its supporting organizations. The effect of modernization efforts of the Squad: Foundation of the Decisive Force (SFDF) initiative include changes across the domains of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Capabilities, when validated and prioritized, will drive the adaptation and innovation necessary to conduct unified operations consistent with the ideas in the Army Capstone Concept and Movement and Maneuver Operational Concept — offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations.

DNNE took an in-depth look at viable solutions to dominate a close fight in complex and challenging conditions. The operating environment for dismounted squads ranges from hours to days and includes wide-ranging rules of engagement (ROE) that may place greater emphasis on higher echelon support due to the longer duration as well as the threat intensity of missions. The ability for a squad to maneuver in an adversary's environment will depend on the availability of enablers, be it sequentially or simultaneously. For example, a company acting as part of a larger element assisting in a forced-entry mission could have its squads in three different

Photo courtesy of PM CCS

A Soldier employs an AN/PSS-14 Mine Detecting Set as a trainer critiques his technique.



tiers of fighting conditions. The first condition, dismounted non-network enabled, will provide limited or no access to external enablers because of weather, distance, terrain, constrained ROE, or threat capabilities. The second squad condition, dismounted networked enabled, has access to external enablers such as network, fire support, close air support, and attack aviation. The third squad condition, dismounted platform enabled, has the support of external and platform enablers like the M1151 Enhanced Armament Carrier, Bradley Fighting, Stryker, and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The network, a combat multiplier, is critical; however, the future squad still requires overmatch capabilities against future threats when the network is limited or denied. Consequently, DNNE provided an opportunity to explore these capabilities and collect the analytics of formation effectiveness for a series of imminent organic capabilities.

Increased lethality and survivability capabilities that allow maneuverability to defeat ever-evolving threats are the cornerstone of PM CCS' portfolio. "Although the landscape of the fight is changing, our premier mission at PM CCS remains consistent — to deliver the most robust, revolutionary advances in technology that allows our Soldiers to respond as necessary to any threat spectrum. We don't want a fair fight, ever," said COL Richard J. Hornstein, project manager for PM CCS, which is part of Program Executive Officer (PEO) Ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.

With a portfolio of products that range from counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IEDs), handheld pyrotechnic devices, C-4 explosives, and shoulder-launched munitions (SLMs) to mine-clearing line charges, hand grenades, and non-lethal weapon sets, PM CCS provided several future technologies that were demonstrated during DNNE.

Having the tactical flexibility to react rapidly and effectively to any scenario ensures success against the varied threats and combat environments our forces face. In the area of SLM, the Infantry has been in pursuit of a lightweight, multi-target SLMs capable of defeating the protection provided by urban structures, field fortifications, and light armored vehicles for more than two decades. The current mix of SLMs provides for field fortification, limited urban structure, and armor defeat capabilities. During DNNE, the potential of such a multi-target capability, the Individual Assault Munition (IAM), was reviewed. Reducing Soldier's overburden, the IAM increased Soldier mobility and provided continued overmatch and lethality while reducing exposure to counterattack by enabling Soldiers to engage targets from small rooms or other confined spaces. The IAM provides the future squad with a lightweight, recoilless fire from enclosure, multi-target munition capable of defeating earth and timber bunkers, masonry structures including adobe and light armored vehicles at ranges of 15-500 meters.

The MK3A2 Offensive Hand Grenade has been in the Army's inventory since 1917. It provides lethal over-pressurization effects without the fragmentation associated with the more commonly used M67 fragmentation hand grenade. However, it was discontinued for use in order to




Photo courtesy of PM CCS

During the DNNE, Soldiers train on the proper handgrip for the improved MK3 offensive hand grenade.

address safety concerns of asbestos in the fiber liner. Due to this, many Soldiers participating in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom never had the opportunity to use the capability. The MK3 grenade is not just another tool in the commander's tool bag; it is an effective warfighting tool all Soldiers need to engage the enemy in close combat. The MK3 is a lethal overpressure concussion hand grenade used for operations in closed and restrictive terrain that includes engagement of bunkers, trench lines, caves, and to enter and clear rooms. The MK3 complements the M67 fragmentation hand grenade in lethality and is used in lieu of the M67 when lethal fragments are not preferred.

In addition, the improvements to the MK3 offensive grenade provide the Soldier with a lightweight blasting and demolition capability that is gripped, armed, and employed in the same manner as a hand grenade. During the exercise, Soldiers trained on the use of the improved MK3 and later used cognitive skill to determine what hand grenade capability (M67 or MK3) was best suited to engage a variety of target sets. Soldiers also had the opportunity to witness the MK3 used for door breaching at Fort Benning's Terry Demolition Range.

The Infantry uses demolitions and breaching munitions to clear mines and IEDs, overcome obstacles, and impede enemy movement. Modernization efforts are aimed at making demolitions lighter, more reliable and less sensitive. The Man-Portable Line Charge (MPLC) is a lightweight, man-portable rocket-launched explosive line-charge system that supports dismounted breaching operations of IEDs and/or

tripwire-triggered hazards. Contained in a rucksack, MPLC consists of 84 feet of plastic-bonded explosive line charge, a small rocket motor used to deploy the line charge, an arrestor strap, a launch rod, and 100 feet of dual-shock tube housed in a skin pack. The overall system weighs 27 pounds. Upon employment and detonation, MPLC can expose and, in some cases, clear buried and surface-laid explosive hazards in urban, rural, or trip-wired environments. MPLC can be employed from covered or concealed positions and, if used in conjunction with a handheld mine detector such as the AN/PSS-14, it can greatly increase the squad's mobility and survivability.

Having the freedom to operate wherever required on the battlefield is important notably when squads face the dangers of IEDs and other explosive hazards with every step and mile they travel. Currently fielded to deployed units in theater, the AN/PSS-14 Mine Detecting Set uses advanced electronics incorporating decades of lessons learned about the business of finding hostile mines. Integrating ground-penetrating radar (GPR) and a metal detector, the AN/PSS-14 provides a three-

dimensional analysis of objects buried in the ground and alerts the operator to the threat prior to detonation, greatly reducing the risk of injury to the squad. The system also features a built-in-test capability to warn the operator when the system is inoperable. Overall weight is 16.2 pounds (5.4 pounds of the weight is the battery). The AN/PSS-14 is the only handheld detector to have withstood rigorous Army testing against the full spectrum of Army requirements. The AN/PSS-14 utilizes the readily available BB-390 battery that can be ordered through the Army supply system.

Another capability evaluated during the DNNE Limited Objective Experiment was the infrared (IR) XM210 Handheld Signal (HHS). The current family of HHS, also known as the slap flare, provides day and night signaling and illumination capabilities. The XM210 complements the operational capability of the existing inventory of HHS with an IR capability at night. The XM210 enhances the operational performance capabilities of U.S. forces with night vision devices without giving unaided enemy forces visible light illumination when using the M127A1 Signal Illuminant White Star Parachute. The XM210 has the same form and fit as the current family of HHS that use an expendable launcher consisting of a launching tube and firing cap. The IR payload of the XM210 is rocket propelled to an altitude of 725 feet.

In addition to the HHS capability, the pen flare signaling device (PFSD) was also a part of DNNE. The PFSD fires visual and auditory signaling pyrotechnic flares without requiring reloading to a range of 70 meters. The launcher consists of a metal body that, when loaded with flares, is only 6.42 inches long. There are three colored (white, red, and green) flares and a flash bang. They are individually launched by pulling and releasing a firing lever. The PFSD is employed for squad-level signaling and can also be used in escalation-of-force scenarios. Soldiers benefit from a weight savings associated with carrying the PFSD rather than multiple white, green, and red HHS star clusters, which weigh 1.2 pounds each.

DNNE's success was not only defined by Soldiers' ability to prove emerging technologies against known requirements but also by the materiel development enterprise's ability to support a rapid experiment. The Soldiers' instantaneous feedback provided a mechanism to make course corrections in ongoing developments and address future tactics. Becoming more efficient in a manner that does not compromise the primary responsibility to the future squad is the mission of the DNNE joint partnership. As the manager of premier close combat capabilities, Team CCS is dedicated to the sustained success of today's joint warfighter and the continued dominance of the future force. PM CCS will continue to provide more lethal and survivable capabilities to empower the squad and increase commander's freedom of action to prevent, shape and win.

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Photo by SGT Melissa Stewart

Soldiers in A Company, 3rd Brigade Special Troops Battalion fire a Man Portable Line Charge during a training exercise.

BRADLEY FAMILY OF VEHICLES UNDERGOES ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSALS

MAJ NAYARI CAMERON


When the West began its ascent to world supremacy in the 16th century, military institutions played a crucial role in its drive to power. Recent historical work suggests that the Western military framework has undergone cyclical periods of innovation beginning in the early 14th century and continuing to the present and that such periods have resulted in systemic and massive changes to the basic nature of warfare and the organizations that fight. The military history of the 20th century indicates that this pattern has continued unbroken except that the periods between major innovations have been decreasing even as the complexity of innovation has increased.

A number of factors have driven innovation in military affairs: the rapid pace of technological change, the vast sums spent on military research, and the increasing sophistication with which military organizations evaluate their performance and that of their weapon systems. The fusion of technology and potent management skills that mobilize mass organizations makes military change inevitable. If anything, the technologies influencing civilian life in the next

century may have even greater impact on military force than has been true in this century.

As the user representative, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capability Manager Armored Brigade Combat Team (TCM-ABCT) continually assesses the capabilities of the Bradley family of vehicles (BFoV) in coordination with ABCT commanders to ensure organizations are properly organized, trained, and equipped for success on the battlefield. Over the course of 30 years, the BFoV has continually evolved, adding technologies ahead of its adversaries making it one of the Army's most combat effective families of vehicles. In the wake of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, lessons learned reflect the need modernize once again as emerging technologies continue to flow into the system at a rapid pace. In the near future, the Bradley will be upgraded with improved underbelly protection and will also be linked to the Army's network via a mission command suite. Network improvements provide the commander the ability to maintain non-interrupted higher, lower, and adjacent

Figure 1 — Bradley ECP 1 & 2 Technologies





U.S. Army photo

The ECP program will enable the Bradley to keep pace with Army modernization, remaining capable and relevant into the next decade and beyond.

communications with all elements of the brigade sustaining situational awareness during decisive actions while on the move. The improvements in networked communications also provide the ability to maintain situational awareness between mounted and dismounted Soldiers including voice, digital, and video capabilities.

Today's BFoV are at, or exceeding space, weight, and power cooling (SWaP-C) limitations. To address this issue, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) began a modernization initiative in 2007 to update requirements documents with the intention of restoring lost platform capability and gaining sufficient SWaP-C margins to host future technology inserts. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) directed all work on Abrams, Bradley, and Stryker modernization to cease during the 2011 Combat Vehicle Portfolio Review (August 2011) and issued guidance that established a new combat vehicle strategy that transforms capabilities for the BFoV using engineering change proposals (ECP) in increments.

During a briefing with the VCSA and Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), the ABCT program manager recommended a two-phase approach to combat vehicle modernization (CVM). The AAE and VCSA concurred with the two-phase approach, and the AAE made the stipulation that the program manager return within one year from the date of the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) and present the Phase II effort to carry to the Defense Acquisition Executive regarding the major systems upgrades of the Abrams and Bradley platforms in accordance with the Army's long-range CVM strategy for Fiscal Year 2017 and beyond.

In phase one, Bradley will undergo two separate ECPs; ECP I and ECP II. ECP I provides track and suspension upgrades to regain lost mobility/ground clearance and support

additional weight due to the addition of the improvised armor and the Bradley urban survival kits (BUSKs) I, II, and III kits. ECP II provides both electrical and mechanical power-based upgrades which improve automotive performance and enable/host the integration of electronics and communication enhancements required for network interoperability. Electric power generation and distribution aspects of the Bradley ECP II include the addition of a second alternator, high speed slip ring, power control module (PCM), data distribution unit (DDU), and battery monitoring system (BMS). These updates provide the additional power needed in the turret and the means for transporting the power. The modified slip ring will have the capability to pass increased radio frequency and power to the turret. Because of the changes to the alternator and the slip ring, the Bradley requires upgrades to the PCMs as well.

The BMS enables the user to monitor the current status of the batteries used for initiating and maintaining silent watch capabilities. ECP II mechanical power upgrades consist of a 675HP engine, 800HP transmission, modified power take-off assembly, and improved final drives.

ECPs I and II were developed and funded to address SWaP-C deficiencies and enable the vehicle to accept various incoming technologies. They are not sufficient for the long-term viability of the BFoV. Therefore, an additional ECP (ECP III) is necessary. ECP III technologies are required to mitigate existing formation gaps, restore threshold capabilities of approved operational requirements and build a margin for future growth. As we look at the combat requirements of the future and the current fiscal realities, continued adaptation of the BFoV is inevitable to support the hybrid threat operating environment. TCM-ABCT will continue to identify ways to keep the BFoV on pace to host future modernizations and will continue to identify ways to make the ECP program better for the Soldier of today, and the Soldier of tomorrow.

* Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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TTPs FOR EMPLOYMENT OF BRIGADE AND TASK FORCE ENGINEERS

COL JASON L. SMALLFIELD

The creation of 32 engineer battalions in the active component over the next two years and 28 engineer battalions in the National Guard over the next four years will provide maneuver commanders with an additional organic engineer capability that they have not recently possessed. The ability to leverage this additional capability, however, will require maximizing a resource that maneuver commanders have not had readily available recently — a task force engineer.

Even more than this, however, an engineer battalion commander — with lettered subordinate companies in the brigade combat team — is a muscle that neither the Army nor the Engineer Regiment has exercised in several years. The purpose of this article is to articulate what has changed, what engineer capabilities are available to a maneuver commander, and to delineate some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that result from this analysis.

From an organizational perspective, there have been three engineer organizational trends over the past 60 years. First, the division-centric Army was re-shaped to a brigade combat team (BCT)-centric force, which will remain the key building block for our Army moving forward.¹ Second, maneuver brigade commanders have clamored for more engineers during combat operations, and this need has often been forgotten when post-conflict inactivations and reduced budgets have required reductions to Army end-strength and corresponding reductions in engineer force structure.² Finally,

engineer planners have generally based their organizational structures on the nature and quantity of work to be done in a given area, while Army planners have

been influenced by the dictates of deployability and unique operational requirements forcing in-lieu-of solutions to meet global demands. This trend resulted in echelon above brigade (EAB) engineer organizations who were neither available, nor optimized, to augment BCT formations.³ As we build the Army of 2020, the Engineer Regiment will re-shape and optimize the remaining EAB force structure. For example, the construction force design update (FDU) is currently under evaluation at Headquarters, Department of the Army. This FDU will correct some of the “over-modularization” in the force and ensure that construction companies all have a vertical, horizontal, and survey and design capability. The goal will be the creation of multi-functional combat and construction units, designed to augment the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) and BCT while ensuring the flexibility to support unified land operations in the division and corps areas.

In 2009 and 2010, the engineer regiment developed the BEB initiative. This FDU was designed to support the two maneuver battalion BCT. By the time the BEB was approved, however, the Army decided to increase the BCT to a third maneuver battalion. The BEB did not include a third engineer company for two critical reasons. First, there was not enough EAB force structure to pay the bill; second, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) limited the size of the BCT. In June 2013, CSA GEN Raymond Odierno announced the creation of a third maneuver battalion for the brigade combat team along with the establishment of a brigade engineer battalion. The engineer battalion assigned to each BCT will provide increased engineer capability, with two companies, but limited capacity to support the third maneuver battalion within the BCT. Additional engineer capacity and capability (i.e. defensive operations, engagement area development, offensive operations, expanding lodgments, stability operations, building partner capacity, defense support of civil authorities [DSCA], port construction and repair, and

A Soldier with the 151st Route Clearance Company provides security for Soldiers as they conduct counter-IED training with Afghan soldiers on 21 February 2013.

Photo by MAJ Brooks Little

mission command headquarters for these EAB enablers) will need to be anticipated, requested, and allocated for home-station training, training center rotations, and support to contingency operations.

The bulk of engineer force structure currently resides in the Reserve component with 19 percent active, 31 percent Reserve, and 50 percent National Guard. Upon completion of active BEB conversion in Fiscal Year (FY) 15, the active force of 19 percent will be 48 percent BEB and 52 percent EAB. While table of organization and equipment (TO&E) organizations are generally designed and built to meet Phase III (dominate) requirements, the strategic impact of this force mix demands recurrent, assured, and predictable access to Army National Guard and Reserve units throughout all phases of the operation (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority).⁴

From a training perspective, the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was approved by the Secretary of the Army and CSA in 2006.⁵ ARFORGEN was the Army's process for meeting combatant commander's requirements by synchronizing the building of trained and ready units.⁶ The underlying idea was to tap into the total strength of the Army, leveraging all active and Reserve units while sustaining the process by employing a rotational, more predictable plan for deployments.⁷ This placed units on a tiered readiness "duty roster" and rotated units through high readiness as they prepared to deploy. This was necessary to meet wartime requirements but led to vast swings as units went from the trained/ready pool into reset. This process was exacerbated in the enabler pool since ARFORGEN was really "BCT-FORGEN." Enablers, like EAB engineers, were forced to operate at a higher operations tempo (optempo) than the supported BCT forces and were typically out of cycle with the units they would support in combat. In addition, the focus of engineer training in the 1990s was upon the broad spectrum of mobility/countermobility/survivability. This broad focus narrowed in the 2000s to be almost exclusively upon explosive hazard defeat. This has caused a degradation of 12B skill sets in other than explosive hazard defeat.

Additionally, both the CSA and the commanding general of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have noted that historically the combat training centers (CTCs) have been our primary leader development training sites. The global war on terrorism, overseas contingency operations (OCO), and ARFORGEN requirements forced the Army to use the CTCs as "readiness factories" rather than their intended purpose of leader development.

From a personnel perspective, two of the most substantial engineer personnel changes involved geospatial engineers and component mix. Changes were made for geospatial engineers in order to leverage the quantum leaps in technology experienced in this area. Military occupational specialties (MOS) 81Q (terrain analyst), 81C (cartographer), and 81L (lithographer) were consolidated to 12Y (geospatial engineer). In addition, the U.S. Army Engineer School has partnered with the U.S. Army Military Intelligence School to form geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) cells (imagery analysts and geospatial engineers) at the BCT, division, and corps headquarters

levels. The other substantial change has been the migration of the Engineer Regiment from the active component to the Reserve component. Some MOSs such as 12G (quarrying specialist) are entirely in the Reserve component while the 12P (prime power production specialist) resides exclusively in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Engineer Regiment now consists of 17 enlisted MOSs, two warrant MOSs, and one officer MOS.

From the above organizational, training, and personnel information, I recommend the following TTPs for how maneuver commanders should use the engineer battalion, the assistant brigade engineer, and task force engineers.

Mission Command. The single most important aspect of the BEB is the mission command component. The engineer battalion commander is the brigade engineer. The battalion commander has a permanent representative assigned to the BCT staff — the assistant brigade engineer (ABE) — who is an engineer staff major. The engineer battalion commander is the senior engineer within the BCT and is the final word on all engineer-related issues. The ABE assists the brigade engineer in developing and providing recommendations to the brigade commander but should never provide engineer advice to the BCT commander without prior coordination with the brigade engineer. The key here is having the right mission command and task force engineer structure that will allow the BCT to effectively plan for, receive, employ, and then return EAB assets.

Brigade Engineer. Because the engineer battalion provides limited engineer capability, a BCT will likely be reinforced with varieties of unique engineer companies, an engineer battalion, or engineer brigade. This engineer reinforcement is temporary, however, and the assigned engineer battalion commander should always retain brigade engineer status for purposes of continuity and familiarity with the brigade commander and staff.

Help Balance Command and Staff Responsibilities. The brigade engineer and task force engineers must balance their command (engineer battalion, company, and/or platoon) and their staff (maneuver brigade or battalion) responsibilities. Over emphasis upon either responsibility may be necessary in the short term but must be avoided in the long term. Maneuver commanders should help their engineers to achieve this balance by providing up-front guidance and a specific timing and execution timeline from which the engineers can plan from in order to help achieve this balance.

Nearly Simultaneous BCT and Engineer Battalion Operation Orders (OPORDs). The engineer battalion should publish its battalion OPORD simultaneously (or nearly simultaneously) with the BCT OPORD. This TTP enables the engineer company commanders and platoon leaders to actively contribute to the development of maneuver battalion OPORDs rather than passively or reactively contributing.

Collocation and Planning Cycle. The brigade engineer and task force engineer main command posts (CPs) should be collocated and integrated into the BCT's and the task force's main CPs and planning cycles. Maneuver commanders and staff should plan for and help enable this collocation.

Engineer Battalion Staff Reinforcement of Maneuver

Brigade Engineer Staff. Maneuver commanders should think of the ABE as the engineer tactical command post (TAC) and the engineer battalion staff as the engineer main CP. The engineer battalion can, and should, reinforce the ABE for both planning and execution/battle-tracking purposes. This will also enable the simultaneous BCT and engineer battalion OPORD publication recommended above and is enabled by the collocation recommended above.

Habitual Relationships. Maneuver battalion and engineer unit habitual relationships are an effective means to facilitate and synchronize training within a garrison environment, especially in a resource-constrained fiscal environment. Habitual relationships, however, are not a default combat task organization. Task force commanders must expect their engineers to be task organized to other task forces depending on the main effort through the various phases of the operation. Engineers are a scarce resource on the battlefield and need to be massed at the critical point on the battlefield for greatest effect, which means that a maneuver battalion may not be allotted engineer support during an operation or during a phase of an operation. Habitual relationships need to be established and maintained down to company team level. This means that engineer squad leaders should integrate into company team planning in garrison so engineer formations can be more effectively used both in the field and in combat. Use of this TTP will help to gain mutual respect and understanding on capabilities and limitations. It will also assist planning operations at the battalion task force level by enabling more educated and informed bottom-up feedback to task force plans, which in turn will enable a more synchronized/parallel planning effort. Key, however, will be that there will be different habitual relationship solution sets for different BCTs due to having three maneuver battalions supported by only two engineer companies and three engineer platoons.

Reserve. Due to the limited capabilities that the engineer battalion provides to the BCT, engineers are never kept in reserve. This means that both task forces and engineer formations need to be adept at seamless and efficient task organization changes. These task organization changes, however, do not just happen. They are the by-product of detailed planning and disciplined execution.

Focused missions. Time is critical for engineers to shape the terrain so engineers need to be employed early and focused upon those missions that only engineers can perform. General missions such as security need to be performed by other formations.

Combined Arms Integration. Engineers should be integrated as a combined arms team for all operations to include offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Surprisingly, this is a lesson that we had to relearn during combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Experience has shown that when conducting route clearance, engineer units that operated independently

Maneuver and engineer leaders must understand what has changed along with what has not changed so that we can critically and creatively develop new TTPs for the effective use of the engineer staff and formations both organic and attached to the BCT.

had less effect and received higher casualties than when route clearance operations were conducted as a combined arms formation and tied to a task force scheme of maneuver.

Recon/Counter-Reconnaissance Fight. Engineers should be integrated into the BCT's reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight so as to better inform the BCT's military decision-making process (MDMP) as well as to enhance maneuver and

engineer effectiveness. The counter-IED fight in OIF and OEF can be thought of as the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle that we did not recognize as such and therefore did not fully leverage as we should have. Success or failure in reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance has a direct causal linkage to success or failure in the main battle area.

Expanded Capabilities. Engineers now have survey and design as well as horizontal capability which will expand the capabilities of the BCT during expeditionary deployments. These capabilities need to be known and leveraged. In addition, every BCT will have a 120A warrant officer. These leaders will provide a level of construction expertise and an operational energy advisor that BCTs have not previously had.

In conclusion, recent history of the Army and the engineer regiment means that the engineer battalion assigned to the BCT is a muscle that has not recently been exercised and is a skill which has atrophied. This necessarily means that there is an experiential and generational gap that cannot be bridged by merely executing what we did as an Army in the 1990s. Maneuver and engineer leaders must understand what has changed along with what has not changed so that we can critically and creatively develop new TTPs for the effective use of the engineer staff and formations both organic and attached to the BCT.

Notes

¹ Vincent Hodge, U.S. Army Engineer School assistant historian, "Evolution of the Engineer Force," 18 March 2003.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, 11 August 2011.

⁵ SSG Alexandra Hemmerly-Brown "ARFORGEN: Army's Deployment Cycle Aims for Predictability, 19 November 2009, <http://www.army.mil/article/30668>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

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INSIDER ATTACKS:

REPAIRING A DAMAGED PARTNERSHIP

CPT SETH HILDEBRAND

Emerging tactics used by an adaptive and creative enemy have forced our Soldiers to be in a state of high alert 24 hours a day.

In February 2012, an enemy combatant wearing an Afghan National Army (ANA) uniform shot and killed two U.S. Soldiers inside a joint forward operating base (FOB). This single act of violence nearly destroyed a partnership that had been built with blood, sweat, and tears over a period of 10 months.

With the Army's continued focus in Afghanistan on partnership and advising the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), leaders must understand how to prevent insider threats and not let them destroy the fabric of relationships built between U.S. and Afghan forces. The article will discuss why insider threats and attacks are so devastating, what leaders and Soldiers can do to prevent them, what steps can be taken to repair a damaged partnership after an insider attack, and how we can better prepare for a mission solely based on partnership.

Protests

By February 2012, Comanche Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, had been deployed in Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province for 10 months. I had served the majority of the deployment as the troop executive officer (XO). Comanche Troop spent the first six months of the deployment in eastern Nangarhar at FOB Shinwar and the remainder of the deployment at FOB Connolly in western Nangarhar. In both locations, the troop's primary focus was developing an active partnership with the ANSF.

Toward the end of February, tensions were running high throughout Regional Command (RC)-East as word spread that Qurans were being burned at Bagram Airfield. Regardless of the truth or validity to the story, an aggressive anti-coalition force campaign by the Taliban sent many locals into a rage, sparking protests and violence within days. On 22 February, large gatherings outside FOB Connolly's front gates turned into small riots. Angry protesters set fires to abandoned structures just outside of the FOB, destroyed cars belonging to local nationals working on the base, and randomly fired weapons to elicit a coalition response.

The 3rd ANA Kandak (battalion) immediately responded to the protests by attempting to disperse the crowd. Simultaneously, Comanche Troop increased security inside the base and kept its defensive posture elevated until late that evening when the crowd was fully dispersed.

With the Army's continued focus in Afghanistan on partnership and advising the ANSF, leaders must understand how to prevent insider threats and not let them destroy the fabric of relationships built between U.S. and Afghan forces.

Early in the afternoon of 23 February, the second day of protests, I heard more shots fired. Previously, the gunfire had sounded distant, coming from outside the FOB. These shots, however, sounded different and much closer. I ran toward where I thought the sounds were coming from only to see mass confusion at the quick reaction force (QRF) staging area. Over the troop radio, I heard even more confusion but was able to gather that there were, in fact, shots fired near the QRF staging area and that two U.S.

Soldiers had been injured.

After seeing that the first sergeant was en route to the staging area, I took up position with our snipers in a tower overlooking the FOB. It was there that the transmissions on the radio became clear as I could see some of the aftermath. The shots had come from the ANA platoon at the staging area. It appeared that an ANA soldier had fired at Comanche Troop's 4th Platoon, which was part of the joint QRF. From the tower, I observed a crowd to the south of the FOB along the outer perimeter. The gunman must have coordinated this gathering and used it as part of his escape route. I watched as U.S. forces and contracted security personnel fired at the man, posing in an ANA uniform, wounding him as he made it over the gates before dissolving into the large body of protesters.

The two Soldiers were transported to the FOB aid station, but shortly after we learned that both had died. This was Comanche Troop's second "green-on-blue" incident of the deployment. The first resulted in nothing more than a scare, but this time a man in an ANA uniform had shot and killed two U.S. Soldiers on the very FOB he shared with them. Initially, it was unclear if the gunman had acted alone. It was also unclear if this was a result of the Quran burnings or an act planned well in advance just waiting for an opportune time.

Developing Partnership

When Comanche Troop, 3-4 CAV deployed to Afghanistan in April 2011, the focus for all ground forces was to build successful partnerships with the ANSF. This period marked the initial phases of the ANSF taking a more active role in the security within their own environment and coalition forces conducting all operations as joint missions. Battalion and company-level command teams partnered with Afghan leadership within the ANA, Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), Afghan Border Patrol, and governmental leadership at the district and provincial levels. Security Force Assistance Teams



Photos by SGT Trey Harvey

At left, an Afghan National Army officer takes notes during a combined arms rehearsal at Forward Operating Base Connolly in Afghanistan on 2 January 2012. Above, U.S. Soldiers from the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, gather around a terrain model during the rehearsal.

(SFATs) were becoming the norm throughout RC-East as the demand for advise and assist roles grew.

Although there was direct emphasis being placed on partnership during this time, the reality was that we still didn't quite understand the best ways to develop those relationships. Many of our Soldiers in 3-4 CAV had previous deployments to Iraq and, right or wrong, carried with them some level of disdain for working with a host national security force. We followed the guidance to place Afghans in the lead by creating the illusion that all patrols and missions were joint and evenly partnered. In reality, U.S. forces controlled every patrol. Because we had not developed any sort of relationship, least of all trust, and because we believed in our own tactical superiority, we decided on everything from mission planning to execution.

The difficulties with the partnership were often a matter of misunderstandings between coalition forces and the ANSF primarily because of our preconceived notions of how they should operate. A lack in understanding the different roles and responsibilities of the different entities that made up the ANSF, coupled with initial expectations of the ANSF operating at our level, created an early struggle for a successful partnership.

Although it was clear that each entity of the ANSF was independent of one another, oftentimes at the Soldier level, opinions of our partners were consolidated, regardless of their different skill set, organizational structure, funding, equipment, or levels of perceived laziness and corruption. Comanche Soldiers initially saw undisciplined security forces that couldn't adhere to timelines, proper uniform, or the ability to conduct patrols without U.S. fuel. These compounding problems caused our Soldiers to not fully trust our partners. Additionally, it was obvious to them that there was a severe lack of trust

between the different entities of the ANSF. Information was rarely shared between two organizations, and AUP or ANA leaders would often not speak openly in front of one another. Early on, this distrust resulted in an unwillingness to work together and made it difficult for Comanche Troop, leaders and Soldiers alike, to understand ANSF as a whole.

Midway through the troop's deployment, positive changes took place between the relationships of U.S. forces and the ANSF. Our Soldiers witnessed as Afghan forces fell victim to the same improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that cause significant damage to our own forces. Our company commander and first sergeant stressed the importance of active partnership, and junior leaders within the formation were teaching their Soldiers to understand that cultural differences didn't make us, as Americans, any better — but simply different. The realization that the ANSF were a valuable asset to have in understanding the operational environment as a whole was beginning to set in, and within a short time, the average Soldier's individual mindset started to shift.

In addition to the opinion shift and efforts to understand a foreign culture's differences, Comanche Troop leaders set the example in partnering at the command and staff levels. The company commander worked daily with the ANA kandak commander and executive officer (XO) while the first sergeant developed strong relationships with the S3, command sergeant major, and operations sergeant major. As the XO, I worked closely with the SFAT at FOB Connolly, which gave me the opportunity to see the inner workings of the kandak's staff sections. We exercised the ANA's logistical supply system and assisted with developing maintenance lessons and schedules for all equipment. Additionally, we formed a joint tactical operations center (TOC) where together ANA

soldiers and Comanche Troop's battle captain were able to track force movement and coordinate mission support.

Comanche's commander continued the success of an active ANA partnership by extending our efforts to the AUP and ABP by holding weekly district security meetings with the local government and every faction of the ANSF. He also held multi-district meetings, bringing together multiple district governors and police chiefs in a forum that provided open dialogue and active partnerships with one another. Ultimately, it seemed that little could cause a divide in the progress we had made, and at the time of the attack, we were determined not to let it cause irreparable damage to our formation and relationships.

Rebuilding Trust

By late afternoon on the day of the attack, our troop commander, along with all troop leadership, had addressed Comanche Soldiers throughout the day, but there was a sense of disbelief among the majority of the Soldiers. After being so successful in developing an active partnership, the attack struck us harder than any IED or mortar attack did up to that point.

We then received word that two VIPs — U.S. Marine Corps GEN John R. Allen, commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Afghanistan and United States Forces – Afghanistan, and General Sher Mohammad Karimi, ANA Chief of Staff — would be visiting the FOB to address the incident with our Soldiers and the ANA officers. That night, both leaders stressed the importance of not allowing a single

unfortunate event carried out by a lone gunman to set us back in the progress we had made. GEN Allen primarily focused his remarks to the ANA officers and praised them for their ability to take the lead in security operations and assured them the incident that took place was understood as an act of one, not the will of many. General Karimi then focused his comments toward Comanche troops. He was sympathetic and apologetic for the events that took place. He, too, stressed that was not how he or his formation felt about American Soldiers and was adamant that he would not tolerate anti-American thoughts and actions in his army.

Despite this, the legitimacy of the ANA became quickly unraveled in many of our Soldiers' eyes. This forced the command to put an immediate stop to thoughts and comments that would severely degrade the progress we had made with our partners over the past few months. Our company commander and first sergeant continued a very open partnership with the ANA battalion's leadership to show a united front by both formations. The ANA leadership engaged platoon leaders and platoon sergeants, expressing condolences in a way that was very visible to our Soldiers. Seeing the leaders stand together during a devastating period empowered our Soldiers to handle their emotions with a unique maturity. Although pain and anger remained, our Soldiers understood their duties and remained both mission and task oriented.

The command's initial focus was on the mental state and morale of the troop, specifically the platoon to which the two deceased Soldiers had belonged. The company commander's goal in this was to create a balance between

allowing the Soldiers an appropriate amount of down time to recover from their loss and sending them back into sector performing day-to-day operations. Having the platoon execute a normal patrol schedule after 48 hours prevented the Soldiers from sitting around the FOB, isolating themselves and dwelling on their loss. It was a mental challenge initially sending the platoon out into sector after such little time had passed to conduct joint patrols with those in the uniform that just attacked our own, but our Soldiers understood that if we weren't partnering then there was no purpose in us being there in the first place.

Immediately following the attack, we made every possible asset available to our Soldiers to help them move forward. Combat stress, mental health, and the brigade's chaplains all responded and maintained a steady presence at our FOB. Every Soldier in 4th Platoon was required to meet with one of the available assets to evaluate his current state. The squadron held a memorial at FOB Shinwar for our fallen brothers, giving the organization an opportunity to come together and pay respects for those we lost. We developed an extensively open and active dialogue which allowed our Soldiers to vent to one another, their leaders, and whoever else would listen in regard



Photo by SFC Mark Burrell

An all-wheeled vehicle mechanic assigned to Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, explains how to fix an Afghan Uniformed Police humvee at Forward Operating Base Shinwar in eastern Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province on 17 July 2011.

to the past events, and through this we were able to convey to our formation that this was the act of one, a single individual, and did not represent the ANA as a whole.

In addition to the intense focus we gave to our Soldiers following the attack, we also had to address our ANA counterparts. The Comanche commander initially spoke with all of the ANA leaders to gain an understanding of their current state and move toward closure. This also opened the doors for our leaders within the troop to have a formal dialogue with the ANA kandak's leaders, providing a format for both the ANA and U.S. Soldiers to speak to one another and help repair a bond

that was nearly shattered in a matter of minutes. It was obvious that the ANA soldiers were deeply affected by everything that happened and were utterly embarrassed by it.

In an effort to show their commitment to us as a partnered force, the ANA became obsessed with finding the gunman who was once in their formation. Records of past postings, family ties, and known associates were made available. Through their intelligence networks, the ANA kandak leadership and staff investigated possible locations for him in district. Two weeks later during a routine partnered operation, Soldiers found a cell phone on an insurgent combatant that had videos from the 23 February attack. The information from the ANA, along with the cell phone, was given to task force intelligence.

Through this, the caliber of our Soldiers was put to an extreme test, and the command was exceptionally proud



Photo by SFC Mark Burrell

An Infantry platoon leader assigned to Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, discusses strategy with Afghan Uniformed Police chief before assisting in a clearing operation on 19 July 2011.

of their composure, military bearing, and professionalism. Comanche Troop was able to continue a partnership with the ANSF during a very trying time. To say that there was a full sense of trust following the attack would be a lie, but to the credit of every Soldier there at FOB Connolly, we remained a mission-first organization.

When leadership is strong and united, it can set a tone that is easily followed despite whatever challenges are faced, both big and small. It was these leadership bonds built throughout the troop that allowed us to come together and move forward.

At the time this article was written, **CPT Seth Hildebrand** was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He served as executive officer of Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, during the unit's deployment to Afghanistan in 2011-2012.

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TALK MORE SUSTAINMENT, LESS TACTICS WITH AFGHAN FORCES

CPT KYLE WOLFLEY

“Amateurs talk tactics; experts talk logistics” — this is a common expression in the military that highlights the important but underrated task of planning sustainment in operations. As the U.S. military retrogrades its materials and draws down its forces from Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are taking the lead on the majority of missions.

Marine Corps Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the current International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, reported in his Summer 2013 commander’s update: “As the ANSF have assumed the lead in their first fighting season, they have proven capable of effectively securing the Afghan people.” However, he continued, “ISAF continues to provide combat support and combat service support where there are remaining ANSF capability gaps.”¹ Though the ANSF has made significant progress over the last few years regarding tactical proficiency against the insurgents, it appears the ANSF still needs improvement in the areas of logistics, maintenance, and medical evacuation.

As with any security force, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) will surely have internal discussions about how to best task organize to resupply and maintain its units in the field. Due to vast cultural and historical differences, the Afghan supply system will develop into something different from the U.S. military’s. Perhaps the system will be more effective than any we have taught them. At the same time, there is reason for concern due to the level of dependence on our logistical system that we have allowed for the past 12 years. From my experiences as a rifle platoon leader and company executive officer partnered with various ANSF elements, I believe that company-level leaders should start prioritizing their counterparts’ sustainment capabilities to ensure the ANSF is able to consolidate its gains and retain recently secured areas after ISAF retrograde. Additionally, with the recent move to regionally-align certain Army brigades, the necessity for lower-level tactical leaders to instruct and mentor foreign armies to sustain themselves is more salient than ever.

My experience working with various AUP and ANA platoon- and company-level leadership in various districts of Paktika Province forced me to realize the importance of self-reliance in sustainment operations. When I arrived to my district in the summer of 2011, it was common practice to provide fuel for the AUP’s trucks when they would patrol with our element. Instead of the AUP patrol leaders moving their convoy to the Afghan police headquarters located only 30 minutes away, they would simply ask us for fuel instead. The road to police headquarters was paved and secure, yet free fuel from our platoon living on the same combat

outpost (COP) was more expedient. In addition, when the AUP’s generators became inoperable, they would expect us to fix the machines so patrolmen could resume enjoying the electricity generated by our fuel. At the heart of the issue is the tension between completing missions quickly and building a long-term sustainment capacity — that is, a choice between efficiency and sustainability. If we wanted the ANSF to patrol with us on every mission, which they were willing to do and would do effectively, we would have to provide them our fuel; if we wanted to force them to practice their own sustainment systems, we could risk them refusing to patrol.

Our company did not realize what we were encouraging until about midway through the deployment when it was apparent ANSF units could not sustain themselves. After a major joint operation with our company and an ANA company to establish outposts in a remote, mountainous area, the ANA company commander requested that we air-lift rice and bread to his position in the mountains. After our battalion coordinated several resupplies to their location, it became apparent that we were doing more harm than good; instead of the ANA learning how to resupply themselves during the fight, they relied on our support. The ANA leadership argued that the road winding the mountainside was too precarious to travel. Adding to the challenge was that this operation was occurring during the winter, making the roads even more difficult to traverse. Working with our battalion security transition teams (STTs), we finally convinced the ANA leadership to force the company to resupply itself with trucks along the roads. We discovered that the ANA was very capable in sustaining itself through ground convoys for the remainder of our deployment.

Our success in this area was two-fold: not only did the ANA provide itself the materials it needed to continue its operations, the company also learned how to properly conduct a secure logistics patrol that was successful in resupplying its soldiers. Furthermore, when ANA company leadership realized the challenges that were present in conducting this convoy, it asked the local AUP for additional trucks to augment its security. The AUP agreed and both security elements conducted a successful joint patrol. As the ANA and AUP conducted multiple resupply operations without U.S. presence, the villagers could see that the ANSF was quite capable of protecting the populace independently. According to a colleague assigned to Regional Command (RC)-South, over the last year security force assistance teams (SFATs) have been successful in weaning their partners off American logistics. However, the ANSF’s long-standing dependency on our support has further implications that reach into other areas such as maintenance and medical evacuation.

So what is the way forward to assist and mentor a foreign army in sustainment operations? There are a few lessons that we as a unit either succeeded or failed to accomplish with our Afghan counterparts, yet after reflection, may be useful for future joint operations with foreign security forces. First, just as in the U.S. Army, we should prioritize sustainment as a training objective in and of itself. In the initial stages of the deployment, we focused on training the ANA on clearing operations and the AUP on detainee operations. During the second half of the deployment, some ANA soldiers asked if we could help fix their high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), which was unable to start. After speaking with my lead mechanic, he replied, "Sir, we're not helping these guys by fixing things for them. Why don't I teach them how to PMCS (preventive maintenance checks and services)?" The mechanic led a small patrol to the ANA combat outpost and taught a group of soldiers how to identify issues and maintain their vehicles. Sadly, it took me this long to understand that we can train them to become proficient in tactics, but if they can't maintain their equipment, they will surely suffer in the long run.

Central to the issue is the ANSF's lack of a maintenance culture which sometimes even pervades units in our own Army. Due to high levels of illiteracy and unfamiliarity with mechanical systems, many Afghans lack the understanding of how important maintenance is to continue operations in the future. An approach SFATs could take would be not only teaching how to, for example, change the wheels of a vehicle, but perhaps tell a personal story or vignette of how a vehicle became inoperable during a mission and led to failed objectives. By providing an understanding of the future implications of failing to take action on maintenance, the ANSF may realize they could be unable to fight during combat. With tightening budgets throughout the Army, the ANSF will suffer from our inability to provide logistical

support. Thus, not only do SFAT leaders need to help the ANSF understand the implications of maintenance but also help devise solutions that are sustainable for the Afghans post-U.S. involvement.

Another example is at the Maneuver Captains Career Course we practiced creating training plans as SFAT commanders for a hypothetical upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. Our culminating event was an ANA squad live fire, and we scheduled in all the necessary battle drills and collective tasks associated with accomplishing the live fire. However, we did not discuss property accountability, maintenance, or resupply operations at all. After 12 years of fighting (and for some, even more), I would argue that most ANA soldiers are proficient in finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy. Yet to consolidate their gains and hold secured areas, the ANA will need to learn how to conduct resupply and maintain their equipment. If U.S. commanders want to see their counterparts in Afghanistan and elsewhere succeed when we transition responsibility, we as an Army should place more emphasis on sustainment operations.

Second, the ANA and AUP should consider reorganizing their units to ensure there are trained maintenance personnel at each company. One of the issues we encountered with our partnered ANA company was that in order to have their vehicles maintained by Afghan mechanics, they would have to drive through three districts into another province where dedicated maintenance was conducted for multiple provinces. In addition, there was only one mechanic for an entire Afghan kandak (battalion), which is clearly overwhelming for that soldier to conduct the necessary services for the entire kandak's vehicles. Clearly, the ANA will face tighter budgets in the coming years and will want to prioritize line soldiers over mechanics. Yet the ANA leadership should focus more on weapon, vehicle, and radio maintenance during initial training. Furthermore, one

soldier could be given the additional duty of mechanic and could be sent to a course that instructs him on the basics of PMCS. He could then bring this knowledge to his unit to instruct the other soldiers how to properly maintain their equipment.

Third, SFAT commanders and small unit leaders in regionally-aligned brigades should resist the temptation to provide logistical and medical support for operations that the host nation forces could provide themselves. As mentioned earlier, though the foreign security forces will ask for logistical support and providing that support would surely optimize operational efficiency, each time we allow that force to rely on us for sustainment we miss a training opportunity to mentor on sustainment and undermine that security force in the long run. When my ANA executive officer (XO) counterpart asked me for oil for his trucks, I immediately



Photo by CPT Andrew Cochran

A Soldier with the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade shows Afghan service members the different parts of a HMMWV's front axle during training at Kandahar Airfield on 27 January 2014.

contacted my STT representative at the battalion and asked what we should do. He advised me to force the XO to use his channels and order the oil properly even though it would have been much easier for us just to give him our oil. Though there will certainly be frustrations (which even we encountered), working through the frictions is necessary in building long-lasting systems.

According to the colleague assigned to RC-South, medical evacuation is a difficult issue to address due to the high costs of refusing medical support. We are fighting alongside the ANSF and other regional partners and providing care and saving lives is ostensibly morally responsible. Yet the ANSF will have to deal with medical evacuation after our departure and when we can allow them to ground evacuate their own casualties, we should. Commanders should prioritize which casualty types should be air evacuated by the ANSF or the U.S. and which others should be ground evacuated by the ANSF. We can help the ANSF reach sustainability by encouraging more medical personnel to be collocated with maneuver forces and incorporate deliberate medical planning into their decision-making process, which will allow them to provide better treatment en-route to a higher level facility. Clearly, there are circumstances that require the U.S. to provide logistical and medical support to the ANA; for instance, major operations that we would not expect the ANA to conduct unilaterally or a mass casualty situation. Commanders should use good judgment in determining which of those sustainment aspects they can assume risk, and higher commanders should support their decisions to trade short-term expediency for long-term success. Regardless, a command-directed policy at the division level or higher should dictate when the U.S. is authorized to provide support to avoid incentivizing a partner unit to seek out another battlespace owner for assistance.

The ANSF have learned the hard lessons of tactics by simply fighting the enemy. The fact that the ANSF understands the culture and the insurgents far better than we ever will, along with their innate desire to survive, will drive them to find better ways to defend against and


defeat the enemy. However, sustainment is challenging for every army, and U.S. forces should focus on teaching and mentoring the ANA on logistics, maintenance, and medical evacuations. After years of providing support, we must transition to forcing the ANSF to become a self-sustaining force. Gen. Dunford understands the necessity to ensure that the Afghans can continue the fight after our eventual withdrawal: "Much work remains to be done on the systems, processes, and institutions necessary to make our progress enduring, and we are providing support at the ministerial level, as well as the corps level and below."¹ I argue that the focus on sustainment should be made much lower: at the SFAT level where Soldiers and squad leaders understand best how to PMCS their equipment and platoon leaders and platoon sergeants know how to plan resupply and medical evacuations in advance. We should ensure our Soldiers mentor the ANSF on these basic soldiering tasks so we can be confident in their ability to conduct self-sustaining operations against an insurgency it is sure to face after our departure. Moreover, our recent emphasis on regionally aligned brigades means that our partnering and mentoring will continue beyond Afghanistan in the years to come and sustainment should be an immediate priority, not an afterthought.

Notes

¹ USMC Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., "Commander ISAF's Afghanistan Update," Summer 2013, accessed 2 October 2013, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-news-list/commander-isaf-s-afghanistan-update-summer-2013.html>.

² Ibid.

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
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MISSION COMMAND AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL: OPERATION DEADSTICK

CPT W. PAUL HILL

The U.S. Army has been working since the end of the Civil War to develop a system that enabled decentralized execution in our maneuver units. This has resulted in numerous failed attempts, most recently the network-centric Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) of the 1990s. After more than a decade of war, the Army's leadership has realized that it is not a system that was needed but to institutionalize a culture and philosophy of command based on trust, understanding, and intent. The Army's Doctrine 2015 has codified this as **mission command**. Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."


With the adoption of mission command into the U.S. Army's doctrine, it has become commonplace for us to look to our own history for examples of leaders and operations demonstrating these traits and philosophy successfully. We have examples throughout our history, to varying degrees. The study of Grant, Sheridan, Lee, Longstreet, Patton, Bradley, and Eisenhower provide excellent examples of command styles that included empowering subordinates and exercising disciplined initiative. However, they are all in an operational or strategic context. In order for company-

grade officers to understand the practical application of mission command at the tactical level, it is essential to study historical company-level operations in-depth. This enables greater understanding of both the art of command and the science of control. It is vital for maneuver leaders to study operations at the tactical level in order to understand that under mission command sufficiently detailed planning and providing flexibility to their subordinates are not mutually exclusive, but in fact enhance each other. An excellent example of a company operation recorded in sufficient detail to provide this necessary depth is Operation Deadstick.

Operation Deadstick, the coup de main seizure of the bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal (now commonly referred to as Pegasus Bridge), was one of the most rapid and decisive victories of the D-Day invasion of Normandy in 1944. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, defines a coup de main as "an offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke." The unit assigned to execute Deadstick on D-Day was D Company, 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, commanded by Major John Howard. During Howard's attack, his company secured all of its objectives in under 10 minutes with minimal casualties. While many factors contributed to the success of Deadstick, the primary reason for the mission's success was Major Howard's ability to lead his company in a manner that adhered to what we now refer to as the principles of mission command.

During the planning stages of the Normandy invasion, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, the commander of the Allied 21st Army Group, decided to secure the left flank of the Normandy beachhead by landing the British 6th Airborne Division on the west side of the Orne River. One of the primary tasks of the division was to secure and maintain a viable avenue of approach toward the city of Caen for the armored forces landing on Sword and Juno beaches.¹ To accomplish this and to prevent the Germans from flanking the landings, Major General Richard "Windy" Gale, the division commander, decided to seize the two bridges crossing the Orne River and Caen Canal — intact. Because the two bridges were only 500 meters apart, the only way they could accomplish this was by glider assault. Gale conferred with

Figure 1 — Operation Overlord Overview



Map from *Normandy: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II*, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/normandy/nor-pam.htm>

the commander of the 6th Airlanding Brigade, Brigadier Hugh Kindersley, and developed a concept for a coup de main assault by a glider force.²

From 25 to 27 March 1944, the 6th Airborne Division conducted a three-day exercise named Bizz. The purpose of this exercise was to validate the soundness of the coup de main concept and to determine the unit most likely to succeed in its execution. Gale and Kindersley were particularly impressed with the performance of D Company of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and Major Howard. At the debriefing for Bizz on 15 April 1944, Gale highly praised Howard and his company.³ Following the debriefing, Howard's battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Roberts, informed him of the purpose of the exercise.

"Colonel Roberts faced me across the desk and, holding my eye, told me that 'D' Company, plus two platoons of 'B' Company and thirty Sappers under command, were to have a very important task to carry out when the invasion started. The Colonel went on to tell me that our task would be to capture two bridges intact."⁴

Roberts informed Howard that his unit's mission was classified top secret and ordered him not to share it with his subordinates yet; he tasked Howard, and the reinforced D Company, with capturing bridges during the corps-level Exercise Mush that took place at the end of April 1944. With the specific mission in mind, Mush provided Howard several crucial lessons for the development of the assault plan.

"I learned that, above all, my plans must be flexible. It was made clear to me in that exercise that events would take place incredibly fast, but in what order and who would carry out the task, was entirely in the lap of the gods. I realized that the chances of us all getting to our destination in the order we wanted was remote."⁵

Howard incorporated the lessons learned from Mush into the evolving plan and executed an intense training program for his company. One key lesson Howard realized was that he would not be able to control both bridge assaults effectively due to their distance apart. In order to compensate for this, he task organized D Company into two assault teams of three platoons and attached Sappers, flying in three gliders. The assault teams would hit the bridges simultaneously with Howard leading the Caen Canal element and Captain Brian Priday, the company executive officer, leading the Orne River Bridge element. D Company then began an exhausting process of running rehearsals with the mock bridges marked off with engineer tape. Major Howard varied these rehearsals by the number of platoons that arrived, the order in which they arrived, and by making key leaders casualties. According to some of Howard's men, every attack brought numerous lessons to the unit of what to do, how to do it, and most importantly what not to do. Private Billy Gray recalled D Company's rehearsals, "We knew exactly what we had to do.

"I learned that, above all, my plans must be flexible. It was made clear to me in that exercise that events would take place incredibly fast, but in what order and who would carry out the task, was entirely in the lap of the gods. I realized that the chances of us all getting to our destination in the order we wanted was remote."

— Major John Howard⁵

We trained and practiced it so often that we knew it like the back of our hand. Anyone could have taken each other's place."⁶ During maneuvers in May 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Pine-Coffin of the 7th Parachute Battalion discovered a pair of bridges that very closely resembled D Company's D-Day objective. He contacted Howard and showed him the bridges. Major Howard then moved his entire company to Exminster and assaulted these bridges for five days, incorporating numerous live-fire exercises.⁷

The assault force integrated with the glider pilots when the company moved to its transit camp in Tarrant Rushton in May of 1944.⁸ These 14 specially selected glider pilots had been training for this specific mission for months. Their training consisted of 43 training flights in different weather conditions, with night and instrument flying, using stopwatches for accurate course changes.⁹

On 5 June 1944 at 2256 hrs, the six Horsa gliders, towed by Halifax bombers, departed Tarrant Rushton's airfield carrying the coup de main party.¹⁰ Just more than an hour later, at 0007 hrs on 6 June 1944, the first glider, piloted by Staff Sergeant John Ainsworth and Sergeant Jim Wallwork, detached from its tug aircraft and put to work all of the training they had done over the previous months. Ainsworth counted time on a stopwatch and told Wallwork when to turn. This process continued for several minutes with the Soldiers in the back of the glider remaining silent as they approached their objective. Ainsworth and Wallwork brought their glider in on course but too high. At 0016 hrs, through an incredible feat of flying, they were able to land within 100 yards of the objective and breach the wire around it by crashing the glider through it. The other two gliders from their element landed right behind them. Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force commander in chief, later described this as "the finest piece of pure flying of World War II."¹¹

The platoons immediately moved to their objectives, with Lieutenant Den Brotheridge's 1st Platoon in the lead. Its objective was to secure the weapon pits on the far side of the bridge. The platoon encountered two German sentries while crossing the bridge. The British soldiers were able to eliminate the sentries quickly, however, not before one of the Germans was able to fire a signal flare. The firing alerted the MG-42 machine-gun position on the far side of the bridge, and the Germans there began suppressing across the bridge, fatally wounding Brotheridge as the platoon assaulted across the bridge.¹² After destroying the MG-42 position, 1st Platoon continued its assault and attacked the enemy positions on the far side of the Caen Canal Bridge. Captain Jock Nielsen and his sappers immediately began searching the bridge for explosives and cutting any wires they found.¹³

Second Platoon, led by Lieutenant David Wood, immediately

moved to destroy a 75mm anti-tank gun and then began clearing the enemy trenches and bunkers on the near side of the Caen Canal Bridge. Wood and his platoon started near the bridge and began clearing out to the left and right using hand grenade and sub-machine gun fire. During the course of clearing the trenches, the enemy wounded Wood and his platoon sergeant, who placed Corporal Godbold in command.¹⁴

Lieutenant Sandy Smith's 3rd Platoon suffered a much harder landing than the other two platoons did. Its glider came apart on landing and partially submerged in a small pond, ejecting and drowning one Soldier. Smith maneuvered his platoon to the bridge as quickly as possible and reported to Major Howard. Howard then ordered Smith to take

3rd Platoon across the bridge and support 1st Platoon in destroying the enemy positions and buildings on the right side of the road. First Platoon was to take the left side of the road.¹⁵

At 0021hrs, resistance at the Caen Canal Bridge had died down, and Howard began to get reports. D Company had secured the first bridge. The engineers found that the bridge was prepared for demolition, but the Germans had not emplaced the charges yet. Lieutenant Brotheridge was wounded and unconscious. Sergeant Ollie, the platoon sergeant, seriously injured his back and ribs on the landing. This placed Corporal Caine in command of 1st Platoon.¹⁶ Lieutenants Smith and Wood were wounded, and Major Howard had heard nothing from the Orne River Bridge.¹⁷

Lieutenant Dennis Fox's 5th Platoon landed by the Orne River Bridge while Major Howard was being updated on the situation. An MG-34 machine gun engaged 5th Platoon as it assaulted toward its objective; however, the platoon's 2-inch mortar quickly eliminated the MG-34.¹⁸ The platoon then continued to the bridge and secured it. A few minutes later, Lieutenant Tod Sweeney and 6th Platoon joined 5th Platoon on the Orne River Bridge. The platoons established their defensive positions, set the sappers to checking the bridge for explosives, and radioed Major Howard that the Orne River Bridge was secured.¹⁹

Less than 10 minutes after he had landed, Major Howard ordered his radio operator, Lance Corporal Ted Tappenden, to transmit the success codes of "Ham" and "Jam." Tappenden continued to transmit the codes while Howard used his whistle to blow the Morse signal of V for victory to alert his company that both bridges had been secured.²⁰ He then began the process of organizing the company's defense of the bridges. As the majority of the 6th Airborne Division was going to be landing on the west side of the bridges, Howard saw the east of the Caen Canal Bridge to be the most likely route of an enemy attack. He ordered Smith to coordinate a defense from the trenches on the far side of the Canal Bridge with his platoon and 1st Platoon. Godbold moved 2nd Platoon and secured the buildings near 1st and 3rd Platoons' positions on the far side of the Canal Bridge. Fox led 5th Platoon on



Photo courtesy of author

The Caen Canal Bridge as seen from Glider 2 landing point.

patrols to the east of the Canal bridge defenses. Sweeney's 6th Platoon established a defense of the Orne River Bridge. Once Captain Nielsen and his sappers completed a more detailed inspection of both bridges, they patrolled between the bridges.²¹ Meanwhile, Major Howard became concerned about the whereabouts of Captain Friday and Lieutenant Tony Hooper's 4th Platoon. He did not find out until 7 June that the Halifax bomber towing their glider released too early due to anti-aircraft fire and it had landed more than five miles away from the objective.²²

During the night, D Company had a series of short but incredibly violent defensive engagements. Sixth Platoon engaged and destroyed a scout squad and two enemy motorcycles and captured Major Hans Schmidt, the commander of the local garrison, when he drove to the bridge in his SdKfz 50 Half Track.²³ Fox's 5th Platoon established an anti-armor ambush and destroyed a tank with a PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank), denying that avenue of approach to the enemy.²⁴ At 0300 hrs, the 7th Battalion of the 5th Para Brigade passed over the bridges and through to the town of Benouville. This placed the 7th Para Battalion between D Company and the majority of the German forces, allowing them to consolidate and reorganize.

At approximately 0700 hrs, a German gunboat moved up the Caen Canal toward D Company. When the gunboat began to engage with its 20mm cannons, Godbold's platoon engaged it with machine guns and its PIAT. Second Platoon forced the gunboat aground and captured the crew.²⁵

At 1300 hrs, Lord Lovat and his famous Commando Brigade relieved D Company. Lovat and his commandos had landed with the first wave on Sword Beach and marched inland directly to relieve D Company.²⁶ Up to the time of its relief, D Company's casualties were 14 wounded and two killed.

The success of Operation Deadstick secured lines of communication for the British 6th Airborne Division from its location east of the bridges to the Normandy beachhead to the west. Additionally, possession of the Orne River and Caen Canal bridges provided the 21st Army Group with a viable avenue of approach to the city of Caen.

A Mission Command Culture

Major Howard not only successfully incorporated what we now call mission command into his planning and execution, but he made it a constant part of D Company's culture. His personal leadership and collaborative method of planning enabled the company to become a cohesive team that was capable of reacting faster to changing situations than the enemy. He had an understanding of the proper balance needed to deliver effective mission orders. Rehearsals had shown that the initial seizure of the bridges would actually take less time than it would to set up the command post. To Howard, this meant that his largest influence on the mission would actually be in the planning phase before the battle, not during it. He had to plan the operation in sufficient detail to effectively synchronize and coordinate his platoons while ensuring his subordinates had the flexibility to adapt to a very fluid situation. Because he did not know in what order the platoons would be landing, Howard assigned both assault elements critical tasks and purposes with timelines and phases. This way, no matter what order the platoons arrived in they could immediately adjust and move to the next objective. The platoon leaders did in fact have to adjust on the ground due to a variety of reasons: losing one platoon and the company executive officer, platoons landing at unplanned distances, and quickly losing several key leaders. However, Howard's clear, flexible orders combined with his soldiers' understanding of the mission and the commander's intent enabled the platoons to quickly adjust and seize both bridges in less than 10 minutes.

Howard created a shared understanding of the mission and tactical problem through his training program and intensive rehearsals. These reinforced the importance of complete understanding of the plan by every Soldier. Howard incorporated his Soldier's lessons learned from post-rehearsal after action reviews (AARs) in order to not only refine his plan, but to increase D Company's level of engagement. This involvement in the collaborative process enabled Soldiers at every level to understand all of the mission's critical tasks. Howard understood that junior leaders had to be able to understand their superiors' jobs and be capable of filling those roles if the company was going to develop the mutual trust necessary to operate effectively. This type of trust enables a considerable amount of operational freedom within the unit, but requires a lot training to achieve and deteriorates rapidly if not maintained through training. The fact that junior leaders such as Corporals Caine and Godbold were able to take over their platoons and still rapidly execute the mission demonstrated that a shared understanding of the mission existed down to the lowest level.

D Company trained for this specific mission for more than two months, was highly proficient in securing bridges, and had a great deal of confidence in its leadership on D-Day. Howard's orders and intent were clear and easy to understand, and the entire company knew not only the critical tasks, but that speed was a vital to success. Together, these factors enabled leaders throughout the company to exercise disciplined initiative. ADRP 6-0 defines disciplined initiative

as "action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise." Lieutenant Fox seizing the Orne River Bridge with only 5th Platoon is an example of how the speed of the assault requires leaders to exercise initiative combined with their understanding of the commander's intent. The original plan was for Captain Priday to lead an assault force consisting of 4th, 5th, and 6th Platoons to seize the bridge together. Neither Priday nor 4th Platoon arrived, and 6th Platoon landed a considerable distance away. Rather than waiting for 6th Platoon to make their way to him, Fox capitalized on the Germans' momentary confusion and successfully seized the bridge with only 5th Platoon.

While there was no formalized doctrine related to mission command within the British or U.S. Armies at the time, Howard led his company in a manner that capitalized on the principles of mission command and enabled D Company to rapidly seize, retain, and exploit the initiative from the German forces. Operation Deadstick is an excellent example of mission command for leaders at the tactical level, and the fact that it occurred 70 years ago demonstrates that these principles are enduring and remain relevant.

Notes

¹ Ken Ford and Steven Zaloga, *Overlord, The D-Day Landings* (Oxford, England: Osprey, 2009), 207.

² Will Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge, Benouville D-Day 1944* (Oxford, England: Osprey, 2010), 12.

³ John Howard and Penny Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries, The Private Papers of Major John Howard DSO* (Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword, 2008) 86-88.

⁴ *Ibid*, 89.

⁵ *Ibid*, 91.

⁶ Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 15.

⁷ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 100.

⁸ *Ibid*, 104.

⁹ Stephen Ambrose, *D-Day* (NY: Touchstone, 1994), 142.

¹⁰ Ford and Zaloga, *Overlord*, 214.

¹¹ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 117-119

¹² Cornelius Ryan, *The Longest Day* (NY: Touchstone, 1959), 111-112.

¹³ Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 42.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 38.

¹⁵ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 122.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 124.

¹⁷ Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 41-43.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 42.

¹⁹ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 123.

²⁰ Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 43.

²¹ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 124.

²² Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 58.

²³ *Ibid*, 47.

²⁴ Howard and Bates, *The Pegasus Diaries*, 127.

²⁵ Fowler, *Pegasus Bridge*, 51.

²⁶ Ambrose, *D-Day*, 132.

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THE LEADERSHIP IMPERATIVE: A CASE STUDY IN MISSION COMMAND

CPT THOMAS E. MEYER

As we transition from more than a decade of war to garrison training, we must identify and implement mission command (MC) into our fighting formations and training management in order to respond to a complex and evolving security threat. Through grounded experiences at the tactical level and academic study of organizational leadership theory, I seek to connect academic theory to Army doctrine and show the successes of MC in practice through a case study of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The following issues discussed are from the point of view and perspective of an individual who has served under multiple chains of command in the positions of platoon leader, company executive officer, and company commander between May 2010 and April 2013.

Hypothetical Vignette

Afghanistan, Regional Command-South — *As the battalion conducts air assault operations behind insurgent improvised explosive device (IED) belts, leaders are faced with an ambiguous and evolving operational environment (OE). The commanders of two companies within the battalion execute simultaneous operations, controlling their platoon leaders and maneuvering their units at the order of the battalion commander. A synchronized battalion operation combining assets from air assault capabilities to air-to-ground integration (AGI) is ongoing as companies push south of the primary insurgent IED belts and defensive zones, all driven by detailed command. The company conducting the battalion's decisive operation pushes south and clears through enemy*

disruption zones, able to find, fix, and finish the enemy. These two company commanders now face the exploitation phase of their operation but are “off the page” — moving beyond the initial contact and explicit direction provided by the battalion operations order. Instead of understanding commander's intent, seizing the initiative, and exploiting the initiative (which leads to assessment and dissemination of gathered intelligence), these company commanders are hindered by the micromanagement of the command and control philosophy that results in detailed command.

The battalion ceases operations, and the companies strongpoint their locations so these two company commanders can meet with the battalion commander and S3 operations officer. While company leadership is unable to perceive and execute the next step, platoon leaders are stifled and, as micromanaged cogs in the wheel, move with their respective company commanders back to the battalion command post (CP) to receive further detailed guidance. At the battalion CP, platoon leaders gather around imagery of the OE as the S3 and battalion commander brief the scheme of maneuver for this unexpected phase of the operation. As the S3 describes the scheme down to platoon movement techniques, company commanders stand behind their platoon leaders observing the concept of the operation in “receive mode” as they conceptualize the directed concept.

Following the brief, company commanders and platoon leaders move back to their individual locations and prepare to exploit their gains. This process gave the enemy 12 hours to consolidate and reorganize. Following the battalion-directed scheme of maneuver, the platoon leaders depart in the early morning hours and face an enemy, previously broken, in prepared defensive positions protected by various IEDs. Meanwhile, company commanders act as radio operators, relaying information to battalion while awaiting further guidance to maneuver their elements. The lack of MC in this situation created a unit devoid of shared understanding. In failing to know the expanded purpose of the operation, the commanders' ability to seize the initiative was limited, which allowed the insurgent force to consolidate forces, plan a counteroffensive, and emplace IEDs forward of coalition forces.

“Leadership is [...] influencing



Photos by 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division Public Affairs Office

Soldiers with A Company, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, execute a deliberate attack of an enemy objective during a training exercise.

people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” — **Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership**

Through the MC Army Functional Concept (AFC), the U.S. Army connects organizational leadership theory to the modern Army Operational Concept (AOC).¹ The Army’s six principles of MC act as a system of ligaments connecting the art with science and relating doctrine to current academic leadership theory.²

In an evolving strategic environment, adaptive leadership is critical. The MC AFC connects doctrinal thought to current organizational leadership theory, incorporating the foundations of servant leadership, authenticity, communication, and leader development to maximize human capital and build adaptive leaders at all levels. The above vignette shows the shortcomings faced when detailed command is used in combat rather than MC. However, MC is not readily implemented in combat unless trained and developed in garrison. Through a case study of the 2nd Battalion (Strike Force), 502nd Infantry Regiment, the tenets of MC are married to the foundations of Organizational Leadership Theory (OLT), creating a delta that provides techniques for leadership to succeed in our learning organization.

MC and OLT Defined

In the contemporary operational environment — where ambiguity, change, and uncertainty are ever-present factors — our military leaders are required to provide authentic and credible influence to facilitate revitalization.³ To stay ahead of our enemies, the U.S. Army requires leaders who are perceptive in the art of proactive change in order to build learning organizations and maintain flexibility both in training and on the battlefield. Proactive change is a cornerstone of a learning organization and is the result of an identified glide path with well-known, attainable organizational goals (a “way ahead” or a “vision”) and self-reflection used to gain advantage from new ways of thinking.⁴ The key to proactive change is creating a culture of continual growth starting at the individual Soldier level.⁵ The unit shown in the hypothetical vignette failed to understand the process and as such achieved the first three phases of F3EAD (find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate). But, without decentralized and disciplined initiative bred through MC, the hypothetical unit lost the opportunities that Strike Force and units embracing MC achieve — the exploit, analyze, and disseminate portions. In the U.S. Army, officers influence this process, but buy-in is required from the NCO corps and junior Soldiers to sustain growth. To implement OLT in our current fighting formations, the U.S. Army replaced command and control, as a warfighting function, with mission command.

OLT is a combination of ideas and academic theories,



Figure 1 — Organizational Leadership Theory Diagram

proposed and practiced by scholars, which have been tested and allowed into the academic canon. Organizational leadership is the combination of leadership art with the science of management, combining beliefs and management tools to maximize human capital. There is no one doctrine of set rules or beliefs for OLT, but more than a century of academic thought provides a canon of accepted principles to define the tenets of OLT. For the purposes of this analysis, OLT is defined by the primary principles of building teams through authenticity, shared vision, shared values, decentralization

to promote initiative, social intelligence (SI), emotional intelligence (EI), organizational communication, and building learning organizations.

MC allows leaders and commanders at all levels to synchronize their capabilities and assets to adapt and overcome all obstacles and enemies; MC doctrine — developed and issued in 2012 — is the basis for unified land operations (ULO).⁶ ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, defines MC as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” MC incorporates a level of art often neglected by the practice-oriented science of its definition. The full spectrum intent of MC is defined in its six-principle framework:

- (1) Build cohesive teams through mutual trust;
- (2) Create shared understanding;
- (3) Provide a clear commander’s intent;
- (4) Exercise disciplined initiative;
- (5) Use mission orders; and
- (6) Accept prudent risk.

These six principles are linked to decades of OLT and provide a framework for building an adaptive, disciplined, and successful unit both in training and in combat.

The Strike Force battalion provides the example of what OLT and MC can create when correctly implemented in combat, as highlighted by recent articles such as the discussion of Operation Dragon Strike during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 10-11.⁷ However, the foundation of MC is not built and implemented in combat but rather starts back in the training environment and is later capitalized upon in combat. If MC had been implemented in the hypothetical vignette, commanders, leaders, and Soldiers at all levels of the organization could have retained the initiative and exploited it without the delay caused by required future guidance from higher. The MC/OLT delta (see Figure 2), as shown through the actions of the Strike Force battalion, provides a map to how MC can be implemented in garrison at the battalion level and below.

Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust: Authentic Leadership

Authenticity and genuine concern are paramount, and

provide the first delta or common ground between MC and OLT. U.S. Marine Corps Col B.P. McCoy prefaces his book, *The Passion of Command - The Moral Imperative of Leadership*, with this warning: "Without genuine concern, this is all worthless," and that commanders are entrusted with the safety and welfare of their men. This moral imperative starts in MC with building the team through a mutual trust only attainable, as argued through OLT, by authentic leadership.

The fundamental state of leadership requires an understanding of people, more specifically in this case, of one's unit from the lowest private to the higher chain of command.⁸ Without understanding, our leaders lack authenticity and fail to gain trust, thus making mentorship unattainable. MC charges leaders to internalize this fundamental state and moral imperative to understand their subordinates' motivations, strengths, and areas of needed improvement to allow for specified training needs, positions of responsibility, and individual development, ultimately resulting in an ability to accomplish the mission. The five touchstones of authentic leadership:

- (1) Know yourself authentically,
- (2) Listen authentically,
- (3) Express authentically,
- (4) Appreciate authentically, and
- (5) Serve authentically from OLT aid in the practice and application of MC.⁹

Authentic leadership — built on a foundation of shared values, perceived motivations, and congruent actions — facilitates trust and creates aligned systems empowering subordinate leaders/Soldiers and in-turn improving the organization. Authenticity is a quality of being "real" and "honest" in how we live and work with others, "rebuilding the links that connect people."¹⁰ Strike Force leaders use trust to build teams by enlisting Soldiers and subordinate leaders to buy-in and adopt the organizational goal as the cornerstone and foundation of their work ethic; understanding this requires a relationship of trust.¹¹ Building this trust relies on the strategic alignment of values, principles, and the organizational mission.¹² Strike Force exemplifies the importance of an organizational mission by communicating it down to the lowest level. Strike Force Soldiers, through the principles of MC, are considered subordinate leaders in the framework of the organization and required to understand the unit lines of effort (LOEs), mission, and intent. This facilitates ownership and creates a committed unit, unified by common goals, where trust, commitment, credibility, and accountability gain individual Soldier buy-in.¹³

Strike Force used open dialogue as a form of strategic internal communication to provide diverse perspectives and develop a culture of learning within the organization. To further promote buy-in and build effective teams, Strike Force




Figure 2 — Mission Command/Organizational Leadership Theory Delta

created working groups for various mission essential initiatives that enlisted the participation of all ranks. The Fierce Falcon Working Group spearheaded the PT program for the battalion and infused change to improve Soldier comprehensive fitness. The mission of the working group was to gain

a comprehensive voice from all levels within the battalion to improve a program dedicated to optimizing the physical and mental development and sustainment of the battalion's most lethal weapon.

Members from each company, varying from rifleman to the battalion commander, received an equal voice unhindered by rank or formal duty position. To achieve this, formally assigned leaders needed to be confident in their message and accept risk in the vulnerability that comes from giving equal voice to those usually on the receiving end of orders.¹⁴ The vulnerability and control sacrificed paid dividends in the buy-in received. Officers within a battalion are more apt to switch-out as part of the Army's revolving door of personnel, but the NCOs and Soldiers are the consistency of the unit, and when they take ownership of the vision, the effects last. Subordinate leaders' level of commitment and work ethic skyrocket when they have a say in the organization. Through its Fierce Falcon PT Program (driven by its working group), Strike Force witnessed improvements in comprehensive fitness including an average of more than a 50-point improvement in Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) scores and improved combat fitness test scores. This collection of diverse opinions harnessed creative tension and provided answers by developing creative and critically thinking leaders.¹⁵ The obvious returns on this program and working group are shown through quantitative data on Soldier fitness and combat readiness. However, the less visible return is the implementation of MC through shared vision and ownership, which combats the need for detailed command displayed in the initial vignette and creates leaders ready to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative as guided by commander's intent. This theory of tapping into human capital, gaining initiative by sacrificing control, is at the cornerstone of servant leadership and MC.¹⁶

Strike Force exemplified servant leadership, and through the overlap between OLT and MC, built cohesive teams through the execution of command climate surveys, safety briefs, and the Family Readiness Group (FRG) program. Command climate surveys are not unique to Strike Force, but how the battalion executed and implemented them is what truly exemplifies the MC/OLT delta. Strike Force did not treat command climate surveys as a "check the box" exercise but, rather, valued them as an opportunity to check the pulse of the unit and allow candid feedback at all levels. Following the survey, a selected group of leaders from multiple levels (squad leaders, platoon leaders, etc.) analyzed the answers/responses and recorded them into an easily transferable

format determined by the battalion commander and his staff to best communicate trends across the battalion. Data provided to the commanders portrayed a statistical picture of certain metrics or majority responses while still capturing the outliers. Following a week to allow commanders to digest this information, companies held sensing sessions for each level of their organization (Soldiers, team leaders, squad leaders, and then platoon leaders/platoon sergeants). The battalion command team repeated the same process including all companies to ensure a comprehensive opportunity to gain/voice feedback. Face-to-face communication between commanders and all levels of their subordinates facilitates a measure of respect and weight to their feedback. This simple practice shows subordinates they have a say in the organization and that their voice matters. The returns on this investment are difficult to gauge through quantitative means but are reflected through the human element of leading.

Leaders at all levels of the battalion, especially commanders and first sergeants, used safety briefs as a form of open dialogue between the formal leadership and the Soldiers to create a relationship of mindful communication and equitable transactions.¹⁷ In the Strike Force culture, safety briefs were not a one-way lecture from commander to Soldier. They were treated as group communication between all Soldiers and leaders, where multiple individuals had the opportunity to talk about each subject of necessary attention. Giving Soldiers the opportunity to talk to their peers and leaders about the dangers of drugs and required safety measures for drinking alcohol, hunting, or riding a motorcycle facilitated active participation and helped the message sink in. During this time, Soldiers were more apt to receive a message from their command team because it was received as authentic communication rather than robotic lecturing. This provided leaders with the opportunity to convey the right message at that critical moment to reach and develop their subordinates. These interactions became training opportunities to build a cohesive team rather than just a safety brief requirement. The better Soldiers understand the values and vision of their organization in garrison, the less they will require the detailed

command and micromanaged supervision that limited our hypothetical unit highlighted in the vignette.

“Friendship” with subordinates holds a negative stigma within the Army that leads to a failing of leaders to understand and know their Soldiers and junior leaders. A fine line exists between professional understanding and unprofessional interactions. The leaders in Strike Force understood the line between professional behavior and hiding behind excuses about avoiding friendships with colleagues to not get “too close.” The battalion’s leaders viewed their relationships with Soldiers as a family to avoid portraying a “lack of candor or fail to validate emotions.”¹⁸ This attitude permeated unit gatherings both at work and outside of work, such as FRG meetings and socials that allowed individual Soldier family units to congregate and build the larger support structure within the unit. The battalion commander frequently (twice a month) held volunteer weekend workouts at his house on Saturdays. These gatherings were open to all ranks/positions and advertised throughout the battalion area. Soldiers, leaders, spouses, and children gathered at the battalion commander’s house to participate in tough and meticulously programmed PT sessions, followed by a family-style breakfast. These opportunities to gather as colleagues, build bonds through strenuous physical activity, and break bread as family helped to build the bonds of a cohesive unit that pay off on the battlefield. Leaders who fail to do this mistake the dangers of institutional vulnerability as transferable to personal vulnerability through genuine expression and transparency.¹⁹

Strike Force united MC’s building cohesive teams to OLT’s authentic leadership through open communication between leaders and subordinates in the form of dialogue, thus creating a foundation of mutual trust. The U.S. Army requires counseling, but where Strike Force achieved the further intent of MC is in *how* they counseled. Leaders mentored their subordinates and used every training opportunity as a form of open dialogue to counsel. The Army’s DA Form 4856 offers a section devoted to “discussion,” but in an OLT sense, this discussion is dialogue in that it is a process by which meaning is transferred.²⁰ Dialogue is a free flow of meaning

between two or more people where information sharing is crucial to achieving understanding.²¹ Strike Force leaders understood that dialogue is a relationship built over time. Every range, physical training session, and even command maintenance Mondays were viewed as opportunities to engage subordinate leaders and instill knowledge through communication as a form of building authentic relationships through trust. No leader in battalion exemplified this as well as the Strike Force team leader.

Team leaders are the lowest level of recognized Army leadership. However, even the team leader viewed his Soldiers as subordinate leaders because he understood he was not only training his SAW gunner or grenadier, he was training his own replacement. Authentic communication guides leaders by fundamental values and a foundation of character, allowing flexibility in their methods to reach every



The company commander for A Company, 2-502nd Infantry Regiment leads an after action review following a squad situational training exercise.

individual; one-size-fits-all leadership is not nearly as effective.²² Above all else, authentic leadership starts at the top and requires shared values and vision to ensure congruent action.²³ The Strike Force battalion formed a cohesive team through authentic leadership and mutual trust but executed initiative as a team through shared understanding. This shared understanding in training will later correlate to understanding in the mission and avoid the failings of detailed command in combat as shown in the vignette.

Create Shared Understanding: Values

Shared understanding is the bridge that connects purpose and intent, ensuring subordinate leaders and Soldiers to the lowest level are able to operate within that intent.²⁴ The delta between shared understanding (MC) and OLT is shared values. Values and ethical stewardship display authenticity and achieve a fundamental state of leadership, facilitated by MC and aligned with the values of servant/principle-centered leadership.²⁵ Through aligned systems such as counseling, safety briefs, and officer/leader development programs (ODP/LDPs), Strike Force leaders acted as ethical stewards and conveyed a clear message using strategic communication, effectively guiding and mobilizing personnel toward a common mission. Battalion Soldiers communicated this through actions and words to connect common organizational values at the individual level as the shared understanding of MC. Strike Force leaders created an environment and culture of family, exemplifying through actions the belief that “we all work for each other.” Strike Force leaders dedicated “personal time” to ensuring their Soldiers and subordinate leaders were cared for, showing that their priority was to their Soldiers and thus building a commitment to the unit. Examples of this were displayed through individual and collaborative leader efforts. On the individual front, specific examples include a squad leader dedicating weekends to teaching a Soldier to drive and walking him through the process of attaining his driver’s license. Collaboratively, Strike Force implemented home visits that required leaders to visit the quarters (both on post and off) of every Soldier, NCO, and officer within the organization to ensure families were being taken care of, information was effectively being disseminated to the family, and the individual was living in a safe environment. These were conducted as a means of ensuring a Soldier’s standard of living was acceptable to his needs and the needs of his family. This also provided an opportunity for leaders to conduct face-to-face communication with family members who may not attend FRG meetings/functions and/or as a check on the lines of communication.

Another accepted and practiced SOP in Strike Force was for leaders to arrive early to morning formation to conduct barracks checks; they would also take turns to do these on weekends as well. These checks were not conducted as “witch hunts” or to catch wrongdoing, but rather to show that leaders care enough to take time out of their weekend to walk through their Soldiers’ living space and ensure their needs



Figure 3 — MC Strategic Framework

are met. Leaders use these and other methods to keep a finger on the metaphorical pulse of the organization and show they value each Soldier as a member of the family unit. New Soldiers and leaders are quickly inculcated to keep the organization at a consistently moving pace, united by a common bond.

GEN (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff, relates strategic alignment and architecture to a bridge with values as the foundation and aligned strategy as the connection between values and means.²⁶ This alignment starts with the congruence of

espoused values and culture or “lead by example/through action.”²⁷ Just as leaders achieve authenticity through clearly defined personal motivations, core beliefs, and fundamental values, organizations/units require these baselines to act congruently within them.²⁸

The principles of MC act as this strategic framework (Figure 3), building the foundation with cohesive teams and then infusing shared understanding to continue the building process toward the pinnacle of allowing leaders to accept prudent risk and ultimately creating an adaptive learning organization. Strike Force’s leaders were not genetically altered or specifically better than any other leader in the Army. Instead, Strike Force took the next step by approaching every task as a training opportunity, planning and executing deliberate multi-echelon training to maximize resources. Instilling this as a cultural understanding and core value of the organization created that baseline and set expectations. Daily PT is not executed solely to maintain standards of fitness, but rather as part of a larger strategic plan to build/foster shared understanding and create adaptive leaders. The Fierce Falcon PT Program assisted in creating a culture of physical, mental, and emotional resilience shown through moral, physical, and adaptive courage. The program was approached with diligent attention from the working group, and all commanders intentionally planned fitness modules and programming that would challenge leaders, promote esprit de corps, and improve comprehensive fitness. Results of the program (APFT scores, functional movement screening tests, combat fitness test scores, etc.) were reviewed and the next phases of programming were briefed to the battalion commander at quarterly PT meetings. LDPs on fitness, nutrition, and other related topics were spearheaded by individual companies and taught to the battalion as a whole. Fierce Falcon was designed to transform Soldiers and leaders into standard-bearers, build unity, and instill adaptive courage through physical training. The Fierce Falcon program meant training for, achieving, and maintaining a level of comprehensive fitness gauged by the Fierce Falcon metrics of success (various tests to include a 12-mile ruck march, APFT, five-mile run, combat fitness test, and comprehensive fitness test).

Creating and building on mutual experiences — whether it is through PT, FRG functions, or strenuous field training — instilled a shared understanding at all levels of the organization. This understanding was facilitated by OLT’s proposed need

for common core values of the organization, commonly identified within the individuals. Shared understanding, within the framework of MC, creates a platform on which to instill shared vision/commander's intent.

Provide a Clear Commander's Intent: Explain the "Why" through Shared Vision

Shared vision is the fourth discipline of a learning organization within OLT and essentially the third principle of mission command.²⁹ Genuine vision instills a "want" to learn or "common caring" rather than a directive.³⁰ Vision fails to breed initiative when kept as a leader's secret. For vision to take effect, it must be communicated, understood, and shared by the organization. Vision, as it is displayed in the MC Strategic Framework, needs to be based on common principles in order to achieve a lasting effect.³¹ Commander's intent, when implemented to achieve the above discussed requirements, allows subordinate leaders and Soldiers to "fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission though [they] be the lone survivor." A clear end-state with benchmarks for success facilitates a better understanding of change in both the "how" and the "why." When the "why" is understood, leaders can adapt the "how."

Before the OEF 12 Strike Force Security Force Advise and Assist Team (SFAAT) deployed, the senior leaders deploying set expectations by providing a vision that guided the organization. The published and understood leader expectations created a culture of self-responsibility and egalitarianism (the message and vision comes from the top).³² A decentralized style of empowering subordinate leaders, driven by a strong and understood vision, allowed for a more effective span of control.³³ This was not to say leaders were not required but rather emphasized the freedom to seize initiative and execute within the leader's communicated vision. Not only was the vision and guidance published by the battalion commander, it was also discussed and implemented at all levels of the organization (short-range training calendar, long-range training calendar, mission essential task list evaluations, Road to War operation order) to describe the way ahead and leader expectations. Leaders from every level of the organization often approached Soldiers and asked for the "why." (Why are they training? What is the task? What is the purpose of the organization?) Soldiers were expected to have these answers because leaders were expected to provide and instill them. Leaders understood Soldiers will not always do what you expect them to do, but they will always execute what you inspect. When the vision is not only communicated but also documented and inspected for understanding at every level, leaders can refer back to it as a map through turbulent times.

When Soldiers, NCOs, and junior officers "buy into" the vision, they — like any shareholder — want their piece. Soldiers will then take ownership, provide input, seek collaborative thought, and accomplish effective change to create a guiding coalition without a second thought or understanding of what they are doing. The art of MC allows commanders to tap into the human capital provided by Soldiers and junior officers, well beyond their own individual expectations or comprehension. With collaborative initiatives, Soldiers feel

personal gratification and satisfaction when yielding positive results.³⁴ Once the guiding coalition is created and the team is built around a common vision, strategies can be discussed, developed, and exploited. It is the leader's responsibility to find what motivates his Soldiers and subordinate leaders and use that to involve them.³⁵

Once vision is created and communicated, the thought needs muscle; a good manager provides the muscle through strategies. The Army has a command structure that pairs managers (executive officer [XO], first sergeant, S3, etc.) with leaders (commanders) to provide the "muscle" or the "how" behind the "thought" or vision/why. Strike Force understood and exemplified this relationship and ensured managers were on the same page with the leaders to execute vision within an understood intent. Through this symbiotic relationship, Strike Force leaders demonstrated the power of providing a clear commander's intent (vision) through the connection to and ownership of the organization at all levels. Understood intent, or vision, distributes the authority to act with initiative to every individual in the organization. When this is implemented and instilled through training, the initiative gains a strengthened resolve through discipline. A unit able to exercise disciplined initiative, as outlined in MC and OLT, avoids the detriments of detailed command outlined in the initial vignette. By communicating the shared vision (or commander's intent) across all levels of the organization, Strike Force built on the foundation already present in its cohesive teams and shared values, thus allowing for the next step in the process: exercising disciplined initiative.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative: Succession Planning, Mentoring, and Diverse Perspectives

Complacency kills learning organizations, and comfort breeds complacency. Maintaining relevance in an organization's field, national, and global communities is the crux of continuous success. Leaders hold a critical charge and monumental challenge to breed continuous hunger within their organizations. Strike Force bred this hunger through strategic succession planning and leader placement. The key to proactive change is creating a culture of continual growth, starting at the individual level, that is nurtured by organizational leaders driven by the ability to exercise disciplined initiative.³⁶ Three principles already discussed breed disciplined initiative: build cohesive teams, create shared understanding, and provide clear commander's intent. Putting these into practice to seize, retain, and exploit initiative is accomplished through succession planning, mentorship, and diverse perspectives. In order to influence and impact a lifelong learning organization, leaders need to be able to reach the pinnacle and strive for more; leaders need to ask "what's next?"

Strike Force, as part of the larger strategic scheme of the Army, rotated leaders within the organization to keep the hunger, drive, and determination required to meet the growing challenges of our national security and answer the call of the changing environment. The battalion demonstrated the power of mentorship, incorporating consent, mutual respect, and proven excellence through the mantra of "leader development" to effectively develop succession planning and maximize human capital. Organizationally in-tune leaders understand

that maximizing human capital and building profits from people are not solely based on short-term earnings. The true Human Capital Management (HCM) model understands that "hope is not a method" and integrates succession planning, a form of deliberate planning for filling voids left by leadership's revolving door for long-term success.³⁷

Organizational Leadership Theory's HCM is a people-centric approach with all functions and factors of the organization feeding into investing in people. HCM requires the application of organizational strategic systems to develop employees and build profits from people.³⁸ The disciplines of learning organizations to building an HCM are decentralization, self-managed teams, selective hiring, employee training and development, shared decision-making, transparency, and performance-based incentives.³⁹ The HCM is creating a learning environment through leader development using coaching and mentorship as a catalyst for improvement.

Doctrine dictates that leaders understand the position and responsibilities two levels above their own. For example, a squad leader understands decisions at a first sergeant (company) level, and a company commander understands the position of a brigade commander. Realistically, leaders understand two levels up and are prepared to execute one level up. Strike Force planned and executed training/knowledge management (KM) in a fashion that exemplifies this doctrinal charge to leaders.

From February 2012 to January 2013, the Strike Brigade deployed 90 percent of its leaders (officers and senior NCOs) to form an SFAAT charged with training Afghan Uniformed Police, National Police, and Afghan National Army in the staff functions and training management techniques required to sustain their own national security. Meanwhile, the remainder of the brigade stayed at Fort Campbell fully engaged in an intensive training cycle (ITC) that was challenging to even the most prepared and distinguished leaders. This required executive officers to step up and execute as company commanders (battalion XO to act as battalion commander). At all levels, leaders were working one to two levels above their rank/grade.

XOs manage systems rather than directly command people. However, managing people, talent, personalities, etc., are critical factors in being an XO. Attack Company fostered a mentorship relationship between the commander and XO based on trust and mutual respect. This relationship prepared the XO to seamlessly step into the commander billet where he already understood all of the systems and requirements. As part of a deliberate leader development/mentorship strategy, the Attack Company commander included his XO in the planning process and training management discussion. He then placed his XO in positions to operate as the commander (battalion training meetings, sync meetings, quarterly PT briefs, etc.). When word of the deployment broke, Attack Company was levels above the rest of the brigade in terms of preparation to shift the organization. Attack Company's ability to understand the system and build succession planning into training/leader development allowed for organizational learning and adaptability; it allowed leaders at all levels to exercise disciplined initiative.

Leaders plan, not because execution always follows suit,

but because the planning allows for adaptation in practice. Competitive organizations understand the revolving door of personnel changeover and preemptively attack this barrier through succession planning with mentorship acting as the catalyst for leader development.⁴⁰ Succession planning is a cornerstone of effective human capital strategy with an undeniable link to strategic/systematic coaching as a form of management.⁴¹ OLT requires a balanced approach to management and leadership through the lens of HCM and KM, providing a link to MC's disciplined initiative.

Strike Force implemented the principles of transparency, systems consultation, decentralized decision-making authority, shared control, and mentorship. The battalion took advantage of the Army's structural organization, placing leaders in roles formatted to mentor a specific group. For example, company commanders mentored XOs and platoon leaders while coaching squad leaders. Strike Force aligned to facilitate mentorship one level down and coaching two levels down in accordance with doctrine. When this structural alignment combined with the personal relationship of mutual trust and respect discussed above, mentorship was perfectly facilitated. This structure of mentorship prepared leaders to step up and move into the role of the leader above them. Strike Force displayed this perfectly when required to put succession planning into practice during the OEF 12 SFAAT deployment. When the deployed leaders returned to their formations, the organization was exponentially better prepared to continue training. The subordinate leaders who were trained, coached, and mentored and then charged to lead levels above their assigned position exercised initiative in the absence of higher leaders to drive the organization in the direction of the shared vision/intent. These leaders, when placed in the vignette, were prepared to exercise initiative within the confines of intent and continue the mission without allowing the enemy to consolidate and reorganize.

Conclusion

As deployments and the timeline of leadership change of commands would have it, Strike Force did not deploy as a battalion under these discussed command teams. Nevertheless, the trained foundations of the MC/OLT delta could have given the hypothetical vignette a different outcome.

Hypothetical Vignette Revisited: Afghanistan, Regional Command-South — *As the battalion conducts air assault operations behind insurgent IED belts, leaders are faced with an ambiguous and evolving OE. The commanders of two companies within the battalion execute simultaneous operations, controlling their platoon leaders and maneuvering their units at the order of the battalion commander. A synchronized battalion operation is ongoing as companies push south of the primary insurgent IED belts and defensive zones, all driven by detailed command. The company conducting the battalion's decisive operation pushed south and cleared through enemy disruption zones, able to find, fix, and finish the enemy. These two company commanders now face the exploitation phase of their operation but are "off the page," moving beyond the initial contact and explicit direction provided by the battalion operations order. By understanding of the commander's intent, however, commanders and leaders*

at all levels are able to seize and exploit the initiative, leading to assessment and dissemination of gathered intelligence.

Company commanders, with understanding of the larger battalion effort, strong-point their locations and gather their platoon leaders. As company teams, these leaders plan the next phase of their connected operation with their adjacent units' tasks and purposes in mind. Commanders then use the battalion update brief conducted via FM communication to brief the battalion commander on their plan. The battalion S3 synchronizes these plans ensuring a united effort. The battalion commander provides additional guidance and allows his company commanders to execute their plans. Once synchronized, company commanders disseminate the plan to their subordinate leaders as their subordinate leaders start necessary movement. Before first light, platoons begin to conduct their continued movement toward the river clearing the last remaining insurgent strongholds and clearing the area of Taliban influence. As the battalion's clearance operations come to a close, commanders use the guidance they received the night before and their understanding of mission/intent to strong-point strategic locations within the area of operations to facilitate future combat and stability operations. The enemy was kept on his heels and pushed past his brink. Now coalition forces hold the ground allowing for security in the region and a transition to the counterinsurgency operations required to succeed in the human domain.

GEN (Retired) Sullivan relates the Army's Human Capital Model to empowering subordinates, building a team, creating a strategic architecture, transforming the organization, growing the learning organization, and investing in people.⁴² The U.S. Army later defined Sullivan's statements through the restructuring of command and control to the new doctrine of mission command. Through our current transition, we as an organization need to apply MC in our garrison training toward readiness to face an evolving security threat. To tap into the full strength of human capital, our leaders need to recognize the connection between current MC doctrine and OLT as a means of implementing knowledge management to develop and train their formations. Strike Force modeled the principles of MC to reveal the shared delta with OLT and tap into the uses the first hidden power of human capital. This leadership "sweet-spot" created a unit of flexible leaders — from Soldier level to command level — that is able to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Notes

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LEFT BEHIND:

ONE REAR-D COMMANDER'S EXPERIENCE

CPT MARCUS B. FORRESTER

“You’re going to be the rear-d commander” — the one phrase no officer wants to hear. Rear-detachment duty is no light task, and I would argue it may be one of the most difficult jobs in the Army. If given the option, I would not have chosen this duty, but I learned so much more than if I had deployed, which has set me up for success in numerous developmental areas.

My brigade, the 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, labeled its rear detachment the Raider Ready Reserve (R3). The difference from most rear detachment commands and my experience was the aspect of being organized with a one-to-11 leader-to-led ratio while transitioning Soldiers and training deployable personnel (which consisted of more than half our formation). I feel I have surpassed my peers, not in stature, but in experience and the ability to manage staff, Soldiers, and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) process as a commander. As the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment (Tomahawks) R3 commander, I learned all the pertinent information every commander wishes he knew in order to spend less time on administrative paperwork and more time training.

As I dwelled on how to accurately describe my experiences, I kept returning back to our brigade commander's (COL Mike Getchell's) repetition of the unit's motto: RAIDERS — ready, accountable, informed, disciplined, experts, resilient, and Soldiers, families, and teams. The best way to convey my lessons learned as an R3 commander is to utilize this acronym.

Ready

Raiders (and in my case Tomahawks) are ready when the nation calls. The nation called on 4-2 SBCT to deploy to Afghanistan from October 2012 until August 2013. Once the brigade was informed of the deployment, preparation for the R3 began. The initial jump start to my success and what put me ahead of the other rear-detachment battalion commanders was being delegated as the R3 commander for 2-23 IN before the battalion departed for its rotation to the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif. This opportunity gave me the chance to gain experience as a commander and, most importantly, gave me an additional six months to prepare before the brigade actually deployed. Most R3 commanders in my brigade were not selected until almost one month before the brigade deployed, which placed that commander in a “catch up” mode for the beginning of the deployment. Being assigned six months prior to deployment allowed me to focus my energy on personnel readiness rather than getting my feet planted underneath me.

The unique thing about the 4-2 SBCT R3 rather than a normal rear-detachment organization was that 40-50 percent of our population was deployable Soldiers. Our force manning level on the mission in Afghanistan maxed at roughly

A gun team from the Raider Ready Reserve (R3), 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, pulls security during a team live-fire exercise at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., on 29 January 2013.

Photos by SGT Ryan Hallock



50 percent of the formation. Unfortunately (or fortunately, however you see the glass filled), Soldiers were taken off the deployment roster, which for many dampened their spirits. On top of the non-deployable medical evaluation board (MEB), chapter, legal, permanent profile, and injured Soldiers, I also had a 40 percent deployable formation that I had to keep proficient and trained to be ready in the event that these Soldiers were needed to replace Soldiers in Afghanistan. Keeping up motivation and giving them a purpose to serve was taxing. Although no one wants to join a football team to be benched in the first season, as a leader you must find ways to inspire others. For me, I encouraged family time and weekend passes. On top of being left behind, you are also engaged with Soldiers that are trying to stay motivated to serve in the Army after receiving backlash from deployed Soldiers. Deployment is an experience, but so was the R3. Soldiers that were left in my formation conducted multiple training exercises, engaged in red cycle taskings monthly, served as borrowed military manpower (BMM) to support division-level taskings, as well as conducted multiple marksmanship ranges, land navigation training, Expert Infantryman Badge training and testing, and numerous memorial ceremonies. To some that doesn't seem difficult, but to give that task to a R3 element with such a low leader-to-led ratio (highest-ranking leaders typically being sergeants) becomes an intense challenge. Most of my leaders were taking on jobs and tasks that were three pay grades above their rank and experience.

This brings me to my next point: putting the correct leaders in the correct positions. In order for the R3 element to be ready to assume responsibility as a company, the deploying companies need to leave back capable and adaptable leaders. It's a lose-lose situation when you leave an E-5 over a platoon of 26 Soldiers, have him sign for more than \$40 million in equipment, and then throw multiple tasks in his face every day. You cannot expect an E-5 in that position to operate at your expectations. As with any leadership challenge, leaders have to place the correct person in the correct job in order to make an organization maintain or grow. If someone isn't working out, be that leader that can fire and rehire. It's not easy and I'm not saying it is, but it's our responsibility.

Accountable

One of the most taxing tasks as the R3 is having NCOs (E-6 and below) sign for an entire company worth of equipment. Coming up with a good sensitive item (SI) procedure (to include adding checklists [Standard Form 702, *Security Container Check Sheet*] on all containers and buildings that contain SI and having staff duty/CQ check it at certain times of the day/night) will make your life easier. SF 702s help identify the point of friction. If any negligence is found with equipment, the SF 702s will help narrow the timeline which something was checked or not, if administered properly. Additionally, every company needs to have a GOOD key control system/custodian. If checks and balances are not in place, then it leads to buildings being unsecured, improper use of storage facilities, and just plain old lost equipment. Lost or stolen equipment leads to a Financial Liability Investigation of Property Loss (FLIPL), which typically leads

to loss of money from the Army or Soldier.

As with any formation, leaders must also be accountable for personnel. Leaders still have to maintain a list of all MEBs, chapters, legal cases, deployable, non-deployable, end term of service (ETS), and permanent change of station (PCS) personnel. On top of tracking all Soldiers and their appointments, the unit is still receiving new Soldiers every day into the battalion. Integrating Soldiers can be undervalued if there are not capable leaders to mentor, coach, and sponsor them. Along with the million other tasks, you must find a way to integrate new Soldiers and not allow them to be influenced by the few undisciplined (example: drug and alcohol misuses) Soldiers left behind.

Informed

As an R3 commander, I was ultimately in charge of more Soldiers than any other company commander in my battalion. I also had the combined chapter and legal cases from the entire battalion into one company. Although a challenging position, I had one strong tool in my toolkit: the consolidation of the family readiness group (FRG) leaders. FRG leaders can either make or break a commander, and in my case I am happy to report I had a great FRG established! While preparing for an R3 company, a leader must continue to focus on ALL aspects of support and communication, including the families. By keeping the FRG and leaders informed of flights, events, and if necessary tragic events, unknown tasks and issues can be resolved with support. There is an old saying: "More communication is better than none." Well, it's true — it saves you time and energy. Give the FRG leaders guidance and watch them work for you. GEN George Patton once stated, "If you tell people where to go but not how to get there, you'll be amazed at the results." It is a MUST to keep your FRG in the loop with everything; they have the leverage, wits, and ability to take care of you as the commander. If the FRG is blown off or not taken care of, the unit will suffer.

When developing a plan to inform your FRG leaders and NCO in charge (NCOIC) in the battalion, don't wait too late to give information. Verbalize whatever info you can when you have it. Don't make perfect the enemy of good enough. So many leaders try to develop a perfect plan before issuing out any guidance, but it backfires due to poor planning and not having the ability to adapt to change. Put out an initial plan/development at a 60-70 percent solution, send out fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), and refine later as you can when time is available.

Disciplined

Not only will the R3 commander be knees deep in grenade pins, but discipline must remain and continue in all Soldiers. Essentially, when having your formation and receiving new Soldiers, continue to enforce the Army standards and maintain that atmosphere all the way through. As the senior officer in charge, the commander must always account for his actions, and there are more people watching than anticipated. An officer must be the moral compass for the unit — whether for a platoon, company, battalion, or brigade. They must hold themselves accountable while also holding their subordinates accountable. What helps in this endeavor

reverts back to what I mentioned previously: having the right person in the right job. If the deployed company left back a stellar Soldier, that just makes your life much easier as a commander. If a less-than-stellar Soldier was left back, it is still your duty to train and retrain.

Although it will seem like you're drowning most of the time, you must find an outlet so you do not get burned out. I had a hard time with time management; I took on too much to ensure my battalion didn't fail. Nine times out of 10, if not completed by 1800, it will still be there in the morning. Additionally, I will add that commanders need to keep emotions out of decision making and focus on facts, particularly regarding Soldier-related decisions. At first, I spent a lot of extra time at the office (working 12-to-17-hour days six to seven days a week easily); I then started making poor decisions and barking orders with no justification. As a leader, never speak out irrationally. I've made many apologies due to my mistakes and actions, but luckily I had built an empire in R3 where we all supported and respected each other. When it came time that I cracked under the whip, my peers/subordinates/junior leaders supported me and offered to take on tasks they could handle. Having a stressed leader will not put an organization in a good position. Don't wait until the last minute to seek help; delegate where needed. I realized over my R3 experience, some nights you will leave early or late, but the work will always be there the next day if not completed. Manage what tasks you CAN complete and which ones you will not complete — I'm not speaking of failing. To use a metaphor, you will have five to 10 balls juggling between your hands at all times. You must figure out which balls can be dropped, which balls can be thrown, and which balls will bounce (and depending how high they bounce may give you leverage to stay afloat).

Finding your outlet to release at the end of the day is crucial.

Although it will seem like you're drowning most of the time, you must find an outlet so you do not get burned out. I had a hard time with time management; I took on too much to ensure my battalion didn't fail. Nine times out of 10, if not completed by 1800, it will still be there in the morning.

You must always remember to be who you are and don't let the burden of R3 change you. My best resource for outlet was finding select peers that understood my stressors and having a 30-minute to an hour conversation at the end of the day to blow off steam. Usually it included a redeployed friend, an NCOIC, or my 1SG. Usually we'd laugh about how crazy our day was and say to ourselves, "Geez ... just when you think you heard it all, today happened!" Typically, when I had that outlet, I felt better when going home to my wife. The bad days were when everyone was stressed and cut out

early to relax, I was left back with no outlet before I left to go home. Those days were not fun and made it very stressful for my wife. You must find that outlet: I golfed on the weekends, rode my motorcycle, and went to the gym. It still always helps to release your stress verbally; however, I would not recommend unloading it all on your significant other (but if that's how you operate, then go for it).

Experts

Bruce Lee once stated, "If you spend too much time thinking about a thing, you won't get it done." Once we began the readiness process to stand up R3, I noticed many of those in the headquarters spent a lot of time coming up with a plan of action to execute R3 operations. Sometimes you've got to just give out a 60-70 percent solution and refine. Continuing to be experts, we had to maintain all readiness statuses for the R3 element. Maintaining readiness included performing equipment maintenance, conducting education on all Army policy updates, training the standard and empowering the NCOs to do their job, and lastly focusing on the continuation of standardized and mandatory annual training.

Unfortunately, on R3 you will not be the expert you expect to be. Many Soldiers in the formation raised their hand to deploy and fight, which is what they train for. On R3, you will need to be the backbone for the formation and

educate your Soldiers so they can be experts at home station as well. Being an expert doesn't necessarily focus strictly on marksmanship or ruck marches. Being an expert involves being that "complete" Soldier and having the integrity to be a professional at all times. For me, being an R3 commander meant being an expert towards managing Soldiers, educating myself on all processes to allow our team to serve our Soldiers properly at home and in Afghanistan, and being able to solve any issues involving Soldiers and family members.



Photo by SGT Ryan Hallock

Soldiers from the Raider Ready Reserve, 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, reload an M240B machine gun during a team live-fire exercise at Range 60 at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., on 30 January 2013.



Soldiers with 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team salute during a redeployment ceremony on 16 June 2013.

Photo by SGT LaToya Nemes

Resilient

Being an expert on rear detachment can be frustrating. As the R3 commander, you are the one leader that everyone in the battalion leans on. The deployed chain of command, the families, the Soldiers, the brigade, and the rest of the R3 team all expect you to be the source of information and the problem solver. Fortunately, you get really, really, really good at handling problems. Unfortunately, you get really, really, really consumed with everyone else's issues. You need a strong and mature person to take charge of the R3 formation. No matter how strong you are though, you will need some sort of resiliency. For me, I attended a Strong Bonds event, and it was great! About the time I needed to attend, my wife and I were stressed beyond belief and could not communicate the way we wanted to. Over the course of R3, I had decided that my job was more important than my wife, unintentionally of course. The Strong Bonds event I attended helped me place my priorities back in order, a form of resiliency. Additionally, my wife and I sought out couples counseling. There is no shame in counseling, especially if needed to restore a marriage. Think of counseling as a vehicle. If you service your vehicle consistently, the less likely it will break down. If you wait until things are broken, the repair could be costly.

The Soldiers and NCOs left back should take advantage of time off: go see a movie, get out of town, submit four-day passes, and go fishing. You have to find something that keeps you who you are and sane! I know many Soldiers who conducted combatives training and martial arts to relieve stress. You must find an avenue of relief in order to prevent from snapping or blowing up. Also, remember that everyone is looking your way, and the wrong move can set a bad example. Find something enjoyable to do as long as it doesn't bring discredit upon yourself or the Army. "Example is Leadership" — Albert Schweitzer

Soldiers, Families, and Teams

I believe this is the most important aspect of my R3 command. In considering who to assign as R3 commander, the single most important question to ask is, "Who do I trust to take care of all the families?" The families in the battalion are extremely important, and this job isn't to be taken lightly. You must always care for them while also not putting yourself into a position to get in trouble. Update families with any information on hand and give timely updates. Trust me, as a commander you will not be able to please them all, but if you have their best interests at heart the rest will fall in place.

We did suffer some injuries and fallen Soldiers. No one can prepare you for caring for those families and wounded Soldiers upon their return. The devastation of losing a Soldier is emotional on both the deployed and R3 command groups. One thing to realize is as the commander, you will be the face of the battalion; this is something leaders should take into consideration while selecting someone to watch after their unit back home. That leader must be professional and courteous. They will be your representative to the deceased and wounded families, which can leave a good or bad impression of the Army on them.

My learning curve was extremely steep throughout the R3 experience and well received. No words can explain the depth of knowledge or respect earned while serving as a R3 commander. Although not a glorious position, my experiences have taught me more than I could have imagined. If given the opportunity to serve as the R3 commander, a person should take advantage of its position, and it will be rewarding.

CPT Marcus B. Forrester served as the rear-detachment commander for the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 4-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Wash. He is a graduate of both Ranger and Airborne courses at Fort Benning, Ga., as well as the Commander/First Sergeant Course and Rear-Detachment Commander/First Sergeant Course at JBLM. He earned a bachelor's degree in psychology from the University of North Carolina-Charlotte.

TRUST: A DECISIVE POINT IN COIN OPERATIONS

LTC AARON A. BAZIN

Bravo Company, led by CPT John Smith, has assumed responsibility for a new area of operations in Afghanistan. This area includes a village, which according to intelligence reports, occasionally supports insurgents who conduct improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in the area. During their first week in the new area, a roadside IED attack kills one of the company's Soldiers and wounds two more. Tensions run high in the company, and Smith develops an aggressive plan to root out insurgents in the village. He back briefs the battalion commander, who approves the plan but directs that they must first meet with the tribal leadership to see if there is any way to gain their support...

Ahmad Khan has lived in the village since he was a boy and is the head of one of the largest and most respected families. Little goes on in the village that he does not know about. He has tried his best to keep the violence outside of his village and prefers to not get involved if he can. However, he is fairly certain that one of the families allows insurgents to store explosives at a safe house somewhere in town. There seems to be many more Americans around recently, and he is concerned that there may be violence in his village soon. An armed convoy approaches his house and a clean-shaven Soldier that looks as young as one of his children approaches. The Soldier introduces himself as Captain John and extends his hand...¹

According to Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (COIN), the struggle for popular support is often the center of gravity of a COIN operation. The insurgent force requires a supportive or apathetic population to exist. At the same time, the counterinsurgent strives for popular support to help increase legitimacy for the host nation. As such, influencing the will of the people becomes a fundamental military objective for both sides.

As counterinsurgents plan, they can choose to array decisive points along logical lines of operations to achieve their desired ends.² The decisive point of an operation is a "geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success."³ During conventional operations, decisive points are typically enemy locations, which once controlled will lead to a military advantage. For counterinsurgents, identifying these points is not quite as simple as drawing a circle on a map. Arguably, one important decisive point of any long-term COIN operation is trust — the "psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another."⁴

Neither CPT Smith nor Ahmad realize it right now, but their meeting today will set the stage for a relationship of trust that will ultimately determine the shared fate of the villagers, Soldiers, and even the insurgents as well. How

well they find common ground and resolve shared problems could very well determine which direction the village will turn. They have arrived at a critical decisive point.

Three Potential Outcomes: the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

If we play out the best-case scenario, the meeting goes well and the parties find some common ground — a win-win. Let us say that Ahmad gives the company commander some information that leads to the company successfully locating an insurgent safe house. CPT Smith is able to promise some development projects that improve the quality of life in the village and help local forces provide a secure environment. He follows-up on his promises, trust increases on all sides, and everyone gets what they want... Except the insurgents that is, who lose support of the population and a secure location from which to operate. In this scenario, the counterinsurgent gains a marked advantage.

In the worst-case scenario, the parties on both sides deceive each other. Smith promises more than he can deliver or loses his temper and outright threatens Ahmad. Perhaps Ahmad misdirects Smith to the wrong part of town, tips off the insurgents so they can avoid the crackdown, or helps set a trap for the company. In this lose-lose scenario, things only get progressively worse as the company distrusts the people, and the people distrust the company in turn. In the worst-case, no relationship of trust forms; the insurgents retain their

sanctuary and can strike with impunity at any time and place of their choosing. Here, the outcome favors the insurgent.

The most probable outcome exists in the murky area somewhere between these two extremes. It is unrealistic to expect one meeting will lead to trust, and at best, the initial outcome is conditional trust. Ahmad postures, attempting to appease and placate both sides, and tries to please whomever he feels has the most to offer at the time. Smith conducts regular meetings and is cautiously optimistic, but he remains ready to drop the hammer if the situation calls for it. In this scenario, the trust outcome is uncertain and neither the insurgent nor the counterinsurgent gains a marked advantage. Only time will tell. As the insurgent will remain long after the counterinsurgent leaves, in the case of a tie, the advantage goes to the insurgent.

These three potential outcomes are an oversimplification of the very complex problems faced by Soldiers in the field but highlight an important point: trust is critical to long-term success. The need for trust takes many forms depending on the stakeholders involved and the nature of the mission. As described here, the counterinsurgent could build trust with local leadership, with military or police partners, or with host-nation military trainees. In recent years, the American military has learned (or perhaps relearned) many lessons of how to build trust to gain advantage over their adversary in a COIN fight.

Components of Trust: Context, Time, and Confidence-building

Through trial and error, service members have learned that COIN and stabilization operations require much more than the biggest stick. For the counterinsurgent, the first critical factor required to build trust is the ability to understand the context of the situation fully. Smith and Ahmad have some

big differences between them based on their backgrounds, personal abilities, and the choices they have made in their lives. They were born and raised under very difficult circumstances and have very different perspectives and worldviews. Cultural differences in education systems, religion, symbols, or behavioral norms could impede communication and the development of trust. As such, the counterinsurgent must always be aware of societal and cultural areas of sensitivity.⁵

If the last American leader that Ahmad interacted with was brash and disrespectful, this may color his perceptions and affect the initial level of trust he feels toward Smith. The level of security in the local area can affect the level of felt distrust as well. In our vignette, the company just lost a Soldier. It is natural to expect that Smith will distrust Ahmad, use caution in discussion, or overreact and display anger. Overall, the ability to understand underlying assumptions, past experiences, and the limiting factors of context will help set the stage for building trust.⁶

The second critical factor that the counterinsurgent must understand is that it will take time. The time required to build trust can range from a few weeks to six months or more. With focused effort and regular interaction, trust typically forms at around the two- to- three-month mark. If the parties share significant risk, such as high levels of enemy contact, a strong bond of trust can form in a matter of weeks. Overall, counterinsurgents should not expect instant results; they will have to conduct numerous meetings and invest a significant amount of time to build rapport and an enduring bond.⁷

The third critical factor for the counterinsurgent to understand is the use of confidence-building measures. Confidence-building measures are the activities that can bring conflicts closer to positive resolution through of promotion the belief that, in the future, each party will act in a mutually

beneficial manner. In COIN operations, confidence-building measures generally fall into the following categories:

- a) Physical measures,
- b) Communication measures, and
- c) Relationship measures.

Physical measures are activities that demonstrate positive intention. Communication measures are activities to exchange information, ideas, and perspectives. Relationship measures are activities that improve interpersonal connections (see Figure 1).⁸

Types of Confidence-building Measures

Confidence-building measures come in many



Photo by SPC Daniel Love

Over chai, a Special Forces company commander meets with village elders and Afghan National Army leaders.




Figure 1 — Use of Confidence-Building Measures in the Contemporary Operating Environment⁹

shapes and sizes, and there are no universal methods for earning the trust of another human being. Physical measures demonstrate positive intention through deeds, not words. One of the easiest but most important things that a counterinsurgent can do to build trust is to collocate with those that they want to build trust with. This leads to shared experiences, risks, and rewards. Through simply being present and involved on a regular basis, the counterinsurgent lays the foundation for trust. To build upon this foundation, the counterinsurgent can conduct partnered activities with the goal of eventually stepping back and supporting the partner in the lead.¹⁰

In an environment where the counterinsurgent cannot speak the native language and must communicate through a translator, physical indicators of positive intention go along way. This includes activities such as helping the other stakeholder meet basic human needs (e.g., providing security, food and water assistance, economic aid, medical assistance). As the stakeholder sees the benefit that the counterinsurgent provides over time, they begin to understand the counterinsurgent's positive intentions.¹¹

Another physical confidence-building measure that coun-

terinsurgents commonly use is to display a non-threatening security posture. This can include actions such as simply removing dark sunglasses to make eye contact, removing helmets and body armor, or being careful to carry weapons in a non-aggressive way. Research studies into the psychology of conflict indicate that the visual presence of weapons can significantly increase the likelihood of aggression and violence. This measure can be controversial because the norms of military behavior are to stay in uniform and always be ready for enemy contact. Again, there is no right answer, and Soldiers must apply professional military judgment to determine what is most appropriate for the situation and level of threat.¹²

The counterinsurgent can use many other actions to communicate trust and gain trust in return. These include activities such

as: participating in sports or physical exercise together, assisting vulnerable populations, supporting development projects, training together, setting conditions for sustainable jobs, or shopping at local markets. What is important for the counterinsurgent to remember is that actions can speak louder than words, and what they say must back up what they do.¹³

Counterinsurgents can conduct a wide variety of activities to improve the exchange of information, ideas, and perspectives. First, for communication to exist, the counterinsurgent should open a line of communication that allows for a free and open exchange of ideas. Language is a natural barrier to communication, and the ability to speak even a few words of the language helps establish rapport. Often, the interpreter becomes the lynchpin, and beyond simply transmitting a message, interpreters act as personal advisors to provide insight into the nuances of culture and the impact of the message the counterinsurgent is sending.¹⁴

Meetings should occur regularly and follow societal norms. In many cultures, people prefer to handle business in small groups or one-on-one after social activities. In these cases, large public forums may actually hamper communication.¹⁵



Photo by SPC Daniel Love

Wearing a patrol cap and using non-threatening body language, GEN David Petraeus talks with civilian and military leaders in Iraq in March 2007.

The counterinsurgent should tailor the nature and formality of the communication forum to the audience.

Often, American officers approach meetings in a very western business-like manner, with a set of agenda items and decisions they need right now. Instead of listening, out comes the standard issue little green notebook and they recite their pre-written talking points, almost oblivious to the person they are talking to. Almost as ineffective is when the officer goes the other route and defaults to note-taking mode, trying to write down every word the other person says. Again, the little green notebook gets more attention than the person sitting across the table does.

Ideally, the counterinsurgent can find a balance between the two through active listening (maintaining eye contact, paraphrasing, and showing empathy).¹⁶ Trust-building communication comes first from listening, then understanding and finding common ground, and then solving problems together. When communicating, the counterinsurgent must resist the urge to jump right to the end and display patience. With patience, small gains over time can build to an irreversible momentum.

The final category of confidence-building measures is relationship activities. These activities are largely social interactions and may or may not be focused directly on the counterinsurgent's goals. By their nature, human beings are social animals, and this cannot be overlooked. Seemingly, inconsequential activities, such as mirroring body posture and sharing food and drink become very important to building rapport and trust.¹⁷

Trust: No Silver Bullet

As with any relationship between human beings, when a person chooses to trust, they are taking a risk. There may be times the other person lets you down or you let the other person down. War is not all unicorns and rainbows and has a way of bringing out both the best and worst in people. Even when a relationship weathers the storm of combat, the enemy still gets a vote. Trust is an important factor, but not the only important factor in COIN.

Counterinsurgents' success is contingent upon their ability to employ all of the warfighting functions effectively and efficiently.¹⁸ Counterinsurgents must have the ability to gather intelligence of value and capitalize on it quickly. Additionally, for long-term success, the counterinsurgent must create a viable host-nation security force that will stay behind and provide a safe and secure environment. Without this force, the host-nation government will flounder, and ultimately, the counterinsurgents' efforts will fail.

Additionally, insurgencies require an intricate web of critical factors, which the counterinsurgent can degrade or deny. These typically include one or more of the following: the ability to mobilize support, training, leadership, intelligence, inspiration, assistance, safe havens, financial resources, military support, and logistical support.¹⁹ The counterinsurgent should consider the application of a holistic operational design that employs all available joint, international, interagency, and multinational ways and means at disposal against the insurgent. Trust is critical, but no panacea.

Conclusion

In over a decade of continuous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, American service members have fought a determined enemy while simultaneously earning the trust and confidence of partner militaries, police forces, and the people; the ones that will ultimately determine long-term success. Simply, if the decisive point of any military operations is where you start winning and the enemy starts losing, then earning and maintaining trust fits the definition of a decisive point in the context of the COIN fight.

Throughout history, when the weak face the strong in combat, the weak have often chosen insurgency as their way of war. As long as the U.S. enjoys the definitive overmatch it has today, future enemies will employ an asymmetric approach to counteract that advantage. These adversaries will not fight fair and likely employ AK-47s, IEDs, or cyber weapons vice multi-billion dollar tanks, fighters, or aircraft carriers. They will choose to fight in a manner where they stand some chance instead of facing America on its terms. As such, U.S. Soldiers must remain trained and ready to build trust on the battlefield of the future.

Notes

¹ The names John Smith and Ahmad Khan were selected at random and do not represent any specific person living or dead.

² FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2006, 3-13, accessed 7 January 2014, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf>.

³ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): xxii, accessed 7 January 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/d/10750.html.

⁴ Denise Rousseau, Sim Sitkin, Ronald Burt, and Coun Camerer, "Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust," *Academy of Management Review* (1998), accessed 31 July 2013, http://portal.psychology.uoguelph.ca/faculty/gill/7140/WEEK_3_Jan.25/Rousseau,%20Sitkin,%20Burt,%20%26%20Camerer_AMR1998.pdf.

⁵ Aaron A. Bazin, "Winning Trust and Confidence: A Grounded Theory Model for the Use of Confidence-Building Measures in the Joint Operational Environment," (diss., University of the Rockies, 2013), 85-101, accessed 7 January 2014, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1431981433?accountid=39364> or https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxSIAAno_dzmgWmtPLTFtZVAzTOU/edit#!

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid; Leonard Berkowitz and Anthony LePage, "Weapons as aggression-eliciting stimuli," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (1967): accessed 7 January 2014, <http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1967-16673-001>.

¹³ Bazin, "Winning Trust and Confidence," 87-101.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Beth Harry, "An Ethnographic Study of Cross-Cultural Communication With Puerto Rican-American Families in the Special Education System," *American Educational Research Journal*, accessed 7 January 2014, <http://aer.sagepub.com/content/29/3/471.short>.

¹⁶ Bazin, "Winning Trust and Confidence," 87-101.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ U.S. Army, ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (2012): 3-2, accessed 7 January 2014, http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/adrp3_0.pdf.

¹⁹ Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, "Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements," RAND, accessed 7 January 2013 from <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/www/external/congress/terrorism/>.



Photo by SGT Jeffrey Alexander

A Soldier from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) greets children during a mission in Afghanistan.

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MANEUVER SELF-STUDY PROGRAM

The MSSP consists of books, articles, doctrine, films, lectures, and practical application exercises to help educate maneuver leaders about the nature and character of war, as well as their responsibilities to prepare their Soldiers for combat, lead them in battle, and accomplish the mission. The intent is to enhance understanding of the complex interaction between war and politics and to improve the effectiveness of maneuver leaders in complex environments and in combat against determined, adaptive enemies. Visit the program's website at www.benning.army.mil/mssp.





WELCOME (BACK) TO THE JUNGLE

COL BRIAN S. EIFLER

The 25th Infantry “Tropic Lightning” Division in Hawaii has resurrected the Jungle Operations Training Course (JOTC) on the island of Oahu in order to prepare and train Soldiers, joint services, and foreign partner nations to conduct successful operations in a jungle environment.

Not since the late '90s has the Army had the capability to train a battalion-sized element in jungle operations — nor did we have the interest. Our focus was quickly drawn (and rightly so) to the urban, desert, and mountain environments of Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently within the Department of Defense, only the U.S. Marine Corps maintains a jungle course in Okinawa, Japan, and its future is uncertain. The U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region necessitates jungle training as a very relevant and necessary move for our Soldiers. This is especially so for the regionally assigned and regionally engaged 25th Infantry Division whose partnerships and theater security cooperation exercises often draw them into a jungle environment.

An Idle Peace-Time Army? Not So Much!

In the spring of 2013, in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Division being off-ramped from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) deployments, the division initiated a plan to set conditions for the “Asia-Pacific Rebalance.” First, it established a much-needed expeditionary mindset, which propelled the division into a readiness status not seen since the advent of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). A battalion task force would provide an immediate reaction company

Soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, descend into the jungle environment of Oahu as they validate the lanes used for the Jungle Operations Training Course.

Photos by SGT Sean Freiberg

(IRC) within 18 hours and battalion task force with a brigade combat team (BCT) assault command post at 96 hours in order to provide the Pacific Command (PACOM) commander with a contingency response force (CRF). Within 90 days, an N-hour sequence, a pre-assumption inspection program, and an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) program had all been developed, validated, and tested. A battalion from each of the two BCTs were empowered to assist in the development of the CRF requirements. The CRF1 (the alert battalion) requirements were primarily planned and validated by the Cacti of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment. How to support the load out, the CRF5, fell to the Gimlets of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment. This empowerment fostered “ground up” development and proved essential to the rapid and effective emplacement of this new capability. This effort was capped off with a 3rd BCT EDRE which combined live, virtual, constructive, and gaming (LVCG) along with live-fire operations all integrated under BCT and division mission command. The culmination exercise validated that we could rapidly deploy and be ready — but ready for what?

Along with this CRF initiative, the division needed to address the missing link to our readiness in the Pacific — the jungle environment. The Bronco Brigade (3/25th ID) had the task and again, empowered a battalion task force

to take the lead in developing this training capability. This fell on the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment's Wolfhounds, who were already eagerly pursuing jungle training. The "No Fear on Earth" battalion vigorously attacked this problem with elements from across the 3rd BCT and division assisting to provide support to the initiative. The battalion researched and collated our U.S. historical jungle operations documents and manuals from World War II forward. This included our previous JOTC in Panama and the 25th Division's Jungle and Guerilla Warfare Training Center that was established in 1966 as part of the Special Warfare Training and Orientation Center (SAWTOC) on Schofield Barracks that was designed to prepare Soldiers for the jungles of Vietnam. American Professor Dr. Daniel Marston from Australian National University assisted in providing more historical data and expertise on jungle warfare from across the Pacific. We also tapped into resident experts in the BCT who had attended foreign jungle schools such as the Malaysian tracker course, Australian jungle school, and the British jungle school in Brunei. The Wolfhounds continued to develop this capability simultaneously with the CRF initiative. In the end, 2-27 Infantry coordinated, resourced, and validated the entire course within six short months despite CRF and other training requirements. In addition, the division obtained a myriad of equipment to facilitate training such as hundreds of sets of old Battle Dress Uniforms (BDUs), mountaineering ropes, squad water purification systems, and other special equipment.

The New JOTC

The JOTC today is not the same as the version conducted in Panama at Fort Sherman and came with



At top, Soldiers assigned to Company A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, use their poncho raft to tactically maneuver down a river during the first phase of Jungle Operations Training Course. Below, a Soldier assigned to Company A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, pulls himself across a rope bridge as part of the JOTC.

an associated cost. The course was built completely out of hide without any additions to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) from Soldiers within the 25th ID's Lightning Leaders Academy that is responsible for Air Assault School, Lightning Leaders Course, and several performance enhancement courses.

Because of the size and breadth of the operations, JOTC had to be limited to company and below operations. Over the course of five weeks, a battalion task force cycles its companies through, starting a new company each week. An artillery battery, forward support company (FSC), weapons company, and a cavalry troop are also integrated. Each company spends 21 days in the field, which forces Soldiers to endure the hardships of the jungle and to put into practice the field craft they learn.

The course is broken down into three phases. Phase I is jungle skills training that includes land navigation, survival skills, waterborne operations, rope assisted movements, jungle communication techniques, insertion/extraction techniques, and survival techniques. Each of these classes are taught in the

jungle while platoons hone their patrol base activities. Both resiliency training and performance enhancement from the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program is embedded early on, and Soldiers begin practical application in this phase. This is a key to preparing for three rigorous weeks of field training without the luxuries of garrison life (no cell coverage either!).

Phase II is the squad/platoon situational training exercise (STX) module that consists of STX lanes for various combat patrols, close-quarter marksmanship, point-man and cover-man live-fire exercise (LFX), squad react-to-contact LFX, and platoon LFX ambush. It is here where Soldiers begin to practice the methods learned in Phase I in a tactical environment. Soldiers change from their ACUs into BDUs



Soldiers with Company A, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, receive training in the typical classroom environment present during the Jungle Operations Training Course on Oahu.

and add camouflage to themselves and equipment. This phase also includes the clearing and establishment of an artillery fire base and the conduct of multiple air assault “gun raids” where guns are slingloaded into remote enemy territory to provide fire support for short-duration missions.

Phase III is the culmination company-level FTX that includes hasty attacks, ambushes, a raid, and multiple air assaults. Throughout all phases, the battalion task force provides the overall mission command from their tactical operations center (TOC) in the field. The division CRF-5 battalion (support cycle) provides the backside support and opposing forces for both Phase II and III.

The BCT’s combat enablers also learn how to adapt to the environment to provide critical support. FSCs are forced to be innovative in their sustainment techniques using low cost low altitude (LCLA) air drops, “speed ball” resupply (free drop), door- kicker bundles, and bulk water purification. At the completion of the course, Soldiers will earn the coveted jungle expert tab authorized for wear while assigned in the Pacific theater.

The Way Ahead

The last edition of jungle doctrine, FM 90-5, was written in 1982. Efforts are being made now in conjunction with the Maneuver Center of Excellence to update the field manual. To assist in bridging the gap, 2-27 Infantry reconstructed the “Green Book,” which is a handbook for Soldiers operating in a jungle environment. The “Green Book” dates back to

our British allies’ field manual used extensively in the Pacific theater during WWII.

For now, this course is designed to prepare and train 25th Infantry Division Soldiers to conduct successful operations in a jungle environment. The course will continue to evolve and be refined after each iteration as more leaders and Soldiers develop jungle expertise. Over the next six months, 3rd BCT, 25th ID will conduct over eight partnered exercises throughout the Pacific Rim where they will have an opportunity to put their expertise to use. The long-term goal will be to have I Corps units pass through this course in preparation for partnered exercises in the Pacific. Also, future opportunities for joint services and foreign partner nations to attend the course and exchange instructors will be incorporated.

With no issues determining relevancy in a “peace-time” or “garrison” Army, the 25th Infantry Division is a more responsive and prepared force in the Pacific theater. The 25th Infantry Division is building a unique skill set for our Army and offering a premier jungle operations venue within the Pacific Command area of responsibility. Tropic Lightning!

COL Brian S. Eifler commands the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. He participated in two Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC) rotations in Panama with the 2nd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. COL Eifler earned a bachelor’s degree in interpersonal and public communications from Central Michigan University and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.



Photo by PFC Erick Warren

Soldiers with Ironhawk Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, raid a tunnel during training at Fort Hood's underground training facility.

TROOP TAKES TRAINING UNDERGROUND

1LT BRIAN E. WILDEY

As the U.S. Army begins its slow withdrawal from our current operations, the training focus in garrison has shifted to a decisive action mind-set, and with that mind-set comes new problem sets and new environments that need to be considered in training. One environment that conventional Army units should look at is subterranean complexes ranging from underground nuclear storage facilities, to chemical weapons depots, to an old salt mine that is now the home of an enemy element.

In late July 2013, Ironhawk Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, conducted subterranean operations at the underground training facility at Fort Hood, Texas, and realized how much remains unknown to conventional units about operating below ground at the company and platoon levels. In order to better prepare conventional units for operations in subterranean or complex environments, Ironhawk Soldiers would like to pass on some lessons learned from this training event.

A body of interest was created in the months prior to this event, which allowed for a presence of interested parties outside of those in the typical observer role. Representatives from the Asymmetric Warfare Group and assisting agencies came to view the problem set that would befall a conventional unit fighting in this type of environment. Their input proved valuable both during operations and when conducting the after action review (AAR). In addition, the Fort Hood Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Integration Cell also provided Ironhawk with training aids inside the tunnels. This provided excellent training for Soldiers who had merely heard stories and never had to

deal with live IEDs in a real world, combat situation.

Ironhawk Troop received a squadron-level operation order (OPORD) that allowed for the notional security of the area up to the breach site of the complex, negating the need for outer security and allowing the two platoons to focus on actions inside the tunnel complex. Intelligence suggested a possible enemy force of no larger than a section armed with assorted small arms and explosives not to exceed the size of a claymore. Designated as the decisive operation, Ironhawk Troop was pushed engineer assets that included robots of varying sizes and capabilities and four breach teams of combat engineers for the initial entry and door breaching inside the tunnel complex.

Tensions ran high at the onset of the operation as all eyes settled on the platoons when they were given the word to breach the entrance to the complex and commence their assault. As the platoons began to flow into the tunnel system, confusion mounted as grenade simulators began to detonate and rifles started cracking. Radios are a pipe dream in a concrete tunnel, and the only means of command and control are either face to face or via runner. Spatial disorientation can set in due to lack of landmarks and the unfamiliar structure. These are only a few of the issues the platoons faced as they assaulted the underground training facility.

Perhaps the single biggest obstacle any platoon leader will have upon entrance into a subterranean environment is to control his platoon effectively and to not outrun his ability to fight in an extremely unforgiving battlespace. Traditionally, platoon leaders are taught violence of action is best, and this is stressed to the utmost, but the well worn adage of "slow is

smooth and smooth is fast” applies to movement of squads below the surface of the earth. Moving slowly and deliberately through a tunnel system is going to be tough on NCOs and Soldiers alike, but the platoon leader must have concrete situational awareness of the known factors (i.e. location of himself and all subordinates, location of friendly units inside the tunnels, enemy situation, friendly casualties) before he pushes the platoon forward into the unknown. Of all the things that cannot be controlled in a tunnel, the tempo of the fight is completely on the platoon leader and must be controlled with an iron fist. Speed in tunnels will get Soldiers killed.

Tunnel complexes are close quarters battle (CQB) engagements on steroids. During basic CQB and room-clearing exercises, Soldiers are taught of the “fatal funnel” and its inherent dangers. A tunnel or hallway can be 10 meters long or 100 meters long and can be defended by one enemy fighter with a single rifle and plenty of ammunition. Using weapons organic to the platoon, this risk can be mitigated. Movement techniques have to be retrained also. Ironhawk had the luxury of a walk-through to refine how movement down a long hallway should be conducted.

Assaulting a tunnel complex with a well-controlled tempo allows for greater situational awareness not only for the platoon leader on the ground, but to his fellow platoon leaders and also to the commander. As units move deliberately through the complex, tracking the path traveled is imperative. Since the radio-telephone operator (RTO) will be used mainly as a runner, he can also draw a map as the platoon moves through the complex by relying on a compass and pace count to accurately map and create the picture of where the platoon has been. Platoon leaders can then compare their RTO’s notes upon link up and create a common operating picture on the fly. These maps can also help the company commander make decisions on the ground faster as he will usually not have the situational awareness of the platoon leader who has been up front with one of his squads.

Spatial disorientation inside the tunnel can be a problem,

but there are ways to mitigate this. Within each squad, we have a dedicated individual carry a piece or two of large children’s chalk to mark directions inside of the tunnel. As the squad moves through the tunnel system, the individual marks only the left-hand walls at certain intervals. When the decision is made to exfiltrate the complex, Soldiers use the nautical system of “red right returning” and ensure the markers are on their right-hand side so they can find their way out of the tunnel.

The marking of rooms, casualties, danger areas, and enemy killed in action (KIAs) also has to be a well thought out and refined standard operating procedure (SOP) understood by all Soldiers entering the tunnel system. Each Soldier has to know, understand, and carry the necessary chem lights to mark any situation they encounter. If a marking was tossed inside the room and could not be seen, fire teams would have to re-clear the room, wasting energy. Marking danger areas, friendly casualties, and enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) are also important. Units may have their own SOPs for ways to mark rooms and casualties, but the key is to ensure that the lowest member in the operation understands and is able to execute the marking procedures by heart.

Control and effective utilization of all assets available to the platoon leader is also critical to mission success in a subterranean operation. The tempo dictated by the platoon leader will also determine what kind of assets he is able to utilize in the tunnel. During Ironhawk’s exercise, the 43rd Engineer Company brought two Talon robots and multiple packable robots that could be carried by Infantrymen. The Talon is a great asset to use, but often both platoons were outrunning the speed of the Talon and neglecting the effort required on the part of the operator to carry all of his gear and the control case for the Talon. The speed of the platoon maneuvering was not altogether fast, but progress had to be halted for the Talon to catch up and clear a few IEDs. The smaller robots can easily zip into a room and identify enemy combatants or IEDs. While the robot is in the room, a squad or team must be standing ready to clear the room if enemy is found dodging the robots.



Photo by SFC Paul Yoder

Soldiers with Ironhawk Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment stack against a wall during a subterranean training exercise at Fort Hood.

Most of the ideas discussed during Ironhawk’s time at Fort Hood’s underground training facility are not new above ground, but in the microcosm of a subterranean environment any small errors in execution or communication can have larger consequences. As the Army pushes toward a decisive action training mindset, this should include at least a base familiarity in underground operations in order to better prepare our Soldiers for future conflicts. Leaders should look toward the future and start identifying gaps in our current training cycles and attempt to get in front of the game and train on tough, realistic problem sets that are certain to be seen by our Soldiers in the future.

1LT Brian E. Wildey is currently serving as a platoon leader with Ironhawk Troop, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas.

MEKONG DELTA 1968: COUNTERINSURGENCY *Then and Now*

RUSSELL A. ENO

In June 1968, the month I reported for duty as a district assistant advisor in Thuan Hoa District, Republic of Vietnam, the Lunar New Year — generally referred to as the Tet offensive by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Vietcong or VC) and the People's Army of Vietnam (NVA) — had been raging since the end of January. The offensive would last nearly until the end of September. Before the communists broke off the offensive, more than 4,300 U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Soldiers had been killed in action and 16,000 wounded. Communist losses have been estimated at more than 85,000 killed; the number of their wounded remains unknown.

I arrived during a war that had been increasing in its intensity since at least the early 1960s, and for the next year my focus was to be on counterinsurgency operations in Thuan Hoa District, Ba Xuyen Province, in the IV Corps Tactical Zone (see Map 1). This lunar new year's offensive saw VC and NVA soldiers attacking in force in more than 100 cities and towns, in province capitols, and even in the nation's capitol of Saigon itself. They were opposed by U.S., ARVN, and other allied forces. Trying to draw specific parallels between our experience in Vietnam and recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan can be risky, but I want to share some thoughts on counterinsurgency as I saw it and touch on some of the considerations that are as relevant to Arab cultures today as they were in the Mekong Delta four decades ago. The geography may have changed, but the fundamentals of counterinsurgency have not, and some of our allies' tactics, techniques, and procedures were first outlined in a piece entitled "Twenty-Seven Articles" for *The Arab Bulletin* of 20 August 1917. T.E. Lawrence served as a British army officer who worked with and advised — although the word learned is perhaps a better description — Bedouin irregulars during World War I against Ottoman Turk and German forces in the Hejaz, a 250-kilometer (150-mile) wide strip of present-day Saudi Arabia bordering the Red Sea. His straightforward recommendations were intended for the eyes of British officers who would later

themselves work with Arab armies, whom Lawrence recognized as potentially valuable allies in middle-eastern affairs. I had not read "Twenty-Seven Articles" before arriving in Vietnam and had to learn many of his lessons firsthand, as had Lawrence.


First and foremost, learn as much of the language — and as much about the language — as you can, and in the local dialect. Listen more than you speak.


You may not soon develop a native proficiency, but do not let that stop you from trying. As you build vocabulary and learn the rules of grammar, you will be dismayed at how much you don't know, but keep going; this anxiety is normal and provides a standard against which to measure your progress. Remember, at first your passive vocabulary and understanding will always exceed your active use of the language. Simply put, you will understand what people are saying, although at the time you may not be able to say it.

But you will learn steadily and eventually amass a workable level of skill and confidence.

One way is to keep a radio tuned to a local station, only loud enough to hear the words and phrases. At first it will be totally unintelligible, but as you study and get accustomed to the tone and sentence rhythm you will gradually pick out single syllables, then words, phrases, and finally sentences. Repeat them aloud. In your interactions with host nation personnel you will also learn key words such as those related to weapons, explosives, vehicles, commands, and simple conversational phrases. Write them down phonetically and learn to pronounce them. When your interpreter is talking to a local, listen closely to see how he uses phrases and accompanying gestures. Your host nation counterparts will probably assist you in this, but don't ask or expect them to become tutors; they have other things to do. You will be surprised at how fast you will be able to pick up snatches of conversation, so develop listening skills. Various dialects can be a problem, but do not get discouraged; keep trying.

Map 1 — Vietnam
Corps Tactical Zones





Map 2 — Closer View of IV Corps Tactical Zone

you plan to say with the interpreter to make sure he understands your intent. Depending on the interpreter's skill and familiarity with American English, you will want to avoid slang, jargon, and idioms that may throw him a curve. If he has studied English in school instead of picking it up on the street, it was likely standard English but did not expose him to idiomatic usage. If you want him to accurately translate your message, speak slowly and clearly, use short sentences, pausing after each phrase, and watch him. Give him time to translate. When he stops talking, go on to the next point, but remember that he has to absorb your message, translate the ideas, and communicate the intent and essence to your counterpart. Some conversations will be routine, unemotional, and easy for him to translate, but others will not. When emotions are running high, keep your cool and let him finish the message. Do not interrupt him; instead use the time to listen carefully and formulate what you're going to say next, and watch the person to whom you are speaking for reactions and changes of expression.

While we're on the subject of language, remember this: the locals understand far more than you think, even though they may be unwilling or unable to speak English effectively. By now, they've been exposed to a great many Americans, have heard the language, probably picked up key words and phrases — including negative comments about their nation and its customs — and have developed that same passive understanding I mentioned earlier. Make sure your subordinates understand this: a careless joke or insensitive cultural comparison can destroy your credibility. Every member of your team must understand this and take it to heart. You may be the most sincere, skilled negotiator on the planet, but another American's muttered comment or smirk can undermine everything you're trying to accomplish. The host nation's people know far more than we do about the local enemy and the threats he can pose, and if treated properly will share that information with us. If one of your team members supports your goals and intent at less than 100 percent, replace him or her.

Today's cultural awareness training is built upon the strengths and weaknesses of the training that prepared us for service in Southeast Asia, although we received comparatively little on customs and courtesies, focusing instead on what we needed for the immediate requirements of the duties we would be performing. Having been selected for advisor duty, I was fortunate to attend the U.S. Army Military Assistance Training Advisor Course at Fort Bragg, N.C. Instruction was heavy on the Vietnamese language, U.S. objectives and current operations in Vietnam, the organization and training of regional forces, and the key roles played by the district and village chiefs. We also learned a great deal about explosives and demolitions and the detection and setting of booby traps.

Just as in Afghanistan today, the resourcefulness of the enemy in Vietnam and his supporters was remarkable. Their eyes and ears were everywhere. They employed a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but their effects and sophistication were primitive compared to today's IEDs. The VC would sometimes quickly move into the impact zone of a B-52 or other bomb strike, count the craters — they knew the payload of each type of U.S. aircraft — and start looking for the ones that had not detonated. Once dug up, these 750- and 500-pound bombs could be defused and hauled off to be used as truly impressive command detonated mines, but this was a comparatively rare event, due to the difficulty in excavating a 750-pound bomb from 10-12 feet of Mekong Delta mud, and because of the sheer logistics of moving their prize to where it could be wired for detonation and reburied without any of this being detected. A far more frequent form of IED was an artillery or mortar shell, either a fired round which had malfunctioned or one which had not been collected from the drop zone (DZ) following an airdropped resupply for the 105mm section at our district headquarters. VC would comb the rice paddy that was our DZ after dark, looking for the odd round that had sunk unnoticed into the mud. I was finally able to convince the district chief to have his troops conduct detailed sweeps of the DZ after all drops and cross-check the load list with the rounds recovered until all were accounted for, something that greatly reduced casualties from command-detonated 105mm shells. This lesson is no less relevant to today's global war on terrorism, where checking your area and litter discipline can literally be a matter of life and death. Just as in Vietnam, insurgents will use anything and everything against us. If something appears out of place, it is probably there for a reason.

Information operations, often pigeonholed under the category of propaganda in the 1960s, have achieved a far greater degree of sophistication than I experienced four decades ago. Today, Al Qaeda and their surrogates are able to rapidly exploit local, regional, and international media — including our own — to communicate their message. When I first arrived in Vietnam, VC elements were still fighting in many of the major cities, and Saigon was packed with refugees fleeing fighting in the suburbs and countryside around the capitol. Our Braniff airliner was on its final approach to Tan Son Nhut air base, only to be diverted to Bien Hoa because

of a VC rocket attack underway on Tan Son Nhut. Sappers and small teams of VC still roamed the city, but they were being ruthlessly hunted down and killed by U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers, who went after them with the grim determination of men with a job to do. The air of uncertainty surrounding the capitol created an ideal growth medium for speculation and defeatism, and the aggressors did not miss the opportunity. The VC relied heavily on random attacks and word-of-mouth messages to create the impression that there were greater numbers of them in the city than was actually the case. This is no different today, where the message of one villager to another is the best and most credible sort of information operation, having greater credibility than any leaflet, broadcast, or other media image.

Just as today, in 1968 the international media, including our own in the U.S., were intent on getting the news out ahead of their competitors, and repeated whatever they could get — either on their own or as Communist press releases — without elaborating on either the full extent of casualties suffered by the VC or the limited objectives they had actually achieved. Without committing extensive resources to their media effort, the VC and NVA were thus able to influence public opinion here and abroad, and it was this external feedback that created the sense of foreboding that pervaded Vietnamese public opinion during those first trying months of 1968. The South Vietnamese government sought to restore stability, both by its own public announcements and by denying the Communists access to media. Radio stations taken over by rebels soon found their power cut off. Our own province capitol of Soc Trang was penetrated, but ARVN units quickly sealed off access and egress routes and set about mopping up the sappers and rifleman who now found themselves with no way out. Sporadic gunfire was a part of the city's routine until well into June 1968, but ARVN successes were well enough publicized to encourage the citizens to resume their day-to-day business. The press and broadcast operation seriously undermined the morale of the remaining VC and served to dry up what little support they had been receiving from sympathizers.

Give your counterpart reason to trust you. An advisor's credibility is his stock in trade, and your counterparts must come to understand that your word is your bond, and because of

this you must never promise anything that you cannot deliver. You control the assets available to you, but for anything else you need to coordinate before you find yourself in over your head. People will ask for everything from money to assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, and if your response is going to be "I'll try," make sure they understand that this does not constitute a promise to deliver the goods, but that you will make an effort to resolve the matter. And this is why you need to know what you can count on before you enter into negotiations. A last comment: keep track of what you are asked to do and what you agree to. Keep a pocket notebook, write it down, and keep the details of negotiations confidential. Faced with a cloud of conflicting demands, it is easy to lose sight of details, and that little notebook will save you a whole lot of trouble.

Don't go in blind. Talk to your predecessor if at all possible. Find out who the key players are, whom you can trust and whom you need to watch, what ongoing unfinished business he's leaving behind, where he has not been successful, and why. In many areas, his commitments may be your commitments, because the locals only understand that the U.S. Army promised to restore power or water treatment and that hasn't happened yet. Changing attitudes and building credibility takes time, and you will be reaping the rewards — and disappointments — of your predecessor's work for a matter of months, just as your own successes may not become evident until well after you took those first tentative steps. What we see as small steps may in fact



Photo courtesy of author

An advisory detachment returns from an operation in July 1968. The Vietnamese RTO has an AN/PRC-77 FM radio. Note that both advisors are carrying M-72 LAWs in addition to their individual weapons.

come across as giant successes in the eyes of the people we are trying to help. Continuity shows commitment, and your successor in turn needs to know what you're leaving for him to accomplish. This is where your next higher comes in: he needs to understand and agree to the plan and what it will cost. It may be great to hit the ground running and launch all sorts of mind-boggling initiatives, but if they're accomplished at the cost of projects the locals have been counting on, the net gain for U.S. credibility is zero. When we redeploy, the last thing we want to leave behind is the Middle Eastern version of the cargo cult, waiting eternally for the great plane load of largesse that never quite gets there.

Tact and diplomacy will be some of your most important tools in trade. We are used to dealing and speaking directly and openly with one another, but other cultures do business differently. What we take for openness can be seen as bluntness. Our insistence on punctuality is baffling to those we are trying to advise, and may easily be interpreted as an attempt to impose our customs and priorities on them. If a meeting is set for 1400, be there, but don't take it too hard if the counterparts show up a little later. We want to get right down to business, but they will want to sip coffee, pass the time of day, renew acquaintances, eventually get around to the subject at hand, and conclude when they feel they've accomplished enough. The agenda is good for a plan, but don't be surprised if you don't get to all the topics in the first sitting. They may want the same things we want, but they have a different way of getting to them. Patience is truly a virtue, and once we understand that we will become less easily irritated and frustrated, and our body language and facial expressions will reflect this. And our counterparts will notice it.

Counterinsurgency is not a simple matter, but all successful counterinsurgencies have recognized that the host nation population is where campaigns are won or lost. The guerrilla seeks to draw his psychological, financial, and logistical support from the population, as he always has. We have heard Mao Tse-Tung's water and fish analogy enough to understand it in light of the global war on terrorism, and we need to take it to heart. If we try to master — or at least learn — the host nation language and learn to use translators effectively, if we develop and sustain our credibility with local citizens and their leaders, and if we continue to expand our cultural awareness training programs and dismiss the idea that such subjects are too touchy-feely, we will have taken a giant step toward defeating al Qaeda and their surrogates, whatever names they may go by. And we cannot afford to underestimate the enemy's resourcefulness, his determination, or his ability to conduct effective information operations. The insurgency is crumbling. Our adversary is losing men faster than he can replace them, his support at home and abroad is dwindling, and our allies in Afghanistan are increasing their pressure against him. We have learned the lessons that contribute to a successful counterinsurgency, and now we need to continue to build on them.

Let me talk about saving face. If you want to lose the trust

and respect of the tribal leader you are trying to advise, just do something or allow something to happen that will embarrass him among his peers. In most regions in which we are prosecuting the global war on terrorism, we are dealing with closed societies that are incredibly suspicious of outsiders, and with your clothing, your cell phones, your outward manifestations of wealth, the firepower you can summon, and the largesse you can dispense you are most certainly a stranger. Be self-effacing, receptive to discussion, willing to learn the customs, language, and culture, and you may earn an opening that will allow you access to the people you need to reach.

Finally, extend respect. My first counterpart in Vietnam was a Vietnamese first lieutenant, Trung-Uy Hiep, who had been commanding the 568 Regional Force rifle company for seven years, since I was a sophomore in high school. He knew the names of most of the local VC officers and NCOs as well as he knew his own soldiers, and was a skilled combat leader. We shared advice and food, planned and executed tactical operations, and visited hamlet and village elders. What did I bring to the table? Access to U.S. field artillery fires; heliborne medical evacuation of casualties; rotary wing fire support and resupply; U.S. Air Force fast movers and B-52 strikes; and access to a logistical system that worked. Trung-Uy Hiep and I shared the respect that only members of our profession can claim, but respect demands yet more, and that involves that half of many nations' populations who go unnoticed: the women. You need to make it plain to each and every one of your soldiers that they cannot under any circumstances become involved with host nation personnel of the opposite sex, for it is not only inappropriate but the consequences are catastrophic. In Vietnam enemy propagandists were quick to seize upon any perceived exploitation of females, but their media access was virtually nonexistent nearly that half a century ago. That is no longer the case, and the potential embarrassment to our Army and the nation can be devastating. Let me be perfectly clear about this: the offense and disgrace lie not in the publicity, but in the crime that engendered it. Ours is a disciplined Army, and we can have it no other way.

We are most certainly a nation at war, and we will be in it for a long time. It will be fought on others' turf, and if we read and heed T.E. Lawrence's painstakingly learned wisdom we will have gained a great deal of useful information. Others have been advisors to other nations' police, Army, and special operations forces and can add to what I have tried to present here. I welcome your input, and we will use it to continue to train the force. Follow me!

Editor's Note: *This article first appeared in the September-October 2007 issue of Infantry Magazine.*

LTC (Retired) Russell A. Eno is currently serving as the editor of *Infantry Magazine*. As an Infantry lieutenant, he served as an advisor to the 566 and 567 Regional Force Rifle Companies in the Mekong Delta, Ba Xuyen Province. He is a 1967 graduate of the University of New Hampshire ROTC program. He retired from active duty in 1991 and has been editor of *Infantry* since 1992.


Book Reviews



Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Vietcong's Big-Unit War Against the U.S., 1965-1966

**By Warren Wilkins
Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2011, 288
pages**

Reviewed by LTC (Retired)
Rick Baillergeon



Those with some knowledge of the Vietnam War have a fairly ingrained perception on how the Vietcong fought the war. It is a view that believes the Vietcong strategy throughout the war was focused on guerilla tactics and utilizing small units or groups of individuals to execute ambushes and emplace various booby-traps. Author Warren Wilkins will unquestionably broaden most people's understanding of the Vietnam War in this superb volume. It is a book which will be important to any reader, no matter his or her comprehension or expertise on the Vietnam War.

The focus of Wilkins' book is clearly articulated in his introductory paragraph. He states, "... few armed forces have captivated the world as much or been more romanticized than the Vietcong. Regrettably, few armed forces have ever been so woefully misunderstood, and aspects of their military campaign so neglected, as the Vietcong and the 'big unit' war they waged against the U.S. military in Vietnam."

In order to enable readers to begin to "understand" the overall strategy and tactics of the Vietcong, Wilkins has organized his volume very effectively. The author utilizes his initial chapters to educate readers on the Vietcong. He includes discussion on their origins, key figures, infrastructure, organization, and their basic offensive and defensive doctrine. In a minimal amount of pages, he provides readers a solid background so that they can better appreciate the remainder of the volume.

The most fascinating portions of the book deal with the debate in Hanoi on how to prosecute the war as the United States entered it. Wilkins emphasizes there was no solidarity within leadership on overall strategy. Ultimately, it was decided that a conventional, "big unit" fight would overwhelm South Vietnamese forces and persuade the United States that taking heavy combat losses was not in their best interest. The author's treatment of how this strategy was determined will be a valuable contribution to most reader's understanding of the Vietnam War.

Wilkins dedicates the majority of his volume to addressing

the "big unit" battles between forces from the period of August 1965 to May 1966. The author provides concise, but detailed discussions on each of the major conventional fights. Within these battles, the Vietcong fought with regimental-size forces and clearly executed combined arms operations. Wilkins' use of easy-to-read maps is a great asset in providing clarity for readers of these battles. Additionally, he expertly analyzes the changing mindset of the Communists as these battles progressed and the quick and decisive victory did not materialize. It is a mindset which resulted in the Vietcong utilizing the tactics and strategy that most are familiar with.

Research is vital in making a book like this authoritative and valuable. Without question, Wilkins has examined all possible areas in developing his book. This includes drawing extensively on communist sources (many just recently becoming available) such as personal memoirs, unit histories, and battlefield after action reviews. The challenges Wilkins had in the utilization of this research were significant. Not only did he have to acquire his sources, but he had to find expertise in translating them and finally, he had to determine what was fact and what was fiction or propaganda. His ability to meet this challenge is found throughout the pages of this volume.

With the wealth of material published on the Vietnam War; it is becoming increasingly rare for an author to add to the existing body of knowledge. However, Wilkins has achieved this in this volume. *Grab Their Belts To Fight Them* will put many events and decisions of the war in far greater perspective for readers. For me personally, it filled in several gaps and answered questions I had for many years. I believe it is truly an important book in our understanding of the Vietnam War.


Command of Honor: General Lucian Truscott's Path to Victory in World War II

By H. Paul Jeffers

NY: NAL, 2009, 336 pages

Reviewed by Meg Reeder

General Lucian K. Truscott Jr. was undoubtedly a man of considerable fortitude, tenacity, and humility. His contributions to the Allied victory in World War II were exceptional. Although Truscott was the only American officer to command a regiment, division, corps, and army during World War II, his name has gradually been overshadowed by the other more



celebrated figures. *Command of Honor: General Lucian Truscott's Path to Victory in World War II* by H. Paul Jeffers is a thoughtfully crafted biography that seeks to educate modern readers of military history about Truscott's proper place in WWII history.

Although a major player in the European theater, Truscott chose not to seek the accolades and publicity of some of the more colorful commanders of WWII. Instead, his main objectives during the war were to train his men effectively and do what he could to help ensure the victory of Allied forces. Curiously, considering his vital role in the European theater during World War II, *Command of Honor* is the first biography of Truscott since his memoir *Command Missions: A Personal Story* was published in 1954.

Although the focus of the book is Truscott's "path to victory in World War II," Jeffers does shed some light on Truscott's life before and after the war. Born in Chatfield, Texas, in 1895, Truscott spent his boyhood and early adulthood in Oklahoma. To help his family financially, he began teaching in one- and two-room schoolhouses in Oklahoma's hinterlands. Truscott believed he was rescued from a life of obscurity by World War I. During the war, he was commissioned in the cavalry as a second lieutenant and served in a variety of cavalry assignments between the World Wars. He also taught at both the Cavalry School and the Command and General Staff School.

Truscott's renowned combat record began in 1942 when he was assigned to develop an American-style commando unit he called the Rangers, a name he chose in honor of early American heroes. Truscott became the first American general to see combat in Europe when he led a small contingent of Rangers in the primarily British and Canadian raid on the French port of Dieppe. During the 1942 invasion of North Africa, Truscott led troops under General George S. Patton in the taking of a crucial port in Morocco. After his duty as field deputy to General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Tunisia, Truscott led divisions in the invasions of Sicily and Italy and crafted the breakout from the Anzio beachhead after months of debilitating stalemate. Shortly after the D-Day landings in Normandy, Truscott commanded a successful invasion of Southern France. Truscott then returned to Italy where he took over the Fifth Army and conducted a campaign that demolished a German last stand.

Shortly after the war, Truscott had multiple responsibilities, including command of the Third Army, military administration of Eastern Bavaria, oversight of war crime trials of the top leaders of the Third Reich, and supervision of displaced person camps. He later served as a member of the War Department Screening Board and was chairman of the Army Advisory Panel for Amphibious Operations. In the early 1950s, he was appointed senior Central Intelligence Agency representative in Germany.

There are several factors that contribute to the overall enjoyment of this biography. *Command of Honor* offers a collection of more than 30 photographs, the majority of which were taken during World War II. Additionally, a bibliography is provided for those who wish to do further research on some of the topics covered in the book. Quotes from Truscott's memoir are interspersed throughout the book, so readers have the added benefit of Truscott's own recollections of important people, places, and events. The section of the biography entitled "Decorations and Citations" is an interesting inclusion which underscores Truscott's valor during World War II. It contains both American and foreign awards.

Some readers may be troubled by *Command's* lack of maps, which are almost obligatory in a book of military history. Additionally, toward the end of the book, Jeffers digresses a bit on topics that do not necessarily advance Truscott's story or pertain directly to Truscott. There is also a notable absence of source notes in the text, which would have been useful to students of military history.

Truscott was a tough but unpretentious general, a commander who garnered respect from those who served with and under him. With no need for personal glory, Truscott became what *Time* considered a "brilliant tactician and master of amphibious landings" during World War II. *Command of Honor* is an apt tribute to him.

Command of Honor is a readable, engaging, and entertaining chronicle of Truscott's involvement in World War II. It provides a fascinating depiction of one of the war's unique, remarkable, but frequently overlooked American heroes. I recommend *Command of Honor* to anyone wishing to learn more about Truscott and his triumphs during World War II. It is a stirring story of a great military leader who became a revered but humble hero of World War II.



U.S. Army Rangers assigned to 2nd Platoon, Alpha Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, infiltrate an objective on foot during task force training at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif., on 27 January 2014. Rangers are constantly training to maintain the highest level of tactical proficiency.


Photo by SPC Steven Hitchcock

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*** The Art of Support by Fire**

*** Contextual Training for Junior Leaders**



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