



# HELL ON WHEELS



DOUBLE

ENVELOPMENT

R 490602

THE ARMORED DIVISION IN THE DOUBLE ENVELOPMENT  
( 2d ARMORED DIVISION IN THE MORTAIN COUNTERATTACK )

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

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## PREFACE

Many students of armor have considered MORTAIN as the initial European Theater proving ground of mass tank-versus-tank action. That concept may be valid; however, we have found little or no evidence to substantiate such concept of mass. Newspaper accounts of the period played up the heroic defense by an infantry battalion cut off and surrounded on a hill to the east of MORTAIN itself; consequently, to the casual reader, infantry ground action was the deciding factor in our success. Some have acclaimed Allied air as the hero of the hour. We have found that tanks did fight tanks; infantry did fight gloriously and successfully; and Allied air did contribute greatly to the defeat of the Germans. Enormous credit must be given to all these members of the team of combined arms; however, we have chosen to present a factor little considered in past studies. We have refrained from detailed consideration of infantry and air actions because their inclusion is beyond the limitations imposed on us by available time and source materials. Later evaluations by historians of the future may attempt to assess each factor in its relative order of merit. That is not our purpose. This study simply points out the employment of an armored division in a role for which it was designed and equipped, and the effective utilization of its mobility, flexibility, fire power and shock action.

Divided between two corps, its combat commands separated by many miles, the 2d Armored Division applied simultaneous pressure of enormous potential on two flanks of a deep enemy penetration. Field

orders available for this study fail to reveal any over-all master plan for employment of the Division in a double envelopment. The reader may decide from the facts themselves whether such operations actually occurred.

Colonel Paul A. Disney, Commander of the 67th Armored Regiment of the 2d Armored Division at MORTAIN supplied the basis for the sketch shown on page 28 and assisted materially in focusing our attention on certain tactical considerations. Major M. J. L. Greene, of the Research and Evaluation Division, The Armored School, secured and made available innumerable maps, documents and other materials. Lieutenant Colonel Frank M. Muller, presently instructing at The Armored School, who was Assistant Division G-4 at MORTAIN, contributed generously from his personal notes and from his prodigious memory. We express our deepest appreciation to these gentlemen and to all others, too numerous to mention, who have generously and graciously aided us in the preparation of this study. We are sure they will agree, however, that our heartiest thanks should go to the wives of the committee members, especially Mrs. Wikoff, for their devoted and unselfish assistance in typing, sketching, and map coloring, and for their patience in listening to the words that follow.

To assist the reader in locating details of information in ready reference form, we have included in Appendix I, Order of Battle, a brief history of the 2d Armored Division, a glossary of German terms and a section showing the general composition of armored divisions, both American and German, as they were organized at MORTAIN. A section

of Appendix V is devoted to the comparative characteristics of American and German tanks. Minor deviations from the authorized organization and equipment may have been in effect; however, for all practical purposes, the composition as shown in the appendices may be accepted. Specific deviations are indicated in the text.

In each instance where available records reflect discrepancies, most of which may be attributed to the confusion of the battlefield, we have attempted to resolve the discrepancy in the manner indicated by the preponderance of evidence. In the event any reader possesses positive factual information which would tend to refute statements made in the monograph, the submission of such information to the Research and Evaluation Division, The Armored School, will be appreciated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. FIRST ACTION OF COUNTERATTACK . . . . .	11
2d Armored Division Enters Picture . . . . .	12
III. MOVE TO BARENTON . . . . .	17
IV. ATTACK IN THE SOUTH (8-9 August) . . . . .	20
V. THE ATTACK IN THE NORTH (10-11 August) . . . . .	31
VI. THE FORCES JOIN . . . . .	43
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	53
APPENDICES . . . . .	
I Order of Battle . . . . .	i
I. United States Forces (6-12 August 1944) . . . . .	i
II. German Forces (6-12 August 1944) . . . . .	iii
III. Organization of United States Divisions . . . . .	iv
IV. Organization of German Divisions . . . . .	vi
V. Glossary of German Terms . . . . .	ix
VI. History of The Second Armored Division . . . . .	xi
II Terrain Analysis . . . . .	xv
Terrain Map . . . . .	xvi
III German Operations . . . . .	xvii
The American Concept of the Operations . . . . .	xvii
First Phase (6-8 August) . . . . .	xxv
Second Phase (9-10 August) . . . . .	xxvii
Third Phase (11-12 August) . . . . .	xxviii
IV United States and German Personalities . . . . .	xxx
United States . . . . .	xxx
German Commanders . . . . .	xxxiii

Chapter

Page

V	Statistical and Logistical Summary . . . . .	xxxv
I.	Supply . . . . .	xxxvi
II.	Critical Ordnance Losses (U. S.) . . . . .	xl
III.	Critical Ordnance Losses (German) . . . . .	xli
IV.	Vehicle Characteristics (U. S. & German) . . . . .	xlii
V.	Casualties . . . . .	xlvi
VI.	Replacements . . . . .	xlvi
VII.	Personnel Evacuation and Medical Support . . . . .	xlix
VIII.	Personnel Evacuation and Replacement . . . . .	l
IX.	Engineer Support . . . . .	li
X.	Unit Strengths . . . . .	lii
XI.	Conclusions . . . . .	liii
VI	Daily Dispositions . . . . .	lvi
	7 August 1944 . . . . .	lvi
	8 August 1944 . . . . .	lxi
	9 August 1944 . . . . .	lxiv
	10 August 1944 . . . . .	lxvi
	11 August 1944 . . . . .	lxviii
	12 August 1944 . . . . .	lxix
VII	Map of Area of Operations . . . . .	lxxiv
I.	Coordinates of Places Named . . . . .	lxxiv
II.	Map . . . . .	lxxvi

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Events leading up to the sudden shifting of Major General Edward H. Brooks' 2d Armored Division,<sup>1</sup> less CCA, from ST. SEVER CALVADOS to new positions near BARENTON (Fig. 1) on 7 August 1944 have been detailed in many readily available publications.<sup>2</sup> The following resume, therefore, touches only on those elements necessary for a clear understanding of the situation in and around MORTAIN the night of 6 August when the coiled Panzer struck.

The significant paragraph of the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff governing General Eisenhower's launching his offensive on the European continent read, "You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."<sup>3</sup>

The first three phases of General Eisenhower's plan called for: Establishment of a lodgement area on the NORMANDY coast; a build-up and breakthrough in the NORMANDY-BRITTANY area; and pursuit on a broad front with two Army groups, emphasizing the left and linking up the right with forces invading France from the south.<sup>4</sup>

The assault to accomplish the first phase of the strategic plan was carried out on 6 June 1944 on a five division front against the beaches between QUISTREHAM and VARREVILLE. The Allies quickly established a firm beachhead and began assembling forces for a breakthrough.

The Germans initially committed all their available armor and a considerable part of their infantry in the CAEN (British) sector, the Allied East, apparently in an effort to secure the SEINE BASIN from assault.<sup>5</sup> Many reasons have been advanced for this strategy; undeniably one of the most cogent was the fear of a link-up between those Allied forces already ashore and those expected<sup>6</sup> to land in the PAS-DE-CALAIS.

However, by 11 July, both the 2d SS Panzer Division\* and Panzer Lehr Division<sup>7</sup> had appeared on the front of General Omar Bradley's First U. S. Army. On that day, Major General Manton S. Eddy's 9th and Major General Leland S. Hobbs' 30th Infantry Divisions smashed a Panzer Lehr counterattack and General Bradley's Army opened a new drive east of the VIRE River, directly at ST LO. Promising gains were made, but intervention by the German 2d Parachute Corps saved ST LO.<sup>8</sup> In spite of his armored reinforcement facing the Americans, it was evident that the German continued to regard the defense of CAEN as most important, and 700 of his available 900 tanks were still located in this sector.<sup>9</sup> On at least two occasions between 8-18 July the German attempted to withdraw his armor from the front to organize a striking force. On both occasions continued Allied pressure forced him to restore his panzers to a crumbling line.<sup>10</sup>

By 18 July both the First (American) and Second (British) Armies had taken up positions from which the breakthrough attacks were to be started (Phase 2 of the strategic plan). First Army

\* German units are underlined throughout this study.

stood on the line LESSAY-PERRIERS-ST LO road. Second Army was driving forward in the EVRECY-ESQUAY area. The over-all plan was a one-two punch, with the British Second Army on the left striking first. After the breakthrough, American spearheads were to swing westward to COUTANCES to isolate enemy divisions between ST LO and the coast, and then strike south through AVRANCHES, creating an open flank. This would permit operations into the BRITTANY peninsula to open up needed ports. It would also permit the encirclement and crushing of the German Seventh Army and at least part of the panzer forces in the west. This encirclement was to be achieved by the British on the east and the Americans on the west.<sup>11</sup>

Heavy rains delayed General Bradley's attack until 25 July.<sup>12</sup> On that morning, following a crushing aerial bombardment, the 9th (right), 4th (center) and 30th (left) Infantry Divisions of Major General J. Lawton Collins' VII Corps, in the center of First Army, drove forward nearly two miles. While the infantry divisions held the shoulders, the 2d and 3d Armored Divisions pushed through on the 26th. Major General Clarence R. Huebner followed with his 1st Infantry Division, motorized. Meanwhile, Major General Charles H. Corlett's XIX Corps on the ~~right~~<sup>LEFT</sup>, maintained their pressure on the remainder of the Army front. Further to the east, the Canadian II Corps advanced southward from CAEN astride the PALAISE road. The Germans were still weak in armor facing the First U. S. Army. Although three panzer divisions were there, the bulk of enemy armor was still concentrated under Panzer Group West, with one panzer division west of the ORNE and five

east of the river.<sup>13</sup>

VIII Corps on the extreme right (West) attacked southward on 26 July. Its armor crossed the SIENNE River, south of COUTANCES on 29 July, and by 31 July had crushed the enemy at AVRANCHES and GRANVILLE, thus eliminating the last barrier into the BRITTANY peninsula and creating the desired open flank.

Meanwhile, the British Second Army attacked south from CAUMONT, and the balance of the First U. S. Army struck southeast from ST LO toward VIRE. The Germans, with two armored divisions, attempted to establish a hinge in the PERCY-TESSAY area on which to conduct operations designed to prevent the collapse of the entire NORMANDY front. VIRE was entered on 2 August, recaptured by the 2d SS Panzer Division on 3 August and finally retaken after several days of bitter fighting. The 1st Infantry Division of VII Corps entered MORTAIN on 3 August and were relieved by the 30th Infantry Division on 6 August. During this period the 2d Armored Division continued with the VII Corps until 31 July, on which date it was attached to XIX Corps.

The Third U. S. Army, under General George S. Patton, Jr., became operational 1 August and incorporated VIII Corps. This Corps continued operations in the BRITTANY peninsula while the rest of the Army struck viciously to the south and southeast, occupying MAYENNE and LAVAL on 6 August. Simultaneously with the activation of the Third Army, command of the First Army (V, VII and XIX Corps) passed to General (then Lieutenant General) Courtney H. Hodges. General Bradley, now commanding 12th Army Group, assumed control of both Armies.

Now the German faced collapse on the NORMANDY front. Allied strategy called for a vast encirclement. The Third Army struck east from MAYENNE, planning to turn north from LE MANS, through ALENCON, toward ARGENTAN. The Canadian First Army,<sup>14</sup> on the Allied east flank, continued its thrust on FALAISE with a view to linking up with the Americans at ARGENTAN, thus executing a great double envelopment. Meanwhile, the British Second Army and First U. S. Army would close in from the north and west respectively.<sup>15</sup>

As early as 27 July, shortly after the breakthrough at ST LO, SS Oberstgruppen Fuehrer Hausser's Seventh Army Headquarters had ordered counterattacks launched southeast from the COUTANCES area in an effort to pin down the driving American columns.<sup>16</sup>

On 30 July, General Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge, commanding OB West, aware that American spearheads had swept far beyond the area contemplated for the Seventh Army counterattacks, directed that those efforts be abandoned. He ordered counterattacks designed to hold AVRANCHES and VILLEDIEU or to eject the Americans if they had reached those places. He contemplated attacking along the line VIRE-ST MARTIN-CHAMPS DU BOULT-ST POIS-AVRANCHES.<sup>17</sup>

The German Seventh Army submitted its estimate and plan to von Kluge on 31 July. By shortening lines and replacing armor with infantry in the line, Seventh Army estimated that the 2d and 116th Panzer Divisions and the 2d SS Panzer Division could be assembled; however, due to their depleted strength, these divisions required tank reinforcements. The plan was to block the American breakthrough on

the general line BRECY-DUCY-PONTAUBOUET, to the east and south of AVRANCHES.<sup>18</sup>

On 1 August, OKW, the Fuehrer's own headquarters, ordered von Kluge to assemble all panzer units presently fighting on the NORMANDY front for a counterattack in the AVRANCHES area to contain the Americans and to destroy any forces which may have broken through. Von Kluge's amazement<sup>19</sup> at this order is not surprising in view of previous experiences in attempting to withdraw German armor from the line.<sup>20</sup> He knew very well that carrying out this order meant the collapse of the NORMANDY front and probable catastrophe, but Hitler insisted on the move.<sup>21</sup> Von Kluge would have preferred withdrawing by phases to the SEINE River.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, in compliance with his orders, he moved quickly to assemble a formidable striking force of the traditional panzer type.

It is interesting to note at this point that Hitler's orders were to establish or to re-establish a continuous front extending through AVRANCHES. Since Major General Middleton's VIII Corps seized AVRANCHES on 31 July, and General Patton's Third Army became operational 1 August, it is unlikely that Hitler originally intended the MORTAIN counterattack to cut Third Army supply lines and separate the First and Third Armies as has been suggested.<sup>23</sup> However, during the period 1-6 August, as von Kluge assembled his forces and made his final plans, Third Army swept on to MAYENNE and LAVAL. It is likely, therefore, that during this planning period, the mission, perforce, changed from blocking, to driving a wedge through the American Armies. The fact

that General Patton's supply lines ran through a narrow corridor at AVRANCHES doubtless added flavor to the undertaking. It is probable that Hitler was unaware of General Eisenhower's capabilities in air transport. Supreme Headquarters could deliver, if necessary up to 2000 tons of supplies daily, in fields designated by any forces which might be temporarily cut off.<sup>24</sup>

Generals Eisenhower and Bradley were aware that the German counterattack was forming up, but they had no fears of the outcome. They reasoned that by taking a calculated risk they could retain only minimum forces at MORTAIN and continue their encircling tactics to crush the cream of the German armies on the NORMANDY front.<sup>25</sup> ( See Appendix III).

Had the counterattack succeeded so early in the Allied European offensive, one is led to speculate on the effect it would have had on the future exploitation tactics of American armor and, indeed, on the entire doctrine of armor.

The forces to be assembled under Seventh Army consisted of: XLVII Panzer Corps (1st and 2d SS Panzer Divisions; 2d and 116th Panzer Divisions), assigned the attack role; LXXXIV Army Corps (84th, 353d and 363d Infantry Divisions and remnants of Panzer Lehr Division), assigned a defensive mission in the MORTAIN area pending XLVII Corps' attack; II Parachute Corps; and LXXXI Army Corps. 10th SS Panzer Division, which played an important role later in the action was with II Panzer Corps, Fifth Panzer Army, further to the north. As happened so many times, both earlier and later, the German expectations did not

completely materialize. Many of these units were either late in arriving at the appointed time for the counterattack, or failed to arrive at all. (See Appendix III for details.)

The decision to attack on the MORTAIN-AVRANCHES axis was based on two cogent factors: known (and estimated) American dispositions, and the terrain. An attack southwest past ST HILAIRE, and thence northwest to AVRANCHES was considered, but was discarded in favor of the more direct route through MORTAIN. (See Appendix II for a study of the terrain and Appendix III for a further development of the German tactical plan.)

Thus on the quiet Sabbath night of 6 August 1944, there lay assembled before MORTAIN, waiting to strike, the nucleus of the mightiest Panzer force yet to test the mettle of American arms. Test them it did, to the utmost. The part played by the gallant 2d Armored "Hell on Wheels" Division in turning the tide to victory will be developed as the study unfolds.

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#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix IV, Personalities, for further information on Major General Brooks and Appendix I, Order of Battle, for a brief history of the 2d Armored Division.

<sup>2</sup>Report by The Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, a report prepared by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), cited hereafter as SHAEF, is one example.

<sup>3</sup> General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), p. 225. (Cited hereafter as CRUSADE.)

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 228-229.

<sup>5</sup> Op. Cit., SHAEF, p. 30

<sup>6</sup> OB West (Atlantic Wall to Siegfried Line): A Study in Command, Historical Division, Department of the Army Special Staff, German Report Series, Volume I, (EUCOM: HD: OHGB: FILE-DA), p.86. (Cited hereafter as OB WEST).

<sup>7</sup> Op. Cit., SHAEF, p. 33.

<sup>8-13</sup> Ibid., pp 33-38.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 39. Canadian First Army became operational under General Crerar (British I Corps) on 23 July. Canadian II Corps joined 31 July. Canadian First Army and British Second Army (General Dempsey) now formed 21st Army Group under Field Marshal Montgomery.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>16</sup> The Counterattack against AVRANCHES, an after action interview with Brigadier General Freiherr von Gersdorff, German Seventh Army Chief of Staff, accomplished at ST GERMAIN, November 1945: Document A-921 Trans, Dept. of Army Special Staff, Historical Division (Washington: The Adjutant General's Office), p. 1. (Cited hereafter as GERSDORFF).

<sup>17</sup> Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, p. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Op. Cit., GERSDORFF, p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> Op. Cit., OB WEST, p. 131.

<sup>20</sup> See page 2 above for previous attempts to withdraw German armor from the line.

<sup>21</sup> Op. Cit., OB WEST, p. 132.


<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 134.

<sup>23</sup> Op. Cit., SHAEF, p. 42.

<sup>24</sup> Op. Cit., CRUSADE, p. 275.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 275.

<sup>26</sup> Op. Cit., GERSDORFF, p. 8.



DIV BEGINS LANDING  
 9 JUNE 1944 (ADV. C.P.  
 LANDS 071830 JUNE)



**OPERATIONS**  
 FRANCE  
 2d Armored Division  
 7 Jun to 19 Aug 1944  
 Scale: 1/250,000  
 Legend:  
 CCA   
 CCB   
 Div   
 Assembly areas 

FIGURE 1

9#-009 01-8

reptiles have been made for these  
~~these~~ but not the position

## CHAPTER II

### FIRST ACTION OF COUNTERATTACK

The Panzer Armies were ready to strike. Thus begins the story of the German counterattack at MORTAIN, a crucial battle of the war, a battle where the Germans, had they been successful, would have seriously crippled and retarded the onward rush of our armies. Because of those who held, those who fought and lived, those who fought and died, the Germans failed in their greatest counterattack in France.

The 117th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, moved into the ST. BARTHELEMY area, just north of MORTAIN, at approximately noon, 6 August 1944, to relieve the 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. The battalions took over the positions of the 26th Infantry just as they were found. The only information the 26th Infantry could give the 117th Infantry was the fact that there were about 50 or 60 Germans from the 116th Panzer Division to their front on the high ground at LA BALISSONNIERE. There were no other identifications. There was no extraordinary activity that night except for the noise of tanks in the distance. There was some artillery fire, and, before dark, a road block group to the north saw three enemy tracked vehicles, at a distance, approaching their position. The men manning the road block fired upon them. The enemy turned and fled back. Later, eleven or twelve infantrymen also appeared, approaching this position. They were fired upon. About midnight, two to four tanks advanced upon the road block, but withdrew after a fight.

To the south, at MORTAIN, the situation was similar in many respects. The 2d Battalion and Co. K, 120th Infantry, were situated on Hill 317, east of MORTAIN. It was understood that the enemy was located in strength northeast of MORTAIN and, if any trouble developed, it could be expected from that direction. Accordingly, the 2d Battalion concentrated defenses and road blocks to meet this threat.

At 0125 on 7 August, the 2d Battalion heard enemy small arms fire east of its position. Five minutes later, the full force of an enemy attack struck.<sup>2</sup>

#### 2d Armored Division Enters Picture

Let us go back to the 6th of August and consider the operations of the 2d Armored Division. The Division, operating under XIX Corps at this time, was in action in the vicinity of VIRE.

XIX Corps' order of 6 August directed the 2d Armored Division to attack, seize GATHEMO and assist in the advance of the VII Corps on the right. Ultimate objectives were on the line DOMFRONT-AMBRIERES. CCA, coordinating with the 29th Infantry Division, was ordered to attack in the XIX Corps' zone, secure VIRE and continue the attack to the southeast. After a heavy shelling, CCA launched its attack on VIRE. Heavy fire from mortars, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and several counter-attacks, held CCA to small gains and VIRE did not fall. Later in the day, CCA was relieved by the 175th Infantry, 29th Inf-

antry Division and withdrew to XIX Corps reserve. CCB successfully penetrated FORET DE ST. SEVER to the vicinity of LE GAST, where the force was relieved by the 115th Infantry and the 109th Infantry of the 29th Infantry Division. This relief was completed by 2030. The Combat Command was assembled between LA BOUCHERIE and LE MESNIL, in the general vicinity of (T548308) to prepare for movement the morning of 7 August 1944. The 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was given the mission of reconnaissance for routes for the proposed move of CCB to MORTAIN and DOMFRONT via ST. POIS and CHERFENCE LE ROUSSEL.<sup>3</sup> It will be noted that XIX Corps directed this move.

Anticipating a German counterattack because of the concentration of panzer forces in the MORTAIN area, higher headquarters began to make adjustments to meet such a threat. Troops were peeled off and fought to the east with an offensive-defensive mission. On the VII Corps front, the 9th Infantry Division continued its drive to the south. The 4th Infantry Division turned east. The 1st Infantry Division, having taken MORTAIN, was relieved by the 30th Infantry Division, which had been shifted from the XIX Corps front up near VIPE. The 1st Infantry Division then moved south of the MAYEENE Rivér, some forty or fifty miles farther southeast, to take over the crossing of the MAYEENE from the Third Army. There was a tremendous gap between MORTAIN and MAYEENE, which gave General Collins, commanding the VII Corps, great concern. General Collins persuaded the First Army Commander to give him the 2d Armored Division, less one.

combat command. As shown in the next chapter, the division's transfer to VII Corps was actually effected on 7 August, after the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion and CCB had started to the south in compliance with XIX Corps' order. VII Corps ordered the Division, less CCA, to continue to the vicinity of BARENTON, with the mission of attacking to the north against the flank of the German Panzer concentration.

The German attack, launched in the early morning hours of 7 August by the XLVII Panzer Corps, met early failure. The bold dash toward AVRANCHES ground to a stop before it was well started. The 2d SS Panzer Division, on the left flank, attacked MORTAIN on the night of 6-7 August, surrounding the town and pushing on to the west. Elements of the 30th Infantry Division, with armor attached from the 3d Armored Division, stopped the Panzer drive west of town. The 2d SS Panzer Division line on 8 August extended from Hill 285 (west of L'ABBAYE-BLANCHE), through ROMAGNY, thence to the southeast, south of MORTAIN.

The 116th Panzer Division, on the XLVII Panzer Corps right flank, reached the PERRIERS EN BEAUFICE-CHEREENCE LE ROUSSEL road before exhausting its drive. This division had the additional mission of protecting the right flank of the spearhead.

The 2d Panzer Division, in the center, drove only slightly further west before stopping on the line LE MESNIL ADELLE-JUVIGNY LA TERTRE.

Simultaneously with the XLVII Panzer Corps' attack around MORTAIN, other elements of Seventh Army counterattacked at

VIRE to safeguard the deep right flank of the Panzer drive.

As a "Thorn in the flesh," the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, held the HILL 317, east and northeast of MORTAIN during the attack of 2d SS Panzer Division. Although in a precarious situation itself, the battalion paralyzied all movements of the Germans in the MORTAIN area. MORTAIN lies at the base of a hill, in a valley, and is surrounded by high ground. The highest ground, HILL 317, is the dominating terrain feature of the area. East-west roads lie both to the north and to the south of the hill. These roads lead to AVRANCHES and the sea. Their use was vital to the Germans if the counterattack were to succeed. With HILL 317 in American hands, the Germans could not use the roads with any degree of security during daylight hours. Less than five hours of darkness separated the long summer days. The presence of American infantry on this hill virtually denied to the Germans their use of the roads. Additionally, road blocks established in and around L'ABBAYE-BLANCHE, immediately to the north of MORTAIN, constituted a further obstacle to the German's unrestricted use of the east-west road lying to the north of HILL 317. The hill and the road blocks had to remain in American hands at all cost. They did.

General Bradley had correctly estimated the enemy capabilities, had disposed his forces to meet the threat, and had no fear of the outcome. When the blow fell, the 4th, 9th and 30th Infantry Divisions and elements of the 3d Armored Division were

in and around MORTAIN. The 4th Infantry Division, on the morning of 7 August, was moved from its assembly area to a defensive position northwest of LE MESNIL TOVE. The 35th Infantry Division, which had been previously released to Third Army, was returned to First Army and quickly attacked to the northeast toward MORTAIN from the vicinity of ST. HILAIRE DU HARCOUET. American reaction to the Panzer attack was swift and vicious. Armor played its part, as will be revealed in subsequent chapters.

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NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup>Combat Interview #96, 117th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, 7-11 August 1944, Historical Records Branch, TAG, D.A.

<sup>2</sup>Combat Interview #96, GL 86, 120th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, 7-12 August 1944, Historical Records Branch, TAG, D.A.

<sup>3</sup>After Action Report, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>4</sup>Address by General Collins, "Employment of Armor in the Normandy Breakthrough and the Envelopment of the Ruhr," (Fort Knox, Ky.), p. 11.

### CHAPTER III

#### MOVE TO BARENTON

Recalling that the German counterattack had begun on the night of 6-7 August and struck in the vicinity of MORTAIN, let us study the actions of CCB, 2d Armored Division, under the command of Brigadier General I. D. White, on its move to BARENTON, as shown in Figure 1. It is of interest to note the march formation used during this move because of its similarity to that recommended by The Armored School today. (For detailed study of this march formation, see Appendix VI).

The 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (commanded by Lt Col Wheeler G. Merriam) moved out at 070010 from positions near ST. SEVER CALVADOS, and acted as advance guard for the Division (less CCA). The main column of CCB left the ST. SEVER CALVADOS area at 0530. At 1100, 2d Armored Division (less CCA) was attached to VII Corps. Company B, 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, contacted enemy after passing CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL, and leading elements of CCB also came under fire. Enemy positions were bypassed and a local tank attack was repulsed.<sup>1</sup>

The march to the south and east had to be continued by way of an alternate route through ST. POIS, CUVES, ST. HILAIRE DU HARCOUET, and LE TEILLEUL. (See Figure 1.) All CCB units closed into the vicinity of BARENTON by 2330 after a 45 mile march. Division reserve and other units of 2d Armored Division (less CCA) began to move on the alternate route of CCB at 1700.<sup>2</sup>

During the afternoon, leading elements of CCB reached BARENTON at 1600 where they contacted Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", 3d Armored Division, and the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment (30th Infantry Division), which held the southern part of the town. Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", was down to eighty men and ten tanks at this time; the remnants of one company of infantry and a company of tanks. This force was having difficulty in holding the town of BARENTON. To assist this Task Force, the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, minus Company K, had been ordered to proceed to BARENTON only to find that the Germans had moved into the town not more than half an hour before their arrival. These two forces joined together and held what they already had in the southern part of the town. This is the setting of the stage when CCB arrived in the area. CCB closed in bivouac south of BARENTON at 2330, and prepared to attack the high ground to the north of BARENTON the morning of 8 August. Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", and 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, were attached to CCB on orders from VII Corps.<sup>3</sup>

On arrival in the BARENTON area, Lt Col Marshall L. Crawley's 3d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment, was ordered to attack to secure the defile three miles northeast of BARENTON at T685082 in conjunction with an attack by Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", to secure the high ground north of BARENTON. The holding of this defile was essential as it was the bottleneck along the GER-BARENTON road which had to be in the hands of CCB if they were to reach their objective, the town of GER.

The terrain was unfavorable to tank action and, therefore, the tanks were road bound and had to pass through this terrain feature. As for the high ground, it was needed in order to have a jumping off place for the attack to follow on the morning of the 8th. The attacks were made that night, but failed to reach the objectives. Lt Col John A. Beal's 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Co A) blocked all roads to the northeast and west of BARENTON to protect the assembly area of the command.<sup>4</sup>

We can summarize the action of the 2d Armored Division (less CCA) on 7 August as a swift tactical maneuver, an "end run" west of ST. SEVER, south of ST. HILAIRE, and then east to BARENTON, where the Division, after a forty-five mile march, struck the enemy on his vulnerable south flank.

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#### NOTES ON CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup>S-3 Periodic Report, CCB, 2d Armored Division, period 1-31 August, 1944.

<sup>2-4</sup>  
Ibid.

## CHAPTER IV

### ATTACK IN THE SOUTH (8-9 August)

On 8 August the U. S. VII Corps continued to eliminate enemy infiltration and consolidate positions following determined German attempts to slash through to AVRANCHES. Heavy attacks against the enemy's defenses led to a deep breakthrough south and southwest of VIRE. The 35th Infantry Division pushed northeast from ST. HILAIRE. Despite heavy enemy pressure west and northwest of MORTAIN, the 30th Infantry Division held the high ground between MORTAIN and CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL. The 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry, still isolated on HILL 317, had to be supplied by air. The 9th Infantry Division, north of CHERENCE LE ROUSSEL, attacked southeast. To the south the 1st Infantry Division consolidated its positions. On the left of the VII Corps the XIX Corps made small gains.<sup>1</sup>

On the morning of 8 August the 10th SS Panzer Division began its move from the area east of VIRE, in the direction of MORTAIN, into the region of ST. CLEMENT. By the evening of 8 August it had not completed assembly. During the day elements of the Division relieved the security detachments of the 708th Division, which had secured the line of ST. CLEMENT - HILL 293 (2.5 km. east northeast of MORTAIN) - FORET DE MORTAIN. The 10th SS Panzer Division had to extend the security line further to the east to contact the LXXXI Corps.

The southern wing of the Seventh Army became a source of anxiety because, on 8 August, elements of the 2d Armored Division

forged ahead in the area north of BARENTON. In the sector of the 2d SS Panzer Division, pressure was built up against the German forces holding GER. The major portions of the attacking divisions (116th Panzer, 2d Panzer, 2d SS Panzer, 1st SS Panzer), were forced on the defensive. There was no hope for further reinforcements. The 9th Panzer Division which originally was intended for the attack, was subsequently held north of LE MANS, in order to cover the deep flank of the Seventh Army.<sup>2</sup>

In the zone of the 116th Panzer Division it was expected this attack could reach LE GODEFROY in the first rush and arrive at AVRANCHES by the morning of 8 August. The most advanced units reached LE MESNIL - ADELEE and LE MESNIL-TOVE on 7 August, but the positions had to be evacuated under heavy American pressure and the German troops were withdrawn to their jump-off position.<sup>3</sup>

The plan called for the LVIII Panzer Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Kruger, to be committed on the south of the zone of the XLVII Panzer Corps to exploit the success of the initial attacks. However, the opportunity to employ this force never presented itself.<sup>4</sup> (For further Intelligence, see Appendix III.)

After the night attacks of 7 August, CCB consolidated positions and made plans to continue the attacks toward GER the following morning. On 8 August CCB attacked to secure the high ground (objective 3) north of BARENTON to the west of the GER road. The attack was launched at 0800 from a position west of BARENTON. CCB moved in two columns with Lt Col Martin J. Morin's 1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry,

reinforced, on the right and the 3d Battalion of the same regiment on the left. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 67th Armored Regiment, supported the armored infantry battalions. (See Figure 2.) Both columns advanced more than three miles over difficult terrain, through mine fields and against antitank guns. At nightfall the two columns consolidated their gains and maintained enemy contact by active patrolling.


Elements of the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion reconnoitred toward GER, MORTAIN and DOMFRONT to cover the attack of CCB, but all patrols soon met heavy resistance and very little progress was made. A patrol of this battalion guarded bridges over LA VARENNE River.

CCB reserve (2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment) went into position about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles northwest of BARENTON and prepared to reinforce either attacking column and assumed responsibility for the town and the east-west road through BARENTON.


Division reserve remained in assembly area, vicinity of LE TEILLEUL, and outposted.<sup>5</sup>

It was apparent that the German's effort to cut through to AVRANCHES had lost its momentum and was stopped. Instead of striking at a soft spot, the Germans had attacked where the First Army was strong. Having blunted the German thrust, the Americans were now beginning to strike back.

Although the German attack of 7 August had been repulsed with considerable loss to Seventh Army, there was every evidence that the Germans were concentrating additional armor east of MORTAIN for a renewal of the attempt to break through to AVRANCHES (Panzer Group



Scale 1:50,000 or 1 Inch to 0.79 Miles




Contour interval 10 metres  
The Grid on this map is Lambert Zone I. Origin—the intersection of the parallel 55 Grades North with the longitude of Paris Observatory  
Longitude of Paris is 2°20'14" East of Greenwich

HEIGHTS IN METRES

1  
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last page



Scale: 1/60000  
P-23  
Figure 2. 8 August 1944

Eberbach.<sup>7</sup>

The new plan called for the 10th SS Panzer Division to follow the left wing of the attack forces initially, in order to capture their objective, which was FONTENAY. This division was assigned the additional task of covering the southern wing of the German drive.<sup>8</sup>

Headquarters of the LVIII Panzer Corps estimated that the order to attack had little chance for success in the face of the numerical superiority now built up by the Americans and the lack of German air forces.<sup>9</sup>

It was obvious that the Fuehrer's "intuition" rather than military acumen was deciding the fate of the Seventh Army. The attack of the 708th Division, from the area south of DOMFRONT against ST. HILAIRE DE MARCOUET, with the purpose of covering the southern wing of the attacking forces, was a complete failure. Only the 2d SS Panzer Division's attack to gain higher terrain west of LE NEUFBOURG succeeded. The range of hills west of MORTAIN were recaptured which improved the German front lines in that sector.<sup>10</sup>

In the 10th SS Panzer Division sector, the 2d Armored Division continued to be active after it succeeded in taking HILL 250 northeast of BARENTON. The 2d Armored Division continued its attack north of BARENTON on 9 August. To prevent the Americans from seizing the MORTAIN-GER road, additional elements of the 10th SS Panzer Division had to be committed.

On 9 August, the Third U. S. Army changed direction to advance east and north to seize a bridgehead over the SARTHE River at LE MANS,

and then prepare to strike the German flank and rear in the direction of ARGENTAN.

The First U. S. Army grasped the opportunity to capture and smash that German force now discovered to be in the area VIRE - MORTAIN - DOMFRONT - GER. VII Corps was to thrust toward the southeast and make a ninety degree turn toward the northeast at the German flank and rear.

In the remainder of the VII Corps zone the 4th and 9th Infantry Divisions made slight gains. To the south the 1st Infantry Division engaged in vigorous patrolling across the MAYENNE River. In the zone of the XIX Corps, the 29th Infantry Division made little progress. The 28th Infantry Division was unable to advance. In the V Corps, mopping up continued around VIRE.

Heavy fighting continued on 9 August in the vicinity of MORTAIN and to the northeast. The 30th Infantry Division continued to hold the high ground west and northwest of MORTAIN. The battalion on the hilltop was still isolated and attempts were made to resupply this unit by air.<sup>11</sup>

At about 1820 on this day, a dramatic episode took place. A German officer, accompanied by an enlisted man bearing a white flag, approached the positions on HILL 317. In his most military and formal manner, he spoke to Lieutenant Elmer C. Rohmiller, (Company E, 120th Infantry) and to Sergeant Wingate (Company G, same Regiment). He stated that he was an officer of the SS and was in position to offer the Americans on the hill an honorable surrender. He carefully pointed

out that the Germans knew they had the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry of the 30 th Division, entirely cut off and surrounded, and that the position of the Americans was hopeless. The request was immediately forwarded to Lieutenant Ralph A. Kerley (C. O. of Company E), who sent word that the men on the hill would not surrender "until our last round of ammunition has been fired and our last bayonet has been broken in a Boche belly."<sup>12</sup>

The enemy aerial activity was more pronounced than for several days. 2d Armored Division (less CCA) was heavily attacked by a dozen or more bombers in the early morning hours before daylight.

CCB resumed the attack toward the vicinity of GER at 1315, 9 August and, by 1630, had seized high ground four miles north of BARENTON at (T670100). The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery barrage and was supported by the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, and elements of the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion. Air support aided the advance considerably by destroying enemy tanks and guns in the MORTAIN - GER - BARENTON pocket. Forward units outposted their positions and patrolled into enemy territory at nightfall. Considerable mortar and small arms fire was received by the infantry holding the objectives secured. Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", 3d Armored Division, placed road blocks on roads north and west of BARENTON. Upon establishment of these blocks this force passed to division reserve control. 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry was relieved from the responsibility of securing BARENTON by the 137th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division at 1835, and upon relief attacked and secured the high ground in

the vicinity of GUE THIBAU (T693070) after dark, meeting only light resistance. CCB then prepared for a renewed attack on the 10th.


2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment (commanded by Major Charles E. Etter) remained in CCB reserve about one mile west of BARENTON, protecting the left flank and took under fire enemy vehicles and personnel at long range.

Following the attack on the 41st Armored Infantry, the 3d Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment was given a second mission for the day and attacked in conjunction with the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, to secure the road on the left of GUE THIBAU at (T693098).

The 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, remained in division reserve.

Patrols from the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion occupied ST. GEORGES DE ROUELLE, contacted the 35th Division elements near MORTAIN, and covered the BARENTON - DOMFRONT highway.<sup>13</sup>

The action of elements of CCB for the 9th of August is an excellent example of a limited objective type of attack. The "Action Insert" (see Figure 3) is introduced to show an attack in extremely rugged terrain not favorable to tanks and weapons in hull defilade to support the attack of two infantry battalions. The sketch does not indicate adequately the extreme slope of the terrain. It was sufficient, however, to permit direct fire of all tanks on objective 4. Objective 4 was taken practically without incident. Following its seizure the Germans began to react with counterattacks to hold open their corridor of withdrawal through GER from MORTAIN. This resulted



Not to scale.

Figure 3. 9 August 1944

p-28

in a stalemate situation in the zone of attack of CCB.<sup>14</sup>

Objective 4 was taken by 1300 and at 1900 a German counter-attack was launched against the left flank of the 3d Battalion with tanks and infantry. At the same time German infantry with tanks attacked against the position down the main GER-BARENTON road. Both of these attacks were successfully repelled.

The attack down the main road by the Germans had drawn the attention of the troops on Objective 3, and during this time the enemy infantry troops had infiltrated around the left flank of Objective 3, had crossed and succeeded in holding a road to the left of the hill. It was for this reason that the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, in conjunction with the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, had to make their attack late in the day. The attack to accomplish the mission was made just before dark and was conducted with such speed and vigor that the enemy was completely routed.<sup>15</sup>

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#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup>VII Corps After Action Report against the Enemy, 6 June 1944 to 31 May 1945, microfilm Item 832, flash #1.

<sup>2</sup>Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup>Interview, General Kruger, Lieutenant General of Panzer Troops, LVIII Panzer Corps, Headquarters, U. S. Forces European Theater, Historical Division Operational History (Germany).

<sup>4</sup>Op. Cit., Report of Operations, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup>S-3 Periodic Report, CCB, 2d Armored Division, 1 to 31 August 1944.

<sup>6</sup>Op. Cit., Report of Operations, p. 8.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>8-10</sup>Op. Cit., Interview.

<sup>11</sup>Op. Cit., Report of Operations, p. 7, 8, 9.

<sup>12</sup>Robert L. Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, The Story of the 30th Infantry Division (Washington: Infantry Journal Press) p. 72, 73.

<sup>13</sup>Op. Cit., S-3 Periodic Report.

<sup>14</sup>Sketch and notes pertaining to CCB in operations at Barenton. Personal interview with Colonel Paul A. Disney, former Regimental Commander, 67th Armored Regiment.

<sup>15</sup>History, 67th Armored Regiment (Brunswick, Germany: George Westermann) p. 251.

## CHAPTER V

### THE ATTACK IN THE NORTH (10-11 Aug)

10-11 August were days of heavy fighting. This period demonstrated that, with the forces available, the Germans could not carry out the intended attack against AVRANCHES. The German defenses were barely succeeding in containing the American pressure. Strong American forces, after by-passing the German southern flank, continued their push farther to the south after advancing from the area north of LE MANS.

This situation worried the Germans. Elements of the American 5th Armored Division appeared for the first time when an attack was launched against portions of the 9th Panzer Division in the region of BEAUMONT-BALLON. Apparently the objective of this attack was to strike deep into the Seventh Army flank. In the sector of the XLVII Panzer Corps and the LXXXIV Army Corps there was a great deal of active fighting by the Americans. GATHEMO was lost. American tanks penetrated into L'ABBAYE-BLANCHE, and on to the HILL 307 north of MORTAIN. Movements on the main roads revealed indications of renewed American attacks. All of the German divisions were weakened. The loss of tanks was particularly high. No further reinforcements for the Seventh Army could be expected due to the need for troops to bolster the defensive front.

On the 10th of August, the 2d Armored Division steadily increased its pressure against the German southern flank, forcing the Germans to employ all units of the 10th SS Panzer Division. This division was

intended to be committed in the center of the push against AVRANCHES, but the action of CCB prevented this. An attack on BARENTON carried out by the 10th SS Panzer Division at first gained ground but finally came to a standstill, and the Division defended itself by arranging its formations in strong points along its front line.

In the sector facing the 2d SS Panzer Division, American pressure became stronger. Reinforcements of American artillery were discovered west of MORTAIN. During the 10th of August, the 2d SS Panzer Division suffered heavy casualties by artillery fire and air raids.<sup>1</sup> (For further Intelligence see Appendix III.)

The First U. S. Army pressed against the enemy in the large pocket from the north and west. V Corps and the 2d Infantry Division pushed forward. XIX Corps attacked with the 28th Infantry Division and CCA of the 2d Armored Division to recapture GATHEMO and moved toward TINCHEBRAY. In the VII Corps zone, northwest of SOURDEVAL, the 9th Infantry Division advanced against strong resistance to straighten and strengthen the line in its sector. The 4th Infantry Division remained in place. The 22d Infantry of the 4th Infantry Division went in on the right of the 35th Infantry Division below LE TEILLEUL. The 35th Infantry Division and CCB, 2d Armored Division, received and repulsed a counterattack against their positions northeast of BARENTON. The 30th Infantry Division made little progress. The 1st Infantry Division continued active patrolling and secured the river crossings between MAYENNE and AMBRIERES LE GRANDE. The plan, in brief, was to trap the bulk of the German forces by a vast encircling maneuver, with the British pushing from the north and the Third U.S. Army swinging in from

the south. Within the vast encirclement, the forces of the 2d Armored Division moved on an inner circle; CCB on the right (southern) flank, exerted pressure on the life line of the German forces trapped in and around MORTAIN; CCA, which composed the striking forces on the left (northern) flank, drove toward GER to close the avenue of escape. So, we have the 2d Armored Division acting as the two arms of a tongs closing in from opposite directions. (See Figure 1.) Valuable and effective assistance was given throughout the day by the fighter-bombers of the 9th Tactical Air Command operating against the congestion of German tanks and motor transport in the SOURDEVAL pocket.<sup>2</sup>

The weather was unfavorable for the first time since the counterattack began and the effect of our air force decreased. The 10th of August was very cloudy and visibility was poor. However, during the night, German air became active and German planes bombed the vicinity of the Division Command Post and the Division Reserve Areas for about 25 minutes, starting at 0100. Heavy demolition and antipersonnel bombs were dropped causing thirty-five casualties.<sup>3</sup>

CCB and attachments went on the defensive following the German counterattack the previous night, and orders for the 10th did not change the situation. At 0530 German infantry, reinforced with tanks, advanced under supporting fires of artillery, mortars, and nobelwerfers, and attacked the left flank of CCB positions north of BARENTON. The attack struck at elements of the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, and Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", 3d Armored Division. The attack, which was initiated from the direction of

HILL 311 (T643084) and the hill to the east (T653084) was repelled by 0800 with heavy casualties inflicted on the Germans. Later in the morning, 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, and Task Force "X", engaged an enemy column on the trail leading into their position from the defile (T655074).<sup>4</sup>

Later during the day elements of CCB acted as a covering force for 30th Infantry Division units, which attacked north to open a supply and communication route to their battalion which had been isolated on the hill east of MORTAIN.

At 2030 a German Infantry column, which moved from the north-east, approached CCB's lines, but supporting artillery dispersed this column.<sup>5</sup>

The Division Reserve and elements of the 35th Infantry Division relieved CCB in the sector generally near HILL 311 (west of T654084). The 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry was moved into the sector on the right of the road near CH. LIVET, occupying the position previously held by the Reconnaissance Company, 67th Armored Regiment, between the right flank of 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, and ST. GEORGES ROUELLE. This entire sector of the front was protected by mined road blocks on the secondary roads to the east of the main road running along the general line held by the 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment.<sup>6</sup>

The 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and attached engineers blew up bridges between BARENTON and DOMFRONT to prevent their use by the Germans for a possible counterattack from that sector. The 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion also occupied ST. GEORGES DE ROUELLE and defended the right or east flank along the LA VARENNE River.<sup>7</sup>

The 238th Engineer Combat Battalion (less one company) arrived in the Division Reserve area, and was placed in direct support of the Division at 1800.<sup>8</sup>

Elements of Division Reserve, which were attached to CCB at 0900, occupied a sector of the front as previously described.<sup>9</sup>

CCA, attached to XIX Corps, assembled a Task Force composed of the 66th Armored Regiment, (less two battalions); the 2d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment; 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; plus Tank Destroyers and Engineers. This force was attached to the 28th Infantry Division at GATHEMO. It became known as Task Force "A" and was under the command of Lt Col William M. Stokes, commanding officer of the 66th Armored Regiment. The Task Force passed through the lines of the 109th Infantry at 0600, and attacked south and south-east of GATHEMO, with the town of VENGEONS and ST. SAUVIER DE CHAULIEU as objectives. It progressed steadily cross-country over rough terrain, encountering mortar, bazooka, and extremely heavy artillery fire, and by nightfall had reached LA BERTHELIERE. The 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, was attached to the 28th Infantry Division for a separate mission. It attacked south of GATHEMO against remnants of the German 84th Infantry Division, which had just been cleared from the town.<sup>10</sup>

The German losses in terrain, troops and tanks, and the serious condition of the flanks caused Seventh Army to withdraw the front in the northern sector during the night of 10-11 August.<sup>11</sup>

The supply situation of the Seventh Army was threatened to

the greatest degree by the breakthrough of the American forces into the supply routes. Panzer Group Eberbach was to be committed to destroy the right American assaulting forces (Third U. S. Army) instead of attacking as originally planned. The shifting of units to protect the southern flanks required shortening of lines and more withdrawals along the front.<sup>12</sup>

On 11 August the Americans continued their attacks against the 2d SS Panzer Division in the MORTAIN sector. The breakthrough in the sector of HILL 307 advanced as far as the foot of HILL 317. MORTAIN was attacked from the south. Attacks were also launched in the area southwest of ST. BARTHELMY. Elements of the 2d SS Panzer Division, committed in the sector of MORTAIN, were cut off from the line to the rear as a result of these breakthroughs. The terrain features of HILL 307 and HILL 317 were decisive for holding MORTAIN, and these were now in the hands of the Americans. Seventh Army promised a limited withdrawal for the 2d SS Panzer Division for the coming night.

In front of the 10th SS Panzer Division American columns were observed moving north from BARENTON. American bombers were extremely active in this sector. It was difficult to move even individual vehicles.

When interviewed, Lieutenant General Kruger had this to say about the air activity,

I have never experienced either before or since, such a complete and intensive mastery of the air by the Americans as on this day, although I had remained constantly on the western front from this point of time.<sup>13</sup>

In spite of strong pressure, the 10th SS Panzer Division was able to hold its positions on the 11th.

In the Seventh Army's deep left flank the Americans inched ahead to a distance of 11 kms. from ALENCON. The 2d French Armored Division, which had been brought up to this sector, captured MAMERS.

At night, the Army Headquarters made the decision to order Panzer Group Eberbach to relieve the pressure on the southern flank of the Army zone. Under cover of this operation the Seventh Army was to withdraw to the eastern front.<sup>14</sup>

An order was issued to arrange for the main line of resistance in the vicinity of MORTAIN, to be occupied during the night. Its trace was as follows: HILL 293 (south of ST. CLEMENT) to southern slope of the FORET DE MORTAIN, to HILL 263 (northeast of BARENTON), to the high ground south of LONLAY L'ABBAYE, then junction with the Ninth Army near the EGRENNE River.<sup>15</sup>

It is interesting to note here that the decision to withdraw and shorten the lines had been made by Seventh Army Headquarters, but the decision to give up the idea of attacking to reach the sea at AVRANCHES still required the approval of the Fuehrer. Fortunately, the preparatory measures for the withdrawal and the reemployment of Panzer Group Eberbach coincided with orders received from higher headquarters later the night of 11 August.


The First U. S. Army held its sides of the pocket awaiting pressure from the north. The V Corps held its grip on the northern flank. The XIX Corps applied pressure by advances with the 28th and

29th Infantry Divisions; CCA of the 2d Armored Division reached VENGEONS on the road to TINCHEBRAY. In the zone of the VII Corps the 9th Infantry Division advanced slightly. The 30th Infantry Division fought forward and reentered MORTAIN, but were unable to relieve the isolated battalion. The 4th Infantry Division took over part of the 35th Infantry Division zone.<sup>16</sup>

The 1st Battalion, 320th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division, with the 737th Tank Battalion attached, drew the assignment to capture HILL 317, and to rescue the "Lost Battalion." This attack began at 1500. The tanks were in column and one company of infantry rode on them. Artillery fired a ten minute preparation and exactly at the time of the attack, planes appeared and bombed the German positions to screen the tank movement. Smoke shells fired by the artillery marked the targets. In one hour the tanks had advanced one mile. Before the day was over they had reached the foot of the hill.<sup>17</sup>

In the north CCA resumed the attack in the XIX Corps zone. Task Force "A" moved out at 0800, with Company D, 66th Armored Regiment, and Company D, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment leading, to capture HILL 338 (east of VENGEONS) and HILL 367 (east of ST. SAUVEUR DE CHAULIEU). Task Force "A" met fierce enemy resistance, including an antitank battalion, but by evening had succeeded in reaching LA HAULE. The balance of CCA remained in XIX Corps Reserve in its assembly area. (See Figure 1.)<sup>18</sup>

Near BARENTON, CCB continued to defend their positions. (See Figure 4.) German attacks were expected and all units participated in counterattack plans. All reserves were placed on a thirty minute alert,



Scale: 1/50,000  
P - 39  
Figure 4. 11 August 1944

ready to move on short notice to counter any German thrust. Vigorous patrolling was conducted to the north and northeast. CCB patrols penetrated FORET DE LAND POURIE, and pressed on toward GER, contacting the enemy in force. One of these patrols became engaged by German infantry which followed it back toward CCB's lines. At 1700 German artillery became very active with most of the fire falling on the main axis from GER to BARENTON. CCB lost some vehicles during this fire. Then, at about 1745, German infantry launched an attack down the highway from GER. The attack, supported by artillery and mortar fire, succeeded in reaching and infiltrating the position. This attack was finally repelled by CCB, assisted by a heavy barrage fired by division artillery.<sup>19</sup>

Division reserve moved to BARENTON and prepared to relieve CCB in its defensive sector during the night so that CCB could renew the attack the next day. 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, was to pass to Division reserve control at that time.

Units of the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion continued to outpost ST. GEORGES DE ROUELLE, and crossings over LA VARENNE River.

The Germans now could see that their push to AVIGNACHES could not succeed with the troops at hand. Realizing the immediate threat to his rear, the Seventh Army commander began to withdraw from his salient to mend the leaks near LE MANS. In the north, XIX Corps with CCA, 2d Armored Division leading, made a bid to smash the remaining forces in the pocket in conjunction with CCB in the south. Though the MORTAIN trap was closing, the enemy was still able to resist and made

CCA fight foot by foot for its gains. The repeated attacks by the Germans demonstrated how critically near CCB advanced to their escape corridor. The German was making his stand to hold open his withdrawal routes from MORTAIN.

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#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> Interview, General Kruger, Lieutenant General of Panzer Troops, LVIII Panzer Corps, Headquarters, U. S. Forces European Theater, Historical Division Operational History (Germany).

<sup>2</sup> Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> After Action Report, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>4</sup> S-3 Periodic Report, CCB, 2d Armored Division, 1-21 August 1944.

<sup>5</sup> Op. Cit., After Action Report, 2d Armored Division.

<sup>6</sup> Op. Cit., S-3 Periodic Report, CCB.

<sup>7</sup> After Action Report, 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>8</sup> Op. Cit., After Action Report, 2d Armored Division.

<sup>9</sup> Op. Cit., S-3 Periodic Report, CCB.

<sup>10</sup> After Action Report, CCA, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>11</sup> Op. Cit., Interview, General Kruger.

<sup>12</sup> Op. Cit., Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, p. 13.

<sup>13</sup> Op. Cit., Interview, General Kruger.

<sup>14</sup> Op. Cit., Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, p. 13.

<sup>15</sup> Op. Cit., Interview, General Kruger.

<sup>16</sup> Op. Cit., Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, p. 12, 13.

<sup>17</sup>Division History, Santa Fe, 35th Infantry Division, Chapter V.

<sup>18</sup>Op. Cit., After Action Report, CCA.

<sup>19</sup>After Action Reports, CCB, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE FORCES JOIN

As darkness fell on the night of the 11th, the leading elements of the 1st Battalion, 119th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, were in MORTAIN. The leading elements of the 320th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division and 737th Tank Battalion had reached the foot of the hill where the "Lost Battalion" was still holding out.

At this time a difficult decision had to be made -- whether to push on in the darkness with men who had been on the offensive for almost five days, or dig in for the night. The plight of the men on the hill was clear; at 2234 that night they stated their case bluntly, "We can hold out until tomorrow."<sup>1</sup>

The rescue forces dared not remain where they were for their positions in the hollow invited both ground attack and concentrated artillery fire. They pulled back to higher ground, abandoning some of the territory won during the day.

That night the enemy abandoned his positions in and around MORTAIN. The Germans covered their retreat with heavy artillery fire and night bombing of the positions from which the battalions had withdrawn. The judgement of the man on the ground had been correct. By noon of 12 August contact was made with the Americans on HILL 317. The "Lost Battalion's" struggle for existence was at an end. This symbolized the winning of the Battle of MORTAIN. The picture began to change. The main body of the German forces began its retreat back

toward the FALAISE-ARGENTAN GAP, leaving strong rear guards behind to cover the withdrawal. On 12 August attacks proved successful all along the front.

German withdrawals ordered during the night of 11-12 August were carried out according to plan. First U. S. Army attacked along the LXXXIV Corps front. 2d Armored Division continued attacking north from BARENTON against the southern flank of Seventh Army. On the deep left flank, the Third U. S. Army continued to push ahead. To eliminate this imminent danger, the Fuehrer ordered that the American forces which had thrust forward were to be attacked to clear the rear and left flank of the Seventh Army. The force provided for this mission was Panzer Group Eberbach. The completion of the mission of Panzer Group Eberbach was dependent upon the holding of the front by the Fifth Panzer Army (north) and Seventh Army (south).<sup>2</sup>

On the afternoon of 12 August, the sector of XLVII Panzer Corps was taken over by LXXXIV Corps. To the north the Americans succeeded in making a sizeable penetration in the LANDE VAUMONT region, south of VIRE. It now became apparent to the German commanders that the Americans were attempting to cut off sections of the German lines, which were pointing out far to the west, in conjunction with the large scale encirclement of Seventh Army being executed by British and American forces now closing in at ARGENTAN and FALAISE. The pressure exerted simultaneously from BARENTON northward (CCB) and from VIRE southward (CCA) could have only one objective--to cut off LXXXIV Corps, as well as XLVII Panzer Corps.

At 1200 on 12 August, Seventh Army Headquarters ordered the withdrawal of the front lines again during the coming night and they designated the general line on which to fall back.<sup>3</sup> (For further Intelligence, see Appendix III).

During 12 August the lines tightened around the German forces. In the zone of the V Corps, good progress was made against heavy enemy fire. The 2d Infantry Division came down on the left, parallel to the British-American boundary. The 29th Infantry Division went into the line and advanced on the right, alongside the 2d Infantry Division, almost to the SOURDEVAL - TINCHEBRAY road. In the zone of the XIX Corps, the 28th Infantry Division advanced rapidly south and southeast linking with the 29th Infantry Division on the left near ST. SAUVEUR DE CHAULIEU and touching SOURDEVAL on its right. In the zone of the VII Corps, the 9th and 35th Infantry Divisions reached prescribed objectives, and the isolated battalion at MORTAIN was relieved. The 3d Armored Division reassembled for a new mission, while the 1st Infantry Division continued patrolling east of the MAYENNE River. The enemy broke contact in the neighborhood of SOURDEVAL, and apparently started a withdrawal toward the ARNE and the SEINE Rivers.<sup>4</sup>

During the morning of the 12th, CCB and Division Reserve continued to hold defensive positions in their zone. Plans had been made the previous night for a renewed coordinated attack with the mission of cutting the MORTAIN - GER road. Division Reserve took over the CCB defensive sector and at 1100 the attack was launched by CCB


with 3d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry, on the left and 1st Battalion (same Regiment) on the right. Both battalions were reinforced by tanks of Lt Col Harry Hillyard's 3d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, which was in support. CCB reserve prepared to assist, on order, the attacking force in securing the final objective about two miles west of GER on the GER-MORTAIN highway. (See Figure 5.) The nature of the terrain, which was rough and wooded, made armored action almost impossible in places and extremely difficult in others.<sup>5</sup>

During the attack the right column advanced against light opposition, but the left column's advance was checked by intensive enemy fire. During this fighting enemy infantry units infiltrated around the left flank and rear of the 3d Battalion, virtually surrounding it when it moved forward to attack the first objective. The battalion was not able to advance.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, (commanded by Major William P. Ring) was moved just west of BOUSENTIER with the mission to be prepared to attack to either flank. This battalion was later ordered back to an area south of BARENTON.

At 1600, Battle Group #2, Task Force "X", 3d Armored Division, reported an enemy counterattack directed at their position. The attack was broken up by artillery fire.

As the attack continued throughout the day the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, was able to advance approximately 1000 yards. An enemy counterattack by one infantry company struck at this battalion in the vicinity of LES GOUBOUDIERES at about 1700, and was repelled



FINAL OBJ

OBJ 550

OBJ 137

AXIS OF  
RCN. Co, 67 AR  
LANDE-POURRIE

MORTAIN

BOUTTE COULE

BARENTON

Scale: 1/50000

Figure 5. 12 August 1944

P-47

by elements of the Division Reserve. An attack of company strength from elements of the 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry, in the vicinity of LE GD. BOUILLON was attempted, with the plan of moving around the left flank of this battalion. This maneuver was not successful.

3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, which had been attached to Division Reserve, was released at 1800 from attachment and returned to the 30th Infantry Division control.

The attack continued until 2200, at which time defensive positions were taken on order of the Commanding General, VII Corps. All units were alerted to be prepared to meet possible enemy counter-attacks.

During the day the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced, sent a force to seize high ground south of LONLAY L'ABBAYE. After accomplishing its mission, the force was relieved by elements of the 4th Infantry Division.

When orders were received to take up defensive positions, the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry withdrew to the high ground of its original position to relieve elements of the 137th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division, on the left.

The 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, attempted to move into position to relieve the 137th Infantry. Heavy enemy shell fire was received during the night, and the relief was never accomplished. Consequently, the 137th Infantry remained on its position until daylight of the 13th, when the relief was finally completed at 0900. Then the 2d Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, assumed responsibility for the sector.<sup>6</sup>

CCA's Task Force "A" continued its attack in XIX Corps zone and captured the crossroads on HILL 338 (east of VENGEONS). At 1330 the force was relieved on the hill by the 28th Infantry Division, and at 1500 rejoined the remainder of CCA. The 2d Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, was placed in XIX Corps reserve near LA ROCHE.

At 1600 CCA formed into three teams prepared to press on to the south. Under the command of the Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, Task Force 1/66, consisting of: Co I, 66th Armored Regiment; Co D, 41st Armored Infantry; Assault Gun and Mortar Platoons, 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment; and a platoon of Engineers and Tank Destroyers, assembled south of HILL 338 where they coiled up for the night.

The second of these teams, commanded by Major Charles E. Etter, C. O., 2d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry, Task Force 2/41, was composed of 2d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry (-), with 1st Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment (-) attached. This force assembled in VENGEONS.

The remainder of CCA, as the reserve, moved to an assembly area one mile north of GATHEMO.<sup>7</sup>

Following this action, CCB, on the 13th, remained on the defensive as ordered by VII Corps, but patrolled to its front. The rest of the front seemed to crumble on the 12th; however, the enemy still exerted pressure on CCB. At this time it was imperative for the Germans to maintain this pressure so they could keep the MORTAIN-GER highway open for the withdrawal of their forces in and around MORTAIN.

During the 13th and 14th the various units which had been attached to CCB during this operation were released from attachment and returned to their parent units. CCB was relieved, assembled for a period of intensive maintenance and reorganization, and then reverted to XIX Corps control.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, on the 12th, CCA with Task Force 1/66 leading, continued its attack south down the VENGEONS - SOURDEVAL road, bypassed SOURDEVAL and by 1100 had reached CROSSROADS 209, one mile southeast of SOURDEVAL. Task Force 2/41, which had been following, moved up and guarded the crossroads.

3d Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, moved to a new assembly area one mile east of GATHEMO during the night 12-13 August where 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, was attached. At 0830 this force moved down the route taken by Task Force 1/66 and, at 1500, passed through to take up the attack. The 3d Battalion, reinforced, pressed steadily south through ROCHE FICHET, ST. CLEMENT and cut the MORTAIN - GER highway near LES HAIES MARTINET where they briefly halted before resuming the attack east on the highway at 1900. The attack to the east succeeded in reaching BUTTE DUCIOS where Task Force 1/66 joined the 3d Battalion, and both assembled for the night.

On the 14th, CCA pushed on through GER, where it turned southeast and finally reached LONLAY L'ABBAYE at 2000. The final objective for CCA was HILL 329, north of DOMFRONT, which was reached at 1000, 15 August. At this point, contact was made with the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion, and the envelopment was completed.

During this period, the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion was to seize DOMFRONT and contact CCA, attacking from the north. They took their objective at 1600, 14 August, and contacted CCA on 15 August. Here CCA was relieved by the 28th Infantry Division and rejoined the 2d Armored Division near BARENTON on 16 August.<sup>9</sup> The 30th Infantry Division relieved the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion.

Thus, with this link-up of CCA driving from the north and left flank of the VII Corps, and CCB driving from the south and right flank of the Corps, the encirclement closed on remnants of the German Seventh Army which were unable to escape back through the FALAISE - ARGENTAN GAP. (See Figure 1.)

Here in a week long struggle, the 2d Armored Division not only helped to smash the enemy's drive toward AVRANCHES, but by maintaining constant pressure played a vital role in the near annihilation of the German Seventh Army as they fled east. In its attack and later defense of the wooded hills north of BARENTON, CCB repelled numerous local counterattacks with great loss to the enemy. A heavy toll of enemy troops and equipment were taken. By clinging tenaciously to the high ground north of BARENTON, the 2d Armored Division (less CCA) held the ground which dominated MORTAIN. In the end this broke the German's back.

For the Germans, it was a costly battle. Time was as important to the Germans as their immediate losses. In taking the desperate gamble of an attack toward AVRANCHES, they sent some of their best units even deeper into the NORMANDY trap. The enemy men and machines

which escaped intact from the battlefields around MORTAIN still had to run the gauntlet of artillery fire and bombs near FALAISE. As a result of the battle, they reached the escape gap days later than they would have otherwise. By then the fires had thickened and the route of withdrawal had become a narrow one.

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#### NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup>Robert L. Hewitt, Work Horse of the Western Front, The Story of the 30th Infantry Division (Washington: Infantry Journal Press).

<sup>2</sup>Report of Operations, First U. S. Army, 1 August 1944 to 22 February 1945, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup>Interview, General Kruger, Lieutenant General of Panzer Troops, LVIII Panzer Corps, Headquarters, U. S. Forces European Theater, Historical Division Operational History (Germany).

<sup>4</sup>Op. Cit., Report of Operations, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>After Action Report, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>6</sup>S-3 Periodic Report, CCB, 2d Armored Division, 1 to 31 August 1944.

<sup>7</sup>After Action Report, CCA, 2d Armored Division, 1 to 31 August 1944.

<sup>8</sup>Op. Cit., After Action Report, 2d Armored Division.

<sup>9</sup>Op. Cit., After Action Report, CCA.

## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Any examination into the facts of MORTAIN inevitably leads to speculation on the proper use of available forces. The question whether the 2d Armored Division was employed to the maximum advantage remains one of the imponderables of war. Were the inherent characteristics of armor--mobility, flexibility, fire power and shock action--effectively utilized? Was the principle of mass properly observed? Did the 2d Armored Division, in fact, accomplish the maneuver indicated by the title of this study? Let us examine the facts.

A brief review of First Army dispositions on 6 August reveals that one of its weakest zones lay to the south of MORTAIN; a vulnerable gap existed between the southernmost elements at BARENTON (3d Battalion, 120th Infantry), and the north flank of the advancing Third Army. As related in Chapter I, Seventh Army had contemplated an attack in that area, but discarded the plan in favor of the more direct route through MORTAIN. The 2d Armored Division, by its lightning move from ST. SEVER CALVADOS to BARENTON, on 7 August, plugged that gap. It is doubtful that any other First Army force of comparable strength then available in the area possessed sufficient mobility to have performed this mission at that crucial time. A review of other available forces capable of mobile armored intervention reveals that they did exist in Third Army; their employment, however, would have proportionately weakened that Army's thrust to close the FALAISE-ARGENTAN pocket. This feature of mobility, so well exemplified by the 2d Armored Division, is one of the outstanding characteristics of armor.

Those who abhor the thought of an armored combat command subordinated to an infantry division can doubtless rise to purple passion over CCA's attachment to the 28th Infantry Division during most of the action recounted in Chapter V. However, the facts show that, concurrently, the 3d Battalion, 120th Infantry, 30th Infantry Division, was attached to the 2d Armored Division's CCB. And on 13 August, the 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, 28th Infantry Division, was attached to CCA for the dash to cut the GER-MORTAIN road. Some allowance must be made for the exigencies of the situation. These attachments, and the division's logistical support of all its units, including CCA, throughout the operation, are superlative testimonials to the inherent flexibility of the 2d Armored Division.

What of fire power? What of shock action? One of the critical terrain features of the area is the dominating ridge north of BARENTON, shown on Figure I as FORET DE LANDE-POURRIE (see also Figure 5). The attacks on this ridge, as narrated in Chapters IV and VI, denied the Germans their heretofore relatively free use of the GER-MORTAIN highway. This, in turn, was a cogent factor in forcing the German withdrawal toward GER. The gutted tanks and the dead and dying Nordies of Hitler's elite 10th SS Panzer Division left on the hillside that sultry afternoon of 9 August were mute, but eloquent tributes to the fire power and shock action of General Brook's armor.

Some may contend that the separation of CCA from the rest of the division was an alarming deviation from the principle of mass. What do the facts show?

The 2d Armored Division, less CCA, by applying armored pressure

to the German left flank, might be said to have produced two distinct effects on Seventh Army tactics. It dissipated the thrust of the 10th SS Panzer Division, thus divorcing that division from its intended mission of driving to AVRANCHES. Also, by attacking the dominating terrain overlooking the GER-MORTAIN highway, it aided in rendering untenable the entire German position. Meanwhile, CCA, on the north, constituted an ever present armored menace to the vulnerable German right flank. It is of interest to note that little substantial progress was made by those elements of First Army on the north during the period 6-9 August. On 10-12 August, as related in Chapters V and VI, CCA, in conjunction with infantry of the 28th Infantry Division, swept forward nearly five miles.

There are vigorous proponents of the principle of mass who will aver that the 2d Armored Division could have been more profitably employed as a unit. This thesis must be supported by the substitution of an equal or superior force for CCA on the north or for the rest of the division on the south. It is doubtful that such force was readily available. One cannot reasonably overlook another salient factor. The 2d Armored Division, as organized at MORTAIN, was somewhat stronger in fire power than is the present armored division. Thus, it possibly lent itself better to divided employment.

The advance of CCA toward the GER-MORTAIN road, which it cut on 13 August, and the link-up with the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion on 15 August, bring us to a consideration of the type maneuver involved. As indicated by the title, the action of the 2d Armored Division at MORTAIN may be characterized as a double envelopment. Field Manual

100-5 describes such an offensive in terms of three forces, two enveloping and one directed against the enemy front. The enveloping attacks are directed against the flank or rear of the enemy's main force and toward an objective in the rear of his front line. CCA, in conjunction with other forces, attacked the German north flank. The division, less CCA, drove against the German left. Simultaneous pressure of enormous armored potential was thus brought to bear on both flanks of the penetration while other forces blunted its nose. The armored division's objectives were GER and the highway to MORTAIN. Concurrently, on a wider perimeter, the Canadian First Army and the Third U. S. Army were executing a similar maneuver at PALAISE-ARGENTAN.

The action at MORTAIN may be divided into three parts, each symbolized by a distinctive event. The German's initial blow, as related in Chapter II, constitutes part one. It is difficult to fix specifically the time and place of part two, the turning of the tide, but it is clearly reflected in the quiet, determined response of Lieutenant Kerly to the German surrender ultimatum of 9 August. The infantry's tenacious stand on HILL 317 demonstrated the German's inability to sustain his forward drive. Part three, of course, is the finale, the Hun's defeat. If any one event can be said to symbolize the utter rout of the German at MORTAIN, it is the meeting of CCA and the 82d Reconnaissance Battalion east of GER on 15 August. The threat was over, the battle won. The gloomy days were past. The future brightened. The bludgeoned German fled back to lick his wounds. Four months elapsed before the menacing Panzer struck again in force, this

time at ARDENNES, on 16 December 1944.


To the men in the tanks of the 2d Armored Division, the battle's end brought brief resp ite. There were bloody days and bitter nights ahead. The manner in which the division continued to distinguish itself is eloquently expressed in the richly deserved sobriquet "HELL ON WHEELS."

APPENDIX I


ORDER OF BATTLE <sup>1</sup>

I. UNITED STATES FORCES (6-12 August 1944)


(6 August 1944)



(7-9 August 1944)




(10-11 August 1944)




II. GERMAN FORCES (6-12 August)


(6-8 August 1944)



(9-12 August 1944)



### III. ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES DIVISIONS




#### Discussion



The information shown above was compiled from best available sources. An official organization chart of the 2d Armored Division for 1944 was not available.

The 2d Armored Division's principal deviation from the standard organization authorized at the time occurred in the armored regiments. In each of these regiments the light tank battalion was broken up and one light tank company was assigned to each of the two medium tank battalions. At the same time one medium tank company

from each medium battalion was assigned to the light battalion. This produced three battalions of equal strength -- two medium tank companies and one light tank company each.



IV. ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN DIVISIONS



### Discussion

It will be noted that the SS Panzer Division had a personnel strength 4,370 greater than the Panzer Division. The SS Panzer Division had the same unit organization as the Panzer Division, but its units were heavier in both personnel and principal combat vehicles. The following table shows a comparison of personnel and tanks in the primary combat units of the two divisions:

UNIT	PERSONNEL	Pz Kw III	Pz Kw IV	Pz Kw V	Pz Kw VI
SS Tk Regt	3,500	15	18	88	88
Tk Regt, Pz Div	3,000	52	28	28	28
SS Pz Gren Regt	3,600				
Pz Gren Regt, Pz Div	2,200				
SS Arty Regt	3,400				
Arty Regt, Pz Div	2,800				

This comparison shows that the SS Panzer Division was considerably stronger in tanks, particularly in medium (Pz Kw V) and heavy (Pz Kw VI) types, than the Panzer Division. In medium and heavy tanks, the SS Panzer Division approximately equalled the medium tank strength of the American Armored Division. The light tank (Pz Kw III and Pz Kw IV) strength of the SS Panzer Division, however, was only approximately one third the light tank strength of the American Armored Division. The Panzer Division had a total tank strength approximating one half the total tanks in the American Armored Division, although twenty-eight of the tanks in the German division were heavy (Pz Kw VI), for which the

American division had no comparable vehicle.

The organization of the German Infantry Division compared closely to that of the American Infantry Division (Section III, supra), however, the aggregate strength of the German division was approximately 2,000 greater.

For detailed study of the characteristics of German combat vehicles see Appendix V, Statistical and Logistical Summary.

## V. GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS

Army Corps (Infantry Corps) - A headquarters designed to control a group of divisions in which infantry divisions predominated.

Battle Group - Battle groups were irregular units of a temporary nature. They varied from less than company to division strength and rarely remained independent for longer than a month. As a rule they were known by the name of their commander. Formerly, they were created for special missions. Later (and during the counterattack against Avranches) they were usually the result of emergency measures and owed their existence more to chance than to planning.

Grenadier - An honorary name, bestowed upon the infantry soldier by Hitler in 1942. It is the automatic nomenclature for infantry companies, battalions, and regiments.

Lehr - Prefix of demonstration units. These were originally designed only as demonstration units for training purposes, but some were also used in the field. (The Panzer Lehr Division, a demonstration division, was used as a combat division on the western front in 1944).

OKH - This is the abbreviation for "Oberkommando des Heeres", which denotes the Army High Command.

OKW - This is the abbreviation for "Oberkommando der Wehrmacht", which denotes the Armed Forces High Command. This is the centralized command of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Panzer - Prefix denoting an armored unit.

Panzer Corps - A headquarters designed to control a group of divisions in which panzer divisions usually predominated.

Panzer Grenadier - Armored infantry.

SS - The 'Schutzstaffeln', or Party Elite Corps. Originally formed to furnish protection for political meetings and bodyguards for party leaders, it was expanded to include police, military formations, guard units for concentration camps, and occupation units. Persons in SS units were selected and they did not swear an oath to the 'Fatherland', but to Hitler, himself, who was the supreme commander of all SS formations. The military branch was the 'Waffen-SS' (Armed-SS).

## VI. HISTORY OF THE SECOND ARMORED DIVISION.

The 2d ARMORED DIVISION was activated on 15 July 1940, with Brigadier General Charles L. Scott commanding. The Division's tank elements were formed from the original American Tank Corps of World War I. The 66th Armored Regiment was a direct outgrowth of units first formed in 1917 when an American Tank Corps was organized for the AEF in FRANCE. Consolidation of the existing tank corps after World War I produced the 1st Tank Group in 1921. In 1929 this tank group was reorganized into the 1st and 2d Tank Regiments. Later, these two regiments were reorganized again as the 66th Infantry (light tanks) and the 67th Infantry (medium tanks). The 66th became part of a provisional tank brigade formed in 1939, and when the 2d Armored Brigade was organized as part of the 2d Armored Division, the Regiment was redesignated the 66th Armored Regiment (Light), and assigned to the division. Further changes in 1942 produced the final form of the Regiment.

The 67th Armored Regiment was a direct descendent of the 301st Heavy Tank Battalion that led the 27th Division in its SOMME attack during World War I.

The third armored reg't was the 68th (Light), which was part of the original tank brigade of the Division. It was reorganized in 1942.

The infantry component of the Division was the 41st Infantry Regiment, also a World War I unit. The Regiment was reactivated in

July 1940, and it became the 41st Infantry Regiment (Armored) of the 2d Armored Division.

The artillery of the Division was formed from the 14th Artillery Regiment, which served in training troops at The Artillery School, FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA, during World War I. It was reactivated and became part of the 2d Armored Division in July 1940 as the 14th Field Artillery Regiment, and the 78th Field Artillery Battalion.

Other elements of the Division were activated at FORT BENNING, GEORGIA, from existing regular army units. The 7th Cavalry Brigade furnished the initial cadre for the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, later designated as the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion.

The original 2d Armored Division was built around the 2d Armored Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General George S. Patton, Jr. The remainder of the Division formed a flexible support and supply echelon. In September 1940, General Patton assumed command of the Division.

In 1941 the Division participated in the Field Maneuvers of the First, Second, and Third Armies.

Following these maneuvers, the 14th Field Artillery Regiment was inactivated and the Division Artillery, consisting of Division Artillery Headquarters and three Artillery Battalions, was organized in its place. The three battalions were the 14th, 78th, and 92d. Tactical sub-headquarters, Combat Command A, and Combat Command B were created from division personnel. A Division Trains Headquarters

Company was also added. The supporting specialist units were also redesignated and remodeled.

The Division participated in maneuvers again in 1942. Upon completion of the maneuvers, the Division moved to FORT BRAGG, NORTH CAROLINA, where it took part in amphibious training in CHESAPEAKE BAY.

In the Fall of 1942 three landing teams from the Division were part of the Allied Force that landed in NORTH AFRICA. The Division did not participate in the TUNISIAN Campaign, but was given the tactical mission of guarding the FRENCH-SPANISH MOROCCO frontier. During this campaign the Division was commanded by General Ernest N. Harmon. In May 1943 General Gaffey became the Division Commander.

During the Sicilian Campaign, elements of the Division left Africa from ARZEW, ALGERIA, and ORAN, and went ashore in SICILY at GELA. Here the Division took part in the rapid drive across the Island, its primary mission being the capture of the City of PALERMO.

The Division moved to ENGLAND in November 1943. In March 1944 General Edward H. Brooks assumed command and the Division participated in invasion preparations during the Spring of 1944.

The Division landed in FRANCE during the period 9-12 June 1944. Combat Command A, committed with the 101st Airborne Division in the CARENTAN area became the first elements of the division to fight on the soil of FRANCE. The Division continued operations in this sector of NORMANDY until 17 July. It was assigned VII Corps for the attack to break the ST LO-VIRE river line. The division continued to

attack successfully in the area of PERCY-TESSY-VILLEBAUDON, and VIRE until the time of the German counterattack against AVRANCHES during the night 6-7 August 1944.

#### NOTES FOR APPENDIX I

1

The data for Appendix I was compiled from the following sources:

Military Intelligence Division, Order of Battle of The German Army (Washington: War Department, March 1945)

Staff Officers Field Manual, Enemy Forces Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, FM-E 101-10 (Washington: Government Printing Office, October 1942)

Staff Officers Field Manual, Organization, Technical and Logistical Data, FM 101-10 (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1941)

The Counterattack Against Avranches, an after action interview with Brigadier General von Gersdorff, Chief of Staff, German Seventh Army, accomplished at St. Germain, November 1945. Document A-921, Trans. (Washington: Special Staff, Historical Division: The Adjutant Generals Office)

History of the Second U. S. Armored Division.

## APPENDIX II

### TERRAIN ANALYSIS

The layer tinted map accompanying this appendix will serve to orient the reader on the area's topography. It will be noted that the area is generally rolling. With the exception of typical Normandy hedgerows, there is little dense forestation and foliage. Cross country movement was slow and hazardous due to the hedgerows.

The German reaction to the terrain is described in Appendix III.

The hill mass approximately 3500 metres north northwest of BARENTON dominated the GER-MORTAIN highway. 2d Armored Division's attacks against this hill are described in Chapters IV and VI. Note the abrupt south slope and the saddle.

Hill 317 ( shown as hill 314 on some maps ), immediately east of MORTAIN, was held by the cut-off battalion of the 30th Infantry Division.

ST SEVER  
CALVAOS

VIRE

TINCHEBRAY

ST POIS

SOURDEVAL

REFFUVEILLE

JUVIGNY LE THEATRE

GER

MORTAIN

BARENTON

ST GEORGES  
DE ROUELLE

LEGEND:

over 300 metres
250-300 metres
200-250 metres
150-200 metres
100-150 metres
under 100 metres

BUAIS

LE TEILLEUL

PASSIS

LANDIVY

Com # 6

## APPENDIX III

### GERMAN OPERATIONS

#### The American Concept of the Operations

As the enemy saw the American First Army gather momentum to the southward out of ST. LO and finally break out at AVRANCHES, his reaction was swift. Pinned to the ground by Hitler's orders and by the Allied Air attacks, the Germans massed all available armor to counterattack the narrow strip which the American forces were pouring through. His attack began on the 7th of August.

Generals Eisenhower and Bradley were aware of the German counterattack preparations. As General Eisenhower relates in his "Crusade in Europe":

Bradley and I, aware that the German counterattack was under preparation, carefully surveyed the situation. We had sufficient strength in the immediate area so that if we choose merely to stand on the defensive against the German attack, he could not possibly gain an inch. However, to make absolutely certain of our defense at MORTAIN, we would have to determine the number of divisions we could have in the enemy rear and to sacrifice our opportunity to achieve the complete destruction for which we had hoped. Moreover, by this time the weather had taken a definite turn for the better, and we had in our possession an air transport service that could deliver if called upon, up to 2000 tons of supply per day in fields designated by any of our forces that might be temporarily cut off.

When Bradley was assured of this support he determined to retain only minimum forces at MORTAIN and to rush the others to the south and east to begin envelopment of the German spearheads.<sup>1</sup>

This concept and plan demonstrates the confidence that the American commanders had in their ability to hold the counterattack while enveloping from the south and east. Even had the counterattack

reached AVRANCHES and the sea it was felt that this success would only be temporary.

### German Employment of 7th Army in the Counterattack Against AVRANCHES

#### Background and initial preparations

On the 27th of July, Seventh Army had made the decision to counterattack the breakthrough from the area of COUTANCES to the south-east, employing his withdrawn and reorganized tank formations while defending on the right. Due to constant pressure by ground forces and Allied air, he was unable to do so.

By 30 July the American breakthrough to AVRANCHES was nearly accomplished. Seventh Army committed a few weak elements against the eastern flank of the breakthrough and for the frontal defense. These measures produced no effect principally because Allied air activity had interrupted communications and made troop movement during the day impossible. However, if successful, the most these measures could hope to accomplish would have been to delay the breakthrough. Seventh Army at this time had no reserves for carrying out successful countermeasures. 2d Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, and 2d SS Panzer Division had all suffered heavy losses and were already tied up so that only small parts of them could be committed for a counterattack without being assembled and reorganized. The 116th Panzer Division had been brought up to XLVII Panzer Corps about 28 July and was committed immediately in the area of PERCY to reinforce the defense of that sector. On 31 July the 116th Panzer Division was ordered to the area of VILLEDIEU, but only a small battle group could reach the

ordered position. This group was encircled and had to fight its way back to the bulk of the division assembled in the area southwest of FORET DE ST. SEVER. On 31 July it was obvious to all commanding staffs in the West that the only way the situation could be changed would be to recapture AVRANCHES, block the American breakthrough, and repulse all further breakthrough attempts.<sup>2</sup>

The initial plan for the counterattack against AVRANCHES was based on an order of Fieldmarshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group B. This order, received by Seventh Army on 30 July 1944, read as follows:

The decision of the Seventh Army of 27 July, to breakthrough from the area of COUTANCES to the southeast, is wrong, because the contact with the west coast of the COTENTIN peninsula will be lost and the thus caused gap in the front will give the enemy the possibility to breakthrough to the south. Therefore, all efforts are to be made to revoke this decision. For this purpose all available forces must be committed. The keypoint AVRANCHES and VILLEDIEU are to be held, and if the enemy seizes them, they are to be recaptured.<sup>3</sup>

On 1 August, OKW sent Fieldmarshal von Kluge an order that read approximately as follows:

Under no circumstances is the enemy to be allowed to gain freedom of action "in the open." OB West will get ready immediately with all available panzer units, for a large scale counterattack, in order to push past AVRANCHES to the coast, cut off the enemy, and destroy the forces that have already broken through. All available panzer units, regardless of their present commitment, are to be taken from the other parts of the NORMANDY front, joined together under one specially qualified panzer operations staff, and sent into a concentrated attack as soon as possible. The outcome of the whole campaign in FRANCE depends on the success of this attack.<sup>4</sup>

For the counterattack, an attacking force consisting of armored units from I and II SS Panzer Corps (5th Panzer Army) and the armored

units already committed to the defense were ordered to assemble under XLVII Panzer Corps in the SOURDEVAL-MORTAIN area.

An estimate of the situation extracted from Fieldmarshal von Kluge's diary for the 4th of August indicates the assembly area and the direction of attack for his original plan:

The American is trying to exploit his penetration at AVRANCHES by pushing southwardly with massed forces and isolate BRETAGNE. It is presently apparent the mission of the enemy units moving east and southeast to secure their east flank.

After repulsing the breakthrough of the English at the left flank of Panzer Group West, a commitment of considerable enemy forces in conjunction with English Army Group for operational purposes in an easterly direction is no longer considered an immediate possibility.

Army intends to attack from the area ST. MICHEL DE MONTJOIE-SOURDEVAL-BARENTON-DOMFRONT in a general direction toward AVRANCHES along the line south bank of ALLIEN-HILLS north and northwest VIRE-ST. MARTIN-CHAMPS DU BOULT-ST. POIS, employing his withdrawn and reorganized tank formations, while defending the right flank.

The first mission is to cut off the enemy units which penetrated to the south from their rear communications and to re-establish our communications with the coast.<sup>5</sup>

The first step in the preparation for the counterattack was the relief, by the 84th Infantry Division, of the defensive sector of XLVII Panzer Corps (2d Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division, and 2d SS Panzer Division). These divisions plus 9th SS Panzer Division and 10th SS Panzer Division (II Panzer Corps) were to compose the attacking force under XLVII Panzer Corps. An Allied attack in the north prevented disengagement of the divisions of II Panzer Corps. American penetration of the left flank of the 84th Infantry Division north of the SEE River sector required that the 116th Panzer Division, which had already assembled in the area of GATHEMO, be again committed in this

sector.

This reduced the strength of the main effort for the first time. A second reduction came when it was determined that the situation on the defensive front of LXXXIV Army Corps would not permit the disengagement of the Panzer Lehr Division. Further reduction occurred when it was learned that the situation in II SS Panzer Corps sector would not allow the disengagement of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions. The 1st SS Panzer Division, now committed at CAEN, was the only unit of 5th Panzer Army that could be disengaged and this disengagement started on 3-4 August, but the movement was delayed and the division could not be expected to complete assembly before 6 August.

On 1 August LXXXI Army Corps, consisting of the 9th Panzer Division and the 708th Infantry Division, was attached to Seventh Army and was committed on the left flank in the area of LE MANS to protect the Army on that flank. The attachment of LXXXI Army Corps completed the Seventh Army organization for the counterattack, which was to begin as soon as the units could be assembled. The disposition of the corps within the Army placed LXXXI Army Corps on the left to defend to the south and southwest in the general area of LE MANS. LXXXIV Army Corps, on the right of LXXXI Army Corps, defended to the west on a line just east of, and generally centered on MORTAIN. II Parachute Corps defended on the right of LXXXIV Army Corps with II SS Panzer Corps, 5th Panzer Army, on its right in the vicinity of the juncture between VIII British Corps and V U. S. Corps. The XLVII

Panzer Corps was the principal attacking force and attempted to assemble its units in the SOURDEVAL-MORTAIN area.

Despite the fact that 1st SS Panzer Division could not completely assemble, Army decided that the attack would begin at 062400 August. The decision to attack at night was dictated by Allied air activity. In the original plan 9th Panzer Division, now attached to LXXXI Army Corps, was to have participated in the attack in the BARENTON-ST. HILAIRE area, but because it was committed to the defense in the area from BARENTON-LE MANS-MAYENNE, it too could not be assembled in time for the attack.

The final overall operation plan differed greatly from the plan as originally conceived by Fieldmarshal von Kluge. The final plan called for an attack between LA SEE River and LA SELUNE River to AVRANCHES to reach the west coast of the COTENTIN peninsula, and cut off the rear communications of the American forces which had broken through. Consideration was given to an attack to the southeast, south of LA SELUNE River, then veer northeast against AVRANCHES, but fear that the attack would stop at ST. HILAIRE and the additional time needed to carry out this plan caused it to be discarded.

The plan was to push a wedge through JUVIGNY to AVRANCHES with the main effort in the center. The 2d Panzer Division was to attack in the center and to push forward between the SEE sector and the road ST. BARTHELMY-JUVIGNY to the west and to thrust past ST. BARTHELMY and open the road from JUVIGNY LA TERTRE to AVRANCHES. The

1st SS Panzer Division was also to be committed here as soon as it completed assembling.

The 116th Panzer Division, already committed north of the SEE sector on defense, was to participate in the attack and to be echeloned in depth and to the right. Its mission was threefold: First, to protect the right flank of the attacking forces; second, to contain the enemy forces north of the SEE; and third, to maintain contact with the defensive front of LXXXIV Army Corps.

The 2d SS Panzer Division was to carry out a pincer movement against MORTAIN. The division then was to accompany the attack of the main effort echeloned in depth and to the left. Elements of the Panzer Lehr Division were attached for reconnaissance on the south flank.

LXXXI Army Corps, with 9th Panzer Division and 708th Infantry Division, was to protect the deep left flank of the Army in the MAYENNE-VARENNE area and prevent American armored forces from penetrating into the area of ALENCON.<sup>6</sup>

The primary reasons for the decision of Army to start the counterattack against AVRANCHES from south of the SEE sector was because it was felt that the enemy would be weaker in this area and the evaluation of the terrain was favorable for this attack.

The SEE sector was a tank obstacle and afforded natural cover for the north flank of the counterattack. The terrain was the hedge-row type terrain of NORMANDY and offered small possibility for the deployment of troops. South of the SEE sector were some hills which offered better observation for artillery and heavy weapons, in the

direction of the offensive as well as to the north. Moreover the main roads JUVIGNY LA TERTRE-AVRANCHES and MONT GOTHIER-AVRANCHES were favorable for the attack and for supply. In the south, the SELUNE sector was a natural obstacle for the flank and a guide for the attacking troops.

The weak points of the operation were the precipitous preparations, the condition of the attacking troops, and the difficulty of assembling for the attack.

Except for the relatively fresh 116th Panzer Division, all the other divisions had suffered heavy losses during previous combat: The 2d Panzer Division and 2d SS Panzer Division had 50-60 percent of their full strength. One panzer grenadier regiment and one tank battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Division had only 50 percent of their strength. The Divisions had the following number of tanks at the start of the attack:

<u>116th Panzer Division</u> . . . . .	20-25 tanks.
<u>2d Panzer Division</u> . . . . .	60-80 tanks.
<u>2d SS Panzer Division</u> . . . . .	20-25 tanks.
Total	100-130 tanks.

The expected elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division, the announced 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions and the fresh tank battalion (type Panther) of 9th Panzer Division seemed to be sufficient to replace all of the tanks out of action.

The assembling for the attack had to be carried out under continuous fighting. The 116th Panzer Division was already engaged

at FERRIERS. Its northern flank was endangered by the critical situation in the sector of the LXXXIV Army Corps. The 2d Panzer Division and the 2d SS Panzer Division were in close contact with the enemy in their assembly areas at CHERENCE, ST. BARTHELMY, and east of MORTAIN.

Supply for the operation presented no difficulties, because the supply of the Army in the area of ALENCON was well equipped and favorably situated. The shortage of some special types of ammunition was due more to production difficulties than to the inability to bring up supply, although the bringing up of supplies was influenced by enemy air activity and was limited to the hours of darkness.

#### First Phase (6-8 August)

The attack by XLVII Panzer Corps began at 2400 the night of 6-7 August. The attack against ST. BARTHELMY did not start until the early morning of 7 August because the units of the 1st SS Panzer Division that were attached to the 2d Panzer Division's left group did not arrive in time. The attack in this area progressed well, however, and by daylight the right group of the 2d Panzer Division reached LE MESNIL ADELEE and the left group moved past ST. BARTHELMY to a point  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of JUVIGNY-LA TERTRE. Further movement during the day was prevented primarily by the Allied air superiority.

The attack of the 116th Panzer Division had no effect because a strong American attack on 7 August penetrated the sector of the 84th Infantry Division, and it was necessary to commit the reserves of the 116th Panzer Division in this sector.

The 2d SS Panzer Division seized MORTAIN on 7 August and advanced to the hills west of the village. The occupied terrain could never be cleaned out. Enemy groups remained in MORTAIN and in the area east of the village. These groups caused small battles during the days that followed, and seriously weakened the fighting strength of the 2d SS Panzer Division.

During the day of 7 August no decisive changes were made in the defensive line of II Parachute Corps and LXXXI Army Corps. The situation in the area of LXXXI Army Corps was critical. American attacks had seized BARENTON on the right of the corps, and were approaching LE MANS on the left.

The entire 1st SS Panzer Division arrived during the day of 7 August and was immediately committed in the center of XLVII Panzer Corps to continue the main effort. LXXXI Army Corps was ordered to commit the 9th Panzer Division in an attack from the area of BARENTON toward ST. HILAIRE.

The air situation in the forenoon of 7 August stopped the whole counterattack. Not one German plane appeared over the area. Numerous tanks were knocked out by rocket bombs of the Allied airplanes. Movement in the combat area was impossible.

The enemy took counter measures during the day, starting strong counterattacks against the spearheads of the 2d Panzer Division, bringing strong reverses from north of the SEE sector.

The 10th SS Panzer Division was, on 7 August, being disengaged from the area west of VIRE (II SS Panzer Corps), and was moving to

reinforce the attacking troops. The staff of LVIII Panzer Corps, 8th Mortar Brigade and one tank battalion (Panther) of the 9th Panther Division were also ordered to reinforce the attack. All these forces could not arrive before 8 August, so the attack was discontinued during the night of 7-8 August. The occupied terrain was to be defended. The defense was continued during the day of 8 August.

#### Second Phase (9-10 August)

The attack had been discontinued during the night of 7-8 August and it was the intention of the Army Group commander to attack again on 10 August after assembling the arriving forces. On 9 August, General of the Armored Forces Eberbach, was appointed commander of the attacking forces. The newly arrived 10th SS Panzer Division was committed on the left beside the 2d SS Panzer Division, and these two divisions were attached to LVIII Panzer Corps. LVIII Panzer Corps, on the left, and XLVII Panzer Corps, on the right, were attached to "Panzer Group Eberbach", which now became the principal attacking force. 116th Panzer Division, 2d Panzer Division, and 1st SS Panzer Division remained under XLVII Panzer Corps. The main effort was to remain at the left of XLVII Panzer Corps in the direction of JUVIGNY LA TERTRE.

During the period 9-10 August the Panzer Group Eberbach had to be committed to defend its sector instead of attacking. The 116th Panzer Division was defending to the north and to the west in the area of GATHEMO. 2d Panzer Division was driven back and was now fighting in the area of MORTAIN, and was being threatened on the south (left) flank by an enemy thrust at BARENTON, where the 10th SS Panzer Division

was being committed. The 10th SS Panzer Division had to fight even before reaching its assigned position. Parts of the 1st SS Panzer Division had to be committed on the defensive front of LXXXIV Army Corps.

The situation in LXXXI Army Corps was becoming continually worse. The 708th Infantry Division was nearly destroyed. The 9th Panzer Division was now fighting against superior forces in the area of ALENCON.

The attack was not continued during this period.

#### Third Phase (11-12 August)

By 11 August the situation made any counterattack against AVRANCHES impossible. The 9th Panzer Division was now almost entirely destroyed in the area of ALENCON. This situation left the Army rear and its access to the supply area open to enemy attack. Hitler now authorized the use of Panzer Group Eberbach to reestablish the situation at ALENCON. When this had been accomplished, it was to reassemble and continue the attack against AVRANCHES. Since this order made it also necessary to defend the SOURDEVAL-MORTAIN assembly area, only part of Panzer Group Eberbach could be used at ALENCON.

Enemy pressure against the defensive front made it necessary for the front line of LXXXIV Army Corps to be withdrawn during the night 11-12 August to the line; LA LANDE VAUMONT-HILL 338- west of SOURDEVAL. Panzer Group Eberbach was to fall back to the line; river crossing approximately 1 mile south SOURDEVAL-HILL 314- LA GRANDE ROCHE-hills north of FORET DE MORTAIN. This allowed the disengagement

of 116th Panzer Division, 2d Panzer Division, and 1st SS Panzer Division during the night 11-12 August. These divisions were to be committed at ALENCON under XLVII Panzer Corps. During the night 12-13 August the 2d SS Panzer Division was also disengaged and attached to the force committed at ALENCON. No further attempt was made to carry out the plan to reach AVRANCHES, because Seventh Army was forced to continue withdrawing units for commitment to prevent encirclement.<sup>8</sup>

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NOTES FOR APPENDIX III

<sup>1</sup>General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1948) p. 275.

<sup>2</sup>The Counterattack Against Avranches, an after action interview with Brigadier General Gersdorff, Chief of Staff, German Seventh Army, accomplished at St. Germain, November 1945. Document A-921, Trans. (Washington: Special Staff, Historical Division: The Adjutant General's Office)(Cited hereafter as Gersdorff), p. 2-5.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>OB West (Atlantic Wall to Sigfried Line) A Study in Command. Historical Divison, D of A Special Staff, Ger. Rpt. Series, Volume I, II, III (EUCOM: HD: OHGB: File-DA)(Cited hereafter as OB West), p. 131.

<sup>5</sup>Report of Operations, First U. S. Army; 1st August 1944--- 22 February 1945, p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Op. Cit., Gersdorff, p. 13-23.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 10-11.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 24-41.

APPENDIX IV

UNITED STATES AND GERMAN PERSONALITIES

UNITED STATES <sup>1</sup>

Major General Edward H. Brooks Comdg. Gen., 2d Armored Division.  
D.S.C., D.S.M., (O.L.C.), L.M. (O.L.C.), S.S.(O.L.C.), B.S.M.  
General Brooks was born in New Hampshire 25 April 93, received Bachelor of Science degree in Civil Engineering from Norwich University, Vermont in 1916. He served on the G.S.C. from July 39 to September 41, and attended the following Army Schools: Graduate of the Army War College in 1937, General Staff School in 1934, Field Artillery Battery Officers Course in 1922. Was promoted to Major General, AUS, August 42.

Major General Isaac D. White Comdg. Gen., CCB, 2d Armored Division.  
D.S.M., L.M. (2 O.L.C.), S.S. (O.L.C.), B.S.M. (O.L.C.).  
General White was born in New Hampshire March 01, received Bachelor of Science degree from Norwich University, Vermont, in 1922. He is a graduate of the following Army Schools: Command and General Staff School, 39, Cavalry School Troop Officers Course, 28. Received promotion to Major General, AUS, March 45.

Brigadier General John H. Collier Comdg CCA, 2d Armored Division.  
D.S.M., L.M., S.S. (2 O.L.C.), B.S.M. (O.L.C.).  
General Collier was born in Texas September 98, received Bachelor of Science degree from The Military Academy in 1918. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School 1941, Cavalry School Basic Course 1920, Regular Course 1937, Advanced Equitation Course 1938. Received promotion to Brigadier General, AUS, November 44.

Brigadier General Charles D. Palmer Chief of Staff, 2d Armored Division.  
D.S.M., L.M., S.S., B.S.M.  
Born in Illinois February 02. Graduated from United States Military Academy 1924, Command and General Staff School 1938, Field Artillery School, Battery Officers Course 1929, General Staff College 1942. Promoted to Brigadier General January 45.

Brigadier General Sidney R. Hinds CO, 41st Armd Inf, 2d Armd Div.  
D.S.M., L.M., S.S. (3 O.L.C.) B.S.M. (O.L.C.), C.R., P. H.  
Born in Illinois May 1900. Graduated from United States Military Academy 1920, Command and General Staff School 1938, Infantry School Basic Course 1921, Tank School 1929. Promoted to Brigadier General, AUS, March 45.

Colonel Paul A. Disney

CO, 67th Armd Regt, 2d Armd Div.

S.S. (O.L.C.) B.S.M. (2 O.L.C) P.H.

Born in Massachusetts November 1904. Graduated from Norwich University, Vermont, in 1927. Graduated from the following Army Schools: Command and General Staff College 1947, Cavalry School, Troop Officers Course 1932, Advanced Equitation Course 1938. Promoted to Colonel, AUS, June 44.

OFFICERS AND STAFF, 2d ARMORED DIVISION, 6-15 JUNE<sup>2</sup>

Commanding General

Major General Edward H. Brooks

Chief of Staff

Colonel Charles D. **Palmer**

G-1

Lieutenant Colonel Lowell S. Love

G-2

Lieutenant Colonel Jessie M. Hawkins

G-3

Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Jenna

G-4

Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Peterson

G-1, Civil Affairs

Major Marcel F. J. B. Brunow

Air Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph G. Focht

Antiaircraft Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence A. Devlin

Artillery Commander

Lieutenant Colonel Carl I. Hutton

Chemical Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Labelle

Engineer

Lieutenant Colonel Louis W. Correll

Hq, Commandant

Major James D. Webster

Ordnance Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Allan L. Harts

Provost Marshal

Major John W. Doran

Signal Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Carmon L. Clay

Division Surgeon

Colonel Abner Zehm

Adjutant General

Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Shell

Chaplain

Major Lawrence M. Nelson

Finance Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Uhrbrock

Inspector General

Judge Advocate

Quartermaster

Ammunition Officer

Special Service Officer

Commanding Officer, CCA

Commanding Officer, CCB

CO, 41st Armd Inf Regt

CO, 1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf

CO, 2d Bn, 41st Armd Inf

CO, 3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf

CO, 66th Armd Regt

CO, 1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt

CO, 2d Bn, 66th Armd Regt

CO, 3d Bn, 66th Armd Regt

CO, 67th Armd Regt

CO, 1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt

CO, 2d Bn, 67th Armd Regt

CO, 3d Bn, 67th Armd Regt

CO, 702d TD Bn (SP)

CO, 82d Armd Ren Bn

CO, 14th Armd FA Bn

CO, 78th Armd FA Bn

Lieutenant Colonel Ernest W. Howell

Major Edward N. Sylva

Lieutenant Colonel Louis M. Flint

Captain Charles E. Branson

Major Marshall W. Dickson

Colonel John H. Collier

Brigadier General Isaac D. White

Colonel Sidney R. Hinds

Lieutenant Colonel Martin J. Morin

Major Charles E. Etter

Lieutenant Colonel Marshall L. Crawley

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stokes

Lieutenant Colonel Charles O. Parker

Lieutenant Colonel Lindsay C. Harkness, Jr

Major Hugh R. O'Farroll

Colonel Paul A. Disney

Major William P. Ring

Lieutenant Colonel William P. Stores, Jr

Lieutenant Colonel Harry Hillyard

Lieutenant Colonel John A. Beal

Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler G. Merriam

Major Lloyd G. VanCourt

Major Harold G. Manard

CO, 92d Armd FA Bn	Lieutenant Colonel William R. Buster
CO, 195th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)	Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence A. Devlin
CO, 17th Armd Engr Bn	Lieutenant Colonel Louis M. Correll
CO, 48th Armd Med Bn	Lieutenant Colonel John S. Wier
CO, 142d Armd Sig Co	Lieutenant Colonel Carmon L. Clay

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CO, Co E, 120th Inf, 30th Div	Lieutenant Ralph A. Kerley <sup>3</sup>
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GERMAN COMMANDERS<sup>4</sup>

Army Group "B"	Fieldmarshall von Kluge
7th Army	SS Oberstgruppenfuehrer Hauser
Panzer Group "Eberbach"	Gen Armd Forces Eberbach
XLVII Panzer Corps	General Freiherr von Funck
LVIII Panzer Corps	Gen Armd Forces Krueger
LXXXI Corps	Gen of Cav Kuntzen
116th Panzer Division	Maj Gen Graf Schwerin
2d Panzer Division	Maj Gen Freiheer von Luettwitz
2d SS Panzer Division	SS Oberfuehrer Baum
10th SS Panzer Division	SS Oberfuehrer Harmel

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NOTES FOR APPENDIX IV

<sup>1</sup>Army and Air Forces Register, Vol I, II, Dept of the Army:  
The Adjutant General's Office (Washington: U. S. Government Printing  
Office: 1948) Vol I & II.

<sup>2</sup>After Action Reports, 2d Armd Div., 1 June 44-31 Aug 44.

<sup>3</sup>After Action Interviews, 2d Bn, 120th Inf.

<sup>4</sup>The Counterattack Against Avranches, an after action interview  
with Brig Gen Gersdorff, Chief of Staff, German Seventh Army, accomplish-  
ed at St. Germain, November 1945. Document A-921, Trans. (Washington:  
Special Staff, Historical Division: The Adjutant General's Office).

APPENDIX V

STATISTICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUMMARY

	Page
I. SUPPLY	
A. Installations	xxxvi
B. Truckhead Able and Baker	xxxviii
C. Fuel Consumption	xxxviii
D. Ammunition Expenditures	xxxviii
E. Example of Ammunition Expenditures in relation to Fuel Requirements (78th Armd FA Bn)	xxxix
II. CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (U. S.)	xl
A. 2d Armored Division (1-15 August)	xl
B. CCB, 2d Armored Division (1-31 August)	xli
III. CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (GERMAN)	xli
A. Reported by CCB	xli
B. Reported by 702d TD Bn.	xli
C. Reported by 67th Armd Regt.	xlii
D. Captured German Ordnance Material.	xlii
IV. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS	xliv
A. U. S.	xliv
B. German	xlvi
V. CASUALTIES	xlvii
VI. REPLACEMENTS	xlviii
VII. PERSONNEL EVACUATION AND MEDICAL SUPPORT	xlviii
VIII. VEHICLE EVACUATION AND REPLACEMENT	l
IX. ENGINEER SUPPORT	li
X. UNIT STRENGTHS	lii
XI. CONCLUSIONS	liii




Figure 7  
 xxxvii  
 xxxvii

## I. SUPPLY

The supply lines were flexible; the Division used more distant dumps as the nearer ones became empty. Initially all the Division dumps were near CANISY (Fig. 1). The Division drew rations and gasoline from VII Corps dumps near MARIIGNY and ammunition from the Army dump near ST LO. Army established an ammunition dump four miles south of LE MESNIL HERMAN and XIX Corps had gasoline and ration dumps seven miles northeast of CANISY. As the advance continued, Army established Class I and III truckheads four miles north of VILLEDIEU, thirty-eight miles from LE TEILLEUL; a Class V dump two miles west of ST MARTIN LE BOUILLANT, thirty miles from LE TEILLEUL; and a Class V truckhead five miles west of BUAIS. The Division used all of these dumps.

The Division established two truckheads, one for each combat command. Truckhead "ABLE", supported Combat Command A, consisted of the following:

12	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Ammunition
26	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Fuel and Lube
8	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Rations
3	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Miscellaneous Supplies
<u>49</u>		Total	

Truckhead "BAKER", supporting Combat Command B, consisted of the following:

18	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Ammunition
22	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Fuel and Lube
5	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Rations
5	$2\frac{1}{2}$	ton trucks	for Miscellaneous Supplies
<u>50</u>		Total	

Combat Command A received its supplies from truckhead "ABLE" even though it was detached. As Combat Command A drove toward VIRE, truckhead "ABLE" followed closely, operated initially near PONTFAROY, then moved forward with the advance.

Truckhead "BAKER" first moved to an area three miles west of VILLEBAUDON, then it moved to an area two miles northeast of MARGUERAY. Shortly thereafter, the Division Trains moved from CANISY and joined truckhead "BAKER" in the MARGUERAY area. When the Division moved from ST POIS, truckhead "BAKER" moved to an area one mile south of ST POIS. On 11 August, it moved to an area two miles west of LE TEILLEUL. On 12 August, the Division Trains moved near ST POIS.<sup>1</sup>

TABLE 1<sup>2</sup>

FUEL CONSUMPTION - 2D ARMORED DIVISION

Gasoline V-80	383,675 gallons
Diesel Fuel	6,360 gallons
Oil (all types)	10,465 gallons

TABLE 2<sup>3</sup>

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES - 2D ARMORED DIVISION

Artillery Ammunition	35,724 rounds
Other types	187 tons

Class III was a critical item during 6-12 August. The long march of CCB further increased the consumption. Later, during the month of August when the long advances increased, the results were that the Army Class III dumps could not be placed as far forward, moved forward as often, nor kept stocked to the former high level.

The result was long hauls for resupply, thus further increasing the gasoline consumption.<sup>4</sup> Class III consumption figures for the period 1-15 August are shown in Table 1.

Class V supply was the most critical item during 6-12 August. The long haul from the Division back to the ASP's and the long haul from the CZ depots forward to the ASP's created poorly stocked ASP's and delays.<sup>5</sup> Ammunition expenditures for the period 1-15 August are shown in Table 2.

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES IN RELATION TO FUEL<sup>6</sup>  
REQUIREMENTS (78th Armd FA Bn)

When an Armored Field Artillery Battalion is in a supporting role in a relatively static situation, ammunition expenditure is high and fuel requirements are low. However, when it assumes a supporting role in a tactical march, ammunition expenditure is light and fuel requirements are heavy.

On 6 August, the 78th Armd FA Bn was in position one mile southeast of ST SEVER CALVADOS. The battalion was supporting CCB from relative static positions. The battalion departed from positions near ST SEVER CALVADOS on 7 August, and executed a 52 mile tactical march to new positions two miles south of BARENTON. During this march the battalion supported CCB. It is interesting to note in Table 3 that ammunition expenditures were 1455 rounds on 6 August. On 7 August, when the battalion made the march, the number of rounds expended decreased to 188. Then on 8-9 August, when the battalion assumed relative static positions, the number of rounds expended increased to 1471. Table 4 shows that during the four days prior to the march, fuel require-

ments were low. Then on the day of the march the fuel requirements were high. The 1500 gallons of gasoline used on 8 August was probably for refilling the vehicle tanks.

TABLE 3<sup>7</sup>

AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES - 78th Armd FA Bn

6 Aug 44	Expended	1455 rounds
7 Aug 44	Expended	188 rounds
8-9 Aug 44	Expended	1471 rounds
10 Aug 44	Expended	1935 rounds
11 Aug 44	Expended	1251 rounds
12 Aug 44	Expended	628 rounds

TABLE 4<sup>8</sup>

GASOLINE REQUIREMENTS - 78th Armd FA Bn

3 Aug 44	Required	2000 gallons
4-6 Aug 44	Required Additional	0
7 Aug 44	Required	2000 gallons
8 Aug 44	Required	1500 gallons
9 Aug 44	Required	400 gallons
10-11 Aug 44	Required Additional	0
12 Aug 44	Required	600 gallons

II. CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (U. S.)

The ordnance material losses incurred by the Division were much less than those of the German forces. U. S. and German losses are shown in Tables 5 through 10.

TABLE 5<sup>9</sup>

2D ARMORED DIVISION (1-15 August)

Small Arms (all types)	39	Vehicle, Tank Rec, T-2	3
Gun, Machine, cal .50 & .30	9	Car, Armd, M8	7
Binoculars, M3	87	Car, H/T, M2	1
Watch, Wrist, 7-15 jewels	48	Car, H/T, M4, 81mm mortar	1
Launcher, Rocket	15	Carrier, Pers, H/T, M3	9
Mortar, 60mm	2	Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton	17
Tank, Light, M5	6	Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	2
Tank, Med, M4A1	27	Motorcycle, Solo	3

TABLE 6<sup>10</sup>

## CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES, CCB (1-31 August)

Tanks, Med (75mm Gun)	11
Tanks, Med (76mm Gun)	3
Tanks, Light	4
Car, Armd, M8	2
Car, H/T, M3	5
Truck, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	2
Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton	2
Motorcycle	3
Trailer, 1-ton	1
Mortar, 81mm	1
Mortar, 60mm	1

## III. CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (GERMAN)

TABLE 7<sup>11</sup>CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (GERMAN)  
Reported by CCB (August)

Tanks, Light	12
Tanks, Heavy and Medium	53
88mm Guns	14
AT Guns	17
Artillery Pieces	7
Half-Tracks	27
Trucks	77
Vehicle, Light	42
SP AT Guns	2
AA Guns	1
Nebelwerfers and Mortars	5
20mm Guns	3
Armored Cars	2
Motorcycles and Bicycles	9

TABLE 8<sup>12</sup>CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (GERMAN)  
Reported by 702d TD Bn

Mk III Tank	1	French Hotchkiss Tank	1
Mk IV Tank	12	AT Gun	1
Mk V Tank	12	Rcn Vehicle	4
Armd Car	6	Motorcycle	1
Trucks	6		

TABLE 9<sup>13</sup>

CRITICAL ORDNANCE LOSSES (GERMAN)  
Reported by 67th Armored Regiment (August)

150mm Gun, How	6	Truck, Large	58
88mm Gun	18	Truck, Small	4
75mm Gun	7	Ambulances	1
20mm Gun	3	Sedans	4
Nebelwerfer	5	Trucks, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	8
40mm Gun	2	Motorcycles	9
AT Gun (Towed)	1	Armored Cars	2
Mk II Tank	2	Artillery Pieces	1
Mk III Tank	9	Half-Track	26
Mk IV Tank	17	Bicycles	185
Mk V Tank	23	Trailers	2
Mk VI Tank	1	Launcher, Rocket	1

TABLE 10<sup>14</sup>

CAPTURED GERMAN ORDNANCE MATERIAL (1-15 August)

Truck, 3/4-ton	1	Sedan, Light	3
Truck, 1-ton	2	Mercedes, Pers, Carr	1
Truck, 2-ton	2	Rifle, M98	31
Tricycle, w/track	1	Gun, Sub-machine	10
Motorcycle, w/side car	1	Gun, Machine, M34	2
Car, Rcn, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton	3	Gun, 88mm	2
Volkswagon	1	Finder, Range	4
Motorcycle, 1-Cyl	3	Telescope, BC	2

#### IV. VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

Vehicle characteristics shown in Tables 11 and 12, and photographs in Figures 2 and 3 are included to give the reader an idea as to the general types of vehicles employed in the MORTAIN action.

TABLE 11<sup>15</sup>

## VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS (U. S.)

TYPE	WEIGHT (Gross Tons)	ARMAMENT	DIMENSIONS
Car, Armored, M8	9	1-37mm	Length 15.4 ft
		1-cal..30 MG	Width 7.3 ft
			Height 6.2 ft
Car, Half-Track, M3	10	1-cal..30 MG	Length 19.8 ft
			Width 6.5 ft
			Height 6.0 ft

The M3 is primarily a personnel carrier. The M2 is principally a command vehicle. Its normal armament is one cal .60 and one cal .30 MG.

Tank, Light, M5A1	17	1-37mm	Length 14.6 ft
		2-cal..30 MGs	Width 7.4 ft
			Height 7.5 ft
Tank, Medium, M4	33	1-75mm	Length 19.3 ft
		2-cal..30 MGs	Width 8.6 ft
			Height 9.3 ft


Tank, Medium M4 (76mm Gun)

This tank has the same characteristics as the M4 (75mm Gun) tank except for the gun. The superiority of the 76mm gun over the 75mm gun was clearly demonstrated, with the result that a great demand for 76mm gun tanks was created. The 76mm gun tanks were made available to the Division.<sup>16</sup>


# GERMAN VEHICLES




MK II




MK III



MK IV




MK V (PANTHER)



MK VI (TIGER)



75MM S.P. GUN



150MM S.P. GUN

TABLE 12<sup>17</sup>

## VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS (GERMAN)

TYPE	WEIGHT (Gross Tons)	ARMAMENT	DIMENSIONS
Tank, Light, Mark II	9	1-20mm 1-LMG	
Tank, Light-Medium, Mark III	18-20	1-37mm or 50mm 2-LMGs	Length 17.7 ft Width 9.8 ft Height 7.8 ft
Tank, Medium, Mark IV	22	1-75mm gun 2-LMGs	Length 19.3 ft Width 9.6 ft Height 8.8 ft
Tank, Heavy, "Panther", Mark V	36	1-75mm gun 1-37mm gun	
Tank, Heavy, "Tiger", Mark VI	45	1-88mm gun 2-LMGs	Length 20.0 ft Width 12.7 ft Height 9.5 ft
150mm (SP) Gun		1-150mm How	Length 18.0 ft Width 7.3 ft Height 6.5 ft

TABLE 13<sup>18</sup>

## CASUALTIES, 2D ARMORED DIVISION (6-12 August)

6-7 August	0
8 August	7
9 August	14
10 August	47
11 August	84
12 August	<u>27</u>
Total	179

TABLE 14<sup>19</sup>

## REPLACEMENTS, 2D ARMORED DIVISION

6 August	129
7 August	6
8 August	0
9 August	0
10 August	69
11 August	22
12 August	<u>0</u>
Total	226

## V. CASUALTIES

The casualty and replacement figures shown in Tables 13 and 14, respectively, indicate that the Division received more replacements than casualties during the period 6-12 August. The Division received fewer casualties on 6-7 August because it apparently met light resistance during the attack through FORET DE ST SEVER and the 52 mile tactical march to LE TEILLEUL.

The casualties were the heaviest on 10-11 August apparently because the Division had to repel numerous counterattacks while maintaining a constant pressure against units of the 7th and 15th German Armies.

#### VI. REPLACEMENTS

The Division received replacements from the 86th Replacement Battalion, which was near LA HAVARDIERE.<sup>20</sup> Usually, the Division received replacements within 24 to 48 hours after it forwarded requisitions. For example, on 10 August, Lieutenant Hamilton, a platoon leader of Company C, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, was seriously wounded. Staff Sergeant Dempsey, the platoon sergeant, assumed command of the platoon until he received an officer replacement on 12 August.<sup>21</sup> The Collecting Companies of the Corps Medical Battalion returned the casualties which were being returned to duty.<sup>22</sup> For example, during August the 92d Armd EA Bn received 12 replacements, which were mostly personnel casualties being returned to duty.<sup>23</sup>

#### VII. PERSONNEL EVACUATION AND MEDICAL SUPPORT<sup>24</sup>

The 48th Armd Med Bn provided evacuation for personnel casualties of the Division by attaching an armored medical company to each combat command. Headquarters and Headquarters Company displaced 38 miles during the period 6-12 August to perform supply and administrative functions of the battalion. Locations of Headquarters, 48th Armd Med Bn were as follows on dates shown:

August 6-9  
August 9-11  
August 11-12

CANISY  
Near MARGUERAY  
Near CUVES

Company A displaced 13 miles during the period 6-12 August to provide medical support to CCA and attached units. Company A operated treatment stations at the following places on dates shown:

August 6-11	1 mile south of PONTFAROY
	$\frac{1}{2}$ mile southwest of BEAUMESNIL
August 11-12	4 miles west of VIRE

Company B displaced 46 miles during the period 6-12 August to provide medical support to CCB and attached units. On one occasion near CUVES, Company B transferred casualties directly from company ambulances to army ambulances. Usually, army ambulances received casualties at the Division Clearing Station. Evacuation was difficult on 9 August because enemy mortar and artillery fires were falling on the only approach to the front line positions. To alleviate this problem Company B established an advanced ambulance point along the main road. Half-track ambulances transported casualties over a tank trail to the advanced ambulance point. Company B operated treatment stations at the following places on dates shown:

August 6-7	1 mile northeast of PERCY
	$2\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of ST SEVER CALVADOS
August 7-10	1 mile north of LE TEILLEUL
August 10-12	$1\frac{1}{4}$ miles northeast of LE TEILLEUL

Company C displaced 35 miles during the period 6-12 August to provide medical support to Division Reserve and Division Trains.

Company C operated treatment stations at the following places on dates shown:

August 6-7	ST MARGUERAY
August 7-12	2 miles north of LE TEILLEUL
August 12	1 mile north of LE TEILLEUL

#### VIII. VEHICLE EVACUATION AND REPLACEMENT<sup>25</sup>

The Maintenance Battalion provided ordnance maintenance support for the Division by placing maintenance companies in direct support of each combat command. On 6 August, Company C supported Combat Command A and Company B supported Combat Command B. These companies usually operated within one or two miles of the fighting troops. On 7 August, the maintenance personnel received 3 casualties which were caused by a single plane strafing. The supporting maintenance companies established vehicle collecting points for each combat command and the maintenance battalion established a division ~~vehicle collecting point with the Division Trains.~~ The Maintenance Battalion, less detachments, was located at the following places on dates shown:

August 6	2 miles south of CANISY
August 7-10	near ST POIS
August 12	southwest of LE TEILLEUL

The Maintenance Battalion effected the replacement of vehicular losses, usually with 48 to 72 hours after the reported loss. For example, on 6 August, Company A, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, lost a half-track due to enemy fire. On 9 August, Company A received a replacement for the half-track.<sup>26</sup>

## IX. ENGINEER SUPPORT<sup>27</sup>

The 17th Armd Engr Bn furnished engineer support for the Division by attaching armored engineer companies to combat commands and other division elements. During the period 6-12 August the Battalion (-) operated under Division control, in close support of Division Reserve. Company A was attached to Combat Command A; Company C was attached to Combat Command B, and Company D, minus one platoon, was attached to the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion. One platoon of Company D was attached to Division Headquarters. Company E was attached to Division Trains. During the month of August the Battalion operated five water points. Division Artillery used the engineer D-7 bulldozer to dig gun positions. On 9 August, the Engineer Battalion (-) removed wooden dummy mines near BARENTON. Battalion (-) was located as follows on dates shown:

~~August 6-7~~ near COULOUVRAY BOISBENATRE  
August 7-11 1 mile northwest of LE TEILLEUL  
August 11-12 1 mile southwest of BARENTON

During the period 6-12 August, while supporting CCA, Company A attached platoons to tank battalions, removed mines, and built a culvert crossing. During this action three enlisted men were killed and three wounded.<sup>28</sup>

During the period 6-12 August, Company B, which was part of Battalion (-), executed the following missions: Attached a platoon to the advance guard of CCB; planned and manned roadblocks; fought as infantrymen on mission of contacting the enemy; and outposting.<sup>29</sup>

During the period 6-12 August, Company C, which was attached to CCB executed the following missions: Constructed and sandbagged two splinter-proof dug-outs for CCB Headquarters; deployed as infantrymen in forward positions; operated a water point; removed a roadblock of 46 mines; destroyed two enemy machine guns with AT Rockets; built roadblocks; observed division artillery fire on 4 enemy artillery pieces and effected their destruction; and constructed culverts and by-passes.<sup>30</sup>

During the period 6-12 August, Company D, which was attached to the 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, executed the following missions: Destroyed a bridge in LONLAY L' ABBAYE; demolished a small enemy ammunition dump in LONLAY L' ABBAYE; destroyed two bridges near ROUELLE; and assisted in destroying four enemy vehicles.<sup>31</sup>

#### X. UNIT STRENGTHS

TABLE 15

#### UNIT STRENGTHS (August)

UNIT	OFF	WO	EM
82d Armd Ren Bn <sup>32</sup>	52	1	955
48th Armd Mod Bn <sup>33</sup>	48		463
2d Armd Maint Bn <sup>34</sup>	36	13	860
14th Armd FA Bn <sup>35</sup>	46	3	723
78th Armd FA Bn <sup>36</sup>	49	3	729
92d Armd FA Bn <sup>37</sup>	50		730

## XI. CONCLUSIONS

After analyzing the available research materials from which the Statistical and Logistical Summary was made, the following conclusions have been reached:

1. The supply, maintenance, and medical support afforded the Division was adequate and was properly employed.
2. Even though Class III and V supplies were critical during the period, the shortages did not materially restrict the Division in accomplishing its mission.
3. The engineer support afforded the Division was adequate and aggressive and the engineer's execution of infantry missions is commendable.

NOTES FOR APPENDIX V

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Colonel F. M. Muller, Personal File, (Ft Knox, The Armored School Library, 1948).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> After Action Report, HQ, XIX CORPS, 31 August 1944, Supply Section.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., Supply Section.

<sup>6</sup> After Action Report, 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, August 1944.

<sup>7</sup> S-4 Periodic Report, 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, August 1944.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., S-4 Periodic Report.

<sup>9</sup> Op. Cit., Lieutenant Colonel F. M. Muller.

<sup>10</sup> S-3 Periodic Report, Hq, CCB, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., S-3 Periodic Report.

<sup>12</sup> After Action Report, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>13</sup> After Action Report, 67th Armored Regiment, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

<sup>14</sup> Op. Cit., Lieutenant Colonel F. M. Muller.

<sup>15</sup> FM 101-10, 1 August 1945.

<sup>16</sup> Op. Cit., After Action Report, HQ, XIX CORPS, Supply Section.

<sup>17</sup> FM 30-40, 1943.

<sup>18</sup> After Action Report, VII CORPS, August 1944, Microfilm - Item 831. There appears to be some discrepancy in this table because the After Action Report of Company B, 48th Armored Medical Battalion of 6-7 August 1944 shows that 101 patients were admitted to its treatment station. Company B was attached to CCB at that time.

<sup>19</sup> Op. Cit., After Action Report, Hq, XIX CORPS, 31 August 1944, Personnel Section.

20

Ibid, Personnel Section.

21

After Action Report, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, 2d Armored Division, August 1944, Company C.

22

Op. Cit., After Action Report, Hq, XIX CORPS, Supply Section.

23

After Action Report, 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, August 1944.

24

After Action Report, 48th Armored Medical Battalion, 2d Armored Division, 6 March 1945.

25

After Action Report, Hq, Maintenance Battalion, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

26

Op. Cit., After Action Report, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, Company A.

27

Ibid, 17th Armored Engineer Battalion.

28

Ibid, Company A.

29

Ibid, Company B.

30

Ibid, Company C.

31

Ibid, Company D.

32

After Action Report, 82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Armored Division, August 1944.

33

Op. Cit., After Action Report, 48th Armored Medical Battalion.

34

Op. Cit., After Action Report, Hq Maintenance Battalion.

35

After Action Report, 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 25 September 1944.

36

Op. Cit., After Action Report, 78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

37

Op. Cit., After Action Report, 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

APPENDIX VI  
DAILY DISPOSITIONS<sup>1</sup>

7 August 1944

2d Armored Division

Troops:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company

Service Company

142d Armored Signal Company

Headquarters, Combat Command A

Headquarters, Combat Command B

41st Armored Infantry Regiment

66th Armored Regiment

67th Armored Regiment

Headquarters, Division Artillery

14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm SP)

78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm SP)

92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm SP)

17th Armored Engineer Battalion

82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Headquarters, Division Trains

48th Armored Medical Battalion

Maintenance Battalion

Supply Battalion

Attached Units

62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm SP)  
65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm SP)  
258th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)  
195th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion (SP)  
702d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)  
3d Battalion, 120th Infantry  
Battle Group 2, Task Force "X", 3d Armored Division

Task Organization

CCA

Hq, CCA  
66th Armd Regt (-2d Bn)  
Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn  
Co A, 48th Armd Med Bn  
14th Armd FA Bn  
Btry D, 195th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)  
Det, Maint Bn  
Co A, 702d TD Bn (SP)  
2d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt (- Co E)

Dispositions

Detached from Division  
at 1100B, in XIX Corps  
Reserve Vicinity VIRE

2d Bn, 66th Armd Regt

Attached to 28th Inf Div  
(XIX Corps)

CCB

Hq, CCB

67th Armd Regt (-1st Bn)

78th Armd FA Bn

Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn

1st and 3d Bns, 41st Armd Inf Regt

Btry A, 195th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)

Co B, 48th Armd Med Bn

Det, Maint Bn

702d TD Bn (SP) (-Co A)

Battle Group 2, TF "X",

3d Armd Div (1 Tk Co (-10 Tks)

and 1 Armd Inf Co (-80 men)

3d Bn, 120th Inf (30th Inf Div)

Order of March (CCB)

Ren Co, 67th Armd Regt

Advance Guard

3d Bn, 67th Armd Regt

Co A, 41st Armd Inf Regt

1 Plat, Co C, 17th Armd Engr Co

Btry A, 78th Armd FA Bn (1 Plat

Btry A, 195th AAA Bn, atchd)

1 Plat, Co C, 702d TD Bn

Departed vicinity ST.

SEVER CALVADOS at 0530B.

Moved to vicinity

BARENTON via ST. POIS,

LE MESNIL GILBERT, CUVES,

REFFUVILLE, ST. HILAIRE

DU HARCQUET, BUAIS, and

LE TEILLEUL.

Loading elements arrived

BARENTON 1600B, closed

2330B.

Holding southern part

of BARENTON. Attached

to CCB on arrival

(1600B).

ST. SEVER CALVADOS to

BARENTON.

Main Body

Forward CP, CCB

78th Armd FA Bn (- Btry A)(Btry A,

195th AAA Bn, -2 Plats, atchd)

Hq CCB, (-Fwd CP)( $\frac{1}{2}$  Plat, Btry A,

195th AAA Bn, atchd)

1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt (-Co A)

Co C, 702d TD Bn (-1 Plat)

Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn (-2 Plats)

67th Armd Regt (-1st, 3d Bns and Ren Co)

1 Plat, Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn

3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt

62d Armd FA Bn (under Div Arty Control)

702d TD Bn (-Cos A and C)

CCB Trains

Combat Trains, CCB ( $\frac{1}{2}$  Plat Btry A,

195th AAA Bn, atchd)

Co B, 48th Armd Med Bn

Det, Maint Bn

Rear guard (Tk Sec, 67th Armd Regt)

Div Arty

Hq, Div Arty

92d Armd FA Bn

62d Armd FA Bn

65th Armd FA Bn

258th FA Bn

Support 82d Armd Ren Bn

General support, Reinf.

78th Armd FA Bn.

Direct support, CCA,

Reinf 14th Armd FA Bn

General support of Div

(-CCA)

Div Control

Hq and Hq Co, 2d Armd Div

(1 Plat, Co D, 17th Armd

Engr Bn atchd)

Service Co

Departed vicinity ST. SEVER

CALVADOS at 1700B, moved

over route of CCB to

vicinity LE TEILLEUL

17th Armd Engr Bn (-Cos A,C,D less 080715B

1 Plat and Co E)

82d Armd Ren Bn (Co D

- 1 Plat, 17th Armd Engr

Bn; atchd)

As advance guard of Div

departed vicinity ST.

SEVER CALVADOS at 0010B,

moved over route of CCB

(above) to vicinity

BARENTON.

Div Res

41st Armd Inf Regt (-1st,  
3d Bns and 2d Bn less  
Co E)  
1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt  
Co C, 48th Armd Med Bn

Departed vicinity ST.  
MARTIN at 1700B.  
Moved over route of CCB.  
Closed vicinity  
BARENTON at 080715B.

Div Trains

Hq Div Trns  
Maint Bn, (-)  
Supply Bn  
48th Armd Med Bn (-Cos  
A, B, & C)  
Co E, 17th Armd Engr Bn

For dispositions of  
trains elements and  
service installations  
see Appendix V.

8 August 1944

Task Organization

CCA: No change

CCB:

Hq, CCB

1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt (Reinf)  
1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt  
1 medium tank Co, 1 lt tank  
Plat, Mortar Plat, Assault  
Gun Plat, 3 Bn, 67th Armd Regt  
1st Plat, Co C, 17th Armd Engr  
Bn

Dispositions

XIX Corps Reserve,  
vicinity of VIRE.

Attacked 0800B to  
take hills at  
(T693075) and  
(T673098). Actually  
secured line (T675095)  
to (T691080)

3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt (Reinf)      Attacked 0800B to  
3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt              take hills at  
1 med tk Co, 1 lt tk                    (T660075) and  
Plat, Mortar Plat,                      (T673098). Reached  
Assault Gun Plat, 2d                    (T659087).

Bn, 67th Armd Regt  
3d Plat, Co C, 17th Armd  
Engr Bn

Battle Group 2, TF "X"                  Attacked, secured hill  
3d Armd Div                              at (T665070).  
3d Bn, 120th Inf                        Held town of BARENTON,  
atcd to Div Res.

CCB Reserve

67th Armd Regt (-Ren Co,              Position  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles NW  
1st and 2d Bns)                        of BARENTON

702d TD Bn (SP) (-Co A)  
(2d Plat, Co C, 17th Armd  
Engr Bn, atcd)

2d Bn, 67th Armd Regt  
(-1 med tk Co, 1 lt tk  
plat, Mortar Plat, and  
Assault Gun Plat)

Ren Co, 67th Armd Regt                  South of LES HEGUINIÈRES  
Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn (-)

78th Armd FA Bn  
Btry A, 195th AAA (AW) Bn (SP)

CCB Trains

Co B, 48th Armd Med Bn

Det, Maint Bn

Div Arty: No change

No change

Div Control

Hq & Hq Co

Service Co

17th Armd Engr Bn (-Cos A, C, D less

1 Plat & E)

82d Armd Ren Bn (Co D, 17th Armd Engr

Bn less 1 Plat, atchd)

Companies reconnoitered  
toward MORTAIN, SOURCEVAL,  
GER, and FLERS. Guarded  
bridges over LA VARENNE  
River.

Div Reserve

3d Bn, 120th Inf

To Div Res Control,  
0800B. Div Res closed  
vicinity LE TEILLEUL  
080715B. Assumed control  
of BARENTON at 0800B.

Div Trains

Organization unchanged.

9 August 1944

Task Organization

CCA: No change

CCB:

1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt

(Reinf)

3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt

(Reinf)

Battle group 2, TF "X",

3d Armd Div

3d Bn, 120th Inf

Dispositions

No change.

Attached, secured high

ground at (T670100)

Established road blocks

at (T667700), (T649697),

(T641696). To Div Res

Control at 1600B.

Relieved of mission in

BARENTON by elements 1st

Bn, 137th Inf (35th Inf

Div), at 1835B. Attacked

after dark, secured hills

at (T665085), (T673098).

CCB Reserve

Ren Co, 67th Armd Regt

Entered assembly area

south of BOUSENTIER.

CCB Trains

No Change

Div Arty

65th Armd FA Bn

Relieved of direct support  
of CCA and reinforcing  
mission to 14th Armd FA Bn.

Div Control

17th Armd Engr Bn (-

Cos A, C, D (less one  
plat) & E)

32d Rcn Bn (Reinf)

Atchd Div Res

Patrols occupied ST  
GEORGES ROUELLE. Patrolled  
BARENTON-DOMFRONT highway,  
guarded bridges over  
LA VARENNE River.

Div Res

3d Bn, 120th Inf

Passed to CCB control

Battle Group 2, TF "X"

3d Armd Div

17th Armd Engr Bn (-Cos  
A, C, D, E)

1835B. On relief in  
BARENTON by elements of  
1st Bn, 137th Inf.

Attacked in position on  
road blocks at (T667700),  
(T649697), (T641696).

Attached to Div Res,  
formed team as Inf with  
1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt.

Div Trains

No change

10 August 1944

Task Organization

CCA:

Task Force "A"

66th Armd Regt (-1st,  
3d Bns, Ren Co & Co A)  
2d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt  
(- Co E)  
14th Armd FA Bn  
Co A, 702d TD Bn  
1 Plat, Co A, 17th Armd  
Engr Bn  
Det, Co A, 48th Armd Med Bn

1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt

CCA Control

Hq CCA  
3d Bn, Ren Co, Co A, 66th  
Armd Regt  
Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn  
(- 1 plat)  
Co A, 48th Armd Med Bn (-)  
Btry D, 19th AAA Bn (SP)  
Det, Maint Bn, 2d Armd Div

Dispositions

XIX Corps Control

Attached to 28th Inf Div,  
attacked south of GATHEMO  
toward VENGEONS and ST.  
SAUVEUR DE CHAULIEU.  
Reached LA BERTHELIERE  
(T580225).

Attached to 28th Inf Div  
Remained in XIX Corps Res  
in Assembly Area.

CCB

1st & 3d Bns, 41st Armd Inf  
Regt (Reinf)

Defended line (T654084)  
to (T673098). Div Res  
and elements 35th Inf Div  
relieved CCB in sector  
west of (T654084).

3d Bn, 120th Inf

Moved to east of road at  
(T695702), area previously  
held by Ren Co, 67th Armd  
Regt between 3d Bn  
67th Armd Regt and ST.  
GEORGES ROUELLE.

CCB Res

Ren Co, 67th Armd Regt

Moved to L'AUNAY and  
outposted vicinity CH.

LIVET.

Elements Co D, 67th Armd Regt

Atchd to CCB Res from  
Div Res 0900B.

1st and 2d Plats, Co B,

Atchd to CCB Res from

17th Armd Engr Bn

Div Res 0900B.

78th Armd FA Bn

No change.

CCB Trains: No change

No change.

Div Arty: No change

No change.

Div Control: No change

No change.

Div Res

Elements D Co, 67th Armd Regt

Atchd to CCB 0900B.

1st & 2d Plat, Co B, 17th

Div Res moved from

Armd Engr Bn

(T618977) to (T61789)

Div Trains

No change

11 August 1944

Task Organization

Dispositions

CCA

Task Force "A"

Attack toward Hill 338

and Hill 367. Reached

LA MAULE with Co D, 66th

Armd Regt and Co D, 41st

Armd Inf Regt. Balance

of force near LA ROCHE.

1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt

Remained atchd 28th Inf Div.

CCA Control

No change.

CCB

67th Armd Regt (Reinf)

Assumed command of defen-

67th Armd Regt (-1st,

sive positions of 10 Aug.

2d Bns & Ren Co)

2 Plats, 17th Armd Engr Bn

3d Bn, 120th Inf (1 Plat, Co E,

67th Armd Regt atchd)

CCB Res

2d Bn, 67th Armd Regt

Assembly area

Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn

(- 2 plats)

1st & 2d Plats, Co B

Released to Div Res

17th Armd Engr Bn

78th Armd FA Bn

No change.

702d TD Bn (-)

No change.

Rcn Co, 67th Armd Regt

Div Arty

No change

No change

Div Control

No change

No change

Div Reserve

Co B, 17th Armd Engr Bn

Atched to TF "X",

3d Armd Div.

CP departed (T617987)

1215B, closed (T655035).

1315B.

Div Trains

No change.

12 August 1944

3d Bn, 120th Inf

Released to 30th Inf Div

Control, 1800B.

Task Organization

Dispositions

CCA

Task Force "A"

Captured Hill 338 at  
1100B, Returned to CCA  
control 1500.

1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt

Returned to CCA control  
1500.

2d Bn, 66th Armd Regt

XIX Corps Reserve near  
LA ROCHE at 1130.

CCA Control

Resumed command of TF "A"  
and 1st Bn, 66th Armd  
Regt 1500.

Task Force 1/66

Attacked 1845, through

Co I, 66th Armd Regt

VENGEONS to crossroad at

Co D, 41st Armd Inf Regt

(T616224), 2130.

1 plat, Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn

1 plat, Co A, 702d TD Bn

Assault Gun and Mortar Plats,

1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt

Task Force 2/41

Followed TF 1/66

2d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt (-)

1st Bn, 66th Armd Regt (-)

CCA Reserve

Assembly area 1 mile

3d Bn, 66th Armd Regt

north of GATHEMO.

Co A, 17th Armd Engr Bn (-)

Co A, 702d TD Bn (-)

CCA Trains

Co A, 48th Armd Mod Bn

Det, Maint Bn

CCB

67th Armd Regt (Reinf)

67th Armd Regt (-1st Bn,

2d Bn and Ren Co)

1st Bn, 41st Armd Inf

Regt (-Co C)

3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf Regt

2 plats, Co C, 17th Armd

Engr Bn

Attached at 1100B, 1st

and 3d Bn, 41st Armd Inf

Regt (Reinf) abreast,

1st on the right.

CCB Res

2d Bn, 67th Armd Regt

Co C, 17th Armd Engr Bn (-2 plats)

Co C, 41st Armd Inf Regt

78th Armd FA Bn

702d TD Bn (-)

Ren Co, 67th Armd Regt

3d Bn, 120th Inf

Released in place to

Div Res, 1100B

Div Arty

No change

No change

Div Control

No change

No change

Div Res

1st Bn, 67th Armd Regt (- Co D)  
Battle Group #2, Task Force "X",  
3d Armd Div, (Co D, 67th Armd  
Regt, atchd)

41st Armd Inf Regt (-1st, 3d Bns  
and 2d Bn less Co E)  
3d Bn, 120th Inf

Atchd to Div Res  
1100B. Released to  
30th Inf Div at 1800B.

Div Trains

No change.

NOTES FOR APPENDIX VI

<sup>1</sup>The data for Appendix VI was compiled from the following sources:

After Action Reports for 1-31 August 1944 of:

2d Armored Division

CCA, 2d Armored Division

41st Armored Infantry Regiment

66th Armored Regiment

67th Armored Regiment

14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

78th Armored Field Artillery Battalion

92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion

17th Armored Engineer Battalion

82d Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

48th Armored Medical Battalion

702d Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)

S-3 Periodic Reports, 1-31 August, 1944, CCB, 2d Armored Division.

## APPENDIX VII

## MAP OF AREA OF OPERATIONS

## I. COORDINATES OF PLACES NAMED.

ALENCON	(Z355835)	FORET DE MORTAIN	(T620085)
ARGENTAN	(U266187)	FORET DE ST. SEVER	(T510300)
AVRANCHES	(T278164)	GATHEMO	(T565238)
BARENTON	(T663048)	GER	(T698138)
BEAUMESNIL	(T565381)	GRANVILLE	(T115338)
BOUSENTIER	(T683072)	HILL 250	(T680085)
BUAIS	(Y558968)	HILL 263	(T693076)
BUTTE DUCLOS	(T651122)	HILL 285	(T567118)
CAEN	(T035685)	HILL 293	(T613122)
CANISY	(T433590)	HILL 307	(T592117)
CAUMONT	(T705594)	HILL 311	(T643084)
CHAMPS DU BOULT	(T543270)	HILL 329	(T787124)
CH. LIVET	(T698071)	HILL 338	(T616224)
CHERENGE LE ROUSSEL	(T532175)	HILL 367	(T660215)
COULOUVRAY BOISBENATRE	(T469267)	HILL 317	(T595105)
COUTANCES	(T238568)	JUVIGNY	(Y900985)
CROSSROAD 209	(T616173)	JUVIGNY LE TERTRE	(T528142)
CUVES	(T469186)	LA BALISSONNIERE	(T605113)
DOMFRONT	(T800035)	LA GRANDE ROCHE	(T604129)
FALAISE	(U142962)	LA HAULE	(T601229)
FLERS	(T863207)	LA LANDE VAUMONT	(T647255)
FONTENAY	(T518088)	LA ROCHE	(T585228)

L'ABBAYE-BLANCHE	(T583123)	ROCHE FICHET	(T622151)
L'AUNAY	(T681064)	ROMAGNY	(T566098)
LE GAST	(T493274)	ROUELLE	(T741048)
LE GD. BOUILLON	(T667079)	SOURDEVAL	(T650190)
LE MESNIL ADELEE	(T490170)	ST. BARTHELMY	(T578143)
LE MESNIL GILBERT	(T503187)	ST. CLEMENT	(T625134)
LE MESNIL HERMAN	(T455535)	ST. GEORGES DE ROUFFLE	(T710050)
LE MESNIL TOVE	(T527168)	ST. HILAIRE DU HARCQUET	(T470033)
LE NEUFBOURG	(T565110)	ST. LO	(T497630)
LESSAY	(T184264)	ST. MARTIN	(T478380)
LE TRILLEUL	(Y628981)	ST. MARTIN LE BOUILLANT	(T420265)
LES GOUBOUDIÈRES	(T659068)	ST. MICHEL DE MONTJOIE	(T527238)
LES HEGUINIÈRES	(T643013)	ST. POIS	(T497223)
LONLAY L'ABBAYE	(T755097)	ST. SAUVEUR DE CHAULIEU	(T653213)
LES HAIES MARTINET	(T635122)	ST. SEVER CALVADOS	(T515322)
MARGUFRAY	(T450388)	TINCHEBRAY	(T745229)
MARIGNY	(T386617)	VENGEONS	(T609224)
MAYENNE	(Y810715)	VILLEBAUDON	(T436461)
MONT GOTHIER	(T399109)	VILLEDIEU	(T391338)
MORTAIN	(T584105)	VIRE	(T635317)
PASSAIS	(Y714956)		
PERCY	(T415414)		
PERRIERS	(T548205)		
PONTFAROY	(T539430)		
REFFUVELLE	(T457134)		