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Title: 17th Airborne Division Historical Report of Operation Varsity

Organization: United States Army

Abstract: Contents include maps, illustrations and charts of the historical report of the 17th Airborne Division in Operation Varsity.

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D 767.72 OPERATION VARSITY
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UNCLASSIFIED

February

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

GWL/chc

17 August 1945.

SUBJECT: Downgrading of History Operation Varsity.

TO : See Distribution.

The History of Operation Varsity is hereby downgraded from "Secret" to restricted.

By command of Major General MILEY:

Gabe W. Lewis

GABE W. LEWIS, JR.,
Lt. Col., AGD
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

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A. I. Knight
Col.

Auth: Str order CG 17ABDiv APO 452 USA
dated 17 Aug 1945

CLASSIFIED

17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION

HISTORICAL REPORT

of

OPERATION VARSITY

- I. FOREWORD BY COMMANDING GENERAL.
- II. REPORTS.
 - A. Narrative.
 - B. Reports of General Staff.
 - 1. G-1.
 - 2. G-2.
 - 3. G-3.
 - 4. G-4.
 - C. Division Artillery Report.
 - D. Report of Land Echelon.
 - E. Reports of Special Staff.
 - 1. Signal.
 - 2. Ordnance.
 - 3. Quartermaster.
 - 4. Medical.
 - 5. Engineer.
 - 6. AGO.
 - 7. Special Service.
 - 8. Provost Marshal.
 - 9. Military Government.
 - 10. Postal.
 - 11. Air Cooperation.
 - 12. Antiaircraft.
- III. DIVISION FIELD ORDER.
- IV. CHARTS AND MAPS.
 - A. Departure Fields and Routes to Landing Areas.
 - B. Enlargement from "YALTA" to Landing Areas.
 - C. Report of Drop and Landing Patterns.
 - D. Operations.
 - 1. 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment - D-Day.
 - 2. 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment - D-Day.
 - 3. 194th Glider Infantry Regiment - D-Day.
 - 4. 139th Engineer Battalion - D-Day.
 - 5. Division Artillery - D-Day.
 - 6. 17th Airborne Division - D-Day.
 - 7. 17th Airborne Division - D/1 and D/2.

~~SECRET~~ ATK

I. FORWARD BY COMMANDING GENERAL

On February 6 information was received indicating the likelihood of the 17th Airborne Division being committed in an operation to force a crossing of the Rhine about the 1st of April. At the same time, the Division was notified that it would move by rail and motor to the vicinity of Chalons, France commencing on February 10th.

At this time the Division was engaged in combat along the Our River where it was holding a small bridgehead just South of Clerveaux, Luxembourg. The Base Echelon consisting of the Parachute Maintenance Company with all the Air Force equipment of the Division and a large part of the Company property with guards from each unit were still in U.K.

The camp at Chalons was not completed, the spring thaws had made the ground a sea of mud and roads were practically impassable in the new camp area. The Division was faced with the problem of housing the Division in a Casserne and tent area where housekeeping facilities were either poor or lacking altogether. The area was cleaned up, tents pitched, walks and roads fixed, latrine facilities built or improved, stoves, cots and other necessary equipment drawn and issued, hard standing for motor parks built. The Division was given four days to settle in its new area and complete all arrangements for housekeeping. At the end of this allotted time the camp was in splendid condition and the Division ready to start training.

Weather handicapped the movement of the Base echelon and supplies which were still in U.K. However, 500 plane loads finally arrived. The Maintenance Company cleaned an old warehouse and by the 10th of March was fully set and operating in the Chalons area.

At this time the stupendousness of the task ahead in preparing for an Airborne operation on such short notice was apparent. The Division had just completed the most rigorous campaign the American Army had ever fought, casualties had been so heavy that some rifle companies had less than 40 men of their original strength and some were without officers. The Division was about 4000 officers and men understrength. The loss of key personnel and specialists had been particularly heavy. Much equipment had been lost or turned in and the remainder was in need of complete overhaul.

As reinforcements and men returning from the hospital arrived, an intensive training program was undertaken. Ranges were secured and fixed up, individual training particularly of specialists and key personnel was started immediately followed as soon as possible by small unit training. Large scale problems and Division CPX's were planned and carried out. All individuals were given familiarization firing, crews of crew-served weapons were picked and trained. Parachute exercises for each parachute regiment were drawn up and conducted. Two complete Division CPX's were held. Experimental work in jumping from the new C-46 was necessary when it was announced that one regiment would have to use these airplanes. Gliders were obtained and new men given glider training.

During this period equipment was drawn to replace losses. A complete show-down inspection was held for all equipment. All weapons were given a thorough inspection and overhaul. Motors of the entire Division were inspected and overhauled in the unbelievably short time of 15 days. Combat loads of ammunition weighing more than 400 tons were hauled and distributed.

In the midst of this strenuous preparation it was decided to completely reorganize the division under new T/O's. This involved the deactivation of one regiment and the consolidation of the personnel of two regiments into one. It also necessitated the withdrawal and reassignment of a large part of the individual and organizational equipment and the reassignment and retraining of individuals. A new Parachute Field Artillery Battalion was assigned to the division and arrived only 10 days prior to D-Day. This battalion had to be given additional equipment and instructions to incorporate it into the division artillery team.

During this entire period, planning for the operation had to be done concurrently. The planning, involving as it did, coordination with the Troop Carrier, Airforce (both American and British) Ground Forces, (American and British) and a highly coordinated plan for Field Artillery support, required the utmost care and energy on the part of all staffs. Not the least difficult part of the planning was the movement of the Division to 12 widely dispersed marshalling areas and the movement of the land tail of approximately 2000 vehicles to a concentration area just west of the Rhine over roads controlled by the British.

Although the difficulties facing the Division at times seemed to be insurmountable the untiring work on the part of the staffs and all echelons of command overcame in the short period of about six weeks the tremendous problems already enumerated and others too numerous to list. The Division was completely equipped, fully trained and morale was at a peak. All movements were accomplished on time, men were carefully and adequately briefed and went into the operation with a feeling of confidence.

The ultimate success of the operation attested the thoroughness of the preparation and is a splendid commentary on the efficiency, energy, and devotion to duty of the staffs and commanders down to the lowest echelon. It was to their credit that operation "VARSITY" was the most successful Airborne operation ever undertaken.

W. M. Miley

W. M. MILEY
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION

SECOND BRITISH ARMY
NINTH U. S. ARMY
FAA
Twelfth Army Gp.
Twenty-First Army Gp.
IX TCC
XIII Corps.
XVI Corps
XVIII Corps (Abn)
XIX Corps
XII British Corps
VIII British Corps
25th Scottish Div.
6th British Abn Div.
82nd Abn Div.
101st Abn Div.
13th Abn Div.
1st British Commando Brig.
6th British Gds Armd Brig.
C & GS School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.
Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.
Field Arty School, Ft. Sill, Okla.
AGF, Washington, D. C.
Airborne Center, Camp Mackall, N. C.

* ~~TOP SECRET~~ *
* Auth: CG 17th Abn Div *
* Init: *
* Date: 18 March 1945 *

~~SECRET~~
VARSITY

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
APO 452, U. S. Army
18 March 1945.

Copy No. 21 of 100 Copies.
To: C of S, 17th Abn Div.

FO #1.

MAPS: GSGS 4414; sheets 4203, 4303, 4403, 4204, 4304, 4404, 4205, 4305, 4405;
scale 1:25,000.

1. a. Int Annex #1 dtd 10 March 1945 and Change #1 dtd 16 March 1945.
 - b. (1) 15 Div (Br) a part of XII Corps (Br) will commence assault crossings of the RHINE R in the vic of WESEL at H-Hour, D-Day.
 - (2) XVIII Corps (Abn) consisting of 6 Br Abn Div and 17 US Abn Div will drop in the WESEL area at P-Hour, D-Day to assist the assault crossings of 15 Div (Br).
 - (3) 1st Commando Brig (Br) will cross RHINE R N of WESEL at H-4 Hours, D-1 Day and capture WESEL.
 - (4) NINTH AIR FORCE will accompany the 17 US Abn Div air lift to WESE. SECOND TAF will accompany US air lift to DZ's and LZ's and continue to work in cooperation with 17 US Abn Div.
 - (5) IX TCC will transport parachute troops, glider troops and equipment of the 17 Abn Div and will effect air resupply to the 17 Abn Div.
2. 17 US ABN DIV will drop at P-Hour, D-Day; seize, clear and secure the div area with priority to the high ground just E of DIERSFORDT, and the bridges over the ISSEL R from (253439) to (235458) (both incl); protect the right (S) flk of Corps; establish contact with 1st Commando Brig (Br) NE of WESEL at (to be announced), with 15 Div (Br) at (to be announced) and with 6 Br Abn Div at (161456), (169462), (219477) and (196467).

Atchd (in land tail):

605 TD Bn, 3" (towed) (US)
771 Med Tk Bn (US)
Co A, 3d Cml Bn (Mtz) 4.2 mortar (US)
387 AAA AW Bn SP (US)
692 FA Bn 25 pdr (US)

3. a. 194 CT

Troops

194 Gli Inf
681 Gli FA Bn
Btry E 155 AA Bn
Btry B 155 AA Bn
Gli Pilots 437, 436, 435, 439 Groups

- (1) Seize and hold crossings over ISSEL R.
- (2) Clear regt'l portion of div area.
- (3) Defend line of ISSEL R and ISSEL CANAL with the minimum of personnel
- (4) Maintain strong reserves to destroy any enemy penetrations into regt'l area.
- (5) Hold one (1) gli inf bn in res to be committed only on div order.
- (6) Prevent enemy penetrations into regt'l sector from SW.

~~SECRET~~
VARSITY

Hq 17th Abn Div, APO 452, U. S. Army, dtd 18 March 1945, FO #1, cont'd.

- (7) Outpost position.
- (8) Prepare plans for movement to SE.
- (9) JUNCTION POINTS:
With 1st Cmdo Brig (Br) - to be announced.
With 513 CT - (223457)
With 507 CT - (209449)

b. 507 CT

Troops

507 Prcht Inf
464 Prcht FA Bn
Btry A 155 AA Bn

- (1) Seize obj and assist by fire the assault crossings of 15 Div (Br).
- (2) Clear regt'l portion of div area.
- (3) Prevent enemy penetrations into regt'l area.
- (4) Assemble along E edge of woods upon junction with assault units.
- (5) JUNCTION POINTS:
With 194 CT - (209449)
With 513 CT - (RJ (182449) & (196453)

c. 513 CT

Troops

513 Prcht Inf
466 Prcht FA Bn
Btry C 155 AA Bn
139 Engr Bn
Gli Pilots 440, 441, 442, 314 Groups.

- (1) 3d Bn 513 Prcht Inf will prevent any enemy crossings of ISSEL R in regt'l area and occupy OPLR.
- (2) 513 CT (-3d Bn)
 - (a) Seize obj and assist by fire the assault crossings of 15 Div (Br)
 - (b) Clear regt'l portion of div area.
 - (c) Consolidate in eastern part of sector upon junction with assault units.
- (3) 513 CT CONTACT POINTS:
With 194 CT - (223457)
With 6 Abn Div (Br) - (161456) and (169462) and (219477) and (196467)
With 507 CT - RJ (182449) and (196453)

d. 17 Abn Div Arty

Reinforcing: RA 53 (W) Div (Br)
81 Field Regt (25 prs)
83 Field Regt (25 prs)
133 Field Regt (25 prs)
One Medium Regt (5.5 in. guns)

- (1) 464 Prcht FA Bn - initially atchd to 507 Prcht Inf. Revert to div control on div order and then to dir sup of 507 Prcht Inf.

Hq 17th Abn Div, APO 452, U. S. Army, dtd 18 March 1945, FO #1, cont'd.

- (2) 466 Prcht FA Bn - initially atchd to 513 Prcht Inf. Revert to div control on div order and then to dir sup of 513 Prcht Inf.
- (3) 681 Gli FA Bn - initially atchd to 194 Gli Inf. Revert to div control on div order and then to dir sup of 194 Gli Inf.
- (4) 680 Gli FA Bn - gen sup.
- (5) RA 53 (W) Div (Br) - gen sup. (133 Field Regt reing fires of 464 Prcht FA Bn; 83 Field Regt reinf fires of 466 Prcht FA Bn; 81 Field Regt reinf fires of 681 Gli FA Bn.

e. 155 AA Bn

- (1) Btry B atchd 194 CT after landing.
- (2) Btry A atchd 507 CT after landing.
- (3) Btry C atchd 513 CT after landing.
- (4) Btry E atchd 194 CT after landing.
- (5) Btrys D and F - in land tail will establish AA protection for Div CP.
- (6) AT Btrys upon landing will go immediately to local defense positions prepared to repulse local armored atks. After reconnaissance btrys will be moved to prearranged positions at which time they become atchd to CT's.

f. 139 Engr Bn

- (1) Atchd to 513 CT upon landing for the purpose of clearing LZ "N" and establishing a defense against a possible breakthrough from the N.
- (2) Be prepared on release from CT attachment -
 - (a) To assist div in crossing ISSEL R. and/or ISSEL CANAL.
 - (b) To clear roads and areas of mines and booby traps.
 - (c) To keep open MSR.

g. 1st Commando Brig (Br)

- (1) Send Ln O to div and 194 CT upon arrival of gli elms.
- (2) Be prepared to extend bridgehead to the E between 194 CT and LIPPE R.

h. Gli Pilots

- (1) Gli Pilots of Groups 435, 436, 437, and 439 atchd to 194 CT. Gli pilots of Groups 440, 441, 442 and 314 atchd to 513 CT. These pilots will be organized and equipped to assist in the defense of div area. Senior gli pilot will submit to div through CO of unit to which atchd a report on gli landings showing landing position of each gli, injuries and supplies left in gliders. Senior gli pilots LZ "N" and LZ "S" will assist abn trs in locating themselves on the ground. Gli pilots will guard gliders to prevent their destruction. Senior gli pilot LZ "N" and LZ "S" will send liaison officers to Div CP as soon after landing as possible.
- (2) Gli pilots will be evacuated on div order at the earliest practical moment to a rendezvous point on E bank of RHINE R.

- x. (1) One (1) Pathfinder team of one (1) officer and nine (9) enlisted men each, will be carried in Serials A-1 and A-5 to DZ "W" and DZ "X" respectively

... of area... will send liaison officer to... as soon after landing as possible.

... (S) ...

Hq 17th Abn Div, APO #1, U.S. Army, dtd 18 March 1945, FC #1, cont'd. (I) .x

- (2) Each individual will be issued a yellow triangle in the marshalling area to be used for ground to ground identification on D-Day.
- (3) British jump helmets may be worn initially by 6 Br Abn Div personnel.
- (4) Red berets may be worn by 6 Br Abn Div personnel for additional identification.
- (5) D-Day - to be announced.
H-Hour - time of assault crossing of RHINE R by 15 Div (Br) (to be announced).
P-Hour - time of land of first airborne personnel (to be announced).

4. ADM O #1.

- 5. a. SOI Index 1-1, Assault Edition. It is to be reported.
- b. CP's - 17th Abn Div (fwd) - vic of 209449 - to be reported.
- c. CR 099278 - to be reported.
- d. 507 - to be reported.
- e. 513 - to be reported.

... (S) ... See Sig. Annex...

... MILEY (I) ... CG

OFFICIAL:

MESSINGER
G-3

ANNEXES:

- #1. Intelligence.
- #2. Air Movement Table.
- #3. Signal.
- #4. Artillery.
- #5. LZ & DZ.
- #6. Opns overlay.

DISTRIBUTION

1 - FAAA	19 - CG	37 - 513
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3 - IX TCC	21 - C of S	39 - 155
4 - Second Army (br)	22 - G-1	40 - Div Arty
5 - XVIII Corps (Abn)	23 - G-2	41 - Div Arty
6 - XII Corps (Br)	24 - G-3	42 - Div Arty
7 - Oise Base Section	25 - G-3	43 - Div Arty
8 - 1st Br Cndd Brig	26 - G-3	44 - Div Arty
9 - 13 Abn Div	27 - G-3	45 - Div Arty
10 - 82 Abn Div	28 - G-3	46 - Sp Trs Cmdr
11 - 101 Abn Div	29 - G-4	47 - (Rcn) Plat
12 - 6 Abn Div (Br)	30 - Chief Ln Officer	48 - QM Co
13 - 15 Div (Br)	31 - Div Surg	49 - Sig Co
14 - 605 TD Bn	32 - Sig O	50 - Ord Co
15 - 692 FA Bn	33 - PM	51 - Med Co
16 - 771 Med Tk Bn	34 - Hq Cndt	52 - Hq Co
17 - Co A, 3d Cml Bn (Mtz)	35 - 194	53 - AGO & File
18 - 387 AAA AW Bn	36 - 507	54 - Div Historian

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II. REPORTS.

A. Narrative.

Planning.

The mission of the Division in "VARSITY", was given to the Division on or about the 1st of March:

"To drop during daylight on D-Day; seize, clear and secure the Division Area with priority to the high ground East of DIERSFORDT in the general area (181449 - 183443 - 191441), and the bridges over the ISSEL River from (253439) to (235458) (both inclusive); protect the right (South) flank of the Corps; establish contact with the 1st Commando Brigade; the 12th British Corps and the 6th British Airborne Division. Objectives to be held at all costs."

The plan was based upon the 507th Combat Team and an echelon of Division Headquarters dropping first in DZ-W followed by the 513th Combat Team dropping in DZ-E with the 194th Combat Team next in order in LZ-S, followed by the Special Units and Division Headquarters in LZ-N.

In order to coordinate with the other units involved and higher headquarters, liaison officers were sent by the Division to the following units: 1st Commando Brigade, 6th British Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, IX Troop Carrier Command.

The division land echelon consisting of 2005 vehicles moved to the vicinity of Issum, Germany, under command of the Assistant Division Commander. This movement was made according to plan and vehicles crossed the Rhine to the appointed release point.

Movement to the marshalling areas began on the evening of 19 March. It was planned to have all troops in the marshalling area two days prior to D-Day. The movement was made to 12 airfields located in France. The construction of these areas at the airfields, the movement of troops and the billeting of the troops was worthy of note. The Service Forces charged with this mission did extremely fine and efficient work and should be commended for their part in making this operation a success.

At each airfield briefing was conducted according to the SOP of First Allied Airborne Army. Joint briefings between pilots and members of the planes, and glider pilots and members of gliders were held. In addition each plane and glider crew was briefed individually with the latest air photos available and sand tables. This briefing of glider pilots as well as members of the gliders proved extremely valuable. Individuals knew exactly what was expected of them and went rapidly about their business upon landing. The briefing created perfect teamwork between glider pilots and airborne troops.

Definite missions were assigned to glider pilots. Pilots were to assemble in designated areas under their squadron commanders. Liaison officers were to report as soon as possible to the Division CP. It was planned to evacuate all glider pilots as soon after D plus 1 as the situation permitted.

All equipment was loaded and checked on D-2 and D-1.

Early on the morning of 24 March, the first element of parachute troops, the 507th Combat Team took off, followed rapidly by the remainder of the Division. The entire column was two hours and eighteen minutes in length and consisted of 226 C-47's and 72 C-46's carrying parachute troops, while 906 gliders were towed by 610 C-47's."

Operation.

The departure of the 17th Airborne Division ran generally as scheduled with last minute changes due to wind velocity so as to maintain correct times over the landing zones. At 0717 on the 24th of March, the first plane took off. Weather and visibility were good. The air was rough for the first hour and one-half but was then smooth to the objectives. Visibility was reduced by a haze from the vicinity of the Maas River to the Rhine River. This haze deepened over the objectives due to fires and smoke in the vicinity of the landing areas. The weather did not affect the success of the operation.

The Division began landing as planned in the vicinity NE of Wesel, Germany, at 240950 March 1945 (for exact landing areas see Part IV C). The landings were carried out against heavy anti-aircraft fire. All serials received moderate to heavy 88mm and 20mm AA fire from the Rhine River to the landing zones. All serials also received S/A fire varying from light to heavy as they neared their objectives. The landings, however, were generally in the vicinity of the scheduled areas.

The 507th CT, consisting of the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment and the 464th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, began landing by parachute at 240953 March 1945. The First Battalion, 507th, was the first to drop. This battalion dropped in an open field NW of Diersfordt, Germany, about 2500 yards north and 2000 yards west of their intended DZ. Part of this battalion, under the command of Colonel Raff, the regimental commander, assembled and advanced NE into the woods bordering the DZ and cleared out resistance consisting of several machine guns and infantry in well dug-in positions. A battery of five 150mm artillery pieces was seen firing in the woods approximately 1500 yards NW of the group. Although this was not in their assigned area, the group captured the battery and personnel intact. This force then retraced its path and proceeded SE along the western edge of the woods clearing the area as they went.

This group killed approximately 55 enemy, wounded 40 and took 300 prisoners, including a full colonel. When they reached the vicinity of Diersfordt Castel, contact was established with another part of the First Battalion, 507th, which had landed in the same field but farther to the south. This group was assembled under the command of Major Smith and proceeded to clear the woods to the east of their landing area of dug-in infantry and several flak guns which at this time were being used against ground targets. The meeting of these two groups occurred at 1100. The majority of the First Battalion was now assembled and an immediate attack was launched against Diersfordt, Germany, with Company A leading. Shortly after this attack was launched, elements of the Third Battalion, 507th, arrived. As this area was part of the Third Battalion objective, Colonel Raff ordered the First Battalion less Company A, which was already committed, to proceed to their assigned position in regimental reserve, leaving the Third Battalion with Company A to proceed with the attack. The first Battalion, less Company A, arrived at their assigned area at 1400.

The Third Battalion was dropped in DZ "W" as planned. This Battalion organized against resistance that was light in the center of the DZ varying to heavy at the north and south ends of the DZ. This battalion cleared the woods as it proceeded NW where it relieved the First Battalion of the attack on Diersfordt Castle. The battalion reduced the castle room by room and within an hour had occupied the largest part of it. Remaining resistance consisted of a large group of officers who were holding out in an isolated turret. In reducing this stronghold, the battalion captured approximately 500 prisoners including several higher ranking officers. Five tanks were also destroyed, two by recoilless 57mm AT guns attached to the First Battalion, two by heavy artillery and one by a Gammon grenade.

The Second Battalion, 507th, dropped on the selected DZ "W". This battalion assembled quickly against machine gun, small arms and light artillery fire and advanced west and southwest to their objectives. The battalion had consolidated their positions by 1100. At 1434, patrols from Company F made contact with British assault battalions which had crossed the Rhine River.

The 464th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion dropped in DZ "W" at 1008. They immediately came under small arms fire from areas adjacent to the DZ. This battalion set up three 50 caliber machine guns on the DZ and fired into the woods in an attempt to neutralize the enemy fire. Within a few minutes of the drop, three howitzers were set up on the DZ and commenced direct fire on enemy emplacements in the vicinity. The artillery fires on the DZ were a large factor in neutralizing the enemy fires and demoralizing their forces. By 1200, the battalion had four howitzers operating in the previously selected positions approximately 1500 yards NE of the DZ. Twelve field pieces had been dropped by the battalion. By 1300, nine of these were in action in the previously selected positions, three were damaged and parts were salvaged from these to assemble the tenth howitzer shortly after 1300.

Res

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The Regimental CP was established in its preselected position at 1250 hours. At 1458, contact had been made with assault battalions of the British, the Second and Third Battalions had made contact with each other, the first battalion was in preselected positions in Regimental reserve and the Field Artillery Battalion was in action with 10 field pieces. During the remainder of the afternoon the regiment mopped up enemy resistance and consolidated positions. One company of the first battalion left to furnish close in protection to the 464th Field Artillery Battalion, and another company was sent to clear the woods north of the artillery positions. By the end of the day, firm contact had been established throughout including contact with the 6th British Airborne Division to the North and the British 1st Commando Brigade at Wesel. The 507th CT had taken all assigned objectives, captured approximately 1000 prisoners, destroyed five tanks, captured one armored car, 2 personnel carriers and one jeep, and had destroyed or captured several batteries of artillery. Casualties for the day were approximately 7.3%.

The 513th CT consisting of the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment and 466th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, began landing by parachute at 241010 March. All of the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment was dropped off the planned DZ. The actual DZ's were approximately 2500 yards northeast of the planned ones, and were in the zone of the British 6th Airborne Division.

The First Battalion, 513th, dropped on the wrong DZ at approximately 1020 and assembled against heavy resistance. Many of the key personnel of the battalion including the battalion commander, executive officer, S-3, adjutant, communication officer and assistant communication officer could not be immediately located. All troops on the DZ were organized by Lt. Cosner, CO of the battalion Headquarters Company. This force then moved south approximately 500 yards to the vicinity of (198475). At this point other elements of the battalion joined the group and a perimeter defense was organized. At 1230, the First Battalion executive officer arrived and he was followed shortly thereafter by Colonel Coutts, the regimental commander, and the battalion commander of the Second Battalion. Each of these officers had large groups of men and Colonel Coutts reorganized the regiment at this time, putting Captain Ivy, Regimental S-2 in command of the First Battalion. The First Battalion advanced SE at 1330 clearing the area as they went to their assigned area in regimental reserve in the vicinity of (208458).

The Second Battalion, 513th, dropped at 241010 March on the wrong DZ and also assembled against heavy small arms fire. The Battalion was formed and reorganized as a battalion within 30 minutes after the drop. The Second Battalion cleared the DZ of enemy and advanced SE toward the planned assembly area. As it advanced SE heavy enemy resistance was encountered. On several occasions this resistance required considerable maneuvering to overcome it. The battalion succeeded in overcoming the resistance and reached the designated assembly area. However, the drop on the wrong DZ plus the heavy resistance encountered on the route to the planned assembly area had cost considerable time. The battalion found on arrival at the assembly area that it had been cleared and immediately pushed on toward its objective along the western edge of the woods W of Diersfordt. After leaving the assembly area, the battalion met only light resistance and proceeded rapidly toward its objective. The First Battalion, 507th Pch Inf Regt, had landed on the wrong DZ and had already cleared the final objective of the Second Battalion, so as darkness fell, this battalion consolidated just E of its final objective and patrolled to the final objective.

The Third Battalion, 513th, dropped on the same DZ as did the rest of the regiment. The battalion met heavy resistance on the DZ and assembled into three main groups. The first group believing it had dropped on the correct DZ move NE for approximately 10 minutes before orienting itself on the town of Hamminklen. It then changed direction to SE and arrived at the battalion assembly area at 1330. Group number two also moved in a northeasterly direction initially before orienting itself. After proceeding a short distance, the officer in charge halted the group, set up a perimeter defense and conducted a reconnaissance during which he oriented himself. This group then proceeded in a southeasterly direction clearing the enemy as it went and arrived at the battalion assembly area at 1530. Group number three obtained their correct location immediately from a PW and proceeded directly to the assembly area.

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arriving there at 1300. The first and third groups of the battalion cleared the northern part of the assembly area shortly after arrival. When group three arrived completing the assembly of the battalion the battalion cleared the remainder of the area. The battalion had occupied its objective and set up a defensive position according to plan by 1630 and had contacted the 194th Gli Inf on its right (S) and the British 6th Abn Div on its left (N) by 1700.

The 466th Prcht FA Bn began landing at 241025. This battalion should have been dropped in DZX along with the 513th Prcht Inf Regt. However the 513 was dropped 2500 yards NE and the 466th was dropped on the correct DZX. As the 466th landed the LZ was completely swept by enemy fire of all description (10 76mm guns were captured on the DZ). The battalion succeeded in overcoming this resistance and assembling some of its howitzers within 30 minutes. Targets of opportunity around the DZ were immediately engaged by direct fire. Direct lay fire was also necessary to enable the battalion to reach its firing positions. In spite of this heavy resistance and the fact that many key men were missing (all of the officers of one battery were killed or wounded before leaving the DZ), the battalion assembled and reached its planned firing positions and was supporting the 513th Prcht Inf Regt by 1200. By 1500 the battalion had 13 howitzers in position. During the day the battalion captured 320 PW's, 18 machine guns, 8 20mm AA pieces, 10 76mm artillery pieces and killed approximately 50 Germans.

The 513th CT after dropping some 2500 yards off their planned DZ's cleared their DZ area, advanced by battalions to their assigned assembly areas and cleared the routes as they advanced. In some cases particularly the 2d Bn, this involved consecutive attacks against series of enemy strong points. In spite of the time lost in the above action the regiment had taken all of its objectives. At the end of the period the second battalion was partially occupying its objective which had been previously cleared by the 1st Battalion 507th Prcht Inf. During the day the regiment captured approximately 1152 PW's and destroyed two tanks, one SP gun and 2 88mm batteries.

The 194th CT, composed of the 194th Gli Inf Regt and the 681st Gli FA Bn began landing at 1030 in CG4A gliders that had been double towed. The CT landed on the previously selected areas except for a small percentage of gliders from each serial. No serial missed the prescribed landing zone.

1st battalion 194th landed in the correct landing zones except for a small percentage of gliders that were scattered. The battalion was able to orient itself immediately and assembled rapidly. The battalion immediately moved northwest from the landing areas toward their objectives, with A Co on the East and C Co on the West leading. The route of the battalion lay generally through areas in which other gliders of the regiment had landed and the battalion occupied objectives by 1400, with the exception of C Co. C Co on the left met very stiff resistance in territory that had not been cleared and they were forced to fight their way toward their assembly area and objective.

The second battalion 194 landed in the correct zone with about 90% of their gliders. A few gliders landed on the east side of the Issel Canal. The gliders were well grouped and this enabled the companies to move off as groups soon after the fire fights on the landing zones were successfully completed. The heavy weapons and AT platoons were able to support the rifle companies almost immediately according to predetermined plans. Within 45 minutes after landing the battalion had overcome initial resistance in the landing areas, had assembled sufficient personnel to function as a unit and was on the move toward their objective. At that time the battalion had established communications with all companies. By 1230 Co E in battalion reserve had reached its assembly area and the battalion CP was in operation. The battalion knocked out two tanks with bazooka fire enroute to its objective. The battalion seized all objectives and repulsed four enemy counterattacks knocking out two more tanks and damaging one.

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The third battalion, 194, also landed against heavy flak and small arms fire. This battalion had heavy initial losses due to flak and enemy action on the landing zones. The battalion organized into small groups overcame the resistance on the landing zones and assembled as they moved toward the assembly area. The battalion had reached their objectives and organized them by 1600. The battalion was initially in reserve and conducted extensive patrolling from its reserve positions contacted the 507th Prcht Inf Regt to the west, the 513th Prcht Inf Regt to the North (3d Bn) and the 1st Commando Brigade (Br) to the South.

The 194th Gli Inf Regt had cleared their landing zones and was 75% assembled and under the control of the Regimental Commander by 1200. The regiment attained all its initial objectives within two hours after landing. During the day the regiment captured 1150 PW's, 4 155mm, 2 150mm, 4 105mm, 11 88mm, 2 76mm, 9 75mm, and 10 20mm guns and destroyed or captured 2 flak wagons, 5 SP guns and 10 tanks.

The 681st Gli FA Bn fought its way off the LZs and into its previously selected firing positions. Calls for fire were received while Battery A was enroute to its firing area and this battery immediately went into hasty firing positions beside the road and fired in support of the 194th Gli Inf. At 1400 this battery proceeded to its planned firing positions.

The battalion landing zones were underfire from S/A's and 88mm guns emplaced around the fields. Upon landing 75mm pack howitzers were put into action beside the gliders and direct fire was delivered on buildings and other enemy positions.

By 1600 the battalion had 10 pieces operating out of a total of 12 brought in. The Command Post and fire direction center were set up and all wire and radio nets were operating to Division Artillery, the 194th CP and both firing batteries by 1400. Radio communication was in to the Artillery on the West bank of the Rhine and they were firing support missions by 1300.

At approximately 1900, 100 glider pilots were attached to the battalion and a perimeter defence was organized around the battalion position so as to give maximum protection to the West flank.

At 2200 the enemy counterattacked the West flank of the battalion with infantry and tank. A heavy fire fight developed and one tank was destroyed before the enemy withdrew.

The 139th Abn Eng Bn began landing from gliders on LZ-N at 1200, and met heavy anti-aircraft fire and ground fire on the landing zone. The battalion landed in two serials 7 minutes apart on the same landing zone. Gliders were widely dispersed on landing and assembly was initially by squad and two squad groups. These groups cleared the landing zones and worked their way to their designated areas. By 1730 the battalion had taken all of its objectives and had consolidated in position. During the day 83 Germans were killed or wounded and 315 captured along with an entire battery of 105 artillery with all of its transportation and equipment.

The 680th Gli FA Bn (105 Howitzers) began landing west of the Rhine at 241140. Approximately 50% of the gliders landed in the correct zones and all gliders landed in an area of 4000 meters square near the center of the Division sector. All elements were subjected to enemy small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire immediately after landing. The battalion cleared its landing area although enemy fire was so intense that a proximately 40 gliders were destroyed on the ground after landing. Firing during this initial phase consisted of direct lay on enemy strong points and artillery pieces, with some guns engaging the enemy within 5 minutes after landing. By 1245 about 1/2 of the battalion had assembled and 6 pieces were laid and ready to fire in the vicinity of coordinates 225447 (sheet 4305). The battalion CP was established with a complete wire net operating at 1345. By 1700, 9 howitzers were in position and 900 rounds of ammunition had been assembled.

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During the day the battalion captured 2 enemy 105mm batteries and one 155 battery which had been deserted. 115 PW's were taken and an estimated 50 enemy killed.

Division Artillery Hq & Hq Battery was divided into a parachute and a glider element for the operation. The parachute element landed in DZ-X at 241025. This element forged their way off the DZ and established a temporary CP at 206450. The glider element landed in LZ-N at 241216. Both elements encountered heavy flak and MG fire. The 2d elements joined at the temporary CP at 1530. Hq & Hq Battery displaced to the Division CP after dark.

The division artillery net opened immediately after landing. Wire nets were completed to all battalions at 251030. Control with supporting artillery West of the Rhine was maintained by radio from 241300.

The mission of the 17th Abn Division was to seize, clear and secure the division area with priority to the high ground just E of DIERSFORDT, and the bridges over the ISSEL R from (253439) to (235458) (both incls), protect the right flank (S) of Corps, establish contact with 1st Commando Brigade (British) NE of WESEL, with the 15th Division (Scottish) and with the 6th Airborne Division (British) on the left (N).

The division mission was accomplished in every particular within a few hours after landing. It was accomplished in the face of heavy flak and heavy initial resistance on and around the landing areas by enemy troops who had been ordered to sleep at their gun positions the preceding night.

The operation was characterized by the rapid assembly of troops and the rapid and effective establishment of communications and control throughout the division.

The division mission was accomplished almost exactly as planned and with very few casualties considering the nature of the mission and the opposition. The high degree of communication and control permitted intelligent controlled compliance with all plans.

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B. Reports of General Staff.

1. G-1.

Planning.

This phase began to approach final stages about two weeks prior to D-day. A visit to Ninth Army, our administration channel, in company of the Division A.G., cleared up many points of difference from the normal routine and paved the way for smooth relations during the heat of operation.

G-1 reports were all called for as of 2400 to be submitted by 1300 the following day. This was designed to give the units a maximum of time for preparation and checking, give the Staff Section time for consolidation, and require the minimum of effort on delivery of such reports. The daily phone in Estimated Loss Report period was established as from 1800 to 1800 hours. By so doing, it was contemplated that units would have a maximum of time to prepare such a report with a high degree of accuracy, yet incorporating most of the personnel changes. All reports were required to be in by the deadline in each case even if messenger had to be used.

The collecting point for the dead was selected to coordinate with the Quartermaster activities, and was designated at a point on one side of the re-supply drop area. By so doing, the Quartermaster personnel could all operate in the same locality affording greatest degree of protection, and supply transportation could be utilized for hauling in the bodies. Furthermore, the location was adjacent to and readily accessible to a proposed bridge at Wesel: and lastly, should temporary burial be necessary, ample space was available for a cemetery.

The Prisoner of War collecting point was designated near the burial collecting point with the view to using prisoner labor should a temporary cemetery become necessary. Furthermore, its location was approximately central in the area and was close to a proposed bridge at Wesel.

Personnel of the section was divided into a glider-borne and an overland group. The glider-borne group was composed of the G-1, the Master Sergeant, Operations Sergeant, and two clerks. No transportation was planned to be taken. Only very limited equipment was to be taken since a join-up by overland forces was contemplated early.

It was felt that initially the Division Chaplain could be of greatest assistance at the Division Medical Clearing Station. The final plan dictated his entry into the area by glider with the Medical Company. His clerk with driver and transportation were to come overland and join him with the other land elements.

The Red Cross personnel with emergency personal supplies were planned to arrive in the overland echelon.

Operation.

Landing by glider was made D-Day about 1220 hours. M/Sgt McAferty was lost evacuated wounded, in the landing. The balance of the section participated in the fire fight to gain the proposed CP location. The CP was opened in that location about 1600 D-Day. The overland group of the G-1 Section with the Assistant G-1, two clerks and two vehicles with drivers arrived on the afternoon of D/2.

Due to heavy fighting and local mopping up operations, only two reports were received during the first evening. One came from a regiment and the other from Signal Company. By the evening of D/1, all units had submitted a report and the first report to higher headquarters was compiled and phoned in on the morning of D/2. D/2 produced the first report which was felt to be reasonably accurate.

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The Quartermaster and supply installations were established at the NW corner of the resupply drop area (DZ W) rather than the SE corner as planned. Therefore, the Graves Registration Collecting Point was established in that area also, to coincide with the plan of keeping the two together. No bodies were received from units D-Day. D/1 found all units evacuating to the new location. This same day, decision was made to start temporary burials D/2. However, directives later in the evening, establishing priorities for D/2 assured movement of the bodies back across the river and no temporary burials were necessary.

Hundreds of prisoners were captured the first day and hundreds more daily thereafter. The PW collecting point of one of the regiments was near the supply and burial installations. This one was taken over by the Division Provost Marshall and designated as the Division Collecting Point. First evacuation to the British Second Army collecting point was made D/1.

The Chaplain came in by glider with the Division Medical Company and worked at that location as planned.

The Red Cross went in overland, joined the airborne group on the afternoon of D-Day and began immediately dispensing needed articles to the men of one of the regiments. On D/1 and 2, all units of the division were visited by one of the representatives.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The report system as set up is workable and practical. It should be continued as set up unless changes in requirements for information become necessary.

In an operation where a join-up of friendly forces is imminent by D/1, the value of the G-1 and section in the airborne echelon is doubtful. Recommend that in such an operation, they join with the overland column. Where the join-up with overland echelon is doubtful by D1, this section definitely should come in airborne.

The division chaplain can be of the greatest value at the Division Medical Clearing Station and should come in airborne to operate at that location.

Total Battle Casualties for operation "VARSAITY" ending 2400, 25 March 1945:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
KIA	41	352	393
WIA	80	754	834
MIA	0	80	80
Total	121	1186	1307

Total Non-Battle Casualties for Operation "VARSAITY" ending 2400, 26 March 1945:

<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total</u>
2	28	30

Total German Prisoners of War captured during operation "VARSAITY" ending 2400, 26 March 1945: 3,341.

2. G-2.

General.

The initial action by the G-2 section was to accumulate and evaluate such material as was on hand concerning the proposed area. A considerable amount of background information was available, and lacking maps and photographs at this time, a careful study was made of the population, terrain in general, and known fortifications in the entire area.

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On 24 February a supply of maps, a limited supply of photographs (mosaics) were received along with considerable additional intelligence information of varying value. At this time the exact area of operation was undetermined, however with the receipt of the Corps overlay early in March this area was definitely fixed and a detailed study could be made.

March 10, was the date set for publication of the Intelligence Annex for operation "VARSITY" and detailed studies were made of defenses, terrain, weather, fortifications, roads and bridges, and enemy Order of Battle. A supplemental Annex was published on 16 March, containing additional information and thereafter Periodic Bulletins were published with current information.

At the marshalling area a large operation tent was maintained containing the Division War Room for staff use, and another section for distribution of maps, photos, documents, etc. During the three day period in the marshalling areas a large volume of material was distributed to the units and two separate intelligence reports were published. Because of the rapidly changing enemy situation and difficulty of positive identification it was necessary to carefully evaluate enemy defenses and continually revise previous estimates.

Problems arising and Methods of Solution.

Security. - It is thought that the security on operation "VARSITY" left much to be desired. From all indications many of the violations were on a very high level. Soldiers of this division were given information while visiting higher headquarters as drivers or messengers, and even in the United States radio announcements were made prior to the operation giving units and plans in a general way.

Extreme efforts were made to prevent local security violations, despite the difficulties involved caused by the close association with French personnel. It was inevitable that when troops suddenly disappear from a small town a considerable amount of question is raised. Every effort was made to conceal the nature of the unit in its movements and to prevent leakage of information as to specific date and place of the operation. Use of 12 separate airfields presented a security problem, but in general security was good. Unit war rooms and unit security was generally good. Communications security was fairly good, and no evidence of overt acts of espionage were present.

Top Secret Control. - Responsibility for TS Control was left entirely with G-2 and all documents regardless of source were processed through the TS Control Section of the G-2 Office. This system worked out very well, but because of limited facilities imposed a great burden during rush period.

Photo and Map Coverage. - Was slow in being distributed during the planning phase of the operation. A large volume of photos and maps were received but only a small percentage actually within areas desired. It is believed that this difficulty was caused by lack of clear delineation of channels. Approaching D-Day the photo and map coverage improved considerably.

Enemy Information. - Because of the peculiar nature of the operation and preceding action, accurate information of the enemy was difficult to obtain. After enemy forces were driven out of Wesel pocket and east of the Rhine direct contact was lost for a number of days, and during this period little accurate information on enemy intentions or dispositions was received.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that more stringent security measures be evoked in the future (VIZ).

- (1) Strict press and radio censorship prior to operation.
- (2) Less non-essential liaison and observers prior to operation.

That Top Secret Control be handled by Adjutant General's Staff under direction of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, This is the prescribed method used by higher headquarters.

3. G-3.

Planning.

On or about February 6, 1945, while engaged in combat along the Our River near Clerveaux G-2 and G-3 were ordered to the Headquarters of the First Allied Airborne Army at Maison la Fritte near Paris. While there they were briefed on the general plan for operation "VARSITY". Certain basic details such as the troops who would participate, the number of planes and gliders necessary to lift the division and the availability of troop carrier air fields on the continent were discussed. It was announced at this time that the 17th Airborne Division would be ordered out of the line in a few days and sent back to Chalons sur Marne to prepare for this operation which was to take place in about six weeks.

Orders were later received by division for its relief and the movement to Chalons sur Marne began on February 10th. The last elements closed in Chalons on February 14th.

The division was given a period of about one week in which to rest, prepare the tent camp area, clean up equipment and clothing and conduct show down inspections. During this time a training directive was published ordering:

(1) Reorganization of the division under new T/O and T/E 71, 16 Dec 1944. The major change under this new T/O was the disbandment of the 193rd Glider Infantry Regiment and the reorganization of the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment with 3 battalions; the reorganization of Glider Field Artillery Battalions with 3 firing batteries; the conversion of 680th Glider FA Battalion to a 105mm howitzer battalion; the addition of a third squad to the rifle platoons of parachute infantry regiments and the addition of another parachute field artillery battalion, the 464th Parachute FA Battalion.

(2) The training of reinforcements.

(3) Airborne training to include:

- (a) Glider pay rides.
- (b) Basic glider training in familiarization with CG4A glider and knots and lashings.
- (c) Door practice for parachute elements.
- (d) Tactical glider and parachute drops to assimilate as nearly as possible conditions expected in operation "VARSITY".
- (e) CPX's to test radio link and other communications as anticipated for coming operation.
- (f) Familiarization firing with all weapons to include the new recoilless type 57mm and 75mm guns.
- (g) The training of 513th Parachute Infantry to familiarize them with the C-46 plane and the jumping of all men of this regiment from this plane.

This training program was carried out and continued until the time of the operation.

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Orders and directives for the operation were issued from time to time by XVIII Corps (Airborne) at Epernay. Close liaison between division and corps was maintained by liaison and staff officers.

A conference was held by CG, IX TCC at IX TCC Headquarters near St. Germain, France. At this conference training and operational requirements for planes and gliders were discussed and schedules set up.

As Allied Forces moved rapidly toward the Rhine River, necessity for an early airborne operation became evident. D-Day was therefore advanced to March 24th.

Liaison officers were sent to First Allied Airborne Army and IX Troop Carrier Command, 6th British Airborne Division, 1st British Commando Brigade and 15th Scottish Division. The last three liaison officers went into the operation with the units to which they were attached and continued to maintain liaison during the operation.

As soon as the definite mission was received from corps a study was made of possible LZ's and DZ's. One DZ was selected for each parachute combat team and two LZ's were selected for gliders. A saturation of approximately 50% was necessary in both LZ's.

Because it was impossible to lift the entire division with the allotted aircraft it was necessary to select the troops and allot units their quota of planes and gliders.

A decision then had to be made on the order in which troops were to be brought in airborne. Missions were assigned units and an air movement table drawn up.

Plans were made for the attachment of ground units which were to come across the Rhine River and lastly a plan was made for extended ground action after D-Day.

Marshalling:

The division moved to the marshalling areas by train and by motor beginning D-4. The land tail moved by motor on D-3 to Issum, Germany, on the west bank of the Rhine.

While in the marshalling areas (12 airfields in France) communications was maintained by TWX, telephone, C-47's, L4's and jeep messenger service.

The G-3 Section was divided for the operation in three echelons: Parachute, glider and land tail.

Operations.

One casualty was sustained in the G-3 Section during the operation. Pfc Herron was killed by enemy small arms fire immediately upon landing by glider.

The Glider Echelon of the G-3 Section assembled with the remainder of the Division Headquarters glider echelon and moved to the Division CP. Later on D-Day they were joined at the CP by the parachute elements of the G-3 Section. On D-3 the land tail arrived.

Conclusions.

1. The mission assigned this division for "VARSITY" was an excellent airborne mission.
2. The time allowed for training and planning was adequate.
3. The morale of the division was at its highest peak for the operation.
4. The division was well equipped and well supported.
5. The planning of units was sound and thorough.
6. All men were properly briefed.

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7. Glider pilots were properly used and well briefed.

Recommendations.

1. A better communications system should be established between marshalling areas.
2. Recoilless rifles should be included in the T/E of an airborne division.

h. G-4.

General.

In operation "VARSITY", functions of supply and evacuation were grouped in three phases, first, the period of planning and refitting extending from 12 February to 18 March (B-6), second, the period of concentrating in the marshalling areas extending from 18 March to 24 March (D-6 to D-Day), and third, the period of operation extending from 24 March through 26 March (D-Day to D+2).

More specific data may be found in the sections covered by Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, Medical, Engineer and CWS sections.

Planning.

Immediately after arrival of the division in the Chalons sur Marne area showdown inspections were held for all units. New Tables of Organization and Equipment had just been authorized the division and it was necessary to reallocate existing equipment, particularly motor vehicles, within units of the division. This process was facilitated by the enlarged 194th Glider Infantry Regiment taking over initially all equipment of the 193rd Glider Infantry, which was deactivated in accordance with the new T/O and E.

Requisitions to cover shortages were prepared by the Division Supply Officer and submitted to XVIII Corps Airborne which forwarded them direct to Comm Zone. High priority was given the re-equipment process and much of the material was delivered to the Division issuing depot. Refitting for the operation had been completed within one month from the date the Division closed in Chalons sur Marne. During this period all armament and motor vehicles were inspected and repaired, the Division Air Force equipment and personnel were flown to Chalons from the United Kingdom, and arrangements were made to expedite the arrival and final equipping of the 464th Parachute FA Battalion, newly on the continent from the United States and newly assigned to the division.

Non T/E equipment and supplies required for the operation were secured concurrently with items of T/E equipment - some of this equipment was made by the 17th Parachute Maintenance Company. Equipment that was non T/E and had to be procured or made consisted of British leg bags, recoilless rifles, loading and lashing rope, yellow florescent handkerchiefs (for identification), BAR containers, machine guns, cal.30 M1919A6 and hand grenades.

Specifications for a suitable marshalling area camp were furnished by the Division to XVIII Airborne Corps and First Allied Airborne Army on 26 February. The latter headquarters constructed thirteen camps scattered throughout four Base Sections. The capacity of each camp was 1200 with the exception of the camp where the C-46's were to depart which had a capacity of 2600. All camps were substantially completed by 15 March and were in operating condition when the Division troops began arriving on 21 March. During this operation the Division provided four liaison officers one with each Base Section Headquarters. These liaison officers provided the only close coordination between the units building the camps and the Division.

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A transportation corps officer from Oise Base Section reported to the division on 8 March. This officer acted as coordinator between division and Oise Base Section and worked out the many details associated with a combined rail and motor movement from the base camp to the marshalling areas.

During the first two weeks of March, units prepared areas within their respective Base camps for storage of individual clothing and baggage to remain with the Base Echelon. A transportation pool was arranged for this echelon by having each unit leave one 1/4 ton truck and a trailer at Base and having each regiment and Division Artillery leave one 2 1/2 ton truck. In addition the Division Quartermaster and the Parachute Maintenance Company provided seven 2 1/2 ton trucks and five 1/4 ton trucks and trailers.

Road clearances and routes were established for the Overland Echelon which was to concentrate west of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Issum, Germany. For this echelon it was necessary to provide thirty 2 1/2 ton trucks from sources outside the division. The 2,005 vehicles involved in the movement of the Overland Echelon used two routes and covered the 246 miles without any overnight halt.

The planning phase for operation "VARSITY" progressed from day to day as reflected by the various activities, initially and principally with XVIII Airborne Corps and subsequently more detailed arrangements with outside headquarters. Arrangements were made with First Allied Airborne Army in regard to air resupply on D-14, and subsequently the G-4 Section inspected supplies being prepared at the resupply airstrips for the operation. The Division G-4 conferred with G-4 of Ninth Army on ground resupply arrangements on D-12.

The general plan for supply and evacuation for the operation called for all classes of supplies sufficient for a minimum of one day to be carried by air as basic unit loads. Immediately following the air lifts of the division a resupply mission consisting of 270 tons of all classes of supply (enough for one day) was to be flown by B-24 bombers based in the United Kingdom. An automatic resupply mission of 540 tons of all classes of supply was scheduled for D/1. Further items to be delivered by air were to be requested by division through XVIII Airborne Corps to First Allied Airborne Army who would be responsible for procuring them, preparing them for aerial delivery and dropping them into the DZ's. DZ's were to be marked by pathfinder personnel. All aerial resupply subsequent to D/1 was to be upon radio request by division, and sufficient material was prepared at the resupply air strips (there were three on the continent) to sustain the division for nine days of operation.

Additional supplies and replacement items of critical equipment, particularly radios and crew served weapons, were carried in the Overland Echelon. Ground resupply arrangements were made with Ninth Army who established a dump west of the Rhine River for this purpose. This dump consisted of all classes of supplies and was to be maintained at three days operating level until normal bridge traffic across the river was established.

A Quartermaster Amphibious Truck Company DUKW's, augmented by 27 additional DUKW's was provided the division for the movement of supplies across the river until bridges were established. These DUKW's also provided an additional means of resupply should the air resupply mission fail or bridging operations be unsuccessful.

Because of the restriction on the number of gliders available for the operation, the bulk of the division supply personnel and equipment was in the overland echelon.

In order to provide the necessary labor to carry out the division's part of the supply plan, one platoon from a Quartermaster Service Company was attached to the division; Ninth Army was to operate the supply dump on the west bank of the Rhine River, the division was to operate all dumps on the east bank of the River.

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As a special measure to expedite the recovery of Air Force Equipment three officers and 57 men from the Division Prcht Maintenance Co were to jump with the 507th CT. These men were to be reinforced by 1 officer and 47 men after contact with the ground echelon was established.

Medical service and supply was to be furnished the Division Medical Co which was to go in airborne and be prepared to hold all casualties for 48 hrs if necessary. Two surgical teams were attached to the Medical Co for the operation. Back up on the west bank of the Rhine was to be provided initially by one platoon from an Army Clearing Co, this platoon was then to ferry across the Rhine on D-1. Six DUKW's were set aside to move casualties to evacuation hospitals on the west bank of the river.

Priorities were established for vehicles in the Overland Echelon to cross the river. The general plan on the priorities was for the tactical units transportation and organic ambulances plus a few control vehicles for Division Supply officers to cross first followed by heavy transportation of Division Service Organizations. An attached tank battalion and attached TD battalion were also given high priority but their crossing depended upon heavy river craft and heavy capacity bridges being available.

Marshalling Areas

Units began to shift supplies and equipment to the marshalling areas on D-6. This left only individual equipment to be carried on the transportation moving the troops. Division Air Force equipment and necessary rigger personnel were also moved to the departure fields at this time. This work was completed by D-6 using only organic transportation.

The rail movement to the marshalling area began on D-4 and advance parties departed by motor at the same time. Comm Zone vehicles were used to carry troops to the entraining points and then used to transport other troops to two nearby airfields. All troops had closed in the marshalling areas early in the afternoon of D-3. Transportation from detraining points to the various marshalling areas was also furnished by Comm Zone. Comm Zone also manned the marshalling areas, ran the messes, furnished the quarters and provided medical service. Every effort was made to give the men as many comforts as possible.

During the three days in the marshalling areas it was necessary to fill small last minute shortages in equipment and supplies. Comm Zone Ordnance repair parties made some minor repairs to individual weapons.

The Division Land Echelon under the Command of the Assistant Division Commander left base camp the morning of D-3 and closed in its appointed assembly area at 0400 of D-2 with no major difficulties encountered.

Operations

On D Day the Division Supply personnel traveling by glider came into the area of operations with only minor losses; however, some supply gliders were not located until late that day.

The airborne medical personnel sustained a substantial loss when members of one surgical team became casualties upon landing due to enemy action. This threw a very heavy burden on the remaining surgical team.

The air resupply mission, which was flown as scheduled, was approximately 75% effective. Some bundles were released very close to the ground while others were scattered. The later was brought about in part by the inability of the pathfinder personnel, who were to mark the resupply DZ, to reach the field in time. This personnel jumped with a battalion of CT 507. This battalion was dropped to the north of its DZ. The pathfinders could not work down to DZ W (the DZ for this battalion and the resupply) until and intervening wooded area was cleared of the enemy.

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Supplies via DUKWS began crossing the Rhine by 1700 D Day. Based on tactical reasons, higher headquarters concelled the air resupply scheduled for D/1. This required a shifting in the loading plan for the DUKWS and a change in their traffic priority, which was accomplished as quickly as possible. It also required the establishment of supply dumps nearer the east bank of the river (originally it was planned to consolidate these dumps with those established for air resupply in the vicinity of the resupply DZ).

By daylight D/1 DUKWS were transporting supplies over the river in quantities more than sufficient to support the current operation. DUKWS were permitted to use the bidge, which expedited their movement materially.

The platoon from the Army Clearing Co established a station on the east bank of the Rhine prior to noon D/1, to which casualties from the Division Clearing Station were evacuated in Division ambulances. Army ambulances and DUKWS were used to move casualties to the evacuation hospitals on the west bank of the river.

Vehicles of the Overland Tail were crossing the river at such rate as to put them in advance of their schedule early on D/1. On D/2 all vehicles reached the east bank of the Rhine.

Personnel from the 17th Prcht Maintenance Co began their salvage of AAF equipment on D Day. In spite of their efforts, only a small part of this equipment either undamaged or damaged was eventually recovered.

By noon of D/2 operation of medical service was normal for Allied personnel - by midnight D/2 all wounded German prisoners had been caried back across the river. Thus medical evacuation had become normal.

By 2400 D/2 Supply dumps Classes I - III - V had been built up to the point where they could support three days operation. Sufficient Class II and IV items were on hand in the vehicles of the Overland Tail to provide for unit needs until normal cross - river traffic could be established.

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D. Division Artillery Report.

Planning.

a. The mission of the 17th Airborne Division and general plan of the Division Commander was given to the Division Artillery Commander on about 20 February 1945. At that time it was tentatively decided that:

- (1) Initially, 466th Precht FA Bn attached to 513th CT, 680th Gli FA Bn attached to 507th CT, and 681st Gli FA Bn attached to 194th CT.
- (2) In event an additional parachute field artillery battalion was assigned or attached to the division that it would be attached to 507th CT and 680th Gli FA Bn would be in general support.
- (3) If sufficient air lift would not be available to bring in all organic ~~bns~~ airborne, to bring them in with the overland elements and depend on artillery on the west bank of the Rhine for direct support where necessary.
- (4) The minimum reinforcing artillery necessary to accomplish the mission would be one reinforcing battalion or field regiment per organic direct support battalion.

b. The Division Artillery Commander attended a conference at Headquarters XII Corps (Br) on 28 February 1945 at which time were present:

CCRA, XII Corps (Br)
Corps Artillery Commander, XVIII Corps (Abn)
CRA, 6th British Abn Div
Division Artillery Commander, 17th Abn Div
CCRA, VIII British Corps
Signal Officer, XII Corps (Br)
Communications Officer, XVIII Corps Artillery.

At this conference the following were discussed and tentatively agreed upon:

- (1) Direct and general support artillery formations available to support the operation from the west bank of the Rhine.
- (2) Forward observer and translator teams for British formations on the west bank of the Rhine.
- (3) Communications.
- (4) Procedure.

c. After numerous conferences with the division commander, the XVIII Corps artillery officer and CCRA, XII Corps (Br) (through the XVIII Corps Artillery Officer) the final artillery plan and organization of the field artillery for combat was arrived at. The final decision was not made until 15 March 1945, when it was evident that the 464th Precht FA Bn, which did not join the division from the United States until 11 March 1945, would be fully equipped and ready for combat. The organization for combat was as follows.

464th Precht FA Bn, initially attached 507th CT.
466th Precht FA Bn, initially attached 513th CT.
681st Gli FA Bn, initially attached 194th Gli Inf.
680th Gli FA Bn (105 How. M3), general support, answer calls for fire from 3d Bn 513th Precht I f.

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Res

- 53 (w) Division Artillery (Br); General support (from west bank of Rhine)
133 Lt Regt. RA reinforce fire 466th Prcht FA Bn
81 Lt. Regt. RA reinforce fires 681st Gli FA Bn
83 Lt. Regt. RA reinforce fires 464th Prcht FA Bn
77 Medium Regt. RA (5.5G), General Support.

Briefing.

Briefing of Division Artillery staff was held to a minimum number and no member was briefed until it was considered necessary, none being briefed prior to D-24. Battalion commanders and staffs were briefed on D-15 and battery commanders on D-8.

Final briefing of all remaining officers and enlisted men in the Air lift was completed between D-3 and D-1 after being sealed at departure fields. The final briefing was so complete that every officer and enlisted man knew the "big picture," the plan for the division, the plan for his unit and what he as an individual was going to do on landing. The value of this complete briefing was proven by the superior performance of the units upon landing.

Rehearsals.

No rehearsals were held except for a communication exercise involving all wire and radio communication of the division artillery, including the special forward observer and translator teams, on 14 March 1945. Since all personnel involved in this rehearsal had not been briefed, it was staged as a type of communication exercise.

Forward Observers, Liaison and Translators.

a. Organic.

464th Prcht FA Bn - one (1) forward observer section and one (1) liaison section with each battalion of 507th Prcht Inf; also a command liaison section with regimental commander.

466th Prcht FA Bn - one (1) forward observer section and one (1) liaison section with each battalion of 513th Prcht Inf; also a command liaison section with each regimental commander.

681st Gli FA Bn - one (1) forward observer section and one (1) liaison section with each battalion of 194th Gli Inf; also a command liaison section with regimental commander.

680th Gli FA Bn - one (1) forward observer section and one (1) liaison section with with 3d Bn, 513th Prcht Inf.

b. 53 (w) Division Artillery (Br)

81 Field Regiment, RA - One (1) forward observer section with each battalion of 194th Gli Inf and one (1) liaison section with CO, 681st Gli FA Bn.

83 Field Regiment, RA - One (1) forward observer section with each battalion of 507th Prcht Inf and one (1) liaison section with CO, 464th Prcht FA Bn.

133 Field Regiment, RA - One (1) forward observer section with each battalion of 513th Prcht Inf and one (1) liaison section with CO, 466th Prcht FA Bn.

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53 (w) Division Artillery - One (1) liaison section with commanding General, 17th Airborne Division Artillery.

XVIII Corps (Abn) Artillery - One (1) Liaison section with CG, 17th Abn Div Arty and one (1) translator team with each of 81st, 83d, 133d Field Regts and with 53 (w) Div Arty. All translator teams were U. S. Army personnel as also were all forward observer and liaison sections representing all elements of 53 (w) Div Arty. These translator, forward observer and liaison sections were trained by XVIII Corps (Abn) Arty and assigned duties by CG, 17th Abn Div Arty. They consisted of one (1) officer and two (2) enlisted men each, the personnel having been drawn mainly from 17th Abn Div Arty.

Execution

Units, with all airborne transportation, moved to departure field on D-4 and D-3. Non-airborne elements moved overland to a rendezvous on the west side of the Rhine under the command of the assistant division commander on D-3.

The division artillery was disposed at five departure fields as follows:

- A-80 - Advance detachment, Hq 17th Abn Div Arty
464th Precht F Bn (less Glider transportation)
466th Precht FA Bn (less glider howitzers and transportation).
- B-24 - Headquarters and Headquarters Btry 17th Abn Div Arty (less adv det.)
Detachment, 466th Precht FA Bn (3 spare howitzers).
- A-39 - 680th Gli FA Bn
Detachment, Hq Btry, 681st Gli FA Bn
Glider Elms, 464th Precht FA Bn, (1 officer, 42 E M, 10 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks,
4 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailers).
- A-48 - 681st Glider FA Bn (less Detachment, Hq Btry)
- B-20 - Glider elms, 466th Precht FA Bn, (2 officers, 40 EM, 9 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks,
5 - $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailers).

Air OP sections centralized under Division Control, were landed at an air strip west of the Rhine on D-3.

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D. Report of Land Echelon.

The land tail of the 17th Airborne Division consisted of those vehicles of the division not transported by gliders (1082 trucks and 353 trailers and the following attached units:

- 144th TD Bn (SP - Br)
- 605 TD Bn (Towed)
- 771 Tank Bn
- 692 FA Bn
- 398 QM (Trk) Co
- 458 QM Co AMP
- Co A, 3d Cml Mortar Bn
- 387 AA Bn (SP)

All of these vehicles and units crossed the Rhine either by ferry or bridge.

In order to avoid congestion near the crossing sites on the west bank of the Rhine a system of staging areas under Br Control was organized. An assembly area between Issum (094273) and Kapellen (048313) was assigned to the 17th Abn Div from which vehicles were moved by stages and on strictly controlled roads to the river. The number of vehicles in the assembly area at any one time was kept at a minimum, only enough being there to insure a steady flow of traffic.

The organic vehicles of the division moved to Bree Belgium on 21 March from whence they were dispatched to Issum-Kapellen area when called for. The attached units reported to the Issum-Kapellen area direct so as to arrive there approximately twenty-four hours prior to their contemplated crossing time.

The British provided wire communications for the staging area including the Division assembly area and liaison officer for the assembly area. The 17th Abn Div sent liaison officers to be with the British Bank Control Officer and at all secondary areas where vehicles were to stop on their way to the river. Two officers were sent to the far bank to supervise the movement of the vehicles from the river to a division contact point at Muhlenfeld. At this place unit guides took control of their own vehicles.

Ferrying and bridge construction was started by the British on D Day North of Xauten (1141) and in spite of strafing and bombing by hostile planes continued uninterruptedly. In accordance with a pre-determined schedule ambulances crossed on D Day; on D+1 most of the self-propelled AT guns and tanks were across and by D+3 the division had its organic transportation and had been joined by all attached units.

Ground resupply arrangements were made with Ninth Army who established a dump on the west bank of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Issum, where was located the Division Rear Echelon. This dump consisted of all classes of supplies which were to be maintained at three days operating level until such time a normal bridge traffic across the river was established.

A Quartermaster Amphibious Truck Company (DUKWS) (augmented by 27 additional DUKWS) was provided the Division for movement of supplies across the river to dumps on the far shore until bridges were established. These DUKWS also constituted an additional means of resupply should the air resupply mission fail and/or bridging operations be unsuccessful.

Supplies via DUKWS began crossing the Rhine by 1700 D Day. Based on certain tactical reasons, higher headquarters cancelled the air resupply scheduled for D+1. This required a shifting in the loading plan for the DUKWS and a change in their traffic priority, which was accomplished as quickly as possible. It also required the establishment of supply dumps nearer the east bank of the river (originally it was planned to consolidate these dumps with those established for air resupply in the vicinity of the resupply DZ).

By daylight D¹ DUKWS were transporting supplies over the river in quantities more than sufficient to support the current operation. DUKWS were permitted to use the birdgo, which expedited their movement materially

REPORTS OF SPECIAL STAFF

I. SIGNAL

Planning

Planning for the signal communications of Operations VARSITY began on 23 February 1945 when the Division Commander notified the Division Signal Officer of the pending operation. The planning was divided into three sections: ground communications after the drop, supply and resupply, and communications in the marshalling areas.

A. Ground Communication Planning.

1. Radio

(a) In order to insure good instantaneous communications upon landing it was decided to set up five parallel radio nets to link the division command post and the regimental command posts. Four of these nets were to be SCR 300, frequency modulated voice radio nets, and the fifth was to be an SCR 694 net amplitude modulated with CW transmission. The four SCR 300 nets were set up as follows: Net FD -3- Division Commander, Chief of Staff and three Regimental Commanders; Net FD - 4-Division G-2 and Regimental S-2's; Net FD-5- Division G-3 and Regimental S-3's; Net FD-6- Division G-4 and Regimental S-4's. The SCR 694 net was to serve Division and the Regimental headquarters.

(b) For radio communication to higher headquarters the Division had two SCR 193 stations in XVIII Corps nets and one SCR 499 in the resupply net to First Allied Airborne Army.

(c) For radio communication to other headquarters, the following plan was adopted:

To 1st Commando Brigade (Br) and to the 15th Div headquarters in the Division Command net FD-1.

To the 6th Abn Div (Br): The 6th Abn Div furnished two 22 radio sets for the lateral link between divisions.

(d) An SCR 193 net, and SCR 300 link and an SCR 610 link furnished communication to the Division Rear headquarters on the west bank of the Rhine River.

(e) An SCR 399 link was set up for radio communication to the Division Base.

Radio teams of two to four men each were used to accomplish these installations.

2. Wire

The wire plan decided upon for the initial wire installation was as indicated on Annex 2. To accomplish this installation for the airborne echelon, six five man teams, each equipped with jeeps with RL-31s and eight miles of W-110 wire were taken in airborne. The remainder of the Signal Co wire section was incorporated in the ground echelon.

3. Other.

The division SOI was put out in two sections; an assault section covering the period D to D+2 and a regular section which was carried by the Division Signal Officer on the airborne operation and distributed on D+2.

During the period 1 March to 10 March meetings were held with the representatives of the Second Army (Br), XVIII Abn Corps, and the 6th Abn Div (Br) to decide upon frequency assignments, cryptographic systems, and means of individual recognition, and to coordinate signal plans for the units concerned.

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During the period 1 March to 17 March all elements of the Division Signal System ran continuous rehearsals simulating as nearly as possible conditions expected on the operation.

B. Planning for Supply and Resupply

1. Supply carried by elements of the Division

To care for immediate needs upon landing each unit carried a three day supply of wire, batteries and tubes.

To supplement the supply carried by the units, the Division Signal Officer with three glider loads of miscellaneous signal equipment went in with the air echelon.

2. Supply by Air.

Aerial resupply for the division was to include three days of signal supplies of 612 tons per day. This was dropped as follows: One days resupply at 1200 D-Day and two days resupply at 1200 on D+1. The division Signal Supply Officer had three men and one 1/4 ton truck and trailer to handle this resupply.

3. Supply by Ground.

A stockpile of signal items considered necessary for replacement of anticipated losses was established on the west bank of the Rhine. These supplies were to be delivered across the river by DUKW's as soon as practicable. The stockpile was established by the Division Signal Supply section and the 9th U.S. Army Signal Officer.

C. Communication in the Marshalling Areas.

Provisions for communications in the marshalling areas were largely assumed by IX Troop Carrier Command. This left the division signal personnel free for duties concerning the operation. IX Troop Carrier Command provided telephone and teletype systems linking all departure fields with the Division CP departure field, and also provided liaison planes for messenger service between fields.

Due to the relatively great distance between the departure fields and the necessity of going through numerous switchboards the telephone and teletype communication was not good. The liaison planes worked well between the fields that were closer together.

Operation

Immediately upon landing the division commander's party which dropped with the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment, began to contact the units as they landed. Contact was established with the 507th Prcht Inf Regt., the 513th Prcht Inf Regt., the 194th Gli Inf Regt., the Division CP and Division Rear almost immediately after landing. Radio communication was also established from the division CP to XVIII Airborne Corps, the 6th Airborne Division (Br), the 15th Division (Scottish) with First Allied Airborne Army, and with Division Base. Contact was not established with the 1st Commando Brigade (Br).

Wire teams left for the Regimental Command Posts as soon as they were reported and wire communication was established with the 513th Prcht Inf Regt and the 194th Gli Inf Regt by 1830 of D-Day. Wire was also installed to the 6th Abn Div (Br) by 2000 on D-Day. Wire was completed to the 507th Prcht Inf Regt and to the Division Rear CP on the west bank of the Rhine early on the morning of D+1. Communication was carried on to the Division Rear CP by improvised radio link using SCR-300's and SCR-610's until the wire was completed.

Messenger service was available upon the establishment of the Division CP at approximately 1600 of D-Day. The first messenger run was made at 1000 on D+1.

The signal installation for the Division Rear CP had been completely established by d-1. A wire net linked all elements of the division west of the Rhine and functioned excellently. This net also included XVIII Airborne Corps CP. Wire from this net was extended across the river to the Division Forward CP on D-Day.

The aerial resupply of signal equipment was not successful. One day of resupply was dropped immediately after the division landed. This resupply was dropped before the airborne signal supply personnel could get to the DZ and when they arrived they found that the signal bundles were spread over a wide area and that every bundle had been opened by either friendly or enemy troops. Although much of this resupply was put to use by our troops, the division signal dump did not receive any of the aerial resupply.

Ground resupply was excellent. The signal dump provided on the west bank of Rhine by Ninth Army was adequate and the transportation of this equipment to division dump east of the River by DUKW's was satisfactory. Ground resupply handicapped to some extent by inadequate personnel and transportation in the division signal supply section.

Recommendations.

Based on experiences in operation "VARSITY", the following recommendations are offered:

1. That no aerial resupply be attempted until a site for a signal dump can be located and marked.
2. That wherever possible a high grade telephone and telegraph system be permanently installed in the marshalling areas.
3. That voice radio nets using SCR 300's be used extensively for command purposes at all levels.
4. That radio link and carrier equipment be provided for the airborne signal company to make quick telephone and teletype communication possible with higher headquarters.
5. That a signal supply dump similar to that provided west of the Rhine by Ninth Army be established near the airborne area.
6. That the division signal supply personnel be increased by three truck drivers and three basics, and that three 2 1/2 ton trucks be furnished to this section.

2. ORDNANCE

Planning

When the division returned to Chalons, France, it had just been through an arduous winter campaign in the Ardennes. The XVIII Airborne Corps Ordnance Officer informed the Division Ordnance Officer on 14 February that it was desired to have the division serviced as soon as possible. Ten days were to be allowed for inspection and repair of armament and fifteen days for inspection and repair of all vehicles. Additional personnel were necessary to complete these jobs in the allotted time and these were supplied by the Comm Zone Ordnance Section as follows: 3 officers and 24 men for small arms, 12 men for artillery, eight men for instruments, and a heavy automotive maintenance company. Thus implemented the airborne ordnance company processed 800 vehicles in fifteen days, and completed other necessary ordnance inspection and repair in ten days.

The XVIII Corps (Airborne) Ordnance Officer made general arrangements with Ninth Army for ordnance support during the operation. On D-7 the division Ordnance officer contacted the Ninth Army Ordnance Officer and completed the following detailed arrangements:

ASP 853 was to be set up on the west bank of the Rhine River in the vicinity of Bonninghardt, Germany (A51.0530). This ASP was to be operated by Army personnel. It was to be opened on D-3 and to have an initial and a minimum stockage of 633 tons of ammunition; 500 tons for divisional units and 133 tons additional for attached units. It was estimated that this would prove sufficient for three days. For the operation it was more than adequate.

Arrangements were also made to have Army personnel operate the ASP on the east bank of the Rhine which it was believed would be necessary to set up initially. Division G-4 made arrangements to ferry 4725 tons of ammunition across the river in DUKW's. An additional 200 tons of ammunition were loaded in organic and attached vehicles.

The necessary additional maintenance and supply personnel and equipment were attached to the division ordnance company rather than in a supporting role. Maintenance and supply personnel attached were as follows: Maintenance one platoon or an ordnance MAM Co., one eight man small arms section, one 22 man artillery section and one tank detachment of 21 men; supply - automotive parts section of seventeen men, 3 parts vans and 13 trucks for an exchange pool of eight 2 1/2 ton trucks and five 1/4 ton trucks.

The Division Ordnance Officer and two clerks left for the west bank of the Rhine to open the division resupply point on D-4. During D-2 and D-1, 72 DUKW's were loaded with ammunition and crossing priority numbers were given to each one. Three officers and 84 men who were to cross with the first 17 DUKW'S.

The ordnance detail had supervision of all CWS and Engineer equipment and supply and extra vehicles west of the Rhine. This took considerable time from the ordnance duties.

On D-2 the Ordnance Co with attachments closed west of the river and during D-2 and D-1 the division supply section drew ammunition and loaded 42 3/4 ton weapons carriers which were to be used as artillery prime movers. Arrangements were made to send an ASP reconnaissance party across the river with the early elements to select sites for the ASP east of the river.

Operation

D-Day - the time of loading personnel on DUKW's was coordinated with the British Officer operating the DUKW's park and personnel were assembled there at 1200 for loading on short notice. At 1530 orders were received to move out the first allotment of DUKW's. The Division Ordnance Officer accompanied this detail. The crossing was made without loss and the party arrived on the east bank at 1900. As the reconnaissance party could not be located the Ordnance Officer reconnoitered for a sump site. This was located and the ASP opened east of the Rhine at 2230.

D/1 - The Division Ordnance Officer located G-4 at the Division CP at 0900 and learned that the serial resupply for D plus 1 had been cancelled. This made it imperative that ammunition be obtained as soon as possible and it was decided to get a bridge priority and bring over the division trucks that had been preloaded with ammunition. The Ordnance Officer departed for the west bank at 1330, organized a convoy of approximately 100 trucks and returned and closed in the ASP at 0500 of D plus 2.

D/2 - The Division Ordnance Company completed crossing the river at 0700 and moved into the vicinity of Fluren (A528544) where it was decided to remain for 48 hours. The Division ammunition section immediately began clearing the drop fields of ammunition. This was initially set along the roads so that it could be picked up and taken to the ASP at a later time. Ammunition recovered in this manner amounted to 56 tons, of which 2 tons was unservicable out of the ordnance supplies dropped. It should be noted that this is only a portion of the ordnance supplies recovered. There is no means of determining the amount of ordnance supplies recovered and used by the line units that did not clear through the division dump but it is believed that a very large percentage of the ordnance resupply was so used.

Recommendations:

1. The complete inspection and repair of armament and vehicles prior to an airborne operation is strongly recommended. The value of such inspection and repair was proven by the negligible amount of maintenance and repair both by the land echelon and by the division during the operation.
2. Arrangements used on Operation VARSITY for ground supply by use of DUKWs proved to be very necessary and satisfactory. However had ammunition expenditures been very heavy it would not have been possible to support the division and attached troops with the number of DUKWs available, and it would have been imperative to supplement this either by providing more DUKWs or by subsequent resupply serials by air.
3. That other supply branches such as CWS and Engineer furnish personnel for handling their own resupply.

3. QUARTERMASTER

Planning

The Division Quartermaster Officer set up a daily air resupply of gasoline and rations sufficient to care for the air lift plus a margin of safety for loss.

Provisions were made in the division glider lift for 2 QM Officers and 30 enlisted men with 3 1/4 ton trucks and trailers to go forward with the mission of establishing a graves registration collecting point, laying out a cemetery forming evacuation parties and locating and assembling the aerial resupply of Quartermaster equipment and supplies after it reached the ground.

Arrangements were made with Ninth Army to set up a dump of concentrated rations, gasoline and oil west of the Rhine River at Bonninshardt, Germany. The stock in the dump was to be maintained at the levels prescribed by division. The number of DUKWs and the number and priority of crossings was obtained from the 12th Corps (Br). Within the division the number of DUKWs and priority of crossings was set up and agreed upon by Division G-4 and Division Quartermaster and Ordnance officer.

The following personnel were attached and joined the ground echelon west of the Rhine River: A graves registration platoon, with one service squad attached and a service platoon of 2 officers and 98 men, of which 40 were attached to the Quartermaster Company and 60 to the Ordnance Company.

The amount of gasoline, oil and grease each vehicle was to carry was prescribed by the Division Quartermaster Officer. Also prescribed was the clothing and equipment to be taken and the number and type of rations each individual unit and kitchen was to carry.

Arrangements were made to have PX rations issued to the air lift in the marshalling areas and to the sea tail in the concentration area. Graves registration points were located on the west side of the Rhine River for future evacuation.

Reconnaissance parties were assigned to ferry across the river with early elements to locate dumps from which the attached troops and later the air lift could be supplied. The first supply DUKWs loaded with gasoline and attached service and graves registration personnel left the west bank of the river D Day at 1530 and reached the east bank at approximately 1830. The reconnaissance parties could not be located and a hasty reconnaissance was made for a dump site.

The Quartermaster air lift landed in the prescribed landing zone and were assembled by the company commander with the exception of one glider load which was lost due to enemy action. Due to enemy action the company was unable to get through to the area previously assigned for dumps, collecting points and the cemetery until the following morning. This delayed the beginning of quartermaster activities by the airborne personnel by about 24 hours.

The DUKWs could not get through to the air lift the night of D Day and a hasty dump was therefore established on the east bank of the river.

D plus 1 - Contact with the air lift was made the morning of D plus 1 and a collecting point and cemetery was established. The D Day air resupply had apparently been successful and the D plus 1 aerial resupply mission was cancelled. Rations were sent across the river by DUKWs and a convoy of 12 QM trucks with gasoline and personnel and three weapons carriers of the graves registration platoon were brought across the bridge.

D plus 2 - The tactical situation had cleared considerably and the bridges across the Rhine were now completely laid out but no burials were to be made until absolutely necessary. The bodies had been collected and processed and necessary records made. During the day the company moved to Wesel, Germany and set up dumps and a collecting point there. More supplies came in by DUKWs. Details searched the battlefield for bodies. It was subsequently learned that evacuation of the bodies would start on the following day (which it did) and it was not necessary to perform temporary burials.

Recommendations:

It is believed that the system used proved to be generally satisfactory.

The supply personnel should be airlanded as near to the anticipated supply installations as possible so that they will not be delayed by enemy activity between their landing areas and the area of the installations.

Aerial resupply subsequent to D Day was cancelled. It is not known what percent of the D Day aerial resupply was used because much of it was collected by the line units, however, it is believed that a high percentage of the supply was found and used by the line units without coming through the quartermaster depot.

4. MEDICAL.

Planning.

After a careful map and aerial photograph study a clearing station site was picked in the western part of LZ "N" (203464).

A dry run was held on all surgical tents and equipment and medical supplies and equipment were inspected to insure servicability.

Arrangements were made for two General Surgical Teams, each consisting of two officers and three men to be attached to the division for the operation. These teams were attached on D minus 11. One Medical Liaison Officer was sent to XVIII Abn Corps and two DDMS were sent to the XII Corps (Br).

Plans for the evacuation of patients by glider were made with Troop Carrier Command but non were used during the operation.

Organic ambulances of the 224th Abn Med Co were given high priority in the river crossing plans. It was planned to establish the division clearing station immediately and hold all patients there until such time as the organic ambulances could join the airborne elements. At such time patients would be evacuated to a holding unit on the east bank of the Rhine River. This holding unit was to be furnished by Ninth Army. Patients would then be evacuated across the river initially by DUKWs and later, when possible, by use of bridges. Ambulances and personnel were dispatched to the west bank of the river and arrangements were completed with Ninth Army for the necessary holding personnel as well as DUKWs and priorities for the medical vehicles and personnel to cross the river.

The Division Medical Company attached one officer and three enlisted men to each Regimental CT. Each officer was furnished a $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck. All of these liaison teams were glider landed with the 194th CT. In addition, two enlisted men jumped with the 513th CT as liaison men.

The equipment and personnel of the Division Medical Company, the Division Surgeons Office and attachments were loaded in 53 CG4A gliders. 25 gliders carried $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks, 26 carried trailers and equipment and 2 carried medical equipment only. Personnel in the airborne lift included 30 officers and 270 enlisted men from the Division Medical Company, Division Surgeons Office, attached surgical teams and the Division Chaplain. Two medical officers and three enlisted men were assigned to land echelon and one medical officer and 3 men remained at the base camp.

Supply.

Normal medical supplies were carried in combat loads. In addition all gliders carried one litter and two blankets as extra supply. All airborne personnel were furnished with packet, first aid parachute; Carlisle Dressing, Sulfadiazine wound tablets, by Medical company on D minus 1 at the marshalling areas.

Operation.

The medical serial landed in DZ "N" at 1225. This was the same landing zone at which the Engineer Battalion and Division Headquarters and Special Troop units landed and was the last serial into that landing zone. The medical gliders were not marked with red crosses or other identifying markings. The medical gliders were taken under fire from flak and small arms from the Rhine River to the landing zones. The landing area had not been cleared when the medical serial landed, resulting in heavy losses in medical personnel. Losses included two officers killed and one wounded and one enlisted man missing out of one of the surgical teams. Approximately one hour after landing the clearing station was set up in the preselected position and casualties were immediately received. Members of the remaining surgical teams proceeded to operate on the most serious cases.

The total number of casualties treated during the day was 394, including 117 seriously wounded, 175 slightly wounded and 33 injuries. The following major surgery was performed: Sucking wounds - 7; compound fractures - 8; abdominal cases - 6; moxillo facial - 2.

The ambulances had not been able to get through to the clearing station and no evacuation was possible on D-Day.

German prisoners were brought to the clearing station to act as litter bearers and to dig foxholes and litter trenches for patients. German medical personnel were given medical supplies and employed to treat their own wounded.

Due to landing on fields that had not been cleared the division medical serial suffered the following casualties; KIA - 3 officers - 11 men; MIA - 2 enlisted men; WIA - 3 officers - 23 enlisted men and injured - 2 officers - 2 enlisted men. The division medical serial lost 2 1/4 ton trucks and 4 trailers destroyed by fire on the landing zones.

D/1 - The ambulances were ferried across the river late on D-Day and were met on the east bank of the river at 0800 of D/1. They were immediately led to the clearing station through some sniper fire and evacuation from the clearing station to the holding unit on the east bank of the Rhine began at 0900.

During the day the clearing station received 270 casualties consisting of 163 lightly wounded, 53 seriously wounded, 21 injuries and 2 diseases. The evacuation of casualties was progressing very satisfactorily.

D/2 - The division was displacing eastward and a holding unit from an army clearing company moved up to care for the non-transportable cases in the station. One platoon of the Division Medical Company then set up a station north of Wesel at 1300. A total of 210 wounded PW's were evacuated by ambulances, trucks and DUKW's. Captured German vehicles were utilized to evacuate some of the wounded.

Total casualties for the day were 351 broken down into 208 lightly wounded, 79 seriously wounded, 30 injured and 11 disease cases. 22 of the cases were allied and one enemy. More ambulances were received on the following day when ambulances from an army ambulance company and an army collecting company joined the airborne elements.

Recommendations

1. It is believed that the employment of the Medical Company in operation "VARSITY" was sound and that it proved satisfactory.

2. The high casualty rate suffered by the medical company might have been reduced by a later landing or a landing in a field previously cleared by an infantry regiment.

3. The advisability of displaying the Geneva Red Cross on equipment and gliders should be decided.

5. Engineer

Battalion air lift personnel located at marshalling area at field A-50. Personnel departed for gliders 0645. Troops in high spirits. Personnel in gliders 0745. Tow planes and gliders began taking off 0819, continued until 0910. Battalion consisted of two serials; first consisted of seven of nine Battalion headquarters gliders, twenty gliders of Company C and ten gliders of Company A, twenty gliders of Company B. Serials were seven minutes apart. Flight from A-50 was very rough, but uneventful. First serial after crossing the Rhine River encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire. Landings on LZ N began at 241200. Immediate contact was made with the enemy. Second serial also encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire, began landing seven minutes behind first serial. Landings of both serials were in general on the correct LZ's although widely dispersed.

Mission of the Engineer Battalion was to clear and defend LZ N from armoured attack from the North. Since LZ N was along the North flank of the 513th Parachute Infantry sector, the engineer battalion was initially attached to them for closer coordination for defense of area.

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Engineer plan was to land in two separate LZ's within LZ N. These LZ's were designated as LZ 1 and LZ 2. The first serial was to land in LZ 1; the second serial in LZ 2. Companies were to clear area by moving along predesignated routes and take up positions at the North or Northeast. The plan, in case of any attack from the North or Northeast which the battalion would be unable to stop, was to use left limiting point of battalion sector as a hinge point and swing back to the West to the railroad, to hold there at all costs.

Because of wide dispersal of gliders upon landing, assembly was by small groups of one or two squad size. These groups moved to their assembly areas along predesignated routes. Squad leaders and platoon leaders were extremely aggressive using what men they could immediately gather and move on towards their objectives and assembly areas.

Company "A", having landed in two separate LZ's, had the most difficult assembly problem. Company A was assigned mission of clearing Southern part of LZ N and was to protect Battalion CP and remain in reserve position in that area. While still in the air, flak shattered the arm of the CO of Company A, and CO first platoon, riding with the CO, immediately took charge. Company A under the direction of its new CO, assembled at location predesignated for the Battalion CP, cleared and set up defense of area. Company A, while assembling encountered small strongpoints and snipers which they neutralized and captured 85 PW's.

Company B landed in LZ 2, contacted enemy immediately. Gliders of Co B were landed in close platoon patterns allowing assembly by platoons to be more readily accomplished. The platoons moved out along predesignated routes to clear Co B's sector of LZ N and set up defensive positions. While clearing area, platoons became engaged by strongpoints, set up in houses and barns. These strong-points were completely neutralized with grenades and small arms fire, and prisoners captured. First platoon, Co B and Co headquarters captured a battery of 105mm howitzers with ammunition, transportation and personnel. This battery had been set up in a farmhouse with its transportation and ammunition, three half-tracks, three 1 1/2 ton trucks, one sedan, one land car, two volkwagons, two motorcycles. Co B's estimate at this time was 20 enemy killed 95 PW's captured. Later in the day, one platoon of Battery C, 155 AA Bn attached 513th Pchnt Inf, took up positions in and around Co B's sector, and fire plans were coordinated between these two units.

Company C landed in LZ 1, contacted enemy immediately. Co C had the only glider destroyed while in flight. This glider loaded with demolitions, received a direct hit from anti-aircraft fire and exploded in mid-air. Gliders were so widely dispersed that assembly was by squads. Movement to assembly areas took place in small groups. Co C had cleared its sector of LZ N and assembled in its predesignated position by 1700. At this time 18 enemy killed, 75 captured.

One of the two gliders carrying the Battalion medical personnel landed immediately adjacent to a German house sheltering forty German soldiers. This glider received terrific small arms fire and a direct hit from mortar fire. The medical officer and staff sergeant escaped unhurt, but their driver was killed and burned with the glider. Along with the glider, the medical jeep-ambulance and a great share of battalion medical supplies were burned. With equipment from the other medical glider, the battalion surgeon set up an aid station and immediately began treating casualties.

Battalion CP was established at 1630 in building previously selected from an aerial photo. Co's had all accomplished initial mission and were in defensive positions at 241730. Counter-attack plans which had been drawn up days prior to the operation, were rechecked. Wire parties were busy laying wire to all companies and to the 513th Parachute Infantry CP. Radio contact was established as a precautionary measure in case of wire failure or sabotage.

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At 2300, Co B reported an enemy force estimated at platoon and a half strength in their vicinity and heading towards left of battalion sector. At 2315, Co B was attacked by this same force. Machine gunners immediately in the path of the advancing enemy held their fire as the Germans moved across the moonlighted patch of open ground. When the lead scout was only fifteen yards away, the machine gunner and all the platoon opened up on the enemy force. Those enemy not hit continued advancing in fanatical fashion until several white phosphorous grenades fell in their midst. The few still standing broke and ran for the woods. Enemy killed 15, wounded 23, captured 30. Our casualties none.

Co A, outpostting Battalion CP captured prisoners constantly throughout the night. Small pockets of the enemy, trying to get back to their lines kept running into Co A's outposts. Up until 242400 March, Co A captured 30 more Germans.

Co C reported all quiet in their vicinity up until 242400 March.

Totals for the day showed as follows:

For the 139th Airborne Engineer Battalion:

7 KIA

14 SWA

1 SWA

3 MIA

For the enemy:

63 Killed

23 Wounded

315 Captured

12 Enemy vehicles captured

Results of glider landings:

Out of 69 gliders landing on LZ "N" and 5 on LZ's

1 Loaded with demolitions exploded in air

3 Were destroyed by enemy action after landing

3 Crashed landed and loads were lost

15 Crash landed but loads were secure

Remainder of gliders landed intact with loads secure

D plus 1 - At 0130, Co C reported in to Battalion CP that they were receiving light counter-attacks by group estimated at two squads. Attack was successfully repulsed with 6 enemy killed and 15 captured. Our casualties, none.

At 0230, Co B reported by radio that their wire had been out. A wire team was dispatched from the company and at 0330 phone communications were again established.

Co A outposts continued to bring in prisoners from groups trying to infiltrate through our lines back to their own. A PW stockade was set up near Battalion CP and every time a sizeable number accumulated they were delivered to the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment PWE.

All companies continued to hold their defensive positions until around 250900 March, when Co A was ordered to send two platoons to collect bundles and unclaimed glider loads from LZ "N" and establish a dump of this material near Battalion CP

One squad of Co A was dispatched to Division CP to repair road in that vicinity.

One platoon of Co C was ordered on mission of collecting bundles and glider loads along with Co A.

Two platoons of Co C and all of Co B remained in defensive positions.

Co B assigned their mechanics the task of getting captured vehicles in working order.

All companies collected friendly and enemy dead and evacuated them to the collecting point.

In conclusion, it should be remembered that the 139th Airborne Engineer Battalion were the initial forces to land in this LZ. One of the missions of the Engineers was to clear this field in order that other gliders might land in comparative safety. For several hours the Engineers were placed under heavy enemy fire. Every house, patch of woods and haystack had been fortified by the Germans. This area was cleared rapidly and with amazing aggressiveness on the part of the troops. The officers and men of this organization advanced upon houses (approaches offered little cover) and were forced to use grenades

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to clear the houses. Instances of hand to hand combat between our forces and those of the enemy occurred. We are very proud of the courage and devotion to duty shown by our troops during this trying time.

6. AGO.

Planning

During this phase of the operation the Division Adjutant General's Office conducted schools for Adjutants and Personnel Adjutants in Battle Casualty Reporting, and assisted in conducting unit schools for company commanders, first sergeants and other key non-commissioned officers. Printed morning report data forms and rosters were distributed. Mimeographed forms for battle-field promotions, awards, re-classification of officers, and personnel rosters were given units to facilitate administration procedures. Conferences were held with the Division Surgeon and Division Quartermaster to insure cooperation in the submission of Medical Reports and Burial Reports. In addition, the Division Adjutant General and the Assistant Adjutant General in charge of battle casualty reporting made a trip to Ninth Army Headquarters, to which this Division was attached for administration for the operation, to insure that Ninth Army Administration procedures were thoroughly understood.

Marshalling Area

While at the marshalling area, the field control officers were instructed to collect morning report data forms and turn them into the Field Control Officer. The Field Control Officer was to turn them into an Assistant Adjutant General at the Base at Chalons, France, who in turn was to forward them to the rear echelon for consolidation in the morning reports. This was only partially successful. The Adjutant General's Office proceeded overland with the rear echelon to Sonnes, Belgium on 21 March 1945, and to Issum, Germany on 24 March.

Operations

An officer from the Adjutant General's Office, and one sergeant were sent into the operation by glider. They had no transportation and carried only a few blank forms with them. Their mission was to collect morning report data forms, and to return them to the Adjutant General of the rear echelon by any means available until messenger service could be established. They were to be augmented as soon as traffic across the Rhine permitted by one warrant officer and three enlisted men with two 1/4 ton trucks and trailers, thus forming a complete administrative section at the forward CP. This was not accomplished during this phase. Due to the nature of the operation, few morning report data forms were collected during this period the first being due at 1300 D/1, to be carried to the forward CP by liaison officers. On D/1 the units were moving so fast and were so heavily engaged that the system was not functioning on D/2 as smoothly as it did one or two days later.

Conclusions

The administrative procedures as developed and put into practice, with the exception of the collection of morning report data forms at the departure fields proved to be sound and effective. Very little adjusting was necessary at any time during the operation. As was anticipated by this office, few morning report data forms bearing battle casualties were collected until D/3, and afterwards. This was caused by rapid movement, heavy fighting, and lack of transportation for the officer from the Adjutant General's Office.

Recommendations

- a. That a conference be held with all field control officers prior to an airborne operation, and a definite understanding reached as to collection and disposition of morning report data forms.
- b. That unless transportation be sent in with the Airborne Administrative Personnel, that the Division G-1 handle collection of morning report data forms and other administration until the forward Adjutant General's Section can be sent up overland.

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7. SPECIAL SERVICE

Planning

The responsibility of providing recreational facilities in the marshalling areas outside the Division Area was delegated to each Com Z section in which the particular field was located, namely Normandy Base Section and Seine Section. The division was responsible to provide only these facilities and personnel at Oise Base Fields. Each marshalling area was to have movies daily, day rooms with radios, games, books, etc., one for officers and one for enlisted men. Athletic equipment for various games was to be placed in the area forty-eight hours before arrival of troops and courts and playing areas constructed and completed for use at that time. Stars and Stripes were to be delivered daily to the troops and gratuitous exchange rations issued twenty-four hours before D-Day. This planning was initiated through command channels and carried out through the various base section Special Service Officers. The general plan was procured through talking with the Oise Base Special Service Officer, and based on his past experience, he recommended the procedure explained above. The procedure was carried out--the various Base Section Special Service Officers serviced the fields outside Oise Base, and the division serviced the Oise Base fields with personnel and both the division and Oise Base provided recreational equipment.

Marshalling

Upon arrival at the fields, the men had the following facilities available at Oise Base fields:

Movies in a movie tent seating 500 men. Movies were held as often as the Commanding Officer desired. Latest movies that had never been seen by the men were shown.

Athletic equipment--soccer, volleyball, softball, horseshoes, and footballs were available in quantities that any man could play games if he so desired. Courts were completed and ready for use when the men arrived.

Two dayrooms were set up--both had radios, victrola and the latest records, and the latest reading material. Stationery, both V-mail and other, was available for writing letters. Mail was censored by Unit Officers and turned over to the Camp CIC.

Loud speakers were set up in all mess halls and music was played and news broadcasts made during meal hours and whenever troops desired the service.

Operation

Conclusion and Recommendation

a. The Oise Base fields had adequate recreational facilities, movies, athletic equipment and playing areas, reading material, day rooms, and delivery of Stars and Stripes daily. Whether this took place at the other fields was impossible to determine, since the fields were too far apart to be personally checked. This check would have to be done by plane.

b. It is recommended that the Division Special Service Officer be informed of such an operation in time to visit each Base Section Special Service Officer and check each of the areas and each Base Section Special Service Officer's plan for recreational activities while the men are in the marshalling area. Also provision should be made for the Division Special Service Officer to check each field at least 24 hours before the men arrive and to make sure that all equipment and personnel available for the operation are properly set up and the plan for recreation at each field as originally planned is being carried out.

8. PROVOST MARSHAL

For a number of days prior to the actual alerting of the division inspections were made of both company and individual equipment to determine shortages which were promptly supplied. Vehicles were checked and rechecked to insure proper working order. Prior to the departure of the division from Chalons, France, the airborne group, which was held in readiness for some time, left for the marshalling areas where they were briefed on the coming D-Day. Maps which were issued were arranged and placed in order.

On 22 March 1945, that part of the Division which remained left Chalons by motor convoys, which were preceded by MP motorcycles and jeep teams whose function it was to control traffic at intersections of highways and through busy towns.

The night of 22 March was spent at Sonnis, Belgium, where the MP teams were on duty throughout the night handling and parking the convoys as they came into the area.

On the morning of 23 March 1945 convoys were again on the road and headed forward toward Issum, Germany; and here again the MP teams functioned as traffic control and as guides. On arrival at Issum, the Division CP set up and the security section of the platoon took over the task of providing adequate security for the CP.

At approximately 0830, 24 March 1945, D Day, the Division Provost Marshal and a small detachment of enlisted men moved forward from Issum towards the Rhine River, crossing it in "Buffalos" provided by the British and on the east bank of the river set up a dispersal point for the vehicles which were to follow.

The Military Police which were included in the airborne element, upon landing in the pre-designated areas operated as infantry until such a time as the Division CP and the FWE could be put into operation whereupon the usual Military Police duties were carried on. The PW section handled 693 Prisoners of War during the first 24 hour period.

The overland element crossed the river in convoy consisting of several jeep teams and immediately on arrival at the east bank dispersal point began the task of patrolling, checking and marking the roads leading to the airborne areas. Every effort was made to expediate the forward movement of vehicles to their respective units.

Recommendations:

It is believed that the proposed plan for operation "VARSITY" was sound and proved satisfactory.

9. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

Planning.

Planning for the operation "VARSITY" took on two aspects: First, there was the problem of what portion, if any, of the Military Government section would go into the operation airborne and what portion landborne and second, the planning of actual Military Government operations after the section arrived in the battle area, regardless of how it was transported.

With reference to the first aspect, the initial thought was that there would probably be a very small number of civilians, including displaced persons of Allied nationality, in the area of the airborne operation when the landing was to take place. No actual intelligence figures were available on what might be expected, but previous reports had indicated that the enemy had followed the practice of evacuating civilians as he withdrew. For this reason the first plan drawn was to the effect that none of the personnel of the section would go into the operation airborne, but would join the Division after it had been linked up with ground troops. This was based, primarily, on the shortage of space in gliders assigned to Division Headquarters. This plan was changed later, however, to provide for the chief of the section to go into the operation by glider, without motor transportation, and for one Regimental Officer to jump in with the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment. The balance of the section, with all the transportation, was to join the Division by land as soon as possible after the landing, probably by D+2.

With reference to the second aspect of planning, it was apparently necessary that the major portion of the actual contact with civilians would be done by the troops themselves so it was necessary to put out instructions to the units in the form of a Military Government Annex to the Administrative Order. This provided for the issuance to troops of spearhead notices written in German which directed all civilians to stay inside their houses until further orders. No plan was made to evacuate civilians from the combat zone. The annex also defined the manner in which civilians were to be treated and defined those civilians who constitute lawful belligerents. It also defined the type of records which were to be seized at

what type of stores and warehouses were to be guarded. It further outlined billeting procedure for troops.

The plan provided for posting of Allied Military Government Proclamation No. 1 in all settlements and towns, but did not provide for posting of other Military Government Ordinances and notices during the combat phase because of an inability to enforce them. It was not planned that any elaborate Military Government System would be established, but rather that emergency actions would be taken to eliminate, insofar as possible, civilian interference with military operations.

No particular plan was made for handling Displaced Persons other than to attempt to keep them in place wherever they were found and then direct them to a DP camp which was to be set up in Wesel by British DP Detachment on D/2 or D/3.

The plan further provided for furnishing a Military Government Liaison Officer to serve as liaison between the 2d British Army and the XVIII Airborne Corps (US). This officer was sent to the 2d Army several days before the operation.

The 6th British Airborne Division had no Military Government Officer and XVIII Corps ordered that one be furnished by this division for the operation, the officer to be returned to us when XVIII Corps was to be withdrawn from the operation. This officer, with transportation, was furnished several days before the operation. The plan provided that he would serve as Military Government liaison between the two divisions as well as to carry out Military Government work for the 6th British Division.

Generally speaking, all plans of the section were coordinated with the CIC due to the close relationship of activity between the two.

Marshalling.

The landborne element of the section proceeded to the land marshalling area with the other landborne elements of Division Headquarters.

In the air marshalling areas the three (3) officers accompanying the airborne elements of the division made a thorough study of the terrain on which the operation was to take place and received briefing instructions on the tactical aspects of the operation. During this time a more thorough study was made of the possible civil population that might be expected to remain in the area, thus permitting a crystallization of plans of action that would be taken once they arrived in the LZ and DZ.

Operation.

The three (3) officers of the section who were airborne made safe landings and proceeded to their respective CP's with the usual amount of enemy opposition. Spearheads handbills were posted and passed out to any civilians seen on the roads or outside their houses. Most of the first day was spent in getting to the CP. In the 507th Regimental area and the 194th Regimental area collecting points for DP's were established on D Day and several hundred DP's and German civilians were collected and held over night. On D/1 the CIC screened these people and the German civilians were sent to their homes. The DP's were moved to a collecting point near Wesel, from where they were later taken into Wesel and turned over to the British MG Detachment for processing. The German civilians, as a whole, were very orderly and offered very little trouble. There were however, many more remaining in the area than had been anticipated. It was apparent that the enemy was unable to evacuate civilians to the rear. Conduct of DP collecting points continued for the remainder of the operation and every effort was made to return these people to the farms and camps from which they had come. One of the greatest handicaps to our attempts to pass out information to them was the language difference. Many of them were unable to read our handbills which were written in German.

Early on D/1, one jeep with a driver, interpreter and clerk from the landborne element of the section reported to Division Headquarters. This transportation enabled the chief of the section to coordinate and supervise the Military Government activities in the division area.

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original.**

Conclusions and recommendations

Some weaknesses existed in the initial plans of operation which hampered the actual fulfillment of the Military Government mission. The greatest of these was the shortage of Military Government personnel and transportation in the combat zone. The regimental officers were handicapped considerably in their moving around and consequently were not able to accomplish all the desired results. It was necessary for them to depend on other units, who were also very busy, to provide interpreters and transportation. It is recommended, therefore, that in future operations of this nature, organic transportation and interpreters personnel be moved in by glider to supply the minimum requirements.

A further recommendation would be that handbills, to be distributed to civilians for initial instructions, be printed in as many languages as required. This appears to be the simplest and most satisfactory means of disseminating Military Government orders to civilians during the early combat phase. The plan to have troops themselves pass out the handbills did not materialize satisfactorily. The exact reason is not known but it is believed that a lack of appreciation on the part of the soldier of the value to the soldier that would result by passing out the handbills, caused him to take a disinterested attitude. It is suggested that on future operations special men from each combat company be designated for the specific job of posting and passing out to civilians these spearhead handbills. Military Government personnel will never be adequate to do this job initially.

During the first days of an operation such as "Varsity", very little, if any, of the specialized work of Military Government can be accomplished. By this is meant the establishment of civil government, etc. The primary mission then, would resolve itself into whatever action can be taken by Military Government personnel to prevent interference by civilians with military operations. This involves as rigid control over civilians as can be exercised. It is believed that Military Government activity in an airborne operation on enemy soil should be given a relatively high priority and that combat troop cooperation should be strongly encouraged.

10. POSTAL

Planning

Mail deliveries were planned to cease upon the movement of a unit from the division area. Mail was to be held at the base at Chalons until delivery was possible after the operation. Preparation of mail for delivery was made at the base at Chalons. Each unit left a mail clerk at the base post office who assisted in sorting the mail and tying it in company or battery bundles. Then each unit's mail was put in separate sacks for ease of distribution at the ration distribution point. For delivery after the operation, the division plane (C-47) was scheduled to make a daily flight with Class I mail to a forward field near Venlo. There it would be picked up by a truck from the Division QM Company and taken to the ration dump where it would be distributed with the rations. It was estimated that one plane per day would carry all the Class I mail.

Marshalling

No mail was delivered to units in the marshalling area. Provision were made by the SOS for mailing outgoing mail which was delivered to them properly censored. It was held by the SOS until the operation, then released.

Operation

At the termination of Varsity (D/2), no mail had been delivered due to the fact that the division plane was on another mission. However, mail was delivered two days later and regular schedule maintained thereafter.

Conclusions and Recommendations

A regular mail delivery service for an airborne operation is feasible and can be operated on a regular schedule subject to weather conditions. One plane per day for Class I mail for a division is adequate.

It is recommended that this system be continued, at least for initial phases of the operation. It is also recommended that a plane or planes be set up with Troop Carrier Command so that the division plane is available for special missions.

11. AIR COOPERATION.

Planning

Air coordination planning for Operation "Varsity" was influenced by the fact that the air coordination would be supplied by the Second Tac Air Force (Br). It was decided that the air power could best be controlled by use of British Air Liaison organization. Experiences of Operation "Market" in which a similar situation existed also supported this decision.

Three British "Tenacle" teams, composed of three enlisted men per team and commanded by two British Air Liaison Officers were attached to the division two weeks before the operation. These men were given glider training and loads arranged to transport the personnel and equipment in the glider serials. In addition, a ground controller team from the RAF was to land with the 6th Abn Div (Br) and to make their way to the 17th Abn CP after the landing. This ground controller team was composed of two flying officers of the RAF, three enlisted men and their equipment.

Conferences on Operation "Varsity" were held with the ground controller team, the tenacles and the air Staff of the division prior to departure for the marshalling areas.

Two of the division VHF radio sets were crystalized on TAF channels as a precautionary measure. Crystals of the 29th TAC (US) were secured as it was contemplated that the division would come under US Ninth Army in the latter days of the operation, and our air power would then be supplied by the AAF.

Three Officers of the division air ground section were to come in by glider with the division Headquarters. Two enlisted men, two $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks equipped with radios and one $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trailer with an SCR 624 were included in the glider echelon. The remainder of the air liaison section was included in the ground echelon.

Operation

Many preparatory missions were flown in coordination with Operation "Varsity". These included bombing of nearby air strips, roads etc. These missions were flown by tactical and strategic units and were not part of the air liaison section planning.

The air coordination was carried out as originally planned. Fighter aircraft of the RAF made air strikes on D-day beyond the bomb line. The British tenacles went into the operation early on D/1, controlling the air power through a rear flight control. One British tenacle officer and two tenacle teams were lost with all of their equipment during the operation.

During the afternoon on D/1 the ground controller team that had come in with the 6th Abn Div (Br) made their way to the division CP and went into operation controlling the aircraft directly.

During the operation the RAF gave excellent cooperation to the division. For the most part, rocket firing Tempests were used ahead of our troops. The TAC R reports given by the RAF were also excellent. On the whole, air coordination during the operation was superior. Strikes were delivered in some instances less than ten minutes after the requests were radioed in.

Recommendations

It is believed that the air coordination planning for Operation "Varsity" was sound and the performance satisfactory.

Reserve personnel and equipment, particularly radio equipment was taken and proved necessary due to casualties from enemy action and malfunctioning of equipment.

12. ANTI-AIRCRAFT.

Planning

Division orders employed the battalion as follows with shown missions:

- a. Battery "A" attached to the 507th Infantry to provide ground defense for that unit. (Anti-tank)
- b. Battery "B" attached to the 194th Infantry, same mission.
- c. Battery "C" attached to the 513th Infantry, same mission.
- d. Battery "E" attached to the 194th Infantry with the mission of giving them 50 cal MG fire support on any missions given them by the regiment.
- e. Batteries "D" and "F" to come overland and join later.
- f. Battalion Headquarters and Medics to go in with division by air.

The battalion was allocated 84 gliders, these gliders took off from 3 separate fields and landed on two, i.e LZ "N" and LZ "S". Battalion Headquarters, Medical Detachment, 3 AT Batteries and one MG battery came in by air; the rest by land.

Approximately 10 days before take-off the battalion received two (2) 75mm recoilless rifles with ammunition. In this short time crews were trained for the rifles and they replaced two 6 pdrs. Batteries "B" and "C" each had one rifle. This was to be the first combat test for these weapons. They were mounted on a standard MG tripod which was in turn mounted in the rear of a jeep. 20 rounds of ammunition, HE and HE AT mixed were taken in the jeep along with a 4 man crew. By merely loosening a turnbuckle the gun and mount could be dismantled and carried by hand. In effect this was a fast, hard hitting airborne self-propelled 75mm rifle, capable of giving instantaneous fire support to attacking or defending infantry.

Moving to marshalling areas, briefing and taking off were all according to schedule.

Operation

The majority of the gliders landed in the vicinity of their chosen areas. Two gliders complete were lost. By 1600 Batteries "B", "C" and "E" had assembled joined their units and were in position. Battery "A" was not able to join the 507th until the following morning. All units engaged the enemy at sometime or another and took quite a few prisoners. On the night of D-day Battery "E" successfully repelled a German counterattack and inflicted heavy casualties.

On D+1 Batteries "D" and "F" joined the battalion.

Recommendations

The Abn AA Bn is in effect the division heavy weapons battalion and should be used as such. It has enormous fire power and this should be exploited to its full.

The 75mm recoilless rifle is far superior to either the 6 pdr or 57mm guns. It is believed that it should be used to replace the latter entirely in the Adn division.

* ~~TOP SECRET~~ *
* Auth: CG 17th Abn Div *
* Init: *
* Date: 18 March 1945 *

~~SECRET~~
VARSITY

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
APO 452, U. S. Army
17 March 1945.

ANNEX #3 to FIELD ORDER #1.

SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Radio Communication:
 - a. The following orders will be observed:
 - (1) Radio nets FD-1, FD-2, FD-3, FD-4, FD-5 and FD-6 will open on D-Day at H-Hour or as soon as possible thereafter.
 - (2) All radio nets will operate on 24 hour basis. Stations will not leave net without permission of the net control station.
 - (3) For composition of radio nets see Annex No. 1, Radio Circuit Diagram.
 - (4) The division radio officer will designate time for change from day to night frequency on Circuit FD-2.
2. Wire Communication:
 - a. As soon as the situation permits, radio communication will be augmented by the construction of field wire lines. The Division Signal Officer will decide which radio stations will close when good wire communication is established.
 - b. All wire circuits will be tagged using existing wire tagging code.
3. Codes and Ciphers:
 - a. Codes and Ciphers as published in Assault SOI will be the only systems carried on the fly-in.
 - b. Code names for Slidex Cards will be extracted from current SOI and carried with the air lift.
4. Code Signs and Headquarters Address Code Signs:
 - a. These will be issued for a fourteen day period. When D-Day is known, the code signs and Headquarters Address Code Signs will be retained for a period D to D+2. The remainder will be destroyed before leaving the ground. Each holder of these items of SOI must pay particular attention to this point.
5. Authentication:
 - a. The Playfair method of authentication as published in the Assault SOI will be the only system used below division level.
 - b. Failure to authenticate must not be allowed to delay or stop the passing of traffic on any net. When transmitting station cannot authenticate message will be taken and plainly marked NOT AUTHENTICATED.
6. Security:
 - a. The absolute minimum of code sign extracts will be carried by individual stations.
 - b. Full divisional code sign extracts will not be carried below regimental level.

7. Signal Operation Instructions:

- a. Regular issues of Signal Operation Instructions will be collected from present holders two days prior to the movement of the airborne element to the marshalling areas or two days prior to the movement of the seetail, (whichever leaves first) and will be turned over to a responsible officer of the seetail. An Assault SOI covering the period D to D/2 will be issued for use during initial landing. On D/2 distribution will be made covering the period D/2 to D/7. By D/7 new extracts will have been issued to bring regular issue of SOI up to date and this issue will be employed from that point on. In the event it is impossible to distribute the D/3 to D/7 issue, D/2 will be used.
- b. Necessary distribution will be taken care of by Signal Officer, 17th Airborne Division.
- c. Precautions will be taken to insure that regular issue of SOI is NOT destroyed.

8. Signal Supply:

All requisitions for signal supplies will be handled through the Division Signal Office at the Division CP.

9. Communications at Departure Airfields:

- a. For Communications at Departure Airfields see Annex Number 2.

MILEY
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MESSINGER
G#3

ANNEXES:

1. Radio Circuit Diagram (Attached).
2. Instructions for Departure Field Communications (Distributed separately)
3. Departure Field Telephone and TWX Directory (Distributed separately).

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original**.

* * * * *
* ~~TOP SECRET~~ *
* Auth: CG 17th Abn Div *
* Arty *
* Init: *
* Date: 18 March 1945 *
* * * * *

~~SECRET~~
VARSITY

HQ 17TH ABN DIV ARTY
APO 452, U. S. Army
18 March 1945

ANNEX NO. 4 (ARTILLERY)
TO
FO 1, 17TH ABN DIV

FO 1:

Maps: GERMANY - Sheets 4205, 4206, 4305, and 4306; scale 1/25,000.
GERMANY - Sheets 16, 36, 17, 37, GSGS 4507, scale 1/50,000.

1. a. See Intelligence Annex to FO 1, 17th Abn Div, 18 March 1945
b. See FO 1, 17th Abn Div, 18 March 1945.
2. Div Arty supports the attack.
3. a. 464th Prcht FA Bn: Initially atchd to 507th Prcht Inf; on reverting to Div control to direct support 507th Prcht Inf. See Overlay No. 1.
b. 466th Prcht FA Bn: Initially atchd to 513th Prcht Inf; on reverting to Div control to direct support 513th Prcht Inf. See Overlay No. 1.
c. 681st Gli FA Bn: Initially atchd to 194th Gli Inf; on reverting to Div control to direct support 194th Gli Inf. See Overlay No. 1.
d. 680th Gli FA Bn: General support (Furnish direct support to 3d Bn 513th Prcht Inf.)
e. RA 53 (W) Div (Br): General Support.
 - (1) 133 Fd Regt (25 prs) reinforce fires of 464th Prcht FA Bn.
 - (2) 83 Fd Regt (25 prs) reinforce fires of 466th Prcht FA Bn.
 - (3) 81 Fd Regt (25 prs) reinforce fires of 681st Gli FA Bn.
- x. (1) Firing chart: Germany 1/25,000, sheets 4205, 4206, 4305 and 4306.
 - (2) Prearranged fires - see Overlay No. 2 and Annex 4a.
 - (3) Forward Observer Groups: See diagram, Special Radio Nets, Annex 4b.
 - (a) One forward observer from reinforcing artillery group will be with each infantry battalion.
 - (b) One liaison officer from reinforcing artillery group will be with each direct support artillery battalion.
 - (4) Metro Message every four hours starting at H/3.
 - (5) Division Artillery Liaison Planes:
 - (a) One plane from each direct support artillery battalion will carry radio with frequencies of reinforcing artillery to act as radio relay provided all other means fail.
 - (b) All other planes operate under Div Arty Control.
 - (6) Special Liaison Instructions:
 - (a) 466th Prcht FA Bn and 690th Gli FA Bn will each furnish one (1) liaison section to 3d Bn, 513th Prcht Inf.
 - (b) 680th Gli FA Bn furnish liaison section to 139th Engr Bn.

<u>Cont. No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
839	16624570
840	15954569
841	15494538
842	15564528
843	18124500
844	22954818
845	23074800
846	23644836
847	22774805
848	21044824
849	21234817
850	21344818
851	21244866
852	21544863
853	25404928
854	25844870
855	Omit
856	Omit
857	Omit
858	Omit
859	Omit
860	Omit
861	24314744
862	24054718
863	Omit
864	Omit
865	23344705
866	23274730
867	23274747
868	21054555
869	Omit
870	22624792
871	Omit
872	Omit
873	23044692
874	Omit
875	19284638
876	19584677
877	20004530
878	19844537

c. In the zone of the 194th Glider Infantry.

<u>Cont. No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
900	22104248
901	23464260
902	23704211
903	23424338
904	24744252
905	24964240
906	24354078
907	24813994
908	25334090
909	26254023
910	27264122
911	28504140
912	29744158
913	25684178
914	25974211
915	25874248
916	26364262

Annex 4a to accompany Overlay No. 2 to FO No. 1, HQ 17th Abn Div Arty, 18 Apr 45,
 Annex 4, (Artillery) to FO No. 1, HQ 17th Abn Div, 18 Apr 45.

<u>Conc No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
917	27044313
918	27284351
919	26284356
920	25924336
921	25064328
922	24194380
923	22854417
924	24954455
925	24834488
926	25124493
927	25614431
928	26124413
929	26604398
930	26714418
931	27974454
932	27274579
933	26054502
934	25524547
935	24904570
936	24124336
937	24224584
938	23764364
939	25534656
940	24174500
941	24834524
942	25884461
943	25934312
944	24444190
945	23044200
946	22534268
947	22314308
948	22114296
949	22164107
950	20434138
951	21804528
952	22514590
953	22804604
954	22954626
955	23484657
956	23694614
957	23614638
958	24634722
959	25034747
960	25104720
961	25244725
962	25554766
963	25604749
964	25934800

1. In the zone of the Sixth Airborne Division (British)

<u>Conc No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
P700	21944788
P701	16934616
P702	18034677
P703	18214679
P704	19534725
P705	19834720
P706	20114755
P707	20664759
P708	21114830

SECRET

<u>Conc No.</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>
P709	21214812
P710	21284805
P711	21284778
P712	21494812
P713	21774857
P714	23004838
P715	15904650

e. No prearranged concentration may be called for by a unit in whose assigned zone it does not fall without clearance from battalion commander of battalion in direct support of the unit in whose zone it does fall. This clearance may be obtained direct or through 17th Abn Div Arty Commander or Corps Artillery Commander, XVIII Corps (Airborne).

f. None of the following prearranged concentrations P700 to P715 inclusive may be fired without clearance from C2A 6th Airborne Division or Corps Artillery Commander, XVIII Corps (Airborne). Initially this clearance must be obtained through Corps Artillery Command, XVIII Corps (Airborne).

2. The following check points will be used by the Division Artillery, 17th Airborne Division. It is requested that the same check points be used by supporting artillery.

<u>Check Point</u>	<u>Coordinates</u>	<u>Description</u>
1	23064720	Building
2	25794556	RJ
3	24744325	Building (Church)

PHELPS

OFFICIAL:

CAMPBELL
S-3

* ~~SECRET~~ *

* Auth CG, 17th Abn Div *

* Init: *

* Date: 17 March 1945 *

* * * * *

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (PARACHUTE)

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

FORM A

Operation "VARSITY"

FORM #2 to FO #1.

	Airborne Unit Include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Aircraft (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	DZ	Aircraft Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Aircraft Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Complete	Time of Take Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-3	507 Regt Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn 507 G-2 Div Hq Col Raff, Cmdg	PF Gp	46	1-3 4-45 46	A-40	W						P	4 racks
	2d Bn 507 507 Regt Hq & Hq Co Lt Col Timmes, Cmdg	438	45	1-42 43-45	A-79	W						P / 4	6 racks - Ser Idr 4
A-3	3d Bn 507 507 Regt Hq & Hq Co Maj Taylor, Cmdg	438	45	46-87 88-90	A-79	W						P / 8	" "
A-4	Div Hq (-) 464 Precht FA Bn Maj Gon Miloy, Cmdg	434	45	1-3 4-45	A-80	W						P / 12	" "
A-5	2d Bn 513 3d Bn (-Co H) Lt Col Miller, Cmdg	313	36	1-21 22-36	B-54	X						P / 16	6 racks

24 Hours prior to Take-Off.

12 Hours prior to Take-Off.

4 Hours prior to Take-Off

1 Hour prior to Take-Off.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (PARACHUTE)

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

FORM A

Operation "VARSITY"

Serial	Paraborn Unit (include designation of serial no)	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Aircraft (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	DZ	Aircraft Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Aircraft Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take- Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
3	Co H 513 Regt Hq & Serv 513 1st Bn 513 Col Coutts, Cmdg	313	36	37-42 43-51 52-72	B-54	X						P / 20	6 racks
	Div Arty Hq (-) 466 Procht FA Bn Brig Gen Phelps, Cmdg	434	45	46-48 49-90	A-80	X	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off		P / 30	6 racks - Ser Ldr 4

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (GLIDER)

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

FORM A

Operation "VARSITY"

Serial No.	Airborne Unit include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Gliders	No. of Gliders (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Gliders Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take-Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-8	G-2 Div Hq Rcn Plat 2d Bn (-Hq Co 2d Bn (-) 194 Gli Inf Lt Col Stewart, Cmdg	437	40	1) 2) 80 77)	1 2-3 4-80	A-58	S						P / 36	
A-9	Hq Co 2 d Bn (-) Regt Hq (-) 1st Bn (-Co F(-) & Hq Co 1st Bn) 194 Gli Inf Col Pierce, Cmdg	437	40	16) 5) 80 59)	81-96 97-101 102-160	A-58	S						P / 48	
A-10	Co B (-) Hq Co 1st Bn Regt Hq Co (-) AT Co (-) 194 Gli Inf Lt Col Schorr, Cmdg	436	36	5) 29) 9) 72 29)	1-5 6-34 35-43 44-72	A-55	S						P / 60	
A-11	AT Co (-) 3d Bn (-Hq Co 3d Bn (-) 194 Gli Inf Maj Rowan, Cmdg	436	36	5) 72 67)	73-77 78-144	A-55	S						P / 70	

24 Hours prior to Take-Off.

12 Hours prior to Take-Off.

4 Hours prior to Take-Off.

1 Hour prior to Take Off.

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (GLIDER)

FORM A

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

Operation "VARSITY"

Serial No.	Airborne Unit include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Gliders	No. of Gliders (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Gliders Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take-Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-12	Hq Co 3d Bn (-) Regt Hq Co (-) Regt Med Det, 194 Gli Inf Hq Det & Med Det Btry B Btry E(-) 155 AA Bn Lt Col Paddock, Comdg	435	36	26) 12) 3) 72 7) 21) 3)	1-26 27-38 39-44 42-48 49-69 70-72	A-48	S						P / 80	
A-13	Btry E (-) 155 AA Bn 681 Gli FA Bn (- Hq Btry (-)) Lt Col Keating Cmdg	435	36	9) 63) 72	73-81 82-144	A-48	S	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off			P / 90	
A-14	Hq Btry (-) 681 Gli FA Bn 680 Gli FA Bn (- Btry B(-) & Hq Btry (-)) Lt Col Oswald, Cmdg.	439	36	7) 65) 72	1-7 8-72	A-39	S						P / 100	

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (GLIDER)

FORM A

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March-1945

Operation "VARSITY"

Serial No.	Airborne Unit include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Gliders	No. of Gliders (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Gliders Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take-Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-15	Btry B (-) Hq Btry (-) 680 Gli FA Bn Trans 507 Trans 464 Supplies (Engr) Lt Col Kuhn, Cmdg	439	36	24) 8) 21) 14) 5)	73-96 97-104 105-125 126-139 140-144	A-39	S						P / 110	
A-16	Rcn Plat IX TCC Control 139 Engr Bn (- Co C, Co A (-)) Lt Col Johnson Cmdg	440	45	2) 6) 37)	1-2 3-8 9-45	A-50	N	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off.		P / 120	
A-17	Co C, Co A (-) 139 Engr Bn Btry A (-) 155 AA Bn Maj Mason, Cmdg	440	45	32) 13)	46-77 78-90	A-50	N	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off.		P / 127	
A-18	Btry A (-) Btry C 155 AA Bn Div Hq (-) Col Liebel, Cmdg	441	48	8) 21) 19)	1-8 9-29 30-48	A-41	N	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off.		P / 134	
A-19	Div Arty Hq (-) 517 Sig Co (-) Col Gunby, Cmdg	442	48	20) 28)	1-20 21-48	B-24	N	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off.		P / 141	

AIR MOVEMENT TABLE (GLIDER)

FORM A

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

Operation "VARSITY"

Serial No.	Airborne Unit include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Gliders	No. of Gliders (chalk)	Take-Off Airfield	LZ	Gliders Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Gliders Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take-Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-20	517 Sig Co (-) 224 Med Co (-) Maj Kenny, Cmdg	441	48	6) 420) 48	1-6 7-48	A-40	N						P / 148	
A-21	224 Med Co (-) Trans 513 Br Air Support G-4 Sup (Ori) Capt Kelly, Cmdg	314	40	8) 21) 8) 40 3)	1-8 9-29 30-37 38-40	B-44	N						P / 155	
A-22	Trans 466 G-4 Sup (QM) G-4 Sup (Ori) Phantom Capt Stewart, Cmdg	314	40	14) 6) 40 19) 1)	41-54 55-60 61-79 80	B-44	N	24 Hours prior to Take-Off.	12 Hours prior to Take-Off.	4 Hours prior to take-off.	1 Hour prior to take-Off.		P / 162	

AIRMOVEMENT TABLE (PARACHUTE)

FORM A

HQ 17TH ABN DIV
17 March 1945

RESUPPLY BY AIR D -/ 1

Operations "VARSITY"

Serial No.	Airborne Unit include designation of serial CO	RAF USTCC Unit	No. of A/C	No. of Aircraft (chalk)	Take Off Air field	DZ	Aircraft Available for Loading	Equipment Loading Completed by	Aircraft Ready for Emplaning	Emplaning Completed	Time of Take Off	Time of Landing	Remarks
A-50	Resupply by Air to 17th Airborne Division	436	45		A-55	W	10 Hours prior to Take-Off.	1 Hour prior to Take-Off			At unit Commanders' discretion	1200	
A-51		436	45		A-55	W						1204	
A-52		435	45		A-48	W						1208	
A-53		435	45		A-48	W						1212	
A-54		439	45		A-39	W						1216	
A-55		439	45		A-39	W						1220	
A-56		440	45		A-50	W						1224	
A-57		440	45		A-50	W						1228	
A-58		441	40		A-41	W						1236	
A-59		441	40		A-41	W						1236	

MILEY
CG

OFFICIAL:
MESSINGER,
G-3

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-8

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	by Flak	
Co G	1		No	X		
	2		No	X	X	
	3		No	X	X	
	4		No	X	X	
	5		No	X	X	
	6		No	X	X	
	7		No	X		Landing gear and floor torn away Hit fence row - Load & Personnel O.K.
	8			No	X	Crashed against fence. Personnel & load O.K.
	9			No	X	X 1 KIA, 8 WIA
	10			No	X	X
	11			No	X	X Landing gear disabled - no brakes Nose crushed, hit stump & fence 1 Gli Pilot, 3 EM - WIA
	12		No	X	X	
	13		No	X		
Co F	14		No	X	X	
	15		No			
	16		No	X	X	
	17		No			X Landed in tree, completely wrecked 4 KIA, 8 SWA, 3 LWA
	18			No	X	X Landed in swamp, through fences and over ditch, left wing 1/2 gone
	19			No		
	20			No		
	21			No	X	Hit fences & ditch, left landing gear folded. Personnel & load O.K.
	22		Yes			Landed on Air Field 17 km NE of Brussels. Tow fitting broke loose
	23			No	X	X
	24			No	X	
25			No	X	X Controls damaged in air, landing gear shorn. 2 men casualties by flak in air - glider load lost to enemy fire as men left glider.	
26			No			
27			No		Nose torn up, ran through 3 fences Load & Personnel O.K.	
28			No		X Left landing gear folded. Glider pilot WIA	
Co H	29		No	X		
	30		No	X		
	31		No	X		X 1 KIA, 2 WIA
	32		No	X		2 WIA
	33			No		X Control & tail shot away. load & Personnel O.K.
	34			No	X	X Flak damaged tail.
	35			No		
	36			No	X	
	37			No		X Burned after landing. 6 KIA, 2 WIA and 2 escaped.
	38			No		X Tug plane hit, premature cut, 2WIA in air, Pilot & co-pilot KIA on ground.

For glider landings see attached overlay.

Incl. #7A

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-8
194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	by Flak	
Co H (Cont'd)	39		No	X	X	2 casualties
	40		No		X	
	41		No	X	X	Pilot & co-pilot hit in air.
	42		No	X		
	43		No			
	44		No			
	45		No	X		
	46		No	X	X	Crashed against boulder in swamp 1 casualty
	47		No	X		1 WIA
	48		No	X		
Hq Co, 2d Bn	49		No	X		
	50		No	X		Hit tail of dead glider. load & personnel O.K.
	51		No			
	52		No	X	X	
	53		No	X	X	Left landing gear shorn
	54		No		X	Landing gear & nose smashed, hit fence & telegraph pole. Load & personnel O.K.
	55		No			
	56		No			
	57		No			Hit fence. Direct hit by Arty. Glider burned 1 Pilot KIA, 2 KIA & 1 WIA. tug wing hit & burning when last seen.
	58		No			Direct hit by arty. 2 WIA Glider burned. Load lost
	59		No		X	Fabric torn up. Tug plane went down in flames. Load & personnel O.K.
	60		No		X	Hit fences in pond nose smashed load & personnel O.K. Tug plane burned,
	61		No		X	1 WIA by flak in air - load O.K. controls damaged.
	62		No	X	X	Left wing 1/2 torn away. 1 KIA Right wing nearly shot off in air, no control
	63		No		X	Tug plane shot down
	64		No	X		Hit fence and damaged fuselage. Load and Personnel O.K.
	65		No	X	X	Glider shot down 9 KIA, load lost.
66		No	X			
67		No		X	6 WIA, both wings torn away load o.k.	
68		No		X		
69		No			Hit fences in landing.	
70		No	X		Hit fence	
71		No		X	Lost landing gear on fence	
72		No		X	1 WIA by flak in air	
73		No		X	Tail damaged. Load & pers O.K.	
74		No	X	X		
75		No		X	Hit tree losing left wing.	
76		No	X	X	Hit 3 fences. 3 WIA by flak in air.	

For glider landings see attached overlay.

Incl. #7A.

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-8
19th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	by Flak	
Hq Co 2d Bn	77		No		X	Landing gear shorn off. Load & Personnel O.K.
	78		No	X		Nose smashed. Load & Personnel O.K.
	79		No			Load consisting of Gli Pilots, 1 O. 5 EM lost. Load lost & personnel reported killed after landing.
(G-2, 17 Abn)	80		No	X	X	Glider crashed. 2 Casualties.

For glider landings see attached overlay.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-9

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Co E.	81		No	X	X	1 WIA by S/A in air
	82		No	X	X	Landing gear shorn on fence Load & Personnel O.K.
	83		No	X		Glider hit two fences
	84		No	X		Landing gear shorn by fence
	85		No	X		
	86		No	X	X	
	87		No	X		Left wing damaged by tree-tail & nose damaged by fence. Load & Personnel O.K.
	88		No	X	X	Nose crushed and wings shorn by telegraph pole. 1 WIA
	89		No	X	X	Tail damaged by flak in air
	90		No	X		Hit fence
	91		No			Left wing lost by hitting wire & other gli. Load & Pers O.K.
	92		No	X	X	
	93		No	X	X	
	Regt'l Hq	94		No	X	
95			No	X	X	Fuselage damaged by flak in air Personnel & Load O.K.
96			No	X	X	Hit fence
97			No	X	X	
Co A	98		No		X	Tail damaged by flak in air, crash landed. Damaged landing gear & wing 1 EM received cuts
	99		No			Glider burned. Cause unknown. After good landing, pers cap- tured or killed.
	100		No		X	1 WIA by S/A in air.
	101		No			Landed NE of Autobahn. Load lost to enemy. Personnel OK 2 back, 1 hospitalized in England, 12 killed, wounded or captured.
	102		No			
	103		No		X	Tug ship hit, and crashed, causing glider to miss LZ
	104		No			Tug ship hit, and crashed, causing glider to miss LZ.
	105		No			Nose hit river bank in landing 2 O 1 EM LWA
	106	Yes				Faulty controls - on long two, couldn't stay in position - landing gear smashed in landing 1 WIA
	107		No		X	
	108		No		X	1 wing torn off by tree in landing. Load & Pers OK
	109		No			
	110		No		X	Right wing hit by flak-lost in landing. Load & Pers OK
	111		No		X	Crushed nose of glider due to soft ground. Load & Pers OK
	112		No		X	Hit fences losing both wings. Bottom of gli torn out. All OK

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-9

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Co C	113		No			Nose damaged by fences
	114		No			Landing gear damaged due to soft ground
	115		No		X	Control damaged by flak. Landing gear shorn & floor damaged due to landing in slip. 3 LWA
	116		No		X	Load & Pers OK
	116		No		X	Wings damaged by flak. Load & Pers OK
	117		No	X	X	Controls damaged by flak. Left side; wing & nose damaged by hitting fence & plowed field. Load & Pers OK
	118		No		X	Tail damaged by flak. Nose damaged on fence post. Load & Pers OK
	119		No			Wings damaged on trees. Load & Pers OK
	120		Yes			Long tow. Left ship slipped wing into tow & comm line.
	121		No	X		1 EM WIA, by S/A in air
	122		Yes			3 KIA 1 DOW 1 SWA - Balance of Pers Missing. Location of Landing unknown.
	123		No			Nose damaged on fence. Load & Pers OK
	124		No	X		Hit fences. Load & Pers OK
	125		No	X		
126		No		X	Left wing damaged by flak. Landed on left side & wheel. Load & Pers OK.	
Co. D	127		No	X		Wings & Nose hit fence.
	128		No	X		Nose & wing hit fence.
	129		No	X	X	Landed on nose due to soft ground. Load & Pers OK
	130		No	X	X	
	131		No	X	X	Landing gear shorn due to plowed field. Load & Pers OK
	132		No	X		Landed OK S/A injured controls slightly. Load & Pers OK
	133		No		X	Landed on nose due to soft ground. Gli cut loose by flak. Copilot & 1 EM KIA by flak
	134		No	X	X	Hit fence without damage. Load & Pers OK
	135		No			Glider landed in ditch nose in ground. Load & Pers OK
	136		No	X	X	Tail damaged by fence in landing. Load & Pers OK
	137		No		X	Nose damaged due to plowed field flak in tail section.
	138		No		X	Flak hit near fusilage and tail section. Gli landed OK
	139		No			Hit two fences-aft cargo damaged. Load & Pers OK
	140		No	X		

For glider landings see attached overlay.

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-9

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remark
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
	141		No		X	Flak hit wing. Nose damaged by hitting fence. Load & Pers OK
	142		No	X	X	Hit 3 fences. Landing gear shorn 1 wing damaged. 1 EM wounded in Jeep. Co-Pilot wounded on landing
	143		No		X	Flak hit midsection in flight. Load & Pers OK
	144		No	X	X	Landing gear shorn upon landing. Nose & wing damaged by collision with telephone pole. Load & Pers OK
	145		No	X		
	146		No		X	Hit fence & farm implements. Landing gear shorn and tail damaged. Load & Pers OK
	147		No		X	Flak shot off tail. Glider landed OK 9 WIA's from flak.
	148		No		X	Hit 2 fences upon landing. No serious damage.
	149		No	X	X	Hit glider in air, then wire line Glider wrecked on canal bank due to loss of control. 2 O's, 1 EM wounded. Load & ammo broke loose and lost.
	150		No		X	
	151		No	X		
	152		No	X	X	Upon landing lost 1/3 left wing on tension tower. Hit 2 fences tearing out rear section of floor. Load & Pers OK.
	153		No		X	Left wing hit in air. Tail hit by flak. Load & Pers OK
	154		No	X		
	155		No	X		Wings torn off on trees. Load & Pers OK
	156		No			Landed on fence losing nose and part of floor. Load & Pers OK
	157		No			Two lifts, first abort & landed on home field. 2d lift OK
Recn Plat	158		No			
	159		No			
Regt'l Hq	160		No	X	X	Wings hit, Crashed landed. Collided with glider 50 ft fr ground losing one wheel. Hit other glider w/ wheel Ran thru fence. Load & Pers OK

For glider landings see attached overlay.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-10
194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
AT Co.	1		No		x	Pilot KIA, 2 EM WIA.
	2		No		x	1 EM injured.
Co B.	3		No		x	Landing gear shorn. Landed in meadow. Load & Personnel O.K.
	4		No	x		Hit fence, bottom torn out. Load and Personnel O.K.
AT Co.	5		No	x	x	Flak hit jeep in air. Pilot & Co-Pilot killed on ground.
Co. B.	7		No	x	x	Controls hit by flak in air. Wings and nose gone. Pilot & Co-Pilot hit. 12 EM WIA (8 EM evacuated).
	8		No	x		Landed in orchard. Glider wrecked. 1 EM Injured and evacuated.
AT Co.	9		No		x	
Co I.	10		No	x	x	Left wing & tail off. 1 EM WIA. Load O.K.
Co. B.	11		No	x	x	Flak cut tow rope in air. Glider broke in two upon landing. 1 KIA, 2 S/WA, 2 WIA. Tug ship hit under control.
	12		No		x	
Co I.	13		No	x		Co-Pilot hit on ground. 1 O, 2 EM hit in air. Load O.K.
	14		No	x	x	Pilot wounded in air. Load and Personnel O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	15		No		x	Hit fence, sheared gear & bottom ripped.
	16		No			On landing direct fire burned glider. 2 O's, & 7 EM KIA.
Co I.	17		No	x	x	1 EM WIA
	18		No	x	x	Landed in swamp, wheels & right wingtip off. 2 KIA, 3 WIA
Hq Co 1st Bn	19		No	x	x	Right wheel off due to soft ground. Load & Personnel O.K.
	20		No	x	x	Hit fence, telephone poles & wire. Glider wrecked. Load & personnel O.K.
Co I	21		No	x	x	Slight nose damage, due to soft field. Load & Personnel O.K.
	22		No	x	x	1 KIA, 4 WIA. Load O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	23		No			
	24		No	x	x	Landed in orchard, right wheel lost. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co. I.	25		No	x	x	1 EM hit by flak. Pilot hit by sniper. Landed O.K.
	26		No	x	x	2 EM casualties. Glider burned upon reaching ground.
Hq Co 1st Bn	27		No	x	x	
	28		No	x	x	
Co I.	29		No	x	x	Landing gear shorne, landed in soft field. Load & Personnel O.K.

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U.S. ARMY

SERIAL A-10

194th Glider Infantry (->)

UNIT	No. on Glider			Hit in air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Hq Co 1st Bn	30		No	x	x	Pilot and 1 EM SWA.
	31		No	x		Nose and right wing wrecked avoiding another glider. Load and Personnel O.K.
Co I	32		No		x	
	33		No	x	x	Tail assembly shot away in air. Glider crashed. 1 EM KIA, 1 EM SWA.
Hq Co 1st Bn	34		No	x	x	Landed in soft ground, glider burned.
	35		No	x		Lost left wheel due to soft ground. 1 EM KIA.
Co K	36		No	x		1 EM casualty.
	37		No		x	2 EM wounded by flak.
	38		No		x	Hit fence, left wing damaged. Load O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	39		No		x	Nose & undercarriage gone as a result of soft ground. Load & Personnel O.K.
	40		No		x	Ploughed field, lost nose. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co. K.	41		No	x	x	
	42		No	x	x	Pilot & Co-pilot hit by flak Landed O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	43		No			
	44		No			Glider wrecked due to avoiding other ship. Hit a tree. Co-pilot SWA.
Co K	45		No	x	x	Landed in ploughed field. Lost control. Pilot & Co-pilot injured. 9 Injured in landing.
Hq Co 1st Bn	46		No	x	x	
	47		No		x	Crash land - out of control. 1 EM KIA, 3 EM SWA. Load O.K.
Co K	48		No	x	x	Landed on nose, floor smashed in. Load & Personnel O.K.
	49		No	x	x	Nose ploughed field upon landing. Load & Personnel O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	50		No		x	
	51		No			
Co K	52		No			
	53		No	x	x	Left wing hit power line. Glider crashed. 2 O's & 9 EM casualties.
Hq Co 1st Bn	54		No			All personnel casualties.
	55		No		x	Wing tip shorn on telephone pole. Landing gear shorn in trees, flak hit tail in air. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co K	56		No	x	x	
	57	Yes	No			Landed in Clement, Belgium.
	58		No	x	x	Left wing & nose damaged upon landing.
Hq Co 1st Bn	59		No	x	x	Landing gear injured on fence. Load & Personnel O.K.
	60		No	x	x	Hit fence, nose injured. Load & Personnel O.K.

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U.S. ARMY

SERIAL A-10
194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider			Hit in air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
	61		No	x	x	
	62		No			Landed in soft ground. 1 EM injured.
Co M	63		No		x	Landed in ploughed field. Load & Personnel O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	64		No			Fence ripped front. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co K	65		No	x	x	Landed in ploughed field. Pilot LWA.
Co I	66		NO		x	Landed in ploughed field. Load & Personnel O.K.
Hq Co 1st Bn	67		No		x	Hit tree, lost wing. Hit 2 fences. Load & Personnel O.K.
	68		No		x	1 O out alive, rest MIA, load lost, 2 known dead, Pilot & Co-Pilot.
Co M	69		No		x	
	70		No	x		Crushed nose. Landed in ploughed field. Load & personnel O.K.
Regt'l Hq Co	71		No			Came down in flames North of Br 6th Abn area. 2 KIA, 3 MIA.
	72		No			Landed North of British 6th Abn area. Glider perforated by flak & S/A. 3 KIA in glider, rest MIA. Load lost.

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 HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
 APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A - 11
 194th Glider Infantry (*)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Co M	73		No		x	
	74		No	x	x	Hit fence, knocked landing gear off. Load & Personnel O.K.
Regt'l Hq Co	75		No			
	76		No	x		Nose damaged hitting another glider. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co M	77		No	x	x	
	78		No	x	x	Left Wing, landing gear & floor wrecked due to soft ground. Load & Personnel O.K.
Regt'l Hq Co	79	Yes				40 min out from A-55, 1 wing came off, glider cut loose, other fell off before it hit ground. All killed. Load lost.
	80		No	x		Landing gear crumbled. Nose smashed. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co M	81		No		x	
	82		No	x	x	Hit fence - nose damaged. Load & Personnel O.K.
Regt'l Hq Co	83		No	x		Nose & Tail ripped on fence - 1 pilot LWA.
	84		No		x	Hit fence floor wrecked. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co M	85		No	x	x	Lost landing gear due to soft ground, Load & Personnel O.K.
	86		No	x		
Regt'l Hq Co	87		No	x		
	88		No	x	x	Glider pancaked - total wrecked. Jeep lost. Personnel O.K.
Co M	89		No	x	x	
	90		No	x	x	Hit 3 fences - nose damaged. Load & Personnel O.K.
AT Co	91		No	x	x	
	92		No	x	x	
Co M	93		No		x	Glider hit high tension wire - load damaged - Pilot WIA.
	94		No	x	x	Hit fence - nose damaged. Load & Personnel O.K.
AT Co	95		No	x	x	Hit fence - landing gear lost. Load & Personnel O.K.
	96		No	x	x	
Co M	97		No	x	x	Hit fence. Nose & 1 wing damaged. Load & Personnel O.K.
	98		No	x	x	Landed in swamp. Nose damaged hit tail of another glider. Load & Personnel
AT Co	99	Yes				Landed in vicinity of Vega, near Brussels, Load & Personnel O.K.
	100		No			Hit fence & another glider - lost left wing & landing gear. Load & Personnel O.K.
Co M	101		No	x	x	Landed OK - Glider burned on ground. Load lost. Personnel O.K.
	102		No	x	x	
	103		No	x		
	104		No	x	x	

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-11

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Co M	105		No			Hit fence - damaged wing & Wheel Load & Pers OK
	106		No	X		Hit fence-damaged nose. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	107		No	X	X	Hit high tension line & fence. Lost landing gear & left wing Load & Pers OK
	108		No			Landed in soft ground-lost nose, landing gear & left wing. Load & Pers OK
Co M	109		No	X	X	Lost landing gear & left wing on hitting ground. Load & Pers OK
Co L	110		No		X	Landed in soft ground-lost wing & tail. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	111		No	X		Tail wheel lost in air due to S/A Load & Pers OK
	112		No	X		Hit fence-lost nose. Load & Pers OK
Co L	113		No	X	X	
	114		No	X	X	
AT Co	115		No			Landed in swamp-hit fence-lost landing gear & left wing. Load & Pers OK
	116		No			
Co L	117		No	X	X	Landed in ploughed field-landing gear shorn off. 2 EM casualty.
	118		No		X	1 O, 3 EM hit by flak in air. Co-pilot WIA. Load OK.
AT Co	119		No		X	Flak hit left wing in air. Hit soft ground damaging nose. Load & Pers OK
	120		No		X	Lost right wheel due to soft ground. Load & Pers OK
Co L	121		No			Hit fence. Load & Pers OK
	122		No	X	X	Hit house on landing-sheared wing tips. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	123		No	X		Hit soft ground-nose damaged. Load & Pers OK
	124		No	X	X	Landed in swamp-hit fence-damaged nose & wings. Load & Pers OK
Co L	125		No	X		Landed in ploughed field. Landing gear shorn off. Load & Pers OK
	126		No		X	Left wing damaged by flak. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	127		No	X	X	
	128		No			Landed in ploughed field-clipped fence, damaged nose, left wing & landing gear. Load & Pers OK
Co L	129		No	X		Landed in soft ground-left side damaged. Load & Pers OK
	130		No		X	Landed in soft ground-nose & landing gear damaged. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	131		No			Hit fence-damaged nose all else OK
	132		No			
Co L	133	Yes				Down 1 mile fr. Ruxensart. 3 miles SW of Marfox. No reports
For Glider Landings		See Overlay				

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-11

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
	134		No	X	X	Hit fence & Power line-damaged wing tip. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	135		No		X	Damaged tail in air-no rudder control. Landed OK
	136		No		X	
Co L	137	Yes				Down in France. 2 EM left for front in jeep, 1 EM left with Glider
Hq Co 3d Bn	138		No		X	Landed
AT Co	139		No		X	Landed in soft ground-landing gear & nose damaged Pers OK
	140		No		X	Landed in soft ground-landing gear & left wing shorn off. Load & Pers OK
Hq Co 3d Bn	141		No	X		Landed in soft ground-hit fence. Damaged tail & left wing. Load & Pers OK
AT Co	142		No			
AT Co	143		No	X	X	Landed OK. Pilot & Co-Pilot KIA on ground.
	144		No	X	X	Landed OK. Glider burned on ground. Lost AT Gun. Pers OK

For Glider Landings See Overlay

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-12

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks	
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak		
Hq Co 3d Br	1		No	X			
	2	Yes				Jeep came loose causing pilot to cut. Landed OK. Load & Pers OK	
	3		No	X		Hit fence. Load & Pers OK	
	4		No			Hit fence. Load & Pers OK	
	5		No	X		Hit fence. Lost landing gear & one wing. Load & Pers OK	
	6		No		X	Landing gear damaged. 2 O's & 1 EM KIA by flak in air. Load OK	
	7		No	X	X	Crash landed, glider burned. Lost load. 1 KIA, the rest SWA	
	8			No			
	9			No	X	Landed in soft ground, damaged nose. Load & Pers OK	
	10			No	X	Landed in ploughed field. Landing gear shorn. Load & Pers OK	
	11			No	X	X Hit fence, damaged tail. Load & Pers OK	
	12			No	X		
	13			No			
	14			No	X	Landed in ploughed field, hit fence damaged landing gear. Load & Pers OK	
	15			No	X	Hit two fences. Load & Pers OK	
	16			No		X Hit two fences, tearing fuselage. Load & Pers OK	
	17			No	X	Landed in ploughed field. Load & Pers OK	
	18			No		Hit fence damaging left wing. Load & Pers OK	
	19			No	X	X	
	20			No			Hit tree & fence damaging left wing and landing gear. Load & Pers OK
	21			No	X		Hit telephone pole & fence damaging left wing and tail Load & Pers OK
	22			No	X		Hit fence damaging left wing. Pilot KIA. Load OK
	23			No			Hit fence damaging landing Gear & one wing. Load & Pers OK
	24			No	X	X	Hit telephone pole damaging one wing. Load & Pers OK
	25		No	No		X	Hit fence damaging left wing. Load & Pers OK
	26			No	X	X	1 WIA. Load OK
	27			No	X	X	
	28			No	X	X	Hit trees & fence damaging landing gear & left wing. Lost jeep. Pers OK
	29			No	X	X	Hit telephone pole damaging nose shearing left wing. Load & Pers OK
	30			No			
	31			No	X		Landed in ploughed field. Jeep broke loose. Load & Pers OK
Regt'l Hq							

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-12

194th Glider Infantry (-)

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Hit in Air		Remarks
		Yes	No	S/A	Flak	
Regt'l Hq Co	32		No	X		Hit fence . Landing gear folded. 1 EM SWA by S/A in air. Load OK
	33		No	X	X	
	34		No			Hit fence damaging wing & tail. Load & Pers OK
	35		No	X		
	36		No	X	X	1 EM SWA by S/A in air. Load OK
	37	Yes				Pilot couldn't control wings. Load & Pers OK
	38		No			Glider hit tree-top and dropped nose first. Pilot & Co-Pilot KIA 1 O & 1 EM SWA. Load held OK
	39		No		X	Landed in ditch, lost landing gear, nose caved in. 4 EM SWA. Load OK
	40		No	X	X	Landing gear shorn & bottom of glider ripped up due to soft grou nd. 2 EM SWA by flak in air. Load OK
41		No			X	

155 AA Bn (-)						
Hq Det & Med Det	42-44		No			Crashed. Pilot, Co-Pilot, 2 O's & 1 EM killed. Location unknown.
	45		No			Crashed, no one hurt.
	46		No			Never found, believed crashed in flames
	47		No			1 O' and 2 EM lost
Btry B	48		No			
	49	Yes				Landed safely in Belgium
	50-53		No			
	54		No			Crashed, Pilot and 2 men killed, and 1 in- jured.
Btry E	55		No			Crashed, Pilot and 1 man injured.
	56-69		No			
	70-72		No			
For Glider landings see overlay						

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-13

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Btry E (-) 155 AA Bn	73-80 81		No	None Landed safely in Holland

681 Gli FA Bn (-Hq Btry(-))	82-107 108	Yes	No	None Pilot couldn't control glider. Cut loose over France. No injuries. Load OK
	109-118 119	Yes	No	None Pilot couldn't control, cut loose over France, Crashed killing all occupants.
	120	Yes		Rope fr No. 119 tangled in wing. Pilot cut loose over France. No injuries. Load OK
	121-133 134	Yes	No	None Right aileron out of commission. Landed in France. Load OK
	135-142 143	Yes	No	None Nose fabric pulled off. Landed in France. Load OK.
	144	Yes		Tail flutter. Landed in France. Load OK.
				For glider landings see attached overlay.

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-18

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Btry A (-)	1-8		No	None.
Btry B 155	9-26		No	None.
AA Bn	27		No	Crashed. One man seriously injured.
	28-29		No	None.

Div Hq (-)	30		No	Hit by flak. Cargo slightly damaged.
	31-43		No	35 & 42 hit by flak. Load O.K.
	44		No	Glider damaged by jeep going through nose on landing & load O.K.
	45-48		No	None.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-19

UNIT	No. On Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Div Arty Hq (-)	1-20		No	None
517 Sig Co (-)	21-30		No	None.
	31		No	Glider burned.
	32-36		No	None.
	37		No	Flak damaged trailer.
	38-48		No	None.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-20

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
517 Sig Co (-)	1-4		No	None
	5		No	Glider and load burned
	6		No	Jeep shot up by MG
224 Med Co (-)	7-8		No	None
	9		No	Collided about 50' altitude. Lost wing resulting in crash landing. Load O.K.
	10-11		No	None.
	12		No	Hole in tail small arm fire. Load O.K.
	13		No	Collided with glider No. 9. Nose smashed Load O.K.
	14-21		No	None.
	22		No	Right side glider hit by flak. Load O.K.
	23		No	Crash landed. Glider perforated by small arms fire and after occupants had gotten out it was hit by artillery destroying load
	24		No	Perforated by small fire. Load O.K.
	25-28		No	None.
	29	Yes		Glider landed on west side of Rhine due to torn fabric on wing.
	30		No	Glider nose smashed on right side. Load O.K.
	31-32		No	None
	33		No	Tail of glider blown away. Load O.K.
	34-35		No	None.
	36		No	Wheels knocked off in landing. Load O.K.
	37-39		No	None
	40		No	Right wheel and wing shot away and right side of glider perforated by small arms fire. Load O.K.
	41-42		No	Perforated by flak holes. Load O.K.
	43-47		No	None.
48		No	Two occupants of glider killed by enemy fire.	

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. Army

SERIAL A-21

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks	
		Yes	No		
224 Med Co (-)	1		No	Flak hole left wing. Load OK.	
	2		No	Perforated by small arms fire. Load OK.	
	3-5		No	None.	
	6		No	Crash landed. Glider and load burned.	
	7		No	Wheels knocked off glider in landing. Load OK.	
	8		No	Glider burned after being unloaded by tracer fire.	
	513 Trans	9-13		No	None
		14		No	1 jeep destroyed. Glider burned on ground by enemy action.
15			No	None.	
16			No	1 jeep destroyed. Glider burned on ground by enemy action.	
17-19			No	None.	
20			No	1 jeep destroyed. Glider burned on ground by enemy action.	
21-24			No	None.	
25			No	1 jeep destroyed. Glider burned on ground by enemy action.	
26-29			No	None.	
Br Air Support	30-37		?	Unable to give information on location or information on gliders 30,32,35,36. 2 EM and 1 O definitely killed. 1 EM evacuated, 3 EM missing. 5 EM OK.	
G-4 (Ord)	38		No	Glider rendered unserviceable. Personnel and load removed safely.	
	39		No	Glider nose damaged. 2 EM injured. Load OK	
	40		No	Glider rendered unserviceable. Jeep slightly damaged. 1 EM injured.	

For glider landings see attached overlay.

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY.

SERIAL A-22

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
466 Trans	41		No	Glider hit power line and made crash landing. No one injured.
	42		No	Glider crashed into a tree severely injuring one officer and two enlisted men. Load destroyed.
	43		No	Mortar fire destroyed rear half of glider. Co-pilot wounded during landing. Load O.K.
	44		No	Glider tore wing loose by hitting tail of another glider. Load O.K.
	45		No	One man wounded while landing by small arm fire. Slight damage to load by flak. Glider O.K.
	46-47		NO	None.
	48		No	Glider hit ditch on landing, wrecking front part of glider. Load O.K.
	49		No	Glider hit power line which tore off tail. Load O.K.
	50		No	Glider hit another glider in landing and tore its tail off. Load O.K.
	51		No	Glider went through two fences damaging nose. Load O.K.
	52		No	Glider hit some posts which tore the bottom out of glider. Load O.K.
	53		No	Nose of glider damaged by hitting fence, that made it possible to remove load.
	54		No	One wing torn off by hitting a telephone pole. Load O.K.
	G-4 Sup QM	55-56		No
57			No	Load and glider destroyed by enemy shell fire.
58-60			No	None.
G-4 Sup Ord	61-79		No	Numbers of damaged and unaccounted for gliders not available. 3 Gliders un-serviceably damaged. 1 glider unaccounted for. Same loads scattered but all recoverable, and serviceable.
Phantom	80		No	None

For glider landings see attached overlay.

~~SECRET~~
 HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
 APO 452, U. S. ARMY.

SERIAL A-22



UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
466 Trans	41		No	Glider hit power line and made crash landing. No one injured.
	42		No	Glider crashed into a tree severely injuring one officer and two enlisted men. Load destroyed.
	43		No	Mortar fire destroyed rear half of glider. Co-pilot wounded during landing. Load O.K.
	44		No	Glider tore wing loose by hitting tail of another glider. Load O.K.
	45		No	One man wounded while landing by small arm fire. Slight damage to load by flak. Glider O.K.
	46-47		No	None.
	48		No	Glider hit ditch on landing, wrecking front part of glider. Load O.K.
	49		No	Glider hit power line which tore off tail. Load O.K.
	50		No	Glider hit another glider in landing and tore its tail off. Load O.K.
	51		No	Glider went through two fences damaging nose. Load O.K.
	52		No	Glider hit some posts which tore the bottom out of glider. Load O.K.
	53		No	Nose of glider damaged by hitting fence, that made it possible to remove load.
	54		No	One wing torn off by hitting a telephone pole. Load O.K.
G-4 Sup OM	55-56		No	None
	57		No	Load and glider destroyed by enemy shell fire.
	58-60		No	None.
G-4 Sup Ord	61-79		No	Numbers of damaged and unaccounted for gliders not available. 3 Gliders un-serviceably damaged. 1 glider unaccounted for. Same loads scattered but all recoverable, and serviceable.
Phantom	80		No	None

For glider landings see attached overlay.

GLIDER LANDING PATTERN OPERATION *Varsity*

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NO A-19
48 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
GLIDERS 1-20 DIV. ARTY. HQ
GLIDERS 21-48 517 SIG. CO.
AF UNIT-442 GP.



~~SECRET~~

Map Ref. 1/12, 500
GERMANY SHEETS
42 05 /3 • 43 05 /1 • 43 05 /2


GLIDER LANDING PATTERN

OPERATION

Varsity

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NO A-18
48 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
GLIDERS 1-8 BTRY. "A"
GLIDERS 9-29 BTRY. "C"
155 AABN.
GLIDERS 30-48 DIV. HQ(-)
AF. UNIT - 441 Gp.



•30

~~SECRET~~

Map Ref. 1/12, 500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3 • 4305/1 • 4305/2


GLIDER LANDING PATTERN

OPERATION
Nearcity

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NO A-17
45 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
GLIDERS 46-47 Co. C, Co. A (-)
139th ENGR BN.

GLIDERS 78-90 BTRY "A" (-)
155 AA BN
AF UNIT - 440 Gp.




Map Ref. 1/12, 500
GERMANY SHEETS
42 05/3.4305/1.4305/2

~~SECRET~~

GLIDER LANDING PATTERN

OPERATION
Varsity

SERIAL NO. A-16
45 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
GLIDERS 1-2 REN PLAT.
GLIDERS 3-8 1X TCC CONTROL
GLIDERS 9-45 Co "C," Co "A"
139 ENGR BN.
AF. UNIT — 440 Gp.



2/JUNE 45/654TH/ENGRS/67

Map Ref 1/12, 500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3-4305/1-4305/2

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HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-17


UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Co C, Co A (-) 139 Engr Bn	46		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	47-54		No	None.
	55		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	56-65		No	None
	66-68		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	69-72		No	None
	73		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	74-75		No	None
76-77		No	Crashed. Load O.K.	

Btry A (-) 155 AA Bn	78-90		No	None.

~~SECRET~~

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
464TH FIELD ARTY. BN.

Overlay of
DROP PATTERN
OPERATION
VARSAITY



INTENDED & ACTUAL
DZ OF
DIVISION HQ
AND
464TH F.A. BN.

SPOT WHERE JUMPMASER LANDED INDICATED BY:

TIME OF
DROP 1002 SERIAL A 4

SHIPS 1-3 DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

SHIPS 4-9 464TH HQ & HQ BTRY.

SHIPS 10-21 "A" BTRY.

SHIPS 22-23 "B" BTRY.

SHIPS 34-45 "C" BTRY.

SPEED OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF DROP 110 M/P/H
ALTITUDE " " " " " 600'
FORMATION " " " " " "V'S"
WIND VELOCITY AT TIME OF DROP 8-10 mph

SERIAL C O
E. BRANIGAN JR.

Map Ref 1/12,500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3 • 4305/1 • 4305/2


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DIVISION ARTY. HQ.
466TH FIELD ARTY. BN.
Overlay of
DROP PATTERN
OPERATION
VARSITY

ACTUAL
DZ OF
466TH FABN.

LINE OF FLIGHT



INTENDED
DZ OF
466TH FABN

SPOT WHERE JUMPMaster LANDED INDICATED BY: •
TIME OF DROP: 1024
SERIAL A7
SHIPS 1-3 DIVISION ARTY. HQ.
SHIPS 4-9 466TH HOEHOBTRY.
SHIPS 10-21 "A" BTRY.
SHIPS 22-33 "B" BTRY.
SHIPS 34-45 "C" BTRY.
SPEED OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF DROP 110 MPH
ALTITUDE " " " " " 700'
FORMATION " " " " " "V'S"
WIND VELOCITY AT TIME OF DROP 3-5 mph
NOTE:
2 STICKS OF "A" BTRY NOT SHOWN
STICK 18 JUMPED WEST OF RHEIN RIVER
STICK 15 ALL CASUALTIES NO REPORT
SERIAL CO
BOOTH


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Map Ref: V12,500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3 4305/1 4305/2

~~SECRET~~

513 CT

DROP PATTERN
OPERATION
VARSITY



ACTUAL DZ
2ND SERIAL

ACTUAL DZ
1ST SERIAL

ACTUAL FLIGHT LINE


	1 ST Serial	2 ND Serial
TIME OF DROP	1018	1020
SPEED OF DROP	95-110 MPH	95-110 MPH
ALTITUDE INDICATED	500-700	500-700
FORMATION (GOOD)	V of V'S	V of V'S
WIND DIRECTION	NE	NE
WIND VELOCITY	8 to 10 MPH	8 to 10 MPH

1ST SERIAL: 2ND & 3RD BN (-H Co) PLANES 1 to 36
2ND SERIAL: H Co, REGT L Hq Co, Sv Co & 1ST BN PLANES 37 to 72

MAP: GERMANY 1/12,500
SHEETS: 4305/1, 4305/2
4205/3, 4205/4

~~SECRET~~

INTENDED FLIGHT LINE




513TH PRCHT INF
D-DAY

~~SECRET~~

LEGEND:

 LZ-DZ AREAS

 FINAL POSITIONS OF UNITS




~~SECRET~~

194TH G.I. INF
D-DAY

~~SECRET~~

LEGEND:

-  LZ-DZ AREAS
-  FINAL POSITIONS OF UNITS



~~SECRET~~

139TH ABN ENGR BN
D-DAY

~~SECRET~~

LEGEND:

○ LZ-DZ AREAS


○ FINAL POSITIONS OF UNITS



~~SECRET~~

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
IV B ENLARGEMENT FROM
"YALTA" TO LANDING AREAS



~~SECRET~~

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
Annex No 1



~~SECRET~~

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Annex No 2 A




Consolidated Line Route Map-23-26 Mar.
 Map: GSGS 4416-1/100,000

J.P. AHERN Maj. Sig.C.
 Sig.O. 17th Abn Div

~~SECRET~~


SERIAL NO A-22
 40 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
 GLIDERS 41-54 TRANS 466
 GLIDERS 55-60 G4 Sup (QM)
 GLIDERS 61-79 G4 Sup (ORD)
 GLIDER 80 PHANTOM
 AF UNIT - 314 GP.

GLIDER LANDING PATTERN
 OPERATION
Veracity
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Map Ref 1/12,500
 GERMANY SHEETS
 4205/3.4303/1.4305/2



Res
~~SECRET~~

Circuit Diagram, 17th Abn Div
 25 Mar 45
 Annex 2 B

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 452, U. S. ARMY

SERIAL A-16

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Rcn Plat	1 2		No No	Damage to cargo only by flak. Wing demolished by another glider load O.K.
IX TCC Cont	3-8		No	None.
139 Engr Bn	9-10		No	None.
(-Co C, Co A)	11-16		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	17-18		No	None.
	19		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	20		No	None.
	21		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	22-23		No	None.
	24		No	Destroyed by enemy fire. Load lost.
	25-27		No	None.
	28		No	Destroyed by enemy fire. Load lost.
	29-33		No	None.
	34		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	35		No	None.
	36		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	37		No	None.
	38		No	Crashed. Load O.K.
	39		No	None.
	40		No	Crashed. Loadk O.K.
	41		No	None.
	42		No	Exploded in Air
	43-45		No	None.

~~SECRET~~
 HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
 APO 452, U.S. ARMY

SERIAL A-15

UNIT	No. on Glider	Abort		Remarks.
		Yes	No	
Btry B (-)	73-76		No	None.
Hq Btry	77	Yes		Crashed glider wings torn off. Jeep wrecked. No personnel injured.
(-) 680 Gl	78	Yes		Landed with load O.K.
FA Bn	79-83		No	None.
	84		No	Crashed landing. Load wrecked, personnel injured.
	85-93			None
	94		No	Glider and load unaccounted for. Personnel listed KIA.
	95		No	Glider and load unaccounted for. Personnel listed SWA.
	96		No	None.
	97		No	Glider and load unaccounted for. Personnel listed LWA
	98		No	Landed w/load O.K. Ammo destroyed by enemy fire.
	99		No	None
507 Trans	105-120		No	None.
	121-122		No	Burnt 2 jeeps lost
	123-125		No	None.
464 Trans	126-139		No	All gliders landed safely with loads O.K. Loads lost caused by enemy action on ground.
Supplies (139 Engr)	140-144		No	None.

~~SECRET~~
 HEADQUARTERS 17TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
 APO 452, U. S. ARMY


SERIAL A-14

UNIT	No. of Glider	Abort		Remarks
		Yes	No	
Hq Btry (-) 681 Gli FA Bn	1-7		No	None
680 Gli FA	8-16		No	None
Bn (-Btry B	17		No	Landed w/load O.K. Destroyed by enemy fire.
(-) & Hq	18-32		No	None
Btry (-)	33			Landed w/load O.K. Ammo destroyed by enemy fire.
	34-36		No	None
	37		No	Landed w/load O.K. Ammo destroyed by enemy fire.
	38		No	None
	39		No	Landed O.K. destroyed $\frac{1}{4}$ ton truck.
	40-50		No	None
	51		No	Landed w/load O.K. Destroyed by enemy fire.
	52		No	None
	53		No	Landed w/load O.K. Destroyed by enemy fire.
	54		No	Crash landed, load wrecked. Personnel injured.
	55-57		No	None
	58		No	Landed w/load O.K. Destroyed by enemy fire.
	56-59		No	None
	70		No	Landed w/load O.K. Howitzer destroyed by enemy fire.
	71-72		No	None.

GLIDER LANDING PATTERN
OPERATION
Varsity

~~SECRET~~

SERIAL NO. A-20
48 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
GLIDERS 1-6 517 SIG. Co.(-)
GLIDERS 7-48 224 MED. Co.(-)
AF UNIT - 441 Gp




~~SECRET~~

Map Ref. 1/12,500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3-4305/1-4305/2

SERIAL NO A-21
 40 GLIDERS SINGLE TOW
 GLIDERS 1-8 224 MED CO (V)
 GLIDERS 9-29 TRANS. 513
 GLIDERS 30-37 Bn AIR SUPPORT
 GLIDERS 38-40 G4 SUPCORD)
 AF UNIT - 314 Gp.

GLIDER LANDING PATTERN
 OPERATION
Varsity

~~SECRET~~




Map Ref 1/12,500
 GERMAN SHEETS
 4205/3.4305/1.4305/2

~~SECRET~~

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17th Airborne Division
overlay of
Glider Landing Pattern
OPERATION
VARSITY




~~SECRET~~

SECRET

17TH Airborne Division
Overlay of
DROP PATTERN
 OPERATION
VARSIITY

PARACHUTE MOVEMENT TABLE

SERIAL NO.	AIRBORNE UNIT	USCC	Nº A/C (CHALK)	TAKEOFF DZ AIRFLD	TIME OF TAKEOFF	TIME OF DROP
A-1	507 REGT HQ & HQ CO 1 ST BN 507 G-2 DIV HQ	PF GP	46 1-3 4-45 46	A-40	W	0725 0952
A-2	2 ND BN 507 507 REGT HQ & HQ CO	438	45 1-42 43-45	A-79	W	0810 0959
A-3	3 RD BN 507 507 REGT HQ & HQ CO	438	45 46-87 88-90	A-79	W	0810 1003
A-4	DIV HQ 464 PRCHT FA BN	434	45 1-3 4-45	A-80	W	0815 1002
A-5	2 ND BN 513 3 RD BN (-CO) W	313	36 1-21 27-36	B-54	X	0800 1007
A-6	CO TH 513 REGT HQ & SERV. CO 513 1 ST BN 513	313	36 37-42 43-51 52-72	B-54	X	0823 1012
A-7	DIV ARTY HQ 466 PRCHT FA BN	434	45 46-88 49-90	A-80	X	0823 1024




DROP PATTERN
 DIVISION ARTY HQ
 513 PARACHUTE INF.
 466 FIELD ARTY BN
 OPERATION
VARSIITY

DROP PATTERN
 DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
 507 PARACHUTE INF.
 464 FIELD ARTY BN
 OPERATION
VARSIITY

SECRET

TOP SECRET



DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
464th FIELD ARTY. BN.

Overlay of
DROPPATTERN
OPERATION

VARSIITY

SPOT WHERE JUMPMASER LANDED INDICATED BY:

TIME OF
DROD
1002

SERIAL A 4

- SHIPS 1-3 DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
- SHIPS 4-9 464th HQ & HQ BTRY.
- SHIPS 10-21 "A" BTRY.
- SHIPS 22-23 "B" BTRY.
- SHIPS 34-45 "C" BTRY

SPEED OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF DROP 1100 MPH
ALTITUDE " " " " " 600'
FORMATION " " " " " "V'S"
WIND VELOCITY AT TIME OF DROP 8-10 mph


Map Ref 1/12 500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3 • 4305/1 • 4305/2

17th Airborne Division Overlay of DROP PATTERN OPERATION VARSITY

PARACHUTE MOVEMENT TABLE

SERIAL No.	AIRBORNE UNIT	USTOD Unit	Sp. A/O	No. A/O (Chalk)	Take of LZ TIME OF AIRFIELD TAKE OFF DROP	TIME OF
A-1	507 Regt Hq & Hq Co 1st Bn 507 G-2 Div Hq	FF Op	46	1-3 4-45 46	A-40 W 0725	0952
A-2	2nd Bn 507 507 Regt Hq & Hq Co	A38	45	1-42 43-45	A-79 W 0810	0959
A-3	3rd Bn 507 507 Regt Hq & Hq Co	A38	45	46-07 88-90	A-79 W 0810	1002
A-4	Div Hq 464 Front FA Bn	A34	45	1-3 4-45	A-80 W 0815	1002
A-5	2nd Bn 513 3rd Bn (-20 H)	313	36	1-21 27-36	B-54 X 0800	1007
A-6	Co H 513 Re. t Hq & Serv Co 513 1st Bn 513	313	36	37-42 43-51 52-72	B-54 X 0823	1012
A-7	Div Arty Hq 466 Front FA Bn	A34	45	46-48 49-90	A-80 X 0823	1024

DROP PATTERN
DIVISION ARTY. HQ
513th PARACHUTE INF
466th FIELD ARTY. BN
OPERATION
VARSITY



DROP PATTERN
DIVISION HEADQUARTERS
507th PARACHUTE INF
464th FIELD ARTY. BN.
OPERATION
VARSITY

Map Ref 1/12,500
GERMANY SHEETS
4205/3-4305/1-4305/2