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Operations Rpt - Leyte
20 Oct 44 - 25 Dec 44

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OPERATION REPORT

XXIV CORPS

LEYTE

20 Oct 1944 — 25 Dec 1944

UNCLASSIFIED

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FOREWORD

This document is presented as a brief report to outline the operations of the XXIV Corps in the Battle of LEYTE, omitting insofar as possible the bulk of routine and SOP material which operates to clutter up reports.

Tactically and strategically the operation presents nothing new in the annals of warfare. However, it did present the first real opportunity for American troops in the Pacific to make full use of maneuver and fire power, and to demonstrate conclusively their superiority over the best the Jap can offer in open warfare using the sound principles enunciated in our training literature.

No material change has been noted in the attitude of the enemy over that shown in other Pacific campaigns. He still fights to the last man when cornered and locally is always a dangerous antagonist. He is still prone to lose control of any situation where he is surprised or unexpected events occur. I feel that all ranks engaged in this battle are now fully convinced that the Jap is highly susceptible to maneuver and will withdraw readily when trapped and there is room to move to another area from which he can hope for offensive action.

In my opinion the difficulties of terrain and weather encountered were fully as difficult if not more so than was the enemy. The assault was simultaneous with the beginning of a rainy season unsurpassed in any area I have experienced. Most of the open country was rice paddies or swamps, with only a few roads, all of which went out for various periods at some time or other under the heavy traffic. All streams were subject to floods. The hill country was rugged, muddy and wooded, cut by deep gorges and with only extremely poor foot trails. Supply problems ranged toward the impossible, and solutions in forward areas included the use of the M29C (Weasel), caribao packs and drags, horses (captured), paradrops, Cub plane drops, native carriers and frequently in the most forward areas, as much as half of a command had to be used as carriers to supply the other half in battle. Most individuals of the command were constantly wet for periods ranging into weeks.

I wish to express my deep appreciation and thanks to all members of the Third Amphibious Force who so ably planned and handled the transporting and landing of the Corps on the LEYTE beaches. Their support, cooperation and assistance in all matters affecting joint action was outstanding and represents a high peak in teamwork between the services.

The splendid performance of the Headquarters and two (2) battalions of the V Phib Corps Artillery (USMC) loaned to this Corps by CINCPOA in the absence of all but two (2) battalions of XXIV Corps Artillery on SAIPAN left nothing to be desired.

I take this opportunity to pay highest tribute to the splendid representatives of the American nation who constitute this Corps, both in combat and service units. Worst possible conditions were accepted as routine and without complaint. Seemingly impossible missions were all accomplished without quibbling or delay. Continuous offensive was maintained only because of the highest order of American courage, determination and patriotism combined with full ability to cooperate in teamwork. The success of this campaign was due almost entirely to the brave spirit and the high morale of the individual men and officers who fought it.

John R Hodge

JOHN R. HODGE,
Major General, United States Army,
Commanding.

OPERATIONS REPORT

XXIV CORPS IN LEYTE (PI) CAMPAIGN

20 October - 25 December 1944

PART ONE

BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

Section I - General, Paragraphs 1-6.

Section II - Seizure of Beachhead, Paragraphs 7-15.

Section III - Expansion of Initial Beachhead, Paragraphs 16-22.

Section IV - Japanese Airborne Counterattack, Paragraphs 23-28.

Section V - Operations on West Coast, Paragraphs 29-36.

Maps - 1/50,000 LEYTE ISLAND.

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. The XXIV Corps was activated 8 April 1944 at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T.H., with Major General John R. Hodge, United States Army in command. Personnel for the Headquarters and Headquarters Company was obtained from sources available to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas (ComGenPOA) (Lt. General Robert C. Richardson, Jr.) and began assembling at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS soon after activation of the unit (Annex A - Roster of Headquarters and Headquarters Company). Training of all available elements of the Corps and attached units was conducted in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, using the excellent facilities provided by ComGenPOA.

2. The initial operation assigned to the Corps was participation in a projected attack on the PALAU GROUP to be conducted by the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (CinCPAC) (Admiral C. W. Nimitz). Planning was promptly initiated for an assault landing on BABELTHUAP, PALAU by the XXIV Corps in conjunction with an attack by the III Marine Amphibious Corps in the southern islands of the PALAU GROUP.

3. By 7 July 1944 the concept had been changed to assign to the XXIV Corps the mission of capturing YAP ISLAND following

a landing by the III Marine Amphibious Corps on PELELIU and ANGAUR ISLANDS of the PALAU GROUP.

4. The Corps completed planning for the YAP operation, conducted a rehearsal at MAUI, T.H. and loaded into the assigned shipping. The Tractor Groups, slowest elements of the convoy, sailed from PEARL HARBOR on 11 September 1944. Coincident with the departure from PEARL HARBOR of the Transport Groups on 15 September 1944, the objective of the XXIV Corps was changed to LEYTE, P.I. The Corps Commander with key members of his staff disembarked and moved by air to Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area at HOLLANDIA to draw plans and orders for the new operation. The last elements of the Corps sailed from PEARL HARBOR on 15 September 1944 (Inclosure No. 1, Organization Chart and page 7, Loading Chart).

5. The operation for the capture of LEYTE was conducted by the Commander in Chief Southwest Pacific Area (General Douglas MacArthur) with the Commanding General, Sixth Army (Lt. General Walter Krueger) in command of the landing force which consisted of the X Corps (Major General Franklin C. Sibert) and the XXIV Corps. The Third Amphibious Force (Vice Admiral T. Wilkinson), charged with movement of the Corps to its objective and establishment of the Corps ashore, was placed under the control of the Commander, 7th Fleet (Vice Admiral T. Kinkaid).

6. The Corps completed reassembly at ENIWETOK on 25 September 1944. The Corps Commander and key members of his staff rejoined by air, conducted conferences, issued a preliminary order for the assault and returned to HOLLANDIA for completion of detailed plans. The Corps again reassembled at MANUS ISLAND, ADMIRALTY ISLANDS on 3 October 1944 where all plans were completed and final orders issued.

SECTION II - SEIZURE OF BEACHHEAD
(Map of Initial Beachhead, page 5)

7. Preceded by beach reconnaissance by underwater demolition teams, air strikes and naval gunfire bombardment, the XXIV Corps began landing according to plan on assigned beaches on schedule at 1000 I, 20 October 1944, with the mission of seizing the initial beachhead on the east coast of LEYTE. The X Corps landed simultaneously. The late hour of landing was necessary to permit daylight entry of the Tractor and Transport Groups into LEYTE GULF, the entrance to which was known to be mined (Inclosure No. 2, Map of LEYTE).

8. The landing formation of the Corps was largely dictated by the manner in which units had been loaded for the YAP operation. The 96th Infantry Division (Major General J. L. Bradley) on the right and the 7th Infantry Division (Major General A. V. Arnold) on the left first put ashore four (4) assault battalion landing teams, each using LVTs carried to the launching area in LSTs. Due to the absence of a fringing reef at LEYTE, later waves in landing craft were able to



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PROV. ENGR. TOP MAP DET.
XXIV CORPS W.O. NO 249

proceed directly from the transports to beaches. (Rehearsals preparatory to the projected YAP assault included transfers from LCVPs to LVTs for passage across the reef).

9. The prescribed scheme of maneuver (Map, page 5) of the 96th Infantry Division was to bypass on both sides the dominating terrain feature of CATMON HILL (59.4-35.4), then to attack north and northwest to make junction with X Corps, secure the northern boundary of the Corps beachhead and seize the TANAUAN (60.3-45.7)-DAGAMI (47.3-39.8) highway. CATMON HILL was to receive especial attention of air and naval gunfire support during the preparation and landing. Neutralization of the hill was to be continued by all available means, including artillery as soon as landed. This plan proved highly effective. Hostile fire from CATMON HILL was never severe enough to interfere seriously with operations. The 7th Division was to make its main effort west on the road to BURAUEN (46.0-29.0), capture the airfields and then turn north and capture DAGAMI, all the while covering the south flank of the Corps. These schemes were carried out without material change.

10. Due to the strong preparation and effective naval gunfire and air support, initial enemy resistance from the extensive field fortifications along all the landing beaches was light. (Map, page 8, Estimated Location Hostile Units on A Day). Almost unlimited beaches, coupled with excellent weather and absence of serious hostile air resistance, permitted the early landing of all elements of the Corps. By 24 October (A plus 4) all shipping was unloaded and the entire Corps of some 55,000 men with 85,000 weight tons of cargo had been firmly established ashore. This is believed to set a record for Pacific operations to date. The cargo included supplies to meet the expected expenditures during approximately thirty (30) days of operations. The Corps CP was opened at CALBASAG (62.3-27.7) at 1200, 23 October, the CP aboard the USS Mt. Olympus (AGC 8) closing at the same hour. At 1500 on the same day the Corps Commander assumed command ashore.

11. On the left the 7th Division drove rapidly west from DULAG (62.7-26.5), capturing DULAG airfield on 21 October and the town of BURAUEN (46.0-29.0) on 24 October. Isolated centers of fanatically resisting Japs were encountered during this advance but except for one counterattack, by tanks and infantry west of DULAG on 21 October, the defensive units appeared to be scattered and lacking in coordinated control by higher headquarters. The 17th Infantry (7th Division) initially in Corps Reserve was released to the division on 22 October.

12. During this advance, the right of the division overran the SAN PABLO (50.9-30.3) and BAYUG (48.0-29.7) airfields but encountered a strong defensive position protecting BURI (47.6-31.3) field. The mass of the division turned north after leaving a garrison in BURAUEN to protect its flank and rear, and advanced toward DAGAMI. A coordinated enveloping attack resulted in capture of BURI airfield on 27 October 1944 after a bitter fight. The 7th Division continued its advance north and captured DAGAMI on 30 October. The resistance encountered in this advance was determined, particularly in the vicinity of BURI (town) (46.8-34.0), GUINARONA (47.3-34.9), and DAGAMI.


SECRET
SOUTHERN LANDING FORCE
SHIPPING ASSIGNMENT
SECRET
YELLOW 1
YELLOW 2
VIOLET 1
VIOLET 2
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
ORANGE 1
ORANGE 2
184 ≡ 32
382 ≡ 383
7 XX 96
7 XX III 17
96 XX III 381
XX
CORPS
SHIPPING
XX


SAMAR
ENEMY DISPOSITIONS
20 OCTOBER 1944
1
22(-)
16
33 SNLF
95
2
9
104
CARIGARA
TACLOBAN
XX
16 (?)
JARO
33 LESS 2ND BN
PALO
LEYTE
TANAUAN
DAGAMI
2
33
9 LESS 2ND BN
98
114
2
33
54
(ORMOC)
BURAUEN
7 IND
DULAG
20 LESS 1ST BN
(ABUYOG)
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XXIV CORPS W.O. NO. 245

13. Meanwhile the 96th Division in a two-pronged attack, drove inland through almost impassable swamps south of CATMON HILL and sent a force north on the beach road to TANAUAN, where contact was made with X Corps units on 25 October. The advance inland met little resistance until it reached the vicinity of TABONTABON (54.7-37.0), which place was captured on 27 October 1944 after a bitter fight. The division's left then advanced in two columns, reaching the TANAUAN-DAGAMI road at the unnamed road junction 2,500 yards east of DAGAMI and at KILING (55.2-41.4). Capture of the latter place - which was stubbornly defended - was expedited by a simultaneous attack from the east by elements of the division which had previously occupied TANAUAN. The assigned mission of securing the beachhead line was accomplished on schedule on A plus 10 (30 October), when the 96th and 7th Divisions made contact in the vicinity of DAGAMI.

14. CATMON HILL which had been initially bypassed and isolated was completely occupied on 30 October by the 381st Infantry (96th Division) which had been released from Army Reserve for this purpose. This regiment, attacking up the ridge from the southeast, encountered only scattered resistance.

15. The latter part of the operation to seize the beachhead line was complicated by the progressive deterioration of existing roads, the increasing difficulties of cross-country movement due to frequent torrential rains and by the withdrawal of naval combatant forces, including aircraft. This latter event, caused by the necessities of the situation which resulted in the "Second Battle of the Philippines Seas," removed all naval gunfire and close air support from the land operations after 24 October. For the next few days friendly air support was practically non-existent and Jap aviation was active.

SECTION III - EXPANSION OF INITIAL BEACHHEAD
(Note: Coordinates refer to Map of LEYTE, 1/250,000 (Inclosure No. 2) or 1/50,000 (Annex E).

16. The Corps promptly initiated operations to complete its mission of liberating southern LEYTE in conjunction with X Corps operations in the north (Map, page10). At this time the Corps' plan contemplated an eventual disposition with the 96th Division making the holding attack from east of the mountains while the 7th Division drove north up the west coast from BAYBAY (33.6-92.5) to complete the destruction of the enemy. Early seizure of the ABUYOG (59.8-02.0)-BAYBAY road - the only one across the mountains in the Corps zone of action - was essential to this plan. This mission was assigned to the 7th Division which was to be gradually released from missions in the beachhead. At this time the 7th Division was also directed to send a reinforced battalion to PANAON STRAITS (southeast LEYTE) (70-30) to relieve X Corps units in that area (Inclosure No. 2, Map of LEYTE).

17. The 96th Division was assigned a zone which included the original beachhead and was directed to begin the progressive relief of 7th Division elements in this area. The 96th also started an advance to the west to destroy the hostile


EXPANSION OF INITIAL BHL
CARIGARA BAY
SAN PEDRO BAY
ORMOC BAY
LEYTE
CAMOTES ISLANDS
(CEBU PROVINCE)
PONSON I
PORO I
KAWIT STRAIT
CUATRO ISLANDS
DANAJON BANK
CANIGAO CHANNEL
CABALIAN BAY
PANAON ISLAND
LAPINIG ISLAND
4 Dec
4 Dec
XXX
XXIV
96
XX
7
124°30'
124°45'
125°00'
11° 15'
11° 00'
10° 45'
10° 30'
10° 15'

forces in its zone of action and to locate and secure all trails over the mountains.

18. Enemy resistance remaining in the hills west of the beachhead was centered in the DAGAMI area. It was later determined that the remnants of the 16th Japanese Division - the original garrison of the island - had withdrawn to well-prepared defensive positions in difficult terrain west and southwest of this place. These positions blocked the eastern entrance to available trails for withdrawal to, or reinforcement from the west coast. Reduction of these positions and destruction of the remnants of the 16th Jap Division east of the principal mountain range occupied the 96th Division for sometime and resulted in numerous bitter fights under extremely difficult conditions. Absence of all-weather roads and the location of successive strong enemy positions on high ground behind the rice paddies and swamps along the road complicated this job. Supply and evacuation were extremely difficult. Recourse to caribao and hand-carry to support forward elements was the rule.

19. The 7th Division immediately initiated its advance to the south of the beachhead with such forces as were available, cleaned out hostile groups south of the MARABANG RIVER (south boundary of the beachhead) and secured ABUYOG (Map, page 10). It seized and repaired the road to BAYBAY against little opposition and by 5 November had a reinforced battalion in that place. Reconnaissance in force was immediately started northward up the coast toward ORMOC (10.8-32.3) to meet and block the anticipated enemy advance southward from that place. By 10 November a strong position was established on the coast in contact with the enemy near DAMULAAN (24.8-15.2). From observation posts on the west coast the 7th Division units during early November repeatedly reported enemy shipping in ORMOC BAY apparently delivering considerable reinforcements. This fact was soon verified.

20. The enemy eventually brought in the 35th Army Headquarters (reputedly under command of Lieutenant General Yamashita) with the 1st, 8th, 26th, 30th and 102nd Japanese Divisions, in whole or in part. Although our air strikes succeeded in destroying portions of these organizations, it is estimated that the Japs succeeded in bringing in at least 60,000 reinforcements.

21. The appearance of substantial hostile reinforcements on the west coast caused a shift in the Sixth Army's weight toward the north to meet the threat against its right flank. The Corps was assigned a new mission of securing the DAGAMI-JARO (31.0-54.5) road and a new zone of action which extended to the JARO-PALO (57.5-51.2) road (Highway 2) on the north (Map, page 10). This new area and mission were given to the 96th Division, which was ordered to suspend relief of the 7th Division in the beachhead and to turn over to the latter that portion of its recently acquired zone of action lying south of GUINARONA (on the BURAUEN-DAGAMI road). In addition to these changes, the Sixth Army directed that one combat team be held immediately available for motor movement to the north and that another be available on order for a proposed operation in northern MINDANAO ISLAND. These changes in the situation caused a delay in the displacement of the 7th Division to the west coast until the 11th Airborne Division (Major

General J. M. Swing) arrived on the island and was placed under the operational control of the Corps. By 22 November this division had taken over the 7th Division zone of action in the BURAUEN area, releasing the latter for an attack in force on the west coast. A battery of Corps' 155mm guns was moved to the west coast, attached to the 7th Division, and pushed forward to enable this division to place artillery fire on ORMOC. The 226th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm gun) moved to DARO (27.1-53.1) under operational control of the X Corps to fire on the ORMOC vicinity. The 77th Infantry Division (Major General A. D. Bruce) arrived on 23 November, was attached to the Corps, and by 24 November was in reserve positions on the east coast. During this period plans for an amphibious landing in the vicinity of ORMOC were abandoned due to lack of shipping and absence of naval support.

22. By early December, the 7th Division had completed assembly in the BAYBAY-CARIDAD (28.0-11.3) area on the west coast and had repulsed several strong attacks on its covering force. This displacement of the 7th Division to the west coast and advance toward ORMOC served to draw all Jap local reserves from the ORMOC area. The mass of the Jap 26th Division was also attracted south by this threat to its rear. At this time, sufficient LSMs and LCIs to lift a strong force, together with destroyer support, were made available and plans were completed to take advantage of this enemy situation by an amphibious operation directed against the ORMOC area. The Corps established an advance CP at BAYBAY on 5 December to permit close contact with this operation, which is described in Section V.

SECTION IV - JAPANESE AIRBORNE COUNTERATTACK (5-11 December)

(Sketch, Scene of Japanese Airborne Attack, page 13)

23. Just after dark 26 November, several Japanese transport planes of DC-2 type crash-landed in the surf on Corps beaches. Two landed safely. One other, attempting to land at BURI Airfield, was shot down by AAA units. All carried fully equipped demolition personnel, some of whom were killed in the landings. Several of the Japs who landed safely were killed by our troops in the vicinity but an estimated thirty (30) Japs escaped and started in the direction of BURAUEN. All our units were alerted and vigorous patrolling was started immediately. During the next few days, most of these Japs were killed. Documents carried by these troops gave indication of plans for an airborne operation directed against airfields on LEYTE.

24. Beginning about 4 December, a marked increase in enemy ground activity west of the BURAUEN Airfields was apparent, with a considerable number of Jap troops infiltrating through our outposts and hiding in rice paddies north of the airfields. These fields were used only for Cub plane and casual operations, no combat air units being stationed in the area. During the evening of 6 December large numbers of Jap airplanes were reported over LEYTE by various agencies on the island. At about 1840, a formation of transports, supported by bombers and fighters, dropped an estimated two hundred and fifty (250) paratroops at the northeast end of SAN PABLO Airfield. Other paratroops were dropped in scattered areas.



SCENE OF JAPANESE
AIRBORNE COUNTERATTACK

SCALE - $\frac{1}{50,000}$ (Approx)

1 1/2 0 1 Miles

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PROV. ENGR. TOP. MAP. DET.
XXIV CORPS W.O. NO. 245-A

During this attack an estimated thirty (30) airplanes - bombers, fighters and transports - were shot down at various parts of the island.

25. From captured orders and prisoner of war statements, it was later learned that the 35th Army had planned to participate on a major scale with the airborne operations of the 1st Parachute Training Regiment, which made the attack. The CP of the 35th Army was apparently moved to the east side of the mountains in anticipation of this operation and orders for a coordinated attack were issued to the remnants of both the 16th and 26th Jap Divisions. The former division moved a considerable force to the area west of the airfields and succeeded in infiltrating some 400-500 through our outposts into BURI airfield. The 26th Division, however, appears to have been blocked by the attack of our 11th Airborne Division through the mountain passes. Captured orders indicated that three (3) echelons of paratroops, totalling some one thousand (1000) were to be dropped. Apparently, only one (1) echelon of about two hundred and fifty (250) paratroops actually made the attack.

26. The paratroops who landed on SAN PABLO field just before dusk on 6 December created considerable confusion among the service troops, aviation ground personnel, aviation engineers, antiaircraft crews and miscellaneous personnel bivouacked in the area, generally without prepared defensive positions. Elements of the 11th Airborne Division (which was charged with defense of the area) located south of SAN PABLO field and a battalion of the 96th Division which occupied a defensive position along the road west of BURI field held their positions during the night of 6-7 December.

27. Early the next morning, available elements of the 11th Airborne Division, consisting largely of artillerymen and headquarters and service personnel, attacked SAN PABLO from the south but were stopped before reaching the strip. The 149th Infantry (less one battalion) of the 38th Division which had just arrived at LEYTE enroute to another operation was made available to the Corps and placed under operational control of the 11th Airborne Division. This regiment moved to the vicinity of SAN PABLO prepared to attack toward the northwest on the morning of 8 December. During the night, however, the Japs withdrew to the northern side of BURI field. A coordinated attack, supported by artillery and mortar fire, eventually succeeded in clearing the entire area by the evening of 10 December.

28. During the night of 10-11 December, Jap remnants began evacuating the airfield area, encountering our outposts in their withdrawal to the hills. On the 11th, a few scattered Japs were killed in the vicinity of the fields. By nightfall 11 December, the area was considered secured with only scattered individuals remaining. Between five hundred (500) and six hundred (600) Japs were killed in the airfield area during the "Battle of the Airfields".

SECTION V - OPERATIONS ON WEST COAST (5-25 December)
(Map, page 15)

29. Meanwhile the coordinated Corps attack to capture


CARIGARA BAY
SAN PEDRO BAY
AMPHIBIOUS
25 Dec
26 Dec
18 Dec
13 Nov
12 Nov
5 Nov
7 Dec
10 Dec
11 Nov
28 Oct
5 Nov
ORMOC BAY
LEYTE
PONSON I
CAMOTES ISLANDS
(CEBU PROVINCE)
KAWIT STRAIT
PORO I
PACHAN I
CUATRO ISLANDS
LEYTE
SOGOD BAY
CABALIAN BAY
DANAJON BANK
CANIGAO CHANNEL
LAPININ ISLAND
PANAON ISLAND
LEGEND
- 7th INF DIV
- 77th INF DIV
- 96th INF DIV
- 11th A/B DIV
Note: Point of arrow designates place and date reached
11° 15'
11° 00'
10° 45'
10° 30'
10° 15'
124° 30'
124° 45'
125° 00'
125°

ORMOC was well under way. The 7th Division launched its attack north from DAMULAAN on 5 December, at which time the 11th Airborne Division attacked west through the mountains to complete the "pincer" on the Jap 26th Division. These attacks were progressing satisfactorily when the 77th Division (less detachments) moved by water from the east coast and landed successfully at DEPOSITO (14.8-27.0) just south of ORMOC on the morning of 7 December. Task Group 78.3 (Rear Admiral Struble), of the 7th Fleet successfully conducted the amphibious phase of this operation in spite of strong air resistance. This landing placed the division behind the 26th Jap Division which had been opposing the advance of the 7th Division north from BAYBAY and in rear of enemy troops operating in the upper ORMOC VALLEY against the X Corps. The 7th Division, using all available fire power and making especially effective use of amphibian tanks moving by water to deliver flanking 75mm fire on hostile defensive positions along the coast, had reached a point about 8,000 yards south of DEPOSITO by the time of the landing of the 77th Division at that place.

30. The 96th Infantry and 11th Airborne Divisions advanced through the mountains from the east, completing the envelopment of hostile positions on the west coast. These operations which were conducted without motor vehicles in extremely rough terrain presented supply and evacuation problems as difficult as can be imagined. The 11th Airborne Division encountered extremely bitter resistance in the MAHONAG-ANAS (29-27) area but after much hard fighting at close quarters broke up organized Jap resistance in the passes and eventually succeeded in reaching the west coast and making contact with the 7th Division. Reinforcement and supply of this force was accomplished to a great extent by air. Medical personnel and equipment, delivered by parachute, established a hospital at MAHONAG. Evacuation from this hospital was largely by hand-carry to the west coast after the pass had been secured, supplemented by Cub planes operating from a strip at LUBI (30.9-26.4). In some cases, it required twelve (12) days to get wounded to clearing stations in these circumstances.

31. The landing of the 77th Division at DEPOSITO caught the enemy by surprise and was met by little ground resistance. The division's advance to the north proceeded rapidly until CAMP DOWNES (11.8-31.0) was reached. At this point determined resistance was encountered and overcome, CAMP DOWNES being captured on 9 December. This was followed closely by the capture of ORMOC on the 10th. Especially bitter resistance was encountered in the advance north from ORMOC with frequent strong Japanese counterattacks from stubbornly defended dug-in positions. VALENCIA (07.0-43.8) was captured on the 18th by well executed flanking maneuver, however, and LIBUNGAO (05.5-50.1) and the strategic road junction just north thereof were captured by 20 December. In the fighting near the road junction the Japs committed fresh troops from the 5th Infantry, 8th Division (which had just landed on the west coast at PALOMPON (84.5-37.0)) in a counterattack from the west. On 21 December contact was made with the X Corps at CANANGA (05.2-53.4) on the boundary.

32. On the night of 11-12 December, one of the wildest melees of the LEYTE campaign occurred when a Jap reinforcement and resupply convoy of two (2) ships and one (1) barge entered ORMOC BAY and, in the belief that ORMOC was still in Japanese hands, attempted to beach at the same time and near the place

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a United States resupply convoy was beaching. One Jap ship and the barge were sunk and many of the Japs killed by fire of AA weapons, amtanks, M8s, tanks and artillery. There was no loss to United States shipping.

33. In the meantime the 7th Division reached IPIL (13.6-28.2) on 11 December and took over west coast supply installations at that place. Soon thereafter, one infantry regiment of the 7th Division moved to ORMOC and took over the defense of that place, under operational control of the 77th Division. On 24 December the 7th Division zone of action was expanded to include all of the west coast south of the line PALOMPON-VALENCIA.

34. After making contact with the X Corps the 77th Division changed direction and advanced west toward PALOMPON against continuous resistance from well-located enemy positions dominating the road. On the night of 24-25 December it dispatched a reinforced battalion from ORMOC in amphibian tractors, supported by amphibian tanks and screened by PT boats, to land near PALOMPON and seize that place. This movement requiring a "swim" of over forty (40) nautical miles, was successfully accomplished with the loss of only three (3) vehicles and no personnel. The landing, which was unopposed, followed by seizure of the PALOMPON area the same day, marked the close of the campaign under the command of the Sixth Army.

35. The initial operations on the west coast were supported almost exclusively by truck hauls over the narrow one-way mountain road between ABUYOG and BAYBAY. Accumulation of sizeable stocks of supplies was never possible. The shipping available to the 77th Division was sufficient to carry only enough supplies for initial needs. The supply situation remained critical on the west coast until regular LSM convoy runs from the east coast were inaugurated in mid-December. Despite frequent air attacks these convoys eventually succeeded in transporting adequate supplies to the west coast units.

36. While the foregoing action officially ended the "organized resistance" on LEYTE, the XXIV Corps continued operations in its zone until early January when it took over all of the LEYTE-SAMAR-CAMOTES area. Active mopping-up operations, including an amphibious operation by a reinforced battalion against the CAMOTES ISLANDS, fully occupied the troops of the Corps for another month and a half. During this latter period, 14,221 Japs were killed and considerable additional supplies and equipment were destroyed before the Corps was relieved by elements of the X Corps early in February. These operations under command of the Eighth Army will be covered in a later report.

PART TWO

INTELLIGENCE

1. General.

a. The fact that a complete change of target occurred after the Corps was embarked greatly increased the normal problem of providing pre-landing intelligence. Distribution of all available material prior to sailing from OAHU, however, supplemented by additional issues at each stop, resulted in a satisfactory solution.

b. Lack of air reconnaissance and photography during most of the operation reduced available information of this type below the desirable minimum.

2. Maps and Aerial Photographs.

a. Available maps (scales 1/25,000, 1/50,000 and 1/250,000) were generally inaccurate and lacking in vertical control. They were of extremely limited value to units smaller than regiments. Except for coast lines and major road nets, horizontal control was uniformly poor. Representation of the interior of the island differed from the terrain by as much as several thousand yards in many cases.

b. Good aerial photographs, including obliques, of the beaches were available prior to the landing. Later, although additional photos were furnished, complete coverage of the area of operations was never obtained. The time lag between a request for photo coverage and receipt of the prints was usually so great that the value of the photos was greatly reduced. For example, a request for strip coverage of the area just west of the BURAUEN-DAGAMI road was forwarded approximately 22 October 1944. Prints of this area were delivered to the Corps on 7 November 1944 long after the area was completely under our control.

c. The disadvantages of this lack of accurate maps and photos, in appropriate scales, are obvious. These difficulties were exaggerated in this campaign where converging operations by large units were the rule. Small units met the situation by continuous extensive patrolling and soon had accurate local maps developed from sketches submitted by the patrols. Captured maps and sketches and guerrilla information also proved to be extremely valuable.

3. Combat Intelligence.

a. Initial intelligence information provided prior to the landing proved to be accurate. The enemy order of battle and troop dispositions were especially good.

b. Beginning with the pre-landing reports of underwater demolition teams, assault units sent back the great volume of information which constitutes the backbone of combat intelligence. As these units became indoctrinated with

the value of such information and the necessity for accurate reporting, the efficiency of the combat intelligence system increased. Native reports, although habitually greatly exaggerated, were valuable, especially in locating enemy stragglers and small patrols in rear of our lines and in providing negative enemy information.

4. Reconnaissance.

a. The scarcity of air observation, except by liaison planes organic to the Corps, placed the ground units "on their own" for reconnaissance to an unusual degree. Patrolling was on such a scale that early in the campaign all parts of LEYTE under control of the Corps were covered by a network of patrols. Especially in the mountainous interior, such patrols often lived away from base for as much as ten (10) days with only such supplies as could be carried or obtained off the country. They located all sizeable groups of Japs and maintained contact with the latter until they were either destroyed or scattered.

b. Artillery liaison planes, despite frequent impossible weather for flying, did an excellent job of visual reconnaissance. Attempts to use K-20 cameras from these planes produced only fair results, however.

c. Water reconnaissance by PT boats when available and by all manner of craft including amphibian vehicles was extensively used.

d. The lack of a Corps reconnaissance unit was keenly felt in this operation. Such a unit would have been very valuable in all phases of the operation. Its absence resulted in additional loads on division agencies overtaxing their capacities and required formation of special task units for missions that could have been more effectively accomplished by a regularly organized reconnaissance unit.

5. Guerrillas.

a. It was hoped that contact would be made early with a reliable, well-organized and equipped guerrilla organization. Such was not the case, however. Individuals, claiming to be guerrillas, streamed into command posts of all echelons. Corps G-2 was soon forced to establish an organization to receive and investigate these individuals.

b. Guerrillas became increasingly valuable as the campaign progressed. Organized units became available and worked under control of division commanders in whose areas they were located. These guerrillas provided much valuable information of the enemy and the terrain, acted as guides, and under American supervision guarded bridges and other installations. In the unoccupied areas in the southern part of the island, guerrilla units were the only troops present.

c. On 25 December 1944, guerrilla units were functioning with divisions as follows:

7th Division - 94th Guerrilla Regiment (less one battalion)

11th Airborne Division - 3rd Battalion, 95th Regiment (-) plus 30 men from combat company and 100 men from service company

77th Division - 96th Regiment

96th Division - 95th Regiment (-3rd Battalion and Detachment)

6. Counter-Intelligence.

a. In view of the large numbers of civilians present and the impossibility of preventing their passage through our lines in both directions, it is probable that Japanese sympathizers and spies among them kept the enemy well informed about our dispositions. It is difficult to get the American soldier to exercise the necessary harshness to keep natives, particularly women and children, from going to their homes or from wandering at will throughout the entire area. CIC units were confronted with a most difficult job in investigating and locating pro-Jap and subversive natives.

b. The CIC organization was as follows:

XXIV Corps CIC:
DULAG - Corps area investigations, routine checks, etc.
RIZAL (61.5-22.4) - Corps CP area security.
BAYBAY-ORMOC - Assisting 7th Division detachment with security checks and in securing information on CAMOTES.

7th Division CIC - ORMOC-BAYBAY - Tactical information on CAMOTES, routine checks, etc.

77th Division CIC - VALENCIA - Routine checks, tactical information, etc.

96th Division CIC - 96th Division CP - Routine checks, security, etc.

7. Prisoners of War.

a. The usual acts of treachery occurred early in the campaign reducing the enthusiasm of the troops for taking prisoners. The Japanese when captured universally appeared to tell all they knew. Although much valuable information was obtained from prisoners, most of them were stragglers with little late information of their own units.

b. The interpreters teams (NISEI) again proved their great value in interrogation of prisoners and translation of captured documents.

c. Cumulative totals of prisoners captured by 25 December follow (see chart on page 21):

7th Division	- 87
11th Airborne Division	- 10
77th Division	- 49
96th Division	- 49
97th AAA Group	- 2
Navy	- 1
TOTAL	198

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

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8. Japanese Campaign on LEYTE.

a. The 16th Jap Division (Lt. General Makino) reinforced by 4,000 troops, with a total strength of about 20,000, is believed to have been the garrison of LEYTE. Extensive field fortifications covered the landing beaches on the eastern coast. Pre-invasion air strikes destroyed many vehicles on roads and apparently disrupted enemy plans to occupy these positions. The preliminary bombardment further disrupted enemy plans so that resistance at the shore line was negligible. Only a few Jap dead were seen in the beach areas during and after the assault.

b. Our drive inland soon overran the only lateral beach road and eventually cut the defending force in the Corps zone into three (3) isolated groups. Resistance by isolated groups was determined. Local counterattacks were delivered with enthusiasm. Little sign of divisional control was apparent in any of these initial defensive activities, however.

c. When the success of our operation to seize an initial beachhead was assured, the 16th Jap Division apparently made an organized effort to reassemble in strong positions generally west of DAGAMI and to secure the trails over the mountains ranging between the east and west coasts for later operations. Extremely limited and ineffective use of demolitions was apparent both during this phase and also throughout the campaign.

d. It was apparently the enemy's intention to employ the bulk of the reinforcements landed on the west coast of LEYTE in an offensive to the north and east of ORMOC to break out of the western coastal plain. The 26th Jap Division with the apparent mission of protecting the rear of this offensive advanced south down the coast and delivered a series of strong attacks against elements of our 7th Division north of BAYBAY. With the repulse of these attacks the Jap 26th Division assumed a passive defense of the West coast, with strong elements attempting to push east over the mountains to secure the ALBUERA (21.8-20.6)-BURAUEN trail and attack BURAUEN.

e. The paratroop attack on the BURAUEN airfield area on 6 December was part of a coordinated attempt to capture airfield installations in the BURAUEN area. The 16th and 26th Jap Divisions were ordered to attack overland and assist the airborne forces. The attack of the 16th Division constituted little more than a nuisance since it involved only some 400-500 troops. The 26th Division was stopped and destroyed in the mountains and never reached BURAUEN in force.

f. Our landing at DEPOSITO on 7 December and establishment ashore of the 77th Division split the Jap forces on the west coast. Our rapid seizure of the western coastline trapped many enemy troops in the area to the east while occupation of all roads on the west coast cut the remaining hostile forces into several small groups. Destruction or capture of the major supply and hospital installations left these groups little logistic support. The capture of PALOMPON on Christmas Day, 1944 closed the last feasible evacuation or reinforcement port.

g. At this time the Jap forces probably consisted of some 15,000-16,000 troops assembled in small groups in the mountains and the western coastal plain. Lt. General Yamagata, 26th Jap Division commander, had his CP in the mountains east of ORMOC and consistently attempted to assemble all enemy remnants in that area. It is thought later on he succeeded in collecting some 3,000-4,000. Other enemy troops on the west coast eventually assembled north of PALOMPON in a group of some 2,000-3,000.

h. Estimated number of enemy killed by major elements of the Corps up to 25 December were:

7th Division	-	9,837
77th Division	-	12,789
96th Division	-	7,296
11th Airborne Division	-	4,247
Corps and Service Troops	-	287
Guerrillas	-	557
TOTAL.....		35,013

i. The following is an analysis of comparative friendly and enemy casualties in this campaign (page 24a):

	TOTAL CASUALTIES PER 100 ENEMY (KIA and POWs)		TOTAL FRIENDLY KIA PER 100 ENEMY KIA	
7th Division	15	(1:6)	3	(1:33)
77th Division	10	(1:10)	2	(1:50)
96th Division	16	(1:6)	5	(1:20)
11th Airborne Division	12	(1:8)	5	(1:20)
Corps Troops	45*	(1:2)	7*	(1:14)
XXIV Corps	14	(1:7)	3	(1:33)

* Probably due to Corps Troops being subjected to enemy action against which only passive resistance was possible. Variables render this figure inaccurate.

Corps Troops include: Hq and Hq Co, XXIV Corps
Attached AA, Ord, Engr, QM Troops
Guerrillas
Naval Personnel (who turned in 1 PW)
XXIV Corps Artillery

This does not include casualties suffered by guerrillas. Enemy killed by guerrillas, however, are a negligible factor in computations above.

9. Enemy Tactics and Weapons.

a. Japanese tactics as encountered on LEYTE were about as had been expected, with no outstanding novelties. Most of the enemy attacks were made at night and usually involved small numbers. Several small hostile daylight attacks were executed with marked skill. The Jap artillery was seldom able to mass its fires but on several occasions delivered good preparations in limited areas.

b. In defense the individual Jap, as always, was a determined fighter, skilled in camouflage and use of ground.

His quickness in attacking - and often destroying - tanks separated from infantry support was conspicuous. An outstanding fault was an almost universal failure to make effective use of demolitions to hinder or delay our advance. Attempts to destroy bridges (of which there were hundreds) were usually only partially effective, leaving the bridges easy to repair.

c. Enemy security was weak. Numerous incidents were reported of our units surprising Japs sleeping or eating. When surprised the Jap was easily killed as he seldom reacted aggressively.

d. Continued aggressive attempts were made by small enemy groups to destroy important installations, especially 155mm guns. Satchel charges were the principal weapons employed in such attempts, some of which were successful.

e. The only weapons encountered new to this command were the Model 90, 75mm gun - an excellent piece of artillery - and the so-called "lunge mine", a shaped charge mounted on a stick for use against tanks.

10. Atrocities.

Instances of atrocities committed by Jap soldiers against civilians, especially by isolated Japs attempting to escape, were numerous.

11. Propaganda Leaflets.

Although some Japs surrendered reportedly as a result of reading surrender leaflets, efforts in this direction could not be considered successful. Special letters directed to enemy division commanders and dropped near fairly well identified CPs had no noticeable effect. The understandable reluctance of our troops to trust any Jap doubtless contributes to the difficulty of inducing the enemy to surrender.

12. Public relations.

Considerable newspaper space was given to the LEYTE campaign in newspapers and magazines in the United States. That this was due to the inherent news value of the campaign rather than to any coordinated effort on the part of Corps Headquarters is self-evident when it is realized that the current T/Os make no allowance for public relations in any headquarters. Public relations work is a necessary and vital function of a Corps Headquarters. Public relations, as expressed in complete news coverage of what the individual soldier in the line and the service forces is doing, is a major morale factor, both on the fighting front and the home front. It is felt that in order to provide such coverage the current T/O should be revised to include a public relations section in both Corps and Division Headquarters. While the Information and Historical Teams will fill this need in part, a permanent organization is required so that public relations work can be conducted on a logical, coordinated and planned basis at all times. A recommended T/O for a Corps Public Relations Office is shown under paragraph 13c below. (Increase in strength of Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Company recommended in paragraph 1, Part Seven,

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

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page 58 will provide required personnel.)

13. Lessons Learned and Recommendations.

a. Corps Headquarters has a continuing requirement for liaison type airplanes. A source of such airplanes independent of Corps Artillery should be available.

Recommendation: That the Corps be furnished a squadron of eight (8) liaison type airplanes including four (4) of L-5 type.

b. A Corps operating with an open flank has a definite need for a Corps Ground Reconnaissance Unit. In this theater, this unit should be equipped for amphibious reconnaissance.

Recommendation: That a reconnaissance squadron be assigned to the Corps for any operation where need of such a unit can be anticipated.

c. Assignment of public relations personnel to Corps and Division Headquarters is believed both desirable and necessary.

Recommendation: That the following Public Relations Section be assigned to the Corps on a permanent basis:

Public Relations Officer	Major, Branch Immaterial
Copy and Assignment Chief	Technical Sergeant
Reporters and Rewrite Men	Two (2) T/4s
Photographer	T/4
Clerk	T/5

Equipment: Two (2) typewriters (one standard, one portable).
1 Camera, Speed Graphic (4 x 5).
1 Camera, 35mm.
Necessary photographic supplies.

PART THREE

OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. The operations on LEYTE confirmed previous opinion that tactics and technique of ground forces as presently established are sound and satisfactory. Nothing novel was discovered by our forces in this campaign.

b. The Japanese parachute attack of 6 December was the first experience of this command in this type of action. Defense in such cases is discussed in paragraph 3 below.

c. The LEYTE campaign was conducted on a land mass large enough to permit maneuver. The terrain on the eastern coastal plain and on parts of the west coast was flat and contained an appreciable amount of relatively open country. The central mountain range was extremely rugged and traversed only by foot trails, few in number. In this area, the action was restricted to small unit mountain fighting.

2. Offensive Operations.

a. The Corps was on continuous offensive from the date of landing (20 October) to the close of the reporting period (25 December).

b. The offensive on the east coast was characterized by initial rapid thrusts, generally following roads, to seize important localities and to divide the Jap forces. This was followed by envelopments from as many directions as possible in the circumstances to contain and destroy the remaining enemy pockets. This method proved to be eminently successful, as in no case did the Jap reaction develop a serious threat.

c. The advance up the west coast as far as ORMOC was made in a narrow coastal plain, dominated on the right (east) flank by extremely rugged terrain, which was in the possession of the enemy (see Part One, page 15). ORMOC BAY on the left flank was controlled by Jap naval surface forces in the initial phases of this campaign, as no friendly surface forces were permanently based in that area until near the end of the period covered by this report. A water envelopment by the 77th Division coordinated with land attacks by all other divisions was successfully used to gain full control of this critical area.

d. Capture of the ORMOC-LIBUNGAO-PALOMPON triangle was accomplished by a combination of the above methods. The initial advance north from ORMOC was a rapid thrust along the road axis ORMOC-CANANGA, followed by a change in direction to the west. The advance west was delayed by resistance from excellent positions blocking the road. The 77th Division sent a battalion landing team largely transported in amphibian tractors to land in rear of these positions and seize

PALOMPON. This action was highly successful. During the above operations, the 7th Division took over areas from the 77th, mopping up remaining enemy resistance and assuming logistic responsibilities in rear of that division.

3. Defensive Operations.

a. The Corps as a whole was never on the defensive during this operation. Small units repeatedly proved their ability to hold defensive positions against attacks by numerically superior forces. Elements of the 32nd Infantry, 7th Division, in their action in holding against repeated strong attacks north of BAYBAY in late November, provided an outstanding example.

b. The paratroop attack on 6 December provided a test of the Corps plan to meet this type of threat. Each of our units, regardless of size, had been indoctrinated with the necessity for a completely organized perimeter, coordinated with its neighbors, and a mobile reserve. This procedure had been in effect ever since the landing on LEYTE and by the date of the parachutist attack was an habitual practice of Corps units. The attack was delivered, however, in an area largely occupied by Air Corps ground crews and service units and antiaircraft units. Defensive preparations of these troops were far below the standard required of troops of this Corps and the reaction to the attack was not sufficiently determined to prevent the enemy from effecting a firm lodgment. The enemy was able to assemble in favorable positions, which our combat troops soon contained. His elimination required a full scale coordinated attack by infantry and allied arms. Delay in isolating the attackers in this instance resulted from inadequate defense of the airfield area and prevented quick crushing of the enemy airborne assault. This is considered as additional evidence of the soundness of the doctrine of defense as applied by troops of the Corps.

4. Artillery.

a. Artillery fire was extensively used and was probably the most effective Jap killer available. Forward observers accompanied all but the smallest patrols, thus insuring adjusted fire on enemy groups as soon as discovered.

b. Corps Artillery.

(1) Organization.

(a) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, V Marine Amphibious Corps Artillery (Brigadier General T. E. Bourke, USMC) was attached to the XXIV Corps when it became apparent that the organic Corps Artillery (which was engaged in the MARIANAS campaign) would not be available for the initial phases of the LEYTE operation. For the same reason the 5th 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the 11th 155mm Gun Battalion, both USMC, were attached to the Corps. These units, with the 198th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer), the 226th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun) and the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion constituted the Corps Artillery until relief of the Marine units on 11 December 1944. The units of the Corps Artillery, incidentally, were never assembled on one island until after their landing on LEYTE.

(b) The remainder of the XXIV Corps Artillery arrived on LEYTE from SAIPAN early in December and relieved all Marine units on 11 December 1944. The new Army units were:

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, XXIV Corps Artillery (Brigadier General Josef R. Sheetz)

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 419th Field Artillery Group

531st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun)

532nd Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun)

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 420th Field Artillery Group

145th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)

225th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How)

(2) Operations.

Reconnaissance parties of Corps Artillery landed on the east coast of LEYTE ISLAND 20-21 October 1944. All elements of Corps Artillery were in position on LEYTE ISLAND by 1500, 24 October 1944 at which time Corps Artillery Commander assumed control of Corps Artillery ashore.(sketch, page 29). The 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion effected common survey control for both X and XXIV Corps. Corps Artillery with the mission of general support reinforced the fires of the 7th Division Artillery with one 155mm Howitzer Battalion and the fires of the 96th Dvision Artillery with one 155mm Howitzer Battalion. The 226th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Gun) was placed under operational control of the X Corps during the period 4 November to 4 December 1944. Corps Artillery battalions displaced forward commencing 1 November 1944 (see sketch, page 29a). From their forward positions the 155mm Gun Battalions maintained continuous interdiction on ORMOC, VALENCIA and the ORMOC-VALENCIA road. The amphibious operation in the vicinity of ORMOC was supported by the 226th Field Artillery Battalion under operational control of X Corps from advanced positions near DARO.

Total ammunition expenditure by XXIV Corps Artillery from 21 October to 26 December 1944:

155mm How Ammunition

Shell, HE, M-107	16,451
Shell, WP, M-105 and M-110	776
Shell, Smoke, BE, M-116	7
TOTAL ...	17,234

155mm Gun Ammunition

Shell, HE, M-101	9,350
Shell, WP, M-104	461
Shell, AP, M-112	68
TOTAL ...	9,879

Total Rounds, Corps Artillery 27,113


SAMAR
1370
1360
BASEY
TACLOBAN
(OPEN CONTROL
226 X CORPS
DARO
SAN PEDRO
BAY
LAKE DANAO
198
DAGAMI
TOLOSA
5(MAR)
NO 4
11(MAR)
287
5(MAR)
XXX
FDC
BURI
SAN PABLO
BURAUEN
DULAG
RIZAL
1320
1330
LA PAZ
ORMOC
BAY
LEGEND
CENTER BN AREA
SECTORS OF FIRE
PRINCIPAL STREAMS
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

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POSITIONS LEYTE
SCALE 1/250000
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5. Coordination of Artillery, Air and Naval Gunfire.

a. From past experience and analysis of reports from recent operations, the problem of coordination of artillery, air and naval gunfire was given particular attention with a view to giving maximum support to the ground operations with the least possible int erference between these supporting agencies and the minimum of danger to friendly elements (including aircraft) from our own fire. Many inter-staff and inter-service conferences were held to acquaint each agency with the problems of the others and with infantry requirements for close support.

b. Prior to the rehearsals, this Corps promulgated an SOP (see Annex E, XXIV Corps SOP) designed to encourage the maximum coordination of these supporting elements. The Corps Artillery Officer was designated to represent the Corps Commander in determining the type of support to be provided and to take appropriate safety measures. This procedure was tried out on the rehearsals, improved and promulgated.

c. Prior to the landing of large masses of artillery and mortars the problem involved principally naval gunfire and air support, and was further simplified by the excellent communications available on the command ship. Beginning with A plus 1 day, as more and more artillery units became available ashore, the time involved in coordination and transmission by radio of necessary firing restriction on artillery inherently became increasingly longer but in no case exceeded thirty (30) minutes. When the Corps Artillery moved its command post ashore on A plus 3, the naval gunfire - air - artillery coordinating team moved into this CP. Artillery telephone communication being available ashore, the time between request for support or detection of a remunerative target and the reaction thereto was sensibly reduced.

d. The coordination obtained between the supporting units was most satisfactory and the principles employed were considered sound. The naval gunfire and carrier-based air support provided until the departure of the fleet on A plus 5 were excellent.

e. After withdrawal of the naval air forces, no close air support was provided for ground operations. Due to scarcity of aircraft for ground support missions, requests for air strikes had to be arranged through many channels well ahead of the time needed and were often delayed in execution or were not delivered at all.

6. Antiaircraft.

a. The battalions of the 97th AAA Group were attached to divisions for movement ashore and occupation of initial firing positions. All gun and AW battalions had at least two (2) batteries in position by A plus 3 and were fully emplaced on A plus 4. Targets were available daily beginning A plus 1.

b. The Commanding Officer, 97th AAA Group, assumed operational control of all Corps AAA on 22 October 1944. Command of all AAA units on LEYTE was assumed by Commanding General, 32nd AAA Brigade, 291200 October. The following

table indicates the activity of Corps AA units during the time they were under operational control of Corps:

SUMMARY OF AAA OPERATIONS* 20-29 OCTOBER 1944:

DATE	NO OF RAIDS	EST NO OF PLANES IN RAID	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
20 Oct	0	0	0	0	0
21 Oct	0	0	0	0	0
22 Oct	2	3	0	0	0
23 Oct	1	4	1	3	1
24 Oct	4	12	4	3	2
25 Oct	5	8	2	4	2
26 Oct	7	29	5½	4½	4
27 Oct	9	31	7	9	4
28 Oct	9	24	5½	5½	6
29 Oct	1	2	0	0	0
(Officially credited to automatic wpns			18	20	16)
(Officially credited to 90mm guns			7	9	3)
Total	38	113	25	29	19

*XXIV Corps Antiaircraft Artillery:
97th AAA Group
Det, 230th AAA S/L Bn
Btry A, 230th AAA S/L Bn
502d AAA Gun Bn
504th AAA Gun Bn
485th AAA (AW) Bn
866th AAA (AW) Bn
727th Sig AW Co (attached to 97th AAA Gp)

c. Prior to the landing all units had been indoctrinated in the Corps SOP which prohibited firing against aircraft by any except AAA units, unless directly attacked. In practice, this rule was frequently violated during the early days of the landing. Many individuals ashore and practically all landing craft present in the harbor fired on any unidentified aircraft as long as it was in sight. This dangerous practice was finally stopped among ground troops in the Corps CP area by use of a public address system and by summarily fining each individual caught in the act of firing, and in other areas by increasingly rigid enforcement with disciplinary action against violators.

d. The Pacific Ocean Areas' terminology for alerts and control of fire was used initially but, after withdrawal

of naval forces, was superseded by the Southwest Pacific Area system. This - with other differences in technique - caused some confusion early in the campaign.

e. The 502d AAA Gun Battalion was used to reinforce the ground fires of the 7th Division Artillery during the period A plus 1 to A plus 5. A total of 1,782 rounds of 90mm ammunition was expended on day and night missions, which were effectively accomplished. Aerial adjustment was used during daylight hours.

f. The 7th AAA AW Battalion (attached to 77th Division) destroyed nine enemy aircraft 6-9 December 1944 during the landing of the 77th Infantry Division on the west coast. Units of this battalion also fired with good effect on Japanese craft which attempted to land troops at ORMOC on the night of 11-12 December 1944.

PART FOUR

LOGISTICS

1. General.

a. The operation for which the XXIV Corps loaded out of OAHU was the capture of YAP — a short, independent operation on a small land mass. Logistic support was to be provided by Army and Navy facilities of the Pacific Ocean Areas. The shipping setup to provide this support was well balanced and was scheduled to arrive at YAP as rapidly as it could be handled by the estimated capacities of the beaches and ports on that island. This shipping was scheduled as follows:

(1) Assault echelon, containing assault units and equipment, with initial supplies including minimum reserves.

(2) Resupply echelons containing additional units as required and maintenance supplies for all troops ashore for 120 days.

(3) Rehabilitation shipping containing rear echelons of assault units and additional units and equipment not lifted with the assault echelon. Most of this shipping was scheduled to rejoin the Corps at NEW CALEDONIA where rehabilitation was to be accomplished.

b. For the LEYTE operation, the assault echelon of the Corps as loaded was assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area. Support of the Operation was to be provided generally as previously planned, to include resupply echelons scheduled to be available on call to the target as required. Rehabilitation shipping was to be diverted to LEYTE. After A plus 120 days, all maintenance supplies of the Corps were to become the complete responsibility of Southwest Pacific Area.

c. Actual echeloning in of the shipping at LEYTE was delayed by a number of factors, including commitment to the campaign of more forces than expected in original plans and extensive use of the meager port facilities available at LEYTE for staging and mounting of units for the LUZON operation before completion of the LEYTE campaign. In addition, some XXIV Corps supplies and equipment had necessarily to be furnished to SWPA organizations during the course of the campaign.

d. The Corps at all times during this operation functioned in varying degrees as an administrative unit although almost all of its service troops were absorbed into the SOS port activities. During the operations of two divisions in the ORMOC area, supply of these elements was handled completely by the Corps.

2. Loading.

a. General.

On 16 August 1944 loading was started at HONOLULU, T.H. for a rehearsal prior to departure for the objective. Upon return from rehearsal, top-loading was completed making a total of 55,000 personnel and some 85,000 weight tons of cargo for the assault echelon.

b. The Third Amphibious Force, charged with landing the Corps, had its headquarters at PEARL HARBOR, readily available to Corps Headquarters and to the various agencies involved in the loading-out process. Close joint planning was effected early and continued until the Corps was ashore.

c. The Transport Quartermaster and Port Operations Section, Headquarters XXIV Corps had been organized on 6 June 1944 from personnel furnished by ComGenPOA on detached service and was the Corps staff agency directly responsible for the loading operation.

d. Available shipping was allotted as follows:

	APA	AKA	AP	AGC	AH	APH	LST	LSM	LSV	LSD
7th Division	9	3	2	1	-	1	23	-	1	2
96th Division	10	3	2	1	-	-	24	-	-	3
Corps Troops	3	2	-	1	-	-	8	-	2	-
TOTAL	22	8	4	3	-	1	55	-	3	5

e. Units of Corps Troops were embarked as indicated below. It should be noted that most of these units had elements on several ships and that they were scattered throughout shipping allotted for lifting the divisions.

	1 AGC	3 APA	2 AK	2 LSV	8 LST
Hq & Hq Co XXIV Corps	X	X			X
Six Teams	X				X
Co B 724th MP Bn (-2 Plat)		X			
Hq & Hq Btry V Amph Corps Arty	X		X	X	X
287th FA Obsn Bn		X	X	X	
5th Marine How Bn (155mm)			X	X	
198th FA How Bn (155mm)		X			X
11th Marine Gun Bn (155mm)			X	X	
226th FA Gun Bn (155mm)					X
828th Amphib Trk Co			X	X	X
Hq & Hq Co 20th Armd Gp		X			X
727th AW Det					X
722nd AWS Det (Port)					X
101st Sig Bn (-Co C) Reinf	X	X	X	X	X
284th Ord Hvy Maint & EEIS Tm		X	X		X
3259th QM Sv Co (-1 Plat)		X	X		X
Hq & Hq Co 1118th Engr Gp		X			X
Hq & Hq Btry, 97th AAA Gun Bn	X	X			X
968th Engr Maint Co (1 Plat)		X			X
Prov Engr Topo Plat		X			
292nd Port Co & Hq Det 504th Port		X	X		
71st Med Bn		X	X		X
165th Sta Hosp		X			X
76th Sta Hosp		X	X		
A-3 Cub 12 (Port)		X			
Hq & Hq Det 492nd QM Bn		X			
Prov Graves Reg Co (-3 Plat)		X			
722nd Engr Depot Co		X			X

	1 AGC	3 APA	2 AK	2 LSV	8 LST
Navy Beach Parties		X			X
Island Comdr and Staff					X
Hq Det 88th Cml Bn		X			
Air Delivery Sect - V Amphib		X		X	

f. (1) Supplies embarked were as follows:

RESTRICTED

Class I - 30 days
Class II - 20 days
Class III - 20 days
Class IV - 20 days (Medical - 30 days)
Class V - 7 U/F 105 Arty and AAA;
5 U/F all other types

(2) Of the above supplies, one-third was issued in bulk to divisions and the other units for loading aboard LSTs. Approximately one-third was palletized and loaded aboard APAs with units concerned. The remaining one-third was bulk-loaded in AKs and AKAs for direct unloading into dumps upon arrival at the target.

g. Equipment.

(1) Since the equipment loaded was based on the YAP operation, wheeled vehicles were sacrificed for amphibians, with the result that less than 50% of T/E allowance of general purpose vehicles accompanied the units. This shortage of transportation caused by the change in targets was the principal hardship resulting therefrom. In addition, extra items of heavy engineering equipment to assist in cargo handling, beach operation and road construction were carried in lieu of approximately 50% of T/E dump trucks. This lack of dump trucks seriously hindered necessary road construction during the operation.

(2) Rear echelons which by original plan were to rejoin their parent units in the rehabilitation area in NEW CALEDONIA were accompanied by many items of organizational equipment which would have been most welcome in LEYTE soon after the landing. None of the ships carrying rear echelons reached LEYTE until January, 1945.

3. Movement to Target and Unloading.

a. The movements from OAHU to LEYTE tookplace as follows:

	LEFT HAWAII	ARR EN-IWETOK	LEFT EN-IWETOK	ARR MANUS	LEFT MANUS	ARR LEYTE
Tractor Groups	11 Sep	25 Sep	26 Sep	4 Oct	11 Oct	20 Oct
Transport Groups	15 Sep	25 Sep	28 Sep	3 Oct	14 Oct	20 Oct

In this connection, it should be noted that all troops were aboard ship at least thirty-five (35) days.

b. Unloading.

(1) The approach of Japanese surface task forces caused an acceleration of the unloading program in order to permit early withdrawal of the transports. Supplies, equipment and troops were put ashore faster than was desirable.

RESTRICTED

This resulted in some confusion on the beaches and considerable misplaced equipment.

(2) Excellent beaches, smooth water, light initial resistance and absence of a fringing reef facilitated unloading, which was accomplished in what is believed to be record time. All shipping, involving some 55,000 men and 85,000 tons, was discharged before evening of 24 October.

(3) Corps troop shipping was not organized into a separate transport division for unloading but was distributed throughout 96th and 7th Division transport divisions. This lack of a separate naval group containing the shipping utilized by Corps troops units resulted in a lack of unified control which caused confusion both in loading and in unloading. The need for an organization in which Corps Troop shipping is consolidated into one unit, controlled by a single naval headquarters, was clearly demonstrated.

(4) Beach and shore parties worked together in an excellent manner.

4. Shore Party Operations.

a. Each battalion landing team came ashore with one engineer company from the engineer group attached to its division for shore party duties. These companies were progressively augmented as higher echelons and service units from the assault shipping came ashore and assumed control of shore party activities.

b. Corps Shore Party, under overall command of the Commanding Officer, 1118th Engineer Group, took over from divisions on 23 October 1944. This organization (although later absorbed in the Service Command) continued to function throughout the operation. Overall control of the port activities together with Corps service troops passed successively under the ASCOM (Service Echelon, Sixth Army) on 3 November 1944 and USASOS (Service Echelon, SWPA) on 26 December 1944.

c. On 29 November 1944 the Corps obtained authority to operate an unloading point at ABUYOG. This task was assumed in order to speed up unloading of resupply shipping which could not be handled by facilities already existing on this island and to establish supplies under Corps control for operations on the west coast (see Map of Port Installations, page 37).

5. Supply.

a. Supply dumps established on the east coast continued to serve (under various controls) as Corps supply points for elements of the Corps.

b. The operations on the west coast at the peak involved some 32,000 men. Additional Corps supply points were established at IPIL early in December, and later at ORMOC, stocked with supplies of all classes and used until the end of operation. Supervision of the physical operation of these supply points had to be delegated to the Commanding General, 7th Division due to lack of Corps service units.

c. The more important deficiencies in supply and equipment which developed during this operation are listed below:


ROAD MAP OF
LEYTE
STATUTE MILES
ORMOC PORT &
DUMP AREA
ASP 7
ASP 11
ASP 6
ASP 10
DULAG DUMP
AREAS
ASP 5
ASP 4 20 OCT
1 NOV DULAG PORT
ASP 9 OPENED
15 DEC
ASP 8
ABUYOG PORT
& DUMP AREA
29 NOV
LEGEND
2 LANE ALL WEATHER
1 LANE ALL WEATHER
1 LANE SEASONAL
NOTE:
Italicized numbers indicate
distance in miles between asterisks
PORT INSTALLATIONS
DUMP AREAS & ASP'S
XXIV CORPS
20 OCT–25 DEC
1944