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Report of King II Operation

-- King Z --
OPERATION REPORT
20 OCT. to 25 DEC. 1944
7th Infantry Division Artillery
VOL. I

UNCLASSIFIED



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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
A.P.O. #7, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

REPORT OF KING II OPERATION

(LEYTE ISLAND)

VOLUME I - MAJOR OPERATIONS

20 OCTOBER 1944 - 25 DECEMBER 1944

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
A.P.O. #7, c/o Postmaster
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REPORT OF KING II OPERATION

(LEYTE ISLAND)

VOLUME I - MAJOR OPERATIONS

20 OCTOBER 1944 - 25 DECEMBER 1944

1. GENERAL NATURE AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

a. The following report is a chronological narrative of events pertaining to the Seventh Infantry Division Artillery immediately prior to and during the KING II Operation, compiled for historical purposes, and includes comments, recommendations, and records deemed to be of value to other units participating in similar operations.

b. The Seventh Infantry Division Artillery, composed of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Seventh Infantry Division Artillery, 31st, 48th, 49th, and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, was assigned the mission of supporting the Seventh Infantry Division in the attack and seizure of LEYTE Island.

2. PLANNING.

a. Tactical: Extensive planning was conducted on the Island of OAHU, T. H., for the STALEMATE II (YAP Island) Operation. On departure from OAHU, notice was received of the cancellation of the STALEMATE II Operation. Two tentative targets were being considered, and during the voyage from OAHU to ENIWETOK, all available material aboard ship pertaining to the targets was studied. On arrival at ENIWETOK, Tentative FO 3, Hq XXIV Corps, was received for the KING II (LEYTE Island) Operation. Prior to the departure from ENIWETOK for SEEDLER HARBOR, MANUS Island, it was decided that the plan of attack for the STALEMATE II Operation was suitable for the KING II Operation without major changes. See FO 9, Hq 7th Inf Div, for plan of attack. Several conferences were held with the Battalion Commanders during the stay at SEEDLER HARBOR and the remainder of the time was spent in studying the terrain and known enemy installations on LEYTE Island.

b. Supply and Administration.

(1) Equipment.

(a) Equipment authorized for the operation was based on T/E 6-10, 6-10-1, 6-25, 6-26, 6-27, and 6-29, dated 15 July 1944, with current changes, and special allowances as authorized by the Seventh Infantry Division and XXIV Corps.

(b) All four (4) Battalions of the Division Artillery were equipped as 105mm Howitzer Battalions, although the ordinarily medium Battalion (31st Field Artillery Battalion) was organized under T/O and E, 6-35, dated 15 July 1943, and retained such personnel as authorized as it was contemplated to later equip this Battalion with 155mm Howitzers.

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(c) Equipment, in addition to T/E, authorized for the KING II Operation was as follows:

Air Corps:

Propeller, Airplane, L-4 7 per Hq Btry DA
 Landing Field Light Set, Portable, B-2 1 per Hq Btry DA

Engineer:

Compass, Lensatic, Luminous 20 per Bn
 12 per Hq Btry DA
 Stereoscope, Pocket, 3" 5 per Bn
 3 per Hq Btry DA
 Pole, Range, Jointed 4 per Hq Btry DA
 1 per Btry
 Sprayer, Knapsack, Sanitation
 Landing Mat, Pierced Plank, (Marston) 180 pcs per Bn
 Odograph, Jeep Mounted 1 per Hq Btry DA
 Sandbags, Wire Concertinas, Rope, and Latrine Boxes were carried by the Div Engr for issue at target.

Ordnance:

Carbines, Cal .30, M1 50% Medical Pers
 Gun, Submachine, M3 10 per Bn
 Binoculars, M-13 2 per Bn
 Watch, Pocket 1 per Bn
 3 per Hq Btry DA
 Watch, Stop 4 per Bn
 1 per Hq Btry DA

Quartermaster:

Case, Canvas, Dispatch 3 per Hq Btry DA
 Conveyor, Roller, 10' Sec 150 per Arty LST
 Desk, Field, Fibre, Co 4 per Hq Btry DA
 in lieu of Desks,
 Regtl
 Funnel, Copper, 2 gal 2 per Btry
 Funnel, Copper, 1 quart 1 per Btry
 Lantern, Gasoline, 2 Mantle 2 per CP Tent
 1 per Tent, Small
 Wall
 Opener, Can, Hand 1 per 10 indiv
 Pump, Barrel, Rotary, Comp 4 per Bn
 Pump, Barrel, Motor Oil, Comp 1 per Bn
 Puller, Nail 1 per Btry
 Saw, Crosscut, 2 man, w/handle 13 per Bn
 1 per Hq Btry DA
 Stencil, Outfit, Comp 1 per Btry
 Wrench, Bung Starter 1 per Bn
 Tube, Flexible, Nozzle 2 per Bn

Signal:

Axlc, RL-27 6 per Bn
 4 per Hq Btry DA
 Bag, Waterproof For all Radios, TG
 Sets, Convertors,
 Swbd's, TP's
 Charging Set, SCR 169 1 per Bn
 1 per Hq Btry DA

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Signal (Cont'd):

Chest, BC-5	5 per Bn
	1 per Hq Btry DA
Climbers, Tree, 5" Gaff	4 per Hq Btry DA
Flag Set, M-133	4 per Bn
	2 per Hq Btry DA
Lance Pole, PO-2	25 per Bn
	10 per Hq Btry DA
Radio Set, SCR 608	1 per Hq Btry DA
Radio Set, SCR 610	2 per Hq Btry DA
RL Equipment, CE-11	12 per Bn
	4 per Hq Btry DA
Swbd, Special, Lt Wt, 12 Drop	1 per Bn
Wire, W-110-B, on DR-4 (Mi)	19 per Bn
	10 per Hq Btry DA

Special Service:

Kit, Special Service "A"	1 per Btry
Kit, Special Service "B"	1 per Btry
Projector, Movie, 16mm w/generator and Screen	1 per Bn

(2) Vehicles authorized were as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>HQ DIV ARTY</u>	<u>31ST FA BN</u>	<u>48TH FA BN</u>	<u>49TH FA BN</u>	<u>57TH FA BN</u>
Trk, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton (Odograph)	1	0	0	0	0
Trk, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton (Ambulance)	0	1	1	1	1
Trk, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton (Radio)	3	4	4	4	4
Trk, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton, W/C	4	6	6	6	6
Trk, $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, Personnel	2	0	0	0	0
Trk, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6 Cargo	1	12	12	12	12
Trailer, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	0	4	4	4	4
Trk, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, Amphibious (See note (a) below)	1	15	15	15	15
Cargo Carrier, M-29-C	2	6	6	6	6
Tractor, Dozer, D-8 (See note (b) below)	0	1	1	1	1
Vehicle, Landing, Tracked (LVT-2) (See note (c) below)	0	2	2	2	2

NOTE: (a) DUKW's were operated by Artillery personnel but were to be returned to the DUKW Company on Corps order.

(b) Tractors, D-8, were operated by Division Engineer personnel and were available to the Artillery for all displacements and for construction of Cub fields.

(c) LVT's were operated by LVT Company personnel; were embarked on Artillery LST's and returned to their organizations on D plus 2.

(3) Ammunition.

(a) Division Artillery was allocated seven (7) units of fire for the operation initially, with six (6) units of fire to be available by A plus 10 and six (6) more by A plus 25, from block shipments.

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(b) Ammunition was allocated in the following percentages:

M-48	-	50%
M-54	-	35%
we M-57	-	10%
M-67	-	5%

(c) In addition, each Battalion carried 300 rounds of concrete piercing fuze, T-105, and 40 rounds of Cannister.

3. TRAINING.

The thirty day period following the FLINTLOCK (KWAJALEIN Island) Operation was devoted to a rehabilitation period. Extensive training commenced about 1 April 1944. Training included qualification of all personnel in the use of their individual weapon, swimming, individual and section training. All Batteries executed Battery GHQ Tests 1 and 2, and all Battalions executed Battalion GHQ Tests 1 and 2, using the amphibious transportation with which this Division Artillery is equipped. Three (3) versions of GHQ Test number 3, of approximately forty eight hours each, were conducted by this Headquarters; (1) rapid movement using Division Artillery Observed Fire Chart; (2) night occupation, photo survey and firing from photomap; (3) night occupation using complete survey, grid sheet unobserved fire chart, target restitution from single verticals. Results achieved were excellent. Due to prior operations no amphibious training was deemed necessary other than training of additional DUKW drivers. In addition to the above, a Transport Quartermaster School of two (2) week duration was conducted by the Division.

4. LOADING.

a. The Division had four loading points for the operation. Each Infantry Regiment operated one point and the Division Artillery operated the fourth. The Division Artillery loading point was at IROQUOIS POINT, PEARL HARBOR, OAHU, T. H. In addition to loading the Division Artillery LST's, the Artillery loaded five (5) Division Supply LST's.

b. Each Artillery Battalion and each supply LST was assigned an area at the piers to receive equipment to be loaded.

c. The coordination of supply movements between the loading point and the Division Supply Agencies, the coordination of labor details, and the assignment of transportation required, were directed by the Division Artillery S-4.

d. The Dock and Storage areas were under the supervision of the Division Artillery Assistant S-1, who lived at the piers and was in direct communication with Division Artillery Headquarters by telephone and telegraph.

e. An officer of the grade of Captain was appointed as Division Artillery Transport Quartermaster. This officer supervised the overall loading, checked all Battalion loading plans with the Battalion Transport Quartermasters, and maintained liaison with the Division Transport Quartermaster.

f. Each Battalion maintained two (2) trained officer Transport Quartermasters and two (2) enlisted assistants. Each of the officers was assigned as LST Transport Quartermaster and was charged with the loading of his individual LST.

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g. The Shipping Chart for Vehicles and Personnel is shown below:

UNIT	PRIMARY LST	SECONDARY LST	OVERFLOW LST	ARTY TRANSP	AKA 55
<u>Hq Btry DA</u>					
1. Hull No	None	No 126	No 461	APH 3 (USS RIXEY)	None
2. Troop CO	None	Capt McPeak	Lt Taylor	Col Booth	None
3. TQM	None	Capt Blair	Lt Schultz	Lt Barbee	None
4. EM aboard	None	2	1	94	None
5. Off "	None	None	None	11	None
6. Vehicles	None	1 DUKW	1 2½-T 6x6	4 Jeeps 4 W/C's 2 1½-T Trks 2 1-T Trls 2 M-29-C	None
<u>31st FA Bn</u>					
1. Hull No	686	126	461	APH 3	None
2. Troop CO	Lt Col Sawicki	Capt McPeak	Lt Taylor	Col Booth	None
3. TQM	Lt Taylor	Capt Blair	Lt Schultz	Lt Barbee	None
4. EM aboard	204	109	13	146	None
5. Off "	15 incl DA Chap	5	1	11	None
6. Vehicles	5 Jeeps 2 ¼-T Trls 3 1-T Trls 6 DUKWs 2 Planes	8 2½-T 6x6 9 DUKWs 1 LVT	3 W/Cs 3 2½-T 6x6 6 M-29-C *1 2½-T 6x6	3 W/Cs 2 ¼-T Trls	None
<u>48th FA Bn</u>					
1. Hull No	242	205	461	APH 3	None
2. Troop CO	Maj Beck	Lt Lossman	Lt Taylor	Col Booth	None
3. TQM	Lt Caraway	Lt Smith	Lt Schultz	Lt Barbee	None
4. EM aboard	197	92	20	100	None
5. Off "	15 incl DA Chap	4	1	6	None
6. Vehicles	5 Jeeps 2 ¼-T Trls 3 1-T Trls 6 DUKWs 2 Planes	1 2½-T 6x6 9 DUKWs 1 LVT	3 W/Cs 11 2½-T 6x6 6 M-29-C	3 W/Cs 2 ¼-T Trls	None
<u>49th FA Bn</u>					
1. Hull No	223	605	461	APH 3	ALSHAIN
2. Troop CO	Lt Col Harrison	Maj Mitchell	Lt Taylor	Col Booth	Lt Sponzo
3. TQM	Lt Dickinson	Lt Paul	Lt Schultz	Lt Barbee	Lt Plumley
4. EM aboard	192	106	20	94	4
5. Off "	13	5	2	4	None
6. Vehicles	5 Jeeps 2 ¼-T Trls 3 1-T Trls 6 DUKWs 2 Planes	1 2½-T 6x6 9 DUKWs 1 LVT	3 W/Cs 7 2½-T 6x6 6 M-29-C	3 W/Cs 2 ¼-T Trls	4 2½-T 6x6
<u>57th FA Bn</u>					
1. Hull No	733	169	461	APH 3	ALSHAIN
2. Troop CO	Lt Col Slaughter	Lt Hardesty	Lt Taylor	Col Booth	Lt Sponzo
3. TQM	Lt Mills	WO Shopnitz	Lt Schultz	Lt Barbee	Lt Plumley
4. EM aboard	207	96	19	97	2
5. Off "	15	4	1	4	None
6. Vehicles	5 Jeeps 2 ¼-T Trls 3 1-T Trls 6 DUKWs 2 Planes	2 2½-T 6x6 9 DUKWs 1 LVT	3 W/Cs 8 2½-T 6x6 6 M-29-C	3 W/Cs 2 ¼-T Trls	2 2½-T 6x6

*Loaded on LST, Hull No 605

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- NOTE: (a) CG, Div Arty, Aide de Camp and 4 enlisted men plus Naval Gunfire Officer and one enlisted man from each Battalion as Naval Gunfire Radio Operators, aboard AGC 1 (USS APPALACHIAN).
- (b) Forward Observers and Liaison Parties shipped with respective RCT's.
- (c) Two Pilots (Division Artillery), two Observers (1 from 31st and 1 from 48th Field Artillery Battalions) aboard CVE 61 (USS MANILA BAY). Also two planes.
- (d) One officer with 96th Division Artillery (Liaison Officer) aboard AGC 3 (USS ROCKY MOUNT).

h. Method of handling ammunition.

- (1) Prior to issue of the ammunition by the CPA Ordnance Dumps, direct liaison was established by the Division Artillery S-4, the Division Ammunition Officer, and the CPA Ordnance Officer. All ammunition dumps were personally inspected, lot numbers were segregated by Ordnance and, prior to the draw, the Battalion Supply Officers were shown the ammunition stacks from which they would draw.
- (2) When the ammunition was drawn, each Battalion attached a Liaison Officer to the Ordnance. This Officer kept the lot numbers separated at the dump and thus prevented mixing lots on the trucks, saw that an even loading rate was maintained to prevent jamming of work and vehicles either at the dump or the loading areas, counted the ammunition to insure accuracy, and inspected the ammunition for condition.
- (3) At the loading area, the Battalion S-4's sorted and checked the ammunition as it arrived. Each Battalion painted a distinctive color on each type of ammunition for easy night identification. Some Battalions went further and added distinguishing marks for different lot numbers.
- (4) No 105mm Ammunition was palletized due to the fact that all seven (7) units of fire were loaded on LST's. There is no hoisting device on the tank deck of an LST for handling pallets.

i. Each Artillery Battalion was assigned a primary LST on which, in addition to the personnel and vehicles shown in shipping chart and all organizational equipment not hand carried, were loaded the following items:

(1) Water:

- (a) An initial supply of 2.5 gallons per individual was carried in five (5) gallon containers.
- (b) An additional 2.5 gallons per individual was carried in Division shipping. Of this amount, 1.3 gallons were in fifteen (15) gallon containers and 1.2 gallons in fifty three (53) gallon drums.

(2) Rations:

- (a) "C" Rations: Two (2) days per individual.
"K" Rations: Two (2) days per individual.
Assault (Gandy) Rations: One (1) day per individual.
Ration Accessories: Five (5) days per individual.
Coffee Component: Five (5) days per individual.
Salt Tablets: Four (4) days per individual.

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- (b) Division carried in the assault shipping in addition to the amounts carried on the Artillery LST's:
- "B" Rations, "10 in 1": Twenty (20) days per individual.
 - "C" Rations: Five (5) days per individual.
 - "D" Rations: One (1) day per individual.
 - "K" Rations: One (1) day per individual.
 - Assault (Candy) Ration: One (1) day per individual.
 - Ration Accessories: Twenty five (25) days per individual.
 - Coffee Component: Twenty five (25) days per individual.
 - Bread Component: Twenty (20) days per individual.
 - Salt Tablets: Twenty six (26) days per individual.
- (3) Ordnance cleaning and preserving materials:
- (a) An anticipated five (5) days supply. These supplies were packed in standard kits prepared by the Division Ordnance. Special kits were available for small arms by Battery plus a special kit for Howitzers by Battery.
 - (b) An additional fourteen (14) days supply was carried in Division shipping.
- (4) Quartermaster cleaning and preserving materials:
- (a) An anticipated six (6) days supply. These supplies were packed in standard kits, based on 100 men, by the Division Quartermaster, and included a proper ration of all supplies needed.
 - (b) An additional fourteen (14) days supply was carried in Division shipping.
- (5) Gasoline, fuels, and lubricants:
- (a) Each vehicle was embarked with tanks $\frac{3}{4}$ full.
 - (b) An estimated two (2) days supply of gasoline for all vehicles, based on War Department Operating Tables, was carried in five (5) gallon containers. For refueling amphibian vehicles, each LST carried eighty (80) fifty three (53) gallon drums of V-80 gasoline plus selected lubricants.
 - (c) A seven (7) days supply of all greases and lubricants, as specified by the Division Ordnance.
 - (d) In addition to amounts carried by the Artillery, Division carried three (3) days supply of all types of gasoline in five (5) gallon containers plus fifteen (15) days supply in fifty three (53) gallon drums. An additional thirteen (13) days supply of lubricants and greases was carried in Division shipping.
- (6) Ammunition:
- (a) Two (2) units of fire for all small arms authorized.
 - (b) Seven (7) units of fire for 105mm Howitzer were loaded on the tank deck, covered with heavy dunnage and the vehicles were secured on top of the ammunition.

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j. Each Battalion carried its T/E allowance of two (2) L-4H Liaison Airplanes on the weather deck of the LST's. This was affected by partially dismantling the planes and building a special crate. The standard crate is far too heavy to be handled by available equipment on an LST. A swing crane was either provided as normal equipment of the LST, or by the Shore Party Engineers, for each Artillery LST. The swing crane is necessary to swing the special crate into position on the deck. The two (2) Division Artillery Planes were carried on Escort Carriers.

k. All cargo to be loaded had reached the loading area and had been segregated and checked prior to time for loading. All ships were loaded in good order and with little or no confusion.

l. During the loading and embarkation period the following duties were performed by the Division Artillery Adjutant in addition to his normal duties:

- (1) Securing transfer of inapt and limited service personnel to the Replacement Depot and securing necessary replacements.
- (2) The securing and dispatching of necessary work details to the docks, Ordnance depots and various places requiring labor.
- (3) The direction and preparation of embarkation tables.
- (4) Coordination of Base Echelon personnel with the Base Echelon Commander.
- (5) The securing of necessary Post clearance for the unit, officers and enlisted personnel.
- (6) The coordination and direction of motor and rail movements to and from the piers for the practice cruise and actual movement of the Artillery.
- (7) The assignment of berthing for units transported on the Artillery Transport.
- (8) The preparation of final reports and correspondence before embarkation.
- (9) Checking personnel aboard ship from the passenger lists and submitting corrected copies to the Adjutant General.

5. REHEARSAL.

The Division Artillery participated in the rehearsal, tactically loaded, on nine (9) LST's and one (1) APH as described in detail in Par 4 g.

A transfer was made of Artillery personnel from LST's to APA's on A-1 Day to permit the Infantry to be on the LST's loaded with the assault LVT's.

On the rehearsal, only the Battalion Commanders Parties and a party from Division Artillery Headquarters, landed on the beach. The above parties, in DUKW's and LVT's were in the vicinity of one of the Battalion LST's at H-30, and then proceeded inland sufficiently to permit reconnaissance for Artillery positions. Battalion Commanders kept the Division Artillery informed as to the progress ashore from information received from Forward Observers and Liaison Officers.

Battalion Command Posts were installed on LST's; Division Artillery Command Post on APH 3 (USS RIXEX), and all radio communication was checked.

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When the Infantry had advanced 800 yards inland the party obtained permission to land. Positions were selected and the rehearsal ended for the Artillery.

Artillery troops on APA's and APH were boated and sent to report to their respective LST's and then returned to their APA's.

On conclusion of the rehearsal, the Division Artillery returned to PEARL HARBOR and all troops except necessary guards debarked and returned to SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. The period covered by the rehearsal was 25 August 1944 to 3 September 1944 and the rehearsal landing was on the Island of MAUI.

6. MOVEMENT TO TARGET AREA.

The Division Artillery moved in two (2) convoys to the staging area. All equipment and the bulk of personnel moved in the LST Convoy. This convoy sailed from PEARL HARBOR on 11 September 1944. The remainder of each Battalion and the Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery moved by APH to the staging area. This ship sailed on 15 September 1944.

At the staging area, Artillery personnel was transferred to APA's and assault Infantry troops were placed on the LST's loaded with LVT's. Troops proceeded to the target area so loaded.

Artillery troops were aboard ship a minimum of forty (40) days. During this period, troops were ashore two days at ENIWETOK and three days at MANUS Island. These periods ashore were recreation periods of about five hours duration.

Aboard ship, calisthenics were stressed to maintain the physical condition of all personnel.

Training aboard ship included general orientation concerning the target and specific problems that would confront various groups. The limited deck space made it necessary to conduct all physical conditioning and training in small groups of ten to twenty individuals.

All convoys arrived, without mishap, off the east coast of LEYTE Island in the early morning of 20 October 1944.

7. UNLOADING.

a. LST's:

(1) Unloading of LST's commenced about 1300 on A Day while the LST's were still several hundred yards at sea. The Howitzers had been preloaded in DUKW's which swam ashore. DUKW's continued to operate from the LST's, unloading ammunition and other high priority supplies. The LST's beached about 1530 and unloading was speeded by the use of trucks.

(2) The 31st and 49th Field Artillery Battalions' LST's beached at Beach YELLOW TWO and started to unload on beach at 1530, 20 October 1944. The 48th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions' LST's attempted to beach at Beach YELLOW ONE, but due to shallow water they were unable to get close enough to shore to use cargo trucks. The 48th Field Artillery Battalion LST's moved to Beach YELLOW TWO and were able to beach. Causeways were used by the 57th Field Artillery Battalion at Beach YELLOW ONE and were in place about 1900, 20 October 1944.

(3) The Unloading Progress Chart is shown below:

20 October 1944:

TYPE OF SUPPLIES	31st F.A. Bn.		48th F.A. Bn.		49th F.A. Bn.		57th F.A. Bn.	
	Time	%	Time	%	Time	%	Time	%
Ammo	1700	5	1700	3	1700	5	1700	3
Water		2		1		15		2
Maint		2		2		2		2
Orgn		0		0		0		0
Vehicles		85		90		90		85

21 October 1944:

Ammo	1700	35	1700	30	1700	35	1700	30
Water		80		20		70		40
Maint		50		40		20		10
Orgn		10		20		15		10
Vehicles		100		100		100		100

22 October 1944:

Ammo	1700	85	1700	65	1700	60	1700	70
Water		100		30		100		100
Maint		100		100		90		60
Orgn		10		50		15		20
Vehicles		100		100		100		100

23 October 1944:

Ammo	0600	100	1200	100	1000	100	1430	100
Water		100		100		100		100
Maint		100		100		100		100
Orgn		100		100		100		100
Vehicles		100		100		100		100

NOTE: The times listed above for 23 October 1944 include time for unloading dunnage. Approximately six (6) hours was needed for this phase of the unloading.

b. Artillery Transport:

- (1) All Artillery Battalion personnel was transferred to parent unit's LST as soon as the transport arrived in the transport area.
- (2) The Division Artillery Executive and reconnaissance Party debarked at 0845, joined Artillery Battalion Reconnaissance Parties and landed at 1230 on Beaches YELLOW ONE and TWO.
- (3) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, commenced loading into small boats at 1030 and landed at 1600 on Beach YELLOW TWO.
- (4) The high priority for unloading the transport was radio vehicles and light vehicles. These were unloaded on A-Day. The remainder of the transportation was unloaded, on Corps order, by A plus 1. Cargo was unloaded into beach dumps by A plus 2.

c. General statistics on unloading:

- (1) The Commanding General, Division Artillery, and Party landed on Beach YELLOW ONE at 1430, 20 October 1944.

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- (2) The Division Naval Gunfire Officer and Party came ashore on A plus 3.
- (3) Each individual debarked with two (2) canteens of water, one (1) "K" and one (1) Candy Ration, and one unit of fire of small arms ammunition.
- (4) Rations, water, small arms ammunition and 105mm Ammunition from LST's were moved direct to Battalion dumps.
- (5) The Artillery Liaison Planes were removed from crates, wheeled down the ramp and assembled ashore. All planes on LST's were unloaded, assembled, and operating prior to 1200 on A plus 1. Due to mechanical difficulties, the planes on the Carriers were not flown ashore until A plus 3.
- (6) The ships unloading platoons for the LST's were furnished by the units transported on the LST and averaged about forty (40) men. When platoons had finished unloading they reported ashore to their unit. An LST ships platoon of forty (40) is adequate if the men are worked in regular shifts.
- (7) The ships unloading platoon for the Artillery Transport was furnished by the 644th Ordnance Ammunition Company and consisted of forty (40) men.

8. ASSAULT ON BEACH.

a. The assault landing was preceded by a Naval Gunfire preparation on the landing beaches, commencing at dawn, 20 October 1944. Fire was intensified during the thirty (30) minute period prior to JIG Hour. When the leading wave was 800 yards from shore the Naval Gunfire, by prearranged signals, was lifted inland and to the flanks.

b. LCI Gunboats preceded the leading wave, covering the beach with rockets and 40mm gunfire. On nearing shore the LCI Gunboats swung to the right and left and covered the flanks with direct fire.

c. The 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion formed the leading wave and provided direct fire coming ashore.

d. The 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion moved inland approximately 200 yards and continued to give direct fire support until the Infantry passed through the tanks. At this time the Tanks took hull down positions with the mission of direct support Artillery, furnishing fire through the Artillery Forward Observers.

e. In addition to the above mentioned fire support, the 91st Chemical Company (4.2 Mortars) provided early fire support through the Artillery Forward Observers.

9. OPERATIONS NARRATIVE.

A - Day (20 October 1944)

The Transports and LST's transporting the Seventh Infantry Division Artillery arrived in the transport area off LEYTE Island at approximately 0730, 20 October 1944. By 0930, all Artillery personnel, except the Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, had been transferred to their parent LST's. By 1000, the Battalion and Division Artillery Reconnaissance Parties had assembled on the Line of Departure. By 1130, the Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery was loaded into small boats prepared to go ashore on call. Battalions were ordered ashore at 1230.

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Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, landed at 1600, and the Division Artillery Command Post opened at 1700. Prior to darkness, all Artillery of the Division had landed; Position Area Surveys were complete. During the night all Batteries were registered on normal barrages. LST's were beached and unloading continued throughout the night. The Division Artillery Metro Section was in operation by 1830 and first Metro message disseminated to Battalions at that time.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion, in direct support of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, went into position approximately 300 yards in rear of the front lines. The 31st Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, went into position on the left of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion. Neither of these Battalions were able to occupy their pre-selected positions because these positions were within enemy territory.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion, in direct support of the 184th Infantry Regiment, went into position approximately 100 yards inland from Beach YELLOW ONE. The 48th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, went into position on the right of the 57th Field Artillery Battalion. Neither of these Battalions were able to occupy their pre-selected positions due to an impassable swamp between Beach YELLOW ONE and their pre-selected positions.

A representative of the Division Engineers accompanied the Division Artillery Air Officer ashore to select site for the Division Artillery Air Strip.

See overlay accompanying Unit Journal for exact positions and situation.

In the late afternoon one (1) Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment was ordered south to cover the bridge over the DAGUITAN River and the 48th Field Artillery Battalion furnished direct support to this Battalion, in addition to its reinforcing mission.

The 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion supplemented the normal barrages and protective fires, one (1) Company being allocated to each Infantry Regiment.

Harassing fires were fired throughout the night on known enemy installations and cross roads.

Air Observation was provided from 1000 to darkness by Artillery Observers in Carrier based TBF's.

Several casualties were suffered by the Artillery Battalions from enemy sniper and Mortar fire.

A / 1 (21 October 1944)

An enemy counterattack against the 32nd Infantry Regiment occurred at 0528. Barrages of the 31st and 49th Field Artillery Battalions were laid down and the attack was broken up.

Preparation fires were furnished by all Battalions. Direct support missions were fired during the day by the 49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions. The 31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions continued reinforcing mission and fired on targets of opportunity using the Artillery Liaison Plane observation. Artillery fires were supplemented by the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion.

Normal barrages were adjusted when Infantry stopped for the night. It was necessary to adjust the majority of the barrage fires after dark. Harassing fires commenced at dark and continued until daylight. Harassing fires were supplemented by Naval Gunfire on request of Division Naval Gunfire Officer.

S E C R E T

An Artillery Air Strip was constructed on the beach between Beaches YELLOW ONE and YELLOW TWO during the night and by 0930 two (2) L-4H Planes were ready to conduct observation. All planes except the two on the GVE were ready to take the air by 1200.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion, less one Battery, and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion displaced forward to west of the DULAG-MAYORGA Road.

During the day two (2) Batteries of the 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion were registered on crossroads at SANTA ANA and provided additional harassing fires.

The 5th Marine Artillery Battalion, with a reinforcing mission, landed but did not provide any fires this day.

Survey Section extended control to displaced Artillery Battalions, two Batteries of the 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion, 3rd Platoon, Company "A", 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Platoons, Company "B", and 1st Platoon, Company "C", 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion.

A / 2 (22 October 1944)

Organic Battalions continued assigned missions.

5th Marine Artillery Battalion registered on Division Artillery Check Points, conducted counterbattery, long range interdiction and heavily shelled caves southwest of SANTA ANA.

49th Field Artillery Battalion displaced to north side of DULAG-BURAUEN Road north of DULAG Airfield.

31st Field Artillery Battalion displaced one (1) Battery to rear of 49th Field Artillery Battalion.

48th Field Artillery Battalion displaced Battery remaining at beach to Battalion area.

Corps Artillery landed and conducted normal Corps Artillery fire missions.

Normal barrages were registered at night, and harassing fires were conducted throughout the night. Harassing fires were supplemented by two (2) Batteries of the 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion and 5th Marine Artillery Battalion.

Survey was extended to displaced Artillery Battalions and to 2nd and 3rd Platoons, Company "C", 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion.

A / 3 (23 October 1944)

Coordinated attack at 0800 by three Regiments. 184th Infantry Regiment left of DULAG-BURAUEN Road, 32nd Infantry Regiment on right. 17th Infantry Regiment, less one Battalion, to spearhead west astride road. 48th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of 17th Infantry Regiment, 49th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of 32nd Infantry Regiment, 57th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of 184th Infantry Regiment, 31st Field Artillery Battalion in general support. Normal fire support throughout the day. Normal barrages registered after dark. Harassing fires were supplemented by two (2) Batteries, 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion and 5th Marine Artillery Battalion and fired during hours of darkness.

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31st Field Artillery Battalion displaced remainder of Battalion to vicinity of MALCANDANG.

48th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions made two displacements by Battery. First to left of road in the vicinity of MALCANDANG. Second to vicinity of TANGNAN.

31st and 49th Field Artillery Battalions displaced in the late afternoon to right of road, vicinity of TANGNAN.

Survey Section extended survey as Battalions displaced, and to Company "A", 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion at DULAG Airport.

The two L-4H Airplanes from CVE flew in and landed at 0940.

A / 4 (24 October 1944)

Continuation of missions as assigned 23 October 1944. Preparation in front of 17th Infantry Regiment prior to attack at 0800. Normal fire support missions. Normal barrages registered after dark. Harassing fires executed during hours of darkness.

Division Artillery Command Post displaced to left of road south of SAN PABLO Airfield number 1.

776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, now out of range, reverted to Beach Security Mission.

502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion's primary mission as Anti-Aircraft too heavy to furnish further Artillery support.

Naval Fire Support Ships withdrew to participate in Naval battle of LEYTE GULF.

A / 5 (25 October 1944)

Continuation of missions assigned 23 October 1944. Preparations were fired for the 17th and 32nd Infantry Regiments prior to attack at 0800. Normal fire support missions. Normal barrages registered after dark. Harassing fires supplemented by 5th Marine Artillery Battalion were fired during darkness.

Cub field moved from Beach to SAN PABLO Airfield number 1.

Survey section returned to beach and completed survey for all Batteries of the 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion.

A / 6 (26 October 1944)

The 17th Infantry Regiment moved north over four thousand yards from BURAUEN toward DAGAMI. The 32nd Infantry Regiment moved west from the east end of BURI Airfield to occupy two thirds of the field. The 184th Infantry Regiment took up defensive positions in the vicinity of BURAUEN.

All Infantry units were supported by their direct support Artillery Battalions from positions west of JULITA.

Observers were told to correct a tendency to adjust a Battery or larger on targets requiring only one (1) gun.

S E C R E T

The Division Artillery Air Officer, MAJOR EVANS, was killed and the plane demolished while flying a reconnaissance mission with the Regimental S-2 of the 184th Infantry Regiment.

Red alerts during the day restricted the activity of the Cub Planes, but they were able to conduct some fire and provide valuable information as to the disposition of the enemy and the bridges he had blown north of BURAUEN on the road to DAGAMI.

Harassing fires were fired during the night.

A / 7 (27 October 1944)

Cub Observers reported a steady movement of enemy, in groups of from ten to fifty, north along BURAUEN-DAGAMI Road toward DAGAMI and thence west toward the hills. No vehicles were observed but carts and possible field pieces were being moved by hand. All observed targets were fired upon.

MAJOR JACK D. BECK, Commanding Officer, 48th Field Artillery Battalion, was wounded in action and replaced by MAJOR CLEMENT B. E. HARTS.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion moved to GUINARONA.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion displaced forward to south edge of SAN PABLO Airfield number 2. The 57th Field Artillery Battalion moved Battery "C" to 300 yards south of BURAUEN.

Harassing fires were fired during the night. Two hundred rounds per Battalion were expended. This fire was supplemented by Corps Artillery.

A / 8 (28 October 1944)

The 17th Infantry Regiment continued the advance to DAGAMI against strong resistance, supported by the 48th Field Artillery Battalion.

Air Observers reported only one or two enemy visible west of DAGAMI.

The fire of the Division Artillery plus Corps Artillery was massed on DAGAMI to destroy the enemy strong point there.

MAJOR JACK D. BECK died from wounds received in action. MAJOR HARTS was appointed Battalion Commander of the 48th Field Artillery Battalion by VCOG.

Battery "B" of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion was alerted to move with the Second Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment to ABUYOG. The movement was to take place early on A / 9.

Firing into the hills west of BURAUEN was limited because many natives were coming out of the hills in that area.

The 184th Infantry Regiment had patrols south of LA PAZ without meeting enemy.

Harassing fires were fired during the night.

The Cub Airstrip at SAN PABLO Airfield Number 1 was strafed by enemy planes. One Pilot and two ground crewmen were wounded. Planes received repairable damage.

A group of enemy attacked the position of the 48th Field Artillery Battalion from the east. Seven (7) Japs were killed and one (1) wounded. No casualties were suffered by the 48th Field Artillery Battalion.

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A / 9 (29 October 1944)

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion, minus Battery "C", moved to LA PAZ. Battery "C" moved to SANTA ANA. The Battalion was attached to the 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "B", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, was attached to Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and moved to ABUYOG.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion continued the support of the 17th Infantry Regiment which entered the south end of DAGAMI.

A request was made by the 32nd Infantry Regiment for Medium Artillery from 0630 to 0800 on A / 10 to harass area west of GUINARONA. Patrols were to enter this area to locate a force of enemy reported to be 1000 troops.

A / 10 (30 October 1944)

After defensive fires and a preparation by the 48th Field Artillery Battalion, the 17th Infantry Regiment occupied the town of DAGAMI against extremely light resistance.

At the request of the 17th and 32nd Infantry Regiments, Artillery fire for the remainder of the day was limited to fires by ground Forward Observers accompanying patrols.

There were no harassing fires for night of A / 10 to A / 11.

A / 11 (31 October 1944)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for patrols of the 32nd Infantry Regiment operating northwest of BURAUEN.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided normal direct support for the 17th Infantry Regiment.

The 48th and 49th Field Artillery Battalions provided night protective and barrage fires for the 17th Infantry Regiment. Light harassing fires by the 48th and 49th Field Artillery Battalions throughout the night.

No firing by the 31st Field Artillery Battalion.

Cub Airfield at SAN PABLO Airfield number 1 was bombed by two (2) VALS. No damage.

No change in Artillery situation.

A / 12 (1 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided normal direct support, normal barrage, night protective fires, and night harassing fires for the 17th Infantry Regiment.

No firing by the 31st Field Artillery Battalion.

Cub Airfield strafed by Jap Planes. No damage done.

No change in Artillery positions.

S E C R E T

A / 13 (2 November 1944)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion furnished direct support for the 32nd Infantry Regiment patrols operating northwest of BURAUEN.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for the 17th Infantry Regiment until 1335, at which time the 17th Infantry Regiment was relieved by elements of the 96th Infantry Division.

No further Artillery activity this day.

Auxiliary Cub Airfield west of ABUYOG completed and in operation at 1030.

A / 14 (3 November 1944)

No Artillery activity this day. Improved positions and conducted maintenance.

A / 15 (4 November 1944)

No Artillery firing this day.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion withdrew to position southwest of BURAUEN.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "B", displaced to southwest of BURAUEN.

A / 16 (5 November 1944)

All Battalions improved positions and conducted maintenance.

A / 17 (6 November 1944)

Battery "B", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to BAYBAY with the Second Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. Battery "B", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to ABUYOG with the Second Battalion of the 184th Infantry Regiment.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion fired at Japs who had been contacted by a patrol of the 184th Infantry Regiment approximately two (2) miles northwest of BUGHO.

Other Battalions, no Artillery activity. Battalions spent day improving positions.

A / 18 (7 November 1944)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the 32nd Infantry Regiment. Battery "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, was attached to the Third Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, and moved to DINAGAT Island.

All Battalions conducted maintenance and improved positions.

A / 19 (8 November 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "B", moved to BAYBAY with the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

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A / 20 (9 November 1944)

No Artillery activity reported by the 31st Field Artillery Battalion and Batteries "A" and "B", 48th Field Artillery Battalion.

No reports were received from the 49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions or Battery "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to Infantry Regiments.

A / 21 (10 November 1944)

Third Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, with Battery "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, attached, did not effect a landing at DINAGAT Island and returned to LEYTE Island. Landed at Beach VIOLET 2 at 0730. Battery "C" reverted to Battalion control.

Oral orders from XXIV Corps: Be prepared to reinforce fires of 96th Division Artillery with two (2) Field Artillery Battalions.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion registered on Check Point of the 361st Field Artillery Battalion (96th Infantry Division).

A / 22 (11 November 1944)

Confirming orders received as follows:

Division Artillery, less two (2) Battalions, will, (a) Be prepared to support the action of the 17th Infantry Regiment west of GUINARONA; (b) Be prepared to support the action of the 96th Infantry Division west of the GUINARONA-DAGAMI Road with two (2) Battalions.

Mission assigned to the 31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions (the only Artillery Battalions now under Division Artillery control).

A / 23 (12 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support to patrols of the Third Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment.

Barrages were registered for the Third Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, by the 31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions.

Harassing fires were furnished by the 361st Field Artillery Battalion.

No change in positions.

A / 24 (13 November 1944)

No change.

A / 25 (14 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for the Third Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion fired harassing fires during the night in support of the 17th Infantry Regiment.

S E C R E T

A / 26 (15 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) was attached to the 7th Infantry Division and was attached by the Division to the 32nd Infantry Regiment. It moved toward BAYBAY to join the 32nd Infantry Regiment. It stopped at the BITO River north of ABUYOG for the night.

A / 27 (16 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment. Harassing fires were fired during the night.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion registered a normal barrage to support the 17th Infantry Regiment.

A / 28 (17 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment. A normal barrage was registered and harassing fires were fired during the night (150 rounds).

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion registered a normal barrage to support the 17th Infantry Regiment.

Positions of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion were reported as follows: Batteries "A" and "C", in the vicinity of BAYBAY. Battery "B" in the vicinity of DAMULAAN.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) in position in vicinity of BAYBAY.

A / 29 (18 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion provided direct support for the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment. A normal barrage was registered and harassing fires were fired during the night.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion registered a normal barrage in front of the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment and registered on a new check point.

A / 30 (19 November 1944)

48th and 31st Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

Battery "A", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, displaced to vicinity of DAMULAAN.

Six (6) truckloads of 49th Field Artillery Battalion rear echelon equipment were moved from previous position to BAYBAY.

1710 rounds of 105mm ammunition were moved to BAYBAY.

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A / 31 (20 November 1944)

No change.

A / 32 (21 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion fired one (1) Battery, three (3) volleys protective fire for the Third Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment.

A / 33 (22 November 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion, no activity.

Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, started its move to BAYBAY and was held up at the BITO River due to washed out bridge and road. Other two (2) Batteries did not move.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion, commenced move to DAMULAAN.

A / 34 (23 November 1944)

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion and the 48th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, continued its move and moved west of ABUYOG. Battery "B" started its move to BAYBAY. Its position at the end of the day was somewhere between PILAWAY and ABUYOG. Battery "A" remained at LA PAZ.

Batteries "A" and "B", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, received enemy Artillery and Mortar fire during the night of 23 November 1944. They fired counterbattery, direct support missions, and fired defensive fires when the enemy launched a counterattack during the night.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion, in position at DAMULAAN.

A / 35 (24 November 1944)

31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no report.

A / 36 (25 November 1944)

31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion received 300 rounds of enemy Artillery fire (77mm) in their vicinity, 100 rounds of which fell in the Battery "B" position. Two (2) Howitzers were disabled. Replacements were secured and sent to BAYBAY the next day. The front lines of the 32nd Infantry Regiment were within 150 yards of our Artillery positions on the right flank.

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original.**

S E C R E T

Batteries "B" and "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, were in position 1000 yards south of DAMULAAN. Battery "A" was on the road between LA PAZ and ABUYOG.

Orders were received from Division that the 31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions would be attached to the 11th Airborne Division when the 11th Airborne Division took over the BURAUEN sector.

A / 37 (26 November 1944)

No change.

A / 38 (27 November 1944)

Division Artillery Forward Command Post displaced to BAYBAY. Work has started on Airstrip between CARIDAD and BAYBAY near the Agricultural School.

A / 39 (28 November 1944)

Division Artillery Forward Command Post arrived at CARIDAD and opened Forward Command Post.

Division Artillery Airplanes flew to temporary Airstrip between CARIDAD and BAYBAY.

The 198th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers) was attached to Division Artillery and began preparations to move from DAGAMI to south of DAMULAAN.

Battery "B", 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, was attached to Division Artillery and ordered to move to west side of Island when transportation became available.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the 32nd Infantry Regiment and reverted to Division Artillery control with the mission of direct support of 32nd Infantry Regiment.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the 184th Infantry Regiment and reverted to Division Artillery control with the mission of direct support of the 184th Infantry Regiment. Battery "A" went into position at CARIDAD.

The 31st and 48th Field Artillery Battalions were attached to the 11th Airborne Infantry Division.

A / 40 (29 November 1944)

Division Artillery Rear Command Post displaced from its position near SAN PABLO Airfield number 1 and joined the Forward Command Post at CARIDAD. The Division Artillery Air Section moved to Airstrip by the Agricultural School.

The 49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions fired direct support missions for the 32nd and 184th Infantry Regiments.

The 91st Chemical Company was attached to Division Artillery. It was in position in the vicinity of DAMULAAN.

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A / 41 (30 November 1944)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for the 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) fired 50 rounds at ORMOC, fired on barges at PANALIAN Point, and registered on IPIL.

A / 42 (1 December 1944)

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) fired 24 rounds at IPIL.

Batteries "A" and "B" of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion did not fire. Battery "C" moved from its position east of BAYBAY to the vicinity of TINAGAN. Battery "C" fired on an enemy field piece during the night.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion continued firing direct support missions for the 184th Infantry Regiment.

The Second Battalion, 305th Infantry Regiment (attached, Battery "B", 305th Field Artillery Battalion) was attached to 7th Infantry Division and assigned mission of defense of BAYBAY.

A / 43 (2 December 1944)

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) fired on Anti-Aircraft Guns at IPIL. Good results reported.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for the 32nd Infantry Regiment and marked Hill 918 for an Airstrike.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for the 184th Infantry Regiment, including fires on buildings on Hill 918 and fires on an enemy Artillery piece.

A / 44 (3 December 1944)

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, in position at TINAGAN, fired observed direct support missions for 32nd Infantry Regiment. 49th Field Artillery Battalion assumed direct support of Second Battalion of the 17th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "A", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, in position at CARIDAD, fired observed direct support missions for the 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) continued general support.

The 91st Chemical Company registered on normal barrage. Assigned general support mission.

General: 306th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers) was attached to 7th Infantry Division Artillery and ordered to move to this sector. 198th Field Artillery Battalion attachment rescinded. Second Battalion, 305th Infantry Regiment, relieved of attachment to 7th Infantry Division and Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment (attached, Battery "A", 675th Field Artillery Battalion) assumed defense of BAYBAY.

S E C R E T

A / 45 (4 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) and 91st Chemical Company, no change in activities, missions, or positions.

306th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers) moved into position in vicinity of DAMULAAN and registered.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, attached to 7th Infantry Division Artillery and began move to this sector.

A / 46 (5 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions fired direct support missions in support of the Division attack.

91st Chemical Company fired general support missions. "C" Platoon displaced to vicinity of PALANAS River.

306th Field Artillery Battalion fired on two barges at mouth of SIBUGAY River.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion, did not fire.

A / 47 (6 December 1944)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for 17th Infantry Regiment. Registered normal barrage and fired harassing fires during the night.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for 184th Infantry Regiment. Registered normal barrage and fired harassing fires during the night. All Batteries displaced to positions on south bank of PALANAS River during the afternoon of 6 December 1944.

The 306th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers) in general support. Displaced to position 300 yards south of mouth of PALANAS River. Registered fires on 77th Infantry Division's landing beach.

The 91st Chemical Company in general support. Registered normal barrage and fired harassing fires during the night. All Platoons displaced to positions along the PALANAS River.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) registered on 77th Infantry Division's landing beach.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, arrived in this sector and started setting up.

A / 48 (7 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for 17th Infantry Regiment. Registered normal barrages. One Battery fired its normal barrage during the night.

57th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for 184th Infantry Regiment. Registered normal barrages. Battery "B" displaced to a position just north of PALANAS River.

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306th Field Artillery Battalion in general support.

91st Chemical Company in general support. Registered normal barrages. Fired harassing fires. Fired a preparation for the attack of 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, completed installations and began operating.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion, no change.

A / 49 (8 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for 17th Infantry Regiment. Registered normal barrage. Fired harassing fires during the night.

57th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

306th Field Artillery Battalion did not fire.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion, did not fire.

91st Chemical Company in general support. Registered normal barrage and fired harassing fires during the night. All Platoons displaced to positions south of the TABGAS River. Four (4) Mortars were out of action with buckled tie rods. Repairs were being made.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, no change.

A / 50 (9 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion, no change in activities or missions. Battery "C" displaced to a position north of BALOGO.

57th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

306th Field Artillery Battalion fired general support missions.

Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns) was relieved and moved out of this sector. It was replaced by Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns). Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, moved into the position formerly occupied by Battery "B", 11th Marine Artillery Battalion.

91st Chemical Company fired general support missions. Two (2) Platoons displaced to positions 1400 yards southeast of ALBUERA. Three (3) of the Mortars reported out of action in yesterday's report were returned to action.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, no change.

A / 51 (10 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion, no change in activities or missions. Batteries "A" and "B" displaced to ALBUERA.

57th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

S E C R E T

306th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers), in general support. Fired harassing fires during the night.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns), no change.

Two (2) Platoons of the 91st Chemical Company displaced to GUNGAB.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, no change.

A / 52 (11 December 1944)

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, displaced to vicinity of ALBUERA.

57th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

306th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers), no change.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns), displaced to vicinity of ALBUERA.

One (1) Platoon of the 91st Chemical Company displaced to vicinity of GUNGAB.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, no change.

Battery "A", 675th Field Artillery Battalion, relieved of attachment to Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and attached to First Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, in defense of BAYBAY.

No harassing fires or normal barrages were fired during the period.

A / 53 (12 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change in activities or missions.

Three (3) Howitzers of Battery "A", 306th Field Artillery Battalion were detached, reverted to 77th Infantry Division control and moved to 77th Infantry Division area. Batteries "B" and "C" displaced to positions north of GUNGAB.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Two (2) Platoons of the 91st Chemical Company displaced to positions just south of SIGUINON.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, no change.

Division Artillery Command Post displaced to 500 yards north of ALBUERA.

A / 54 (13 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

The remaining Howitzer of Battery "A", 306th Field Artillery Battalion, and all Battery "A" personnel moved to 77th Infantry Division area.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

RESTRICTED

91st Chemical Company, no change.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, moved to IPIL. Positions located on road from ORMOC to 7000 yards south of ORMOC.

A / 55 (14 December 1944)

No change.

A / 56 (15 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

306th Field Artillery Battalion moved to ORMOC and reverted to control of the 77th Infantry Division.

Battery "B", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, shifted position and made adjustments on PONSON Island and southern tip of LEYTE Peninsula.

91st Chemical Company was detached from Division Artillery.

Battery "B", 287th Observation Battalion, moved to 77th Infantry Division sector and came under their control.

A / 57 (16 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion assumed, in addition to present missions, direct support of Second Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment.

57th Field Artillery Battalion moved to IPIL. Relieved of all previous missions and assigned direct support of 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, fired four round CI adjustment in strait between PONSON Island and southern tip of LEYTE Peninsula.

A / 58 (17 December 1944)

No change.

A / 59 (18 December 1944)

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, fired one mission for 77th Infantry Division.

A / 60 (19 December 1944)

No change.

S E C R E T

A / 61 (20 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "A", moved to ORMOC. Battery "A" remained at ALBUERA, in support of Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and Second Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment. 49th Field Artillery Battalion relieved of direct support of First and Third Battalions, 32nd Infantry Regiment. In general support.

57th Field Artillery Battalion assumed direct support of First and Third Battalions, 32nd Infantry Regiment. No change in position.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Division Artillery Command Post moved to ORMOC.

A / 62 (21 December 1944)

49th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment and Second Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, and general support mission.

57th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for First and Third Battalions, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and provided night protective fires for 184th Infantry Regiment.

48th Field Artillery Battalion relieved from attachment to 11th Airborne Infantry Division and commenced movement to this sector. Batteries "A" and "B" and most of Headquarters Battery bivouacked for night at LAGOLAGO.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, in general support, fired no missions.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzers), 419th Group, XXIV Corps Artillery, occupied position in ORMOC with mission of reinforcing fires of 7th Infantry Division Artillery.

A / 63 (22 December 1944)

48th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "C", in position at LINAO. Registered on Division Artillery Check Point at DOLORES. In general support. Battery "C" in position at BURAUEN.

49th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "A", in position at ORMOC, fired direct support missions for First and Second Battalions, 184th Infantry Regiment. Battery "A" in position at ALBUERA fired direct support missions for Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and Second Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment.

57th Field Artillery Battalion, in position at IPIL, provided protective fires for First and Third Battalions, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and Third Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, in position at ALBUERA. Seacoast and general support missions.

Adjacent Units: 225th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "A", at ORMOC.

RESTRICTED

A / 64 (23 December 1944)

48th Field Artillery Battalion adjusted on three Check Points. Fired one general support mission on CATAYOM.

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to 7th Infantry Division Artillery. Remained in present position.

Adjacent Units: 225th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "C", moved from this sector and was attached to the 77th Infantry Division.

A / 65 (24 December 1944)

48th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "A", fired barrages for Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment.

Battery "A", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, joined Battalion in present position. Fired harassing fires during night. Was in direct support of 184th Infantry Regiment during day. 184th Infantry Regiment requested no protective fires.

57th Field Artillery Battalion adjusted two Battery barrages for First Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and one Battery barrage for Third Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, checked adjustment on PONSON Island and tip of LEYTE Peninsula.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

A / 66 (25 December 1944)

No change.

10. COMMENTS AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS.

FRIENDLY ARTILLERY TACTICS AND EFFECT

Firing Batteries utilized "Diamond" and "W" formations to facilitate all around fire and local security. Battalion Command Posts were normally centrally located between the firing Batteries. See Field Artillery Battalion reports for further detailed information.

The Field Artillery provided direct support for each Infantry Battalion. Reinforcing and general supporting fires were furnished by all types of Artillery to include Chemical Mortars, Amphibious Tanks, Anti-Aircraft Gun Batteries and organic reinforcing Corps Artillery. The above mentioned Artillery was all tied into the Division Artillery Survey.

S E C R E T

✓ Methods of placing fire on the target included the use of Air Observation from L-4H Artillery Liaison Planes, Forward Observers with the Infantry and tanks, survey data and map data. The map data were unsatisfactory due to the quality of the maps. In many instances the maps were so far in error that it was impossible to use them. Points of observation for target area survey were seldom available, consequently the prime method of placing or massing fires was the Division Artillery Observed Fire Chart, using position area survey.

Night protective fires were provided by adjusting all available Artillery on normal and emergency barrages. Barrages were registered after the Infantry had settled down for the night. In the majority of cases the Infantry did not consolidate and establish their lines in sufficient time for the barrages to be adjusted during daylight hours. It is felt that much better fire support could be provided if Infantry established their front lines in time to register barrages during daylight hours.

Uncertainty of Infantry as to the location of their own and adjacent front line elements necessitated Forward Observers adjusting each single piece in narrow sectors and pockets, using excessive ammunition and placing the fire farther out than necessary, thus reducing the efficiency of the barrages. Liaison between adjacent Infantry units must be improved.

Night harassing fires were placed on known and suspected enemy installations and troops, utilizing all types of available Artillery. Ammunition for harassing fires varied in proportion to the available ammunition supply.

Location of Artillery units with respect to the supported Infantry elements varied with the situation and available positions from extreme ranges, to the Artillery actually forming part of the front lines.

Very few instances are known of requests for Artillery fire being denied. At times restrictions had to be placed on the types of targets to be attacked by Artillery fire, due to the availability of ammunition. During these periods the Infantry Commanders were advised of the ammunition situation and were in accord with the Division Artillery Commander.

During the early stages of the operations, lengthy preparations at a slow rate of fire were fired for the Infantry prior to an attack. Count of the enemy dead proved that much of this ammunition was wasted as the Jap digs in well to protect himself against the American Artillery and when the first round lands near him he takes to his hole and remains there until the firing has ceased. Thus he is still there to offer resistance to the Infantry. The policy adopted was to adjust the preparation at least thirty (30) minutes before the attack and then cease fire until five (5) or ten (10) minutes before the attack and fire a short preparation at maximum rate of fire. Count of enemy dead proved this to be much more effective.

The procedure for firing on targets of opportunity consisting of enemy personnel, unless they were in the open with no protection other than movement, was to adjust one gun on the center of the area, cease firing for twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes then fire three (3) volleys Time on Target with all available Artillery.

This type of firing produced a much greater percentage of casualties than adjustments followed immediately by fire for effect. The one (1) gun adjustments are very similar to the Jap delivery of fire, consequently they are caught unaware when the mass of fire arrives later.

SECRET
RESTRICTED

Many instances were encountered where elements of the Infantry, being furnished direct support by a particular Artillery Battalion would go beyond the range of the supporting Artillery Battalion while the majority of the Infantry unit was still in the vicinity of the Artillery Battalion concerned. This would ordinarily require a displacement of a portion of the Artillery Battalion concerned, thus robbing the majority of the Infantry of the advantages of massed fires. The policy adopted in these instances was to assign to another Battalion, within range, the direct support of that portion of the Infantry element beyond range of its normal supporting Battalion. The communication problem that arose was solved by placing a spare radio in the Fire Direction Center of the new supporting Battalion. This radio was set on the frequency of the sets with the Forward Observers providing fires for the Infantry element. This condition was more prevalent during the mopping up phase.

To prevent firing into friendly troops by Air Observers, while firing on targets of opportunity, it was SOP for the Air Observer to check with the Forward Observer nearest the area to be fired into as to the latest changes in friendly positions. The latest positions were made known to the Air Observer either by voice description or by marking with smoke grenades or panels.

Prisoners report that the Artillery is the most feared and deadly weapon of the American Army and that it accounted for a great portion of the enemy dead. Every effort was made by the enemy to destroy our Artillery. The assignment of forces to destroy our Artillery was prevalent in captured enemy orders, although in almost all cases the personnel assigned to this mission was pitifully insufficient to accomplish the mission. Natives and prisoners report that harassing fires were extremely effective and in many instances drove the enemy from defensive installations before the arrival of our troops. In addition to the killing effect, harassing fires reduced the efficiency and morale of the enemy forces. Artillery barrages broke up all counterattacks occurring where Artillery was available. Time fire proved very effective in killing the enemy in open foxholes and forced the enemy to dig their foxholes down and then back, forming an "L".

COMMUNICATIONS

The communications equipment issued and its functioning were excellent with a few exceptions.

Complete wire nets were installed throughout the operation. Previous experience had taught the value of raising the wire overhead. This was especially necessary due to the tracked vehicles in operation and the extremely wet climate. The numerous coconut trees typical of this terrain greatly simplified the raising of wire. Where coconut trees were lacking, bamboo poles and lance poles were used. In the later stages of the operation, and due to extended lines of communications, wire became a critical item. Wire could only be laid and maintained adjacent to roads, of which there were few, consequently each road-side was overloaded. This condition slowed up the servicing of wire and, coupled with the weather element, made the salvaging of wire impractical during the early stages. As wire became critical, salvage crews were sent out to recover wire, the wire was renovated and reinstalled. It is the policy of this Division Artillery to install lateral lines between units, which has many times proved its worth.

The Communications Officer was informed of proposed displacements and when the displacements were confirmed, wire was extended to the new position, starting prior to the displacement. The Division Artillery Headquarters Battery laid one hundred fifty (150) miles of wire during this operation.

Due to the extreme amount of moisture in this climate, signal equipment was in constant threat of becoming inoperative. Switchboards picked up this moisture and, in several instances, EE-2-B units had to be removed and dried out.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

When wire lines exceeded six (6) miles in length, the normal two (2) party conversation was impossible. This was largely due to the damp climate and lack of booster units.

Jap interference on both AM and FM was not sufficient to make the nets inoperative.

AM reception was generally good during the hours of daylight. After dark, atmospheric interference decreased the normal working ranges considerably.

Radio batteries BA-39 and 40 varied greatly in actual battery life. One entire supply of BA-40's gave between two (2) and three (3) hours operation where in previous operations they have averaged from six (6) to eight (8) hours.

The 600 series radio was satisfactory as the Field Artillery radio with the following exceptions:

- (1) The SCR 609 radio does not have sufficient range to work with Forward Observers at long ranges. This situation was overcome by installing SCR 608 relay stations on the ground and using the SCR 609 in planes to relay messages and fire commands.
- (2) The weight of the SCR 609 radio is an undesirable feature for a radio with the Forward Observers. Inasmuch as the Forward Observer must stay with the front line Infantry, under fire a large percentage of the time, a lighter pack radio would produce less fatigue and provide greater protection.
- (3) Insufficient radios were available for relay stations, replacements and the providing of radios to non-Artillery units attached to the Division Artillery.
- (4) Many instances were reported of the SCR 609 radios jarring off their set frequency. This is greatly due to the age of the radios in this Division Artillery. The majority of the radios of this Division Artillery have been through three (3) months of desert maneuvers and two (2) combat campaigns, a total coverage of over two (2) years.

LIAISON

a. With organic units.

Three (3) Artillery Liaison Parties were placed with each Infantry Regiment. In addition to this, two (2) Forward Observer Parties were placed with each Infantry Battalion. These parties were equipped with radio and wire to communicate with their parent unit. This liaison was at all times excellent.

b. With adjacent units.

Prior to the operation, Liaison Officers were exchanged between the 7th and 96th Infantry Division Artilleries. A Liaison Officer from Corps Artillery was placed with the 7th Infantry Division Artillery. These Liaison Officers were not equipped with radios from their parent units to provide direct contact; consequently communications were slow and inefficient. Direct communications would have eliminated the danger of firing into adjacent friendly troops. The terrain on LYTE Island is such that adjacent units could very easily cross the boundary between Divisions without being aware of it.

RESTRICTED
SECRET

All Liaison Officers returned to their parent units when the 7th Infantry Division moved from the east side of LEYTE Island to the west coast of LEYTE Island. Liaison with other Divisions was then had through the Division.

During the two weeks period when the 511th Airborne Infantry Regiment was attempting to break through the mountains east of ALBUERA and contact the 7th Infantry Division, excellent liaison was had through an Artillery Liaison Party with the 511th Airborne Infantry Regiment which had been placed with them by the 48th Field Artillery Battalion prior to their start across the mountains.

All Liaison Officers who were placed with this Headquarters were extremely cooperative, and when they were able to establish communications with Artillery Battalions of adjacent and Corps units operating in or near the 7th Infantry Division sector much better liaison was had.

c. Comparing a. and b. above, the predominating feature between excellent and poor liaison was the provision of equipment to the Liaison Officer necessary for direct contact with his parent unit. An alternate solution is to place an organic Artillery radio with the unit with which liaison is desired.

OBSERVATION

a. Ground.

Ground observation was provided by the Artillery Forward Observer with either the Infantry or the Tanks. Observation with the Infantry was satisfactory for close support but the terrain was such that visibility was limited to 300 to 400 yards. The limited visibility from the tanks combined with the limited terrain visibility made observation from tanks unsatisfactory. It is believed that this type of observation will prove satisfactory in more open terrain.

The enemy held all high ground, consequently no ground Observation Posts were available for observation in rear of the enemy front lines.

b. Air.

Air observation was initially provided by Artillery Observers in Navy TBF's flown from Carriers. The use of the TBF was suitable for check point adjustments, and firing on well defined terrain features, but due to its high rate of speed and limited visibility the firing was much slower than when using the Artillery Liaison Plane; consequently as soon as the Artillery Liaison Planes were operational the TBF was dispensed with except for reconnaissance flights in the distant rear of the enemy lines.

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

The intelligence information obtained by each Battalion was forwarded by each Battalion S-2 by radio or telephone to the Division Artillery S-2, who in turn disseminated the information to all other Battalions. Information of tactical plans and dispositions of friendly troops was disseminated through the Division Artillery S-3 to all Battalion S-3's. The complete dissemination of all information to all Battalions created a more than normal amount of communication traffic but it is believed that the value of keeping all units informed of the complete picture more than offsets the additional traffic.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Due to the direct contact with the front lines through the Artillery Forward Observers, much information of value to the Division staffs can be had earlier than through the Division Communications Net. To disseminate this information to all of the Division staffs would have overloaded the communication channels beyond their capacity, consequently the policy adopted was to send all of the information to the Division G-3. When the Division Command Post and the Division Artillery Command Post were near each other, a direct wire was installed between the Division G-3 and the Division Artillery S-3 to accomplish the above.

During the operation, except when firing was extremely heavy, all fire missions and flight reports were forwarded to the Division G-3 immediately on the completion of the missions. During heavy firing periods the reports were telephoned in periodically. It is believed that much information of value, with respect to enemy dispositions, types of enemy weapons being employed, and terrain information, was had from these reports.

SURVEY

A representative of the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion accompanied the 7th Division Artillery Survey Officer ashore in the initial landing and established a common point and direction. The Corps Artillery carried survey to the 96th Infantry Division and Corps Artillery units. The 7th Division Artillery Survey Officer provided each Battalion with a place mark initially, and during all displacements started extending survey to the new position prior to the movement of Battalions. This, at times, entailed surveying under small arms and Mortar fire, but the time gained was of great value. The Artillery Battalion Survey Parties completed position area surveys for all positions occupied. Terrain and lack of high ground in the 7th Division sector prevented any target area survey prior to the mop up period.

When the 7th Division moved to the west side of LEYTE Island a new survey base was initiated by the 49th Field Artillery Battalion at BAYBAY. On arrival of the Division Artillery, the 49th Field Artillery Battalion survey base was adopted by all units. Prior to the advance north of DAMULAAN, Battery "B" of the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was attached to the 7th Division Artillery. The area held by friendly forces was too narrow to provide a base of sufficient length to accurately locate enemy gun positions by sound and no high ground was available for flash locations. When the 77th Infantry Division landed on the west coast of LEYTE Island, the 7th Division Artillery survey was carried to them at ORMOC by the 287th Field Artillery Observation Battalion.

AMMUNITION

No use was found for the T-105 fuze as no concrete fortifications were encountered by the 7th Division Artillery.

A small amount of Cammister is deemed necessary for the protection of the Battery.

No suitable targets were encountered for the HE AT M-67 in this operation.

The amount of M-57 (WF) available proved insufficient for the operation. It was found to be exceedingly valuable for locating rounds in densely wooded areas, driving the Japs out of houses and holes, and for marking targets for Air Strikes. Where several Artillery units are operating in narrow sectors a colored smoke for the marking of targets for Air Strikes would be more suitable to prevent mistaking smoke rounds of other units as the target.

The original seven units of fire were handled in Battery and Battalion dumps until expended. Ammunition became critical as the operation progressed. Since there was a constant shifting, loading and unloading of ammunition between Battalions as new supplies were received, a central ammunition dump for Division Artillery was established. The Assistant S-1 operated the Division Artillery Ammunition Dump. Each Battalion was authorized one (1) unit of fire to be on hand at all times. Excess of this amount was kept in the Division Artillery Ammunition Dump. This plan proved satisfactory and greatly reduced the extra handling and loading with each displacement.

Ammunition expenditures by Battalion, by type, per day are shown below:

	31st F.A. Bn.			48th F.A. Bn.			49th F.A. Bn.			57th F.A. Bn.		
	M 48	M 54	M 57	M 48	M 54	M 57	M 48	M 54	M 57	M 48	M 54	M 57
Oct. 20	107	68	16	531	0	1	1581	440	21	531	38	0
21	1682	355	28	624	57	10	985	307	14	654	98	2
22	658	79	0	820	407	19	752	298	14	527	58	4
23	602	30	5	257	154	14	761	154	25	453	109	11
24	601	10	27	1036	14	40	601	298	23	840	4	23
25	2017	1562	6	481	111	75	571	118	17	728	93	18
26	309	101	2	327	263	33	584	112	25	300	15	10
27	489	51	35	383	140	78	452	87	29	301	35	8
28	843	203	60	782	112	84	448	104	36	327	10	18
29	177	13	19	1319	2037	86	1664	933	46	39	0	6
30	0	0	0	11	21	26	22	85	46	22	0	4
31	0	0	0	33	108	29	2	0	19	4	0	1
Nov. 1	0	0	0	656	1390	24	229	35	24	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	234	210	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	16	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	51	0	19
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	42	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	45	7	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	29	4	0	20	0	0
10	0	0	0	4	0	10	12	43	0	0	9	0
11	0	0	0	17	7	24	5	28	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	45	0	15	11	6	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	7	0	0	18	9	0	0	0	0
14	26	1	9	62	0	18	13	8	0	0	0	0
15	14	0	1	95	67	25	0	0	0	11	0	0
16	0	0	0	145	46	11	189	25	6	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	11	247	13	62	13	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	51	82	18	78	55	6	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	65	28	16	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	57	0	50	12	144	21	83	55	10	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	44	5	4	0	101	0	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	59	7	5	21	59	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	16	8	5	0	6	0	0	0	0
24	0	0	0	25	63	5	7	428	4	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	44	25	6	20	379	34	48	0	10
26	0	0	0	4	47	2	139	439	35	147	75	13
27	0	0	0	8	0	0	364	429	11	101	102	8
28	0	0	0	4	0	11	146	61	17	231	18	58
29	0	0	0	0	0	0	89	24	6	147	53	15
30	28	0	1	76	2	15	44	2	24	211	49	20
Dec. 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	0	1	239	106	45
2	0	0	0	375	17	25	23	31	21	112	28	51
3	0	0	0	31	22	6	0	30	13	88	8	11
4	0	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	10	106	25	18
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	339	217	21	406	76	10

S E C R E T

	31st F.A. Bn.			48th F.A. Bn.			49th F.A. Bn.			57th F.A. Bn.		
	M 48	M54	M 57									
Dec. 6	24	0	11	37	10	8	212	98	51	140	124	40
7	34	0	22	2	23	3	328	406	41	473	50	41
8	147	2	22	202	95	37	453	31	31	399	1	37
9	145	149	23	81	131	6	354	38	54	606	59	40
10	177	20	9	101	325	0	667	7	95	459	87	43
11	242	39	20	0	0	19	371	63	57	81	16	41
12	167	15	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	477	0	10	0	0	0	213	24	26	0	0	0
14	60	0	8	0	0	0	308	162	14	0	0	0
15	60	0	0	0	0	0	225	276	19	148	41	42
16	46	0	12	12	0	1	52	54	19	34	0	5
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	84	8	16	75	36	17
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	89	0	21	36	20	18
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	477	0	30	65	68	35
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	87	0	7	97	0	38
21	28	0	0	0	0	0	94	5	14	111	28	42
22	15	0	1	2	6	2	185	92	58	21	17	22
23	0	0	0	73	0	8	24	0	29	0	0	0
24	30	0	0	18	5	3	354	0	23	80	29	49
25	96	0	14	7	3	2	17	0	20	118	43	0

Total by Bn: 9357 2698 415 9261 6439 881 14977 6589 1183 9676 1677 882

Total by Type:	M 48	M 54	M 57
31st F.A. Bn.	9357	2698	415
48th F.A. Bn.	9261	6439	881
49th F.A. Bn.	14977	6589	1183
57th F.A. Bn.	9676	1677	882
TOTALS	43271	17403	3361

GRAND TOTAL

64035

Average Daily Expenditures: 955 Rds per day or 0.39 Bn. U/F.

SECURITY MEASURES

The Division Artillery maintained its normal Command Post in the forward areas. The Division Artillery Command Post and installations normally require an area of approximately two hundred (200) yards square. At times the terrain features did not permit an area this large, consequently dispersion was fitted to the available area. The Command Post area was wired, using barbed wire, concertinas, and trip flares, when these materials were available. In all cases a shortage of the above mentioned items was encountered.

T/E allows this Headquarters and Headquarters Battery five (5) fifty caliber machine guns. Three (3) of these were installed at the Command Post and two (2) were installed at the Division Artillery Air Strip. The three machine guns around the Command Post were placed to cover avenues of approach of foot or mechanized troops. The machine guns were equipped with Anti-Aircraft mounts and could be used against low flying planes. The machine guns were dug in and tied together with sound powered telephones which in turn were tied into the Division Artillery switchboard. The machine guns were manned by one (1) man during the day and by three (3) men at night. T/O allows a total of two (2) enlisted personnel to man the five (5) machine guns. Personnel to man the guns are detailed from various sections who must also continue their T/O duties.

Guard posts, in addition to the above, were maintained in accordance with the situation but never less than two (2).

RESTRICTED

The Operations Section was either dug in or sandbagged to a height of two and one half ($2\frac{1}{2}$) to three (3) feet. Foxholes or slit trenches were dug for all personnel in the vicinity of their normal positions.

Camouflage and concealment were obtained from the existing local features and materials. In most instances the trend was to sacrifice camouflage and concealment, if necessary, for protection.

Additional security was obtained by tying in to the local security elements of adjacent units.

The Division Artillery Air Strip was protected by the two (2) remaining machine guns manned by personnel of the Air Section. These guns were placed to provide both ground and air protection. The above protection was normally supplemented by a section or a platoon of Anti-Aircraft Automatic Weapons, though in many instances these were not made available. Further protection against ground attack was had when there was Infantry or other elements in the vicinity of the Air Strip.

Flash Reds and Flash Whites were transmitted over all wires and radios. Local warning was given by standard means. One (1) guard post acted as air sentinel and notified remainder of Battery when there were planes overhead during hours of darkness.

When an enemy attack was imminent the guard posts notified the Sergeant of the Guard, who in conjunction with the First Sergeant, alerted the remainder of the Battery for movement to the point of attack.

ARTILLERY LIAISON AIRPLANE OPERATIONS

One of the most valuable pieces of equipment used in this operation was the L-4H Artillery Liaison Airplane. Its uses were many and varied. It provided the only observation in rear of the enemy front lines giving information of enemy troop movements and troop dispositions, the type of terrain over which the Infantry must traverse, road and bridge conditions, locating roads and trails not shown on maps, taking photographs of strategic positions. The planes were used for dropping critical supplies to troops in inaccessible terrain, for locating and reporting locations of friendly front lines and patrols, taking Infantry Commanders on reconnaissance flights over the territory they must fight across, dropping surrender leaflets, messenger service, transporting emergency casualties across Island to hospitals with necessary equipment, delivery and pick up of film to photographic units and transporting personnel on important missions that had to be accomplished immediately.

The above missions were in addition to the Artillery Liaison Airplane's primary mission of observing and adjusting Artillery fires for which it was liberally and invaluablely employed.

Except when Artillery Battalions were detached, all planes were operated under Division Artillery control from a common base field. This reduced materially the number of flights and maintenance problems. The combined Air Sections operated their own mess and by pooling personnel provided a limited amount of local security.

Each plane had one channel of its radio set on its parent Battalion Channel and all plane radios had a common Air Spot Channel. This enabled any plane to work with its parent unit on the parent unit channel or work with any unit on the Common Air Spot Channel.

S E C R E T

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Operation of planes from roads, such as are found on LEYTE Island, produced a plane casualty far in excess of the available replacement parts. There is no terrain on LEYTE Island, other than the above mentioned roads, on which planes can land without prior preparation.

The Division Engineers had assigned as one of their priority missions, the construction of Cub Strips and accomplished this mission at all times.

During the period 20 October 1944 to 25 December 1944, the Division Artillery Liaison Airplanes flew 751 missions, or a total of 974.4 hours, with a loss of one (1) pilot, no Observers and four (4) planes.

Original estimates for supplies and equipment were based on a fifteen to thirty day operation but, based on experience of other units, extra propellers, fabric and dope were taken along, enabling the planes to remain operational during the operation. Propellers, oil sumps, air cleaner assemblies, fabric, dope, and thinner were the items used most.

The type of field available to a great extent determines the pitch of a propeller needed. The propellers issued were not adjustable or controllably pitch propellers and in many cases did not fit the field. Adjustable or controllable pitch propellers can be set to fit any field.

To maintain contact with all planes in the air is desirable but this requires three (3) additional sets at the base field. An SCR 608, jeep mounted radio would eliminate these three sets in addition to providing a greater range.

When the Division Artillery Air sections combined are operating from a base field there is a total of fifteen (15) radios present. The field is usually located a considerable distance from either the Battalion or Division Artillery Command Posts and there are no authorized radio technicians available for maintenance or immediate repair of these radios.

The pick up and delivery of film to photographic units could be eliminated and much faster service derived if the Division Artillery Air Section was equipped with sufficient materials and equipment to develop the K-20 Camera film. The above materials and equipment have been requisitioned.

Though used for the purpose of dropping supplies the L-4H Plane does not have sufficient power or carrying capacity to effectively conduct other than extreme emergency drops. During the later stages of the operation, inter-island observation was required and the L-4H was greatly handicapped by its limited flight time.

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

a. Transportation.

The KING II Operation required long lines of supply, numerous displacements, heavy expenditures of ammunition that required long hauls over the roughest terrain, besides furnishing vehicles for Division use. The transportation available was constantly inadequate. Vehicles were often deadlined for excessive periods due to the lack of spare parts. This was especially true of the M-29-C Cargo Carrier.

Much of the work now delegated to Third Echelon could be more easily and quickly performed by the Unit Second Echelon, thus speeding up repairs, if the Unit Second Echelon were authorized a larger and more complete stock of tools and spare parts.

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The M-29-C Cargo Carrier was far superior to any other type vehicle for wire laying and a radio vehicle when operating over the type of terrain found on LEYTE. It cannot be used as a towing vehicle without soon becoming nonoperational.

The DUKW, as in prior operations, proved its worth for early landing of Howitzers. Many bridgeless rivers were encountered on LEYTE Island and the DUKW was able to cross when other vehicles would stall. At times it was necessary to take to the sea to accomplish the mission. For this type of terrain the DUKW is superior to the $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton Truck. Where roads were good, the $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck was faster and more maneuverable and was easier to load and unload.

b. Chemical Warfare.

Units were unnecessarily burdened with complete impregnated clothing per individual. This requires a large volume of shipping, wastes vital transportation, and requires constant care to protect from rain and moisture.

c. Engineer.

The D-8 Bulldozer with Boom Crane was invaluable for clearing roads to Battery positions, clearing fields of fire, constructing gun emplacements, constructing pits for ammunition and supplies, assisting other vehicles over difficult and muddy terrain, and for building flight strips. The Boom Crane was especially useful in hoisting drums, pallets, and ammunition and greatly expedited the flow of these supplies. The Dozers used by the Artillery belonged to the Engineers and were operated by Engineer personnel. The Engineers did excellent work under the circumstances but with the exception of construction of flight strips the Dozers were seldom available when needed most.

d. Ordnance.

The new Gun, Sub-Machine, M-3, was more suitable for use in the Artillery than the Thompson Sub-Machine Gun. This gun is light, has a fast firing rate, is more easily maintained and is especially adaptable for Forward Observers Parties, Wire Sections, Survey Sections and for defense of Command Posts.

Trip Flares, M-48, were issued in insufficient quantities to provide proper local security.

e. Signal.

Insufficient 600 series radios were available to provide relay stations when the lines of communication became too long for the range of these radios. Also there were not sufficient radios to be placed with units under control of Division Artillery and which were not organically equipped with the type radios used by the Division Artillery.

f. Air Corps.

There was an insufficient supply of plane parts and spare propellers to meet the replacement requirements in this operation.

NAVAL GUNFIRE

Naval Gunfire was utilized effectively, using guns of all calibers, in support of the initial landing. Naval Gunfire was provided, using calibers appropriate to the target, effectively on point and area targets when requested by land forces. Gunfire was requested and provided long range interdiction and harassing fires and illuminating shells very effectively.

S E C R E T

The Naval Gunfire Officer came ashore on A / 3 and maintained communication with the Command and Fire Support Ships until A / 4 when the fleet was withdrawn to take part in the Naval battle of LEYTE GULF.

For detailed information of Naval Gunfire Support, see Appendix E to Annex 3 of 7th Infantry Division Operation Report.

MEDICAL

All medical detachments in the Division Artillery functioned with a high degree of efficiency throughout the operation, considering the weather, limited personnel and transportation.

Equipment and supplies were satisfactory except as noted below:

a. In many instances the ambulance jeeps could not evacuate wounded because of the deep mud. In this connection, a one and one half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) ton 6 x 6 would facilitate patient evacuation. The transportation was too limited in the detachments to allow early landing and movement to new sites. Division Artillery Medical Detachment does not have any transportation.

b. Many patients were made uncomfortable in the ambulance jeeps due to the low top. This could be corrected by welding a six (6) inch extension on the side bar support thus elevating the top.

c. Many fungus infections of the ear canal were encountered, necessitating particular examination and treatment. The old fashioned ear speculum is inadequate for viewing the ear drum and canal. An Oscope with battery light attached would greatly assist in diagnosing and treating all ear conditions. The Navy Medical Department and civilian drug houses have a preparation called CRESATIN which is far superior to the medication we have for treating fungus infections of the ear canal.

d. Tentage was a problem in some medical detachments. When the Artillery was located on the front line as it was in many instances during this operation, tents could not be pitched for tactical reasons. Tarpaulins were found helpful when used over dugouts.

e. In many instances men were compelled to wash in contaminated streams, thereby becoming infected with water borne diseases. This condition could be corrected by issuing water pumps to the units and fresh water wells could be dug and used.

f. Mosquito netting should be brought along for early fly control about kitchens and latrines.

g. DDT Crystals should be taken along by the units for the next operation to be sure of having it. Spray apparatus should accompany each unit.

h. Many skin conditions were aggravated by the too frequent use of Iodine. Tincture of Merthiolate would be superior for most first aid work. Tincture of Benzoin is also excellent, but it is not available.

i. Many cases of indigestion and stomach irritation could be treated with Amphojel but the product is not available to field units.

j. Resupply items for the jungle medical kits, salt tablets, foot powder and Halazone Tablets, should be more readily available.

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k. In every instance, chemical warfare chests and contents were either partially or completely ruined because of Di-Chloramine T Liquid eating out of its container. Suitable glass stoppered containers would eliminate this great loss, and also preserve the CWS equipment in good condition if it was suddenly needed.

l. In many instances, Batteries which were displacing separately, had to go without aid men due to the limited number of aid men available. Frequently all Batteries of the Battalion are widely dispersed and Service Battery is divided two or three times. If two aid men are sent to each Battery and one to each Service Battery Section, there are not enough men in an eleven-man detachment to go around. One man per Battery is not adequate in combat due to the increased work demand and the need for more equipment than one man can carry. When casualties are sustained or members are ill in the medical section, it is still more handicapped.

m. Skin rashes are very frequent and spread rapidly; therefore, skin inspections should be frequent. No doubt many arm pit and crotch fungus infections are a direct contamination from Athlete's or fungus infected feet. Men who have fungus infections of the feet should not contaminate their towel on the feet but dry between the toes with the tops of socks and use foot powder daily for one month or more.

n. Painful and debilitating foot, ankle and leg conditions developed due to friction of wet shoes and leggings. The skin of feet and legs could be toughened while aboard ship by the practice of wearing shoes and leggings for the daily calisthonic period. Of course the same thorough routine of painting, sunning and powdering the feet aboard ship brings real results and should be continued.

o. Non-tactical casualties were far too many. Many injuries such as lacerations with ration cans, knives, and bamboo wood could have been avoided.

p. In many instances of emergency, the Medical Officer is not present or cannot attend to all serious casualties immediately, therefore it is felt that all Surgical Technicians should become proficient in giving intravenous injections of plasma and glucose solutions. Very few technicians have sufficient intravenous ability.

q. Battalion Aid Stations were poorly placed in some instances, respecting availability for the complete Battalion and for security measures. In many instances the detachment was placed on a perimeter position with inadequate protective firepower. Aid station locations should only be chosen by the Battalion Commander or by the Battalion Surgeon.

r. It is felt that the early institution and enforcement of rigid sanitary measures was noteworthy during this entire operation. Excellent cooperation was exercised by all troop commanders throughout the Artillery, thereby keeping the health and morale of the command at a high level.

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CASUALTY REPORT FOR KING II OPERATION

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		MIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
20 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn		1		1		
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn				1		
	TOTAL	0	1	0	3	0	0
21 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn	1	4	1	9		
	57th FA Bn				1		
	TOTAL	1	4	1	12	0	0
22 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn		1		4		
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	1	0	5	0	0
23 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	0	0
24 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn				1		
	57th FA Bn				3		
	TOTAL	0	0	0	4	0	0
25 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	0	0
26 Oct 1944 to 30 Oct 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty	1			1		
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn	1		2	3		
	49th FA Bn				2		
	57th FA Bn				1		
	TOTAL	2	0	2	7	0	0
31 Oct 1944 to 4 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
5 Nov 1944 to 9 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty				1		
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn	0	1				
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	1	0	2	0	0
10 Nov 1944 to 14 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

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CASUALTY REPORT FOR KING II OPERATION

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		MIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
15 Nov 1944 to 19 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
20 Nov 1944 to 24 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
25 Nov 1944 to 29 Nov 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn		2	1	7		
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	2	1	7	0	0
30 Nov 1944 to 4 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn		1		1		
	57th FA Bn				1		
	TOTAL	0	1	0	2	0	0
5 Dec 1944 to 9 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn		1				
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn				1		
	57th FA Bn		2	1	3		
	TOTAL	0	3	1	5	0	0
10 Dec 1944 to 14 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn				1		
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn				1		
	57th FA Bn			1	2		
	TOTAL	0	0	1	5	0	0
15 Dec 1944 to 19 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
20 Dec 1944 to 25 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn			1	1		
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn			1			
	TOTAL	0	0	2	1	0	0
TOTALS FOR PERIOD	Hq Btry Div Arty	1	0	0	2	0	0
	31st FA Bn	0	3	0	10	0	0
	48th FA Bn	1	0	3	9	0	0
	49th FA Bn	1	8	2	22	0	0
	57th FA Bn	0	2	3	12	0	0
	GRAND TOTAL	3	13	8	55	0	0

S E C R E T

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original**.

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PERSONNEL STATUS AS OF 25 DECEMBER 1945

UNIT	TOTAL PERSONNEL LOST FOR PERIOD 20 OCT 44 TO 25 DEC 44, INCL.			REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED			UNIT STATUS AS OF 25 DEC 44			REPLACEMENTS NEEDED: FULL T/O STRENGTH		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HQ BTRY, DA	1	0	4	0	0	4	18	0	105	1	1	0
31ST FA BN	1	0	9	0	0	2	30	2	480	0	0	6
48TH FA BN	1	0	13	1	0	4	34	2	459	0	0	14
49TH FA BN	6	0	43	0	0	18	28	2	448	6	0	25
57TH FA BN	3	0	26	0	0	3	30	2	446	4	0	27
TOTAL	12	0	95	1	0	31	140	8	1938	11	1	72

MATERIEL CASUALTIES

The following Howitzer materiel casualties were reported by units of the 7th Infantry Division Artillery:

TYPE OF REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT	31ST FA BN	48TH FA BN	49TH FA BN	57TH FA BN	TOTAL
Sights replaced by Contact Team.			10	1	11
Sights replaced by Ord direct.			2		2
Undercarriage cracked & replaced by Btry personnel from damaged How.			1		1
Howitzers replaced direct by Ord.		1	2	1	4
Operating handles broken. Repaired by Contact Team.			1		1
Weak brakes. Repaired by Ord.			1		1
Locking ring, locking screw. Replaced by Contact Team.			1		1
Aiming Post Light. Replaced by Contact Team.			1		1
Fuze wrenches worn out. Replaced by Contact Team.			1		1
Undercarriage. Replaced by Ord.		1	1		2
Range Quadrants. Repaired by Ord.		1	2	2	5
Frozen Draw Bar. Repaired by Gun Mechanics.		1			1
Cracked Trail (junction of Axle & Trail). Repaired by Ord.		1			1
Panoramic Sights w/interior moisture. Repaired by Ord.		7		6	13
Elbow Telescope w/interior moisture. Repaired by Ord.		1			1
Recoil System. Repaired by Ord.	1			2	3
Equalizer support. Repaired by Ord.				1	1
Pintle Pin Bearing. Foreign material removed by Ord.				1	1
Lunette traveling locking lug latch. Replaced by Ord.				1	1
Trail Handspike. Repaired by Ord.				1	1
Traveling locking lug latch. Replaced by Ord.				1	1
Lanyards. Replaced by Gun Mech.		10		30	40
Shield. Straightened by Gun Mech.				1	1
Trigger Forks. Replaced by Gun Mechanics.				2	2

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MATERIEL CASUALTIES (Cont'd)

TYPE OF REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT	31ST FA BN	48TH FA BN	49TH FA BN	57TH FA BN	TOTAL
Firing Pin. Replaced by Gun Moch.				1	1
Sear Spring. Replaced by Gun Moch.		2		1	3
Extractor. Replaced by Gun Mech.		2		1	3
Firing Mech. Repaired by Gun Mech.				2	2
Drawbar Bushings. Repaired by Gun Mechanics.				1	1
Elev Mech Shaft Gear. Tightened by Gun Mechanics.				1	1
Traversing Moch Shins, Set. Re- placed by Gun Mechanics.				1	1
Bulbs in Night Lighting Devices		18			18
TOTALS	1	45	23	58	127

For details of repairs by Ordnance, see report of the 707th Ordnance Company.

ENEMY ARTILLERY TACTICS

The enemy was well equipped with Artillery up to and including 150mm caliber, but displayed poor tactical use of it. Guns were used singly, in pairs, and only in rare instances, as Batteries. The gun positions were well constructed and excellently camouflaged but the positions were so selected as to allow a limited field of fire. Elaborate fire control instruments and computing devices were captured but there was no indication from his delivery of fire that they were ever used. Fires were not massed. Fire would be classed as of an harassing nature. Only one instance is recorded of an actual adjustment being made and followed by a concentration of fire. The observation terrain of the enemy far exceeded that of the friendly Artillery, but the advantage was not utilized for the delivery of Artillery fire.

The enemy was very adept at camouflage and concealment. He exercised excellent judgement in utilizing terrain features, natural camouflage materials and existing man made structures. Guns were found to have been placed in Nipa huts with only a hole to shoot out of. The excellent smokeless powder used by the enemy reduced to a minimum the possibility of locating the enemy piece by its flash. The enemy learned early in the battle the effectiveness of the Artillery Liaison Plane and when one appeared on the scene would cease firing and seek cover. From captured documents it was learned that orders had been issued to all Jap troops not to fire on Artillery Liaison Planes.

Several attempts were made to destroy Artillery pieces, one successful, utilizing especially trained crews of ten to twenty men. Personnel of these crews were armed with rifles, rifle grenades, one light machine gun, and demolitions. Tactics are to infiltrate the crew to the vicinity of the Artillery piece to be destroyed, grenade the piece to be destroyed until the gun crew is driven to cover and keep the gun crew pinned down with rifle and machine gun fire while two (2) members of the crew advance to the gun and place demolitions on the gun. The above attack was made against a Battery occupying a position near the front lines. All other attempts were unsuccessful. The enemy excels in infiltration tactics as evidenced by the above attack, and in one instance, he infiltrated through the Infantry front lines and through the local security guards and placed booby traps on two (2) of the Artillery Liaison Planes.

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11. RECOMMENDATIONS.

- (1) That full T/E authorization of vehicles be carried on operations involving movement from a beachhead.
- (2) That ammunition be allocated on the following percentages:

M-48 - 52%		600 Fuzes, T-105, per Bn
M-54 - 34%	Plus	48 Rds per Bn of Cannister
M-57 - 12%		150 Rds per Bn of Colored Smoke
M-67 - 2%		
- (3) That all impregnated clothing be carried as Division CWS stock rather than by units.
- (4) That one (1) D-8 Bulldozer with Boom Crane be authorized each Field Artillery Battalion.
- (5) That the new Gun, Sub-Machine, M-3, be issued in lieu of a like number of Carbines as follows:

25 per Artillery Battalion
10 per Division Artillery Headquarters Battery
- (6) That Trip Flares, M-48, be issued prior to an operation on the following basis:

150 per Artillery Battalion
50 per Division Artillery Headquarters Battery
- (7) That Unit Second Echelon Sections be authorized a larger and more complete stock of tools and spare parts. Amounts to be determined by a board of Ordnance and Motor Officers.
- (8) That fifty percent (50%) of the Liaison Planes authorized the Field Artillery be the L-5H type.
- (9) That the Division Artillery Air Section be authorized spare propellers on the basis of $1\frac{1}{3}$ per plane, of which $\frac{1}{3}$ are either adjustable or controllable pitch; five (5) extra oil sumps; five (5) extra Air Cleaner Assemblies; 250 yards of fabric; fifty (50) gallons of clear dope; fifty (50) gallons of thinner; and all other spare parts be increased 100 percent.
- (10) That the Division Artillery Air Section be authorized one (1) pyramidal tent, one (1) large fly, and one (1) squad tent in which to store supplies and repair planes.
- (11) That a twenty (20) man Cooking Unit be authorized the Division Artillery Air Section.
- (12) That the Battalion Air Sections be authorized one (1) pyramidal tent and one (1) large fly in which to store supplies and repair planes.
- (13) That the Division Artillery Air Section be authorized one (1) SCR 608 radio, jeep mounted, as a base set, and that the T/O be increased to include one (1) radio technician.
- (14) That each Artillery Headquarters Battery be authorized one (1) extra SCR 608 radio to establish relay stations when the lines of communication become longer than the range of the SCR 609 radio.

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- (15) That the new SCR 619 radio be secured and issued in lieu of the present SCR 609 radio, to all Field Artillery Forward Observers.
- (16) That the present Field Artillery T/O's be increased to provide one (1) man per machine gun with primary duty of guarding the gun at all times and maintaining, installing, and preparing the gun for movement.
- (17) That the Division Engineer stock a more ample supply of barbed wire and concertinas.
- (18) That the Division Signal Supply have available not less than two (2) SCR 609 radios to be issued in place of radios turned in for repair and not less than four (4) SCR 609 radios available for issue to non-Artillery units attached to the Division Artillery.
- (19) That each Artillery Battery be authorized a hand operated or mechanical driven water pump for pumping water from wells.
- (20) That T/O of Artillery Medical Detachments be increased to sixteen (16) enlisted men.
- (21) That Artillery Medical Detachments be authorized a large tarpaulin to be used in forward areas.
- (22) That Artillery Medical Detachments be authorized an OTOSCOPE with light attached.

12. This report is concluded as of 2400, 25 December 1944, at which time the 7th Infantry Division passed to control of Eighth Army. For details of mopping up phase, see Volume II, submitted separately through Headquarters Eighth Army.

L. J. Stewart
L. J. STEWART
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
A.P.O. #7, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

REPORT OF KING III OPERATION

(LEYTE ISLAND)

VOLUME II - MOP UP PHASE

26 DECEMBER 1944 - 10 FEBRUARY 1945

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HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
A.P.O. #7, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

REPORT OF KING II OPERATION

(LEYTE ISLAND)

VOLUME II - MOP UP PHASE

26 DECEMBER 1944 - 10 FEBRUARY 1945

1. GENERAL NATURE AND PURPOSE OF REPORT.

a. The following report is a chronological narrative of events pertaining to the Seventh Infantry Division Artillery during the mopping up phase of the KING II Operation, from 0001, 26 December 1944 to 1200, 10 February 1945, compiled for historical record.

b. The Seventh Infantry Division Artillery, composed of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Seventh Infantry Division Artillery, 31st, 48th, 49th, and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, was assigned the mission of supporting the Seventh Infantry Division in the mopping up of enemy forces on the west coast of LEYTE Island.

2. OPERATIONS NARRATIVE.

A / 67 (26 December 1944)

The 32nd Infantry Regiment defended the ORMOC perimeter and dispatched numerous patrols. It was supported by the 57th Field Artillery Battalion.

The 184th Infantry Regiment patrolled in the area north of ORMOC. The First and Second Battalions were supported by the 49th Field Artillery Battalion. The Third Battalion was supported by Battery "A", 48th Field Artillery Battalion.

The 17th Infantry Regiment defended the MSR from BAYBAY to IPIL, secured the Division rear areas, and conducted patrolling in the area south of ORMOC.

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 11th Airborne Infantry Division, was on the east side of LEYTE Island.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion had Batteries "A" and "B" in position at LINAQ. Battery "A" was in direct support of the Third Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment. Battery "B" was in general support. Battery "C" was on the east coast of LEYTE Island preparing to move to LINAQ.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion was in position at ORMOC. Its mission was direct support of the First and Second Battalions, 184th Infantry Regiment.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion was in position at IPIL. It was in direct support of the 32nd Infantry Regiment and maintained normal barrages around the ORMOC perimeter, supported patrols of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, and fired several Air Spot missions on enemy located by natives.

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Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the Division 23 December 1944, was in position at ORMOC with the mission of general support.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the Division 9 December 1944, was in position at ALBUERA with the mission of guarding the strait between PONSON Island and the southern tip of LEYTE Peninsula. It fired harassing fires at PONSON Island and the southern tip of LEYTE Peninsula during the night.

Battery "B", 502nd AAA (Gun) Battalion, at PANALIRAN Point, was tied in to Division Artillery by survey.

A / 68 (27 December 1944)

Battery "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, relieved of direct support of Third Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, but fired protective fires for Third Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, and Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion. Battery "B", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion fired direct support missions for First and Second Battalions, 184th Infantry Regiment. Supported patrols of First Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion supported patrols of Second Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, and provided protective fires for 32nd Infantry Regiment. Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, was attached to Third Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, and moved to vicinity of LILOAN.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, fired thirty rounds harassing fires on PONSON Island and southern tip of LEYTE Peninsula.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Air Observation was lacking due to unfavorable weather conditions.

Adjacent Artillery: Positions of the 77th Division Artillery: 304th and 902nd Field Artillery Battalions in vicinity of VALENCIA. 305th and 306th Field Artillery Battalions in vicinity of DIPI. Positions of Corps Artillery: 225th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "C", vicinity of SAN JOSE. Position of 61st Field Artillery Battalion (1st Cavalry Division) 1500 yards north of DIPI.

A / 69 (28 December 1944)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion supported patrols of the Third Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion supported patrols of the First Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, and was in direct support of the Second Battalion of the 184th Infantry Regiment. Battery "B" was attached to the First Battalion of the 184th Infantry Regiment and moved to vicinity of DOLORES.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion supported patrols of the Second Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

S E C R E T

A / 70 (29 December 1944)

The 48th and 49th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion supported the 17th Infantry Regiment patrol, in addition to usual mission.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to LINAO.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

A / 71 (30 December 1944) Through A / 72 (31 December 1944)

No change.

A / 73 (1 January 1945)

The 184th Infantry Regiment was ordered to attack southwest from DOLORES. Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, moved from LILOAN to DOLORES to support this attack. No change in other Artillery missions or positions.

A / 74 (2 January 1945)

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 11th Airborne Infantry Division, and prepared to move to this sector.

Battery "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to this sector, joined the Battalion, and went into position at LINAO.

49th and 57th Field Artillery Battalions, no change.

The 531st Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "B", was attached to the Division. Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion (attached to the Division 9 December 1944) was at ALBUERA. Remainder of Battalion, less Battery "B", was at SAN JOSE preparing to move to this sector.

Battery "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, no change.

A / 75 (3 January 1945)

The 225th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "B", was attached to the Division. Battery "C", attached 23 December 1944, remained at LINAO. Remainder of Battalion, less Battery "B", prepared to move to ALBUERA.

Other units, no change.

A / 76 (4 January 1945)

Battery "A", 31st Field Artillery Battalion, moved to BAYBAY and replaced Battery "A", 675th Field Artillery Battalion, in defense of that area. Remainder of the Battalion was in SAN PABLO area prepared to move to this sector when transportation became available.

Battalion Headquarters and Battery "A", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to MALITBOG. Battery "A" was assigned mission of general support.

Battalion Headquarters, 531st Field Artillery Battalion, moved to MALITBOG. Battery "A" moved to GUENABATAN with mission of guarding the strait between LEYTE Peninsula and PONSON Island.

RESTRICTED
SECRET

All Batteries of the 48th Field Artillery Battalion were registered on a normal barrage in defense of ORMOC perimeter.

Information was received from Division that the enemy was located in the gulleys between CANALE and MAHUYAB. Air Spot registrations were made in all the gulleys to drive the enemy into the open. When the enemy was observed, fire was placed on him.

A / 77 (5 January 1945)

Battery "B", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to MALITBOG.

Other units, no change.

Surveillance of the gulleys between CANALE and MAHUYAB was continued. Fire was placed on several concentrations of enemy with good results.

A / 78 (6 January 1945)

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion, minus Battery "A", moved to vicinity of Agricultural School at LAGOLAGO and went into a non-tactical bivouac.

Other units, no change.

A / 79 (7 January 1945)

Information was received from Prisoner of War that the enemy was concentrated in two areas near the headwaters of the PANILAHAN River. Batteries "A" and "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, were moved to IPIL. During the morning Time on Target fire was placed on the reported enemy areas using Batteries "A" and "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, Batteries "A" and "B", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and Batteries "A" and "C", 225th Field Artillery Battalion.

Battery "B", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, was relieved of direct support of First Battalion, 184th Infantry Regiment, and moved to LINAO.

Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to CAMP DOWNES.

Other units, no change.

A / 80 (8 January 1945)

Massed fire was placed on a reported enemy concentration area near the headwaters of the PANILAHAN River, using Batteries "A" and "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 57th Field Artillery Battalion.

Battery "C", 31st Field Artillery Battalion, personnel moved to TOLOSA Beach as part of a Dock Battalion. Organizational equipment remained at LAGOLAGO.

Batteries "A" and "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to DEPOSITO, in direct support of the 17th Infantry Regiment. Battery "B" personnel moved to TOLOSA Beach as part of a Dock Battalion. Organizational equipment was moved to DEPOSITO.

The 225th Field Artillery Battalion, less Battery "B", moved to vicinity of the PANILAHAN River with mission of general support.

SECRET

S E C R E T

Batteries "A" and "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, fired fifteen rounds each, harassing fires on PONSON Island during the night.

Other units, no change.

A / 81 (9 January 1945)

Battery "B", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, was attached to the Division and prepared to move to this sector.

Other units, no change.

A / 82 (10 January 1945)

Battery "B", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, joined the Battalion and went into position south of the PANILAHAN River.

Other units, no change.

A / 83 (11 January 1945) Through A / 84 (12 January 1945)

No change.

A / 85 (13 January 1945)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved of direct support of the Second and Third Battalions, 17th Infantry Regiment. Moved to vicinity of LINAO. Assigned missions of reinforcing fires of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and general support.

The 57th Field Artillery Battalion was assigned additional mission of providing direct fire support to Second and Third Battalions, 17th Infantry Regiment.

Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, was alerted for participation in the SWEET POTATO (CAMOTES Islands) Operation, to take place starting 15 January 1945.

Other units, no change.

A / 86 (14 January 1945)

No change.

A / 87 (15 January 1945)

A Division Task Force attacked the CAMOTES Islands. Code designation of the operation was SWEET POTATO Operation. No light Artillery accompanied the Task Force. Artillery support was provided by sixteen (16) Amphibious Tanks. The Division Artillery furnished three (3) Forward Observer Parties and two (2) Liaison Parties to fire the Amphibious Tanks. Preparations were made to move Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, to PONSON Island in support of the operation.

Battery "C", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, fired 30 rounds harassing fires on PILAR (PONSON Island) from 0710 to 0740.

Two officers and seventy three enlisted men from the 31st Field Artillery Battalion, and twenty five enlisted men from the 48th Field Artillery Battalion made an administrative move to the TAGLOBAN area to form an LST Company.

Other units, no change.

RESTRICTED

A / 88 (16 January 1945)

Enemy activity was observed in the area south of LAKE DANA0. Several check points and concentrations were registered in the area, using Air Spot. All enemy observed in the area were fired on with good results. Harassing fires in the area were fired during the night by the 225th Field Artillery Battalion.

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, displaced to DOLORES to provide direct support for troops operating in the LAKE DANA0 area.

Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, displaced to the southern tip of PONSON Island to support operations in the CAMOTES Islands (SWEET POTATO Operation).

Other units, no change.

A / 89 (17 January 1945)

Batteries "A" and "C", 48th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforcing fires of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and in general support.

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, at DOLORES in direct support of units operating in the LAKE DANA0 area. Battery "A", in direct support of the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, moved from CAMP DOWNES to a position on the south bank of the PANILAHAN River, 5000 yards inland, in support of patrols of the 17th Infantry Regiment. Batteries "A" and "B", at IPIL, in support of the 17th and 184th Infantry Regiments.

Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, registered on several points on PORO and PACIJAN Islands.

Other units, no change.

A / 90 (18 January 1945)

No change.

A / 91 (19 January 1945)

Battery "B", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, relieved of tactical mission and moved to TARRAGONA as an LST Company.

Other units, no change.

A / 92 (20 January 1945)

The 225th Field Artillery Battalion fired 140 rounds harassing fires in the area south and east of LAKE DANA0.

Other units, no change.

A / 93 (21 January 1945)

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, fired 84 rounds harassing fires south of LAKE DANA0 during the night and supported patrols of the 32nd Infantry Regiment in the LAKE DANA0 area.

S E C R E T

Battery "C", 57th Field Artillery Battalion, moved from its position on the PANILAHAN River to CAMP DOWNES.

The 225th Field Artillery Battalion fired 60 rounds harassing fires south of LAKE DANA0 and registered concentrations in the LAKE DANA0 sector.

Other units, no change.

A / 94 (22 January 1945) Through A / 95 (23 January 1945)

No change.

A / 96 (24 January 1945)

The enemy was reported to be assembling in the mountains northwest of SOONG. Thorough reconnaissance of the area was made, using the Artillery Liaison Planes. Several enemy positions were spotted.

No change in Artillery missions or positions.

A / 97 (25 January 1945)

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, moved from DOLORES to ORMOC.

Battery "C" and Battalion Headquarters, 531st Field Artillery Battalion, were detached from the Division.

Other units, no change.

A / 98 (26 January 1945)

No change.

A / 99 (27 January 1945)

Battery "A", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, moved from its position on the PANILAHAN River to LIL0AN, with the mission of general support. Remainder of the 225th Field Artillery Battalion was detached from the Division.

Other units, no change.

A / 100 (28 January 1945) Through A / 101 (29 January 1945)

No change.

A / 102 (30 January 1945)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion was alerted to commence movement to rehabilitation area.

Other units, no change.

A / 103 (31 January 1945)

The 49th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved of direct support of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. Battery "A" was relieved of tactical mission and moved to east coast of LEYTE Island to the rehabilitation area, vicinity TARRAGONA.

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion assumed direct support of the 32nd Infantry Regiment.

RESTRICTED
SECRET

Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Guns), commenced displacement from PONSON Island.

Other units, no change.

A / 104 (1 February 1945)

Battery "C", 49th Field Artillery Battalion, moved to rehabilitation area.

Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, continued move from PONSON Island to BAYBAY.

Other units, no change.

A / 105 (2 February 1945)

Remainder of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion moved to the rehabilitation area. Battery "A", 225th Field Artillery Battalion, was detached and moved from this sector. Battery "A", 531st Field Artillery Battalion, was detached from the Division.

Other units, no change.

A / 106 (3 February 1945)

Division Artillery Command Post moved from ORMOC to the rehabilitation area.

Other units, no change.

A / 107 (4 February 1945) Through A / 108 (5 February 1945)

No change.

A / 109 (6 February 1945)

The 48th Field Artillery Battalion completed movement from LINAO to the rehabilitation area.

Other units, no change.

A / 110 (7 February 1945) Through A / 111 (8 February 1945)

No change.

A / 112 (9 February 1945)

The 31st Field Artillery Battalion completed movement from vicinity of BAYBAY to the rehabilitation area.

Other units, no change.

A / 113 (10 February 1945)

Seventh Infantry Division Artillery was relieved at 1200 of all tactical responsibility on LEYTE Island.

S E C R E T

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES.

Ammunition expenditures by Battalion, by type, by day, are shown below:

DATE	31st FA Bn			48th FA Bn			49th FA Bn			57th FA Bn		
	M-48	M-54	M-57									
Dec 26	12	0	0	0	0	0	47	0	12	278	78	14
27	19	0	0	0	0	0	135	0	8	58	0	9
28	0	0	0	0	0	0	47	45	3	32	0	11
29	82	0	6	0	0	0	79	0	4	82	0	11
30	21	0	0	0	0	0	1039	329	81	48	0	7
31	48	1	1	29	3	2	319	9	15	83	0	17
Jan 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	653	1	19	156	0	2
2	0	0	0	17	0	15	639	109	31	234	0	8
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1054	171	57	225	49	77
4	0	0	0	43	0	7	1113	203	49	452	77	34
5	0	0	0	64	0	18	684	237	18	314	0	32
6	0	0	0	215	19	16	126	137	16	244	0	22
7	0	0	0	650	14	34	114	0	26	501	6	28
8	0	13	0	427	0	29	92	50	22	647	0	26
9	0	0	0	134	0	14	354	0	17	538	47	27
10	0	0	0	652	23	11	211	0	15	386	0	30
11	0	0	0	74	0	8	6	0	16	373	12	24
12	0	0	0	0	0	10	773	275	46	13	8	9
13	0	0	0	0	0	6	14	21	8	269	20	28
14	0	0	0	4	0	2	84	0	13	203	153	7
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	29	0	16	87	120	8
16	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	4	198	31	4
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	110	0	3	138	0	9
18	0	0	0	0	0	3	321	0	17	15	123	5
19	0	0	0	33	0	12	63	21	0	0	8	0
20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	115	23	7	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	3	0	6	99	13	15	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	102	106	25	63	0	0
24	0	0	0	6	4	0	132	309	19	66	13	0
25	0	0	0	321	0	5	54	191	9	0	0	0
26	0	0	0	16	50	0	0	188	2	0	0	0
27	0	0	0	0	67	0	87	22	0	0	0	0
28	0	0	0	16	35	0	44	132	3	0	0	0
29	0	0	0	75	104	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
31	0	0	0	0	14	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Feb 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	8	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	56	190	10
TOTAL BY	182	14	7	2787	333	206	8755	2592	596	5759	935	459
Bn												

RESTRICTED

Total by Type:	<u>M-48</u>	<u>M-54</u>	<u>M-57</u>
31st FA Bn:	*192	14	7
48th FA Bn:	2787	333	206
49th FA Bn:	8755	2592	596
57th FA Bn:	5759	935	459
TOTALS:	*17493	3874	1268

GRAND TOTAL: *22635 rounds

Average daily expenditures: 503 rounds or 0.20 Bn Units of Fire per day.

*31st FA Bn fired ten (10) rounds Ch 7, Sh M-84 (Propaganda leaflets) on dates indicated:

Dec 29 4
Dec 30 6

4. CASUALTY REPORT FOR MOP UP PHASE.

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		MIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
26 Dec 1944 to 31 Dec 1944	Hq Btry Div Arty		2		1		
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn				2		
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn		1				
	TOTAL	0	3	0	3	0	0
1 Jan 1945 to 5 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
6 Jan 1945 to 10 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn				1		
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	1	0	0
11 Jan 1945 to 15 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
16 Jan 1945 to 20 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn				1		
	49th FA Bn				1		
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	2	0	0
21 Jan 1945 to 25 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0

S E C R E T

DATE	UNIT	KIA		WIA		MIA	
		OFF	EM	OFF	EM	OFF	EM
26 Jan 1945 to 31 Jan 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn			1			
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	1	0	0	0
1 Feb 1945 to 5 Feb 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
6 Feb 1945 to 10 Feb 1945	Hq Btry Div Arty						
	31st FA Bn						
	48th FA Bn						
	49th FA Bn						
	57th FA Bn						
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS FOR PERIOD	Hq Btry Div Arty		2		1		
	31st FA Bn			1			
	48th FA Bn				3		
	49th FA Bn				2		
	57th FA Bn		1				
	GRAND TOTAL	0	3	1	6	0	0

5. Comments, critical analysis, and recommendations for both phases of the operation are included in REPORT OF KING II OPERATION, VOLUME I - MAJOR OPERATIONS, a copy of which is included in this report. All data concerning planning, training, loading, rehearsal, movement to target area, unloading, assault on beach, and operations during the major operations phase are in REPORT OF KING II OPERATION, VOLUME I - MAJOR OPERATIONS.

L. J. Stewart
L. J. STEWART
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Commanding

Inclosure:

REPORT OF KING II OPERATION, VOLUME I - MAJOR OPERATIONS

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