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SHOULD BATTLE GROUPS BE
COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT COLONELS

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PREFACE

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The subject of who can effectively command a unit of a specific size and type encompasses a wide variety of variables and cannot be truly analyzed unless a concrete set of circumstances remain constant. All of us in the military realize that effective command is a long time program, rather than a sudden achievement-one which, by necessity, must be diligently followed, constantly and critically studied by those who wish to be successful.

The author's indebtedness to many can be merely suggested here. There are those whose books have been mentioned in the bibliography; those who have been instrumental in establishing basic military doctrine as outlined in field manuals used in the preparation of this paper. Special acknowledgement is extended to the General Officers and Senior Field Grade Officers whose opinions are valued beyond explanation because they represent the fundamental position taken in this paper.

The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author-not necessarily that of the United States Infantry School or the United States Army.


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INTRODUCTION

Today, with the constantly changing conditions in the reorganization of our post war Army one of the Army's continuous problems is that of establishing and maintaining an educational and training program to keep pace with the concept of modern warfare. The basic problem is one of command since this is the greatest influence in the production of a combat effective unit.

The Battle Group is presently commanded by Infantry Colonels, the majority of whom have held varied assignment not necessarily related to command of any nature. The Lieutenant Colonel has often been "Selected" as the most logical to command a Battle Group mainly because of it's size.

Which one of these individuals is best qualified? What are the prerequisites for this type of commander? Does the present career pattern insure adequate preparation for this command position? What is the age of this commander? These are the considerations which must be analyzed in answering the question SHOULD BATTLE GROUPS BE COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT COLONELS?

In order to limit the scope of this paper three assumptions were necessary as they would automatically distort the picture, and would appear initially to answer the question to a limited degree. The first of these is that the grade of the Rifle Company Commander will remain a Captain. Second, that if the Battle Group were commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel the Battle Group Staff would be adjusted accordingly to that of the staff of the obsolete Battalion. Third, that the recommended grade be appropriate in both peacetime and wartime.

The subject of experience in proportion to age, training, physical and mental stability is discussed at considerable length since this is the most important area in command.

The present day Battle Group is a highly explosive, maneuverable fighting force, while comparatively small in size, it's fire power is considerably greater than that of the "old" Regiment. The problem of who should

command the present day Battle Group meets great proportion when the following are considered. The first of these is that effective command is synonymous with effective leadership. Secondly, that commanders, in effect, are managers and as such must direct, plan, organize, control, coordinate and mold men and materials into machinery capable of being used efficiently in gaining military objectives. Thirdly, that effective leadership is based upon the possession of such qualities as superior drive and energy, emotional stability, at least average intelligence and general dependability. Fourthly, that the qualities essential for successful leadership in general are obviously very important factors in military management. They are good judgement, decisiveness, self confidence, reserve, discretion and courage. At Battle Group and higher units such traits as resourcefulness, tactical imagination, initiative, objectivity and realistic tough-mindedness are also essential. All of the above listed qualities can be developed through proper training and experience. Others are inherent. All are difficult to evaluate.

From these facts one would picture the commander as an even-tempered man, serene under all adversities, thoughtfully self-restrained, a possessor of broad knowledge, reason and common sense. Admittedly these facts are valid at any level of command, however, they are of utmost importance to the commander of the Battle Group, in this space age, for it is at this level of command that decisive battle field victories will be won.

DISCUSSION

The Infantry Battle Group Commander's position in the Pentagonal Division is one in which many officers are striving to attain yet a feeling of unpreparadeness might very well accompany this ambition. This feeling of unpreparadeness would not necessarily be due to any particular personal attribute such as the lack of application of his personal traits in subordinate command assignments, or any acute inability to keep pace with current fundamental doctrine--rather this anxiety would develop from a set of uncontrollable circumstances which exist today, created by the modern concept of war; it's swiftness, magnitude and it's finality. Since the organization of the ROCID Division, there has been, and still is, a great amount of constructive criticism of the Infantry Battle Group and its structure of command. The Battle Group Commander, it has been said, cannot "fight" his unit on the nuclear battlefield successfully with it's present staff organization; that there is a need for an additional Lt Col or even a Colonel who could effectively control a portion of the unit in a fast moving action. In support of this addition to the staff is the contention that the Lt Col, Executive Officer should be a specialist in each of the staff positions as presently organized with the Battle Group and that he be given direct control of each staff section. Here it is felt that the commander would be released from time consuming staff conferences and all but major decisions and courses of actions be at the descretion of this highly trained staff officer.

On the other hand there are those who advocate the reduction in the rank of the Battle Group Commander. The reasons offered are that the present day Battle Group is no larger in size than that of the obsolete Battalion, that staff work in planning combat operations is greatly reduced due to the fact that the Division itself must plan operations centered around the employment of nuclear weapons and therefore it must "spell-out" actions and orders of the Battle Group.

There is still another that the Battle Group Commander's position will be one of mere "tape reading" which would be produced from data fed into a machine frequently referred to as a "brain" or computer of some variety. This however, even in this age of rocketry and other mechanical advancements, has failed to show any sign of becoming a reality.

From the former commanders of battalions and regiments of WWII and Korea come the opinion that command does not change simply because the unit organization changes. They insist that the small unit leader is the key to success. Under the old triangular concept senior commanders stressed THE FUNDAMENTALS maintaining that "if we will train good platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders, we will have good divisions and a good Army as well." (3:27) There is an obvious omission of the regiment which might cause speculation as to the importance of this headquarters even under this concept. To further support this idea was the much used statement that "If an officer can command a battalion, he can command anything." (3:27)

It is readily apparent that the statements and generalizations mentioned above do not offer a solution to the problem under consideration; however, they do illustrate the inconsistencies and the wide variety of "opinions" in the all important aspect of the military profession--command. It is also evident that this position of command is one in which all the qualities of leadership, management abilities, physical stamina, and all the other command characteristics mentioned previously must be employed with greater enthusiasm than ever before.

To logically determine the rank of the Battle Group Commander it is necessary to make several analysis. The first of these is the job to be done; to clearly show the responsibilities of the commander and to list the minimum requisites to carry out these responsibilities. Second, to analyze the span of control of the Battle Group Commander and its effect on military management in modern warfare. Third, an analysis must be made of the overall career pattern through which military skills are

attained. Fourth, an analysis of age and experience gained in relationship to the present structure of command. The fifth and final analysis will concern the vitalization of the Officer Corp through the promotion system.

The analysis of the areas referred to above are isolated in the discussion to follow in order to make clear some of the specific types of considerations existent within the broad scope of command. In no case, however, should any subject dealt with in the context of the analysis be understood to exist as separate and distinct. There is a great deal of overlap between and among the areas of discussion.

The first analysis deals with the command responsibilities of the Battle Group Commander. "The commander controls his Battle Group and is responsible for everything it does or fails to do. He meets his responsibilities by planning, by making timely decisions and issuing orders, and by personal supervision. This requires a thorough understanding of the combat and service elements in the Battle Group, including their tactical and technical employment and their capabilities and limitations, as well as an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of other arms and services that may be associated with the Battle Group in combat. The commander inspires confidence in his subordinates by sound, decisive action, and by demonstrating his ability to overcome obstacles. By aggressive action, he favorably influences the performance of individuals and elements in his command. The commander maintains his unit at a high state of training, discipline, and combat efficiency, and requires high standards of administration. He promotes esprit within the Battle Group and cooperative action in its various elements. He encourages initiative, ingenuity, and aggressiveness in all units. To foster self-reliance and initiative, he allows his staff and unit commanders maximum freedom of action in carrying out his orders.

The Battle Group Commander exercises command through his unit commanders. He prescribes policies, mission, and standards for the Battle Group. By personal visits to his units and by formal or informal inspections, he insures that his policies and missions are executed properly and

that his standards are attained. The commander is responsible for the combat effectiveness of his unit and the personal well-being of individuals in his command. He insures combat effectiveness by developing sound plans and orders, adequately supervising the execution of orders and training, fostering esprit, insuring a high state of morale, making effective use of available personnel and supplies, keeping personnel in good physical condition, and promoting a high quality of leadership. He insures the personal well-being of individuals by looking after their physical comfort, promoting confidence in and respect for their leaders, providing a sense of accomplishment, and fostering good mental attitudes and a sense of security. By his personal actions and by directing and supervising his staff, he insures that a continuous and effective effort is made to attain the highest possible standard in these matters. The commander uses his staff (Annex A) to acquire information for him, to prepare detailed plans for implementing his decisions, to coordinate plans and operations, and to relieve him of other details so that he may freely visit his units to supervise their activities personally and obtain the personal knowledge of their problems." (1:1)

To discharge these responsibilities with any degree of success the Battle Group Commander must have had considerable experience in a wide variety of fields. His physical condition is of utmost importance and plays a vital roll in success or failure in discharging his responsibilities.

The span of control is closely allied to responsibilities. It is a managerial problem inherent in any organization. In the military, the span of control is an area of command too often overlooked. In any sort of activity an individual can only pay attention to a limited number of things at one time. The principal application of the span of control is concerned with time, distance, physical and emotional factors. "The time that it takes to get things done and the number of things that have to be done go hand in hand in effecting the span of control. Much delay occurs through the bureaucratic nature of the military organization."

(6:28)

Here then, one can see the vulnerability of insufficient authority given to subordinate commanders in the accomplishment of an assigned mission. Under the present day concept of warfare time becomes more and more important. Serious consideration must be given to the time necessary to get a decision from levels of command which are several echelons removed. The decision to be made by the commander will be based on his desire for an efficient organization and the amount of time and energy he is willing to expend. Distance between the commander and his subordinates create an even more difficult problem. Here again authority must be given to accomplish the mission. However, in the delegation of his authority the Battle Group Commander must guard against under-control.

The Exception Principle in its proper employment offers a unique application of the span of control by its latitude and sound leadership principals. There is so much to know about so many things that the commander could spend his every waking hour looking after all the little details of his job. However, in order to have proper direction it is necessary that people in positions of responsibility are not buried under a mountain of detail. They must have time to devote to a consideration of the objective or mission. The commander must control the efforts of his subordinates by making decisions. He must assign certain missions to his subordinates. When he gives them the responsibility for their work he must also give them the authority to carry out the job assigned. Regardless of how much authority he gives to them he is still responsible for their actions. To retain control of the activities under him requires that he keep abreast of the situation at all times, and that he render such decisions as are necessary to keep the activity within the bounds of policies and regulations. "If the commander requires that every detail of every operation be made known to him and that nothing be done without his approval, his organization will fall apart. The commander must let his subordinates decide the easy problems for themselves, and have them bring the exceptional problems to him for decision." (6:32)

The problem of span of control is not new. The factors of numbers, distance and time, psychological factors of emotion have always existed. The point of discussion in this particular analysis is one of individual differences. These individual differences are "those of physical stamina, intelligence, and adaptability to change" (6:30) which will definitely influence the selection of the Battle Group Commander.

The third analysis concerns the over all officer career pattern through which military skills are attained. The Army's system of training and education is perhaps the best of its kind in the world. The key to successful implementation of the career program is rotation of assignments. An example of this rotation system is the assignment philosophy used during the Korean conflict. Many successful Infantry leaders were reassigned to a staff and vice versa. In addition the rotation policy of bringing battle tested individuals to the United States and sending fresh officers to Korea effectively accomplished, in part, the goal of career management.

Officer schools generally fall into four categories: branch, specialist, command and staff, and joint schools. The Army's school system is designed to broaden the officer's background and prepare him for greater responsibilities. Attendance at staff or joint schools is selective and considerable care is exercised in the choice of those officers who attend them. In addition to these schools, schooling at civilian institutions for periods of one to three years to study a wide variety of subjects is available.

Officers of the grades of major and lieutenant colonel are eligible to attend the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels are assigned to the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. These officers might also attend one of the schools of the Air University located at Montgomery, Alabama, or the Naval War College located at Newport, R.I.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, Speaking before the

United States Conference of Mayors, Miami Beach, Florida made the following comments on the Army Educational System. "Not only do we train recruits, but we run the schools at all levels, from the lowest, short term specialty to the advanced courses for the intellectual and professional development of our senior officers. This educational system includes a total of 35 schools ranging for officers from the United States Military Academy to the Army War College. A wide variety of technical and special schools are available for all ranks. Additionally, the development of selected individuals is furthered by an extensive graduate training program in civilian universities, together with cross-education in the schools of the other Armed Forces and at the higher national and joint levels. In Fiscal Year 1958 Army-conducted schools taught some 700 courses, graduating over 150,000 students, including foreign military personnel from 62 nations." (7:65)

Schooling is not the only aspect of Career Management. The more important is "on the job" training. This training is of vital importance to the development of the officer's career therefore it is monitored by Career Management to insure an ever-broadening background.

There has been considerable criticism as to the worth of the Career Management Branch, however most of them are made without considering the fact that the Needs of the Service must be satisfied first, then the Officer's desires. It is not always possible to direct every officers assignment so that it is directly related to his basic branch. However the assignments, other than those directly related to his basic branch, do serve to further his development toward accepting greater responsibilities in the future.

"The key to successful implementation of the career program is rotation of assignments. Commanders have a definite responsibility to develop their subordinates. Although commanders are responsible for rotating assignments of officers under their command, each officer has an individual responsibility of insuring that he does not become channelized in one job. If through an oversight he threatens to be channelized,

he should make that fact known to his commander and request a change in assignment." (5:98)

The school background, both military and civilian, coupled together with variety in assignments insure professional competence. Therefore it is of utmost importance that this background be carefully evaluated and weighted proportionally in the selection of the Battle Group Commander.

The fourth analysis of age and experience gained in relationship to the present command structure is conjunctive, in nature, to the preceding analysis. That is to say the command structure as depicted in annex B was designed to offer experience in these command positions to those officers within a certain age bracket while at the same time preparing them for the next higher position and greater responsibility. From this system the officer's potentials and over-all value to the service would be indicated by his demonstrated ability to master assignments within this category. Here then we can see the importance of Career Management.

"Leadership is distributed along a scale, everyone having some of it. It is at first specific, that is, related to a particular kind of activity, but with increasing experience the successful leader tends to broaden his horizons, and generalize his methods." (4:16) This Educational psychology certainly is applicable to this analysis in that it underscores the previously mentioned requisites for the commander.

"Learning capacity is a function of age. The ability to learn new material rises rapidly in childhood, and the rate of rise declines until at about the age of 25 there is no further increase. Between 25 and 45 or 50 there is possibly a slow decline and after that age a more rapid decline. The habits once established are resistant to change." (4:263) This may or may not support the theory that Battle Group commanders and Division commanders should be younger men from the standpoint of effective command. However it does substantiate the need for "directed" assignment immediately upon completion of Service Schools to apply the principals learned and to remain in the specified field until professional competence

is assured. Professional improvement is not the sole responsibility of Branch management-rather that of the individual officer as well. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, says in part "for a military man, the process of education and intellectual growth must never end. Although from time to time he will have access to the facilities of the magnificent Army school system, a significant part of his education must be acquired by personal study." (8:1)

This analysis reveals the close relationship of several facets, which, when considered under our present command structure, restrict or promote the process of gaining military experience. The experience is gained through actual job performance whereas knowledge may be derived from a variety of sources. The need for experience cannot be over emphasized; however age in this regard must be the primary consideration in it's attainment. This is, without a doubt, the most important aspect of command and must be given it's full value in determining the rank of the Battle Group Commander.

The fifth analysis deals with the promotion system and the broad concept of specialization. The promotion system is viewed from the standpoint of it's application to the command structure. An understanding of military rank will aid in the analysis of this system. AR 600-15 defines Military rank as "that relative position or degree of precedence bestowed on military persons which marks their station and confers eligibility to exercise command or authority in the military service within the limits prescribed by law. It is divided into degrees or grades which mark the relative positions and powers of the different classes of persons possessing it." (3:2) The promotion laws must provide for the Army and Government it serves, a system whereby this end may be attained. The present day system revolves around the actions of Selection Boards which recommend officers for promotion on the basis of the individual officer's record and the promotion criteria. There are many aspects to the management of this system which are not discussed because they are not necessary considerations in arriving at a logical answer to the question of rank of the Battle Group Commander. The major consideration is that of

advancement in rank, the time required, and the effect this system has on the ROCID Division.

In general, promotion to grades of Captain, Major, and Lieutenant Colonel will be made prior to the completion of seven, fourteen, and twenty-one years' service, respectively, if recommended by the selection board. "Promotion to the grade of Colonel are made only when vacancies in that grade exist. This specification will and does result in forced attrition in that the Lieutenant Colonel must retire from active service if not selected for promotion by the time he completes twenty-eight years of service. Colonels not selected will be retired after five years in grade but not until they have completed 30 years of service. These are the general rules of the present day promotion policies. The minimum age limitations of 26, 31, 34, and 38 for Captains, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels respectively is an inherent part of this system." (9:458)

The point of discussion in this analysis is not one of criticism of the promotion system. On the contrary, it is to emphasize the established attitude the Army's has taken in regards to age and experience in relationship to the structure of command. This system allows for the attainment of this experience within a definite age bracket. This system also provides for the promotion of especially outstanding Officers who are not within the zone of consideration. Promotion to the next higher grade is an acknowledgement of past performance, and carries with it additional responsibilities along with a demand for greater professional competency.

To say, without reservation, that the commander of the Battle Group should be a Colonel or a Lieutenant Colonel based strictly on the criteria by which each is advanced in rank is absurd. The promotion system is an instrument of morale; to permit continuous vitalization of the officer corps and to eliminate those officers who cannot or will not maintain an acceptable standard. Thus, the promotion system serves to give sufficient time for the officer to become thoroughly proficient in

the position called for by his present grade while at the same time measures his ability to shoulder greater responsibility.

The mere fact that the command position common to the grade of Lieutenant Colonel has been eliminated in the Battle Group organization does not, in itself, reduce the effectiveness of his ability to command a Battle Group once he has been promoted to the grade of Colonel. It is more likely to enhance his capability to command more effectively the Battle Group due to the wide variety of assignments in staff positions. The experience gained while serving in the "Staff Grades" will result in a highly efficient, superbly trained Battle Group Commander.

CONCLUSION

In our study we have shown the all-encompassing nature of commanding an Infantry Battle Group; the scope of responsibility, and the inherent problems that arise in directing, training and supervising a unit of this type. The responsibilities cannot be taken lightly for their proper execution insures combat efficiency. From our analysis of the Battle Group Commander's responsibilities, we see the necessity for a leader who possesses comprehensive knowledge of the underlying principles of command, and most important, the skill in the application of these principles.

The effect of the span of control as discussed in our second analysis indicate increasing limitations of psychological and physical factors such as distance, time, and individual differences which hinders the effective control of the Battle Group. Therefore it is paramount that the Battle Group Commander must be the possessor of broad knowledge, skilled in human relations, physically and psychologically well equipped to lead men.

Investigation of the over-all officer career pattern clearly revealed the necessity for the maximum development of the professional officer's potentials through the Army's school system and Career Management Program. In addition we see the importance of "on the job" training in a variety of duty assignments, preventing channelization and insuring that the officer's experiences are progressively broadened.

The fourth analysis of age and experience substantiated several facts. The first of these is that experience broadens the successful leader's horizon. Second, that the structure of command is derived from age and experience factors. It is designed to permit the gaining of experience through actual job performance. The third fact is that experience is the most important single aspect of command.


The final analysis of the promotion system further indicated the importance the Army places on experience. A point of emphasis here is that the system permits the attainment of experience within a definite age bracket by establishing a minimum and maximum time in grade criteria.

All of the foregoing analysis have reiterated the facts known to commanders for many years. Never in recorded history have these facts been more significant than they are today in the conduct of modern warfare. There is every indication that "tomorrows" battle field victories will be won only by the commanders whose potentials were recognized in the early stage of his military career, subsequently developed by expert guidance, resulting in a superbly trained infantry leader. The ingredients necessary to produce this leader-commander are established in our Army today. Comprehensive knowledge is gained through the Army School System. Experience is gained through "on the job" training. Human Relation Techniques are an inseparable phase of leadership which stems basically from our American way of life. Vitalization of the officer corp is maintained through the promotion system.

The command of the Infantry Battle Group cannot be entrusted to any other than those officers whose capabilities include illimitable knowledge, mature thinking, decisive actions, and dynamic leadership. Only maximum military experience and education guarantee the attainment of these capabilities.

It is concluded then that these capabilities are beyond the realm of the officer serving in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel and that the Battle Group should not be commanded by Lieutenant Colonels.

ANNEX A - (Functional diagram of battle group staff)(1:4)



----- staff relationship

ANNEX B (Command Structure) (5:39)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TIME IN GRADE</u>	<u>AVERAGE AGE</u>
Division	as vacancies occur	48-65
Battle Group	as vacancies occur	41-60
	5-7 years Lt. Col.	36-46
	5-7 years Maj	31-39
Company	5-7 years	26-32
Platoon	5-7 years	22-25

ANNEX C (Questionnaire forwarded to Commanding Generals, Assistant Division Commanders, Chiefs of Staff of Active Divisions)

SHOULD BATTLE GROUPS BE COMMANDED BY LIEUTENANT COLONELS?

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. The rank of the rifle company commander will remain a Captain.
2. If the Battle Group were commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel the Battle Group staff would be adjusted accordingly, thereby assuming the rank of the staff of the now obsolete Infantry Battalion.
3. The recommended rank be appropriate in both peacetime and wartime.

I FEEL THAT AN INFANTRY BATTLE GROUP SHOULD BE COMMANDED BY A:

_____ COLONEL

_____ LT. COL.

BECAUSE: (Check as many reasons as you feel appropriate and add any additional reasons that you have under your choice)

_____ Age
_____ Experience
_____ Prestige
_____ Broader Knowledge
_____ Responsibility for
_____ Combined Arms
_____ Schooling
_____ Better alignment of rank
_____ of Battle Group Commander
_____ and Division Commander
_____ and his staff.

_____ Age
_____ Phy Condition
_____ Shorter periods
_____ between commands
_____ Size of Battle
_____ Group as compared
_____ with size of
_____ Regiment and
_____ Battalion.
_____ Better alignment
_____ of rank of Battle
_____ Group staff and
_____ Rifle Company
_____ Commander.

I FEEL THAT A BATTLE GROUP SHOULD NOT BE COMMANDED BY A:

_____ COLONEL

_____ LT. COL.

BECAUSE: (Check appropriate reason and add any you desire)

_____ Age
_____ Phy condition
_____ Time between commands
_____ Small size of unit
_____ Rank differential with
_____ Company Commander

_____ Age
_____ Lack of sufficient
_____ experience
_____ Lack of prestige
_____ Lack of sufficient
_____ schooling
_____ Responsibility for
_____ combined arms command.
_____ Rank differential
_____ with Division CG and
_____ staff

ANNEX D (Summarization of Questionnaire)

A total of 44 questionnaires were sent to 14 Divisions. Of this total 31 indicated a preference for Colonels and 5 indicated a preference for Lieutenant Colonels to command Battle Groups.

The following excerpts are representative of the opinions expressed in answer to the questionnaire:

"The demands of the atomic battle field, the resultant wide distances, deep zones, and greater range of operations all dictate that the basic fighting organization, the battle group, be commanded by a person of wide experience. When you consider that the battle group commander will, in the near future, have atomic munitions at his disposal you can readily see that major decisions on the battle field will be within the grasp of the Battle Group Commander....."

FORREST CARAWAY
Brigadier General
1st Division

"I will enclose two draft papers, one supporting the Colonel and one supporting the Lieutenant Colonel--I personally vote for the latter. My reason is that, simply stated, for the job that a Battle Group Commander must do I believe that you need younger commanders. My experience in WWII and Korea leads me to believe that the young commander who can get around on the battle field will soon learn, if he hasn't already, to handle his troops properly....."

R. H. WIENECKE
Major General
2d Division

"It is the belief of the 8th Infantry Division that the Battle Group should be commanded by a Colonel for the following reasons: Responsibility for combined arms, need for experience, maturity. This element (maturity) must be considered and although it is closely allied with experience it is not quite the same. Age is a factor. Most of our Battle Group Commanders are in their late 30's and early 40's - this has, as stated, given them a chance for schooling, staff know how and the experience. This places them in an age bracket where they will 'look before they leap'....."

PHILLIP F. LINDEMAN
Major General
8th Division

"The Battle Group is presently constituted about the same as the Triangular Division Battalion Combat Team. I see no need for a Colonel to command the Battle Group. I feel the biggest single reason for the Lt Col is the fact that there is presently very little opportunity for command between the grade of Captain and Colonel.."

KENNETH R. LINDNER
Colonel, C/S
2d Division

"We must avoid changing a grade structure which has proven itself generally sound and practical, just to accommodate an organization structure which is itself likely to change. In fact, organizational structures are constantly changing and I am sure our present Battle Group organization will change with the changing capabilities and requirements of the future....."

GEORGE E. BUSH
Major General
1st Cavalry Division

"A Battle Group will be the most difficult command assignment for senior officers. In combat these commanders will normally not be more than 35 years old. Responsibility and prestige are the factors favoring the rank of Colonel for the position of Battle Group Commander regardless of comparative youth....."

JOHN H. MCGEE
Brigadier General
4th Division

"The commander of a Battle Group must be a USACGSC graduate and preferably an USARWC graduate also. The Battle Group is a combined arms team whose commander requires maximum practical experience and military education. In peace and war the individual achieves this background by the time he is a Colonel. The Battle Group Commander in peace time has a wide range of extra curricular responsibilities which suggests that he be schooled at the political-diplomatic-military level (Army War College). This asset in military background would be desirable in war-time....."

WM. F. TRAIN
Brigadier General
8th Division

"The Airborne Battle Groups in the division normally have attached a 105mm How Btry, Engr Plat, Area Communications Center Plat, Support Plat from the Emerg Repair Company, Evacuation Section, MI Team, and a Forward Air Controller. This in itself is a reinforced Battle Group and the commander must have a thorough knowledge of the component elements."

H. H. CRITZ
Colonel, C/S
101st Division

"An important consideration is the rank alignment between Company Commander and Battle Group Commander. The necessary close relationship and support between commanders of succeeding echelons of command is extremely difficult to establish when rank changes from Captain to Colonel."

W. J. BOEHMER
Lt Col, G-3
4th Division

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