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WHAT SHOULD BE THE ANTIGUERILLA WARFARE DOCTRINE
FOR THE BATTLE GROUP?

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PREFACE

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The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author - not necessarily that of the United States Army or the United States Army Infantry School.


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INTRODUCTION

Scope: Effective defense against guerilla warfare requires a thorough understanding of the guerilla methods and the coordinated application of various measures whose eventual aim is complete destruction of the guerilla effort. In the broad strategic sense, an antiguerilla campaign involves political and psychological action to prevent the guerilla force from forming; or to weaken the effectiveness of one already formed; and offensive operations aimed at destroying the guerilla force. Political and psychological efforts by themselves will not succeed without the necessary military measures. The antiguerilla effort must be mainly military from the offset. Military action designed to prevent the formation of a guerilla force, or weaken it if it is already formed must be adopted. It is with the characteristics of this military effort that we are mainly concerned in this discussion.

Purpose: To acquaint commanders, staff officers, and subordinate commanders of the Infantry Division Battle Group with the organization, tactics and characteristics of anti-guerilla units. To further provide a guide for the conduct of antiguerilla warfare within the battle group.

Source of terms: The terms used in this monograph are in accordance with the definitions in the "Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage" unless otherwise defined.

DISCUSSION

What is guerilla warfare? "The word is Spanish, its literal meaning "little war", from the Spanish word Guerra, "War"." (8:14)

Guerilla warfare is essentially warfare carried out by irregular forces in conjunction with regularly organized military forces as a phase of normal war. It is a war against the enemy's morale, supplies and communications.

Historical Examples: Guerilla warfare has, in recent years, assumed increasing importance as a weapon of aggression. It is a type of warfare peculiarly suited to the aims and methods of international Communism.

In the purely tactical sense, guerilla-type operations are as old as war itself, and examples are found throughout history. The strategic aspects have developed more recently as the result of great political and social changes during the past several centuries. When war began to involve all the people of a country, rather than merely the military forces of contending rulers, the employment of irregular methods of warfare increased in scope and importance.

Napoleon was plagued by guerillas in Spain and to a lesser extent in Russia. In the American Revolution, Francis Marion's guerilla force was a deciding factor in our victory. In the war between the states, John S. Mosby organized and lead guerillas against Union Forces. Guerilla methods and techniques were employed against the Central Powers in World War I. In World War II the fighting by regular forces was

augmented by guerilla activities of varying scope in China, Burma, Russia, Poland, the Balkans, Italy, and France. The Korean conflict was no exception. "When North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel in June 1950 three ROK divisions were already fighting approximately 5,000 guerilla in southwest Korea - miles south of the 38th Parallel." (2:6)

Today most guerilla forces are instruments of Communist aggression against the free world. If the future brings general war, we can assume that guerilla forces will be even more active and devastating than they have been in the past.

ORGANIZATION

General: Learning to deal with guerilla operations is one of the Army's most urgent problems. We must establish and disseminate firm doctrines for antiguerilla tactics. To be effective, antiguerilla units should be organized, trained and equipped to combat guerilla forces by using guerilla methods and techniques. Through necessity most of their operations are carried out during darkness; therefore, this force should be small and specialize in surprise and clandestine action. Special antiguerilla units should, whenever possible, be assigned on a more or less permanent basis to one region so that they become familiar with the local situation and terrain. The following is taken from a passage in the Soviet Handbook of the Guerilla digested at the Command and General Staff School"units most commonly used by the Germans in fighting guerillas are companies and platoons armed with heavy machine guns and grenade rifles. For transportation, they use bicycles, motorcycles and trucks. Small detachments take dogs with them." (7:104)

Organization: (See Annex A) The squad is the smallest organized group and, therefore, should be the base of the organizational structure in the antiguerrilla unit. This basic unit would be capable of expansion into a larger unit by merely adding additional personnel and proportionate staff, command and support personnel. The size of this squad generally varying from nine to twelve men. Local conditions would dictate feasible squad organization and strength, but uniformity in strength and composition should be established and maintained with this force. Such a squad would be capable of limited independent action and composed of the following elements in balanced proportions:

- a. Squad Leader and Assistant
- b. Automatic Riflemen and Grenadeers
- c. Riflemen
- d. Scouts

The organization and size of an antiguerrilla force will vary according to many factors such as the topography, support facilities and radius of operation. The British have this to say of their experiences in Malaya where on occasion they had to move out in great strength to clean out an area.

".... It is a fact that most successful operations have been those planned and executed on a company level. Personal experience has tended to show that the larger the operation and the higher the level on which it is planned, the less chance of success it has. Not only is a large number of troops impossible to control in badly mapped jungle, but also the build-up is so ponderous, the preparations so vast and lack of security so likely, that, if any bandits have been stupid enough to remain in the area after 'H hour' they will certainly have left it before the last 'stop' and the last

ambush party are in position prior to the advance of the striking force on to its objective." (4:128)

Arms and Equipment: The need for mobility dictates light and portable weapons and equipment for the antiguerilla unit. Armament for the guerilla fighters should include but not be limited to light machine guns, rocket and grenade launchers, sub machine guns, automatic rifles, and rifles. "The armament of the band (guerilla) fighting units must be adapted to the requirements for band fighting. Even in difficult terrain the troops must carry with them their weapons by their own power. Especially advantageous in fighting the bands are weapons which make for rapid fire readiness. Hand fire arms and sub machine guns, automatic rifles, rifles equipped with telescopic sights, light and heavy machine guns, light and medium anti tank guns, light infantry guns, light anti aircraft guns, light flame throwers, those are weapons which have proven their value for fighting the bands in swamp and virgin forest. Heavy weapons, for instance artillery, heavy anti tank guns and heavy anti aircraft guns, reduce the marching speed of band fighting troops in swamps and virgin forest." (12:18)

Communications equipment should be limited to radio and messengers since it is the most flexible means of communications. Each antiguerilla unit should have a light portable radio and messenger personnel for communications with their base of operations and other friendly units.

"For fighting the bands (guerilla) the troops require strong forces for communication purposes; these forces must be readily committable and must possess the degree of mobility which conditions within the individual territory may require. Mounted messengers and when road conditions permit

motorcycle riders represent an indispensable supplement to the mechanical means of communications." (12:20)

Finally, antiguerrilla forces must be very mobile. Transportation of every known type can and should be utilized by the guerilla fighter. The extent and kind of transportation is limited by the area the guerilla controls, the means at their disposal, and the terrain. "After all care has been given regarding the combat equipment for the troops it is still a matter of seeing that it is not too heavy. Many an operation has failed merely because troops were weighted down by too much equipment." (12:20)

TRAINING

General: "Guerilla activities are best countered by small specially trained and equipped units that can beat the guerilla at his own game." (10:1) The training of antiguerrilla units must be flexible as is their organization and operation. This training should be in consonance with the regular concept of standard unit training. Training that builds confidence in the individual, his weapons and his leaders is of paramount importance in creating an efficient anti-guerilla force. Although this training would vary to meet specific conditions of various areas of operation, the following phases of training should be emphasized so that the individual could acquire the skills peculiar to guerilla operations:

Individual Training Phase: This phase should include first aid; chemical and bacteriological warfare; individual cooking; field living and supply discipline.

Weapons Training Phase: Functioning; care and mainten-

ance; assembly and disassembly; demolitions; and booby traps.

Physical Training Phase: Conditioning; marches; load exercises; hand to hand combat; and competitive sports.

Intelligence and Communication Training Phase: Code; signalling; wire repair and laying; radio voice procedure and control; message center operation and procedure; map and aerial photo reading and interpretation; and compass reading.

Transportation Training Phase: Driver training; care and maintenance of vehicles; loading and unloading; traffic control and discipline.

Tactics Training Phase: Scouting and patrolling; camouflage and concealment; small unit warfare in desert, woods, jungle, towns and villages; and night fighting and firing. Also in this phase the theory of guerilla warfare and antiguerrilla tactics would be integrated into the training.

Field Exercise Phase: Consideration should be given to field exercises and maneuvers that include some "guerilla opposition" not only to alert the soldier to the problem of guerilla warfare but to acquaint him with antiguerrilla methods and techniques they might be forced to adopt.

PLANNING

General: Past history of guerilla warfare has manifested two major errors on the part of those engaged in anti-guerilla warfare. The first of these errors is the failure to adequately prepare in advance for this type of operation and secondly, the overwhelming reliance placed upon pure defensive measures as an effective deterrent to the guerilla menace. "In any campaign of the future, the participants

who fail to take proper cognizance of guerilla warfare, either in the planning or execution stages, may suffer severe setbacks, if not eventual defeat." (6:15)

Basic Principles:

a. "To be successful, antiguerrilla operations must be based on a broad, realistic plan that coordinates not only the political, administrative and military phases of the operation but also the activities of adjacent areas and antiguerrilla commands.

b. "Preventing the formation of a resistance movement is much easier than dealing with one after it is formed. Putting down such a movement is much easier during its early stages than when it has reached full development.

c. "Except in the immediate vicinity of a front-line combat area, guerilla units cannot exist without the support of some segments of the civilian population. Anti-guerilla operations must therefore include appropriate measures against the supporters of the guerillas.

d. "A firm, and if necessary harsh, attitude is necessary in dealing with guerillas and civilian supporters.

e. "Adequate intelligence about the terrain, the population, and the guerillas is essential.

f. "Continuity of command and policy are necessary.

g. "An area confronted with a serious guerilla menace is as much a combat area as are the front lines. Commanders and troops in such an area must maintain the same alert and aggressive attitude as front-line troops. A "rear-area" psychology makes it easy for guerillas to employ one of their most potent weapons -- surprise.

h. "Purely defensive security measures allow a guerilla movement to grow and become strong. They are justi-

fied only when the importance of the area does not justify, or the lack of adequate forces permit, offensive operations. Even limited offensive operations are preferable to a purely passive attitude. Offensive action should be continuous and not interspersed with periods of inactivity.

i. "Points of greatest guerilla vulnerability are:

- (1) Support of the civilian population.
- (2) Food Supply
- (3) Leadership
- (4) Communications and organization
- (5) Morale
- (6) Arms and ammunition supply

j. "Guerilla security is apt to be poor during darkness and inclement weather. These periods are therefore excellent for attacks against guerillas.

k. "Secrecy of movement and surprise are essential in attacking guerillas.

l. "The aim of antiguerilla tactics is to destroy or capture the guerillas and their leaders. Envelopments and encircling movements are therefore the rule.

m. "Conditions permitting, one of the most effective ways to fight guerillas is to wage guerilla warfare against them. Elements of the population friendly to our forces are valuable for this type of operation." (11:35)

CONDUCT OF ANTIGUERILLA WARFARE

General: Atomic warfare is an infinitely complex effort. It requires a highly efficient command; well organized lines of supply and communications; weapons and equipment of maximum effectiveness and efficiency; and personnel

trained in countless skills. Tactical doctrines must be developed that take advantage, or overcome the difficulties of these conditions and requirements. Guerilla warfare has almost none of the above characteristics. The direct and decisive combat of conventional ground warfare is avoided by guerilla forces. They make raids rather than sustained attacks of a conventional type. They strike from the rear and on the flanks, rarely from the front. Regular forces hold defensive positions when necessary. Guerillas seldom defend a position as such, except in brief holding actions to cover withdrawals. The objective of regular forces often is the seizure and holding of ground; guerillas rarely fight for ground but concentrate on weakening or destroying the enemy's offensive capability. The following was extracted from the Soviet Handbook of the Guerilla, 3rd Edition 1942, digested at the Command and General Staff School. "...Operating against our (Soviet) guerillas, the Germans recognize only one kind of battle -- the offensive battle. Defensive battles are considered extremely undesirable. If their attack fails, they prefer to quit fighting and withdraw." (7:105)

The best defense against guerilla attack is for every unit, every headquarters, every installation, every soldier and every commander, no matter how far behind the lines to be constantly alert to the possibility of guerilla attack and always be prepared to meet the attack in an aggressive manner.

Mission: "The primary mission of all antiguerrilla operations is to prevent the guerilla from seriously interfering with our operations against the enemy's regular forces. This consideration will determine the amount and type of action that we take against guerillas. Most of the

time, this will mean that we will deal with the guerilla problem, not by solving it, but by learning to live with it successfully." (13:69)

Phase I - Gathering of Intelligence on the Guerilla Forces: Offensive action against guerillas is seldom successful unless we have accurate intelligence on the guerilla and the terrain and unless we are able to achieve surprise. Unless we know where the guerillas are, unless we know the terrain well and unless we can get within striking distance of the guerilla bands before being discovered, we cannot catch them. To attempt antiguerilla operations without adequate intelligence could and usually means wasted time, material and troop effort.

The commander needs to know the strength and disposition of the guerilla forces as he would any opposing force, in order to determine the number of troops needed to destroy them. Because self-supporting guerilla groups are a rarity, intelligence concerning the supply and command channels between the guerillas and the sponsoring power is a prime factor in anti-guerilla planning. Detailed intelligence about guerilla occupied terrain, location and location of civilians who supply the guerilla with food are facts the commander requires in formulating his offensive action.

The soldier must develop and practice his intelligence-gathering powers to the maximum in order to gain this vitally needed information. He must be fully aware that the guerillas conceal weapons and disguise themselves. He must be versed in many intelligent gathering techniques and he should be able to speak the guerilla's language. The ability to speak the language of the guerilla for the interrogation of prisoners is of great importance. "Statements by prisoners

represent one of the best sources of information. For this reason it is wrong to shoot captured bandits on the spot."

(12:27)

"Communications provide the essential link between guerilla forces and their allied forces. Control, coordination, and logistical support within unified guerilla commands and with allied forces all depend on communications. Radio is normally the essential mean of communication in guerilla organizations. Special consideration is given to monitoring and locating guerilla transmitter-receiver stations. Intelligence efforts should include the operation of special radio stations that enter the guerilla radio net using guerilla call signs and procedures." (6:81)

Phase II - Maintaining security: Traditional local security measures are imperative in guerilla country; but they are far from enough. In danger from all sides, the unit is an island in a hostile area. Guerillas can hit it anywhere on the perimeter. The front is all around. Constant and vigilant observation of native activity all around the position is necessary.

In guerilla country, the choice of location of supply and other installations is largely determined on security grounds. When the site has been selected, its natural defensive advantages are increased by every possible means. Around a supply installation, for example, there should be cleared fields of fire, wire, alarm and barriers.

These defenses are useful only when manned by alert and adequately trained soldiers. In guerilla country there can be no distinction made between combat and Service troops, for all are in the battle zone and must provide their own security.

The importance of mobility to rear area security re-

quires maximum protection of supply routes and communication facilities. Principal methods include frequent patrolling along roads and railroads, the maintenance of control points and the grouping of small convoys into larger combinations when moving through dangerous guerilla country.

A heavy reliance should not be placed on pure defensive measures alone in protection against guerilla warfare. It is granted that the pure defensive approach to protection of a vital installation or area will have a great deal of success at localized points; but, it is area protection that a commander should strive for if he is to succeed in the protection of an installation over an appreciable period of time. This area protection can only be accomplished by aggressive, active, and extensive patrolling in conjunction with the antiguerilla forces plus any other defenses the commander might adopt for protection. "Allow the guerilla no rest. Use raiding parties carrying light equipment and having a lot of firepower." (14:9)

Aggressive patrolling means that patrols sent out by the unit commander will not hesitate to give battle to guerillas if contact is effected. By active and extensive patrolling, it is visualized that the patrols will not conform to set patterns, either as to time or routes, but will be far ranging in both space and time, and will adapt themselves to the prevalent guerilla tactics.

The greatest tactical advantage of patrolling lies in the fact that patrolling will immeasurably strengthen and complement any other defensive device the unit may have effected against the guerilla menace. Patrolling will produce other tactical benefits of immediate value to the commander - these are its destructive effects upon the gue-

rilla forces.

"Special control over civilians is a must in all warfare. In antiguerrilla warfare these measures become more complexed and more important to security." (10:12) Effective control of the civilian population should as a minimum include stopping and searching suspected guerillas, establishing control points and issuing passes and other means of identification. Restrictions on civilian travel and transportation should also be imposed.

Phase III - Sustained offensive operations aimed at destroying the guerilla forces:

Offensive action takes the initiative away from the guerilla, forcing them to be more concerned with survival than with operations against our forces. "Infantry normally is the principal arm employed in active counter guerilla operations." (6:74)

The element of surprise has particular value against guerillas. Guerillas seek to avoid a pitched battle and tend to rely heavily on their intelligence net to keep them out of situations that will force them to fight such a battle. A sudden attack against which they have not been forewarned can force them into the kind of battle they are least prepared to fight.

Unorthodox and ingenious tactics, ruses and well conceived deception plans often are practical in guerilla country and can contribute much to achievement of surprise. Mobility is indispensable because the guerillas often possess more complete knowledge of the terrain and are served by an efficient intelligence net. The battle can be carried to the guerilla only by superior mobility.

Encirclement, frontal attack and pursuit are the offen-

sive patterns most commonly employed against guerilla forces. Encirclement is the best of these because it is most likely to accomplish complete destruction of the guerilla force. The other two are employed when encirclement cannot be achieved or when the remnants of an encircled force are being destroyed.

The encirclement action is similar to highly organized game drive in hunting, its purpose being to flush the guerillas out of their hiding places. The attacking forces must have sufficient troop strength to block all possible avenues of escape. "The encirclement of guerilla forces, whether they are large or small, is the most effective way to completely destroy them. The encirclement is made in depth with adequate reserves and supporting arms to meet possible guerilla attack in force." (6:82)

Surprise is essential in the encirclement maneuver. The attacking troops reach the line of encirclement simultaneously. The initial phase is the most crucial, because the guerilla invariably will make a prompt and violent effort to break out of the trap. It is possible to anticipate the point of the break-out attempt and to deploy the strongest elements of the attacking force in that area. Nevertheless, the entire perimeter must be adequately covered to assure successful encirclement. "The basic principle of this combat method (Encirclement) is: to cut off the bands (guerillas) from all avenues of escape and thereafter to methodically destroy every part of the bands." (12:27) Deliberate destruction of the guerilla force is accomplished by striking inward from the line of encirclement to isolate and destroy various major guerilla points of resistance.

Unsuitable terrain, lack of time, or lack of sufficient

troops may make it impracticable to attempt an encirclement. In this case a surprise frontal attack on the guerilla position if followed by aggressive and continuing pursuit may achieve the same effects as a successful encirclement. The tactical aim of the frontal attack is not to take ground or to disperse the enemy, but rather to destroy him. The guerilla must be given no opportunity to disengage. The pursuit must keep pace with all the efforts of the guerilla force to withdraw. Even when the guerillas are driven to headlong retreat the chase must be kept up. "It is advantageous to force the bands (guerilla) surprisingly into battle, to destroy them by quick attack and to chase the small groups into which they have split and to destroy them individually." (12:32) To accomplish this kind of pursuit the antiguerrilla units must be flexible and capable of matching the mobility of the fleeing guerilla forces.

CONCLUSION


The frontages and depths envisioned in atomic defense make a unit more vulnerable to attacks by guerilla and infiltrating forces. Basic military principles are applicable in antiguerrilla warfare; however, the doctrine and tactics must be modified to meet the peculiarities of guerilla forces and their operation.

The antiguerrilla doctrine developed for the Infantry Division Battle Group should have the capability of destroying the guerilla base of operation, halt and destroy the re-supply of the guerilla forces and re-orient the population so as to gain their cooperation and support in the antiguerrilla effort.

Special antiguerrilla units, organized, equipped, and trained to beat the guerilla at his own game, make it possible to conduct an effective offense with relatively small forces. These units like the forces they oppose should specialize in surprise and clandestine action avoiding local populace and remaining in concealed camps during the day. If at all possible, these units should be assigned on a permanent basis to insure familiarity with local conditions and terrain.

Current United States Army doctrine on antiguerrilla warfare as enunciated in current Field Manuals is sound and adaptable to the Infantry Division Battle Group.

ANNEX A-(ORGANIZATIONAL CHART)



1 COMDR
 1 PLAT SGT
 1 PLAT SGT ASST
 1 RADIO OPR
 1 RADIO OPR ASST
 1 MSGR
 1 MED NCO
 1 MED NCO ASST

 2 SMG CAL .45
 6 CARBINE CAL .30

1 RADIO SET A/N VRC-10

1 $\frac{3}{4}$ TON TRUCK
 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ TON TRUCK

1 LDR
 1 LDR ASST
 3 DRIVERS
 2 EMAN AUTO
 4 RIFLEMEN

 1 MG CAL .30
 2 GRENADE LAUNCHER
 2 AUTO RIFLE
 1 SMG CAL .45
 8 RIFLE CAL .30

1 RADIO SET A/N PRC-10

1 $\frac{3}{4}$ TON TRUCK
 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ TON TRUCK

Typical Antiguerilla Unit For The Battle Group

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