

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia

STUDENT MONOGRAPH
Advanced Infantry Officers Course
Class #2
1953 - 54

TITLE

ARE WE GOING TOO FAR
IN THE STREAMLINING OF OUR INFANTRY UNITS?

Major James H. Tate

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PREFACE

The author hereby expresses his appreciation to the personnel of The Infantry School Library whose assistance was of inestimable value during the research phase of this work.

Attention is invited to the direct quotations of high level officials of government contained herein. Although they are "on the record" statements and thereby constitute the official view of the person quoted, they and the conclusions drawn in this monograph do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army nor of The Infantry School.

12 April 1954

James H. Tate
JAMES H. TATE
Major Infantry

INTRODUCTION

A soldier in North Africa during World War II noted that the Arab farmers had an unusual combination of a donkey and camel for a plow team. Curious as to the reason for this he asked an Arab.

"The donkey is very strong but he is stubborn and won't plow unless he is hitched with a camel," was the reply.

Dissatisfied with the answer, the soldier asked another Arab. "The camel is strong but he is very stubborn and won't plow unless he is hitched to a donkey."

Confused by these contradictory answers, the soldier asked still another Arab farmer and received an answer which he accepted: "Because my father did it that way."

This apocryphal story emphasizes the point that in approaching the discussion of any kind of change, one should beware. To the naive investigator, the trap of unquestioned acceptance opens wide.

As stated by Brig. Gen. George E. Lynch, "The retention of forms beyond the existence of the reason for their origin can be found almost anywhere...Until the end of World War II, field artillery batteries included only four cannon. Possibly the best explanation for settling on the number four was advanced by the late Maj. Gen. Harry G. Bishop (then a captain) who wrote that four pieces was the greatest number the officer giving firing orders could reach with his voice...only belatedly, after World War II did our artillery adopt the six piece battery organization."¹

In our attack on the objective of "Are we going too far in the streamlining of our infantry units?" we have established a mission

1. Brig. Gen. Geo. E. Lynch, "The Infantry Division, Triangular or Square", Combat Forces Journal, IV, (November 1953), p. 9.

a line of departure, and considered certain critical terrain features. These should be examined before the attack is launched.

First, our course of action is simply to consider those major factors which of necessity must affect and direct the organization of our infantry units. We have not aimed at spelling out what that organization nor any part of it should be. In fact, we must disqualify ourselves for such a job as recommending specific changes in the Tables of Organization and Equipment. In our opinion, that is the task of a board of officers who have the mission, time, and facilities to make such a study, test it, draw conclusions and make recommendations. What we have tried to do is to set down the framework within which that optimum infantry organization must fit.

Secondly we have defined our subject for the needs of this work since the dictionary meaning - "the free flow of air about a body" - will not suffice. For our purpose it means relative increase in the mobility, self-sufficiency, control, and killing power of an infantry unit.

Thirdly we have made certain assumptions concerning these qualities. We assume for instance that 10 machine guns have more killing power than five; that telephone and radio communications equipment provide better control than semaphore and runner; and that lighter equipment plus more and better transportation make for more mobility. We assume that any TO&E equipment will be properly maintained and supported.

Fourthly, we are considering the regimental unit, not all infantry units.

The scope of this monograph is to provide an orientation for those persons who have been assigned (or given themselves) the task of investigating infantry organization and recommending detailed, specific changes. It is hoped that such persons, having read this monograph, will better understand the major outlines which the result of their work must fit. To the writer's knowledge, there is now no single current piece of writing which will give them such assistance.

DISCUSSION

In the military beginning there were two men standing toe to toe flailing at each other with their bare fists. Then one day the smarter of the men picked up a rock and knocked his opponent flat. This was the first use of a weapon. The struck man ran off and hid behind a log thus taking the first counter measure. The man with the rock ran behind the log and hit his opponent again. This was the first use of maneuver. In the eons since this event armies have merely engaged in a military race to keep ahead or abreast of the other in these three fields - weapons, counter measures, and mobility.

From this summary glance at military history it would seem that since that first battle armies have gone in the opposite direction from streamlining. Surely the vast amount of equipment and material which is today carted about by military units in the field does not constitute streamlining. Or does it? An examination of the U.S. infantry regiments of 1918, 1944 and 1954 will help provide a basis for the answer:

COMPARATIVE TABLE
1918, 1944, 1954 U.S. Army Infantry Regiments

Date	Strength	Transport	Commo	Small Arms	Fire Spt Wpns
1918 ²	3,300	16 4-mule kitchens 19 4-mule combat wagons 60 horses 10 mules 2 mtroyl 1 mtr car	8 buzzer tp 25 tp, camp	3200 rifle 192 ARs 1174 pistol	3 1-pounder gun 6 3-inch mortar 390 rifle grenade dischargers 16 MG
1944 ³	3,258	149 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trk 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ ton " 31 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton " 34 $\frac{2}{2}$ ton "	72 radio 60 tp	1909 rifle 836 carb 293 pistol 31 ARs	6 105 how 18 57mm guns 112 2.36" RL 27 60mm mort 18 81mm mort 18 LMG 24 HMG 35 MG Cal 50
1952 ⁴	3,302	199 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trk 49 $\frac{3}{4}$ ton " 81 $\frac{2}{2}$ ton " 22 med tk 1 heloptr 1 lt A/c	289 radios 146 tp	2150 rifle 162 AR 811 carb 500 pistol 37 SubMG	22 90mm gun 12 105mm RR 6 75mm RR 27 57mm RR 86 3.5" RL 27 60mm mort 12 81mm mort 12 4.2" mort 615 grenade launcher 12 HMG 69 LMG 31 MG cal 50

A glance at the total strength column shows that all three of these units have the same approximate manpower with the 1944 regiment slightly the lowest. It will be recalled that in the definition of streamlining, no mention was made of manpower. Actually there is no real relation between the two. If the number of men remains the same and the ingredients of streamlining are increased, the unit has streamlined. In fact, streamlining has taken place if only one of its ingred-

2. Table of Organization and Equipment, War Department, 1918, "Tables of Organization and Equipment, United States Army", UA 23 .A3

3. Training Bulletin, The Infantry School, 1944, "Organization of the Infantry Regiment". U408 .I32 1-1 dU

4. Reference Data, The Infantry School, March 1953, "Reference Data, Infantry Regiment", p. 2.

ients has increased.

The transportation column shows the increasing mobility of the regiment. Less than five per cent of troops rode in organic transportation in World War I compared to almost 45 per cent today.⁵

This of course means that the same regiment, moving farther and faster, can find and fix the enemy to a much greater degree than ever before. And the two aircraft in the modern regiment are only a wave of the military future.

The firepower column speaks for itself. Although the machine guns and pistols have merely been modified in the last 36 years, the addition and/or replacement of other weapons has been so great as to constitute a firepower revolution. For those who long for the good old days when the rifle was supreme in the regiment, crocodile tears should be shed. Admittedly the 1954 regiment has 1,050 fewer rifles than the 1918 unit. But they have been more than replaced by 45 additional mortars, 116 more machine guns, 86 rocket launchers, 45 recoilless rifles and 22 90mm guns.

As any combat-experienced soldier will attest, control is the big problem of a military commander whose unit is committed. This by no means is a new problem. Perhaps the most amazing example of someone "not getting the word" resulted in the Battle of New Orleans which was fought after the War of 1812 had ended officially.

In the World War I infantry, signal equipment was a minor adjunct to voice commands, arm-and-hand signals and messengers which were the mainstays of the subordinate commanders. The 146 telephones and 289 radios in the current infantry regiment give the commander two complete communications nets in addition to the secondary means of visual, sound and messenger.

In summary, by the criteria established the infantry regiment has become progressively more streamlined.

Having streamlined thus far, have we streamlined enough? The Commander-in-Chief thinks not:

5. Ibid., p. 49.

"Every single day things change in this world, and any staff or group of leaders doing its job is re-examining the world situation, the advances of science, the whole situation, geographic and otherwise...to see what it is that we now need most to insure our security and peaceful existence.

"You cannot possibly say that the kind of a unit and organization which I took to war across the Channel in 1944 would have any usefulness today whatsoever. What would two atomic bombs have done to the whole thing?"⁶

MAJOR FACTORS INFLUENCING INFANTRY REGIMENT

This plainly indicates a need for continuing change - or streamlining. But since the situations are also continually changing, they must be thoroughly examined to determine whether proposed infantry units would meet those situations.

In the current situation there seem to be five major factors which must be considered in deciding what kind of infantry regiment the United States should have. These are 1) high level decisions, 2) technological progress, 3) atomic weapons, 4) the world situation, and 5) the U.S. culture.

A glance at these subjects reveals the vast scope of each of them. Here, however, we will endeavor only to show how they affect the infantry. Consequently, studies on changes in the infantry must consider these factors.

1) High level decisions - When a regimental commander receives an operation order, his only concern is how he can best accomplish the mission which he has been given. The same holds true for any study of changing the infantry regiment; we must first look at the decisions made by the top levels of the military establishment. Do those decisions, which we can not change and should not question, emphasize the Ranger-type attack for the next war? Or armor? Or, possibly, air? Do they indicate an isolationist defense? If so, what type - Maginot Line or gun boats a few miles off shore (as Thomas Jefferson advocated)?

6. The New York Times, 18 March 1954, p. 14, col 7.

Fortunately the answers to these questions are available. During the last year a "New Look" for the U.S. military has been formulated which will affect the military forces for many years. It was officially announced by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a speech to the National Press Club in Washington on December 14, 1953.

Excerpts from the Admiral's text are as follows:

"(The) New Look is a reassessment of our strategic and logistical capabilities in the light of foreseeable developments, certain technological advances, world situation today, and considerable estimating of future trends and developments.

"...The motif and tempo of the New Look stemmed from the directive contained in the President's speech last April when he said that henceforth planning would be on the basis of preparations for the long term pull.

"...Today's emphasis is actually pointed toward the creation, maintenance, and the exploitation of modern air power...The President of the United States, The Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of one mind on this matter: This nation will maintain a national air power superior to that of any other nation in this world."⁷

After reading Admiral Radford's speech it is painfully obvious that those infantrymen who still maintain that the defense of the United States rests primarily on the man with the rifle are definitely out of order. The views expressed by the admiral were not off-the-cuff sentiments of an air power advocate. They were official pronouncements which point the direction the U.S. military machine is heading.

But does the "New Look" forsake the infantry? By no means. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, air power is not synonymous with Air Force.

"It (air power) includes the Air Force, Naval Aviation, Marine Corps Aviation, Army Aviation (underline author's), and the tremendous aircraft industry and civil air transportation systems of the United States."⁸

This is clearly an opportunity for the Army to participate in the emphasis on air power.

7. The New York Times, 15 December 1953, p. 31, col 2.

8. Ibid., col 8.

However, lest anyone feel that the "New Look" is total air power, he should be reassured that "It is a forced compromise between two incompatible ideas (total air power strategy and the conventional surface theory). It provides for an Army because the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not convinced the Air Force can make the super bombs do what the air power strategist says they will do. And they don't want to take a chance on a one-weapon strategy that has not been tested in the only laboratory where it counts - on the battlefield.

"National policy makers, therefore, have decided the Army's role will be to provide relatively small, highly mobile combat units for rapid deployment to trouble spots by air or sea."

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles corroborated the view that our defense would emphasize air power and mobility by stating that the National Security Council made a basic decision to depend primarily upon a greater capacity to retaliate instantly by means and in places of our choosing.¹⁰

2) Technological Progress - Riddle: What is the common denominator for penicillin, the helicopter, and radar? Answer: The development of all three, like hundreds of other examples of technological progress, was catalyzed by war.

The irony of war's part in furthering such progress is that the military is too often the last to benefit from the new inventions and developments. The much maligned "military mind" is often at its worst when confronted by something radical. Yet military history is replete with examples of victory going to the commander who was not afraid of anything - even a new idea.

Many officers scoff at a new idea as being in the science fiction category. Yet they never stop to realize that today in an infantry regiment they have radio, radar, recoilless rifle, automotive vehicle, fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, infra-red light, and VT fuses. If these items of standard equipment today had been described to the regimental commander of 1918, his disbelief would have been almost total. And that was only thirty-six years ago, the age of today's battalion commander.

9. Lloyd Norman, "The New Look Strategy", Combat Forces Journal, IV, (February 1954), p. 20.

10. Ibid., p. 15.

Even when all this is pointed out, the conservative too often refuses to project it into the future. He can't accept the tenet that in the very near future the regimental commander ~~is~~ will have television reconnaissance, two-way wrist radios, atomic devices and total air mobility. But to accept this, one has only to consider the logical extension of past and present progress and the maxim of scientific discovery that each new step accelerates the next one.

The relation of this subject to the streamlining of the infantry regiment should be obvious. Although the human element will not be subordinated for the foreseeable future, the tools and equipment of the infantry can grow steadily better if the results of our technological progress are applied to the infantry's needs. Adherence to old, familiar weapons, techniques and equipment can never be permitted to obstruct the path to greater combat effectiveness.

3) Atomic Weapons - "Let's face it... Hiroshima upset the world's military applecart... The next war, if it comes, is going to be different - made so by the biggest 'X' factor ever introduced into military calculations, the atomic bomb.

"(The) classic concept of fire and movement for seeking a tactical decision...has been unchallenged since its exposition by Von Clausewitz... .. The tremendous concentration of fire power in a single package suggests that a new look be taken at this classic concept... The concentration of men and guns that once barred frontal assault may now comprise the most remunerative target for atomic weapons in the enemy's entire positions." 11

The atomic weapon capability will affect the infantry regiment in several ways. First, since we have it in strength, a top level decision has been made to put primary reliance on air power and to use ground power through relatively small highly mobile units for rapid deployment. Since these units will certainly be either divisions or regiments or both, they will need a greater self sufficiency for independent or semi-independent operations. The other affect of the atomic weapon on the infantry unit is the increased need for mobility. To minimize the effectiveness of enemy atomic weapons, infantry units must be widely dispersed but must also possess the capability of re-grouping quickly for mobile defense or to exploit friendly use of the weapon.

11. G.C. Reinhardt and W.R. Kitner, Atomic Weapons in Land Combat, (Harrisburg, Penn., 1953), author's preface.

After the shock of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki casualties wore off, there set in a belief that the atomic bomb was just another weapon. Department of Army pamphlets give distances at which personnel are safe from atomic blast in varying types of shelter and provide statistics concerning the minimum effects of an atom bomb if all personnel are trained to take proper defensive measures.¹² The seeming fallacy here is that most such measures are based on being hit with a "small" atomic bomb (20 KT) and that the statistics assume all personnel are in shelter of some type.

All of the general knowledge available today on atomic weapons and defense against them concerns fissionable materials. And although they introduced explosive power far in excess of that ever known before, even it pales before the power of fusionable materials (the thermonuclear bomb.)

A brief glimpse at the thermonuclear weapon was given by U.S. Congressman Sterling Cole, chairman of the joint Committee on Atomic Energy:

"The Thermonuclear test of 1952 completely obliterated the test island in the Eniwetok Atoll. It tore a cavity in the floor of the ocean - a crater - measuring a full mile in diameter and 175 feet in depth at its lowest point."¹³

By newspaper accounts printed two weeks after the March 1, 1954 explosion, the thermonuclear device surpasses anything conceived even by the scientists who designed it. According to newspaper stories, the explosion inflicted injury on persons 93 miles from the point of detonation.

In reorganizing or re-equipping the infantry regiment for the future, no one should accept the thesis that the atomic bomb is "just another weapon."

12. Pamphlet, Department of the Army, 1951, "Individual Training in Atomic Warfare", p. 13-16.

13. Time Magazine, LXIII, (1 March 1954), p. 51, col 1.

4) The World Situation - It is only good sense to assume that when next the U.S. Infantry fights, it will be against the infantry of the Soviet bloc, be it Chinese or Czech, Rumanian or Russian. World events have established that all of these infantry march to the same music and have many of the same characteristics. Disregarding racial characteristics and logistical capabilities, the Russian ground forces furnish us with a pilot model for examination.

According to a recently published, highly regarded book on the Russian army,¹⁴ it continues to stress infantry as the basic arm of the USSR military forces. This source also reports that artillery in great mass is used to back up the hordes of Russian infantry divisions.

As to characteristics of the Soviet ground force, the following are reported:¹⁵

- (1) A slow and heavy build-up prior to launching an offensive.
- (2) Emphasis on depth both in the offense and defense.
- (3) A heavy reliance on massive concentration of artillery.
- (4) Successive assaults by successive organizations.
- (5) Relatively low ability to continue heavy assaults when the action has progressed beyond Soviet logistic and artillery capabilities.

All of these characteristics, except (3), could apply to the Chinese Communist infantry in Korea.

Another aspect of the Communist infantry should be mentioned. British Lieutenant General Gifford Martel, the only high-ranking Allied officer permitted to observe the Red Army closely in World War II stated: "Their (Russian infantry) one secret weapon is the willingness of their troops to die in active participation in the battle field."¹⁶

14. Raymond L. Gartooff, Soviet Military Doctrine, (Glencoe, Illinois, 1953), p. 299-307.

15. Lynch, "The Infantry Division, Triangular or Square," op. cit., p. 10, col 2.

16. Bill Davidson, "Why Half of Our Combat Soldiers Fail To Fire", Collier's, (November 1952) p. 17-18.

Our probable enemy - the Communist bloc - has a population of three quarter of a billion people. Russia and the European satellite nations have a standing army of about 235 divisions.¹⁷ Communist China has an Army of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ million.¹⁸ As for employing this huge manpower mass the concept of the worth of the individual in these countries is so foreign that these troops can be and have been expended like ammunition.

The only enemy in sight, then, has two outstanding characteristics, vast ground power and extreme willingness to expend it. Against any enemy, it is foolish to attack his strength. Rather, the military maxim is to avoid it and hit weakness. Applying this generally, the U.S. should avoid large scale ground warfare in which vast armies engage (as in World War II). Instead the U.S. should conserve its limited manpower and concentrate on winning through utilization of its technological and industrial capabilities.

Another aspect of the world situation which affects the infantry regiment is geopolitics. Today the enemy terrain stretches from Berlin to Bangkok. The U.S. may at any day be engaged at any point along this vastness.

Admiral Radford comments on this by saying "our military task is complicated by the two requirements enforced upon us. We must be ready for tremendous, vast retaliatory and counter-offensive blows in event of a global war, and we must also be ready for lesser military actions short of all out war."¹⁹

Whether in an all out war (spearheaded by the Strategic Air Command with atomic missiles) or lesser military actions (Indo-China and Korea), other factors dictate a need for hard-hitting, self-reliant, highly mobile infantry regiments. Such infantry units would be equally effective fighting "brush fires" or engaging in total atomic war.

17. Encyclopedia Britannica, (Chicago, London, Toronto, 1953), XIX, p. 733, col 1.

18. Joseph Alsop, "The Shocking New Strength of Red China", Saturday Evening Post, CXXVI, (13 March 1954), p. 158 and 161.

19. The New York Times, 15 December 1953, p. 31, col 5.

5) The U.S. Culture - The Spartan father handed his soldier son a shield with the instructions to return with it or on it. In the U.S. today, the Chief of Staff and the regimental commander have less stern material. Our soldiers can not match the physical stamina nor indifference to hardship of the Chinese coolie or the Russian peasant. They must be afforded such militarily non-essential items as mail, hot food, quality clothing, USO shows, rotation, ad infinitum.

This is not to argue the rightness or wrongness of the situation, but merely to state it as a factor to consider in streamlining the infantry regiment. Regardless of the merits, the reorganizer of the U.S. infantry must realize that he can not go too far towards austerity without loosing more - through the reaction of the public as well as military personnel - than he could hope to gain.

This distaste for doing things the hard way is not limited to shirkers nor is it an antisocial attitude. In fact it can be strongly maintained that such an attitude had great affect on the progress of the nation. Every man, wanting a better life, looked for easier methods.

Recently, President Eisenhower expressed just such an attitude toward the infantry. "For forty years I was in the Army and I did one thing; Study how to get an infantry platoon out of battle. The most terrible job in warfare is to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon when you are on the battlefield."²⁰

Another aspect of the U.S. culture which affects the infantry regiment is the recently discovered phenomenon that the majority of U.S. infantrymen do not fire their weapons at the enemy.

In a personal experience, Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall (who is generally given credit for discovering this important military fact) tells of a night defense by a battalion of the 165th Infantry on Makin Island in November 1943. The enemy attacked throughout the night, at times assaulting with rifle and bayonet. Yet only 36 men (mostly gun crews) could be found who had fired.²¹

20. The New York Times, 18 March 1954, p. 14, col 7.

21. Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire, (New York, 1947), p. 55-56.

General Marshall considered the possibility that this was an unusual situation. Later, however, as he continued compiling statistics he came to another conclusion:

"Even allowing for the dead and wounded, the figure did not rise above 12 to 25 per cent of the total for any action. The best showing that could be made by the most spirited and aggressive companies was that one man in four had made at least some use of his fire power."²²

This information concerned a war ten years ago. Have things changed? Either through training, more aggressive leadership, or the characteristics of the Korean action (or more probably a combination of the three), the figure did rise to a maximum of fifty per cent for that campaign. Even in Korea, however, the reluctance of the American infantryman to fire was marked.²³

What causes this strange reluctance of Americans to shoot at an enemy who is trying to kill them? One answer lies in the U.S. culture. From the time the male child is aware of his surroundings he is taught to be gentle and considerate. He is punished for exuberant behavior and told to turn the other cheek. As he grows older he encounters religious prohibitions and legal restrictions to violent action. By the time he is of military age, he is so completely civilized that in the majority of cases he refuses to defend himself against an enemy who is trying to kill him.²⁴ There is no indication that this early conditioning can be altered by military training to improve on the Korean percentage of men who fired.

Unfortunately the enemy doesn't fail to fire. General Marshall says that "In Russia where life is cheap and violent death frequent, the Red soldiers have been reared with far fewer inhibitions against killing."²⁵ This perhaps applies even more to the Chinese Communists.

As much as it may hurt national pride, the facts dictate that to rely upon rifle fire as a major factor in the firepower of the infantry regiment is to rely on a factor that is only 12 to 25 per cent effective normally and only 50 per cent at a maximum.

22. Ibid.

23. Davidson, "Why Half of Our Combat Soldiers Fail to Fire," op. cit., p. 18.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

We have examined in broad terms the major factors which will affect the infantry regiment and what that affect will be. Summarized they are as follows:

1. High level decisions definitely state that the U.S. defense will rest primarily on air power and that it will retain a highly mobile and hard striking force. To the infantry regiment this means that every effort should be made to exploit army aviation for observation, transportation, liaison, and cargo purposes, thus increasing its self-sufficiency, control and mobility.

2. Technological progress - This outstanding characteristic of the United States must be exploited to the fullest to provide the means to counter the enemy's strength and to save our manpower. Every proved method of increasing firepower, mobility, and communications must be accepted and incorporated into the infantry regiment. It must have weapons which are lighter but more lethal, radios with more range and reliability, and increased transportation both automotive and aeronautical.

3. Atomic weapons - Since the atomic capability of the U.S. is so great, its delivery by air is being relied upon as the primary countermeasure against the potential enemy. Because of this and other factors discussed in this monograph the infantry thereby should become a force composed of relatively small, highly mobile units of great striking power.

Tactically also, the atomic bomb means that the infantry must be mobile; in the defense it must deploy for protection against enemy use, in the offense it must move fast to take maximum advantage of friendly use.

4. The world situation plainly indicates our probable enemy - the Communist bloc. Any time, energy and money spent in preparing to

fight any other enemy will weaken the U.S. effort in direct proportion. Therefore it is imperative that the U.S. Infantry be tailored to engage this specific enemy which can out mass it, out man it and over run it. To stand with the Communist line infantry division strength and slug out the war to a decision is to invite national suicide. Overwhelming manpower in infantry, backed up by legions of artillery, is the main strength of the Communist armies.

To fight this enemy, the U.S. Infantry must be ready to move quickly to any part of the globe at any time. It must be highly mobile in order to compensate for enemy mass. To meet this requirement it must be flexible enough to adjust to the hills of Korea, the jungles of Indo-China, or the sandy wastes of Iraq. It must be mobile enough to get to the point of engagement quickly and after an action to move to another danger point. It must have the firepower and mobility to offset the enemy's mass.

5. U.S. Culture - One of the basic principles of the American way of life is the importance of the individual. As a consequence of this, even military action must not sacrifice the soldier if there is any alternative. This fact of life plus the relative physical weakness of the U.S. soldier and the lack of aggressiveness of individual riflemen points toward a greater dependence on crew served weapons of great fire power.

Combined, these factors require that the infantry regiment have more firepower, mobility, and self sufficiency. These of course will necessitate more control measures or communications equipment.

Fortunately, present studies²⁶ are headed in exactly this direction though some are far more radical than others. Although it is desirable, as the President said, to make continuous changes, they must be gradual.

26. Study, U.S. Army Field Forces, November, 1953, "Operation Falcon, Proposed Infantry Regiment".

Study, Headquarters, The Infantry School, Combat Developments Office, November 1953, "Proposed Infantry Organization, Type S".

Study, Headquarters, The Infantry School, Combat Developments Office, November 1953, "Proposed Infantry Organization, Type A".

Study, Headquarters, The Infantry School, Combat Developments Office, November, 1953 "Proposed Infantry Organization, Type C".

Study, Fairchild Aircraft Corp, Amended December 1953, "Triad Infantry Division Based Upon the Transair Weapons System".

According to Admiral Radford "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to radical changes in a hurry because they are militarily undesirable; and from the standpoint of the security of this nation not practical. By radical I mean the dictionary meaning - 'fundamental'."²⁷

In summary, my answer to the question "Are we going too far in streamlining our infantry units?" is a flat, unequivocal NO! Further, it is inconceivable that we could go too far since the instant we stop progressing we start retrogressing. What appears to be a streamlined unit today may tomorrow seem as unwieldy and inefficient as the 1918 regiment is to us now.

In conclusion it might be well to ponder the conversation between the Red Queen and Alice in Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass." The two had been running for some time when Alice noticed that they were still in the same place.

"Why I do believe we've been under this tree the whole time," she said. "In our country you'd get somewhere if you ran very fast for a long time."

"What a slow sort of country," cried the Queen. "Now here it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere, you must run at least twice as fast as that!"

The military planner who thinks he has already streamlined enough should take heed to the President and the Queen.

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27. The New York Times, 15 March 1954, p. 31, col 2.

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Lesson Plan

Title of Lesson: Are We Going Too Far in the Streamlining
Of Our Infantry Units?

ESSENTIAL INFORMATION

Day and Date: _____ Hour: _____
Place : _____ Class: _____
Instructor : Maj. James H. Tate Assistants : _____
Uniform & Equipment: A Faculty
References : Student Monograph Monograph
Advisor: Lt.Col. Keith M. Schmedemann
Training Aids: _____
Rehearsal : _____

LESSON OBJECTIVE: To acquaint the student with changing conditions which affect the infantry regiment and to outline the major factors which must be taken into account in reorganizing or re-equipping the infantry regiment.

LESSON OUTLINE

1. Introduction (3 min)
 - a. North Africa anecdote
 - b. Gen. Lynch quote
 - c. Lesson objective
2. Discussion (14 min)
 - a. Present comparative military might result of armament race stemming from man-versus-man beginning.
 - b. Accouterments of present armies are result of this race. Is this streamlining? Definition: relative increase in killing power, mobility and control of a unit.
 - c. Comparison of these three aspects of 1918, 1944 and 1954 U.S. Infantry regiments.
 - d. By definition. U.S. Infantry has become progressively more streamlined. Enough? Quote President Eisenhower.
 - e. Study reveals five major factors which affect infantry
 - (1) High level decisions -
 - (a) Quote Admiral Radford's definition of the "New Look" and his definition of air power.
 - (b) Secretary Dulles' corroboration
 - (2) Technological progress -
 - (a) Catalyst of war on technological progress (with examples) and irony of military resistance to new ideas.
 - (b) Examples of items in today's regiment in "science-fiction" category.

(c) Examples of new equipment which can and must be made available soon to the regimental commander.

(3) Atomic Weapons

(a) Quote re influence of atomic weapons on warfare

(b) Affects of atomic weapons on infantry offensive and defensive tactics.

(c) H-bomb brings new concept of power.

(4) World Situation

(a) Only enemy in sight is Communist bloc. What are the characteristics of its' infantry?

(b) Manpower strength of the Communist bloc and policy toward expending it.

(c) Geopolitics of Communism forces us to be ready to fight local or total war anywhere and everywhere.

(5) U.S. Culture

(a) Different backgrounds of U.S. and Communist soldiers

(b) Military aspects of this difference

3. Conclusions - What characteristics do these factors dictate? (3 min)

a. High level decisions - ability to move quickly anywhere to counter enemy strongly.

b. Technological progress - full use of inventive and productive capacity of U.S. to exploit our strength, i.e. lighter weapons of greater fire power, more automotive and aeronautical transportability, greater control through better communications facilities.

c. Atomic Weapons - disperse for defense, exploit for offense.

d. World Situation - avoid enemy strength (manpower) and exploit our strength (weapons and machines) by making maximum use of new means.

e. U.S. Culture - U.S. soldiers, being physically weaker, less aggressive, and requiring more creature and psychological comforts, are best with crew served weapons and other machines of death.

4. Summary

a. These characteristics add up to a regiment of total mobility, greatly increased firepower primarily through crew served weapons, and full acceptance of all new technological methods especially in communications.

b. We can never streamline enough. Story of Alice in Wonderland.