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TITLE

Should section headquarters be provided for the 106mm rifle  
and 81mm mortar squads of the weapons platoon of the rifle  
company TOE 7-17T?

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PREFACE

1 September 1957

For editorial assistance in the preparation of this monograph, acknowledgement is given to my wife Loretta.

The present organization of the rifle company (TOE 7-17T), and specifically that of the weapons platoon of the rifle company, has not yet been tested under actual combat conditions. Therefore it is quite apparent that any discussion of the organization, or any proposed changes thereto, must be based on experience gained with other organizations of similiar type and employing similiar weapons, and opinions as to how atomic warfare may affect the tactical employment of the rifle company and it's subordinate units. The author feels that since the last three years of his career have been devoted to the duties of company commander, two years as a rifle company commander and one year as a heavy mortar company commander, that he is qualified in the matters relative to the weapons platoon organization and it's tactical employment.

The point of view expressed in this paper is that of the author- not necessarily that of the United States Infantry School or the United States Army.

*Donald M. Wood*  
DONALD M. WOOD  
Capt            Inf

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to determine whether or not the need exists for a section headquarters for the 106mm recoilless rifle squads and the 81mm mortar squads of the weapons platoon, rifle company TOE 7-17T.

The discussion is divided into four chapters entitled, Organization of the Weapons Platoon of the Rifle Company (ROCID), Tactical Employment of the 81mm Mortar Squads, Tactical Employment of the 106mm Recoilless Rifle Squads, and Practical and Comparative Considerations.

It is felt by the author that a thorough discussion of each of these subjects will point out the factors necessary to resolve the problem posed by the subject of this monograph. In the discussion of the tactical employment of the mortar squads and the antitank squads, it is realized that operations other than the attack and the defense will pose special problems not discussed herein. It is felt that other types of operations are either a form of attack or defense and therefore they were not included.

Because the organization under discussion is new and not yet battle tested, certain difficulties were encountered in conducting the necessary research. Very little reference material, other than opinion material, was available. While this did not pose a serious handicap in the preparation of this monograph it should be noted by the reader that very little factual material pertaining to the subject exists.

The reader's attention is invited to Annexes A,B,C, and D to which reference will be made occasionally throughout the discussion.

## DISCUSSION

### Organization of the Weapons Platoon of the Rifle Company (ROCID)

Is the weapons platoon of the rifle company (ROCID) organized in such a manner as to be consistent with the missions it may be assigned on either the atomic or non-atomic battlefield? Basically this is the question posed by the subject of this monograph. To be more specific, the need for presently non-existent section leaders for the 81mm mortar squads and the 106mm recoilless rifle squads will be investigated. To be able to completely analyze this problem it is necessary that we first be familiar with the organization of the platoon, and secondly, that the assigned missions, or possible missions, are thoroughly understood. The organization of the weapons platoon will be discussed in this chapter and the reader's attention is invited to Annex A - (Organization- Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company, TOE 7-17T)

The weapons platoon has grown up in respect to its firepower capabilities. The section of three 60mm mortar squads, prescribed by the previous organization, has been replaced by the three squads of 81mm Mortars. Therefore the indirect fire capability of the platoon has been increased from a range of approximately 2000 yards to a range of approximately 4000 yards, or about a 100 percent increase. The section of three 57mm recoilless rifle squads, of the previous organization, has been replaced by two squads of 106mm recoilless rifles. While the number of weapons has been decreased by one, the range capability has been increased from approximately 800 yards, maximum effective, to approximately 1200 yards, maximum effective, or about a 50 percent increase. The maximum range has been increased from 4850 yards to 8400 yards. In comparing the two weapons, considerations other than the range capabilities should be made. While the 57mm recoilless rifle was an excellent and accurate weapon against point targets such as bunkers or grouped enemy personnel, it

was not basically considered an antitank weapon. Now with the assignment of the 106mm recoilless rifle to the platoon, the rifle company has truly gained an antitank capability with long range characteristics as compared to it's previous antitank weapon, the 3.5 inch rocket launcher. It is quite apparent that the weapons platoon has matured in respect to it's firepower capability.

Platoon headquarters includes the command group of the platoon, the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, and the messenger. In addition it includes the fire direction personnel for the 81mm mortars, the forward observers, the computers, and the radio telephone operators. The transportation organic to the headquarters includes a 1/4 ton truck with trailer and a 3/4 ton truck with trailer. The 1/4 ton truck provides transportation for the platoon leader and may be used in an ammunition re-supply role when necessary. The 3/4 ton truck and trailer provides ammunition resupply for the 106mm recoilless rifle squads.

A further study of this headquarters organization reveals two points that should be retained for consideration as the discussion is developed. First, ... "the platoon sergeant, in addition to being second in command of the platoon, has a primary responsibility of ammunition supply for the platoon and also the responsibility for supervision of the platoon's transportation." (4:4) This in itself does not appear to be to unusual but it will become quite evident as we progress, that ammunition re-supply, along with communications, poses a problem in itself when considered in view of the present organization. Secondly, the duties of the radio telephone operators are to ... "operate and maintain their radios, in addition, two of the operators operate and maintain the platoon headquarters transportation." (4:4) This fact in particular must be considered because it is quite evident that the two radio operators necessary to operate the two vehicles will not be able to provide communications for the forward observers when they are employed as truck drivers. This lack of communications will seriously affect the efficiency of the mortars in providing their close fire support of the front line or assaulting platoons. It is true that other personnel of the platoon may be trained and used as radio operators, however to do so will cause their assigned tasks

to remain unattended. If the requirement for communications between the forward observers and fire direction computers, and the requirement for ammunition resupply, for which the vehicles to be driven by the radio operators are to be used, were to occur separately instead of concurrently, the dual assignment of tasks might be practical. It is quite evident that these two tasks must occur simultaneously and continuously.

Each of the three 81mm mortar squads are composed of a squad leader, a gunner, two ammunition bearers, and an assistant gunner. Each squad has organically assigned a 3/4 ton truck and trailer to be used for a carrier and for ammunition resupply. One of the ammunition bearers is the assigned driver of the vehicle and will undoubtedly be away from the squad most of the time, either under the control of the weapons platoon sergeant who is responsible for the ammunition resupply for the platoon, or the company supply sergeant who is concerned with ammunition resupply for the company as a whole. The fact that this man <sup>may</sup> be absent is not in itself a problem to the squad leader since the driver and the vehicle are performing their assigned mission, that of ammunition resupply. When it is considered in the light that an additional man may be absent from the squad as a replacement for the forward observer's radio operator, the situation does become more serious. One additional drain on the squad's strength is also capable of existing. ... "When the squads are operating from a central firing position, the platoon leader may direct the senior squad leader to exercise command supervision over the squads." (4:70) This situation will be most common since the employment of the mortars, in order to provide flexibility and massed fires, will normally be utilized in a general support role.

The two antitank squads are each composed of a squad leader, a gunner, a loader, and a light truck driver. The squads have organically assigned a 1/4 ton truck as the 106mm recoilless rifle carrier and to provide transportation and mobility to the squad. The vehicle also carries six rounds of ammunition for the 106mm recoilless rifle. The ammunition resupply for each squad is provided by the 3/4 ton truck and trailer organic to platoon headquarters. A lack of personnel and the assignment of additional tasks, not in keeping with primary duties,

should be mentioned at this point. It is visualized by Training Text 7-10-2, that in the resupply of ammunition to the antitank squads,... "the antitank squad leader and the truck driver will carry ammunition from the vehicle to the gun position." (4:69) It is felt by the author that the squad leader will normally be far too busy to be employed as an ammunition bearer.

The problems of the antitank squad leader in regards to organization, are much less than the mortar squad leader's since the members of the squad are not assigned additional duties within the platoon and will normally be present with the squad. It is anticipated however, that like the mortar squads, ... "when the squads are located near each other, the platoon leader may direct the senior squad leader to exercise command supervision over both squads." (4:68) Basically this is providing a section leader for the antitank squads under these circumstances. It is the opinion of the author that the mission of the squads will cause them to normally be separated in order to provide maximum antitank protection to the complete company over an increased frontage. When this situation occurs it will not be necessary to assign a squad leader the additional duty of command supervision, however the platoon sergeant will still be concerned with ammunition resupply to both squads. From the platoon sergeant's point of view, this might prove time consuming if the squads are widely separated.

This discussion of the organization of the weapons platoon has indicated several factors, or opinions, which should be considered in determining the need for section leaders for the mortar and antitank squads of the platoon. They are the decrease in communications capability if the forward observer's radio operator is required to drive a vehicle used primarily for ammunition resupply and separated by space from the forward observer, increased problems of the mortar squad leader caused by the assignment, or possible assignment, of additional duties to members of his squad as well as himself, the requirement for supervision and personal activity in the ammunition resupply of both the mortar and antitank squads by the platoon sergeant, and the assignment of additional tasks not associated with the primary assigned tasks.

### Tactical Employment of the 81mm Mortar Squads

The discussion of the 81mm mortar squads in their tactical role will be generally broken down into the two basic types of operations, the attack and the defense. Each of these will be discussed in the light of the mission, communications, transportation, ammunition supply, and span of control.

"The mission of the 81mm mortar squads during the attack is to furnish close and continuous fire support to the attacking rifle platoons." (4:67) During the attack, when possible, the three squads of 81mm mortars will be employed together so as to provide flexibility and the ability to mass fires quickly where and when needed. This type of employment increases the need for centralized control since the squads are operating in close proximity to each other with like missions. According to the present doctrine it is visualized that ... "the weapons platoon leader will normally be located near the fire direction center and the 81mm mortar positions to insure maximum fire support for the attacking rifle platoons." (4:68) If this will always be the case, the need for a section leader is decreased since the platoon leader can effectively control the three squads and the fire direction center. It has been noted during the author's experience as a rifle company commander that the weapons platoon leader cannot pin down his battle station in the attack to one particular locality. He has many duties that require his presence at several different locations. The antitank squads with a different, yet just as important, mission as the mortar squads, require supervision and assistance. The need for reconnaissance of the new firing positions, the control of the displacement of the mortar squads and the antitank squads, and the requirement for advice and recommendations to the company commander, are all factors which deny to the platoon leader the ability to remain at the mortar firing position. There are two solutions to this problem of control in the platoon leader's absence, however both have their disadvantages. First it may be necessary to require the platoon sergeant to remain at the mortar firing location to control the firing, or secondly, the senior squad leader may be designated to exercise control of all three squads in the execution of their

mission. It would appear from the discussion of the platoon sergeant's many duties, in the previous chapter, that if he is concerned with ammunition resupply to the extent that he must do more than just supervise, as well as controlling the platoon's transportation and acting as second in command of the platoon, he will have very little time to devote to the control of the 81mm mortar squads when employed together in general support. Training Text 7-10-2 states in regards to ammunition resupply for the mortar squads by the platoon sergeant that, ... "when he is occupied with ammunition supply for the antitank squads, he temporarily delegates this duty to the senior mortar squad leader."

(4:71) If the senior squad leader is assigned the duties of controlling the three mortar squads in the execution of their firing, as well as the fire control personnel, and the ammunition resupply for the mortar squads, he will be unable to devote himself to his squad for which he is responsible. This becomes a chain reaction since it requires a doubling up of the duties within his squad, thereby distracting from the primary duty of each individual member of the squad. From this discussion it appears that an additional person acting in the capacity of section leader for the mortar squads would enhance the indirect fire capability of the weapons platoon during the attack.

A communications problem may exist between the forward observers and the fire direction element of the platoon headquarters if the need exists for a forward observer with more than one of the attacking rifle platoons as it usually will. This problem was mentioned earlier and should be reiterated at this point. The problem is based on the fact that two of the radio operators of the forward observer parties are also designated as light truck drivers and are concerned with ammunition resupply. The author grants that it is possible for the forward observer to carry all of his equipment as well as the communications equipment, both wire and radio, (Annex B), and still be able to perform his primary mission of observing. It is felt that if this situation exists, the efficiency of the forward observer would be greatly decreased. Should the situation be such that only one forward observer is required with the attacking platoons then the problem is practically eliminated. The normal tactical

employment of the rifle company in the attack will require at least two observers be present with the attacking platoons since usually a minimum of two platoons are committed in the attack.

When, because of the company's mission or the terrain, it is determined by the company commander and the weapons platoon leader that the most desirable method of employment for the 81mm mortar squads is attachment, the problem of control and ammunition resupply is eliminated considerably as it affects the weapons platoon. Again it should be noted however that ... "when possible, the squads are employed in general support of the company and fire from one centrally located position area with one fire direction center." (4:70)

Displacement of the mortar squads during the attack is accomplished under the direction of the weapons platoon leader who normally will accompany them to their new firing positions. This is certainly an operation that the weapons platoon leader is vitally concerned with, but due to his many commitments, previously mentioned, he will at times be unable to physically accompany the displacing element. When this situation occurs, the control of the displacement will become the responsibility of the platoon sergeant or the senior squad leader. The author visualizes the control of the displacement being accomplished by the senior squad leader with the location of the firing positions being indicated by the platoon leader either on the ground or by map.

The mission of the 81mm mortar squads in the defense is ... "to provide close and continuous fire support to the rifle company." (4:141) The mortar squads will normally be employed in general support of the company from one central location. It is the opinion of the author that in the defense the difficulties of control, ammunition resupply, and communications will not pose as great a problem as they did in the attack due to the very nature of the operation. The defense is usually more stable than the offense and the various installations tend to become more permanent.

When the front line company is responsible for a portion of the combat outpost line, it will be common for the company commander to place at least one 81mm mortar squad with his garrison on the combat outpost

line. It is anticipated that this will normally be done by attachment. The responsibility for ammunition resupply to this squad is removed from the weapons platoon, although they are still concerned with the problem, and assumed by the platoon to which the mortar squad is attached. This eliminates a portion of the platoon sergeant's duties as they apply to ammunition resupply. The remaining two squads will be employed in close proximity to each other and will require a certain amount of control. Once the company's battle position is organized it is possible for the platoon leader to spend more of his time at the firing positions than was possible in the offense.

Communications, as it is affected by the dual missions of the radio operators of the platoon headquarters, still exists in the defense but may be more easily solved than in the attack situation due to the ability of the platoon leader to free certain personnel from their assigned tasks to assist with ammunition resupply.

In summing up the employment of the 81mm mortars in offensive and defensive missions, certain conclusions may be formed which in respect to the subject of this monograph become quite applicable. It is quite evident that the offensive situation poses the greatest number of problems, or at least to a greater degree, than in the defensive situation. These problems are, the lack of personnel to accomplish certain tasks and therefore requiring an unpractical assignment of additional duties, the communications difficulties that exist when the problem of ammunition resupply and the need for accurate and timely observation of indirect fire are in conflict, and the many requirements imposed upon the platoon leader which will tend to decrease his ability to effectively control his platoon. It is therefore felt by the author that the defensive situation requires an additional person to provide the necessary and continuous control of the mortar squads, and to anticipate and insure their logistical support. This requirement is not so predominate in the defense and the present organization will work as it applies to the mortar squads of the weapons platoon. The complete conclusion in respect to the tactical employment of the mortar squads, as it applies to the subject of this monograph, is that a section leader for the mortar squads is necessary.

### Tactical Employment of the Antitank Squads

The discussion of the antitank squads of the weapons platoon, as in the previous discussion of the 81mm mortars, will be broken down into the two basic types of operations, the defense and the attack. These two types of operations will be discussed separately in the light of the mission, control, communications, and ammunition resupply.

"The primary mission of the antitank squads in the defense is to provide antitank protection for the company." (4:141) Under the present concept for employment of the rifle company in the defense, it will be normal to assign a wide battle area to the company. ... "This frontage may range from 1000 yards, when the rifle company is in a position defense in close terrain, to as much as 3000 yards, when the rifle company is performing a delaying type mission in conjunction with the battle group's defense in open terrain." (4:112) This increased frontage may cause the two antitank squads to be widely separated in order to adequately cover the most dangerous armored approaches into the company's battle area. A situation of this nature may require the antitank squads to become attached to the front line platoons for operational control. Normally the two antitank squads will be employed in general support of the company in order to provide the maximum amount of flexibility to the company's antitank defenses. It may become necessary to place one or both of the 106mm recoilless rifles on the combat outpost line when the company is required to maintain a portion of the line. With the combined arms capability of the battle group and the division, it will not be uncommon for a platoon of tanks, or the assault gun platoon, organic to the battle group, to be attached to the rifle company in the conduct of the defense. This provides antitank defense in depth for the company and may allow for the employment of the two antitank squads together rather than widely separated.

The employment of the two antitank squads discussed in respect to communications indicates that a problem of control is not present as it was with the 81mm mortar squads. Each of the squads possesses a radio, AN/PRC-6, (Annex B), which is included in the company command net. This allows the company commander, the weapons platoon leader, or even the

rifle platoon to which the squad may be attached, to effectively control the squad remotely. In addition to the radio, the squads each have a telephone, TA-1/TT, (Annex B), for communications with the remainder of the company through the weapons platoon switchboard. The only possible limitation in respect to communications in the defense would be the operating range of the radio, AN/PRC-6, ... "which is only one mile."

(3:5) Since the defense is usually more stable than the offense, wire is normally the predominate means of communication, backed up by radio.

The problem of control is also decreased due to the fact that members of the antitank squads are not normally assigned additional tasks within the platoon which will distract from their primary mission.

Ammunition resupply for the antitank squads during the defense has been mentioned previously. It presents no real problem because of the mobility of the antitank squads. Each 1/4 ton truck, in addition to being the weapons carrier for the 106mm recoilless rifle, also carries six rounds of ammunition. Additional ammunition is provided by the 3/4 ton truck from the platoon headquarters. If the two squads are employed together covering the same armored approach, the senior squad leader may be designated to maintain control and, in conjunction with the platoon sergeant, insure that the ammunition resupply is accomplished.

It is the opinion of the author that the employment of the antitank squads in the defense does not present sufficient reasons for the addition of a section leader. The squads are capable of operating independently as long as they are logistically supported and can communicate.

The employment of the antitank squads during the attack poses more problems in regards to control and ammunition resupply than was true in the defense. This is due to the fact that the defense is usually stable while the offense is normally quite fluid.

During the attack ... "The primary mission of the antitank squads is to provide antitank protection for the company. The squads have a secondary mission of providing close fire support to the attacking rifle platoons." (4:67)

In order to accomplish the mission, the antitank squads are normally employed in general support so that antitank protection for the entire

company is insured. As in the defense, it may become necessary to attach the squads to the attacking rifle platoons due to the situation or the terrain.

Communications present more of a problem in respect to control during the attack than it did during the defense. Because the attack is fluid, the primary means of communication is radio. With an operating range of one mile, the radio, AN/PRC-6, may not provide the necessary communications to the antitank squads to insure their control. Wire may be used in the attack but cannot always be depended upon in a fast moving operation. Because of this situation, the author is of the opinion that the platoon leader or platoon sergeant may have to directly control the squads. This means that the other tasks such as ammunition resupply and control of the 81mm mortar squads may be neglected to some extent.

Displacement of the antitank squads during the attack does not present a great problem of control as long as sufficient communications are available. Reconnaissance for the new firing positions is normally accomplished by the platoon leader but the supervision of the displacement can be effectively controlled by the squad leaders.

Ammunition resupply during the attack is more difficult, but is normally accomplished in the same manner as in the defense. The squad leader with sufficient communications can insure the resupply of ammunition, although it will cause the platoon sergeant to be absent from platoon headquarters and the mortar firing positions, since he normally takes an active part in the ammunition resupply of the antitank squads.

It is the opinion of the author that the problem of control during the attack is hinged on the communications available. The addition of a section leader for the antitank squads in the attack is not necessary since it is possible to eliminate the problem by the replacement of the present radio with a radio of increased operating range.

In summary, the discussion of the antitank squads in both the defense and the attack brings to light certain facts for consideration. The antitank squads are usually in general support and may be employed separately across the company's front or zone of action. This separation does not cause substantial problems in respect to control. The

antitank squad leaders are capable of controlling their squads and accomplishing their mission as long as adequate communications are available. The problem of communications is greater in the offense than in the defense. Ammunition resupply is not a problem to the squad leader, but does cause the platoon sergeant to be absent from his other assigned tasks. The employment of the antitank squads when considered in view of these facts indicates that a section leader is not necessary for the antitank squads providing adequate communications are available.

#### Practical and Comparative Considerations

So far in this discussion a study has been made of the organization of the present weapons platoon and the tactical employment of the platoon's organic squads. The 81mm mortar and 106mm recoilless rifle squads have been evaluated in respect to their mission, control, communications, and ammunition resupply. Final conclusions could be made at this time, pertaining to the need for section leaders in the weapons platoon, however it is the author's desire that certain other aspects which are applicable to the problem be considered.

With the exception of the actual organization of the weapons platoon, which is fact and does exist, everything so far in this discussion is based upon opinion. This is true because very little information is available at this time pertaining to the operation of this platoon under combat conditions. Also in order to widen the picture slightly, a comparison should be made with other organizations employing similar weapons.

On 1 February 1957, the 35th Infantry Regiment, garrisoned at Schofield Barracks, T.H., was ordered to reorganize, in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Division's reorganization, under the ROCID concept. The author, at that time assigned to the 35th Infantry, was able to observe the reorganization and visualize the critical points in the organization where problems might develop when the new battle group was tested in the field under combat conditions. One of these critical points, visualized by most of the rifle company commanders, was in fact, the very question posed by this monograph. Does a need exist for section leaders for the

81mm mortar and 106mm recoilless rifle squads of the ROCID rifle company?

Late in April 1957, after the author's return to the United States, the 1st Battle Group, 35th Infantry, departed for the Pohakuloa Training Area, high in the mountains on the island of Hawaii. Their mission was to shake down and test the new organization under simulated combat conditions and as a result provide recommendations for any structural changes in the organization that were deemed necessary.

The letter which was received by the author from Major Raymond H. Ross, S-3 of the first Battle Group, 35th Infantry, (2:1, Annex C), was in reply to questions pertaining to problems which developed during the field testing of the 1st Battle Group, 35th Infantry.

Major Ross's letter seems to bear out the sub-conclusions pointed out in the discussion so far. The shake down of the new organization determined the need for a section headquarters for the 81mm mortars. As stated by Major Ross in his letter, "...the platoon sergeant has many duties away from the mortars which keep him occupied. Attempts were made to utilize the senior squad leader to supervise the three squads but it was found that his normal duties were too extensive to permit the dual role." (2:1) Based on these factors, the 35th Infantry established a section headquarters for the three 81mm mortar squads.

The need was not found for a section leader for the antitank squads. The 106mm recoilless rifles were normally positioned by the platoon leader, as was indicated in previous discussion, and the actual supervision of the squads in the accomplishment of their mission was handled by the squad leader in a satisfactory manner.

One other point was brought out by Major Ross in respect to the organization, which has not yet been discussed. "...By creating the new section leader's position, a more complete chain of command was established to provide experience for the responsibilities of the platoon sergeant's job should a vacancy exist." (2:1) The possible objection to this theory would be the lack of opportunity for the antitank squad leader to progress through the chain of command to the platoon sergeant's job under normal conditions.

Another aspect to be considered before a conclusion can be made

regarding the need for section leaders, is a comparison with organizations utilizing weapons similiar to those in the present weapons platoon.


The weapons platoon of the rifle company organic to the airborne division's battle group is organized under the ROTAD concept. This platoon, with exactly the same mission and weapons as the weapons platoon of the ROCID rifle company, was organized with section leaders. The author is unable to produce any evidence which might explain the reasoning behind the conflicting organizations. With the exception of the delivery means to the battle field, the two platoons are employed in an identical manner under all tactical operations.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is the opinion of the author, that a section leader should be provided for the three 81mm mortar squads. It is further concluded that a section leader is not required for the two antitank squads of the weapons platoon.

The author has included for consideration a proposed organization for the weapons platoon of the ROCID rifle company. (Annex D) The addition of certain personnel and equipment is felt to be advisable even when considered in view of economy impositions that must exist in a peacetime army.

ANNEX A - (Organization - Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company, TOE 7-17T)  
(1:3A)



PERSONNEL

1 Lt Plat Ldr  
1 MSgt Plat Sgt  
3 Sgt Fwd Obsr  
3 Sp2 FD Compt  
1 Pfc Msgr  
4 Pfc Rad Tp Op \*

TRANSPORTATION

1 Trk Cargo 3/4-T  
1 Trk Util 1/4-T  
1 Tlr Cargo 3/4-T  
1 Tlr Cargo 1/4-T

COMMUNICATIONS

4 Radio AN/PRC 10  
1 Radio AN/PRC 6  
1 Swbd SB 18/GT  
5 Telephone TA-1/TT  
1 Reel Equip CE-11

WEAPONS

1 Cbn Cal .30  
1 GL  
2 RL 3.5-in  
12 Rifle US Cal .30

PERSONNEL (Sqd)

1 Sgt Sqd Ldr  
1 Sp3 Gnr  
2 Pfc Ammo Bear \*\*  
1 Pfc Asst Gnr

TRANSPORTATION (Sqd)

1 Trk Cargo 3/4-T  
1 Tlr Cargo 3/4-T

COMMUNICATIONS (Sqd)

1 Telephone TA-1/TT

WEAPONS (Sqd)

1 Mort 81mm w/mount  
2 Pist Auto Cal .45  
3 Rifle US Cal .30

PERSONNEL (Sqd)

1 Sgt Sqd Ldr  
1 Sp3 Gnr  
1 Pfc Loader  
1 Pfc Lt Trk Dvr

TRANSPORTATION (Sqd)

1 Trk Util 1/4-T

COMMUNICATIONS (Sqd)


1 Radio AN/PRC 6  
1 Telephone TA-1/TT

WEAPONS (Sqd)

2 Pist Auto Cal .45  
1 Rifle 106mm  
w/mount  
2 Rifle US Cal .30

\* 2 EM also Lt Trk Driver  
\*\* 1 EM also Lt Trk Driver

ANNEX B - (Weapons Platoon - Radio Net and Wire System)  
 (3:56,57)



KEY

-  Radio AN/PRC 10
-  Radio AN/PRC 6
-  Telephone TA-1/TT
-  Reel Equip CE-11

ANNEX C - ( Letter by - Maj Raymond H. Ross, S-3, 1st Battle Group, 35 Inf)

(2:1)

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTLE GROUP  
35TH INFANTRY (THE CACTI)  
APO 25


3 September 1957

"Is there a need for a section headquarters for the 81mm mortars and the 106mm recoilless rifles within the weapons platoon of the ROCID Rifle Company?"


Since reorganization we have created a section headquarters for the 81mm mortar section but not for the 106mm recoilless rifle section. The platoon Sgt has many duties (away from the tubes) which keep him occupied. Since close supervision is needed, attempts were made to have the ranking squad leader assume these duties but it was found that his normal duties were too demanding to permit a dual role.

By creating this job, it gives a senior NCO the experience and practice to move into the platoon Sgt's slot when rotation or discharge creates a vacancy.

In our training and field exercises the 106's normally are positioned by the platoon leader (or platoon sergeant) and the two guns are directly supervised by the senior squad leader. No section leader is deemed necessary.

  
RAYMOND H. ROSS  
Major, Infantry  
S-3

ANNEX D - (Proposed Organization - Weapons Platoon, Rifle Company, TOE 7-17T)



PLAT HQ	81mm MORT SECTION		AT SQUAD (2)
	SECT HQ	MORT SQUAD (3)	
<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
1 Lt Flat Ldr 1 MSgt Plat Sgt 1 Pfc Msgr * 1 Pfc Rad Tp Op	1 SFC Sect Ldr 3 Sgt Fwd Obsr 3 Sp2 Fd Compt 4 Pfc Rad Tp Op 1 Pfc Lt Trk Dvr	1 Sgt Sqd Ldr 1 Sp3 Gnr 2 Pfc Ammo Br # 1 Pfc Asst Gnr	1 Sgt Sqd Ldr 1 Sp3 Gnr 1 Pfc Loader 1 Pfc Lt Trk Dvr
<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Transportation</u>	<u>Transportation</u>
1 Trk Util 1/4T 1 Trlr Cargo 1/4T	1 Trk Cargo 3/4 1 Trlr Cargo 3/4	1 Trk Cargo 3/4 1 Trlr Cargo 3/4	1 Trk Util 1/4T
<u>Communications</u>	<u>Communications</u>	<u>Communications</u>	<u>Communications</u>
1 Rad AN/PRC 10 1 Swbd SB 18/GT 2 Tel TA-1/TT	4 Rad AN/PRC 10 1 Tel TA-1/TT 3 RL Equip CE-11	1 Tel TA-1/TT	1 Rad AN/PRC 10 1 Tel TA-1/TT
<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Weapons</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
1 Pist Auto Cal .45 2 Cbn Cal .30 1 Rifle US Cal .30 1 GL	3 Pist Auto .45 3 Cbn Cal .30 6 Rifle US .30 1 GL 1 RL 3.5in	1 Mort 81mm 2 Pist Auto .45 3 Rifle US .30	2 Pist Auto Cal .45 1 Rifle 106mm Recoilless 2 Rifle US Cal .30
* Also Lt Trk Dvr # Also Lt Trk Dvr			

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