

# MONOGRAPH

## Operations Other than War "Patrolling During Operation Uphold Democracy"

Bravo Company,  
3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry  
22 September 94 to 11 November  
94

CPT Michael Dane Acord  
IOAC 2-97  
Seminar 2  
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During Operation Uphold Democracy, Bravo Company 3-14<sup>th</sup> Infantry, conducted missions in Port Au Prince, Haiti, to provide a safe and secure environment for the Haitian people. I was the platoon leader for 2<sup>nd</sup> platoon, Bravo Company. On September 28, 1994, my platoon conducted a security patrol that is an excellent vehicle for disseminating lessons learned.

Haiti is 750 miles from Miami, Florida, and approximately 50 miles from Cuba. It shares the island of Hispanola with the Dominican Republic. Haiti occupies a land mass of approximately 10,714 square miles of extremely mountainous terrain. In relation to the United States, it is about the size of Maryland. Haiti has an average high temperature of 91 and an average low temperature of 80. The country has prevailing easterly winds that contribute to its frequent thunderstorms. In 1994, there were about 6.5 million people in Haiti. Ninety-five percent of the population was black, with 5% Mulatto or white. The official language is French; however, most people speak Creole. Eighty percent of the population practices Roman Catholicism, although Voodoo (African beliefs mixed with rituals of Catholicism) is widespread. The literacy rate is only 23%. Most of the population lives on less than \$100 per year, and unemployment reaches 68%. The upper class (Haiti elite and rich) makes up 4.5% of the population, and the rest is the lower class (there is only a small middle class). Massive ecological damage characterizes rural Haiti. Deforestation, due to cutting firewood and farming, has

contributed to massive erosion. This erosion has damaged farmland, water resources, and the fishing industry.<sup>1</sup>

Bravo Company operated almost exclusively in the city of Port au Prince. The terrain in an urban environment is challenging; however, the most prevalent existing obstacle we faced in the city was the crowds. In a short period of time, hundreds of people could form, providing a formidable barrier against movement. The shanty towns throughout Port Au Prince were also obstacles because of the restricted access and movement through them. Avenues of approach were numerous. The only restrictive avenues of approach were in the shanty towns, where the roads and alleys were typically not on the map nor did they exceed four feet in width. Most of the city's roads were damaged, which made vehicle movements difficult and maintenance intensive. Key terrain in the city was the major government installations. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division occupied all major government buildings, which included the National Parliament Building; the Ministry of Interior, Defense, and Finance; the National Palace; the International Airport; and other buildings. Observation and fields of fire were restricted by the density of the city. From the roof of the Parliament building, fields of fire were out to 350 meters. However, during patrols observation was restricted to about 100-150 meters. Cover and concealment was limited. Although the buildings were of mass construction, they were not sound. Typically, the cement was of poor quality.

However, the major threat was small arms, so most buildings did offer some degree of protection. On the streets, out cropping, from buildings and debris (not rubble), offered some cover and concealment.

The history of Haiti definitely provided road signs to our impending invasion and operation. Almost 500 years of unrest culminated in American military forces intervention in Haiti. In 1791, over 500,000 slaves revolted against France. After and 11 year conflict, Haiti won its independence. In 1821, Haiti conducted offensive operations in the Dominican Republic only to be defeated in 1844. This defeat resulted in 78 years of unrest and instability. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson ordered a Marine Expeditionary Force to "restore stability" in Haiti. Its mission was to restore order, strengthen the government, and build the infrastructure. In 1934, U.S. forces withdrew. Francois Duvalier assumed power in 1945 and proclaimed himself "President for Life." He and his son ruled for 41 years, and after blatant misuse of power, the Haitian Army revolted. A constitution was implemented in 1987, and democracy was born (see Appendix C).<sup>2</sup>

Haiti held its first Democratic elections in October 1990. However, many Haitians did not easily accept this bold move for democracy. The military, which normally swayed the balance of power political power, was now on the decline. Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected president by 67% of the vote. His first act as president was to "retire" several Army generals who threatened

his power. Although he promoted Colonel Raoul Cedras to Chief of Staff, Cedras led a revolt that ousted Aristide on September 30, 1991.

On October 2, 1991, the United Nations (UN) demanded the reinstatement of the legitimate government. On October 25, 1991, the UN imposed sanctions against Haiti, but its efforts did not influence the return of Aristide or the growing reports of human rights violations. On April 20, 1993, the UN sent civilian monitors to observe and report the state of the nation. After the UN monitors submitted their official report on human rights violations, the UN imposed an Oil and Arms embargo on Haiti effective June 23, 1993. LTG Cedras initiated talks with Aristide. They adopted the Governor's Island Agreement on July 3, 1993, which called for the return of the legitimate government. However, Paramilitary organizations prevented UN military forces from landing in Haiti (part of the agreement) which nullified the agreement. On July 11, 1994, Haiti military officials ejected the UN monitors. On July 31, 1994, the UN authorized "all necessary means" to restore the legitimate government. As a final diplomatic effort, on September 17, 1994, the U.S. sent a diplomatic team to persuade the Military Junta to step down. Cedras stepped down only after he was granted amnesty. On September 19, 1994, U.S. forces landed in Port Au Prince (see Appendix D).<sup>3</sup>

Our antagonists were the Haitian military, or FAD'H; the Front for Revolutionary Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH); and various attaches (paramilitary organizations in support of the military junta).<sup>4</sup> The FAD'H to offered little resistance. However, most soldiers were hesitant to give up their arms because fear of retribution from the populace, so US forces used the FAD'H in the transition as the police force. Once FAD'H disbanded, some of the soldiers went to work in the interim police force (NATO formed and trained), but the people never trusted the FAD'H because it reminded them of past afflictions.

The FRAPH and attaches were our major threat. They were an anti-Aristide and militant guerrilla force. They would appear, then disappear rapidly into the crowd. They were armed and had a system of communication. They had leadership and motivation. We expected the FRAPH and attaches to disrupt our attempts at restoring democracy. They continued their reign of terror through the first few weeks of our occupation, but limited operations as the deployment progressed. The populace gravely feared these groups. As a result, at night, the streets were mostly deserted although nearly 1.2 million people lived in the city.

In early August, the Division alerted 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 14<sup>th</sup> Infantry, for Haiti. Considering the lessons learned from Somalia, we conducted extensive training prior to deployment. We conducted training exercises on checkpoint/roadblock operations, defense of a static site, civil disturbance, and live fire raid

which integrated AC-130 and cobra gunships (used extensively in Somalia). We conducted country briefings, training down to soldier levels on customs and courtesies, and civil affairs training. We packed our bags and loaded our equipment into Sea-Land containers and waited for our flow into Haiti. We waited for the word to go for about two weeks. During this time, I conducted platoon training (I had a composite platoon!). Until former President Carter reached a peace agreement with Cedras, this was a combat insertion, so I had the full focus of the soldiers. On September 19, 1994, we received our movement orders, issued our operations orders and departed for Port Au Prince. In a matter of days, the United Nations (mostly U.S.-10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division) had staged approximately 20,000 troops in Haiti.

The 10th Mountain's purpose was to protect key facilities and restore civil order. We occupied various key installations across Port Au Prince. The center of gravity was for the operation was the Port Au Prince International Airfield, but battalions also occupied the Port, the Light Industrial Complex, and Bowen Army Airfield in City Soleil. My battalion, Task Force Strike, arrived in Haiti on September 22, 1994. TF Strike's mission was to stand up as the Task Force Reserve and, on order, conduct contingency operations in Port Au Prince to establish a stable environment.

Our first company mission as the TF Reserve was to defend the National Parliament Building to protect the upcoming session of the legitimate General Assembly. This would allow TF Mountain to

prevent the obstruction of the democratic process. This was the first session of the legitimate government since Aristide was ousted. Its success would facilitate the quick return of democracy and our exodus. During this operation, security patrols were essential to protection of the company's position.

On September 28, 1994, I received the missions to conduct security patrols to protect the Parliament from FRAPH and attaches intervening in Parliamentary procedures. To accomplish this mission, each squad carried the following equipment: one M60 Machine Gun, two Squad Automatic Weapons (SAW), and two M203 Grenade Launchers. For navigation each squad carried an AN/PSN 11 Global Positioning System (PLUGGER). For communications, each squad and the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant carried an AP/PRC 126 Squad Radio. The headquarters element had 2 AN/PRC 119 (SINGARS).

At 1300, I issued a hasty OORDER. My plan was to have two squads negotiate the route using traveling overwatch, and one squad remain in reserve at the Parliament building with the company commander. We were to travel along a designated route and report "suspicious" activity. I exited the wire at 1400. At Checkpoint 2, I lost communications with the trail squad. The distance from my location to the Parliament building was less than 300 meters (Figure 1). I halted the patrol, and after several failed attempts on the squad radio, I contacted the company RTO via SINGARS. I relayed the message to move to the

trail squad. Apparently, the squad leader had left his PLUGGER in his ruck and had returned to retrieve it. After about five minutes he returned and moved.




Figure 1. Communications lost.

Eventually, the trail squad was in sight. I instructed the squad leader on the radio to follow us along the route at the current interval. As I reached check Checkpoint 3, the platoon was executing the mission smoothly. I proceeded north to Checkpoint 4, but the trail squads continued east off the designated route (Figure 2). Just beyond Checkpoint 4, the lead squad encountered an MP platoon conducting a cordon and search of a suspected FRAPH house only 100 meters from our defense.




Figure 2. Bungle with MP Platoon and initial separation.

I relayed this information, and neither the company commander nor the battalion commander was aware of the operation. I immediately located the MP platoon leader, informed him of by status, and asked him if I could assist in any way. At his request, I detached one squad to provide local security for his more vulnerable mounted soldiers.

The trail squad had not reached Checkpoint 4. When I had turned north, I had lost visual contact with it. Now, 5-7 minutes had passed, and it had not linked up with me yet. I tried the squad radio, but there was no response. My RTO tried the SINCGARS, but there was too much interference. The squad had

turned south and was now rapidly moving away from our location (Figure 3).




Figure 3. Communication Lost.

After about 15 minutes, the MP platoon departed. We moved east out of the crowd to checkpoints 5 which was a prominent intersection along the route (Figure 4). I contacted the commander about the lost squad.




Figure 4. Growing Separation.

The commander moved the CP to the highest point in the building. There, he was able to communicate with the lost squad via SINCGARS to the FO's RTO. My platoon sergeant had assumed control of the squad and was attempting to contact me. He halted at the intersection of Rue de Chareron and J. J. Desalines. I relayed through the commander for the lost squad to move north on J.J. Desalines until he met us. After what seemed like an eternity, the lost patrol linked (Figure 5) up with us and we completed the patrol together. The entire movement of two kilometers took almost two hours.




Figure 5. Platoon Linkup.

Our action was not decisive to the battalion's mission. It had little known effect on enemy operations. The action that day was brief and almost insignificant to the return of the legitimate government. However brief, it did provide our platoon with some valuable lessons for conducting operations in urban terrain and low intensity conflict. Those lessons learned were significant because they set the conditions for success for future, more difficult operations.

The most effective collection medium in Operations other the War is the dismounted infantry patrol. On this patrol, we had few information requirements. Without information requirements, we patrolled with little or no direction. Soon the Battalion Intelligence Officer (S2) developed Specific Orders of Request<sup>5</sup>

(see Appendix B) to shape our collection efforts. After patrols, we would debrief an intelligence analyst, and he would update an overlay which represented our area of operation. During patrols, remembering important information was challenging. I carried a small tape recorder to capture information as my squad leaders relayed it to me. This captured information greatly assisted debriefing. Later, I used aerial photography. It was an excellent source of information on the terrain along my routes.

I stopped frequently during patrols and had my interpreter talk with the local populace. They were an excellent source of information, and communication built unity with the Haitians in our area of operation. Having an understanding of the culture increased our effectiveness. Haitians were extremely emotional and dramatic. Often, they would excite troops by exaggerated stories of enemy activity. Also, they would hold demonstrations frequently. Having an understanding of their culture prevented "chasing" every enemy pointed out by citizens. I always had my interpreter monitor demonstrations. As long as the displays of emotion were peaceful, I continued normal operations.

Navigation in an urban environment is challenging. Our maps (1/12,500 Port Au Prince) were fairly accurate, but they had some problems. Street signs were grossly inaccurate. Small alleys and trails were often confused as main roads, and new buildings had been erected since the maps were produced, which disoriented users. Solid land navigation is essential when working in MOUT

(especially in underdeveloped nations). I used azimuth and pace as my primary method of navigation. We disseminated the route down to team leader level, and I had each squad navigate independently. The PLUGGER Global Positioning System (GPS) was an excellent aid in navigation. However, any system that battery consumption and weather affects should never be used as a primary means of navigation.

Soldier's load and endurance challenged us daily. We carried a basic load of ammunition in our load bearing equipment (LBE) and wore Flack vests. We also carried assault packs that held our sensitive items, water, and additional equipment. The weight of the equipment was 60-70 pounds. The weight and extreme heat quickly fatigued soldiers. To prepare for this, during the two weeks prior to air flow, we focused our physical fitness program on mental toughness (road marches, long runs, etc.) and we wore our flack vests. This gave us the necessary stamina to endure the extreme change in weather and weight of combat equipment. We also drank six to eight quarts of water daily and ate properly.

Crowds were a significant obstacle while patrolling. During one operation, we had crowds of people in the alleys with us and on the roofs around us. This instance, I evaded crowds by avoiding unnecessary stops. We did not give time for crowds to form to handicap our ability to acquire and engage targets. By learning the basic phrases, we were able to manipulate the crowd

with or without our interpreter. People generally responded better when we spoke in Creole.

During my first patrol, I did not use my fire support assets. Although indirect fires were not available while in Port au Prince, other fire support assets were available. The aviation scout weapons team was a great asset to have support our missions. During a subsequent operation, it maneuvered to the objective and provided up-to-the-minute information on "enemy" activity. A scout weapons team in Haiti consisted of one OH-58 Alpha and a Cobra gun ship. Our forward observer was able to talk directly to the team. Its presence provided peace of mind and deterred the enemy. The AC-130 gunship was on station every night. Again, my forward observer could talk directly to the aircraft and employ it from our location. Once, we had the gunship illuminate a portion of the city with its IR searchlight. This enhanced our NVGs and night capabilities. Although mortar and artillery fires were not available, air delivered, precision fire support (potentially from the AC-130 and Cobra gunships) greatly increased our chances of success in the event of enemy contact.

During the initial weeks of Uphold Democracy, there was little effort to limit operations in the city. We had no operational or control graphics to restrict movements of units throughout the city. The situation with the Military Police platoon had potential for disaster due to the ignorance of

adjacent units to their operations. As a result of my first patrol, I issued extensive control measures to guide operations within sectors of responsibility and to reduce chances of fratricide. Detailed planning became a priority. An understanding of the missions, down to the soldier level, was imperative to success and survival. After my patrol, I developed standard squad and platoon rehearsals and conducted a detailed briefback with the entire platoon. If a soldier was not well informed on the mission, I counseled the squad leader.

Our ability to communicate was greatly challenged during operations in Haiti. The problems with the PRC 126 that we faced on the first patrol would shadow us on every operation. After the incident with the lost squad, I decided to keep the platoon together during patrols. This allowed me to enjoy the benefits of massed combat power and reduced the negative effect of degraded communications. The SINCGARS worked satisfactorily; however, power lines and buildings degraded communications with that system as well. One technique that worked well was for squad leaders was to use small civilian type "walkie talkies," purchased at home station, to communicate directly with their point man. This added measure of communication enhanced control and increased flexibility. The PRC 127 was a hand held FM transceiver that worked with narrow band frequencies (crystals). The narrow band reduced interference and worked well in the city(similar to equipment used by the FRAPH); however, we had too

few in our battalion to replace the squad radio. Redundant communication measures (relaying, hand and arm signals, added radios, etc.) reduced the effects of our degraded communications.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> Platoon was "successful" because we prevented the enemy from obstructing parliamentary procedures, but our performance was not to standard. We were lucky that day to have no incidents. Support and stability operations (SASO) are extremely fragile. During democracy building, even the most insignificant event can disrupt the process and delay progress for years. Today, the presence of U.S. forces in SASO requires leaders to be cautious and soldiers to be well trained. I discussed tactics, techniques, and procedures used during a successful stability type operation that will assist leaders in planning and training for future stability operations. Although our wartime mission still applies, one's ability to function in this role is mission essential.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> *Center for Army Lessons Learned-Haiti (Special Limited Edition)*, Volume 94-3, (Army Publications, July 1994), pp. II-8

<sup>2</sup> *Encyclopedia Britannica, Haiti*

<sup>3</sup> *UN Military Operations*, <http://Ralph.gmu.edu/CFPA/peace/unmil.html>

<sup>4</sup> *CALL, Haiti (Special Limited Edition)*, pp. II2-5

<sup>5</sup> Conway, William, CPT, *Specific Orders or Request*, September 1994.

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# Checklist used for AO BOXER

SOR Specific Orders of Request for all patrols, for starters this is what I need to know!

- All road classification  
one lane, two lane, bituminous, asphalt, washouts, trails, foot patrol only
- Specific TRPs (recognizable terrain / facilities) for CPs
- All bridges, classification, recon possible fording sites
- Physical geography changes  
streams, rivers not on map, water sources, wells (community), roads not on map, alleys of use to us.
- All FAH'd POLICE HQs buildings and AVANT posts.  
personnel manned, security, uniform, equipment, weapons
- All Key Facilities, grid, description, sign.  
i.e. GE Plant, Warehouses
- All Government Bldgs
- All Churches / chapels / SCHOOLS
- Who is the mayor? Line and BLOCK OF FAH'd / GOV'T
- Population, identify slum, poor, middle, upper, rich class  
population reaction to U.S. forces.
- All FRAPH / ATTACHÉ suspected locations.
- Anything unusual - bathing locations, peculiar building.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT

CONWAY  
SZ.

## APPENDIX C

- 1492-Christopher Columbus discovered the island of Hispanola.
- 1500-Hispanola occupied by French pirates.
- 1697-Spain recognized France as in control of the western third of Hispanola.
- 1788-There were over 500,000 slaves on the island.
- 1791-Slaves rebelled.
- 1799-Napoleon sent an army to recover the island.
- 1803-Rebels defeat French army. Leaders proclaim Haiti free.
- 1821-Haiti conquers colony in the Dominican Republic.
- 1844-Colony in Dominican Republic revolted against Haiti.

\*\*\*\*\*78 years of unrest followed\*\*\*\*\*

- 1915-Woodrow Wilson sends Marines to Haiti to restore order. Their mission was to strengthened the government, build the infrastructure, and improve the quality of life.
- 1934-United States forces withdraw.
- 11 years of failed investments and unrest. Francois Duvalier proclaimed himself "Dictator" and "President for Life"

- Francois Duvalier was followed by son Jean Claude Duvalier. Jean Claude Duvalier starts Tonton Makouts—a military style, secret order of Police.
- 1986-Haitian armed forces revolt; Henry Namphy takes over.

1987-New constitution implemented.

#### APPENDIX D

- 7 FEB 91-Aristide took office. One of his first acts was to "retire" several generals. He promotes Colonel Raoul Cedras to Chief of Staff.
- 30 SEP 91-Army overthrows Aristide.
- 25 OCT 91-UN imposes sanctions against Haiti.
- 2 OCT 91-UN demands immediate reinstatement of legitimate government.
- 3 NOV 91-First reports of widespread human rights violations reach UN.
- 21 JAN 92-Refugees become an issue to the United States.
- 24 NOV-92-UN demands return of Aristide, again.
- 17 JAN 93-LTG Cedras attempts to resolve politic crisis. Aristide rejects general amnesty of Junta.
- 20 APR 93-UN sends Joint International Civilian Team to Haiti.
- 6 MAY 96-UN imposes more sanctions against Haiti.
- 3 JUN 93-Official report on violation of Human rights by the Joint Team released to UN.
- 23 JUN 93-UN imposes oil and arms embargo against Haiti.
- 3 JUL 93-Governor's Island Agreement-Peace settlement between Aristide and Cedras.
- 14 JUL 93-New York Pact-6 Month transition to democracy.

- 25 AUG 93-Suspension of embargo.
- 11 OCT 93-Attache's prevent international police from arriving.
- 13 OCT 93-Embargo re-imposed.
- 6 MAY 94-UN imposes more sanctions against Haiti.
- 11 JUL 94-Military officials in Haiti oust UN monitors.
- 31 JUL 94-UN authorizes "all necessary means" to return legitimate government.
- 17 SEP 94-Final diplomatic effort. U.S. sends former President Jimmy Carter and Colin Powell to persuade the Junta to step down.
- 19 SEP 94-First US forces land in Port Au Prince.