OPERATION JUST CAUSE:
THE ROLE OF AN AIRBORNE DELTA COMPANY IN COMBAT.

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SEMINAR # 8
MONOGRAPH

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At 0100 hours on December 20, 1989, the United States executed OPERATION JUST CAUSE "...to protect the lives of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States." (Bush). As an Anti-Tank Platoon Leader for 1st Platoon, Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, I participated in the liberation of Panama during OPERATION JUST CAUSE.

In May of 1989, Manuel Noriega lost to Gillermo Endara in the election of Panama's leader by an apparently large margin. Noriega, however, voided the results and reclaimed himself as a de facto ruler of Panama (Broderbund, 138). This prompted small groups of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) to attempt a coup against the Panamanian Dictator on 6 October 1989. This coup attempt was a failure due to the overwhelming numbers of PDF still loyal to Noriega. Many leaders in America condemned the U.S. administration's failure to aid in this coup. Noriega then proclaimed that a state of war existed between the Republic of Panama and the United States due to the pressure from the U.S. requesting him to step down. On December 16th, the PDF killed Marine LT Roberto Pas and assaulted a naval officer and his wife. As tensions built, an attack of Panama by the U.S. was inevitable (The Fayetteville Times, 11A).

The 82d Airborne Division had a particular interest in Panama. Prior to October 1989, the Division had at least one battalion in Panama participating in the Jungle Operations Training Center (JOTC). The concentrated battalion rotations through JOTC were highly irregular due to the high expense of sending units to Panama for training. At Fort Bragg in November 1989, the Division's 3rd Brigade participated in a "secret" training exercise very similar to the mission executed by 1st Brigade in Panama.

In November, Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, finished company EXEVALs (External Evaluations) at Fort Bragg with flying colors. After the EXEVALs, the company concentrated on maintenance for the
Operational Readiness Survey (ORS) inspections which are required for the assumption of the Division Ready Force-1 (DRF-1). As the DRF-1, the battalion is designated as the first battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division to go to war. After the ORS inspection, the battalion commander is required to choose the ten most important vehicles he will need in case he goes to war. These ten vehicles are then sent to the Heavy Drop Rig Site (HDRS) to be loaded with supplies, ammunition, and a parachute. Once these vehicles are prepared, they are locked up in cages and guarded twenty-four hours a day by armed guards. The HDRS is also the location for the battalion's CDS (Container Delivery Systems) which contain medical supplies and MREs. These CDS bundles contain a parachute and are dropped in conjunction with the vehicles. The HDRS is conveniently located near Pope AFB for ease of transportation during deployment. The other vehicles which passed the ORS are parked in an area near the battalion where they could be easily driven to Pope AFB to be loaded on planes to airland instead of parachuting. My platoon was selected to load four vehicles in the HDRS.

Delta Company in the 82d Airborne Division contains five platoons. As a platoon leader in Delta Company, I was responsible for six TOW vehicles. The Division had recently configured my platoon to also contain four .50 CAL machine guns. This change was widely accepted by the officers and the soldiers since it expanded our mission from a “tank killer only” platoon to a “tank and dismounted killer” platoon. As it turned out, this was one of the most significant changes the Division had made.

The possible deployment to Panama was on the minds of everyone, and any indication of a deployment, be it rational or irrational, would confirm this feeling. While my platoon and I were down at the HDRS rigging the vehicles, I noticed an over stockage of CDS bundles. A storage area that used to hold a maximum of 20 bundles now held over 100. During the changing of the guard, I spoke to the platoon leader who I was replacing as the DRF-1 unit. He indicated that my battalion was the “lucky” one, the one to be deployed. Needless to say, the men took this detail with the
seriousness of combat itself.

We begrudgingly assumed DRF-1 on at 18 December 1989 because as DRF-1, the battalion was on two-hour recall during the Christmas holiday season. This meant no traveling, no drinking, and no fun for most of the soldiers of 1-504 PIR. As a consolation for the disturbed Christmas season, the 1-504 PIR had planned a series of half-day schedules from 18 December through 2 January.

At 0900 on 18 December 1989, the battalion received a call out, which dismissed all plans for the holidays. My company commander, CPT John Howerton, told the company that the call out was a typical EDRE (Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise). An EDRE is a no-notice call out designed by Division to test a DRF-1 battalion’s actual readiness. Usually an EDRE would consist of a jump, followed by a quick three-day mission on post. I received this announcement with great disbelief since EDREs are never scheduled during holidays. Furthermore, news of an EDRE usually leaks down to the battalion about four days prior.

During the call out, the battalion was immediately locked in, the phones were disconnected, and key leaders were rushed away to the N+2 (Notification Hour plus two hours) Room at the Division headquarters. Trucks arrived at the battalion area to pick up the troops and take them to the PHA (Personnel Holding Area). The PHA is used to prepare the troops for the mission and received the mission brief. Since the mission was to be an EDRE, four vehicles from Delta Company’s 2nd Platoon were immediately rigged for the “supposed” training exercise. This was an SOP since the “go to war” vehicles are maintained in case of an actual emergency. Unfortunately, the word of the Panama deployment was not given to us until after 2nd Platoon vehicles were loaded on the planes. Training Ammunition previously loaded on 2nd platoon’s HMMWVs was hastily exchanged for live ammunition.

My battalion was joined at the PHA with 2-504 PIR and 4-325 AIR, which were DRF-2 and DRF-3, respectfully. The 3-504 PIR was currently in Panama participating in JOTC. On the early morning of the 19th, I received the word that we were going to
Panama. The mission for our battalion was not yet given to the companies; however, we continued to prepare for combat within the confines of the PHA. My platoon rehearsed SOPs, combat drills, and soldier procedures throughout the evening. Each of my soldiers received a rules of engagement card (Appendix A) and we reviewed them in depth. We attempted to sleep, but with the impending deployment looming over our heads, sleep was hard to attain.

On the 19th of December, the decision was made to “bump” 4th Platoon of D Co from the mission. The decision was allegedly made to make room for senior officers from Division and Corps who supposedly just “had to go” (Briggs, 66). If this had been a training mission, the soldiers of 4th Platoon would have been overjoyed; however, since it was combat, it was a great disappointment for them. 2LT Tim McAttear, the 4th Platoon Leader, had only been in the company for a month and was extremely disappointed but hid it well.

I received a mission brief from CPT Howerton the afternoon of the 19th. The battalion was to jump into Tocumen-Torrijos Airport, Panama (Appendix B and Appendix C). Upon consolidation, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie companies were to conduct an air assault to seize Tinajitas. Tinajitas, the battalion objective, was the headquarters of the “Tiger” brigade, located on top of a very steep hill almost directly center of Panama. Delta Company’s 3rd Platoon was to air assault to seize the B’high Temple to be used as a possible support position. The B’high Temple was about two kilometers from Tinajitas and at about the same altitude. The mission of 2nd Platoon, 5th Platoon, and my platoon was to locate all the battalion’s heavy drop vehicles and CDS bundles. Once supplies and vehicles were recovered, we would link up at the Battalion Field Trains (tentatively planned at the eastern end of the airfield). Once the Field Trains had gained knowledge of the seizure of the battalion objective, convoy operations would commence along the MSR to Tinajitas for resupply. CPT Howerton decided to go with 3rd Platoon on the air assault. Due to the limited aircraft, there would be no airland for our other vehicles. I was rather disappointed in the
small amount of information that was given to the platoon leaders. The nervousness and the tension of going to combat was heightened due to the lack of knowledge of the enemy.

I pieced together an operations order and briefed my platoon on where the vehicles and CDS bundles might land and the route to be taken to Tinajitas. There was no guarantee the vehicles would be in those locations or even dropped for that matter. My platoon realized this and had already experienced the frustration of vehicle recovery on numerous exercises prior to this deployment. I was lucky to have such an experienced platoon, and although I was nervous, I knew we would be successful. Immediately after my operations order, my Platoon Sergeant, SSG Gary West, was quickly snatched for jump master duty. SSG West was selected to be the jump master for MG James Johnson, the Division's Commanding General.

After the issue of contingency items, distribution of live ammunition, and continuous back-briefing, it was time to prepare for the jump. My platoon was broken into different chalks to establish the brigade cross load. The cross load technique is used to ensure that the platoon mission will be accomplished in the unfortunate event of a downed plane. The three battalions were organized into twenty chalks, one chalk per plane. During the final manifest call, I was astounded at the silence in the three battalions. It was an eerie feeling to see at least two-thousand paratroopers on one small field not making any noise. Once in chalk order, the jumpmaster reviewed each jumper on the fundamentals of parachuting. The order was given to remove all cold weather gear prior to rigging. The order was unpopular but necessary since weather at Ft Bragg was below 32 degrees in contrast with Panama which was over 90 degrees.

As Murphy's Law would have it, all twenty of the Division's C-141s were iced over due to the extremely cold night (Harris, 121). Pope AFB had one water truck spraying warm water on the wings and tail fins of the C-141s, attempting to remove the large icicles that had formed during the night. This process was slow and delayed
the mission. The original mission of a complete mass attack was changed to flying five sorties over the airfield. As for the jumpers, the plan was to send half the chalk on the plane to rig. Once they were rigged and seated, the other half would board and rig. As we waited outside the plane in the cold drizzle, a nervous chaplain passed through the chalks, giving the troops spiritual encouragement. Soldiers who I thought would never pray were praying with the chaplain.

The flight to Panama was extremely short to me. Once the doors of the C-141 were opened, I could feel the incredible heat and humidity of the jungle environment. As the green light came on and the jumpers poured out of the plane, the adrenalin was pumping through my body as no other jump I had made before. Once out the door and I knew my parachute had opened, I felt as if a huge weight had been lifted off my shoulders. I was on the ground before I could lower my equipment. Once on the ground, I felt more comfortable as if I was in control. I heard tremendous fire coming from the airport terminal to the north. I knew from earlier briefings that the Rangers were there to establish security on the airfield. I did a quick recon of the area and discovered I was east of the airfield. I immediately started moving west toward the Delta Company assembly area. Knowing that there is strength in numbers, I linked up with as many paratroopers as I could. I was in charge of an informal squad as the numbers grew during movement. Once on the airfield, we parted ways to link up with our units.

I arrived at the assembly area about 0530 hours and spoke to CPT Howerton prior to the battalion air assault. CPT Howerton had information as to the location of the battalion heavy drop vehicles and CDS bundles, then pointed in the direction of the Field Trains. CPT Howerton, accompanied by 3rd Platoon, hurried off to the Battalion PZ for the combat air-assault into the B'high Temple. By the time I arrived, about half of the vehicles had been recovered. The majority of the heavy drop landed in a swampy area to the south of the airfield. Once my platoon was assembled, we went out to find the equipment and supplies. Movement through the swamp was
slow, and recovery of the vehicles even slower. We made no enemy contact while in the swamp. We found three vehicles; one of them was from 4-325 which was later returned. Recovery of these vehicles was difficult. Fortunately, some of the vehicles were equipped with a wench on the front bumper which made recovery possible. Another technique was to use the sling sets from the vehicles for tow ropes. The sling sets are designed to be used for lifting the vehicle with a helicopter; however, they made great recovery tools. At first, I cursed the Air Force for being so incompetent. I later learned that the vehicles were dropped there simply to protect the air strip from damage in the event of a parachute not opening. The air strip was vital for our reinforcements and supplies.

The 1-504 met great resistance while attacking the objective. The objective was secure about 1000 hours on 20 December 1989. We lost two soldiers during the attack: Specialist Jerry Daves in HHC and Private First Class Martin Denson in Bravo Company. The battalion had also sustained several serious injuries on the objective. Each soldier had deployed with only four quarts of water and three MREs per man which could last a day during regular conditions; however, the extreme heat and stress had seriously depleted the paratroopers on Tinajitas significantly of supplies. The 1-504 companies on Tinajitas were in desperate need of water, food, and ammunition to maintain combat effectiveness.

My platoon moved to the Battalion Field Trains at about 1500 hours with our vehicles and an abundance of supplies. The Field Trains was a small shack at the eastern end of the airfield. Much to my surprise, I saw civilian trucks driven by our soldiers. I found out that earlier the engineers hot-wired these trucks to be used as delivery platforms, something that never happens in training.

MAJ Abraham Turner, my Battalion Executive Officer, was the officer in charge of all the convoys heading to Tinajitas. MAJ Turner selected 2nd Platoon to man the first convoy for security since their vehicles were the ones that dropped in. My platoon would replace 2nd Platoon once they returned to the airfield. SFC Bascom,
the acting 2nd Platoon Leader, mounted three of his vehicles with .50 CAL machine guns and one with a TOW. The convoy was also accompanied by two Sheridan tanks from the 73rd Armor Battalion which were OPCON to 1-504. The plan was to start the convoy at night under cover of darkness to conceal movement from the enemy. We had also anticipated that the curfew would also minimize the accidental killing of civilians in the case of an actual fire fight. As they pulled out at 0200 hours on the 21st for the first convoy, I felt great remorse for not being first; however, I knew I'd get my chance soon enough.

Since the majority of the CDS bundles were recovered, and Division had established a fluid resupply via the Air Force, my platoon kept guard at the convoy link-up point along with 5th Platoon. I monitored my radio on the convoy's progress until they were out of range. Once they were out of range, I switched to the battalion command net. Since Tinajitas was at such a high altitude, we could hear the battalion clearly during the evening. However, during the day, radio communication, on a PRC-77 with the battalion, was almost non-existent, even with the help of a field expedient 292 antenna. The Field Trains, however, could range out to Tinajitas.

SFC Bascom's 2nd Platoon, along with the rest of the convoy ran into a PDF ambush along the route to Tinajitas. SPC Shomburg of Delta Company was hit in the arm and was immediately medivaced to Texas once the convoy arrived at Tinajitas. On Tinajitas, 2nd Platoon was used in conjunction with the scouts to retrieve weapon caches with in the area. The convoy, led by MAJ Turner, departed Tinajitas about 2300 hours on the 21st to return to the airfield, only to be met by two more ambushes located in the same vicinity. When the convoy returned to the Field Trains (my location) SFC Bascom noticed he received a bullet wound in his elbow. Due to the adrenalin and excitement of the enemy ambushes, he did not realize the injury he sustained. SFC Bascom went to the Brigade first aid station located at the airport terminal a few hundred meters from the Field Trains to be treated and evacuated.

I grabbed LT Mark "Bubba" Smith, my Company Executive Officer, for an
informal after action review. He rode in one of 2nd Platoon's vehicles during the resupply convoy. LT Smith was still a little shaken up as he explained that the enemy could not be seen while in the ambushes. He assumed that the ambushes were manned by PDF squads armed only with AK-47s. He also stated that the enemy's fire would immediately die down once the HMMWV .50 CAL machine guns would open up. Neither obstacles nor mines were employed on the highway. We assumed they did not mine the roads since the highway was still used by the civilians. While I was talking to LT Smith, my men were talking to their 2nd Platoon counterparts. My men were scared but also excited about moving from the airfield and seeing some action.

The decision was made to try running the second convoy during the day under the assumption that the enemy would be less likely to establish an ambush since they could be spotted. We also thought the enemy would be reluctant to initiate a fire fight while surrounded by their own Panamanian civilians. As we lined up for my first convoy to Tinajitas, an MP Lieutenant drove up to me out of the blue and handed me an M-60 with 1200 rounds. My section sergeant, SSG Glen Miller, excitedly took the weapon and began to load it. In the process of loading the weapon, he accidentally popped off about three rounds which ricocheted off the tarmac and flew rounds over LT Smith's head. No one was hurt except the feelings of SSG Miller as he received several verbal reprimands from the officers and soldiers of the convoy. One of the Sheridan tanks had broken on top of Tinajitas; however, we still had the other tank which would lead the convoy.

The second convoy pulled out of the airfield at 1200 hours on the 22nd. As we drove through the city, I was disgusted to see the Panamanian people looting their own stores and taking advantage of the situation. Small children were pulling bags of goods which looked like they weighed twice as much as they did. I saw an old lady running down the highway carrying a twin sized mattress on her head. We were not given the authority to fire on unarmed looters; furthermore, our mission was not to apprehend looters but to deliver the supplies.
As we entered the northern part of Panama City, large groups of civilians lined the streets waving flags in support of our actions. This made me feel even more nervous since any one of these civilians could be armed or have handgrenades to toss in one of the vehicles. As the convoy turned left on to Highway 3, about four AK-47s opened up on the overpass over Highway 1 (Appendix C). My .50 CAL machine gun opened up as we rounded the corner. Unfortunately, the .50 CAL fire initiated other very nervous soldiers to fire. I immediately called a cease fire unless they had a clear identification of the snipers. When our fires were finally controlled, we heard nothing more from the enemy. The total exchange of fires lasted for about three minutes, but felt like three hours. Fortunately, none of my soldiers was injured in the heated exchange of fire. As my vehicle rounded the corner for Highway 1, I saw a civilian clothed man running into a crowd of Panamanians with an AK-47. I could not fire on him due to the possibility of shooting the innocent civilians which surrounded him. Since our purpose was to resupply the battalion, we did not stop to capture him either. We attempted to drive through the danger zone as quickly as we could; however, the maximum speed we could attain was 40 miles per hour due to the Sheridan tank which was leading the convoy. When the tank climbed a steep incline in the road, our speed would drop to 25-30 miles per hour. This would cause the follow-on vehicles to be exposed in the kill zone longer than necessary.

Through this exchange, we realized that the enemy in an ambush would not fire on the tank. They would let the tank pass along with the first few vehicles before initiating their ambush. The ambushes were usually set up in an area prior to a steep incline to actually use the reduced speed of the tank to increase the follow-on vehicle’s exposure to their fires.

Once on Tinajitas, my Battalion Commander, LTC Renard Marable, briefed me on our next mission: deliver Alpha Company to an electrical utility company near the University of Panama. No sooner than we pulled out of the Tinajitas compound, than we received about four mortar rounds on top of our position. I kept the convoy
moving down the steep slope which led to Alpha Company's objective. These mortar attacks by the enemy were very predictable. We would receive incoming fire every time a convoy departed. The enemy mortars were later apprehended at a road block which we were running later during the deployment. They enemy had two mortar tubes hidden in the back of a television repair van and would move around to predesignated points to drop rounds on our position. After dropping about four rounds on our position, they would immediately load up and move to a hide position. We received no contact along the route to the utility company and no enemy occupying the facility itself.

We returned to Tinajitas to receive several Corps and Division directed missions. These missions were aimed at weakening the resistance by apprehending enemy weapon and ammunition caches. The locations of these cache points were given to us by Division and Corps. Since D Co. contains the majority of the Battalion's mobility, the Battalion Commander used us extensively to accomplish his directives. Time was critical in the execution of these missions because the intelligence reports that generated these missions were perishable. If too much time was wasted in their execution, the enemy could possibly booby trap, move, or guard these objectives prior to our arrival.

A typical task organization for the cache missions would consist of the four Delta vehicles, a scout squad vehicle, and an empty HMMWV to be filled with enemy weapons and ammunition. The maps we used did not show all the small streets and trails to these locations. However, Division and Corps were able to give us very good directions. One mission required us to drive down Highway 3 until we reached a sign with a picture of a cow on it, turn left on the next street, then right at the red mailbox. The objective was a large house on top of a hill side. We were only told that the house contained weapons and enemy related items. We found a PDF pick-up truck in the driveway. I thought that the enemy must be in the building, either retrieving the weapons or dropping them off. We entered the house using our MOUT SOPs and
discovered about 100 AK-47s on the floor and in army trunks. We searched the house but found no one there. We quickly loaded up the weapons then returned to Tinajitas. Many of the cache points were located on large estates of the very wealthy in Panama. Every point we went to was either not guarded or guarded by PDF willing to surrender without firing a shot. Many prisoners we had taken would also tell us of more cache points throughout the city. We did not act on many of these reports due to the possibility of a trap. The possibility of an unexpected hit from the PDF was always on my mind. Even though the missions had gone extremely smooth, none of the soldiers let their guard down.

By Christmas, the majority of the resistance had died down, and my platoon relieved 3rd Platoon on the B'high Temple. The 3rd Platoon leader, LT Dan Austin, was extremely relieved to be moving from the temple. Not that it was a dangerous place, but a peaceful and relaxing place. He was very anxious to be doing more for his country than to sit on a hilltop, admiring the scenery. The view from the temple was immaculate. From that hill I could see Tinajitas clearly. I could also see both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to include the beautiful countryside.

As we pulled guard around the temple, the men took a much needed rest. We stayed at the temple until finally relieved by 5th Platoon around the 27th. Much of the fighting had subsided by then, and we received no more cache missions from Division. My battalion was tasked with running road blocks throughout the city around the 29th. We were supplied with black lists (lists with Noriega supporters' names) by Division. We would stop about every third car to check their name on their drivers license to the names on the black list and also search their car for weapons and ammunition. This kept the men occupied and helped in collecting dangerous weapons which could be used against us. Road block operations were hindered by the Army's program for offering money for weapons. Our Division's PSYOPs unit distributed leaflets with the posted prices on rifles, pistols, handgrenades, etc., in hopes that Panamanians would turn in their weapons. The
leaflets told the Panamanians to take their weapons to the nearest American soldier to collect the cash. During a road block, Panamanians would approach our soldiers with weapons in their hands, making the soldier think that he was attempting hostilities. Soldiers would take the weapons and return a scratch piece of paper which he wrote the weapons taken, his name, unit, and time. These “receipts” were honored at all Class A agent points. Fortunately, no incidents occurred during this operation. We continued road block operations until about 25 January 1990. My battalion was replaced by elements of the 7th ID (1). We prepared for the return trip to Ft. Bragg at the same airstrip we jumped into, culminating with the jump on Sicily Drop Zone back at Ft. Bragg.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE is a classic example of how a Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is to be fought under the latest AirLand Battle Doctrine. Coordination between all levels of command and different branches is necessary to the success of the major objective. Through cooperation with the intelligence at Corps and Division, many objectives were immediately neutralized. Medivac for injured personnel was always on time to retrieve the soldier and take him to medical care. The supply system was also responsive to our needs. We were able to receive almost everything we asked for in the way of additional supplies. In fact, during the last days in Panama, we ate food prepared by our cooks in the mess hall at Tinajitas.

Flexibility on the Delta Company level is paramount in combat operations. On the modern battlefield, we can expect to be fighting in unpredictable circumstances and changing situations. Although the information that is initially received may be small, it is up to the unit as a whole to remain flexible to accomplish any mission. It is also imperative to maintain an effective training program which covers a number of combat related tasks. The more a unit knows about different types of missions, the more effectively it will perform during combat.

Another important aspect in combat is leadership. The platoon leader stands as the sole representative of the platoon. What a leader does and how he does it not only
Appendix A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

RULED FOR LEADERS

1. A commander will take all steps necessary and appropriate for his unit's self-defense.
2. Use only the minimum force necessary to control the situation.
3. If possible when returning fire, use selected marksmen.
4. Without endangering your unit or risking the success of the mission, take measures to minimize risk to civilians.
5. Riot-control agents may only be used when authorized by the division commander or his designated representative.
6. Upon cease-fire, take necessary measures to maintain control and assist any injured.

RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS

1. If fired upon, fire back if necessary in self-defense.
2. If it appears that you are about to be fired upon, fire if necessary in self-defense.
3. When returning fire, aim directly at its source; do not spray your fire into a general area.
4. Cease fire when the threat is over.
5. Allow anyone who is trying to surrender to do so.
6. Treat innocent civilians with respect.

UNDER THE LAWS OF WAR YOU MUST:

1. Treat civilians and detainees humanely.
2. Respect civilians and their property.
3. Avoid forbidden targets, tactics, and techniques.
4. Prevent and report to your superiors and crime committed under the laws of war.
reflects on the leader, but also the unit he leads. It is important to project a strong image in the face of danger, even if the leader himself is scared. Leadership on all levels must display strong character to be victorious. The PDF had given up because of poor leadership on all levels of their command. In contrast, we were successful due to the ability of all our leaders to set the example.

Above all, sensitivity towards non-combatants and minimal collateral damage is imperative during low intensity combat operations. The United States will demand that U.S. forces minimize civilian casualties, fratricide, and collateral damage to all property. This requires thorough briefings of the Rules of Engagement to the lowest levels. Soldiers must display a high level of discipline to hold fires until an enemy can be identified. It is up to the leadership to ensure that this happens. Sensitivity is not only imperative due to the ethical issue but is necessary for the rebuilding of a country once the conflict is won.
WORKS CITED


1-504 PIR AREA OF OPERATIONS

OPERATION JUST CAUSE 1989-1990
Appendix B

Overall Areas Of Interest

From: Ft. Bragg, NC
38°55'N, 77°00'W
To: Panama, Panama
8°57'N, 79°30'W

Distance: 2,075 miles
Bearing: 185.0°

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Panama

Population
2.5 Million
Area (sq mi)
30,193

City Population
- Over 1,000,000
- Over 500,000
- Over 100,000
- Under 100,000
- Capital

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