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Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo Company, 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 3-4 October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia.  
1993

Type of operation described: Air assault raid into urban enemy stronghold to capture Somali combatants.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

In December 1992, the United States spearheaded a forced entry into Somalia to establish the conditions for peacekeeping operations, allowing the delivery of humanitarian relief to end a famine that killed thousands upon thousands of Somalis. Twenty-eight thousand U.S. troops from the Marine Corps and Army's 10th Mountain Division succeeded in establishing a relative peace. The many bandits now had difficulty raiding United Nations storehouses of food and other humanitarian aid. The Marines instituted a curfew in Mogadishu and confiscated any weapon seen on the streets. Thousands of weapons were confiscated and destroyed, including the majority of the heavy weapons such as tanks, artillery pieces, and anti-aircraft guns. This initially established an environment where aid convoys could proceed, sometimes without military escort, and deliver the aid required by this impoverished nation that lacked even the simplest of infrastructures. With aid flowing to the needy, the famine began to disappear, and in May, the U.N. took over control of the operation from the United States, who wanted to decrease their presence and increase the legitimacy of the U.N..

All forces in Somalia served under U.N. command called United Nations Somalia II (UNISOM II). The U.S. contingent consisted of 1,400 combat troops from the 10th Mountain Division. The bulk of the U.N. forces consisted of troops from 32\* other countries ranging from Bangladesh to Sweden. The problems began here with this coalition of forces. These countries contributed in various degrees, some with medical support like the Romanians and the Swedes, some with peacekeeping forces like the Pakistanis, Italians, and the Egyptians. As in any coalition under another nation's commander, the problem of loyalty arises. How much allegiance and commitment should be given to this coalition and its mission? How much risk to friendly troops can be accepted? For instance, the Italians paid off Somali clan elders to not bother their troops, and even fed them information about U.N. operations. Additionally, the Nigerian commander complained vehemently to the U.N. that Italians guarding a checkpoint merely watched, as six Nigerian peacekeepers got ambushed and killed not more than one hundred meters away. The lieutenant colonel commanding the Kuwaiti contingent even asked CPT Rysewyk, the Ranger company executive officer, if he knew of their dealings.

The peace the Marines and 10th Mountain established began to deteriorate, as the rules of engagement (ROE) changed, and the U.N. forces retreated behind the safety of barred doors at night. The Marines had laid down the law. Now, U.N. soldiers could no longer confiscate small arms, and they could only shoot if a Somali used a weapon with hostile intent. Consequently, the Somalis dug up weapons from hidden caches or snuck them into the city in 55 gallon drums, unchecked by U.N. soldiers. The Somali bandits took advantage of the slackening of the ROE with increasing acts of banditry and violence. A regression was taking place in Somalia, back to the lawless chaos from which it had just come.

The two principle warlords that the U.N. had dealt with were General Mohammed Farah Aideed who headed the Somali National Alliance (S.N.A.) and Aideed's chief rival, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, who headed the Somali National Congress (S.N.C.). These men were no fools. Both wanted to rule Somalia. They had been a part of the civil war that toppled the regime of Siad Barre and had risen to the top of the various clans, Aideed the Habr Gadir, Ali Mahdi the Abgaal. With no working infrastructure, the only organizations existing were these clans and subclans, based on family ties. They initially greeted the U.N. with open arms in December and appeared to set their differences aside. However, as their country began to rise from the ashes of civil war and famine, their support of the U.N. proportionally decreased. Aideed and Ali Mahdi again chose sides, as the U.N. now attempted to build up the country's infrastructure. Ali Mahdi wanted to work with the U.N. and establish a government. Aideed wanted the U.N. out, so he could take control of Somalia.

The relationship between the U.N. and General Aideed continued to deteriorate. Confrontations between Aideed's militia and the U.N. forces increased and escalated, from simple mortar attacks, to sniping and drive-by shootings. Finally, these conflicts came to a head when twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers were ambushed and killed on 5 June 1993. Outraged, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for the arrest and punishment of those responsible for the ambush, namely General Mohammed Farah Aideed. U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali lobbied intensely for further U.S. assistance.

On the 8th of August, four Americans on patrol, were killed when their HUMMWV hit a command detonated land mine. Again, tempers in the United States flared for a solution to the problem. Finally on August 22nd, six more Americans were injured by a command detonated mine, pressuring the Clinton Administration for a solution. President Clinton agreed to the U.N. request. A contingent of 450 U.S. Army Rangers and other Special Operations forces was the answer. This signaled an extreme change in policy from peacekeeping to peacemaking\*.

## II. DEPLOYMENT OF TF RANGER

On 26 August <sup>1993</sup>~~1994~~, B Company, 3/75th Ranger Regiment and other Special Operations forces, arrived in Mogadishu to reinforce the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), 2-14 IN, and support other UNISOM II missions. CNN greeted TF Ranger just as they had the Navy SEALs in December. The media overwhelmed the Rangers and flooded the system with television and news coverage of how the Rangers were going to Somalia to capture Aideed\*. This only forced Aideed deeper into isolation. He had not gained his power by luck. Information and sightings of Aideed significantly decreased. He slept in a different house each night, was never seen in public, and was extremely careful not to set patterns. He feared that he could be snatched at any time.

Dismayed at leaving one rifle platoon from A Co. 3/75 back at Ft. Bragg, because of a political constraint of 450 special operations personnel in country, the men of TF Ranger stood incredulous upon learning that no AC-130 Spectre Gunships would support their mission. Spectre provided immense firepower, a great sense of security, and instilled fear in the Somalis from its use in the previous months. The Rangers did not understand why the reinforcing platoon from A Company and Spectre were not in theater, especially since both had participated in rehearsals at Ft. Bragg. Not until congressional hearings on 12 May 94 did the public learn about MG Garrison's, Task Force Ranger Commander, request for the AC-130, and the subsequent denial by GEN Hoar, head of Central Command, and the Defense Department\*. Lacking these assets would prove costly to the task force a month later.

TF Ranger occupied an old Russian hangar at the Mogadishu Airport (Map B, pictures A,B). Timeliness of intelligence, proximity to potential targets, desert sands, and aircraft maintenance and storage considerations, all pointed to the hangar and airport, even though the main gate and enemy lay only one hundred meters away. Another Beirut would stop the show and was on everyone's mind.

Within a week, the Rangers fortified the compound with shipping containers and connexes (picture A), stacked upon each other, and sandbagged bunkers strategically placed around the compound. The result was another Fort Apache or Firebase Gloria.

The climate and weather did not have a significantly affect operations on either side. Located on the beach, temperatures averaged between 75 to 85 degrees, with minimal amounts of rain.

The terrain, however, significantly affected operations. First, the man made obstacles of the urban terrain posed serious problems for TF Ranger to overcome. Many cinder block buildings along with the rubble from the civil war, posed an obstacle to vehicular movement. The narrow dirt roads with numerous pot holes were also easily mined and blockaded with berms, vehicles, or burning tires, and provided natural ambush sites, causing difficulty conducting and turning around convoys. The huge influx of a million people because of the famine, and their resulting thatch huts built on any open ground available, also posed a man made obstacle.

Avenues of approach on the primarily dirt, narrow, rubble strewn, and crowded streets, constricted traffic and made movement slow and easily interrupted. The lack of road signs, good maps, and recognizable features made both land and air navigation confusing. Few telephone wires and antennas made air avenues of approach quick, with few obstacles.

Key terrain consisted primarily of the airfield, which was situated in low ground making it an extremely easy target for mortars or rockets. Many huge planes, including C-5s, landed daily with humanitarian aide and other resources. The airport was limited to no more than three large planes at one time. The New Port also proved important because of the logistics and other aid flowing through it. Additional key terrain included any area free of loose debris and obstacles which could accommodate helicopters for a pick-up zone.

Observation and fields of fire were also limited. Buildings were built close together with courtyards and narrow alleys. Alleys and roads became engagement areas. This built up terrain also afforded the Somalis great cover and concealment. They could fire through doors and windows even when closed and pop out into an alley or street to shoot Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), with little chance of being hit by fire because of their short exposure time. The Rangers learned this deadly lesson quickly, after a few vehicles stopped in alleys on 3 Oct 93 and were hit. Many times it was impossible to tell where the fire originated. Bullets would crack close overhead and RPGs would explode nearby without leaving any signature of their origin.

The SNA militia with various military backgrounds, received training from rebellious nations like Sudan and Iran. Before the Battle of the Black Sea, Aideed had just received 250 newly trained militia. They controlled most of southern Mogadishu and knew it well (See map A). The militia definitely had a great numerical advantage, numbering in the mid--high thousands. The Somalis still had a few anti-aircraft guns and technical vehicles mounting heavy machine guns or 106mm recoilless rifles, but they mostly brandished their weapons of choice, thousands of AK-47s and RPG-7s, literally one behind every door.

Aideed's militia was capable of much more than they were given credit. They knew the terrain and had much actual combat experience on the same terrain. Pinpointing them in the close in buildings proved extremely difficult. This was their greatest advantage. Aideed's forces used primarily Motorola hand held radios and signals like banging on pipes for a technologically simple, but effective communications system. He was capable of conducting guerrilla tactics against allied forces, such as ambushes.

The militia's most probable course of action would consist of fleeing the immediate area threatened by UNISOM II or TF Ranger forces. They would then tend to filter back toward the action as the mission progressed. Any mission gathered hundreds of curious, bored onlookers who had nothing better to do. Sniping would soon pick-up, many times coming from crowds or behind women or children. This would escalate to more bold actions and even an RPG or two.

No significant battles where both sides were decisively engaged had occurred, except where the 24 Pakistanis were killed.

Aideed's militia's most dangerous course of action would be a synchronized attack on the airfield, combining mortars, technical vehicles, and organized squads.

The composition and strength of the two forces varied significantly. The Americans were very well equipped and trained. The QRF consisted of a brigade headquarters under Colonel Casper, 2-14 IN under the command of LTC David, and a helicopter package of AH-1 Cobras and UH-60 Blackhawks from the 9-101 AVN. TF Ranger consisted of 450 personnel, including an undersized B Co. 3/75 RGR RGT under the command of LTC McKnight, a helicopter package of eight MH-60s, four MH-6s, and four AH-6s, commanded by LTC Mathews, and other special operations and support forces. 3/B/3/75 also had eight kevlar armored HMMWV's with either .50 cal machine-guns or MK-19 automatic grenade launchers mounted. UNISOM II had much more firepower that included attack helicopters, tanks, and a various assortment of armored vehicles.

TF Ranger was capable of an approximate 20 minute reaction time to anywhere in the city. They gained this through daily rehearsals and over-flights of the city, where the pilots and Rangers became familiarized with the city, during both day and night. The Rangers could always insert with helicopters by fastroping down into small areas. However, Mogadishu's small streets made it very difficult to extract by air. Suitable landing zone's were always identified, but many times unrealistic because of their proximity to the target. Additionally, armored HMWV's were used to add flexibility in extracting Rangers as well as prisoners. AH-6 attack helicopters, armed with 7.62 mini-guns and 2.75 inch rockets, always provided immediate close-in fire support on all missions and would soon prove their worth.

### III. INITIAL MISSIONS

With its superior firepower, TF Ranger felt confident of handling any contingency with the Somalis, especially after capturing Osman Atto, Aideed's chief financier and right hand man on 21 September. Each of the six missions leading up to the battle on 3-4 October had been relatively quick with very minimal casualties (See map A, and annex C). Although daily and nightly overflights helped the pilots learn the city and lulled the Somalis into a sense of harmlessness, they signalled a predictable way of operation. This coupled with the six missions already done in a similar fashion, telegraphed to Aideed how the Rangers conducted business.

### IV. BATTLE OF THE BLACK SEA

At 031459 Oct 93, the HUMINT source confirmed a meeting between Salad and Qeydid at a house near the Olympic Hotel. These were two of Aideed's key lieutenants who had been targeted for a few days and would pose a serious setback on Aideed's infrastructure if captured. The plan was fine tuned, and the order to stand-by was given. When the source signaled the targets' presence at the objective by raising his car hood, (Annex D), the commander gave the word to go.

The assault force launched in helicopters while the ground reaction force (GRF1, a platoon (-) under LTC McKnight) moved out to preposition for a possible extraction with nine HMMWV's and three five ton trucks. The assault on the objective commenced at 1542. The mission proceeded as planned except for a few problems of identifying the objective building because of the thick dusty rotorwash from the dirt streets. At 1553, GRF1 moved to link-up with assault force. Five minutes later, one of the 5-Ton trucks was hit by an RPG, wounding one Ranger, and disabling the vehicle. By 1604, the assault force began collapsing on the objective for ground extraction. LTC McKnight then reported that he was evacuating one critically wounded Ranger who had fallen from the fastrope.

GRF1 arrived at the objective at 1613 for extraction and loaded the detainees onto the two remaining 5-Ton trucks. Fire had started to pick up and one pilot reported an RPG airburst over the target. At 1620, one blackhawk helicopter was hit by an RPG in the tailrotor and crashed, killing the two pilots and wounding two.

The pilot CW3 Cliff Wolcott had radioed to the crew to brace for a crash while the helicopter spun out of control toward the street below. LTC McKnight decided to send the prisoners back with a 5-Ton with HMMWV security, while the remaining vehicles attempted a link-up at the crash site. At 1624, one MH-6 managed to land in the narrow street. As the co-pilot hovered and suppressed the enemy with his weapon from the helicopter, the pilot ran to the downed helicopter to give any survivors assistance. They remained on the ground for seven minutes and extracted two friendly WIAs who had survived the crash and had been wounded fighting to secure the area.

By 1628, a Ranger assault force element under the command of 1LT Tom Ditomasso, who had been defending the objective, and the Search and Air Rescue Team (SAR) under SFC Al Lamb, arrived simultaneously and secured the crash site. As the SAR team fastroped into the crash site, their helicopter was hit by an RPG. The pilots, realizing that Rangers were still on the rope, remained steady until they were all on the ground, then limped back to the airfield, where they quickly moved to the spare aircraft.

At 1641, while in an orbit providing precision fire support with two snipers, a second blackhawk was hit by RPG fire and crashed. With no other friendly force immediately available, the two snipers, MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randy Shugart armed with a CAR-15 and M-21 respectively, made three requests to go in to provide security to the crash, completely disregarding their own personal safety. They were finally allowed to go in after the third attempt. Although badly wounded, the entire crew survived the crash. MSG Gordon and SFC Shugart lead a fight for more than twenty minutes against overwhelming odds in an attempt to protect the crew. They killed numerous Somalis as they came in small groups. Then a lull occurred in the fighting around the second crash. Some of the crew and one of the snipers had been wounded. The other sniper pulled CW3 Mike Durant away from the crash to a building a few feet away, and gave him the CAR-15 with the last five rounds remaining. The Somalis became wise after the lull and rushed the crash, killing all but CW3 Durant, who fired the last five rounds and placed the weapon on his chest and opened his arms. Beating him, the crowd lifted him up with his broken back and leg, and paraded him around. CW3 Durant remained a prisoner another eleven days, and he says that he owes his life to those snipers \*.

Casualties mounted as the Ranger assault force moved the few blocks from the objective to secure the northern (first) crash site. GRF1 reported numerous casualties as LTC McKnight led the way attempting to find the first crash. By 1700, all of the Ranger forces reported heavy fire.

By 1703, a second Ranger Ground Reaction Force ( GRF2, consisting of the remaining 27 Rangers in the compound, mostly cooks and headquarters personnel, two 5-Tons and seven HMMWVs) moved out to secure the second crash site. The QRF had been alerted at 1626 and arrived at the airport at 1710. As GRF2 left the north side of the airfield, it was ambushed. MK-19 and .50 caliber machine gunners fired point blank into the buildings with a deafening roar, as the GRF2 continued toward the objective (See map B). Proceeding on, the GRF2 ran into an earthen berm roadblock. Turning around at 1720, the Ranger force tried another route and ran into a series of burning tire roadblocks. With one of the crashes smoldering and visible on the far hill, the Somalis initiated an ambush. SSG Struecker, who had just extracted the urgent casualty who had fallen from the fastrope near the objective, led the convoy and saw four RPGs fly across his front. Then, their machine guns opened up. Luckily, the Somalis had initiated their ambush too early, and the GRF2 was out of the kill zone. Returning fire and managing to turn around in the narrow street, the convoy barely escaped without injury. Finally, while trying yet another route to the second crash, GRF2 met GRF1 at 1740, just north of the K-4 circle with many casualties and shot-up vehicles. As LTC McKnight raced by with all four tires shot flat, the trail vehicles, a disabled cargo HMMWV being pushed by a 5-Ton, stopped. The men of the GRF2 dismounted, pulled security, crossloaded casualties to a GRF2 5-Ton, and destroyed the cargo HMMWV in the middle of the street with two incendiary grenades. Both GRF's were ordered back to the airport (Map B).

Meanwhile, a fourth blackhawk had been hit by an RPG at 1727 and managed to go down at the New Port (Map B). At 1745, the QRC moved to the second crash site. It ran into the destroyed HMMWV and began to make contact which developed into a firefight. After sustaining some casualties, it too was ordered back to the airport at 1830. The assault force, now consolidated around the first crash, still reported that one body was trapped in the aircraft and that it had numerous urgent casualties needing immediate evacuation. It would not leave the body. 11

With the situation at the first crash site becoming secure around 1900, a plan was approved for two Malaysian mechanized companies and a Pakistani tank platoon to move with the QRF and GRF2 and most of the remaining GRF1 Rangers to the crash sites (Annex D). A resupply effort of helicopter crew chiefs pushing out water, ammunition, and medical supplies was ongoing, while the QRF briefed and coordinated the movement to both crashes.

By 2130, the QRF moved to the New Port to link-up with the allies. After coordinations, the plan was to send one QRF company with Malaysian Condor APCs to each crash site. The Reconstituted Ranger force of seven HMMWVs and 56 personnel would secure National Street with the Pakistani tank platoon.

The QRF attacked from the New Port at 2323 to secure both crash sites and extract friendly personnel. The convoy began taking fire along the route at 2345 (Map B). The relief column returned fire with an immense volley of point-blank .50 caliber and MK-19 fire into the buildings lining the road. This fire moved down the column as the vehicles went by these few blocks. This "Gauntlet" was directly two blocks south of the Sheik Dere compound, a double walled safehouse where Aideed's spiritual advisor lived.

At 2350, National Street was secured for the extraction route and A Co. 2-14 IN moved to the northern site while C Co. 2-14 IN moved to the southern crash. Both elements had TF Ranger LNOs to coordinate the link-up with Ranger forces. The fighting lasted all night with barely a lull for more than a minute. The attack helicopters made constant gun runs, sometimes as close as 25 meters, in order to protect the force. RPGs exploded. Rounds cracked overhead constantly. It was nearly impossible to tell where the firing was coming. One RPG landed next to the GRF2 cargo HMMWV with the Ranger weapons platoon leader, the cooks, and other headquarters personnel in it, disabling the vehicle and wounding four Rangers. One Ranger, SFC Rick Lamb complained of a massive headache. He had a small amount of blood coming from a scratch on the forehead, but he continued to fight. Later, the Ranger found out that he had a piece of shrapnel from that RPG lodged two inches into his forehead between the lobes of his brain. This same Ranger had surgery to remove it and was running nearly five miles four months later.

Continuous, heavy small arms fire continued. By 0155, the QRF linked-up with the Rangers surrounding the first crash. One of the dead pilots was still stuck in the aircraft and would take time to get the body out. At 0227, the QRF radioed that the second crash site was secure, but no friendlies could be found. The QRF placed thermite grenades on the crash at 0300. Meanwhile, two Malaysian Condor 's took a wrong turn south toward the second crash, which proved fatal. The Somalis made easy pickings of them, destroying both with RPGs and killing a few of the crew. As the night gave way to the quickly coming morning, the sense of urgency to retrieve the body and return to safety increased. Most of the casualties had come from fighting before sundown. Finally at 0530, after fighting all night under continuous small arms and RPG fire, the body was recovered from the aircraft. Attack helicopters continued to provide cover for the withdrawal. By 0630, the QRF and TF Ranger elements consolidated, minus the four aircrew and 2 snipers at crash site 2 , and withdrew to the Pakistani Stadium. The countless wounded were cared for, accountability was taken, and sensitive items gathered. Total casualty figures from TF Ranger numbered 16 KIA and approximately 80 WIA. The QRF had 2 KIA and 26 WIA. Red Cross estimates ranged from 250-300 Somali KIA and 700-800 WIA.

16 KIA and nearly a hundred WIA represents over 50% casualties of TF Ranger's actual "shooters". TF Ranger reorganize their fighting force. Only 3 of 8 blackhawks were usable which hampered efforts to recover CW3 Mike Durant. . Aided had over 1000 casualties. He was hurt so bad that he called a unilateral cease-fire on about the 9th of October, three days after TF Ranger received reinforcements doubling its force.

## V. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

The President changed his policy in Somalia after this battle. This battle not only impacted U.S. policy in Somalia, but also in Haiti, where plans for military action changed, and further reinforced policy of non-involvement in Bosnia. The President reinforced U.S. forces, but vowed to pull them out by March 31. Now, the U.S. had enough troops to do the job; however, it was too late. The political constraints of limiting the number of special operations troops allowed in country to 450 severely hampered TF Ranger's mission, and limited flexibility.

TF Ranger had rehearsed with a company (+) and an AC-130, but deployed with no extra platoon and no AC-130 which would have given excellent fire support and would have been able to vector GRF1 to either crash site instead of just driving in circles collecting casualties. The additional platoon would have added flexibility in conducting missions and would have allowed for an actual reaction force. Ideally, the entire 3/75 Rangers would have been deployed. This would have provided for all the necessary assets and reinforcements required. No help would have been needed from any other forces, no outside coordinations that took almost six hours.

This problem of unity of command added problems throughout. Although the secretive and timely nature of the TF Ranger mission made coordinations with allied units risky and untimely, notification of the QRF for possible reinforcement sooner would have led to a quicker extraction of the assault force. Unity of command problems also existed with allied forces with coordinations and during the mission. A heavy force attached to the QRF on the same strip alert, would have further speeded up the extraction of the assault force and possibly saved life of one Ranger, CPL James Smith, who died of wounds.

The press had a major impact on the outcome of TF Ranger's mission. Before the force even deployed, the news of the day described how the U.S. was sending 400 elite Rangers to Somalia to hunt for the fugitive warlord Aideed, "Ranger 'hit team' mission in Somalia denied"\* CNN waited on the airfield tarmac for the Rangers. Numerous reports even implicated the elite counter-terrorist unit Delta Force in the operation, "Delta Force troops part of arrivals"\*. This only telegraphed our mission directly to Aideed and set TF Ranger up for failure by sending Aideed into deep reclusion. It was no wonder that intelligence reports rarely pinpointed Aideed. Also, news reports had a major impact on creating these force limits and put extraordinary pressure on TF Ranger to "not screw-up! A few dry holes were expected, but..." Articles with titles like "U.S. troops stage raid . . . on wrong target"\* and "Rangers arrest 'good guys' in second flubbed Somalia mission"\*, frequented the media.

The bad press and political constraints consequently led to a predictable and cautious way of operating. In the six prior missions, the Rangers primarily used a helo insert and extraction. This proved to be a tough umbilical cord to break. The timeliness of intelligence demanded a quick reaction and assault time.

Aideed saw this and developed a plan to counter the Ranger's quick strike helicopters. But, he failed to count on the individual Rangers resolve. The Rangers fought all night in Aideed's stronghold on 3-4 October because they vowed to never leave a fallen comrade. Aideed's unilateral cease-fire that he imposed on himself told the story of the Battle of the Black Sea.

## VI. LESSONS

1. Continuous training even when deployed is mandatory. TF Ranger received its best live-fire training once it landed in country.
2. Loading AH-6s with rockets because of the bad area around the objective proved wise.
3. Good maps are a necessity.
4. Pre-combat checks are needed before each mission, no matter how redundant the mission seems.
5. Consider all contingencies when planning. This will drive a smart combat load and resupply plan.
6. Marking the target building in MOUT with smoke (day) greatly helps orientation and prevents fratricide.
7. Keep fire low when working with many air assets.
8. Disseminate information to lowest levels.
9. Gunners must look 360 degrees in MOUT.
10. Avoid halting in alleys or streets as they become fire sacs.
11. A properly trained Search and Air Rescue team is absolutely critical when working with aircraft. This paid great dividends.
12. The SAR team needs jaws of life available.
13. Colored smoke works well for marking positions in MOUT.
14. Plan on strapping thermite grenades on all vehicles and sensitive equipment.
15. Speed is security.
16. Unity of effort in all missions is critical. This was violated at all levels.
17. **Never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy!**
18. Special training with medics paid for itself a thousand times over. Get the most people qualified to do the most (ie. CBT Lifesaver, EMT).
19. Take night vision goggles (NODS) even during daytime missions.
20. Cross training on all equipment and procedures from weapons to radios to calling for fire and directing fire support assets, is critical.
21. Bullets run about a foot off of walls, get off walls.
22. Must have a good resupply plan even if past history doesn't require (pre-packaged in ammo cans, CL. V, CL. VIII, and water).
23. IR strobes are good if there are not many lights. Aircraft could mistake for ground fire.
24. Bring extra radio batteries.
25. Keep accountability of both personnel and equipment at all times. Have good SOPs of who accounts for KIA/WIA equipment and personnel.
26. Kevlar works. Two sided level III vests should be standard issue, must stop 7.62.
27. Keep training MOUT Close Quarters Battle. Nearly every mission will deal with some type of built-up area.
28. Train quick fire techniques (Close Quarters Marksmanship).
29. Wearing NODS with an AIM-1 on SAWs and .50 cal MGs (TVS-5 mount with an AIM-1) in MOUT is smart.
30. Aimpoints in MOUT adds much accuracy and speed to M-16 family weapons.

31. A pistol is critical for gunners.
32. Load vehicles with a pre-planned supply package.
33. Maintain a strong PT program while deployed.
34. Tailor soldiers load to the mission.
35. Encourage small unit initiative with reporting.
36. In a well trained unit, acts of bravery are commonplace.
37. Don't count on heroism to accomplish the mission.
38. Plan for multiple contingencies for extraction.

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
Operational timeline constructed by the TF Ranger operations cell.

This provides an outstanding source to the big picture of what actually happened from the operation's center point of view. All of the major events are covered here by the time that they were logged during the battle. This served as the primary document to reconstruct the events of the day and night in a chronological order to ensure that events are covered as they happened.

Colonel Casper's Summary of Combat Actions on 3 October 1993.

COL Casper's summary provides a different point of view to the battle. It also was derived from a TOC, this time the 10th Mountain Division's. He provides more details that would come from someone on the ground, but has a thick bias to his QRF. This is a good source to cross level the Ranger operational timeline against because they both have specific times. Some times in this document are somewhat skewed.

Map of Mogadishu.

  
Lee A. Rysewyk  
Captain, Infantry

## MISSIONS OF RANGER TASK FORCE IN SOMALIA

1. 30 AUG 93 - Lig Ligato Compound -
  - \*Retaliation for mortar attack which wounded two crewmen and damaged some helicopter doors that were stacked against each other.
  - \*Let many people know of our prospective hit.
  - \*Confirmed the template.
  - \*C Co. 2-14 IN stood by for possible ground exfil. CO was a terrible whiner, impatient and wanted to leave with Rangers still on the ground.
  - \*No KIA/WIA's.
  - \*Command and control site.
  - \*NGO's were not supposed to be there and were crooked.
  - \*Press totally blew hit out of proportion because of NGO's.
  - \*Minimal collateral damage.
  - \*French NGO created a considerable fuss afterwards.
  - \*President and CJCS chided CG for accuracy of reports.
  - \*Now felt considerable restraint to go on mission. Checklist of precursors.
  - \*Helo in, helo out.
  
2. 6 SEP 93 - Old Russian Compound
  - \*By reviewing stand.
  - \*2 friendly (SGT Pringle in Kevlar earflap and SPC Anderson RPG frag on thigh and buttocks.
  - \*2 enemy WIA's.
  - \*Aideed 2-3 houses away.
  - \*Saw man running to "T" intersection by blocking forces, turned and ran away from BP. Darkness helped him escape.
  - \*17 detainees, 2 Tier 3.
  - \*4 assault rifles, 1 RPD MG.
  - \*Helo in, helo out.
  - \*Ground Reaction Force (GRF), plt with bn cdr, prepositioned for support.
  
3. 14 SEP 93 - Old Jialiou House Raid.
  - \*SSG Burns and men of 3rd Plt saw Aideed lookalike dart out of Italian Embassy.
  - \*39 detainees and much ammo, weapons, radios.
  - \*Abgaal Clan so released and returned light weapons and equipment.
  - \*Police Chief looked like Aideed.
  - \*Helo in, helo out.
  - \*GRF prepositioned.
  
4. 17 SEP 93 - Radio Aideed.
  - \*Ground mounted, entirely.
  - \*1 enemy KIA.
  - \*1 civilian WIA.
  - \*Dry hole.

5. 18 SEP 93 - Atto's Garage.
  - \*Atto there 0815, not found 0846.
  - \*Watched him.
  - \*Most escaped.
  - \*8 pax detained.
  - \*1 man chained to tree/rival clan member.
  - \*Helo in, ground exfil to embassy.
  - \*Dan Bush threw flash bangs at press, who were danger close to OBJ, too funny.
  
6. 21 SEP 93 - Captured Atto.
  - \*No KIA, 1 WIA - Atto's driver.
  - \*Vehicle take-down, no Rangers.
  - \*Found hiding with bunch of people, readily identified himself.
  - \*Shoot from helos.
  - \*No ground force.
  - \*Helo in, helo out.
  
7. 3 OCT 93 - Salad Meeting Site Raid.
  - \*Salad, Siad, Awale
  - \*364 KIA, 754 WIA
  - \*16 Ranger TF KIA, 83 WIA.
  - \*Helo in, mostly ground out.
  - \*GRF1 prepositioned.
  - \*GRF2 went out to help.
  
8. 6 OCT 93 - 60mm Mortar Attack.
  - \*1 KIA, 16 WIA's.



QUICK REACTION FORCE  
FALCON BRIGADE, 10TH MOUNTAIN DIVISION  
SUMMARY OF COMBAT OPERATIONS  
ON 3 OCTOBER 1993

On 3 October 1993 at 1414 hours the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) Brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) was notified by the Task Force Ranger (TFR) JOC that certain sectors of central Mogadishu would be off limits to UNOSOM air and ground forces. Task Force Ranger was going to conduct operations in these sectors. (GRG 24, 29, 30, 35, 36).

At 1537hrs the Quick Reaction Company (QRC) was alerted to Readiness Condition 1 (REDCON 1) by QRF Headquarters. This was done following notification by TFR that they would be launching soon on a capture mission.

At 1545hrs TFR reported that the cordon and search elements were on the objective in the Bakara Market area. At 1610hrs a TFR aircraft was shot down. No location given. At 1627hrs the UNOSOM Operations Officer (U3) directed that two(2) scout weapons teams from the QRF aviation assets be placed on REDCON 1. This had already been done. CW4 Coates, of TF 2-25, verified the amount of rockets in the ASP and directed all aircraft with TOWs replaced with 2.75 rockets. He also verified the status of aircraft. Two Scout Weapons Teams (SWT) were ready to fly (2 OH58s/5 AH1s) in support of the TFR.

At 1629hrs COL Casper, the QRF Commander, directed the QRC, which is garrisoned at the University Compound adjacent to the former U.S. Embassy Compound, to move immediately to the airfield. At this point TFR had notified the QRF that problems were developing on the objective and that assistance might be needed. COL Casper directed LTC Bill David, Commander, 2-14 Infantry Battalion to use the Main Supply Route (MSR) Bypass. At 1645hrs LTC David departed for the airfield with his QRC and Battalion TAC. One minute later, another company of 2-14 was placed on REDCON 1.

Only three minutes later, at 1649hrs, the QRF TOC was informed by the TFR JOC that a second TFR aircraft had been shot down during action at the objective. At 1654 a third TFR aircraft was reported hit by enemy fire but was able to stay airborne and returned to the New Port where it landed.

At 1700hrs all 2-25 Company Commanders were in the TOC. The situation was still not clear enough to launch any aircraft into the area of operations. Airspace over the AO was still controlled by TFR.

At 1711hrs COL Casper informed LTC David, by radio, that the QRC and the battalion TAC would be controlled throughout the operation by the TFR commander. At this time COL Casper was located at the QRF TOC. Within minutes, at 1724, LTC David arrived at the airfield with the QRC. At this time the QRC was C Company, 2-14 Infantry, call sign Tiger, commanded by Captain Whetstone. By 1747 LTC David

had been briefed on the situation and received his mission. In a nutshell, he was informed by the TFR JOC that about 100 Rangers had inserted by air and ground into an area near Bakara Market. They had successfully detained 24 individuals. However, after the aircraft were downed, the Rangers converged on the northern crash site to secure the crew and aircraft. In doing this, they had continued to experience heavy enemy fire and resistance and became pinned down in the vicinity of the northern crash site.

LTC David was informed that his mission was to move to the southern crash site and secure the crews and the Rangers located there. By 1747 LTC David had assembled and briefed his QRC and departed for the objective from the airfield. The route of travel selected was through the K4 traffic circle. As LTC David travelled north he radioed that he was now moving to the crash sites but that he needed air cover. The air cover that was to be provided by TFR was not in a position to cover and was experiencing communications problems. COL Casper informed him that QRF aviation assets (TF 2-25) would provide his air cover. Shortly thereafter, TFR aircraft did, in fact, arrive on station. TF 2-25 aircraft remained at the airfield at flight idle for an immediate response, if needed.

At 1754 LTC David reported that he observed tracer fire about 300 meters north of K4 traffic circle and that the air cover was not yet on station. Three minutes later, at 1757, LTC David reported that a HUMMV was hit and disabled. At 1802, he reported a second HUMMV engaged and disabled north of K4. Neither vehicle was part of the QRC force and were suspected at this time of being Ranger vehicles egressing from the objective.

Between 1730-1800hrs the QRC was engaged with small arms fire as they approached the burning vehicles 300-400meters north of K4 traffic circle. The convoy suppressed enemy positions on both sides of the road and continued to move. As the convoy reached National Street it was engaged again with a large volume of fire from the east. Instead of turning east the convoy continued North and continued to receive fire until reaching the intersection at grid coordinate 345265. At that point the convoy stopped and dismounted on the west side of the road. The QRC suppressed the enemy fire with MK19s and began assaulting across the road and was then engaged with a large volume of RPG and heavy machine gun fire from the vicinity of the milk factory. Two WIAs resulted from this engagement (1 Ranger and 1 QRC soldier). At 1815 SWF aircraft had reported taking small arms fire near the New Port. Black smoke was observed at K4 by the 2-14 S3 and that communication was lost with LTC David. The S3 reported that he was working the second QRC (Terminator) to secure the exfiltration route for the Tiger element currently at K4.

Around 1821hrs BG Gile, ADC-O, 10th Mountain Division and COL Casper instructed LTC David to break contact with the enemy. LTC David then directed the Tiger element to break

contact with the enemy and return to the airfield as soon as possible. MG Montgomery, Deputy Forces Commander UNOSOM directed Malaysian Mechanized Battalion assets and Pakistani tanks be made available to the QRF. At 1838hrs MG Montgomery, US Forces Commander, contacted BG Gile, who was located at the TFR JOC and directed him to take command of the operation. At 1840hrs LTC David reports that the Tiger element is now consolidated and will begin the move back to the airfield. At 1845hrs COL Casper directs the TF 2-25 Commander, LTC Gore to launch a SWT to support TF 2-14. Prior to leaving the K4 area and the burning HUMMVs, LTC David directs Tiger element to use two dismounted platoons to check disabled vehicles. Tiger requests air cover. At 1849hrs 2 SWTs cover QRC movement.

At 1858hrs COL Casper directs LTC David to recall Tiger elements to the airfield. No search of vehicles needed because all Rangers at that location were accounted for. As the Tiger element egressed to the airfield they again passed the TFR HUMMVs and were again engaged by small arms fire which was suppressed by a heavy volume of fire from the Tiger element.

Prior to 1900hrs BG Gile and COL Casper coordinate and plan the task organization and mission for the follow on operation. At 1905hrs, LTC David directs Major Munch, the Battalion Executive Officer to move the entire battalion, with combat trains to the airfield. At 1907hrs LTC David returns to the airfield. AT 1912hrs TFR OPCONS a platoon size ranger element with 4 HUMMVs to the QRF. Tiger element returns to airfield at 1914 hrs and immediately rearms from the TFR ASP. At 1922 the TFR JOC reports that the Rangers are consolidated and pinned down in the vicinity of grid coordinate 36242679.

At 1935hrs COL Casper and his battle staff with LNOs board aircraft to move to airfield to plan the rescue. He and his staff linked up with LTC David and LTC Gore at the airfield terminal. Initial mission analysis was conducted and the route was planned for movement to New Port. LTC David issued the order to move out. At 1945 the Division Surgeon reports the 46th CSH has received 22 casualties.

At 2020 A Co. reports he has closed on the airfield. At 2025 COL Casper and staff arrive at airfield and begin parallel planning with 2-14. At about 2045 BG Gile, COL Casper, LTC David, LTC Gore and TFR meet at the airfield to discuss the concept of the operations and link-up with the Rangers on the objective. At 2052 LTC David directed his elements to move to New Port. Shortly thereafter, the QRF S2 reports grid locations for downed aircraft as follows: Site 1, grid coordinate 36142685. Site 2, grid coordinate 36402625. Bravo company reports to airfield at 2056hrs. COL Casper and battle staff arrive at New Port to continue planning the operation.

At about 2100hrs COL Casper receives a change in the

mission from BG Gile. BG Gile directs COL Casper to effect link-up with the Rangers at the northern crash site first. If the tactical situation permits, LTC David is to proceed to the southern crash site to rescue survivors or recover bodies. At 2130 LTC David links up with Malaysians and Pakistanis. He briefs the plan to all elements with graphics which were copied by all elements. LTC David was now in command of 32 Malaysian wheeled APCs with each vehicle containing a Malaysian vehicle commander, driver and gunner, a Pakistani tank company, C/2-14(QRC), B/2-14, A/2-14 in reserve, a platoon from C/1-87, AT platoon/2-14, and approximately 4 HUMMVs and 40 Rangers from TFR. The plan was to lead with the tanks followed by APCs. LTC David briefed the two QRF LNOs on what he expected. 1LT Ben Mathews was in the lead tank as the LNO to the Pakistanis and 1LT John Breen was the LNO to the Malaysians.

At 2210hrs the QRF S3 informs QRF battle captain of intended route and mission and that elements will begin to move to the objective at 2300hrs. At 2200hrs LTC Gore, call sign Raven 6 continues to coordinate the direct fire air support and deconflict air space between TFR helicopters and 2-25 helicopters. 2-25 covers convoy to CP 207 and hands off to TFR. 2-25 aircraft include Coyote 06, controlling a 1:2 SWT; Rebel 13, OH58D; Raven 06(LTC Gore) and Courage 54 in command and control UH60.

COL Casper reports there are problems with the Pakistanis and the order of march. At 2256hrs COL Casper reports that Malaysians will now lead the order of march with 2 APCs and the Pakistanis will follow. This changes again and the Pakistanis do, in fact, lead the column. At 2303hrs OH58D reports the route of march appears clear of roadblocks

At 2323hrs OH58D reports observing 3 suspected technicals. At 2324hrs the QRF with Malaysian and Pakistani support depart the New Port for the objective. SWT will guide the QRF to the objective.

About one kilometer outside of New Port the Pakistani tanks encountered a roadblock and the Pakistani commander refused to go through in fear that it was mined. 1LT Matthews fired a magazine of 5.56 ammo into the roadblock, told the commander to go through. The Pakistani commander complied.

The convoy continued east to CP 77 and turned north to CP 69. At CP 69 the Pakistani commander was informed by his commander that he could no longer lead the column. The Malaysian APCs then took the lead. Then two APCs took a wrong turn and were engaged and destroyed by RPG fire. 500 meters past CP 207 the tanks were ambushed by machine gun and RPG fire. Seven to ten RPGs were fired at the lead tank. The tank stopped and returned fire. It took several minutes for 1LT Mathews to get the column moving again. The tank company passed the road leading to the crash site and secured the far west end of National Street.

The Terminator element, carried by the Malaysian

APCs, continued west toward the Olympic Hotel and reports receiving fire on National Street at 2359hrs. Shortly thereafter at 0013hrs heavy fire is reported coming from the south side of National Street. Terminator was engaged by effective sniper fire from the Olympic Hotel. The company dismounted and took three WIA. MK19s neutralized the enemy at the hotel. It was a considerably long time before the column resumed movement. The delay was caused by the Malaysian commander's concern about his APCs that had turned south and separated from the main column.

Coyote 06 (SWT) moves into position to engage targets on the south side of National Street. At 0050 the QRF Tiger element reports it is 300-500 meters past CP 207. Four minutes later, CPT Whetstone, the Tiger Commander reports 2 WIA from his unit. At this time the airfield reports an explosion, source undetermined.

At 0056hrs King 57 reports that no friendly activity is observed in the vicinity of the crash site at 36402625. Following this report LTC David reports at 0103 that dismounted troops are moving into the southern objective area and that he will attempt to guide them.

At 0120hrs LTC Gore attempts to get Terminator element to mark enemy targets for SWT to engage.

Terminator Commander reports at 0134hrs that he is working his unit onto the northern objective with assistance from King 57 and the IR laser. Four minutes later Terminator reports he is within 100m of the northern objective.

At 0142hrs it is reported that 2 Malaysian APCs are disabled. One is reported burning, the other is reported inoperative. At 0145hrs the Tiger element reports it is moving in on the Southern objective mounted. At 0155hrs Terminator reports link up at northern objective with Rangers. Three minutes later the Tiger element reports it is 100 meters off of southern objective.

At 0205 the Terminator element reports they can account for 22 Rangers so far. At 0226hrs COL Casper directs that elements on the objectives egress to the Pakistani camp in the stadium. He orders to coordinate MEDEVAC to fly from the Pakistani stadium. QRF TOC notified the Pakistanis and MEDEVAC of these directives.

At 0228hrs the Tiger element is reported on the southern objective. LTC David reports that both companies are on their respective objectives. He states that Tiger has not located any Rangers so far but that Terminator is still linking up with the Rangers at the northern location. He explains that time on the northern objective will be longer than southern objective because of a body trapped under the aircraft wreckage.

LTC David reports that Malaysians have one KIA and several WIA. At 0244hrs Terminator requests more transport APCs for passengers, otherwise overflow will walk out. Shortly after this report at 0257hrs Tiger reports receiving heavy machine gun and RPG fire at southern objective.

During the time that the companies were on the objective, hundreds of RPG rounds are reported fired at the APCs and ground forces.

At 0307hrs COL Casper provides BG Gile a situation report: Terminator element, minus one platoon, is still on northern objective and has recovered all KIA and WIA except one soldier who is trapped in the helicopter. He informs BG Gile that LTC David has instructed Terminator not to leave the site until the body is recovered. Tiger, at the southern objective has had no contact with any Rangers or any crew members. Tiger is using thermite grenades to destroy sensitive equipment and render aircraft inoperative. No Rangers or equipment were found. He reports further that there are many casualties, no numbers available and that 2 APCs were hit. MEDEVAC issue is being worked. Egress will be to Pakistani stadium and TFR will provide air cover.

At 0337hrs LTC David reports that 3, maybe 4 APCs are hit by enemy fire and that 1 or more is burning. Reports many casualties and that it will take longer on the objective. Has received report that crew from southern site may be in a building south of crash site. Requests guidance whether to continue search based on this report.

At 0344hrs the Joint Operations Center(JOC) reports that bandits are starting to move out of Villa Somalia. Directs that all aircraft stand off so that mortars may be fired by the Pakistanis at SP1. Later at 0409hrs the JOC reports that the Pakistanis have secured the egress route from the stadium to SP 207. At the same time LTC David reports multiple mortar rounds impacting within 40 meters of his location. At 0418hrs the JOC reports that the Pakistanis will fire 40 mortar rounds into Villa Somalia in 2 minutes.

At 0420hrs the Pakistanis report that egress route is no longer clear. From 0427hrs to 0429hrs aircraft continued to work with Terminator element to identify and engage targets. At 0431hrs the 2-14 TOC reports to ORF HQ to be prepared for 40-50 WIAs. At 0444 Terminator reports 100accountability and is conducting link up with crew on south objective.

Between 0445hrs and 0450hrs Tiger links up with Terminator platoon leader(Terminator 26) on southern objective and reports they are now attempting to move with APCs. Tiger reports difficulty linking up with the Terminator platoon 300 meters south because of heavy enemy forces sandwiched between the platoon and Tiger. Tiger directs MH6 mini guns and rocket fire on enemy positions. Following suppression of the enemy positions the Malaysian Company Commander led the three APCs to pick up the platoon.

At 0505hrs a body is reported still trapped in aircraft at northern objective and is KIA. The Pakistanis report they will enter the stadium from the North through checkpoint 33. At 0524hrs the Malaysian APCs, carrying C/2-14 passed CP 207. The ORF TOC directs 2-25 to destroy

any abandoned APC's left by the Malaysians.

At 0528hrs Terminator extracts body from aircraft at northern objective and at 0537hrs departs objective area to return to base. At 0554hrs Terminator requests Malaysian APCs to return down National street to pick up additional passengers. LTC David directs that overflow personnel ride on top of the APCs.

At 0545hrs TF 2-25 reports ZSU 23-2 anti-aircraft gun fire from the vicinity of Olympic Hotel and National Street. TFR moves north to 21 October Road while AH-1s from TF 2-25 engage with 20mm cannon and 2.75 rockets. The target is neutralized. At 0604hrs the SWT destroys APCs on the southern objective. At 0608hrs it is reported that there are still Rangers dismounted. Falcon 16 states he has 2 APCs at SP 207 and will move to assist. LTC David orders movement stopped until Rangers are picked up.

At 0620hrs LTC David reports all personnel are now with vehicles and orders march to resume. TF 2-25 reports it has destroyed the disabled APCs.

At 0632hrs LTC David reports QRF and Task Force Ranger are closed on the Stadium. Charlie Company, 1-87 infantry reports it has 8 vehicles at the airfield and 2 vehicles at the Pakistani stadium. He reports 1 WIA and 1 pair of PVS-7 missing. All QRF LNOs are accounted for. At 0717hrs LTC David reports to the 2-14 TOC unit casualties as 1 KIA, 14 WIA. Final casualty report was 1 KIA, 22 WIA. At 0725hrs LTC Gore reports all aircraft and personnel are accounted for.

LAWRENCE E. CASPER  
COL, AV  
Commanding

TIME	EVENT
1350	<p>REPORTS POSSIBLE SALAD/QEYDID MTG AT HOUSE NEAR VIC OLYMPIC HOTEL (GRG SHEET 24, 12.8/M.8; UTM NH36122665)</p>
1403	<p>RECCE LAUNCH (2 x H-530 &amp; 1 x OH-58D); REEF POINT PREVIOUSLY ON STATION.</p>
1410	<p>COORDS PASSED TO CAPT DONAHUE (UNOSOM LNO). CONFIRMED NO NGO IN VICINITY OF TARGET. MG MONTGOMERY NOTIFIED.</p>
1415	<p>REPORTS SOURCE/SIGNAL MAY HAVE OCCURRED PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF RECCE.</p>
1424	<p>RECCE REPORTS WHITE TOYOTA LAND CRUISER PARKED IN FRONT OF HOTEL - FITS DESCRIPTION GIVEN BY SOURCE.</p>
1427	<p>SOURCE VEHICLE (SILVER WITH RED STRIPES ON DOORS) STOPPED IN FRONT OF TARGET HOUSE AND RAISED HOOD LAW PREARRANGED INSTRUCTIONS TO LET US KNOW HE WAS AT TARGET.</p>
1434	<p>WILL REMAIN ON MEETING HOUSE LOCATION; WILL TRACK WHITE TOYOTA VEHICLE.</p>
1447	<p>SOURCE MAY NOT HAVE GIVEN PREARRANGED SIGNAL IN FRONT OF TARGET HOUSE (GAVE SIGNAL ONLY TO LET US KNOW HE WAS IN THE VICINITY; RECCE POSSIBLY ON WRONG TARGET; J2 ATTEMPTING TO RECONFIRM/PINPOINT ACTUAL TARGET LOCATION.</p>
1450	<p>SOURCE WILL DRIVE AROUND BLOCK AGAIN AND GIVE SIGNAL TO RECONFIRM TARGET LOCATION (APPROX LOCATION 1 BLOCK NORTHEAST OLYMPIC HOTEL; GRG SHEET 24, 12.9/M.5.</p>

TIME	EVENT
1459	SOURCE CONFIRMED TARGET. RECCE MANEUVERING TO PROVIDE VIDEO OF BOTH SIDES OF BUILDING. RECCE ADVISES THIS AREA HAS REPORTED NUMEROUS SMALL ARMS FIRE IN RECENT PAST. AIRCREWS/GROUND FORCES BRIEF MISSION.
1505	CONFIRMED AIRSPACE DECONFLICTION WITH QRF HELOS.
1509	RECCE PROVIDES OBSTACLE/HAZZARD INFO ON PLANNED HLZS.
1519	[REDACTED] REPORTS 1+00 FUEL ON-STATION REMAINING = 1+10.
1523	[REDACTED] (AH-6) FLIGHT REPOS TO FARP
1527	ASSAULT FORCE ROUTE PASSED TO RECCE; [REDACTED] FLIGHT WILL HAVE ROCKETS - NO PREPLANNED FIRES AT THIS TIME. CONVOY ROUTE (K4 - NATIONAL - OLYMPIC) 9 x HMMWV & 3 x 5-TONS: WILL DEPART WHEN HELO FORCE DEPARTS AIRFIELD.
1529	ASSAULT FORCE PAX LOADED AND READY FOR LAUNCH
1530	RECCE REPORTS 2 x ROADBLOCKS (BURNING TIRES) VIC INTXN 21 OCT RD AND NATIONAL. ROUTE CHECKED AGAINST POSSIBLE LAND MINE LOCATIONS
1532	HELO ASSAULT FORCE LAUNCHES
1535	GROUND REACTION FORCE CONVOY DEPARTS TF RANGER COMPOUND
1537	INITIATE ASSAULT CODEWORD PASSED TO ALL ELEMENTS
1540	RECCE PASSES CONVOY ROUTE IS CLEAR OF ALL OBSTRUCTIONS.
1542	HELO ASSAULT COMMENCES ON TARGET/EXACT TARGET BUILDING UNKNOWN/CITY BLOCK WILL BE CLEARED
1543	SUPER 61 REPORTS GROUND FORCE HITTING THE GROUND; RECCE IS PROVIDING FLIGHT FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCE

TIME	EVENT
1545	GROUND REACTION FORCE AT PREPLANNED HOLD POINT
1546	AK-47s SIGHTED/REPORTED IN COMPOUND; ██████████ REPORTS FORCES TOO CLOSE TO HOTEL TO FIRE ROCKETS
1547	LARGE CROWD COMING UP NATIONAL TOWARD TARGET. * GROUND FORCES REPORT SPORADIC GROUND FIRE CONTACT - NO KIA/WIA
1550	SUPER 61 REPORTS FRIENDLIES ON ROOF OF TARGET BUILDING.
1551	RECCE REPORTS 8-9 ENEMY (MILITIA) APPROX ONE BLOCK OVER AND ENROUTE TO TARGET.
1553	RPG/SMALL ARMS FIRES REPORTED 1 BLOCK EAST NEXT TO GREEN WATER TANK; GROUND REACTION FORCE MOVES TO EFFECT LINK UP WITH ASSAULT FORCE.
1555	SUPER 62 WILL ENGAGE GREEN WATER TANK; MAN WITH RPG RAN DOWN STREET AND IS IN SMALL SHACK - BARBER WILL ENGAGE. WOMEN/CHILDREN IN AREA; STAR ELE TO RTB FOR FARP.
1558	RPG REPORTED HIT 5-TON - ONE WIA (GUNSHOT TO LEG) AND VEHICLE DISABLED.
1600	RECCE REPORTS TROOPS WITH AK-47s MOVING TOWARD TARGET.
1602	██████████ REPORTS 9 x PC WITH POSSIBLE PRINCIPAL CAPTURED.
1604	ALL FORCES TO BEGIN COLLAPSING TO BUILDING #1 FOR LINK UP AND GROUND EXFIL OF ALL FORCES AND PC. WILL USE BLDG #1 ROOF PZ IF REQUIRED.
1610	SUPER 61 REPORTS RPG BURST OVER TARGET; LOCATION OF FIRES PASSED TO BARBER.
1613	██████████ REPORTS ONE CRITICAL WIA WILL EVACUATE BY GROUND ASAP; HELOS WILL PROVIDE GUNS AS REQUIRED. ██████████ AT BLDG #1 FOR EXFIL. <span style="float: right;">6001</span>

TIME	EVENT
1620	SUPER 61 SHOT DOWN BY RPG - SOLAMIS APPROACHING CRASH SITE. GRG SHEET 24, 16.2/0.7, UTM NH 36142685. GROUND REACTION FORCE (██████████) MOVING TO SECURE CRASH SITE. SURVIVORS CLIMBING OUT OF WRECKAGE - ACFT IS NOT ON FIRE. ASSAULT FORCE PERSONNEL (APPROX. 7), SECURING THE POSITION. REPORT: AREA SECURE FOR ██████████ ELE TO EFFECT EXFIL OF CASUALTIES (2X KIA, 2 X WIA).
1622	REPORT: LARGE CROWD OF SOMALIS APPROACHING CRASH SITE.
1624	██████████ HAS LANDED AT CRASH SITE - SUPER 62 PROVIDING COVER - RPG GUNNER REPORTED IN TARGET AREA - BARBER INBOUND.
1626	██████████ WILL MOVE TO CRASH SITE WITH ASLT FORCE AND PC; MOVE TO CRASH SITE #1 APPROXIMATELY 1635. PC ENROUTE BACK TO TF RANGER COMPOUND VIA 5 TON WITH HMMWV SECURITY. ORF ASSISTANCE REQUESTED; ORF TO REPORT TO TF RANGER COMPOUND TO LINK-UP.
1628	SUPER 68 (SAR) INFILS SST AT CRASH. - SUPER 68 HIT BY RPG - REQUIRE RTB ASAP.
1630	SUPER 68 LANDS TF RANGER COMPOUND. CREW TRANSLOADS TO SPARE AIRCRAFT.
1631	██████████ EXFIL 2 X WIA FROM CRASH.
1634	REPORT: RPG FIRE 200 METERS EAST OF CRASH SITE.
1641	SUPER 64 IS DOWN - RPG; GRID 36402625, SUPER 62 FASTROPES 2 X SNIPERS ON SITE. ██████████ DIRECTS ASSAULT FORCE ASSIST ASAP. REPORTS: LARGE CROWD MOVING TOWARD SECOND CRASH SITE.
1644	RPGs BEING LAUNCHED FROM NUMEROUS LOCATIONS.
1654	██████████ REPORTS NUMEROUS CASUALTIES (NUMBERS/TYPE UNKNOWN).

TIME	EVENT
1655	UNABLE TO LEAVE CRASH SITE #1 - CANNOT RECOVER 1 X KIA IN AIRCRAFT.
1656	REPORTS HEAVY SNIPER FIRES.
1701	SUPER 62 TAKING REGULAR/CLOSE RPG FIRE; MOST FROM WEST SIDE OF 2ND CRASH SITE.
1703	SECOND RANGER GROUND (GRF) ELE RECONSTITUTED AS RECOVERY FORCE FOR 2ND CRASH SITE. (27 PAX ON 7 HMMWV'S).
1710	GRF ARRIVES COMPOUND.
1713	PC W/SECURITY AND WIA'S ENROUTE TO TF RANGER COMPOUND. CONTINUING TO CRASH SITE #1 UNDER HEAVY FIRE.
1715	ELE RTB TO FARP.
1720	GRF #2 APPROACHING 2ND CRASH SITE; ROAD HAS BEEN BLOCKED WITH TIRE FIRES; GRF #2 RECEIVING HEAVY FIRE.
1723	RTB TO FARP; REQ RETURN TO CRASH SITE #1 TO RECONSTITUTE. U64 HAS NUMEROUS CASUALTIES - CANNOT RETURN TO CRASH SITE.
1726	ELEMENTS MOVE OVERLAND TO CRASH SITE #1 AND SECURED.
1727	SUPER 62 HIT - GOING DOWN AT NEW PORT - REQ MEDEVAC ASAP - NUMEROUS CASUALTIES.
1730	SUPER 68 (SPARE) ENROUTE TO NEW PORT TO EVACUATE CASUALTIES.
1734	2 X URGENT CASUALTIES AT NORTHERN CRASH SITE - NEED GRF ASSIST ASAP; ALSO LIVE CASUALTIES AT SOUTHERN SITE STILL IN ACFT - NEED GRF TO SECURE THAT SITE ALSO.
1735	GRF DPT FOR CRASH SITE #2.

TIME	EVENT
1740	GRF #2 LINK-UP W/ [REDACTED] (-) AT K-4 CIRCLE. GRF #2 ATTEMPTING DIFFERENT ROUTES; RECEIVING HEAVY FIRE WHEREVER HE GOES; CHANCE LINK-UP [REDACTED] (-) RETURNING TO COMPOUND) TRANSLOAD PC AND WIA FROM DISABLED VEHICLES - ENTIRE FORCE RTB.
1743	SUPER 68 WILL PICK UP REMAINING PAX AT SUPER 62 (NEW PORT)
1744	[REDACTED] CONTINUES TAKING RPG FIRES (APPROX 50M NORTH OF 2ND CRASH SITE); [REDACTED] REPORTS AIRCRAFT HAS TAKEN NUMEROUS ROUNDS - CAN STILL FLY.
1745	QRF IN FIRE FIGHT VIC K-4 CIRCLE; WILL PROCEED TO CRASH SITES ASAP.
1746	SOMALI ROAD BLOCK BEING BUILT AT 2ND CRASH SITE - BARBER WILL ENGAGE TO DISSIPATE CROWDS.
1751	REQ EOD TO DISARM POSS ACTIVE GRENADE AT TF RANGER COMPOUND ON REMAINS - 10TH MIN NOTIFIED (TF RANGER EOD W/ASSAULT FORCE.
1755	[REDACTED] REPORTS RUNNING SHORT OF AMMO AND MED SUPPLIES.
1758	[REDACTED] - RIGHT GUN JAMMED - WILL RTB AND GET IT REPLACED.
1801	[REDACTED] ROCKETS ONLY CAPABLE - AT CRASH SITE #1
1808	[REDACTED] TAKING FIRES - NO DAMAGE.
1810	QRF (VAN ARSDALE W/EN C2) PINNED DOWN AT K-4 CIRCLE.
1820	[REDACTED] REPORTS AMMO GETTING CRITICAL.
1830	SUPER 68 WILL RTB & P/U AMMO AND IV BAGS//QRF RECONSTITUTES FORCE AFTER BREAKS IN CONTACT CAUSED BY AMBUSH; RTB TF RANGER COMPOUND.

TIME	EVENT
1836	NUMEROUS RPG LAUNCHES IN VIC N-CRASH SITE; STILL HAVE ONE BODY TRAPPED IN ACFT - UNABLE TO GET DUE TO NUMEROUS SMALL ARMS.
1854	<sup>HH-6</sup> [REDACTED] BREAK FROM K-4 AND RTB NORTH CRASH SITE.
1855	<sup>HH-6</sup> [REDACTED] TAKING RPG FIRES
1856	NORTH CRASH SITE STILL WORKING RECOVERY OF BODY FROM ACFT - WILL NOT LEAVE THE BODY.

TIME	EVENTS
1900	PLAN APPROVED FOR QRF TO MOVE TO CRASH SITE W/2 X MALAYSIAN MECH COMPANIES & 1 X PAKISTANI ARMOR PLT.
1908	SUPER 66 WILL DROP RESUPPLY ITEMS ( [REDACTED] ) AT CRASH SITE #1; PZ MARKED BY IR STROBE; [REDACTED] SUPPORTING WITH GUNS. ASSUME FRIENDLIES AT THE STROBES. TAKING FIRES FROM 9-0'CLOCK; RESUPPLY SUCCESSFUL. AT LEAST 20 ENEMY WITH AK'S IN VIC.
1926	[REDACTED] REQUESTS QRF GET TO CRASH SITE #1 ASAP!! NEED TO LOOK AT DRIVING TO PAKI STADIUM THEN GET AIR EXFIL TO AFLD. [REDACTED] REPORTS 21 OCT HWY IS CLEAR/QUIET.
1947	REPORT FROM [REDACTED]. PILOT STILL PINNED IN CRASH, WILL NEED JAWS TO RETRIEVE HIM, REQUESTS EVAC (AGAIN) FOR 2 X CRITICALLY WOUNDED PAX ASAP.
2025	[REDACTED] ADVISES THAT "IF QRF DOES NOT GET THERE (NORTH CRASH) SOON, THERE WILL BE MORE KIAS FROM PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED WIA; GET THE ONE STAR TO GET HIS PEOPLE MOVING!"
2027	[REDACTED] ADVISES 1 x CRITICAL WIA AT CRASH SITE #1 IS NOW KIA.
2032	[REDACTED] WILL SPARKLE RPG SITE WHICH JUST FIRED ON [REDACTED] ELE; [REDACTED] WILL SERVICE.
2035	THERE IS A LOT OF FRUSTRATION OVER QRF/QRC NOT MOVING TO ASSIST. MG GARRISON [REDACTED] AND LTC MCKNIGHT DISCUSSING QRF PLAN OF ATTACK WITH BG GILE AND QRF STAFF.
2100	SITREP CRASH SITES. CRASH SITE #1: 99 TOTAL PAX (13 x WIA/3 x KIA). CRASH SITE #2: NO REPORT, SITUATION - UNKNOWN.
2108	BG GILE REPORTS TO CG - QRF WILL PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO MOVE UNTIL APPROX 2200.


TIME	EVENTS
2130	QRF ENROUTE TO LINKUP WITH MALAYSIANS AT NEW PORT.
2200	QRF ARR NEW PORT/LINK-UP W/PAKIS & MALAYSIANS/FINALIZES PLAN: ESTABLISH HOLDING AREA BETWEEN CRASH SITES; MOVE 1 COMPANY TO EACH CRASH SITE, RECONSTITUTED RANGER FORCE (7 X HMMWV, 56 PAX) TO SECURE AREA/ACT AS RESERVE.
2224	[REDACTED] CALLED. COVERED OPREP 3 REPORT WITH HIM.
2228	MG MONTGOMERY REQUESTS QRF CONVOY ROUTE FOR POSSIBLE "IMPROVEMENT" PLANNING PRIOR TO DEPARTING. NO ESTIMATE ON WHEN CONVOY WILL PROCEED TO CRASH SITES FOR TF RANGER RELIEF.
2230	FINAL PC STATUS: 24 DETAINEES; 1 x WIA 3 x KIA = 24 TOTAL; ENEMY KIA ARE CURRENTLY IN 507TH MORTUARY SUPPORT ELE (AT AFLD).
2300	TELECOM BETWEEN [REDACTED] REQUESTS STOP JAMMING - [REDACTED] SAID NO - NOT UNTIL ALL TF RANGER FORCES RECOVERED; [REDACTED] REQUEST [REDACTED] PUT UP CASH REWARD FOR ANYONE WHO AIDS AMERICANS OR HELPS RECOVER REMAINS; ALSO, TRY TO GET "SOURCES" IN VIC OF CRASH SITES TO INFORM ON WHAT'S GOING ON.
2305	[REDACTED] CALLED [REDACTED] AND REQUESTS PLUS-UP [REDACTED]
2323	QRF DEPARTING NEW PORT.
2345	QRF RECEIVING FIRE ENROUTE TO HOLDING AREA.
2350	QRF ARRIVE HOLDING AREA/A CO DISPATCHED TO CRASH SITE #1.
2353	[REDACTED] <sup>M-6</sup> WILL BREAK FOR FUEL.

TIME	EVENTS
2357	QRF CONVOY AND CRASH SITES TAKING HEAVY SMALL ARMS FIRE. FRIENDLIES BELIEVED SOUTH OF SOUTHERN CRASH SITE BASED ON PLS CODES BEING PICKED UP IN THAT VIC (OLD SAUDI EMBASSY).
0002	QRF BELIEVES LOCATION APPROX 200M FROM TFR CRASH SITE #1 UNDER HEAVY CONTACT. LEAD ELE OF QRF (TF RANGER LNO ELE) HAS QUICKIE SAW TO CUT REMAINING BODY FROM AIRCRAFT.
0026	PAKISTANI TANKS REFUSE TO MOVE ON/APC'S VERY RELUCTANT TO MOVE, BUT EVENTUALLY DO. ROADBLOCK REMOVED BY HAND, BY DISMOUNTED QRF TROOPS.
0036	[REDACTED] RELAYS QRF TROOPS DISMOUNTED WAY TOO SOON. APPROXIMATELY 3-4 BLOCKS FROM TFR FORCES.
0120	[REDACTED] REPORTS QRF APPROX 300M FROM TFR LOCATION.
0122	FRIENDLIES BELIEVED IN ABANDONED BLDG APPROX 100M SOUTH OF OLD SAUDI EMBASSY (CRASH SITE #2).
0148	ENEMY FORCES APPROX 150M EAST OF CRASH SITE #1.
0155	LINK UP BETWEEN TFR AND LEAD QRF ELEMENT; ENSURE GOOD ACCOUNTABILITY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO MOVEMENT & CUT KIA OUT OF ACFT.
0210	QRF ENROUTE TO CRASH SITE (#2)
0227	CRASH SITE #2 SECURE - NO SIGN OF AIRCREW
0230	CG RECEIVES APPROVAL TO BRING REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT INTO THEATER. C5 WILL BRING 5XMH60 AND 2XAH6 WITH SUPPLEMENTAL CREWS.
0239	[REDACTED] REPORTS 4 x BARREL GUN FIRING (POSSIBLY PAKI) HAVE THEM CHECK FIRE. ENEMY ILLUM AT SITE #2.

TIME	EVENTS
0248	QRF (TF RANGER LNO) ADVISES SEVERAL HOURS REQUIRED TO CUT FREE/RECOVER KIA IN ACFT AT SITE #1.
0249	NO BODIES FOUND AT CRASH SITE #2 (SUPER 64) & NO ONE ANSWERS TO AIRCREW'S NAMES IN VIC. (4 X AIRCREW PLUS 2 X [REDACTED] SNIPERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN THERE).
0300	THERMITE GRENADES SET ON CRASH SITE #2 (SOUTH) - NO CONFIRMATION THEY HAVE BEEN LIT.
0336	[REDACTED] RETURNS TO AIRFIELD WITH INOPERATIVE FUEL GAUGE AND "FUEL LOW" LIGHT.
0348	PAKIS REQUEST TO FIRE MORTARS INTO VILLA SOMALIA. (MORTAR POSITION).
0350	REEF POINT VERY BRIEFLY PICKED UP 2 X PLS IN VIC CRASH SITE #2.
0400	[REDACTED] SERVICE RPG LAUNCH LOCATION VIC CRASH SITE #1.
0409	PAKISTANIS CLEARED ROAD FROM PAKI STADIUM TO CP207, NO MINES REPORTED.
0415	[REDACTED] RTB FOR MAIN ROTOR BLADE REPLACEMENT, ESTIMATED 30 MIN DOWN TIME.
0420	PHONECON FROM [REDACTED] REPORT: 2 X APC'S REPORTED HIT BY RPG'S VICINITY GRID NH363265. REQUESTING ASSISTANCE FROM TF RANGER GUN HELOS. PASSED TO TF GREEN.
0424	PAKISTANIS RPT THEY HAVE NOT CLEARED ROAD FM STADIUM TO CP207. PAKIS HAVE A GUIDE TO RDVZ W [REDACTED] AT CP ON NATIONAL.
0438	[REDACTED] QUERYING AVAIL OF ADDITIONAL TRANSPORT TO PICK UP DISMOUNTED TROOPS.

TIME	EVENTS
0453	<p><sup>ASCT</sup> RPTS HE HAS 200 DISMOUNTED, (QRF/ASSAULT FORCE/RGR BLOCKING FORCE) WILL LINK W/TRANS ON NATIONAL ONCE BODY RECOVERED.</p>
0500	<p><sup>ASCT</sup> QUERY ABOUT POSSIBLE RESUPPLY OF 5.56/40MM/AND WATER TO <sup>ASCT</sup> ADVISES REDISTRIBUTE FM VEHICLES, HIGH HELO THREAT. STILL AT LEAST 20 MINUTES TO CUT BODY FROM WRECKAGE.</p>
0515	<p><sup>ASCT</sup> RPTS ATTEMPTING TO CUT OUT MAJORITY OF BODY FM WRECKAGE.</p>
0523	<p><sup>LNO</sup> RPTS NO CONTROL OVER MALAYSIAN VEHICLES, APC'S ABANDONED DRAGON 6 POSITION, MALAYS APPEAR RETURNING TO PAKI STADIUM.</p>
0530	<p>BODY RECOVERED. DESTRUCTIVE CHARGES SET ON HELLO. <sup>ASCT</sup> PROVIDING COVER FIRE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CRASH SITE #1.</p>
0542	<p><sup>ASCT</sup> MOVING ALL ELEMENTS OUT OF TGT SITE. <sup>ASCT</sup> ELE CONTINUES FIRE SUPPORT.</p>
0550	<p>TERMINATOR &amp; KILO ELEMS LINKING UP WITH DRAGON ELE.</p>
0605	<p>NOT ENOUGH TRANSPORT, 50 PAX STILL DISMOUNTED. <sup>ASCT</sup> REQUESTING MORE APC'S.</p>
0610	<p>30 PAX OF KILO MOUNTING APC'S.</p>
0620	<p>ALL PAX LOADED, CONVOY MOVING OUT.</p>
0627	<p>COBRA'S MAKING TOW SHOT ON ABANDONED APC'S.</p>
0630	<p>CONVOY PULLING IN TO PAKI STADIUM.</p>
0715	<p>CONFIRMING NAMES OF 20 PAX RTB TO NEW PORT SO <sup>ASCT</sup> CAN CHECK HIS HEADCOUNT.</p>
0720	<p><sup>ASCT</sup> RTB</p>


TIME	EVENTS
0734	[REDACTED] ELE ALL ON STUNBY AT FAARP
0745	[REDACTED] FEELS THAT 2 SNIPERS INSERTED TO CRASH SITE 2 ARE POSSIBLY RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING BODIES AND ROUTE FM SITE. MIGHT BE IN HIDING NEAR SITE
0810	BEGIN SHUTTLE OF RANGERS FM STADIUM RIB NET MONITORING WEAK INTERMITTENT TRANSMISSIONS FM VIC OF CRASH SITE 2.
0815	[REDACTED] POSSIBLE BEACON TRANSMISSION, FREQ BEING INVESTIGATED.
0827	[REDACTED] BEING LAUNCHED. [REDACTED] BEING STOOD DOWN.
0845	VOICE CAME IN OVER BEACON SAYING "MY ARM IS BROKEN" ATTEMPTING TO DF SOURCE.
0915	CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH COMMS WITH BEACON STATION UNSUCCESSFUL. BEACON BEING TURNED ON AND OFF.
0916	GROUND COMMANDERS REPORT ALL PERS ACCOUNTED FOR EXCEPT FOR THE 4 CREWMEMBERS AND 2 SNIPERS INSERTED INTO CRASH SITE 2.



\* NOTE  
CORNER'S AND  
SHIPPING  
CONTAINERS  
AROUND COMPOUND.

PICTURE A

TF RANGER RAISING OLD GLORY OVER COMPOUND  
FOR THE FIRST TIME.




\*  
BACK  
WALL OF  
COMPOUND

\*  
BACK WALL  
OF COMPOUND

PICTURE B

B Co. 3/75 RGR REGT AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE  
BLACK SEA ON 3-4 OCTOBER 1994.



PICTURE C  
JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF  
BULLET-PROOF GLASS.



PICTURE D  
RPG PENETRATED HMMWV FULL WITH APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN  
PERSONNEL. ROUND IMPACTED TWO 60mm MORTAR CANS FILLED WITH  
.50 CAL AMMUNITION, WHICH MUFFLED EXPLOSION. MSG TIM "GRIZ" MARTIN  
WAS KILLED IN THE EXPLOSION.



PICTURE E

RPG HIT PFC KALLMAN'S DOOR WHILE DRIVING TO CRASH #1. HE ONLY SUSTAINED BRUISES TO HIS LEFT SIDE.



PICTURE F

THE ARMOR AND BULLET-PROOF GLASS IN THIS SPECIAL DOOR SERVED ITS PURPOSE IN DEFLECTING THE RPG.