

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

BRAVO COMPANY

1st BATTALION, 504th PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT

20 DECEMBER 1989

Captain Daniel Walrath

IOAC 1-93

At approximately 0100 on 20 December 1989, the United States invaded the Republic of Panama to remove General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power and to neutralize the country's military, the Panamian Defense Force (PDF). The invasion was based on the contingency operations plan 'BLUE SPOON' and was later named Operation Just Cause. During Operation Just Cause, I participated in the H-Hour assaults as the rifle platoon leader of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment of the 82d Airborne Division.

On 15 December 1989, 1st Battalion, 504th PIR, assumed the role as the Division Ready Force 1 (DRF1). The DRF1 battalion is at the highest state of readiness and prepared to deploy worldwide by parachute assault with only 18 hours notice. To accomplish this task, the DRF1 battalion pre-rigs ammunition, food supplies, and vehicles for parachute delivery. Each soldier's individual equipment is packed according to a standard packing list, and all weapons and equipment are fully mission capable. Finally, all soldiers in the battalion are placed on alert recall so that the battalion can be fully assembled within two hours of notification. The DRF1 role is standard procedure in the 82d Airborne Division and continually rotates among the nine battalions in the division. On 15 December 1989, the 1st Battalion, 504th PIR, was ready to deploy to combat anywhere in the world.

At 0900, on 18 December 1989, the 1st Battalion, 504th PIR, received a red notification. The Company First Sergeant, 1SG Gregory Duhon, began assembling the company. This was accomplished within 30 minutes since everyone was already at work. I reported to the Company Commander, Captain Charles Thrash, to receive a warning order. CPT Thrash told the assembled platoon leaders and platoon sergeants that the battalion was going to conduct an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) on the Fort Bragg reservation. EDRE's are simulated emergency deployments used as training exercises to rehearse an actual deployment outload. EDRE's are regular occurrences in the 82d, and we had all participated in one before. However, the killing of a Marine officer by the PDF over the past weekend and the increased media hype over a possible U.S. military response led all of us to believe that the red notification was more than an EDRE on Fort Bragg.

By 1300, we had drawn all our weapons, night vision goggles, radios, and individual rucksacks. By 1400, we had loaded trucks and occupied the division personnel holding area (PHA). The PHA is a secure compound used to isolate units during the planning and marshalling phases of a deployment. The compound is several acres in size and contains quonset huts for temporary shelter and several large open areas for ammunition issue, vehicle marshalling,

rehearsals, and airborne pre-jump training. The entire compound is guarded and surrounded by fence and wire. No one, to include the media, is allowed access. The 2d Battalion, 504th PIR, (DRF2) and 4th Battalion, 325th AIR, (DRF3) were also arriving in the PHA along with flatbed trucks loaded with live ammunition. Once we were secure in the PHA, CPT Thrash gathered the entire company together and informed us that the battalion was going to participate in the invasion of Panama and that the battalion objective was the 2d Infantry Company (PDF) garrison at Tinajitas.

While the battalion staff prepared the operations order, we began manifesting for the upcoming airborne operation, and each soldier in the company received his individual issue of ammunition. These activities were supervised by my Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant Joseph Sedach.

The operations order was issued by late afternoon to all of the officers in the battalion operations center building. The battalion mission was to neutralize the 2d Infantry Company (PDF) at Tinajitas, vicinity PA647018, to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the Commandancia in Panama City to the south. The Commandancia was the PDF Headquarters and the main objective of Task Force Gator, consisting of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry (Mechanized), and elements from the 193d Infantry Brigade.

The operation would be conducted in two phases. First, 1-504 would conduct an airborne assault on the Omar Torrijos/Tocumen airfield complex at H+:45 (0145). The battalion would jump as part of a brigade airborne assault with 2-504 and 4-325. However, prior to our jump, the 1st Ranger Battalion, reinforced with a company from 3d Ranger Battalion, would jump at H-Hour (0100) to destroy the 1st Infantry Company (PDF) garrisoned at Tocumen airfield and secure the International Terminal at Omar Torrijos airfield. My battalion would reinforce 1st Ranger Battalion, if required. Second, 1-504 would air assault from a PZ on Omar Torrijos airfield to LZ Leopard and assault Tinajitas to neutralize the 2d Infantry Company. According to the plan, both the parachute and helicopter assaults would be conducted during the hours of darkness (See Figure 1).

The rules of engagement were also significant to the operation. To minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties, we would use 'measured response' during our assault on Tinajitas. Once the battalion occupied its assault positions, we would give the enemy the opportunity to surrender. If the PDF refused, then we would demonstrate our firepower with small arms firing and then close air support attacks. These demonstrations would increase in intensity until the PDF surrendered. If it became apparent

that the PDF would not surrender, we would assault the PDF barracks.

Following the battalion operations order, each company attended a situation briefing given by the Battalion Intelligence Officer with the aid of a large terrain board of Torrijos/Tocumen airfield and overhead photographs of the airfield and the objective area. CPT Thrash then gathered me, 2LT Scott Sweetser (2d PLT LDR), 2LT Will Harty (3d PLT LDR), and 1LT Thornton Cutler (XO) and issued an abbreviated company operations order. We were greatly assisted in the planning process by the availability of several oblique photographs of the Tinajitas garrison.

Late on the evening of the 18th, I issued my platoon operations order. SSG Sedach, SSG Dennis Etheridge (1st Squad Leader), SGT Buck Rogers (2d Squad Leader), SGT Dale Wheatle (3d Squad Leader), SGT Henry Pfeffer (Weapons Squad Leader), and the rest of the platoon were in attendance. The company would jump onto Torrijos Airfield and assemble in a company perimeter midway down the airfield between the main runway and the taxiway (See Figure 2). The 1SG would mark the assembly area with a green '2' STINER AID. Alpha Company would air assault to LZ Leopard first, and on order, Bravo Company would then move to a helicopter pickup zone, load ten UH60 Blackhawks, and air assault to LZ Leopard. Charlie Company would insert after Bravo. Bravo Company would occupy an assault position on the southern side of Tinajitas with Alpha to the right and Charlie to the left. If an assault was necessary, Alpha would assault on the right flank to seize an intermediate objective consisting of an observation post building located on a high spur extending 400m from the southeastern corner of the garrison. With Alpha now providing support by fire, Bravo and Charlie would then assault the main barracks building from the south. The 1st Platoon would be the lead assault element for Bravo, and I planned to have my three rifle squads on line (See Figure 3).

During the planning phase, I had coordinated with the units that would be adjacent to 1st Platoon during the assault. The 3d Platoon, Alpha, led by 2LT Chuck Hensley, would be to my right, and 3d Platoon, Charlie, led by 2LT Robert Friedenbergh, would be to my left. We all coordinated our axis of advance, orientation of fires, and fire control signals.

On 19 December, 1st Platoon rehearsed the react to contact drill and the platoon assault. The battalion later rehearsed the drop zone assembly and movement to the PZ. The remainder of the day was consumed by manifest calls and airborne pre-jump training. Around 1700, each aircraft load walked the half mile to GREEN RAMP on Pope AFB. The parking ramp was overflowing with over forty C141 Starlifter

aircraft. Twenty C141's would air drop the brigade's heavy equipment, and the remaining twenty would carry troops for the jump. Under jumpmaster supervision, each chalk began rigging its parachutes and loading its respective aircraft. My aircraft, chalk number 5, took off around 1930.

The weather at Fort Bragg played a significant role during the planning phase, and its effects would be felt long after we departed. On 18 and 19 December, the temperature had hovered around 29°F with a freezing rain. Prior to rigging, every soldier stripped all of his undergarments off since the temperature in Panama would be in the 80's. This meant everyone had to endure the freezing temperatures for over two hours with nothing more than a lightweight BDU top to protect him. The freezing rain was also causing ice to form on the surfaces of the aircraft. The de-icing machines could not keep up. By the time they had de-iced the last aircraft, the first one had already iced over again.

I do not remember much of the flight. I slept for most of the five hours. About one hour before our scheduled drop time, the Brigade Operations Officer, who was on my aircraft, addressed us over the loudspeaker. He explained that the ice storm had caused some delays and that only the first eight aircraft would make the scheduled drop time. He further explained that 1st Ranger Battalion was already on the ground and reporting sporadic enemy resistance and small arms fire.

The jumpmasters began hollering the jump commands to the 115 paratroopers loaded down with their heavy gear. Everyone was now so busy hooking up, checking static lines, and checking equipment that our collective anxiety disappeared. The doors opened, the jumpmasters issued the 30-second time warning, the green light flashed on, and the two sticks of jumpers moved toward the doors and exited at 0211 on 20 December. My parachute opened, and I was floating toward the ground. The silence was broken by occasional bursts of automatic weapons fire on the airfield. Drop altitude was 500 feet, so I only had a few seconds to orient myself. I knew immediately that I was not over the Torrijos Airfield as planned. The only thing I saw below me was dense jungle vegetation. Judging by the clusters of bright lights and the sound of the small arms fire, I determined the airfield complex to be to the left of the aircrafts' flight path. Since the aircraft were flying from south to north, Torrijos was to the west.

I landed and disappeared in shoulder-high kuna grass. I loaded a round into the chamber of my weapon, removed my harness, collected my rucksack, and moved out to find my RTO. Before jumping, I had told PFC Countryman, who jumped behind me, that I would link up with him before moving to

the assembly area. While moving, I suddenly heard a Spanish voice nearby. I froze in place to determine who was talking and where they were. I did not understand Spanish, but I began to hear the same Spanish words spoken repeatedly. After several moments of uncertainty, I realized the source of the voice was a tape recording with a message probably urging the PDF to surrender. I guessed that a PSYOPS unit had air dropped the recorder prior to my jump. Several minutes later, I found PFC Countryman by a telephone pole, and we began moving west. I checked my map, but I was unable to figure my exact location. I later determined that I had landed over 2000 meters from the planned drop site (See Figure 4). As PFC Countryman and I moved, we began to meet other paratroopers. Everyone used the running password 'Bulldog' to identify himself and avoid being accidentally shot. When my group finally reached the northeastern end of the Torrijos runway three hours later, I had about 25 paratroopers under my control. Most of them were from 2-504 and 4-325. I pointed them in the general direction of where their respective battalion assembly areas were supposed to be, and I took the 1-504 soldiers with me and moved southeast. The 'Green 2' identifying the Bravo assembly area flashed in front of us. PFC Countryman, several other Bravo soldiers, and I moved to the center of the perimeter where we found 1SG Duhon and 1LT Cutler. They accounted for us and directed us to our respective platoon locations in the perimeter (See Figure 4).

I found 1st Platoon and received an update from SSG Etheridge, the senior NCO present. Only half of the platoon, to include SSG Etheridge and SGT Rogers, were present. SGT Wheatle and several more soldiers arrived a short time later. By this time, the firing on the airfield complex had ceased. Talking with my soldiers, I learned that some of them had landed on the airfield runway while others, like myself and PFC Countryman, had landed in the jungle 2000 meters to the west. The time was now around 0530, and the last aircraft were finally arriving over the drop zone to drop their troops. First light was less than an hour away; it was apparent that 1-504 would not conduct its air assault during darkness.

The delay in assembly and, subsequently, the air assault was caused by two factors. First, the ice storm delayed the departure of half of the troop transport aircraft, and only the first eight chocks jumped at the original drop time. The remaining aircraft arrived piecemeal, with the last aircraft arriving just before first light. Second, not everyone landed according to plan. The paratroopers who landed in the jungle had to struggle against the dense vegetation for one to two hours before reaching Torrijos airfield.

At 0630, the company was still missing one third of its soldiers, but 1LT Cutler directed the platoon leaders to prepare to move to PZ Center. Several minutes later, we began moving toward the southern end of the airfield down the east side of the runway. After moving 1500 meters, we met CPT Thrash and the rest of the company, to include SSG Sedach and SGT Pfeffer from 1st Platoon (See Figure 4). The 1st Platoon was now only missing two soldiers, who we later learned were injured on the jump. Bravo Company was now staged at the PZ and waiting orders to load helicopters.

1LT Cutler gathered the platoon leaders and issued a quick situation update. He informed us that 2-504 had already air assaulted to its objective at Panama Viejo and was meeting stiff resistance. The atmosphere suddenly became tense. The helicopters were returning from Panama Viejo now, and 1LT Cutler said that Alpha and then Bravo would air assault next to LZ Leopard. I immediately passed the information on to SSG Sedach and the squad leaders. The platoon consolidated its rucksacks to be left behind on the airfield, secured essential equipment, and organized into twenty-two man chinks.

The flight of seven Blackhawk helicopters lifted off at 0800 with Alpha on board. Twenty minutes later, they returned to pick us up. We did not know it at the time but during the insertion of Alpha, every helicopter had received direct hits from small arms ground fire and one pilot had been shot in the head. The 1st Platoon loaded two helicopters in the center of the lift: twenty-two men to a helicopter. I was sitting all the way forward in the left door next to the crew chief. We took off just prior to 0830. The helicopters flew low over the urban sprawl below, and the crew chief leaned over and yelled, "Hot LZ." I relayed the message to the men sitting behind me, and several seconds later, we all heard hard knocking sounds on the underside of the helicopter as we were hit by ground fire. The fire continued and increased in intensity. I could now hear the report of the weapons firing but was unable to identify their location.

The helicopters flared, and the door gunners began to fire as the lift approached the LZ and prepared to land. My helicopter never actually landed but hovered momentarily over the kuna grass as we leaped out and fell six feet to the ground. My aircraft load ended up on the ground in a big heap with bullets whining overhead, and I could hear mortar rounds impacting somewhere nearby. I found SSG Sedach who was with the other aircraft load, and I gave the squad leaders the order to move off the LZ on the planned azimuth. The order of movement was 2d Squad, 1st, and then 3d. SGT Pfeffer had one M60 forward behind my headquarters element, and SSG Sedach had the other M60 in the rear.

As we moved off the LZ to the northeast, we advanced up a steep hill. About halfway up this hill, SGT Rogers called back to me on the platoon radio net that he had linked up with the trail element of the battalion headquarters, which was following behind Alpha. At this point, I was not in contact with any other element from Bravo, and PFC Countryman was unable to reach CPT Thrash on the company radio net. I directed SGT Rogers to continue following Alpha. As we continued our advance up the hill, the platoon was concealed by the tall kuna grass though bullets were still whining overhead. The PDF were firing at us from our rear from positions in the villages. About 100 meters before we crested the top of the hill, the kuna grass ended. The top of the ridgeline was barren and exposed to enemy observation and fire. At this moment, PFC Countryman and I were laying nearly vertical on the side of the steep slope when machinegun fire struck PFC Countryman on the side of his helmet and landed inches away from me. We both immediately slid down the hill to escape the enemy fire coming from our rear. SSG Sedach called on the radio that the fire had wounded PVT Bodiford in the back of the neck. He also told me that he had the enemy firing position under observation and that he would emplace the rear M60 to fire and suppress it. I ordered SGT Rogers to move his squad over the crest of the hill under the covering fire of the M60. As soon as SPC Thomas began firing, SGT Rogers rushed his squad forward and over the hill. My headquarters element followed, and then 1st Squad. SSG Etheridge then provided covering fire as 3d Squad advanced over the hill with SSG Sedach and SPC Thomas' machinegun team (See Figure 5).

The crest of the ridgeline behind us offered limited cover and concealment from the PDF and Dignity Battalion positions in the surrounding San Miguelito barrio to the south, and we were still receiving small arms fire, though it was not nearly as accurate as before. The platoon was now spread out in a large open area on the north side of the ridgeline crest. We continued to move toward a small tree line 200 meters in front of us while mortar rounds landed along the ridgeline at one to two-minute intervals. The platoon reached the treeline, and I placed my men in an east to west line about 100 meters long oriented to the north. From this vantage point, we could see the Tinajitas garrison on top of a hill 600 meters to the north. There was a small village with a stream running through situated in the low ground between Tinajitas and our location on the ridgeline. I was awed by the steepness of the hill; it would have made a good ski slope if snow were present. Everyone knew that Tinajitas was located on a hill, but our maps and photographs had given no indication that the hill was so severe. It would be a hard climb, especially if any PDF remained to fight.

I was now located with the Battalion Command Post with LTC Marable; the Battalion Operations Officer, MAJ Wilson; and his assistant, CPT Burt Thompson. The Alpha Company Commander, CPT Gordon Guidumal, was also present. Since I still had no contact with CPT Thrash, I told LTC Marable that my platoon was located adjacent to his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) overlooking Tinajitas. He informed me that he was in radio contact with CPT Thrash, who had moved the remainder of Bravo towards Tinajitas on an axis of advance further north than originally planned. LTC Marable then told me that after a firepower demonstration, Alpha would begin the advance up the hill and that my platoon would provide overwatch. CPT Guidumal and I then went to the edge of the woodline where we could observe Tinajitas. I pointed out my platoon's position, and CPT Guidumal pointed out the route on which his company would advance. If any PDF still located in the Tinajitas garrison fired on Alpha during its advance, my M60 and SAW machinegunners would return fire and suppress the enemy firing positions (See Figure 6).

During the coordination with CPT Guidumal, two other things happened. LTC Marable began the firepower demonstration and directed the Battalion Air Liaison Officer (ALO) to call for a close air (CAS) mission. An F16 Falcon arrived overhead and made two bombing runs on the Tinajitas garrison, hitting the barracks compound each time with one bomb. The Battalion TOC had also requested medevac, and several helicopters were now landing in the open area that we had just crossed. CSM Hoggard and SSG Sedach were organizing personnel to be evacuated. The evacuees included soldiers wounded by gunfire and several suffering from severe heat exhaustion. The 60° change in temperature was taking its toll. From 1st Platoon, SSG Sedach evacuated PVT Bodiford, who had a gunshot wound in his neck, and two other soldiers with heat stroke (See Figure 6).

I moved back to my platoon's location. I went to each squad leader and each machinegun team and gave them our new mission to overwatch Alpha's advance and provide suppressive fires if necessary. The squad leaders passed the information on to their soldiers, and we all watched as the soldiers of Alpha began their advance. They moved down the north side of the ridgeline and into the small village. When Alpha's soldiers emerged from the far north side of the village, they began to climb the Tinajitas hill. We continued to watch their advance until they disappeared into a deep ravine about 200 meters up. LTC Marable came over to me and asked if I still had visual contact with Alpha. I said no. Fifteen minutes later, the Battalion Commander told me that I would displace forward and follow Alpha while the TOC would follow my platoon.

The platoon began moving down into the village with SGT Wheatle's squad leading. The villagers were curious enough to look out at us, but they stayed in their shacks and kept out of our way. On the far side of the village, we moved along a trail for 100 meters and then began climbing the hill. SGT Wheatle led the platoon into the same ravine that Alpha had used. As we moved, we passed several soldiers from Alpha who had fallen back because of the heat, and I could now see the trail soldiers of Alpha 100 meters ahead of 1st Platoon (See Figure 7).

Since we had departed our overwatch position, the PDF had stopped firing at us until heavy mortars began impacting just ahead of Alpha's lead element. The PDF were not firing the rounds from Tinajitas, but instead from positions hidden in the surrounding barrios. After the barrage ended, we continued to move toward the observation building that was Alpha's initial objective. The hill was now a near vertical climb, and as we neared the top, the PDF fired automatic weapons against us, again from the surrounding towns. Everyone had drunk his two quarts of water, and some, to include myself, drank the saline solution from IV bags. Alpha reached the east side of the garrison to find that the PDF had abandoned it. Charlie had advanced up the west side of the hill along the entrance road and entered the garrison complex from the west where it also found no enemy. I followed Alpha to the top of the hill and met CPT Thrash with the remainder of Bravo several minutes later. Since the objective was clear, the battalion was now occupying a perimeter defense around the entire garrison complex. Bravo covered the southern approach with 1st Platoon on the left (See Figure 8). After the squad leaders had emplaced their men, SSG Sedach and I checked each man's position. I also ensured that the platoon was tied in with 2LT Hensley's platoon to the left and 2LT Sweetser's platoon to the right. It was now around 1730, and the sun was just beginning to set.

When the 2d Infantry Company (PDF) learned of the American invasion force, it had abandoned its garrison and occupied the high ground and barrios surrounding Tinajitas. The PDF then fired at us during our air assault and assault up the Tinajitas hill, but because of their concealed positions in the villages, our men were usually not able to identify the enemy's firing positions. Due to the risk of causing civilian casualties, we were prohibited from blindly returning fire. The cost was two soldiers killed in action, both from Bravo Company. One man, SPC Denson, was shot in the leg while sitting in the helicopter during the air assault. After landing, a medic treated and stabilized him, but while he was waiting for a medevac helicopter, he was killed by a mortar barrage on the LZ. PFC Daves, a mortarman, was shot in the back of the head by sniper fire while advancing up the hill. A fellow soldier kept him

alive for four hours under continued enemy fire, but he died before a medevac helicopter arrived to evacuate him.

For the first several hours of the night, everyone prepared for a possible PDF counterattack. The Battalion Commander would not allow us to emplace our claymore mines, but CSM Hoggard showed everyone a trick from his Vietnam years. He had the squad leaders backfeed the firing wire so that during an attack, they could throw the claymore out like a grenade, connect the firing device, and detonate the mine. Everyone had his entrenching tool and began digging fighting positions. During past training exercises, when we dug positions in the soft sand at Fort Bragg, there were always several E-tools that broke. Ironically, digging in the rocky soil on Tinajitas and under the threat of a real attack, nobody's E-tool broke. In the distance, we heard several hollow thumps and recognized them as the sound of mortar rounds firing. Everyone dove into their holes yelling "Incoming". Twenty seconds later, several rounds impacted on the hill without hitting anything. These small barrages continued every two hours, each time the rounds landing closer to the perimeter as the PDF made adjustments. Finally, on their third or fourth attempt, the rounds landed 75 meters to the left of 1st Platoon in Charlie's sector (See Figure 8). Several paratroopers and a fellow platoon leader were hit, wounded, and evacuated by helicopter.

During the days that followed, we conducted platoon-sized missions into the barrios of San Miguelito and Pedregal to re-establish order over the anarchy that followed the invasion (See Figure 9). The missions consisted of dismounted patrols, checkpoints, and roadblocks, all with the purpose of capturing PDF members and their weapons. During these missions, we issued receipts to Panamanians who turned weapons over at our roadblocks. The Panamanians could then redeem the receipts for cash at designated locations. This tactic produced a turn-in of thousands of weapons.

After General Noriega's surrender from his sanctuary in the Vatican Embassy and the establishment of President Guillermo Endara's government, 1-504 was relieved in place by an element from the 7th Infantry Division. We redeployed to the Torrijos-Tocumen airfield complex and subsequently redeployed to Fort Bragg via parachute assault on 12 January 1990, 24 days after the beginning of Operation Just Cause.

At the tactical level, there were several lessons that I learned from Operation Just Cause. Probably the most obvious lesson is that missions never happen exactly as planned. Delays in our assembly caused by the de-icing problem, and our dispersed delivery over the drop area led to our unplanned daylight air assault against Tinajitas. On the objective, my platoon's separation from the rest of the

company and the establishment of the intermediate support position in support of Alpha were both unplanned. These unexpected changes required a great deal of flexibility. Unexpected events will always occur during future missions and necessitate a high degree of contingency planning.

Proper analysis of the terrain, as always, is critical to the planning and successful accomplishment of any mission. Even with overhead photos, the actual steepness of the Tinajitas hill was not realized until we arrived in the objective area. The steep inclines and open areas we were forced to negotiate would have provided a marked advantage to the 2d Infantry Company had they decided to remain and defend their garrison.

Combat is physically and mentally demanding. Everyone in 1-504 was exhausted after the ten hour assault up the Tinajitas hill under almost continual small arms and mortar fire in 90 degree heat, and the battalion had to evacuate several soldiers due to severe heat exhaustion. Ironically, the two soldiers from my platoon who were evacuated were the same soldiers who always scored poorly on physical fitness tests or fell out of unit roadmarches. Despite technological advances, infantry combat will continue to be a physically tough endeavor, demanding soldiers to carry heavy loads and move under the most strenuous conditions. Tough physical training is essential to preparing soldiers for future combat.

Civilians were also present everywhere my platoon operated, to include the initial assault on Tinajitas. The rules of engagement were restrictive because of the civilian population and prevented unnecessary civilian casualties. Prior to Operation Just Cause, my platoon had never trained the task of establishing a roadblock or checkpoint. During our security patrols, my platoon quickly developed standard procedures, fire control measures, and engagement criteria for roadblock missions in the barrios. One civilian was killed by a Alpha Company roadblock when a man sped his truck through a roadblock and ignored warning shots. Small units must incorporate civilians into their training scenarios and learn how to deal with them, with the goal of minimizing civilian casualties and reducing risk to friendly forces.




FIGURE 2: B/1-504 ASSEMBLY PLAN




FIGURE 3: B/I-504 CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION SKETCH




FIGURE 5: MOVEMENT OFF LZ LEAPORD




FIGURE 6: INTERMEDIATE SUPPORT BY FIRE OF ALPHA




FIGURE 7: ASSAULT ROUTE





FIGURE 8: BATTALION DEFENSIVE PERIMETER



SECURITY PATROLS FOR 1/B/1504


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
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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS SKETCH

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1000 FEET



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Villa Guadalupe

CONCEPCIÓN

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