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THE OPERATIONS OF THE LOS BANOS FORCE (1ST BATTALION, 511TH  
PARACHUTE INFANTRY AND 1ST BATTALION, 188TH GLIDER INFANTRY)  
11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION, IN THE LIBERATION OF INTERNEES FROM  
THE LOS BANOS INTERNMENT CAMP, LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,  
23 FEBRUARY 1945  
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Battalion Operations Officer)

Type of operation described: BATTALIONS IN THE ATTACK

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the Los Banos Force, 11th Airborne Division, United States Army, in effecting the liberation of 2,147 allied internees from the Los Banos Internment Camp, Province of Laguna, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 23 February 1945.

In order to enable the reader to understand the general situation, let us consider the events leading up to the operation.

On 15 January 1945 the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Area, directed the Commanding General, Eighth Army, to support the offensive of the Sixth Army in the Central Plains of Luzon, by operations south of Manila. In accordance with this order the 11th Airborne Division (less the 511th Regimental Combat Team) executed an amphibious landing at Nasugbu, Batangas Province, on 31 January 1945. The division pushed inland against heavy Japanese resistance toward Tagaytay Ridge, where, on 3 February, the 511th Regimental Combat Team parachuted to unite with its parent unit. This action opened the southern approaches to Manila, the suburbs of which were reached on 4 February after a rapid advance. The Japanese had organized strong defensive positions in the Nichols Field - Fort William McKinley area, and here the division found itself heavily engaged with the enemy. (1)

(1) A-3, p. 9.

At this time, intelligence reports reaching General Headquarters indicated that several hundred allied civilians and possibly some prisoners of war were being held prisoner by the Japanese in an internment camp at Los Banos, a barrio (village) on Laguna de Bay, approximately forty miles southeast of Manila. (See Map A) As the Japanese were noted for their infamous mistreatment of allied prisoners, it was feared that with the approach of the American forces the enemy would evacuate these internees to a more secure prison or might even take extreme and brutal action against them. Consequently, General MacArthur, on 4 February, assigned to the 11th Airborne Division the task of rescuing these internees.

Due to the fact that his entire force was heavily engaged, precluding the immediate possibility of organizing a highly mobile column to carry out the mission, the Commanding General of the Division requested that this mission be deferred until he could withdraw a force of sufficient strength from action in the Manila area. This recommendation was approved.

On 10 February, the 11th Airborne Division made contact with units of XIV Corps, and control of the division passed to the latter. A Sixth Army field order vested the mission of the liberation in XIV Corps which delegated the actual carrying out of the assignment to the Airborne Division. (2)

#### THE GENERAL PLAN

Since the troops to participate would be engaged in the Manila area until they were pulled out of the lines to execute the raid on the camp, Major General Joseph M. Swing, the division

(2) A-1, p. 1; A-2, p. 159.

commander, directed that his division staff would be responsible for reconnaissance and most of the detailed planning. (3)

Contacts were immediately made with guerilla units which set out to prepare detailed sketches of the camp and its environs. Several escaped internees were of invaluable aid in this respect. The complete information thus gathered included the location of sentries, the camp headquarters, guard barracks, and all weapon racks, in addition to the arrangement of internee barracks. Americans were infiltrated into the area for the purpose of reconnoitering approaches for an attack on the sentries and to select a parachute drop zone near the camp as well as arrange for its security in the event that an airborne attack was made. (See Map B) (4)

Engineers of the Airborne Division conducted a road reconnaissance as far south as Calamba on Highway No. 1, and made bridge repairs or constructed fords at all streams north of the San Juan River to insure the passage of trucks, artillery pieces, and armored vehicles. The outstanding engineer contribution, however, was the reconnaissance for landing areas for amphibious vehicles near Los Banos, since the muddy shores of Laguna de Bay prohibited vehicular operation in many places. A near beach at Mamatid and a far beach at San Antonio near Los Banos were recommended as a result of this survey. (5)

Other information gathered indicated the presence of a force of about 6,000 Japanese in Laguna Province, while the garrison at the Los Banos camp, a former agricultural college, consisted of eighty guards commanded by a major. A very important fact, learned at this time, was that the garrison assembled for roll call at 0700 daily and that the Japanese then assembled for

(3) A-1, p. 2; (4) A-1, p. 2; (5) A-1, p. 2; Personal knowledge.

calisthenics, without arms. This fact was to be the most important bit of information obtained. (6) (7)

It was further reported that a company of Japs with four machine guns and two 105-mm howitzers was located in a gravel quarry 3,000 yards to the west of the camp. A road block manned by eighty men equipped with two 75-mm guns was plotted just south of the San Juan River at Lecheria Hills on Highway No. 1. The natives in the area were considered by reliable sources to be "Makapili", Japanese sympathizers. (See Map C) (8) (9)

With the above information at hand, it was now time to formulate a plan of action. It was feared that a troop movement overland south toward the objective would afford the Japanese guards sufficient time to dispose of the inmates. The same disadvantage existed in regard to an over-water move via Laguna de Bay. A combined land, water, and air operation was finally decided upon, to:

(1) destroy the garrison in a surprise attack, thus releasing the internees from Japanese control before they could be harmed, and,

(2) transport the rescued to safety well within our own lines before the enemy could retaliate. (10)

The plan was to have the Provisional Division Reconnaissance Platoon, accompanied by a group of fifty selected guerillas and two escaped internees, infiltrate into the enemy stronghold and move by stealth to concealed positions from which it could destroy the Japanese prison guards before the main attacking force arrived, since a fire fight of any appreciable size would endanger the lives of the internees. This party was to set out in native

(6) A-9; (7) A-4, p. 26; (8) A-2, p. 164; (9) Statement of Major Vanderpool, GHQ Representative with Guerillas in Batangas Province, on 22 February 1945; (10) A-1, p. 1.

bancas (oared or wind-propelled canoe-like vessels) from the west shore of Laguna de Bay at H minus 36 hours in order to insure that it would be in position at H hour. Selected personnel were to proceed to the parachute drop zone and to the landing beach, mark those sites with smoke grenades, and provide security until the paratroops and the amphibious force arrived. Members of the platoon were detailed as executioners of posted sentries, while the drill area, weapon racks, and other vital points were assigned to groups of marksmen. On a pre-arranged signal - the opening of the first parachute of the airborne reinforcements, scheduled for H hour - the infiltrating force would attempt to annihilate the guards before any defensive action could be taken. (11)

Company B, 511th Parachute Infantry, was designated to provide the airborne punch. It was to take off from Nichols Field, Manila, in planes of the 65th Squadron, 54th Troop Carrier Wing. The unit was to parachute to a drop zone approximately 800 yards west of the internment camp, and then was to hasten to the assistance of the infiltrating force, destroying any guards who might escape the initial attack and organizing the internees for speedy evacuation upon the arrival of the main force. Since the jump was to be made at H-hour, the opening of the first parachute (clearly visible to all troops in the operation) was selected as the attack signal. (See Map C) (12)

In order to successfully complete the rescue, it would be necessary to safely evacuate the internees to a place well behind friendly lines where they could be given food, clothing, rest, and medical care. Such an evacuation could not be carried out on foot, because the under-nourished condition of the rescued

(11) A-2, p. 164; (12) A-1, p. 3.

would not permit, and because the time required to complete such a withdrawal through enemy occupied territory would allow the enemy time to strike the column in force. The same disadvantage in point of time, with the added handicap of roads made impassable by demolished bridges, prohibited the effective use of motor transportation for the rescue. The plan to move the rescued across Laguna de Bay in amphibious tractors was therefore adopted. (13)

The distance across the lake, Mamatid to San Antonio, was seven and two-tenths miles, requiring an estimated one hour and fourteen minutes to traverse by amphibious tractor. The fifty-four amphibious tractors (amtracks) available with the 672d Amphibious Tractor Battalion were to make the journey carrying the 1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, less Company B (the airborne element). Two 75-mm assault guns from Battery D, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion were also to be a part of this force. Landing on the far beach at H-hour, the amphibious force was to establish road blocks and overcome Japanese resistance while the amtracks were quickly loaded and shuttled back across the water to Mamatid. In order to expedite the evacuation of the rescued, specific amtracks were designated to proceed - upon arrival at the camp - directly to correspondingly numbered wards and barracks. It was anticipated that the internees could all be evacuated in two serials (that is, two complete round trips across the lake) and that the rescuing troops would then withdraw, fighting, if necessary, up the west shore of Laguna de Bay to a juncture with the 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry, (13) A-2, p. 164.

scheduled to attack south across the San Juan River. (14) (15)

The battalion of the 188th was to be supported by two battalions of field artillery and a company, less one platoon, of tank destroyers. Its mission was to push vigorously south at the moment of the parachute-amphibious landings in the Los Banos area and to effect a meeting with the liberating force, assisting its withdrawal to the north.

This part of the plan had a further advantage in that it constituted a direct threat which the Japanese defenders in the area south and west of Laguna de Bay could not ignore. It was hoped that this threat might distract attention from the raid at Los Banos long enough to permit the liberation of the internees with little interference from the enemy. (16)

#### EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK

On 12 February, Nichols Field was captured. The Americans then turned their strength against Fort McKinley, which was occupied on 19 February. (17)

The troops selected for the daring raid were withdrawn from the lines at this time and preparations were begun for the new operation. (18)

On 20 February, the barrio of Muntinlupa was reached by American patrols. Reconnaissance to the south revealed no enemy forces north of the San Juan River, although many Filipino civilians in that area were actively in league with the Japanese military. A number of these "Makapili" were in control of the town of Calamba, just south of the San Juan River. (See Map A) (19)

Field Order Number 18, Headquarters, 11th Airborne Division,

(14) A-1, p. 4; (15) A-2, p. 166; (16) A-4, p. 27; (17) Personal knowledge; (18) A-1, p. 2: Personal knowledge; (19) A-9: Personal knowledge.

dated 21 February 1945, designated 23 February as the ~~effective~~ day for the plan to be put into operation. The order created the Los Banos Force, commanded by Colonel Robert H. Soule, 188th Glider Infantry. The task force consisted of the following units:

Headquarters, 188th Glider Infantry (Force Headquarters)

1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry - commanded by  
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest H. LaFlamme

1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry - commanded by  
Major Henry A. Burgess

Battery D, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion -  
commanded by Captain Luis M. Burris

675th Glider Field Artillery Battalion - commanded by  
Lieutenant Colonel Ernest L. Massad

472d Field Artillery Battalion - commanded by Lieutenant  
Colonel Thomas F. Bienvenu

672d Amphibious Tractor Battalion (attached) - commanded  
by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Gibbs

Provisional Division Reconnaissance Platoon - commanded  
by Lieutenant George Skau

Company B, 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less one  
platoon) - commander unknown. (20)

By the night of 22-23 February all the forces to take part in the operation had moved from their staging areas at Paranaque, and were quietly occupying bivouacs south of Muntinlupa, with the exception of the parachute company which was sleeping under its planes at Nichols Field. (See Maps A and C)

(20) A-1, p. 2; A-2, p. 161.

Near Muntinlupa, a hospital was being set up in the New Bilibid Prison for the treatment of the internees expected to be landed at Mamatid on the morrow. Final preparations were being made for the convoys of ambulances and trucks to transport them from Mamatid to Muntinlupa, for the military police to escort the convoys, for the distribution of Red Cross items, and for the handling of the many newspaper correspondents expected to invade the hospital in search of interviews.

Eighteen miles to the south the amphibious force was in position, ready to mount vehicles and embark before dawn in order to approach the far shore at H-hour, announced as 0700. Two miles farther south, the battalion which was to attack across the river had been joined by Lieutenant Colonel O'Campo's Filipino guerillas, who were to attack and capture the town of Calamba. (21)

As the time for the operation drew near, a feeling of apprehension began to assert itself upon those concerned. Rumor had it that the secrecy of the maneuver had been violated. An escaped internee had reported that the internees were holding daily 11th Airborne Division Rescue Drills. A radio report was received, supposedly from an Alako Scout in the target area, that the enemy garrison had been reinforced by 3,000 troops. At midnight of 22-23 February, just seven hours before H-hour, a night fighter plane reported that many Japanese truck lights were seen moving in the Los Banos area. These reports were not considered reliable, so the information was not passed on to the assault troops. However, sufficient concern was felt to cause the division commander to alert the 2d Battalion, 511th Parachute (21) Personal knowledge.

Infantry, as a possible reserve, and to place himself in the near vicinity of the force headquarters to facilitate taking command of the situation in the event of serious contact. (22)

#### THE LIBERATION

While the large units were busily moving into the Laguna de Bay area, the Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon had moved out from the west shore in native bancas at H minus 36 hours in accordance with the original plan. The group encountered adverse winds which greatly increased the time required for the journey. The original time estimates had taken such a contingency into consideration, but even so, there was little time to spare as the group, after abandoning the bancas, worked its way through thicket and rice paddy to the camp. Individuals moved to their previously designated positions, some being able to work their way to within a few yards of the sentries they were to kill. (23)

Meanwhile, at 0515 the fifty-four amtracks had entered the water at Mamatid, bearing the amphibious force, totalling 350 men in all. As the voyage was begun before daylight, the initial course had to be steered by compass. The initial formation was a column of three's, eighteen vehicles deep. (24)

At 0630, nine C-47 troop transport planes took off from Nichols Field carrying Company B, 511th, plus the machine gun platoon of Headquarters Company, 511th. This group consisted of one hundred and twenty-five officers and men. After a rendezvous over the airfield the planes headed south toward the Province of Laguna. As the planes approached the shores of

(22) A-1, p. 3: Statement of Major Joseph Giardano, then Liaison Officer, Headquarters, 11th Airborne Division, on 30 October 1947.

(23) A-2, p. 164; A-4, p. 26: Statement of Lieutenant George Skau, Division Provisional Reconnaissance Platoon, on 12 March 1945.

(24) A-2, p. 165.

Laguna de Bay, jump-masters standing in the plane doors could see the troops on the north bank of the San Juan, gazing up and silently "sweating" the jump which would be their signal to attack. Then the waves of amphibious tractors could be seen, apparently motionless in the haze, but trailing long white wakes as they pointed blunt noses toward the southern shore. (25)

Inside the camp enclosure below all was serene. The little yellow conquerors went about their daily military routine, falling out noisily for their morning formation. Silently, twin columns of smoke began to rise from the rice paddy selected as the parachute drop zone, while off to the east two more columns climbed slowly skyward from the beach at San Antonio. Thus, at 0658 the infiltrating force had completed the first part of its mission, the marking of the drop zone and landing beach for the approaching liberators. (26)

At 0700, as the nine jump planes appeared over the trees at Los Banos, bodies moved under cover of the foliage, bringing the members of the infiltrating force into firing positions. As the first parachute - that of Lieutenant John Ringler - cracked open in the sky, a withering fire was delivered on the stunned Japanese. Shock gave way to panic, but so great was the surprise inflicted that not one of the guards reached the arms racks alive. All were killed by rifle fire, grenades, or the bayonet. So far as is known, the enemy was unable to send out any message during the brief action. It can, therefore, be presumed that the efficient elimination of the garrison by the raiders was responsible for the enemy's failure to organize a counterattack in time to prevent the subsequent liberation. (27)

(25) Personal knowledge; (26) A-2, p. 165; (27) A-1, p. 4: Statement of Lieutenant Joseph P. Dixon, 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, on 25 September 1947.

As soon as they hit the ground, the paratroops rolled out of their harness, assembled equipment, and headed east toward the prison camp at double time, spurred on by the rifle reports from that direction. Between the drop zone and the camp a pillbox manning a light machine gun was encountered and destroyed.

When the first airborne troops arrived at the camp, at 0717, they found that the infiltrating force had done a thorough job, leaving only a mere handful of the Japanese garrison still to be sought out and a perimeter defense of the compound still to be organized. (28)

The task of organizing the internees for rapid evacuation was not a simple one, however. The excitement caused by the surprise invasion of their prison after three long years of hoping and waiting was too much for most of them to take in a calm manner. Contrary to the report mentioned above, the internees had no knowledge of their impending rescue prior to the events just described. (29)

Those present at the scene have many interesting anecdotes to relate. Some did not wish to abandon their prison until after eating the meager morsels of food available in the kitchens. Others wished to burden themselves with absurd items to which they had grown attached during their restraint. One elderly woman, after sincerely thanking a paratrooper for her rescue, added very seriously, "But, I had so hoped that we'd be rescued by the Marines!" (30)

Let us go back for a glimpse of the amphibious force.

As the craft neared the San Antonio beach, there appeared

(28) A-2, p. 165; (29) Statement of Mr. Carl Gabrielson, Yokohama, Japan, on 23 February 1947; (30) Statement of Lieutenant Dixon on 25 September 1947.

no evidence that the infiltrating party had successfully made its way into the area. However, at 0658, the white smoke, marking the beach, appeared. Executing right flank turns, so that the fire power of nine amtracks was brought into line in each of six waves, the vehicles rumbled onto the beach. (31)

When they arrived on the beach, the first amtrack waves split into two groups. Company "C", as one group, made its way immediately to Mayondon Point where it proceeded to eliminate a small Jap force. Following this action, a roadblock was established near Los Banos.

Company "A" proceeded down the road toward Bay and dominated approaches from the east.

The artillery pieces were put in position on the beach. From this position they fired on active machine guns at Mayondon Point. (32)

The remainder of the vehicles, with their accompanying troops, proceeded to the camp. Upon arrival with the amtracks the battalion commander assumed control of the infiltrating and airborne groups. Because of thorough prior planning, there was little confusion in loading the vehicles. Consequently, the amtracks, loaded with 1,500 internees, were soon rumbling toward the beach for the return to Mamatid. The first serial, of course, included the sick, crippled, and aged, and those otherwise requiring priority in evacuation.

The remaining internees were herded together and were escorted on foot to the beach, there to endure the long wait for the return of the amtracks. (33)

(31) Personal knowledge; (32) Statement of Lieutenant Dixon on 25 September 1947; (33) A-1, p. 4: Statement of Lieutenant Dixon on 25 September 1947.

Original planning had called for evacuation of all internees via water, the liberating force then to make its way up Highway No. 21 to a juncture with the 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry, which, after crossing the San Juan River, was making its way south along the west shore of Laguna de Bay. It now became apparent, however, that the remaining internees and the entire liberating force already at Los Banos could be evacuated on the next trip of the amtracks. The battalion commander requested approval of this modification in the plan, and the change was ordered. The road blocks were then withdrawn and a strong defensive perimeter was thrown around the beachhead. (33)

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 188th Glider Infantry, had crossed the river, and, after supporting the guerilla assault on Calamba by fire of infantry mortars and machine guns, engaged the enemy force at Lecheria Hills. By mid-morning the twin hills had been taken, road blocks had been established against attack from the Santo Tomas - Batangas Province areas, and the attack pushed south along Highway No. 21. (34)

The amtracks arrived at the San Antonio beachhead for their second shuttle at about 1145. There they found the internees and troops anxiously waiting, for each minute of delay favored any force attempting to cut off their withdrawal through the American lines. The amtracks were quickly loaded, clearing the beach of all personnel, and they once more set out for Mamatid. (35)

At 1200, the battalion of the 188th reached the Dampalit

(33) A-1, p. 4: Statement of Lieutenant Dixon on 25 September 1947.

(34) Personal knowledge: Statement of Captain William F. Enos, 188th Glider Infantry, on 10 November 1947.

(35) A-2, p. 166.

River on the north edge of Los Banos, but the success of the mission being assured, it was ordered by radio to withdraw to the San Juan River and there secure a bridgehead for a future offensive. The withdrawal was completed by 1700 with all troops in a defensive position south of the river. From this position a strong Japanese attack was repulsed that night. (36)

By 1500 all the amtracks except one had returned safely to Mamatid and by 1700 all the 2,147 rescued internees were being cared for at the New Bilibid Prison. One amtrack had been damaged by enemy fire at the far beach, and, its passengers first being transferred to another vehicle, was sunk to avoid capture. (37)

Among those rescued during the day's activity were 1,583 Americans, 323 British, 144 Canadians, 32 Australians, 22 Poles, 16 Italians, 10 Norwegians, and several French and Nicaraguan citizens. 107 were immediately hospitalized for illnesses arising from their internment. (38)

"Thus ended the rescue of the Los Banos internees, an operation brilliantly conceived and meticulously executed - - -."

(39)

The most remarkable feature of the entire operation is the fact that only a few of the actual liberating force were injured, none fatally, and only one internee was wounded, but slightly. Casualties were higher in the overland force, one officer (the tank destroyer company commander) and three enlisted men having been killed. (40)

The number of Japanese killed in the day's operation was two hundred and forty-three. (41)

(36) Personal knowledge; (37) A-4, p. 29: Statement of Lieutenant Dixon on 25 September 1947; (38) A-2, inclosure No. 2, Report of Corps Surgeon, p. 35; (39) A-2, p. 166; (40) Personal knowledge; (41) A-1, p. 4.

### ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

From a study of this operation, it is apparent that the undertaking was extraordinary. Nevertheless, it is not an isolated instance, since similar missions were assigned other units in the Pacific Theater, notably on Luzon, at Cabanatuan and at Santo Tomas University, Manila.

The situation provided a perfect opportunity for utilizing large personnel-carrying amphibious vehicles in an evacuation, while the presence of an airborne division made the use of parachute troops for their surprise value a practical maneuver.

The preparation and issuance of orders for carrying out the assigned mission were complete. The division commander made use of his own staff to perform the detailed planning, because the tactical situation prevented the personnel who were to be called on to carry the plans into execution from devoting sufficient time to the task of preparation to insure the success of the operation. Unfortunately, the time available, as well as the peculiar nature of the operation, afforded the subordinate commanders but little opportunity for reconnaissance. That they were sufficiently briefed in the action and that the utmost coordination was effected is evidenced by the amazing smoothness and speed with which the complex plan was executed.

The intelligence operations of the staff were outstanding. Due to the presence of intelligence agents of General Headquarters with guerilla units throughout the area, the problem of getting detailed information of the enemy was simplified. However, experience had indicated that many reports received from guerilla units or their contacts were far from accurate. Thus, intelligence

officers were faced with the difficult task of carefully evaluating the many reports brought in before they could be acted upon. As evidenced in this operation, some erroneous information of enemy movements was so vital as to threaten disaster for the mission. In this case, the final decision to proceed with the operation was made by the division commander. That his decision was correct cannot be questioned in the light of history.

Air photo missions would have been appropriate as a reconnaissance measure. However, at no time did the writer see any aerial photographs of the camp or of enemy positions, nor did he hear of any being distributed to the units. No mention is made of this point in the references on the operation. This may have been the flaw in an otherwise perfect intelligence operation.

There is room for criticism of the lack of an adequate reserve in the vicinity of the operation. Had one or both of the assault battalions become involved in a major engagement with the full force of the enemy a powerful reserve force would have been needed at once. However, no such force was available since all elements of the division not participating in the Los Banos operation were engaged in the vicinity of Manila, and no other large force was then south of Manila.

In the final analysis, the operation was a large scale raid in which the Japanese were completely surprised and out-maneuvered by an isolated force well behind their own defenses.

The complete and utter destruction of an enemy garrison resulted in so severing his communications that no counter-blow

was struck until the entire attacking force had withdrawn to safety, carrying with it over two thousand American citizens and allied subjects.

A great deal of credit is due the officers and men who participated in the raid. After three weeks of severe combat they were withdrawn from contact and alerted for the new task only three days before the liberation effort. The men and their junior officers had no knowledge of the operation prior to receipt of orders to move to the Laguna de Bay area. This withholding of information was, of course, necessary for security reasons. When the mission finally became known, all entered whole-heartedly into the spirit of the task, appreciating the involved matching of wits with the enemy much more than is normally the case in an ordinary operation. That all joined together in a classic display of determination, team-work, and skill can be directly attributed to the soldierly attitude and to the high state of training of each individual concerned.

#### LESSONS

Some of the lessons emphasized by this operation are:

1. Surprise is a vital factor in the success of a small force in an operation against an enemy possessing superior numbers.
2. The sudden appearance of enemy troops behind defensive positions can cause great confusion and disruption of communications. It has an effect far greater than the strength of the attacker warrants.
3. Careful and thorough reconnaissance is a necessary part of a successful operation.

4. Intelligence reports, even though from seemingly reliable sources, must be carefully weighed and evaluated.

5. An operation involving airborne, amphibious, and ground troops can be successfully coordinated when it is carefully planned and the initiative is maintained.

6. Aggressiveness and daring play lead parts in successful raids upon an enemy.

7. Airborne troops are best employed in the initial stages of an operation.

8. Only by the swift movement of troops by air can an attacker be certain that his intent and the direction of his attack will remain secret for the maximum time.

9. A high state of training is essential to success in combat.