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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 34TH INFANTRY DIVISION
AT HILL 609, TUNISIA, NORTH AFRICA,
27 APRIL - 1 MAY 1943
(TUNISIAN CAMPAIGN)

Type of operation described: INFANTRY DIVISION ATTACKING
AND HOLDING A KEY FEATURE IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 34TH INFANTRY DIVISION
AT HILL 609, TUNISIA, NORTH AFRICA,
27 APRIL - 1 MAY 1943
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ORIENTATION

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 34th Infantry Division in the battle for HILL 609, TUNISIA, NORTH AFRICA, 27 April - 1 May 1943, during the Allied advance to the TUNIS PLAIN.

In order to orient the reader, it will be necessary to discuss briefly the major events which led up to this action.

Early in November 1942, the Allies successfully invaded NORTH AFRICA. The landings were a combined British-American operation and became the northern arm of a large pincer movement in conjunction with the British Eighth Army operations in EGYPT. These attacks were planned to drive the Germans from northern AFRICA. This would allow the Allies to use the MEDITERRANEAN SEA as a supply route with the protection of land based aircraft. It would also open another possible route for the invasion of EUROPE. It would prevent the invasion of EGYPT, the SUEZ CANAL, and the MIDDLE EAST by the Axis powers, thus blocking the Axis powers almost completely in all areas.

(1) (See Map A)

The successful landings in the north combined with the advances of the British Eighth Army in the south led to the Tunisian Campaign. "This campaign which lasted six months was divided into three phases. The first covered the race

(1) A-1, p. 3

between the Allies and the Axis to build up a force, in the BIZERTE-TUNIA area, strong enough to deny the other this key terrain. The second phase covered the period of Axis initiative, during which time the Germans developed and expanded a strong perimeter defense around their holdings in TUNISIA. The third phase included the decisive period of the campaign; the Allied victory at MARETH, the capture of BIZERTE and TUNIS, and the subsequent surrender of all Axis forces in NORTH AFRICA." (2)

The first phase -- "The race between the Allies and the Axis to build up a force in the BIZERTE-TUNIS area", was won by the Axis powers. This phase commenced immediately after the successful landings in NORTH AFRICA, and lasted until the end of December 1942. The second phase -- "the period of Axis initiative", found the Allies resisting attacks on all fronts, especially during the month of January 1943, but by the end of February 1943 the Allies had successfully contained the Axis attacks. During the first part of March the Allies regrouped and reorganized their forces and on the 16th of March the Allies commenced the final or third phase of the Tunisian Campaign. (3)

THE GENERAL SITUATION (See Map B)

When the II U. S. Corps received the orders for the final drive through TUNISIA it was located south of MARTAR and was ordered to move the entire Corps of over 100,000 men with their equipment to a new zone of action. This was located in the north, from the coast at CAPE SERRAT, south approxi-

(2) A-1, p. 14

(3) A-1, p. 34

mately 40 miles to the north edge of MEDJERDA VALLEY. (4)

(See Map B)

The II U. S. Corps at this time consisted of the 1st U. S. Armored Division, the 1st U. S. Infantry Division, the 34th U. S. Infantry Division, the 9th U. S. Infantry Division, and the French Corps Franc d' Afrique*. (5)

The mission of the II U. S. Corps was to attack in its zone of action and capture the high ground southeast of MATEUR, and the heights in the area north of JEFNA and west of LAKE ACHKEL. (6)

To accomplish its mission, the II Corps commander decided to make the main effort of the Corps on the right flank, where the attack would assist the main Allied drive through the MEDJERDA VALLEY. (7)

The TINE RIVER VALLEY was the only area in the Corps zone of action in which an armored thrust could be made, but to use this valley without first capturing the hills on each side would place the unit making the thrust in a trap. Because of this obvious trap, it was planned to attack through the hills using the 1st Infantry Division on the north of the TINE RIVER. The 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, part of the 1st Armored Division, was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and given the mission of clearing the enemy from the hills south of the TINE RIVER. The area north of the BEJA-MATEUR ROAD was assigned to the 168th Combat Team, part of the 34th Infantry Division. (8) (See Map B)

(4) A-3, p. 4

(5) A-1, p. 42

(6) A-1, p. 41

(7) A-3, p. 11

(8) A-3, p. 11

* A provisional force that consisted principally of 2 regiments of "Goums".

The attack in the north part of the Corps zone was made by the 9th Infantry Division and the attached French Corps. The objective of this attack was the high ground north of JEFRA.

The 1st Armored Division, less the 6th Armored Infantry Regiment, and the 34th Infantry Division, less the 168th Combat Team, were initially in reserve. (9)

This Axis forces, now in well prepared defensive positions that made the maximum use of the natural defensive terrain in the area, had several advantages over the attackers. First, the terrain was best suited for defense, and the Germans had used the terrain to the maximum. Second, the Germans were familiar with the terrain. Third, the German units defending the area in front of the II U. S. Corps were approximately at full strength; their supply routes and lines of communication were good and their troops were seasoned combat soldiers. (10)

The German defensive position in the area facing the II Corps were anchored in the north at CAPE SERRAT, running south-east down a range of mountains to the TINE RIVER. (11) (See Map B)

The terrain in the II Corps zone of action consisted of a belt of hills from 15 to 20 miles wide. This belt of hills running across the entire zone of action protected the enemy communication center of MATEUR, which was also the key to the BIZERTE area. In the south half of the sector these hills had rockyslopes which at times, raised into abrupt cliffs. The valleys were narrow and afforded no protection to the attackers. The vegetation consisted only of short grasses. There were no

(9) A-3, p. 12

(10) A-3, p. 11

(11) A-2

trees except in the few olive groves located in the Valleys.

(12)

The weather during this period was warm during the day but the nights were chilly, making it very uncomfortable.

The best roads in the southern section of the Corps Zone were crowned with black top, but were very narrow and mined in depth. The other roads were little more than trails and were of little use. The railroads were narrow gauge roads whose beds and rails had not been maintained; therefore, the movement of personnel and equipment over these railroads was at best uncertain. (13)

Due to the recent movement of the II Corps into the area, and the lack of adequate transportation facilities, supply points had not been established and it was necessary for each division to obtain its supplies from approximately 50 miles to the rear using its own organizational transportation. (14)

The II Corps attacked on 22 April 1943, and by 26 April, after hard fighting, the 1st Infantry Division had advanced 5 miles into the area southeast of SADI NSIR, dangerously exposing its left flank. To protect the 1st Infantry Division it was planned to launch a coordinated attack by the 1st Infantry Division and the 34th Infantry Division. The objective of this attack was to capture the hill mass of HILL 609 (DJEBEL TAHENT) which was the key enemy stronghold dominating the highway and railroad from BEJA to MATEUR. (15) (See Map B)

SPECIAL SITUATION (See Map C)

By the beginning of the Tunisian Campaign, the 34th In-

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- (12) A-3, p. 9
(13) A-3, p. 11
(14) A-4, Sect
(15) A-1, p. 42

fantry Division had proven itself on several battle grounds in NORTH AFRICA. This gave the troops confidence in themselves, their leaders, and their weapons. Their spirit was high, and their morale good. The strength of the division was 90% or higher in all units. The Organization of the Division for Combat was as follows: (16)

168th Infantry Regiment -- 175th Field Artillery Battalion Direct Support

135th Infantry Regiment -- 125th Field Artillery Battalion Direct Support

133rd Infantry Regiment, less 2nd Battalion (2nd Battalion attached to II Corps) in Division Reserve

151st Field Artillery Battalion General Support

During the period immediately prior to the 25th of April, which the Division was in Corps Reserve; intensive night training was conducted. This training was designed to give personnel confidence in their ability to operate efficiently at night, and was to pay off with interest in the battle for HILL 609. (17)

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The supply problem during the battle for HILL 609, which could have become very serious, was handled with very little difficulty. The II Corps had allowed the 34th Division to build up a five day level of supply prior to the start of operations. This provided the division with supply support which they could not have had otherwise. The main supply problem was moving the supplies from division to the assault units. In the assault area resupply was made during the night with small vehicles. Larger vehicles could not operate on the

(16) A-4
(17) A-4

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terrain and also this forced the units to transport ammunition to positions in small vehicles. Class I supplies were forwarded in the form of C rations because of the time and space required by Class V supplies. Class I supplies were cut down, however, this shortage did not hamper the operation.

The method of attack used by the Division, in most cases, commenced with the troops crossing the line of departure from 30 minutes to 2 hours prior to daylight. This method of attack was used because of the lack of concealed routes of approach to the assigned objectives.

The terrain in the zone of action of the 34th Division was mountainous, with the highest hill, HILL 609, rising to a height of 609 meters above sea level. The deepest valley was about 280 meters above sea level. HILL 609 was a large hill mass with knolls protruding from its slopes, and valleys or ravines behind each knoll. These small hills were characterized by steep slopes which at times became cliffs of from 20 to 50 feet in height. The area was covered with a short grass about a foot in height. The only trees or brush to be found were around the town ^{HEAD C} SIDI NSIR. The ground was hard, dry, and rocky making it very difficult to dig emplacements.

The enemy units defending HILL 609 and the adjoining hills made the maximum use of the terrain. They controlled all of the observation in the area in the initial stages of the action. The enemy in contact with the division in this action were generally a higher type of soldier than those that had been encountered by the division in previous engagements.

Units of the enemy in contact with the 34th Division consisted of the following:

2d Battalion, 754th Infantry Regt.	Hill 529-531 ✓
1st Battalion, Barenthin Regiment	Hill 407-473-375 ✓
2d Battalion, Barenthin Regiment	Approx. 2 miles N. of Hill 609
3d Battalion, Barenthin Regiment	Hill 609
Special Mission Battalion	Hill 409
Marsch Battalion Oberdland	Hill 461

The enemy facing the 34th Division were in positions with their right flank firmly anchored at DJEBEL HARA which consisted of HILLS 407, 473 and 375. From there east to HILL 490, then southeast to HILL 529. (18) (See Map C)

The plan of maneuver of the 34th Division was to attack the hill mass of HILL 609 with two regiments abreast. The 135th Infantry on the right, and the 168th Infantry on the left. The 133d Infantry in division reserve. The 168th Infantry was to capture HILLS 407, 437, and 375, with the additional mission of protecting the division left flank. The 135th Infantry was given the mission of capturing HILL 609, after first clearing the enemy from the protecting hills.

(19) (See Map C)

On 25 April, the 168th Infantry was in position holding a line from DJBEL GREMBIL south to HILL 344. The 1st Battalion and the 3d Battalion were astride the hill mass DJBEL GREMBIL with the 1st Battalion on the right. The 2d Battalion was in position on HILL 433.

(18) A-4,

(19) A-5

Heavy artillery concentrations were fired on HILLS 407, 473, and 375 by the 175th Field Artillery Battalion, with II Corps artillery supporting this fire.

The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 168th Infantry attacked the hills immediately after the artillery concentrations lifted, but were soon pinned down by heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. No further advance was made by the Division that day. The 135th Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry on HILL 344. (20)

On the 26th of April the 168th Infantry continued the attack on HILLS 407, 473 and 375. The plan of attack was for the 1st and 2d Battalions to continue the attack in the same direction as on the 25th of April. The 2d Battalion, which had been relieved by the 135th Infantry on HILL 344, was to attack the flank of HILL 437. After another heavy concentration by the artillery, the attack jumped off and this time the regiment was able to capture HILLS 407 and 437. (21)

In the meantime, the 135th Infantry had sent its 3d Battalion to capture SIDI NSIR which was accomplished with little difficulty.

The stage was now set for the final phase of the attack of HILL 609. The 34th Division line now ran from HILL 473 east to the base of HILL 490, south to HILL 530. HILLS 484 and 530 had been cleared of enemy by the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry during its advance on SIDI NSIR. (See Map C)

NARRATION

27 APRIL 1943 (See Map D)

The 34th Infantry Division Field Order No. 35, issued

(20) A-4, Sect
(21) A-4, Sect

26 April 1943, directed that on 27 April 1943, the 168th Infantry Regiment was to continue its attack on HILL 375 and to continue protecting the 34th Infantry Division left flank. The 168th Infantry by nightfall had been able to locate the enemy positions on HILL 375 and during the night of 27 April made necessary preparations for a dawn attack on HILL 375 with the 175th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support.

(22)

The 135th Infantry was directed to attack in the direction of the high ground around SIDI NSIR STATION, and especially HILLS 490 and 529, which blocked the approach to HILL 609. The mission of attacking HILL 490 was given to the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry which was forced to attack across the SIDI NSIR RIVER. In crossing the river and advancing up the slopes to HILL 490, the 3d Battalion was exposed to heavy enemy fire, but despite this disadvantage, the 3d Battalion reached HILL 490, and after heavy hand to hand fighting captured it. (23)

The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, after capturing HILL 490, immediately commenced reorganization and prepared to defend the hill. The enemy launched an extremely heavy counter-attack and succeeded in recapturing the hill, and driving the 3d Battalion back to the base of the hill. During the night the 3d Battalion made preparations for the recapture of HILL 490 the next day. (24)

The 133d Infantry Regiment, less the 2d Battalion, continued in division reserve, however the regiment moved from their positions of 26 April to positions nearer to the front

(22) A-5
(23) A-4
(24) A-4

lines.

28 APRIL 1943 (See Map D)

On 27 April, the 34th Infantry Division issued Field Order No. 36, directing the 168th Infantry to attack in its zone of action to capture HILL 375. The 135th Infantry was ordered to support the attack of the 1st Infantry Division, on the right flank of the 34th Infantry Division, by attacking HILL 609 from the northwest and by making feinting attacks towards HILL 531. The main effort of the Regiment was to be made on the northwest slopes of HILL 609 by attacking HILL 461. (25)

The 135th Infantry assigned the 1st Battalion the mission of supporting the 1st Infantry Division. The 3d Battalion was to seize HILL 435 after first capturing HILL 490. The 1st Battalion was to make the feinting attacks toward HILL 609 and 531 from its positions on HILL 529. (26)

The 1st Battalion carried out its mission by placing intensive 81 mm mortar and machine gun fire on HILLS 609 and 531. Two of its companies made repeated unsuccessful attacks against stubborn resistance attempting to seize HILL 531.

The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry made a dawn attack on HILL 490 after a heavy preparation by their supporting artillery. The attack was successful after heavy hand to hand fighting and this time the enemy was unable to counterattack immediately. After the successful capture and occupation of HILL ⁴⁹⁰ 409, the 3d Battalion continued the attack and captured HILL 435. Hardly had it cleared the top of HILL 435, when the

(25) A-5

(26) A-4

enemy made a determined counterattack against HILLS 435 and 490. This counterattack was repulsed by the 3d Battalion with the aid of the supporting artillery. The 3d Battalion was not to be firmly in possession of HILLS 435 and 490 until it had repulsed three more determined efforts to recapture these hills. (27)

During the fighting on the 28th of April, the enemy used artillery air bursts, mortar and machine gun fire with deadly effect, especially since the hard rocky ground and the absence of vegetation made it almost impossible for the men of the 135th Infantry Regiment to find cover and protection.

The 168th Infantry continued its attack on HILLS 375 and 433 which were captured. This secured the 34th Infantry Division's left flank, and also covered the approach of the 135th Infantry to HILLS 435 and 490.

At dusk on 28 April, the 3d Battalion, 133d Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion of the 135th and assumed responsibility for the defense of HILLS 435 and 490. (28)

29 APRIL 1943 (See Map D)

On 29 April 1943, the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry was attached to the 135th Infantry and the battalion commander received orders to move at dusk to an assembly area on the southeast slope of HILL 490. The Battalion Commander, with the Battalion S-2 and all Company Commanders, made a thorough reconnaissance of all possible routes to the new assembly area and a route was chosen that was completely in defilade. During this reconnaissance, the Battalion Commander received a

(27) A-4
(28) A-4

warning order describing three missions, any one of which the battalion was to be prepared to carry out immediately upon arrival in the new assembly area. The missions were:

1. Carry out a night attack.
2. Attack at dawn, with or without tanks.
3. Attack at dawn with a rolling barrage.

Regardless of the mission assigned the battalion, the objective was to capture and hold the northwest slopes of HILL 609. The direction of attack would be to the north until the right flank company reached the foot hills just below HILL 609, then the battalion would pivot on the right flank and attack HILL 609 in a northeasterly direction. (29)

The battalion started its move to the new assembly area at 2130 hours and closed in the area at 0400 hours. During this move, Company I, 1st Armored Regiment was attached to the battalion. Company I, 1st Armored Regiment was divided between the two assault units.

The formation for the attack was for two companies with the attached tanks to attack abreast with the Heavy Weapons Company in general support of the battalion, and one rifle company in reserve to follow the battalion on order of the Battalion Commander. The battalion was to cross the line of departure at 0600.

All assault units crossed the line of departure at 0600 with the infantry following immediately behind the tanks and some men holding on to the tanks. Coordination between the tanks and infantry was superior. The riflemen showed the tank gunners targets, and the tank gunners brought accurate and

(29) A-4

effective fire on the targets immediately. The assault advanced as planned to the foot hills of HILL 609, then pivoting on the right flank, the battalion turned to the northeast and moved on to the northwestern slope of HILL 609 by 0645 hours. Here it prepared defensive positions and continued to clear the foot hills of enemy. In this operation by the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry, and Company I of 1st Armored Regiment, 21 German prisoners were taken. The majority of casualties received by the 1st Battalion and Company I were sustained after the occupation of positions, when enemy artillery and mortar fire became intense. (30)

The 135th Infantry continued to attack in its zone of action with the 3d Battalion reorganizing and then clearing the enemy from HILLS 367 and 434, and the southwest slopes of HILL 609. The 2d Battalion took over the mission of capturing HILL 461 from the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion was to clear the enemy from HILL 531 and from the east and northeast slopes of HILL 609. (31)

The 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, closely following the artillery battalion's rolling barrage, was able to reach the escarpment of HILL 609 about 1030 hours. When the barrage was lifted, the 3d Battalion was heavily counterattacked by the enemy and driven back about 400 yards. However, by 1600 that day the 3d Battalion had regained the ground lost during the counterattack. (32)

The 2d Battalion, 135th Infantry, attacking HILL 461, met very strong resistance and was harassed by enfilading fire from HILL 435 where some enemy troops had infiltrated during the

(30) A-4, Sect
(31) A-4, Sect
(32) A-4, Sect

night. Progress was very slow and by nightfall the 2d Battalion had not reached its objective. (33)

The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry was unable to make any progress during the day. The 1st Infantry Division had been driven off HILL 523 leaving the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry exposed, and it was harassed by small enemy attacks most of the day. One heavy enemy counterattack was partly broken up by artillery fire, observed and directed by the 1st Battalion Commander from his observation post. The enemy finally was repelled by hand to hand fighting. Late in the afternoon, the 1st Battalion again made an attack on HILL 531 but progress was slow, and only 2 platoons were able to reach the northwest tip of HILL 531. During the night the 1st Battalion continued to attack HILL 531. (34)

30 APRIL 1943 (See Map D)

The night attack of the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry was successful and by 1500 hours had gained complete control of HILL 531. All 'fighting' did not stop with the capture of HILL 531. Due to the terrain on top of the hill, the enemy was able to establish small packets of resistance that had to be cleaned out one at a time. The Battalion spent the rest of the day driving the enemy from these pockets. (35)

The 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry was attached to the 135th Infantry on 30 April 1943, and ordered to move from its assembly area in the vicinity of HILL 375 to HILL 434. It received orders to relieve the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, on the southeast slope of HILL 609, during the night 30 April -

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- (33) A-4, Sect
(34) A-4, Sect
(35) A-4, Sect

1 May, and to be prepared to defend the position against possible counterattack. It would make contact with the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry now located on the northwest slopes of HILL 609.

Upon arrival at the base of HILL 609, the 2d Battalion found that the 3d Battalion, 135th Infantry, had pulled back from its original positions, because of "short" friendly artillery fire. This fire continued to fall during the entire period of relief, causing numerous casualties. After the relief was completed the 2d Battalion settled into its position and waited for daylight. One hour after dawn a group of enemy, approximately a company in strength, was observed approaching the position. These enemy troops were allowed to approach to within 50 to 100 yards of the position before the order to open fire was given. Approximately 50% of the enemy were casualties.

Contact with the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry, as yet had not been effected, even though several attempts to contact them had been made. To make contact with this unit, the Battalion Commander of the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry extended his line to the left by attaching one platoon from the reserve company to the company on the left flank. This platoon extended the line enough to contact the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry. (36)

The 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry remained in position on the northwest slope of HILL 609 and continued to clear the area of enemy snipers and isolated groups.

1 MAY 1943 (See Map D)

On 1 May the enemy made a determined counterattack against
(36) A-4, Sect

the 1st Battalion, 133d Infantry, but after several hours of continuous fighting the counterattack was repulsed. (37)

The 2d Battalion, 135th Infantry continued to organize the positions on HILL 461 and repulsed local counterattacks. While doing this the battalion sent small elements up the slope of HILL 609 to clean out the last of the enemy resistance.

The 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry completed the capture of HILL 531 by clearing out the remaining enemy pockets of resistance. The 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry, with Company I, 1st Armored Regiment, attached, attacked the southeast base of the escarpment of HILL 609, at dawn, which they captured and cleared of all enemy resistance by early morning. (38)

By 1200, 1 May, the entire mass of HILL 609 was in the hands of the 34th Infantry Division and, except for mopping up isolated enemy pockets of resistance, all action had ceased. (39) (See Map D)

To sum up the results of this battle the 34th Division in capturing HILL 609 made the German positions, in front of the 1st Infantry Division on the right untenable. This allowed the 1st Infantry Division to advance and capture all of the high ground along both sides of the TINE RIVER. The way was cleared for the II Corps to use the 1st Armored Division through the TINE RIVER VALLEY and their capture of MATEUR on the 3d of May.

During the battles of HILL 609 the 34th Division encountered very stiff resistance in terrain well suited for the defenders. The Germans, due to their knowledge of the area, were able to establish weapon emplacements that were almost impos-

(37) A-4
(38) A-4
(39) A-4

sible to locate. The observation that was controlled by the Germans forced the division to make most of their movements at night. The attacks of the different hill positions were, from necessity, started prior to daylight making control difficult. Regardless of these difficulties the 34th Division was able to capture this enemy stronghold with a minimum of casualties.

The effort made by the Germans to hold and then to recapture HILL 609, is evidence of its importance in the battle for TUNISIA. The success of the 34th Division safeguarded and assisted the advance the 1st Division was making in the hills farther to the east.

It is my belief that the best summary of this operation was written by General Bradley, Commanding General II U. S. Corps, when he described the last counterattack on HILL 609 by the Germans. He wrote, "A strong enemy attack was repulsed. Fighting all day was intense and bloody. The enemy was engaged with bayonet and grenade, and there were many cases of outstanding bravery."

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. Analyzing the operation of the 34th Infantry Division at HILL 609, it must be noted that the division made maximum use of night training conducted by the division during the period prior to the operation. As a result of the good observation enjoyed by the enemy, the division was forced to make all their movements after dark. It must be remembered that night movements are very hard to control. The Division Commander took advantage of the period of inactivity for night training

to give both officers and men practice in night movements. If he had not done this, the night movements the division was required to make could have had an adverse effect on the outcome.

2. The dawn attack was used to a great advantage by the division, by moving across the line of departure immediately prior to daylight. They were in some cases able to approach quite close to the objective before the enemy could see that they were being attacked. This reduced the number of casualties to a minimum by allowing the troops to cover as much open ground as possible before being observed by the enemy.

3. Proper use of the division reserve was made in using them in one case to relieve one of the assault battalions that had been forced into a defensive position. This allowed that unit to continue in the assault. In another case one battalion from the division reserve was attached to one of the assault regiments for a tank-infantry attack on the division objective. This is a very good example of the proper use of the reserve at the proper time.

4. Flexibility of organization and command is another outstanding point that cannot be overlooked. At one time one of the assault regiments had five battalions under its command, all of which were actively engaged with the enemy. The two extra battalions were attached to the regiment while it was in the assault. The regiment was able to assume command of them and direct their operations with the same results as their original battalions.

5. Missions that could not be accomplished by the regiments

were not assigned to them. In cases where the regiments were having difficulty in carrying out the mission the reserve was given to them. This prevented the units from losing their forward momentum and allowing them to keep the offensive at all times.

6. The proper use of artillery in this operation is one of the outstanding points. In almost every case the artillery was used to the utmost, both in the attack and defensively against the counterattack. The effect of the artillery preparation and rolling barrage is shown in the example of one battalion following a rolling barrage and actually capturing these objectives. The battalion was then driven off after the barrage was lifted. Another example of the proper use of artillery is given in the counterattack phase, when counterattacks by the enemy were actually stopped by the artillery.

7. The proper training of all infantry personnel in adjusting artillery fire should be given high priority in all units. The results of this type of training is shown in the example of the battalion commander who observed a counterattack coming and was able to adjust his supporting artillery fire on the enemy. This all but stopped the counterattack.

8. The use of infantry-tank teams was demonstrated very effectively by the 3rd Battalion, 133rd Infantry and Company I, 1st Armored Regiment. Cooperation between the infantry and tanks in this attack was outstanding. This cooperation was due to the training that had been received by both units. For tank-infantry teams to be successful in combat they must work together.

LESSONS

1. All troops should be trained in night operations.
2. Where units must attack from positions without cover,
and the route of attack is over open ground, dawn or night attacks should be made.
3. The division reserves should be committed before the assault units have lost their forward momentum.
4. Units should not be given missions that they cannot accomplish.
5. Field artillery should be used to support the attack whenever possible and concentrations planned to help defend against the counterattack.
6. Infantry personnel should be trained to adjust artillery fire.
7. Units must be able to work under any commander without effecting their efficiency.
8. Infantry and tank units should be trained together.