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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 148TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
(37TH INFANTRY DIVISION) AT MANILA, LUZON,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 9 JANUARY - 3 MARCH 1945
(LUZON CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Regimental Intelligence Officer)

Type of operation described: REGIMENT IN ATTACK ✓

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 148th Infantry Regiment, 37th Infantry Division, in the battle for Manila, Luzon, Philippine Islands, 9 January - 3 March 1945, during which period the initial landings were made, the great Central Plain traversed, the city itself totally mopped up and the regiment relieved for a much needed rest.

To orient the reader, let us go back quite some time to the actual beginning of the battle for Manila. Most of us like to think of it as being in its embryo stage when the now famous utterance of General Douglas A. MacArthur, " I shall return, " was made. (1) With this ominous statement of his heartfelt concern at leaving Corregidor under presidential orders for the safety of Australia and the assumption of a new and more highly diversified command, this famous officer and leader withdrew with his small party via PT Boat. (2)

Recollection of the fall of Manila and, ultimately, the Philippines, comes easy to all of us. First came the bombing phase of the attacking enemy, starting 8 December 1941, (3) followed by the token landings at Aparri and Vigan 10 December, (4) in an effort to divert reserves held in the vicinity of Manila from the sites of the main landings which were eventually made at Lingayen Gulf 22 December and Lamon Bay 23 and 24 December. (5) The continued ground and aerial

(1) A-5, p. 172 & 176; A-6, p. 62 & 230; A-7, p. 19 to 25;
(2) A-5, p. 63 to 68; (3) A-1, p. 70; A-5, p. 32 & 33; (4)
A-1, p. 71; (5) A-1, p. 72 & 74

attacks, gradually whittling down the forces of the defender; the stubborn but ill-fated stand on Bataan; and, the dreary days of incessant shelling and bombing on Corregidor were merely preludes to the unconditional surrender which followed.

(6)

Intermingled with these soul devouring defeats was the declaration of ' open city ' status for Manila. This came quietly on Christmas Eve to allow the military forces sufficient time to evacuate the city. (7) The formal announcement was made 26 December. (8) The following two days the little yellow Sons of -- Nippon bombed the city for the last time, apparently trying to make sure that the will to resist was truly gone. (9)

The return trip of American troops to the Philippines was long and arduous. The regiment with which we are dealing had already made a portion of the trip along one of the routes. It had been battle-tested on New Georgia, held its place in the defences^s of Bougainville, and, following a heavy training phase which included amphibious, assault team, tank-infantry-artillery-engineer team and town and village fighting training, was well prepared for the job at hand. (10)

Here, it must be realized, was not the island by island fighting which some believed was to characterize the war in the Pacific Theatre. Instead, this sizable operation of bypassing and island hopping, dwarfing previous similar executions, was designed to drive a wedge in the Japanese resistance from the south thus rendering many thousands of troops ineffective and providing the springboard for our eventual leap to the enemy homeland. (11)

(6) A-7, p. 135; (7) A-5, p. 43; A-6, p. 59; (8) A-1. p. 75; (9) A-1, p. 75; (10) & (11) A-11

THE PLANNING PHASE

Planning for the Mike One Operation^{*} suffered many growing pains as it developed. First of all, Sixth Army was barely into the Leyte and Mindoro Operations from the standpoint of planning until they were also faced with the plans for Mike One. The two former operations were merely stepping-stones to the paramount objective in the recapture of the Philippines -- Luzon with its key port, Manila.

Progress on Leyte was slow, forbidding the development of airfields badly needed for the planned future operations. Realizing this necessity, timely revision of the advanced planning postponed the Mindoro Operation from 5 December 1944 to 15 December 1944. This dictated the change in target dates for the Mike One Operation from 20 December 1944 to 9 January 1945. Thus the beleaguered planners guaranteed direct air support and neutralization of enemy air bases to the impending operation against Luzon. (12)

It is only reasonable to assume that XIV Corps, to which the 37th Division was assigned, had ^{its} ~~their~~ troubles during this period. It is a matter of record that the 37th Division did. Paper loadings of the presumably assigned shipping were completed several times, only to find that the ships which were actually loaded had entirely different specifications. (13)

The division was loaded into two serials for the waterborne assault. One was called the Landing Craft Convoy since it was made up mainly of LST's and LSM's; the other the Transport Convoy composed of AKA's, APA's, Liberty type ships and other transport and cargo vessels. All were loaded, keep-

(12) A-9, p. 1, 5 & 9; (13) A-3, p. 1; A-11

ing the factors of tactical unity and dispersion foremost. Loading was completed 14 December and the convoys sailed 15 and 16 December in order of their relative speeds.

Practice landings were made in the Huon Gulf Area of New Guinea enroute to the target area. Following these rehearsals, the convoys sailed to Manus Island in the Admiralty Group where they were destined, in part, to lay over until New Years Eve. (14)

The Landing Craft Convoy sailed 27 December, followed by the Transport Convoy on 31 December, finally enroute to the target area. (15)

The enemy, although weakened in aerial strength, was not sleeping during our movement.. One attack by a single twin-engined bomber and five attacks by fighter-bombers kept gun crews and pilots alert. By S-Day, four ships had been hit by suicide planes but none carried personnel of the 37th Division. (16)

As long as we are discussing the enemy, let us pause here momentarily to scrutinize the available information concerning his locations and strengths. (See Map A) It was estimated that the island of Luzon held a total, of 270,000 enemy troops. Of this total, 233,500 were believed to be north of Manila or within easy reach of the city from the south, 4,500 were occupying the small islands across the Babuyan Channel north of Aparri and 32,000 were in the southern reaches of the island. I point out numbers rather than organizations because the reader would only draw false conclusions as to strength unless he knew Japanese Order of Battle. The main interest in particular units centered

(14) A-3, p. 15 & 16; A-8, p. 1; A-11; (15) A-3, p. 17; A-11; (16) A-3, p. 18; A-11

around the presence of the 2nd Armored Division and the possibility of the presence of at least one additional armored regiment. These were believed located in the north-eastern portions of the Central Plain. It is well to recall that the above-mentioned estimates and beliefs were in great part developed from guerrilla radio contacts on the island itself. (17)

Arrival in the Lingayen Gulf Area the night of 8 - 9 January brought an end to the continuous planning and training phase which was, by now, ' old stuff ' to the enlisted personnel concerned. (18) (See Map B)

THE LANDING PHASE

The landing proceeded as planned with the XIV and I Corps abreast, XIV Corps on the right (west), and, inside the XIV Corps, 40th and 37th Divisions abreast, 37th Division on the left (east). The 148th Infantry Regiment landed in the right sector of the division zone (contrary to A-9) with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast, 1st Battalion on the right (west). The 129th Infantry Regiment was on the left of the 2nd Battalion.

The mission of the regiment was to seize the landing beach in its zone of action, capture and hold a bridgehead across the Calmay River and be prepared to seize and hold the Corps Beachhead and Army Beachhead Lines on order. (19)

Assault waves were loaded and formed to hit the beach at 0930 as scheduled. Naval gunfire launched its planned preparations and lifted to inland targets to allow the LCI gunboat and rocket fire to take its toll. Enemy air attacks (17) A-10, Diagram 2; (18) A-3, p. 19; A-11; (19) A-3, p. 19; A-8, p. 2; A-11

attempting to hamper the operation were driven off by our aircraft before they could offer more than token resistance and with little resultant damage to shipping or injury to personnel. (20)

Both assault battalions, each landing with two companies abreast, crossed the beach without opposition and, in the ensuing advance against light resistance, 2nd Battalion seized the bridgehead at the Calmay River, crossing it in LVT's since the bridge was out.

3rd Battalion landed as the reserve of the regiment but was committed early when the 1st Battalion moved too far to the west. Confronted by an unfordable stream, they guided on it and left their zone of action. This unfortunate incident necessitated a change in the disposition of the regiment and created a delay in the conduct of the attack. (21)

THE CENTRAL PLAIN PHASE

The following day an advance on San Carlos and the Corps Beachhead Line was ordered. The 3rd Battalion attacked down the road with 2nd Battalion echeloned to the left rear and the 1st Battalion following on the road in reserve. 3rd Battalion entered the town without opposition to be greeted by a huge swarm of people who adorned them with wreaths of flowers, crying bitter tears as they recalled the grim occupational nightmare, yet, cheering the arrival of American troops.

For the first time in almost two years these troops saw the materialization of their dream -- to see civilization again. They had seen no town, city or civilian population (20) A-3, p. 19; A-11; (21) A-3, p. 19; A-8, p. 2; A-11

since leaving the Fiji Islands 12 February 1943. They were almost as overcome as the populace and morale was perceptibly raised in all ranks.

3rd Battalion now set about establishing defenses around the town. The other two battalions soon arrived in the town with orders close on their heels to continue the advance and occupy the Army Beachhead Line. At this time, 3rd Battalion was sent to Dompay and Company E was told to occupy Abanon. The remainder of the 2nd Battalion outposted San Carlos while the 1st Battalion remained in reserve at the outer edge of the town. Our battalions had accounted for eleven enemy dead, remnants of the force last to leave the beach, and Company I had presented us with our first prisoner of the campaign. (22)

The next five days were spent in the San Carlos Area organizing the Army Beachhead Line and patrolling in an effort to find the enemy. Guerrilla and civilian reports sent us on a few fools errands but caused us only a little difficulty since we were already patrolling the areas concerned. 3rd Battalion made contact with approximately ninety enemy near Dita and ~~dispatched~~^{KILLED} thirty-one of their number as the Japs, not wanting a fight, managed to break contact. This group was chased all over the sector but was never cornered again. During this period, Company E was moved to Urbiztondo where Company F joined them two days later. Company K outposted the 3rd Battalion sector. Patrols throughout the area were negative after reaching as far south as the Agno River. (23)

(22) A-3, p. 21; A-8, p. 2; A-11; (23) A-3, p. 21 & 23; A-8, p. 2 & 3; A-11

Forward movement was resumed the morning of the 16th following receipt of orders to move to the Agno River. We were in the middle of the move when a change of orders told us to outpost each forward battalion sector with one company and to retain the reserve battalion on the Army Beachhead Line. This last portion of the order caused the 1st Battalion to countermarch almost five miles although they had already had the longest march of the day. (24)

Vigorous patrolling was the order for the 17th and 18th both to try to locate the enemy and to reconnoiter routes forward in anticipation of our next move. Company C made one minor contact during this period and Company B outposted the 1st Battalion sector south of the Agno River without incident. (25)

19 January the regiment moved forward under orders to occupy the line Camiling - Balacang - Paniqui. 1st Battalion moved through Bayambang down the railroad track to Moncada and on into Paniqui without resistance finding guerrillas in occupancy of the town. 3rd Battalion crossed the river at Wawa and proceeded south to occupy the line Camiling - Balacang. 2nd Battalion moved to a reserve position northwest of Balacang.

Continued advance on the 20th carried the 3rd Battalion to the line Gerona - Pura. (See Map C) 2nd Battalion joined them taking over the right half of this line at the end of the day. 1st Battalion moved to and took up a reserve position in the vicinity of Ramos.

At this time, the 37th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the regiment. They were sorely needed to bolster our

(24) A-3, p. 23; A-8, p. 3; A-11; (25) A-3, p. 25; A-8, p. 3; A-11

organic reconnaissance elements since we were travelling with both flanks open and stretching our supply lines to quite some length. (26)

21 January the 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced abreast and occupied the line Tarlac - Victoria. 1st Battalion moved to Pura. Return of the 37th Reconnaissance Troop that evening brought news of the absence of enemy in La Paz. 3rd Battalion was ordered to move up under cover of darkness preceded by a motorized patrol. This patrol from the Reconnaissance Troop made contact with the enemy at a road junction one thousand yards west of La Paz at about 1700. 3rd Battalion claimed the road junction after reducing the road-block. 2nd Battalion moved to a position on the right of 3rd Battalion while 1st Battalion moved to the vicinity of Lomboy.

3rd Battalion attacked the town of La Paz at daylight the next morning to find the town deserted and, by 0900, the line La Paz - Balingcanaway (contrary to A-3) was occupied and patrols were on their ways to Zaragoza and Balanoy. (27)

By this time, I Corps, heavily engaged almost from the time of the initial landing, had fallen back deeply on our left (east) flank causing that flank to be open without hope of tying in with them again soon.

Lack of resistance to our front made it desirable to press our advantage but, since our left flank was so irreparably open, it was deemed necessary to patrol that flank to determine the presence or absence of enemy before extending ourselves further. Therefore, plans were formulated late 22 January for long range motorized reconnaissance patrols to

(26) A-3, p. 26; A-8, p. 3; A-11; (27) A-3, p. 28; A-8, p. 4; A-11

our left (east) flank.

Reconnaissance Company, 637th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached and was used as a basis for the long range job. One motorized rifle platoon from 3rd Battalion and one demolition team from Company C, 117th Engineer Battalion were added to the patrol for obvious reasons. They were to cross the Rio Chico de la Pampanga River east of La Paz and, taking the most direct route to Cabanatuan, return with what information they could gather.

37th Reconnaissance Troop with two motorized rifle squads from 2nd Battalion and two demolition teams from Company C, 117th Engineer Battalion were to patrol to the limit of ground reconnaissance south of Licab. Our own Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was to patrol to the same limit within our own regimental sector.

Here we suffered our first reversal of the campaign. During the night of 22 - 23 January, Mr. Nip walked in with one tank and an estimated 15 - 20 infantrymen under the support of some light artillery, drove in our outpost at the bridge over the Rio Chico de la Pampanga River, destroyed the bridge and left us holding the wreckage and our fine patrol plan. The bridge concerned was the only possible obstacle that could have loomed to hold our patrols from entering the area we needed to reconnoiter. This failure to properly block and defend the approach to a bridge that was already ours necessitated a change in patrol routes that cost us twelve hours delay in executing one of the patrol missions and extended the route of another by more than thirty miles. The principal reason for the failure appeared to be the fact that those manning it did not realize that

such a block must be maintained in a different manner during hours of darkness than during daylight hours.

Patrols departed the next day as rescheduled. 37th Reconnaissance Troop and the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon returned from their assignments with negative reports.

The larger patrol moved through Victoria - Pura - Guimba and, dropping a roadblock at the road junction north of Baloc, proceeded toward Baloc. Hearing firing to the northwest, the patrol leader found that the roadblock group had made contact with an estimated one hundred enemy in the vicinity of Puntod. Leaving its role of reconnaissance temporarily, the patrol engaged the enemy. Two pill-boxes, each containing an anti-tank gun, were knocked out in the first firing. Those enemy who made it to their defensive installations set up a stubborn resistance. During the fire-fight which followed, the enemy managed to reinforce with four mortars from undetected positions in the rear of his defenses. Apparently his observation was poor for he caused very little damage with them. Fire from .50 calibre machine guns, raking the general area from which the mortars were firing, succeeded in silencing them. About this time, a guerrilla from a group in the vicinity brought word that a heavy column of dust was approaching from the north. Observation of the length of the column indicated to the patrol leader that he was about to be engaged by a superior force unless he acted quickly. He ordered the patrol to spray the area with tracer fire and, at the same time, directed the fires of his heavier weapons on the approaching column. He then withdrew, noting that the column had perceptibly slowed or possibly had stopped and that he had set fire to two ammunition dumps, one gasoline dump and

several buildings. He estimated that at least forty enemy dead were left behind and, during the fracas, was able to effect the release of thirty-five impressed Filipino laborers from one of the buildings.

The patrol did not reach Cabanatuan, nor did it reach the Pampanga River west of that city. We were still without sufficient information from that quarter.

Late the same evening the Company Commander of Company C was given a motorized patrol composed of two rifle squads, one light machine gun section, one 37mm squad, one 60mm mortar section and one SCR 284, all mounted in $\frac{1}{4}$ T 4 x 4 trucks, and was given the mission of obtaining the needed information. The patrol was ferried across the site of the blown bridge east of La Paz and proceeded on its night raid into enemy positions. They reached the Pampanga River after light encounters at San Emiliano and San Felipe and were able to observe the town of Cabanatuan where they saw only some large fires burning. No bridge spanned the river. This patrol not only accomplished its mission but was able to destroy twenty-six of the enemy and capture one of his machine guns in the doing.

With the return of these patrols we were again free to pursue the course of extending our spearhead toward the city of Manila. (28)

Our 1st and 2nd Battalions moved to the vicinity of Concepcion - Santa Monica during the night 23 - 24 January, while 3rd Battalion, after relief by a battalion of the 129th Infantry, moved to a reserve area near Santa Cruz. 2nd Battalion outposted along the Bamban River. 1st Battalion (28) A-3, p. 28; A-8, p. 4, 5 & 6; A-11

established roadblocks on all roads leading into Concepcion.

Heavy patrolling was continuous. 24 January proved an exceptionally hard day for those assigned the job. A patrol from Company G reconnoitered as far as Mabalacat only to be ambushed on their return although they had encountered no enemy or seen any signs of them enroute. They had reached a point about one thousand yards west of Santa Maria when one of the patrol members remarked that a haystack by the side of the road was new and that it had not been there when they had passed through the same area earlier. The roving haystack turned out to be an enemy tank cleverly camouflaged which, with other supporting weapons, engaged the patrol. Mortar, machine gun and 37mm fire from the tank forced the patrol to withdraw. Efforts to bypass the resistance brought them new grief when their vehicles mired in a soft field through which they attempted to travel. First reports of this action came from an engineer officer who had accompanied the patrol. He stated that the whole patrol had either been killed or captured creating quite a stir in our own and higher headquarters.

Company B was hurriedly motorized and rushed to the scene of the action where they were met by an officer from the tank destroyer battalion that was in support of the 40th Division who stated that there were approximately two hundred enemy with tanks in the vicinity of San Roque. The area was shelled. Caution was exercised not to fire too close to the harassed patrol but a few bursts were noticeably close to them. When the patrol was finally extricated from their predicament we learned that they had lost two men killed, five men wounded, two $\frac{1}{2}$ T 4 x 4 trucks destroyed and two

others badly damaged. This was a far cry from the distorted initial report made by a very excited officer. We were unable to determine the comparable amount of damage inflicted upon the Japanese.

The same day a patrol from Company B killed several enemy dressed in civilian clothes just south of Santa Maria. Moving on, they met further resistance. An estimated two platoons of enemy supported by one light tank and four tankettes, in addition to mortars and machine guns, drove our patrol east toward Mount Arayat where it was strengthened by a guerrilla contact and set up for the night. Pressure of the enemy attack had forced them to abandon their radio equipped $\frac{1}{4}$ T 4 x 4 and other vehicles early in the fight. These were later recovered with the exception of one vehicle. Luckily, the patrol had managed to get off with a few slight injuries and were returned to our control the following morning after sending a man through to tell us of their plight. Reports of the various members of the patrol indicated that an estimated seventeen of the enemy had been accounted for and at least one direct hit had been made on a tankette with a rocket launcher.

Adding to the turmoil of the day, a wild report that a platoon of Company A, patrolling to the southeast, was under heavy attack reached regimental headquarters. 1st Battalion Commander immediately took off with the remainder of Company A to take relief to them while Company L, the nearest company to the scene of the action, was alerted in the event they were needed. Arrival at the scene of the reported incident found all quiet and serene with the patrol proceeding on its orderly way.

The 25th of January was spent patrolling south of the Bamban River and, by the end of the day, our troops out-posted the sector at a point one thousand yards south of it.

(29)

No enemy contacts were made 26 January as the patrols dispatched to completely cover the sector reported negatively. Forward movement was continued this date, however, with 1st Battalion attacking through 2nd Battalion, followed by 3rd Battalion echeloned to the left rear. 2nd Battalion reverted to regimental reserve in the vicinity of San Roque. The line Magalang - Mabalacat was secure at the end of the day.

Here, early the following morning, a report of the approach of a column of enemy tanks from the south caused a hurried concentration of anti-tank weapons to intercept it. A call to a regimental observation post in a church steeple in Magalang gave us the information that they were able to see a heavy column of dust in the direction of the threat, but, that the 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ T 6 x 6 trucks making it were plainly visible under the dust cloud. Efforts to check the source of the false report were futile but it is believed local civilians started it. We knew it was transmitted by our own troops since it was received from them. Needless to say, the Regimental Commander, after two days of such tomfoolery, was well prepared to explain evaluation of information and investigation of source to the offenders.

Advancing a portion of the line 27 January, using the 1st Battalion in assault, we extended our front to the line Magalang - Angeles. The only incident of the day was a contact by Company B with about eighteen of the enemy.

(29) A-3, p. 29; A-8, p. 6 & 7; A-11

Fifteen were destroyed. Patrols again reported no contacts with the elusive enemy. One patrol, reinforced with armor, managed to get within eight hundred yards of Mexico but failed to reach San Fernando, as ordered, when two of their tanks mired in a difficult cross-country run.

Meanwhile, 37th Reconnaissance Troop, travelling by another route, had gained a position from which they appeared to be able to reach San Fernando. They were ordered to proceed into the city and did so late in the day without resistance.

Prior to daylight the following morning, Company L, reinforced, was sent to relieve them and to protect the bridge, captured intact, over the San Fernando River. The bridge had been fully prepared for demolition but had apparently failed to detonate in the hurried withdrawal of the enemy when the reconnaissance troop rolled into the city. (30)

The remainder of the 3rd Battalion followed Company L and by 0200 29 January had closed into the city and were occupying it.

Arrival of the Regimental S-2 in San Fernando somewhat earlier, found a crowd of approximately five thousand Huk-balahaps (guerrillas) more or less in possession of the city. They were aroused by the previous arrival of two Counter-Intelligence Corps operatives who were posting notices that the surrender of all arms by guerrilla elements was to be made without delay. A hasty conference with the men posting the signs and the leaders of the guerrillas brought satisfaction to all pending the arrival of the 3rd Battalion.

On the same date, 29 January, 2nd Battalion moved to
(30) A-3, p. 31; A-8, p. 7; A-11

Dapdap as division reserve; and, Company A relieved elements of the 145th Infantry Regiment in the right sector of the division zone. All patrol reports were negative until about 1800 when a patrol from 3rd Battalion and 37th Reconnaissance Troop combined encountered an enemy roadblock in the vicinity of San Vicente. This group of an estimated sixty enemy was engaged and driven from their positions at which time the patrol withdrew to our own lines, due to the rapidly approaching darkness. (31)

Patrols on the 30th of January found no enemy in our sector and it was not until 1100 hours on the 31st that contact was reestablished near Calumpit when 2nd Battalion Commander and a portion of his troops wormed their way over the twisted structure of a partially destroyed bridge over the Pampanga River. The crossing was continued with the use of Landing Vehicles (tracked) which were brought up on call. Late in the day we find the 2nd Battalion seizing and occupying Calumpit with Company F engaged with an estimated two hundred enemy. This contact was broken by the enemy shortly after darkness set in. During this same period, Company L occupied the Santa Monica - San Simon Area without incident.

Here it would be well to digress momentarily to assist the reader in an understanding of the full situation by pointing out that I Corps was still heavily engaged in what was called the Northern Sector and had no hopes of coming abreast on our left flank. The 145th and 129th Infantry Regiments had turned right to engage the enemy concentration at Fort Stotsenburg. Due to the over-extension of our supply

(31) A-3, p. 33; A-8, p. 7 & 8; A-11

lines and the long open flanks, the 145th Infantry Regiment was ordered to come abreast of the 148th Infantry Regiment and the 129th Infantry Regiment was left, attached to the 40th Infantry Division, to complete the job at Fort Stotsenburg. It was here that word arrived stating that the 1st Cavalry Division would be committed on our left. Rumors had previously passed through the ranks that this former horse cavalry was to be given the honor of retaking Manila. Notification of their commitment, at this time, did little to spike the rumor. (32)

The following day, 1 February, the 2nd Battalion advanced across the Labangan River against light resistance and were heavily engaged near Mojon. The river barrier allowed no supporting weapons to accompany the foot-troops and soon the battalion was on the receiving end of a barrage of automatic weapons, mortar and anti-tank gun fire. They were unable to continue to advance. Our supporting artillery was on the move since it had been temporarily out of range. Engineers worked rapidly and soon had the Anti-tank Platoon of 2nd Battalion across the river and in action. Artillery swung off the road and took temporary positions long enough to give the needed support. Beyond a doubt, good communications and an all-out effort on the part of supporting arms averted many casualties.

1st Battalion, meanwhile, had made a night march and, crossing the Pampanga River, approached Plaridel where they were to engage in the first major battle of the offensive. An enemy outpost at Santa Cruz was driven in only to assail his main strength at the outskirts of Plaridel. Here the

(32) A-8, p. 8; A-11

terrain, alternately jungle, woods and open ground, lent itself well to the intention of the enemy. They met us with mortar and artillery fire, coupled with their never - say - die spirit, and forced us to use every type of tactics in the book as we pushed them back into the town. There, although mauled and beaten, they came back like wounded tigers in an effort to retain control of this vital communication center where the roads lead off to the north toward their planned mountain strongholds in the Baguio - Cagayan Valley - Balete Pass Areas. 3rd Battalion moved to San Vicente during the day where they were held in reserve.

2 February found the 1st Battalion still heavily engaged at Plaridel. The raging battle found the critical junction of Routes 3 and 5 changing hands many times as these fanatical defenders, apparently charged to hold at all cost, alternately defended and counterattacked. Advance of 2nd Battalion had rolled over continuous resistance to San Juan. Enroute, the battalion had hit resistance at Malolos and, after a hard fight, pushed on through. It was later believed that these withdrawing enemy reinforced the stiff resistance at Plaridel. The battalion also had difficulty here with guerrillas when two forces of them pushed into the town and were disputing possession of it. This was settled by officers of the 2nd Battalion. The end of the day found them patrolling south to Bocaue. 3rd Battalion, still in regimental reserve, had moved through Guiguinto to San Juan. (33)

Contact at Plaridel continued throughout the night but toward morning, 3 February, the enemy broke contact. Company A was left to mop up and hold the important road junction

(33) A-3, p. 35; A-8, p. 8 & 9; A-11; Statement by Lt. Col. H. W. Radcliffe, then 2nd Battalion Commander, 16 February 1948

while the rest of the battalion was ordered to Bocaue. The 2nd Battalion, enroute to the same town earlier in the day, had met slight resistance and, upon entering the municipality, received small arms and mortar fire from the far bank of the Bulacan River running through the town. Full use of supporting arms carried their attack across this river and subsequent advance through Mecauyan to Banga retained the initial contact to the close of the day. 3rd Battalion moved through Bocaue and Marilao to a position approximately five hundred yards south of the latter town. The first contact was made with the 1st Cavalry Division during the day when they passed through the positions of Company A at Plaridel. (34)

THE BATTLE FOR MANILA

We were now virtually knocking at the gates of the city of Manila. The past few days had seen the springing up of the highly touted race of the 1st Cavalry Division against the 37th Infantry Division to be the first in the town. It is necessary to pause here to inform the reader that there was never any intention on the part of the 37th Division to be taking part in a race but rather to accomplish the tactical missions given it, thereby giving their utmost toward the successful accomplishment of the overall missions of the United States Army. The posing of one question will set the mind of the reader at ease and quell any doubts he may have of the foregoing statement. The question -- is any infantry division, after hiking approximately one hundred thirty miles (not including countermarches, deployment, circuitous routes, patrols, etc.) in twenty-four days (35) against intermittent

(34) A-3, p. 37; A-8, p. 9; A-11; (35) A-8, p. 9; A-11

resistance, fording and bridging many streams, and overcoming obstacles of terrain, weather and enemy, prepared to race with a fully motorized, comparatively fresh division whose advance to the scene of the action is made against little or no resistance and over few, if any, obstacles? The answer is quite obvious. It would be well to add that the author believes the above to be the true attitude of the entire 37th Division and that it is doubtful that Major General Robert S. Beightler, Division Commander, said anything to the effect that we'd beat those so - and - so feather merchants or know why as quoted later by a Time correspondent.

It was decided to attempt an entry into the city via the surprise route by passing the 3rd Battalion through the 2nd Battalion and having them continue on into the city under cover of darkness. (See Map D) This was done and, after overcoming a light outpost, the battalion entered the city at 0705 4 February. Here they hit resistance at the Caloocan Railroad Station but slowly continued to advance against increasing resistance.

2nd Battalion pushed on up the main highway when 3rd Battalion turned down the railroad track. They soon arrived at the banks of the Tullahan River to find the bridge blown and the river impassable. Pioneers and engineers, aided by infantrymen, went to work without delay and soon built a crude foot-bridge across which the battalion passed.

We soon found that one squadron of the 1st Cavalry Division had preceded us by about eleven hours and were already holding Santo Tomas University and Malacanan Palace. Their brilliant, lightning-swift move had gained the desired

element of surprise.

2nd Battalion closed into the city early on the 4th and, by the end of the day, with the 3rd Battalion, were well established in the key city of the Philippines. 1st Battalion was held in reserve in north Manila.

The highlight of this day came when the 2nd Battalion reached the walls of Bilibid Prison and liberated eight hundred ^{and} ten American prisoners of war and four hundred ^{and} sixty-five civilian internees. Their condition is well known to the world by the date of this writing. (36)

It was apparent in the first few hours of occupancy of the city that the enemy had no intention of giving it up without a fight. Roadblocks built of steel railroad rail uprights, six to eight feet high, supported by steel drums filled with sand, soil or cement and, additionally, wired for demolition and covered by fire, covered the important intersections on the route of advance. In front of these, artillery shells, bombs of all sizes, naval depth charges and floating mines were fused with regular mine detonators and were countersunk in the streets. Many were wired for electric detonation by observers in buildings overlooking the site. (See Diagram I)

Adding to these conditions and to the fires already burning when we entered the city, the enemy, in his stubborn effort to delay us north of the Pasig River, set fires and began dynamiting on a width of about nine blocks. The wind was favorable to his efforts and soon the fires had spread to such huge proportions that our forward positions were untenable. Earlier on this same day we were close enough to the

(36) A-3, p. 37 & 38; A-8, p. 9 & 10; A-11

Pasig to bathe our feet in her uninviting waters.

The civilian Filipino is a great looter. It was apparent that our rapid advance and early entrance into the city gave him a chance to engage in this activity. As a result, the fires were assisted in their spread by drums of gasoline and oil ^{BY WHOM?} rolled under the residences of the looters. Explosion followed explosion enhancing the inferno.

Meanwhile, word had been received that we were not to use artillery or dive-bombers in the city. Now, when they were most sorely needed, the enemy slowly opened with his own mortars, artillery and rockets. Although permission was granted to employ direct fire methods with our own supporting weapons, this was practically impossible and we were compelled to receive fire which we were not allowed to counter.

Advances made during the day of 5 February were lost as the raging fires crept block by block jeopardizing the lives of the twelve hundred seventy-five residents of Bilibid Prison. Transportation of all types was gathered from all available sources and, augmented by any and all civilian transport we were able to place in use, the entire group was evacuated from the path of the fire in a hectic three-hour fight against time and conflagration. Many of these were unable to walk and had to be carried to and from ambulances by litter teams.

Advance early on the morning of 6 February carried us to the Pasig River shortly after 1200. Here our troops confirmed the previously received information that no bridge across the tidal stream was left intact. Due to a change of boundaries by XIV Corps, we were ordered to relieve the 1st

(See MAP D)

Cavalry between Quezon Bridge and the San Juan River. This was done. (37)

7 February the regiment was ordered to cross the Pasig River and was consequently relieved of responsibility north of the river by the 145th Infantry Regiment. Erratic mortar, artillery and rocket fire fell throughout the entire morning. (See Map E)

3rd Battalion was moving to a position west of Malacanan Palace when orders were issued with 2nd Battalion to the left rear and 1st Battalion to the right rear. The plan was to launch the shore to shore movement with one company, governed by the number of engineer assault boats immediately available, from the 3rd Battalion, seize the bridgehead and close the remainder of the regiment to the far side of the river as early as practicable.

3rd Battalion Commander chose Company L for the lead assignment since they were leading his column. They seized the initial crossing site in an excellent maneuver that, due to the partial screening by well laid smoke and proper use of cover of the wall around the palace, led the enemy to place his fires west of the point of embarkation -- a mistake that went totally undiscovered during the entire movement.

The first wave of engineer assault boats was allowed to cross the river without being hampered by defensive fires and arrival on the far shore found no enemy defenses. The opposition was all down stream toward Manila Bay. He soon awakened, however, and was able to bring some machine gun and mortar fire on the second wave. Direct fire from the (37) A-3, p. 41 & 43; A-8, p. 10; A-9, p. 11, 12, 13 & 27; A-11

Cannon and Anti-tank Companies silenced some of these weapons as fast as they were able to spot them. The tempo of the enemy fire increased with each passing minute as he worked feverishly to reposition his weapons bringing more and more fire to bear upon our bridgehead and what he thought was the point of embarkation. Finally opening to the full with artillery, dual purpose guns, mortars, machine guns and rockets, the enemy started what was the only major coordination and massing of fires ever perpetrated by the Japanese, in the experience of the author.

Although enemy fires failed to locate our loading site, as previously stated, their fires did take a toll of Regimental Headquarters Company personnel who were trying to execute their assigned support missions. They were also successful in sinking some of our small craft as assault boats carried troops and LVT-4's carried weapons and weapons carriers in successive waves. (38)

Late afternoon during the river crossing found the Division Commander, Division Artillery Commander, one other general officer and several staff officers from higher headquarters behind the wall at Malacanan Palace watching the show. They enjoyed the returning volume of fire to such an extent that restrictions on the use of artillery were removed without further ado. This with the admonition that all possible steps would be taken to avoid unnecessary injury to civilians known to be in the areas under attack. It is noteworthy that dive-bombing was never allowed in the city.

The end of the day found our bridgehead enlarged by the
(38) A-3, p. 43 & 45; A-8, p. 10 & 11; A-11; Statement by Lt. Col. H. W. Schultz, then 3rd Battalion Commander, 15 Feb48

passage of the 2nd Battalion to the far side where they were joined by 1st Battalion the same night. 2nd and 3rd Battalions were abreast, 2nd Battalion on the right, with the 1st Battalion in reserve.

As an aid to the reader, let us examine the quality and quantity of the adversary. Estimates of enemy strength defending Manila ran to a figure approximating thirteen thousand but order of battle personnel were taxed to the utmost trying to gather who or what type troops they were. It was finally agreed that they were a hodge-podge of navy, army and service troops, including airmen, laborers both impressed and voluntary, and shipping and port elements. This was supported by evidence of an intended immobile defense incapable of maneuver. It looked as though our turtle had pulled in his head and was depending on his shell to save his neck. (39)

We made only small gains 8 February as the 2nd and 3rd Battalions extended the bridgehead seizing the line Cristobal Street - Estero de Concordia - Manila Railroad - Pasig River. (40) (see MAP E)

Early the morning of the 9th, 1st Battalion attacked through 2nd Battalion only to be stopped in their tracks by heavy opposition from Paco Railroad Station and Paco School. Resistance from these fortified stone and cement buildings was great. 2nd Battalion moved to the Pandacan District following their relief and took over the chore of protecting the left flank and clearing the rear areas of by-passed enemy.

Resistance continued strong until the following morning (39) A-3, p. 45 & 47; A-8, p. 10; A-11; (40) A-3, p. 47 & 49; A-11

when, after an all night pulverization by our mortars and artillery, Company C was able to force a crossing of the Estero de Concordia and capture Paco School. This apparently relieved the pressure on Company B and Paco Railroad Station soon fell. These successes carried us to the Estero de Paco.

At this time, 3rd Battalion, who had rested a full day in the Pandacan District, attacked in the left sector. Late afternoon 10 February found them abreast of the 1st Battalion with Company C in possession of the only remaining bridge over the Estero de Paco. (41)

A coordinated attack 11 February ran us into a new stone wall. 1st Battalion hit the strongly defended Paco Cemetery after crossing the Estero de Paco and overcoming light but stubborn resistance in the Market Place. At the cemetery the enemy had taken full advantage of the wide wall containing the crypts of the interred and had substituted his weapons for the caskets at intervals completely around the wall. His fire bristled from these firing ports at the sight of any of our men.

3rd Battalion advance encountered heavily barricaded and fortified concrete buildings in its path. Snipers added diversion in all areas. (42)

Fire was again used as an effective weapon on the 12th not only prohibiting the advance of the 3rd Battalion but causing them to give ground slightly while waiting for its intensity to subside.

1st Battalion employed everything at its command during the day but were unable to claim more than a foothold in the (41) A-3, p. 49; A-8, p. 11 & 12; A-11; (42) A-3, p. 53; A-8, p. 12; A-11

Paco Cemetery by nightfall. Shortly after darkness had set in Company C announced that it held the cemetery in its entirety but that heavy fire was coming in from the flanks and rear of the position. Completion of the mopping up in the stronghold the following morning showed the Company Commander of Company C that the previous night was merely the lull before the storm. Heavy fighting ensued on an almost hand to hand basis which ended in our undisputed possession of the cemetery. (43)

At this time, 1st Cavalry units again came abreast relieving us of the anxiety of an open flank and releasing troops assigned to afford it extra attention. Thus 2nd Battalion was made available for commitment 13 February.

2nd Battalion attacked through 1st Battalion at 0800 13 February and fought its way to Pennsylvania Avenue where resistance slowed the attack and finally halted it.

3rd Battalion, on this same day, drove through to Taft Avenue, one of the city's main arteries. The fighting which assumed a street by street proportion previously now boiled down to a building by building affray. The enemy's strong reinforcement of all concrete buildings made him difficult to dislodge and his tenacity in defending them compelled our troops to actually enter his dugouts, caverns and pill-boxes and annihilate him before his resistance ceased.

Well organized, heavily armed and supported assault teams failed to break the stranglehold of the enemy on Taft Avenue, during the period 13 - 15 February, in the right battalion sector. 3rd Battalion in the left sector, however, was able to advance to Dewey Boulevard after a hard

(43) A-3, p. 55; A-8, p. 12; A-11

fight at Malate Circle.

Incessant artillery, mortar and rocket fire pounded us throughout the period and the enemy pulled a new, heavy rocket out of his bag of tricks. It was later found to weigh approximately fifteen hundred pounds, be over seventeen inches in diameter, more than sixty-eight inches long and was filled with high explosive. The thin metal case of this projectile broke on contact but did not disintegrate into small fragments. The result was purely concussion with a few large, jagged pieces of metal tossed about the receiving area. Rockets captured later proved to be 447mm.

The push of the 3rd Battalion to Dewey Boulevard provided the left block which effectively closed the enemy in an area enclosed by water by the Manila Bay and Pasig River sides and by our forces on land. No escape route was available to him. (44)

3rd Battalion attacked generally north from Remedios Street, 16 February, and began pushing in the enemy right flank. 2nd Battalion, having already placed the Philippine General Hospital under seige, attacked west against it. Shortly after noon, 1st Battalion took over the job of 3rd Battalion leaving the latter free to mop up the ground they had already taken and, thereby, retaining greater strength on the Japanese south flank. By nightfall, 1st Battalion had cleared out most of the pockets of resistance in their zone of advance and held a line running east from Manila Bay to Taft Avenue, about seventy-five yards north of Tennessee Avenue.

Heavy supporting fires, meanwhile, had enabled 2nd
(44) A-3, p. 55, 57, 59 & 61; A-8, p. 12; A-9, p. 25;
A-11

Battalion to cross Taft Avenue and gain a small portion of the nurses home at the Philippine General Hospital. Here, after gaining an entrance, our men were extended at every turn as room by room posed a new enemy barricade and suicidal resistance. (45)

An all day effort by the 2nd Battalion on the 17th netted them only about half of the main buildings at the hospital as they shared wing for wing with the enemy. Their advance was bitterly contested by an enemy who met them in barricaded rooms and corridors with flurries of machine gun and rifle fire and showers of hand grenades. An outpour of Japanese captives, released by this penetration, badly hampered the operations of 2nd Battalion in mid-afternoon. By dawn the following morning, an estimated seven thousand refugees and patients made their hurried exits from the hospital and surrounding areas.

1st Battalion also continued their attack this date and, supported by tanks and M-7's, knocked out the continuous resistance from Jap weapons commanding all streets and intersections with a heavy cross-fire, seized Herran Avenue and were able to tie in with the 2nd Battalion along Wright Avenue by 1700 that evening. (46)

Coordinated efforts of 1st and 2nd Battalions 18 February cleared the main hospital buildings as 1st Battalion neutralized hostile fires from the Medical School, Convent and Conservatory. All three contained resistance at the end of the day, however. 1st Battalion left flank reached Faura Street during the day. (47)

The regiment (less 3rd Battalion) was relieved by a
(45) A-3, p. 63; A-11; (46) A-3, p. 65; A-11; (47) A-3,
p. 67; A-11

brigade of the 1st Cavalry at 1030. 19 February and moved to a rest area in Santa Mesa. 3rd Battalion was left on the bay to secure the area from Faura Street to the division left boundary. Thus ended what our men were later to refer to as " The First Battle For Manila ". (48)

THE SECOND BATTLE FOR MANILA

This portion of the operation also gained its name from the enlisted men of the regiment. Just as they were settled to the idea that they were done fighting and ready to settle down for some long-awaited diversion, some of them were called upon to rejoin the beleaguered enemy in battle.

From the time of relief until we again entered the strife, the enemy, finding himself sewed up tightly in a pocket between the 1st Cavalry and 37th Infantry Divisions, with Manila Bay as his only possible route of withdrawal, finally holed up in five of his originally fortified major strongpoints -- the Finance, Agricultural and Legislative Buildings, Intramuros and Fort Santiago. (49) (See Diagram II)

The latter two strongholds were successfully assaulted by the 129th and 145th Infantry Regiments while we were resting. 1st Cavalry, meanwhile, cleared minor points of resistance in the Port Area. (50) Weapons from our regiment supported these operations almost throughout their entirety.

The 3rd Battalion secured their assigned portion of the bay area during this period and were successful in cutting off many infiltrators seeking avenues of escape. (51)

Orders were issued 24 February assigning the Legislative

(48) A-3, p. 65; (49) A-3, p. 81 & 83; A-8, p. 13; A-11;
(50) A-3, p. 77, 79, 81 & 83; A-8, p. 13; A-11; (51)
A-3, p. 75 & 77; A-11

and Finance Buildings to the 148th Infantry. (See Diagram III) On 25 February, 1st Battalion moved into the area and set up weapons in and around adjacent buildings to begin the neutralization fires which were intended to bring the suicidal defenders to their knees in surrender. The battalion was supported by two batteries of 155mm howitzers, three platoons of tank destroyers, one tank company and two platoons of M-7's in the direct fire role and one company of 4.2 mortars in the direct role in addition to its own heavy weapons. Fires were continued throughout the day but had little affect as the enemy periodically countered with well placed machine gun and rifle fire. Intermittent fire was maintained during the night 25 - 26 February and, after more direct fire the following morning, Company B assaulted the battered building and was able to get a foothold in it. Thirty minutes later the Japanese threw them out bodily and the direct shelling was resumed. (52)

Company B again attacked the following day and, after an all day effort, had control of the first two floors. Mopping up was completed the following morning. The building was tunneled under the lower floor. Pill-boxes had been built in the corners of corridors on all floors positioned to fire cross-fires in them. A prisoner captured at a later date stated that he had lived in the caverns beneath the building until 8 March. (53)

We turned to the Finance Building (See Diagram IV) and, after two days of the same treatment given its sister building, Company C successfully assaulted it and was promptly joined by Company B which was to help them mop up and end the

(52) A-3, p. 83 & 85; A-8, p. 13; A-11; (53) A-3, p. 85 & 86; A-8, p. 13; A-11

show as early as possible. As Company B went toward the building, a white flag was hung from one of the upstairs windows. This was unusual. Believing this to be a symbol of surrender of the garrison, our troops held in place and all activity ceased. We found that only four had any ideas of surrender and were finally able to bring in only two of them when the defenders again opened fire. This was the signal to our men to continue aggressive action which resulted in the clearing of the building. (54)

An interesting sidelight of the last operation for the city of Manila was the propaganda broadcast made to the Finance Building 1 March. After a thirty minute harangue, twenty-two PW's managed to sneak out under the fire of their comrades and surrender. (55)

Up to and including 3 March, the regiment had killed four thousand four counted enemy, captured two hundred ninety-seven and had sealed an unknown number in the tunnels under the buildings. Countless others were undoubtedly buried under the debris left from shelling and fires. In the same period, we had lost one hundred forty-eight killed and twelve hundred two injured. Of the latter number, four hundred eighty-three were never evacuated and approximately two hundred had returned to the regiment by 14 March. No man from the regiment suffered the indignity of being captured and none were missing. (56)

One regiment, the 148th Infantry, had cleared nine hundred sixty-seven square miles of ground, exclusive of areas patrolled outside their sector, and had played a major role in returning "The Pearl of the Orient" to its owner, (57)

(54) A-3, p. 86; A-8, p. 13 & 14; A-11; (55) A-3, p. 166; A-8, p. 14; A-11; (56) & (57) A-8, p. 15; A-11

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

Here we have seen a force at first disposed to meet the attacker on the beaches. Later, after what proved to be a very accurate estimate of the situation, we see the enemy commander disinclined to make such a stand. Instead, he chose to delay, harass and make as costly to our forces as was possible in men and materiel the reclamation of the major port in this portion of the Pacific. He never committed his better troops in this phase of the Luzon Operation but entrusted the mission to his poorest ones made up of a conglomeration of all services and including hurriedly drafted civilians of the same nativity. His withdrawal to his planned mountain retreats and strongholds was well executed and it was only when these were threatened that he saw fit to commit any of his well-trained men and units. His suicidal outer defenders were well indoctrinated with the bushido spirit and willingly gave their lives for their emperor in accordance with their custom.

Manila (although the enemy knew he could not retain it) was to be stubbornly defended, to the death, both to deny the use of this port to the allied forces and to wreak the worst possible vengeance of attrition on the attacker who was determined to capture this prize.

The Japanese stopped at no ruse or countermeasure to delay allied successes. He donned civilian clothes, murdered hapless civilians, held others as hostages often using them as shields, mined and barricaded major routes of communication, effectively executed demolitions on bridges and in buildings, fortified the larger, quake-proof buildings and made well coordinated strongpoints of each individually.

Failures were those previously encountered in Pacific combat. Japanese failure to mass fires was always noteworthy. Development of strongpoints, although well executed within each strongpoint individually, lacked coordination with other local points of resistance. Buildings, although well fortified and practically impenetrable to our weapons, provided firing embrasures allowing little, if any, traverse. This canalization of fields of fire obviously aided the attacker once discovered.

Barricades were, as a rule, well constructed, although improvised, but mines laid in conjunction with them were obvious to the attacker and, therefore, presented no great problem. Likewise, remote control demolition of mines and charges laid to obstruct were, more often than not, deserted rather than blown.

Defenses in the city were actually sited toward the bay and to the south. The rapidity of the attack from the north allowed little time for changes in these. In addition, there was a lack of mobility which, although well adapted to the defense as executed, allowed the attacker freedom of maneuver while the defender sat rigidly in his prepared positions. In this connection, it is noteworthy that ^{Enemy} no force was held as a maneuvering reserve but that a hard core of resistance protected by successive outer defenses was the design from the very development of the plan.

Our own forces were hard put to overcome eagerness to advance in the Central Plain Phase. Restraint of higher commanders gave the enemy little chance to cut our supply lines.

Denial of use of aerial bombardment and restricted use

of mortars and artillery within the city were met with two trends of thought. The higher commander believed in sparing the civilian caught in such chaos while the lower commander and combat soldier seemed to feel that, if it was a choice of sacrificing civilians or soldiers, the latter were to be the first preserved. All mentally questioned the eventual attitude when civilians concerned were not those of an allied nation.

Once again the Jap demonstrated his versatility at improvisation. His blocks and barricades to obstruct the advance from the north were constructed from the materials at hand; his lack of weapons was at least partially overcome by making grenades from sections of steel pipe, spears of sharpened bamboo, depth charges, naval mines, bombs and artillery shells used to add to his meager supply of mines, artillery pieces taken from ships and placed on home-made pedestal mounts and machine guns and automatic anti-aircraft weapons cannibalized from ships and planes. Individual weapons of United States production were found in some quantity still in their original packing and cosmoline. Fortunately, despite his aforementioned ingenuity, the Jap was unable to provide ammunition for these.

Commitment of nine divisions to this assault against an estimated two hundred odd thousand enemy did not give the balance of power generally foremost in the mind of the American Commander. Air superiority, better weapons, better methods of employment and good logistical support more than counterbalanced the lack of personnel superiority.

LESSONS

Lessons reemphasized by this operation are:

1. A defense, to have a reasonable chance for success, must be an all-around defense; positions must be mutually supporting; it must be flexible; it must contain a maneuverable reserve; fires of all weapons must be coordinated; and, a route of reinforcement or withdrawal must be available avoiding suicidal manpower losses to future offensive efforts.

2. Firepower properly utilized and massed along with effectively used air power and air superiority can replace the needed element of troop mass when the enemy is inferior in the mentioned fields.

3. Supply lines may be extended and long, open flanks permitted only when reconnaissance to successively greater depths, corresponding to the depths of the open flanks, is continuously conducted. In this regard, good intelligence must be maintained.

4. Civilians in an enemy occupied area greatly hamper the efforts of the attacker.

5. Release of prisoners of war and internees during an operation poses additional problems to combat troops.

6. Continuous planning and training prior to, during the mounting of and until the actual landing in an amphibious operation pays dividends in supply and personnel savings.

7. Lower unit commanders must be taught to evaluate sources of information before reporting them as fact or, in any case, check and report actual source.

8. Troops facing an adversary indoctrinated with

fanaticism and making a suicidal stand in well fortified positions must be highly trained, combat seasoned and extremely well disciplined. Leaders must have the positive confidence of their men.

9. Troops defending a critical point must be made to understand the value of that point and every possible step must be taken to hold it at all costs.

10. Long range patrols should be provided with radios capable of communicating with the dispatching headquarters.