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THE OPERATIONS OF THE 3D BATTALION, 5TH INFANTRY  
(71ST INFANTRY DIVISION) IN A RIVER CROSSING AND  
THE ESTABLISHING OF A BRIDGEHEAD ON THE SOUTH BANK  
OF THE DANUBE RIVER ON 26 - 27 APRIL 1945  
(CENTRAL EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN)  
(Personal Experience of a Battalion S-3)

Type of operation described: RIVER CROSSING AND  
ESTABLISHING A BRIDGEHEAD

Captain John W. Williams, Infantry  
ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO. I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
Index .....	1
Bibliography.....	2
Introduction .....	3
The General Situation .....	4
The Regimental Situation .....	6
The Battalion Situation .....	9
The Attack .....	12
Analysis and Criticism .....	20
Lessons .....	22
Map A - Allied Situation	
Map B - Plan of Attack	
Map C - Battalion Plan	
Map D - Danube Bridgehead	
Map E - Attack on Mintraching	

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operations of the 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry, 71st US Infantry Division in a river crossing and the establishing of a bridgehead on the south bank of the Danube River in the general vicinity of Regensburg, Germany, on 26 - 27 April 1945.

In order to bring the reader abreast with the situation, it is necessary to discuss briefly the action leading up to this operation.

On 7 March 1945, elements of the First Army had succeeded in crossing the Rhine River. (1) Twenty days later found seven armies well established in and driving deep into the heart of Germany. (2)

The operations which had taken place between 23 February and 22 March had left the enemy too weak to resist much longer. The few German armies left were suffering from lack of replacements and shattered communications. Only small make-shift units remained of what once was a powerful war machine.(3) The Russians were driving in from the east and the Allies from the west—The remainder of the German army was being compressed. (See Map A) (4) This was the setting for the final phase which was to be the destruction of the German Military <sup>and</sup> the overrun of the German territory. This destruction

would be accomplished with the continued rapid action on all fronts. (5)

Although the German Army was highly disorganized, it was believed that his control might improve and by so doing enable him to organize a defense. (6) Reports had been received by the Allies that a last ditch type warfare would be attempted in Southern Bavaria, the Redoubt Area. The north flank of this Redoubt Area was believed to be in the vicinity of Regensburg. There the Germans expected to hold out indefinitely against the Allies. (7)

By the 15 April 1945, the Third US Army was advancing deep into Germany. Leading elements were only one mile from Chemnitz. (See Map A) (8)

#### THE GENERAL SITUATION

On 15 April 1945, Third Army received a directive to attack southeast from the city of Chemnitz, with its axis of advance Regensburg - Linz, thereby, cutting off the enemy known to be retreating to the Redoubt Area. (See Map A) The mission was to make contact with the Soviet forces which were advancing from Vienna.

The XX Corps was given the task of making the main effort. The Corps plan was to attack with the 65th Division on the south flank and the 71st Division on the north flank, advancing abreast. <sup>Map indicates differently</sup> The 80th Division was to be held in reserve. (9) A screening force consisting of the Third Cavalry Group, reinforced with the 5th Ranger Battalion and other elements, had the mission of <sup>developing</sup> developing any enemy lines in their zone north

of the Danube River and of seizing bridges found intact over the Danube.

On 22 April 1945, the Third Cavalry began its drive to the Danube. After overcoming enemy resistance, the 24 April found them approximately one-half mile from the Danube. Here they were turned back by heavy gun fire from enemy defensive positions. A reconnaissance was made and the Third Cavalry reported all bridges out in the vicinity of Regensburg. (10)

The 65th and 71st Divisions encountered negligible resistance in their advance. <sup>from wheel</sup> On the 25 April, the 71st Division was southeast of Regenstauf, approximately 12 miles from the Danube River. (See Map B) (11)

General Walton H. Walker, Commanding General of the XX Corps, ordered the crossing to take place at 0200 hours on 26 April. The 65th Division was to cross the river east of Regensburg and attack and seize the city of Regensburg from the south. They would be assisted by fire from the north bank of the Danube by one Regimental Combat Team from the 71st Division. The 71st Division minus one Regimental Combat Team would pass through elements of the Third Cavalry Group and cross the river in its zone of action. The 80th Division was to remain in Corps Reserve. (See Map B) (12)

After crossing the Rhine River on 28 March 1945, the 71st Division had driven through 250 miles of German territory and had attacked almost continuously, assaulting and capturing cities in its path and overcoming small pockets of enemy in its zone of action. (13) After 1 April, the division had

not XX Corp information

not used overmap  
Map B

*not in formation, to  
General*

moved at increasing speed, by-passing small elements of enemy. The units of the division had used organic and other available transportation in its drive. However, many of the men had marched between five and ten miles per day. Due to the extended supply lines and rapid movement, only types C and K rations had been issued.

#### REGIMENTAL SITUATION

The division was organized into three Regimental Combat Teams, the 5th, 14th, and 66th. The 5th Regimental Combat Team, consisting of the 5th Infantry Regiment, the 607th Field Artillery Battalion, Company B of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion, and Company A of the 271st Engineer Battalion, had advanced in its zone of action southeast of Regenstauf by the afternoon of 25 April. It had been moving by motor and on foot for the past 48 hours. It was here that they received orders from the 71st Division to move as fast as possible to an assembly area north of the Danube River and be prepared to make a simultaneous crossing with the 14th Regimental Combat Team at 0200 hours, 26 April. They were to cut all highways leading to Regensburg from the southeast. (See Map B) (14)

The 5th Combat Team Commander, Colonel Sidney C. Wooten, knew that time would not permit him to make a personal reconnaissance. He directed the Regimental S-3 to make arrangements with the Division Artillery to be flown in an artillery liaison plane over the Danube in the 5th zone of action, and to locate best possible crossing sites for two battalions and road nets suitable for the transportation which would be used.

*See Map B*  
the terrain on the northside of the Danube to be heavily wooded and very mountainous, rising to approximately 300 feet. The southside was very flat and open. The river was approximately 175 yards wide. He also found that there were two possible routes leading to Frengkofen which seemed to be the only suitable crossing site. (See Map B) His reconnaissance also disclosed that a levee about fifteen feet high extended along the north and south banks of the Danube. This was not shown on the 1:100,000 maps being used. (15)

*subject is correctly also*  
With the use of the Combat Team organic transportation, plus vehicles which were made available to the regiment by the division, the 1st and 3d Battalions were motorized. Due to the very poor road net and mountainous terrain encountered, the two battalions did not arrive at assembly areas until 1800 hours. (See Map C) The attached transportation was sent back to move the 2d Battalion which was enroute on foot.

Just at dusk, the I and R Platoon was given orders to make a reconnaissance of route A. The 3d Battalion would send a motorized patrol consisting of two one-quarter ton trucks from M Company to reconnoiter route B. (See Map C) This patrol had the mission of gaining information of enemy and also checking route B to determine whether or not it was suitable for the two and one-half ton trucks which would transport the assault boats to the crossing site. At approximately 1930 hours, the patrol returned from their mission and reported to the Regimental Commander. He decided that route B would be used. Although it was not in the best condition, it provided the

Route B was a small unimproved road which ran along the valley for about five miles and then turned in the direction of the river. It was concealed from the south<sup>side</sup> of the Danube by a large wooded hill mass which extended from Sulzbach to Frengkofen. This route seemed to be an ideal approach to Frengkofen. (See Map C) (17)

The Regimental Commander issued a fragmentary order for the crossing. The crossing was to be made in the vicinity of Frengkofen, the exact site to be selected by the 3d Battalion Commander. After the launching site was secured, the 1139th Engineer Group would construct a treadway bridge. The 607th Field Artillery Battalion and Company B of the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion, attached to the regiment, were to make a night occupation of positions. Firing would be restricted until after the crossing was made. (18) The 1st<sup>when possible</sup> and 3d Battalions would cross simultaneously in assault craft to be furnished by the 271st Engineer Battalion. The 3d Battalion was to move as soon as possible to an assembly area between the river and Frengkofen. The 1st Battalion was to follow the 3d Battalion and move into its assembly area about 400 yards west. <sup>of the 3rd</sup> The 2d Battalion was to move into an assembly area on the high ground in the rear of the 1st Battalion and be prepared to make its crossing on order. (See Map D) (19)

Since the crossing was to be made without artillery preparation, all precautions would be taken in moving into the assembly areas. Only weapon carriers required to transport weapons and ammunition would accompany the battalion to the

*Enemy situation*

forward assembly areas. The remainder of the vehicles would remain under battalion control in their present assembly areas. If possible, it would be necessary to by-pass enemy known to be north of the river. The entire operation depended on silence preserved prior to the crossing. Radio silence was to be in effect immediately. Every effort would be made to give the men all the rest possible prior to the crossing. The Regimental Commander would issue final orders at a forward Command Post which would be established near the crossing site. (20)

#### BATTALION SITUATION

The 3d Battalion Commander, Lt. Colonel I. B. Robertson, oriented his Company Commanders as to the situation at the time and gave the order of march. The patrol which had made the reconnaissance to Frengkofen was to be used as an advance guard. The march was to be made in a column of twos, on either side of the road; the order of march was to be as follows: Companies K, L, Battalion Headquarters, M, and I. Companies were to be closed up in order to keep contact. (21)

The battalion moved out at approximately 2000 hours. Control was difficult due to the extremely dark night. No enemy was encountered during the march to the assembly areas. The battalion closed into the assembly area at 2230 hours. Company Commanders established security around their positions and reported to Battalion Headquarters.

The Battalion Commander gave his general plan of attack in order that they could reconnoiter as much as possible for the launching site. The crossing was to be made with Companies L

I was to be in reserve. Company M was to attach one platoon of machine guns each to Companies K and L, the attachment to be made immediately. Additional ammunition was to be issued at once. 81 millimeter mortars were to be placed in position to support the crossing the following morning. The S-3 was to accompany the Company Commanders on a reconnaissance and make recommendations as to possible crossing sites. The Battalion Commander was awaiting the arrival of the Regimental Commander.

(22)

It was found that only one good crossing site was available in the immediate area. A levee ran along the north bank of the river. The terrain between the river and the levee was low and marshy and sloped to the river's edge. This <sup>was not suitable</sup> made it necessary to portage the assault boats for about 300 yards. The S-3 recommended a crossing site at approximately 300 yards upstream. <sup>from where?</sup>

(23)

At 2400 hours, the Regimental Commander, accompanied by the 1st and 2d Battalion Commanders, arrived at the 3d Battalion Command Post. He ordered a change in our crossing plan due to the number of assault craft available. We were able to secure only enough for one company to cross in each wave. Accompanied by the Battalion Commanders, he made a reconnaissance of the crossing site.

At 2400 hours, the final orders were issued. The 3d Battalion was to make the first crossing, attack in its zone of action, cut the Regensburg - Straubing Highway, be prepared to continue the attack, and capture the town of Mintraching.

Contact would be established and maintained with the 14th

Infantry Regiment on its right. (See Map C) The 1st Battalion would cross following the 3d Battalion, attack in its zone of action, cut the Regensburg - Straubing Highway, and be prepared to continue the attack. The 2d Battalion would follow the 1st Battalion and remain in reserve in the general vicinity of Auburg. (See Map C) An aid station would be located in Frengkofen. Wire communications would be established as soon as the battalions completed the crossing. (24)

The 3d Battalion Company Commanders were called to the Command Post, told of the change in plans, and given the battalion mission. On the arrival of the assault craft, Company K would portage them to the launching site. Each company would furnish two men per boat to cross with the company preceding it, in order that the boats could be returned to their company. Company K would cross in the first wave, followed by Company L, which in turn would be followed by Company I. Companies L and I would move to the launching site in rear of Company K and be prepared to support Company K's crossing by fire if necessary. On reaching the far side, Company K would move to the right in its zone of action and remain in position until Company L had completed its crossing, providing no enemy fire was received. (25) All fire would be held until all companies had crossed. The battalion would attack on orders of the Battalion Commander. Company K would attack in its zone of action, capture Friesheim, and continue the attack to the battalion intermediate objective. Company L would attack in its zone of action, capture Illkofen, and

continue on order to the battalion intermediate objective. (See Map C) The 81 millimeter mortars were to stay in position and be prepared to fire on call. After the capture of Illkofen, they were to displace by sections across the river. The Command Post would remain on the north side of the river. The Battalion Commander, S-3, S-2, and Artillery Liaison Officer, would cross in the second wave and establish an Observation Post in rear of Company L. (26)

At 0300 hours, the 271st Engineer Battalion arrived with the assault craft. They reported that due to the unmarked route, they had missed a road junction on route B which caused their delay in arrival. It was found that they did not have sufficient personnel to unload the boats. Company K was assigned this task. As the boats were unloaded, they were transported to the crossing site. It seemed that all men realized the importance of maintaining a silent operation. The entire movement of the boats was conducted with very little confusion or noise. At 0350 hours, Company K was in position at the launching site. (27)

#### THE ATTACK

*Background on  
Training would help*  
At 0400 hours, Company K, commanded by Captain Horace S. Berry, moved out from the near bank of the river. It was an unusually silent move, considering that the men had no training in handling assault boats. The crossing was executed in a perfect manner. All boats seemed to reach the far side of the river simultaneously. No opposition was encountered. The company reorganized with little confusion and took position

(26) Statement of Lt. A. G. Hess, then Battalion S. 2, on

as planned. The Non-commissioned Officers and Officers had maintained excellent control. (See Map D) (28)

The remainder of the battalion made the crossing <sup>with</sup> as the boats were returned. By 0500 hours, the entire battalion was across the river. (See Map D) Apparently the Germans had been taken completely by surprise. Unmanned, newly dug foxholes were found along the river front, which indicated that a river line type defense was intended. From prisoners, <sup>who were they captured?</sup> it was later learned that they had expected the crossing two days later. (29)

Daylight was approaching but visibility was poor due to river fog. The small town of Illkofen could be seen faintly in the distance. Messages arrived from the companies reporting that they were in position. The Battalion Commander ordered that the attack begin at once. (30) By this time, several enemy were seen getting out of foxholes, apparently still unaware of our presence. Suddenly, two of L Company's machine guns opened fire on the left flank. Enemy fire was returned from foxholes to the front. The position was quickly overrun by Company L. (31) Company K also could be seen moving in the direction of Friesheim. Enemy small arms fire was received by Company L from the town of Illkofen. They moved rapidly to the levee about 100 yards in front of the town but enemy small arms fire increased and they were unable to advance. (See Map D) Hand grenades and small arms fire could be heard in this vicinity. Captain D. M. Buie, L Company Commander, reported that they could not advance and requested artillery fire. The Artillery Liaison Officer reported that

(29) Statement of Captain Henson S. Perry, then K Company

artillery had not as yet registered. Realizing that too much time would be required to secure artillery fire, the Battalion Commander instructed Captain Buie to use 81 millimeter mortars. Within a matter of minutes, the 81 millimeter mortars were placing effective fire on the enemy positions which were located on the near side of the town, approximately 50 yards in front of Company L. High explosive ammunition was used initially, then the fire shifted to the center of town and white phosphorus was fired, setting several buildings afire. When the mortar fire was shifted, Company L assaulted the town. Civilians waving white flags began to stream out of the town going toward the river. By 0530 hours, the capture of Illkofen was complete. Company L reported approximately ten enemy casualties and 25 enemy prisoners taken. (32)

The Officers and Non-commissioned officers were having a difficult time keeping the attack moving due to the state of exhaustion <sup>from what</sup> of the men. It was noted that when movement stopped, some men would fall asleep even though under fire.

Heavy mortar fire could be heard in the vicinity of the 1st Battalion. A report came from regiment stating that the 1st Battalion had been caught in the open by mortar fire and had received approximately 40 casualties. The 2d Battalion was to pass through the 1st Battalion and continue the attack. (33)

The Battalion Observation Post was located in a shell hole about 500 yards southwest of the crossing site. The 3d Battalion Commander, S-3, and the Artillery Liaison Officer

from the rear when a member of the Battalion Command Group exposed himself. Company I was ordered to clear the river bank of enemy. Later they reported that two enemy snipers had been killed and one captured. These snipers had been by-passed by Company K. (See Map D) (34)

Company K reported that it had been held up about 300 yards from Friesheim by an enemy machine gun located there. The Burgomaster had been contacted on the edge of town and was instructed to return to tell the enemy to surrender or be shelled. He failed to return. Artillery fire was requested and a battalion concentration was fired on Friesheim at 0930 hours. On completion of this, Company K assaulted the town. At 1000 hours, Company K reported the capture of Friesheim and approximately 75 prisoners taken. (See Map D) (35)

Company K organized a patrol to contact the 14th Infantry on the right. The patrol was compelled to move across open terrain. During their return, they were fired on continuously by friendly artillery. The 3d Battalion Field Artillery Liaison Officer attempted to locate the unit which was firing but was unable to do so. Fortunately, no casualties resulted. (36)

The Observation Post <sup>what caused it</sup> was established in Frengkofen. All companies had reported that contact could not be maintained with SCR536. All SCR300 radios in the battalion command net were weak. Radio contact was lost with Company L. A wire team was sent out at once to establish wire communication. It was not established until Company L had reached the Regensburg - Straubing Highway. (37)

Artillery fire was now falling on the crossing site where the engineers were attempting to construct the bridge. In spite of the fire, they were able to assemble a pontoon raft ferry. With this, they ferried ammunition and some of the regimental communication and command vehicles. *The ferry was not* This ~~was~~ abandoned because of the continued artillery fire and long range 20 millimeter anti-aircraft fire which was directed on the launching site from the high ground to the southeast. Our artillery fired on these positions but failed to neutralize the anti-aircraft fire. (38)

A messenger from Company L reported that approximately 100 prisoners had surrendered. They had prepared positions in the woods in L Company's sector but had offered no resistance. (See Map D) *- every not shown* (39)

By this time, Companies L and K were sending large groups of prisoners to the rear. They could not be evacuated across the river; therefore, it was necessary for them to be held at Illkofen. (40)

At 1500 hours, Companies L and K reported that they had arrived on the Regensburg - Straubing Highway and were prepared to continue the attack. (See Map E) They reported that they had approximately 200 prisoners. The Battalion Commander instructed them to remain in position until the 2d Battalion reached the highway and contact was established. This contact was established at 1630 hours on the Regensburg - Straubing Highway.

At 1645 hours, the 3d Battalion continued the attack in their zone of action with the town of Mintraching as their

final objective. Contact was lost with the 14th Infantry on its right. We later learned that they had received orders to remain on the Regensburg - Straubing Highway. (41)

At 1730 hours, Companies K and L had arrived at a group of farm houses approximately 800 yards from Mintraching and had received machine gun and small arms fire from the near side of town. (See Map E) (42) The Battalion Commander moved forward and made an estimate of the situation. Darkness was approaching and due to the exhaustion of the men, he requested the Regimental Commander to allow the 3d Battalion to go into position there for the night. His request was approved. (43)

*not shown*  
The Regimental Commander instructed the 3d Battalion to attack and capture Mintraching the following morning. He stated that Regensburg had surrendered and that the 66th Infantry was moving through the 1st and 2d Battalions to establish a position south of the Regensburg - Straubing Highway. The morning following the 3d Battalion's capture of Mintraching, the 66th Infantry would pass through Mintraching and continue the attack. (44)

The bridge site had been changed to about 2000 yards east of the launching site. A message had been received that it would be completed by 2400 hours and that the 3d Battalion vehicles would be given priority in crossing.

The Battalion Commander instructed the Company Commanders to go into a perimeter defense for the night. Only two squads per company would be in actual positions. The remainder

of the companies would be given all the rest possible. The Battalion Commander, realizing that no tank protection other than 2.36 rocket launchers ~~were~~<sup>were</sup> available for anti-tank defense, ordered that they be placed along the roads leading to our position. (45)

Part of the Battalion Command Post was still at Frengkofen with the Battalion Executive Officer, S-1, and S-4 operating there until the vehicles could be crossed. Four one-quarter ton trucks and trailers had been crossed by ferry to supply ammunition and rations to the battalion; however, no anti-tank vehicles had been crossed. (46)

The Battalion Commander had made his plans to attack the town of Mintraching the following morning. He ordered the attack to begin at 0600 hours with Company K on the right, Company L on the left, and Company I in reserve. One machine gun platoon would remain in reserve in the vicinity of the farm houses. The 81 millimeter mortars would remain in position and be prepared to support the attack. The 607th Field Artillery Battalion would fire a five minute preparation on the objective starting at 0555 hours. After the capture of Mintraching, the battalion would remain in this position while 2d Battalion of the 66th Infantry passed through to continue the attack. (47)

At approximately 2200 hours, radio contact with regiment was found to be out. The artillery liaison radio was also out. Wire communication had not been established but the Battalion Communications Officer had a wirehead established within one

mile of the battalion and had an SCR300 radio at this point. It was necessary to relay messages to the Battalion Rear Command Post, and then to regiment. An effort was being made to secure more wire to extend the line to the forward Command Post. (48)

At 2330 hours, Company K reported that an outpost could hear tanks to the front. The same report came from Company L. In a short time, the enemy tanks could be heard very distinctly to the front. (See Map E) The entire battalion was alerted and all companies took previously designated positions. There was much confusion in the farm buildings. The Battalion Commander instructed the Artillery Liaison Officer to call for artillery fire. It was necessary to use the complicated communications that existed: the SCR300 radio to the wirehead and relayed over the infantry battalion and regimental wire net to the artillery battalion. (49)

The tanks fired into the farm buildings with 75 millimeter and machine guns. Within a short time, the artillery was adjusted. A battalion concentration fell on the target. One tank was set afire and two other tanks withdrew. No further opposition was encountered for the duration of the night. (See Map E) (50).

At 0100 hours, the organic vehicles arrived. At 0600 hours, the attack was launched and the town of Mintraching was captured without opposition. The enemy had withdrawn under cover of darkness. The 66th Infantry passed through the 3d Battalion and continued the attack to the southeast.

The 3d Battalion moved to the regimental assembly area. (51)

This concluded the hasty river crossing and the establishing of the bridgehead seven miles south of the Danube. The 3d Battalion had captured approximately 500 prisoners and there had been twenty enemy casualties, while 3d Battalion had suffered only six.

#### ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

This hasty crossing of the Danube River by the 3d Battalion, was typical of its operations in the pursuit of the German Army. Many tactical principles lost their importance as speed and surprise proved more valuable. The initial river crossing was made in the proper manner. However, the continued attack to secure the bridgehead and the accomplishment of the Battalion mission slowed and failed to gain the high ground necessary to deprive the enemy of observation over the crossing and bridge site. This was due primarily to the exhausted state of the men of the battalion. *(ground opposite this)*

Only little information of a general nature was known of the enemy situation prior to the crossing of the river. Had the enemy manned the prepared positions and had security elements alert, no doubt great difficulty would have been encountered and the crossing might have failed initially. A ground reconnaissance would have disclosed these positions.

Valuable time was lost due to the fact that the routes to the crossing site had not been marked or guides furnished to the engineer battalion which supplied the assault boats for the crossing. The engineers were instructed where the crossing would take place. *Guides could have been provided*

8+  
Analysis

if the proper coordination had taken place at the time the order was issued. The delay in arrival and the inadequate number of assault boats caused unnecessary confusion to the units involved. Riflemen had to be assigned the task of returning the assault boats. This was caused by the failure of engineers to furnish the proper personnel for the mission.

Radio was relied on almost entirely during the entire operation. Wire was established across the river by the regiment but as the attack progressed, wire communication did not provide sorely needed communication. The battalion communications platoon expended its wire and no provision was made for resupply. This wire should have been made available on the south side of the Danube as early as possible after the crossing.

In the operation instructions, proper coordination should have been made for the patrol that was sent from the 3d Battalion, 5th Infantry, to the 14th Infantry Regiment to establish contact. Artillery forward observers should not have been overlooked in the dissemination of this information.

Alternate plans were not made prior to the river crossing for the crossing of the anti-tank weapons. The absence of anti-tank protection could have ended in a terrific loss, had the enemy counterattacked with the available armor.

The attack slowed after the captures of Illkofen and Friesheim, allowing the enemy to organize and have advantage of observation over the bridge site. They were able to place effective artillery fire in that vicinity, preventing the engineers from building in the location selected. Had the

*How did this affect operation?*

*How did this affect op.*

*poorly worked*

*OK*

*fair*  
would have been prevented and the direct fire weapons would have been silenced.

### LESSONS

*by*  
1. In the pursuit, speed is essential to prevent the enemy from gaining enough time to organize a defensive position.

*by*  
2. When possible, daylight reconnaissance of crossing sites should be made. Night reconnaissance are not adequate.

*by*  
3. If unfamiliar routes are to be used at night, they should be well marked and guides should be furnished.

*by*  
4. When assault boats are used in a river crossing, they should be manned by a minimum of two trained engineers per boat.

*by*  
5. The communications plan should be flexible. Radio should not be relied on entirely.

*by*  
6. Once a wirehead is established across a river, it should be pushed aggressively until it reaches units for which it is intended. Ample wire should be made available initially to reach the final objective.

*by*  
7. It is imperative that subordinate units be notified of plans made by higher units for contact patrols between elements in the front lines.

*by*  
8. Once a river crossing is made, the attack should be pushed with all speed to secure high ground and possible enemy observation over the crossing or bridge site.

*by*  
9. Every effort should be made for the early crossing of anti-tank weapons.

10. The value of the principle of surprise cannot be