

**U.S. Army TRADOC  
TRADOC G2  
Handbook No. 1.08**

# **Irregular Forces**



**20 December 2010**

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**U.S. Army**

**Training and Doctrine Command**

**TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity**



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# Irregular Forces

## Contents

	Page
<b>PREFACE</b> .....	<b>ix</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>xi</b>
Irregular Forces and Complex Conditions .....	xi
Understand the Threat.....	xiii
Assess the Operational Environment .....	xiii
Train to Defeat the Enemy.....	xv
Overview of Irregular Forces .....	xvi
<b>Chapter 1 Irregular Forces</b> .....	<b>1-1</b>
<b>Section I - Define the Threat</b> .....	<b>1-1</b>
Threat Analysis .....	1-2
Threat or Enemy and Terrorism .....	1-2
Traditional versus Unconventional-Irregular Forces.....	1-3
Hybrid Threat .....	1-6
Basic Principles of Irregular Forces.....	1-7
<b>Section II - Know Information Warfare (INFOWAR)</b> .....	<b>1-10</b>
Tactical Level INFOWAR.....	1-10
Elements of INFOWAR .....	1-11
Operational Environment Challenges .....	1-22
The Human Dimension.....	1-23
Cultural Awareness.....	1-23
Summary .....	1-27
<b>Chapter 2 Intent of Irregular Forces</b> .....	<b>2-1</b>
<b>Section I - Aims</b> .....	<b>2-2</b>
Demonstrate Capability .....	2-2
Obtain Concession .....	2-4
Establish Sanctuary .....	2-4
Expand Influence .....	2-5
Expel Opposition Actors .....	2-6
Diminish Government Authority.....	2-7
Gain Legitimacy.....	2-9

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**\*This publication 1.08 will be a baseline for transition of FM 7-100.3 to Training Circular 7-100.3.**

	Achieve Objective.....	2-9
	<b>Section II - Motives.....</b>	<b>2-12</b>
	Motivational Categories.....	2-12
	Ideological Categories.....	2-13
	Summary.....	2-16
<b>Chapter 3</b>	<b>Irregular Warfare Designs .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
	<b>Section I - Designs in Irregular Warfare.....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
	Popular Protracted Conflict .....	3-3
	Urban Focused Conflict.....	3-5
	Military Focused Conflict .....	3-7
	Conspiratorial Focused Conflict .....	3-7
	Special Issue Conflict.....	3-8
	<b>Section II - Operational Reach .....</b>	<b>3-9</b>
	Domestic – National Influence .....	3-9
	International – Regional Influence.....	3-9
	Transnational Influence.....	3-10
	<b>Section III - Operational Circumstances of Adversary .....</b>	<b>3-10</b>
	Deployed Forces .....	3-10
	In-Transit Forces.....	3-11
	Institutional Forces .....	3-11
	<b>Section IV - Reasons for Targeting Military Forces.....</b>	<b>3-12</b>
	Determine Target Accessibility.....	3-12
	Depreciate Symbolic Value .....	3-13
	Demonstrate Organizational Capability.....	3-13
	Delay or Prevent Movements-Maneuver.....	3-14
	Decrease Adversary Operational Capability .....	3-15
	Degrade Social Stability .....	3-16
	Disrupt Economic Environment.....	3-16
	Discredit U.S. Policy.....	3-17
	Summary.....	3-17
<b>Chapter 4</b>	<b>Irregular Forces Organizational Models .....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
	<b>Section I - Organizational Form and Function .....</b>	<b>4-2</b>
	Cellular Foundation .....	4-3
	Hierarchical Structure.....	4-3
	Networked Structure .....	4-4
	<b>Section II - Organizational Command, Control, and Influence .....</b>	<b>4-7</b>
	Senior Leaders.....	4-8
	Operational Leaders.....	4-9
	Cadres and Operatives .....	4-10
	Active Supporters .....	4-10
	Passive Supporters .....	4-12
	Basic Cellular Functions.....	4-12
	Direct Action .....	4-13
	Intelligence .....	4-15
	Information .....	4-16

	Communications .....	4-16
	Logistics .....	4-17
	<b>Section III - Organizational Evolution .....</b>	<b>4-18</b>
	Organizational Means and Ends .....	4-18
	Historical Perspective: Guerrilla Bands and Mao .....	4-19
	Current Perspectives: Tailor the Organization .....	4-21
	<b>Section IV – Irregular Guerrilla Unit Structure (Example).....</b>	<b>4-23</b>
	Guerrilla Battalion .....	4-23
	Guerrilla Hunter/Killer Company .....	4-25
	Guerrilla Company .....	4-26
	Guerrilla Platoon .....	4-27
	Guerrilla Squad .....	4-28
	Women as Combatants .....	4-29
	Children as Combatants .....	4-30
	<b>Section V - Irregular forces in an Insurgency (Example).....</b>	<b>4-31</b>
	Local Insurgent Organization (Example) .....	4-31
	Higher Insurgent Organization (Example) .....	4-34
	General Support .....	4-36
	Political-Military Capability .....	4-38
	<b>Section VI - Irregular forces and Terrorism .....</b>	<b>4-39</b>
	Irregular and Terrorist Affiliations .....	4-40
	Irregular Force External Support .....	4-42
	Irregular Force Weapon Systems Capabilities .....	4-43
	Summary .....	4-44
<b>Chapter 5</b>	<b>Actors in Complex Contemporary Conditions .....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
	<b>Section I - Know Combatant from Noncombatant .....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
	Law of Armed Conflict .....	5-2
	Defining Key Terms: Enemy Combatants .....	5-3
	Defining Other Armed Combatants .....	5-3
	Paramilitary .....	5-3
	Insurgent .....	5-4
	Guerrilla .....	5-4
	Terrorist .....	5-4
	Mercenary .....	5-5
	Describing Noncombatant Examples .....	5-6
	Armed Noncombatant (Examples) .....	5-6
	Private Security Contractors .....	5-6
	Criminal Organizations .....	5-10
	<b>Section II - Other Operational Considerations.....</b>	<b>5-14</b>
	Unarmed Noncombatants (Examples) .....	5-14
	Media .....	5-14
	Nongovernmental Organizations .....	5-15
	Transnational Corporations .....	5-18
	Other Civilian Groups .....	5-19
	Summary .....	5-19

<b>Chapter 6</b>	<b>Irregular Force Methods of Operation</b> .....	<b>6-1</b>
	<b>Section I - Irregular force Tactics</b> .....	<b>6-1</b>
	Irregular Tactics .....	6-1
	Irregular Techniques .....	6-2
	<b>Section II - Forms of Offensive Operations</b> .....	<b>6-3</b>
	Planning the Offense.....	6-3
	Planned Offense .....	6-3
	Situational Offense .....	6-4
	Organizing Irregular Forces for Offense .....	6-4
	Types of Offensive Action .....	6-5
	Attack .....	6-5
	Assault.....	6-7
	Ambush .....	6-8
	Raid.....	6-10
	Feint .....	6-11
	Demonstration.....	6-11
	<b>Section III - Forms of Defensive Operations</b> .....	<b>6-11</b>
	Planning the Defense.....	6-12
	Planned Defense.....	6-12
	Situational Defense .....	6-12
	Organizing Irregular Forces for Defense.....	6-13
	Types of Defensive Operations.....	6-14
	Defensive Actions .....	6-16
	Retrograde Actions .....	6-19
	<b>Section IV - Irregular Tactics, Techniques, and Terrorism</b> .....	<b>6-21</b>
	Threat or Hoax .....	6-21
	Arson.....	6-22
	Sabotage.....	6-23
	Bombing .....	6-24
	Kidnapping .....	6-28
	Hostage Taking.....	6-29
	Hijack-Seizure .....	6-31
	Raid or Ambush .....	6-32
	Assassination .....	6-32
	Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) .....	6-34
	Summary.....	6-34
<b>Chapter 7</b>	<b>Irregular Forces Planning Cycle</b> .....	<b>7-1</b>
	Broad Target Selection .....	7-1
	Initial Intelligence Gathering and Surveillance .....	7-2
	Specific Target Selection .....	7-3
	Pre-Attack Surveillance and Planning.....	7-4
	Rehearsal.....	7-5
	Attack and Actions on the Objective .....	7-6
	Escape and Exploitation.....	7-7
	Summary.....	7-8
<b>Chapter 8</b>	<b>Irregular Conflict and Emergent Vectors</b> .....	<b>8-1</b>

Emergent Awareness and Understanding .....	8-1
Radicalized Motivations .....	8-2
Adaptive Organizational Tactics .....	8-4
Versatile Organizational Affiliations .....	8-6
Devastating Full Spectrum Weaponry .....	8-8
Targeted Economic Disruption .....	8-10
Globalized Propaganda .....	8-11
Summary .....	8-13
<b>SOURCE NOTES .....</b>	<b>Source Notes-</b>
.....	<b>1</b>
Special Segments.....	6
<b>GLOSSARY .....</b>	<b>Glossary-1</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>References-1</b>
Documents Needed.....	References-1
Readings Recommended.....	References-1
<b>INDEX.....</b>	<b>Index-1</b>

## Figures

Figure I-1. Who is an Irregular Threat? – Who is an Irregular Enemy? .....	xi
Figure I-2. Dynamics of OE Awareness by Irregular Forces .....	xiv
Figure I-3. Operational Environment and the Threat .....	xv
Figure I-4. Full Spectrum Operations and Training Readiness .....	xviii
Figure 1-1. Situational Understanding of Culture.....	1-24
Figure 1-2. Creating Doubt in an Adversary’s Mind.....	1-25
Figure 2-1. Irregular Forces Near-Term Intent in Ways-Means-Ends .....	2-1
Figure 2-2. Al-Qa’ida Training Locale: Afghanistan (1998).....	2-4
Figure 2-3. USS <i>Cole</i> Hull Damage (2001) .....	2-6
Figure 2-4. 1983 Bombing of USMC Facility in Beirut: Before and After .....	2-8
Figure 2-5. 2006 Golden Mosque in Samarra: Before and After .....	2-8
Figure 2-6. Beslan Hostage-Murder (2004).....	2-12
Figure 2-7. Al-Shabaab: Indigenous Struggles and AQ Affiliation .....	2-13
Figure 2-8. Shining Path: Rural Terror for Revolution .....	2-13
Figure 2-9. Kashmir-Regional Grievances and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) .....	2-14
Figure 2-10. Irregular Forces: al-Qa’ida in Iraq.....	2-15
Figure 3-1. Human Dimension in Design and Operations .....	3-2
Figure 3-2. Urban Warfare.....	3-9
Figure 3-3. Operational Reach .....	3-10
Figure 3-4. Soldiers on Patrol: Afghanistan .....	3-11
Figure 3-5. In-Transit Movements .....	3-11
Figure 3-6. Operational Circumstances of Adversary.....	3-12
Figure 3-7. Saudi Hizballah: Khobar Towers Bombing (1996) .....	3-14

## Contents

---

Figure 4-1. Irregular Force: Hierarchy or Network Organizational Variants .....	4-1
Figure 4-2. Hierarchical Organization.....	4-4
Figure 4-3. Networked Organization and Structural Options .....	4-5
Figure 4-4. Chain.....	4-5
Figure 4-5. Hub and Star.....	4-6
Figure 4-6. All-Channel Network .....	4-6
Figure 4-7. Affiliated Network.....	4-7
Figure 4-8. Typical Levels of Organization.....	4-8
Figure 4-9. Al-Zwahiri.....	4-8
Figure 4-10. Hakimullah Meshud .....	4-10
Figure 4-11. HAMAS Political-Social Support and Terrorism.....	4-11
Figure 4-12. Hizballah: Coercion and Terrorism .....	4-12
Figure 4-13. Functional Structure of Insurgent Force (Example).....	4-13
Figure 4-14. Direct Action Cell: Bomb and Sabotage .....	4-14
Figure 4-15. Guerrilla Company Organization: Generic Example (CHICOM ca. 1930s) .....	4-20
Figure 4-16. Guerrilla Tactical Organizations: Generic Example (CHICOM ca. 1930s) .....	4-21
Figure 4-17. Guerrilla Force Infantry Squad (Example) .....	4-22
Figure 4-18. Guerrilla Battalion (Example).....	4-24
Figure 4-19. Hunter-Killer Guerrilla Company (Example) .....	4-25
Figure 4-20. Guerrilla Company (Example) .....	4-26
Figure 4-21. Guerrilla Platoon (Example).....	4-27
Figure 4-22. Guerrilla Squad (Example) .....	4-28
Figure 4-23. Female Suicide Bomber IED .....	4-29
Figure 4-24. Child's School Bag with Improvised Explosives.....	4-30
Figure 4-25. Local Insurgent Organization (Example) .....	4-32
Figure 4-26. Higher Insurgent Organization (Example) .....	4-34
Figure 4-27. AQIM Training: Sand Table Rehearsal, Video Live-Feed Recon, Attack .....	4-36
Figure 4-28. Insurgent Political Structure (Example) .....	4-39
Figure 4-29. Irregular Force Affiliation and Functional Linkages (Example).....	4-42
Figure 4-30. Sniper System (Tier I Weapon Example) .....	4-43
Figure 4-31. Enfield Rifle (Tier IV Weapon Example).....	4-44
Figure 5-1. Combatant and Noncombatant Actors and Irregular forces .....	5-1
Figure 5-2. PSC in VIP Security Task .....	5-7
Figure 5-3. Private Security Contractor Organization (Example) .....	5-9
Figure 5-4. Three Generation Model of Criminal Organization (Example).....	5-10
Figure 5-5. Large Scale Criminal Organization (Example).....	5-13
Figure 5-6. NGO Field Office Functions (Example) .....	5-18
Figure 6-1. Irregular Force Methods and Tactical Options.....	6-1
Figure 6-2. Ruse and Deception .....	6-22
Figure 6-3. Arson by Insurgents During Convoy Ambush .....	6-23
Figure 6-4. Sabotaged Oil Pipeline .....	6-23
Figure 6-5. VBIED Detonates Outside Main Gate.....	6-24

**Contents**

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Figure 6-6. U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device Symbols ..... 6-24

Figure 6-7. IED of Artillery Shells..... 6-26

Figure 6-8. Foreign or Domestic Terror ..... 6-26

Figure 6-9. U.S. Soldier Hostages in FYROM-Serbia Region (1999)..... 6-30

Figure 6-10. Ambush on General Kroesen..... 6-33

Figure 6-11. CBRN Threat..... 6-34

Figure 7-1. Gather Intelligence on Possible-Probable Targets..... 7-3

Figure 7-2. Select a Target and Attack Objective..... 7-4

Figure 7-3. Refine Intelligence on Enemy Patterns and Vulnerabilities ..... 7-5

Figure 7-4. Rehearse Actions and Contingencies ..... 7-6

Figure 7-5. Attack with Rapid and Violent Conduct ..... 7-6

Figure 7-6. Exploit Success with Mass Media Coverage..... 7-7

Figure 8-1. Emergent Vectors ..... 8-1

Figure 8-2. Extremist Cleric ..... 8-3

Figure 8-3. Mumbai Attack Cell Composition (2008)..... 8-4

Figure 8-4. Mumbai Vignette: Nearly Simultaneous Multiple Attacks (2008)..... 8-5

Figure 8-5. Urban Economic Infrastructure and Mass Populations..... 8-8

Figure 8-6. Materiel and Improvised EFP Weapons..... 8-9

Figure 8-7. Anthrax Letters as Biological Attack in U.S. (2001) ..... 8-10

Figure 8-8. East Coast Grid Blackout (2003)..... 8-11

Figure 8-9. Al-Qa'ida Propaganda ..... 8-12

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## Preface

The purpose of TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.08, *Irregular Forces*, is to describe contemporary irregular forces and summarize irregular threat actions to counter U.S. forces in the operational environment (OE). Contemporary irregular force patterns and trends indicate how irregular threats might act in future near and mid-term conflicts against the United States of America.

This unclassified publication applies to all Army units (Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard) participating in Army or joint training exercises and operations unless otherwise directed. Conditions, derived from a composite of actual worldwide circumstances in the OE, pose realistic challenges for training, operational readiness, leader development, professional military education, and capabilities development of Army forces and joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational (JIIM) partners. By improving situational awareness and understanding of the real-world diverse capabilities, limitations, and intentions of irregular forces, this publication complements the deliberate processes of military risk management, protection of the force, mission orders conduct, and adaptive leader decisionmaking. Information in this publication supports Army doctrine for the Opposing Force (OPFOR) program in training readiness. (See AR 350-2 *Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program*).

The proponent for this publication is Headquarters, U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The preparing agency is the Contemporary Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID), TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity. Send comments and suggested improvements on DA 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to CTID at the following address: Director, CTID, TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity-Threats, ATTN: ATIN-T (Bldg 53), 700 Scott Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1323. This publication is available at Army Knowledge Online (AKO) on the General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library (ADTDL) at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil> and is also available on the TRADOC Homepage at <http://www-tradoc.army.mil>.

Readers should monitor the TRADOC G2-TRISA website at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil> (AKO access required) for information updates to this publication. Periodic review and update of this publication will be conducted based on significant emergent threat information on irregular forces. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to men. The publication date on the cover and title page of the electronic version will reflect the most current update.

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**Note.** This publication references the Army Field Manual 7-100 series on training and the Army Opposing Force program. U.S. Army symbols, graphic measures, and terms are used for clarity in figures and illustrations about irregular forces. This FM 7-100 series is in transition to Army training circulars (TC) during 2011.

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# Introduction

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*Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.*

U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, 1 December 2008

This introduction provides an overview of irregular forces in the complex conditions of full spectrum contemporary operations. Irregular forces and their aims in armed conflict and related actions illustrate diverse capabilities in operational reach and intent, organizational design and models, recruitment and training, weaponry and materiel support, and psychological resolve and ideological commitment. Effective leadership and irregular force ability to command, control, communicate, and influence are crucial to motivating and sustaining a mission focus on achieving organizational objectives. Versatile and adaptive irregular leaders and their subordinates will tailor and apply ways and means to optimize effects in a specific operational environment (OE). Persistent conflict by irregulars will normally be indirect and asymmetric; however, irregular forces can be integrated into a full range of military and other functional capacities such as politics, social welfare, religious ideologies, economic programs, and regional or global media affairs. Ultimately, irregular forces will promote strategic concepts, conduct operational actions, and execute tactics to obtain influence over a targeted population and enhance legitimacy for their organizational objectives. This publication presents a framework to improve situational awareness and understanding of irregular forces in the current era, based on recent historical experiences, and indicates how irregular forces might act in the near-term future.

## IRREGULAR FORCES AND COMPLEX CONDITIONS

Irregular forces and terror are norms in contemporary full spectrum operations. The nature of irregular armed conflict is not a new phenomenon. Conditions change in any operational environment and cause irregular forces to adapt operations in order to achieve their aims. Irregular forces exist as significant actors in today's complex world and will continue to act as a critical consideration in future conflicts.



**Figure I-1. Who is an Irregular Threat? – Who is an Irregular Enemy?**

Any generalized image of an irregular force is likely to be too simple. Context will be different in any two or more comparisons. For example, state and non-state actors can operate in open armed conflict with irregular organizational capabilities, or may act covertly at various levels of directed or supported assistance to proxy

organizations such as irregular forces that can more readily ignore international law, political sanction, or traditional customs in armed or other forms of conflict.

By definition, irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces can incorporate a broad range of capabilities in diverse and flexible combinations that may include conventional and unconventional organizations, traditional or guerrilla tactics, insurgent subversion, and multiple forms of violence, crime, or acts of terror.

### Irregular Force

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, and other internal security forces.

JP 3-24

Irregular forces of expanding operational reach and power will frequently confront the United States of America and its strategic partners. Irregular forces know that the United States is a nation at war in a global campaign against al-Qa'ida, its terrorist affiliates, and other threats and enemies, and will continue to be involved in a persistent worldwide long-term conflict for the foreseeable future. The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the U.S. Homeland exposed the realities of the current global security environment. The United States is engaged in a protracted war against enemies fighting with unconventional means. The U.S. Army is a key land power component in this a global war against violent extremist movements that threaten democratic freedoms.

Groups such as al-Qa'ida, Iran-backed irregular factions, and other violent extremists such as the Taliban consider themselves at war with western democracies and specific Muslim states. Armed conflict displays challenges in conventional and unconventional combat, changing allegiances and attributes, emerging new technologies, and novel operational techniques. Irregular force and terrorist actors in this adaptive period of change may be very difficult to distinguish from innocent members of a civil population. Conflicts and context are becoming more unpredictable. Incidents can arise suddenly, expand rapidly in effects, and continue for uncertain durations in unanticipated, austere locations. They can recur in areas once contested as unstable but subsequently considered stable. Conflict is also expanding to areas historically outside the realm of land maneuver such as cyberspace and space. Irregular forces have demonstrated the capacity to operate or support actions in all of these arenas.

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*Note.* This publication addresses *irregular forces* with examples of guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and terrorism as types of conflict noted in Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (2008), and includes other irregular forces in an operational environment such as criminal organizations and loosely affiliated or independent actors.

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The context of contemporary and future conflict by irregular forces will span local, regional, and global arenas of nation-states in contest with each other, transnational commerce, expanding urbanization, and growing segments of populations that are disenfranchised from opportunities to enjoy personal prosperity and security. Irregular forces and their forms of conflict are interwoven into the fabric of these societies and locales.

Irregular force capabilities can be as basic as coercion or deadly force with a blunt instrument or as sophisticated of advanced information attack technologies and psychological military information support operations. Conduct of irregular forces can be described in the context of military operations, or masked as local crime or associated

in transnational criminal enterprises. Irregular operations, whether local or global in scale, can be assessed within a framework of fundamental offensive and defensive tactics that depend on a protracted conflict to achieve organizational aims.

Given the continuous global information environment and the exponential increase in forms of near-instantaneous communication, the irregular force will optimize information systems to collect or disrupt and degrade U.S. Army information operations, public affairs, and system networks. Irregular forces will use strategic communications and timely media affairs to script and promote a compelling story that attempts to “win the battle of the narrative.” Although irregular conflict will often use kinetic means to ensure visible and immediate effects, the most desired effect is to create and sustain psychological trauma on a targeted population in order to erode an enemy’s power, influence, and will on that population.

## **UNDERSTAND THE THREAT**

This publication serves as an unclassified resource to inform U.S. military members on irregular forces and aspects of terrorism in the operational environment. In creating situational awareness and understanding of the diverse capabilities, limitations, and intentions of irregular forces, this publication is an information resource for threats and enemies in an operational mission or in conditions for training exercises and readiness.

From a current or recent contemporary threats perspective, irregular force capabilities and limitations indicate possible or probable types of action that may be directed against U.S. military and family members; allies, partners, and friends; and activities that attempt to counter an irregular force agenda. U.S. Army commanders, organizational leaders, other military members, and the Army community can use this publication to:

- Know the goals and objectives of an irregular force or terrorist threat.
- Understand the nature of an irregular force or terrorist threat, methods of plans and action, and organizational structures commonly used by irregular forces or terrorist cells.
- Study asymmetric and traditional operations available to irregular forces or terrorists.
- Assess situational trends and emergent techniques that offer insight to patterns of an adaptive enemy.
- Appreciate the threat of irregular forces and terrorism to U.S. military forces, equipment, and infrastructure.

## **ASSESS THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**

The primary interest of this publication is at the tactical level of conflict. Irregular forces can be an actor in operations that range confrontations with several adversary nation-states to the significance of a lone individual or small cell intending to use a weapon of mass destruction. Challenges exist when states employ regular military capabilities and recognize constraints of international law or similar protocols that address use of regular military and internal security forces, and civil law enforcement agencies. Irregular forces can be novel in their flexibility and adaptability in ways and means to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents.

An irregular force in the operational environment must be prepared to conduct offensive and defensive operations simultaneously. Operational variations can include other than simultaneous or nearly simultaneous conduct. An irregular campaign can display the complexity of several missions of varying duration and magnitude that are ongoing in parallel or overlapping in operational time and space. Actions may appear sporadic or random. Extending the duration of a conflict usually favors an irregular force agenda.

Multiple threats by an irregular force will stress the coverage capability of an enemy such as the U.S. Army and its partners. A most dangerous threat is irregular force acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods that produce WMD-like effects. Breakthrough information technologies might be able to limit or negate the operational advantage of a technologically advanced state, and stress or fracture alliances, coalitions, or international agreements and partnerships. An irregular force narrative intended to manipulate mass media distribution might coerce or deceive public opinion.

Irregular forces can advocate and support any of these challenges with violence and terrorism to influence people, promote a narrative of justice as they perceive truth in a global confrontation, and demonize statements

on democratic ways of life as mere rhetoric. The combined efforts of an irregular force international community, both direct and indirect in ideological, philosophical, fiscal, and materiel support, will rely heavily on wearing down the collective resolve of unilateral action, alliances, or coalitions of an enemy.




Figure I-2. Dynamics of OE Awareness by Irregular Forces

Irregular forces know several avenues of analysis by an enemy may identify vulnerabilities in the irregular organization and operations. Self analysis by irregulars will identify these potential vectors in plans, operations, and support functions. These critical points will be planned and acted against by the irregular force in order to preserve irregular forces security and capability. Examples of critical capabilities to protect from disruption include state and private support programs to an irregular force, overt political support by a partner, tacit protection and safe haven when overt support is not feasible by a sponsor, and a sustainable recruitment and training program within a population.


The irregular understands that its base of flexibility and power resides in the values and culture of the population that the irregular must accommodate in operational aims. Organizational components and locations of irregular actions will isolate, coerce, or remove adversary leaders and programs in the political and social structure that might alienate active and passive support to an irregular force. Identifying the crucial connections among components can spotlight assailable links of an adversary's command, control, and influence in order to selectively target and attack objectives. Actions to dominate a population may include apparent random terrorism and intentional incidents that cause mass casualties, degrade infrastructure, or demonstrate an inability to an established governing group to secure its own people.

The enemy in irregular major operations will often be an alliance or coalition operating in conjunction with a host nation or other recognized political entity. The U.S may participate gradually in an area of operations through several of its Federal departments or agencies, but a swift U.S. involvement as a unilateral action is always a consideration for irregular force planning. Missions, in conjunction with a host nation government, may range from peaceful humanitarian assistance to high-intensity combat operations. Irregular force operations will attempt to counter such multinational or unilateral introduction to an OE with a full array of available influences such as direct or indirect diplomatic pressure, economic disruption, social-cultural coercion, and information operations against U.S. forces, their allies and coalition partners, as well as a host nation governing body.

Varied advanced technologies are available to almost anyone, yet sophistication of weapon systems may be a liability for the irregular force. Intelligence and operational tools must overlap and integrate complex sensor-surveillance systems with the clarity of redundant and continuous human intelligence "eyes on the ground" for collection and analysis. Engagement among significant actors in the OE can span formal and informal nation-

state representatives to the impact of individual combatants and noncombatants on a rural farmer's field or metropolitan city alleyway. Irregular forces will seek to build this full spectrum capability of intelligence systems, but may consciously decide how to use technology and materiel at varied levels of simplicity or sophistication to their best advantage.

To understand complex interactions of the OE, a framework of systems assists in assessing and gaining situational awareness. The irregular force will conduct a comprehensive assessment of advantages and disadvantages to its stated aims and objectives. They may use, in some form, an appreciation of the OE similar to U.S. joint doctrine and its system assessments of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) perspectives to conceive, shape, and conduct missions. PMESII and other variables such as physical environment and time (PMESII+PT) affect practical circumstances and information operations throughout irregular force domains of interest and action that may include land, sea, air, and space.



**Figure I-3. Operational Environment and the Threat**

This broad perspective, combined with mission, enemy, friendly irregular forces and partners, and cultural sensitivities and resolve, is critical to irregular force mission success. Defining physical environmental conditions include rural or urban settings with terrain features of space, super-surface, surface and sub-surface, weather, topography, and hydrology. The variable of time influences actions such as developing concepts, plans, multi-echelon decision cycles, tempo of operations, and projected pacing of popular support or dissatisfaction for irregular operations and incidents. Whether considering the conditions of a real world threat or a declared enemy, PMESII and other variables of physical environment and time can accurately describe the OE for an irregular force.

## **TRAIN TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY**

Irregular forces are aware of the U.S. Army's versatility and adaptability to meet the challenges of an OE and norms of operating in military missions as part of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational associations. Army operations are a continuous, adaptive cycle of innovation and experimentation informed by experience. Senior U.S. Army leadership emphasizes the importance of versatility as the Army trains for constant and adaptive readiness: "Campaigns imply time, and time allows an enemy [irregular forces] to adapt. This means that when we [U.S. Army] are deployed, we must be prepared for all forms of contact and be trained to anticipate the changes that occur in the operating environment during the course of a campaign. In this environment of hybrid threats, it seems to me the Army's institutional imperative must be versatility."

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*Note.* The **enemy** of irregular forces addressed in this publication is the U.S. Army and its partners in missions to counter an irregular force program and intent. This publication presents information primarily from an irregular force perspective.

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The U.S. Army recognizes the danger and effects that irregular forces project in the OE: “In the near term, we know what the most likely threats will be: non-state actors, insurgents, criminals and terrorists. ... These threats have the potential to be as dangerous as any state actor or near-peer competitor because of their access to state of the art weapons, training, and advanced information technologies.”

To defeat these types of enemy [U.S. Army] forces at the tactical level, the irregular force attacks the enemy’s network of information, intelligence, maneuver, logistics, and mission command structures in an attempt to effectively disrupt and defeat U.S. programs. A catastrophic defeat or destruction of an adversary such as the U.S. or coalitions is not a realistic expectation. Kinetic successes at the tactical level are important; however, the psychological demoralizing of an enemy is the essential component of a long term irregular conflict and defeat of that enemy. From a U.S. perspective, the Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force/United States Forces-Afghanistan stated the essential issue of irregular warfare succinctly in July 2010: “This effort is a contest of wills.”

## OVERVIEW OF IRREGULAR FORCES

This irregular forces publication uses a number of standard definitions, descriptions, vignettes, and illustrations at the tactical level of conflict to identify how irregular forces have planned and operated in past conflicts and how they may operate in future near-term conflicts. Tactical topics addressed in this publication are as follows:

### THE IRREGULAR THREAT IN THE OE.

Irregular forces will adapt to an operational environment (OE) and tailor their operations to counter an adversary’s strengths and to attack an adversary’s weaknesses. Irregular forces can combine with conventional armed forces, unconventional forces, as well as elements of a civil population such as criminal organizations for selective or hybrid capabilities. The irregular combatant actors of these organizations can be categorized usually as insurgents, guerrillas, various forms of militiamen, or criminals or terrorists cooperating with irregular forces.

The complex conditions of irregular warfare will involve a host of noncombatants too. Distinction between a combatant and noncombatant may appear unclear in some circumstances; however, the law of armed conflict as adopted by the Geneva Conventions states specific criteria to describe a combatant. U.S. Federal descriptions and directives recognize the complexity of combatant, armed noncombatant, and unarmed noncombatant organizations or activities in conduct of U.S. Army military missions. Irregular forces use this complexity to their operational advantage.

### INTENT OF IRREGULAR FORCES.

The intent of irregular forces is to use a full range of capabilities within their capacity at a selected point in time and focus effects on a particular population. Actions by irregular forces will accent violence, when necessary, in order to gain influence, develop legitimacy, and dominate a populace. Ways to achieve this aim involve weakening an enemy’s physical power while reducing an enemy’s influence across a broad range of political, social, economic, information, and military factors.

To effectively understand an irregular force commitment, knowing the underlying motivation of the irregular is fundamental to appreciating the irregular actor resolve to plan and act. Resolve may be an ideological obligation that borders on absolute allegiance and fundamental extremist beliefs, values, and a supportive social-ethnic culture. Commitment may also be as basic as violence for fiscal hire or personal gain and power.

## **DESIGNS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE OPERATIONS.**

An irregular force perspective is versatile and adaptive concerning situational awareness and understanding of the complex conditions in an operational environment. Appreciating the constantly changing conditions of conflict is essential to irregular force effectiveness. Irregular warfare can apply capabilities of an indigenous population or a domestic criminal organization, a force with robust international connections, a transnational networking affiliation, or a combination of these capabilities to degrade practical or perceived power by an enemy.

Elements of design in irregular warfare operations describe a constant assessing and evaluating of the variables in the operational environment in order to develop and revise concepts, plans, and operations. An adaptive irregular leader creates and maintains a clear understanding of an OE, with its probable and even improbable possibilities of effects on a conflict, in order to prioritize to critical opportunities and challenges in the context of a particular complex situation. Conditions and circumstances are analyzed continually by an irregular force.

A general concept of plans, decisions, and actions can be used as a framework for sequencing actions by irregular forces and the probable or possible actions of an adversary. Irregular force phases, series, or groups of activity in a campaign or tactical operation can be descriptive but are rarely prescriptive. A generic sequence and timing of irregular force events depend on organizational capabilities and limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization. The irregular force constantly reviews an intelligence preparation of the OE to confirm or adapt the crucial points, people, and events to pursue toward achieving stated intermediate objectives and an ultimate aim. Irregular force operations, having conceived effective ways to apply the resources available, will remain agile in the speed of adaptability, and flexible in contingent or novel responses to evolving OE conditions and circumstances.

## **ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS FOR IRREGULAR FORCES.**

Characteristics of organization can be used to understand a particular irregular force. Organizational form builds from the individual actor and cell. Structure of a cell can expand in size, form, and capability as either a hierarchy or network. Hierarchy is linear in structure and flows with familiar links of command and control and operations. A network is often asymmetric and can portray unexpected proportion or interconnectedness in its command, control, and conduct. Both of these models can operate at varied centralized or decentralized levels, and use sophisticated or simple control and information measures, or a combination of these features.

An irregular force can be an armed unit of significant military composition and capability or be an independent individual. When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can combine conventional military, paramilitary, and criminal activities. In complex conditions, an irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells to global networks in order to promote mission success and psychological effect. Such networks can be local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media affairs processes; as well as acquire covert or overt financial, political, military, or social support.

Irregular forces can be assessed from a military perspective with the following main functional areas: command and control; maneuver; information warfare (INFOWAR); reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (RISTA); fire support; protection; and, logistics.

## **METHODS OF OPERATION FOR IRREGULAR FORCES.**

Tactics and techniques used by irregular forces are based on fundamental offensive and defensive actions. The conditions of irregular warfare can include guerrilla actions, insurgency, and terrorism, but may also be integral to an encompassing conventional armed conflict. Irregular warfare differs from conventional operations dramatically in two aspects. This form of warfare occurs primarily among and within the people of a designated population, and is planned normally as a protracted conflict with episodes of extreme violence and terror, while multiple concurrent nonviolent operations seek to gradually weaken an enemy for eventual defeat.

The aim of an irregular force is not necessarily for military supremacy in an area of operations. The aim is to obtain power and influence over a targeted population. This power is usually demonstrated in political authority or coercion, but can also be experienced in social and economic venues that convince segments of a population

to align with the irregular force. The effective use of irregular forces can create or support the conditions for other state or non-state actors to exert their influence on a population.

**EMERGENT TRENDS BY IRREGULAR FORCES.**

Emergent trends of irregular warfare can be considered variations and adaptation to age-old truths of conflict when at least two forces are unequally matched in military power. Armed conflicts and other irregular operations in each region of the world are indicative of a weaker force seeking vulnerabilities in a more powerful force, and attacking those weaknesses with an expectation of persistent conflict. No accurate prediction exists on the character, location, or duration of any specific future armed irregular conflict.

Situational accelerators can spotlight probable future vectors of attack by irregular forces in the near-term years. Some overarching issues are the uncertainties of the pace or tempo an irregular force will demonstrate in its operational reach, what effects an irregular force will display throughout the strategic depth of an enemy, how successful the “battle of the narrative” will be in influencing a targeted population and disrupting enemy alliances or coalitions, and how resilient the motives and ideological commitment is of an irregular force in the presence of a resolute and adaptive enemy.




Figure I-4. Full Spectrum Operations and Training Readiness

# Chapter 1

## Irregular Forces

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*Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other security forces.*

U.S. Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02

This chapter describes an irregular force threat that exists in contemporary operational environments (OE). The U.S. Department of Defense definition of irregular forces describes armed individuals or groups but excludes regular military forces and law enforcement entities such as police and other security forces. Irregular forces will adapt to an OE and tailor their operations to counter an adversary's strengths and to exploit an adversary's weaknesses. U.S. Army forces, employed as part of an alliance, coalition, or unilateral military mission, will encounter a broad range of irregular force capabilities. Irregular forces can combine with conventional armed forces, unconventional forces, as well as elements of a civil population such as criminal organizations for flexible and agile hybrid capacities. This chapter defines significant terms and describes important concepts in order to understand irregular forces.

### SECTION I - DEFINE THE THREAT

1-1. What is the threat? Army Regulation 350-2 describes the threat from an opposing force training perspective as any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies. From the aspect of intelligence support to Army capabilities development, AR 381-11 states threat in terms of risk to U.S. mission accomplishment. For this publication, "threat" is defined as follows:

#### **Threat**

The sum of the potential strengths, capabilities, and strategic objectives of any adversary that can limit or negate US mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness.

AR 381-11

1-2. In setting the conditions for mission readiness in full spectrum operations, the U.S. Army will "realistically portray the operational environment for threats in targeted regions and capabilities-based threats that exist with the operational environment to integrate observations, insights, and lessons learned to

adapt training.” Areas of interest with known or possible threats, concerns of emergent threat capabilities, or anticipated limitations and constraints to conducting military operations influence how a term such as threat is defined.

## THREAT ANALYSIS

1-3. With a definition of threat and how strengths and weaknesses of an adversary can be structured to confront a U.S. force, a complementary understanding must address how such threats relate to irregular warfare and terrorism and acts such as raids, ambushes, kidnapping, and hostage-taking. This publication focuses on an awareness perspective, and uses the Department of Defense definition of threat analysis related to antiterrorism. This definition of threat analysis applies to the broad category of irregular forces:

### Threat Analysis

In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism.

JP 1-02

## THREAT OR ENEMY AND TERRORISM

1-4. To know the enemy, threat analysis considers the announced purpose of a group or cell, demonstrated capabilities, stated and implied intentions, adaptations through the group or cell history, and what targets are attacked or most likely to be targeted. Some targets can be used as a supporting effort or as a diversion from primary targets.

1-5. For example, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) openly targets foreign nationals in its regional area of operations. Kidnapping and hostage-taking contractors, tourists, and other foreign nationals can have a significant impact on foreign investment in a region. These criminal acts can be a lucrative means of self-financing terrorism with the ransoms that are often paid to captors for the release of victims. Ransoms reported in millions of Euros or U.S. dollars is a recurring event. Concurrently, announcements by cell leaders may proclaim loftier ideological goals and aims such as perceived theological righteousness, a belief that collective actions similar to other al-Qa'ida affiliates will yield recognition of their cause in the Maghreb, and accent the negative psychological and physical effects that kidnapping creates on “...our enemies...and apostates and crusaders.”

1-6. Combating terrorism is a combination of antiterrorism and counter-terrorism actions. Three Department of Defense definitions describe defensive and offensive measures against terror:

**Combating Terrorism**

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

JP 1-02

**Antiterrorism**

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. See counterterrorism; proactive measures; terrorism.

JP 1-02

**Counterterrorism**

Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism.

JP 1-02

**TRADITIONAL VERSUS UNCONVENTIONAL-IRREGULAR FORCES**

1-7. Traditional warfare is a form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.

1-8. Armed conflict will usually include a range of military capabilities. Three main categories of military capability are as follows: (1) traditional military unit capabilities of highly proficient conventional forces, (2) transitional paramilitary forces, and (3) adaptive unconventional or irregular forces. Traditional forces characterize standing military units of a nation-state. Transitional forces represent capabilities such as border security units, constabulary, and law enforcement organizations with an assigned paramilitary role for a nation-state. Guerrilla units can be present in this type of composite force too as a force organized along military structure and capability. Irregular forces can exhibit a mixed capability of paramilitary, insurgent, guerrilla, and armed criminal elements present in an OE with any of these actors capable of conducting terrorism. Conventional military units may also be involved directly or indirectly in coordination with irregular warfare operations.

1-9. Unconventional warfare encompasses a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations which are normally of long duration and usually conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. These forces are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external authority. Operations include but are not limited to guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. All of these activities can include acts of terrorism.

1-10. Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population. The population can be defined in many aspects and may describe itself in terms of its culture, ethnicity, familial lineage, theology, ideology, or geographic locale.

### **Traditional Warfare**

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies.

DOD Directive 3000.07 December 1, 2008

1-11. Irregular warfare is a protracted conflict that confronts state and nonstate adversaries in a regional area that can be readily connected to transnational actions due to globalization on political, economic, financial, and fronts. The definition of irregular warfare highlights a key issue of a relevant population and the intention to damage an adversary's influence over that population.

### **Unconventional Warfare**

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, it includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.

JP 1-02

1-12. Different types of irregular forces may use varied levels of violence or nonviolence to achieve this influence. Access to technology will impact irregular operations. Some forces will remain a low technology force while attempting to counter the capabilities of a superpower such as the United States of America. Yet, a constant search for improved technologies will parallel a constantly changing set of operational conditions. State of the art weaponry such as unmanned aviation platforms, man portable air defense [attack] systems, modern large caliber rocket propelled grenades, surface to surface rockets, and encrypted communications have been used in recent conflicts. The war between Hizballah and Israel in 2006 illustrates the multi-level aspects of capabilities from conventional-like forces coordinating sophisticated weapon systems to terrorist cells striking with improvised explosives and murder. This war also displays Hizballah use of a particular operational environment to prepare and shape the confrontation of irregular forces against a conventional military force in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Hizballah was able to focus on a primarily defensive oriented action in terrain well prepared with multiple defensive belts and probable or known avenues of approach into the defenses.

1-13. Irregular warfare at the tactical level applies common TTP but may do so with asymmetric applications and means. Of note, irregular warfare action "...encompasses insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism..." and elevates these descriptions above the perception that they are a lesser form of conflict below the threshold of warfare. Operations use subversion, coercion, attrition, and exhaustion to undermine and erode an adversary's power, influence, and will to exercise political authority over a relevant population.

### Irregular Warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.

JP 1-02

1-14. Faced with the conventional warfighting capacity of the U.S. Army and joint or combined forces partners, adversaries of the U.S. are likely to choose to struggle that uses a hybrid of irregular, disruptive, catastrophic, or traditional capabilities as a way to achieve their strategic objectives. A strategy of U.S. adversaries will be to degrade and exhaust U.S. forces rather than cause a direct U.S. military defeat. They will seek to undermine and erode the national power, influence, and will of the United States and any strategic partners.

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*Note.* This publication addresses topics from an *irregular forces* perspective and uses examples of irregular warfare against an adversary such as the U.S. Army.

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1-15. An adaptive adversary may focus for an extended period on tactical successes rather than long term aims such as eroding national resolve. Nonetheless, a relevant population is a central point in irregular warfare. Threats can stress situational awareness with changing conditions for the effect of how a local population perceives the presence and actions of U.S. military forces.

1-16. Paramilitary organizations are those organizations that are distinct from the regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or purpose. These organizations can be part of the government infrastructure or operate outside of the government or any institutionalized controlling authority. Organizations capable of paramilitary operations include internal security forces, insurgents, militias as described in some situations, terrorists, and large scale criminal organizations.

### Paramilitary Forces

Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

JP 1-02

1-17. Nonmilitary organizations, as described in this publication, do not rely on the force of arms for accomplishing their purposes. They do not resemble military forces in their organization, equipment, training, or purpose. These forces can include the media, international humanitarian relief organizations, transnational corporations, criminal elements, or other civilians. These groups generally fall under the heading of noncombatants. While considered noncombatants, some of the nonmilitary elements may be armed. One armed example is a private security force of a large transnational corporation.

1-18. Sponsoring organizations in support of paramilitary may promote armed conflict, while other variables of power might complement a varied overarching strategy. In addition to a paramilitary force, such sponsoring organizations typically apply other instruments of power too: diplomatic-political, informational, and economic-social. Sponsors may help finance, train, and equip insurgents or terrorist cells operating against a regional opponent. If an extra-regional force becomes involved in a regional issue, a sponsor may continue or begin to support paramilitary forces.


1-19. Criminal organizations, with or without state support or affiliation, may take advantage of the turmoil of war in order to pursue their own interests such as financial gain and related power and profit. However, they might also accept financial aid from a state, or gain an agreement that a state would not interfere with their criminal operations after the warfare ends. Criminal organizations may also steal weapons or supplies from the extra-regional force in order to sell them to insurgent or state forces.

1-20. Nonmilitary organizations, such as media and humanitarian relief agencies, often become involved in a region because of the effects of armed conflict. A normal expectation is the presence or arrival of large numbers of civilian contractors needed to support military and host nation operations.

## HYBRID THREAT

1-21. The definition of hybrid threat for the U.S. Army is "...the diverse and dynamic combination of regular and irregular forces, either conventional or unconventional, as well as criminal elements all unified in purpose." This definition is in U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command White Paper, *Operational Environment 2009-2025* (2009) (version 6.0) as signed by the Commander, U.S. Army TRADOC.

1-22. The Department of Defense recognizes the multi-faceted challenges of confronting a type of complex hybrid threat that the U.S. expects will be increasingly common. Complexity can involve irregular forces applying fundamental and sophisticated capabilities simultaneously, as well as tailoring conventional and irregular methods to achieve tactical and operational objectives in support of strategic aims. The definition of hybrid threat indicates that change and adaptation are norms in military means and other operational variables in an operational environment such as governance, culture, economics, and society. Yet, a term such a hybrid threat should not be considered discovery of something new or unique.



1-23. Hybrid threats have existed throughout military history. In most cases of major conflict between traditional forces, some form of hybrid threat emerges as a component of military power. These threats will attempt to optimize the effects of multiple offensive probes in order to identify or create a significant weakness in an enemy. Then, capabilities will be massed for direct and indirect means to achieve effects against vulnerability. For example, Hizballah capabilities in the 2006 armed conflict with Israel spanned technologies from anti-ship missiles and sophisticated signals intelligence to classic geographic defense in depth operations. Hizballah used time as a combat multiplier while increasing Israeli casualties and

blocking Israeli ground maneuver momentum. Simultaneously, the terrorist group exploited global media with limited access to the operational area by designated journalists, selective propaganda provided via the Internet, and other mass communications and slanted messaging in near real-time coverage of the conflict.

1-24. Hybrid threats will emerge as a warfare variant dependent on local-regional circumstances and capabilities. The 2009 *Army Training Strategy* (ATS) further describes hybrid threats as "...a diverse and dynamic combination of two or more regular forces, irregular forces (either conventional or unconventional), criminal elements, or terrorist cells that are distinctly different in nature, but unified in purpose or effect, employed to counter our [U.S.] strengths."

1-25. A hybrid threat can plan and act within its organizational capabilities to disrupt and degrade known critical assets and objectives of an enemy. In portraying a skillful and adaptive enemy, a hybrid threat may shift or shield their assets to prevent direct military confrontation with U.S. forces while concurrently maintaining direct and indirect efforts to coerce or otherwise influence a local or regional population. Whether centralized or decentralized in organizational structure, irregular forces demand agile and flexible operations that can absorb unexpected probes and quickly avoid an enemy's strength. This is more than just geographic redirection in time; this is the ability to tailor an organization as opportunities arise and adapt when capabilities are made available to an irregular force or when capabilities are unexpectedly degraded. Tactical impacts, assessed as insignificant on a local scale, must be evaluated continually in a larger context of long-term circumstances and potential effects.

1-26. Overwhelming concentration of military power with precision effects can result in extraordinary outcomes; however, the U.S. acknowledges that military power does have limits. The Secretary of Defense appreciates limitations when he says, "Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what technology can accomplish...But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain." Effective irregular forces recognize these aspects that impact directly on a rural or urban population in an area of operations, and seek to demonstrate a comprehensive approach to conflict and its resolution on terms satisfactory to the irregular force. Improving an irregular force's influence and legitimacy with the population is a main aim of both violent and non-violent tactics and techniques.

1-27. Conflict in contemporary operations will normally not be limited as a sequential array of actions. From a military perspective, simultaneous or nearly simultaneous groups of actions will be the norm over short violent engagements that will likely recur in long-term operations. These operations may include conventional high technology combat, paramilitary forces operating overtly in conjunction with conventional forces or operating in clandestine support of conventional forces, while other irregular forces conduct operations with common or novel ways to achieve tactical success. Narco-criminals or other well organized criminal organizations, terrorists with extremist agendas, or random acts by unaffiliated radical individuals can further demonstrate the uncertainty and complexity of an operational environment. These elements may align with irregular forces for hire or temporary mutual goals, or just as quickly abandon an irregular force cause. One of the most dangerous threats is the danger of irregular forces gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When an irregular force uses WMD in an act of terrorism and is unaffiliated or the proxy of a state or non-state sponsor, the ability for an attacked state to respond will be problematic and complicated.

## **BASIC PRINCIPLES OF IRREGULAR FORCES**

1-28. Irregular forces can be loosely affiliated groups of individuals united to attain a common goal by force of arms. They can also be organized in a strict organizational structure. In either case, a set of basic principles will guide organizational and individual actions. Since irregular forces resemble military forces in many ways, some of these principles are very similar to fundamental military principles in regular type forces. In some cases, however, they are tailored to specifically address the considerations of irregular operations. Depending on the type of organizational model and its goals and motivations, some or all of the following principles may exist.

## DISCIPLINE

1-29. Discipline is the ability to put the goals of the organization ahead of individual needs. Members demonstrate discipline while living and operating in hostile environments for lengthy periods, and often without a dedicated support structure. Additionally, the organization's leaders rely upon the discipline of members to operate in small groups operating on specified assigned tasks or and mission orders. When required, orders will be direct and specific. The principle of discipline is continually reinforced through indoctrination and organizational enforcement.

## PERSEVERANCE

1-30. Perseverance is the long-term commitment to keep fighting until the organization accomplishes its operational goals and strategic aim. Organizations develop a comprehensive, integrated plan to achieve long-term goals, or as a minimum, to achieve short-term objectives that support the attainment of long-term goals. Ultimately, long-term goals and phased victory may be defined by mere survival until the enemy withdraws. This process may take decades or generations to achieve. Organizations will achieve their goals if they persevere longer than the enemy. The enemy may attempt to resolve issues within a timetable, while an irregular force organization rests, refits, and prepares itself to continue their struggle.

## LEGITIMACY

1-31. Legitimacy is a condition by which a group of people confers authority upon other people. In the short term, an organization's members may confer authority on themselves without regard to the local population's political structure or social goals. An irregular force may declare that the organization's actions are acceptable and justifiable under existing conditions. The members organize and recruit others to their cause. Until the leadership gains acceptance from a larger segment of the population, however, the irregular force confers legitimacy upon themselves. Over time, the organization must gain legitimacy from the domestic populace and official recognition from external states and organizations in order to accomplish long term goals. Once established, organizations must sustain the legitimacy of their causes, their leadership, and their actions. Irregular forces attempt to degrade the legitimacy of the enemy.

## AGGRESSIVENESS

1-32. Aggressiveness is the principle of the offensive spirit. Irregular forces want to dominate the environment and are able to do so through offensive actions. Organizations demonstrate aggressiveness down to the individual level. The leadership relies on its members to maintain the initiative. A less capable group can defeat a highly trained and well-equipped enemy by employing the principle of aggressiveness. Aggressiveness must be tempered with patience in order to wait for the correct opportunity to act. Audacity may include the decision to take bold actions without regard to normal political and legal considerations. A simple plan boldly executed has potential to succeed. Audacious, calculating irregular leaders who are willing to take prudent risks based on the importance of the target, are likely to succeed.

**Principles of Irregular Forces**

- ◆ Discipline
- ◆ Perseverance
- ◆ Legitimacy
- ◆ Aggressiveness
- ◆ Mobility
- ◆ Initiative
- ◆ Flexibility
- ◆ Adaptability
- ◆ Concentration
- ◆ Surprise

## **MOBILITY**

1-33. Mobility is the ability to move unconstrained within areas controlled or occupied by the enemy. One way to achieve this is by blending in with the population and maintaining anonymity when desired. When mobility through anonymity is unattainable, forces use secrecy in an effort to evade detection and confrontation with the enemy. For example, seemingly impassable terrain can be used as avenues of approach to accomplish what an enemy assesses as impractical to traverse. In urban combat, a force may use masses of people or animals and corridors through them, in the same manner as geographic terrain and obstacles. The enemy may not expect forces to have great mobility or may be unable to easily track movement of irregular force members. In-depth knowledge of geographic and cultural terrain facilitates mobility. An irregular force may initially have an advantage over the enemy regarding knowledge of terrain and exploit this advantage in order to reposition assets or conduct bold offensive actions. A high degree of mobility enables irregulars to use available combat power with maximum effect at a decisive time and place in an OE.

## **INITIATIVE**

1-34. Initiative forces the enemy to react to the actions of the irregular force. Success in engagements and battle favors the force that conducts itself actively and resolutely. Initiative implies that friendly forces, not the enemy, control the environment. Initiative allows irregular force leaders to make and implement bold decisions and to establish or change the shaping of a confrontation. Subordinate leaders take advantage of new developments immediately while operating within a higher commander's intent. Irregular forces overcome a position of relative operational inferiority by creating conditions of local superiority. Initiative takes advantage of exploiting the enemy's restrictive rules of engagement (ROE).

## **FLEXIBILITY**

1-35. Flexibility is the ability to conduct activities anywhere within the target area, regardless of weather, terrain, or other conditions in the operational environment. When operating within their own geographic or cultural region, irregular forces are acclimated and intimately familiar with the terrain, indigenous resources, and the populace. This familiarity, coupled with initiative, allows irregular forces to adapt rapidly and operate under any conditions in order to take advantage of fleeting tactical windows of opportunity. Such organizations can easily be tailored to a particular task under particular conditions.

## **ADAPTABILITY**

1-36. Irregular forces must be adaptive to changing conditions and anticipate what changes may occur in future operations. This means that they must use creative thinking and technology available in adaptive or innovative ways. Irregular forces take advantage of opportunities to upgrade equipment or ordnance primarily through captured equipment, criminal enterprise, or sponsor support. Focused solutions and simple tactics and techniques can be used against an enemy's sophisticated technology systems.

## **CONCENTRATION**

1-37. For irregular forces, concentration is the ability to mass the effects of available assets. Concentration allows smaller forces to achieve comparatively greater gains. Concentration of effort at the decisive time and place is critical to success. As soon as an irregular force has accomplished a particular mission, the irregular force immediately disperses. The need for concentrating effects from dispersed locations stems from the necessities of operating normally with a minimal or unidentifiable signature within a population.

## **SURPRISE**

1-38. Surprise is striking the enemy at a time and place where the enemy is not expecting action or in a manner the enemy is not prepared to confront. Surprise means being unpredictable and cunning. Surprise delays the enemy's reactions, causes confused responses, and disrupts his command and control. Irregular forces surprise a prepared enemy through deception activities used in conjunction with operations security

(OPSEC). These measures are used to prevent indicators of a planned overt action or clandestine action. Sun Tzu provides timeless advice on the value of surprise. “All warfare is based on deception...he who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious...Move when it is advantageous and create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of forces... Know the enemy and know yourself.”

1-39. Surprise may be achieved by changing tactics or the intensity of actions against the enemy, and can deliver victory as a result of timing, boldness, and concentration. For example, forces may suddenly conduct a series of ambushes after conducting security operations for a long period. The adaptation of weapons use other than their intended purpose can be used to great effect. Modern warfare requires great emphasis on the speed and timing of operations. Irregular forces may be able to anticipate enemy actions. Actions of irregular forces are rapid, deliberate, and well-planned in advance to exploit enemy weaknesses and vulnerabilities. As noted in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, (2008), “Surprise is the reciprocal of security. It is a major contributor to achieving shock. It results from taking actions for which the enemy is unprepared. Surprise is a powerful but temporary combat multiplier. It is not essential to take enemy forces completely unaware; it is only necessary that they become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, operations security, and asymmetric capabilities.”

## SECTION II - KNOW INFORMATION WARFARE (INFOWAR)

1-40. An irregular force integrates information warfare into all of its operations. Actors in the contemporary operational environment witness the constant increase in levels of technology used in communications, automation, reconnaissance, and target acquisition systems. In order to ensure the successful use of information technologies and to deny the enemy the advantages afforded by such systems, irregular forces will continue to develop its capabilities for conducting information warfare (INFOWAR).

1-41. Information warfare is the specifically planned and integrated actions taken to achieve an information advantage at critical points and times. The goal of information warfare is to influence an enemy’s decisionmaking through his collected and available information, information systems, and information-based processes, while retaining the ability to employ friendly information, information-based processes, and systems. This section focuses on INFOWAR activities in tactical operations. For more details, see TC 7-100 (2010).

### TACTICAL LEVEL INFOWAR

1-42. The irregular force recognizes the unique opportunities that INFOWAR gives tactical commanders and it continuously strives to incorporate INFOWAR activities in all tactical missions and battles. INFOWAR may help degrade or deny effective enemy communications and blur or manipulate battlefield awareness. In addition, INFOWAR helps achieve the goal of dominating the tempo of combat. Using a combination of perception management activities, deception techniques, and electronic warfare (EW), the irregular force can often effectively slow or control the pace of battle.

1-43. INFOWAR supports counter-reconnaissance at the tactical level. The irregular force constantly seeks ways to attack, degrade, or manipulate the enemy’s reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities. While the effects of INFOWAR can be multidimensional and at times hard to pinpoint, the irregular force highlights the following tasks and associated effects as critical to the application of INFOWAR at the tactical level:

#### InfoWar Tasks and Effects

- ◆ Destroy
- ◆ Degrade
- ◆ Disrupt
- ◆ Deny
- ◆ Deceive
- ◆ Exploit
- ◆ Influence

- **Destroy.** Destruction tasks physically render an enemy’s information systems ineffective. Destruction is most effective when timed to occur before the enemy executes a function or when focused on a resource-intensive target that is hard to reconstitute. Neutralizing or destroying the opponents’ information capability can be brought about by physical destruction of critical communications nodes and links.
- **Degrade.** Degradation attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s information infrastructure, information systems, and information collection means.
- **Disrupt.** Disruption activities focus on the disruption of enemy observation and sensor capabilities at critical times and locations on the battlefield. Disruption impedes the enemy’s ability to observe and collect information and obtain or maintain information dominance.
- **Deny.** Denial activities attempt to limit the enemy’s ability to collect or disseminate information on the irregular force and deny accurate enemy collection efforts. These actions complement deception.
- **Deceive.** Deception activities strive to mislead the enemy’s decision makers and manipulate his overall understanding of irregular force activities. Deception manipulates perception and causes disorientation among decision makers within their decision cycle.
- **Exploit.** Exploitation activities attempt to optimize vulnerabilities in the enemy’s command and control or RISTA capabilities to the advantage of the irregular force. Actions focus on enemy vulnerabilities.
- **Influence.** Influence of information through forms of misinformation and data manipulation effects an enemy’s beliefs, motives, and perspective. Degraded reasoning capabilities limit enemy ability to effectively affect irregular force objectives.



**ELEMENTS OF INFOWAR**

1-44. Integrated within INFOWAR doctrine are the following seven elements: electronic warfare (EW), deception, physical destruction, protection and security measures, perception management, computer warfare, and information attack (IA). The seven elements of INFOWAR do not exist in isolation from one another and are not mutually exclusive. The overlapping of functions, means, and targets makes it necessary that they all elements be integrated into a single, integrated INFOWAR plan. However, effective execution of INFOWAR does not necessary involve the use of all elements concurrently. The use of each element or a combination of elements is determined by the tactical situation and support to the overall operational objective.

1-45. The irregular force visualizes targets of INFOWAR as decision makers, weapons and hardware, an opponent’s critical information infrastructure, mission command system, information and telecommunications systems, and command and control centers and nodes. Information links will be targeted for specified times to gain best effects. These targets may be more susceptible to precision fires and more traditional forms of attack based on EW. However, the irregular force is extremely adaptive and will employ the best option available to degrade, manipulate, influence, use, or destroy an information link. In the systems warfare approach to combat, an irregular force often focuses on attacking critical components of an enemy’s combat system such as C2, RISTA, and key logistics. Attacking these types of targets is often more feasible than directly engaging enemy combat or combat support forces. Tactical-level INFOWAR

can be a primary means of attacking these assets, either on its own or in conjunction with other components of the irregular force's own combat system.


1-46. In order to conduct successful action against a more powerful force enjoying a technological overmatch, the irregular force must exploit windows of opportunity. Sometimes these windows occur naturally, as a result of favorable conditions in the operational environment, but most often the irregular force will have to create its own opportunities. Resources for waging INFOWAR can include, but are not limited to, conventional physical and electronic destruction means, malicious software, denial-of-service attacks, the Internet, the media, international public opinion, and communication networks, as well as various types of reconnaissance, espionage, and eavesdropping technologies. INFOWAR can employ civilian and military sources and assets of third-party affiliated actors.

1-47. INFOWAR supports creating windows of opportunity for offensive or defensive action by conducting effective deception techniques, EW, and physical destruction. INFOWAR activities can contribute to creating windows of opportunity this by:

- Destroying or disrupting enemy C2 and RISTA assets.
- Deceiving enemy imagery and signals sensors.
- Selectively denying situational awareness.
- Slowing the tempo of enemy operations.
- Isolating key elements of the enemy force.

## ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1-48. Electronic warfare (EW) is conducted to control or deny the enemy's use of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, while ensuring its use by the irregular force. EW capabilities allow an actor to exploit, deceive, degrade, disrupt, damage, or destroy sensors, processors and mission command nodes. At a minimum, the goal of EW is to control the use of the electromagnetic spectrum at critical locations and times in an OE or to attack a specific system. Thus, the goal of irregular force EW is to limit or disrupt or selectively deny an enemy's use at specific locations and times on the battlefield. The irregular force intends to challenge the enemy's goal of information dominance. EW is a perfect example of the integrated nature of INFOWAR elements. It overlaps significantly with protection and security measures, deception, and physical destruction. Reconnaissance, aviation, air defense, artillery, and engineer support may all contribute to successful EW for INFOWAR purposes.



1-49. The irregular force employs both nonlethal and lethal means for EW. Nonlethal means range from signals reconnaissance and electronic jamming to the deployment of corner reflectors, protective countermeasures, and deception jammers. The irregular force can employ low-cost GPS jammers to disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Lethal EW activities include the physical destruction of high-priority targets supporting the enemy's decision-making process, such as reconnaissance sensors, command posts (CP), and communications systems. They also include activities such as lethal air defense suppression measures. If available, precision munitions can degrade or eliminate high-technology command and control assets and associated links.

1-50. EW activities often focus on the enemy's advanced command and control systems developed to provide real-time force synchronization and shared situational awareness. By targeting vulnerable communications links, the irregular force can disrupt the enemy's ability to digitally transfer and share information. The irregular force enhances its own survivability through disrupting the enemy's ability to mass fires with dispersed forces, while increasing enemy crew and staff workloads and disrupting control and fratricide prevention measures.

## SIGNALS RECONNAISSANCE

1-51. Signals reconnaissance is action taken to detect, identify, locate, and track high value targets (HVT) through the use of the EM spectrum. It includes both intercept and direction finding (DF) which may enable a near-real time attack on the target. Irregular force commanders will determine the priorities for signals reconnaissance by determining which HVTs must be found in order to have the best chance for success of their plan. Signals reconnaissance targets must be detectable in some manner in the electromagnetic spectrum, and the irregular force must have systems available that can perform this detection. HVTs that do not generate a signature of some sort in the electromagnetic spectrum must be detected by some means other than signals reconnaissance. If the collected intelligence value is of higher significance than the destruction of the target, the commander will determine the best tactical course of action to target and destroy or continue to exploit the collected information.

1-52. Signals reconnaissance is not limited to electronic means. The information gained from electronic means is integrated with information obtained from other sources. For example, trained reconnaissance teams put human observation on objectives, collect required information including SIGINT, and provide early warning and monitor lines of communication and movement corridors in a target area.

## ELECTRONIC ATTACK

1-53. Electronic Attack (EA) supports the disaggregation of enemy forces. The primary form of EA is jamming to interfere with an enemy signals link in order to prevent its proper use. However if the collected intelligence value is of higher significance than disrupting communications, the commander will determine the best course of action. Actions may include continued jamming or continued exploitation of the collected information.

1-54. Jamming priorities are similar to those for signals reconnaissance. Maneuver units are jammed in order to disrupt coordination between and within units, especially when enemy units are achieving varying degrees of success. Reporting links between reconnaissance and engineer elements and the supported maneuver units are attacked as they attempt to exploit irregular force weaknesses the enemy may have found. As with signals reconnaissance, the choices of which links to disrupt varies with the scheme of maneuver, the impact of the disruption, the enemies' sophistication, and the availability of irregular force EA assets.

### Targets

1-55. The irregular force can and will conduct EA on virtually any system connected by signals transmitted in the electromagnetic spectrum. This includes communications and non-communications signals and data. As with signals reconnaissance, the choices of which links to disrupt varies with the scheme of maneuver, the impact of the disruption, the enemies' sophistication, and the availability of irregular force EA assets. A limited but representative list of example targets includes—

- C2 links between a key unit and its higher command.
- Link between a GPS satellite and a receiver.
- Link between a firing system and its fire direction center (FDC).
- Link between a missile or munitions and its targeting system.
- Computer data links of all types.

### Distributive Jamming

1-56. Instead of wideband barrage jamming using large semi-fixed jammers, the OPFOR often fields small distributive jammers either dispersed throughout the battle area or focused on a single or several select targets. These jammers may be both fixed and mobile ground vehicle or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). These jammers can be controlled through civilian cellular phone networks and/or controlled by local forces. Along with known military frequencies, the irregular force can target civilian radios and/or cellular phones (of a regional neighbor, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), or other civilians from outside the region).

1-57. Distributive jamming causes:

- Loss of GPS, communications, and non-communications data links (such as enemy personal or unit communication).
- Degradation of situational awareness and common operational picture.
- Disruption of tempo.
- Reduction of intelligence feeds to and from CPs.
- Opportunities for ambush, with the resulting ambush videoed and used for perception management operations.
- Units forced to use alternative, less secure communications.

### Expendable Jammers

1-58. The irregular force takes advantage of the time prior to an enemy attack to emplace expendable jammers (EXJAMs). These jammers can disrupt enemy communications nets. When used in conjunction with terrain (such as at natural choke points, mountain passes, or valleys), they can achieve significant results despite their short range and low power. The irregular force can also use them to support a deception plan, without risking expensive vehicle-based systems. While limited in number, artillery-delivered EXJAMs may be employed. These jammers are especially useful in those areas where support is not available from more powerful vehicle-mounted jammers.


### Proximity Fuze Jammers

1-59. Proximity fuzes used on some artillery projectiles rely on return of a radio signal reflected from the target to detonate the round within lethal range of the target. Proximity fuze jammers cause the round to explode at a safe distance. Such jammers are deployed to protect high-value assets that are within indirect fire range from enemy artillery.

## DECEPTION

1-60. The irregular force integrates deception into every tactical action. A deception plan is always a major element of the overall INFOWAR plan in order to deceive the enemy concerning the exact strength and composition of its forces, their deployment and orientation, and their intended manner of employment. When successfully conducted, deception activities ensure that the irregular force achieves tactical surprise, while enhancing force survivability. All deception measures and activities are continuously coordinated with deception plans and operations at higher command levels. Affiliated forces may assist in executing deception activities. While creating the picture of the battlefield the irregular force wants the enemy to perceive, deception planners have two primary objectives. The first is to cause the enemy to commit his forces and act in a manner that favors the irregular force's plan. The second is to focus deception activities when time is limited, is to minimize friendly-force signatures. This limits detection and destruction by enemy attack.

1-61. The irregular force employs all forms of deception, ranging from physical decoys and electronic devices to tactical activities and behaviors. The key to all types of deception activities is that they must be both realistic and fit the deception story. Due to the sophistication and variety of sensors available to the enemy, successfully deceiving him requires a multispectral effort. The irregular force must provide false or misleading thermal, visual, acoustic, and electronic signatures.



## Feints

1-62. Feints are offensive in nature and require engagement with the enemy in order to show the appearance of an attack. The goal is to support the mission and ultimately mislead the enemy. Feints can be used to force the enemy to:

- Employ his forces improperly. A feint may cause these forces to move away from the main attack toward the feint, or a feint may be used to fix the enemy's follow-on forces.
- Shift his supporting fires from the main effort.
- Reveal his defensive fires. A feint may cause premature firing, which reveals enemy locations.

## Demonstrations

1-63. Demonstrations are a show of force on a portion of the battlefield where no decision is sought, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. They are similar to feints, but contact with enemy is not required. Advantages of demonstrations include:

- Absence of contact with enemy.
- Possibility of using simulation devices in place of real items to deceive the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities.
- Use when a full force is not necessary because of lack of contact with the enemy.

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*Note.* Principles of feints and demonstrations are discussed further in chapter 6 of this publication. Types of ruses and decoys are described as follows:

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## Ruses

1-64. Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy in order to obtain a tactical advantage. They are characterized by deliberately exposing false information to enemy collection means. Information attacks, perception management actions, and basic camouflage, concealment, cover, and deception (C3D) all support this type of deception.

## Decoys

1-65. Decoys represent physical imitations of irregular force systems or deception positions to enemy RISTA assets in order to confuse the enemy. The goal is to divert enemy resources into reporting or engaging false targets. It is not necessary to have specially manufactured equipment for this type of visual deception. Decoys are used to attract an enemy's attention for a variety of tactical purposes. Their main use is to draw enemy fire away from high-value assets. Decoys are generally expendable, and they can be:

- Elaborate or simple. Their design depends on several factors, such as the target to be decoyed, a unit's tactical situation, available resources, and the time available.
- Preconstructed or made from field-expedient materials. Except for selected types, preconstructed decoys are not widely available. A typical unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to replicate its key equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working knowledge of the electromagnetic signatures emitted by the unit.

1-66. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location and realism. Logically placing decoys can greatly enhance their plausibility. Decoys are usually placed near enough to the real target to convince an enemy that he has found the target. However, a decoy must be far enough away to prevent collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws enemy fire. Proper spacing between a decoy and a target depends on the size of the target, the expected enemy target acquisition sensors, and the type of munitions likely to be directed against the target. Decoys must be constructed according to an irregular force's standing operating procedures and must include target features that an enemy recognizes.

The most effective decoys are those that closely resemble the real target in terms of electromagnetic signatures. Completely replicating the signatures of some targets, particularly large and complex targets, can be very difficult. Therefore, decoy construction should address the electromagnetic spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable.

### Smart Decoys

1-67. Smart decoys are designed to present a high-fidelity simulation (heat, electromagnetic, electro-optical, audio, and visual signatures) of a real vehicle or other system. They are distributed, controlled decoys. Computerized controls turn on decoy signatures to present a much more valid signature than previous-generation “rubber duck” decoys. Smart decoys can be emplaced close to prohibited targets (such as churches, mosques, schools, or hospitals) and civilian populations. If the enemy engages these decoys, the irregular force can exploit resulting civilian damage in follow-on perception management activities. Smart decoys cause—

- Loss of situational awareness.
- Flood of fake targets, bogging down the enemy’s targeting process.
- Expenditure of limited munitions on non-targets.
- Negation of multispectral RISTA assets (such as night vision goggles, infrared scopes, and other electro-optical devices).
- Negation of critical targeting planning and allocation of assets.

### Deception Command Posts

1-68. The INFOWAR plan may also call for employing deception CPs. These are complex, multi-sensor-affecting sites integrated into the overall deception plan to assist in achieving battlefield opportunity by forcing the enemy to expend his command and control warfare effort against meaningless positions.

### False Deployment

1-69. The irregular force attempts to deny the enemy the ability to accurately identify its force dispositions and intentions. Knowing it cannot totally hide its forces, it tries to blur the boundaries and compositions of forces, while providing indications of deception units and false targets.

1-70. Actions are also taken to hide the exact composition and deployment of forces. Specific activities include—

- Establishing deception assembly areas or defensive positions supported by decoy vehicles.
- Establishing disruption zones to conceal the actual battle line of friendly defensive positions.
- Concealing unit and personnel movement.
- Creating the perception of false units and their associated activity.
- Creating false high-value assets.

1-71. By providing the appearance of units in false locations, the irregular force attempts to induce the enemy to attack into areas most advantageous to the irregular force. When the deception is successful, the enemy attacks where the irregular force can take maximum advantage of terrain. False thermal and acoustic signatures, decoy and actual vehicles, and corner reflectors, supported by false radio traffic, all contribute to the appearance of a force or element where in fact none exists.

### Signature Reduction.

1-72. The reduction of electromagnetic signatures of irregular force units and personnel is critical to the success of any deception plan. Minimizing the thermal, radar, acoustic, and electronic signatures of people, vehicles, and supporting systems is critical to ensuring deception of the enemy and enhancing survivability. The irregular force extensively uses a variety of signature-reduction materials, procedures, and improvised methods that provide protection from sensors and target acquisition systems operating across the electromagnetic spectrum.

## Electronic Deception

1-73. Electronic deception is used to manipulate, falsify, and distort signatures received by enemy sensors. It must be conducted in such a manner that realistic signatures are replicated. Electronic deception takes the form of manipulative, simulative, imitative deception, and often noncommunications deception. The irregular force may use one or all of these types of electronic deception.

### *Manipulative Electronic Deception*

1-74. Manipulative electronic deception (MED) seeks to counter enemy jamming, signals intelligence (SIGINT), and target acquisition efforts by altering the electromagnetic profile of friendly forces. Specialists modify the technical characteristics and profiles of emitters that could provide an accurate picture of irregular force intentions. The objective is to have enemy analysts accept the profile or information as valid and therefore arrive at an erroneous conclusion concerning irregular force activities and intentions.

1-75. MED uses communication or noncommunication signals to convey indicators that mislead the enemy. For example, to indicate that an irregular force unit is going to attack when it is actually going to withdraw, the unit might transmit false fire support plans and requests for ammunition.

1-76. MED can cause the enemy to fragment his intelligence and EW efforts to the point that they lose effectiveness. It can cause the enemy to misdirect his assets and therefore cause fewer problems for irregular force communications.

### *Simulative Electronic Deception*

1-77. Simulative electronic deception (SED) seeks to mislead the enemy as to the actual composition, deployment, and capabilities of the friendly force. The irregular force may use controlled breaches of security to add credence to its SED activities. There are a number of techniques the irregular force uses.

- With unit simulation, the irregular force establishes a network of radio and radar emitters to emulate those emitters and activities found in the specific type unit or activity. The irregular force may reference the false unit designator in communications traffic and may use false unit call signs.
- With capability or system simulation, the irregular force projects an electronic signature of new or differing equipment to mislead the enemy into believing that a new capability is in use on the battlefield. To add realism and improve the effectiveness of the deception, the irregular force may make references to “new” equipment designators on other or related communications nets.
- To provide a false unit location, the irregular force projects an electronic signature of a unit from a false location while suppressing the signature from the actual location. Radio operators may make references to false map locations near the false unit location, such as hill numbers, a road junction, or a river. This would be in accordance with a script as part of the deception plan.

### *Imitative Electronic Deception*

1-78. Imitative electronic deception (IED) injects false or misleading information into enemy communications and radar networks. The communications imitator gains entry as a bona fide member of the enemy communications system and maintains that role until he passes the desired false information to the enemy.

1-79. In IED, the irregular force imitates the enemy’s electromagnetic emissions in order to mislead the enemy. Examples include entering the enemy communication nets by using his call signs and radio procedures, and then giving enemy commanders instructions to initiate actions. Targets for IED include any enemy receiver and can range from cryptographic systems to very simple, plain-language tactical nets. Among other things, IED can cause an enemy unit to be in the wrong place at the right time, to place ordnance on the wrong target, or to delay attack plans. Imitative deception efforts are intended to cause decisions based on false information that appears to the enemy to have come from his own side.

***Noncommunications Deception***

1-80. The irregular force continues to develop and field dedicated tactical noncommunications means of electronic deception. It can simulate troop movements by such means as use of civilian vehicles to portray to radar the movement of military vehicles, and marching refugees to portray movement of marching troops. Simple, inexpensive radar corner reflectors provide masking by approximating the radar cross sections of military targets such as bridges, tanks, aircraft, and even navigational reference points. Corner reflectors can be quite effective when used in conjunction with other EW systems, such as ground-based air defense jammers.

1-81. Integral to the planning of deception activities is the irregular force's identification of the deception target. This target is that individual, organization, or group that has the necessary decision-making authority to take or not take action in line with the deceiver's deception objective. On the tactical battlefield, this target is typically the enemy commander, although the irregular force recognizes the importance of focusing actions to affect specific staff elements.

1-82. Successful deception activities depend on the identification and exploitation of enemy information systems and networks, as well as other conduits for introducing deceptive information. Knowing how the conduits receive, process, analyze, and distribute information allows for the introducing specific signatures that will be received as believable to meeting collection requirements. On the tactical battlefield, the enemy reconnaissance system is the primary information conduit and receives the most attention from irregular force deception planners. The international media and Internet sites may also be a target for deceptive information at the tactical level, being provided false stories and videotape that portrays tactical-level actions with the goal of influencing operational or even strategic decisions.

**PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION**

1-83. The irregular force integrates all types of conventional and precision weapon systems to conduct the destructive fires, to include fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, cannon artillery, multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and surface to surface missiles (SSM). It can also utilize other means of destruction, such as explosives delivered by special purpose forces (SPF), insurgents, terrorists, or other affiliated forces. Physical destruction measures focus on destroying critical components of the enemy force. The irregular force may integrate all forms of destructive fires, especially artillery and aviation, with other INFOWAR activities. Physical destruction activities are integrated with jamming to maximize their effects. Specific missions are carefully timed and coordinated with the INFOWAR plan and the actions of the supported friendly forces.

1-84. Special emphasis is given to destruction of RISTA capabilities prior to an attack identified for irregular force defensive positions. Once the attack begins, the irregular force heavily targets enemy command and control nodes responsible for the planning and conduct of the attack along with supporting communications. Typically, destruction of command and control nodes prior to the attack may allow the enemy time to reconstitute his control, whereas targeting them once forces are committed to the attack can cause a far greater disruptive effect.

1-85. The accuracy of modern precision weapons allows the irregular force to strike at specific INFOWAR related targets with deadly accuracy and timing. Due to the mobility and temporary locale validity of many INFOWAR targets, precision weapons deliver the munitions of choice against many high-priority targets.

1-86. The irregular force continues to research and develop directed energy weapons, to include radio frequency weapons and high-power lasers. While the irregular force has fielded no dedicated weapon systems, it may employ low-power laser rangefinders and laser target designators in a sensor-blinding role.

## PROTECTION AND SECURITY MEASURES

1-87. Protection and security measures encompass a wide range of activities, incorporating the elements of deception and EW. The OPFOR will attempt to exploit the large number and superior technology of the enemy's sensors. The use of signature-reducing and signature-altering devices, along with diligent application of operations security measures, supports deception activities in addition to denying information.

1-88. At the tactical level, protection and security measures focus primarily on counter reconnaissance, C3D, and information security. These and other protection and security measures may overlap into the realms of EW or deception.

### Counter-reconnaissance

1-89. Winning the counter-reconnaissance battle is critical to mission success since it can limit what information the enemy is able to collect and use in planning and executing an attack. Tactical commanders realize that enemy operations hinge on an intelligence appreciation of the situation. Defensive preparations will focus on destruction and deception of enemy sensors in order limit the ability of enemy forces to understand the irregular force defensive plan and overall operations. A high priority for all defensive preparations is to deny the enemy the ability to maintain reconnaissance contact on the ground.

1-90. The irregular force recognizes that, when conducting operations against a powerful opponent, it will often be impossible to destroy the ability of standoff RISTA means to observe its forces. However, the irregular force also recognizes enemy military commanders are reluctant to operate without human confirmation of intelligence, and know the relative ease with which imagery and signals sensors can be deceived. Irregular force tactical commanders consider ground reconnaissance by enemy special purpose forces as a significant threat in the enemy RISTA suite and will focus significant effort to ensure its removal. While the irregular force will execute missions to destroy standoff RISTA means, C3D is the method of choice for degrading the capability of such systems.


### Information and Operations Security

1-91. Information and operations security can protect the physical and intellectual assets used to facilitate command and control. Security must function continuously to be effective. It must conceal not only operational intentions, current locations and configurations, and actions but also the tactics, techniques, and procedures of information systems employment and operation.

1-92. The irregular force understands the importance of information security. Commanders understand their vulnerabilities to being attacked through their own information systems and develop means to protect these systems. In addition, the irregular force must be capable of isolating attacks on its information systems while maintaining the ability to execute missions. In order to reduce the vulnerability, the irregular force emphasizes strong communications, computer, and systems transmission security.

### Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception (C3D)

1-93. The irregular force gives particular attention to protective measures aimed at reducing the enemy's ability to target and engage irregular force systems with precision munitions. Knowing that the enemy cannot attack what his RISTA systems do not find, the irregular force employs a variety of C3D techniques



throughout the disruption, battle, and support zones. These range from the most simple and inexpensive methods to hide from observation to the most modern multispectral signature-reducing technology.

1-94. The irregular force dedicates extensive effort to employing C3D to protect its defensive positions and high-value assets. All units are responsible for providing protective measures for themselves, with support from engineer units and organic assets. The irregular force employs signature-reducing or signature-altering materials and systems, to include infrared and radar-absorbing camouflage nets and paints.

## PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT

1-95. The irregular force seeks to undermine an enemy's ability to conduct combat operations through perception management and PSYWAR operations aimed at deterring, inhibiting, and demoralizing the enemy and supporting civilian populations. Perception management involves measures aimed at creating a perception of truth that best suits irregular force objectives. It integrates a number of widely differing activities that use a combination of true, false, misleading, or manipulated information. Targeted audiences range from enemy forces, to the irregular force homeland's citizens, and to world popular opinion. The various perception management activities include efforts conducted as part of: psychological warfare (PSYWAR), public affairs, media manipulation and censorship, statecraft and diplomacy. The last two components, while not conducted at the tactical level, have a great impact on how and where the irregular force conducts tactical-level perception management activities. Perception management activities conducted at the tactical level must be consistent with operational and strategic goals.



1-96. PSYWAR is a major contributor to perception management during combat. Targeting the military forces of the enemy, PSYWAR attempts to influence the attitudes, emotions, motivations, and reasoning of enemy personnel. Specialists plan PSYWAR activities at all command levels. In addition to the enemy's military forces, the specialists also concentrate on manipulating the local population and international media in favor of the irregular force, turning opinion against the enemy's objectives. Planners focus special emphasis on highlighting enemy casualties and lack of success. The enemy nation's population is a major target of these activities, due to the importance of public support for enemy military activities.

1-97. The irregular force employs media and other neutral actors, such as nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, to influence further public and private perceptions. Media warfare or perception management targeting the media, aims at influencing domestic and international public opinion in order to build public and international support for the irregular force military actions and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing policies perceived to be adverse to the state's interests. It exploits the international media's willingness to report information without independent and timely confirmation.

1-98. Perception management techniques by the irregular force will seek to define events in the minds of decision makers and populations in terms of their choosing. Successful perception management consists of two key factors: speed and connection. Speed means reaching the target audience before enemy-provided information can alter the perception of events. Connection means having the right media to provide the story to the target audience in a way they will find credible and memorable. World opinion is a primary target of perception management, either to gain support for the irregular force cause or to turn world opinion and support against their enemy. The irregular force's national or regional capabilities in public affairs and censorship to control its own population's access to information and perception of reality. Successful preparation of the population significantly enhances public support for the irregular force's military actions.

## COMPUTER WARFARE

1-99. Computer warfare consists of attacks that focus specifically on the computer systems, networks, and nodes. This includes a wide variety of activities, ranging from unauthorized access (hacking) of information systems for intelligence-collection purposes, to the insertion of malicious software (viruses, worms, logic bombs, or Trojan horses). Such attacks concentrate on the denial, disruption, or manipulation of the infrastructure's integrity. The irregular force may attempt to accomplish these activities through the use of agents or third-party individuals with direct access to enemy information systems. Other avenues to access and attack systems include communications via the Internet.

1-100. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks use a network of slave computers to overwhelm target computers with packets of data and deny them outgoing access to networks. Such attacks could disrupt logistics, communications, intelligence, and other functions. The irregular force will employ various types of malicious software or malware on enemy computers to slow operations, extract data, or inject data. Poor operational procedures can enable this type of attack and cause significant loss of either capability or spillage of data or a combination of both effects. These attacks also cause the enemy to waste data time and cycles in prevention and remediation. Malware could affect internal clocks, such as creating positional errors and communications difficulties, and slow the functional speed of computing.

1-101. Irregular force computer warfare activities may be conducted prior to or during a military action. By damaging or destroying networks related to an enemy's projected force deployments and troop movements, the irregular force can effectively disrupt plans, misdirect movements, and cause substantial confusion and delays in operational timetables. As modern military forces increasingly rely on just-in-time logistics support, targeting logistics-related computers and databases can produce delays in the arrival of critical manpower or materiel such as ammunition, fuel, and spare parts during critical phases of a conflict.

## INFORMATION ATTACK

1-102. Information attack (IA) focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports accomplishment of the irregular force mission. Unlike computer warfare attacks that target the information systems, IA targets the information itself. The irregular force recognizes the increasing dependence of modern armies on tactical information systems. The irregular force attempts to preserve the advantages of such systems for its own use, while exploiting the enemy's reliance on such systems. This type of action focuses on the intentional disruption or distortion of information in a manner that supports accomplishment of the mission. Attacks on commercial Internet by civilian hackers have demonstrated the vulnerability of cyber information systems to innovative and flexible penetration, disruption, or distortion techniques. Irregular force information attackers (cyber attackers) learn from and expand upon these methods.

1-103. IA offers a powerful tool for the irregular force. For example, an information attacker may target an information system for electronic sabotage or manipulate and exploit information. This may involve altering data, stealing information, or forcing a system to perform a function for which it was not intended, such as creating false information in a targeting or airspace control system.

1-104. Data manipulation is potentially one of the most dangerous techniques available to the OPFOR. Data manipulation involves covertly gaining access to an enemy information system and altering key data items without detection. The possibilities are endless with this technique. Some examples are:

- **Navigation.** Altering position data for enemy units, soldiers, and systems, making them think they are in the right place when they are not.
- **Blue Force Tracking.** Altering position data of enemy units, soldiers, and systems to make other units, soldiers and systems believe them to be in one place where they are not or to lose track of them altogether. Alternately, data manipulation can make OPFOR units appear as enemy or vice versa.
- **Battlefield information systems.** Enhancing OPFOR success by the ability to mitigate and/or influence enemy activities controlled via battlefield information systems.

- **Survey and gun/mortar alignment.** Causing enemy weapons to fire on the wrong target location.
- **Targeting and sensors.** Misdirecting sensors to have false reads, locate false targets, or identify the enemy's own units as OPFOR targets.
- **Weapon guidance.** Sending weapons to the wrong location or wrong target.
- **Timing.** Changing internal clocks, thereby disrupting synchronization.
- **Logistics tracking.** Sending logistics packages to the wrong place or delaying their arrival. This can be done by altering bar codes on equipment or by hacking and altering logistics (delivery/request) data.
- **Aviation operations.** Changing altimeter readings, position location data, or identification, friend or foe (IFF) codes.

1-105. The irregular force will attempt to inject disinformation through trusted networks. They will attempt to make the enemy distrust their ISR and situational awareness assets by injecting incorrect information. Attacks could take the form of icon shifting (blue to red) or moving an icon's location. Fire missions and unit control would require significant human interaction and slow the enemy's target engagement cycle time. Likely targets for an IA are information residing in the critical tactical systems of an opponent: telecommunications links and switches, fire control, logistics automation, ISR downlinks, situational awareness networks, and command and control systems.

## SECTION III - UNDERSTAND THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (OE)

### OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGES

1-106. The U.S. Army is in a long-term conflict on a global scale with several primary adversaries indoctrinated with ideological extremism. Threats are many in such a world and enemies can arise suddenly with unexpected capabilities. Full spectrum operations present challenges that can span diverse operations from peaceful engagement to the possibility of general war. More than likely, these threats or enemies will be hybrid, that is, a capability that is neither just a regular nor irregular force but a combination of "...regular and irregular forces which are well trained, well armed, well equipped, and often ideologically inspired." Means of conflict by irregular forces may often be without the constraints observed in traditional warfare. Besides terrorism and associated activities by criminals, actions could include hacking into and disrupting financial networks, power grids, or critical communications. The danger of weapons of mass destruction is not beyond the means of a dedicated threat as evidenced by the chemical sarin attack in Tokyo (1995) or the relatively simple yet mass destruction by improvised explosive means used on New York City (2001), and the sophisticated biological means of anthrax attacks in or near Washington, DC (2001).

1-107. Recent U.S. policy reaffirms that:

The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are endangered. And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that they would use them. These facts compel us [U.S.] to act along with our friends and allies. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future...we will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity...we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security...we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan...These are the three core elements of our strategy: a military effort to create the conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective partnership with Pakistan.

1-108. The Army recognizes an OE challenge when an array of threats does not fit a simple category:

Formerly, we [U.S. Army] could differentiate and categorize threats as conventional or unconventional; regular or irregular; high intensity or low intensity; traditional, terrorist, or criminal. Such categorization was useful because each categorized threat had an associated counter. It is no longer enough to discern the “correct” conflict category and then pursue a singular solution; we are more likely to face hybrid threats – dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically to counter our advantages.

1-109. The U.S. Army acknowledges a task to deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors in context of a national defense strategy by the Department of Defense. At the same time, U.S. military forces must remain prepared to fight a traditional war against a powerful state or alliance of hostile states. This type of war has the potential of involving hostile states that possess a nuclear arsenal. Whether confronting traditional or irregular warfare, two critical considerations are factors of time and distance in projecting or massing combat power. Often, these two factors will affect two other critical aspects of military operations: logistics and access to an area of operations. Irregular forces will seek ways to create a tactical vulnerability and then attack it for optimum effects on the larger conflict.

## THE HUMAN DIMENSION

1-110. The human dimension of deterring and defeating a threat or enemy requires a qualitative edge and decisiveness by U.S. Army leaders. The Commander of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command states, “Leader development remains the TRADOC’s number-one priority.” The contemporary era requires leaders who can assess an environment at the tactical level, understand the implications, and act with a clear understanding of the threat or enemy. The Army leader fully appreciates that an adversary will often “decentralize, network, and operate among the people to overcome our [U.S.] technological advantages.”

1-111. To ensure readiness of this appreciation and understanding, Army training events optimize the complexity and uncertainty that exists in an operational environment with hybrid, networked, and decentralized threats. Although military intelligence retains an interest in location, disposition, and timing of threat or enemy force actions in traditional sense, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G2 notes that “...defeating networks and protecting populations requires identity resolution as the essential criteria of intelligence information...against a networked adversary requires a bottom-up struggle for knowledge that recognizes that identity and intent are critical to most operational decisions, from engagement to kill/capture.”

1-112. How, then, do U.S. Army leaders acquire and maintain a “bottom-up” knowledge and understanding of threats or an irregular force? A challenging operational environment and capabilities-based threats are integrated into each Army training program imperative. Army training programs “...focus on preparing units and leaders for operations in this era of persistent conflict – a fight characterized by the massing of effects over time, decentralized to *platoon and company-level* [emphasis added], where the integration and synchronization of precision lethal and nonlethal effects and units are especially key.” Known unit deployment cycles and regions of employment direct the type of threat in training preparations and certification. Whether a combat training center (CTC) training rotation mission rehearsal exercise (MRX), a different culminating collective training event such as a Warfighter Exercise (WFX), or a patrol pre-combat check and ongoing mission update, how does the Army leader characterize the actors in a particular mission set? Cultural awareness and cultural understanding set the tenor and tone of effective relationships with the people during the planning and conduct of military operations.

1-113. Full spectrum operations are “continuous and simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks, as well as civil support functions.” Military missions will definitely impact on the civilian population in an area of operations.


## CULTURAL AWARENESS

1-114. A term heard commonly when dealing with culture is the metaphor of “human terrain.” Like many metaphors, the term can be easily misunderstood but can also serve useful purpose in conveying

associations within a context. Terrain is a term familiar in military forces and infers an ability to clearly describe, illustrate, and understand a topic. However, clarity and image can be misleading to the untrained observation and interpretation of an actor in an environment. A concept of human terrain with graphic techniques has limitations if attempting to comprehensively present a condition of culture. Human terrain maps are a concise display, but a two-dimensional representation does not account for many dynamic social conditions. Appreciating and applying cultural aspects of an environment is never easily visualized on a schematic or diagram. Stereotype and intentional or unintentional bias can confuse and distort the actual perspective of culture and its impacts on operations.

1-115. Notwithstanding, human terrain as a phrase has advantages in highlighting the importance of cultural awareness in a military operation. Situational understanding of the people is a significant combat multiplier. Conditions have many roots in this terrain such as history of the region, ethnic identity, religion, social status, and language. The dynamics of socio-cultural analysis is critical to situational awareness and understanding of an operational environment.

1-116. Why do people act the way they do? Circumstances in time and location influence and create physical conditions that cause a person to act or react. These events are interpreted by a person through that person's worldview – the culture that describes how that person should act or not act. To understand and interact effectively with a culture, actors apply an integrated approach to assessing a specific personality, place, and time while recognizing that this situational understanding is fluid and changes over time. Stated by General Petraeus in his 4 July 2010 letter to the NATO International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan: “We must never forget that the decisive terrain in Afghanistan is the human terrain.”



**Figure 1-1. Situational Understanding of Culture**


1-117. One conceptual approach that may be useful is assessing a triad of ecological, social, and symbolic structures of a culture. An ecological avenue considers an environment and can display competition over limited available physical resources. Social structure can accent the stress of varying roles, rights, and privileges among people. Shifting allegiances and dynamics of influence emerge to clearly identify that any social perspective is not static. Perspective changes. A symbolic approach to culture highlights the social power of beliefs, traditions, rituals, and values. It can evolve as supportive or devolve as repressive. This type of world view can be the most difficult aspect of culture to appreciate when such fundamental ways of justifying social norms are non-negotiable, that is, an ideology defines who a person is and why they act and behave in a particular way within a social group.

1-118. Using three approaches of ecological, social, and symbolic structures of a culture may appear more simple than assessing through the many lens of variables such as political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment and time (PMESII+PT). However, this triad that centers lifestyle, roles, and values easily incorporates the full range of PMESII+PT variables. Noted in *Operational*

*Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Application*, a way to describe a continuum of assessment and refined definition for use in military operations is to use a cycle of studying and confirming the situational understanding of "...those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; conversely the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operations." To summarize culture in the terrain of human relations, "culture is not a single and isolated component of the area of operation [human or geographic], but a complex system of interdependent dimensions, the dynamics and impacts of each of which affect the dynamics of all the others." But who are the actors in an operational environment?

## HOSTILE, FRIENDLY, NEUTRAL, AND UNKNOWN ACTORS

1-119. Symbols create a way to display types of actors in an operational environment. Terms and graphic symbols presented in U.S. Army Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics* (2004) present a simple four group manner of representing people in an OE: hostile, friendly, neutral, and unknown. Common visual aids provide standardization and enhance clarity of operational information coordinated among U.S. military units. Colors used with symbols provide meaning also. Friendly forces or assumed friendly forces are colored in blue and hostile or suspected hostile forces are colored in red. People assessed as neutral are displayed in green, and people of an unknown status are colored with yellow. Any illustration of relationships is but a snapshot in time and is susceptible to change on no notice. "War will always involve a battle between two creative human forces. Our [U.S.] enemies are always adapting and learning...And they will surprise us."



**Figure 1-2. Creating Doubt in an Adversary's Mind**

1-120. From an irregular force perspective, creating doubt in an adversary's mind of who is trustworthy as a stated U.S. partner or who is a neutral to be allowed certain accommodations in support a military mission is part of the psychological stress that can be amplified to limit U.S. forces effectiveness. As a hostile force, will an irregular force suggest or coerce opportunities that changing allegiances might be advantageous to a particular actor or group such as becoming neutral or some other change in adversarial relationship? What actions will be conducted to convince an adversary that indications or announcements of allegiance, betrayal, or transition are believable? Who is deceptive? Who is a passive supporter of an adversary? Who is a combatant and who is a noncombatant in a particular complex and uncertain military setting?

## COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS

1-121. Terminology and definitions may be inadequate to describe a particular setting or relationship. The differences between a combatant and noncombatant may appear very clear to some group while remaining purposely vague by another group. From an irregular force perspective, this aspect of the nature in an operational environment can be used as a tactical advantage. Combined with irregular force operational norms that may not comply with the law of war or other international protocols, the irregular force may be able to hinder the effective use of U.S. military forces combat power.

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*Note.* An expanded discussion on combatants and noncombatants is at Chapter 5 “Actors in Complex Contemporary Conditions” of this publication. Discussion addresses combatants and types of irregular forces. Noncombatant actors are grouped in two categories: armed noncombatant actors and unarmed [by organizational purpose] noncombatant actors.

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1-122. The vast reservoir of “human terrain” in combatant or non-combatant organizations is more than a generic category or grouping. The Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study, *21st Century Strategic Technology Vectors*, identifies that “mapping the human terrain” underpins the operational need for cultural understanding of the human layer in an area of operations. This notion is not new. When carrying out stability, humanitarian relief and other operations in Somalia, General Anthony Zinni stated, “What we need is cultural intelligence. What makes them [the faction leaders and people] tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that’s so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think, compared to my values and the way I think in my western, white-man mentality?...What you need to know isn’t what our intel apparatus is geared to collect for you, and to analyze, and to present to you. ....” In 2006, General Petraeus reflected on recent experiences in the Middle East and accented, “...awareness of the importance of understanding the huge impact of cultural, religious, and ethnic factors -- that knowledge of the so-called ‘cultural terrain’ was as important in many cases as knowledge of the physical terrain in contemporary operations.”

1-123. Latent, as a term, can describe a person in the OE who is present and capable of becoming an active actor though action is not now visible and identified. This aspect of human terrain applies to the power or quality of a person or group that has not yet come forth but may emerge and develop as an active participant in operations. Optimizing latent human terrain is a consideration as a combat multiplier. Latent human terrain can be visualized as a collective environment of motivations, resolve, and behavior that is adaptable to actual or perceived wants, commitments, or obligations. Such motives can fluctuate or can be resolute depending on the social-cultural, theological, economic and political knowledge or conviction of an individual or group.

1-124. Using complex battle position as a metaphor to latent human terrain, a population existing among two polar opposites of friendly forces and enemy forces is the environment to be accessed, denied, abandoned, or reinforced. Adapted properly, latent human capacity emerges as foundational to mission resolve. Handled poorly, human advocacy and ambivalence can degrade into dissonance and decay. The construct of deception adds a qualifier of determining what is real, what is conditional, and what is treacherous in order to manipulate information toward a desired perception in support of irregular force objectives.

1-125. How does the irregular force manipulate and compel this latent human terrain to enhance its objectives? Similar to U.S. variables for assessing the operational environment, the irregular force uses a full range of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information conditions plus factors of physical environment and time to leverage the active or passive support of the populace. Leaders and groupings throughout the society are influenced, convinced, or compelled to act in a particular manner. Latent human terrain is a prime resource in the operational environment for achieving psychological and physical effects, direct and indirect, in order to accomplish objectives. The individual who is present in the environment may or may not be readily visible, obvious, or active as a key influence on a local or regional population. However, once identified, those individuals can be nurtured or persuaded to be an essential combat multiplier in support of objectives. The issue centers on one key principle -- it’s all about people.

## **TERRORISM**

1-126. Terrorism is a special type of violence. While terrorism often seeks legitimacy as a form of political action, terrorism is a criminal offense in accordance with any national or international legal code. Although terrorism has not caused the physical devastation and large number of casualties normally associated with large scale traditional warfare, terrorism can produce a significant adverse psychological impact, degrade an enemy’s capabilities, and present a threat greater than a simple compilation of the

number of people killed or the quantity of materiel and infrastructure damaged or destroyed. Examples of psychological impact are the 911 suicide jet attacks on the United States in New York and its East Coast and the anthrax attacks of the same period in 2001. For some people, these attacks weakened their sense of safety and security. The experience of catastrophic terrorism was evidence that the United States was not immune to attacks by known terrorist groups or unidentified terrorists at the time of attack.

### Terrorism

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

JP 1-02

1-127. What is terrorism? Terrorism is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as: “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” This definition is not a universally accepted definition outside of the Department of Defense. The study of terrorism is often mired in conflict over definitions and frames of reference. The DOD doctrinal definition of terrorism will be used for this publication.

1-128. However successful in attracting attention or creating fear and anxiety, terrorist acts often fail to translate into concrete long-term gains or achieve an ultimate objective. Escalating acts of terrorism can be self-defeating when the acts become so extreme that public reaction focuses on the acts rather than on the terrorist’s intended purpose and issue.

1-129. Nonetheless, extremists exist and will continue to promote their agenda on selected populations. Noted in U.S. joint counterterrorism doctrine, extremists are those who seek to force their ideological beliefs on others. They oppose, in principle and practice, the right of people to choose how to live and how to organize their societies, and support the murder of ordinary people to advance their extremist ideological objectives. Many violent extremists, because of the manner in which they carry their violence, are best described as terrorists.

## SUMMARY

1-130. This chapter described the contemporary irregular force threat that exists in today’s operational environment (OE). The irregular force threat will be specific to a situation in time and location. A full or partial capability of an irregular force depends on varied combinations of state and non-state actors, combatants and non-combatants, paramilitary, and other elements of a society and population. An irregular force considers principles similar to U.S. Army principles of war in the planning and conducting of operations. Irregular forces, even though they are not members of a traditional military organization, can combine capabilities with conventional armed forces, unconventional forces, terrorist cells, as well as elements of a civil population such as criminal organizations. Understanding the human dimension and corresponding cultural awareness of an OE is essential to appreciating why and how irregular forces may be effectively employed. This chapter defined significant terms for this publication of threat, traditional warfare, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, and irregular forces in order to describe important concepts of irregular warfare and to understand the environment of irregular force operations.

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## Chapter 2

# Intent of Irregular forces


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*What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign – a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and moderation. In the long-term effort against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct military force will continue to have a role. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.*

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

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This chapter presents the intent of irregular forces that can exhibit a full range of capabilities, accented by violence, and focused on a particular population in order to gain influence, develop legitimacy, and dominate a populace. Ways to achieve this aim involve weakening an adversary's physical power and reducing an adversary's influence across a broad range of political, social, economic, and military factors. Violent acts and information operations in a long term campaign attempt to demoralize an enemy and a targeted population in order to degrade resolve and eventually achieve dominance over that population.



**Figure 2-1. Irregular Forces Near-Term Intent in Ways-Means-Ends**

Motives cover rationales for political, economic, or social-cultural commitments and may include forms of ideological or theological extremism. In order to appreciate these long-term plans, design of irregular campaigning reviews the historical context of some prominent irregular conflicts of the past century and current decade. These conflicts can be as expansive as the “People’s War” that spanned decades in today’s Peoples Republic of China or as limited in scope as ongoing rural regional operations in Peru or past urban warfare intentions in large metropolitan regions of Brazil. Whether conflicts are urban, rural, or a composite in geographical scope, contemporary operations apply irregular warfare lessons learned in dynamic and adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

## SECTION I - AIMS

2-1. Irregular forces attempt to accomplish their aims against an adversary that usually overmatches them in conventional military power. When facing such conditions and capabilities, irregular forces adapt in applying operational principles in armed conflict and subversion. Some of these principles apply specifically to counter an extra-regional coalition, while other principles apply equally to any adversary that overmatches the paramilitary capabilities of an irregular force.

2-2. In evaluating threats that can influence the aims of an irregular force, irregular forces study the strengths and weaknesses of varied extra-regional powers such as a national state or possible coalition. Irregular forces also analyze the capabilities and limitations of forces within a locale or region of interest such as internal security units, local and regional police, governmental paramilitary organizations, and regular armed forces. How governance is administered in a region is a key political aspect for analysis. Infiltrating these types or organizations is an aim of irregular forces to subvert and minimize their effectiveness to counter irregular warfare.

2-3. Aims focus a progressive display and ability to influence. Eventually, controlling conditions promote and provide for achieving the objectives of an irregular force.

### DEMONSTRATE CAPABILITY

2-4. Irregular forces must demonstrate capability. They vary the level and tempo of operations to suit tactical and operational conditions. They may initially employ rapid tempo in an attempt to achieve their aims in a locale or region before an external force can be introduced. Rapid tempo may enhance conditions for access or control operations before an external force can establish a lodgment in the locale or region. Tempo may also use a gradual phasing of actions to minimize interest and support to a region. Demonstrating capability complements principles of maintaining the initiative and remaining flexible and adaptive to evolving conditions.

### CONTROL TEMPO

2-5. Most superior extra-regional forces rely on rapid power projection capabilities. Prior to or during the initial phases of these forces entering a region, irregular forces employ a high operational tempo to take advantage of any weakness inherent in enemy power projection access. As external forces begin deployment from known embarkation sites, actions to slow or stop access can focus on embarkation locations and facilities, intermediate staging areas, and debarkation and other access nodes. Concurrently, irregular forces could attack initial entry forces and sabotage facilities or logistic stockpiles. These measures, combined with diplomatic and propaganda efforts within the influence of the irregular force, aim to stop or slow the conflict quickly before external forces can employ coordinated operations and combined arms maneuver.

2-6. If irregular forces cannot end a conflict quickly, they may attempt to slow the tempo and prolong the conflict. This action seeks to reduce an external force's resolve over time and convince external support to disengage and abandon their presence. In protracted conflict, preferred tactics for irregular forces include the raid or ambush as a means of wearing down the enemy while avoiding decisive combat with superior

#### Irregular Force Aims

- ◆ **Demonstrate Capability**
- ◆ **Obtain Concession**
- ◆ **Establish Sanctuary**
- ◆ **Expand Influence**
- ◆ **Expel Opposition Actors**
- ◆ **Diminish Government Authority**
- ◆ **Gain Legitimacy**
- ◆ **Achieve Objective**

enemy forces. These activities may not be linked to only maneuver or ground objectives. Targets of opportunity allow for massing combat power of an irregular force in order to defeat or destroy an objective.

## CHANGE THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

2-7. Irregular forces will try to change the nature of conflict to exploit the differences between elements in an external force and present the enemy with conditions for which the enemy is not prepared. An advantageous way to achieve a change in the nature of conflict is often to exploit ambiguous political-military objectives of the enemy.

2-8. Against an extra-regional adversary, irregular forces can take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the initial period of a phased enemy deployment to change the nature of the conflict. During that period, irregular forces may continue to operate as usual against their regional opponents, while engaging in access-control activities directed at the interregional force. By changing the nature of the conflict as enemy forces are deployed, irregular forces can render an enemy's force package inappropriate to the threat or operational environment. As the interregional force approaches building combat power to a point of tactical or operational overmatch, irregular forces will change their methods of operation to preserve their own combat power and exploit limitations in the enemy's rules of engagement (ROE). Modern regular military forces and coalitions usually operate under restrictive ROE. Irregular forces study these limiting factors in a way to undermine ROE effectiveness. One example is to operate close to and in the civilian population that restricts when and how combat power of an external force such as a coalition can be applied. Differences in interoperability among governmental and coalition forces is another key issue. Irregular forces may use international borders with a sympathetic population to provide refuge or a staging area for training and attack preparation. Irregular forces may introduce terror tactics against civilians and military members.


## CONDUCT VARIED ACTIONS

2-9. Irregular leaders use initiative to conduct battles or actions at a time and place of their choosing. Immediate objectives may disperse and isolate the enemy, or negate or mitigate the combat power differences between forces. This may mean fighting in complex terrain such as urban or mountainous environments, or fighting during periods of reduced visibility to offset external force technological advantages. Similarly, irregular forces may conduct dispersed and decentralized activities that may be coordinated for simultaneous actions.

2-10. Decentralized, dispersed, and distributed activities are recurring aspects of irregular warfare. Each approach seeks to reduce vulnerabilities of an external force or coalition's combat power such as air power, precision munitions, large massed mobile forces, and sophisticated intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities. Decentralized actions are employed when erratic or degraded command and control (C2) measures exist or when employed by design. These activities feature autonomous or semi-autonomous action by irregular forces which operate within the mission guidance from higher command authority or organizational leadership. This technique insulates elements from some effects of C2 disruption by external forces.

2-11. Dispersed actions require elements to operate independently in their areas. Conduct of operations provide for flexibility and initiative applied within the guidance of senior or operational leaders. Dispersed actions provide a level of force protection to irregular forces. Geographically separate irregular elements may come together through centrally coordinated measures to assemble and strike key enemy systems at opportune moments. Once the action is complete, these elements return rapidly to their separate locations to avoid enemy counterstrikes. Complex terrain within mutually supporting distance is ideal for this type of activity, and is facilitated by pre-positioned munitions, other logistics, and dismounted infiltration.

2-12. Distributed actions require good C2 networks that can range from sophisticated digital devices to man-delivered messages. These activities use the capabilities of all sizes and types of irregular forces in a



coordinated effort to seize the initiative from state or coalition forces. Operations are well-prepared, simultaneous actions throughout an entire area of interest to maximize the effects of irregular combat power within complex environments.

## OBTAIN CONCESSION

2-13. Irregular forces, if participating in an insurgency, generally share some combination or variation of four common objectives: political change, overthrow of the government, resistance against an outside actor, or nullifying political control in an area. Insurgencies may have more than one end, and the ends can change with circumstances. The ends desired can be identity or ideologically motivated, or be a combination of identity issues and an ideological extremism. In some cases, irregular forces may conduct operations that purposely cause an international community to intervene within a region. Outcomes can include a political change from within a government, or may be support of irregular force aims due to the presence of foreign-external organizations or military forces and international diplomatic pressure.

2-14. Insurgents may seek to overthrow governments. Efforts to overthrow a regime can range from an unplanned, spontaneous explosion of popular will to a small group coup d'état with little support from the population. Most insurgencies fall between these two extremes and are characterized more by a strategy of protracted attrition than broad-based populist revolution or coup d'état.

## ESTABLISH SANCTUARY

2-15. Access to sanctuary enhances the effectiveness of an irregular force. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Such assistance does not need to come just from neighboring regions. Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can support an irregular force agenda. Irregular forces may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding, or use the Internet to create a support network among unsuspecting nongovernmental organizations (NGO). Ethnic or religious communities in other regions may also provide a form of external support and sanctuary, as well as significant fiscal and material provision.



**Figure 2-2. Al-Qa'ida Training Locale: Afghanistan (1998)**

2-16. Irregular forces can manipulate virtual sanctuaries in the form of Internet, global financial systems, and the international media. Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. Operations in urban environments present different planning considerations from rural environments. Border areas contiguous to a region may provide external support and sanctuary.

2-17. Sanctuaries often develop in urban environments in order to leverage formal and informal networks for action in complex terrain. While irregular forces intend to use complex terrain as sanctuary from the effects of external forces, they seek to disrupt or deny governmental forces easy control of such terrain. Raids, ambushes, and terror tactics are effective means for disrupting or denying sanctuary to enemy forces. They are prepared to attack enemy forces in a locale that provides tactical advantage toward mission success and also considers attacking throughout an operational depth with irregular force capabilities. This can result in diminished governmental manpower and resources to provide adequate force protection measures and improve irregular force expectation of a prolonged conflict.

2-18. Irregular forces may disperse their forces in areas of sanctuary. The sanctuary may be physical, often located in complex terrain that limits or degrades the capabilities of regional forces or coalition force systems. Irregular forces may also use moral sanctuary by placing their forces in areas shielded by civilians or close to sites that are culturally, politically, economically, or ecologically sensitive. They will defend in sanctuaries when necessary. A key concept in changing the nature of the struggle is that irregular forces may have different criteria for achieving an objective than does their enemy. Irregular forces may be willing to sacrifice large numbers of innocent civilians, sometimes of their own population, to attain their objective.

2-19. Irregular forces may be part of non-state actors who seek to create or maintain a region where there is no governmental control or governmental control that they can compromise or coerce. For example, powerful criminal organizations desire a space where they can conduct their activities unrestrained by a government. If these criminal organizations can challenge a host nation's control beyond the local or regional and even national level of government, they may appear to be an insurgency. Some insurgencies may have the goal of nullifying one government's control of a region with the intent to form a sanctuary in support of action elsewhere. Such a sanctuary may be safely over an international border from the primary focus of a protracted conflict or may be far from the location that is contested. In either case, a safe haven can be used to train, plan, prepare, and project irregular forces and support for operations.

2-20. Irregular organization can coerce or convince regional actors to deny coalition forces use of staging and support facilities in a region. The goal is to present the enemy with nonlinear, simultaneous actions within a region as well as adverse impacts beyond a locale or region. Such actions will assist in eroding national resolve to confront the irregular force and its agenda.

## EXPAND INFLUENCE

2-21. Irregular forces can instigate chaos and disorder with a small number of highly motivated actors with simple weapons, credible operations security (OPSEC), and effective propaganda. Against a technologically superior force, irregular organizations disperse their forces in areas where complex terrain limits the enemy's ability to apply his full range of technological capabilities. However, they may be able to rapidly mass forces and fires from these dispersed locations for decisive engagements at the time and place of their own choosing. Irregular organizations train their forces to operate in adverse weather, limited visibility, rugged rural terrain, and urban environments. Such conditions can shield them from the effects of an enemy's high-technology weapons and deny an enemy the full benefits of, if available, reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) systems.

2-22. Irregular forces can use such technologies, if available, to employ surveillance, precision munitions, and sophisticated camouflage, deception, or decoy systems to negate or minimize the effects of enemy high-technology weaponry. Irregular forces can employ low-cost global positioning system (GPS) jammers to disrupt enemy precision munitions targeting, sensor-to-shooter links, and navigation. Irregular forces will concentrate their own RISTA, maneuver, and fire support means on the destruction of high-payoff systems. Losses among these premier systems may not only degrade enemy operational capability but also undermine enemy morale.

2-23. Irregular forces may have easy access to commercial products to support precision targeting and intelligence preparation of the battlefield. The proliferation of advanced technologies permits organizations to achieve a situational awareness of enemy deployments and force dispositions formerly reserved for the militaries of technologically advanced nations. Much information on sources of such technology is readily available on the Internet and in open-source documents. Those media can provide irregular forces extensive

information on an enemy and its armed forces. Intelligence can also be obtained through greater use of human intelligence (HUMINT) assets that, among other sources, gain intelligence through civilians or local workers contracted by the enemy for base operation purposes. Similarly, communication monitoring technologies are becoming more reliable and inexpensive.

2-24. Irregular forces can usually afford to be patient. Similar to time duration and prolonged conflict concepts, irregular forces can use space to wear down an opponents' resolve. They will seek to attack relatively weak areas and remain mobile. Irregular forces will fight on ground of their choosing, wear down an opponents' combat power, and force their opponent to be reactive rather than proactive.

## EXPULSION OF OPPOSITION ACTORS

2-25. In some cases indigenous elements seek to expel or overthrow organizations or military presence perceived as occupiers or outsiders. These irregular forces may initially have little or no central direction or they may be part of a planned resistance effort. The actions of these small groups can have a cumulative impact. Irregular forces can be a significant factor in gaining momentum to resistance. Resistance is usually more easily addressed if action is taken early in any arrival of military forces from outside the region. Some resistance groups could come under the control of a government in exile or by rogue factions competing for that role. The objective of general resistance is often to protract the war until the external forces lose the resolve for a mission and decide to reduce operations or withdraw.



Figure 2-3. USS *Cole* Hull Damage (2001)

## CONTROLLING ACCESS INTO A REGION

2-26. Extra-regional enemies capable of achieving overmatch against the paramilitary forces must first enter the region using power-projection capabilities. These forces may not be located in the areas of the world where regional conflicts involving paramilitary forces will be fought. They must have the capacity to project and sustain power over long time and distances, with forces originating in their respective homeland. Therefore, the first reaction to threatened intervention is focused on access control, that is, to selectively deny, delay, and disrupt entry of extra-regional forces into the region and to force them to keep their operating bases at a significant state of security and commitment of forces. Thus, access-control operations come in two basic forms: limiting access and operational exclusion.

2-27. Access-control activities can begin even before the time the extra-regional power declares its intent to come into the region, and are continuous throughout a conflict. They can reach beyond the country or region within which the paramilitary forces predominantly operate.

## **LIMITING ACCESS INTO A REGION**

2-28. Limiting access seeks to affect an extra-regional enemy's ability to introduce forces into the region or country. The goal is to limit the accumulation of applicable combat power to a level and to locations that do not threaten the goals of the paramilitary organization. Disrupting the enemy's force projection capabilities is the easiest manner of preventing the massing of enemy combat power.

2-29. Irregular forces can achieve this through many methods and types of action within the region, at the enemy's home stations and military communities, and at all points in between garrison locales and the operational deployment area. For example, airfields, seaports, transportation infrastructures, and lines of communication (LOCs) should be attacked featuring coordinated actions of all available forces. Actions might include terror tactics and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to present the enemy with a nonlinear, simultaneous battlefield with the possibility of catastrophic effects on a locale or region. Irregular organizations might exploit and manipulate international media to present foreign intervention as unneeded or unwanted, decrease international resolve, and affect the force mix and rules of engagement (ROE) of the deploying extra-regional forces.

## **PRECLUDING ACCESS INTO A REGION**

2-30. Operational exclusion seeks to selectively deny an extra-regional force the use of or access to forward bases of operation within or near the region. For example, through economic or political connections, information campaigns, and hostile actions, paramilitary organizations might seek to deny the enemy the use of bases in nearby foreign nations. They might also attack population and economic centers for the intimidation effect by using terror tactics.

2-31. Irregular forces seek to limit the introduction of extra-regional forces that threaten the overarching aims of the irregular force and any supporting state or non-state affiliate. For example, actions may be able to limit or interrupt the enemy's deployment through aerial and sea ports of debarkation in the region. As enemy forces enter a region, irregular forces will disrupt and attempt to isolate enemy forces in order to create opportunities for successful attack and further disruption. Propaganda distributed through international media outlets present access operations as unwanted foreign intervention, decrease international support and resolve, and potentially cause restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) favorable to the irregular force operations.

## **DIMINISH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY**


2-32. As long as irregular forces survive to regenerate and continue their conflict, they can continue to erode a government's capabilities and resolve. These actions can lead to a government losing relative strength, credibility, and legitimacy within its populace as well as with an international community.

2-33. Irregular force successes may cause the government to react in a repressive manner against sectors of the population and alienate general support of the government. These grievances may provide a rationale of building sympathy and subtle support of the population. This support may develop from passive to active support of irregular forces in local and regional support networks. The synergy of these operations and propaganda can expand the recruitment of individuals and groups, sometimes voluntary and sometimes initially coerced, into an aggressive anti-government movement.

## **CAUSE POLITICALLY UNACCEPTABLE CASUALTIES**

2-34. Irregular forces must attempt to inflict highly visible and embarrassing losses on enemy forces to weaken the enemy's domestic resolve and national will to sustain the deployment or conflict. Modern wealthy nations may become sensitive to domestic and world opinion in relation to conflict and seemingly needless casualties, and determine to withdraw commitment to a counterinsurgency or similar series of actions. A comparative advantage against superior forces may be the collective psyche and resolve of an irregular force with segments of a population that support its agenda and endure hardship and casualties.

2-35. This difference in willingness to endure losses can help an irregular force establish or build the perception of its own legitimacy while degrading the legitimacy of its adversaries. Mass casualties and significant personal family and society losses can cause the populace to doubt the viability of a regime or government to protect its population.



**Figure 2-4. 1983 Bombing of USMC Facility in Beirut: Before and After**

### **DEGRADE PUBLIC SAFETY**

2-36. Irregular forces conduct operations to cause anxiety and fear in a population, and may be willing to commit heinous acts on governmental activities and the general population to achieve their strategic goals. They will try to influence public opinion in the immediate region and in the homeland of an extra-regional force. Irregular operations will attempt to discredit the ability of a government to protect its people or maintain civil order.

2-37. An overreaction by governmental authorities may be an intended irregular outcome when such actions alienate segments of a population from the government. One example of sectarian violence is the 2006 Sunni insurgent bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque which destroyed the “Golden Dome” of this Shi’a holy place. The shrine includes the tombs of Shi’ite imams revered to Shi’a worldwide. The attack ignited a series of sectarian attacks and counterattacks between Sunni and Shi’ite in Iraq as the region attempted to preclude civil war.



**Figure 2-5. 2006 Golden Mosque in Samarra: Before and After**

## **GAIN LEGITIMACY**

2-38. Establishing an appearance of legitimacy sets the public stage for controlling the political, economic, and social variables of a selected population and region. Indicators of legitimacy, promoted with an aggressive and accurate public affairs program, convince enough of the population of the value to support the agenda of the irregular force.

## **PROVIDE CIVIL SAFETY**

2-39. Providing the populace with physical security is fundamental to establishing trust and a willingness to listen to irregular force agenda. Forms of safety may include reducing violent acts to an acceptable level of crime in a locale. Correspondingly, corruption reduced to an acceptable level may encourage citizens to align actively or passively with an irregular force. External threats may be a significant concern for the citizen. Knowing that a paramilitary or military capability exists in the irregular force to confront and limit external paramilitary or military threats adds to the confidence in a level of local security.

## **PROMOTE SOCIAL SUPPORT**

2-40. Promoting an agenda that responds to social needs such as potable water, consistent electrical power, or regular sewage and garbage disposal can demonstrate interest and support for accommodating basic functional needs of a lifestyle. Preventive medicine and health services are direct and immediate means to garner appreciation from a citizenry when governmental activities are incapable or unwilling to provide such social support. Other programs within the social group may include business assistance, political information, religious teaching, or pre-school, primary, and secondary levels of education.

## **ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION IN A POLITICAL PROCESS**

2-41. Encouraging citizens to be part of a political process can improve a psychological wellness in being part of social change and lifestyle. Soliciting simple support such as attendance to a public rally or sophisticated support in the form of professional printing of informational brochures are examples of finding a way for people to contribute to an irregular force agenda. Developing leaders at the local level of social groupings can further the positive political marketing of civil and social projects intended to assist citizens in daily livelihoods.

## **DEMONSTRATE ECONOMIC PROGRESS**

2-42. Demonstrating ways that citizens can increase their personal or social group well-being in economic projects and regular unskilled or skilled labor can be emphasized in the local to strategic communication of progress within an irregular force agenda. The ability to demonstrate practical improvements to fiscal wealth, personal health, or social group prestige through enhanced individual or collective work skills can build confidence in the institutions established and supported in an irregular force agenda.

## **GAIN EXTRA-REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS ACCEPTANCE**

2-43. Gaining the acceptance of an irregular force agenda by extra-regional institutions is a significant signal of emergent legitimacy. This acceptance will often be a progressive series of acknowledgements on particular aspects of social, economic, and political programs by an irregular force. Strategic communications are a critical means of how and when a message is transmitted to people internal to the regional area and those people outside of the regional geographic parameter. Effectiveness in communicating these messages and reinforcing the legitimacy of programs, projects, and actions is essential to obtain and sustain the intention for regional, extra-regional, international, and global support.

## **ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE**

2-44. Achieving the objectives of irregular organizations differ throughout the world and range actors from regional single-issue terrorists, irregular paramilitary forces using guerrilla warfare tactics, to transnational

extremist or criminal groups operating for hire and commercial profit. As a prominent democracy and significant economic, military, and political power, the U.S. is a convenient target for extremists.

2-45. To paraphrase U.S. Army doctrine on the principle of objective, irregular force action supports a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The principle of objective drives all irregular activity. At the operational and tactical levels, objective ensures all actions contribute to an encompassing aim. Objectives focus capabilities on essential or critical tasks. Clearly stated objectives also promote individual initiative. Objectives support achieving an irregular conflict's overall political goals. Tactical operations must contribute to achieving operational and strategic objectives. Force used to achieve an objective considers the effect on a local or regional population. An incident can have strategic impact. Although irregular means will use coercion or threat as needed, the overarching intent of irregular operations is to gain willing acceptance of a population.

2-46. Achieving an objective with an irregular force may be of short duration but will usually require a concept of protracted conflict. A sample statement by an al-Qa'ida spokesperson focuses on a primary strategic aim of al-Qa'ida. By causing the United States to commit significant wealth to protect its economy and associated infrastructure and to employ a fully engaged U.S. Armed Forces, al-Qa'ida intends to stress and degrade U.S. global presence and prestige.

2-47. Use of terrorism against the U.S. by regional or global competitors may occur when these forces cannot openly challenge, constrain, or defeat the U.S. with any other technique. Sovereign nations have employed state sponsored or state directed terrorism to produce results that could not have otherwise been achieved against U.S. opposition. Non-state actors span the wanton attack of an individual terrorist to apocalyptic or theological extremist groups that seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

2-48. Al-Qa'ida and its affiliated terrorist networks configure a major terrorist threat with global reach. Attacks on high value economic targets are likely to be targeted within the U.S. Homeland and U.S. presence abroad. How can comparatively small terrorist groups believe they can successfully confront the United States? For some Islamic extremists, part of the answer reflects the constructed narrative of fighting in Afghanistan and their success against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Many of these Islamic fighters were persuaded through their indoctrination and propaganda that they alone defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan based on their determination in a prolonged series of campaigns and years of war. Their narrative minimizes the substantial U.S. support provided to the Islamic fighters of the period. For example, provision of man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Afghanistan insurgents by the U.S. provided a significant combat advantage to regional and foreign fighters that resulted in a crippling effect on Soviet airpower and stressed Soviet and host nation ground forces operations.

## **OPTIMIZE PROPAGANDA AND ACTION**

2-49. Some irregular forces may view the U.S. as particularly vulnerable to the psychological impact and uncertainties generated by terror tactics in support of other activities. Consequently, terrorist networks such as al-Qa'ida are likely to try capitalizing on what they may perceive as vulnerabilities. Al-Qa'ida has publicized expectations that include:

- The United States of America is extremely casualty averse. Any loss of life takes on strategic significance out of proportion to the tactical or operational circumstances.
- The U.S. Government policies and policy makers are overly influenced by public opinion, which in turn is particularly susceptible to the adverse psychological impact of terrorism.
- The U.S. economic performance is perception driven and very vulnerable to the adverse psychological impact of terrorism.
- The U.S. cannot sustain long term efforts or exhibit public sacrifice in pursuit of difficult national goals.

2-50. Other possible vulnerabilities to consider for attack are as follows:

- Differences in Coalition Member Rules of Engagement (ROE).
- Predictable Tactics and Techniques.
- Preference for Standoff Combat Operations.

- Dependence on Advanced Technologies.
- Inattention to Cultural Awareness and Sensitivity.
- Security of Force Projection Access Points.
- Requirements for Robust Logistics.
- Extended Lines of Communication.
- Use of Significant Numbers of Contractor Support Organizations.

2-51. If domestic political, social, or economic issues can be fomented by irregular forces to polarize and separate segments of a population, terror attacks by a variety of domestic or so-called homegrown terrorists can further disrupt and subvert public support for the legitimacy of a government in power. Terrorist cells could target U.S. forces as symbols of government oppression or means to gain terrorist organizational prestige through a successful attack.

2-52. These actions exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities believed to exist in an enemy's activities, organization, or force structure. By following these principles, a smaller or less capable force can plan to neutralize the overmatch afforded to technologically or numerically superior forces. Actions used against superior foes will focus on perceived centers of gravity such as national will and the enemy's willingness to endure casualties, hardship, stress, and continued deployments over time. Many of these principles are interrelated and overlapping since all contribute to the overall goal to prevent a more powerful adversary from bringing sufficient military power to bear to defeat the paramilitary irregular forces.

2-53. These principles are idealistic, indicating what an irregular force would like to do but not what it might be capable of doing. If the irregular force is not capable of implementing particular actions, it may choose to affiliate with other paramilitary forces, criminal organizations, or regular military forces of a region.

### EMPLOY OPERATIONAL SHIELDING

2-54. Irregular forces will use all means necessary to protect key elements of their combat power or infrastructure from a more powerful force. This protection may use of any or all of the following:

2-55. Operational shielding generally cannot protect the entire force for an extended time period. Rather, an irregular force will seek to protect selected elements of its forces for enough time to gain the freedom of action necessary to conduct important actions in keeping with the other principles for dealing with a more powerful adversary.

2-56. The nature of terrorists and their behaviors are a wide ranging set of influences, circumstances, and intent followed by action. Terrorism has many motivations depending on the special interests of the individual or cells. Common characteristics or clearly defined traits may be indicated in simple comparisons, but any detailed study will identify that significant contrasts are more often the norm. Nonetheless, terrorism can have a significant impact on the motivations and behaviors of individuals and organizations. Observations on human nature and group dynamics under the conditions of stress, anxiety, and extremist values can provide insight into actions in order to achieve a desired effect.

2-57. Understanding the goals of the enemy promotes an active approach to analyzing the transfer of goals to objectives, and objectives into operational plans and tactical actions. This transition of motivation to

### Shielding Considerations

- ◆ Complex Terrain
- ◆ Noncombatants
- ◆ Risk of Unacceptable Collateral Damage
- ◆ Countermeasure Systems: Cyber
- ◆ Dispersion
- ◆ Fortifications
- ◆ Irregular Warfare
- ◆ Hybrid Warfare
- ◆ Terrorism

action can be visualized as developing a concept, gathering resources, and applying capability to achieve a task. While prediction is conditional, irregular forces will consider target value and cost required to successfully attack and accomplish a mission objective.

## SECTION II - MOTIVES

### MOTIVATIONAL CATEGORIES

2-58. Motives for conducting irregular warfare can be grouped in categories of identity, ideology, or a combination of identity and ideology. Knowing the rationale of why irregular forces are conducting armed conflict or involved in subversive actions may indicate probable types of operations. Operations can be very focused with self-imposed limitations on targeting or can be open to a full range of conflict and terrorism.

#### SEPARATIST

2-59. Separatist groups reach for a goal of separation from existing entities through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination. The ideologies that separatists promote include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. Categories of ethnicity and nationalism can crossover in a support rationale. In the case of the 2004 Beslan, North Ossetia hostage and mass murder incident, extremists attempted to coerce the Russian government to make concessions related to Chechnya.



Figure 2-6. Beslan Hostage-Murder (2004)

#### ETHNOCENTRIC

2-60. Ethnocentric groups see ethnicity as a defining characteristic of a society and basis of cohesion. Group members promote the attitude that a particular group is superior because of its ethnic or racial characteristics, or may seek to establish ethnic recognition and governance. The Tamil minority on the island nation of Sri Lanka combined terrorism and guerrilla tactics in an insurgency in an attempt to establish a Tamil state in the north and east of the island. After several decades of armed conflict, recent major military operations by Sri Lanka severely dismantled this insurgency.

#### NATIONALISTIC

2-61. Loyalty and devotion to a national consciousness place one nation's culture and interests above those of other groups is the motivating factor. This can aim to create a new nation or aim to split from an existing

state in order to join another nation with perceived national identity. Other aims may attempt to combine tribal or familial clan relationships of power with ideological extremism. Local or regional irregular forces may promote multiple reasons for armed conflict and publicize support and sometimes allegiance to larger insurgent or terrorist activities. Ongoing turmoil in Somalia and the surrounding region has demonstrated the ability of a terrorist organization such as al-Shabaab to export its agenda to a broader international arena.



**Figure 2-7. Al-Shabaab: Indigenous Struggles and AQ Affiliation**

## REVOLUTIONARY

2-62. These groups are dedicated to the overthrow of an established order and replacing governance with a new political or social structure. Often associated with communist political ideologies, political movements advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals. The Shining Path in Peru promotes a Maoist doctrine-like regime and seeks to replace the Peruvian government with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. Actions include bombings, ambushes, and assassinations. The insurgency continues in remote regions of Peru and is associated with regional cocaine production and criminal activities.



**Figure 2-8. Shining Path: Rural Terror for Revolution**

## IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

2-63. Political ideology is a way of attempting to categorize motives for irregular force actions. This grouping samples a span of extremist political orientation, sometimes linked to extremist religious beliefs, social expectations, or other motivations.

## RIGHT WING

2-64. These groups are associated with the reactionary or conservative side of the political spectrum, and often are associated with fascism or neo-Nazism. Despite this, right-wing extremists can be every bit as revolutionary in intent as other cells, groups, or organizations. Their intent is to replace existing forms of government with a particular brand of authoritarian rule.


## LEFT WING

2-65. These groups are usually associated with revolutionary socialism or variants of communism such as Maoist or Marxist-Leninist dogma. With the demise of many communist regimes and the gradual liberalization of many contemporary regimes toward capitalism, left-wing rhetoric can often move towards anarchistic beliefs and criminal-terrorist action.

## RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

2-66. Religious extremist inspired terrorism is a significant danger in contemporary environments. This is not a novel phenomenon. Islamic extremist organizations have been the most active and greatest recent terrorist threat to the United States. Religious extremism can couch terrorism with distorted interpretation of theological dogma and can mask secular objectives as holy writ, infallible guidance, and non-negotiable responsibility. One commentary states, “The literature on terrorism clearly documented a dramatic rise in the religious affiliation of terrorist organizations. A generation ago none of the eleven international terrorist organizations was religiously oriented. The majority of terrorist groups using suicide attacks as a norm are Islamic extremist, displacing secular groups in this form of notoriety such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, religious extremist-oriented organizations account for a disproportionately high percentage of attacks and casualties.”

2-67. Religious motivations can also be tied to ethnic, regional, and nationalist identities, such as Kashmiri separatists combining their desire to break away from India with a religious contention by extremists between Islam and Hinduism. The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland provides an example of the intermingling of religious identity with nationalist motivation. Many of the theological traditions experience extremism. Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Hindu, and Muslim religious beliefs have experienced extremist members who commit terrorism with a distorted rationale. Some extremists may follow beliefs aligned with a cult and have little or nothing to do with religion.



**Figure 2-9. Kashmir-Regional Grievances and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)**

2-68. Religiously oriented and millenarian groups may attempt mass casualty incidents. An apocalyptic extremist frame of reference may determine loss of life as irrelevant and encourage mass casualty producing incidents. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, under the leadership of Shoko Asahara, attempted to cause mass casualties by releasing sarin in the Tokyo subway system. This attack caused several deaths and thousands of people required medical screening and treatment. A previous sarin attack by the group affected a residential area that caused several deaths and over 500 people receiving medical attention and care. Ideological categories describe the political, religious, or social orientation of the group. While some

groups will be committed to a clearly stated and understood ideology, other groups may use ideological narrative as a rationale to provide justification for their actions to outsiders or sympathizers. Ultimately, ideology is about power and influence over a selected grouping of people and resources. Common ideological categories include political, religious, and social beliefs.

## ANARCHIST

2-69. Anarchist groups are anti-authority or anti-government, and strongly support individual liberty and voluntary association of cooperative groups. Often blending anti-capitalism or communist-like messages, modern anarchists tend to neglect the issue of what will replace the current form of government, but generally promote that small communities, self-determination, and independent actions are a better form of political-social organization.

## SOCIAL

2-70. Often particular social policies or issues will be so contentious among individuals or groups that beliefs incite extremist behavior and terrorism. This form of social terrorism is often referred to as single issue or special interest terrorism. Some issues that have produced terrorist activities in the United States and other countries are: animal rights, abortion, ecology and the environment, anti-government, and ethnic, race, or minority rights. Examples include the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) or the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in their criminal actions to oppose what their members believe is exploitation of the planet, animals, or related risks to the environment, human health, and wildlife.

2-71. Groups with secular ideologies and nonreligious goals will often attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence to achieve a specific politically oriented aim. This often requires them to keep casualties at the minimum amount necessary to attain the objective. The intention is to avoid a public backlash that might damage the organization's acceptability and maintain the appearance of a rational group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks, they reduce the risk of undermining external political, social, and economic support.

2-72. For terrorist groups professing secular political, religious, or social motivations, their targets are often highly symbolic of authority: government offices, banks, national airlines, and multinational corporations with direct relation to an established governing body. Likewise, they may conduct attacks on representative individuals whom they associate with economic exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While extremist religious groups also use much of this symbolism, there appears to be a trend to connect attacks to greater physical devastation and suffering. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals such as denominational leaders, missionaries, or religious activities such as worship services and memorial events to a targeting equation.



Figure 2-10. Irregular Forces: al-Qa'ida in Iraq

2-73. With increased global attention on contemporary Islamic extremism and terrorism, the 2007 NCTC report on terrorism incidents during 2006 cites an interesting statistic. “As in 2005, Muslims in 2006 again bore a substantial share of the victims of terrorist attacks. Approximately 58,000 individuals worldwide were either killed or injured by terrorist attacks in 2006...well over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims, and most were victims of attacks in Iraq.” The indication of indiscriminate murder by Islamic extremists is apparent in this annual summary. Although some terrorist groups publicly state that they are actively seeking to minimize civilian casualties in their campaigns of terror, much of the contemporary acts of terror suggest this is a hollow statement. NCTC data published in 2010 for 2009 terrorism statistics listed over 48,000 victims as killed or injured with most of the high casualty attacks occurring in South Asia or the Near East. Sunni extremists, spread among almost 90 groups, were identified in about one-half of all attacks in 2009. Of all the casualties, well over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims with most being victims of Sunni extremist attacks in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

2-74. Symbolism related to ideology may focus terrorist targeting in striking on particular anniversaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike to commemorate battles won or lost during a conventional struggle, whereas religious groups may strike to mark particularly appropriate observances. Many groups will attempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations, or the executions or deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. For instance, Timothy McVeigh and one accomplice conducted the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building on April 19th, the anniversary of the end of the Branch Davidian siege near Waco, Texas in 1993. April 19<sup>th</sup> was also a violent incident in 1775 from the period of the U.S. American Revolution.

## SUMMARY

2-75. Irregular warfare can use a full range of capabilities that applies violence with the intent to gain influence and dominate a populace. Ways involve weakening an adversary’s physical power and reducing an adversary’s influence across a broad range of political, social, economic, and military factors. Violent acts and information operations in long-term campaign attempt to demoralize an adversary and a targeted population in order to degrade resolve and eventually achieve dominance over a population. Motives cover rationales for political, economic, or social-cultural commitments and may include forms of ideological or theological extremism. Eventually, irregular forces will attempt to establish legitimacy and recognition with regional or international influence. Whether conflicts are urban, rural, or a composite in geographical scope, contemporary operations apply irregular warfare lessons learned among a population in dynamic and adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

<b>Motivational Considerations</b>	
◆	<b>Political</b>
◆	<b>Theological</b>
◆	<b>Cultic</b>
◆	<b>Social-Cultural</b>

## Chapter 3

# Irregular Warfare Designs

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*While al-Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen al-Qaeda's message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other...Aided by the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe...But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location – including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts – is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism.*

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, December 2009

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This chapter presents an irregular force threat perspective on situational awareness and understanding of the complex conditions in an operational environment. Understanding the ever-changing conditions of conflict is essential to an irregular force threat. Irregular warfare can apply capabilities of an indigenous population or a domestic criminal organization, a force with robust international connections, a force with transnational networking resources, or a combination of these capabilities. Irregular forces use intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), risk assessment, and risk management to identify practical objectives and measures to combat U.S. military forces and degrade visible or perceived U.S. national power. Elements of design describe a constant assessing and analyzing of the variables in the operational environment in order to develop and revise concepts, plans, and operations.

### SECTION I - DESIGNS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

3-1. Design is a way to constantly assess and evaluate current situational conditions, reflect on past performances, and project how to achieve contemporary and future missions. This situational understanding has foundation in enduring fundamentals such as estimate of the situation, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, risk assessment and management, contingency planning with assumptions and facts, and fragmentary orders conducted within an ongoing operation to achieve a mission purpose. Knowing situational context encompasses the decisions if and when to act.

3-2. Another fundamental is to know the desired end state (objective) and what actions are required to effectively accomplish an acceptable solution of moving from a current state to a desired end state. Design is a mutual process of critical and creative thinking. Critical thought identifies practical ways and means to achieve an objective; creative thought takes practical options and challenges these perspectives with innovative and novel possibilities. Creating opportunities is the aim.




Figure 3-1. Human Dimension in Design and Operations

3-3. Objective can be a specified and very distinct task or can be an overarching goal that results in an acceptable condition within the aims of an irregular force. Conditions can be quantified using a framework of operational variables (PMESII+PT), but must also be acknowledged as an ever-changing group of interrelated circumstances. Time is a constant, whereas natural events such as weather and characteristics of terrain can be assessed for their general degree of predictability and impact. Notwithstanding, the action and reaction people display will be an essential element of any design.

3-4. Situational awareness and situational understanding in design require a shared common understanding among organizational members of action and outcome probabilities and possibilities as well as operational capabilities, constraints, and any known restrictions. Narrative and graphics provide a simple multimedia approach to clearly present information and speculation of conditions in an operational environment. The impact of support or opposition well outside of the immediate area of operations encompasses consideration of social behaviors, cultural norms, religious beliefs, and ethical perceptions. Just as these factors and assumptions will cause leaders to tailor how they construct an operational mission, leaders will adapt organizational means to best accomplish an intended outcome.

3-5. People, the human dimension of a mission, are of particular interest. Relevant actors in a design will be supportive, passive, or non-supportive to the aims of the irregular force. The ability to affirm or change public or private commitment of key leaders, influential persons, or the support of a general populace will involve detailed plans and actions. Acts of mutual respect, persuasion, coercion, or terror are several means that can be applied at varied tempo and pressure to ensure support or minimize interference of an irregular force agenda.

Irregular Forms of Conflict	
◆	Popular Protracted Conflict
◆	Urban Focused Conflict
◆	Military Focused Conflict
◆	Conspiratorial Focused Conflict
◆	Special Issue Conflict

3-6. Design is an action-oriented iterative process. Design provides initial planning guidance and updated direction with current knowledge and informed analysis in conduct of a mission. Principles of design are operational in expectation but can also be applicable to plans and actions in tactical operations.

## POPULAR PROTRACTED CONFLICT

3-7. The popular protracted war strategy is a classic communist insurgency model. Mass popular support and escalating violence are the cornerstones of this strategy, and advocate a three-phase approach. The three strategic phases are as follows: defensive, stalemate, and counteroffensive. These phases are not necessarily linear and can overlap depending on a regional situation. Conditions indicate the presence of a political, social, or economic irritant, or combination of conditions that cause people to support dramatic change. Those people willing to commit to such radical change involve themselves in covert or overt action. In any of the phases of popular protracted war, significant support may be provided by an established legitimate political, religious, or economic entity outside the country.

3-8. The protracted popular war strategy has both a political wing and a military wing. This strategy requires a high level of organization and indoctrination and leadership to direct the shifting of phases according to circumstances. In all the variations of this strategy, certain characteristics tend to stand out as actions occur concurrently, such as:

- Gain and maintain the active or passive support of the regional population.
- Produce leaders with the resolve to conduct irregular warfare to accomplish aims.
- Infiltrate governmental offices, military and paramilitary forces, and public safety organizations.
- Promote an ideology in concert with a political cadre.
- Develop guerrilla warfare capabilities with paramilitary forces and auxiliary activities.
- Be flexible to adapting operational phases with an expectation of protracted conflict.
- Display patience in progressive and continuous operations and attacks against the government in conflict with the insurgency.

### PHASE ONE

3-9. Phase I, sometimes referred to as incipient or latent insurgency, equates to strategic defense. Gaining substance and legitimacy is the primary goal during this phase. Insurgents must obtain, preserve and consolidate resources. Psychological aspects such as propaganda, creating incidents that can be shaped into grievances, sabotage, and supporting low levels of public resistance to security services and government institutions can entice the civilian base to passively and then actively support the irregular forces. The enemy may not recognize the threat posed by the irregular forces in this phase of conflict. Insurgents actively but carefully recruit, establish civic and even political organizations in the populace, gain popular support, and conduct limited intelligence collection against the government or enemy. While the insurgent organization recruits during this phase, internal security is the primary concern. Thus, recruits are carefully screened to prevent possible government infiltration. Other activities conducted during phase one includes demonstrations, labor strikes, recruiting, guerrilla training, and infiltration of government and other organizations. Information warfare initiatives are also initiated, such as the establishment of Internet websites, operation of radio stations, sponsorship of cultural events and organizations, and widespread use of posters and graffiti.

3-10. The first phase of an insurgency tends to begin with the government having stronger forces than the insurgents. As a result, insurgents often must concentrate on survival and building support. Insurgent efforts may include:

- Establish and expand the organization.
- Indoctrinate the ideology through information operations.
- Incite antigovernment activity such as demonstrations and strikes.
- Raise funds through illegal taxation and criminal activities.

- Organize local irregular forces that conduct small-scale operations.
- Sabotage governmental and population area infrastructure.
- Intimidate uncooperative government officials and members of the population.
- Terrorize selected targets uncooperative to the irregular warfare aims.
- Initiate a nucleus of leaders for an eventual counter-state organization for political action.

## PHASE TWO

3-11. Phase II, or guerrilla warfare, occurs when the insurgents have developed sufficient organization, leadership, resources, and internal or external support, and logistics support. This phase displays organized warfare against the enemy. During phase II, the enemy and the insurgency are at a strategic stalemate. The government acknowledges the organization's existence and attempts to eliminate it. The irregular force's goal is to discredit the government and conduct a protracted effort to isolate and alienate the people from the government while preventing the government from exercising its authority and power. The basic strategy is to force the government to overextend government capabilities. A supporting aim is to force the government and its allies into mistakes and abuses which can alienate the population from the government. Irregular forces continue to degrade the government's legitimacy while continuing to build its popularity with the populace.

3-12. Expansion into more aggressive acts requires the formation of local military-type elements to engage in warfare. The leadership element stays hidden. Full-time leaders coordinate the activities of the part-time and full-time members at the local and regional command levels in rural and urban environments. Small units conduct raids and ambushes against a wide variety of political, economic, and military targets. Tactics are employed that allow the irregular forces to avoid decisive engagement. The objective is to reinforce the idea that the government is incapable of protecting and providing for the population. Meanwhile, the insurgent organization expands civic-action programs to highlight its own capabilities. Logisticians expand internal and external support mechanisms, sanctuaries, and facilities for materiel support. Finance personnel begin to establish internal and external funding and funds management mechanisms. Similarly, skilled information warfare operators appeal to the international community through the media for political and logistics support. Diplomatic representation is established, and the irregular force seeks overt or covert support from abroad.

3-13. The second phase of an insurgency starts when force correlations approach equilibrium and irregular conflict and guerrilla actions emerge as a pervasive activity. Irregular force efforts may include:

- Increase capability and frequency of attacks in attempts to force government forces into a defensive posture.
- Increase use of sabotage.
- Increase use of terrorism against selective targets.
- Intensify propaganda.
- Demonstrate assistance to population needs in social, medical, and as required by circumstances, religious support.
- Gain control of isolated geographic areas.
- Develop bases for further training, staging, and operational support.
- Establish local political structure to be clandestine control or governmental approach.
- Increase strategic communications to obtain regional and international support.
- Increase strategic communications toward national and international recognition as legitimate authority and governance.

## PHASE THREE

3-14. In Phase III, known as a war of movement or conventional war, an insurgency is on the strategic offensive. Long-term goals, such as overthrowing the government or establishing a separate country, have primacy in this phase. A portion of the irregular force organization may take on a more formalized military structure and engage enemy forces in major conventional military actions, while other irregular forces with fewer capabilities continue guerrilla actions.

3-15. The size and duration of actions depend on the level of development of the insurgent organization. Large-scale irregular force units attempt to destroy the government's military forces while small specialized irregular cells conduct attacks against strategic targets such as the enemy leadership or critical infrastructure. Riots and acts of sabotage characterize support of force-on-force operations. The military-type organizations sustain combat activities with well-developed logistics and communications systems. They continue the tactics employed in phases I and II.

3-16. The third phase of an insurgency normally begins when insurgents believe they have superior strength and their military forces attempt conventional operations to destroy the government's military capability. Irregular force efforts may include:

- Combine irregular force groups into larger organizations for training in larger scale operations.
- Conduct conventional-like operations when conditions are suitable to the irregular force. Acquire more powerful and sophisticated weapon systems and support through clandestine or discrete assistance.
- Obtain training and technical support from external military forces for irregular or conventional-like operations.
- Expand geographic areas of physical control, expand support bases, and increase political activity.
- Replace the government with their own political network that had developed from early stages of an irregular force counterstate organization.

## COMPRESSED PHASES

3-17. There is often no clear distinction between the three phases of an insurgency. Insurgent groups may not transition through all of the three phases. If the leadership of large elements of trained military forces of the government converts to the insurgent cause and these armed forces are known to be personally loyal to the insurgency, the insurgents may have the necessary strength to intimidate or challenge the remaining government forces in a force-on-force battle. The insurgent organization may also incorporate existing ethnic-based militias or obtain the services of contract or volunteer forces. Similarly, an organization may train a well-equipped force in a foreign or internal sanctuary and thus move quickly into phase two or three. Furthermore, an insurgency may have elements operating within all three phases simultaneously in different parts of the country.

3-18. An enemy's perception of and reaction to the level of insurgency will be influenced by the type of threat in a particular area. A contrast in examples is a political rally versus force-on-force operations. The strength and resolve of the government, the degree of support at local levels, the organizational development of the insurgent group, and the external factors all influence the capability of the insurgency.

## URBAN FOCUSED CONFLICT

3-19. The urban-focus conflict features small cells employing terror tactics within one or more urban areas to exploit the ability to merge into the mass population. This vulnerable environment for infiltration of the irregular cells counters this by often relying on familial, social, or religious affiliation and allegiance. A distinctive nature of this strategy is to turn a political issue crisis into an armed conflict. Conducting violent

acts intends to force the government military, internal security forces, and law enforcement to overreact and alienate the population's support. The government's lack of ability to restore security and government overreaction will eventually turn the masses away from the government. An urban insurgency typically follows five phases.

3-20. This strategy can be initiated without popular support. Its success relies heavily on a gradual or spontaneous uprising sparked by rage at government oppression and inability to provide security to its citizens. In the 1950s, the National Liberation Front in Algeria used an urban strategy when they launched a series of bombings and attacks that caused significant civilian casualties, reprisals by French forces, and conditions that led to negotiations. The urban strategy actions are often predictable and possess these characteristics:

- Irregular forces often use terrorist attacks, which they hope are highly visible and produce high casualties. Their true intention may be primarily to cause fear or terror and to provoke the government forces into overreaction.
- Propaganda tends to focus on government brutality and calls attention to specific harsh government actions such as massacres, torture of political prisoners, disappearances of individuals, and brutal responses to peaceful demonstrations.
- Political organization is minimal with no sustained effort to indoctrinate political cadre or the masses.
- Irregular forces make little or no effort to subvert the government from within; however, infiltration of host nation government and security forces is still possible.
- Chaos and multiple small cell attacks intend to intimidate and eventually portray military and law enforcement activities as ineffective.

### **PHASE ONE**

3-21. The first phase is characterized by an active information campaign emphasizing economic or political repression by the government. In their propaganda, the insurgents include threats of violence against targets symbolic of government repression.

### **PHASE TWO**

3-22. In the second phase, the insurgent group organizes. It begins recruiting, establishes a cellular structure, and initiates infiltration of the government. Then, it develops control over areas of a large urban area by demonstrating its power through selective acts of terror and sabotage.

### **PHASE THREE**

3-23. In phase three, the insurgency attempts to control the daily urban environment, neighborhoods, or larger urban regions by targeting government security and public safety forces, and demoralizing the government through intimidation. The insurgent organization begins providing an alternative form of governance and social-economic services support to segments of the population.

### **PHASE FOUR**

3-24. The fourth phase of an urban insurgency is the mobilization of the masses. The urban insurgents attempt to provoke the government into arbitrary and indiscriminate reprisals, such as martial law, suspension of civil liberties, and mass arrests. Insurgents exploit the governmental reactions to undermine the legitimacy of the government, and further unite the people into active opposition and participation. Popular discontent shows itself in labor strikes, marches, and rioting organized by overt insurgents.

### **PHASE FIVE**

3-25. The fifth and final phase is characterized by the urban uprising. Terror tactics and widespread mass demonstrations and rioting combine to cause large-scale defections from security forces. This can produce political collapse and a power vacuum, creating opportunity for the insurgents to seize control and power.

In the urban strategy, the insurgents attack government targets with the intention of causing government forces to overreact against the population. The insurgents want the government's repressive measures to enrage the people so they will rise up, support the insurgency and overthrow the government.

## MILITARY FOCUSED CONFLICT

3-26. The military-focus strategy differs from the strategy of protracted popular war in the importance of popular support. No attempt is made to mobilize the population. This strategy assumes that popular support either already exists or will exist. A weak government may encourage irregular forces to adopt this strategy, which is not as time dependent as the protracted strategy. Proponents of this method believe that a small, elite group can conduct raids, ambushes, and terror activities that will cause the government to collapse. Leaders of this form of insurgency assert that an insurrection itself can create the conditions needed to overthrow a government. They often believe that a small group of guerrillas operating in a rural environment can eventually gather enough support to achieve their aims. This *focoist* approach was used by Che Guevara in South American incursions into sovereign states. In contrast, some secessionist insurgencies have relied on major paramilitary or conventional forces to try to secure their aims.

3-27. Military-focused insurgencies may initially have little or no political structure; they may spread their control through movement and maneuver of combat forces rather than political subversion. Other military-focused insurgencies may attempt to politicize controlled areas. Irregular forces will use varying levels of coercion, indoctrination, direct military control of civil institutions, and martial law to solidify their position. Political subversion in areas outside of those under insurgent military control remains infrequent. With each victory, the insurgency gains additional popular support, leading to its leadership's replacing the government leadership. Because this strategy occurs over a relatively short period, the insurgent leadership develops a concept and an organizational structure for a political system that it can implement once it topples the government.

3-28. The military-focused conflict uses military action to create the conditions needed for success. The success of this small group depends upon successful military action and popular uprising. Military-focused conflict actions include:

- Attack specific targets to gain popular support.
- Use propaganda in conjunction with military operations to incite people to join the insurgency and military actions.
- Disrupt governmental political programs.
- Sabotage social infrastructure to weaken political authority.
- Demoralize governmental military and internal security forces.
- Displace political control of selected leaders, areas, and functions.
- Replace political control and recognized authority of former government.

## CONSPIRATORIAL FOCUSED CONFLICT

3-29. A conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders and a militant cadre or activist party seizing control of government structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation. Such insurgents remain secretive as long as possible. They emerge only when success can be achieved quickly. This approach usually involves creating a small, secretive, vanguard party or force. Insurgents who use this approach successfully may also overtly or covertly assimilate elements of government security forces. Clandestine operations generate mass support to seizing power. Support external to the state may be necessary to promulgate a successful sudden attack with overwhelming force at the onset of the conspiracy.

3-30. The conspiratorial strategy attempts to subvert the government from within and often involves a few leaders and a militant cadre. Although subversive activities may take place in other strategies, particularly in

the protracted popular war or urban strategies, conspiratorial strategies often attempt to have its illegal political party become a legitimate political party, enter the government infrastructure and then take control of the government. Insurgents using the conspiratorial strategy do not intend to integrate into the national government, but to overthrow the government. Once the insurgency succeeds in gaining legitimate political representation, newly legitimized politicians who may have been previously targeted by counterinsurgents, must be re-evaluated to see if they are still legitimate targets. In the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik Party actively worked to break the existing government and regime while being positioned to serve in the existing governmental administration. Distinguishing characteristics of this type conflict include:

- Insurgent meet with host nation government to discuss ceasefires.
- Attacks on infrastructure wear down and reduce the credibility of government.
- Political cadre distance themselves from the insurgency by making public statements denouncing violence.
- Identify government key leaders to acts of graft and corruption.
- Embed operatives in the intelligence services of the host government.
- Foment dissatisfaction by government law enforcement agencies at local and regional locations.
- Coerce internal security and border constabulary forces to allow safe passage lanes across regional and national boundaries.
- Manipulate regional news reporting institutions to criticize government programs.
- Indicate a breach between militant and political elements of the insurgency, real or ruse, may be publicized to garner support of a wider population base.
- Form new alliances with groups that may seem to have little in common with the insurgency or its ideology.
- Reduce or halt guerrilla activity with an increase in political activity.
- Promote intensive efforts to gain international moral and political support.
- Use sophisticated propaganda aimed at specific target audiences.
- Introduce political wing entry into politics, including election to local, district, departmental, regional, or national offices.

## **SPECIAL ISSUE CONFLICT**

3-31. The special issue conflict mobilizes support based with common identity of religion, clan, tribe, or ethnic group. Legitimacy within a region can build on self-identity. External support is garnered from international elements of the same identity. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil Tigers fought a long-term insurgency against the government with the intent to establish an ethnic Tamil state and received significant materiel support from sympathetic sources external to the land-sea-air area of operation. Contemporary characteristics of the identity-focused strategy include:

- Attacks on those who threaten the traditions and social structure of the identity.
- Minimal requirement to form a shadow government when a form of group governance already exists.
- Mass base easily aligns with common identity objectives.

3-32. Conflict can use protracted conflict waged by independent cells or loosely affiliated cells that require little or no popular support. As societies have become more interconnected and networks more sophisticated, this approach can be an expedient until group dynamics stress and fracture existing social and political structures.

3-33. Irregular forces may not have a dual military and political hierarchy evident in other protracted popular approaches. Rather, communities often join the movement as a whole, bringing with them their existing social and possible paramilitary or militia. Loosely affiliated coalitions can be formed temporarily among special interest groups.



Figure 3-2. Urban Warfare


## SECTION II - OPERATIONAL REACH

### DOMESTIC – NATIONAL INFLUENCE

3-34. These irregular forces are local or national in scope and end state. These forces do not gain any substantive external support from outside a locale or region. Some irregular forces are localized with a larger geographic operational area that remains generally within identified boundaries of a government or state. These irregular forces receive external support from other actors with operations focused in a localized context. External support may come from diverse sources and may be either overt or covert.

### INTERNATIONAL – REGIONAL INFLUENCE

3-35. These irregular forces concentrate operations in a geographic area but readily cross state borders to operate internationally. Support arrives from a global perspective while applying resources in an international region. For example, some insurgencies use subversion and violence in a localized area while using information operations (IO) for a regional or global impact. These IO often originate from a site geographically separate from the area where the insurgency operates.



### Figure 3-3. Operational Reach

3-36. The support network of this type of insurgency may be global in scope, especially when there is a sympathetic diaspora or émigré population. Operations of this nature can be found in multiple states, which adds to the difficulty of effectively dealing with them in a coherent fashion. An example of this type of insurgency was the Liberation Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE). Their efforts focused on one island while their support came from an international network of fiscal and materiel support. A large support structure exists even after the defeat of Tamil Tiger military forces. Another example is al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM). A regional terrorist group claims affiliation with a transnational terrorist group as it pursues regional aims. Although some support may come from outside the region, this conflict is focused in a regional perspective.

## TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCE

3-37. Irregular forces with transnational affiliation will have a radical end state to force major change in the world. Capabilities demonstrate political, economic, and social impacts affecting worldwide perspective. Operations may cause change in prioritized regions with an intention to expand influence and control over other areas in a protracted timeline. Global insurgencies actively use regional grievances to encourage affiliation and coalition with diverse smaller forces and regional insurgencies.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Transnational Threat</b></p> <p>Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States national security interests.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JP 3-26</p>
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3-38. Some insurgencies attempt to leverage religious extremism or ideological identity to create and support a transnational array of insurgencies. The propaganda of al-Qa'ida is one example of such extremism in media marketing and ideology.

## SECTION III - OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF ADVERSARY

3-39. In assessing operational circumstances and opportunities, irregular forces may assess vulnerabilities of U.S. military forces in one of three environments: deployed forces, in-transit forces to or from an operational mission, or institutional forces that by organizational activity operate from a fixed location or semi-permanent facility and do not normally deploy in order to conduct their mission or mission support.

## DEPLOYED FORCES

3-40. Operating forces are deployed U.S. military forces and individuals operating away from their permanent locations on either operational missions or training exercises. This category includes programmed unit rotations into combat areas of operation, stability missions, civil support operations, or training assistance to foreign military forces or government programs.



**Figure 3-4. Soldiers on Patrol: Afghanistan**

3-41. Deployed forces apply to all individual assignments in overseas locations such as military attachés, military members and family members, USG employees, or contractors. Vulnerabilities have usually been exploited in the daily routines of an intended target. Attack sites will often be near or at place of residence, a work location, or the routes between these locations.

## IN-TRANSIT FORCES

3-42. In-transit forces are either preparing for or processing in a deployment and redeployment phase of an operational mission. This includes active component units within the U.S. or positioned overseas, and reserve component units identified for operations, mobilization, or demobilization. Examples include a brigade combat team deploying from a U.S. installation in the Homeland, an Army National Guard unit returning from an operational mission in Iraq, or an Army Reserve unit deploying to Afghanistan.

3-43. The locale of an attack on in-transit forces can overlap with the geographic area of deployed forces and institutional forces. Examples include an aerial port of debarkation in an operational area of operations, or an intermediate staging area as military forces marshal for entry into an area of operations.



**Figure 3-5. In-Transit Movements**

## INSTITUTIONAL FORCES

3-44. Generating forces are located at active and reserve component garrisons, training and logistics facilities, and other activities or installations that do not deploy to accomplish their organizational mission.

Examples are an activity such as a provost marshal office assigned to an installation garrison or an institutional organization such as a research and development facility.



Figure 3-6. Operational Circumstances of Adversary

3-45. Institutional forces may confront foreign, foreign inspired, or domestic threats. Examples include the plot to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey (2007), and the attack on soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas (2009).

## SECTION IV - REASONS FOR TARGETING MILITARY FORCES

3-46. Why attack military forces? Large numbers of military forces located in varied areas of the world make military members a lucrative target. Whether terrorism comes from an individual with a single issue concern or a terrorist organization with global reach, many factors are considered in target selection, vulnerability analysis, and risk management before attacking a target. With the variety of terrorist motivations and goals, the reasons to target military forces or individuals are equally varied. Several most common rationales are as follows:

### DETERMINE TARGET ACCESSIBILITY

3-47. Presence of military members, units, and activities in large numbers makes an inviting target. Presence of U.S. forces in some regions of the world may offend particular political or religious sensibilities and can be presented as a justification for terrorist attack.

3-48. For example, during the 1970s to 1990s U.S. military installations and personnel were frequently targeted by anti-NATO European terrorists or state sponsored terrorists acting on behalf of a number of regimes. These attacks generally struck at military targets that were not engaged in hostilities but were accessible to terrorists of the geographic region. Today, the expansive presence of U.S. military forces is clearly evident in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, and many other regions of the world due to political and economic factors as a global superpower.

## DEPRECIATE SYMBOLIC VALUE

3-49. Commitment of military forces is a significant indicator of national interest and carries major political consequences. The targeting military forces can often achieve a greater notoriety for terrorists than targeting civilian targets such as diplomats, commercial businessmen, or government officials and public facilities.

3-50. An example of successful terrorist attack is the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia. To Islamic fundamentalists, the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia was considered offensive. In June of 1996, a housing and general complex for coalition forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was attacked with a large truck bomb. The Khobar Towers attack killed nineteen U.S. military members, wounded about 400 other U.S. military members, and demonstrated a terrorist ability to back up threats with destructive action. A large number of local civilian casualties occurred also in the immediate area of the bomb detonation. Members of Saudi Hizballah, a terrorist organization associated with Lebanese Hizballah, and an unnamed Iranian were indicted by the U.S. Department of Justice for this act of terrorism. Soon after this attack, terrorists announced that all U.S. forces must be withdrawn or suffer further attacks. Terrorists could claim they caused U.S. military forces to relocate from this urban setting to remote locations in Saudi Arabia.

## DEMONSTRATE ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITY

3-51. Terrorist action that demonstrates the capability to negate U.S. military operations security and force protection can promote individual terrorist or organizational terrorist agendas when they attack U.S. military forces.

3-52. Senior military officials are often a target. In the 1970s and 1980s, The Red Army Faction (RAF) conducted numerous terrorist activities against military presence in Germany and countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Shifting from original goals for a complete revolution of German society, the RAF concentrated much of their capabilities on a campaign to reduce NATO and U.S. military presence in Germany as a way to possibly build a more sympathetic understanding for societal change in Germany. In 1979, the RAF attempted to assassinate General Alexander Haig, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and NATO. RAF surveillance confirmed that a road near Casteau, Belgium was used frequently by General Haig. A remotely controlled bomb placed in a culvert of the road had a detonator, nine-volt batteries, and a household switch with wire camouflaged by earth and grass. The blast lifted the general's car into the air, damaged an accompanying security vehicle, and injured three guards. General Haig was physically unharmed.

### Targeting Considerations versus an Adversary

- ◆ Determine Target Accessibility
- ◆ Depreciate Symbolic Value
- ◆ Degrade Psychological Stamina
- ◆ Disrupt Critical Infrastructure
- ◆ Delay or Prevent Movement-Maneuver
- ◆ Decrease Operational Capabilities
- ◆ Discredit Host Nation or U.S. Policy

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*Note.* See Chapter 3 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of the Khobar Towers VBIED bombing.

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**Figure 3-7. Saudi Hizballah: Khobar Towers Bombing (1996)**

3-53. Penetrating U.S. facilities and locations deemed secure can aim to cause a large number of casualties and increase the requirements for additional security forces and protection measures. An example is the individual terrorist suicide bombing of a military dining facility in Mosul, Iraq in 2004. An individual was able to gain entry past security stations and detonated a suicide vest bomb in a group of U.S. military members and civilian workers eating a meal in a large military tent. Fourteen U.S. soldiers were killed. Several American civilian contractors and Iraqi security soldiers were killed also in the blast. Many other occupants were wounded by the explosion and ball bearings used as part of the suicide vest bomb.

## **DELAY OR PREVENT MOVEMENTS-MANEUVER**

3-54. During Operation Desert Shield, Saddam Hussein called for terrorist activity to be directed against the countries of the coalition preparing for operations in Iraq. Attacks conducted by indigenous terrorist groups Dev Sol and 17 November occurred against U.S. staging areas in Turkey and Greece. Iraq may have supported these overseas attacks with weapons components delivered via diplomatic pouch and other assistance. Although Saddam Hussein did not have the influence to convince or compel a larger Middle East surge in terrorism, terrorist activities in general did increase during the period of the air campaign and subsequent invasion of Iraq. Due to extensive counterterrorism efforts and international coordination, the overall effort to disrupt coalition deployments was ineffective.

3-55. During Operation Desert Shield and preparations for the liberation of Kuwait, Iraq conducted a large scale hostage taking crisis. They seized Kuwaiti citizens and hundreds of foreigners resident in Iraq and exploited them in the media as human shields. In one instance, about 350 passengers on a British Airways flight were held captive as the airplane attempted a refueling stop in Kuwait. Most of the United Kingdom hostages and other UK citizens were released before the initiation of Operation Desert Storm.

3-56. Disruption of transportation may take place by sabotage or direct attack upon the unit being transported and its mode of transportation. Methods of attack would be selected depending upon the mode of unit transport. Air, rail and sea are normal modes of transport for long voyages or distances, but may also be motor transportation means such as buses or organic unit vehicles to move to a destination. Weapons likely to be employed include bombs, antitank rockets, rocket propelled grenades, and small arms gunfire. In some cases, sophisticated shoulder fired missiles could be used. Sabotage may be designed to produce maximum casualties in the ensuing crash, derailment, or fire. In January 2003, intelligence sources detected the targeting of chartered aircraft participating in the buildup of forces against Iraq.

3-57. Destroying facilities such as docks, airfields, refueling facilities, and cargo terminals at intermediate stops or at the final destination is another way for terrorists to prevent or delay deployment. Attacking critical private infrastructure through physical and cyber means could cause similar effects. Adding depth to a conflict does not necessarily require the projection of physical terrorist assets and weapons into more distant countries. If timed to coincide with the arrival or departure of military units, such destructive attacks could cause significant casualties. In 1975, the *Montoneras* terrorists in Argentina advanced from individual terrorist acts to paramilitary guerrilla operations and achieved significant physical and psychological effects to Argentine military forces using this technique. Placing explosives in an abandoned tunnel underneath an airfield runway, the bomb was detonated as a C-130 aircraft carrying an antiguerrilla unit was starting its departure. The C-130 was destroyed resulting in four killed and forty injured, as well as damaging the runway. This was a psychological blow to the Army's image with its nation.

## DECREASE ADVERSARY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

3-58. Terrorists may target U.S. military forces to reduce or remove a specific capability or impair effectiveness. The intent would be to cause additional employment of military forces and further stress finite unit and soldier assets weaken morale. A likely method of attack would be a small to medium size improvised explosive device (IED) or mortar-rocket attacks.

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*Note.* See Chapter 4 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of the 2000 USS *Cole* bombing. Also, in August 2005, katyusha rockets were fired at and landed near the USS *Ashland* and USS *Kearsarge* while docked at Aqaba, Jordan. No U.S. casualties or ship damage occurred in the 2005 attacks, but the attack caused immediate changes in the planned activities and location of these ships.

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3-59. The suicide boat bombing of the USS *Cole* in 2000 occurred while the ship was moored at a refueling point in Aden, Yemen. Terrorists exploited access control measures and perimeter security vulnerabilities of approaches to the ship. The result, besides the international media attention, killed 17 U.S. sailors and wounded 42 crewmembers. The explosion caused extensive damage to the ship.

3-60. Terrorists may seek to seize U.S. military members as prisoners and exploit them for media attention or a military reaction by U.S. forces. A May 2007 raid on a U.S. military observation post near Mahmoudiya, Iraq killed four U.S. soldiers and one Iraqi interpreter. Three missing U.S. soldiers were presumed to be captured. Media reports stated about ten individuals attacked the two U.S. crews and their vehicles during limited visibility with small arms gunfire and grenades. Before departing the area, the terrorists belonging to an al-Qaida affiliated cell used IEDs to slow any U.S. response force into the attack site. Subsequent search missions for the missing U.S. soldiers reduced available U.S. forces planned for other military operations.

3-61. In more recent military operations, during the preparation for and conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom, threat of terrorist attacks may have contributed to decisions by Turkey that significantly limited U.S. use of Turkish territory, facilities, and materiel.

3-62. A terrorist cell with a rudimentary biological weapons capability could have the potential to infect enough of a unit with a debilitating or contagious disease. Quarantine and other medical treatment would delay a planned deployment sequence. Additionally, terrorist capability and suspected or known intention to use biological weapons against U.S. military forces could cause extraordinary processes for vaccination of U.S. military forces. These additional preventive medicine and safety issues could complicate deployment timeframes for U.S. military forces.

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*Note.* See Chapter 1 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of the 1995 sarin chemical agent attacks in the Tokyo subway system. Acquisition and use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material and weapons by terrorists is a significant concern. See Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.04, *Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment* published in 2007 for a discussion of this threat to U.S. military forces.

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## DEGRADE SOCIAL STABILITY

3-63. Terrorists prefer an environment that is chaotic. A fluid, poorly policed or uncontrolled situation often permits normally suspicious activities to go unnoticed. However, hostile environments can place military forces at heightened levels of security, reduce the opportunities to get close to targets without being challenged or detained, and increase the difficulty of achieving any degree of operational surprise.

3-64. Attacks on personnel at social gatherings can occur at clubs on military installations or during unit functions at private homes or commercial establishments off post. Traditional observances of organizational days, town hall meetings, and family support briefings are often publicized in advance and give attackers planning dates for possible gatherings in accessible locations. Attacks at commercial entertainment establishments such as bars, clubs and restaurants could be targeted because the density or presence of military personnel. The most likely attack method will be a small to large sized IED, although terrorists could employ other means such as improvised mortars or other weapons from a standoff distance.

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*Note.* See Chapter 6 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of the 2004 Beslan (Russia) hostage crisis and mass murder.

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3-65. In some cases urban terrain favors the terrorist in accomplishing these ends. Cities provide the terrorist with a population to conceal personnel, structures and facilities to hide and store equipment or weapons, and transportation nodes for ease of movement. Terrorists may use the advantages of surprise and security by hiding within a population. Sometimes terrorists may forego specific terror activities and operate as guerrillas in areas of active combat operations. They can also operate as an affiliated element of an insurgency force in combat operations.

## DISRUPT ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

3-66. Terrorist incidents indicate the potential for disrupting deployments or materiel in transit. The tensions of political, environmental, and economic impacts due to threat or attack add to the specific damage or destruction of an incident. The terrorist suicide boat bombing in 2002 of the French tanker ship *Limburg* near Ash Shihr and east of Aden, Yemen spilled 90,000 barrels of oil into the ocean and contaminated 45 miles of coastline. One immediate economic impact of this small boat attack on the *Limburg* was a maritime insurance increase in rates that tripled in the Yemeni area.

3-67. Vulnerable links in economic chains can include disruption or destruction of critical access means of transportation. Damaging multiple bridges or under-river tunnels could isolate a major metropolitan area. Blocking a major intra-coastal waterway could stop major commerce routes. Contaminating a major transfer site of conveyances such as a seaport or major railroad yard complex would slow normal delivery schedules. The 2007 attack of the Glasgow, Scotland airport, even though the attack was a rudimentary car bomb, caused major temporary disruptions of airflow to and from the region.

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Note: See Chapter 5 of U.S. Army TRADOC DCSINT Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of the 7 July 2005 subway and bus bombings in London, United Kingdom.

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## DISCREDIT U.S. POLICY

3-68. Terrorists can attack U.S. military forces with the intent to force a change in U.S. policy. Hizballah and Syrian sponsors were concerned that the deployment of international peacekeeping forces into Lebanon in the spring of 1983 would reduce their freedom of action in the ongoing Lebanese Civil War. Suicide truck bomb attacks on the U.S. Marine Corps and French Army barracks in October of 1983 killed over 240 U.S. Marines and over 50 French soldiers. Combined with an earlier bombing campaign against the embassies of the U.S. and other countries, these attacks resulted in the withdrawal of the international military forces.

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*Note.* See Chapter 2 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, for a case study of an act of U.S. domestic terrorism in the 1995 Murrah Federal Building bombing.

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3-69. The desire to discredit U.S. Federal, state, and local governments can result in military members, units, or infrastructure being targeted by domestic terror groups. For example, during the Vietnam War extremist groups targeted U.S. Army cadet (ROTC) detachments at civilian colleges and universities, draft board offices, and university facilities involved in military research. During the same period, the Weather Underground targeted recruiting offices and facilities linked to the military. In contemporary times, terrorists operating in foreign nations attempt similar influence with threats against U.S. military members or U.S. tourists in locations such as Germany. In 2007, several Islamic extremist organizations threatened violence unless Germany withdrew its contingent from the NATO force in Afghanistan.

## SUMMARY

3-70. This chapter presented an appreciation of the human dimension and the variables of the operational environment. An overview of strategies displayed varied means from a threats perspective on situational understanding of the complex operational environment. A group of accelerators create conditions in which irregular warfare can thrive. Operational reach of an irregular force may be limited to a regional area, or may impact on transnational associations. Irregular forces identify vulnerabilities in the cyclic flow of enemy military units in a region. Practical objectives to combat U.S. military forces and degrade visible or perceived U.S. national power are to attack military personnel and materiel while in-transit, deployed, or when positioned in home stations or institutional settings. A constant analysis of vulnerabilities seeks to disrupt enemy movement and maneuver timetables; attack and penetrate enemy defenses and sustainment locations; and, defeat U.S. forces at the tactical level in an uncertain and complex operational environment.

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
## Chapter 4

# Irregular forces Organizational Models

*We [U.S Army] are facing an era of persistent conflict where the character of conflict is more likely to feature hybrid threats – diverse and dynamic combinations of two or more regular forces, irregular forces (either conventional or unconventional), criminal elements, or terrorist cells that are distinctly different in nature, but unified in purpose or effect, employed to counter our strengths.*

U.S. Army Training Strategy (ATS) 12 November 2009

This chapter presents characteristics of organization that can be used to configure irregular forces by the ways and means that a particular group operates. Organizational form builds from the individual actor and cell. Structure of a cell can expand in size, form, and capability as either a hierarchy or network. Hierarchy is linear in structure and flows with familiar links of command and control and operations. A network is often asymmetric and can portray unexpected proportion or interconnectedness in its command and control. Both of these structures can operate at varied levels of centralized or decentralized command, and use sophisticated or simple control and information measures. An irregular force can be an armed unit of significant military composition and capability or be an independent individual.



**Figure 4-1. Irregular Force: Hierarchy or Network Organizational Variants**

4-1. The U.S. Army unit commander plans and conducts his training to improve readiness and sustain training to standards once achieved. To properly plan for mission success against a known enemy or an adversary, the unit commander analyzes and understands the general form and function of the opponent.

4-2. Basic models of hierarchical or networked organization emerge. The model adds the level of external support systems as information is collected, analyzed, and developed into useable intelligence for a mission. These support systems may be overt assistance from a global consortium with fiscal accounts, materiel logistics, and worldwide media access to the localized surveillance and reporting from civilians in an area of operations.

4-3. A training model adapts to the requirements of a particular threat and the expected degree of proficiency and sophistication or simplicity in the means available to the enemy or adversary. In this sense, an enemy is known and an adversary is a force having the potential to become an enemy within a unit mission set.

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*Note.* The irregular force models provide the flexibility for a U.S. unit commander to adapt a constructive tool to create the specific training conditions required. A generic irregular model in this chapter displays a wide range of capabilities that can be tailored in accordance with a commander's analysis and visualization of his mission. The details of specific cells and organizational capabilities are illustrated with several examples extracted from Army Field Manual 7-100.4, *OPFOR Organization Guide*, and its complementary volumes of organizational data and equipment. This field manual will be revised and transition to TC 7-100.4.

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## SECTION I - ORGANIZATIONAL FORM AND FUNCTION

4-4. Organizational form and functions can display sequential direction and conduct, multi-nodal and nearly simultaneous interconnectivity, affiliated confederations, or independent actions. Irregular forces can comprise several echelons of participation: senior and operational leaders, cadre and operators, active supporters, and passive supporters. Another element of irregular influence could be the psychological coercion on an unaffiliated populace. Sponsorship of irregular forces is state-sponsored or state-directed, state-supported, or non-state supported. Irregular forces attempt to optimize sanctuary in which to prepare and from which to conduct irregular warfare. These physical or propaganda havens can be provided by political, military, ideological, financial-economic, or populist-social sponsors.

4-5. A terrorist organization's structure, membership, resources, and security determine its capabilities and operational reach. Knowledge of current and emergent models of terrorist organization improves an understanding and situational awareness of terrorism in a contemporary operational environment.

4-6. Popular images of a terrorist group sometimes suggest operating in accordance with a specific political agenda and motivated by ideology or the desire for ethnic or national liberation dominated traditional appreciation of terrorism. While true of some terrorist organizations, this image is not universally valid. Terrorism threats range al-Qa'ida and affiliated cells with regional, international, or transnational reach to domestic hate groups and self-radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists with single issue agendas and finite capabilities.

4-7. What is one of the most significant adaptations in terrorist organization? "Perhaps the most fundamental shift rests in the enemy's downsizing. We [U.S. Army] will not see large al-Qa'ida armies. Rather, we [U.S. Army] will increasingly face enemy forces in small teams or even individuals. From an operational perspective, these are 'micro-targets with macro-impact' operating in the global exchange of people, data, and ideas. The enemy, their tradecraft, their tactics, their weapons, and their battlefield, our battlefield -- all evolve at the pace of globalization itself. We are facing the future

### Organizational Models

◆ Hierarchy

◆ Network

of war today. The ongoing debate, sometimes disagreement, among allies reflects this new reality, this new way of war.”

4-8. Contemporary groups tend to organize or adapt to opportunities available in the network model. Other variants professing an ideology can have more defined effects on internal organization. Leninist or Maoist groups can tend towards centralized control and hierarchical structure. Terrorist groups that are associated with a political activity or organization will often require a more hierarchical structure, in order to coordinate deliberate terrorist violence in conjunction with political action. Examples include observing cease-fire agreements or avoiding particular targets in support of political objectives.

4-9. However, al-Qa’ida presents an example that has evolved from a hierarchical organization to branches with a more networked organization. Aspects of hierarchy still exist in senior leaders, cadre for functional coordination, and dedicated sub-groups of terrorism. Current patterns display an increasing use of loosely affiliated networks that plan and act on generalized guidance on waging terror. Individuals with minimal or no direct connection to al-Qa’ida may take their inspiration for terrorism from ideological statements of senior al-Qa’ida leaders.

4-10. Presenting any generalized organizational structure can be problematic. Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development or decay in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Change in terrorist leadership, whether through generational transition or in response to enhanced security operations, may signal significant adjustments to organizational priorities and available means to conduct terrorism. Groups professing or associated with ethnic or nationalist agendas and limiting their operations to one country or a localized region tend to require fewer capabilities. Larger groups can emerge from smaller organizations, or smaller groups can splinter off from larger organizations. Organizational method is situation dependent on specific circumstances of an operational environment during specified periods of time or events.

## **CELLULAR FOUNDATION**


4-11. The cell is the smallest element at the tactical level of terrorist organization. Individuals, usually three to ten people, comprise a cell and act as the basic tactical component for a terrorist organization. A cell could be a lone individual. One of the primary reasons for a cellular configuration is security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells. Compartmenting functions within organizational structure makes it difficult to penetrate the entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and cannot provide sensitive information to infiltrators or captors.

4-12. Irregular forces may organize cells based on family or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action or intelligence. The terrorist group may also form multifunctional cells. Cell members remain in close contact with each other, given allowance and guidance by a directing authority, in order to provide motivational support and enhance security procedures. The cell leader is normally the only person who communicates and coordinates with higher levels and other cells. A terrorist group may form only one cell or may form several cells that operate in local or regional areas, across national borders, or among several countries in transnational operations.

4-13. Two basic methods define organizational structure of an irregular force model. These methods are hierarchical and networked models. A terrorist group may also employ either type or a combination of the two models.

## **HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE**

4-14. Hierarchical structure organizations are those that have a well-defined vertical chain of command, control, and responsibility. Data and intelligence flows up and down organizational channels that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not necessarily move horizontally through the organization.



**Figure 4-2. Hierarchical Organization**

4-15. Hierarchical organizations feature specialization of functions in their subordinate cells such as support, operations, intelligence. Usually, only the cell leader has knowledge of other cells or contacts, and only senior leaders have visibility of the organization at large.

4-16. In the past, terrorism was practiced in this manner by identifiable organizations with a command and control structure influenced by revolutionary theory or ideology. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, as well as ethnic or nationalist terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA group, conformed to this structure. These organizations had a clearly defined set of political, social or economic objectives, and tailored aspects of their organizations such as a political wing or social welfare group to facilitate their success. The necessity to coordinate actions between various subordinate cells such as political offices or non-violent support groups favored a hierarchical authority structure.

## **NETWORKED STRUCTURE**

4-17. Terrorists are increasingly using a broader system of networks than previously experienced. Groups based on religious or single issue motives may lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda. They have less need for a hierarchical structure to coordinate plans and actions. Instead, they can depend and even thrive on loose affiliation with groups or individuals from a variety of locations. General goals and targets are announced and individuals or cells are expected to use flexibility and initiative to conduct action in support of these guidelines.

4-18. The effectiveness of a networked organization is dependent on several considerations. The network achieves long-term organizational effectiveness when cells share a unifying ideology, common goals or mutual interests. A difficulty for network organizations not sharing a unifying ideology is cells can pursue objectives or take actions that do not meet the goals of the organization, or are counterproductive. In this instance, the independence of cells fails to develop synergy between their activities and limits their contribution to common or selective objectives.

4-19. Networks distribute the responsibility for operations and plan for redundancies of key functions. Cells do not contact or coordinate with other cells except for coordination essential to a particular operation or function. Avoiding unnecessary coordination or command approval for action provides ability for terrorist leaders to deny responsibility of specified acts of terror, as well as enhance operational security.

4-20. Networks are not necessarily dependent on modern information technology for effective command and control. The organizational structure and the flow of information and guidance inside the organization are defining aspects of networks. While information technology can make networks more effective, low technology means such as couriers, paper messages, and landline telephones can enable networks to avoid detection and operate effectively in certain circumstances.




Figure 4-3. Networked Organization and Structural Options

**CHAIN**

4-21. Each cell links to the node next in sequence. Communication between the nodes is by passing information along the line. This organization is common among networks that smuggle goods and people or launder money. Sever one node or link and the chain is disrupted until a link is reestablished.





Figure 4-4. Chain

**HUB AND STAR**

4-22. Cells communicate with one central element. The central cell need not be the leader or decision maker for the network. A variation of the hub is a wheel design where the outer nodes communicate with one or two other outer cells in addition to the hub. A wheel configuration is a common feature of a financial or economic network. Identifying a central node may be the desired target, or isolating a particular cell from other nodes may be preferred depending on the intended purpose.




**Figure 4-5. Hub and Star**

### **ALL-CHANNEL**

4-23. All nodes are connected to each other. The network is organizationally flat indicating there is no hierarchical command structure above it. Command and control is distributed within the network. This is communication intensive and can be a security problem if the linkages can be identified or tracked.

4-24. Despite their differences, the three basic types will be encountered together in hybrid organizations. A transnational terrorist organization might use chain networks for its money-laundering activities, tied to a wheel network handling financial matters, tied in turn to an all-channel leadership network to direct the use of the funds into the operational activities of a hub network conducting preliminary targeting surveillance and reconnaissance.



**Figure 4-6. All-Channel Network**

4-25. Whatever the means of command, control, and coordination, the selection of critical nodes or linkages between and among nodes is dependent on what outcome is required. Task sets may include surveillance, disruption, destruction, or insertion of misinformation and corrupted technology as part of a larger mission set. Structures can be configured in domains such as key leaders and people, communication means, or supporting materiel infrastructure systems.

### **AFFILIATE ASSOCIATE**

4-26. A variation on network structure is a loosely affiliated method which depends more on an ideological intent, rather than any formalized command and control or support structure. These semi-independent or independent cells plan and act within their own means to promote a common ideological position. Irregular forces may use a combination of functional structures and support from organizations and individuals with varied local, regional, international, or transnational reach.

4-27. Individual actors may interpret a theology, social cause, or perceived grievance to an extreme viewpoint and commit to collective violent acts with personal action. Cells may form from a general inspiration such as al-Qa'ida or similar ideological announcements. Other agendas may emerge from a distinctly individual assessment of purpose and conduct operations as an individual or small cell. Examples include terrorism that spotlights an agenda such as abortion rights and the willingness to murder or coerce individuals who support abortion; individuals who conduct acts of sabotage on facilities or processes that use animals in scientific research; individuals who use arson or other property destruction of commercial enterprises or individual property that intends to develop tracts of land as part of urban expansion projects.




Figure 4-7. Affiliated Network

## INDEPENDENT CONFEDERATE


4-28. An Individual actor may have some direct contact with a terrorist cell or irregular force, and align belief in an extremist agenda, philosophy, or theology that promotes violent acts with personal action. An individual actor may also develop extremist viewpoints with no apparent external support system and decide to commit acts of violence as an individual commitment to action. An example of individual terrorism in the U.S. is the 2001 biological attacks with anthrax mailed through the U.S. postal system that caused several deaths and significant disruption of postal distribution functions, as well as the general psychological stress to large segments of the population.

4-29. Another type of actor individual may be a delusional individual with psychological or physical ailments. These medical conditions are not related to functional structures and organization whose actions could be mistaken as deliberate terrorism or other criminal activity.

## SECTION II - ORGANIZATIONAL COMMAND, CONTROL, AND INFLUENCE

4-30. Typically, different levels of commitment exist within an organization. A way to display levels of commitment within a population consists of passive supporters, active supporters, cadre and operatives, operational leaders, and senior leaders.

4-31. The pyramid diagram at figure 4-8 is not intended as an organizational diagram, but indicates a relative number of people in each category. The general image of overall density holds true for networks as well as hierarchies. Passive supporters may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of what their actual relationship is to the organization. Individuals may develop suspicions of activities that might be supporting criminal actions but decide to continue whatever actions they had been conducting in their immediate community. The population is a frame of reference for a desired mass base or human dimensional environment that many networks want to use as a shield as well as support entity. The display of the population signifies the mass base in which all of the irregular force resides and operates.



**Figure 4-8. Typical Levels of Organization**

4-32. Some groups will use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from individuals. This cooperation can range from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing operation. Blackmail and intimidation are common forms of coercion. Threats to family or community members, as well as a targeted individual, may be employed. Some individuals may be duped into criminal acts without their knowledge, such as a vendor who is unknowingly used to deliver a VBIED that is remotely detonated.

## SENIOR LEADERS

4-33. Senior leaders are the recognized leaders of a movement. They conceive and state a philosophical or practical justification for actions by subordinate operational leaders and followers. These leaders announce strategic direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and provide overarching guidance for operations and protracted conflict. Senior leaders in some irregular forces communicate directly with subordinate echelons and may be vulnerable to penetration. However, clandestine communications can use sophisticated techniques or be decentralized and simple such as human messaging couriers and transfer.

4-34. Actions may include financing and supporting specific operations to attack high payoff targets in an attempt to enhance the perceived ability of a movement. Leaders may use the media and propaganda to intimidate and coerce targeted populations.



**Figure 4-9. Al-Zawahiri**

4-35. The leadership cell is the nucleus of the group. This cell, with a small number of members, is critical to the group's survival and consists of the leader, experienced advisors, and may have elements such as an internal counterintelligence team. The leader focuses on the strategic perspective and thoroughly understands the ideology that motivates the group. A leader may have risen from the tactical ranks of the organization and may have demonstrated his notoriety through acts of terror. The leader of an armed element may join the leader of a political element and other supportive action elements to form a collective leadership for the entire group. The leader is knowledgeable of world politics and the complex socio-political environment in which an organization operates. He exhibits leadership skills often supplemented by personal charisma.

4-36. Skilled and experienced advisors consult with the leader on policies, campaigns, tactics, and weapons to be used, and often make use of information-age technology. Such advisors may coordinate the activities among the various types of supporting cells while also coordinating activities of direct action cells.

4-37. An internal counterintelligence team, a separate cell in some organizations, conducts internal security functions. This team or cell is directly subordinate to the leadership because of the sensitive nature of its activities and the discipline it wants to generate within the organization concerning the following of orders. Security measures are developed, disseminated, and enforced. In many organizations, violation of these security rules can result in death to the violator or family members. Members of the counterintelligence team or cell infiltrate other cells to identify security weaknesses or breaches. Individuals assigned to the counterintelligence teams or cells are usually mature, experienced, and senior operatives in the organization.

## OPERATIONAL LEADERS

4-38. Operational leaders control geographic areas and functions, and command and control active hierarchies or networks. They provide direction and guidance, approve goals and objectives, and provide overarching guidance or directives in support of senior leader guidance. These operational leaders may include senior staff members, spokespersons, political leaders, functional leaders, auxiliary leaders, and in some cases, leaders of specialized cells. If decentralized in structure, these leaders are organized to plan and act within senior leader mission guidance. Other operational leaders, if structured in a more hierarchical military type organization, plan and act within specified planning directives of senior leaders.

4-39. These key leaders can have varied effects on an organization when they are eliminated. Che Guevara was a well-known leader that regional counterinsurgents effectively targeted. When he was killed, his insurgency fell apart and lost any momentum for continued irregular force actions. However, in the case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi being killed, the regional terrorist organization continued as a functioning terrorist cell even though operations were severely disrupted. Collecting, validating, and categorizing characteristics, habits, and motivations assist in identifying vulnerabilities in an organizational leader.

4-40. Operational leaders will often broker associations for selected purposes when cooperative efforts might normally not occur. Hakimullah Meshud leads an insurgent force, Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan (TTiP). Members include Pashtuns from Pakistan, Sunni-Deobandi Islamists allied with al-Qa'ida and other related groups. The group's intention is to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish a Taliban regime and an Islamic Emirate of Pakistan.

4-41. Insight on an operational leader can be assessed and analyzed from a number of sources. These avenues toward understanding include:

- Public Statements
- Historical and Recent Activities
- Associates
- Personal Background
- Personal Beliefs, Motivations, and Ideology
- Education and Training
- Temperament

- Positional Advancement within the Organization
- Public Popularity



**Figure 4-10. Hakimullah Meshud**

## **CADRES AND OPERATIVES**

4-42. Cadres and operatives are the active members of an irregular force or terrorist cell. This echelon plans and conducts operations, and conducts functions such as intelligence, finances, logistics, propaganda, and communications. Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadre and recruits are direct action agents. These actors can also perform tasks of intelligence, finance, logistics, propaganda, and communications.

4-43. The term cadre can describe the political or ideological core of an insurgency in one form of irregular force. If present, the cadre is part of the underground. Some cadre activities are violent with enforcement of political and ideological discipline, subversion of opponents, and manipulation of social power to support the insurgent strategy. Cadre leaders may perform key shadow government or government-in-exile functions. Cadre activities may include control of intelligence and counterintelligence networks; focus and integration of IO capabilities against the government, the population, and the international community; direction and coordination of acts of sabotage; and operation of the command structure or shadow government. Parts of the cadre may act as a formal political party. Movements based on religious extremism include religious and spiritual advisors among their cadre.


## **ACTIVE SUPPORTERS**

4-44. Active supporters operate in functions such as political, fund-raising, and information activities of the group. Acting as a visible or tacit partner, they may also conduct intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safehaven houses, financial contributions, medical assistance, and transit assistance for cadre members of the organization. Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the organization but do not normally commit violent acts.

4-45. The underground and auxiliary, technically separate elements, are loosely connected to provide coordinated capabilities for the insurgent movement. The key distinction between them is that the underground is the element of the organization that operates in areas denied to the guerrilla force. Members of the underground often control cells used to neutralize informants and collaborators from within the insurgency and the population. Most underground operations are required to take place in and around population centers that are held by counterinsurgent forces. Underground leaders oversee specific functions that are carried out by the auxiliary

4-46. The underground is a cellular organization of active supporters of the insurgency. They are more engaged than the auxiliaries are and may at times be guerrillas. They conduct clandestine, covert, and overt operations, and sometimes infiltrate a host nation government. Members of the underground continue normal positions in society, but lead clandestine lives for the insurgent movement. Some insurgencies are unique in that they conduct most of their political activities inside the underground while a different section trains recruits, maintains propaganda, and assists in population control. The underground may conduct any of the following actions:

- Spread propaganda.
- Support sabotage, assassination and subversion.
- Support intelligence and counterintelligence operations.
- Run safe houses.
- Provide transportation.
- Manufacture and maintain arms and explosives.



**Figure 4-11. HAMAS Political-Social Support and Terrorism**

4-47. The auxiliary describes a support element of an insurgent organization. The auxiliary's organization and operations are normally secretive in nature, and members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the insurgent movement. Support enables the combatant force and can take forms such as logistics, labor, or intelligence. Typical auxiliary support activities include: running safe houses; storing weapons and supplies; acting as couriers; providing intelligence collection; giving early warning of counterinsurgent movements; providing funding from lawful and unlawful sources; and providing forged or stolen documents and access or introductions to potential supporters.

4-48. Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important logistical services but do not normally participate in combat operations. Auxiliaries may operate full time or part time for the insurgency and generally conduct activities less identifiable than the underground. They can include women, children, and other individuals that tend to be less scrutinized by counterinsurgent forces. Examples of auxiliaries could include shepherds or street merchants that may openly operate near a counterinsurgent base and provide intelligence on that site. Examples of support that auxiliaries provide include:

- Store weapons and supplies.
- Perform courier operations.
- Provide passive intelligence collection.
- Give early warning of counterinsurgent movements.
- Acquire funds from lawful and unlawful sources.
- Provide forged or stolen documents.
- Promote and facilitate desertion of security forces.
- Recruit and screen new members.
- Provide medical support.
- Manufacture and maintain equipment.



Figure 4-12. Hizballah: Coercion and Terrorism

## PASSIVE SUPPORTERS

4-49. Passive supporters are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of an overarching agenda, but are not committed enough to take an active role in guerrilla or insurgent actions or in terrorism. They may not be aware of their precise relation to an irregular force or terrorist group. They might interface with a front that hides the overt connection to an irregular force or terrorist group. Sometimes fear of reprisal from terrorists is a compelling factor in passive support. Sympathizers can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and unwitting or coerced assistance in intelligence gathering and other non-violent activities. The mass base of support is an ever-changing group of groups with multiple motives.


4-50. Irregular forces recruit from populations that are sympathetic to their goals. Legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. Some recruiting is conducted on a worldwide basis in schools financed from sympathetic supporters and non-governmental donations and grants. Recruiting may be conducted for particular skills and qualifications and not be focused on ideological commitment. Some irregular forces and terrorist organizations have sought current or former members of the U.S. armed forces as trained operatives and as agents within an organization.

4-51. The primary value of the mass base to an irregular force, such as in an insurgency, is marshalling large portions of a population groups to act in specific ways that support the insurgency. Elements of the mass base are divided into three distinct groups in relation to the insurgent movement of pro-insurgent; anti-insurgent; and uncommitted, or ambivalent. The political cadres conduct activities to influence or leverage these groups. These groups may or may not be knowledgeable of the insurgent nature of operations or activities in which they are used.

## BASIC CELLULAR FUNCTIONS

4-52. An irregular force typically has a cellular structure that is capable of direct and support actions and basic recruiting, intelligence, and propaganda activities. The structure at this level of capability is similar in terrorist organizations. Not every organization has all the types of cells or the numbers of cells shown in the example.

4-53. Cells may be organized based on social or work relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action and intelligence. Alternatively, irregular forces may combine some functions into multifunctional cells. Cell members may remain in close contact to provide psychological support or to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures. Other cells may operate in a distributed mode and only be remotely in contact through designated leaders. Each cell has a leader who normally communicates and coordinates with higher levels and other cells.



**Figure 4-13. Functional Structure of Insurgent Force (Example)**

4-54. As irregular forces grow in capabilities, organizational development may take one of two patterns. In some cases, cellular structure can merge with a larger number of cells. Some functional cells may expand into larger sections that organize into more highly specialized cells. When loosely affiliated irregulars evolve into a more military-type organization, direct action cells may combine to form squads, platoons, and companies, while some of the functional cells expand into support sections. The following paragraphs describe and display examples of various functions and cells.

**DIRECT ACTION**

4-55. Direct action cells can conduct raids, ambushes, terror tactics, and harassment. Some direct action cells may have specialized functions. Direct action cells receive baseline support from intelligence, logistics, communications, and information cells. However, they usually perform their own final target reconnaissance and internal logistics and communications. As an irregular force develops into more sophisticated capabilities, a military-type organization can evolve from direct action cells to form guerrilla-like squads, platoons, companies, and battalions. In some cases, squads can distribute into direct action cells. A platoon or company may retain some direct action cells as teams or squads for special functions. There can also be separate cellular structures that are not part of a company or battalion.

4-56. Direct action cells conduct various types of terror tactics. Special direct action cells may have single-use functions such as the recruitment and employment of suicide bombers. Direct action cells may make use of baseline material or resources from intelligence, communications, or logistics and support cells. A small group might have small direct action cells, whereas a large group might have direct action cells with 20 to 40 members. A terrorist group may have one or many direct action cells. Some cells may have teams proficient in one specific tactic, such as kidnapping or bombing, and other multifunctional cells proficient in many terror tactics. A specialized team has individuals who are adept at specific tactics and techniques.

4-57. Figure 4-14 provides an example of a direct action cell organization that specializes in bomb and sabotage missions. As previously described, the leader provides overall guidance and direction to the direct action cell leader with overall responsibility and authority for the activity. The direct action cell leader selects the appropriate team configuration and equipment to conduct a specific action. Additional support personnel and equipment can be task organized from other cells. Cell members are



lightly armed with pistols or rifles for self protection and may use other weapons as determined in their mission analysis and during cell surveillance of an objective.

See FM 7-100.4 [to be revised and transitioned to a Training Circular 7-100.4] for additional descriptive and diagram data.

Local Insurgent Organization  
 FM 7-100.4, OPFOR Organization Guide

Demolition, Sabotage, & IED Team, Technical Support Cell \_\_\_\_\_

**DEMOLITION,  
 SABOTAGE  
 & IED TEAM**

Team Leader/Sr Demo Expert (x1) ..... PM/AKMS  
 Asst Tm Ldr/Demo Expert/Electrician (x1) .....AKMS  
 Demo Specialist/Communications (x1) .....AKMS  
 Demo Specialist/Computer Tech (x1) ..... PM/RPK  
 Demo Specialist/Fuze (x1) .....AKM/BG-15

Total Personnel..... 5

**PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT**

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>
9-mm Pistol, PM .....	2	GPS Receiver, Handheld .....	2
7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM.....	1	Night-Vision Goggles .....	1
7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS.....	3	Radios:	
7.62-mm LMG, RPK .....	1	Base Station, Long-Range	
40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....	1	Cordless-Telephone .....	1
Demolition, Fuzes/Detonators * .....	Assorted	Cell Phone.....	15
Demolition Materiel **.....	Assorted	Computer, Laptop .....	3
Mines (AP, AT, & AV) ***.....	Assorted	Computer, PDA.....	2
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) ****.10		Handheld, Long-Range Cordless-	
Sedan, Civilian.....	1	Telephone.....	3
Van, Civilian.....	1	Handheld, Very-Low-Power.....	5
Binoculars .....	1	Manpack, Low-Power.....	2
Camcorder, Video .....	1	Portable, Satellite Telephone .....	1
Camera, Digital.....	1	Vehicle Mount, Medium Power.....	1
Electrician Set.....	2		

NOTES: See next page.

- \* Assorted fuzes/detonators include time, optical, pressure, pressure release, command armed fuzes, sensor fuzes (acoustic, optical, infrared, seismic, magnetic), command detonated (electronic, RF, pressure release, etc).
- \*\* Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.
- \*\*\* Includes remotely detonated mines, boobytraps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is mission dependent and varies.
- \*\*\*\* The number and types of IEDs and fuzing varies. The demolition, sabotage, and IED team has at least 10 IEDs fabricated and on-hand at any given time. Other IEDs may be in various stages of manufacture.

**Figure 4-14. Direct Action Cell: Bomb and Sabotage**

4-58. The leader of the direct action cell might need to receive authority from a superior prior to conducting an activity, or might have the autonomy to operate independently. The direct action cell leader is responsible for:

- Training direct action members to perform direct action missions.
- Coordinating for logistical support.
- Controlling activities of various teams and support personnel to conduct an action.

4-59. During the preparation for and execution of a mission, the leader coordinates the activities of specific direct action teams such as the hijacking team, and support personnel such as a communications technician assisting from other cells. Individuals executing and supporting the action may meet with the direct action cell leader at a remote site to finalize plans and conduct rehearsals.



4-60. The direct action cell, the bomb and sabotage team in this example, includes technicians and operators who are skilled in various bomb-making and sabotage techniques. They typically carry multiple weapons for personal protection and assault purposes. The bomb and sabotage team reflects the activity conducted by this particular direct action cell. If the direct action cell is designated to conduct another type of action, such as assassination, hijacking, hostage taking, or kidnapping, then team configuration would reflect that mission expertise.

4-61. The intelligence cell and other cells collect information relating to their function. The information cell, for example, collects information on enemy psychological operations and identifies enemy vulnerabilities. All members of the irregular force receive training in basic intelligence collection and surveillance.

## INTELLIGENCE

4-62. The intelligence cell plans, coordinates, and implements the intelligence collection plan and provides intelligence information to internal and external consumers. The cell also conducts reconnaissance to obtain information about the activities, tactics, and resources of the enemy. Reconnaissance methods include surveillance, use of informants, and infiltration of enemy organizations. Observation is the most common method used to conduct reconnaissance. In addition to conducting intelligence analysis, typical activities of any intelligence cell in the insurgent organization may include tracking enemy movements; determining enemy TTP; scouting potential targets; establishing enemy vulnerabilities; selecting attack locations; and stalking potential assassination targets.

4-63. Intelligence cell personnel may serve in any occupation such as a taxi or delivery driver, or truck driver which allows them to blend in with the population and still provides them the flexibility and mobility needed to gather information. Every member of the organization is an intelligence-gathering mechanism. Information in raw form may be freely provided by sympathizers conducting surveillance on behalf of the insurgent organization while living, traveling, or working near either a target area or the enemy. Raw information may also be purchased locally from affiliated insurgents, guerrillas, or criminal organizations.

4-64. The insurgent organization's intelligence will often be superior to the enemy's due to its intimate first-hand knowledge of all aspects of the local environment, penetration of governmental structures, relationships with the population, and its ability to maintain observation across the countryside or urban area. Collecting information, overtly and clandestinely, is a continuous function performed by every insurgent organization. Overt activities include the open collection of information by individuals who circulate among the people. Clandestine activities involve secret collection of information. This can include information collected through the use of extortion, bribery, or coercion. Groups clandestinely collect

information using electronic devices and human-intelligence agents who may join or infiltrate popular organizations, government organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

4-65. When planning any action, an intelligence cell analyzes information from both overt and clandestine sources. Sleeper agents, members of the movement who may reside within the target area for years, often have the specific mission of covertly gathering and reporting information. The information they gather may later serve to support direct action missions. In the offense, efforts are concentrated on the enemy at his location and the area surrounding the target. In the defense, the reconnaissance effort is to determine when and where the enemy will conduct offensive actions against irregular forces.

## INFORMATION

4-66. Different from the intelligence cells, information cells develop, produce, and disseminate propaganda, recruit and indoctrinate members, and coordinate information campaigns. These cells conduct overt activities to obtain media exposure, in order to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the government or to show the increasing power of the insurgent organization.



This cell can coordinate with the communications cell to operate clandestine radio and television stations and gain access to the Internet to disseminate propaganda.

4-67. In a larger guerrilla or insurgent force, information sections specialize. Within the section, one cell may develop and produce products while others disseminate through means such as print, audio-visual, and computer. Additionally, a cell may specialize in aspects of strategic perception management and actions aimed at external sources of support. They develop, coordinate, and have primary responsibility for the group's information campaign. The information programs attempt to create, improve, and maintain the irregular force legitimacy and influence at local, national, and international levels.

## COMMUNICATIONS

4-68. Communications cells facilitate communications within the irregular force. Members provide courier service, maintain and service message transfer locations, develop codes and ciphers, and operate a number of communications means. In an irregular force, communications cells may also conduct electronic warfare such as communications intercept, jamming, and deception in cooperation with the intelligence cells based on member expertise.



4-69. The communications cell leader often dispatches members to support other elements during preparation for and execution of a mission. In a large irregular force, communications personnel and equipment are permanent members of a unit. Each guerrilla company in a battalion, for example, has its own communications capability. When necessary, the communications section at the guerrilla battalion level augments lower level communications cells.

4-70. With the availability of modern communications systems such as cellular telephones and computers on the commercial and black markets, communications asset availability is limited only by financial ability. However, in many cases irregular forces may use very simple communications techniques such as opening and closing windows, the location of a tethered animal, or the arrangement of laundry to signal and avoid enemy detection and increase the organization's flexibility.

4-71. The cell is often technically capable of operating a variety of communications equipment ranging from landlines to computers on the Internet to satellite communications. At the direction of the irregular

force leader, the leader of the communications cell dispatches operators, technicians, and equipment to various cells as they prepare for and execute an action. Members of the communications cell may act as trusted middlemen between various cells. Use of the Internet for communication through encrypted electronic-mail and websites can be effective. Cellular telephones can be used and abandoned after short periods of use and switching to other cellular phones or small hand held transmitter-receivers.



## LOGISTICS



4-72. Logistics cells provide all types of logistics support. They obtain, maintain, store, and issue supplies and material. Actions include coordination for transportation delivery of supplies, and materiel; relay or transmission of funds; operation of safe houses and front companies; and provision for medical support. In a guerrilla battalion

or higher headquarters, separate cells exist in a logistics section with functions such as financial and medical. When an irregular force at a particular level does not have a separate engineer element, logistics cells could be responsible for limited engineer mobility and countermobility support.

4-73. The logistics and support cell provides all support functions required to conduct direct action missions and sustain the armed wing. The members of this cell perform the following functions:

- Establish and maintain caches.
- Provide for materiel, transportation, and maintenance.
- Coordinate for medical support.
- Conduct activities to support bribery, extortion, and robbery, and operating front companies in order to finance and resource activities.
- Allocate and distribute arms and munitions.
- Establish and maintain safe houses.

4-74. These functions probably are not conducted by members of the same teams. For example, a member with a cover as an entrepreneur in a front company probably would not risk compromising that cover by conducting other illegal activities.

4-75. The logistics and support cell often owns front companies or other organizations that support the irregular force's overall objectives. A front organization may be a legitimate business owned and operated for the purposes of generating money or an organization that hides or sustains the group's illegal activity. For example, the logistics and support cell may operate an international shipping company that facilitates movement of materiel and serves as a cover for money laundering.



4-76. Armored cars, banks, or other lucrative enemy businesses are favorite targets of robbery. Robberies are completed quickly and are low risk actions because they offer relative anonymity. The members, if apprehended, portray themselves as common criminals and not as members of the irregular force.

4-77. The logistics and support cell may be responsible for employing simple sensors and alarm systems in safe houses or at logistics sites. Remote sensors around a cache may alert the group to a compromise. Video surveillance devices can alert of the enemy's presence or confirm the identity of a contact. The cell uses unobtrusive or passive measures instead of barriers. For example, a sensor warns of an intruder whereas a mine would draw immediate reaction. The group's security plan is to prevent compromise and achieve early warning.

4-78. The logistics and support cell prepositions materiel prior to a mission in order to reduce logistics and security requirements. The cell may use primary markers to alert other group members to the path to the stored materiel. One example could be a shirt such as on a clothesline that blends into the environment while identifying a cache location.

## **MATERIEL SUPPORT**

4-79. Materiel support includes the transportation, storage, and supply of all materiel required to sustain activities. Supply bases, caches, and safe houses are techniques used to store and supply materiel. All three techniques use cover, camouflage, concealment, deception, and other security measures to protect against or avoid enemy detection.

## **TRANSPORTATION**

4-80. The logistics cell or section employs a variety of organic, stolen, or captured conveyances, such as animals, vehicles, ships, and aircraft. Resources and the terrain determine the type of conveyance used. Animals are a popular means since they can carry relatively large quantities of supplies and materiel over rough or difficult terrain. Land vehicles require little operator training and less logistics support and are more readily available than coastal or river vessels and aircraft. In most cases, vehicles can be stolen, captured, or purchased from internal sources. Ships and aircraft may be more problematic to acquire.

## **MAINTENANCE**

4-81. Maintenance includes all functions conducted to maintain, repair, and prepare equipment and weapons for employment. The logistics cell or section is responsible for maintenance. It may establish a facility in which to perform maintenance or use a civilian business, such as an auto repair shop. The facility may be located underground or at a camp. Some insurgents receive maintenance training for high-value or specialized equipment, such as computers or electronic warfare equipment.

## **MEDICAL**

4-82. Medical support includes the medical measures required for evacuation and treatment of casualties and for the prevention of disease. Civic actions often incorporate medical support to help build and maintain internal support. In a large organization, a specialized cell within a logistics section provides medical support.

# **SECTION III - ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION**

## **ORGANIZATIONAL MEANS AND ENDS**

4-83. An insurgent group evolves its organizational structure as it gains support from the active, passive, or coerced support of the population in its area of operations, or from the materiel that it acquires from direct actions against an enemy. A constructive approach to understanding insurgent organizational models reviews general guerrilla warfare principles from the Chinese communist insurgency model of Mao Tse-tung [Zedong] during the early and mid decades of the 20th Century. From a later urban guerrilla warfare perspective, principles of Carlos Marigela present a variation on insurgency with an initial focus on urban centers for direct action and safe haven.

4-84. These examples of structure are generic in organization and function. Each organization has an adaptive expectation in capabilities based on local-regional circumstances and emergent conditions. Recognizing that conditions are dynamic is key to estimating duration of contemporary capabilities and vulnerabilities, and when a significant change may occur that affects irregular force operations or the actions of the enemy.

## HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: GUERRILLA BANDS AND MAO

4-85. This overview of Mao Tse-tung’s concept for guerrilla units, and the insurgency purpose to defeat an established government through revolutionary war and replace it with a communist regime, concentrates on the fundamental structure of small unit organizations and basic principles used in the tactics of his insurgency. Noted in *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, USMC FMFRP 12-18 (1989), and as translated by Griffith in 1940, Griffith introduces guerrilla war as “not dependent for success on the efficient operation of complex mechanical devices, highly organized logistical systems, or the accuracy of electronic computers. It can be conducted in any terrain...Its basic element is man... endowed with intelligence, emotions, and will...politically educated and thoroughly aware of the issues at stake.”

4-86. This indoctrination on ideology is an essential principle that acknowledges direct action of combat and fighting, while promoting operational aims and strategic intent. The commitment of willing support comes from a dedicated and continuous effort to organize, instruct, agitate, and use propaganda to persuade and convince the population on the value of the insurgency.

4-87. A prime characteristic of guerrilla operations is to attack points of enemy weakness and in conditions developed by the guerrilla force or as selected by the guerrilla force. Deception and mobility are aspects to achieving surprise and avoiding engagements unless the tactical opportunity weighs heavily in the favor of the guerrilla. At the tactical level of operations, attacks are planned and conducted as sudden, violent decentralized actions. Principles of rapid dispersion and rapid concentration facilitate these types of operation.

**Guerrilla Tactic**

Select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west, avoid the solid, and attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision.

*Guerrilla Warfare* Mao Tse-tung

4-88. Ultimately, this model centers on a political objective that must coincide with the expectation of the population. Mao stated seven principles to realize the cooperation and support of the masses involved.


- Arouse and organize the people.
- Achieve internal unification politically.
- Establish bases.
- Equip forces.
- Recover national strength. [as in resolve and active support]
- Destroy enemy national strength.
- Regain lost territory.

4-89. Guerrilla forces evolve gradually from rudimentary paramilitary elements to more traditional-like military forces that plan and operate in conjunction with regular army units of the revolutionary army.

Guerrilla warfare, cannot be isolated in concept or practice from the offensive and defensive actions of the regular army. To attempt separating guerrilla warfare from traditional warfare denies the synergy that each type of force provides the other in operational effectiveness.

4-90. Capabilities or limitations of a guerrilla force emerge from the sources of its members. The Mao model lists multiple sources for guerrilla members that include volunteers from the general population, regular unit soldiers detailed temporarily to a guerrilla force, regular unit soldiers detailed permanent to a guerrilla force as a cadre, combinations of regular unit members and locally recruited civilians, local militia or self defense home guard members, deserters from the enemy forces, and even former “bandits and bandit groups.” Military leaders and political officers are positioned throughout the organizational echelons.

4-91. Three main echelons of combatant guerrilla forces are (1) the squad, platoon, or company, (2) the battalion comprised of two to four companies, and (3) the regiment consisting of two to four battalions and the brigade that configure with subordinate regiments. The squad usually has nine to eleven soldiers inclusive of a leader and assistant leader. Two to four squads comprise a platoon.




**Figure 4-15. Guerrilla Company Organization: Generic Example (CHICOM ca. 1930s)**

4-92. Initiative and mobility characterize operations while establishing and preserving bases in which to train, self-sustain, prepare for future missions, and evolve organizational capability. Concurrently, guerrilla actions can have strategic consequences of denying an enemy a secure rear area while conducting tactical operations. Actions aim at keeping an enemy physically and psychologically stressed from constant harassment and disruption when a distinct defeat or destruction of an enemy is not practical. As successes allow expansion of influence and commitment to more of a population, guerrilla forces may extend operations from rural areas into urban centers and other critical nodes in an enemy’s lines of communication.

*Note.* An irregular force will display different forms of organization and capacity and will change its form based on capabilities and limitations. The following example traces an organizational structure but is clearly *not* the only way for an irregular force to organize. This example has a guerrilla force basis along military lines of organization. Later examples will display insurgent organizational options, and include the aspect of using terrorism in guerrilla, insurgent, or other forms of irregular forces that may include criminal organization affiliations.

4-93. When a platoon acts independently, a political officer accompanies the platoon in order to conduct political propaganda activities. A company consists of two to four platoons. Organizational structure remains flexible at battalion, regiment, and brigade. A brigade structure has at least two regiments. Mao's *On Guerrilla Warfare* offered flexible options on organizing independent guerrilla unit hierarchy such as the simplified illustration below:



Note: Unit organizations use contemporary U.S. Army military graphics-symbols.

Figure 4-16. Guerrilla Tactical Organizations: Generic Example (CHICOM ca. 1930s)

## CURRENT PERSPECTIVES: TAILOR THE ORGANIZATION

4-94. At the lowest-level organizations such as infantry squad in FM 7-100.4, the organizational directories list individual personnel with their individual weapons and equipment. The numerous examples provided in this doctrinal base are a guide to describe and illustrate manning and equipment. Notes within the data displays state options for tailoring capabilities. The example at Figure 4-17 is a guerilla squad. These listings are easily adaptable to an irregular force manning and equipping requirement.

*Note.* Organizational directories in FM 7-100.4 provide a very detailed listing of personnel and equipment. These examples can be tailored to the specific training requirement and conditions established by the commander of the unit being trained. For some training requirements, trainers and training planners can extract the appropriate pages from the organizational directories and tailor them by eliminating the detail they do not need.

Guerrilla Battalion, Guerrilla Brigade  
FM 7-100.4, OPFOR Organization Guide

**Guerrilla Squad, Guer Plt**

**GUERRILLA  
SQUAD**

Squad Leader (N) (x1) .....	AKM/BG-15
Machinegunner (x1).....	RPK
Grenadier (x1).....	RPG-7V/AKMS
Asst Grenadier (x1).....	AKM
Rifleman (x2) .....	AKM
Asst Sqd Ldr (N) (x1) .....	AKM/BG-15
Machinegunner (x1).....	RPK
Grenadier (x1).....	RPG-7V/AKMS
Asst Grenadier (x1).....	AKM
Sniper/Marksman (x1) .....	M/Nag
Rifleman (x1) .....	AKM
Total Personnel .....	12.....O-0/N-2/E-10

**PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT**

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>
7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM.....	7	ATDL, RPG-22 ** .....	2
7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS.....	2	Demolition Materiel **/**** .....	Assorted
7.62-mm LMG, RPK .....	2	Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **/*** .....	2
7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.....	1	Mines (AP&AT) **/***** .....	Assorted
40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15 .....	2	Radios:	
ATGL, RPG-7V .....	2	Handheld, Very-Low-Power.....	2

**NOTES:**

1. The guerrilla squad consists of at least two maneuver fire (or hunter killer) teams. The squad leader may choose to command one fire team while the assistant squad leader commands the second. The squad may be augmented by elements from the machinegun squad—in which case the guerrilla squad may operate with three (possibly four) maneuver fire teams (or anti-armor hunter-killer teams).
2. The riflemen also support other weapons including the machinegunner, the ATGL grenadier, the sniper/marksman, or attachments from the weapons squad.
3. Some squads may have a 7.62-mm GP MG, PKM in lieu of a 7.62-mm LMG, RPK (mission dependent). This gives the squad one GP MG and one LMG. In this case the rifleman becomes the assistant machinegunner while the GP MG gunner receives a Pistol, PM.

- 
- \* With II night sight.
  - \*\* Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon— the BOI may vary.
  - \*\*\* No dedicated operator.
  - \*\*\*\* Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.
  - \*\*\*\*\* Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, boobytraps, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is mission dependent and varies.

**Figure 4-17. Guerrilla Force Infantry Squad (Example)**

4-95. Directly following the individual’s title and rank category is the number of personnel occupying that position, such as (x1) or (x2). This is followed by the nomenclature of the individual’s assigned personal weapon, such as AK-74M or SVD. In some cases, an individual may have two assigned weapons; for example, an individual assigned a 7.62-mm GP MG, PKM may also be assigned a 9-mm Pistol, PM. This reads as PKM/PM in the listing. In some instances, the individual also serves as the gunner/operator of a weapon. For instance, the Grenadier (x1) is the gunner/operator of the ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600. His personal weapon is the 5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U. The Riflemen (x2) are assigned the 5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M with the 40-mm Under-Barrel Grenade Launcher, GP-30 (similar to the U.S. M16/M203). In determining an approach to configuring irregular forces as larger units, Appendix D of FM 7-100.4 displays details, for example, of a motorized infantry platoon, company, and battalion.

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
*Note.* The contemporary irregular force is a tailored force dependent on the means available to equip and man selected organizational intentions. For setting conditions for training, FM 7-100.4, *Opposing Force Organizational Guide*, provides detailed examples of organizational size, equipment, and weapons. See also, TRADOC G2 *Worldwide Equipment Guide*, Volumes I, II, and III.

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## SECTION IV – IRREGULAR GUERRILLA UNIT STRUCTURE (EXAMPLE)

### GUERRILLA BATTALION

4-96. A guerrilla battalion operates as a military organization. Each guerrilla battalion differs but all have a similar structure of a battalion headquarters, support staff, and combat and support elements. The headquarters staff may include a deputy commander and an executive officer, political advisor, administrative staff, and legal advisor.




#### Commander, Political Advisor, Deputy Commander, and Staff Section Officers

4-97. The guerrilla battalion may have any combination of capabilities. Examples are presented as hunter-killer (H/K) companies or guerrilla companies. The H/K company is especially effective and lethal in close environments such as urban, forest, swamp terrain. Organizational structure allows masking within a population. Congested terrain can shield by using a supportive or coerced population. Attack on guerrilla forces is difficult or restrictive depending on rules of engagement that are in effect by an enemy. The guerrilla company fights with platoons, squads, and fire teams.

4-98. Often a battalion size guerrilla force may not be appropriate for an operational environment. If a task organized battalion is required, capabilities may include four or five hunter/killer companies, organic

battalion units, and a weapons battery from a brigade. These fires may provide mortar, antitank, and rocket launcher platoons and possibly IEW support. Guerrillas can coordinate and act with local insurgents.

4-99. Within an irregular battalion, most direct action cells combine to form irregular squads, platoons, and companies. An irregular battalion is capable of a variety of activities. With sufficient equipment and resources, it can conduct sustained company level combined arms actions. A fully capable battalion could conduct a raid with three or more companies supported by mortars and light artillery. When employing guerrilla tactics, an irregular battalion may not fight as a battalion but instead direct platoon and company size actions within a geographic area. Some of the other functional cells expand into sections in a support staff that supports the companies and other elements of the battalion.



**Figure 4-18. Guerrilla Battalion (Example)**

4-100. Mortars and light artillery (122 mm and smaller) are normal for fire support. The engineer element provides primarily countermobility and survivability support, such as obstacles and field fortifications. Insurgent engineer support to the companies, platoons, or direct action cells comes from the engineer element at battalion level.

4-101. In the support staff, the sections of intelligence, logistics, communications, and information often consist of specialized cells. An intelligence section, for example, may have counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and surveillance cells. Likewise, a logistics section may have cells dedicated to transportation, medical, finance, or other materiel support functions.

4-102. Guerrillas may be a mixture of men, women, and children. Women and children may be used as runners, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, snipers, look-outs, or other roles. They may also emplace or detonate IEDs and mines. Women may be fighters and participate in active armed conflict, assassinations, assaults, ambushes, and raids. The guerrillas may or may not wear a uniform, but will usually be recognized as paramilitary by their uniforms, badges, weapons, or equipment.

4-103. The guerrilla battalion has sufficient assets to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate fight. The battalion may be dependent upon support from higher headquarters or external sources such as

caches and civilian augmentation to transport materiel for a sustained fight. Organic transportation provides the battalion a degree of operational autonomy and may be employed separately from a brigade. The area of responsibility for guerrilla units may be quite large. The battalion may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles such as motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high mobility all-terrain vehicles. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The guerrilla commander may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. Guerrillas may have no vehicles at all and depend completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means.

## GUERRILLA HUNTER/KILLER COMPANY

4-104. The guerrilla company can be organized for combat into a guerrilla hunter-killer (H/K) company. Guerrilla company assets are augmented and restructured for combat into task organized H/K teams. The H/K team structure is ideal for dispersed combat such as fighting in urban areas. The guerrilla company is broken into three H/K groups. One example of H/K group organization is three sections with each section comprising 12 H/K teams. The company, in this example, contains a total of 36 H/K teams or 39 H/K teams if the two sniper teams and the company scouts are task organized.




Figure 4-19. Hunter-Killer Guerrilla Company (Example)

4-105. The guerrilla H/K company has sufficient assets to transport munitions and materiel for the immediate fight. Organic trucks provide the company with some level of operational autonomy from the battalion. The area of responsibility and operations for guerrilla units may be fairly large. Conditions vary and support from a higher guerrilla headquarters can be problematic. The company commander requisitions or confiscates resources to support the mission and sustain his irregular force.

4-106. Vehicles may be a mix of military and civilian. The guerrilla company may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles (motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on the mission. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The commander may requisition/ confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This includes the use of civilian personnel to serve as porters. The guerrillas may have no vehicles at all and depend on caches, porters, or other transportation means.

4-107. The guerrillas may or may not be in military-like uniform. They might wear civilian clothing and be indistinguishable from the local population (other than weaponry which they may conceal or discard). Some guerrillas may disperse into the civilian population when not assembled to conduct military operations. Other guerrillas may evade to safe houses or other safe havens until alerted for a subsequent mission or support role to another unit.

## GUERRILLA COMPANY

4-108. A guerrilla company can be organized in a simple organization for command and control and conduct of operations. As an irregular organization expands in capabilities, a cellular structure can retain a typical hierarchy of paramilitary or conventional military forces. One example displays a company headquarters with three platoons and one weapons platoon.




Figure 4-20. Guerrilla Company (Example)

4-109. The guerrilla company will organize support with available resources of the region to ensure adequate transportation of munitions and materiel for the immediate fight. The company commander requisitions or confiscates resources to support the mission and sustain his irregular force. Some support might be provided from higher guerrilla headquarters to transport materiel or be prepositioned in caches for periodic sustainment. Within a company, direct action cells or teams can be formed from squads and platoons. A platoon or company may tailor some direct action cells for special tasks in support of the company mission.

4-110. *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*, a collection of articles published by the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute in 2002, spotlights the value of combining regular and irregular forces in armed conflict. Bjorge, in his assessment of the 1948-1949 campaigning of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, reflects on the earlier military structure development in the 1920s-1930s that Mao Zedong organized as a three tiered mutually supporting organization.

But if from the beginning of his revolutionary struggle, Mao viewed the regular army as an essential requirement...Mao saw that military power could come from irregular forces as well as from regular forces. Because the Communist base area had only enough economic resources to support a limited number of full-time soldiers, two irregular military organizations were established. The Red Guards...was organized on a county basis. The other force, called "insurrectionary detachments," was organized on a township basis. Both forces provided military capability while allowing their members to continue their regular productive work. Of these two irregular organizations, the Red Guards was better trained and equipped.

## GUERRILLA PLATOON

*Note.* This sample of a guerrilla platoon uses a three squad base in addition to a machine gun section. The details of equipment and manning are listed and can be tailored easily for specific requirements. The equipment list below the platoon diagram is a direct extract from the guerrilla battalion and subordinate unit data in FM 7-100.4.




Figure 4-21. Guerrilla Platoon (Example)

### PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>
9-mm Pistol, PM.....	3	Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series *.....	6
7.62-mm Assault Rifle, AKM.....	34	Mines (AP&AT) **/*****.....	Assorted
7.62-mm Carbine, AKMS.....	6	Binocular Laser Rangefinder.....	2
7.62-mm LMG, RPK.....	6	GPS Receiver, Handheld.....	2
7.62-mm GP MG, PKM *.....	3	Night-Vision Goggles.....	2
7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, Mosin/Nagant.....	3	Radios:	
40-mm Grenade Launcher, BG-15.....	7	Handheld, Long-Range Cordless-	
ATGL, RPG-7V.....	6	Telephone.....	1
ATDL, RPG-22 **.....	6	Handheld, Very-Low-Power.....	12
Demolition Materiel **/*****.....	Assorted	Manpack, Low-Power.....	1

#### NOTES:

1. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. The commander may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets. Other civilians or draft animals may be used as bearers/porters.
2. The guerrilla platoon may be augmented by military or civilian vehicles (motorcycles, trucks, cars, bicycles, carts, or high-mobility/all terrain vehicles) or personnel depending on the mission.
3. One of the guerrillas is cross-trained as a medic.
4. Ammunition and assorted mines are distributed (cross-leveled) amongst members of the platoon.

- 
- \* With II night sight.
  - \*\* Issued as ammunition rather than a weapon— the BOI may vary.
  - \*\*\* No dedicated operator.
  - \*\*\*\* Includes bangalore torpedoes, shaped charges, AT grenades, other tactical demolitions.
  - \*\*\*\*\* Includes remotely detonated mines, IEDs, and side-attack (AT & anti-vehicle) mines. The mix is mission dependent and varies.

## GUERRILLA SQUAD

Note: This sample of a guerrilla squad provides a familiar yet easily adaptable organization to meet requirements. The squad is structured as two fire teams with one squad leader who also controls one fire team and a team leader who controls one team. Members can range from nine or more squad members. Data is an extract from FM 7-100.4, Appendix D.

Squad Leader (N) (x1)	AK-74M
Asst Sqd Ldr (N) (x1)	AK-74M
Machinegunner (x1)	PKM/PM
Asst Machinegunner (x1)	AK-74M
Sniper/Marksman (x1)	SVD
Grenadier (x1)	PZF3-T/AKS-74U
Asst Grenadier (x1)	AK-74M
Rifleman (x2)	AK-74M/GP-30
<b>Total Personnel:</b> 9 (TBD)	<b>O-0/N-2/E-7</b>



### PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Total</u>
9-mm Pistol, PM .....	1
5.45-mm Assault Rifle, AK-74M .....	6
5.45-mm Carbine, AKS-74U.....	1
7.62-mm GP MG, PKM * .....	1
7.62-mm Sniper Rifle, SVD * .....	1
40-mm Grenade Launcher, GP-30.....	2
ATGL, Panzerfaust 3-T600 * .....	1
ATDL, Armbrust.....	1
Flame Weapon, RPO-A Series **.....	2
Mines (AP&AT) **/** .....	Assorted
Binocular Laser Rangefinder * .....	2
GPS Receiver, Handheld .....	2
Night-Vision Goggles .....	2
Night-Vision Goggles (AK w/GP-30).....	2
Radios: Handheld, Very-Low-Power.....	2

**NOTES:**

1. The infantry squad consists of at least two maneuver fire teams. The squad leader may choose to command one fire team while the assistant squad leader commands the second. The infantry squad may be augmented by elements from the weapons squad—in which case the infantry squad may operate with three maneuver fire teams (or anti-armor hunter-killer teams).
  2. The squad leader and assistant squad leader both have NVGs, a handheld radio, LRF, and GPS. The riflemen also support other weapons including the machinegunner, the ATGL grenadier, the sniper/marksman, or attachments from the weapons squad.
  3. Some squads may have a second machinegunner in lieu of the rifleman (mission dependent). In this case the second rifleman becomes the assistant machinegunner. You gain a PKM and PM for the machinegunner and an AK-47M for the assistant machinegunner but lose the two AK-74M/GP-30s the riflemen carried previous to the substitution.
- \* with II night sight.  
 \*\* Issued as ammunition rather than weapon; BOI may vary  
 \*\*\* Includes remotely detonated mines and side-attack (AT and anti-vehicle) mines. The mine mix is mission dependent and varies.

**Figure 4-22. Guerrilla Squad (Example)**

## WOMEN AS COMBATANTS

4-111. Women participate in many armed forces throughout the world. When acting as combatants, they are protected by the same rules as their male counterparts. If moved to a prisoner of war camp, they should be held separately from men.

4-112. From a support perspective, women can be key operators in the logistical support of irregular forces. Personnel operations can involve the recruitment of new members and a maternal acceptance from men and women recruits coming as an image of mother, aunt, sister, or friend. Recruitment can exist in the form of selective invitation and voluntary acceptance to overt coercion and forceful levy for irregular manning on a local community.

4-113. Propaganda and general news reporting often spotlights the contributions of women in particular irregular warfare locales or regions. Direct actions by women span a broad range of capabilities and demonstrated performance in both rural and urban settings. The act and weapon of suicide bombing by women is one example of a sensational combat incident that receives much attention in media affairs. Less obvious but often just as dangerous are the many other forms of direct combative and support activities.

4-114. Training of particular skills such a bomb making or other functional capabilities and apprenticeship programs can support the transition of recruits to be fully accepted members of an irregular force. Women may be responsible for establishing and maintaining safe houses for irregulars that may require a temporary haven on short notice. Women may also be the overt presence in a facility used for maintaining kidnapped people, cached supplies, or medical treatment sites. Women serve a valuable role as couriers when cultural custom or civil restrictions in a region allow them easier ability to transit public areas without the level of detailed personal searches that a man would normally experience at checkpoints.



**Figure 4-23. Female Suicide Bomber IED**

4-115. Fund raising and the informal connections within a community can use women as a significant symbol of family value and need. Irregular forces may encourage their charity front organizations to promote the visible presence of women in their public collection efforts.

4-116. When the option of public expression is available in a locale or region, such as recognition as a legitimate political party, similar attention can be placed in media affairs coordination and publicity of women as journalists in support of fighters in irregular warfare. In some cases, women have earned prestige as a political spokesperson for an irregular force agenda.

4-117. Women have been acknowledged in irregular forces as effective direct action fighters for decades. Whether acting in direct action as a fighter with a weapon, a courier of money or munitions, a shield to male fighters who engage an opponent with small arms fire, or other forms of support operations in an irregular force, the role of women in irregular warfare is a significant combat multiplier.

## CHILDREN AS COMBATANTS

4-118. A child is generally defined as a person who is not yet 18 years old. In the law of armed conflict, however, different provisions apply to those under 15 years of age and those between 15 and 18. In this discussion, the term child is defined as a person under 15 years of age. Treaty law prohibits the direct participation in hostilities of children under the age of 15. If children are recruited into armed forces and captured during hostilities, they are handled with conditions of captivity which take their age into consideration whether or not they are prisoners of war.

4-119. Contemporary conflicts often experience the active participation of children in hostilities. Boys and girls have been direct participants in armed conflict as part of irregular forces. Whether obtained as an expedient in a localized condition or coerced in a tradition of dragooning children in the absence of adults or kidnapping children from a locale, the child irregular can be just as dangerous as an adult irregular. These child fighters may operate often with little or no training. Incidents have been confirmed where alcohol and drugs dulled resistance by children to assist in irregular force activities. Terrorist organizations have used children's toys and props such as backpacks in order to camouflage explosive charges.



**Figure 4-24. Child's School Bag with Improvised Explosives**

4-120. Irregular forces have been known to use lesser trained conscripts that include boys and girls as the initial elements of assaults, raids, or other forms of attack. More experienced veterans of irregular conflict allow these elements to take the brunt of opposing small arms fire when attacking an enemy. Veterans adjust their tactical maneuver in reaction to the effect on these children front ranks. Irregular force casualties are replaced with subsequent forced conscription and extortion of regional families for children, adolescents, and adults, or similar collection schemes from displaced people in an area of operations.

4-121. In a 2010 International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague on a former militia leader and his use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), former child soldiers testified:

...being abducted by [rebel] militia while on their way from school and being subjected to harsh training routines in [rebel] camps where punishment for disobeying orders ranged from being detained in waterlogged pits to flogging. They said those who were found guilty of deserting the frontline were killed by firing squad... being forced by their superiors to extort money from civilians, and how commanders routinely raped female child soldiers. Many of them testified to being forced to smoke cannabis before going to battle, as their commanders believed the drugs made the minors fearless.

4-122. Reports in 2010 noted that the Taliban were using children as young as five years old to carry and emplace improvised explosive devices in areas of Afghanistan. In one case, surveillance cameras recorded one child placing an IED in a hole and another child following close behind the first child to cover the IED

along a road. In a separate instance within the region, a child approached coalition forces in a friendly manner, identified who the patrol leader was, returned later to the same patrol, and detonated a suicide vest.

## SECTION V - IRREGULAR FORCES IN AN INSURGENCY (EXAMPLE)

### LOCAL INSURGENT ORGANIZATION (EXAMPLE)

4-123. Insurgent organizations are a category of irregular forces. This section presents generic examples of how an insurgent irregular force could be organized. The appearance of an insurgent group and that of a guerrilla unit or a terrorist cell may be difficult to determine without understanding the purpose and intent of a specific organization. With no regularized table of organization and equipment structure, factors that shape an insurgent irregular force include its ideological frame, mission, environment, geographic factors, and other operational variables. The configuration and composition of each insurgent organization and its subordinate cells is case specific to a particular operational environment. (See FM 7-100.4, APP C).

4-124. The term *local insurgent organization* includes any insurgent organization below regional, provincial, or district level in a more traditional description of insurgency and its political activities. Geographic entities include small cities, towns, villages, parishes, communities, and neighborhoods, or other lower-level insurgent clusters of the indigenous population. Cities with a large population or urban areas covering large areas such as a metropolis or megalopolis may be considered regions and may have several local competing insurgent organizations. These local insurgent organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. Local insurgent organizations can be subordinate or loosely affiliated to a larger insurgent structure or may be independent actors with their own agenda.

4-125. A generic template of direct action cells and functional capabilities that might exist in a local insurgent organization is displayed at Figure 2-25. FM 7-100.4 provides detailed narratives, equipment lists, and a series of illustrations with manning, weapons, and materiel. Direct action cells can be multifunctional or have a specified purpose. The dashed boxes in the graphic indicate the possibility for tailored numbers of cell organization depending on required functions. Other direct action or functional cells may emerge during brief or sustained periods while others may diminish in capability or disappear as a threat.

4-126. This section provides examples of insurgent organization and functions that can be tailored for a particular threat. A number of multifunction direct action cells and specialized cells present a menu from which to construct an organization. The dashed boxes in the local insurgent organizational graphic indicate possibilities for varying numbers of each type of cell. For the overall local insurgent organization and for any cell where organizational diagrams show varying numbers of subordinate teams, personnel and equipment totals reflect only the cells in solid boxes.

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**Note.** For details on number of personnel and specific options on equipment and weapon systems, see FM 7-100.4.

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4-127. The term *local insurgent organization* includes any insurgent organization below regional, provincial, or district level and can be located in urban, rural, or both urban and rural locales. The insurgent organization is primarily a covert organization. Its structure is cellular and more typical of groups using terror tactics, while the guerrilla's organization reflects their functioning similar to a more formal military structure such as platoon, company, or battalion.

4-128. Their ability to continually adapt to all aspects of their environment is directly relational to their survivability and lethality. There are several factors that differentiate the structure and capability of the insurgent organization direct action cells from the structure and capability of a guerrilla organization. The

leader of any insurgent organization may be one individual, with or without advisors; several individuals and advisors; or a council. The leader may also be a tribal, cultural, political, or religious leader. A leadership council may be comprised of tribal, religious, political, secular, radical sectarian, or other personnel, or any combination of the above. A guerrilla unit will use a military command hierarchy.

4-129. The weapons of the insurgents are generally limited to small arms, RPGs, and IEDs with very few crew-served weapons (82-mm mortar, 107-mm single tube rocket launcher). A guerrilla organization contains weapons up to and including 120-mm mortars, ATGMs, and MANPADS, and can conduct limited mine warfare and sapper attacks. While both organizations are very effective and lethal in close and populated terrain, the guerrilla organization normally performs more typical fire and maneuver tactics.

4-130. Insurgent organizations generally do not possess the heavier and more sophisticated equipment the guerrilla organization may possess. Some examples of equipment and capability the guerrillas have in their organizations that the insurgents generally do not have included: 73/82/84-mm recoilless guns, 100-mm and 120-mm mortars, ATGMs, MANPADS, or GPS jammers. In the event insurgents require these weapons or capabilities, they may either obtain them from guerrillas or the guerrilla organization may provide its services depending on the relationship between the two organizations.




Figure 4-25. Local Insurgent Organization (Example)

4-131. Local insurgent organizations are not always subordinate to a regional, national, or transnational insurgent organization. The localized insurgent organization may not be associated with a larger insurgent movement. They can be either subordinate or loosely affiliated, or they may be completely independent of regional and national insurgent organizations. Relationships can fluctuate and be mission dependent, event or agenda oriented, or for any other reason or motivation. In some cases a local insurgent organization may provide only financial support and general guidance to their action elements (organic direct action cells). There may be loose coordination of attacks due to a specific affiliation, after which the organizations revert back to their independent modes.

4-132. Local insurgent organizations may have some type of relationship with guerrilla organizations or criminal organizations or noncombatants, based on similar or a shared goals and interests. Insurgents receive a wide variety of support from noncombatants. The support provided by many different categories of noncombatants ranges from only being sympathetic to the goals of the insurgents, to providing monetary support, to actively supporting and engaging in combat alongside the insurgents or with guerrillas.

4-133. Insurgent forces conduct reconnaissance to obtain information about the terrain or the activities and resources of the enemy. Observation is the most common method used to conduct reconnaissance. However, with the availability of specific equipment, reconnaissance using electronic devices is becoming increasingly popular.

4-134. Reconnaissance is crucial prior to the execution of raids and ambushes. Typically, a reconnaissance patrol reconnoiters the routes to and from the site and the site layout, and observes the capability of the enemy. Whenever possible, the leader uses personnel who are local residents of the area to conduct the reconnaissance mission. If practical, he personally checks the area near the raid or ambush site.

4-135. Surveillance using visual, electronic, photographic, or other means is continually collecting data. Civilians living, traveling, or working near either a target area or the enemy can conduct surveillance on behalf of the insurgent forces. Some civilians volunteer, while others are coerced into providing this support. The leader and his intelligence section evaluate the information passed by civilians based on their trustworthiness and past performance. Intelligence section members also conduct surveillance. After collecting information through reconnaissance and surveillance, by coming in contact with the enemy, or by interviewing civilians, insurgent personnel prepare an intelligence report that is constantly updated.

4-136. The members in an insurgent organization are likely to be indistinguishable from the local population other than weaponry which they may conceal to blend into the population. Insurgent organizations usually contain a mixture of men, women, and children. Local women and children may be used as runners, videographer/camera operators, messengers, scouts, guides, suicide bombers, drivers, porters, snipers, lookouts, or in other roles. They may also serve willingly or unwillingly as suicide bombers. Insurgents may attempt to appear as if they are local militia, police, security guards, or other acceptable armed groups.

4-137. The intelligence, counterintelligence, security, planning, information warfare, logistics, communications, technical support, finance, training, recruiting, transport, civil affairs, shelter, and medical cells are subordinate to the insurgent organization either supporting the role of the direction action cells or exploit their successes. Some insurgent organizations may not have separate cells for all of the above functions; however, someone in the organization can be designated to perform these functions. Key events and results of direct action cell activities can be recorded with videotape and still photographs. Upon mission completion, the digitalized recordings are turned over to the information warfare cell for manipulation and exploitation. The videographer or camera operator may position in the populace in order to record an attack, or may record the preparatory phases of a mission, such as loading explosives, for future training reference. In other situations, an event or activity will be staged for the camera.

4-138. Depending on the mission, the local insurgent organization may be augmented with personnel and by varied types of vehicles. Insurgents may have no vehicles or supplies at all and rely completely on caches, porters, or other transportation or supply means. Local sympathizers may volunteer their equipment and services. Insurgents may requisition or confiscate local civilian transportation assets and materiel. This

includes the use of civilian personnel for porters and possibly as lookouts and security personnel. In particular environments, draft animals may also be used as bearers/porters.

### HIGHER INSURGENT ORGANIZATION (EXAMPLE)

4-139. The term higher insurgent organization includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial, district, national, or transnational level. Cities, towns, or villages with a large population or covering a large geographic area can be considered regions in particular situations and may therefore control several local insurgent or guerrilla organizations.




Figure 4-26. Higher Insurgent Organization (Example)

4-140. Higher insurgent organizations usually contain a mix of local insurgent and guerrilla organizations. Each of these organizations provides differing capabilities.

4-141. The term *higher insurgent organization* includes any insurgent organization at regional, provincial, district, or national level, or at the transnational level. Large population centers or covering large geographic areas such as a metropolis or megalopolis may therefore control several local insurgent organizations and include guerrilla units. The example at figure 4-26 provides a generic template of capabilities that might exist in a higher insurgent organization. See FM 7-100.4 for a detailed narrative, equipment lists, and series of illustrations with manning, weapons, and materiel. Other direct action cells and functional cells may emerge during brief or sustained periods. As in the local level insurgent illustration, the dashed boxes in the higher insurgent graphic indicate the possibility for tailored numbers of cell organization depending on required functions.

4-142. The mission, environment, geographic factors, goal, and many other variables determine the configuration, and composition of each insurgent organization. Insurgent organizations may or may not be associated or subordinate to a higher insurgent organization such as that at the national or transnational level. The insurgents may operate independently without central guidance or direction from the overall movement and may not be associated with a higher echelon of insurgent movement. The insurgent organization can be subordinate, loosely affiliated, or completely autonomous and independent of national and higher insurgent organizations

4-143. The dashed boxes in the organizational graphic indicate the possibilities for varying numbers of each type of cell, depending on the functions required for the insurgent organization to accomplish its mission. Personnel and equipment totals will vary among higher insurgent organizations.

4-144. Insurgent organizations may have some type of relationship with guerrilla organizations or criminal organizations or other civilians based on similar or a shared goals and interests. The nature of the shared goal and interest determines the tenure and type of relationship and the degree of affiliation. In some cases lower level guerrilla organizations may be subordinate to a local insurgent organization. Higher insurgent organizations may have guerrilla organizations subordinate in the overall structure.

4-145. Subordinates and supporting elements of insurgent organizations may or may not be collocated with each other or with an insurgent organization. They may be dispersed in separate villages, towns, cities, regions, states, or countries, as long as they can adequately and securely provide the required support in a timely fashion. The numbers and types of each, and their locations may change frequently. There are several types of support that provide information about irregular force capabilities. These measures of indicate political and popular support, fiscal assistance for a group, training, as well as the number of personnel and sympathizers the group influences. These aspects are additive to an organization's abilities to conduct and sustain operations, gather intelligence, seek sanctuary and exploit the results of operations.

## RECRUITING

4-146. The recruiting cell is the manpower resourcing and recruitment planner for the insurgent organization. Insurgent organizations may attempt to recruit current or former members of national armed forces, both as trained operatives and as agents within an enemy's organization. Recruiting may be for particular skills, training, and qualifications, and may not be tied to ideological characteristics. Recruits might not be aware of the true nature of the organization they are joining. Legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for insurgent organizations. The organizations from which individuals can be recruited need not necessarily be violent or illegal themselves, but simply contain populations that are sympathetic to the same goals as the insurgent organization. Incentives for recruitment may include monetary, religious, ethic, nationalistic, frustration, revenge, power, or fear. Recruiting may be wittingly or unwittingly financed from governmental and nongovernmental donations and grants.

4-147. Insurgents may also use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from key individuals. This cooperation can range anywhere from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing. Blackmail and intimidation are common forms of coercion. Other support from civilians can range actions sympathetic to the goals of the insurgences, to monetary support, to those actively supporting and engaging in combat alongside the insurgents and guerrillas. The relational dynamics include all of the

actors in the insurgent’s environment. Insurgents may use, fight alongside of, or assist affiliated forces, and guerrillas to achieve their common missions and goals.

## TRAINING

4-148. Training is evaluated by the level of proficiency with tactics, techniques, technology and weapons useful to terrorist operations. Innovative application of tactics can render moderately harmless activities threatening. For example, the ability to stage a peaceful demonstration may be used to set the conditions for a riot that will provide cover for sniper assassinations of responding security forces.

4-149. Training video tapes have shown terrorist operatives conducting live fire exercises for a number of scenarios. These scenarios include assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and small unit raids on various types of targets. They often conduct detailed planning, diagramming, and walk-through rehearsals prior to the actual live-fire training exercise. The Internet provides easy access to current techniques and procedures conducted by any cell willing to place its operations on websites with videotape, interviews, analyses, and exchange of emerging ideas to improve proficiency.



**Figure 4-27. AQIM Training: Sand Table Rehearsal, Video Live-Feed Recon, and Attack**

4-150. Proliferation of expertise and technology enables irregular forces to easily acquire particular skills. In addition to the number of terrorists and terror groups that are willing and available to exchange training with one another, there are also experts in technical, scientific, operational, and intelligence fields willing to provide training or augment operational capabilities on a contract basis.

4-151. The training cell plans and facilitates training for the insurgent organization. Basic instruction covers the organization, duties, and responsibilities of the insurgent organization; basic marksmanship; surveillance and intelligence-collection methods; and basic tactical instruction and communications techniques. Examples of specialized instruction may include advanced tactical instruction, such as the proper conduct of ambushes, assassination, and sniper activities; advanced surveillance and intelligence-collection methods; kidnapping and extortions; and advanced skill training. Training may be centralized or conducted at the cell level depending on the structure and mission of the insurgent organization. Generally, it is a combination of both, with the basics taught in a centralized location and specific mission and functional training conducted at the local cellular level.

## GENERAL SUPPORT

4-152. General support for an insurgent group is divided into two sources of internal and external support. Primarily, insurgent organizations must rely on themselves and the various cells or sections internal to the

organization for assistance. To attain long-term goals, popular support is critical. Some actions require external locations in other countries, organizations, or individuals sympathizing with the insurgents may help the insurgency develop or hasten its victory.

4-153. Internal support is critical to the survival of any insurgency. Depending on its strategy, the insurgent force either needs internal support immediately as in a case of a protracted popular war or urban strategy, or it assumes internal support already exists or will exist as in a military-focused strategy. Insurgents try to force the enemy into responses that alienate the populace from the government and create popular support for the insurgency. Regardless, the insurgency cannot succeed without internal support at some point.

4-154. The indigenous population may provide active or passive support. Active supporters assist either by joining the insurgency or by providing goods and services. They may provide information, offer refuge, maintain or repair equipment, or participate in rallies. Passive support includes those who sympathize but do not provide assistance. Techniques used to gain and maintain popular support include persuasion, coercion, or appealing to people's needs and wants.

### **FINANCIAL-ECONOMIC**

4-155. Money is a significant force multiplier of capabilities and involves practical matters of income and expenditure. Many of the terror groups of significant durability such as HAMAS or Hizballah have large financial resources. Infrastructure costs consider the political and social support obligations that some groups promote to the population they exist within in order to gain active or passive support.

4-156. HAMAS is an example of a terrorist organization with significant strong financial support. Although the actual amount of money available to HAMAS is difficult to determine, estimates are that they obtain several tens of millions of dollars per year. Sources for their funding include unofficial sources in the Mideast and includes support from Iran. They also receive funds that are siphoned from apparent charities or profitable economic projects that are actually front organizations for HAMAS.

4-157. The finance cell is the financial and economic planner for the insurgent organization. It plans fund-raising activities and incorporates bribery, extortion, robbery, and front companies to resource the insurgent organization's activities. This includes local, regional, and links to national and international fund-raising activities. The cell also influences some roles of direct action cells and other cells in acquiring additional funds for the insurgent organization. Finance personnel establish and monitor internal and external funding and funds management mechanisms. Similarly, skilled operators appeal to the local and international community, possibly through the media, for an interrelated political, monetary, and logistics support.

### **SUPPLY BASES**

4-158. Supply bases in semi-fixed locations are the largest facilities used for the storage and distribution of equipment, materiel, and supplies. Generally, these facilities characterize the upper echelons of the supply system and are high-value targets for the enemy. These facilities are very well protected and concealed. Supplies located in these bases are cross-leveled or redundant in nature, so that if one base is compromised or destroyed, the capability may be reduced but not significantly impaired.

### **CACHES**

4-159. Caches are hiding places for selected supplies and equipment will use local rural or urban terrain to conceal their location. Examples include storage areas found underground or in dense vegetation, caves, remote areas, basements, or false walls. Security measures employed to protect caches include obstacles, patrols, guards, and early warning systems. In case of compromise, insurgents often configure caches with demolitions to prevent the enemy from using the equipment or supplies.

### **CAMPS AND SANCTUARIES**

4-160. Insurgent forces need safe areas where they can retire, voluntarily or involuntarily, in order to rest and recuperate; to maintain, repair, and prepare equipment and weapons; or to train. These areas, sometimes

called camps, are located in remote, rugged terrain or areas away from avenues of approach into a region occupied by irregular forces. Camps located in other countries are referred to as sanctuaries.

4-161. Camps have no set pattern and can be permanent or temporary. A low-capability insurgent force is more likely to have temporary camps. The purpose of the camp, size of the force, operational purpose for using the camp, and terrain determine the dimensions of the camp. There are four basic types of camps—base, reserve, mobile, and false.

4-162. A base camp is a permanent camp used for command and control or training. The insurgent organization constructs buildings and training facilities in areas under its control or in other countries. These camps have an integral security system based on concentric rings of extensive security measures, such as observation posts, guards, patrols, obstacles, and early warning systems.

4-163. A reserve camp is a preselected location that forces occupy if the base camp is permanently evacuated. Once occupied, the reserve camp becomes the base camp. The location of a reserve camp is closely guarded and known only to select members. During the conduct of actions, insurgents may establish temporary mobile camps. Emplacing false camps intends to deceive enemy forces regarding the actual location of irregular force camps, and may create circumstances to ambush enemy forces.

### **SAFE HOUSES**

4-164. A safe house is a building or location where irregular forces engage in activities with relative security from discovery. A safe house is similar to a base camp in order to provide sanctuary but will normally be minimal in its geographic signature.

## **POLITICAL-MILITARY CAPABILITY**

4-165. As an insurgent organization develops, a political structure evolves to communicate with the indigenous population, external supporters, and the disaffected members of the enemy. The leaders in this political headquarters direct the actions of military operations in order to ensure that the insurgency remains focused on reaching its long-term goals.

4-166. The political headquarters guides and directs the overall insurgent organization through a series of lower-level political headquarters based on geographic location and population demographics. A central military headquarters of the insurgent organization is subordinate to the political headquarters. Under this military headquarters, the insurgency's military organization as a network of insurgent units located in various parts of the targeted country, has its own command structure. Lower-level military or paramilitary units coordinate and comply with the political headquarters of the geographic area in which they are operating and maintain liaison with those political headquarters. Additional detailed information is available in FM 7-100.1 and FM 7-100.4.

4-167. A front is the largest area of territorial responsibility and includes several regions. Political regions are geographical and are influenced by demographic data by design. A region coordinates the actions of its subordinate districts. Each region is comprised of a varying number of districts. Geographic relationships and the population distribution serve as the basis for the formation of districts. Districts typically form within a city section, encompass a large village, or several small villages occupying a large area. These regions and districts may or may not geographically align with the boundaries established by the present government.

4-168. Fronts, regions, and districts are political organizations, whereas battalions and companies are military organizations with a separate command structure from the political headquarters. Within the force structure, battalions and companies are subordinate to the military headquarters. The number of battalions and companies per region and district depends on the size of the region, the amount of internal support, available resources, and the overall capability of the organization. These battalions vary in composition and size.

4-169. Since the insurgency may have several political or military elements at different phases of development, some conditions may dictate variation of subordination within both the political and military structures. The military structure may have some insurgent battalions or companies seemingly not associated with a military headquarters in that district or region. These seemingly autonomous entities are indeed within the political-military structure and have command and control relationships similar to conventional military units referred to as a separate unit.

4-170. Coordination and communications exist between different levels of the political structures and military structures. Subordinate political entities may have a local agenda which supports the overall political campaign. Similarly, military commanders only follow orders from their higher command. Since both political and military entities share the same geographical area and long-term goals, coordination and liaison between the two is essential. Even though the political and military structures are independent organizations they are mutually supportive and the needs and actions of one side can influence the activities and agenda of each other in order to attain the mutual goal.



**Figure 4-28. Insurgent Political Structure (Example)**

4-171. The organization and mission of a large, high-capability insurgent force closely approximate the characteristics of conventional military forces. Although well-developed insurgent groups are capable of conducting force-on-force actions, hit-and-run actions such as raids, ambushes, and terror tactics are preferred. These activities are normally low-risk and high-payoff.

4-172. Does the organization have political sponsors or representation, either within international, state, or sub-state political bodies? This degree to which a group is state sponsored or supported impact the organization’s political representation. Political support can blur the distinction between terrorism and other forms of conflict and can generate sympathy and reduce negative consequences. What is the level of popular support or empathy? Passive or active support for the organization among the population it affects or operates within shapes the organizational tempo of activities. Support from a constituency increases the effectiveness of other types of support and increases the legitimacy and visibility of a group. This may also reduce the security risks and complicate the tasks of detection and defeat for the opposing security forces.

4-173. The size of a group in terms of the number of personnel is important but less so than other aspects of support. A small, well-funded, highly trained group may effectively attack targets, whereas a larger poorly funded and untrained group may be no direct threat to U.S. targets other than those in immediate proximity to its base area of operations.

**SECTION VI - IRREGULAR FORCES AND TERRORISM**

4-174. Irregular forces can use terrorism or associate with elements recognized as terrorist organizations in the conduct of irregular warfare. Capabilities of an irregular force can often be assessed by comparing the known association with the sophistication of sponsorship for terrorism by state and non-state actors. This

section addresses several common classifications of support to terrorist organizations, and provides a means to determine reasonable levels of direct and general support available to a specific irregular force.

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*Note.* The concept of a terrorist cell operating for a sole purpose of conducting terrorism is improbable. From an irregular warfare perspective, an irregular force might use terrorism to coerce or otherwise influence an adversary as well as influence a targeted population.

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## IRREGULAR AND TERRORIST AFFILIATIONS

4-175. Categorizing terrorist groups by their affiliation with governments or other actors provides indications of their capability for intelligence, operations, sustainment, and access to types of weapons. U.S. joint doctrine identifies three affiliations: state-directed, state-supported, and non-state supported terrorist groups.

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*Note.* Additional terrorism and organizational affiliation data is available in TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (Version 5.0).

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### STATE DIRECTED TERROR

4-176. This form of terror is sometimes referred to as “terror from above” where a government terrorizes its own population to control and repress them. These actions are acknowledged policy of the government and apply official institutions such as the judiciary, police, military, and other government agencies. Changes to legal codes can permit or encourage torture, murder, or property destruction in pursuit of government policy. Methods included demonstration trials with predetermined verdicts on political opponents, punishing family or friends of suspected enemies of the regime, and extralegal use of police or military force against the population. Historical examples include Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons in a campaign against his Kurdish population in Iraq.



4-177. State directed terror can include death squads as unofficial actions taken by officials or functionaries of a regime to repress or intimidate their own population. While these officials will not claim responsibility for such activities, information often indicates that these acts are sponsored by the state.

### STATE SUPPORTED TERROR.

4-178. Some governments provide supplies, training, and other forms of support to non-state terrorist organizations. This support can be provided without intending any specified governing authority by the state. Provision can be safe haven or physical basing for a terrorist network. Another crucial service a state sponsor can provide is false documentation for personal identification such as passports or internal identity documents. Other means of support can include access to training facilities and expertise not readily available to terrorists, extension of diplomatic protections and services such as immunity from extradition, use of



embassies and other protected grounds, or diplomatic pouches to transport weapons or explosives.

4-179. The U.S. Department of State declares four state sponsors of terror: Iran, Syria, Cuba, and Sudan. State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism. This support includes extensive funding, training, and weapons to terrorist networks.

4-180. Syria's political and material support of Hizballah is another example. Syrian political support includes the physical basing of leadership structure for several terrorist organizations such as other states remain a concern. Sudan has openly supported HAMAS, but has been taking measures to disrupt foreign fighters from using Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for extremists going to Iraq.

4-181. North Korea has not been openly supporting terrorist networks for several decades; however, the 2006 detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea provides a threat of expanding the possibility of WMD technology being obtained by terrorist networks. As part of ongoing international negotiations to limit North Korea's nuclear weaponry, on October 11, 2008 the United States rescinded its designation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law. Nonetheless, North Korea has conducted atomic tests and regularly threatens use of nuclear weapons.

## NON-STATE SUPPORTED TERROR

4-182. Forms of terrorism threats range non-state transnational networks with global reach capability such as al-Qaida, terrorist cells affiliated with regional or international aims, or individual self-radicalized and unaffiliated terrorists with single issue agendas. Yet, each type of network or terrorist cell has criminal intentions limited by finite capability. Terrorists exist as a foreign and domestic threat to the United States in the U.S. Homeland and in United States presence throughout the world.

4-183. Conflict will continue to be an adaptive and often asymmetric arena. Given the significance of U.S. military power and the effectiveness of other U.S. elements of national power in finance, intelligence, diplomatic, legal, and social domains, a noticeable structural change has occurred in many terrorist activities. Enemy distribution of forces to reduce physical and cyber visibility already appears as small cells or even individuals acting in a distributed or semi-independent manner.

4-184. Some terrorists are fully independent and have self-radicalized. Terms such as fifth generation warfare or unrestricted warfare indicate capabilities that globalization provides advanced knowledge and technology, mobile international transportation, and cyber communication as expanding means for asymmetric conflict.

4-185. The descriptor of "homegrown threat" to the United States is indicative of individuals or small groups of individuals resident in the United States that are intent on harming the U.S. citizenry. These terrorists may be U.S. citizens or citizens from other nations. Examples range terrorists who have quietly embedded themselves in our society from international locations to U.S. citizens with special agendas that may result in terrorist attacks. Either type of group or individual may incorporate established criminal links to enhance capabilities.

4-186. Association between or among terrorist groups increase their capabilities through the exchange of knowledge and other resources. Exchanges occur both directly and indirectly. Direct exchange occurs when one group provides the other with training or experienced personnel not readily available otherwise. An example of direct exchange is the provision of sophisticated bomb construction expertise by the IRA and ETA to less experienced groups. "In 2001, three members associated with the IRA were arrested in Colombia." Traveling on false passports and with traces of explosives on their clothes and luggage, the three individuals appeared to be an instance of inter-group terrorist support in use of explosives and other terrorist techniques. U.S. government reports state an IRA and FARC connection since at least 1998 with multiple visits of IRA operatives to Colombia. "Terrorism techniques not previously observed as a norm in FARC operations, such as use of secondary explosive devices, indicate a transfer of IRA techniques."



mercenaries, a significant body of independent or loosely collaborative individuals may be available for hire to an irregular organization. These personnel may have served in guerrilla units or regular military units.


4-191. Transnational economic entities such as international business corporations, may provide support in order to further their business interests, or provide assistance as the result of coercion or extortion. Individual financiers may provide support in order to advance personal agendas or cultural, ethnic, political or religious causes.

## IRREGULAR FORCE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES

4-192. Although much of irregular warfare applies political and diplomatic means, assessing and evaluating the military variable of an OE remains mutually critical. To understand varied levels of irregular force capabilities, comparison and contrasts can use an unclassified four tier system of weapon system and equipment capabilities in the current three volume set of the TRADOC G2 *Worldwide Equipment Guide* (WEG).

4-193. Equipment tiers are arranged and explained with detailed data in the TRADOC G2 *Worldwide Equipment Guide* (WEG). Four tiers of weapon system and equipment capabilities represent examples of comparable levels of modernity for use with a force at that a particular level of capability.

4-194. Each tier provides an equivalent level of capability for systems across different functional areas. A value to using the tier tables is determining comparative combat power variables among irregular forces and potential or known adversaries and enemies.



### TIER I

4-195. Tier I is the highest state of readiness with weapons systems across the functional areas that a major military force with state-of-the-art technology would generally have in an operationally ready and deployable condition. This capability provides an irregular force with technical equality or selected overmatch against similar U.S. military forces weapon systems. A high caliber rifle with sophisticated optics is an example of bridging Tier II and Tier I weapon systems in contemporary operations.

### TIER II

4-196. Tier II provides modern competitive weapons systems, fielded in significant numbers for the last 10 to 20 years, available to an irregular force. This level of capability can minimize vulnerabilities with progressive application of available technology and skills training upgrades.



Figure 4-30. Sniper System (Tier I Weapon Example)

### TIER III

4-197. Tier III categorizes equipment systems dating to the past as 30 to 40 years. These weapon systems have limitations in subsystems categories of mobility, survivability, and lethality. This tier can challenge vulnerabilities of U.S. forces.

### TIER IV

4-198. Tier IV weapon systems are 40 to 50 years old. Some of these systems have been upgraded numerous times. The equipment characterizes technology and weaponry that is outdated and substandard to contemporary systems. At the tactical level of conflict, adaptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); niche technologies, and limitations caused by OE variables could enable a Tier IV irregular force to challenge the effectiveness of a U.S. or partner force. Improvised weapons or equipment are a norm in this level of equipment capability. For example, an Enfield rifle can be just as effective as a sophisticated sniper system when employed by a trained individual in particular conditions.



**Figure 4-31. Enfield Rifle (Tier IV Weapon Example)**

4-199. Equipment capability categorized by a tiered system cannot be easily compared to a particular threat or enemy. Weapon systems used by a particular adversary may range one or more tiers. A Tier I sniper weapon system with sophisticated optics can be compared and contrasted with a reliable rifle with open sights such as the Enfield, as a Tier IV weapon. Contemporary operations in various U.S. combatant commands demonstrate that an adversary will attempt to remain flexible and adaptive in order to counter U.S. military forces capabilities. The novel or asymmetric approach to countering U.S. strengths requires diligent intelligence and constant probing for weakness or lapse in protection.

## SUMMARY

4-200. This chapter provided descriptions of the common organizational models for irregular forces. Discussion focused on hierarchical and networked structure. Levels of commitment exist within an organization and span senior leaders, active cadre, active supporters, and passive supporters. The cell is the foundation building block of either organization. Depending on how cells are linked to other elements, structure will display one of three basic configurations: chain, hub and star, or all-channel networks. Irregular forces can align as state directed, state sponsored, or non-state supported organizations. In some cases, the state itself can be a terrorist regime. Principal themes in knowing the threat and an enemy are: (1) examine who will want to engage U.S. military forces with irregular forces and terrorism, (2) understand organizational models of significant irregular forces and terrorist cells, and (3) determine probable capabilities of specific irregular forces based on their affiliation or association with other terrorist groups, powerful criminal organizations, or sovereign governments. Proactive knowledge and situational awareness of an operational environment and the actors in an OE enhance the ability for irregular forces to counter the effects of enemy activity in the conduct of irregular force missions.

## Chapter 5

# Actors in Complex Contemporary Conditions

*As the [U.S.] Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew. At the same time, emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our understanding of the global security environment. Military success alone will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment.*

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008)

This chapter addresses several complex conditions in irregular force operations. The irregular combatant actors of these organizations can be categorized usually as insurgents, guerrillas, various forms of militiamen, or criminals cooperating as irregular forces. The complex conditions of irregular warfare will involve a host of noncombatants too. Distinction between a combatant and noncombatant may appear unclear in some circumstances; however, the law of armed conflict as adopted by the Geneva Conventions states specific criteria to describe a combatant. Compliance or disregard for the law of war or international agreements in armed conflict can be used to support irregular force intentions. This chapter discusses a range of combatant, armed noncombatant, and unarmed noncombatant organizations or activities that complicate the conduct of military missions in a contemporary operational environment.




Figure 5-1. Combatant and Noncombatant Actors and Irregular forces

## SECTION I - KNOW COMBATANT FROM NONCOMBATANT

5-1. As defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, an irregular actor is an armed individual or group who is not a member of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security force. When irregular

forces are difficult to distinguish from a civilian noncombatant population, terms such as unlawful enemy combatant describe individuals who do not openly carry weapons, and yet, are active supporters to an irregular force. The U.S. Department of Defense states that individuals who engage in such acts in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict are not entitled to combatant immunity and may be held accountable for their unlawful actions.

5-2. The identification between a combatant and noncombatant can be a difficult task in a contemporary mission task that requires operating among a civilian population while confronting an irregular force. Rules of engagement and guidance for working effectively with a population can produce multiple decision dilemmas. Yet, even in the case of individuals acting as members of a militia, volunteer corps, or other form of self-titled or organized resistance, the Geneva Conventions criteria centers combatant description on people who operate under the recognized command and control of an organization, are clearly armed, and do not attempt to disguise their intended actions when deploying for a military-like operation and during the conduct of any military-like engagement.

## LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

### LAW OF WAR

5-3. The law of war is described as that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities and occupation. It is often called the “law of armed conflict” and encompasses international law applicable to the conduct of hostilities that is binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and applicable customary international law.

### BASIS FOR CONDUCT: TREATY LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT

5-4. Treaty law is based on Geneva law and Hague law. Geneva law is aimed at protecting the victims of a conflict who are in the power of the adversary – military or civilians apprehended in a conflict or taken as a prisoner of war (POW). The four 1949 Geneva Conventions are aimed at addressing such situations. These conventions protect the wounded and sick on land and at sea, prisoners of war and civilians. Hague law is very much practical soldier’s law with an aim to establish rules for the conduct of operations, on how the fighting is conducted by stating, for example, what you can attack and how you should attack it. It gives rules which limit the destructive effects of combat exceeding what is really necessary to achieve the military aim or mission.

5-5. The International Committee of the Red Cross provides a description of armed conflict in their *The Law of Armed Conflict* publication that notes at least three levels of conflict:

The law of armed conflict applies even if there has been no formal declaration of war. It applies in two quite different types of situation: international armed conflicts such as the Gulf War or non-international armed conflicts such as Sri Lanka. The 1949 Geneva Conventions adopted the more general term “armed conflict” deliberately to cover the complete range of situations and to avoid legal arguments over the exact definition of war. States today are less inclined to speak of war or admit that a state of war exists, but as we all know armed conflicts certainly do.

An armed conflict arises whenever there is fighting between states or protracted armed violence between government authorities and organized armed groups or just between organized armed groups. An international armed conflict arises when one state uses armed force against another state or states. The term also applies to all cases of total or partial military occupation, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance. It is irrelevant whether the states concerned consider themselves to be at war with each other or how they describe the conflict.

## **INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT**

5-6. An international armed conflict is considered to be over once active hostilities or territorial occupation have ceased. POWs still held by the parties nevertheless remain under the protection of the law until their ultimate release.

## **NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT**

5-7. Non-international armed conflicts, also known as internal armed conflicts, take place within the territory of a State and do not involve the armed forces of any other State. One example is the use of the State's armed forces against dissident, rebel or insurgent groups. Another is two or more armed groups fighting within a State, but not necessarily with the involvement of government troops. This type of conflict is covered by specific provisions of the law. Slightly different provisions apply where the internal opposition is better organized in terms of command and control of territory and therefore able to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and itself implement the law, but only if government forces are involved.

## **LOWER LEVELS OF INTERNAL VIOLENCE**

5-8. Lower levels of internal violence...can involve...internal disturbances and tensions involving violent demonstrations and riots – are not covered by the law of armed conflict. It can sometimes be difficult to tell exactly when the threshold for application has been crossed, but that is not a matter for you to decide. If in doubt, apply the rules for internal conflicts, together with whatever domestic legislation is applicable.

## **DEFINING KEY TERMS: ENEMY COMBATANTS**

5-9. The terms of insurgent and guerrilla are defined within this publication. The term militia is described generally as a paramilitary force organized and controlled by a sovereign government similar to an internal security force and is therefore not considered an irregular force for the purpose of this explanation. Nevertheless, some groups of armed individuals can band together and either self-declare or be categorized with the “militia” term.

The *Department of Defense Detainee Program* states policy and responsibilities to ensure compliance with the laws of the United States, the law of war, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and all applicable policies, directives, or other issuances. Some key terms in this program are defined in DOD Directive 2311.01E dated May 9, 2006. Terms used in this directive are defined, and are to be interpreted, in accordance with U.S. law and the law of war. For example, a detainee is defined as any person captured, detained, held, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel (military, civilian, or contractor employee) with some exclusion for persons being held primarily for law enforcement purposes, except where the United States is the occupying power. Other terms of great interest are enemy combatant, lawful enemy combatant, and unlawful enemy combatant. Definitions are provided in the special segment below.

## **DEFINING OTHER ARMED COMBATANTS**

5-10. Terms have specific meanings and combatants can be casually categorized without appropriate attention to what a particular term defines in the purpose, intent, or character of an armed combatant. Several terms that can easily be misused include paramilitary forces that are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resemble them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

## **PARAMILITARY**

5-11. A member of a paramilitary organization is specifically not a part of the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

## INSURGENT

5-12. An insurgent is member of an organized group or movement that uses subversion or violence in order to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

**Enemy Combatant**

In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy combatants.”

**Lawful Enemy Combatant**

Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power.

**Unlawful Enemy Combatant**

Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term Unlawful Enemy Combatant is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.

U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, September 5, 2006.

## GUERRILLA

5-13. A guerrilla is a combat participant in guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla operations are military and paramilitary actions conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular forces comprised of predominantly indigenous people of the region.

## TERRORIST

5-14. A terrorist is an individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. The following special segment provides definitions of these types of combatants with a merger of organizational definitions.

### Paramilitary

[Member of]...forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

JP 3-24

### Insurgent

[Member of]... an organized movement that uses an organized, protracted politico-military struggle to weaken control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

JP 3-24

### Guerrilla

A combat participant in guerrilla warfare...[that is, military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.]

JP 3-05

### Terrorist

An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives.

JP 3-07.2

See also: Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, as amended through April 2010, is dictionary for descriptions.

## MERCENARY

5-15. Mercenaries are essentially armed individuals who use conflict as a professional trade and service for private gain. The Geneva Conventions define mercenaries using six criteria. Those who fall within that definition are not considered combatants and are not entitled to prisoner of war status. A suspected mercenary should be treated as a prisoner of war until their status has been correctly determined by higher military authorities. If captured, individuals confirmed to be mercenaries who have taken a direct part in hostilities maybe put on trial as unlawful combatants under the conditions described above. In 1976, several individuals were put on trial as mercenaries in the Angolan civil war. Several mercenaries were found guilty and executed while several other mercenaries were found guilty and sentenced to prison.

5-16. The term mercenary applies to those acting individually and in formed units. An important note details the difference on soldiers serving officially in foreign armed forces. They are not mercenaries. Loan service personnel sent to help train the soldiers of other countries as part of an official training agreement between sovereign governments are not mercenaries even if they take a direct part in hostilities.

5-17. A brief description of mercenary, in accordance with Geneva Conventions (GC IV, Art. 5, GP I, Arts. 47 & 75 (1 & 4)), describes individuals who act individually or act a member of a formed group, and:

- Volunteer from recruitment locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict, are operating directly in the hostilities,

- Are motivated by the desire for private gain, are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party;
- Are neither nationals of a party to the conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict;
- Are not members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and are not on official military duty representing a country that is not involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment.

## DESCRIBING NONCOMBATANT EXAMPLES

5-18. The current *Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary* defines “noncombatant” as “one that does not engage in combat, such as a member (as a chaplain) of the armed forces whose duties do not include fighting.” As noncombatants, people are considered in a status of friendly, neutral, or unknown.

5-19. They can be either armed or unarmed, and have the potential to become combatants in certain conditions and may decide to support combatants willingly or be coerced to provide support. Noncombatants have protection and rights in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.

5-20. The U.S. Department of Defense does not define the term “noncombatant” in its dictionary but provides insight in describing “noncombatant evacuees.” Description includes words such as “citizen” and “civilian employees” and “their dependents.”

5-21. Given the indicators in these military and civilian definitions and for the purposes of this document, the term “noncombatant” is a civilian involved in an area of armed conflict, who is neither a willing nor coerced member of combative or supporting actions in irregular warfare nor the special categories recognized by the Geneva Conventions as noncombatant such as a chaplain.

5-22. Noncombatants, in the strictest sense, are individuals who are in an area of combat operations but are not armed and are not participating in any activity in support of any of the factions or forces involved in combat. Some of these nonmilitary elements may support or otherwise affect the conflict. Some of them might actually be armed. Knowing the actual character of an individual can be a dilemma.

5-23. To varying degrees, the civilian population has an impact all other elements that comprise the contemporary operational environment and to a large extent determines the nature of political and military action. Aside from military and paramilitary forces, the civilian population of a nation or region is often the single most important aspect of the environment. Two types of noncombatants used in this document are armed noncombatant and unarmed noncombatant.

## ARMED NONCOMBATANT (EXAMPLES)

5-24. There are likely to be armed noncombatants who are not part of any military or paramilitary organization. Some may be in possession of small arms legally to protect their families, property, or businesses. Some may use weapons as part of their occupation such as hunters, security guards, or local police. Some may be minor criminals who use their weapons for activities such as extortion and theft. Other criminals might steal from U.S. forces for personal profit. They may be completely neutral or display support at varied levels for either side or several sides of a conflict. However, they are not members of or directly affiliated with a hostile faction. Examples of armed noncombatants discussed commonly are legitimate private security contractor (PSC) organizations, or criminal organizations labeled as cartel, gang, or localized-regional militia. Some entities are completely legitimate enterprises while some activities can be criminal under the guise of legitimate civilian business.

## PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS

5-25. Private security contractors (PSC) are commercial business enterprises or local ad hoc groups that provide security and related security services on a contractual basis. Describing a PSC is varied in

understanding that depends on what a PSC actually does as functions. Titles can include: private military corporations, private military firms, private security companies, military services providers, or privatized military industry. Functions can include contract hire to protect a person or people, transport convoys, forward operating bases, buildings, and other economic infrastructure, as well as train security forces. Other descriptions include risk advisory services, cash transport, intelligence services, workplace security, war zone security needs, weapons procurement, personnel and budget vetting, armed support, air support, logistical support, maritime security, cyber security, weapons destruction, tasks within prisons, surveillance, psychological operations, or covert operations.

5-26. For the U.S., the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2008* (P.L. 110-181 Sec. 864) defines private security functions as the guarding of personnel, facilities, or properties, and any other activity for which contractors are required to be armed. However, this does not include unarmed personnel who provide services directly related to security, such as coordinating the movements of private security contractors throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. Many services provided by security contractors are more than armed security. Two major categories are: (1) armed services and (2) unarmed services.

- Armed Services: Static Site Security such as housing areas, building sites, government complexes,
- Convoy Security, and
- Security Escorts.
- Personal Security Details such as full time protective security for designated important people.
- Unarmed Services: Unarmed security functions can be more of a presence in some geographic areas,
- Operational Coordination (e.g., command and control, management, communications),
- Intelligence Analysis (e.g., information collection and threat analysis),
- Hostage Negotiation, and
- Security Training (e.g., training domestic and international security forces)

5-27. Private security contractors provide several key capabilities to the U.S. Government (USG). Often, they can be hired and deployed faster than a military force with similar skill sets. This flexibility allows USG agencies to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing operational environment. When employing PSC, more military forces are available to conduct traditional or specialized military missions. A fiscal consideration is apparent even though PSC can be analyzed as being an expensive fiscal decision. Short term, focused contractual agreements with contractual completion criteria can be a fiscal savings rather than making a long term investment on near term requirements that may change significantly in an area or capability. Nonetheless, U.S. Department of Defense and Department of State officials state that they would be unable to execute their respective mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the support of private security contractors. In a DOD report, there were 5,198 private security contractors in Afghanistan as of June 2009. Of these PSC, 99% or 5,165 were armed. For the armed PSC, 95% were local nationals.



Figure 5-2. PSC in VIP Security Task

5-28. Private security contracts can act as an adjunct to other security measures and provide advisors, instructors, and support and services personnel for host-nation military, paramilitary, and police forces training, as well as to private individuals and businesses such as transnational corporations. The PSCs may be legitimate, well-respected transnational corporations providing contract advisors and employees as part of a military nation-building program funded by a foreign government. PSCs may also be domestic firms, which supply contract guard forces. In its simplest form, a PSC might be a local citizen organization that performs these actions on a contractual basis.

5-29. From an irregular force perspective, these factors and demographics can be analyzed for potential vulnerabilities and subversive or direct actions by the irregular force. Given several high-profile incidents involving PSC and regional citizens, propaganda can spotlight these known or alleged abuses in order to build anti-coalition sentiments in a region. Infiltration of contract organizations can observe actions and procedures, sabotage processes, and incite dissatisfaction within and among foreign and national contractors. A private security contractor may provide services on a contract basis outside its country of origin. A legitimate PSC may be susceptible to insider threats that coerce elements of the organization and subvert legitimate practices into forms of corruption.

5-30. A 2010 U.S. House of Representatives report on host nation trucking (HNT) contract in Afghanistan illustrates corruption and extortion that can pervade essential support in an operational environment. Recognizing the value of outsourcing logistical HNT support to contractors, local truck drivers, and private security companies, the report emphasizes that negative impact of corruption and extortion by warlords and possible support to the Taliban. This report cites a \$2.16 billion contract value. For example, a typical convoy of 300 supply trucks going to Kabul to Kandahar will travel with 400 to 500 guards in dozens of trucks mounting heavy machine guns and guards armed with assault rifles, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades. Two findings of the report are as follows:

The principal private security subcontractors on the HNT contract are warlords, strongmen, commanders, and militia leaders who compete with the Afghan central government for power and authority. Providing “protection” services for the U.S. supply chain empowers these warlords with money, legitimacy, and a *raison d’être* for their private armies. Although many of these warlords nominally operate under private security companies licensed by the Afghan Ministry of Interior, they thrive in areas that may appear to be a vacuum of government authority. Those interests are in fundamental conflict with U.S. aims to build a strong Afghan government.

The HNT contractors and their trucking subcontractors in Afghanistan pay tens of millions of dollars annually to local warlords across Afghanistan in exchange for “protection” for HNT supply convoys to support U.S. troops. Although the warlords do provide guards and coordinate security, the contractors have little choice but to use them in what is claimed to be a vast protection racket. The consequences are clear: trucking companies that pay the highway warlords for security are provided protection; trucking companies that do not pay believe they are more likely to find themselves under attack. As a result, almost everyone pays. In interviews and documents, the HNT contractors frequently referred to such payments as “extortion,” “bribes,” “special security,” and/or “protection payments.”

5-31. When an incident involving a PSC is identified or suspected, information can be used to damage international and coalition relationships and trust. Additional public dissent might limit use of PSC or restrict where and how they can be used. Prohibition on use of PSC in certain circumstances could further constrain government and coalition initiatives and programs, as well as place additional requirements on the military forces operating in the region.

5-32. PSCs are most diverse in regard to organizational structure and level of capability. These, too, are often directly related to the client’s ability to pay. Figure 5-3 depicts a basic example of possible functions in a PSC organization.


5-33. Evolution of private sector military-like services by corporations can be a very influential variable in international and regional diplomacy. Although coalition operations may appear in need of services from PSC, governmental authorities and private citizen groups can be concerned on the level of PSC transparency and accountability when high-profile incidents occur that involve private security contractors.

Incidents have involved shooting civilians misidentified as combatants, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs and beliefs, or other inappropriate actions.

5-34. PSC teams may consist of bodyguard teams, patrol teams, stationary guard teams, or information and investigation teams. PSCs are employed to prevent, detect, and counter intrusions or theft; protect property and people; enforce rules and regulations; and conduct investigations. They may also be used to neutralize any real or perceived threat in their area of responsibility. The capabilities of PSC employees vary from highly trained former military members to uneducated, poorly trained recruits. The level of sophistication and competence of a PSC is often directly related to client ability to fund the contract requirements.

The weapons and equipment mix is based on team specialization and role. Other equipment might include listening and monitoring equipment, cellular phones, cameras, facsimiles, computers, motorcycles, helicopters, all-terrain vehicles, antitank disposable launchers, submachine guns, and silenced weapons.

5-35. The board of directors acts much like a headquarters staff of a military organization. Administrative services provide administrative, financial, and logistics support. Guard services provide bodyguards and perform surveillance. Patrol services may conduct patrols and tactical actions such as an ambush. Guard and patrol service members receive weapons training. Information and investigative services collect, analyze, and disseminate all types of information and intelligence, including economic intelligence. They also perform personnel security investigations and counterintelligence functions.



**Figure 5-3. Private Security Contractor Organization (Example)**

5-36. Each organization is tailored to serve its customer's needs. For example, the leader of an insurgent or criminal organization may employ a PSC to provide bodyguards or conduct surveillance or a search and assessment prior to his arrival. Another group, such as a drug organization, may contract a PSC to guard its facilities. The PSC may erect a fence or employ roving, armed guards to protect facilities. Private security organizations use both active and passive measures that may be either rudimentary or employ advanced technology, such as surveillance, identification devices, and alarms. During the conduct of their duties, members of a PSC can take offensive actions. A PSC patrol, for example, might conduct a hasty ambush to counter an intrusion in progress.

5-37. This freedom of offensive action is not authorized when describing a PSC employed by the U.S. Department of Defense. In a designated area of combat operations, the term PSC expands to include all companies employed by U.S. Government agencies performing private security functions under a covered contract. Contractors performing private security functions are not authorized to perform inherently


governmental functions. In this regard, PSCs are “...limited to a defensive response to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent.”

## CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS

5-38. Crime and irregular warfare are often connected. Crime is often a lucrative means to fund operations, coerce and control a population, and erode governmental authority. Some insurgents and criminals can form temporary coalitions when it improves their collective interests. Paradoxically, some criminals may oppose insurgencies that threaten criminal goals. The most powerful criminal organizations can employ paramilitary elements or expand from traditional criminal activities to an insurgency in their own right.

5-39. Criminal organizations are normally independent of nation-state control, and large-scale organizations often extend beyond national boundaries to operate regionally or worldwide. Individual criminals or small-scale criminal organizations do not normally have the capability to adversely affect large scale legitimate political, military, and judicial organizations. However, large-scale criminal organizations can challenge governmental authority with capabilities and characteristics of a paramilitary organization.

5-40. By mutual agreement, or when their interests coincide, criminal organizations may become affiliated with non-state paramilitary actors, such as insurgents or individuals providing capabilities similar to a private army for hire. Insurgents or guerrillas controlling or operating in the same area can provide security and protection to the criminal organization’s activities in exchange for financial assistance or arms. Guerrilla or insurgent organizations can create diversionary actions, conduct reconnaissance and early warning, money laundering, smuggling, transportation, and civic actions on behalf of the criminal organization. Their mutual interests can include preventing U.S. or government forces from interfering in their respective activities.



**Figure 5-4. Three Generation Model of Criminal Organization (Example)**

5-41. At times, criminal organizations might also be affiliated with nation-state military or paramilitary actors. In time of armed conflict or support to a regional insurgency, a state can encourage and materially support criminal organizations to commit actions that contribute to the breakdown of civil control in a neighboring country.

5-42. Some criminals may form loosely affiliated organizations that have no true formal structure. Individual criminals or small gangs may be a recurring issue to local law enforcement personnel, but generally they do not have the significant power to influence legitimate institutions. Nevertheless, even low-capability criminals sometimes can impact events through opportunistic actions. Left unchecked, criminal violence degrades a social and political environment. Criminal activities can develop from low-level protection to drug trafficking, piracy, and smuggling people, body parts, armaments, and other commodities with a market willing to obtain items through illegal means. As small criminal organizations expand their activities to compete with or support long-established criminal organizations, they can expand their geographical areas and commercial expectations. Criminals may seek areas of political nullification that allow them sufficient latitude to operate and discourage rival criminal enterprises.

5-43. Some criminal organizations can generate sub-state, state, and international instability and insecurity. They can align with irregular forces in order to further their own criminal ends. Some criminal organizations may seek to take political power through corruption and intimidation. Some criminal organizations may not want to take direct control of the government in favor of gaining the freedom to act and enhance their criminal operations. A way to assess the evolution of a criminal organization from relatively small activities to the possibility of a transnational criminal organization is to visualize a growth pattern in three generations.

### **First-Generation**

5-44. The first-generation, or traditional, street gangs are primarily turf-oriented. They have loose and unsophisticated leadership that focuses on turf protection to gain petty cash or other profit. They often focus on gang loyalty within their immediate environment such as designated city blocks or neighborhoods. When first-generation criminal organizations engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and individual in scope, tends to be localized, and operates at the lower end of extreme societal violence.

5-45. Most gangs stay firmly within this first generation of development, but some evolve into and beyond to the second generation of criminal organizations. First-generation gangs are not irregular forces; however, they certainly can be a local destabilizing factor and can work, either actively or incidentally, to assist irregular forces. They can also further degrade conditions in a generic and unaffiliated manner or even actively oppose insurgent actions that degrade their criminal activity.

### **Second-Generation**

5-46. This generation is organized for illicit business and commercial gain. The leaders of these organizations are more centralized and tend to focus on trafficking and market protection. These criminal organizations operate in a broader area than first-generation criminal organizations, which may include neighboring cities and countries. Second generation criminal organizations are known to expand their activities such as smuggling people, body parts, weapons, and cars. Other acts include associated intimidation, murder, kidnapping and robbery, money laundering, and home and community invasion. Intellectual property theft includes the production of pirated goods; and other lucrative activities.

5-47. These criminal organizations use the level of violence necessary to protect their markets and control their competition. They seek to limit control or incapacitate government security institutions, and they often begin to dominate vulnerable community life within large areas of the nation-state. As second-generation criminal organizations develop broader, market-focused, and sometimes overtly political agendas to improve their market share and revenues, they can overtly challenge state security and sovereignty. When these criminal organizations use subversion and violence as political interference to negate law enforcement efforts directed against them, they approach consideration to be categorized as an irregular force.

### **Third-Generation**

5-48. Some criminal organizations develop into sophisticated transnational criminal organizations (TCO) with ambitious economic and political agendas. These third-generation criminal organizations often begin to control ungoverned territory within a nation-state, acquire political power in poorly-governed regions, and eventually vie for geographic controlled territory. This political action is intended to provide security and

freedom of movement for the criminal organization's activities. As a result, the third-generation criminal organization and its leadership challenge the legitimate state authority on exercise of political control and use of criminal violence within a given geographical area. In this case, a third-generation criminal organization is an irregular force, although its ends are materially focused and not ideological.

### **The Zetas – A Criminal Paramilitary**

At the top, or at the center of the organizational structure, depending on whether one is looking at a pyramid or at concentric circles, is a small command structure. This group of senior individuals provides strategic- and operational-level guidance and support to its network of compartmentalized cells and to allied groups or associations. This structure allows relatively rapid shifting of operational control horizontally rather than through a relatively slow vertical military chain of command. Then, a second layer (circle) of leadership exists. These individuals oversee or manage guidance received from above, particularly in the areas of intelligence, operational planning, financial support, and recruitment and training. Additionally, this leadership group may manage special geographically and functionally distributed "project teams." At a third level, cell members may be involved in lower-level national and subnational, as well as international, activities of all kinds. The fourth and last level (circle) of the generalized and horizontalized organizational pyramid comprises a series of groups (*clickas*). These groups may be constituted by aspirants (that is, new recruits trying to prove themselves) and/or by specialists. The specific subgroups include the following: (1) *Los Halcones* (The Hawks), who keep watch over distribution zones; (2) *Las Ventanas* (The Windows), who whistle or signal to warn of unexpected dangers in an operational area; (3) *Los Manosos* (The Cunning Ones), who acquire arms, ammunition, communications, and other military equipment; (4) *Las Leopardas* (The Leopards), who are, as prostitutes, attached to the intelligence section of the functional organization and are trained to extract information from their clients; and (5) *Direccion* (communications experts), who intercept phone calls, and follow and identify suspicious automobiles and persons, and have been known to engage in kidnapping and executions.

Manwaring, Max G. A "New " *Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies*, September 2009. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute., pp. 19-21.

5-49. In some cases, these criminal organizations may have the objectives to neutralize, control, depose, or replace an incumbent government. In other cases, they may wish to control parts of a targeted country or sub-regions within a country and create autonomous enclaves that are sometimes called criminal free-states or para-states.

5-50. The Zetas, with some members being former Mexican Army special forces soldiers, applied their training, organization, equipment, experience, and discipline to establish a feared and prominent role in criminal protection. Their skills led them from simple protection missions to more challenging operations.

They expanded operations to collecting Gulf Cartel debts, securing new drug trafficking routes at the expense of other cartels, discouraging defections from the cartel organization, and tracking down and executing rival cartel and other gang leaders in Mexico and Central America. Other activities include kidnapping, arms trafficking, money laundering, and creating their own crime routes to and from the United States, as well as developing their own access to cocaine sources in South America.

5-51. Criminal organization can align with other forces attempting to undermine the established government while achieving their own profit-making activities. Nonstate actors can illustrate all three categories of criminal organization with a range from transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) such as cartels, enforcer gangs, support for political and ideological insurgents; and paramilitary groups that generate violence and instability, erode democracy and challenge a national authority, security, and sovereignty. As an example, the privatized violence in Mexico includes a complex collection of TCO, small private military organizations such as the Zeta enforcer gangs (the Aztecas, Negros, and Polones), mercenary groups such as the Central American Maras, and other small vigilante groups.




Figure 5-5. Large Scale Criminal Organization (Example)

5-52. Criminal organizations, whatever their level of capabilities, can provide advantages to an irregular force in a complex operational environment. Not abiding by the law of armed conflict, their criminal acts can add to the general instability caused by an irregular force while not necessarily having elements that traditional military-like forces are obliged to confront: formal declaration or termination of war; clearly identified human foe to attack and defeat; specific geographical territory to attack and hold; a credible government or political actor as an opponent; and compliance to any agreement between or among contending actors.

5-53. Experience in unconventional nonstate and intrastate war and criminal connections indicate that:

- There are no national or international laws, conventions, or treaties that cannot be ignored or utilized;
- There are no territories that cannot be bypassed or utilized;
- There are no national boundaries or frontiers that cannot be bypassed or utilized; and,
- There are no instruments of power (military, diplomatic, economic, political, informational, or psychological) that can be ignored or left unused.

5-54. Irregular forces may be difficult to identify. Yet, irregular force safe havens do exist and challenge host nation and international programs to protect and secure their populations.

## SECTION II - OTHER OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

5-55. Any OE may have nonmilitary personnel who are armed but not part of an organized paramilitary or military structure. They may be disgruntled and hostile. Some of these nonaffiliated personnel may possess small arms legally to protect their families, homes, or businesses. Some might only be opportunists who decide to attack a convoy, a vehicle, or a soldier in order to make a profit. Their motives might be religious, ethnic, or cultural and express revenge, hatred, or greed.

5-56. Armed civilians in the operational environment are an ever-present condition. These people may be an undecided element of a population with any number of catalysts that might cause them to change sides. An event causing the change might be the injury or death of a family member, loss of property, or the perceived disrespect of their culture, religion, or communal group.

### UNARMED NONCOMBATANTS (EXAMPLES)

5-57. The local populace contains various types of unarmed nonmilitary personnel who, given a set of conditions, may decide to purposely and materially support hostilities against the United States. This active support or participation may take many forms, not all of which involve possessing or using weapons. In an insurgent organization, for example, unarmed personnel might conduct recruiting, financing, intelligence-gathering, supply-brokering, transportation, courier, or information warfare functions including videographers and camera operators. Technicians and workers who fabricate IEDs might not be armed. The same is true of people who provide sanctuary for combatants. Individuals who perform money-laundering or operate front companies for large criminal organizations might not be armed. Individual criminals or small gangs might be affiliated with a paramilitary organization and perform support functions that do not involve weapons.

5-58. Unarmed religious, political, tribal, or cultural leaders might participate in or actively support a paramilitary organization. Unarmed media or medical personnel may become affiliated with a military or paramilitary organization. Even unarmed individuals who are coerced into performing or supporting hostile actions and those who do so unwittingly can in some cases be categorized as combatants.

### MEDIA

5-59. The media include local, national, and international journalists, reporters, and associated support personnel. Media personnel may be independent or affiliated with a particular news agency. Although

media personnel may seek to remain objective and report accurately, reporter bias can favor an irregular force perspective. Some media representatives will purposely distort information.

5-60. A normal expectation is to provide near simultaneous reporting on current events. Equipment in media teams include cameras, video cameras, tape recorders, videocassette recorders, cellular telephones, laptop computers, general office equipment, and satellite-linked computer and video equipment. The sophistication of the equipment depends on the financial resources of the media element. A well-resourced reporter may have a cellular telephone, a notebook or laptop computer, assorted audio-visual equipment, and an all-terrain vehicle equipped with the latest video manipulation technology. All media personnel carry credentials to indicate who they are and for whom they work.

5-61. An irregular force may seek to control the media internally and exploit them externally. The pervasive presence of the media provides a certain situational awareness that might not otherwise be available. Media may allow an opponent the opportunity to attack the national will of its enemy. Selective reporting can be used as an outlet for propaganda and psychological information operations. Media coverage of operations can dramatically affect international relations and strategic interaction. With or without manipulation by irregular forces, the media can have a great effect on public opinion and national resolve.

5-62. The balancing effect of multiple reporting sources tends to reduce the impact of any one source with overt bias. Democracies with freedom of the press and widespread access to media and other information systems can be less susceptible to propaganda but are still susceptible to media influence. Populations that have only limited access to information are more vulnerable to manipulated reporting.

## **NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS**

5-63. A nongovernmental organization (NGO), as defined by the U.S. Department of Defense, is "...a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society." NGOs organize in many types of forms, sizes, and purposes. The DOD *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military* provides an overview of NGOs with a focus on international relief organization principles. For perspective of presence around the world in many types of support initiatives, more than 30,000 NGOs operate in the international arena with approximately half of these organizations represented by western-based activities operating in developing countries. Of these NGO efforts, about 95% of NGO relief work is provided by less than 50 major American or European organizations.

5-64. The global community of NGOs hosts a wide range of organizations. These organizations can be usually recognized in one of four main categories. Those categories are:

- Humanitarian Aid. (Both emergency response and developmental).
- Advocacy Groups.
- Faith-based Groups. (Humanitarian aid originally founded on faith-based principles but do not use religion as a part of the aid provided).
- Missionary Aid Groups. (Humanitarian aid distribution as access for religious awareness and conversion).

5-65. Nongovernmental organizations often comprise both local NGOs as well as an international support presence of larger NGOs. International NGOs may use localized staffs in building capabilities for a region. Sometimes larger NGO may not be openly visible but operate through these local organizations. This can provide resources unavailable at the local and regional levels during a crisis while incorporating localized capacity and knowledge of conditions, interpersonal relationships, and informal operations.

5-66. In legal and organizational terms, there is little difference between an NGO and a nonprofit or not-for-profit organization in the United States. When nonprofits extend their activities overseas are they popularly called NGOs or private voluntary organizations (PVO). Most NGOs are incorporated organizations that are structured to protect its founders, employees and board members from personal liability.

5-67. The Board of Directors serves as the trustee body of the NGO, normally part of the large-scale decisionmaking process and working issues of the organization. Board members are valuable in that they extend the organization's resources into various communities and include personalities that are not specifically significant in daily operations but provide credibility to the organization as a whole. Many NGO boards have celebrities, former government officials, experts, academics, and community leaders with the intention of attaining recognition or publicity. During emergency appeals, NGOs will often send board members out to make public statements, write newspaper or journal editorials, make speeches, or give interviews to spark focus on the organization's work and needs in responding to the emergency.

5-68. NGO boards vary widely in style. Some are very active, often establishing close relationships with NGO officers and staff and involving themselves in programmatic planning processes and fundraising programs. Other boards are largely fundraising entities, lending their names to give credibility to an organization's fundraising practices. Boards can be primarily symbolic and fulfill the legal requirements of meeting a specific number of times each year and certifying financial obligations. The actual authority may reside in operational leaders or unpublicized donors of a NGO.

5-69. Internal coordination, though not always formal, is the most common way civilian sectors organize in humanitarian emergencies. In Kosovo, Burundi, Darfur, Iraq, and Afghanistan, NGOs coordinated extensively within the NGO community to manage information, for safety, as well as advocacy bodies to international donors or local and regional governments. External coordination between NGOs, militaries, governments, and donor agencies has also produced a substantial amount of experience for all actors involved in coordinating, communicating, and generally interfacing with one another. The preferred external coordination for NGOs is a UN-coordinated effort rather than a military-administered effort unless the UN is unable to do so. In Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, NGOs and militaries interfaced in military run operations centers.

5-70. Communications provide some special challenges to NGOs that military personnel are unlikely to experience. NGOs strive to provide assistance based on need rather than race, religion, political affiliation, or ability to pay. To avoid the perception of favoritism and operate in a neutral manner, NGO do not normally use any encryption devices and operate with the understanding that the local government will likely be monitoring all their communications. They will be exposed to sensitive information that could be used to assist political or military objectives of either side. This requires that information be recorded and transmitted in a way that reduces rather than incites conflict. Although modern communications equipment is essential for the NGO headquarters to remain in contact with field offices or mobile teams, the equipment might make NGO personnel a target of crime in areas where the technology is not commonly available. A satellite phone, which provides an NGO team global coverage, might represent a significant capability if acquired by an irregular force. The same might apply for a vehicle outfitted with a communication suite of wide-band frequency radios. In some areas, simply carrying a cell phone or radio could be viewed as a threat by actors who would like to keep their activities concealed.

5-71. Reliable transportation is essential for NGO operations, but also poses the greatest risk of accidents, assault, injury, and death for aid workers. The NGO must balance the need for a completely reliable vehicle against the risk of becoming a target of carjacking in areas of conflict or crime. NGOs may hire local drivers who have influence of which routes to use, how check points are negotiated, and gain eventual trust as a representative of the organization. A driver from a disenfranchised group due to religious, ethnic, racial, or caste, may cause prejudice against the NGO. A driver might also be part of a criminal gang or irregular force intent on stealing the vehicle or committing a crime against the NGO.

5-72. Security planning is an ongoing process that continually refines and reassesses the threat environment. Before the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, many NGOs operated in violent environments without developing a strong organizational culture of safety and security. Many times, aid personnel relied on the immunity provided by a perceived humanitarian space and did not view themselves as party to the conflict. A series of factors including connected NGO and U.S. Government programs could cause specific targeting of NGO staff for kidnapping or murder by violent extremist groups. Many of the NGOs who remained in Afghanistan and Iraq have built more formal safety and security systems to meet these threats. These changes include adding safety and security measures to grant proposals and providing safety and

security education and training courses for deploying personnel. Some NGOs use professional security officers with formal military, police, or intelligence experience.

5-73. The military and NGOs nevertheless should not assume mutual understanding. Examples may include how medical ethics, services, and support can differ between a military organization and an NGO. NGOs understand that the military, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, must provide treatment to combatants but not necessarily extend that care to civilians. Military hospitals are established to treat combat-wounded soldiers and combatants rather than for civilians to receive treatment. Priorities of support and operational decisions can be situational dependent. Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq saw military hospitals flooded by civilians seeking care. At the same time, NGOs were inundated with members of local host communities with some actors probably having been combatants requesting care in refugee and IDP camps. Under such circumstances, NGOs have decided that care must be given to all. Efforts have been made not only to assist in refugee camps, but also in local communities that may be hosting millions of refugees.

5-74. Large NGOs will often employ specialists or retired military personnel to assist in managing relations and activities that require interface with U.S. or other military entities. NGOs and military units both have significant incentives to coordinate and collaborate. NGOs often need many things from the military: logistical assistance, communications, intelligence, and protection. The military finds value in coordinating with NGOs for understanding ground-level activity, to manage population movements, assistance projects, and general humanitarian activities. Both groups find that coordination is essential. Military personnel are also often guided to the NGO coordination body, which will typically have contact information for member NGOs, can indicate what NGOs are doing in the region, and can identify which NGOs are active in specific sectors. The UN often sets up Humanitarian Information Centers (HIC) that also serves as central coordination points. Many times NGOs are either required or voluntarily register with an HIC to keep updated on information and regional developments. A Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) or Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) can be established as the official coordinating center between NGOs, the UN, governments, IOs, and the military.


5-75. Experiences suggest that NGOs and militaries can operate together but that challenges exist. During the Kosovo crisis in 1999, NATO forces and NGOs worked closely together in many instances. Still, communication and expectations became skewed. A Watson Institute paper titled *NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis* suggested two themes. First, despite coordination efforts and extensive collaboration, NGOs often became frustrated with the idle capacity that military commanders left on reserve for emergency or contingency action. NGO managers thought it strange that thousands of troops and large logistical supply stores were left unused for long periods while NGOs were short staffed and the needs existed for displaced persons. Second, NGO and military culture clashed, even in coordination settings. NGOs often wanted to ensure of a distinct line between military operations and NGO relief activities. At the time, NGOs felt intimidated or frustrated over the way military personnel sometimes operated.

5-76. Several observations on NGOs to consider are:

- NGOs are generally capable organizations but lack robust communication and logistical capacities.
- NGOs are civilian organizations that do not fall into a military-style command structure.
- NGOs prefer to keep their programs, activities, and image as independent as possible.
- NGOs can work effectively and efficiently during an emergency, often with a comparative advantage, in specific sectors or regions.
- Routine and informal meetings between the NGO community, UN agencies, and the military can reduce much of collective tension and misunderstanding.

5-77. Working with the military does not necessarily mean sacrificing impartiality or transparency, and often the benefits of working with the military can enhance more effective and efficient NGO operations. Despite continuing to work to alleviate suffering and remain impartial, many NGOs feel that close collaboration with the military would compromise their impartiality, security, or humanitarian image. Many NGO personnel feel as if military objectives, goals, systems, and organizational direction are not integrated with humanitarian principles. This situation is changing, but many NGO personnel still argue that militaries

have little or no role in humanitarian assistance. Although the number of actors who hold these opinions seems to be diminishing, such perceptions still an important facet for military and government representatives to consider when dealing with a diverse NGO staff body.



**Figure 5-6. NGO Field Office Functions (Example)**

5-78. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are not affiliated with a government, but may be influenced by government policies of their home nation. Some organizations and individual participants may have motivations that differ from their public organizational mission statements. These can be economic, political, religious, cultural, or private motivations. As in many organizations, there are both stated and hidden interests and objectives of leaders and operators.

## TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

5-79. A transnational corporation is a corporation that conducts business beyond a national and international focus. Corporate interest is mega-regional reach and global interconnectivity. According to the *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World*, the term “transnational” as opposed to “international” is intended to accentuate the fact that the activities, organizations, and movements being described do not occur at the behest of national governments. Instead, transnational activity arises under private auspices.

5-80. Transnational corporations may enter into partnerships with transition states that are trying to increase their world economic position. Emerging states may invite such corporations to establish research and manufacturing facilities in their countries as a means of building infrastructure. The presence of these corporations can also enhance a country’s security. However, their motivations are business oriented and not usually charitable; the transnational corporation may try to influence regional affairs or assist their host country in actions that promote their own economic gain.

5-81. When external forces become involved in a particular country or region, they must take into account transnational corporations conducting business there. The presence of these outside business interests can put additional pressure on the intervening interregional forces to avoid collateral damage to civilian life and property. Some transnational corporations also have their own armed security forces to protect their own interests or perhaps also those of their host country.

5-82. With globalization of economies, a host country must also take into account transnational corporations conducting business within its borders or in its region. If the country's actions adversely affect other foreign enterprises or regional security, conditions could emerge for irregular warfare.

## OTHER CIVILIAN GROUPS

5-83. Other civilians in an operational environment can include government officials, businesspeople, the local population, transients, internally displaced civilians, or refugees. Government officials, such as police, mayors, town council members, and emergency service personnel, may be elected, appointed, or hired to perform duties. These officials are generally associated with a defined geographical area. Some officials, such as emergency service personnel, have specialized equipment and standard uniforms while other officials, such as mayors and town council members, wear clothing appropriate to the locale and do not require specialized equipment to perform their duties. Although a part of the civilian population, these groups and actors are to varying degrees connected to governmental infrastructure. Business people, farmers, lawyers, doctors, the clergy, tradesmen, and shopkeepers provide a wide range of services and conduct their daily routine without direct connection to the government. Each actor has varied concerns and agenda.

5-84. A serious tension may exist between various interests as they compete to gain the support of the population to achieve their objectives. Support from the civilian population is a key doctrinal tenant common to all irregular warfare movements. It is from the population that an irregular organization recruits its manpower, gains intelligence, and receives safe haven and materiel support. No true irregular force can exist for an extended period without significant support from the civilian population.

## SUMMARY

5-85. This chapter presented the complex conditions that irregular forces face in a contemporary operational environment. Rarely will just military force be involved in establishing, restoring, or stabilizing a safe and secure environment. Irregular forces can choose to ignore the rule of law and accept the sanctions that may result. Irregulars can be held accountable for crimes committed or acts that do not comply with various legal protocols in participating in armed conflict. A host nation and its partners will attempt to apply a whole government effort that integrates the activities of civilian and military law and order capabilities to support host nation civil institutions to fortify and support the rule of law.

5-86. Several of the more noticeable armed noncombatant actors, depending on their status in relation to a state's armed forces, openly carry weapons. Public law enforcement agencies and various types of internal security forces exemplify such organizations and individuals. Other organizations may be authorized to conceal the carrying of personal weapons. Private security organizations can be legitimate private security contractors. Other legitimate venues for carrying weapons may include citizens authorized to protect their businesses or personal property. Nonetheless, mercenaries or criminal gangs introduce other concerns of who is armed and a noncombatant in an OE.

5-87. Unarmed noncombatants are other significant actors that must be addressed in military operations. These individuals and activities span offices, bureaus, and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, host nation civil organizations, and independent or multinational corporations. Political associations, theological groups, and social affiliations add to the complexity of verifying the status of noncombatant actors. Criminal organizations or elements of a criminal organization can be involved in armed combatant acts, viewed as armed noncombatants, or exhibit actions as unarmed noncombatants who violate civil law.

5-88. People in a particular population may include a diverse array of displaced persons, transients, and refugees. Whether indigenous to a region, forcefully pushed into a region, or voluntarily arriving from outside a region, the challenge of knowing combatant from noncombatant actors and supporters in military operations will remain a complex and illusive task. Irregular forces can marshal and conceal its combatant capabilities while hiding among noncombatant actors of a populace living in the conditions of a complex OE.

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and engagements. Actions focus on tailored organization and maneuver of armed forces to conduct missions in order to achieve objectives. Appreciating tactics within the context of strategic and operational levels of war provides an understanding of the direct linkages of tactical operations to relatively short major operations or campaigns, or a persistent conflict which can result in a strategic success.

6-2. For the purpose of this document oriented to irregular forces, tactics focus on the engagement rather than the battle as described in U.S. Army definition. An engagement is a small unit tactical conflict between irregular forces and an enemy. These tactical operations can be conducted with irregular forces with up to brigade-type level capabilities, but for this document, will usually be conducted by small groups of company level strength or lesser unit capability. Augmentation and special support vary on a case by case basis. An engagement is normally planned for short duration and can be conducted in seconds, minutes, or hours. An engagement extending toward 24 hours in duration is rare. An engagement can be a single event or an action interrelated to other engagements that comprise a battle.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Engagement</b></p> <p>An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces usually conducted at brigade level and below.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>FM 3-0, Operations (2008)</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Battle</b></p> <p>A battle is a set of related tactical engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>FM 3-0, Operations (2008)</i></p>
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6-3. Tactics are the employment of irregular forces in armed conflict. Arrangement of capabilities is ultimately about human contest and resolve. A mission and a commander's intent focus the massing of combat power in materiel and men and women against a particular target, in time and terrain, in order to accomplish a specified or implied task.

## IRREGULAR TECHNIQUES

6-4. Techniques are the inseparable companion of tactics. Techniques present general and non-prescriptive methods of how to perform missions, functions, or tasks. When detailed steps are required to effectively employ a weapon system or cause specific effects on a population, procedures state a prescriptive set or series of tasks. Standards of performance ensure efficient and effective conduct of techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP).

6-5. Irregular warfare methods emphasize the indirect approach. Irregular forces normally avoid a direct military confrontation, and can use tactics to deceive and surprise an enemy force in order to shape and attack vulnerabilities. In particular instances, the populace can become the target to further disrupt and degrade a constituted civil authority and its ability to protect and safeguard its citizens. Criminal acts such as terrorism may be used to subvert and exhaust an opponent. An irregular force may consider if terrorism is the only practical means to engage a more powerful military force. Irregular warfare seeks to defeat an opponent's will through anxiety, progressive attrition, and constant low level conflict.

6-6. This chapter describes forms of offensive and defensive operations, tactics, and illustrates examples of tactical techniques employed in recent decades and the contemporary period of armed conflict. Norms

such as mission and intent; tailored organization for combat; time, speed, and tempo; terrain and weather; composite risk management; and knowing the local or regional population and their culture are essential to properly plan and execute successful tactical operations. Ultimately, an expert irregular commander and seasoned subordinates combine and concentrate individual and collective skills with cell or group capabilities to mass combat power (task) at a designated time and place (conditions) in order to accomplish a mission task outcome (standard).

## SECTION II - FORMS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-7. The aim of offense at the tactical level is to achieve tactical missions in support of an operational plan. A tactical command ensures that its subordinate elements thoroughly understand both the mission and intent of higher headquarters operations and the specific purpose of a particular mission and tasks they are to execute at their level of conflict.

6-8. Tactical offensive actions are designed to achieve a specified action; however, the purpose of any given offensive mission varies with the situation. The primary distinction among types of offensive missions is their purpose. The irregular force may recognize five general types of tactical offensive missions according to their purpose: gain freedom of movement; restrict freedom of movement; gain control of key terrain, personnel, equipment or their combination; gain information; and dislocate. These general purposes serve as a guide to understanding the design of an offensive mission and not as a limitation placed on an irregular force commander.

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*Note.* See additional details on offensive actions use methods described in Chapter 2 and 3, FM 7-100.2. This FM will transition to TC 7-100.4.

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### PLANNING THE OFFENSE

6-9. For irregular forces, the key elements of planning offensive missions include: determining the level of planning and rehearsing possible, organizing for the engagement, tailoring forces, coordinating activities in support of the offense, and supporting the intent of the objective of the offensive action.

6-10. Offensive actions during transition and adaptive operations will not rely simply on massing combat power at a decisive point. Such actions will typically include an increased use of infiltration, and incorporation of local population support for intelligence and general support. The offense is categorized as either planned or situational.

#### Irregular Forms of Offense

◆ Planned Offense

◆ Situational Offense

### PLANNED OFFENSE

6-11. A planned offense is developed when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and rehearse forces for specific tasks. Key considerations in offensive planning are:

- Select a clear and appropriate objective.

- Determine which enemy forces (security, reaction, or reserve) must be fixed.
- Develop reconnaissance plan that locates and tracks all key enemy targets and elements.
- Create or take advantage of any opportunity to preclude irregular forces from an enemy advantage.
- Determine which element or capability of an enemy to attack.

## SITUATIONAL OFFENSE


6-12. The irregular force conducts a situational or hasty offense. Fleeting opportunities to strike at an enemy weakness will present themselves and often just as quickly disappear. Although detailed planning and preparation greatly mitigate risk, a window of opportunity may limit deliberate planning in favor of rapid decision and action.

6-13. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situational offense:

- The irregular force identifies a key enemy unit, system, or capability is exposed.
- The irregular force has an opportunity to conduct a spoiling attack to disrupt enemy preparations.
- The irregular force unit makes contact with an enemy on favorable terms for decisive effects if immediate actions are conducted.

6-14. In a situational offense, the irregular force commander rapidly develops his personal assessment of the conditions. Time will not normally allow significant staff study or extensive course of action development. The commander provides a basic course of action to the staff with the staff quickly turning that course of action into a combat order. Even more so than other types of offensive action, the situational offense depends on effective battle drills by subordinate tactical units and leaders. See Chapter 5, FM 7-100.2.

6-15. Organization of the battlefield in a situational offense will normally be limited to a mission order with minor changes to existing control measures. Organization of forces in a situational offense will typically require the use of small groups with specific capabilities. The nature of situational offense is such that it often involves smaller, independent elements accomplishing discrete missions.



## ORGANIZING IRREGULAR FORCES FOR OFFENSE

6-16. Irregular forces use a different scheme for organizing forces than the fix-assault-exploitation force methodology used by regular military forces. The irregular force tends to use small units or cells to accomplish a single tactical task rather than combining a multi-task mission on an individual element. Standard tactical consideration can be visualized in three elements or functions: the security element, the support element and the direct action element that is described, depending on the situation, as the firing or assault element.

6-17. The security element provides local tactical security for the detachment and prevents the enemy from influencing mission accomplishment. The security element provides early warning of approaching enemy forces and disrupts the enemy in their tactical actions. Security elements often make use of terrain chokepoints, obstacles, ambushes and other techniques to resist larger forces for the duration of the assault. The irregular force commander may decide to accept risk and employ a security element that can only provide early warning but is not strong enough to halt or repel enemy reinforcements.

6-18. The irregular force action element accomplishes the tactical task. The action element of an assault element maneuvers to seize the enemy position and defeat or destroy any forces there.

6-19. The support element provides combat and combat service support and command and control for the irregular force. In certain situations, an irregular force may task organize one or more specialist elements. Specialist elements are typically formed around an element with a specific capability such as a reconnaissance element or deception element. The support element provides the assaulting element with one or more of the following: combat service support, supporting direct fire such as heavy machine guns, antitank guided missiles, recoilless rifles, or automatic grenade launchers, supporting indirect fire such as mortar or artillery, or mobility and obstacle clearing support.

## TYPES OF OFFENSIVE ACTION

6-20. The types of offensive action in irregular force doctrine or norms are both tactical methods and guides to designing operational courses of action. An offensive mission may include subordinate elements that are executing different offensive and defensive courses of action within the overall offensive mission framework.


6-21. The concept of attack is similar to the basic tactical principles in U.S. Army doctrine. The decision to conduct an attack considers aspects of concentration or dispersion, specific opportunity given time and weather and terrain for probable mission success, and types of offensive action that best suites the tactical situation.

## ATTACK

6-22. An attack seeks to achieve tactical decision by defeating the enemy's military power. Aspects include disruption and dislocation for the subsequent defeat that occurs when combat forces are rendered irrelevant by the loss of physical capability or psychological resolve to continue the fight. There are two types of attack: integrated attack and dispersed attack.

6-23. The irregular force does not have a separate design for exploitation as a distinct offensive course of action. Exploitation is considered a central part of all integrated and dispersed attacks. Correspondingly, the irregular force does not have a separate design for pursuit. A pursuit is conducted using the same basic course of action framework as any other integrated or dispersed attack. The fixing force gains contact with a fleeing enemy force and slows it or forces it to stop while the assault and exploiting forces create the conditions to complete destruction of the enemy force capabilities.

6-24. The irregular force recognizes that moving forces that make contact must rapidly choose and implement an offensive or defensive course of action. Irregular force methods to accomplish these actions are discussed in Chapter 5, FM 7-100.2.



## INTEGRATED ATTACK

6-25. Integrated attack is an offensive action where the irregular force seeks military decision by destroying the enemy's will or ability to continue fighting through the application of combined arms effects. Integrated attack is often employed when the irregular force has combat power overmatch on its opponent. Actions can be employed against a more sophisticated and capable opponent when an appropriate window of opportunity is created or available.

6-26. The irregular force recognizes that modern militaries cannot continue without adequate logistics support and effective command and control. Irregular forces probe for a vulnerability to identify and attack, and an indirect approach as the norm.

## DISPERSED ATTACK

6-27. Dispersed attack, also known as decentralized attack, is the primary manner in which the irregular force conducts offensive action when threatened by a superior enemy. Dispersed attack relies heavily on information warfare and dispersion of forces to permit the irregular force to conduct tactical offensive actions while overmatched by enemy weapon systems and intelligence sensors. The dispersed attack is planned as continuous and employs multiple means operating in an interdependent manner.

6-28. The primary objective of dispersed attack is to take advantage of a window of opportunity to bring combat power to bear in order to destroy the enemy's will and capability to continue fighting. To achieve this, the irregular force does not necessarily have to destroy the entire enemy force, but does need to defeat critical enablers of the enemy force.

6-29. The tactics of attack can be categorized by one of three descriptions: assault, ambush, or raid. Variations on these tactics will be discussed later in this document in conjunction with several offensive techniques.

## SPOILING ATTACK

6-30. A spoiling attack is designed to control the tempo of combat by disrupting the timing of enemy operations. This is accomplished by attacking during the planning and preparation for the enemy's own offensive operations. Spoiling attacks have limited objectives. Conversely, planners must focus carefully on what effect the attack is trying to achieve and how the attack will achieve that effect. In some cases, the purpose of the attack will be to remove a key component of the enemy's force array or combat system so it is unavailable for the planned attack and reduces overall enemy plans for success. More typically, the attack is designed to slow the development of conditions favorable to the enemy's planned attack.

6-31. The spoiling attack can develop as a situational attack. This occurs when situational understanding of enemy dispositions clarifies suddenly to present a situational advantage to the irregular force commander. This may indicate a spoiling attack conducted by a reserve or response forces that can rapidly shift from their current posture to strike at the enemy.

6-32. Spoiling attacks are characterized by:

- Requirements to have a clear picture of enemy preparations and dispositions.
- Independent, small unit action.
- Focused objectives within a command intent.
- Opportunity that a spoiling attack may create a probability of opportunity for other combat actions.


6-33. The irregular force seeks to have the following conditions met in order to conduct a spoiling attack:

- Enemy attack preparations are identified from reconnaissance and intelligence.
- Enemy security, reserve, and response forces are located and tracked.
- Enemy ground reconnaissance in the attack zone is destroyed or rendered ineffective.

6-34. Spoiling attacks are conducted using an integrated attack, dispersed attack, sophisticated ambush, or raid. The primary difference between a spoiling attack and the other types of limited-objective attack is the purpose of the attack.

## COUNTERATTACK

6-35. A counterattack is designed to cause an enemy offensive operation to culminate and allow the irregular force to return to the offense. A counterattack is designed to return the initiative to the irregular force.



6-36. The counterattack can develop as a situational attack. This occurs when an unclear understanding of enemy dispositions suddenly clarifies to some extent and the commander wishes to take advantage of the knowledge he has gained to disrupt enemy timing. This means that counterattacks are often conducted by reserve or response forces that can rapidly shift from their current posture to strike at the enemy.

6-37. Counterattacks are characterized by:

- Shift in command and support relationships to assume an offensive posture for the irregular counterattacking force.
- Identification that the enemy is at or near its culmination.
- Rapid transition of the remainder of the force to the offense.
- Expectation to create a window of opportunity for other combat actions.

6-38. The irregular force seeks to set the following conditions for a counterattack:



- Locate and track enemy reserve forces and cause them to be committed.
- Destroy enemy reconnaissance forces that could observe counterattack preparations.

## ASSAULT

6-39. An assault is the basic form of irregular force tactical offensive combat. An assault is an attack that destroys an enemy force through firepower and the physical occupation or destruction of his position. During an offensive operation, the irregular force objective will be terrain-oriented or force-oriented. Terrain-oriented objectives may require the irregular force to seize a designated area and often requires fighting through enemy forces. If the objective is force-oriented, a terrain objective may be assigned for orientation with irregular force efforts focused on the enemy force. Assaults at any level of command have the same basic characteristics:

- Suppress the enemy force to permit the action element to move against the enemy position without receiving destructive fire.
- Surprise the enemy force in order to attain the enemy position while remaining combat effective.
- Isolate the enemy position (objective) to prevent reinforcement during the engagement.
- Mass combat power with violent and rapid fires and maneuver. Consolidate the objective and continue the mission.

6-40. The irregular force conducts mounted and dismounted assaults as the same basic principles apply to any assault action. The irregular force views assaults as combined arms actions.



## TASKS OF THE SECURITY ELEMENT

6-41. The security element is typically the first element to act in an assault mission. The security element moves to a position or positions where it can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce the objective or interfere with the mission of the assault element. The security element is equipped and organized such that it can detect enemy forces and prevent them from contacting the rest of the irregular force. In larger irregular forces, a security element normally conducts a screen or guard mission. If an irregular force is coordinating as a part of a large conventional force, irregulars may have responsibilities in a cover mission.

6-42. The security element may also be directed to perform other tactical tasks in support of its purpose:

- Ambush

- Block
- Canalize
- Contain
- Delay
- Disrupt
- Fix
- Interdict
- Isolate

### TASKS OF THE SUPPORT ELEMENT

6-43. The support element can have a wide range of functions in an assault mission. The irregular force commander can exercise command and control from within the support element or can lead within the assault element. The support element controls all combat support and combat service support functions, as well as any supporting fires. In larger tactical units, the support element typically does not become decisively engaged. Elements of the support may employ direct suppressive fires.

6-44. Tasks typically expected of support elements in the assault are:

- Attack by Fire
- Disrupt
- Fix
- Neutralize
- Support by Fire
- Tasks of the Assault Element

### TASKS OF THE ASSAULT ELEMENT

6-45. The assault element maneuvers from its assault position to the attack objective and destroy the enemy located there. It can conduct attack by fire, but this is usually a task assigned to the support element. Tactical tasks assigned to the assault element can include:


- Seize
- Clear
- Occupy
- Secure

6-46. Speed of execution is critical to an assault. The assault element moves quickly from its attack position to the assault. The irregular force plans for the three coordinated elements of an assault to be as rapidly as possible.

### AMBUSH

6-47. An ambush is a surprise attack from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. Similar to an assault, an irregular force or cell conducting an ambush is organized into three elements: the assault element, the support element, and the security element.

6-48. The action element, the firing or assault element of an ambush, has the mission of attacking and destroying enemy elements in the kill zone. The security element of an ambush has the mission to prevent enemy elements from responding to the ambush before the main action of the attack is successfully concluded. The security element prevents the assault element from becoming decisively engaged. This is often accomplished simply by providing early warning. The support element



**Ambush**

of an ambush has the same basic functions as in an assault and can supporting the assault element with both direct fires and indirect fires.


6-49. There are three types of irregular force ambush: annihilation, harassment, or containment. Desired effects determine which type of ambush is conducted based on available resources. The irregular force conducts ambushes to provide force protection, kill or capture enemy personnel, destroy or capture equipment, restrict enemy freedom of movement, or collect information and materiel.

### ANNIHILATION AMBUSH

6-50. The purpose of an irregular force annihilation ambush is to destroy the enemy force. Generally, this type of ambush employs mines and other obstacles to halt or canalize the enemy in the kill zone. Obstacles channel and keep the enemy in the kill zone throughout the action. Through direct fire systems, the support element destroys or suppresses enemy forces in the kill zone. The ambush irregular force remains in a covered and concealed location and may combine small arms fire with special weapons such as antitank rocket propelled grenades or guided missiles. The support and assault elements kill enemy personnel and destroy equipment within the kill zone by massed fires.

6-51. The assault element remains in covered positions until enemy activity ceases within the kill zone. Once the enemy ceases his activity, the assault element secures the kill zone and eliminates or captures any remaining enemy personnel. The assault element remains in the kill zone to search for any usable information, intelligence, and equipment. Materiel not removed by the assault element is destroyed.

6-52. The security element positions to ensure early warning and to prevent the enemy from escaping the kill zone. Following the initiation of the ambush, the security element contains the kill zone and prevents any enemy forces in or out of the area. The ambush force withdraws in sequence; the assault element withdraws first, followed by the support element. The security element is the last element to depart the area. The ambush force reassembles at a predetermined location and time.



### HARASSMENT AMBUSH

6-53. A harassment ambush disrupts routine enemy activities, impedes the enemy's freedom of movement, and creates a negative psychological impact on enemy personnel. The irregular force may choose to conduct a harassment ambush if the enemy has superior combat power. This type of ambush does not require the use of obstacles to keep the enemy in the kill zone. The irregular force normally conducts the harassment ambush at a distance greater from the enemy than an annihilation ambush. This distance may be up to the maximum effective range of its weapons.

6-54. The assault and support elements can be combined to provide better control of fires throughout the kill zone. The assault element does not normally perform the role of assaulting the kill zone, but can assault if conditions develop and support this close combat. The assault and support elements concentrate direct and indirect fires in the kill zone. The security element provides early warning.

6-55. Harassment ambushes may be accomplished with minimal resources. The action and security elements may be as little as two to four personnel. In cases where the primary weapon system is one or more improvised explosive devices, the ambush may be conducted by a small cell, or can be one person depending on the intention to detonate, observe, or record effects of an improvised explosive device (IED) attack.

6-56. While the assault and support elements withdraw, the security element may remain to provide warning and to delay any pursuing enemy forces. As in all ambushes, the irregular force may emplace mines and plan for indirect fires to cover withdrawal routes.

## CONTAINMENT AMBUSH

6-57. A containment ambush is an irregular force security measure that is usually part of a larger action. The ambush is used to prevent the enemy from using an avenue of approach or interdicting another action such as a raid. The assault element may attack to secure the kill zone as described in the annihilation ambush. The support and security elements perform the same functions as those described in the annihilation ambush.

6-58. Obstacles are an integral part of a successful containment ambush. They prevent the enemy from using the avenue of approach and restrict the enemy in the kill zone. Within time allowances, the irregular force ambushing force may erect multiple, mutually supporting obstacles covered by direct and indirect fires.

## RAID

6-59. A raid is an attack against a stationary or moving target for the purposes of its capture or destruction. A raid is a limited objective attack usually small in scale, and involves swift penetration of hostile terrain to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy infrastructure. A raid concludes with a planned withdrawal to a designated location upon completion of the mission. Irregular force unit composition for a raid mission comprises three functional elements: a direct action element, a support element, and one or more security elements. A breach element will be organized if required to accomplish the direct action.


6-60. The irregular force action element in a raid has the task of destruction or seizure of the objective. The support element provides fire support, combat support, and combat service support to the assault and security elements. The irregular force commander normally controls the raid from within the support element but may position as part of the assault element. The security element in a raid is primarily focused on fixing enemy security and response forces. The security element is equipped and organized such that it can detect enemy forces and prevent them from contacting the rest of the detachment. Security elements deploy to locations where they can deny the enemy freedom of movement along any ground or air avenues of approach that can reinforce the objective or interfere with the mission of the action element.

6-61. The irregular force may conduct a raid to accomplish a number of missions, on order, to:

- Capture prisoners.
- Destroy specific command, control, and or communications locations.
- Destroy logistical areas.
- Obtain information concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strengths, intentions, or methods of operation.
- Confuse the enemy or disrupt his plans.
- Seize materiel.

6-62. The task organization for a raid is determined by the purpose of the operation. However, a raiding force normally consists of the following elements:

- Support element which supports the assault by fires.
- Assault element.
- Breach element when attack requires a breach of obstacles in order to accomplish the raid task. Once mobility tasks are complete, the breach element can augment the support element.



- Security element.

6-63. In larger units, the security element may be assigned a screen or guard mission, but may also be called upon to perform other tactical tasks in support of its purpose:

- Ambush
- Block
- Canalize
- Contain
- Delay
- Disrupt
- Fix
- Interdict
- Isolate

6-64. Irregular force reconnaissance and surveillance identify vulnerabilities, and create advantages through deception. Offensive actions may include a feint or demonstration in order to develop a situation and create vulnerabilities in the enemy force tactics.

## FEINT

6-65. A feint is a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location and time of an actual irregular force operation. Feints attempt to induce the enemy to move reserves and shift his fire support to locations where they cannot immediately impact on the actual operation. When directed to conduct a feint, the irregular force seeks direct fire or contact with the enemy but avoids decisive engagement.



**Feint or Decoy**

6-66. The irregular force planning, preparation, and execution considerations are the same as for other forms of attack. The enemy must be convinced that the feint is an actual attack.

## DEMONSTRATION

6-67. A demonstration is a form of attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the actual operation by a display of force. Demonstrations induce the movement of reserves and shifting of fire support to locations where they cannot immediately impact the intended irregular force operation.

6-68. When directed to conduct a demonstration, the irregular force or cell does not seek to make contact with the enemy. The planning, preparation, and execution are the same as for other forms of attack. The demonstration must appear to be an actual impending attack.

## SECTION III - FORMS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

6-69. While the irregular force knows the offense as the decisive form of military action, conditions may dictate a requirement to defend. The general task and purpose of all defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack and gain the initiative for offensive operations. The irregular forces may conduct the defense to gain time, retain key terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another, or erode enemy forces. A well coordinated defense can set the conditions for follow-on forces and follow-on operations.

6-70. Irregular force defenses can be visualized as a shield of blows. Each irregular force and zone of the defense plays an important role in the attack of the enemy's combat system. A tactical level defense is structured to disrupt the effective use of an enemy's combat power and make an enemy vulnerable to attack and destruction. Defensive battles are designed to achieve the tasks of the operational mission through

active measures while preserving combat power. The purpose of any given defensive battle depends on the situation.

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*Note.* Additional details on defense are in FM 7-100.2. Methods to orient actions from the defense to the offense are discussed in Chapter 5, FM 7-100.2.

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## PLANNING THE DEFENSE

6-71. For the irregular force, the key elements of planning defensive missions are:

- Determine the objective of the defensive action.
- Determine the level of planning possible given the conditions and available time.
- Understand the current situation and future probabilities.
- Tailor forces.
- Coordinate information warfare activities in support of the defense.

6-72. Actions will typically include increased use of infiltration to conduct spoiling attacks and ambushes, and coordination with affiliated forces for reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, security, and attacks. Irregular force defensive actions during transition and adaptive operations do not use attrition-based tactics in layered engagement areas.



## PLANNED DEFENSE

6-73. A planned [deliberate] defense is a defensive mission or action undertaken when there is sufficient time and knowledge of the situation to prepare and rehearse forces for specific tasks. The irregular force plans a defense using the methods described in Chapter 2 and 4, FM 7-100.2. Key considerations in defensive planning are:

- Select a clear and appropriate objective.
- Determine which enemy forces must be defeated or destroyed.
- Determine which component or components of an enemy's combat system to attack.
- Select key positions from which to dominate surrounding avenues of approach.
- Determine the method that will deny the enemy his tactical objectives.
- Develop a plan for reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition that locates and tracks enemy formations, and determines enemy patterns of operations and probable objectives.
- Create or take advantage of any opportunity to disorient an enemy advantage.

## SITUATIONAL DEFENSE

6-74. The irregular force may also conduct a situational [hasty] defense. It recognizes that the modern battlefield is chaotic. Circumstances may change so that the irregular force cannot conduct offensive action and must temporarily transition to the defense. If the irregular force determines that a situational window of opportunity is closing, it may assume a situational defense.

6-75. The following are examples of conditions that might lead to a situational defense:

- An enemy is conducting a spoiling attack to disrupt irregular force offensive preparations.
- An enemy surprises an irregular force and seizes the initiative.

- An enemy counterattack was not effectively fixed.

6-76. In a situational defense, the irregular force commander develops his assessment of the conditions rapidly and without a great deal of staff involvement. He provides a basic course of action to the staff, which then quickly turns that course of action into an executable combat order. Even more than other types of irregular force defensive actions, the situational defense uses battle drills by subordinate tactical elements. Organization of the battlefield in a situational defense will normally be limited to minor changes to existing control measures. Tailoring forces in a situational defense will typically rely on minor modifications to existing structure.


## ORGANIZING IRREGULAR FORCES FOR DEFENSE

6-77. The irregular force commander specifies the task organization of irregular forces within his command. However, organization of forces can shift during the course of an engagement or operation. For example, a unit that initially was part of a disruption force may eventually occupy a simple battle position or becomes part of a complex battle position within the area of operations, or could become part of a reserve force.

6-78. The defense concentrates combat power into an engagement area or kill zone. The success of any engagement depends on how effectively the irregular force leader integrates obstacle and indirect fire plans with a direct fire plan in the engagement area. At the irregular force small unit level, engagement area development remains a complex function that requires parallel planning and preparation.

6-79. The irregular force leader and subordinate leaders use a standardized set of procedures to plan and establish a defense. Major elements of developing a defense involve:

- Identify likely enemy avenues of approach.
- Identify the enemy scheme of maneuver.
- Determine where to kill the enemy.
- Plan and integrate obstacles.
- Emplace direct fire weapons systems.
- Plan and integrate indirect fires.
- Conduct engagement area and kill zone rehearsals.



### INTEGRATED DEFENSE

6-80. A tactical defensive action is integrated if an irregular force has the ability to achieve full combined arms synchronization through all levels of command and throughout the area of operations. This requires a modernized command and control system, a robust logistics capability, and the ability to operate relatively free of enemy influence in the support zone and battle zones prior to the commencement of deliberate enemy offensive action.

6-81. Integrated defenses are able to:

- Surprise the enemy and maintain the initiative.
- Maximize the effects of obstacles and destructive fire and maneuver.
- Achieve tactical decision through primarily military means.

## DECENTRALIZED DEFENSE

6-82. A defensive action is decentralized if the irregular force command and control or logistics capability has been significantly degraded or it does not have the ability to operate freely in the area of operations. This may occur when the enemy enjoys significant technological overmatch. Decentralized defenses do not achieve decisive action, but focus on preserving current combat power. Actions may support evolving additional irregular force combat power in a probable long term persistent conflict.

6-83. In some cases, an irregular force commander may choose to adopt a decentralized defense to preserve his command and control and logistics, understanding that his ability to synchronize operations will be degraded. Tactical commanders are constantly estimating the situation to determine risk versus reward for active measures. A decentralized defense relies on initiative of subordinate commanders and the discrete targeting of elements of the enemy's combat power to reduce capability and expose enemy forces to destruction.

6-84. To be successful, decentralized defenses must:

- Optimize complex terrain.
- Employ both countermobility and survivability measures.
- Use information warfare.
- Make effective use of reconnaissance fires (See Chapter 8, FM 7-100.2).

## TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

6-85. The types of defensive action in irregular force doctrine or norms are tactical methods and guides to the design of operational courses of action. The two basic types are maneuver and area defense. A defensive battle plan may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations of maneuver and area defenses along with some offensive courses of action within the overall defensive mission framework.

### MANEUVER DEFENSE

6-86. The irregular force may determine that their irregular forces are capable of conducting a tactical maneuver defense. This type of defense is designed to achieve tactical decision by skillfully using fires and maneuver to destroy key elements of the enemy's combat systems and deny enemy forces their objectives, while preserving the friendly force. Maneuver defenses may cause the enemy to degrade effectiveness until the enemy can no longer achieve its objectives. The irregular force can economize force in less important areas while the irregular force moves additional forces onto the most threatened axes.

6-87. Maneuver defenses are almost always integrated defenses. Decentralized maneuver defenses typically occur as part of transition operations. As an extra-regional enemy builds combat power to overmatch levels but before the irregular force is completely overmatched, maneuver defense can create time for other forces to move into sanctuary areas and prepare for adaptive operations.

6-88. Even within a maneuver defense, the irregular force commander may use area defense on some enemy attack axes given priorities of effort. Conversely, the irregular force commander may employ maneuver defense techniques to conduct actions in the disruption zone if it enhances the attack on the enemy's combat system and an area defense in the battle zone.

6-89. Maneuver defense inflicts losses on the enemy, gains time, and protects friendly forces. This allows the defender to choose the place and time for engagements. Each portion of a maneuver defense allows continuing attack on the enemy's combat systems. The maneuver defense accomplishes its objective



through a succession of engagements and defensive battles in conjunction with short, violent counterattacks and fires. Maneuver allows abandoning some areas of terrain when responding to an unexpected enemy attack or when conducting planned engagement in the disruption zone. In the course of a maneuver defense, the tactical commander tries to force the enemy into a situation that exposes enemy formations to destruction.

6-90. Defensive maneuver consists of movement by bounds and continuous fires on enemy forces. A disruption force or elements of a main defense force perform defensive maneuver. In either case, the irregular force must divide its combat power into two smaller elements: a contact force and a shielding force. The contact force is the element occupying the forward-most defensive positions at any point in time. The shielding force is the element occupies successive defensive positions.

6-91. At each array of coordinated defensive positions, the contact force forces the enemy to deploy his maneuver units and perhaps begin his artillery preparation for the attack. Then, before the contact force becomes decisively engaged, it maneuvers to its next preplanned line, behind the line occupied by the shielding force. While the original contact force is moving, the shielding force is able to keep the enemy under continuous attack. When the original contact force passes to the rear of the original shielding force, the latter force becomes the new contact force. When the original contact force occupies its next line, it becomes the shielding force for the new contact force. In this manner, units continue to move by bounds to successive lines, preserving their own forces while delaying and destroying the enemy.

6-92. Subsequent lines are far enough apart to permit defensive maneuver by irregular elements. The distance should also preclude the enemy from engaging one line and the subsequent positions without displacing his indirect fire weapons. This means that the enemy, having seized one line, must change the majority of his firing positions and reorganize his attack in order to assault to the next line. However, the lines are close enough to allow the irregular defending elements to maintain coordinated, continuous contact with the enemy while moving from one defensive position to the another position.



## AREA DEFENSE

In situations where the irregular force must deny or slow access to key areas, or in situations where the irregular force is overmatched by the enemy, the irregular force may conduct a tactical area defense. Area defense is designed to achieve a decision in one of two ways:

- Force the enemy’s offensive operations to culminate before he can achieve his objectives.
- Deny the enemy his objectives while preserving combat power until decision can be achieved through subsequent operations.

6-93. The area defense does not surrender the initiative to the attacking forces, but takes action to create opportunity that permits irregular forces to attack key components of the enemy weapon systems or cause unacceptable casualties. Area defense can also set the conditions for destroying a key enemy force in a strike mission. Extended time and evolving opportunities permit the action of maneuver forces to prevent destruction of key positions and facilitate transition to a larger offensive action.

6-94. Information warfare is particularly important to the execution of the area defense in adaptive and transition operations. Deception is critical to the creation of complex battle positions, and effective perception management is crucial to the creation of the windows of opportunity needed to execute maneuver and fires.

6-95. Area defense inflicts losses on the enemy, retains ground, and protects friendly forces by occupying fortified battle positions and dominating the surrounding area with reconnaissance fire. These fires attack designated elements of the enemy's combat systems to destroy components and subsystems that create an advantage for the enemy. The intent is to begin disrupting the enemy combat system in the disruption zone. When enemy forces enter the battle zone, they should be incapable of synchronizing combat operations.

6-96. Area defense creates windows of opportunity in which to conduct spoiling attacks or counterattacks and destroy key enemy systems. In the course of an area defense, the tactical commander uses terrain that exposes the enemy to continuing attack. An area defense trades time for the opportunity to attack enemy forces when and where they are vulnerable. The irregular force might use an area defense when conditions:

- Promote access or control operations.
- Indicate enemy forces have combat power overmatch.
- Allow canalizing enemy forces into engagement areas for destruction.

6-97. A skillfully conducted area defense can allow a significantly weaker force to defeat a stronger enemy force. However, the area defense relies to a significant degree on the availability of reinforced complex terrain and decentralized logistics. Units conducting an area defense typically place small ambush and raiding forces in complex terrain throughout the area of operations to force the enemy into continuous operations in order to steadily reduce enemy combat power and resolve.

6-98. Within an overall area defense, the irregular force might use maneuver defense on some portions of the larger area of operations, especially when physical terrain may not be important to irregular force leader's intent. This occurs most often during transition operations as forces initially occupy the complex terrain positions necessary for the execution of the area defense.

## DEFENSIVE ACTIONS


6-99. Irregular forces conduct defensive actions in one of two postures. Defense location is described as either a simple battle position or a complex battle position. The types of defensive action in irregular force doctrine are tactical methods and guides to the design of tactical and operational courses of action and intended outcome. Given the two basic types of defense as maneuver and area defense, a tactical commander may use both forms of defense simultaneously across his area of operations or selective use dependent on requirements of a higher headquarters. A defensive battle plan in a large irregular force may include subordinate units that are executing various combinations of maneuver and area defenses, along with some offensive courses of action within an overarching defensive mission framework.

6-100. Irregular force units normally fight both area and maneuver defense actions employing simple battle positions. Alternatively, an area defense may employ complex battle positions.

### DEFENSE OF A SIMPLE BATTLE POSITION (SBP)

6-101. A simple battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach or objective area. Simple battle positions are not necessarily tied to restrictive terrain but will employ as much engineer effort as possible to restrict enemy maneuver and protect irregular forces. The unit size designator of the force occupying an irregular force battle position is placed in the graphic symbol opposite the primary orientation of the battle position to the enemy.

6-102. The outline of a battle position illustrates the irregular trace and array shape of coordinated fighting positions and battle position oriented to physical placement on the terrain. Defenders of simple battle positions will take all actions necessary to prevent enemy penetration of their position or defeat a penetration once it occurs. Unlike a complex battle position, which is typically independent, a SBP may form a larger integrated defense with other SBPs.



**Generic SBP Perimeter**

### **Disruption Element**

6-103. SBP forces assigned to the disruption element have the mission of defeating enemy reconnaissance efforts, determining the location, disposition, and composition of attacking forces, and in some cases target designated subsystems of the attacking enemy's combat systems. In larger irregular forces, a disruption element may form Combat Security Outposts (CSOP) and ambush teams.

6-104. CSOPs prevent enemy reconnaissance or small groups from penetrating irregular SBP and force the enemy to prematurely deploy and lose momentum in the attack. CSOPs are generally composed of task-organized platoon or squad-size forces. Elements forming the CSOP are generally drawn from a larger unit reserve or second echelon forces if organized in this manner, but can also be formed from available elements within an irregular force of less structure and capability. CSOPs are positioned forward of the battle zone on key terrain or along key avenues of approach. They typically will not be positioned directly astride avenues of approach into kill zones, but may cover them with fire. If decisively overmatched by enemy combat power, CSOPs may withdraw to the battle zone in accordance with their orders. During a counter-reconnaissance battle, other forces may augment CSOPs and cover avenues of approach that the CSOPs do not cover. CSOPs are typically assigned one or more of the following tactical tasks:

- Ambush
- Attack by Fire
- Delay
- Disrupt
- Fix

### **Main Defense Element**

6-105. The main defense element of a SBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. If required, irregular forces maneuver to defeat a penetration or seizure of other SBPs.

6-106. Irregular forces mass combat power in designated engagement area kill zones of the main defense. Combat power equates to all functional capabilities available to the irregular force.

### **Reserve Element**

6-107. The reserve element of a SBP provides the irregular force commander with tactical flexibility. During the counter-reconnaissance battle the reserve may augment forces in the disruption zone in order to provide additional security to the main defense element. During this period and prior to enemy contact, the reserve element will also rehearse potential counterattack routes.

6-108. Once a significant attacking force is detected in the disruption zone, the reserve element will withdraw, on order, to a covered and concealed position. Some typical additional tasks given to the reserve may include:

- Conduct a counterattack.
- Conduct counter-penetration (blocking or destroying enemy penetration of the SBP).
- Conduct anti-landing operations.
- Assist engaged forces in breaking contact.
- Act as a deception element.

### **Support Element**

6-109. Arrangement of support assets may be located internal and external to the SBP. The support element of a SBP has the mission of providing one or more of the following capabilities to the defense:

- Combat service support.
- Command and control.
- Supporting direct fire.
- Supporting indirect fire.


- Supporting nonlethal fires.
- Engineer support.
- Tasks as assigned by the irregular force commander.

### DEFENSE OF A COMPLEX BATTLE POSITION (CBP)

6-110. CBPs are designed to protect the units within them from detection and attack, while being prepared to deny their seizure and occupation by the enemy. They are not oriented to an enemy avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch local attacks.

6-111. Camouflage, cover, concealment, and deception (C3D) measures are critical to the success of a CBP. These C3D efforts and actions include but are not limited to: underground facilities, complex urban terrain as appropriate, fortifications, false and decoy positions, and information warfare support. The outline of a battle position illustrates the irregular trace and array shape of coordinated fighting positions of the battle position oriented to physical placement on the terrain. The unit symbol and size of the force occupying an OPFOR complex battle position may be inside the graphic symbol to indicate a deliberate defense plan that is not oriented on an avenue of approach or primary direction toward an enemy.

6-112. Cultural standoff, sometimes called cultural shielding, is a key combat multiplier. The act of using social aspects of the environment to provide protection and freedom to maneuver. Cultural standoff tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) employed by irregular forces include: integrating religious, medical, and other sensitive facilities into complex battle positions, employing human terrain for C3D purposes, and exploiting a population using information warfare.



Generic CBP Perimeter

### Complex Battle Position (CBP)

A complex battle position is designed to protect the units within them from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. The CBP is not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch local attacks.

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6-113. Irregular force commanders occupying CBPs intend to preserve their combat power until conditions permit offensive action. In the case of an attack, CBP defenders will engage only as long as they perceive an ability to defeat an attack. If the defending commander assesses that his forces are decisively overmatched, he will attempt a withdrawal to preserve combat power. Complex Battle Positions have the following characteristics that distinguish it from Simple Battle Positions:

- Limited avenues of approach which are easily observable by the defender.
- Not oriented on an enemy avenue of approach.

- 360 degree fire coverage and protection from attack.
- Engineer effort prioritizes to cover and concealment measures.
- Large logistic caches.
- Multiple exfiltration routes from CBP identified for use, on order.

### Disruption Element

6-114. The disruption element of a CBP is primarily focused on detecting attackers and providing early warning to the defending force. In addition to observation posts and ground ambushes, the security force will establish anti-landing ambushes and anti-landing reserves. When the CBP is attacked, designated security forces will remain in position to provide the irregular force commander with a reconnaissance and surveillance capability. The security force may also include indirect fire assets such as mortars to provide immediate and observed harassing fires.

### Main Defense Element

6-115. The main defense element of a CBP is responsible for defeating an attacking force. This element also covers the withdrawal of the support force if an evacuation of the CBP is required.

### Reserve Element

6-116. The reserve element of a CBP exists to provide the irregular force commander with tactical flexibility. During the counter-reconnaissance battle the reserve may augment forces in a disruption zone, in order to provide additional security to the main defense element. The reserve will rarely be decisively engaged in the disruption zone.

### Support Element

6-117. The support element of a SBP has the mission of providing one or more of the following capabilities to the defense:

- Command and control.
- Supporting direct fire.
- Supporting indirect fire.
- Supporting non-lethal fires.
- Engineer support.
- Tasks as assigned by the irregular commander.

## RETROGRADE ACTIONS


6-118. The retrograde is an irregular force defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The enemy may force these operations or a commander may execute them voluntarily.

6-119. Retrograde operations are transitional and are not considered in isolation. There are three forms of retrograde:

- Withdrawal
- Delay
- Retirement

### WITHDRAWAL


6-120. A withdrawal occurs when an element disengages from enemy contact to reposition itself for another mission. Regardless of employment, an irregular force leader conducts his withdrawal in accordance within a higher commander's guidance.



6-121. In a withdrawal not under pressure, irregular forces may be part of the forces that remain in contact. Deception techniques convince an enemy that most of an identified irregular force is still in position. If the irregular force cannot position a security element, it conducts a fighting withdrawal. The irregular force disengages from the enemy by fires and maneuvering out of contact with the enemy.

## DELAY

6-122. In a delay, the enemy slows its forward momentum when irregular forces cause the repeated deployment of an enemy in preparing to attack. After causing the enemy to deploy, the delaying irregular force withdraws to new defensive positions. A delay is typically conducted to extend the time and space between an irregular force and an enemy attempting a decisive engagement or battle. Irregular forces act in support of a higher command element's mission intent for subsequent missions that aim ultimately at offensive action.



6-123. As part of a company or larger size irregular force operations, a platoon size element can be tasked as a reserve, security force, or part of a main body. The squads or sections and platoons disengage from the enemy as a withdrawal under pressure and move directly to their next position and defend. Squads and platoons slow the advance of the enemy through use of:

- Ambushes.
- Snipers.
- Obstacles.
- Minefields and deception minefields.
- Artillery and mortar fires.


6-124. A common control measure used in these missions is the delay line, which is a phase line the enemy is not allowed to cross until a specified date and time. A delay operation terminates when the delaying force conducts a rearward passage of lines through a defending irregular force, the delaying force reaches defensible terrain and transitions to the defense, the advancing enemy force reaches a culminating point and can no longer continue to advance, or the delaying force goes on the offense.

6-125. Irregular forces can use stay-behind operations as part of defensive or retrograde operations. In these operations, the commander leaves a unit in position to conduct a specified mission while the remainder of his forces withdraw or retire from an enemy. Conducting stay-behind operations concludes when the force conducts a linkup with attacking irregular forces or enters an irregular force sanctuary.

## RETIREMENT

6-126. Retirement is a form of retrograde in which an irregular force not in contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy. Retiring units organize to fight but do so for self defense and continuation of a retirement.

6-127. Retirements are usually not as risky as delays or withdrawals. Retiring irregular forces maintain normal tactical security and are prepared to conduct situational defense or offense.



## SECTION IV - IRREGULAR TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND TERRORISM

6-128. The irregular uses a wide array of tactics and techniques in conducting terror. This section is not an exhaustive presentation of methods or approaches. Norms regarding terror operations are use of surprise, secrecy, innovation, and direct or indirect methods of attack. Tactics are as broad and diverse as the resources of the terrorist cell and the resolve of the terrorist leader. Extensive use of the Internet exchanges information and training among terrorists. Training material, training videos, and on-line dialogs develop and sustain initiatives and encouragement. Irregular forces continue to improve techniques as field experiences demonstrate degrees of effectiveness in real-world situations such as Chechnya, Colombia, Iraq, Kashmir, the Balkans, and Afghanistan.

6-129. The irregular uses tactics, forces, and weapons specifically tailored to a particular mission. Terrorist operations are planned for a specific target and effect. A terrorist relies on reconnaissance and surveillance to plan, counter, and overmatch. If changes or unexpected conditions render success unlikely, the terrorist may cancel or postpone an operation and return later, or choose a different target and continue his planning and attack process.

6-130. Activities can be used to gain information about the target's response to a potential attack. Where the occupants go during the evacuation of a building, and how long it takes them to exit are useful elements of information in operational planning, and can be obtained through simply making an anonymous phone call with a bomb threat or activating a fire alarm. Observation of regularly scheduled exercises or drills of emergency response procedures can provide similar information. This technique can also be combined with an actual attack to circumvent fixed security measures. For example, the occupants of a bomb-resistant building with controlled access and a guard force could be forced to evacuate by a plausible but false threat. Most security plans would respect the potential danger such a threat represented and evacuate the building. Unless assembly areas are properly secured, the evacuation could make the occupants more vulnerable to weapons such as a car bomb or another mass casualty technique placed near the facility exits or at known assembly points.

### Forms of Terrorism

- ◆ Threat-Hoax
- ◆ Arson
- ◆ Sabotage
- ◆ Bombing
- ◆ Kidnapping
- ◆ Hostage Taking
- ◆ Hijack-Seizure
- ◆ Raid or Ambush
- ◆ Assassination
- ◆ WMD

### THREAT OR HOAX

6-131. A terrorist cell can use threats to coerce or preclude actions by a targeted individual or population. Threats and hoaxes can degrade the effectiveness of preventive or countermeasures when a targeted individual or population loses situational awareness of an actual terrorist target or disperses finite assets against many possible threats. At the less lethal end of the conflict spectrum, hoaxes can simply be methods to annoy and wear down security forces and keep the population constantly agitated. Bomb threats, leaving suspicious items in public places, and other ploys consume time, resources, and effort from other security operations and contribute to general uncertainty and anxiety.

6-132. Extortion is an example of a threat that obtains money, materiel, information, or support by force or intimidation. Numerous reports from the Afghanistan region indicate that warlords and militias that protect

coalition supply convoys, in many cases, are corrupt and extorting large sums of money from the host nation trucking (HNT) contractors. Such reports are evidence in U.S. official reports to Congress. Other Taliban extortion occurs in the opium trade of the region with “taxes” levied on farmers, traffickers, and trafficking ring leaders. Some HNT contractors report another issue of corrupt government officials or activities that also require bribes to retain business permits or easy route access.

6-133. Intimidation is another form of extortion. Intelligence cells or a specialized team can intimidate people to obtain information on a target location or to provide resources. Death threats against an individual or his family may cause him to provide information or resources to a group with which he has no interest or allegiance. A terrorist cell can also intimidate people not to take an action. For example, security personnel may not implement required security measures because of intimidation. The power of coercing individuals can be significant; several terrorist groups have successfully used these techniques to force individuals to carry out suicide bombing missions.



**Figure 6-2. Ruse and Deception**

## **ARSON**

6-134. Arson is most often used for symbolic attacks and economic effects. One example is an October 2010 attack on a temporary staging area in southern Pakistan for fuel tanker trucks. A small group of extremists shot at and ignited fuel trucks that were part of NATO coalition supply convoys. Approaching the parked fuel trucks in two vehicles, about eight to ten individuals caused the destruction of over 20 fuel trucks as fire spread among the trucks. The attackers were able to evade any response by local authorities. The disruption of a main supply route and the resulting requirement for reallocation of security forces slowed resupply missions. More than an isolated incident, a number of attacks by small groups of armed extremists hampered other ongoing coalition operations and regional law enforcement responsibilities.

6-135. Some single-issue groups, such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), favor arson for its criminal actions. Although ELF has claimed responsibility for dozens of arsons, probably the most costly arson committed by this group was in San Diego, California in August 2003. Claiming it was targeting rampant urban development, ELF started a fire that caused an estimated \$50 million worth of damage in San Diego’s fast-growing northern edge suburbs.

6-136. Arson can be combined, directly or indirectly, with other forms of terror. An arson attack on a bank killed five people in an Iranian city bordering Pakistan as a mosque bombing incited civil unrest. Violence in Zahedan near the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan is difficult to pinpoint to a particular cell in a crime infested region, laced with major drug trafficking routes, and experiencing attacks from Sunni guerrillas fighting for greater autonomy from Iran's Shiite leadership.



**Figure 6-3. Arson by Insurgents During Convoy Ambush**

## SABOTAGE

6-137. Sabotage is the planned destruction of the enemy's equipment or infrastructure. The purpose of sabotage is to inflict both psychological and physical damage.

6-138. This can result with an incident creating a large number of casualties or from a severe disruption of services for the population. Destroying or disrupting key services or facilities impresses the power of the saboteur on the public consciousness and either increases a target population frustration with the ineffectiveness of the government or may inspire others in the population to resist.

6-139. A terrorist group normally aims its sabotage actions at elements of infrastructure, in order to reinforce the perception that nothing in a community is safe. Oil pipelines, water purification plants, sewage treatment facilities, air traffic control hubs, and medical treatment or research facilities are several examples of potential targets. Terrorist groups use many techniques such as bombing, arson, cyber, or use of contaminants to conduct sabotage.



**Figure 6-4. Sabotaged Oil Pipeline**

6-140. Examples of sabotage have been evident in Iraq since the end of major combat operations where attacks have been conducted against power generation facilities and water pipelines. Attacks on Iraq's oil pipeline were persistent in 2003 and estimates spotlighted that the country was losing \$7 million daily because of damage to the pipeline that carried oil from the Kirkuk fields to a Mediterranean port in Turkey. In a 2010 assessment, total attacks against oil and gas targets worldwide declined by 27 percent in 2009 and have steadily declined since 2006.

## BOMBING


6-141. Bombs are a favored weapon for terrorists. Bombs are highly destructive and can be easily tailored to the mission, do not require the operator to be present, and have a significant physical and psychological impact. To demonstrate their prominence in terrorist operations, 324 out of 482 total terrorist incidents or planned acts in the U.S. between 1980 and 2001 were bombings, and 119 of 208 international terrorist incidents in 2003 were bombings. In 2006, the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reported that bombing incidents increased by 30 percent from those in 2005 and the death toll in these incidents during 2006 increased by 39 percent and injuries by 45 percent. Given the NCTC parameters for measuring noncombatant terrorist incidents, over 6400 people were killed by terrorist bombs in 2006.



**Figure 6-5. VBIED Detonates Outside Main Gate**

6-142. Data from 2009 NCTC statistics for 2008 noted an increase in female suicide bombings. Indications also noted that suicide vehicle borne bombings (VBIED) appeared to be a more used form of homicide-murder than the previous period. In a general tally of attack methods, only armed attacks surpassed the use of bombing by terrorists. This comparison of armed attack versus bombing remained true in 2010 NCTC data for 2009.

6-143. Car bombs, commonly referred to as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), are used regularly by terrorists. Besides the use of commercial jet planes on September 11, 2001 to hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, another notorious incident occurred in the United States on April 19, 1995 when a truck bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The result killed 168 people and injuring hundreds of other people. Timothy McVeigh was convicted and executed for the bombing, while an accomplice was sentenced to life in prison.



**Figure 6-6. U.S. Army Improvised Explosive Device Symbols**

6-144. Overseas, a suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Corps Marine Barracks in Beirut in October 1983 killing 241 Americans. A truck bomb that exploded near the Khobar Towers military complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996 killed 19 people and injured over 500 people.



**Terrorism Vignette: VBIED Bombing**

**Khobar Towers and Saudi Hizballah**

The terrorist bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in June 1996 exposed more than a physical vulnerability of Americans serving abroad. U.S. military forces encountered security issues with host nation authorities that restricted desired U.S. protective measures. Members of Saudi Hizballah conducted surveillance of Khobar for a year and met in Syria in mid-June 1996 to confirm tactical plans. A fuel truck converted into a truck bomb was backed against a perimeter fence and detonated with a timed fuse. The massive explosion killed nineteen U.S. military members and wounded over 370 other Americans, as well as Saudi civilians and other third country citizens in the area. A combination of situational factors allowed terrorists to identify target site vulnerabilities, conceive a plan to attack a point of weakness, conduct methodical preparation, react to disruption of terrorist cell membership, successfully attack, and damage prestige of the Saudi royal family and U.S. government.

6-145. Numerous methods exist for emplacing and detonating bombs. For example, directional bombs have been disguised as bricks in roadside walls and radio command detonated in the Israeli-occupied territories. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) improved methods of remote detonation of a bomb using police laser speed detection devices. Detonation would occur from a particular laser pulse within line of sight.

6-146. The Department of Homeland Security distributed a warning reflecting new tactics being used by terrorists in this area based on the bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in May 2003. These included terrorists hitting multiple targets, conducting simultaneous attacks, using multiple vehicles per target, and using assault and breaching teams armed with small arms to kill security personnel and gain access to the target area. The NCTC report on terrorism incidents in 2006 notes that terrorists continued techniques of an initial bomb explosion followed by secondary bomb detonations as first responders or other people arrive at the attack site. The 2010 NCTC report noted a trend of suicidal militia style attacks similar to the 2008 attack in Mumbai.

6-147. In recent years, bombs and in particular improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increased in lethality and adaptation of techniques used by terrorists. Terrorists have mastered the employment of roadside explosives to attack both individuals and motorcades or convoys. Some IEDs are bulky devices often made from artillery shells and detonated with garage door openers or doorbells. However, terrorists are producing smaller devices that can be planted quickly and can be detonated from longer distances with more sophisticated devices.

6-148. Another IED innovation is use a device called an explosively formed projectile (EFP). This penetrating principle is common of shape charge munitions. The innovation in recent conflict is its increasing use as an IED to outmatch armor protection. Although some technical skill and machining is required to obtain an optimum effect, a simple EFP is a section of pipe filled with explosives and capped by a shaped copper disk. When the explosive detonates, the EFP liner is generally folded into its final slug-like shape for maximum penetration of armor plating. Emplacement of the EFP is factored to hit a most likely point of penetration that can be from below a target, along a side or front of a target, and can even be from above or at an extended height from a road or trail surface.

6-149. Explosive devices can be placed at a target site and remotely detonated. The terrorist bombing attack in Spain in March 2004 used ten backpack bombs with nails and screws packed around the

explosives for shrapnel. Bombs were detonated on four trains almost simultaneously using cell phones as the initiation device. The results were nearly 200 dead and over 1,800 injured people. Another significant impact was the outcome of political elections and subsequent national decisions that withdrew levels of support from a coalition fighting an ongoing war on terrorism.



**Figure 6-7. IED of Artillery Shells**

6-150. The prevalent suicide tactic in use today involves an individual wearing or carrying an explosive device to a target and then detonating the bomb, or driving an explosive laden vehicle to a target and then detonating the bomb. Suicide attacks differ in concept and execution from other high risk operations. In other high-risk missions, mission success does not require that the participants die. The plan will allow for possible escape or survival of the participants. Suicide tactics are particular methods of delivering a bomb or conducting an assassination. The suicide tactic can be defined as “an act of terror, employing an explosive or incendiary device that requires the death of the perpetrator for successful implementation.”



**Figure 6-8. Foreign or Domestic Terror**

6-151. In early 2010, two suicide bombers killed and wounded many civilians at two central Moscow stations filled with morning commuters. A Russian security official described the bombs as filled with bolts and iron rods. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced links to the North Caucasus and Chechen separatists. The first blast occurred about 8 a.m. on a metro train station. This location is very close to the headquarters of the FSB. It killed at least 23 people. Less than 40 minutes later, a second suicide bomber detonated her bomb in a train at a separate station that killed 12 more people with many additional casualties.

6-152. Some terrorist cells have used people who are unknowingly part of a suicide attack. An example is an individual associated with a terrorist cell who believes he is only a courier of information, but is unknowingly transporting an improvised explosive device in a vehicle that is command detonated by an observer against a selected target.

6-153. Another way of describing a suicide bomber is a highly effective precision-guided munition. Psychological impact increases when confronted by a person who plans to intentionally commit suicide and kill other people as a tactic. Although a suicide bomber can be a lone terrorist working independently, the use of suicide terrorism as a tactic is normally the result of a conscious decision on the part of the leaders of terrorist organizations to engage this form of attack. Notwithstanding, suicide bombing can be an indication that a terror organization has failed to meet its goals through less extreme measures.



**Terrorism Vignette: Suicide Bombing**

**London Subway-Bus Bombing and Homegrown Terrorism**

On 7 July, 2005 terrorists conducted four nearly simultaneous suicide bombings in the center of London, United Kingdom. Three individuals detonated their backpack bombs on three subway trains as the trains departed into tunnels of the London subway system. A fourth terrorist detonated his suicide bomb on a city bus a short time later. These four young men were UK citizens, radicalized with religious extremism and indoctrinated with connections to al-Qaida. An aim of terrorism is a demoralizing psychological effect on a target population and its leaders, but can also have an opposite effect of fortifying the resolve of a population. The immediate public outrage in London, the United Kingdom, and many nations of the world appears to illustrate such resolve. In September 2005, a videotape attributed to al-Qaida spotlighted a suicide statement of one of the terrorists. A similar July 2006 videotape presented one of the other suicide bombers saying, "What you have witnessed now is only the beginning..." Homegrown terrorism had arrived.

6-154. Religiously motivated extremist groups as well as secular issue groups have employed this tactic. In addition to the Middle East; suicide attacks have been conducted in countries such as India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey, Tanzania, and Kenya. Other locations include Russia and the United States. One of the most successful suicidal terrorist groups in attacking key leaders is the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. A lone woman belonging to the Tamil Tigers assassinated former Prime Minister Ravij Gandhi with a suicide vest-belt bomb. Tamil Tigers also killed a President of Sri Lanka with a suicide bomber.

6-155. As in any other terrorist operation, extensive pre-operational surveillance and reconnaissance, extensive planning, rehearsals, and sufficient resources will be devoted to an operation employing suicide as a tactic. Although suicide bombers have been historically a male dominated tactic, women are becoming more involved in conducting these type operations. Women participated in 30 to 40 percent of the LTTE's nearly 200 suicide bombings in Sri Lanka. Suicide attacks have also been conducted by Chechen and Palestinian women, as well as attacks conducted by women in Iraq, Turkey and Morocco.

6-156. Teenagers have been suicide bombers. Palestinian teenagers have been involved in attacks against Israel for several years. In February 2004, three boys, ages 13, 14, and 15 were arrested because they were planning to carry out an attack in the northern Israeli town of Afula. Use of children in suicide attacks became evident on March 16, 2004, when an 11-year-old boy was stopped at an Israeli checkpoint with a bomb in his bag. Although investigation doubted that this boy was aware of the bomb, later that month a 14-year-old was stopped at a checkpoint wearing a suicide explosive vest.

6-157. The first major suicide bombing that struck at U.S. military forces was Hizballah's attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in October 1983 where 241 Americans were killed. Suicide attacks have also been used against coalition forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In a one day example on

27 December 2003, 12 Iraqis and six coalition troops were killed, and 100 Iraqis and 26 coalition troops were wounded when four suicide bombers conducted coordinated attacks in the city of Kabala. Suicide is an increasing danger given the number of attempted or successful suicide attacks. Between March 2006 and February 2007 in Iraq, over 30 suicide vest bomb incidents were reported as well as over 275 vehicle borne improvised explosive devices.

6-158. In one example of multiple suicide attacks, on 8 December 2009 at 10:00 AM, in the Rashid district of Baghdad, Iraq, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) targeting a police checkpoint in the southern Durah neighborhood near the Baghdad Technical Institute, killing three police officers and 12 students, wounding between five and 23 students and civilians, and damaging the checkpoint and several vehicles. Approximately 30 minutes later, three suicide VBIEDs exploded within minutes of each other near the New Finance Ministry and Labor and Social Affairs Ministry buildings in the central Shorja neighborhood in the Ar Rusafa district, near the Nida'a Mosque on Palestine Street in the northern Al Qahirah neighborhood of the 'Azamiyah district, and near the Karkh Civil Court building in the Al Karkh district. Attacks killed 112 government employees and civilians, wounded between 425 and 490 government employees and civilians, and damaged dozens of vehicles, several police vehicles, three government buildings, three houses, and a public market. Thirty-four of the total fatalities occurred at the New Finance Ministry bombing. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility.

## **KIDNAPPING**

6-159. Kidnapping is usually an action taken against a prominent individual for a specific reason. The most common reasons for kidnapping are ransom; release of a fellow terrorist, insurgent, or other criminal; or the desire to publicize a demand or an issue. The terrorist cell conducts detailed planning, especially regarding movement of the kidnapped individual. The kidnapped victim is moved to a location controlled by the cell. The group makes demands and is often willing to hold a victim for a significant time.

6-160. Success of kidnapping relies on balancing the cost to the government represented by the threat of harm to the victim, with the costs of meeting the kidnappers' demands. Some kidnapping operations are actually assassinations with killing the victim as an intended outcome. The terrorists intended objective in this case being the intermediate concessions and publicity obtained during the negotiation process that they would not receive from a simple assassination.

6-161. Kidnapping can also be used as a means of financing the organization. Ransom from seized individuals or groups are a significant slice of income for groups in several regions of the world. Latin America has long been a victim of terrorist kidnapping, especially by the FARC and ELN in Colombia.

6-162. The Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines uses this method to finance their operations. Ransoms vary but often demand significant payment. Ten employees of a Spanish energy consortium were kidnapped in Ecuador in October 2000 by kidnappers believed to be linked to the Popular Liberation Army of Colombia. The oil companies eventually paid \$13 million in ransom for their release. Some regions experience kidnapping as a regular means of terror.

6-163. In Nepal in 2006, Maoist rebels continued acts of kidnapping, extortion, and murder. Even with some accommodations and cease fire agreements that suspended the insurgency between Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN/M), a separatist terror group emerged from the Maoist rebels declaring their intent to secede a portion of the plains and countryside from Nepal. In Nigeria in 2007, kidnapping of foreigners remains a regular danger as rebels struggle for control of oil and mineral wealth in the Niger Delta. Kidnapping of foreign nationals working for NGOs or transnational corporations remains a critical concern in the region.

6-164. An example of kidnapping a U.S. military member is Lieutenant Colonel William Higgins, USMC. He disappeared on May 17, 1988, while serving as the Chief, Observer Group Lebanon and Senior Military Observer, United States Military Observer Group, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. He was kidnapped and held by Iranian-backed Hizballah terrorists and later murdered. A photograph of his body hanging from a noose was released to the news media in July 1989. His remains continued to be held until they were released in December 1991.

6-165. Another example was the kidnapping of Brigadier General James Dozier, senior U.S. official at a NATO headquarters in Verona, Italy, by Red Brigade terrorists on December 17, 1981. The targeting of General Dozier broke the pattern of previous terrorist activities in Italy since terrorist groups had previously concentrated their actions against key Italian personalities such as senior Italian politicians, industrialists, jurists, newspaper publishers and police officials. Following General Dozier's kidnapping, numerous additional threats were received which provided a clear indication that the terrorism situation had changed in Italy and other Americans and U.S. facilities were potential targets for terrorist actions.



### **Terrorism Vignette: Kidnapping**

#### **U.S. Army Brigadier General Dozier and Red Brigade**

Brigadier General James Dozier, senior American official at a NATO headquarters in Verona, Italy, was kidnapped from his residence in 1981 by Red Brigade terrorists. The terrorists conducted surveillance of Dozier's residence for at least 30 days from positions in a park and at a bus stop across from the building. Techniques included young people standing at the bus stop and young couples in the park area. Additionally, the terrorists conducted reconnaissance of his apartment at least twice while posing as meter readers. Two men pretending to be plumbers conducted the actual kidnapping. They told General Dozier that there was a leak in an apartment below his residence and needed to check his pipes as a possible cause. Leaks were common in the building. When he let them into the apartment, he was placed in a chest and moved to a terrorist safehouse. After being held captive for 42 days, Dozier was rescued by Italian police.

6-166. The terrorists conducted surveillance of General Dozier's residence for at least 30 days from positions in a park and at a bus stop across from the building. The techniques used were young people standing at the bus stop and young couples in the park area. Additionally, the terrorists had been in his apartment at least twice while posing as meter readers. Two men pretending to be plumbers conducted the actual kidnapping. They told General Dozier that there was a leak in the apartment below and wanted to determine if it was coming from Dozier's apartment. Since leaks were common in the building, he let them into the apartment, at which time the kidnapping was executed. After being held for 42 days, he was rescued by Italian police.

6-167. Consider the amount of media attention given the abduction and eventual murder of reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002, and how the video of his murder was nearly presented on cable television networks. Subsequent murders since then have involved kidnapping and beheading. Nicholas Berg was kidnapped in Iraq and beheaded in May 2004. Another American, Paul Johnson who worked in Saudi Arabia as a contractor, was kidnapped and beheaded in June 2004. In both cases, the terrorists distributed videos or photographs to the media and posted similar exploitation means on websites.

6-168. A May 2007 attack on a U.S. two vehicle army observation post in Iraq resulted in several killed soldiers, an Iraqi soldier, and three missing U.S. soldiers. Afterwards, U.S. officials received credible evidence that the attack was conducted by al-Qaida or an al-Qaida affiliated cell with the intention to capture prisoners. Previous incidents of capturing U.S. soldiers had created immediate media attention. Website postings in May 2007 by terrorists mocked U.S. attempts to find the soldiers and gained significant international media attention of this small squad-size tactical raid.

## **HOSTAGE TAKING**

6-169. Hostage taking is typically an overt seizure of people to gain publicity for a cause, gain political concessions, political asylum, release of prisoners, or ransom. Terrorists will take often hostages with the intent to kill them after they believe they have fully exploited the media coverage from the situation.

6-170. Unlike kidnapping where a prominent individual is normally taken and moved to an unknown location, the hostages are usually not well known figures in the enemy's society. While dramatic, hostage situations are frequently risky for the terrorist group especially when conducted in enemy territory. They expose the terrorists to hostile military or police operations, and carry significant possibility of both mission failure and capture. Therefore, terrorists will usually attempt to hold hostages in a neutral or friendly area, rather than in enemy territory.



**Figure 6-9. U.S. Soldier Hostages in FYROM-Serbia Region (1999)**

6-171. Similar issues could arise with captured U.S. soldiers. A case in point occurred during the air campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999. Three U.S. Army soldiers patrolling the Yugoslav-Macedonian border became separated from a larger patrol and were captured by the Serbians. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic orchestrated an international media campaign during their month long captivity. Maintaining an ambiguous stance on the status of the prisoners and their possible fate, Milosevic eventually released the three U.S. soldiers to an unofficial mission of prominent American political figures that resulted in even more media coverage. The political and psychological impact far outweighed any operational impact caused by the capture of three soldiers and one vehicle.



**Terrorism Vignette: *Hostage Taking***

**Three U.S. Army Soldiers and Milosevic**

During the air campaign against Serbia in the spring of 1999, three U.S. Army soldiers patrolling the Yugoslav-Macedonian border became separated from a larger patrol mission and were captured by the Serbian military forces. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic orchestrated an international media campaign during the month long captivity of the U.S. Army soldiers. Maintaining an ambiguous stance on the status of the prisoners and their possible fate, Milosevic eventually released the three U.S. soldiers to an unofficial mission of prominent American political figures that resulted in even more worldwide media coverage. The political and psychological impact on an international scale far outweighed any direct tactical or operational impact caused by the capture of three soldiers and one vehicle.

6-172. An example of a hostage crisis was the Moscow theater siege in October 2002. Over 30 Chechen terrorists seized a movie theater, threatening to kill all of the hostages if the Russians did not meet their demands. The rebels demanded that Russian forces end the war in Chechnya along with other demands. Following an extended stalemate approaching several days, Russian forces assaulted the theater. Over 60 hostages and over 30 terrorists died. However, 750 hostages were released. In another hostage crisis in

2004, an extremist regional group of men and women seized a middle school and over 1000 people in the city of Beslan in North Ossetia, Russia.

**Terrorism Vignette: Raid and Hostage Taking**

**Beslan and Separatist-Muslim Extremist Terror**

A troubled Eurasian region near Chechnya imploded during a raid and three day hostage crisis in September 2004 in the North Ossetia town of Beslan. A raid on the opening day ceremonies of a middle school by separatist-Islamic extremists netted over 1000 civilian hostages with the vast majority being children. Terrorists wanted to embarrass Russian authorities with an apparent inability of Russia to protect its citizens, and to seek political concessions concerning Chechnya. The well planned and heavily armed raid exploited the media with sensational videotape, interviews, and graphic scenes of death and mayhem. Dysfunctional responses by Russian authorities complicated the crisis and culminated in a several hour gunfight that resulted in the death of over 300 men, women, and children and over 700 other casualties. Reports note that all but one terrorist were killed, but other reports indicate that a number of terrorists evaded capture. The terrorist leader openly acknowledged civilians as the intended targets and victims of the raid.

6-173. A three day crisis culminated in mayhem when an explosion erupted inside the school and caused a hasty assault of the school facilities by Russian forces. Over 300 children, men, and women died in the explosion, assault, and subsequent fighting before all terrorists were killed or captured and the school building complex was secured. Some reports indicate that a small number of terrorists were able to exfiltrate during the mayhem. Nonetheless, the terrorists were able to capture global media attention for several days in this intentional action of hostage-taking and mass murder.

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*Note.* See Chapter 6 of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terror*, as a case study of Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia events and insights on domestic and foreign terrorism.

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## HIJACK-SEIZURE

6-174. Hijacking involves the forceful commandeering of a conveyance. Although normally associated with planes, it can also include naval vessels or other craft. There are many purposes to hijacking, such as hostage taking activities, obtaining a means of escape, or as a means of suicide. While hijacking of aircraft for hostage taking has declined in frequency since the implementation of improved security measures, the use of hijacked aircraft for escape or as a weapon continues. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 are vivid examples of the hijacking abilities of terrorist groups and the destructive power of hijacked jet planes.

6-175. Another example is the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 from Athens to Rome in 1985 by members of Hizballah. The terrorists held the plane and 153 hostages for 17 days. They received worldwide media attention as they transited locations in the region while demanding release of Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. The hostages from Flight 847 were released after Israel freed 435 prisoners. However, terrorists murdered a U.S. Navy diver, Robert Stethem, during the crisis and dumped his body on the airport tarmac.

6-176. The use of hijacked vehicles for destructive devices is not restricted to aircraft. Trucks carrying cargoes of explosive or flammable materials have also been seized to use as delivery devices. The possibility of such a technique being used with a ship carrying oil, refined petroleum products, or liquefied

natural gas (LNG) is of great concern. The results of several accidental explosions and fires from mishaps in handling such vessels in port show the catastrophic potential of this technique. Although not related to terrorism, ships loaded with tons of ammonium nitrate exploded in the harbor of Texas City, Texas in 1947 and destroyed significant portions of these towns and caused a massive death toll.

6-177. Seizure of a critical element of infrastructure, similar to hostage taking intentions, can be a physical site such as a facility of importance to a target population, or a cyber node that disrupts or precludes use of selected cyber functions. Threat of disruption or destruction of the seized infrastructure can be the bargaining issue for a terrorist cell to obtain a desired negotiation.

## **RAID OR AMBUSH**

6-178. A terrorist raid is similar in concept to a conventional operation but is usually conducted with smaller forces against targets marked for destruction, hijacking, or hostage operations. A raid permits control of the target for the execution of some other action. The kidnapping or assassination of a target that has a security force can often require a raid to overcome the defenses. Successful conduct of these type attacks requires extensive preoperational surveillance and detailed planning.

6-179. Examples of this type tactic are the raids conducted by terrorists on three Riyadh western housing compounds in Saudi Arabia on 11 May 2003. Attackers penetrated each compound and then detonated vehicle borne IEDs. The attack at the al-Hamra compound demonstrates the tactics of a raid. A sedan pulled up to the gate, followed by another vehicle. A number of terrorists dismounted, shot the guard, and then forced their way into the compound. As both vehicles drove to the center of the compound, terrorists shot into buildings and at any moving targets. Once they reached the housing area, one of the suicide terrorists driving a vehicle detonated the explosive device as a VBIED.

6-180. An ambush is a surprise attack characterized by violent execution and speed of action. The intended objective may be to cause mass casualties, assassinate an individual, or disrupt hostile security operations. Explosives, such as bombs and directional mines, are a common weapon used in terrorist ambushes. Other weapons frequently used are rocket launchers, automatic weapons, and other small arms.

6-181. An example of a complex attack was the bombing in Bali on 12 October 2002 attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamic terrorist group linked to al-Qaida. Initially, an electronically triggered bomb was detonated in a bar that forced the patrons out into the street. A more powerful car bomb was detonated in the street in front of another establishment. The bombings caused casualties of 202 killed and 209 injured.

6-182. Terrorist ambushes are frequently conducted from a variety of mobile platforms. Cars, vans and motorcycles have been used to conceal the attackers, isolate or immobilize the target, and then allow the attackers to escape. Ambushes from mobile platforms can be conducted while moving, or can be designed to bring the target to a halt in order to allow the attack team to physically close with and attack a target. In March 2004, an attack on five U.S. civilians working for a private volunteer organization (PVO) in Iraq killed four and wounded one during a mobile ambush in the city of Mosul.

## **ASSASSINATION**

6-183. An assassination is a deliberate action to kill specific individuals, usually VIPs such as political leaders, notable citizens, collaborators, particularly effective officials. The terrorist group assassinates people it cannot intimidate, people who support their enemy, or people who have some symbolic significance for the enemy or world community. Terrorist groups often refer to these killings as punishment or justice as an attempt to legitimize their actions. In 1981, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated by fundamentalist Islamics for his support of the peace process in the Middle East and his relationship with Western nations. In September 2001, Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud was assassinated in Afghanistan by two suicide bombers believed to be from al-Qaida. The assassination was due to Massoud's opposition of the Taliban regime and al-Qaida's presence in Afghanistan.

6-184. Extensive target surveillance and reconnaissance of engagement areas are required to select the optimum mode of attack. Although many factors play into the decision, the target's vulnerabilities determine the method of assassination. For example, a target driving to work along the same route each day may be vulnerable to an emplaced explosive device. An assassination attempt during the 1981 Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) training exercise was directed against the U.S. military by the Red Army Faction. As the Commander in Chief of United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and Commander of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), General Frederick Kroesen was attacked as he and his wife were in their sedan on a main street near the military headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany.



**Terrorism Vignette: Assassination Attempt**

**U.S. Army General Kroesen and Red Army Faction**

As the Commander in Chief of United States Army Europe (USAREUR) and Commander of NATO's Central Army Group (CENTAG), General Frederick Kroesen and his wife were attacked in their sedan as they drove near his headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany. The 1981 assassination attempt by the Red Army Faction (RAF) used rocket propelled grenades and small arms gunfire when the sedan was at a halt for a city stoplight. After the attack, a site was discovered about 200 yards from the target point with an abandoned tent, radio transmitter, sleeping bag, and food. The terrorists had conducted surveillance and developed detailed plans for the assassination attempt. Fortunately, sedan armor plating and bulletproof glass on his vehicle, combined with inaccurate rocket detonations, prevented any serious injuries.

6-185. The assassination attempt used rocket propelled grenades and small arms gunfire when the sedan was at a halt for a city stoplight. After the attack, a site was discovered about 200 yards from the target point with an abandoned tent, radio transmitter, sleeping bag, and food. The terrorists had conducted surveillance and developed detailed plans for the assassination attempt. Fortunately, sedan armor plating and bulletproof glass on his vehicle, combined with inaccurate rocket detonations, prevented any serious injuries.



**Figure 6-10. Ambush on General Kroesen**

6-186. Many targets of assassination are symbolic and are intended to have great psychological impact on the enemy. For example, assassinating an enemy government official, a successful businessperson, or a prominent cleric can demonstrate the enemy's inability to protect its own people. Assassinating local representatives of social or civic order, such as teachers, contributes to disorder while demoralizing other members of the local government and discouraging cooperation with them. An example of this is the attempted assassination of Iraq's most prominent Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in February 2004. This incident was an attempt to create anger in the long oppressed Shiite community and increase the sectarian and ethnic violence in Iraq. Many assassinations have targeted Iraqis who have assumed leadership positions in support of a transition to a sovereign democratic government.

6-187. Unfortunately terrorists have been successful in some assassination attempts. In April 1989, Communist insurgents from the New People's Army in the Philippines assassinated an American military advisor, Colonel James Rowe. He was killed in a moving ambush where small arms fire defeated the limited protection of his vehicle. This terrorist group was attacking Americans they considered directly linked to the Philippine military campaign being conducted against their insurgent group. Sometimes an assassination can be planned to occur by creating an event to obtain the presence of a key leader, or may simply be an unplanned opportunity for murder. On 30 December 2009, between 9:30 AM and 10:10 AM, in Ar Ramadi, Al Anbar, Iraq, a possible suicide bomber detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a security checkpoint near the provincial government building; then approximately thirty minutes later, as the provincial governor went to survey the scene, a suicide bomber approached and detonated an improvised explosive device (IED), killing between 24 and 29 civilians and police officers and one provincial council member, wounding between 54 and 102 civilians and police officers, two provincial council members, and one governor, and damaging the security checkpoint and 20 vehicles. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) claimed responsibility.

## WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

6-188. Listing a category as weapons of mass destruction acknowledges a broad range of capabilities that specific terrorist groups would like to acquire. Once acquired, this capability would allow for catastrophic results through numerous delivery means. These type weapons include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives. In some cases, low yield explosives can cause incidents categorized as use of a weapon of mass destruction.

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*Note.* See the 2007 version of U.S. Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.04, *Terrorism and WMD in the Contemporary Operational Environment*, for a guide on weapons of mass destruction and the threat of terrorism.

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


Figure 6-11. CBRN Threat

## SUMMARY

This chapter addressed tactics and techniques used by irregular forces across a broad spectrum of conflict that includes irregular warfare, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and terrorism. This form of warfare occurs primarily among and within the people. Violent conflict is waged not necessarily for military supremacy but for power and influence over a population. Nevertheless, the effective use of irregular forces can create or support the conditions for other state or non-state actors to exert their influence on a population. Often, tactics and techniques will include terrorism in order to achieve an objective. Some irregular forces openly state their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction on a targeted population.

## Chapter 7

# Irregular forces Planning Cycle

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*What may be the defining ideological conflict of the 21st century, is marked by the rising threat of a violent extremist movement that seeks to create anarchy and instability throughout the international system.*

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008)

This chapter provides a general concept of planning that can be used as a framework for action by irregular forces. The seven concept phases are descriptive but not prescriptive. A generic sequence and timing of irregular force events depend on organizational capabilities and limitations, operational constraints, and the level of commitment of an irregular force actor or organization. To effectively understand this commitment, knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to appreciating resolve to plan and act. The irregular force sets conditions to optimize its awareness, training, and mission readiness objectives to counter U.S. military forces. When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can combine conventional military, paramilitary, criminal activities, and terrorism. Tactics, techniques, and procedures include creating conditions of instability in a particular region, alienating the population from the legitimate authority of the region, and improving the irregular force influence on a designated populace. In complex conditions, an irregular force may be able to employ a range of organizational options from small loosely affiliated cells to global networks in order to promote mission success and psychological effect. Such networks can be local, regional, international or transnational affiliations; host simple or sophisticated media propaganda; as well as acquire covert or overt financial, political, military, or social support.

## BROAD TARGET SELECTION



**Conduct broad target analysis and general intentions.**

7-1. Irregular and terrorist operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of success by avoiding an adversary's strengths and concentrating on an enemy's weaknesses. Emphasis is on maximizing security and target effects. This normally means a small number of mission members to successfully conduct an operation. Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises.

7-2. Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon. While some targets may be vulnerable enough for shorter periods of observation, the information gathering will still be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or cancelled due to changes at the target or local conditions. Tactical missions combine to complement operational objectives and strategic goals. The psychological impact on the target population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.

7-3. There is no universal model for planning, but experience and success have demonstrated traditional principles for plans and operations. Organizations exchange expertise in personnel and training, and study methods and operational successes of other groups and cells. Innovation is a proven key component of operational success.

7-4. Tactical and operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular organizations. The differences among irregular forces, insurgent groups, or terrorist cells organizations center on factors of intent and capability.

7-5. Current threats display the increasing desire and ability of a learning organization. Irregular forces gather information and intelligence, analyze strengths and weaknesses, determine patterns, trends, and emerging actions, and identify vulnerabilities in an adversary's or enemy's security to attack.

7-6. Consideration in choosing targets adapts directly to counter sovereign government or supporting force programs that demonstrate security, safety, and assurance to the population. Subversive or direct action tactical operations can be planned and conducted to counter programs, or targeted groups or leaders such as:

- Secure the population and critical areas in the region.
- Reclaim the population and areas that support the irregulars.
- Eliminate the insurgency, politically, militarily and philosophically.
- Develop military, police, or other internal security forces.
- Support the restoration of government presence and control.
- Key Leaders in the government and administrators.
- Promote normalcy and stability.
- Protect basic civil services.

### Terrorist Planning Cycle

- ◆ Broad Target Selection
- ◆ Intelligence and Surveillance
- ◆ Specific Target Selection
- ◆ Pre-Attack Surveillance and Planning
- ◆ Attack Rehearsal
- ◆ Actions on Objective
- ◆ Escape and Exploitation

## INITIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE



7-7. Targets showing vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort. This interest establishes the requirement to gather additional information on a target’s patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span months and even years. Examples include the 2004 accounts of terrorist surveillance conducted for years on the International Monetary Fund, Prudential Building, New York Stock Exchange, as well as facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target type. Elements of information typically gathered include:

- **Practices/Procedures/Routines.** Assessing facilities includes scheduled deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures and other observable routines. For individuals, it can include regularly scheduled errands such as laundry pickup days or car parking locations.
- **Residence and Workplace.** This category applies primarily to the physical layout and individual activities at the two locations that the target typically spends the most time.
- **Transportation/Routes of Travel.** For individuals, this is the mode of transport and common routes to any regular destination such as house, work, gym, and school. For facilities, it addresses access and exit points, types of vehicles allowed on the grounds, or availability of transportation into the target site.



Figure 7-1. Gather Intelligence on Possible-Probable Targets

- **Security Measures.** This topic includes inspection areas depending on the complexity of the security around the target: presence of a guard force; the reaction time of response units; any hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency reaction drills are examples of key collection objectives. The intent is to avoid or minimize security measures and strike the target during a period of vulnerability.

## SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION



7-8. Selection of a target for actual operational planning considers some of the following factors:

- Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?
- Will the target attract immediate high profile media attention beyond the immediate region?
- Does attack success emphasize the desired grievance to the correct target audience?

- Is the effect consistent with objectives of the irregular force or terrorist cell?
- Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the irregular force or terrorist cell by demonstrating its capabilities?
- What are the costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?



**Figure 7-2. Select a Target and Attack Objective**

7-9. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the selected target. Targets that do not receive immediate primary consideration may still be collected on for future opportunities.

## PRE-ATTACK SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNING



7-10. Members of the actual operational cells begin to appear during this phase. Trained intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the irregular force or terrorist cell may be organized to prepare for the operation. This phase gathers detailed information on the target's current patterns in recent days to weeks. The attack team confirms information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

7-11. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target's activities. The information gained is then used to:

- Conduct security studies.
- Conduct detailed preparatory plans and operations.
- Recruit specialized operatives.
- Procure a base of operations in the target area such as safe houses and caches.
- Design and test escape routes.
- Decide on types of weapon and other means of attack.



Figure 7-3. Refine Intelligence on Enemy Patterns and Vulnerabilities

## REHEARSAL



7-12. As with conventional military operations, rehearsals are conducted to improve the probability of success, confirm planning assumptions, and develop contingencies. Rehearsals test security reactions to particular attack profiles. Irregular forces or terrorist cells use their own operatives and unsuspecting people to test target reactions.

7-13. Typical rehearsals include:

- Equipment and weapons training.
- Communications and signals.
- Skills performance.
- Staging for final preparatory checks.
- Pre-operations checks.
- Deployment into target area.
- Actions on the objective.
- Primary and alternate escape routes.
- Initial safe house or kidnapping confinement facilities and guard operations.
- Transfer plans from initial to subsequent safe havens or confinement sites.

7-14. Tests in the target area will be conducted to confirm:

- Target information gathered to date.
- Target patterns of activities.
- Physical layout of target or operations area.
- Time-distance factors from the assault position to the attack points.
- Security force presence during varied states of alert.
- Reaction response timing by security forces to demonstration or threat.
- Ability to position and retrieve equipment or vehicles near the objective.
- Ease of blocking or restricting an escape route at critical choke points.



Figure 7-4. Rehearse Actions and Contingencies

## ATTACK AND ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

7-15. Once terrorists reach this stage after a well planned rehearsal of their operation, the odds often favor a successful attack against the target. Planned and rehearsed operations possess tactical advantages. Attackers possess the advantages of initiative and deception, and provide for:

- Use of Surprise.
- Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack.
- Employment of diversions and supplemental attacks.
- Conduct of security and support positions to neutralize target reaction forces and security measures.



Figure 7-5. Attack with Rapid and Violent Conduct



7-16. Simultaneous actions may include an assault element, security element, and support element. Some missions may require a breach element. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks:

- Isolate the objective site.
- Gain access to the individual, individuals, or asset to seize or destroy.
- Control of the target site.
- Achieve the mission task.

## ESCAPE AND EXPLOITATION

7-17. Escape plans are well rehearsed and executed. Rapid dispersal from the target site can involve multiple withdrawal routes and temporary safe houses. Even in the case of a suicide attack, an observer or recorder in an attack cell require a plan to evade identification and capture. Similar expectation to evade capture occurs in an attack by fire element or support by fire element in an attack. Media exploitation to a global audience will usually include video coverage, sometimes with audio commentary by observers with a videographer. Mass casualties or major disruption of economic and social services are known to gain prime international media coverage that may further promote awareness of an irregular force agenda, and overtly or indirectly assist the irregular force “battle of the narrative.”



7-18. The irregular force operation must be actively publicized to achieve an intended effect of exploiting a successful attack. Media outlets influenced or coerced to support an irregular force and prepared public statements are examples of preparation to effectively exploit operations. Actions and announcements will be timed to take advantage of media cycles for the selected target audiences at the local, regional, and global levels of information warfare.



Figure 7-6. Exploit Success with Mass Media Coverage

7-19. Unsuccessful operations are disavowed by the irregular force when possible. The perception that an irregular force or terrorist cell has failed can damage the organization’s prestige, indicate cell vulnerability, and ineffective conduct.

7-20. In addition to the impact on the enemy, successful attacks can bring favorable attention, notoriety, and encourage support such as funding and recruiting to the irregular force or terrorist cell. The proof that an attacker can attack and evade can sway potential recruits to join, and convince recruits that have been coerced to approach assigned tasks with an expectation of success and survival.

### SUMMARY

7-21. This chapter provided a general concept of planning that can be used as a framework for action by irregular forces. The seven concept phases are generally descriptive of tactics and techniques but not prescriptive. Operations retain an adaptive expectation based on evolving conditions. Knowing the underlying motivation is fundamental to appreciating the resolve of irregular forces to plan and act.

7-22. The irregular force sets conditions to challenge the mission objectives of selected U.S. military forces. When advantageous to irregular force operations, capabilities can combine conventional military, paramilitary, criminal capabilities, and terrorism. Tactics and techniques include creating conditions to improve irregular force influence on a designated populace. Regardless of an irregular force network as local, regional, international or transnational in capability, media exploitation using simple or sophisticated propaganda is critical to create the desired influence within a targeted population.

## Chapter 8

# Irregular Conflict and Emergent Vectors

*America is at war, and we live in a world where global terrorism and extremist ideologies are realities. The Army has analytically looked at the future, and we believe our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of “persistent conflict”—a period of protracted confrontation among states, nonstate, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.*

U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (2008)

This chapter presents emergent trends and patterns of irregular warfare that confront and will confront U.S. military forces. Armed conflicts and other military operations around the world that are indicative of persistent conflict. No accurate prediction exists on the nature, location, or duration of U.S. military forces participation in future armed conflicts. Emergent vectors offer indications of the types of conflict that the U.S. Army will confront in coming decades. Irregular forces will seek to identify vulnerabilities in an enemy’s training, professional education, and operational readiness. Enemy weaknesses will be the focus of most irregular force attacks. Some overarching issues are the uncertainties of armed conflict in irregular warfare, the complex nature of motives and commitment by irregular forces, and the presence of a learning and adaptive enemy.

### EMERGENT AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING




Figure 8-1. Emergent Vectors

8-1. Understanding situational context approaches the issue of irregular emergent vectors along an avenue of action used by irregulars, paramilitary, guerrillas, terrorists, insurgents, or criminals. Intent has a premise of adapting constantly to optimize knowledge, training, logistical support, and readiness to conduct operations. Terrorism will be used when this type of action accomplishes the desired psychological effect. Irregular forces can be patient. They will plan while waiting for critical opportunities to strike.

8-2. Emergent vectors are categorized in this document in five groupings that can range simple capabilities to sophisticated full spectrum weaponry and systems. combat power multipliers are as follow:

- Radicalized Motivations.
- Adaptive Operational Tactics.
- Versatile Group Affiliations.
- Devastating Capabilities.
- Globalized Propaganda.

8-3. The *Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force* published in January 2007 by the Department of Homeland Security, assessed possible future threats to the United States for five years to 2012. The lead finding of the report stated, “There is every indication that the number and magnitude of attacks on the United States, its interest and its allies will likely increase.” Predicting the nature, timing, or location of the next attack is beyond the scope of this report, however, the task force members spotlight, “The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology.”

8-4. The *2009 Report on Terrorism* by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center recorded about 11,800 terrorist-type attacks against noncombatants during 2008 based on NCTC criteria for attacks. These attacks resulted in 54,000 deaths, injuries and kidnappings. The most prevalent means of attack were armed attacks, bombings, and kidnappings. 2010 statistics from the NCTC report for 2009 describe similar motivations, means of attack, and target as primarily civilians.

8-5. Understanding current vectors must consider the nature of irregular forces and the capabilities and limitations of specific irregular forces such as insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists or associated criminal element in an evolving contemporary operational environment. As the regions of the world advance in technological areas, expand the mobility opportunities of people, and exploit the Internet and other media, extremists concurrently fuel grievances and alienate segments of populations to foster support for their agendas.

8-6. An expanding concern is the intent of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates to conduct high-profile attacks inside of the United States. Cooperation and collaboration among some extremist groups, attempted attacks on the U.S. homeland in recent years, and American citizens who have traveled to train or fight as members of extremist groups indicate that attempts to attack the U.S. will increase. Self-radicalized individuals have conducted or attempted to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States.

**Irregular  
Emergent Vectors**

- ◆ **Radicalized  
Motivations**
- ◆ **Adaptive  
Operational Tactics**
- ◆ **Versatile  
Organizational Affiliations**
- ◆ **Devastating  
Full Spectrum Weaponry**
- ◆ **Globalized  
Propaganda**

## **RADICALIZED MOTIVATIONS**

8-7. A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment of global terrorism states, “Al-Qaida’s strategic objectives – reestablishing the Islamic caliphate, unified by a common ideology rooted in a violent rejection of apostasy and characterized by fervent opposition to Western influence in traditionally Islamic

countries compel al-Qa'ida's commitment..." Senior leaders of al-Qa'ida have repeatedly stated an aim of establishing Islamic states that would include Afghanistan, an Islamic state in the Levant, Egypt, and neighboring states in the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq.

8-8. Core grievances are real or perceived issues of segments in a targeted population. The importance of the core grievances or even their existence can change over time. Irregular forces can manipulate core grievances to create conditions for developing the willing support within a population. The perception of foreign exploitation or a host nation government that appears to be excessively influenced by foreigners can be a core grievance. For example, if foreign businesses dominate critical portions of the local economy, some of the population may feel that they or their country are being exploited by outsiders. A foreign military presence or military treaty may offend national sentiment as well. The mere presence or specific actions of foreigners may offend local religious or cultural sensibilities. A state or regional governance in an area can be a core grievance.

8-9. Extremists that are very conservative can be as revolutionary in intent as other groups that are considered very liberal. Intents may include replacing forms of legitimate government with varied types of authoritarian rule. Socialism or variants of communism can exist in many forms. However, ideology can range the political variable from fascist or other totalitarian intentions to an opposite political perspective of anarchism. As regimes fail to demonstrate its value to a subjected population, a population may gradually and secretly plan and act for change. A 2010 U.S. Director of National Intelligence assessment to Congress states "...beyond al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa'ida will continue its efforts to encourage key regional affiliates and jihadist networks to pursue a global agenda. A few al-Qa'ida regional affiliates and jihadist networks have exhibited an intent or capability to attack inside the Homeland."

8-10. Religious fundamentalism or extremist viewpoints can become a core grievance of insurgency. One example is Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric based in Yemen. He encourages American Muslims to fight the U.S. as a religious obligation. In an audiotape released in March 2010, he stated, "To the Muslims in America, I have this to say: How can your conscience allow you to live in peaceful coexistence with a nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed against your own brothers and sisters?" Al-Awlaki was a cleric in Denver, San Diego, and Falls Church, Virginia before going to Yemen in 2004. He was arrested and imprisoned in 2006 for suspected links to al-Qa'ida, but was released after claiming his repentance. Charged again on similar counts, he went into hiding and is believed to be in Yemen. Subsequent investigations and announcements link al-Awlaki to Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, who attacked U.S. Army soldiers in a shooting rampage at the Fort Hood, Texas. Al-Awlaki described Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian student who attempted to suicide bomb a commercial jet near Detroit, Michigan, as "...one of my students...."




**Figure 8-2. Extremist Cleric**

8-11. Pervasive and desperate poverty often fosters and fuels widespread public dissatisfaction. Young people without jobs or hope are ripe for recruitment into an insurgent movement. Lack of essential services to a population will complicate an operational environment. Examples of these essential needs are availability of food and potable water, credible law enforcement, emergency services, electricity, shelter, health care, schools, transportation, and sanitation programs for trash and sewage. Stabilizing a population requires meeting these basic needs. People pursue essential needs until they feel they are met.

## ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS

8-12. In an era of sophisticated weapon systems and rapid international deployment of military forces, recent incidents demonstrate the effectiveness of simple tactics conducted efficiently by small irregular forces. The November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai are an example of such organizational tactics.

8-13. The terrorist attack on Mumbai was conducted by ten terrorists operating in five two-man teams. The nearly simultaneous incidents occurred at five separate locations by five different teams. The attacks and eventual destruction of the terrorist teams spanned over 60 hours with significant murder and mayhem. The terrorists used primarily small arms and hand grenades, although improvised explosive devices were set at some sites. The counteractions by Indian government forces were a methodical containment and room-by-room reduction of historic and multi-story buildings in a large urban metropolitan complex. Global media coverage of the terrorist attacks was continuous throughout the incident.



**Figure 8-3. Mumbai Attack Cell Composition (2008)**

8-14. Recruitment, selection and indoctrination of the terrorist cell included six months of specific training on weapons, explosives, and tactics. Training occurred for more than one year prior to November 2008 Mumbai assaults. Membership did reconfigure from the original member selection and eventually manned for the attack as a ten member terrorist cell. Surveillance of the target sites started in January 2008 and was augmented with detailed reconnaissance and graphic products for the assault teams. The team was briefed on their specific mission in mid-September. Movement to the attack area also required training in small boat

operations and navigation. The group initially seized a small boat to travel almost 600 nautical miles. They transferred to a motorized rubber boat near the shore. The teams quickly moved to their assigned targets.

### Mumbai Mass Murder and Hostage Crisis (2008)

**Overview.** On 26 November 2008, a heavily armed ten person terrorist cell attacked several prominent sites in Mumbai, India in nearly simultaneous assaults, that caused over 170 deaths and wounded over 300 additional people in site seizures and hostage crises lasting over 60 hours. The cell was linked to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group. The choice of targets as business and commercial hubs, famous entertainment sites, and cultural landmarks was combined purposely with indiscriminate killing in a populace as well as focused murder of people based on their nationality or religion. LeT intent appeared to be exceptional psychological trauma on a major urban population and nation, undermine the confidence of India's ability to protect its people and foreigners, and expand a LeT regional agenda to global attention and international ideological extremism.

**Terror Tactics.** The terrorist cell was thoroughly trained and indoctrinated. More than one year in preparation, surveillance and reconnaissance refined intelligence. Methodical conduct of infiltrating to the objective area was followed by ruthless actions at each objective and corresponding exploitation of mass media during and after the crisis. The terrorists used a global positioning system (GPS) and an array of communications to transit over 500 kilometers of sea to a rendezvous point off the shoreline of Mumbai. Having seized a small fishing trawler at sea, the terrorists murdered the crew and transferred their weapons and explosives to an inflatable boat to reach the shore. Four two-person teams went ashore and used taxis while one team walked to their target. A fifth two-person team continued in an inflatable boat along the shore to their target. With all teams at their urban objectives, attacks were initiated within minutes of each other at five dispersed locations. Mass murder occurred as terrorists used semiautomatic rifle fire and hand grenades against people in a rail station, hospital, urban streets, café, hotels, and Jewish cultural center. Earlier, IEDs had been hidden in two taxis timed to explode well after the main attacks were underway. These explosions caused additional confusion and mayhem in the first hours of the incident. After attacking the café, one team quickly joined the team assaulting a hotel, killing people, starting fires in the hotel, and seizing hostages. Hostages were seized at a Jewish cultural center and eventually murdered. Another team entered a second hotel and immediately started killing people and seizing hostages. One team shot people randomly in a train station, a hospital, and departed to possibly link up with other team members but were killed in a city street confrontation with police. Several other IEDs were emplaced at some of the sites but were discovered prior to causing casualties. The terrorist team members were well armed with AK-56 assault rifles and 8-10 ammunition magazines, pistols with two extra magazines, 8-10 hand grenades, explosives for IEDs, and basic food and water. They communicated with each other and operational handlers remote from Mumbai with cellular telephones and subscriber identity module (SIM) cards, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), satellite telephone, personal digital assistant (PDA) devices, and referenced high-resolution satellite imagery. Handlers provided ideological encouragement and direction, and tactical advice observed from live media coverage at the attack sites. Local law enforcement was initially overwhelmed by terrorist firepower. Once Federal military forces arrived on site, police and military forces killed nine terrorists and captured one terrorist.

**Assessment.** A small well trained and resourced terrorist cell of 10 men attacked several public and relatively unprotected urban targets in nearly simultaneous assaults to mass murder, seize sites, and take hostages. The terrorists expected to be killed during the LeT inspired mission while obtaining several days of constant world media coverage of the terror and attention to the terrorist organization's agenda. Effective intelligence sharing among governmental agencies might have disrupted or defeated the attack. Law enforcement agencies must have sufficient and immediate capability to protect its citizenry and counter an active shooter crisis. Multiple site, nearly simultaneous terrorist attacks will require responsive support from specialized counterterrorism forces.

**Figure 8-4. Mumbai Vignette: Nearly Simultaneous Multiple Attacks (2008)**

8-15. Only one terrorist was captured in the Mumbai attacks. The other nine terrorists were killed during the counterattack by government forces. Ten terrorists with simple weapons, dedicated training, and commitment to their mission success resulted in over 100 murdered citizens, over 300 wounded casualties, and a media coup that spotlighted regional issues among sovereign nations and irregular forces.

## VERSATILE ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS

8-16. Irregular cells will normally start as small entities with modest operational capabilities. As a cell develops success in its actions, plans will focus on acquiring improved capabilities across the functions of intelligence, logistics, communications, media affairs, and direct action. Building capacity in order to demonstrate commitment and capability is progressive. Temporary setbacks in plans and actions require flexibility to adjust timelines and adapt support networks. These networks can be as local as a neighborhood information-intelligence collection effort to a disciplined outreach for assistance from sources external to the immediate locale or region.

8-17. Organizational versatility can include cells focused on acts of terrorism or other actions which are difficult to distinguish from civil crime. The increasing role of criminal activity in financing an agenda, either in partnership or competition with traditional criminal activities, can be a condition used by irregular forces. These enterprises include drug trafficking and smuggling, fraud, tax evasion, counterfeiting, money laundering, and theft. Some activities are associated with terrorist group evolving capabilities for false documents production and concealment of money transactions for their operational purposes.

8-18. Irregular forces and criminal organizations are becoming more closely related as irregular forces in actions. Bases and operations in rural and urban environments will increase. Irregulars have typically operated in both environments. Mega-cities are expanding in countries with poor services and weak governance. Rampant unemployment and dissatisfaction creates a productive recruiting ground and operating environment for irregular forces promoting grievances acknowledged by large segments of the population. Many of these city areas have materiel, communication, and transport capacities for irregular forces to use, a potentially huge base of sympathizers and recruits, and ineffective law enforcement.

8-19. A development related to this is the emergence of regions where governments exercise marginal control. Control is imposed by sub-state actors that can span criminal organizations, militias, guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists. The *Zetas* are one example of paramilitary capabilities that challenge the authority of a sovereign government. They have acquired power beyond the drug cartels which originally contracted these former military members to protect and enforce criminal enterprises. Government forces confront a violent and capable enemy who often resort to open coercion and terrorism of officials, police officers, military forces, their families, and the general citizenry. “The violence in Mexico can be organized into three broad categories: intra-cartel violence that occurs among and between members of the same criminal syndicate, inter-cartel violence that occurs between rival cartel groups, and cartel-versus-government violence,” as reported by the Mexican Attorney General’s Office. Over 30,000 drug-related murders have occurred in Mexico in recent years.

8-20. In addition to overt intimidation of a populace, irregular forces will exploit the vulnerabilities of new technologies to attack and have a great deal of flexibility in their use of new technology. They have the advantage of only needing to attack or neutralize specific systems or capabilities, and can concentrate fiscal expenditures on specialized counter technology to protect their criminal systems. Nonetheless, irregulars can often neutralize advanced systems or capabilities through the use of simple and unconventional techniques such as a suicide bomber.

8-21. From a cyber threat perspective, use of public forums seems to be diminishing in favor of using encrypted, private chat services to conduct criminal enterprise. “Cyber criminals are becoming smarter about the ways they communicate, organize, scheme, and network...these criminals work like ‘corporations’ with extraordinary logistics. They typically consist of a small group of trusted ‘associates’ who respect the skill sets each has to offer and work together...” Supporting activities for cyber criminals can include contracting for specific capabilities without allowing entrance of a specialist into a trusted criminal network,

organizing franchises to move money under a legitimate appearing guise or deliberate scam, or participating in complex proxy services in order to hide their identity.

## **EXPANDED TRANSNATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS**

8-22. Transnational action and terrorism, such as promoted by al-Qa'ida, presents a global challenge. Al-Qa'ida aims at domination are global and uncompromising: to fight its enemies wherever it is able and ultimately to establish a pan-Muslim super-state. The battlefield is global. Major operations seek large scale, maximum casualty impact. Globalization removes the perceived security that national borders and geographic distance from adversaries and enemies once indicated. Commerce and finance is international, travel is international, and society in general is a much more international community. Operating beyond the organizational reach of an opponent can provide the physical space or fiscal and media affairs support to enhance an irregular force purpose. Examples of this expansion can be the use of physical safe havens outside the immediate geographic area of conflict, and can be the electronic safe haven of multiple means for electronic communication, planning, and attack, fiscal resource repositories, and material acquisition.

8-23. Irregular forces can operate in and among this international reach and develop transnational capabilities through a loose affiliation of clandestine networks, inserted sleeper or active cells within geographic regions, and adaptability to constantly shift and change in organizational form. When extremist ideology is the primary motivation, the commitment is often absolutist with no allowance for compromise and seeks no negotiation. Violence signals a committed path to conditions with no restrictions by social norms, laws, or values. Actions such as terrorism are becoming more network based. Irregular forces can encourage loosely organized, self-financed organizational structure. The motivation of terrorist groups appears to be based increasingly on theological extremes and ideological absolutes. International or transnational cooperation among some terrorist groups provides an improved ability to recruit members, develop fiscal support and resources, gain skills training and expertise, transfer technology, and when desired, political advice.

## **EMERGENT INDEPENDENT ACTORS**

8-24. The presence of varied irregular forces and possible independent actors that separate from an originating organization can easily blur in organizations claiming responsibility for incidents. These actors can be at the individual level or small cells acting on a specified agenda that may be similar but distinct from a more well known organization. Independent actors may purposely minimize or preclude public announcement of their plans and action in order to improve their cell security.

8-25. During the evolution of modern terrorism in the Cold War era, even nationalist insurgent groups sought and required a sponsor from one of the two competing ideological blocs of democracy and socialism. Sponsors could effectively influence the policy of their clients, and exercise a limited form of control over their actions. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the motivations and capabilities of a large number of state sponsors. This loss of significant resources eliminated support for many terrorist groups, particularly those terrorist groups closely aligned with the communist bloc.

8-26. Punitive actions against rogue states or states of concern have gradually reduced or denied some geographical sanctuaries and sources of support for irregular forces. Although this can be temporarily disruptive, new support structures can replace previous systems. Groups based in Libya shifted to Iraq or Syria when support was restricted due to international sanctions and U.S. military action against Libya. Similarly, al-Qa'ida shifted key functions from the Sudan to Afghanistan when U.S. actions and diplomatic pressure was focused in that geographical area.

8-27. Irregular forces are adjusting their financial operations to become more self-sustaining in their activities, resulting in greater independence from any external control. The facility with which groups can obtain and move funds, procure secure bases, and obtain and transport weaponry determines their operational abilities and the level of threat that they pose. The international nature of finance, the integration of global economies, and the presence of terrorists in the illegal economies of slaves, drugs,

smuggling, human trafficking, counterfeiting, identity theft, and fraud have aided an independence from traditional sources of state-linked sponsorship and support.

8-28. Terrorist Abu Mus'ab al-Suri published his vision for how to best carry on terrorism with the value of small semi-independent or independent terror cells in host countries. Minimal organizational structure or compartmenting supervision enhances security of individual terrorist operations, even though logistics and other support may be problematic. Al-Suri writes, "The groups must move from the classical structure for an underground organization, which is a hierarchical pyramid shaped chain of command, to a "secret gang-war [structure], which has different and numerous cells untied together [separate cells]." Individuals plan their own missions and often will be responsible for their own financing.



**Figure 8-5. Urban Economic Infrastructure and Mass Populations**

8-29. Examples of individual extremists attempting to conduct or actually conducting terrorist activity include Najibullah Zazi who was plotting to attack the New York City subway system; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who was charged in an indictment for his 2009 alleged attempt to bomb Northwest flight 253 traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit; Faisal Shahzad and his 2010 attempt to detonate a car bomb in Times Square of New York City; or, David Headley and his involvement with several terrorist activities. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation cites that during 2009-2010, "The threat from radicalization has evolved. A number of disruptions occurred involving extremists from a diverse set of backgrounds, geographic locations, life experiences, and motivating factors that propelled them along their separate radicalization pathways."

## DEVASTATING FULL SPECTRUM WEAPONRY

8-30. Weapon lethality can be assessed in many ways but efficiency and effectiveness are two general means to determine intent. Some weapons are quite simple and very deadly in effect. Lethality and overall effects are key considerations when assessed with types of action to obtain attention and reaction. The trauma of violent deaths as well as mass injuries and damage on a targeted population can be critical to the psychological effect and consequent actions or inaction by the affected population. Terrorism will continue to seek forms of indiscriminate violence. Acts of terror can also be targeted to specific people, groups, or capabilities. Terrorism is merging and combining with various other state and sub-state actors, further blurring the difference between criminals, rogue governments, and terrorists.

8-31. Ongoing conflicts display that terrorist cell attacks account for only a small fraction of civil violence but the high-profile nature of many terrorist operations can have a disproportionate impact. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Iraq combined with industrial chemicals caused casualties and heightened anxiety, however, this use of explosives with toxic chemicals such as chlorine does not approximate the damage and destruction that would be caused by a weapon of mass destruction.

## CONVENTIONAL IMPROVISATIONS

8-32. An example of conventional improvisation is an explosively formed projectile (EFP) or penetrator. The science of a conical shaped charge is not new. A concave metal hemisphere or cone in a casing is combined with an explosive. A detonator initiates the explosive material and collapses the liner into a slug that acts as an effective penetrator against armor plating. An improvisation in recent conflicts is the localized mass production of the weapon. This assembly process can range from individual manufacture with improvised material to a dedicated process using industrial machine shop technology.



**Figure 8-6. Materiel and Improvised EFP Weapons**

8-33. Typical construction is a copper or steel plate or bowl, backed with several pounds of explosives in a cylindrical shaped device looking similar to a section of pipe. The weapons are generally cylindrical in shape, with the forward end enclosed by a concave metal disk liner. When the explosive is initiated, the concave metal liner collapses to form the disk into a slug that penetrates metal with a high-velocity effect at a single point.

## MASS DESTRUCTION, DISRUPTION, AND MAYHEM

8-34. Conditions and changing dynamics in conflict can create a perception in the civilian population of unchecked violence and fear. Such perception can harden different opinions, empower militias and vigilante groups, increases a middle-class exodus from a region, and disrupt confidence in government and security forces. Terrorism plays a key role in much of this physical and psychological violence. Fewer incidents with greater casualties appear to be the aim.

8-35. The means to cause mass casualties can span a highly sophisticated weapon system such as a nuclear bomb to an improvised low yield explosive weapon such as the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon. While purposeful mass casualty incidents may have appeared to be extraordinary events several decades ago, contemporary acts of terror surpass these former acts and demonstrate a profound impact on populations at the local, regional, national, and international levels. Cyber attack is another means to cause or complement mass disruption, damage, or destruction of critical infrastructure and key assets. Near instantaneous media coverage and global communications accent the attention of mass casualty incidents and terrorism. Emergent actions indicate that terrorism previously centralized and controlled by formal networks and organizations, is being conducted increasingly by loosely affiliated terrorists or groups that may generally identify themselves with an ideology or special purpose agenda.

8-36. The threat can be foreign and domestic. Conventional explosives were used by U.S. citizens in terrorist action such as the 1995 bombings of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. That attack killed over 160 people and caused over 850 additional casualties. McVeigh was a U.S. citizen with personal beliefs that festered into a growing mistrust and eventual hatred of the U.S. government. McVeigh selected the Murrah Building from a list of sites he developed as potential targets. He wanted his

attack to target Federal law enforcement agencies and their employees. His pre-attack surveillance identified that many innocent people would be injured or killed.

8-37. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a particularly alarming issue. The specter of their effects amplifies the dangers of a catastrophic attack. Information is readily available on many aspects of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material, as well as conventional high yield or low yield explosives. Some of these materials that could be used to construct some form of WMD are easily accessible in the public domain. Other potential capabilities are quite problematic to weaponizing materiel.

8-38. The knowledge and technological means of specialists to produce WMD is a shadowy area of science, crime, and intrigue available to some terrorists. Materiel such as toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) could be used to devastating effect with simple means. Although not an act of terrorism, the 1984 industrial incident of a massive chemical release in Bhopal, India illustrates the mass casualties, psychological harm, and economic disruption that can be caused with TIC resources in an urban area for an attack. Another example is accidental explosion of tons of ammonium nitrate Texas City, Texas the 1947. The explosion devastated an urban area and port facility.

8-39. Of the technologies that are available to a well financed terrorist group or individual actors, biological and radiological material used as a weapon may be the most significant near term WMD threats. The United States was attacked by anthrax in 2001. After an extensive multi-year investigation, the U.S. Department of Justice determined that the attack was the action of one highly skilled U.S. citizen.



**Figure 8-7. Anthrax Letters as Biological Attack in U.S. (2001)**

8-40. The trend to exploit available technologies and the desire for more casualties will probably accelerate the quest of irregular forces to employ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Documented use of a chemical [sarin] weapon (Tokyo 1995) and a biological [anthrax] weapon (Washington D.C. 2001) demonstrate the ability of an individual or individuals of an irregular force to use WMD. Al-Qa'ida has stated the intention to acquire and attack the United States with WMD. The President of the United States underscored the threat of nuclear weapons and terrorism in a 2010 nuclear security statement:


...we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.

## TARGETED ECONOMIC DISRUPTION

8-41. Modern, high-technology societies are susceptible to a concept of complex terrorism. Dependence on electronic networks, sometimes with minimal redundancy, and concentrating critical assets in small geographic locales can present lucrative targets for the terrorist. Ensuring redundant systems exist,

dispersing critical assets physically, and creating buffers, firewalls, or other type safeguards can enhance defense and recovery from such complex attacks.

8-42. Many of the emerging irregular forces that are emerging to wield effective power in failing states are only concerned with the immediate tactical effects of their actions. They view terrorism as an effective mode of conflict. They can point to the fact that al-Qa'ida invested only \$500,000 in a 2001 attack that is estimated to have cost the U.S. Government well over \$125 billion in damages and recovery costs. Several recent significant terrorist attacks required only mere thousands of dollars to conduct.



**Figure 8-8. East Coast Grid Blackout (2003)**

8-43. A terrorist attack on other critical infrastructure could be catastrophic. In the United States, the electric grid could be a prime terrorist target. Several factors, not linked to terrorism, contributed to the August 14, 2003 blackout that left 50 million people around the Great Lakes without power for a period of time and cost the nation's economy an estimated \$1 billion. Although redundancies are built into the power systems, a simple natural event caused a power surge overload and shutdown of the electrical power grid servicing New York, New England, and eastern Canada. Other critical infrastructure and support systems for the United States provide terrorists with a wide array of potential targets in land, maritime, cyber, and space environments.

8-44. Overseas, U.S. interests and an access vulnerability may focus on oil. Infrastructure for oil production has critical aspects in the Middle East. Single points of failure in the infrastructure or denying critical services for a period of time might cripple many of the world's economies. One example is the Saudi Arabian oil production facility at Abqaiq which at one point in time handled about two-thirds of the Saudi crude oil daily output. In Nigeria, rebel factions, the government, and irregular forces struggle over access and control of that region's oil from the Niger Delta. Destruction of infrastructure, murder, and kidnapping significantly hampers Nigerian oil production.

8-45. The United States Government assesses the al-Qa'ida network as the most serious international threat to the United States. Targets and methods of attack will most likely continue to focus on economic targets such as commercial aviation, energy sector, or mass transportation. Such attacks will also have a socially destabilizing effect. As security measures make attack more difficult on such targets, other targets may be selected such as large public gatherings or symbolic locations of monuments or notable buildings.

## GLOBALIZED PROPAGANDA

8-46. Exploiting mass media for propaganda purposes is not a phenomenon of the contemporary era. Incidents in recent decades illustrate the value of effectively marketing an irregular force message through strategic communications. By the mid-1970s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and extremist Shiites in Lebanon stressed whatever tenuous political power sharing existed in the region. Competing militias staked claims to geographic areas and political influence and the country regressed into civil war. Both Syria and Iran supported various groups as part of regional power plans. Religious extremists resorted to terrorism to attempt the removal of Western influence in Lebanon. Some incidents indicated that

terrorism might be a successful tactic or operational campaign. To some observers, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and hostage crisis in Tehran (1979-1981) and the 1983 bombings in Lebanon appeared to create a sense of U.S. concession and withdrawal or U.S. inability to respond.

8-47. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, promoted a concept of international terrorism where targeting could be indiscriminate, that is, anyone or anything might be selected as a target to enhance a particular organizational objective. Terrorist groups could consider working together to exploit a struggle on a global frontage rather than limited to local or regional domain. An additional principle was the requirement for creating and maintaining international attention and impact. Terrorist incidents must be spectacular to attract mass media coverage. An overarching objective was to gain international awareness and attention to Palestinian grievances and issues.

8-48. Exploiting media coverage is a norm for irregular forces and terrorist cells. Effectiveness of information operations will be measured by ability to cause a dramatic impact of fear and uncertainty in a target population. Surprise and sustained violence will be normal against specified people representing elements of civil or military control and order. Common citizens may also be a target in a culture of violence. Damage or destruction of community, regional, or national infrastructure and governance will be used to gain attention, provoke excessive reaction by host nation or coalition military forces, and attempt to alienate general population support of a governing authority.



Figure 8-9. Al-Qa'ida Propaganda

8-49. Due to the increase in electronic information outlets and competition with increasing numbers of other topics in news, irregular forces often use increased amount of violence or novelty to attract mass attention. The tendency of major media and an audience ready to receive reports on sensational acts, even when tragic and catastrophic, can encourage increased violence of attacks.

8-50. A sinister yet simple aspect of media marketing is the indoctrination of children to hate and promote violence and terror with distorted views of the world. For example, HAMAS al-Aqsa television broadcasted a graduation ceremony of kindergartens of the Islamic Association in Gaza. As adults guide the program and ask the children “What is your most lofty aspiration?” The children respond, “Death for the sake of Allah.” The small boys dressed to resemble Palestinian militants march into view and drop to the floor to crawl on their stomachs as if in a tactical maneuver. HAMAS conducts many charitable activities to assist Palestinians but concurrently promotes hate and terrorism. In a similar adolescent example, some Palestinian Authority schoolbooks reject Israel’s right to exist, promote terror, and present maps that do not display Israel as a nation state and claim this geography as Palestine.

8-51. Irregular forces attempt to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities to information dominance. Casualty avoidance and the media effect are interrelated perceptions of the U.S. social and political situation. Irregular forces may believe the U.S. is extremely casualty averse and that images and news of casualties will be easy to deliver to the American public in their living rooms. Al-Qaida is steadily increasing its use of videotape releases to a global audience. Techniques to reach a larger audience include broadcast anchors in periodic announcements, improved video engineering quality, and use of Arabic and English as subtitles in videos. Some speeches are issued in Arabic, English, French, and Urdu in order to recruit and expose listeners to ideological rationale for terrorism.

8-52. Irregular force operations consider a desired media effect and plan for verbal or visual reporting coverage. Supporting events and interviews reinforce the desired message. These messages may present

disinformation and false perspectives. Frequently, military reluctance to comment on ongoing operations in the media for operational security (OPSEC) reasons can assist the terrorist. If no balanced information comes from official sources in a timely manner, the media may use the information readily available from the irregular force or a terrorist cell as a primary source for reporting an incident.

8-53. An example of expanding sophistication in the quality of electronic publication is the summer 2010 issue of *Inspire*, announced as a periodical magazine of the “al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula. The document is published in English, uses commercial-like graphic designs, and features primary articles that promote an extremist version of world events interspersed with topics and visual highlights or narrative instructions on how to conduct types of attack. Whether ideological rhetoric or simplified techniques for bomb making or encrypting electronic messages, the document aims to appeal to an English speaking audience. The message is centered on fundamental extremism and a call to violent action based on radical beliefs.

## SUMMARY

8-54. Future armed conflicts are more likely to be fought “among the people” rather than “around the people.” Conflict in urban areas and populated locales is inevitable. Much of the world’s population is already located in urban terrain. In the next two decades, estimates pose five billion of the world’s eight billion people will live in cities. Many of the population hubs will be along coastlines throughout the world’s regions. Of the five billion urban dwellers, about two billion will exist in great urban slums of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Irregular forces will attempt to blend into concentrated populations in order to marginalize detection of their recruiting, training, and staging initiatives; obtain support within a coerced or passive populace, and act at times and locations of their own selection.

8-55. Rural areas and their inhabitants, depending on conditions in particular regions, will complement operations in urban centers. Irregular forces will evolve hybrid capacity of selective conventional military, paramilitary, and criminal organization capabilities. Rural irregular forces will operate in regions providing cover and concealment such as heavily forested or mountainous areas that hinder some forms of detection and interdiction. Notwithstanding, a rural orientation must lead back to urban centers as a presence and connection to the main population masses.

8-56. Irregular actions will normally be protracted operations using adaptive asymmetric tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), complex battle positions (CBP), cultural standoff, a range of vintage to advanced technologies and weapon systems, and information operations to limit or negate the power of entities that oppose the aims of an irregular force. The influence of propaganda will be optimized via a multifaceted, nearly instantaneous, globally networked electronic media environment in a contest of purpose, perception, and dominance of personal and population resolve.

8-57. Adaptive conditions challenge the mission sets in contemporary and future operational environments. As noted in *The Joint Operating Environment 2010* published by U.S. Joint Forces Command:

**“Irregular warfare remains subject to the same fundamental dynamics of all wars: political aims, human frailties, and human passion...What past irregular wars have suggested is that military organizations confronted by irregular enemies must understand the ‘other’...The greatest difficulty U.S. forces will confront is facing irregular warfare is that such conflicts require a thorough understanding of the cultural, religious, political, and historical context within which they are to be fought.”**

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## Source Notes

These are source notes quoted or paraphrased in this publication. Some website references may no longer be in effect. The left column reference locator is by paragraph number, and uses a page number when the item of interest is not within a numbered paragraph.

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## SPECIAL SEGMENTS

Special segments in chapter 6 are collated information from multiple open source documents.

# Glossary

## SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>911</b>	11 September 2001 Attacks on USA
<b>Abu Sayyaf</b>	Al-Harakat al Islamiya; also, ASG
<b>Al-Shabaab</b>	Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; also, The Youth
<b>Al-Qa'ida</b>	The Base; also, al-Qaeda; AQ
<b>AQI</b>	Al-Qa'ida in Iraq
<b>ARFOR</b>	Army Forces
<b>ASCC</b>	Army Service Component Command
<b>AT</b>	Antiterrorism
<b>ATGM</b>	Antitank Guided Missile
<b>AQIM</b>	Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
<b>BCTP</b>	Battle Command Training Program
<b>C3D</b>	Camouflage, Concealment, Cover, and Deception
<b>CPN/M</b>	Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists)
<b>CBP</b>	Complex Battle Position [OPFOR doctrine]
<b>CBRN</b>	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
<b>CPX</b>	Command Post Exercise
<b>CSOP</b>	Combat Security Outpost
<b>CTC</b>	Combat Training Center
<b>DDoS</b>	Distributed Denial of Service
<b>EA</b>	Electronic Attack
<b>EFP</b>	Explosively Formed Projectile
<b>ELF</b>	Earth Liberation Front
<b>ELN</b>	National Liberation Army
<b>EM</b>	Electromagnetic [spectrum]
<b>EW</b>	Electronic Warfare
<b>FARC</b>	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
<b>FP</b>	Force Protection
<b>FTO</b>	Foreign Terrorist Organization
<b>GPS</b>	Global Positioning System
<b>HAMAS</b>	Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; also, Islamic Resistance Movement
<b>HIZBALLAH</b>	Party of God; also, Hezbollah
<b>HRO</b>	Humanitarian Relief Organization
<b>HVT</b>	High Value Target
<b>IA</b>	Information Attack
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Device
<b>IO</b>	Information Operations

<b>INFOWAR</b>	Information Warfare
<b>IPB</b>	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
<b>JI</b>	Jemaah Islamiya
<b>JIIM</b>	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
<b>JMRC</b>	Joint Manuever Readiness Center
<b>JRTC</b>	Joint Readiness Training Center
<b>LeT</b>	Lashkar-e-Tayyiba; also, LT
<b>LGN</b>	Liquified Natural Gas
<b>MANPADS</b>	Man Portable Air Defense System
<b>MRL</b>	Mobile Rocket Launcher
<b>MRX</b>	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
<b>NCTC</b>	National Counterterrorism Center [USA]
<b>NTC</b>	National Training Center
<b>NGO</b>	Nongovernmental Orgnaization
<b>OE</b>	Operational Environment
<b>OPFOR</b>	Opposing Force
<b>PIJ</b>	Palestinaian Islamic Jihad
<b>PMESII+PT</b>	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical, Time
<b>PFLP</b>	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
<b>PFLP-GC</b>	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
<b>PLO</b>	Palestinain Liberation Organization
<b>POW</b>	Prisoner of War; also PW
<b>PSC</b>	Personal Security Contractor
<b>PSYWAR</b>	Psychological Wafare
<b>RAF</b>	Red Army Faction
<b>RISTA</b>	Reconnaissnace, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquirtion
<b>ROE</b>	Rules of Engagement
<b>RPG</b>	Rocket Propelled Grenade
<b>SBP</b>	Simple Battle Positon [OPFOR doctrine]
<b>Shining Path</b>	Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui
<b>SIGINT</b>	Signals Intelligence
<b>SPF</b>	Special Purpose Forces
<b>SSM</b>	Surface to Surface Missile
<b>Taliban</b>	Students; TB; also, fundamentalist Islamic groups in vicinity Afghanistan
<b>TTP</b>	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
<b>TTiP</b>	Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan; also, TTP
<b>VBIED</b>	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
<b>WEG</b>	Worldwide Equipment Guide [U.S. Army TRADOC G2 document]
<b>WFX</b>	Warfighter Exercise
<b>WMD</b>	Weapon of Mass Destruction

## SECTION II – TERMS

### **Antiterrorism**

Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 3-07.2)

### **Battle**

A set of related tactical engagements that last longer and involve larger forces than an engagement. (FM 3-0)

### **Combatting Terrorism**

Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See antiterrorism and counterterrorism. (*National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*) (See also JP 3-26)

### **Complex Battle Position**

A complex battle position is designed to protect the units within its perimeter from detection and attack while denying their seizure and occupation by the enemy. The CBP is not necessarily tied to an avenue of approach. CBPs protect forces while providing sanctuary from which to launch local attacks. (Army TRADOC White Paper *Operational Environment 2009-2025* (2009)) See also Opposing Force.

### **Condition**

Those variables of an operational environment or situation in which a unit, system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect performance. See also joint mission-essential tasks. (JP 1-02) See also, FM 7-0.

### **Counterterrorism**

Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 3-26) See also, JP 1-02.

### **Deception**

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (JP 3-13.4)

### **Enemy**

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (FM 3-0)

### **Enemy Combatant**

In general, a person engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict. The term “enemy combatant” includes both “lawful enemy combatants” and “unlawful enemy combatants.” (U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, September 5, 2006)

### **Engagement**

An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces usually conducted at brigade level and below. (FM 3-0)

### **Guerrilla**

A combat participant in guerrilla warfare ... [that is, military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.] (JP 3-05)

### **Hybrid Threats**

Hybrid threats are the diverse and dynamic combination of regular and irregular forces, either conventional or unconventional, as well as criminal elements all unified in purpose. (Army TRADOC White Paper *Operational Environment 2009-2025* (2009))

### **Improvised Explosive Device**

A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from military components. Also called IED. (Pending acceptance into JP 1-02 per JP 3-07.2)

### **Information Operations**

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. See also computer network operations; electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations. (JP 3-13)

### **Irregular forces**

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02) See also, DODD 3007.07.

### **Irregular Warfare**

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (JP 1)

### **Insurgent**

[Member of]...an organized group or movement that uses subversion and violence in order to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. (As collated from JP 3-24)

### **Lawful Enemy Combatant**

Lawful enemy combatants, who are entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions, include members of the regular armed forces of a State party to the conflict; militia, volunteer corps, and organized resistance movements belonging to a State party to the conflict, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the laws of war; and members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the detaining power. (Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, September 5, 2006)

### **Mercenary**

An individual who acts individually or acts a member of a formed group and volunteers from recruitment locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; is operating directly in the hostilities; is motivated by the desire for private gain, are promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to the combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; is not a member of the armed forces of a party of the conflict; and, is not on official military duty representing a country that is not involved in the conflict such as a legitimate loan service or training appointment between. (*Geneva Conventions IV*)

### **Nongovernmental Organization**

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. NGO. (JP 3-08) See also DOD, Office of the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense (Health Affairs). *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military* (2009).

**Operational Area Security**

A form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces. Forces engaged in area security operations focus on the force, installation, route, area, or asset to be protected. (FM 3-37)

**Operational Environment**

A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)

**Opposing Force**

A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. armed forces. Also called OPFOR. (AR 350-2)

**Paramilitary**

[Member of]...forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (As collated from JP 3-24)

**Paramilitary Forces**

Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission. (JP 3-24)

**Procedure**

Standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. See also tactics; techniques. (JP 1-02) See also FM 3-0.

**Propaganda**

Any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly. (JP 1-02) See also, FM 3-05.30.

**Protection**

The preservation of the effectiveness of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. (FM 3-37)

**Red Team**

An organizational element comprised of trained and educated members that provide an independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans and operations in the context of the operational environment and from the perspective of adversaries and others. (JP 1-02) See also, FM 5-0.

**Risk Management**

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM. (JP 1-02) See DA Pam 385-10.

**Role Player**

In training environments such as Combat Training Centers (CTCs), educational institutions within the military, and other agencies, role-players portray actors of the contemporary operational environment (COE). In training exercises, role-players portray characters of an existing or fictitious country or region that constitutes the physical environment of the operational environment (OE) simulated for training purposes. In a mission readiness exercise (MRX) and mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), role-players depict characters in an actual country-region related to a unit mission. Role-players will frequently portray combatant or noncombatant state and non-state actors. (Army *TRADOC G2 Actors and Role Players Handbook* (2007))

**Rules of Engagement**

Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE (JP 1-04)

### **Simple Battle Position**

A simple battle position is a defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach or objective area and may be an element of an integrated defense with other SBPs. (FM 7-100.2 (2004). See also Opposing Force.

### **Tactic**

The employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. See also procedures; techniques. (JP 1-02) See also FM 3-0.

### **Technique**

Non-prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. See also procedures; tactics. (JP 1-02) See also FM 3-0.

### **Terrorist**

An individual who commits an act or acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological objectives. (JP 1-02) See also AR 525-13; FM 3-37.2 TBP

### **Terrorism**

The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 3-07.2)

### **Terrorist Group**

Any number of terrorists who assemble together, have a unifying relationship, or are organized for the purpose of committing an act or acts of violence or threatening violence in pursuit of their political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also terrorism. (JP 3-07.2)

### **Threat**

The sum of the potential strengths, capabilities, and of any adversary that can limit or negate U.S. mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness. (AR 381-11)

### **Threat Analysis**

In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism. (JP 1-02) See also, AR 525-13.

### **Traditional Warfare**

A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. (DOD Directive 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, December 1, 2008)

### **Transnational Threat**

Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States national security interests. (JP 3-26)

### **Unconventional Warfare**

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source, and includes but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02) Also, operations conducted by, with, or through irregular forces in support of a resistance movement, an insurgency, or conventional military operations. (FM 3-05.201)

**Unlawful Enemy Combatant**

Unlawful enemy combatants are persons not entitled to combatant immunity, who engage in acts against the United States or its coalition partners in violation of the laws and customs of war during an armed conflict. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the term Unlawful Enemy Combatant is defined to include, but is not limited to, an individual who is or was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. (Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2310.01E, *The Department of Defense Detainee Program*, September 5, 2006)

**Weapon of Mass Destruction**

Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. Also called WMD. (JP 3-40) WMD effects can be caused by other means such as high yield or low yield explosives.

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# Index

Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.) or pages (pp.) is specified. After a page reference, the subsequent use of paragraph reference is indicated by the paragraph symbol (¶). For topics with multiple entries, **bold type** indicates the main reference entry.

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Note: The index will be posted when this publication transitions to TC 7-100.3.

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***Irregular Forces***

**U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command**

**TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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