



Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

**WHINSEC Occasional Papers Series
#1**

**First Annual WHINSEC Hemispheric
Security Conference
November 28-30, 2001**

WHINSEC OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

In the past two decades, the nations of the Western Hemisphere have achieved unprecedented stability, giving rise to democratically-elected governments and free market economies. This transformation has been facilitated by a U.S. foreign policy in the region that emphasizes respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Our national security strategy is based on cooperation and engagement with other democracies, working together to meet the continuing challenges of terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crime and other non-traditional security threats. To achieve hemispheric cooperation on these important issues, the U.S. Congress has established various institutions. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) is one such institution, under the U.S. Department of Defense, which plays a key role in supporting U.S. foreign policy for the region.

The Institute provides professional education and training for military, law enforcement and civilian government personnel from eligible nations of this hemisphere. WHINSEC strives to foster mutual understanding, confidence and cooperation among nations and promote democratic values and respect for human rights.

The Institute's Occasional Paper Series reflects these core values, goals and objectives in a manner accessible to the general public. The material published in this series reflects the wide variety of activities conducted at WHINSEC, including conferences, special lectures, research and classroom teaching. I hope that you will find these papers informative and stimulating. We would welcome your comments on the issues raised in these papers.

COL Richard D. Downie, Ph.D.
Commandant
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
U.S. Department of Defense

INTRODUCTION TO WHINSEC OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

In the past two decades, the nations of the Western Hemisphere have achieved unprecedented stability, giving rise to democratically-elected governments and free market economies. This transformation has been facilitated by a U.S. foreign policy in the region that emphasizes respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

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INTRODUCCIÓN A LA SERIE DE DOCUMENTOS INFORMATIVOS DE WHINSEC

En las dos últimas décadas, las naciones del Hemisferio Occidental han alcanzado una estabilidad sin precedente, dando origen a gobiernos elegidos democráticamente y economías de mercado libre. Esta transformación ha sido el producto de la política extranjera norteamericana en la región, la cual destaca el respeto a la democracia, el imperio de la ley y los derechos humanos.

Nuestra estrategia de seguridad nacional se basa en cooperación y compromiso con otras democracias, trabajando juntos para enfrentar los desafíos persistentes del terrorismo, del tráfico de drogas y del crimen transnacional, además de otras amenazas no tradicionales a la seguridad. Para lograr la cooperación hemisférica en estos puntos tan importantes, el Congreso de EE.UU. ha creado varias instituciones. El Instituto de Cooperación para la Seguridad Hemisférica (WHINSEC) es una de estas instituciones, al amparo del Ministerio de Defensa de EE.UU., la cuál tiene una función importante de apoyar la política extranjera norteamericana para la región.

El Instituto ofrece educación y adiestramiento profesional a personal militar, de la fuerza pública y a funcionarios del gobierno de las naciones elegibles de este hemisferio. WHINSEC se esfuerza en fomentar el entendimiento mutuo, la confianza y la cooperación entre las naciones y promover los valores democráticos y el respeto por los derechos humanos.

La Serie de Documentos Informativos de WHINSEC refleja estos valores, metas y objetivos esenciales en una forma accesible al público en general. El material publicado en esta serie refleja la amplia gama de actividades que lleva a cabo WHINSEC, tales como conferencias, charlas especiales, investigación e instrucción en el aula. Espero que encuentren estos documentos informativos y sugestivos. Sus comentarios sobre los puntos presentados en estos documentos son bienvenidos.

COL Richard E. Downie, Ph.D.
Comandante
Instituto de Cooperación para la Seguridad Hemisférica
Ministerio de Defensa de EE.UU.

The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation
(WHINSEC)
Presents

The 1ST Annual Hemispheric Conference

"Civil Society and Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere"

Participating Institutions

University of Alabama

U.S.A.F. Air University

Connecticut College

University of El Salvador, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Emory University

University of Florida

U.S. Joint Forces Staff College

Institute for Latin American Social Sciences, Chile

University of Louisiana at Lafayette

Manhattan College

Minot State University

Nova Southeastern University

Rhodes College

Saint Leo University

University of South Florida

Tougaloo College

Special Presentations

Honorable Roger Pardo-Maurer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Western Hemisphere Affairs

Gen (Ret) Jose Serrano, Former Chief of Colombian National Police

LTG John Le Moyne, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, US Army

LTG (Ret) Carmen Cavezza, Columbus City Manager

Major General Carlos Morales-San Martin, Inspector General, Ecuador

BG Galen B. Jackman, Director of Operations, USSOUTHCOM

COL Walter Navarro, Director General, Costa Rica Civil Guard

28-30 November 2001

Ridgway Hall, Historic Bldg #35

Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

El Instituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica
(WHINSEC)
Presenta

I Conferencia Anual Hemisferica

"La Sociedad Civil y Temas de Seguridad en el Hemisferio"

Instituciones participantes

Universidad de Alabama
Universidad de la Fuerza Aerea de EE.UU.
Universidad de Connecticut

Universidad de El Salvador, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Universidad Emory
Universidad de la Florida
Universidad de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Conjuntas de EE.UU.
Instituto de Ciencias Sociales Latinoamericanas, Chile
Universidad de Louisiana en Lafayette
Universidad Manhattan
Universidad Estatal Minot
Universidad del Sudeste de Nova
Universidad Rhodes
Universidad Saint Leo
Universidad del Sur de la Florida
Universidad Tougaloo

Presentaciones especiales

Honorable Roger Pardo Maurer, Subsecretario Adjunto del Ministerio de Defensa para
Asuntos del Hemisferio
Gral. (Ret) Jose Serrano, exjefe de la Policia Nacional Colombiana
Tte. Gral. John LeMoine, excomandante General del Fuerte Benning
Tte. Gral. (Ret) Carmen Cavezza, Administrador Municipal de Columbus
Gral. de Div. Carlos Morales-San Martin, Inspector General de Ecuador
Gral. de Bda. Galen B. Jackman, Director de Operaciones de USSOUTHCOM
Cnel. Walter Navarro, Director General, Guardia Civil de Costa Rica

28-30 de noviembre del 2001
Ridgway Hall, Edif. Historico 35
Fuerte Benning, Georgia 31905

Welcome to our first annual WHINSEC Conference on Civil Society and Regional Security in the Western Hemisphere. During the coming three days, a distinguished panel of diplomats, military and police officers, and university professors will analyze a wide range of emerging security issues for the 21st century, and the implications that these issues hold for the development of civil society in our region. Resident students from our Command & General Staff College Class, plus other classes now in session, will engage the speakers with questions and discussion. We are also honored here by the presence of citizens at large, governmental representatives, private sector leaders, high school students, college students, and many more who care about democracy and security. We hope that you will share the messages here presented with the communities you represent when our Conference has ended. We hope that the contributions of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation will be made known in public and private circles, in universities and high schools, and homes, in short, throughout our free societies. Some 61 years ago this month, a similar conference was hosted for the first time ever in this very building. World War II loomed large on the horizon, and the U.S.-Latin American military-to-military relationship was new. Now, having surmounted many challenges to external and internal threats against our freedoms, we come together to study the 21st century and the security issues that loom before us. Thank you for caring so much that you devoted your time to this vital activity, and may God bless all who care about freedom and security in our beloved Americas.

Richard D. Downie, Ph.D. Colonel, Infantry, Director, WHINSEC

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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT



Welcome to our first annual WHINSEC Conference on Civil Society and Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere. During the coming three days, a distinguished panel of diplomats, military and police officers, and university professors will analyze a wide range of emerging security issues for the 21st century, and the implications that these issues hold for the development of civil society in our region. Resident students from our Command & General Staff College Class, plus other classes now in session, will engage the speakers with questions and discussion. We are also honored here by the presence of citizens, governmental representatives, private sector leaders, high school students, college students, and many more who care about democracy and security. We hope that you will share the messages here presented with the communities you represent when our Conference has ended. We hope that the contributions of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation will be made known in public and private circles, in universities and high schools, and homes, in short, throughout our free societies. Some 61 years ago this month, a similar conference was hosted for the first time ever in this very building. World War II loomed large on the horizon, and the U.S.- Latin American military-to-military relationship was new. Now, having surmounted many challenges to external and internal threats against our freedoms, we come together to study the 21st century and the security issues that loom before us. Thank you for caring so much that you devoted your time to this vital activity. May God bless all who care about freedom and security in our beloved Americas.

Richard D. Downie, Ph.D. Colonel, Infantry, Commandant
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

OFICINA DEL COMANDANTE



Bienvenidos a la primera conferencia anual de WBINSEC sobre la Sociedad Civil y Temas de Seguridad en America Latina. Durante los proximos tres dias, un panel distinguido de diplomiticos, oficiales militares y policiales, al igual que profesores universitarios analizaran una amplia gama de asuntos emergentes de seguridad en el siglo = y sus implicaciones en el desaffollo de la poblacion en nuestra region. Los estudiantes de nuestra clase de Comando y Estado Mayor General, al igual que de otras clases en sesion dirigiran sus preguntas a los conferencistas y los ocupardn en discusiones. Es un honor para nosotros contar tambien con la participacion del publico, en general, representantes del gobierno, lideres del sector privado, estudiantes de escuelas secundarias y universitarios, y de muchas otras personas interesadas en temas de democracia y seguridad. Esperamos que al concluir la conferencia, comparten los mensajes expuestos aqui con las comunidades que ustedes representan. Esperamos que las contribuciones del Instituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica sean del conocimiento de los sectores publicos y privados, de las universidades y escuelas secundarias y de los hogares, o sea de todos los sectores de nuestras sociedades libres. Este mes, hace 61 anos se llevo a cabo una conferencia similar por primera vez en este mismo edificio. La 11 Guerra Mundial cobraba mucha importancia y se comenzaba a manifestar las relaciones entre las fuerzas armadas de America Latina y Estados Unidos. Hoy dia, despues de haber superado, muchos retos de amenazas externas e internas contra nuestras libertades, nos reunimos para estudiar el siglo,XXI y los temas de seguridad que vislumbramos. Gracias por su interes y disponer de su tiempo para participar en esta actividad tan importante, y que Dios bendiga a todos los que se preocupan por la libertad y seguridad de nuestras queridas Americas.

Richard D. Downie, Ph.D. Coronel, Infanteria, Comandante,
Instituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica

Purpose of the Hemispheric Conference

The Annual Hemispheric Conference at Fort Benning focuses on key issues affecting regional security and contributes to the professional education of officers and enlisted soldiers, security and police personnel, and civilian governmental officials and non-governmental organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation carries out these overall goals through the medium of its annual Conference:

1. Provide a productive dialogue on Civil Society and Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere.
2. Define and exemplify Security Forces roles and missions supporting responses to legitimate national, transnational, and multilateral challenges.
3. Promote the support of democratic principles by both the Security Forces and the civilian government
4. Assist in an integrated response to transnational threats.
5. Achieve closer military-to-military and military-to-civilian ties and promote long-term working relationships
6. Foster expansion of the Officer and Noncommissioned officers' role in Western Hemisphere forces and the interactivity between the military and their civilian counterpart and control.
7. Establish a forum for United States and Western Hemisphere officers, Civilian Government officials, and non-Governmental Organizations to exchange ideas regarding the roles, missions and interactivity of sovereign resources.

Proposito de la Conferencia Hemisferica

El elemento fundamental de la Conferencia Hemisferica anual en el Fuerte Benning, son los temas esenciales que afectan nuestra seguridad regional y que contribuyen a la capacitacion profesional del personal militar tanto oficiales como alistados, de las autoridades policiales, de seguridad y gubernamentales, y de las organizaciones no gubernamentales de todo el Hemisferio Occidental. El Instituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica (WHINSEC) cumple con estos objetivos generales por conducto de su conferencia anual.

1. Ofrecer un dialogo productivo, sobre la Sociedad Civil y Temas de Seguridad en el Hemisferio Occidental.
2. Definir e ilustrar las funciones y misiones de las fuerzas de seguridad que brindan su apoyo en respuesta a los retos legitimos nacionales, transnacionales y multilaterales.
3. Fomentar el apoyo de los principios democriticos tanto por las fuerzas de seguridad y el gobierno civil.
4. Participar en una respuesta integrada a las amenazas transnacionales.
5. Lograr estrechar los lazos entre las fuerzas armadas y entre, las fuerzas armadas y el sector civil y promover las relaciones de trabajo a largo plazo.
6. Fomentar la expansion de los deberes de los oficiales y suboficiales en las fuerzas del hemisferio y la influencia, mutua entre los militares y sus homologos civiles y oficinas reguladoras.
7. Establecer un foro para el intercambio de ideas entre oficiales norteamericanos y del hemisferio, funcionarios gubernamentales civiles y organizaciones no gubernamentales sobre las funciones, las misiones y la influencia mutua de los recursos del estado.

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

DATES / EVENTS TMES

28 NOV

0800-0815 Conference Welcome COL Downie, Pratt Hall

0815-0900 Panel #1 U.S. Policy

"The Role of the Department of Defense in Military to Military Diplomacy"
Hon. Roger Pardo-Maurer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Western Hemisphere Affairs

"US Security Assistance Influence in Latin America: The Unheralded Treasure"
Dr. Russ Ramsey, Troy State University

"Combating Terrorism in Latin America"
BG Galen B. Jackman, Director of Operations, USSOUTHCOM

0900-0915 Break

0915-1000 Roundtable # 1 - Hon Mr. Pardo, Dr. Ramsey, BG Jackman

1000-1015 Break

1015-1100 Panel # 2 Economics

"Security and Justice in Latin America"
Dr. Steven Rozman, Tougaloo College

"Civil Society and Security Issues in Latin America: The Economic Dimension"
Dr. James Ondracek, Minot State University

"NAFTA and the Next Step"
Prof Joel Cassman, Director, Advanced Studies Department, WHINSEC

1100-1115 Break

1115-1200 Roundtable # 2- Dr. Rozman, Dr. Ondracek, Prof. Cassman

1200-1230 Conference Photo In front of WHINSEC

1230-1330 Informal lunch Engineer Dining Facility

1330-1415 Panel # 3 Military

"The Role of Latin American Airpower in the Current Crisis"

Dr. James S. Corum, USAF Air University

"The Political Economy of National Security in the Andean Region"

CAPT (Navy) Jose Gonzales, Joint Forces Staff College

"Latin American and European Security Links"

Dr. Hal Kearsley, Advanced Studies Department, WHINSEC

1415-1430 Break

1430-1515 Roundtable # 3- Dr. Corum, CAPT (Navy) Gonzales, Dr. Kearsley

1515-1530 Break

1530-1615 Panel # 4 Colombia

"Educating Civilians at Military Institutions of Higher Learning"

Dr. Jose Paz University of El Salvador, Argentina

"Lessons from the Drug War in Colombia"

Gen Jose Serrano, Bogotá, Colombia

"The Military Role in Democracy"

MG Carlos Morales-San Martin, Inspector General, Ecuador

1615-1630 Break

1630-1715 Roundtable # 4- Dr. Paz, Gen Serrano, MG Morales

1845-2100 Group Dinner

The Cannon Brew Pub

29 NOV

0800-0815 Opening Remarks Dr. Russ Ramsey, Pratt Hall

0815-0900 Panel #5 Special Topics

"My Army Career and Latin American Security"

LTG John Le Moyne, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, US Army

"When Terrorism Strikes a City"

LTG (Ret) Carmen Cavezza, Columbus City Manager

"The Terror Environment"

COL Richard Downie, Commandant, WHINSEC

0900-0915 Break

0915-1000 Roundtable # 5-LTG Le Moyne, LTG (Ret) Cavezza, COL Downie

1000-1015 Break

1015-1100 Panel # 6 South America

"Determinants and Prevention of Violent Deaths: The Brazilian Experience"

Dr. Glaucio Soares, University of Florida

"The Tenuous Bridge Between the Free Market and Democracy in Latin America"

Dr. Alex Hybel, Connecticut College

"The Desire for Stability: The Threat of Civil Authority"

Dr. Robert Buckman, University of Louisiana

1100-1115 Break

1115-1200 Roundtable # 6-Dr. Soares, Dr. Hybel, Dr. Buckman

1330-1415 Panel # 7

Security and Democracy

"Cuba and Future Security Threats in the Caribbean"

Dr. Frank Mora, Rhodes College

"Panama's Security in the Post-Cold War Environment"

Dr. Michael Conniff, University of South Florida

"Why Democratic Systems Provide the Best Security for Latin America"

Dr. Juan Del Aguila, Emory University

1415-1430 Break

1430-1515 Roundtable # 7- Dr. Mora, Dr. Conniff, Dr. Del Aguila

1515-1530 Break

1530-1615 Panel # 8 Legal/Moral

"The Security Waltz: Peru and the U.S Over the Years"

Dr. Larry Clayton, University of Alabama

"A Walk Through a 20th Century Torture Center: Villa Grimaldi, Santiago, de Chile"

Dr. Pedro Matta, Institute for Latin American Social Sciences

"Aspects of Catholic Theology"

Dr. Joseph Fahey, Manhattan College

1615-1630 Break

1630-1715 Roundtable # 8- Dr. Clayton, Dr. Matta, Dr. Fahey

1845-2100 Group Dinner

Buckhead Grill

30 NOV

0800-0815 Opening Remarks-Dr. Russ Ramsey, Pratt Hall

0815-0900 Panel # 9 Central America

"The Current Security Plan in Costa Rica"

COL Walter Navarro, Director General, Costa Rica Civil Guard

"Cooperation for Security in the Americas: The New Agenda"

Dr. Mauricio Aguilar, WHINSEC

"The Need for Improved Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America,"

Dr. Donald Harrington, Dean, WHINSEC

0900-0915 Break

0915-1000 Roundtable # 10-COL Navarro, Dr. Aguilar, Dr. Harrington

1000-1015 Break

1015-1100 Panel # 11 Special Topics

"Conference Closing, Remarks by Senator Zell Miller"

Read by COL Richard Downie, Commandant, WHINSEC

1100-1115 Break

1115-1200 Roundtable # 11 Dr. Shingleton, COL Downie, Dr. Ramsey

1200 Conference Closed

PLAN DE ACTIVIDADES

| <u>FECRA</u> | <u>HORA</u> | <u>ACTIVIDADES</u> |
|------------------|----------------------------|--|
| 28 NOV | | |
| 0800-0815 | Bienvenida | Cnel. Downie, Pratt Hall |
| 0815-0900 | Panel num. 1 | Politica de EE.UU. |
| | | "El Papel del Ministerio de Defensa en la Diplomacia Intermilitar" Hon. Roger Pardo-Maurer, Subsecretario, Adjunto del Ministerio de Defensa para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental |
| | | "Influencia de la Asistencia de Seguridad de EE.UU. en America Latina: El Tesoro no Anunciado" Dr. Russ Ramsey, Universidad Estatal Troy |
| | | "Combatiendo el Terrorismo en America Latina" Gral. de Bda. Galen B. Jaclanan, Director de Operaciones, USSOUTHCOM |
| 0900-0915 | Receso | |
| 0915-1000 | Mesa redonda num. 1 | Hon. Sr. Pardo, Dr. Ramsey, Gral. de Bda. Jackman |
| 1000-1015 | Receso | |
| 1015-1100 | Panel num. 2 | Economia |
| | | "Seguridad justicia en America Latina" Dr. Steven Rozman, Universidad Tougaloo |
| | | "La sociedad civil y los temas de seguridad en America Latina: La dimension economica" Dr James Ondracek, Universidad Estatal Minot |
| | | "NAFTA y el proximo paso" Prof Joel Cassman, Director del Departamento de Estudios Avanzados, WHINSEC |
| 1100-1151 | Receso | |
| 1115-1200 | Mesa redonda num. 2 | Dr. Rozman, Dr. Ondracek, Prof Cassman |
| 1200-1230 | Fotografia oficial | Frente a WHINSEC |

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|---|----------------------------|--|
| 1230-1330 | Almuerzo informal | Comedor de los ingenieros |
| 1330-1415 | Panel num. 3 | Fuerzas Armadas |
| "El papel del poderio aereo, de America Latina en la crisis actual" | | |
| Dr. James S. Corum, Universidad de la Fuerza Aerea | | |
| "La politica econ6mica de la seguridad nacional en la region de los Andes" | | |
| Dr. James S Corum, de la Fuerza Aerea | | |
| "Enlaces de seguridad latinoamericanos y europeos" | | |
| Dr. Hal Kearsley, Departamento de Estudios Avanzados, WHINSEC | | |
| 1415-1430 | Receso | |
| 1430-1515 | Mesa redonda num. 3 | Dr. Corum, Cpt. (Marinade Guerra) Gonzales, Dr. Kearsley |
| 1515-1530 | Receso | |
| 1530-1615 | Panel num. 4 | Colombia |
| "Capacitacion de civiles en instituciones militares de estudios superiores" | | |
| Dr. Jose Paz Universidad del Salvador, Argentina | | |
| "Lecciones de la guerra contra las drogas en Colombia" | | |
| Gral. Jose Serrano, Bogota, Colombia | | |
| "El papel de las fuerzas armadas en la democracia" | | |
| Gral. de Div. Carlos Morales-San Martin, Inspector General, Ecuador | | |
| 1615-1630 | Receso | |
| 1630-1715 | Mesa redonda nun. 4 | Dr. Paz, Gral. Serrano, Gral. de Div. Morales |
| 1845-2100 | Cena oficial | The Cannon Brew Pub |

29 NOV

| | | |
|---|-----------------------------|---|
| 0800-0815 | Palabras de apertura | Dr. Russ Ramsey, Pratt Hall |
| 815-900 | Panel num. 5 | Temas especiales |
| <p>"Mi carrera militar y la seguridad latinoamericana"</p> | | |
| Tte. Gral. John Le Moyne, excomandante General del Fuerte Benning | | |
| <p>"Cuando el terrorismo ataca a una ciudad"</p> | | |
| Tte. Gral. (Ret) Carmen Cavezza, Administrador Municipal de Columbus | | |
| <p>"Ambiente de terror"</p> | | |
| Cnel. Richard Downie, Comandante, WHINSEC | | |
| 0900-0915 | Receso | |
| 0915-1000 | Mesa redonda num. 5 | Tte. Gral. Le Moyne, Tte. Gral. (Ret) Cavezza, Cnel. Downie |
| 1000-1015 | Receso | |
| 1015-1100 | Panel num. 6 | America del Sur |
| <p>"Factores determinantes y prevencion de muertes violentas: La experiencia brasileña"</p> | | |
| Dr. Glaucio Soares, Universidad de la Florida | | |
| <p>"El puente poco fuerte entre el mercado libre y la democracia, en America Latina"</p> | | |
| Dr. Alex Hybel, Universidad de Connecticut | | |
| <p>"El anhelo de estabilidad: La amenaza de la autoridad civil"</p> | | |
| Dr. Robert Buckman, Universidad de Lousiana | | |
| 1100-1115 | Receso | |
| 1115-1200 | Mesa redonda num. 6 | Dr. Soares, Dr. Hybel, Dr. Buckman |
| 1200-1330 | Almuerzo oficial | Club de Oficiales |

1330-1415 Panel num. 7 Seguridad y Democracia

"Cuba y las futuras Amenazas a la seguridad en el Caribe"
Dr. Frank Mora, Universidad Rhodes

"La seguridad de Panamá después de la Guerra Fría"
Dr. Michael Conniff, Universidad del Sur de la Florida

"Por qué los sistemas democráticos ofrecen la mejor seguridad para América Latina"
Dr. Juan Del Aguila, Universidad Emory

1415-1430 Receso

1430-1515 Mesa redonda num. 7 Dr. Mora, Dr. Conniff, Dr. Del Aguila

1515-1530 Receso

1530-1615 Panel num. 8 Aspectos legales/morales

"El valor de la seguridad: Perú y EE.UU. a través de los años
Dr. Larry Clayton, Universidad de Alabama

"Un recorrido a través de un centro de tortura del siglo XX: Villa Grimaldi, Santiago de Chile"
Dr. Pedro Matta, Instituto de Ciencias Sociales Latinoamericanas

"Aspectos de la Teología Católica"
Dr. Joseph Fahey, Universidad Manhattan

1615-1630 Receso

1630-1715 Mesa redonda num. 8 Dr. Clayton, Dr. Matta, Dr. Fahey

1845-2100 Cena oficial Buckhead Grill

30 NOV

0800-0815 Palabras de apertura Dr. Russ Ramsey, Pratt Hall

0815-0900 Panel num. 9 America Central

"El Plan de Seguridad Actual de Costa Rica"

Cnel. Walter Navarro, Director General, Guardia Civil de Costa Rica

"Cooperacion para la seguridad en las Americas: La nueva agenda"

Dr. Mauricio Aguilar, WHINSEC

"La necesidad de mejorar las relaciones entre civiles y militares en America Latina"

Dr. Donald Harrington, Decano, WHINSEC

0900-0915 Receso

0915-1000 Mesa redonda num. 10 Cnel. Navarro, Dr. Aguilar, Dr. Harrington

1000-1015 Receso

1015-1100 Panel num. 11 Temas Especiales

"Palabras de Clausura por el Senador Zell Miller"

Presentacion por el Cnel. Richard Downie, Comandante, WHINSEC

1100-1115 Receso

1115-1200 Mesa redonda num. 11 Dr. Shingleton, Cnel. Downie, Dr. Ramsey

1200-1215 Palabras de clausura

CONFERENCE SPEAKERS

Dr. Mauricio Aguilar Robles is from Puerto Cortes, Honduras and is currently serving as the first WHINSEC Fellow. He holds a Law Degree from the National University of Honduras and a Masters in International Relations from the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO). Dr. Aguilar is a graduate of the Diplomatic Academy of the Republic of Chile, holds a High Studies Diploma from the National Defense College of Honduras and is a Foreign Affairs Service Functionary of Honduras. He has served as a Law Professor at the National University of Honduras, Human Rights and Counter Narcotics Affairs Director, of the Honduras Foreign Affairs Ministry, and Counter Narcotics National Council member, representing the Foreign Affairs Minister of Honduras. He has also served as a Professor at the Honduran National Defense College and at the Command and Staff School of the Honduran Armed Forces.

Dr. Robert Buckman is an associate professor of communication at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and a specialist on Latin American media. He has had several Army Reserve assignments in Panama, lived in Paraguay for two years and had a Fulbright Fellowship in Chile in 1991, teaching public affairs reporting at Catholic University. For four years he was Army reserve attaché to Colombia, until his retirement as a lieutenant colonel in 1998. For five years he has been the author of Latin America, an annually revised reference book published by Stryker-Post Publications. A freelance foreign correspondent since 1989, he has covered elections in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela for a number of major newspapers. He holds bachelors and master's degrees from Texas Christian University and a doctorate from the University of Texas at Austin.

Professor Joseph Cassman is a career U.S. Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State. He has served overseas in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico, in addition to assignments as an instructor at the U.S. Air Force Academy and two tours of duty in the State Department. Mr. Cassman is a graduate of Georgetown University and holds two master's degrees and PhD (ABD) in economics from the University of California, Davis. Mr. Cassman has received three Meritorious Honor Awards from the U.S. Department of State and commendations from the U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the Venezuelan National Drug Commission and the Ecuadorian National Police for his achievements in combating international drug trafficking.

Lieutenant General (Ret) Carmen Cavezza completed thirty-three years of service in the United States Army with extensive assignments in Asia. He served two years in Vietnam and commanded the U.S. Army Infantry Center and School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science from the Citadel, a Master of Arts Degree in Government from the University of Miami, a Master of Science in International Affairs and a Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science from George Washington University. He has held a variety of important command and staff positions including Executive to the Secretary of the Army in Washington, DC. His awards and decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster), the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star Medal with the "V" Device, and

the Purple Heart. Lieutenant General Cavezza is authorized to wear the Combat Infantryman Badge, The Master Parachutist Badge The Ranger Tab and Army Genera I Staff Identification Badge. In May 1997, he accepted the position of City Manager, Columbus Consolidated Government.

Dr. Larry Clayton is currently the Chairman, Department of History at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa. He holds a B.A. degree from Duke University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Tulane University. Dr Clayton served in the United States Navy from 1964-1966. He has written numerous articles and books on Latin America, including The Bolivarian Nations; A History of Modern Latin America, and, most recently, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle. He is currently working on BARTHOLOMEW: A Biography of Bartolome de las Casas. His articles have appeared in such journals as the Hispanic American Historical Review, the Journal of Latin American Studies and the Christian Science Monitor. He is the former director of the Latin American Studies Program at the University of Alabama and held two Senior Fulbright Lecturing Awards at the University of Costa Rica and the University of Lima.

Dr. Michael L. Conniff directs the Latin American and Caribbean Studies program at the University of South Florida, in Tampa. He is also a professor in the History Department. Previously he taught at Auburn University and at the University of New Mexico. Conniff is a specialist on the modern history of Central America, Brazil, and the Caribbean, regions where he has lived for over a decade. His books include *Africans in the Americas* (1994); *Black Labor on a White Canal* (1985); *Modern Brazil* (1991); *Panama and the United States* 2nd ed 2001); *Urban Politics in Brazil* (1981); *A History of Modern Latin America* (1999); and *Populism in Latin America* (1999). He has recently begun working on Cuban politics and history. Dr. Conniff served as Peace Corps volunteer in Ecuador and Fulbright professor in Panama and Brazil, and he is fluent in Spanish and Portuguese. He delivers many invited lectures each year, at universities and conferences throughout the Americas. His degrees are from the University of California at Berkeley (BA 1968) and Stanford (MA 1969, Ph.D. 1976).

Dr. James Corum is a Professor of Strategy at the School of Advanced Air Power Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base. He is the author of four books on airpower in developing nations and his areas of expertise include the Chaco War and the Spanish Civil War. He is a frequent lecturer at the WHINSEC. Dr. Corum also serves as a lieutenant colonel in the United States Army Reserve. Dr. Corum has done original work on Latin American Air Power.

COL Richard D. Downie, United States Army, was born in New York and commissioned in 1976. After graduation from the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, he served in the Infantry and subsequently qualified as a Foreign Area Officer for Latin America. He attended Airborne School, Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Ranger School, the LANCERO Course (International Ranger in Colombia), the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Course, the Defense Strategy Course and the U . S. Army War College. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree from USMA, West Point; a Master of Arts Degree and Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California; and was an Army Fellow in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Seminar XXI Program. Colonel Downie assumed the

position of Director of the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation on January 17, 2001. He has served in a variety of command and staff positions in mechanized infantry, light infantry, and airborne infantry units. Colonel Downie has authored the book Learning from Conflict: The U. S. Military in Vietnam. El Salvador and the Drug War Greenwood Press, 1998; and several articles including, " Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Policy: Old Wine in a New Bottle?" Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (Vol. 15, No. 1, Jan- Mar, 1992, pp. 53-67, Military Review. His awards and decorations include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, National Defense Medal, Army Expeditionary Medal, Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon, Inter- American Defense Board Medal, Orden Merito Academico (Colombia), Bosnia/Former Yugoslavia NATO Medal, and Humanitarian Service Medal.

Dr. Juan Del Aguila is a professor in the Latin American Political Science Department at Emory University, Carter Center, Atlanta. Born in Cuba, he is the resident expert on the Emory University Faculty on the Caribbean region. The author of two books, Dr. Del Aguila has written extensively on security issues in the Caribbean. Dr. Del Aguila is known in Political Science circles as one of the leading authorities on Cuban politics.

Dr. Joseph Fahey received his B.A. in Philosophy, and his M.A. in Theology from Maryknoll Seminary. His Ph.D. is in Religion and Social Ethics from New York University. He is the author and editor of. Peace, War and the Christian Conscience; Irenology: The Study of Peace; Reinhold Niebuhr on Human Nature and World Peace; A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order along with numerous articles, essays, and reviews. He serves on the Advisory Board of Peace Review: A Transnational Quarterly. Dr. Fahey is Professor of Religious Studies at Manhattan College and is a co-founder and former Director of college's B.A. degree in the Peace Studies. He has also taught at Fordham University, Vassar College, and The Maryknoll School of Theology. He has served as Honorary Research Fellow at Queens University, Belfast and as a Scholar-in-Residence at New York University. He has served on the National Councils of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, The Peace Studies Association, and the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development.

Navy Captain Jose Gonzales was born in Lima, Peru in 1958. He graduated with a B.S. in Naval Architecture from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1979, and holds advanced graduate degrees from Harvard University and MIT. He is also a distinguished graduate of the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College in Callao, Peru, and a lecturer and Board member of the Center of Managerial Development at Pacific University in Lima, Peru. Captain Gonzales has served onboard surface vessels, both in the United States and Peru. After serving four years at the Commanding General's Office in Lima, both as Undersecretary and Plans, Programs and Budgeting Officer, he reported to CINCLANTFL T N-5 as Liaison Officer in January 2000 for a two-year tour in Norfolk. He is also an Adjunct Professor on Latin American Affairs at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, having had an active participation in courses and exercises related to military operations other than war (MOOTW A). Captain Gonzales personal awards include the Peruvian Navy Cross, the Meritorious Sea Service Award, and several unit and service awards.

Dr. Donald Harrington received degrees from Westfield State College (B.S. ed. in 1963) and the University of Connecticut (M.A. in 1966 and Ph.D. in history in 1970). After teaching at Waynesburg College in Pennsylvania from 1970 to 1976, he entered the Foreign Service in January 1976, serving in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (1976-78); Economic Officer in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany (1979-81); Political Officer in Santiago, Chile (1981-85); Argentine Desk Officer in the Department of State (1985-87); Consul for Political Affairs, Deputy Principal Officer and Acting Principal Officer during Desert Shield in Sao Paulo, Brazil (1987-89); student at the National War College in Fort McNair, Washington D.C. (1991-92); Political Counselor, Acting Deputy of Mission and Charge in San Jose, Costa Rica (1992-95); Political Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission in Guatemala City, Guatemala (1995-98); and Political Counselor in Brasilia, Brazil (1998-99). He was named the Dean of Academics and International Affairs at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in early July 2001. He speaks Spanish and Portuguese.

Dr. Alex Hybel, a native of Argentina, received his Ph.D. from Stanford University and also holds Masters Degrees in Political Science and International Relations. He is currently the Susan Eckert Lynch Professor of Government at Connecticut College. He is the author of the books The Logic of Surprise in International Conflict, How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America, and most recently Made by the U.S.: The International System. He recently completed a trip to Cuba to research the readiness of that country for democracy. Dr. Hybel is also a Vietnam Veteran.

Brigadier General Galen B. Jackman was commissioned from the University of Nebraska ROTC Program in 1973. He has served in company grade leadership positions with the 82d Airborne Division, and 25th Infantry Division. Brigadier General Jackman has commanded the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division; 2d Brigade, 7th Infantry Division; and the Ranger Training Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia. He has also served as the Director of Combined Arms and Tactics at the United States Army Infantry School, as well as the Deputy J3 for Training and Readiness, United States Pacific Command, Hawaii. Brigadier General Jackman most recently served as Chief of Staff, and Assistant Division Commander for Support, 10th Mountain Division (LI). Brigadier General Jackman holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from the University of Nebraska and a Master of Science in Acquisition and Contract Management from the Florida Institute of Technology. He has earned the Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Expert Infantryman Badge. His awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Army Commendation Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters and Army Achievement Medal.

Dr. Hal Kearsley serves as Program Coordinator for Social Science and Chair of the International Relations Department of Troy State University at Fort Benning. He holds an M.A. degree in International Relations from the University of Southern California and a Ph.D. in International Relations/Political Science from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. A former Naval Officer, Dr. Kearsley has also authored several books, including Maritime Power in the 21st Century.

Lieutenant General John Le Moyne assumed duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army, in November 2001. Lieutenant General Le Moyne was born in Ohio and enlisted in the Army in 1964 to serve as a Special Forces Soldier, and was later commissioned from the Reserve Officer Training Corps as an Infantry Officer in 1968 from the University of Florida. General Le Moyne's military experience spans every level of command and staff. His commands include The United States Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, the 1st BDE, 24th Infantry Division in Saudi Arabia and Fort Stewart, an Infantry Battalion in Germany, and Infantry Companies in Vietnam and Germany. General Le Moyne has combat tours in Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq. Previous to his current assignment, General Le Moyne served as the Commander, United States Army Infantry Center/Commandant United States Army Infantry School and Chief of Infantry. His military education includes the Royal College of Defense Studies, London, England, the Army War College, and the Marine Corps Staff College. General Le Moyne's awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (2OLC), the Bronze Star Medal (6OLC) with 3 awards for Valor, the Purple Heart, the Meritorious Service Medal (4OLC), the Army Commendation Medal (4OLC) with 2 awards for Valor, and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. General Le Moyne also holds the Ranger Tab, the Master Parachutist Badge, and the Expert Infantryman's Badge.

Dr. Pedro Matta was a student leader at the Law School of the University of Chile in Santiago when the coup de etat of September 11 that 1973 that overthrew the democratically elected government of President Salvador Allende took place. In May 1975, Matta was arrested, taken to two different torture centers and tortured by DINA, Pinochet's Secret Police, and then imprisoned for over 13 months. He was never brought before a court of law or charged with any crime, or even a misdemeanor. He is one of the survivors of the notorious torture center known as Villa Grimaldi. He emigrated to the United States where he already had been acknowledged as political prisoner and granted asylum. Dr. Matta went to New York and testified before the United Nations Commission of Human Rights about abuses and violations of Human Rights in Chile, during the Commission's July-August 1976 sessions. He returned to Chile in 1991 after fifteen years of exile. Since his return, he has put his detective skills acquired abroad at the service of human rights, documenting the abuses of the torture centers and advocating remembrances as a way to confront and heal the wounds of the past to prepare a better future. In September 2001 Dr. Matta participated in the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) XXIII Congress that met in Washington D.C.

Dr. Frank O. Mora is Associate Professor and Chair of International Studies at Rhodes College, Memphis, TN. He also holds the Latin American Studies Research Fellowship at Rhodes College. Some of the publications include "US Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America: Lifting the Ban on Fighter Aircraft," Airpower Journal "International Involvement in the Americas: Latin American and Caribbean Engagement with Extra-Hemispheric Actors," forthcoming chapter in volume published by the National Defense University Press; "From Fidelismo to Raulismo: Civilian Control of the Military in Cuba," Problems of PostCommunism; "Readjusting Civilian Control of the Military in Cuba: A Comparative Study of the Effects of Bingshang on Civil-Military Relations in Cuba and China," Armed Forces and Society and "Raulismo and the

Technocrat-Soldier: The Economic Role of the FAR and Its Implications for Transition in Cuba," in The Cuban Military and Transition: The Politics of Military Extrication in Comparative Perspective (edited by Eusebio Mujal Leon). Professor Mora is a contributing editor to the Handbook of Latin American Studies, Library of Congress and has worked as a consultant to the US Air Force, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) of the National Defense University, and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs.

Major General Carlos Morales-Sanmartin enrolled in the "Eloy Alfaro" Military Academy in the grade of second lieutenant (armored cavalry branch) in Quito, Ecuador in 1970, and was recently promoted to the rank of major general in 2001. He attended the Chilean Army Armor School, where he received degrees as a master equestrian. He served as an armored-cavalry officer in several Ecuadorian Army units. He is a graduate of the Brazilian Army Officer Development School and of the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, in the United States, where he completed the Continental Defense Course. During his military career, he has held several important positions among which are assignments as advisor to the Inter-American Defense College, permanent military advisor to the Organization of American States, and Director of Staff for the Inter-American Defense Board headquartered in Washington. Furthermore, he served as the Director of the "Eloy Alfaro" Military Academy for Advanced Studies, Director of Mobilization, Joint Command, Ecuadorian Armed Forces, Secretary for the National Security Council (COSENA), and Director for Ground-Force Operations. He currently serves as Inspector General and Chief of the Planning Staff for Ground Forces. The awards and decorations that Major General Morales-Samnartin has received include the "Abd6n Calderon" Star and the "Guerrillero Jose Miguel Lanza" Award in the grade of "Caballero" awarded by the National Government of the Republic of Bolivia.

Colonel Walter Navarro served as Assistant Commandant, United States Army School of the Americas from December 1994 to December 1996. He enlisted in the Public Safety Forces of Costa Rica as a private in 1975, moving up in rank until reaching that of colonel in 1991. COL Navarro has served in the capacity of Director of Personnel and Director for the Department of Public Safety. He currently holds the position of Director of Security Forces. Colonel Navarro has received numerous honors attesting to his meritorious and devoted career as a public servant. He is now Director General of the Costa Rican Civil Guard.

Dr. James Ondracek is an Associate Professor of Business Administration and the Director of the Institute for International Business at Minot State University, Minot, ND. In 1994, Jim earned a Ph.D. from the University of South Carolina in strategic management (primary area), and international business (secondary area). He also holds an MBA from California State University - Fresno, and a BS from Montana State University in microbiology. In the last few years Dr. Ondracek has authored more than ten academic publications. Dr. Ondracek's research interests include economic development, entrepreneurship, international business, and strategic management. Much of his effort is focused on advancing North Dakota's economic development, in particular by integration of the state and regional economy with that of the world. However, his research interests are international in scope. Dr. Ondracek has traveled, studied, or worked in over 30 countries around the world. In particular, Latin American development issues are of keen

concern to him. Currently he serves as the Director of the Institute for International Business (IFIB) at Minot State University.

Honorable Roger Pardo-Maurer is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the senior political appointment in the Defense Department with responsibility for hemispheric affairs. Before joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Pardo-Maurer was president of *Emerging Market Access*, a consulting firm based in Washington, D.C. He was also a managing partner of Access Management, a trade and investment advisory firm based in Washington, D.C. and Mexico City. He has worked as a specialist in Latin American and U.S.-Hispanic issues at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Between 1986 and 1989 he was chief of staff to the representative of the Nicaraguan Resistance in Washington D.C. In this capacity he was actively involved in the process that culminated in the cease-fire and elections in Nicaragua. Mr. Pardo-Maurer was born in Connecticut in 1963, and raised in Costa Rica. His published writings on Latin America include books and articles on a range of economic, political, social, and military themes. He obtained a B.A. in history from Yale University, and a postgraduate degree in development economics from King's College at Cambridge University. Mr. Pardo-Maurer is a reservist and currently serves in the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Dr. Jose Paz holds joint appointments as a faculty member, San Salvador University in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and as National Security professor with the Defense Ministry of Argentina. He recently was a Guest Speaker at the WHINSEC Conference for Distinguished Argentine Visitors on the topic of "Terrorism and Its Environment." Dr. Paz has published and lectured in several countries, on a variety of national and regional security topics. He is currently a selectee for the position of Fellow, WHINSEC, where his duties will include research, lectures, and public speaking on Hemispheric defense issues.

Dr. Russ Ramsey is the longest standing US scholar in close contact with the armed forces and police of Latin America. Author of Guardians of the Other Americas: Essays on the Military Forces of Latin America (1997), and Strategic Reading on Latin America, 3d ed. (2001), his work is published in Latin American Research Review, Hispanic American Historical Review, Hispanic American Historical Review, Journal of Inter-American Studies, Parameters, Military Review, and Naval War College Review. His book Soldados y Guerrilleros (Bogota, 2000) is the standard history of the Colombian violencia. Former faculty member at the University of Florida and the U.S. Army School of the Americas, Dr. Ramsey currently is Visiting Professor of Latin American Studies to WHINSEC from Troy State University at Ft. Benning. He commanded a company of airborne infantry in Vietnam and was Latin American Desk Officer for Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, J-5, during the critical Central American conflict era.

Dr. Steven Rozman currently serves as the Dean of the Social Science Division at Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, Mississippi. Dr. Rozman graduated from the University of Minnesota with a B.A. degree in Political Science and a minor in Spanish, earned an M.A. degree from the

University of Florida in Latin American Studies/Political Science, and obtained a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Florida. Dr. Rozman has broad experience in consulting and training programs throughout Latin America and has written numerous publications on Latin America. Since 1994, Dr. Rozman has served as the President of the Mississippi Partners of the Americas. He has done recent in-country research on Vietnam and Cuba.

General Rosso Jose Serrano Cadena until recently served as the Chief of the Colombian National Police. A graduate of "La Gran Colombia" University where he studied Law and Political Science, General Serrano was responsible for constructing a more humanitarian police force in Colombia, one which TIME magazine described as notable for its low levels of crime, corruption, and human-rights violations. General Serrano has been recognized on many fronts as a hero in the international fight against illegal drugs.

Dr. Glaucio Soares holds a Bachelor of Law degree from the Candido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, a Master of Law from Tulane University, and a Ph.D. in Sociology from Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Director of the Institute for Latin American Social Sciences in Chile, has taught and researched at UCLA; UC-Berkeley; Cornell University; MIT; University of Essex (England); El Colegio de Mexico; UNAM; Universidad Catolica de Chile; Universidad de Chile, Universidade de Brasilia, IUPERJ and the University of Florida. He has published more than half a dozen books, the most recent one published in October 2001, *A Democracia Interrompida* (Rio de Janeiro: FGV). Four of the books dealt with the Brazilian military regime, 1964-1985, and include interviews with different officers, predominantly in the security area. He has published about 150 articles in academic journals in 15 different countries. He is currently researching the prevention of lethal violence: accidents, homicides and suicides. He was also an adviser on crime issues to the Governor of the Federal District, Brazil, 1995-1998. He is the current President of the Brazilian Political Science Association.

CONFERENCISTAS

El Dr. Mauricio Aguilar Robles es originario de Puerto Cortes, Honduras, y en la actualidad es academico en el Instituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica (WHINSEC). Se graduó de la Escuela de Leyes de la Universidad Nacional de Honduras y obtuvo una maestría en Relaciones Internacionales en la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). El Dr. Aguilar es graduado de la Academia Diplomática de la República de Chile, ostenta un Diploma en Estudios Superiores de la Escuela de Defensa Nacional de Honduras y es funcionario del Servicio de Asuntos Exteriores de Honduras. Ha desempeñado los cargos de profesor de leyes en la Universidad Nacional de Honduras, y director del Departamento, de Asuntos Relativos a Derechos Humanos y Asuntos Antidrogas del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Honduras; ademas, es miembro del Consejo Nacional Antidrogas, en representación del Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Honduras. Tambien se ha desempeñado como profesor en la Escuela de Defensa Nacional Hondureña y en la Escuela de Comando y Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas Hondureñas.

El Dr. Robert Buckman es profesor asociado de comunicaciones en la Universidad de Luisiana, situada en Lafayette, y es especialista en prensa latinoamericana. Ha sido asignado varias veces a Panamá por la Reserva del Ejercito; residió en Paraguay durante dos años y fue asignado a Chile como Academico del Programa Fullbright en 1991, para la enseñanza de Reportaje de Asuntos publicos en la Universidad Católica. Durante cuatro años fue agregado militar de la Reserva del Ejercito en Colombia hasta jubilarse en 1998 como teniente coronel.

Ha sido autor durante cinco años de America Latina, un libro de referencia revisado anualmente y publicado por Publicaciones Stryker-Post. Habiéndose desempeñado como corresponsal extranjero independiente desde 1989, ha cubierto, las elecciones de Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, México y Venezuela para un sinnumero de periodicos importantes. Ostenta una licenciatura y maestría de la Universidad Cristiana de Texas y un doctorado de la Universidad de Texas en Austin.

El Profesor Joseph Cassman es funcionario de carrera del Servicio Exterior del Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. Ha prestado servicio en Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua y México; ademas fue asignado a la Academia de la Fuerza Aerea de EE.UU. como instructor y ha cumplido dos periodos de servicio en el Departamento de Estado. El Sr. Cassman es graduado de la Universidad Georgetown y ostenta dos maestrías y un doctorado (ABD) en Economía conferidos por la Universidad de California, ubicada en Davis. El Sr. Cassman ha recibido tres Condecoraciones de Honor Meritorias del Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. y reconocimientos de encomio del Servicio de Aduana de EE.UU., la Administración Antidrogas de EE.UU., la Comisión Antidrogas Nacional Venezolana y la Policía Nacional Ecuatoriana por sus logros en la lucha contra el narcotráfico internacional.

El Teniente General (Retirado) Carmen Cavezza prestó 33 años de servicio en el Ejercito de EE.UU. con asignaciones extensas en Asia. Sirvió por dos años en Vietnam y comando el Centro de Infantería del Ejercito de EE.UU, ubicado en el Fuerte Benning, Georgia. Ostenta una licenciatura en Ciencias Políticas, otorgada por la Universidad de Citadel, una maestría en

Gobierno, otorgada por la Universidad de Miami, una maestria en Asuntos Internacionales y un doctorado en Ciencias Politicas de la Universidad George Washington. Ha desempenado una variedad de importantes cargos de comando y estado mayor, incluso el de Ejecutivo para el Secretario del Ejercito, en Washington, D. C. Entre sus premios y condecoraciones figuran: la Medalla por Servicio Distinguido (con dos Racimos de Hojas de Roble), la Medalla de Estrella de Plata (con un Racimo de Hojas de Roble), la Legion de Merito (con un Racimo de Hojas de Roble), la Cruz de Aviacion por Servicio Distinguido, la Medalla de Estrella de Bronce con el Dispositivo en "V", y el Corazon Purpureo. El Teniente General Cavezza esta autorizado a usar el Distintivo del Soldado de Infanteria, el Distintivo de Paracaidista Maestro, la Insignia de Comandos y el Distintivo de Identificación del Estado, Mayor General del Ejercito. En 1991, acepto el cargo de Administrador de la Ciudad, en el Gobierno Consolidado de Columbus, Georgia.

El **Dr. Larry Clayton** es actualmente Decano, Interino de la Facultad de Historia de la Universidad de Alabama en Tuscaloosa. Recibio el grado de Bachiller en Artes en la Universidad Duke y la maestria y doctorado en la Universidad Tulane. El Dr. Clayton presto servicio en la Marina de EE.UU. de 1964 a 1966. Ha escrito numerosos articulos y libros, entre ellos The Bolivarian Nations: A History of Modern Latin America (Las naciones bolivarianas: Historia, de Latinoamerica moderna); y mas recientemente, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle (Peru y Estados Unidos: El condor y el aguila). Actualmente esta escribiendo BARTHOLOMEW: A Biography of Bartolome de las Casas (BARTOLOME: Una biografia de Bartolome de las Casas).

El **Dr. Michael L. Conniff** dirige el Programa de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Caribenos de la Universidad del Sur de la Florida en Tampa, donde es tambien profesor en la Facultad de Historia. Anteriormente dicto clases en la Universidad de Auburn y en la Universidad de Nuevo Mexico. El Dr. Conniff es especialista, en la historia moderna de las regiones de Centroamerica, Brasil y el Caribe, donde ha vivido por muchos anos. Entre sus libros se cuentan Africans in the Americas (Africanos en las Americas), Black Labor on a White Canal (Trabajadores negros en un canal blanco), Modern Brasil (Brasil Moderno), Panama and the United States (Panama y los Estados Unidos), Urban Politics in Brazil (Las politicas urbanas en Brasil), A History of Modern Latin America (Historia de Latinoamerica moderna), y Populism in Latin America (El populismo en Latinoamerica). Sirvio como voluntario en el Cuerpo de Paz en Ecuador, se desempeno como profesor Fulbright en Panama y Brasil, y habla espanol y portugues. Anualmente dicta muchas charlas en universidades y conferencias en todo el continente americano.

El **Dr. James Corum** es profesor de estrategia en la Escuela de Estudios Avanzados del Poderio Aereo en la Base Aerea Maxwell. Es autor de cuatro libros sobre el poderio aereo en naciones en vias de desarollo y es especialista en la Guerra del Chaco y la Guerra Civil de Espana. Dicto charlas en la Escuela de las Americas en dos ocasiones. Ademas, es teniente coronel en la Reserva del Ejercito de EE.UU.

El **Coronel Richard D. Downie**, Ejercito de EE.UU., nacio en Nueva York y recibio su

nombramiento de oficial en 1976. Luego de graduarse de la Academia Militar de Estados Unidos (USMA) en West Point, presto servicio en la Infanteria y subsiguentemente fue calificado como Oficial de Area Extranjera para America Latina. Asistio a la Escuela de Paracaidismo, a los Cursos Basico y Avanzado para Oficiales de Infanteria, a la Escuela de Comandos, al Curso de Lanceros (Comando Internaciona en Colombia), al Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor General del Ejercito de EE.UU., al Curso de Estrategia del Ministerio de Defensa y a la Escuela de Guerra del Ejercito de EE.UU. Ostenta una licenciatura en Ciencias, otorgada j por la Universidad del Sur de California; y fue Academico del Ejercito en el Programa Seminario XXI del Instituto de Tecnologia de Massachusetts. El Coronel Downie asumio el cargo de Director del Instituto, de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica el 17 de enero del 200 1. Ha prestado servicio en varias posiciones de comando y estado mayor en unidades de infanteria mecanizada, infanteria ligera e infanteria aerotransportada. El Coronel Downie es autor del libro *Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador and the Drug War* (*Aprendiendo de los Conflictos: Las Fuerzas Militares de EE. UU. en Vietnam, El Salvador y la Guerra Antidrogas*), Imprenta Greenwood, 1998, y de varios articulos, incluso "Low Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Policy- Old Wine in a New Bottle?" (Doctrina y Politicas Relativas al Conflicto de Baja Intensidad: ?Vino Añejo en Botella Nueva?, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (*Estudios sobre Conflicto y Terrorismo*) (Tomo 15, Num. 1, enero a marzo, 1992, pags. 53-67), *Military Review*. Entre sus premios y condecoraciones figuran: la Medalla por Servicio Meritorio del Ministerio de Defensa, la Medalla por Servicio Meritorio, la Medalla de Encomio de los Servicios Conjuntos, la Medalla de Encomio del Ejercito, la Medalla del Ejercito por Logros Alcanzados, la Medalla de Defensa Nacional, la Medalla de Servicio Expedicionario del Ejercito, la Cinta por Servicio en el Ejercito, la Cinta por Servicio en Ultramar, la Medalla de la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, la Orden de Merito Academic (Colombia), la Medalla de la OTAN por Servicio en Bosnia y la Antigua Yugoslavia y la Medalla por Servicio Humanitario.

El Dr. Juan Del Aguila es profesor en la Facultad de Ciencias Politicas Latinoamericanas en la Universidad Emory, Centro Carter en Atlanta. Nacido en Cuba, es experto en la region caribena para la Universidad Emory. Es autor de dos libros y ha escrito sobre temas de seguridad en el Caribe. El Dr. Del Aguila es conocido en los circulos de Ciencias Politicas como una de las autoridades mas notables en asuntos politicos de Cuba.

El Dr. Joseph Fahey obtuvo su licenciatura en Filosofia y su maestria en Teologia en el Seminario Maryknoll. Ostenta un doctorado en Religion y Etica Social de la Universidad de Nueva York. Es autor y editor de las siguientes obras: La Paz, la Guerra y la Conciencia Cristiana; Irenologia: El Estudio de la Paz; La Naturaleza Humana y la Paz Mundial de Reinhold Niebuhr; Un Lector de Paz: Lecturas Esenciales sobre la Guerra, la Justicia, la No Violencia y el Orden Mundial conjuntamente con numerosos articulos, ensayos y revisiones. Es miembro de la Junta de Asesores de la Revista Paz: Una Publicacion Transnacional Trimestral. El Dr. Fahey es Profesor de Estudios Religiosos en la Universidad Manhattan y es co-fundador y antiguo director de la Facultad de Estudios de Paz (Licenciatura) de esta universidad. Tambien ha dictado clases en la Universidad Fordham, en la Universidad Vassar y en la Escuela de Teologia Maryknoll. Fue Academico de Investigaciones Honorario en la Universidad Queens, en Belfast, y erudito interno en la Universidad de Nueva York. Ha prestado servicio en los Consejos Nacionales de la

Hermandad de Reconciliacion, la Asociacion de Estudios de Paz y el Consorcio de Investigacion, Educacion y Desarrollo de Materias de Paz.

El Capitan de la Marina Jose Gonzales nacio en Lima, Peru, en 1958. Egreso de la Academia Naval de EE.UU. en 1979 con una licenciatura en Arquitectura Naval, y ostenta grados universitarios avanzados de la Universidad Harvard y el Instituto de Tecnologia de Massachusetts (MIT). Es, ademas, graduado distinguido del Curso de Comando y Estado, Mayor que ofrece la Escuela de Guerra Naval en Callao, Peru, y orador y miembro de la Junta del Centro de Desarrollo Empresarial de la Universidad del Pacifico, en Lima, Peru. El Capitan Gonzales ha prestado servicio a bordo de embarcaciones de superficie, tanto en Estados Unidos como en Perd. Tras prestar servicio durante cuatro aflos en la Oficina del Comandante General, situada en Lima, tanto en calidad de Subsecretario como de Oficial de Planes, Programas y Presupuesto, en enero del 2000 se traslado a Norfolk para fungir de Oficial de Enlace en CINCLANTFL T N-5 por un periodo de dos anos. Tambien es Profesor Adjunto de Asuntos Latinoamericanos en la Escuela de Estado Mayor de Fuerzas Conjuntas, ubicada en Norfolk, habiendo participado activamente en cursos y ejercicios relacionados con las Ilairnadas Otras Operaciones Militares (MOOTW A). Entre los premios personales del Capitan Gonzales figuran la Cruz Naval Peruana, el Premio por Servicio Maritimo Meritorio y varios premios de unidades y servicio.

El Dr. Donald Harrington obtuvo sus titulos universitarios en la Universidad Estatal Westfield (licenciatura en educacion en 1963) y en la Universidad de Connecticut (maestria en artes en 1966 y doctorado en historia en 1970). Tras impartir instruccion en la Universidad Waynesburg, Pensilvania, de 1970 a 1976, ingreso al Servicio Exterior, en encro de 1976, y presto servicio en Santo Domingo, Republica Dominicana (1976-78). Luego desempeno los siguientes cargos: Funcionario de Asuntos Econ6micos en Bonn, Repfibrica Federal Alemana (1979-81); Funcionario, de Asuntos Politicos en Santiago de Chile (1981-85); Oficial Encargado de los Asuntos de Argentina en el Departamento de Estado (1985-87); Consul para Asuntos Politicos, Ayudante del Funcionario Principal y Funcionario Principal Interino durante la operacion Escudo del Desierto en Sao Paulo, Brasil (1987-9 1); estudiante de la Escuela Nacional de Guerra en Fuerte McNair, Washington, D.C. (1991-92); Asesor Politico y Ayudante Interino de Mision y Responsabilidad en San Jose, Costa Rica (1992-95); Asesor Politico y Jefe Auxiliar de Mision en la Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala (1995-98); y Asesor Politico en Brasilia, Brasil (1998-99). Fue nombrado Decano de Asuntos Academicos e Internacionales en el histituto de Cooperacion para la Seguridad Hemisferica (WINNSEC) a principios de julio del 2001. Habla espanol y portugues.

El Dr. Alex Hybel es oriundo de Argentina, obtuvo su doctorado en la Universidad Stanford, y actualmente es el Profesor Susan Eckert Lynch del Gobierno en la Universidad de Connecticut. Es autor del libro How Leaders Reason: U.S. Intervention in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America (Como, razonan los lideres: La intervencion de EE.UU. en la Cuenca del Caribe y America Latina), y Made by the U.S.: The International System (Hecho por EE.UU.: El sistema internacional), a publicarse el proximo ano por St. Martin's Press. Recientemente realizo un viaje a Cuba para estudiar la preparacion de ese pais para la democracia.

El General de Brigada Galen B. Jackman fue nombrado oficial en el Centro de Preparacion de Oficiales de la Reserva (ROTC) de la Universidad de Nebraska en 1973. Ha desempeinado posiciones de mando, de oficial subalterno en la 82a. Division Aerotransportada y la 25a. Division de Infanteria. El General de Brigada Jackman ha comandado al 1er. Batallon, 14o. de Infanteria, 25a. Division de Infanteria, a la 2da. Brigada de la 7a. Division de Infanteria y a la Brigada de Adiestramiento de Comandos, situada en Fuerte Benning, Georgia. Tambien se ha desempenado como Director de Armas Combinadas y Tactica en la Escuela de Infanteria del Ejercito de Estados Unidos y como J3 Suplente para Adiestramiento y Listezza, Comando de Estados Unidos en el Pacifico, Hawaï. El General de Brigada Jackman desempeno mas recientemente los cargos de Jefe de Estado Mayor y Subcomandante de Division para Apoyo, 10a. Division de Montana (LI). El General de Brigada Jackman ostenta una licenciatura en historia, obtenida en la Universidad de Nebraska, y una maestria en Adquisiciones y Administracion de Contratos, conferida por el Instituto de Tecnologia de Florida. Es recipiente del Distintivo de Comandos, el Distintivo de Paracaidista Maestro, el Distintivo de Asalto Aereo y el Distintivo de Soldado de Infanteria Experto. Sus condecoraciones incluyen: la Medalla por Servicio Superior del Ministerio de Defensa, la Legion de Merito con dos Racimos de Hojas de Roble, la Medalla por Servicio Meritorio del Ministerio de Defensa, la Medalla por Servicio Meritorio con dos Racimos de Hojas de Roble, la Medalla de Encomio del Ejercito con dos Racimos de Hojas de Roble y la Medalla del Ejercito por Logros Alcanzados.

El Dr. Hal Kearsley fungo de Coordinador de Programas de Ciencias Sociales y Decano de la Facultad de Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Estatal Troy en el Fuerte Benning. Obtuvo su maestria en Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad del Sur de California y su doctorado, en Relaciones Internacionales y Ciencias Politicas en la Universidad de Aberdeen, Escocia. El Dr. Kearsley es ex-oficial de la Marina y autor de numerosos libros, entre ellos *Maritime Power in the 21st Century* (El poderio maritimo en el Siglo XXI).

El Teniente General John Le Moyne asumio sus deberes como Jefe Suplente de Estado Mayor para Personal del Ejercito de Estados Unidos en noviembre del 2001. El Teniente General Le Moyne nacio en Ohio, y se alisto en el Ejercito en 1964 para prestar servicio como, Soldado de Fuerzas Especiales. Fue nombrado Oficial de Infanteria en el Centro de Preparacion de Oficiales de la Reserva de la Universidad de Florida, en 1968. La experiencia militar del General Le Moyne abarca todos los niveles de comando y estado mayor. Las unidades comandadas por el incluyen el Centro de Infanteria del Ejercito de Estados Unidos, situado en Fuerte Benning, la 1ra. Brigada, 24a. Division de Infanteria, en Arabia Saudita y Fuerte Stewart, un Batallon de Infanteria en Alemania, y companias de infanteria en Vietnam y Alemania. El General Le Moyne sirvio en combate en Vietnam, Panama e Irak. Antes de su actual asignacion, el General Le Moyne ejercio los cargos de Comandante del Centro de Infanteria del Ejercito de Estados Unidos/Comandante de la Escuela de Infanteria del Ejercito de Estados Unidos y Jefe de Infanteria. Su educacion militar incluye la Universidad Real de Estudios de Defensa, situada en Londres, Inglaterra, la Escuela de Guerra del Ejercito y la Escuela de Estado Mayor del Cuerpo de Infanteria de Marina. Entre las condecoraciones del General Le Moyne figuran: la Medalla por Servicio Distinguido del Ministerio de Defensa, la Medalla por Servicio Distinguido, la Legion de Merito (dos Racimos de Hojas de Roble), la Medalla de Estrella de Bronce (seis

Racimos de Hojas de Roble) con tres condecoraciones por Valor, el Corazon Purpureo, la Medalla por Servicio Meritorio (cuatro Racirnos de Hoj as de Roble) con dos condecoraciones por Valor y el Distintivo de Soldado de Infanteria. El General Le Moyne tambien ostenta el Distintivo de Comandos, el Distintivo de Paracaidista Maestro y el Distintivo de Soldado de Infanteria Experto.

El Sr. Pedro Matta era lider estudiantil en la Escuela de Leyes de la Universidad de Chile, situada en Santiago, para la fecha en que tuvo lugar el golpe de estado que deroco al gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, el 11 de septiembre de 1973, un gobierno electo democraticamente. En mayo de 1975, el Dr. Matta fue arrestado y llevado a dos centros de tortura distintos, donde fue torturado por la DINA, la Policia Secreta de Pinochet. Luego fue confinado por mas de 13 meses. Nunca fue juzgado ante un tribunal ni acusado de cometer delito alguno, ni siquiera un delito menor. Es uno de los sobrevivientes del conocido centro de tortura Villa Grimaldi. El Dr. Matta emigro a Estados Unidos, donde ya ha sido aceptado como prisionero politico y se le ha concedido asilo. Vijo a Nueva York y declaro ante la Comision de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas sobre las violaciones de los derechos humanos ocurridas en Chile, durante las sesiones celebradas por la Comision de julio a agosto de 1976. Regreso a Chile en 1991, luego de haber estado en el exilio quince anos. Despues de su retorno a Chile, ha puesto las destrezas investigativas que adquirio durante su estadia en el exterior al servicio de los derechos humanos, documentando las violaciones de los centros de tortura y defendiendo remembranzas como una forma de enfrentar y sanar las heridas del pasado para preparar un mejor futuro. En septiembre del 2001, el Dr. Matta participo en el XXIII Congreso de la Asociacion de Estudios Latinoamericanos (LASA), que se reunio en Washington, D.C.

El Dr. Frank O. Mora es profesor adjunto y Decano de la Facultad de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad Rhodes, Memphis, TN. Es ademas Becario Investigador de Estudios Latinoamericanos en la Universidad Rhodes. El profesor Mora es autor de numerosos articulos, ponencias y libros publicados en Europa y en Estados Unidos que tratan sobre relaciones civico-militares, democratizacion, relaciones entre EE.UU. y America Latina, seguridad hemisférica y la politica cubana. Aigunas de sus publicaciones son "US Arms Transfer Policy for Latin America: Lifting the Ban on Fighter Aircraft," (La politica de distribucion de armas para Latinoamerica: Eliminacion de la prohibicion de aviones caza), *Airpower Journal* (Revista Poderio Aero); "International Involvement in the Americas: Latin American and Caribbean Engagement with Extra-Hemispheric Actors," (Participacion internacional en las Americas: Compromiso latinoamericano y caribenno con las figuras extra hemisfericas), proximo capitulo en el tomo publicado por la Universidad de Defensa Nacional; "From Fidelismo to Raulismo: Civilian Control of the Military in Cuba" (Del fidelismo al raulismo: Control Civil de las Fuerzas Armadas Cubanas), *Problem o Post-Communism* (Problemas del Postcomunismo); "Readjusting Civilian Control of the Military in Cuba: A Comparative Study of the Effects of Bingshang on Civil-Military Relations in Cuba and China," (Reajuste del control civil de las Fuerzas Armadas Cubanas: Un estudio comparativo, de los efectos de Bingshang en las relaciones civico-militares en Cuba y China), *Armed Forces and Society* (Las fuerzas armadas y la sociedad); y "Raulismo and the Technocrat-Soldier: The

Economic Role of the FAR and its implications for Transition in Cuba," en The Cuban Military and Transition: The Politics of Militail Extrication in Comparative Perspective (Raulismo y el soldado tecnocrata: La funcion economica de la FAR y sus implicaciones en la transicion en Cuba", en Las Fuerzas Armadas Cubanas y la transicion: La politica de retirada militar en la perspectiva comparativa) (editado por Eusebio Mujal Leon). El profesor Mora ha firmado de editor colaborador invitado de una edicion especial sobre Cuba publicada en el numero de noviembre-diciembre del 2001 de Problemas del post comunismo. El profesor Mora es editor colaborador de *Handbook of Latin American Studies* (Libro de estudios latinoamericanos), Biblioteca del Congreso y ha trabajado como asesor para la Fuerza Aerea de EE.UU., el Instituto para Estudios Estrategicos Nacionales (INSS) de la Universidad de Defensa Nacional y la Oficina del Subsecretario Adjunto de Defensa para Asuntos Interamericanos.

El General Carlos Morales Sanmartin egreso como Subteniente de Caballeria Blindada de la Escuela Militar "Eloy Alfaro", situada en Quito, Ecuador, en el año 1970, y ascendio a General de Division en julio del 2001. Asistio a la Escuela de Caballeria del Ejercito de Chile, donde se graduó de Licenciado y Maestro de Equitacion, y presto sus servicios como oficial de Caballeria Blindada en varias Unidades del Ejercito Ecuatoriano. Es graduado de la Escuela de Perfeccionamiento de Oficiales del Ejercito de la Republica Federativa del Brasil y de la Escuela Interamericana de Defensa en Washington, Estados Unidos, donde asistio al Curso de "Defensa Continental". Durante su carrera militar ha desempenado varios cargos, incluso asignaciones como asesor de la Escuela Interamericana de Defensa, asesor militar permanente ante la Organizacion de Estados Americanos, y Director del Estado Mayor de la Junta Interamericana de Defensa con sede en Washington. Ademas ejercio las funciones de Director de la Escuela Superior Militar "Eloy Alfaro", Director de Movilizacion del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas del Ecuador, Secretario del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional "COSENA" y Director de Operaciones de la Fuerza Terrestre. Actualmente se desempena como Inspector General y Jefe del Estado Mayor Planificador de la Fuerza Terrestre. Entre sus premios y condecoraciones figuran: la "Estrella Abdon Calderon" y la Condecoracion "Guerrillero Jose Miguel Lanza" en el Grado de "Caballero", conferida por el Gobierno Nacional de la Republica de Bolivia.

El Coronel Walter Navarro firmo de Subcomandante de la Escuela de las Americas del Ejercito de EE.UU. desde diciembre de 1994 hasta diciembre de 1996. En 1975, se unio a las filas de las Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica de Costa Rica como recluta, fue ascendiendo en el escalafon de mando hasta llegar al rango de coronel en 1991. El Cnel. Navarro se ha desempenado como Director de Personal y Director del Departamento de Seguridad publica. Actualmente es Director de las Fuerzas de Seguridad. El Coronel Navarro ha recibido numerosos honores como testimonio a su meritaria y fiel carrera como servidor publico. Actualmente es Director de la Guardia Civil de Costa Rica.

El Dr. James Ondracek es actualmente Director del Instituto de Asuntos Internacionales y profesor asociado de Administracion de Empresas en la Universidad Estatal Minot en Minot, Dakota del Norte. En 1994, Jim obtuvo un doctorado de la Universidad de Carolina del Sur en Administracion Estrategica (concentracion principal) y administracion internacional (estudios secundarios). Tambien tiene una maestria en Administracion de Empresas de la Universidad

Estatal de California en Fresno y una licenciatura en ciencias en microbiología de la Universidad de Montana. En los últimos años, el Dr. Ondracek ha escrito más de diez publicaciones académicas y conducido más de quince presentaciones académicas. Las investigaciones del Dr. Ondracek incluyen el desarrollo económico, la capacidad empresarial, empresas internacionales y administración estratégica. La mayor parte de sus esfuerzos está orientado hacia el adelanto económico de Dakota del Norte, particularmente mediante la integración de la economía estatal y regional con la mundial. Sin embargo, sus estudios investigadores tienen un enfoque internacional. El Dr. Ondracek ha viajado, estudiado y trabajado en más de 30 países alrededor del mundo. Los asuntos de desarrollo latinoamericano son de interés particular para él. Ha gestionado la creación de varias becas, incluyendo dos del Programa de Empresas y Educación Internacional del Ministerio de Educación de EE.UU., Sección VI-B. En la actualidad funge de Director del Programa de Becas y Director del Instituto de Empresas Internacionales (IFIB) en la Universidad Estatal Minot. Bajo su liderazgo el IFIB se ha convertido en un miembro respetable de la comunidad proveedora de servicios económicos de Dakota del Norte.

El **Honorable Roger Pardo-Maurer** es Subsecretario Adjunto del Ministerio de Defensa para Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental, el cargo político de más alto rango en el Ministerio de Defensa responsable de los asuntos del hemisferio. Antes de unirse al Ministerio de Defensa, el Sr. Pardo-Maurer era presidente de la firma *Emerging Market Access (Acceso a los Nuevos Mercados)*, una firma consultora con sede en Washington, D.C. También era un socio administrativo de la firma Access Management (*Administración de Acceso*), una firma asesora de asuntos comerciales y de inversiones con sede en Washington, D.C. y Ciudad de México. Se ha desempeñado como un especialista en asuntos latinoamericanos e hispanoamericanos en American Enterprise Institute (AEI) (Instituto de Empresas Americanas) y en el Centro de Estudios Estratégicos e Internacionales (CSIS). Entre 1986 y 1989 fue jefe de Estado Mayor del Representante de la Resistencia Nicaragüense en Washington D.C. En este cargo participó activamente en el proceso que culminó en el cese de fuego, y en las elecciones en Nicaragua. El Sr. Pardo-Maurer nació en Connecticut en 1963 y se crió en Costa Rica. Escribió sobre América Latina inclusive en libros y artículos sobre una variedad de temas económicos, políticos, sociales y militares. Obtuvo, una licenciatura en historia en la Universidad de Yale y postgrado en economía para el desarrollo en Kings College en la Universidad de Cambridge. El Sr. Pardo-Maurer es reservista, y actualmente presta servicio en el 20º Grupo de Fuerzas Especiales (aerotransportadas).

El **Dr. Jose Paz** desempeña dos cargos como miembro de la facultad en la Universidad de San Salvador, Buenos Aires, Argentina y como profesor de Seguridad Nacional en el Ministerio de Defensa de Argentina. Recientemente fue orador invitado en la Conferencia de WHINSEC para visitantes distinguidos de Argentina sobre el tema de "Terrorismo y su Ambiente". El Dr. Paz ha publicado y disertado en varios países en una variedad de temas de seguridad regional y nacional. Actualmente ha sido seleccionado para ocupar la posición de académico (Fellow) en WHINSEC en donde sus deberes incluirán investigación, disertaciones y charlas públicas sobre asuntos relativos a la defensa hemisférica.

El Dr. Russ Ramsey es el academico norteamericano regular mas antiguo que mantiene contacto cercano con las fuerzas armadas y la policia de America Latina. Autor *of Guardians of the Other Americas: Essays on the Military Forces of Latin America* (*Guardianes de las Otras Américas: estudios sobre las fuerzas militares latinoamericanas*) (1997), *Strategic Reading on Latin America, 3 Edicion* (2001) (*Lecturas Estrategicas sobre America Latina, 3 Edicion*), su trabajo ha sido publicado en *Latin American Research Review*, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, *Journal of Interamerican Studies*, *Parameters*, *Military Review*, y *Naval War College Review*. Su libro *Soldados v Guerrilleros* (Bogota, 2000) es la historia regular de la violencia colombiana. Exmiembro de la facultad de la Universidad de Florida y de la Escuela de las Americas del Ejercito de EE.UU., el doctor Ramsey actualmente es profesor visitante de estudios latinoamericanos en WHINSEC de la Universidad Estatal Troy en Fuerte Benning. Estuvo al mando, de una compaffia de Infanteria Aerotransportada en Vietnam y fue oficial encargado de asuntos latinoamericanos en la Oficina del Estado Mayor Conjunto, J5, durante la critica era de los conflictos centroamericanos.

El Dr. Steven Rozman actualmente es Decano de la Division de Ciencias Sociales en la Universidad Tougaloo, en Tougaloo, Mississippi. El Dr. Rozman se graduó de la Universidad de Minnesota con una licenciatura en Ciencias Políticas, con subespecialización en español, obtuvo su maestría en Estudios Latinoamericanos y Ciencias Políticas y doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de la Florida. El Dr. Rozman tiene vasta experiencia en programas de asesoramiento y capacitación a través de toda América Latina y tiene numerosos escritos sobre América Latina. Desde 1994, el Dr. Rozman funge de Presidente de los Socios de Mississippi para las Américas. Recientemente llevó a cabo un estudio sobre Vietnam y Cuba en dichos países.

El General Rosso Jose Serrano Cadena fmgio de Jefe de la Policía Nacional Colombiana hasta hace poco. Es graduado de la Universidad La Gran Colombia, donde estudió Leyes y Ciencias Políticas. El General Serrano fue responsable de la formación de una fuerza policial más humanitaria en Colombia, la cual la revista TIME describió como notable por su bajo nivel de crimen, corrupción y violación de los derechos humanos. El General Serrano ha sido reconocido en muchos frentes como, un héroe en la lucha internacional contra las drogas.

El Dr. Glaucio Soares obtuvo su grado de licenciatura en Leyes en la Universidad Cândido Mendes en Río de Janeiro, Brasil, una maestría en Leyes en la Universidad de Tulane y un doctorado en sociología en la Universidad de Washington en St. Louis. Es el exdirector del Instituto para Ciencias Sociales en América Latina, ha enseñado y ha hecho trabajos de investigación en UCLA; UC-Berkeley, Universidad de Cornell; MIT; Universidad de Essex (Inglaterra); el Colegio de México; UNAM; Universidad Católica de Chile; Universidad de Chile; Universidad de Brasilia; IUPERJ y la Universidad de la Florida. Ha publicado más de media docena de libros, el más reciente fue publicado en octubre del 2001, *Una Democracia Interrumpida* (Río de Janeiro: FGV). Cuatro de los libros trataban sobre el régimen militar de Brasil, 1964-1985, e incluyen entrevistas con diferentes oficiales, especialmente en el área de seguridad. Ha publicado alrededor de 150 artículos en revistas académicas en 15 países

diferentes. Actualmente esta haciendo un trabajo de investigacion sobre la prevencion de la violencia letal: accidentes, homicidios y suicidios. Tambien fue asesor en asuntos criminales para el gobernador del Distrito Federal de Brasil, 1995-1998. Actualmente es el Presidente de la Asociacion de Ciencias Politicas de Brasil.

"United States Security Assistance Influence in Latin America- the Unheralded Treasure"

Civil Society and Security Issues for the 21st Century Conference

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

November 28 – 30, 2001

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Russell W. Ramsey, Ph.D., D. Min.

Troy State University, Visiting Professor to WHINSEC

In early 1940, the U.S. Army posted twenty officers in the Latin American republics in the capacity of Military Attaché or Senior Military Advisor to the host nation's army, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps similarly fielded a smaller network. The Army officers so assigned came here to this building at Fort Benning for a conference in November of that year, just sixty-one years ago this week, to give their new Latin American counterparts a tour of the U.S. Army Infantry Center. U.S. Navy officers conducted comparable visits to port facilities in Florida and Virginia.

The impetus to signing the executive agreements resulting in these relationships was the pressure applied by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt about possible German incursions into the Western Hemisphere through previously existing security assistance relationships with German officers. Churchill also exaggerated the probability that Adolph Hitler might order an invasion from Africa across the Atlantic to the hump of Brazil. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Director J. Edgar Hoover pointed out the very real threats of German U-boats gaining intelligence information with which to sink Allied ships in the Atlantic after leaving Latin American ports, and inserting clandestine spy operatives in several Latin American countries. Furthermore, Hoover demonstrated, the Colombian SCADTA Airline employed pilots who were German Luftwaffe reservists and might later bomb the Panama Canal.

By 1945, at the successful conclusion of World War II, the U.S.- Latin American military advisory structure set up in 1940 had far exceeded its value in cost, many times over. Brazil sent a huge Expeditionary Force which fought well with U.S. IXth Army in Italy, Mexico sent an Air Force Squadron to fight with U.S. 20th Air Force against Japan in the Philippines, Ecuador placed troops to guard radar sites on the strategic Galapagos Islands, coastal navies performed efficient anti-U-boat screening, Colombia took control of SCADTA and the German pilots, and several countries worked closely with the U.S. armed forces and the F.B.I to arrest and dismantle the Nazi German spy apparatus in their midst.

From 1946 until 1950, two unfortunate U.S. policies drove the relationship between the Pentagon and its Latin American allies. One was the disappointing decision by the Harry S. Truman administration not to invest heavily in Latin America at the same time that billions of dollars were invested in Europe and Asia. This decision was based on the idea that re-starting damaged industrial economies was possible, while placing investment capital in developing nations that lacked basic industrial infrastructure was a waste of money. The other regrettable policy was the rapid turnover of excess war material to host nations willing to accept it. The policy was moderately useful in countries like Colombia and Mexico, where civilian control of the armed forces was well established, but in countries like Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican

Republic the U.S. surplus war material program tended to strengthen anti-democratic elements and position the U.S. military mission in the anti-democracy camp.

To their great credit, the U.S. Army and Navy, and the newly independent Air Force after 1948, decided on their own to foster excellent military-to-military relationships in the Western Hemisphere, creating a useful, democratically-oriented cultural presence, and a constitutionally obedient role model. This fact is an unheralded treasure awaiting discovery by historians, and blurred by Cold War actions that cast shadows on a worthy relationship. Also lost today is the valuable aggregate of lessons the United States was to learn from the sixty-year relationship with their Latin American friends.

The closing of the Berlin Air Corridor in 1948 by the Soviet Union, and the fall of Nationalist China to Mao Tse-tung's communist revolutionary forces, combined to cause a politically retrograde U.S. policy in the Latin American region until 1961. George F. Kennan, the "Mr. 'X'" of the U.S. State Department and author of the anti-communist manifesto article that became the policies of containment and deterrence, wrote a follow-up memorandum equating social disorder in Latin America with communist revolutionary subversion. With high unemployment, high inflation, and depression owing to post-war economic adjustment, several countries were having riots and challenges in favor of a broader and more responsive type of democracy. The U.S. military advisory groups therefore became expressions of a simplistic anti-communist rhetoric which advocated not only the professionalization of the host armed forces- a valid goal in any democracy- but also the use of those armed forces as internal police forces. This second concept was compatible with a medieval governmental philosophy in the Hispanic world called the fuero militar, in which the armed forces operate under a separate law external to the Constitution and have a legitimate and determinative policy making role. Anti-communism as a policy goal became understood in the region, then, as U.S. support for military dictatorship and the practice of coup d'etat in Latin America.

In 1961, President John F. Kennedy articulated the new U.S. policy of counter-insurgency through the military advisory groups in Latin America. His brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, headed the national Counterinsurgency Task Force, largely a response to the new threat of Fidel Castro's stated intention to export communist subversion throughout the region and topple Constitutional governments. The 1961 National Security Act also partially unified the U.S. armed forces more strongly than the original 1948 Unification Act had done, and all security assistance was placed under State Department oversight by the Security Assistance Act of 1961. The U.S. military advisory groups were directed to support a counterinsurgency doctrine that respected democracy and human rights, and whose final political goal was stable democracy, not military dictatorship. Yet by 1975, when the U.S. supported non-communist government in South Vietnam had collapsed under North Vietnam's huge and renewed military assault, the U.S. counterinsurgency concept was generally held in disrepute. This misunderstanding is sad, for U.S. military advisors and their State Department colleagues had explained for years that they were not advocating the French Algerian counterinsurgency policy, which advocated killing suspected communists first and creating stable government later. The U.S. military advisory groups played no determinative role whatsoever in the internal South American wars of the 1970s, but worldwide mis-perception of differing counterinsurgency doctrines has created the opposite impression in much interpretive writing.

By the advent of the 1980s, counterinsurgency plus military professionalism had made the

transition to nation building, and the U.S. military advisory groups articulated this policy as part of a multi-agency team. While methodologically cleaner to explain, the nation building policy became overshadowed in Central America by the civil wars provoked there when Fidel Castro inserted Soviet-trained and Soviet-equipped Cuban military advisors into Nicaragua, and provided guerrilla training for the Salvadoran FMLN. Consequently, once again, the U.S. military advisory structure in Latin America found itself embroiled as an apparent opponent of popular protest, for by the 1980s virtually every Marxist group in the world outside the communist countries had learned the deceptive art of pretending to be fighters for freedom, and denouncing the Pentagon and its agents as right-wing reactionaries. Yet it was, indeed, this same U.S. military advisory structure in Central America which presented the newly elected Bush Administration, in January 1989, with the recommendation that negotiated settlements were the only rational outcomes possible in Central America. There is a great irony here, for radical Marxist elements in the United States continue to trumpet to this very day that the U.S. military advisory structure caused the most violent and brutal aspects of both the South American civil wars in the 1970s, and the Central American civil wars in the 1980s.

The 1990s saw a great change in U.S. policy within Latin America. Anti-communism, as a battle cry, gave way to the furtherance of human rights, democratization, structural adjustment to privatization, and the discovery of new humane roles for the armed forces. With the United States also searching with some doubt for its exact leadership role in the post Cold War world, the U.S. military advisory groups functioning in Latin America were free to do some pragmatic experimentation. Thus, the Latin American armed forces and police found themselves conducting previously unknown discussions about the employment of basic military trainees to plant trees, about the use of security troops to police the troublesome Balkans region, and the reduction in total size of the armed forces concurrent with a modest degree of technological modernization. The military advisory group structure had a vital role in helping Ecuador and Peru resolve the border conflict of 1995, in helping Colombia's neighbors plan for the non-proliferation of the illegal narcotics plague, and in helping several disaster relief efforts in response to hurricanes, fires, and floods.

Today, as we address the 21st century, the U.S. relationship between its military advisory groups in Latin America and the host country armed forces and police is a world model of propitious excellence. These U.S. military advisory groups are small and often have excellent linguistic and cultural credentials; they tend to be trusted friends and advisers of their Latin American counterparts. If Latin America enters the 21st century as the world's least militarized region, measured in percentage of manpower and money devoted to state preparation for conflict, what has the United States gained in exchange for its commitment to maintain this role which has been, admittedly, a source of controversy? First, the United States has gained a region of allies who prohibit the existence of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons by statute. Second, the United States is flanked by the region which renders the greatest per capita support to United Nations peacekeeping forces. Third, the United States lives in a region where a sane, professional conversation may be conducted on any given day about any sort of regional security issue. Thus, whether the topic is tracking down radical Islamic terrorists, separating out the combatants and the victims in the drug war, or planning a relief campaign for earthquake victims, there is a body of professionally educated people in uniform, backed by informed policy-making civilians, who can implement sane bi-lateral or multi-lateral policy in a

democratic manner. This capability is Latin America's unseen gift to the United States. The unheralded gift from the United States to Latin America, perhaps, is the network of U.S. military professionals who have actualized, since 1940, the dreams of George Washington and Simon Bolivar to create a Hemisphere that was both free and stable.

On this 61st Anniversary of the Latin American Military Conference conducted right here in this room, we recognize the good work, which has been done by those who dared to dream here when the world looked very different. Today's challenges are greater, but so are the resources at our disposal, and we have 61 years' experience in a climate of professionalism, trust, and mutual confidence upon which to draw.

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“Influencia de la Asistencia de Seguridad de Estados Unidos
en América Latina-el Tesoro Desconocido”

La Sociedad Civil y los Asuntos de Seguridad para la
Conferencia del Siglo 21

Instituto de Cooperación para la Seguridad Hemisférica

28 al 30 de noviembre del 2001

Fuerte Benning, Georgia 31905

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A principios de 1940, el Ejército de EE.UU. asignó veinte oficiales a las repúblicas latinoamericanas en calidad de Agregado Militar o Asesor Militar de Mayor Jerarquía para el ejército de las naciones anfitrionas, y la Marina y el Cuerpo de Infantería de Marina de EE.UU. también enviaron un grupo similar más reducido. Los oficiales del Ejército que fueron asignados a Latinoamérica visitaron este edificio del Fuerte Benning para una conferencia celebrada aquí en noviembre de ese año, esta semana se cumplían 61 años, para que sus homólogos latinoamericanos conocieran el Centro de Infantería del Ejército de EE.UU. Los oficiales de la Marina de EE.UU. realizaron visitas similares a las instalaciones portuarias de Florida y Virginia.

La premura de firmar los acuerdos ejecutivos que tuvieron por resultado estas relaciones fue la presión que ejerció el Primer Ministro Británico Winston Churchill sobre el Presidente de EE.UU. Franklin D. Roosevelt en relación con posibles incursiones alemanas en el Hemisferio Occidental debido a relaciones de asistencia de seguridad previamente existentes con oficiales alemanes. Churchill también exageró la posibilidad de que Adolfo Hitler pudiera ordenar una invasión desde África a través del Atlántico hasta la saliente geográfica de Brasil. El director del Departamento Federal de Investigación Criminal (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover, señaló las amenazas reales que constituía que submarinos alemanes obtuvieran información de inteligencia con la cual podrían hundir los buques de las fuerzas aliadas en el Atlántico al abandonar éstos los puertos latinoamericanos, y que insertaran operativos clandestinos de espionaje en varios países latinoamericanos. Asimismo, Hoover demostró que la aerolínea colombiana SCADTA empleaba a pilotos que eran reservistas de la fuerza aérea alemana, Luftwaffe, y que más tarde podrían bombardear el Canal de Panamá.

Para 1945, al concluir exitosamente la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la estructura de asesoramiento militar estadounidense-latinoamericana establecida en 1940 había excedido ampliamente su valor monetario. Brasil envió una enorme Fuerza Expedicionaria que combatió bien con el IX Ejército de EE.UU. en Italia; México envió una Escuadrilla de la Fuerza Aérea para combatir con la 20^a. Fuerza Aérea de EE.UU. contra Japón en las Filipinas; Ecuador apostó tropas para proteger los puntos de radares en las estratégicas islas Galápagos; las marinas costeras realizaron esfuerzos eficaces de detección de submarinos alemanes; Colombia tomó el control de la aerolínea SCADTA y de los pilotos alemanes; y varios países trabajaron estrechamente con las fuerzas armadas estadounidenses y con el FBI para arrestar y desmantelar el aparato de espionaje nazi entre ellos.

Desde 1946 hasta 1950, dos desafortunadas políticas estadounidenses dictaron la relación

entre el Pentágono y sus aliados latinoamericanos. Una fue la decepcionante decisión tomada por el gobierno de Harry S. Truman de no invertir demasiado en América Latina en tanto que se invertían miles de millones de dólares en Europa y en Asia. Esta decisión se basaba en la idea de que reiniciar economías industriales afectadas era posible, mientras que invertir capital en naciones que se encontraban en vías de desarrollo y que carecían de una infraestructura industrial básica era un desperdicio de dinero. La otra política deplorable fue la del traspaso rápido del material de guerra excedente a naciones anfitrionas que estuvieran dispuestas a aceptarlo. La política era moderadamente útil en países como Colombia y México, donde el control civil de las fuerzas armadas estaba bien establecido, pero en países como Cuba, Nicaragua y la República Dominicana, el programa estadounidense de material de guerra excedente tendía a fortalecer a elementos antidemocráticos y a colocar la misión militar estadounidense en una posición antidemocrática.

Para su crédito, el Ejército y la Marina de EE.UU., y la recién independiente Fuerza Aérea después de 1948, decidieron fomentar, por cuenta propia, excelentes relaciones intermilitares en el Hemisferio Occidental, creando una presencia cultural útil, orientada a la democracia, y un modelo que se adhería a la Constitución. Este hecho es un tesoro desconocido que aguarda ser descubierto por los historiadores y que disiparon las acciones de la Guerra Fría que le hacían sombra a una relación ventajosa. También se ha perdido el valioso cúmulo de lecciones que Estados Unidos debió aprender durante los 60 años de relación con sus amigos latinoamericanos.

El cierre del Corredor Aéreo de Berlín, en 1948, por la Unión Soviética y la caída de la China Nacionalista ante las fuerzas revolucionarias comunistas de Mao Tse-tung se combinaron para ocasionar una política estadounidense retrógrada, en el aspecto político, en la región latinoamericana hasta 1961. George F. Kennan, el "Sr. X" del Departamento de Estado de EE.UU. y autor del artículo anticomunista que se convirtió en las políticas de contención y disuasión, redactó un memorándum de seguimiento en el que comparaba el desorden social en América Latina con la subversión revolucionaria comunista. Con el alto índice de desempleo, de inflación y la depresión debida al ajuste económico posterior a la guerra, en varios países estaban estallando motines y presentándose desafíos en favor de una democracia más amplia y respondiente. Los grupos de asesoramiento militar estadounidenses se convirtieron, por consiguiente, en expresiones de una retórica anticomunista simplista que defendía no sólo la profesionalización de las fuerzas armadas de las naciones anfitrionas—una meta válida en cualquier democracia—sino también el empleo de dichas fuerzas armadas como fuerzas policiales internas. Este segundo concepto era compatible con una filosofía gubernamental de la época medieval en el mundo hispánico a la que se le llamaba el "fuero militar" y en la cual las fuerzas militares operan bajo una ley independiente externa a la Constitución, y tienen una función legítima y determinante de formulación de políticas. En la región, el anticomunismo llegó a ser comprendido primero como meta política, y luego, como apoyo estadounidense a la dictadura militar y a la práctica de golpes de estado en América Latina.

En 1961, el Presidente John F. Kennedy expresó claramente la nueva política estadounidense de contrainsurrección a través de los grupos de asesoramiento militar en América Latina. Su hermano, el procurador general Robert F. Kennedy, dirigió la Fuerza de Tarea de Contrainsurrección nacional, que era principalmente una respuesta a la nueva amenaza de la intención expresada por Fidel Castro de exportar la subversión comunista por toda la región y

hacer tambalear a los gobiernos constitucionales. La Ley de Seguridad Nacional de 1961 también unificó parcialmente a las fuerzas armadas estadounidenses con mayor vigor que la ley original, la Ley de Unificación de 1948, y toda la asistencia de seguridad fue colocada bajo la supervisión del Departamento de Estado por la Ley de Asistencia de Seguridad de 1961. Los grupos de asesoramiento militar estadounidenses debían apoyar una doctrina de contrainsurrección que respetaba la democracia y los derechos humanos, y cuya meta política final era una democracia estable, no una dictadura militar. Sin embargo, para 1975, cuando el gobierno no comunista de Vietnam del Sur, que era apoyado por EE.UU., se derrumbó bajo el extenso y renovado asalto militar de Vietnam del Norte, el concepto de contrainsurrección de EE.UU. fue desprestigiado. Este mal entido es doloroso, ya que los asesores militares estadounidenses y sus colegas del Departamento de Estado habían explicado por años que no estaban defendiendo la política de contrainsurrección de la Argelia francesa, que favorecía primero el aniquilamiento de presuntos comunistas y luego la creación de un gobierno estable. Los grupos de asesoramiento militar estadounidenses no desempeñaron ningún papel determinante en las guerras internas sudamericanas de la década de 1970, aunque la equivocada percepción mundial respecto a doctrinas de contrainsurrección conflictivas ha creado la impresión contraria en gran parte de los escritos interpretativos.

Para la llegada de la década de 1980, la contrainsurrección y el profesionalismo militar habían hecho la transición al desarrollo nacional, y los grupos de asesoramiento militar de EE.UU. expresaron claramente esta política como parte de un equipo multiagencial. Aun cuando se podía explicar con mayor facilidad desde el punto de vista metodológico, la política del desarrollo nacional fue ensombrecida en América Central por las guerras civiles provocadas allí cuando Fidel Castro introdujo en Nicaragua a asesores militares cubanos que habían sido adiestrados y equipados en la Unión Soviética y proporcionó adiestramiento en prácticas de guerrilla al FMLN salvadoreño. En consecuencia, una vez más la estructura de asesoramiento militar estadounidense en América Latina se encontró enredada como supuesta opositora a la protesta popular, ya que para la década de 1980 prácticamente cada grupo marxista establecido fuera de los países comunistas había aprendido el engañoso arte de pretender ser un grupo que luchaba por la libertad y de denunciar al Pentágono y a sus agentes como reaccionarios de la derecha. Sin embargo, sin duda alguna, fue esta misma estructura de asesoramiento militar estadounidense en América Central la que le presentó a la recién electa administración de Bush, en enero de 1989, la recomendación de que los acuerdos negociados eran los únicos desenlaces racionales posibles en América Central. Existe aquí una gran ironía, ya que los elementos marxistas radicales en Estados Unidos siguen anunciando hasta el día de hoy que la estructura de asesoramiento militar estadounidense ocasionó los aspectos más violentos y brutales de las guerras civiles de América del Sur en la década de 1970 y de América Central en la década de 1980.

En la década de 1990 se presenció un gran cambio en la política de EE.UU. en América Latina. El anticomunismo, como un clamor de combate, dio paso al fomento de los derechos humanos, a la democratización, a los ajustes estructurales en la privatización y al descubrimiento de nuevos papeles para el personal en las fuerzas armadas. Con Estados Unidos buscando también con cierta duda su papel exacto de liderazgo en la época posterior a la Guerra Fría, los grupos de asesoramiento militar estadounidenses que laboraban en América Latina estaban en libertad para realizar algunos experimentos pragmáticos. En consecuencia, las fuerzas armadas y

policiales de América Latina se encontraron en conversaciones previamente desconocidas sobre el uso de reclutas militares para sembrar árboles, el uso de tropas de seguridad para vigilar la problemática región de los Balcanes y la reducción del tamaño total de las fuerzas armadas a la vez que modernizaban modestamente su tecnología. La estructura del grupo de asesoramiento militar desempeñó un papel vital ayudando a Ecuador y a Perú en la resolución del conflicto fronterizo de 1995, ayudó a los vecinos de Colombia a formular planes para la no proliferación de narcóticos ilegales y prestó ayuda en esfuerzos de socorro en casos de desastre como huracanes, incendios e inundaciones.

Hoy, al enfocarnos en el siglo 21, la relación de EE.UU. entre sus grupos de asesoramiento militar en América Latina y las fuerzas armadas y policiales de los países anfitriones es un modelo mundial de excelencia propicia. Estos grupos de asesoramiento militar son pequeños y a menudo tienen excelentes credenciales lingüísticas y culturales; tienden a ser amigos y asesores confiables de sus homólogos latinoamericanos. Si América Latina inicia el siglo 21 como la región menos militarizada del mundo, evaluada en porcentaje de mano de obra y dinero dedicados a la preparación estatal para conflictos, ¿qué habrá ganado Estados Unidos a cambio por su compromiso de mantener su papel, que ha sido, en realidad, una fuente de controversia? En primer lugar, Estados Unidos ha ganado una región de aliados que prohíbe, por ley, la existencia de armas químicas, nucleares y biológicas. En segundo lugar, Estados Unidos está flanqueado por la región que presta el mayor apoyo per cápita a las fuerzas de mantenimiento de paz de las Naciones Unidas. En tercer lugar, Estados Unidos vive en una región donde se puede celebrar una conversación sana y profesional cualquier día sobre cualquier asunto de seguridad. Por lo tanto, ya sea que el asunto sea perseguir a terroristas islámicos radicales, separar a los combatientes y a las víctimas en la guerra contra las drogas, o planear una campaña de socorro para las víctimas de un terremoto, existe una fuerza educada a nivel profesional en uniforme, respaldada por personal civil informado que se encarga de la formulación de políticas, que puede implementar políticas bilaterales o multilaterales sanas en una forma democrática. Esta capacidad es un regalo tácito latinoamericano para Estados Unidos. El regalo que hace Estados Unidos a América Latina es, quizás, la red de militares profesionales estadounidenses que han actualizado, desde 1940, los sueños de George Washington y Simón Bolívar de crear un Hemisferio libre y estable.

En este 61º. aniversario de la Conferencia Militar Latinoamericana, reconocemos aquí, en esta sala, la buena labor que han realizado aquellos que se atrevieron a soñar aquí cuando el mundo era muy diferente. Los desafíos de hoy son mayores, pero también lo son los recursos que tenemos a nuestra disposición, y tenemos 61 años de experiencia en un clima de profesionalismo, confianza y seguridad mutua que podemos aprovechar.

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Problem: The need for improved civilian-military relations in Latin America is obvious. Like many, I lamented the obvious during 24 years in the Foreign Service until the spring of 1997 in Guatemala when I had a chance to be a small part of the solution. Soon after the peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict were signed in December 1996, the U.S. Embassy realized we had an opening to use the \$250,000 earmarked for International Military Education and Training (IMET) as long as we were careful to choose educational courses from the E-IMET catalog.

Program: We chose a mix of courses that would achieve our goal of improving civilian-military relations in Guatemala and be affordable within our limited budget. For participants, we asked the General Staff of the Guatemalan Army to designate 21 majors to attend the series of in-country courses. Meanwhile, I interviewed dozens of candidates offered by civilian NGOs, human rights groups, think tanks, the government and major political parties. We convinced the URNG, the recently legalized guerrilla coalition, to send a participant, as well as 20 others drawn from the organizations mentioned above. While we were able to insist that the civilian participants attend all four courses, the military sent a different group of 21 for each course.

The courses included: a two-week seminar in civilian-relations, offered in September, focused on human rights, rule of law, civilian authority over the military and civilian-military relations; the second was a three-week seminar in November on resource management, including how to do a military budget; the third in March was on Operational Law and Human Rights; the fourth in May sent ten educators ranging from professors to deans to rectors from six civilian universities and the military academy to Monterey for a week in a "teach the teachers" program; and the fifth was a follow-on in May in which half the class visited a JAG unit in Washington and half went to SOUTHCOM in Panama for a hands-on course in operational law. Realizing in May that a little money was left over, we arranged a repeat of the civilian-military relations course for 60 students and cadets from six civilian universities and the military academy.

Successes included breaking down barriers between civilian and military participants, the full incorporation of the URNG participant, the inclusion of a colonel who was the head of the Guatemalan JAG and who intended to use what he learned to re-organize his JAG units and the selection, two years later, of one participant as the first civilian Political Adviser to the Minister of Defense, as well as the continuing interest and activity of several of the participants in civilian-military issues to the present time. Another success I only recently learned about was a request from the Guatemalan Army to conduct a similar series of courses this fiscal year.

Lessons Learned: Among the lessons learned are that: gains are likely to be modest in tackling this difficult problem and expectations should be equally limited, although there may be more willingness to engage than we think; participants should be strongly encouraged to forge links with others engaged in similar issues throughout the hemisphere; the key to the future probably lies in getting such a program into the universities and military academies; to seriously involve

participants career outlets must be encouraged; and all these will probably require U.S. involvement at least as an initial catalyst.

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Noviembre, 2001
Primera Conferencia Hemisférica
LA NECESIDAD DE MEJORES RELACIONES
ENTRE LOS
CIVILES Y MILITARES EN AMÉRICA LATINA

EL PROBLEMA: Es una verdad incontrovertible que hay una necesidad imperiosa de que mejoren las relaciones entre civiles y militares en América Latina. Este hecho ha sido obvio por generaciones, como también las razones del problema, entre las que se pueden citar el aislamiento de los militares, el desprecio civil hacia los militares, tanto en el aspecto social como intelectual, entre otras razones. Por supuesto, nada de esto ha impedido que tanto civiles como militares se aprovechen uno del otro cuando resulta conveniente. A pesar de estas circunstancias, sin embargo, la relación no ha sido provechosa.

Igual que muchas otras personas, pasé gran parte de mis 24 años en el Servicio Diplomático en América Latina, lamentando la falta de unas mejores relaciones entre civiles y militares y proclamando que alguien debía hacer algo al respecto. De repente, en la primavera de 1997, tuve oportunidad de ser una pequeña parte de la solución, en lugar de ser uno más de los que se lamentan de lo obvio. Esta oportunidad se presentó en Guatemala, donde las relaciones entre civiles y militares eran peores de lo que era la norma en América Latina, al concluir un conflicto interno que había perdurado por 36 años, con la firma de los acuerdos de paz en diciembre de 1996.

Poco después de firmarse los acuerdos, varios de los que estábamos en la Embajada de Estados Unidos nos percatamos de que teníamos una oportunidad de usar los \$250,000 que se habían destinado para Adiestramiento y Educación Militar Internacional (mejor conocido como IMET en los círculos militares de Estados Unidos), y que por motivo de las sanciones decretadas contra Guatemala por abusos contra los derechos humanos cometidos en el pasado, no se habían usado en los últimos seis años. Aunque no había posibilidad de usar el dinero para entrenamiento militar regular, era posible emplearlo bajo el programa de IMET-ampliado, que es una versión del IMET regular que se enfoca en la educación, en lugar del entrenamiento. Literalmente, hay cientos de cursos que se ofrecen en diversas organizaciones militares de enseñanza en Estados Unidos, y aparecen enumerados con descripciones breves en un catálogo que es un mamotretos parecido en tamaño al famoso catálogo de la Sears.

EL PROGRAMA: Mis colegas y yo miramos ese catálogo varias veces en busca de la debida combinación de cursos que pensábamos serían aceptables para nuestros regentes del congreso y que lograrían nuestras metas de mejorar las relaciones entre civiles y militares en Guatemala y cuyo costo pudiera sufragarse con nuestro limitado presupuesto. Al mismo tiempo, le pedimos al

Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Guatemala que designara a 21 oficiales con el grado de mayor para que asistieran a una serie de cursos que se presentarían en el país. Mientras tanto, yo realicé una serie extensa de entrevistas con los candidatos que habían propuesto las numerosas organizaciones no gubernamentales, los grupos de derechos humanos, el gobierno y los principales partidos políticos. Nuestro golpe maestro fue convencer al URNG, que era la coalición de guerrillas que acababa de ser legalizada, para que presentara un candidato de su facción política. Seleccionamos también a un participante del PAN gobernante, uno del grupo de derechos humanos de la iglesia, uno del gobierno, un diputado, cuatro de grupos formuladores de ideas como el FLACSO, IRIPAZ y otros, mientras que los doce restantes eran de diversas organizaciones no gubernamentales. Algo que pudimos hacer con los civiles pero no con los militares, fue convencerlos de que todos asistieran a los cuatro cursos ofrecidos.

Desafortunadamente, el Estado Mayor General insistió en nombrar un nuevo grupo de 21 para cada curso, aunque su anuencia en participar y relacionarse con un grupo de civiles cuyo punto de vista era totalmente negativo respecto a los militares y los asuntos militares, fue un indicio adicional de una nueva transparencia en la estructura del mando militar guatemalteco.

La voluntad mostrada por ambos bandos para echar a un lado las eternas y profundas sospechas a fin de participar en una serie de cursos de esta naturaleza, fue indicativo del deseo general de dejar atrás los años de conflicto interno y normalizar las relaciones, no obstante la gran desconfianza que había en la sociedad guatemalteca. Estas sospechas estuvieron siempre latentes, sin embargo, y a menudo se manifestaban en formas inesperadas.

El primer curso fue un seminario de dos semanas sobre las relaciones entre civiles y militares, y fue presentado en julio y agosto e incluyó secciones importantes sobre derechos humanos, el régimen de derecho, y la autoridad civil sobre los militares, así como relaciones generales entre civiles y militares. En la primera semana las relaciones fueron algo tensas, pero para la segunda semana, las cosas habían mejorado. En una pequeña recepción a mitad de la segunda semana, varios participantes civiles y militares me informaron que jamás habían dialogado unos con otros y reconocieron que quizás “los otros” no eran tan fieros después de todo. En forma irónica, el que logró mayor éxito en tal sentido fue el participante del URNG, quien pareció encontrar temas de interés mutuo con los militares a comienzos del curso, situación ésta que se repitió en los siguientes cursos.

Se presentaron cursos sucesivos que incluían:

- Administración de recursos (tres semanas en noviembre);
- La ley operacional y los derechos humanos (dos semanas en marzo después de la visita de una semana en febrero por dos oficiales del Cuerpo Jurídico Militar para ayudar a preparar el curso); y
- Una semana en Washington en mayo para la mitad de los participantes del curso a fin de observar las operaciones del Cuerpo Jurídico Militar, mientras que la otra mitad fue al Comando Sur en Panamá para participar activamente en asuntos atinentes a la ley operacional.

- Una semana en Estados Unidos en mayo para diez educadores de las seis universidades civiles y la academia militar, que incluía profesores, decanos y rectores en un programa de capacitación de maestros con miras al establecimiento de cursos para civiles y militares en sus respectivas universidades.

En mayo nos percatamos de que había quedado una pequeña cantidad de dinero, por lo que nos comunicamos con las principales universidades guatemaltecas y la academia militar y organizamos una versión repetida del curso inicial para civiles y militares en noviembre, para 60 estudiantes universitarios y cadetes. (Algo interesante es que esta clase fue diseñada y conducida principalmente por estudiantes de las clases anteriores y se llevó a cabo en la antigua academia militar, que fue un sitio sugerido que casi da al traste con el curso original.)

Desafortunadamente, no hubo dinero el año siguiente para continuar con los cursos. Como resultado, el experimento fue solo un ejemplo de lo que se podría lograr con una labor continua. Un acontecimiento inesperado que demuestra el impacto de este esfuerzo un tanto fallido ocurrió durante mi primera semana aquí en WHINSEC (la primera semana de julio), cuando de repente una voz me saludó desde la puerta de mi oficina. Al levantar la mirada, quedé sorprendido al reconocer a nuestro estudiante más entusiasta de esos cursos (proveniente de uno de los grupos formuladores de ideas), que había venido al Instituto de visita con un general de Guatemala. Al recibir su tarjeta de presentación, fue para mí un grato placer ver que su título era "Asesor Político del Ministro de Defensa." Me informó además, que varios de los otros estudiantes civiles habían continuado trabajando y estudiando en el área civil-militar y que de hecho uno de ellos estaba en Washington esa semana participando en un seminario patrocinado por uno de nuestros competidores.

En pocas palabras, aunque decepcionados de que no se pudiera continuar con los cursos, aún logramos más éxito del que esperábamos, ya que en forma directa ayudamos a preparar a un estudiante para que a la postre llegase a ser asesor civil en lo que de otra manera era una organización netamente militar, y al atizar el interés de varios otros estudiantes. La presencia de un coronel que era el director del Cuerpo Jurídico Militar de Guatemala y quien estaba interesado en el curso y el viaje a Washington, que le permitiría consultar con el Jefe de nuestro Cuerpo Jurídico Militar, como parte de su labor de revisar la forma como operaban sus unidades. Otro éxito del que me enteré recientemente es que el Ejército de Guatemala se ha puesto en contacto con el grupo que enseñó los cursos en Guatemala en 1997 y 1998 para que presente una serie similar de cursos este año fiscal.

LECCIONES APRENDIDAS: Del experimento también salieron algunas lecciones que conviene considerar en cualesquiera labor futura similar. De hecho, aquí en WHINSEC tenemos presente esas lecciones al cumplir nuestra misión de educar y adiestrar a militares, policías y civiles.

- Es posible que los logros sean modestos al hacer frente a este problema tan difícil. Aunque fuimos afortunados en que uno de nuestros estudiantes lograra ocupar un puesto de asesor del Ministro de Defensa, él es sólo una voz civil en lo que es una organización plenamente militar. En forma similar, aunque algunos de los estudiantes han continuado

- estudiando y trabajando en el ámbito de las relaciones civiles y militares, aparentemente lo han hecho mayormente bajo los auspicios continuos del Gobierno de Estados Unidos. Lo mismo es cierto respecto a las buenas noticias de que el Ejército quiere que continúe esta situación, en que instituciones del Gobierno de Estados Unidos imparten la instrucción y por lo menos sufragan parte de los costos.
- Un área que se debe promover vigorosamente y que fue desarrollada mediante esfuerzo propio por el participante que fue nombrado asesor civil, es la de enlazar a las personas que están interesadas e involucradas en asuntos civiles y militares en todo el hemisferio, tanto para fines de información como para establecer una red de contactos que se apoyen mutuamente.
- Aun las sospechas más arraigadas se pueden superar, ya que el deseo de establecer unas mejores relaciones quizá sea mayor de lo que imaginamos. Si se puede lograr esto tras 36 años de conflicto interno en Guatemala, no hay duda de que se puede lograr en cualquier otra parte.
- En mi opinión, la clave del éxito en el futuro yace en la instauración de un programa permanente en los niveles de universidad y academia militar. En otras palabras, esto debe comenzar con los jóvenes.
- Para atraer a los estudiantes más prometedores, se les debe ofrecer un trabajo provechoso en el futuro, tal como asesores de los Ministerios de Defensa, o como académicos laborando en esa área o, como mínimo, como intelectuales colaborando dentro de una red de personas igualmente interesadas. Sin ninguna posibilidad de trabajo, hay poco incentivo para trabajar en este campo.
- Basado en las experiencias en Guatemala y en observaciones y conversaciones sostenidas con ambas partes durante el último cuarto de siglo en ocho países del hemisferio, considero que hay interés en cerrar la brecha entre civiles y militares en América Latina, pero es preciso dar un empujoncito al proceso para ponerlo en marcha. En este caso, igual que en la mayoría de los casos, esto con toda probabilidad corresponderá a Estados Unidos; como gobierno o en instituciones como WHINSEC o en relaciones entre universidades y entre grupos formuladores de ideas. Cualquiera que sea la forma, Estados Unidos es quizá el catalizador indispensable, por lo menos en el futuro previsible.

"NAFTA And the Next Steps"

Professor Joel Cassman
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Since its entry into force in 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement has greatly expanded trade and investment opportunities in the United States, Canada and Mexico. The total volume of trade between the three countries has increased 128 percent, from US\$ 297 billion in 1993 to more than US\$ 676 billion in 2000. Although some of the trade liberalization provisions (for example, services) were phased in over several years and did not take effect immediately, nevertheless most analysts agree that NAFTA has greatly benefited the economies of the three countries.

Mexico, in particular, has greatly expanded and diversified its economy due to NAFTA. Over the past seven years, Mexico's exports to its NAFTA partners have increased 238%. This export-driven growth has contributed more than half to Mexico's real GDP increase, created 2.8 million new jobs, and stimulated a 300 percent increase in the annual average capital inflow.

In the U.S., NAFTA is credited for playing a major role in the longest post-war boom in our history and in the creation of 15 million new jobs. In addition to stimulating economic growth, NAFTA has helped the consumer by lowering costs and diversifying our choices of products.

Impressed by the success of NAFTA and convinced of the long term benefits of open markets and foreign investment, our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere south of Mexico have also been liberalizing their economies, lowering tariffs and reducing non-tariff barriers. In a series of high level Presidential and Ministerial summit meetings beginning in 1994, the countries of the Western Hemisphere have initiated comprehensive negotiations to establish a Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. This process is moving forward through working groups and periodic ministerial meetings. At the most recent Presidential Summit meeting in Quebec held in April 2001, the heads of state of Western Hemisphere countries ratified the work on the FTAA negotiations to date.

The FTAA negotiations are conducted under an agreed structure which ensures broad geographical participation, with a rotation of the chairmanship every eighteen months. The actual day to day work is being carried out in 13 negotiating groups and special committees. The areas of discussion in these negotiating groups include market access, investment, government procurement, agriculture, dispute settlement, intellectual property rights, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, competition policy, electronic commerce and other issues.

In addition, the FTAA negotiations include expert group meetings on a wide range of areas such as Customs-related business facilitation measures, creation of a hemisphere trade and tariff database, facilitation of visa requirements for business travelers, and commercial arbitration/alternative dispute resolution regimes.

There are some thorny issues in the negotiations, although most countries are in general agreement of the broad outlines of the free trade accord. The most difficult negotiations to date have been on intellectual property rights (IPR) issues (which the U.S. wants) and reform of subsidies/anti-dumping/countervailing duties laws (which many Latin American countries want). Somewhat surprisingly, most countries are in agreement on the environmental protection and labor provisions of the FTAA, which were highly contentious during the NAFTA negotiations a decade ago.

The United States has been strongly supportive of the FTAA process since its inception. The FTAA enjoys a broad bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Congress. In September 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee reported out a bill to provide "Trade Promotion Authority" (previously known as "Fast Track Authority") to the President in order to negotiate and sign the FTAA by the target date of December 31, 2004. The bill also contains U.S. congressional input on labor and environmental standards, which track closely with the provisions proposed in the current FTAA negotiations. If approved by the full Congress, this Trade Promotion Authority will give the President the power he needs to complete FTAA negotiations and submit the entire package to the U.S. Congress for ratification. We are confident that the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas will become a reality in 2005, realizing the dream of many to create the world's largest free trade zone.

Latin American Nations and Airpower's Role in the War on Terrorism

Dr. James S. Corum
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The brutal surprise attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 was, in the words of President Bush, "An attack on all civilized nations". The Organization of American States also immediately recognized this fact in a unanimous resolution passed on 13 September. Many of the Latin American nations had citizens killed in the attack on New York. Not since World War II have the nations of the Western Hemisphere witnessed such a clear threat to the security of America and, indeed, their own security.

Today the peace, prosperity, freedom and security of Latin America and Canada are even more closely linked to the security of the United States than any other time since World War II. The enormous and growing volume of trade and investment throughout the hemisphere have linked all of the economies of the region closely to the US economy. If the United States goes into an economic recession then every country in the hemisphere will suffer economic consequences. If America is weakened and insecure then the other democratic nations in the hemisphere are become weaker and more insecure. In short, while it is America's national interest to resolutely wage war on terrorist groups and the states that support them it is also in the direct and immediate national interest of all the democratic nations of Latin America to fully support action against terrorism.

In many respects, the campaign by terrorist groups threatens Latin America even more than the United States. The United States has the largest economy in the world, the most powerful military forces in the world and a very stable democratic tradition. It would take enormous effort and power to undermine the foundations of American strength and prosperity. Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan failed to do it. The Soviet Union tried to defeat the United States in the Cold War and instead ended up a bankrupt third world state. Basically, the United States is in a position to weather the current crisis, although the terror attacks have increased the effect of the economic downturn that began a year ago. However, most Latin American nations have democratic systems and economies far less secure than those of the United States. Any severe downturn of the United States economy or a loss of American resolve that pushes America to disengage from hemisphere affairs and trade would produce serious consequences for the less stable nations of Latin America.

Despite a long history of American disputes with Latin American nations, a few wars, numerous military interventions, disagreement on trade and immigration policies and so on-- all of the democratic nations of the hemisphere today recognize and accept American leadership on fundamental issues of developing democracy, trade and hemisphere security. They do so simply because it is in their national interest. I know that South and Central Americans often find American leadership irritating. Yet I believe that they recognize a basic reality, to paraphrase my distant cousin Winston Churchill, that American leadership is the worst possible system for the hemisphere—except for all the others.

Starting from the position that the United States and Latin America are engaged together in a war against terrorism and that this is a very serious threat to the freedom and stability of our nations, we need to understand that old assumptions, attitudes and policies towards joint cooperation for the security of the Americas have to be reviewed and, in many cases, adjusted and rethought. We have a new security threat that requires some new approaches and new levels of military and political cooperation. Previous attitudes and policies that hindered security cooperation between the United States and Latin America need to be quickly discarded—for the sake of all of our nations.

On the role of Military Aviation

My expertise, which is tied into the subject of my paper, is military aviation in Latin America with a special emphasis on the use of aviation in combating insurgency. Military aviation has a large tactical and operational role in hemisphere security and in the war against terrorism and I intend to look at how the Latin American nations and US can cooperate and work together on the airpower side of the equation. Certainly military aviation cannot be considered outside of a general military/political strategy for the region. However, airpower is a very important part of the security issues at stake and, per my own academic research, I will suggest some tactical and operational recommendations for initiatives and programs for Latin American and American military aviation that can improve the security of the United States and Western hemisphere.

In considering military strategy one must, as Carl von Clausewitz urged, consider the nature of the conflict that we find ourselves in. It is difficult to exactly define the nature of the current conflict. It has elements of a traditional state versus state conflict such as the campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It also has many aspects of an insurgency. Some of my colleagues have termed the terrorist actions by Al Qaeda as “an insurgency against the Western nations”—essentially radical Islam fighting the West, as exemplified by the United States, by any means. Such means include terrorism against the government institutions, armed forces, infrastructure, economies and civilians of the United States and its allies. Terrorist tactics and an ideological mindset that supports it are common features in almost all insurgencies.

If we look on the current conflict as one that has most of the characteristics of an insurgency then we also need to look at the lessons that have been learned about fighting insurgencies and using airpower against insurgents. Professor Wray Johnson, now teaching at the Marine Corps Staff College, and I have been working together for several years writing a comprehensive history of airpower in small wars—essentially a history of how airpower has been used in counterinsurgency. (The book will be published next year by the University Press of Kansas). In our book, Dr. Johnson and I have discovered some valuable lessons about counterinsurgency strategy and airpower that have a direct applicability to the current conflict. That will be the theme of my talk.

The Threat

We should not take the position that since the major sources of terrorism are Middle Eastern and far away that we have little to fear in the Western Hemisphere. Insurgents almost always look to establish alliances with friendly states and with other insurgent groups in order to establish secure bases, gain monetary, logistical and military support, to obtain diplomatic support and to widen the front against the enemy government. To win, insurgents normally need considerable outside support. In the Middle East we have the example of Hizbullah using terrorist tactics against Israel in Lebanon from 1983 to 2000 with the support of Syria, Iran and various groups within Lebanon. During El Salvador's insurgency (1980-1992) considerable support and safe bases were provided by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The various insurrections in Africa, from the 1960s to the 1990s all obtained bases and support from other states. The list goes on and on. One of the unusual features of the insurrections in Colombia and Peru is the lack of significant support from other nations. In these cases the Tupac Amaru in Peru and FARC rebels in Colombia turned to the lucrative international drug trade to finance their insurrections.

Insurgents and terrorists are usually pretty intelligent. If not, they don't last very long in the business. Although the worldview of Al Qaeda and many insurgent groups can be pretty bizarre, such groups commonly develop highly sophisticated strategies, tactics and operational methods. It makes perfect sense for Al Qaeda and allied movements to make common cause with insurgents and radicals in this hemisphere and to open up another major front against the United States close to home in order to divert and dilute American power and will. That terrorist groups from outside this hemisphere will make common cause with groups in this hemisphere has already occurred. On 11 August of this year Colombian police arrested three members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as they returned from a part of the country controlled by the FARC rebels. One of the IRA terrorists was the IRA's representative in Havana.ⁱ I do not believe that senior members of the IRA were in Colombia and Cuba for a vacation.

It makes perfect sense for Al Qaeda, and perhaps other states such as Iraq, to establish an alliance with insurgents and terrorists in the Americas. If the FARC rebels were to take power in Colombia, Al Qaeda and foreign terrorists could establish support and training bases to attack the United States and other targets in the Americas. Even without an outright victory, FARC currently controls a large part of Colombia and has even established itself in portions of Darien province in southern Panama. FARC could easily provide clandestine bases for Mideastern terrorists. In return, Al Qaeda could generously support FARC by providing large quantities of heroin for the international drug trade. Afghanistan, under Taliban control, currently grows approximately 70% of the world's opium crop – a potentially lucrative source of terrorist financing.ⁱⁱ FARC is heavily involved in the drug trade and has standing connections with various drug smugglers and cartels for drug distribution. An alliance between the two groups makes perfect sense. Al Qaeda and Middle Eastern groups have access to huge quantities of heroin and money while FARC has territory and a terrorist support infrastructure in this hemisphere. The democratic American nations ought to assume that such an alliance will take place and that it will likely get clandestine support from Cuba (which has an impressive intelligence network throughout the hemisphere) and from hostile nations outside the

hemisphere. In short, we need to look at the current regional drug interdiction operations not as a distraction or as a law enforcement problem but as a part of the international war on terrorism.

One of the strategies common to virtually every insurgent movement is a campaign to seriously damage and disrupt the opponent's economy. This strategy attacks the will of the civilian population by making life harder, it strikes at the credibility and security of the government and it denies financial and economic resources to the opponent. Campaigns to disrupt the economy were part of all the post World War II insurgencies in Africa, Asia and in the Americas. Electricity and the transportation net were prime targets for rebels in El Salvador during the 1980-92 civil war.ⁱⁱⁱ Today in Colombia, oil production and pipelines remains the primary target of terrorist attacks.^{iv} The attacks on New York on September 11 were certainly aimed at damaging and destabilizing the US economy. Given the very consistent record of insurgents in attacking economic targets it is only sensible to assume that the US will face more attacks against its economic infrastructure.

One can think of few more lucrative American economic targets than the Panama Canal. A terrorist attack that shuts down the Panama Canal for even a few months would cost the US many billions of dollars. The South and Central American nations would also be hard hit by the closure of the Canal. Moreover, shutting the canal would be a serious strategic blow against the US armed forces by making naval movements between the Atlantic and Pacific more difficult. It would also make the shipment of military supplies much more expensive and time consuming. An attack on the Canal would not be a fatal blow to the US, but it would be a serious blow to the prestige of America. Panama, on the other hand, would be economically devastated by the loss of the Canal and the Central American economies would be especially damaged. In short, any prudent strategist must assume a serious threat to the Panama Canal from terrorists. Moreover, since the US withdrew military forces from Panama in 1999, the Canal is much less secure. The Republic of Panama's security force simply does not have the men, training, money or equipment to adequately guard the Canal against a determined attack.^v The fact that the FARC can freely cross the border and operate in the southern regions of Panama is yet another indication of the weak state of Panamanian security.^{vi}

In summary, the terrorist threat to the American nations is a complex one that includes the drug trade (a means of financing insurgency and terrorism), several insurgencies, (providing terrorists bases and support) and the threat of economic disruption (attack on the Panama Canal). The next half of the paper will outline the role that Latin American military aviation can play in answering some of these threats to hemisphere security.

Proposing Some Solutions

I would make it clear that when I talk about using airpower in the war against terrorists I am not talking about developing an "airpower alone" solution or even a purely military solution to terrorist threats. Airpower is just one of the tools, albeit an important one, against insurgents or terrorists. In every case that Wray Johnson and I have examined in our book on airpower in counterinsurgency, military aviation was only truly effective when it was applied as part of a

comprehensive strategy that included full consideration of other military elements as well as a long-term economic and political strategy. Applying military forces without a comprehensive and realistic strategic framework usually results in failure.^{vii} Therefore, what I am proposing now are some means by which airpower might contribute to a larger strategy.

Surveillance and Intelligence

Counterinsurgency is perhaps the most intelligence intensive form of conflict. Government forces normally have a huge superiority in military forces, firepower and resources over any insurgents. Yet, without good intelligence information, the huge superiority of the government forces is almost useless. In counterinsurgency campaigns one of the most important roles of airpower is to provide accurate and timely intelligence. Indeed, this has been one of the primary roles of airpower against insurgents ever since the French Army deployed reconnaissance aircraft against Moroccan rebels in 1913. In the 12-year civil war in El Salvador the ability of the Salvadoran Air Force to cover the country by air made operations especially difficult for the FMLN rebels. Under constant air surveillance, insurgents could only move forces at night and had to hide by day. Supplies and smuggled weapons also had to be moved by night at great inconvenience. When the insurgents assembled forces to attack government forces or infrastructure light observation aircraft could call in artillery and air strikes. Aviation served as a tremendous "force multiplier" for the government. Of course, insurgents were able to learn and adapt to the conditions of constant aerial surveillance, but their ability to operate effectively was greatly constrained.^{viii} In Clausewitzian terms, the ability of one side to freely observe the whole country from the air (at least in daylight) created a great deal of friction for the insurgents and made their operations considerably more difficult.

Aerial surveillance is one of the most important elements of the war on drugs. The problem is that air forces are very expensive propositions for the small nations of Central America and the Caribbean Region. Not only are the aircraft expensive but pilot training and an air force infrastructure costs are high. However, there are several historical examples of small nations effectively mobilizing their civilian general aviation assets, namely private pilots and light aircraft, and using them as an inexpensive force multiplier in counterinsurgency operations.

In 1982, during the height of a civil war, Guatemala created an air force reserve force out of private pilots and light, privately owned, aircraft. Private civilian pilots were given the rank of second lieutenant in the Air Force Reserve and a couple of weeks of military training. Using their own or company aircraft (usually Cessnas, Pipers, Beech and other single or twin engine planes) the approximately 200 Air Force Reserve pilots flew surveillance and reconnaissance missions over areas of rebel activity. The Air Force provided aviation fuel for the operations. The light aircraft pilots also flew many of the routine, non-combat missions of the military such as flying personnel and small cargoes into remote airstrips and sometimes evacuating the sick or wounded. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s until the end of the civil war in 1996, the Air Force Reserve of Guatemala performed a very useful service. At a minimal cost, the Reserve pilots were able to relieve the regular air force personnel of many routine missions so that the regular forces could concentrate on combat operations. The small and fairly slow light planes, such as Cessnas and Pipers, proved to be very effective at conducting low level surveillance of ground

activity and on many occasions provided the army with timely information of guerrilla and bandit activity along main roads.^{ix}

Rhodesia, which faced an insurgency from 1965-1980, and South Africa, which fought an insurgency in Namibia from 1967-1990, both made extensive use of private pilots and civilian aircraft in counterinsurgent operations. The Rhodesians enrolled their private pilots in the Police Reserve and used light aircraft extensively in patrolling the borders and in flying personnel and cargo to small, isolated garrisons. The South Africans established more than a dozen air force reserve squadrons composed of private pilots with more than 500 flight hours and who had access to an aircraft. In both insurgencies, the general aviation pilots were able to relieve the regular air force units of small missions. In both counterinsurgency campaigns light aircraft proved to very effective in spotting movement of guerrillas while patrolling at low level. Once observed from the air, small heliborne infantry units (called ‘fireforces’ – usually 1-2 platoons) were able to react quickly and engage the insurgents. The light aviation patrols, combined with elite, helicopter-borne light infantry reaction forces, proved a very lethal combination. Both the Rhodesians and South Africans were able to identify and intercept insurgent groups in the border areas before they reached their targets in the interior of the country. The interior regions of Rhodesia and Namibia and the economically valuable infrastructure saw very little insurgent activity and suffered little damage during the long wars.

The small air forces of Central America and the Caribbean could significantly increase their aerial surveillance capabilities for a small cost by establishing air force reserve forces on the model of Guatemala in the 1980s. Light aircraft private pilots could be recruited and a subsidy provided for civilian aircraft enrolled in the force. For example, the government could install improved avionics, transponders and GPS receivers in civilian aircraft for a few thousand dollars per plane. Aviation fuel could be provided and pilots receive a daily pay for military missions performed. It would not be at all difficult to enroll private pilots in a reserve force. As a private pilot myself, I know that most pilots would welcome the chance to fly and get paid—or at least receive an aircraft subsidy—for doing something that they enjoy. Light aircraft could conduct surveillance of coastal boat and ship traffic and monitor aircraft activity on the many remote, small airstrips throughout the region. If suspicious activity was noted, naval and police units could be alerted to intercept the boats or planes.

A great part of the traffic in drugs and arms moves through the Caribbean and Central American region by boat and light aircraft.^x The use of such air force reserve units in light aircraft would significantly increase surveillance of coasts and airfields at a small cost. An air force of light aircraft could also assist the police and armed forces by flying personnel and small cargoes into small outposts. A program such as the one I have described might not get the dramatic results of an expensive AWACS plane, but increased surveillance in the region would, at very least, make life much more difficult for drug and arms smugglers who would be forced to operate at night and in bad weather. An air force reserve program, such as I have described, could be set up and operating within weeks. Moreover, it could be done for little cost in aircraft, infrastructure and pilot training.

One of the consistent lessons of counterinsurgency operations is the need to quickly process all information into one intelligence center. Setting up a single center for intelligence processing not only avoids confusion but also makes a rapid reaction to a threat or illegal activity possible. Currently, the US shares information gained from air and sea surveillance with other countries on a bilateral basis but there is no true joint/combined intelligence center for the Caribbean region with representative from all the cooperating states sharing information and acting on it. Before the US pulled all of its forces out of Panama in 1999 the idea of turning Howard Air Force Base into a regional center for counter drug operations was floated. The idea was to turn Howard Air Force base into a true multinational counter drug headquarters. However, this proposal that failed to materialize due to disputes about US basing, rent of property, funding and so on. Now that a serious threat to the hemisphere is recognized we need to again look at turning Howard AFB or Albrook Field into a multinational intelligence and operations center where information about ship and aircraft movements throughout the whole Caribbean region can be analyzed and processed and quickly passed to national police and military forces. There would be no problem with fully respecting the sovereignty or the countries in the region. Armed with timely intelligence, much of it obtained through more intense aerial surveillance, national representatives at the multinational counter drug and counter terrorism center could coordinate the response of their own nation's police and armed forces as necessary.

There is presently some useful cooperation between the nations of Central America in fighting the drug trade. Military and police forces from six Central American nations participated in counter drug exercises in 2000. In 1999 El Salvador Air Force and Guatemalan Air Force aircraft cooperated in forcing a drug smuggler aircraft to land. When the plane was seized it had over 400 pounds of cocaine aboard. Such actions are a start, but truly effective international cooperation is still far away.

Protection of the Panama Canal

As already noted, the Panama Canal is a "soft" target. Simply put, if a determined terrorist group wished to attack the Canal and inflict damage that might close the Canal for months, the Panamanian security forces could not do much to stop it. Given the threat, the US should immediately negotiate with Panama to deploy a light infantry brigade to Panama to bolster the defense of the Canal against terrorist attack. A light infantry brigade, supported by at least one helicopter battalion, would provide ample security for the region's most important single strategic target. To assuage Panamanian sensibilities, the deployment of US troops to Panama need not be on a permanent basis. The deployed brigade could be a National Guard unit to serve on a six-month to one-year rotation, to be replaced by another National Guard brigade for a short tour of duty. National Guard infantry brigades would not need to be trained up for large-scale warfare to effectively conduct a security mission. Protecting the Canal requires only good small unit skills. National Guard units can be quickly deployed as a security force without extensive operational training and can hone their small unit skills while "on the job" defending the Canal.

Supporting Colombia's Counterinsurgency Campaign

The current battle against terrorism ought to remind us that FARC and other insurgent movements in Colombia are a serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. If FARC were to increase its control over Colombian territory or to actually overthrow the government the consequences in the region would be disastrous. The \$1.3 billion US aid program to Colombia approved last year is a good start but considerably more economic and military assistance will be necessary for Colombia to defeat its insurgents.

On the military side, for the last 50 years the most effective and lethal weapons against insurgents have been well-trained infantry units supported by helicopters. From the experience of the British SAS in Malaya and the French paratroops in Algeria in the 1950s to the "hunter" battalions of the Salvadoran Army in the 1980s and 1990s, small helicopter-borne infantry units have been the most effective means of engaging guerrilla forces on the battlefield. Historically speaking, another extremely valuable weapon in counterinsurgency campaigns has been air transport. Transport aircraft enable government forces to maintain a presence in isolated areas and to quickly shift forces from one end of a country to another, as the tactical situation requires. The US effort in training and equipping Colombian counter drug battalions is a good start—but only a start.^{xi} Colombia needs a large military helicopter force, preferably the UH 60 helicopter, which can carry twelve fully loaded soldiers and has the power to operate effectively at Colombia's high altitudes. A long-term plan to fight the Colombian insurgency should consider three-four highly trained infantry brigades mounted on helicopters that can carry the fight deep into rebel territory.

At this time, the Colombian Air Force's (FAC) small transport force is far too small to effectively support outposts by airlift or to supply isolated garrisons and towns deep in rebel-held country.^{xii} Colombia needs a significant expansion of its transport force – and US C-130s would provide the best answer. As the US Air Force Air Mobility Command is currently modifying some of its C-130 fleet, some older model C-130s might become available. The USAF ought to consider providing additional C-130s to Colombia as soon as possible. Supplying helicopters and transport aircraft to Colombia will not win that nation's war by themselves—but troop lift and transport could certainly make a major difference.

The US Role

In a previous era when the hemisphere was threatened, namely during World War II, the US provided arms, aircraft, training and support to allied nations including Mexico and Brazil. The US and Latin Americans cooperated to fight the German U-boat menace in the Caribbean and Atlantic and defeated the Germans mostly through aerial action. The Americans provided over 2000 aircraft under the Lend Lease program to Latin America between 1941 and 1945, many of them used for naval surveillance.^{xiii} Virtually every nation in Latin America cooperated with the US military by providing over flight rights and airfields for American use. Five US Navy anti-sub patrol squadrons were even based in Northern Brazil during the war.^{xiv} Even though the Western Hemisphere was never a major focus of the war effort, the US still provided considerable forces and military aid for the security of the hemisphere. This was the beginning of the US-Latin American security partnership.

Now we are facing a threat to the hemisphere that is considerably more dangerous than the German U-boats. While the US and allied nations will probably do most of the fighting against terrorism far from the Americas, defense of our own backyard is still a high priority that requires a coordinated response by the nations of the Caribbean region in particular. When the hemisphere was threatened before, the United States became the “arsenal of democracy” and provided considerable assistance and training to Latin American forces for hemisphere defense—and it was successful. The United States should again play the role as the arsenal of democracy and generously provide the equipment and training needed for the Latin American countries to participate fully in hemisphere defense. Due to the nature of the conflict and the important role of surveillance, aircraft and air force infrastructure and training ought to have a top priority in the US military aid program- as they did in World War II.

In the war against terrorism Southcom has an important role to play. Southcom’s mission includes coordinating defense efforts and managing military training and assistance programs. Military assistance to Colombia needs to be greatly increased—with UH-60 helicopters and C-130 transports at the top of the equipment list. The other nations in the Caribbean region also need training and assistance, especially in improving their air forces. At present the USAF has committed much of the 6th FID Squadron—a unit that specializes in military training and assistance-- to the Southcom area. A case can certainly be made for additional FID squadrons to be formed in the USAF with Central America and the Caribbean Region and South America each having one committed FID squadron.

Developing joint/combined intelligence centers will require an outlay of funds from the US government. However, any problems in creating an effective multinational intelligence center are more political than technological or financial. The issue of stationing US troops to protect the Panama Canal is also more of a political problem than an operational one. Yet, given the current crisis, I hope that the American nations will understand that intelligence sharing and military cooperation are not threats to national sovereignty but rather in the national interest of allied nations.

Some of the ideas I have proposed, such as helping Central American and Caribbean nations establish air force reserve programs, can be quickly and implemented at relatively low cost. For the last decade, the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the security of the Panama Canal, the war on drugs, and supporting the fight against insurgency in Colombia have all suffered from considerable benign neglect from the viewpoint of Washington. Crises in Europe, Asia, the Mideast, Bosnia and Kosovo have all grabbed the attention of the US government. This has left few resources for Southcom and our own hemisphere. For example, in 1999 the US committed only \$4.3 million in military counterdrug assistance for all of the Central American countries.^{xv} No wonder that Central American airspace and coastal areas are preferred routes for drug traffickers. Yet one can certainly make the case that the war against drugs and the security of Panama Canal, for example, are considerably more important to the US and Western hemisphere nations than creating a multinational government in Bosnia. Some strategic priorities ought to be changed to place a renewed emphasis on the security of the Americas. In any revision of security priorities in the hemisphere, military aviation will be a central player.

“Formando civiles universitarios en los Institutos Superiores de educación militar: El caso Argentina”

Dr. Jose Gabriel Paz
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Abstract

Las instituciones educativas militares de nivel superior de la Argentina, se han lanzado durante la última década a un importante desafío: participar en la enseñanza oficial universitaria y formar civiles y militares a través de carreras de nivel universitario.

Las tres Fuerzas Armadas, mediante sus estructuras orgánicas educativas, -el Instituto de Educación de Ejército (IESE), el Instituto Universitario Naval, y el Instituto Universitario Aeronáutico, respectivamente-, han encaminado sus acciones con el fin de participar activamente en la enseñanza superior universitaria, con la firme convicción en que el conocimiento constituye el factor estratégico fundamental para el desarrollo en el siglo XXI.

Debe advertirse que si bien la incorporación de civiles a algunos de los cursos dictados por dichas Instituciones Militares se venía realizando conforme modalidades impuestas por cada Fuerza desde hacía ya bastante tiempo, es a partir de la década de los 90' cuando se inicia un trascendental cambio y la incorporación al sistema oficial.

Este importante paso, fue dado en forma casi simultánea en las tres Fuerzas Armadas argentinas, y se han constituido en un gran avance en materia de institucionalización de las relaciones cívico-militares.

Llevar adelante el desafío impuesto, ha generado la necesidad de estructurar un profundo cambio, puesto que no es tarea fácil convertir una unidad académica militar en una unidad académica universitaria, sin perder de vista su rol educacional militar.

Para poder cumplir ése objetivo, las instituciones educativas militares han debido incorporarse al sistema educativo nacional argentino, -y con ello al sistema universitario nacional-, ajustándose a sus normas, y por consiguiente, conformando sus exigencias.

El ingreso al sistema universitario nacional ha sido un importante desafío, donde se han debido adecuar aquellos claustros nacidos del interior de la tradición académica de las instituciones militares, a una nueva dinámica educativa en la que se requiere un permanente contacto, articulación y vinculación con el medio externo, componente fundamental en el rol de una estructura universitaria en el mundo actual.

It All Depends on What You Mean by “Security” Peru and the United States Through the Years

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Over the years Peru and the United States have been partners in western hemisphere security. We will briefly overview of the historical evolution of security concerns between Peru and the United States, then look at questions of civil society and security as they interfaced dramatically in the last two decades as the drug trade, domestic terrorism (Shining Path and Tupac Amarus), and—today—international fundamentalist Islamic terrorism all intersect.

Security really began as an important theme between Peru and the U. S. in the period immediately preceding World War II. The threat by Nazi Germany and militant Japan prompted the Franklin Roosevelt administration to increase vigilance and mutual security across the Western Hemisphere. Numerous Pan American Union (predecessor of OAS) conferences in the late 1930s prepared for the eventuality of war. Indeed, the eighth Inter-American conference met in Lima in December 1938 and partially achieved a hemispheric defense agreement.

At work between Peru and the United States, however, were a multitude of factors, including the one that President Oscar Benavides had decidedly pro-Fascist sentiments and admired the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini a great deal. Italian banks in Peru, Japanese immigrants, and German investments all tended to heighten the Roosevelt administration’s determination to hammer out a pro-American defensive alliance.

In the end no defensive alliance emerged, but instead the “Declaration of Lima” whose principal components echo today in the twentieth century. “In somewhat extravagant terms the principles upon which American solidarity was established were enumerated: spiritual unity through republican institutions, unshakable will for peace, sentiments of humanity and tolerance, absolute adherence to international law, equal sovereignty of states, and individual liberty without religious or racial prejudice.”¹

With the election to the presidency of Manual Prado y Ugarteche (1939-1945), a close friend of the United States and democracy, the U. S. could count on friendship from Peru during the war years rather than the coolness of a Benavides. During the Second World War, Peru even interned thousands of its citizens of Japanese descent, mirroring the concerns and acts of the United States.

After WWII, security was focused on the threat of communism during the long period of the Cold War. More often than not the U. S. and Peru cooperated, as U. S. military missions expanded into the region—and into Peru—and fostered a pro-American bias in the military. Yet sometime during and early after the Second War a subtle change occurred in the definition of “security.” It changed the nature of how the U. S. and Peru would view “security” for the next half century. It began under the auspices of the Office of Inter-American Affairs created by Roosevelt during the war and directed by the young scion of oil, Nelson Rockefeller.

In Latin America, a number of *servicios* were established (the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Salud Pública and the Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Producción de Alimentos were two) to promote public health, agriculture, education and in other areas that we

¹ Ralph Robert Stackman, “Laurence A. Steinhardt: New Deal Diplomat, 1933-45,” (unpublished dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967), p. 148.

normally associate with economic and social developments. The military and strategic dimensions of security were never far from Rockefeller and his planners, but they pushed “security” beyond its traditional parameters. It came to mean something else, in addition to its traditional meaning.

The Cold War further expanded the meaning of security. President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program launched in 1949 followed closely on the heels of the Marshall Plan. By the 1960s, the Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps were pushing “security” into the far corners of social and economic development.

Even Rocky got into the act. Out of government after 1945, he launched his own “Marshall Plan” for Latin America in the late 1940s. His American International Association was to help modernize the region’s educational, health and agricultural infrastructure. AIA was philanthropic and non-profit. A commercial counterpart, the International Basic Economy Corporation, was created to spread the genius of Yankee enterprise into Latin America, and, by extension of course, Peru. The supermarket, mass distribution, low retail prices, all emphasizing the market economy, free enterprise and profits, and bundled with a social conscience. This was North America’s response to the Cold War threat in Latin America.

In an irony of ironies, some in the Department of State described the Rockefeller group as possible “communist fellow-travelers,” who, if not card-carrying Communists, were, at the least, “do-gooders and one-worlders like so many in federal agencies at the time.”²

Traditional security cooperation nonetheless expanded between Peru and the U. S. during the Cold War. At the heart of the program was the Military Assistance Program (MAP) signed between Peru and the U. S. on Feb. 22, 1952. Whereas formerly cooperation and military missions between the U. S. and Peru dated back to a U. S. Naval Mission to Peru in the 1920s under the Augusto B. Leguía regime, the MAP institutionalized the relationship. It raised the level of military aid, loans, and outright grants from thousands to millions of dollars. The first sixteen-man U. S. military mission came to Peru in July, 1944, and in 1952 military aid was valued at \$100,000. In 1956 it totaled \$9.1 million, and from 1952 to 1967 MAP delivered to Peru \$73.2 million, the third largest program in Latin America after those in Brazil and Chile.³ During President John F. Kennedy’s term of office in the early 1960s, the meaning of “security” continued to expand. The Peace Corps, as noted above, was one expression of the Kennedy’s determination to link “security,” which effectively meant preventing another Castro-style presence in the Western Hemisphere, to economic and social development, and political democracy. Peru’s military, too, was evolving into a new phase.⁴

Traditionally the Peruvian military had had a dual mission: one, to protect and defend the nation against external aggression (read Chile and Ecuador for all practical purposes in the latter half of the twentieth century); and, two, to provide for internal peace and order.⁵ Percolating through the Center for Higher Military Studies in Chorillos, however, [its Spanish acronym is CAEM, or *Centro de Altos Estudios Militares*] was a new doctrine that blossomed in the 1960s. Not only was the military devoted to combating Communist, or Communist-inspired, guerrilla

² Clayton, *Peru and the United States*, pp. 167-168.

³ *I bid.*, p. 180.

⁴ For a good book on Peru’s military, see Daniel Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso (Contributions in Military Studies)

⁵ Clayton, *Peru and the United States*, pp. 180-182.

revolutionary movements, but it was also recognizing the growing need that a long-term response to internal subversion and insurgency had to include the promotion of social and economic development.

And, as the 1960s proceeded, Peru's military officers were committed more and more to the position that the problems in the distribution of wealth and power were apparently insurmountable to the politicians, even the genial, progressive, Fernando Belaunde Terry who came to power in 1964. An insurgency movement in the highlands in 1965 not only threatened law and order, but the existence of the military as an institution.

Given the failures of the politicians, and the needs of the nation, the military increasingly viewed itself as the best institution to promote social justice and economic development to reduce and eliminate the circumstances that gave rise to poverty, inequality, injustice, and, in the end, insurgency movements. The implications of extending "security" beyond mere matters of military and strategic concerns were far ranging in Peru. The amazing Peruvian Institutional Revolution of 1968 came about precisely because the military had gone far beyond the traditional boundaries of security.

In Peru these domestic concerns overrode the Cold War agendas of the U.S. (then locked into the embrace of the war in Vietnam), and the Peruvian Institutional Revolution of 1968 set back U.S.-Peruvian cooperation. Peru's leftist govt. (1968-1975) turned to the Soviet Union for arms and training, and it marked a low point in cooperation between the two countries. Security to the Peruvian military was promoting national development, social justice, and economic equality. Dramatic nationalizations (IPC, Cerro de Pasco, W. R. Grace & Co. and others), agrarian reform, and a super-heated Peruvian nationalism eventually led to the expulsion of the U. S. military mission, a nadir or sorts in the history of security affairs between the two countries.

Since the 1980s and the rise of domestic terrorism and the drug traffic, the two countries have cooperated militarily and politically on the security front, but sometimes with two different ends: Peru wishing to eliminate terrorism; the U. S. wishing to dry up the drug trade.

The Fujimori regime (1990-2000) was marked by some spectacular successes, and, perhaps, an even more spectacular failure. President Alberto Fujimori went nose-to-nose with the leading terrorist movements in Peru—especially the Sendero Luminoso—and the samurai in Fujimori won the day. He loosened the Peruvian military, abridged the constitution, and in the end captured Abimael Guzman (Presidente Gonzalo, Champú). The eviscerated movement today is a mere shadow driven far into the recondite jungles and corners of the nation.

The United States contributed to this effort, but as a corollary to what truly drove U. S. policy—the desire to eradicate the drug trade. The presence of the U. S. military (and other agencies such as the DEA, CIA, etc.) increased dramatically in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, pumping money, arms, and motivation into the Peruvian police and military. Eradication and interdiction were combined with a policy of alternate crop development, which Fujimori insisted upon to lessen the shock of the campaign on the people involved in the growing of coca.

Security thus took on another dimension: drug eradication. The *narcotráfico* joined the list of elements that had come to define "security" over the years, from the military defense of the Western hemisphere in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, to the Cold War, to the terrorism of *Sendero Luminoso*.

The discoveries in 2000 of Vladamiro Montesinos' activities (the principal adviser to President Alberto Fujimori, 1990-2000) including political chicanery, intervention in Colombian affairs,

reference between 2000 and today. Superimposed on those activities is now the international terrorism of militant fundamentalist Islam emanating from the Middle East but casting its violence across the world.

In a way, Peru is ahead of the curve on this issue, having dealt with an internal terrorist movement for over twenty years, dating to 1980 when *Sendero* went underground. The U. S. is only now facing the grim image of hundreds and thousands of people sacrificed on the altar of fanaticism.

In the larger picture, the administrations of Presidents Bush and Toledo share a basic conservative philosophical context, marked by a continuation of Fujimori's neo-liberalism in the economic context in Peru and a "compassionate" Republicanism in the U. S. The coca production has diminished in Peru, Toledo has been successful in raising international capital for development, and "security"—at least between Peru and the U. S.—appears to be continuing an era of cooperation.

It will be interesting to see what new dimensions are added to the definition of "security" between Peru—and by extension—Latin America and the United States as the administrations of Bush and Toledo develop. At play on the world's stage are two great, antagonistic phenomenon: one is globalization; and the second is increasingly strident and demanding nationalism. I am guessing that "security" will be interpreted even more widely, and it would be good to hear what some of these new directions will be from our panel.

ROL DE LAS LAS MARINAS LATINOAMERICANAS EN LA GLOBALIZACIÓN

EXPOSITOR: Capitán de Navío Carlos Tejada Mera (Perú)
Peruvian Navy

Hoy, todos los países de la región tienen gobiernos democráticos e impulsan la libertad de mercado en el marco de sus políticas económicas basado en los conceptos de cooperación y la globalización, con el fin de alcanzar un sostenido desarrollo, agotando esfuerzos por establecer un clima de estabilidad interna y regional. Este esquema se sustenta, como doctrina, en dos grandes pilares, el bienestar general y la seguridad integral. Por lo que podemos indicar que sin seguridad no hay posibilidad de desarrollo de una nación.

El propósito de esta exposición, es proponer una visión del rol de las Marinas Latinoamericanas en un entorno de globalización, como instrumento que coadyuve a que nuestras naciones alcancen el desarrollo que esperan nuestros pueblos.

SEGURIDAD Y DESARROLLO DE LA REGIÓN

los procesos económicos actuales han hecho indispensable un proceso creciente de integración que se viene reflejando en el desarrollo de la llamada infraestructura logística sudamericana, proyecto que viene siendo monitoreado por la Corporación Andina de Fomento y que ha merecido el apoyo de la Primera conferencia de Presidentes Sudamericanos de Río de Janeiro. Este proyecto se suma a otros de similar índole que se vienen llevando a cabo en los países de Centroamérica.

Nuestro continente está siendo integrado por un gran sistema de hidrovías, carreteras, puertos y sistemas de telecomunicaciones. Además estamos desarrollando centros de producción y mecanismos de distribución de energía e infraestructuras y comunicación autónomas. Esta infraestructura logística está generando una nueva realidad política, puesto que una vez en plena actividad ella generará una interdependencia de tal naturaleza que veremos cómo blancos estratégicos, situados en otros países, resultarán de capital importancia para la supervivencia de nuestras naciones. La destrucción de un puerto en el Perú o Chile, podría perjudicar el comercio marítimo de Bolivia, Paraguay o Brasil a través del Océano Pacífico. Como ha hecho notar Condón en afectar nuestro desarrollo lezra Rice, asesora en temas de seguridad del actual Presidente de los Estados Unidos, la protección de la infraestructura crítica se ha convertido en la tarea clave de seguridad para las Fuerzas Armadas de toda potencia, subrayando que esta infraestructura crítica puede ser amenazada tanto por enemigos convencionales como no convencionales

AMENAZAS PARA LATINOAMERICA

Las nuevas amenazas para la región, distintas a las tradicionales que se derivan de la modernidad y de la actual coyuntura, sobrepasan el ámbito nacional, cabiendo presentarlas de acuerdo a la siguiente agrupación:

El narcotráfico, fuerzas no convencionales (insurgentes), el contrabando y otras actividades ilícitas.

Las profundas desigualdades de orden económico, social y educacional, son factores de injusticia social latente que pueden acarrear violencia política y convulsión en la sociedad. Están presentes los riesgos de resquebrajamiento de las economías débiles de los Estados como consecuencia de la adaptación a las tendencias neoliberales que pueden causar desequilibrios internos. Asimismo existe una desigualdad de cultura política por la falta de madurez de las élites. Se refleja que se tornan vulnerables al mercantilismo político y a la corrupción, con la consecuente apatía por parte de las mayorías que se traduce en un vacío político, ambiente proclive al estancamiento, y, en caso extremo, a la anarquía.

TERRORISMO INTERNACIONAL

Los ataques y acciones de violencia realizados por grupos fundamentalistas religiosos y étnicos, tal como los repudiables actos de terrorismo realizados en EEUU el 11 de septiembre, también se convierten en una amenaza contra Latinoamérica, más aún cuando casi todos los países de la región han manifestado públicamente su rechazo a estos actos durante la última Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, expresando su solidaridad y apoyo a EEUU. Asimismo, en la XI Cumbre Iberoamericana realizada la semana pasada en la ciudad de Lima, 23 Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno han efectuado similar pronunciamiento.

La depredación de los recursos del mar y la exclusión en la participación de los recursos de los fondos marinos

El Océano Pacífico se presenta como el escenario del intercambio comercial mundial y como la gran reserva de recursos naturales en sus aguas y en sus fondos. Su explotación por parte de las grandes potencias, por su capacidad tecnológica, afectaría directamente a las economías y a la soberanía de los países ribereños con derechos sobre las aludidas aguas.

La depredación, contaminación y alteraciones ecológicas de los espacios terrestres y acuáticos
Por ejemplo, la región amazónica constituye una de las zonas de mayor riqueza en Latinoamérica en contraste con muchas regiones del mundo donde existe una significativa escasez de recursos naturales.

El deterioro ambiental de los espacios marítimos

El transporte de desechos industriales y nucleares por vía marítima podría poner en peligro nuestra ecosistema.

Las migraciones clandestinas.

La sobre población de países industrializados del hemisferio norte, podría conducir al forzamiento de grandes migraciones a regiones geográficamente extensas y de reducida población relativa como América Latina. Al respecto se presentan dos problemas importantes: primeramente la recepción emigrantes de desconocida calidad humana. En segundo término, se crearían identidades distintas al interior del territorio propio, con el riesgo de generarse conflictos culturales en la región.

Los controles extra regionales sobre el propio territorio.

.De otro lado, en la actual era de la globalización, el desarrollo socio - económico de los países así como el crecimiento de las economías de Latinoamérica, tienen como uno de sus ejes gravitantes el Comercio Marítimo Internacional.

En este contexto, el permitir que las vías de comunicación a través de la cual se lleva a cabo este

Comercio se mantengan libres y seguras es una tarea que los países de la región tienen que desarrollar de manera prioritaria .

CONSIDERACIONES SOBRE SEGURIDAD EN LA REGIÓN

La adopción de modelos democráticos de gobierno, la aplicación de una economía de mercado y la globalización en la búsqueda del desarrollo de las naciones de la región, han venido creando problemas de seguridad más complejos, de las cuales han surgido corrientes inherentes a la seguridad en el hemisferio , pero teniendo en consideración que ninguna nación de la región cuenta con la dimensión, estructura, ni los medios para enfrentar por sí solos estas amenazas, por lo que nuestras políticas de defensa requieren una urgente adecuación. Las tareas convencionales para las que las Fuerzas Armadas fueron diseñadas no son las únicas, se han extendido a otras tareas. La políticas de seguridad deben ser diseñadas de acuerdo a esta nueva realidad y no sólo en función a conflictos con países vecinos.

Sin dejar de prestar atención a los problemas tradicionales del frente externo de respuesta convencional, la tendencia es la prioridad de los conflictos de respuesta especializada y puntual.

En función a estas consideraciones y amenazas a la seguridad regional cobra especial relevancia la instauración de un sistema o mecanismos de seguridad colectiva regionales de defensa, que no sólo persiga crear una voluntad general de paz, sino que esté basado en coincidencias y intereses comunes, de los cuales se desprenderán objetivos concurrentes. Al respecto, el Contralmirante en retiro Roberto Pertusio, catedrático de Estrategia Operacional en la Escuela de Guerra Naval de la Armada de Argentina, en su obra “Entre la Guerra y la Paz” formula el siguiente listado, que él denomina objetivos convocantes:

Defensa de la democracia.

Mantenimiento de la libertad de mercado

Desarrollo de la economía regional en su conjunto, apuntalada por el progreso individual de las economías nacional esa que integran la región.

Desarrollo tecnológico que permita participar en el mundo desarrollado.

Aspirar a participar de los recursos de los fondos marinos.

Compartir los beneficios que brinda el aprovechamiento de los espacios ultraterrestres.

No admitir controles ajenos o internacionales sobre el propio territorio

Oponerse a toda agresión ecológica.

Oponerse a restricciones al desarrollo científico de la región.

Oponerse a la depredación de especies transzonales, como los recursos pesqueros.

POLÍTICAS DE SEGURIDAD PARA NUESTRA REGION

La primera tarea urgente y vital de nuestras Fuerzas Armadas, es asegurar la protección de nuestro ámbito de tal manera que no quede pretexto para una intervención extra-regional. Esto obliga a lograr una apropiada coordinación de las políticas de protección y defensa comunes, con

capacidad de disuadir cualquier intento interno regional de alterar por la fuerza nuestros intereses comunes.

En este aspecto, aparte de la estandarización en los gastos de defensa, sería conveniente tener un franco intercambio de información sobre el potencial militar.

Algunos autores consideran que es momento de pasar de la etapa de las medidas de confianza a una etapa de seguridad colectiva, coordinada y estructurada apuntando a un mando regional, tal como el que está sucediendo en la Unión Europea, donde las responsabilidades se asuman de acuerdo a cada situación y posicionamiento geográfico, existiendo un mando supremo rotativo. Se puede afirmar que se viene generando necesidades de coordinación colectiva con Fuerzas Armadas repotenciadas para la defensa de intereses regionales compartidos.

ROLES DE LAS MARINAS DE LA REGION

Las Marinas de la región cumplen sus roles y tareas tradicionales para el cumplimiento que sus misiones constitucionales y de los objetivos estratégicos asignados por el nivel político, relacionados al mantenimiento de su soberanía e integridad territorial, sobre su propia percepción de amenazas.

Sin embargo, en el marco de la globalización, los roles de las Marinas en tiempos de paz se han venido incrementado también para la preservación de riquezas y recursos, haciendo necesario que cada país, sienta la necesidad de diseñar el perfil de su flota en forma balanceada, para afrontar los desafíos derivados del potencial militar conjunto, y al mismo tiempo, los necesarios para un creciente protagonismo en tiempos de paz.

Al respecto, somos conscientes que cada vez con más intensidad las flotas pesqueras transregionales incursionan en zonas de interés nacional, utilizando equipos y procedimientos de grado de sofisticación creciente, obligando a encarar el control del mar, con medios y planes compatibles con la misión bélica de las unidades navales y aeronavales.

Un caso similar puede encontrarse en las tareas que varias Armadas cumplen en diferentes países, en apoyo a las misiones policiales contra el narcotráfico, contrabando y represión de otras actividades lícitas, como la contaminación y la piratería, migraciones clandestinas (sobre todo las procedentes del Asia), etc.; algunas de estas tareas están relacionadas con la Convención del Mar.

Otras amenazas a la seguridad como el traslado marítimo de materias altamente peligrosas como desechos nucleares son una tarea que de por sí exige acción conjunta y coordinada de las Marinas de la región.

El combate eficaz de estas amenazas se lograrán mediante operaciones de interdicción aérea, marítima y terrestre, así como la labor integrada de inteligencia.

Especial énfasis debe tenerse respecto al terrorismo internacional, a raíz del atentado realizado contra EEUU en el último mes de septiembre así como por el envío de bacterias de ántrax a través de los servicios postales, ya que la percepción de esta amenaza se ha incrementado notablemente, afectando sensiblemente las economías de muchos países de la región. Cabe citar como un ejemplo de los nuevos roles para el combate de esta amenaza por parte de las Fuerzas

Armadas y especialmente de las Marinas, se produjo en el Perú con ocasión de la XI Cumbre Iberoamericana en Lima, ya que se desplegaron unidades navales de superficie y aéreas para efectuar un estricto control en un área de mar mediante operaciones de vigilancia e interceptación que permitieron ejercer un riguroso control del tráfico aéreo y marítimo, efectuándose operaciones conjuntas con la Fuerza Aérea, ya que la mayoría de hoteles y locales donde se realizaron las actividades oficiales de los 23 Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno estaban ubicados frente o cercanos al mar de Lima, declarándose un área de exclusión aérea. Con estas acciones se logró un adecuado efecto disuasivo, lográndose obtener una apropiada seguridad de los mandatarios.

Respecto a la amenaza de pretender ejercerse controles extra regionales sobre el propio territorio, las Marinas pueden afrontarla de manera combinada, como por ejemplo entre Chile y Argentina el control de los pasos australes entre los dos océanos; o a Ecuador, Perú y Chile la custodia del riquísimo mar fertilizado por la corriente de Humboldt. Estas tareas deberían ser asumidas de manera coordinada de modo que se evite la duplicación de esfuerzos o peor aún el descontrol en la zona. Hay algunas tareas que afectan a toda la región tales como la protección de la infraestructura crítica del continente.. En lo que a las Marinas se refiere, esto afecta sustancialmente a la protección de puertos, hidrovías y vías marítimas de comunicaciones

CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES

En el marco de la globalización, las Marinas de la región pueden contribuir con el combate de las nuevas amenazas de manera más eficaz mediante una estrecha colaboración.

Ninguno de nosotros puede por si sólo afrontarlas exitosamente sin la cooperación de los otros. Este hecho nos obliga a llevar adelante e institucionalizar un sistema de coordinación eficiente y eficaz.

Las Marinas han comprendido esta situación, vienen incrementando su participación en programas de cooperación, pero para lograr un esquema de seguridad regional como el caso de Europa debemos continuar con el proceso de mejorar nuestra interoperatividad y especialmente con Estados Unidos y los países de la OTAN, mediante el incremento de operaciones combinadas, estandarización de procedimientos, doctrinas, recursos, tecnologías; conocimiento del inglés, que nos permita poder participar adecuadamente con Marinas o Armadas de países amigos y aliados lo que requerirá tiempo y tendrá costos, pero es indispensable.

Las Políticas de Estado de reducir gastos en armamento y presupuesto de defensa, hacen necesario implementar una seguridad continental con un amplio concepto de cooperación, y por qué no, pensar en un futuro cercano en el diseño de una fuerza regional con una estructura logística compatible.

Un caso elocuente de esta tendencia, se evidenció en las declaraciones del Almirante Jorge Patricio Arancibia Reyes, ex Comandante en Jefe de la Armada de Chile con ocasión de una conferencia dictada en la inauguración del Mes del Mar en el mes de Mayo 2001, cuando mencionó respecto al Proyecto “Tridente”, consistente en la construcción de fragatas en Chile, que desde su concepción inicial fue pensado como un proyecto que pudiera ser abordado desde

la perspectiva de una aventura combinada, habiendo sido analizado y resuelto en lo que a las plataformas de los buques se refiere, sobre la base de una adecuada interacción con la Armada Argentina. Asimismo, indicó que posteriormente podría ser de interés la participación de otras Armadas amigas del continente, con lo que no sólo tendrían la posibilidad de conformar una Fuerza Regional de notables capacidades y fácil conducción y operación, sino que se estaría en condiciones de permitirles compartir una base logística de repuestos, piezas y partes, con la consecuente reducción de inventarios y tiempos de obtención.

“El Tenue Puente Entre el Mercado Libre y la Democracia en América Latina”

Alex Roberto Hybel

Susan Eckert Lynch, Profesora de Gobierno, Universidad de Connecticut

La elección presidencial del año pasado en México puso fin a la hegemonía política del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Con la elección de un candidato presidencial no afiliado al PRI, surgió la esperanza de que México había dado otro gran paso en su trayectoria hacia la democracia. Hubo varios factores que sirvieron de estímulo para este cambio. Tres de los más importantes fueron la campaña lanzada por México en 1970 para "comercializar" su economía; la casi disolución financiera que sufrió el país en 1994-95 y la operación de rescate financiero iniciada por Washington en 1995. Paradójicamente, dos de estos determinantes pueden socavar, a final de cuentas, las esperanzas de México de consolidar su base democrática. Antes de explicar los efectos de los factores antes mencionados y el futuro precario de México, debo apartarme brevemente del tema para discutir algunos de los antecedentes de la política económica mundial de Estados Unidos.

Un viejo rumbo hacia el futuro

El 2 de abril de 1917, el Presidente Woodrow Wilson se presentó ante una sesión conjunta del Congreso para proponer la participación de Estados Unidos en la guerra que tenía sumergida a Europa por casi tres años. Su razonamiento era simple. Estados Unidos, indicó el Presidente, tenía que participar en la guerra "por la democracia, por el derecho de aquellos que se someten a la autoridad para tener una alternativa en su propio gobierno, por los derechos y las libertades de las pequeñas naciones... y para crear, por lo menos, un mundo libre"⁶. La protección y el desarrollo de la democracia no eran los únicos motivos del Presidente Wilson. Según sus comentarios en su discurso de los Catorce Puntos ante el Congreso el 8 de enero de 1918, la participación de Estados Unidos en la guerra ayudaría a "eliminar ... todas las barreras económicas y a establecer condiciones de igualdad de comercio entre todas las naciones que consientan en la paz y se asocien entre sí para conservarla."⁷ Sin embargo, para comienzos de la siguiente década, ya los norteamericanos no estaban tan seguros de querer cargar con las responsabilidades que acarrearía el cumplimiento de los objetivos internacionales del Presidente Wilson.

Tres cuartos de siglo más tarde, desvanecida la amenaza comunista, el Presidente William Clinton le dijo a los norteamericanos que para Estados Unidos no había un interés nacional "más urgente que el de asegurar el triunfo de la democracia en todo el mundo".⁸ El nuevo Presidente afirmó que el mundo se había convertido en el teatro de operaciones de Estados Unidos, y que ya no existía un adversario capaz de desafiar la autoridad moral impuesta por la democracia. Otros miembros de su administración también exhortaron a los norteamericanos a respaldar la globalización de las economías de mercado. Según lo explicó Anthony Lake, primer asesor de

⁶ Cita de Ronald Steel tomada de, *Walter Lippmann and the American Century* (Boston:Little, Brown, 1980), 112.

⁷ Discurso de los Catorce Puntos del Presidente Woodrow Wilson presentado ante la Sesión Conjunta del Congreso el 8 de enero de 1918.

Reimpreso en *A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Relations-The Mid-1890's to 1979* (Lanham, Maryland:University Press of America, 1980), 58.

⁸ Cita de Tony Smith tomada de "En defensa de la Intervención", *Asuntos del Exterior* 73, núm. 6 (noviembre/diciembre 1994):40.

seguridad nacional del Presidente Clinton, durante un discurso en la Universidad Johns Hopkins en septiembre de 1993:

La expansión en el extranjero de la economía basada en el mercado aumenta nuestras exportaciones y crea empleos norteamericanos, mejorando además las condiciones de vida y avivando las demandas de liberalización política en el exterior. La adición de nuevas democracias significa para nosotros mayor seguridad, ya que entre los países democráticos existe la tendencia a evitar las guerras unos con otros y a patrocinar el terrorismo....

Esta dinámica descansa sobre la base fundamental de los más profundos razonamientos de Woodrow Wilson; aunque algunas veces sus moralismos debilitaron su razonamiento, él comprendió que nuestra propia seguridad está configurada por el carácter de los sistemas de gobierno extranjeros....

Durante la Guerra Fría, contuvimos una amenaza global contra las democracias de mercado; ahora procuramos expandir su alcance, particularmente en lugares de especial significado para nosotros. El sucesor de una doctrina de contención deberá ser una estrategia de expansión--expansión de la comunidad de democracias de mercado libre mundial.⁹

La Doctrina de Expansión y sus efectos en América Latina: Los casos de México y Argentina
Los estados de América Latina han sufrido guerras, guerras civiles, revoluciones y golpes militares desde su independencia en las primeras décadas del siglo diecinueve. El ritmo de estos acontecimientos, sin embargo, ha cambiado a través del tiempo. Desde fines del siglo diecinueve, han sido pocos los países latinoamericanos que han intentado expandir su poderío apoderándose de territorios aledaños. A pesar de que los golpes militares y las guerras civiles continuaron a lo largo del siglo veinte, fueron menos comunes después del final de la Guerra Fría. Estos dos últimos cambios no han sido fortuitos.

Casi desde sus comienzos, Estados Unidos consideró a América Latina una región vital para sus intereses de seguridad. Esta idea jugó un papel central durante la Guerra Fría. Durante ese periodo, Washington apoyó a aquellos líderes latinoamericanos que estaban dispuestos y capacitados para ayudar a Estados Unidos a contener el comunismo, sin tomar en consideración si estaban o no comprometidos con la democracia. Esta acción de parte de Estados Unidos, con frecuencia desencadenó acciones contrarias que, a su vez, produjeron golpes militares, regímenes autoritarios, guerras civiles, o los tres. El fin del comunismo como alternativa política viable le dio a Estados Unidos la libertad de ser más severo con América Latina. La mayoría de los estados de América Latina, reconociendo que la única alternativa que había era la dictada por Washington, convinieron en iniciar grandes reformas, lo cual significó poner fin a las guerras civiles y los golpes militares, creando regímenes democráticos y economías basadas en el mercado.

Los resultados han sido mixtos. A medida que el nuevo siglo toma forma, casi todo estado latinoamericano sigue rodeado por las mismas fronteras que lo definieron en 1945, casi ninguno enfrenta la probabilidad de guerra y las guerras civiles y los golpes militares ya no son

⁹ Anthony Lake, "De la Contención a la Expansión". (Washington, DC: Prensa de la Universidad Johns Hopkins, Escuela Avanzada de Estudios Internacionales, 21 de septiembre de 1993): 4-5-

características comunes del panorama político de América Latina.¹⁰ No obstante, la región continúa aquejada de una serie de grandes problemas políticos, económicos y sociales. A principios de 1990, el 30 por ciento de los empleos en América Latina estaba en el sector informal, donde los salarios eran mucho más bajos que en el sector formal y la seguridad de empleo era virtualmente inexistente. Con la introducción de la alta tecnología en sus industrias y un sector de servicio cada vez mayor a nivel mundial, la cantidad de empleos industriales en América Latina ha menguado. Estos empleos fueron frecuentemente reemplazados por empleos de menor salario, más temporeros y con menos posibilidad de protección por los sindicatos obreros. Los efectos de estos acontecimientos sobre la distribución de ingresos han sido considerables. Se ha estimado que mientras la disparidad en la proporción de ingresos en Europa Occidental es de 5:1, y en Estados Unidos de 10:1, en América Latina se mantiene cerca de 16:1 (en Brasil es de 25:1).¹¹ En Chile, por ejemplo, durante el gobierno de Augusto Pinochet, su régimen implementó grandes ajustes económicos estructurales desde 1973 hasta 1988. Uno de los resultados de esta política fue reducir en un 3 por ciento el ingreso del 20 por ciento de la clase más baja, y aumentar en un 10 por ciento el ingreso del 20 por ciento de los más ricos. La brecha salarial entre la mano de obra especializada y la no especializada también aumentó en más de 30 por ciento en Perú y 20 por ciento en Colombia. Según indicó el *Financial Times*, la economía mundial libre sigue siendo una "fuerza imperfecta.... Casi dos terceras partes de la población mundial han obtenido poca o ninguna ventaja substancial del rápido crecimiento económico".¹² El problema se ha agravado debido al rápido deterioro experimentado por la economía de Estados Unidos después de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre. Según señaló Enrique Iglesias, presidente del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, "América Latina está entrando en uno de los períodos más difíciles que haya tenido que enfrentar en muchas décadas".¹³ Es posible que no haya otro país al sur de Estados Unidos que ejemplifique tan bien como México el valor excesivo que Estados Unidos ha puesto en su estrategia de expansión, y el futuro incierto que enfrentan muchos estados de América Latina debido a ello.

¹⁰ Perú y Ecuador todavía no han resuelto completamente sus pleitos fronterizos; las probabilidades de guerra civil en Colombia son todavía mensurables, y Venezuela está en peligro de caer en manos de un líder con aspiraciones autoritarias.

¹¹ Birdsall, "La vida es injusta: Disparidad en el Mundo". *Política Exterior* núm. 111 (Verano 1998): 78.

¹² Cita de Eric Hobsbawm, en *La Era de los Extremos. Una Historia del Mundo, 1914-1991* (New York: Panteón, 1994): 574.

¹³ *The New York Times*, (octubre 14, 2001): A3. 85

“Panama, its Canal, and Regional Security at Reversion + 2”

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Two years have passed since the United States turned over the Panama Canal and the last of its military bases to the Republic of Panama. President Mireya Moscoso, who received these lands and facilities, has just completed two years of administration. And only two months have elapsed since the catastrophic terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. As many have said recently, the world is a very different place—and so is Panama.

The government of Panama continues to manage the affairs of state yet has not found a solid footing in public approval or international effectiveness. President Moscoso’s administration has lacked leadership, signature projects, unequivocal successes, and the appearance of a mission or program. The best that can be said is that she has avoided major debacles. The Canal continues to run efficiently, as do the ports, and the railroad recently started up operations again after several years of rebuilding. The economy muddles along, albeit with high rates of unemployment. The National Police have remained subject to civilian authorities and provided reasonable levels of public safety.

The threats to Panama’s security, identified last year, do not seem measurably worse today, with one exception. Plan Colombia continues to unfold in the south, but its major impact in Panama has been immigration of exiles from the war zones. Drug trafficking through Panama has declined, and with it ancillary crime.

Defense planners have known since World War II that the Canal could not be 100% protected, and the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles further increased its vulnerability. During the mid-1970s the world contemplated sabotage as well. Happily, no hostile attack has occurred in all those years.

After September 11, the threats of sabotage and a full-scale assault on the Canal cannot be ruled out. The upper locks, control room, and Lake Alajuela are all vulnerable, and losing them could shut down the Canal for years. The publicity value of such damage to a global shipping hub would seem very tempting. (Discuss some options.)

Many Panamanians believed that without U.S. ownership, the Canal would be less likely to be targeted by enemies. That may still be true, but Panama cannot accept that on faith. With or without U.S. help, Panama simply must gain intelligence and counter-terrorism capability in order to protect its most valuable asset. U.S. responsibility for protection of the Canal continues under the multilateral defense treaty signed in 1977. The Canal certainly appears on the list of possible targets being considered by counter-terrorism specialists today.

Panama will need to tighten regulations and apprehension of immigration violators as well. Its borders and inspection stations have been porous, to say the least. The Panama Canal Authority must work closely with intelligence agencies in the United States and Western Europe. And a system of ship inspections may need to be instituted at Canal approaches.

The world could adapt to loss of the Canal; Panama could not. The disruption, poverty, and chaos it would cause could very well become an international security threat in its own right. 30 October 2001.

“The Just War in the Catholic Tradition”

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Throughout its two thousand year history, the Catholic tradition has taken four stands regarding war and peace: Pacifism; Just War; Crusades; and World Community. Today the Roman Catholic Church is most prominently associated with the Just War tradition, although elements of Pacifism and World Community are also prominent in papal, Conciliar, episcopal, and theological teaching. This presentation will briefly discuss the Pacifist, Crusade, and World Community traditions in order to situate the Just War tradition in its proper historical and theologian context. We will discuss each in turn:

I. Pacifism. The Christian religion began as a pacifist religion due largely to the Sermon on the Mount where Jesus charged his followers:

"You have heard that it was said, 'You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy. But I say to you, Love your enemies, and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven...' (Matthew, 5:43-44)

With some exceptions, the early Christians did not serve in the Roman army, and upon conversion, newly baptized Christians resigned from military service or posts that required the killing of others. The renunciation of wealth and love of enemies were ethical demands made of early converts to Christianity and the chief reason for the rejection of military service appears to be that killing and conversion of enemies were incompatible with the Christian Gospel.

II. Just War. In the fourth and fifth centuries a dramatic change took place in Christianity when Sts. Ambrose of Milan and Augustine of Hippo began to teach that wars "undertaken with a mournful attitude" were permissible for the Catholic church both to combat enemies of the Church within and enemies of the Roman Empire without. This undoubtedly resulted from the Constantinian Edict of Milan in 313 that recognized Christianity as a legitimate religion within the Roman Empire. The reasons for the acceptance of the Just War into Christian history appear to be two: (1) the Augustinian theology of Original Sin: Augustine thought of the heavenly "City of God" as a place for virtue and peace, while the earthly "City of Man" was a place of sin and depravity, and (2) a growing fusion between the Pax Romana and the Pax Christiana that enabled the Church to spread the Christian Gospel through the political realm of the Roman Empire. Hence, the Sermon on the Mount was no longer the dominant witness within Christianity; it was now relegated to the clergy or to the monastery.

The Just War principles were not unique to Christianity. Indeed, they are

found in pre-literate societies and in almost every civilized society where wars are fought. The Christian formulation of the Just War principles was influenced by limitations placed on war in the Hebrew Scriptures; by the philosophical writings of Plato and Cicero; and by the view of St. Augustine that "The love of enemies admits of no dispensation, but love does not preclude wars of mercy waged by the good."

The Just War principles were initially elaborated by Sts. Ambrose and Augustine and later commented on by St. Thomas Aquinas and other scholastic philosophers. The Catholic Church's official teaching on the Just War principles can be found in the Catholic Catechism in sections 2307-2317. The Catechism teaches that "as long as the danger of war persists and there is no international authority with the necessary competence and power, governments cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed." (2308)

The Catechism then goes on to list "the traditional elements enumerated in what is called the 'just war' doctrine":

" the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
all other means of putting an end to it must have been shown to be impracticable or ineffective;
there must be serious prospects of success,
the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily on evaluation this condition." (2309)

Concerning soldiers, the Catechism teaches:

"Those who are sworn to serve their country in the armed forces are servants of the security and freedom of nations. If they carry out their duty honorably, they truly contribute to the common good of the nation and the maintenance of peace." (2310)

The Catechism continues:

"Non-combatants, wounded soldiers, and prisoners must be respected and treated humanely.
Actions deliberately contrary to the law of nations and to its universal principles are crimes, as are the orders that command such actions. Blind obedience does not suffice to excuse those who carry them out. Thus the extermination of a people, nation, or ethnic minority must be condemned as a mortal sin. One is morally bound to resist orders that command genocide." (2313)

Roman Catholic teaching also provides for both absolute and selective Conscientious Objection to warfare. The Catechism teaches:

"Public authorities should make equitable provision for those who for reasons of conscience refuse to bear arms; these are nonetheless obliged to serve the human community in some other way." (2311)

Finally, the Catechism goes on to urge regulations against acts of war "directed to the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities," against the "accumulation of arms" and against the "production and sale of arms" that "compromise the international juridical order." (2314-2316)

III. Crusades. In 1095 Pope Urban II at Clermont, France urged European Catholics to "succor your brethren in the East, menaced by an accursed race, utterly alienated from God." He urged them to "Start upon the road to the Holy Sepulcher to wrest that land from the wicked race and subject it to yourselves." "Deus vult" shouted the assembly: God wills it. The Crusades were total or Holy wars waged in God's name, for God's glory, and for God's gain.

The Just War principles were ignored and indiscriminate slaughter and environmental destruction were common during this period. Clergy even fought in the Crusades and monastic pacifism collapsed with the creation of monastic military orders. The Crusades continued in another form with the Columbian invasion of the "New World" through the Conquistadors many of whom continued the intolerant and exploitative practices of the Crusaders, the extraordinary work of Bartolome de las Casas and other missionaries notwithstanding.

IV. World Community. The collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, the creation of nation states that resulted from the Protestant Reformation, and the intellectual influence of the Enlightenment gave rise to scholars who believed there should be a "law of nations" that would maximize justice and minimize war. Hugo Grotius is most commonly associated with international law but other thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria, Erasmus of Rotterdam, and Juan Luis Vives have contributed to the call for a new international order.

In the contemporary period, the conduct of war in the 20th century and the use and creation of atomic, biological, and chemical means of mass destruction have caused the Catholic Church to "undertake an evaluation of war with an entirely new attitude." (Vatican II) This "new attitude" was inspired, in part, by Pope John XXIII's historic encyclical *Pacem in Terris*. In this letter, Pope John calls for the creation of a worldwide public authority to serve the common good:

"Today the universal common good poses problems of worldwide dimensions, which cannot be adequately tackled or solved except by the efforts of public authority endowed with a wideness of powers, structure and means of the same proportions: that is, of public authority which is in a position to operate in an effective manner on a worldwide basis. The moral order itself, therefore, demands that such a form of public authority be established." (Pacem in Terris, 137)

Pope John has identified war as a result of structural deficiencies and only a restructuring of global authority can severely limit or abolish this old, but not ancient, social institution.

In conclusion, we have reviewed the four perspectives on peace and war that have emerged in the long Catholic tradition. It remains for each of us, through the examination of our consciences, to determine where our duties lie.

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“Civil Society and Security Issues in Latin America: The Economic Dimension”

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Abstract

The nurturance of societies that advance the interests of all their citizens, while respecting the sovereignty of others is an ideal. Equitable economic development plays a significant role in the promotion of this ideal.

Economic development delivers freedom from want. High per capita income correlates with tolerance, freedom from oppression, civil liberties, democracy, long life expectancies, and low infant mortality. Equitable economic development builds societies whose citizens become stakeholders in the promotion of functional and secure societies.

Today, of the world's 6,000,000,000 people, 2.8 billion live on less than US\$ 2 per day; 1.2 billion live on less than US\$ 1 per day. And, the gap between the rich and poor countries is widening. Now the richest 20 countries in the world have 37 times the per capita income of the poorest 20. This gap has doubled in the last 40 years.

While the world percentage of people subsisting on less than US\$ 1 per day has declined by four percent from 1987 to 1998 (28% to 24%), population growth has kept the absolute number of poor worldwide constant. In Latin American and the Caribbean 15 percent of the population subsist on less than US\$ 1 per day and, 15,000,000 joined this rank in the 1987—1998 period.

If economic growth is to lift people from poverty, we must know the sources of growth. In general four mechanisms exist. 1) Growth attributable to trade. As larger and larger markets are linked, finer divisions of labor and increased productivity are possible. 2) Growth attributable to savings, investment and application of productivity enhancing tools. 3) Growth attributable to scale effects. 3a) Modest population growth spurs demand. 3b) Infrastructure project costs tend to be lumpy and often a larger taxpayer base can secure more infrastructure than can a small base. 4) Growth attributable to entrepreneurship and innovation.

Without innovation, all other forms of growth are self-limiting. Thus, innovation and its agent, the entrepreneur, are key to economic growth.

Entrepreneurs are activated by the profit motive. In action, entrepreneurs can be both an agent of disequilibrium-creation and equilibrium-resolution. On the first point, innovation can thrust the economy forward by creating new knowledge, methods, or products that destroy old ways. On the second point, innovation on the part of the entrepreneur creates the more modest innovations that bridge the gaps in time and space and allow the economy to function more smoothly.

As a means of creating equitable economic development, enabling entrepreneurship is key. Latin America and the Caribbean do not lack for willing entrepreneurs. However, structural impediments must be resolved. Hernando de Soto's The Mystery of Capital (2000) provides recommendations. 1) People must be allowed to enter business legally—with fast, fair, and inexpensive licensing. 2) Poor people have significant assets in the form of untitled property. Such property, if legalized, can be used as collateral and leveraged to create significant businesses. 3) Better-capitalized legal businesses will generate jobs, taxes, and wealth—economic development.

“The Political Economy of National Security in the Andean Region”

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Abstract

The Andean Region countries, namely Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Colombia, have experienced in recent years severe political, economic and social problems, with clear negative implications for their stability and national security.

While there is clearly the need of the governments of the region to allocate public resources to the national defense and security of their countries, they currently face the dilemma of how much security and defense their taxpayers are willing to finance and accept, considering the increasing social demands of their poorest citizens and the pressure of biased political groups.

It is the purpose of this lecture to provide an economic perspective for the formulation of a coordinated regional security policy in the Andean Region, on the basis of an honest and well-intended regional cooperation effort against common threats like the illicit drugs trade, urban crime, terrorism, displaced population migration and extreme poverty itself, redefining the use of the human and physical capital accumulated in each of the national defense systems of the countries in the region, and propitiating resource sharing and joint regional operations. The argument behind is that the returns and benefits of the required public investments in the countries of the region should be measured as a function of the value assigned by their citizens to the peace and stability generated by the linkages between peace, investment, growth and development.

“COOPERACION PARA LA SEGURIDAD EN LAS AMERICAS. LA NUEVA AGENDA.”

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El análisis de la Seguridad Hemisférica debe retomar su enfoque integral, como tal y no reducirlo solamente al sector defensa o a la criminalidad.

El final de la confrontación política ideológica y conflictos de baja intensidad entre los antiguos bloques antagónicos, y más aún después del ataque que sufrieran las ciudades estadounidenses de Nueva York y Washington, nos plantean nuevas disyuntivas que merecen ser consideradas dentro de un análisis concienzudo y la continuación con más ahínco de la discusión en los distintos foros, especialmente en los foros multinacionales establecidos institucionalmente como es el de la Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica (CSH) de la Organización de Estados Americanos (O.E.A.).

El ataque a los Estados Unidos de América, perpetrado por un grupo fundamentalista entronizado en una nación del Oriente Medio a través de la fuerza y el terror, plantea la necesidad de incluir dentro del análisis de la Seguridad Hemisférica la existencia de sociedades que se encuentran padeciendo de los flagelos de la antidemocracia, el atraso cultural, la miseria y la apatía gubernamental para resolver los problemas ingentes de su población, razones que no les permite la superación de su condición humana y les sumerge cada vez más profundamente en la iniquidad de antivalores convirtiéndoles en amenaza latente para las sociedades más evolucionadas que quieren vivir en paz.

Estamos en presencia de amenazas diferentes a las convencionales que necesitan de la atención multinacional y cuyas respuestas deben ser del objeto de la cooperación internacional o hemisférica. Antes de los eventos impactantes del 11 de septiembre, mostrados al mundo en el mismo momento que ocurrían gracias al adelanto tecnológico de la comunicación; una acción terrorista ocurrida en Madrid, en el Ustler, en Buenos Aires o en Bogotá, se veían como problemas aislados de la incumbencia solamente de las naciones que los padecen y no como problemas que afectan a la raza humana y que deben resolverse mancomunadamente, en forma multilateral, con respuestas creativas integrales y nuevas concepciones a la noción de soberanía nacional.

El Ataque a la ciudad de Nueva York debe de ser considerado como un ataque al hemisferio, a la sociedad occidental que quiere vivir en paz dentro de un sistema democrático representativo y el respeto a los derechos fundamentales y a la libertad, no solamente porque se hirió a una nación poderosa líder y defensora del concepto de “Democracia Occidental”, sino porque el acto criminal fue perpetrado con la infamia nunca antes utilizada, con la confabulación de símbolos

de la protección jurídica internacional; este hecho no puede ser dejado desapercibido por los analistas en seguridad, por los juristas, ni por los políticos. No podemos considerar una improvisación o ingeniosidad el hecho de que se haya utilizado como arma un medio de comunicación masiva objeto de protección especial de la legislación internacional, dirigido a destruir un objetivo civil y al mismo tiempo un centro de la economía mundial de libre mercado, en donde habrían de morir personas de todas las razas y nacionalidades pero que les abriga un sistema común.

La Comunidad Internacional debe de establecer los mecanismos institucionales que comprenda instrumentos jurídicos capaces de permitir a una Organización Internacional, mundial o regional, que en un determinado momento de respuesta a una situación extremadamente anómala, coyuntural e incontrolable, propiciada por un gobierno nacional que esté amenazando la paz y la seguridad internacional.

Una nación en cualquier parte del mundo, que esté confrontando problemas estructurales, con un gobierno impositivo en su grado máximo que esté violentando flagrantemente los derechos fundamentales a su población, con avanzado índice de descomposición social, armamentismo descontrolado, liderada por facciones extremistas; debe de ser sometida a la atención internacional mediante mecanismos y procedimientos preestablecidos, que comprenda consultas a la población y decisiones oportunas consensuadas entre las partes.

Bajo este contexto, es hora de fortalecer el diálogo y acercar posiciones dentro del seno de la Comisión de Seguridad Hemisférica, considerando otras amenazas no tradicionales, más complejas y sofisticadas, que igualmente presentan serios peligros al hemisferio, que deben ser objeto de la consideración y cooperación entre los países de las Américas. Es el momento de conciliar los intereses y encontrar las convergencias que nos permitirá identificar las amenazas para viabilizar la cooperación regional.

ⁱ John Miller, "In Castro's Service", *National Review*, Nov. 5, 2001 pp. 45-47

ⁱⁱ *USA Today*, "U.S. Expected to Target Afghanistan's Opium", 16 Oct. 2001, p. 1.

ⁱⁱⁱ Edwin Corr and Courtney Prisk, "El Salvador: Transforming Society to Win the Peace, in Low Intensity Conflict ed. Edwin Corr, Boulder; Westview Press, 1992, pp. 223-256. See also Max Manwaring and Courtney Prisk, El Salvador at War: An Oral History, Washington DC: NDU Press, 1988

^{iv} The ELN terrorists, Colombia's second largest insurgent group, attacked Colombia's second largest oil pipeline 152 times in 2000- leading to numerous shutdowns. Ecuador's oil infrastructure was also attacked. See US Department of State, Latin America Overview: Patterns of Global Terrorism-2000, released April 2001.

^v For patrolling its long coastline and jungle borders, Panama currently has 6 light transports, 6 light trainers and 7 light helicopters. With a maximum effort Panama could currently put one helicopter-mounted platoon into action in response to an attack on the Panama Canal.

^{vi} In November 1999, when the American forces were almost gone from Panama, a FARC group hijacked two civilian helicopters in Panama City with little trouble and flew them south to the FARC-held Colombia-Panama border region. It is likely that FARC is building up its own mini air force of light aircraft - capable of air attacks on government installations. Currently Panamanian Security Forces have no armed aircraft.

^{vii} Issues of airpower against insurgents and terrorists will be examined in detail in the forthcoming book: James Corum and Wray Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002 (scheduled publication)

^{viii} For a detailed discussion of the air war in El Salvador 1980-1992 see James S. Corum, "The Air War in El Salvador" *Airpower Journal*, Summer 1998 pp. 27-44

^{ix} Nothing has been written on the Air Force Reserve of Guatemala. My information comes from correspondence with some former members of the Air Force Reserve

^x "A New Battlefront Forms for the U.S. in Central America", *Los Angeles Times*, July 9 2000, p. 1. This article points out that planes and boats can easily move large quantities of drugs through Central America and its coastline due to lack of assets for interdiction.

^{xi} The Colombian Air Force 16 UH-60 Blackhawks, and 44 UH-1Hs and a few attack helicopters. The Army Aviation force of Colombia has 7 UH-60s, 10 Mi-17 "Hips", and 20 UH-1H helicopters. Given the size of the country and the large insurgent forces arrayed against the Colombian forces, this is not much. The UH-1s are not very effective at the high altitudes common to Colombian terrain.

^{xii} The FAC (Colombian Air Force) currently has a transport force with 8 C-130s, 5 C-47s, 1 Arava, 9 CASA 212s, 2 Fokker 28s and 3 Pilatus Porters. Given the size of Colombia and its armed forces, this is less than half of its basic air transport requirement.

^{xiii} For details of aircraft supplied to Latin America during World War II see Adrian English, Armed Forces of Latin America, London: Janes', 1985. Brazil received 946 US aircraft, Mexico 224, Chile 231, Colombia 100+, Venezuela, 76+, Peru 67, Uruguay 50+, Paraguay 43, Ecuador 50+, Honduras 30, Haiti 12, Bolivia 100, Guatemala 21, etc.

^{xiv} Ibid. p. 120

^{xv} "A New Battlefront...", *Los Angeles Times*, 9 July 2000, p. 1

