I thought I would offer some thoughts about what it means and what it takes to be a leader in our Armor and Cavalry formations. Armor and Cavalry will always be essential to the U.S. Army’s fighting and winning our Nation’s wars. But to be clear, this has nothing to do with the tanks and Bradleys that we bring to the fight. In- stead, I would argue that we Armor and Cavalry leaders are built different. And we will always be needed because of how we think, how we act, and how we fight as part of the Combined Arms Team.....read more
From the Boresight Line: The Z-PatternThe coaxially mounted machine gun enhances the lethality and versatility of armored vehicles, allowing crews to engage targets effectively and contribute to the success of combined arms operations. Its integration with the main gun’s fire control system also ensures coordination and synchronization of firepower, maximizing the vehicle’s combat effectiveness on the battlefield. Training and proficiency in gunnery techniques like the z-pattern are essential for armored vehicle crews to maximize the effectiveness of the coaxial machine gun in combat situations. Regular practice and simulation exercises help develop the skills and muscle memory needed to employ the weapon system accurately and decisively on the battlefield.....read more
Gunnery Branch - C92: Training Circular 3-20.31-120 Gunnery – Heavy GunneryIt has been ten years since the last re-vision of the tank gunnery manual. In the coming weeks the 2025 version of the Abrams gunnery manual will be authenticated and formally published through the Army Publishing Director- ate (APD)1. This manual has a great number of changes from its predecessor, TC 3-20.31, Training and Qualification, Crew2. Change is inevitable. Change can be good. According to C92, these are the key changes every leader should be aware of. As the Armor force focuses on large-scale combat operations (LSCO), the evolution of tank gunnery must refocus to more complex, longer-range engagements and appropriate techniques....read more
From the Combat Training Centers: As the Commander, I willThere are no easy days in the desert of the National Training Center (NTC), especially for commanders. The NTC’s Box is an unforgiving environment that tests our ability to fight and lead through constant contact and incomparable demands for our time, our authority, and our direct and organizational leadership. We fail to manage our sleep cycles in an attempt to sprint the entire fourteen days of simulated large scale combat operations during the force on force and live fire periods, insecure of where to best place ourselves before and during the fight, and frustrated that our staff cannot turn our guidance into fighting products faster. We look back over our shoulders with guilt that we failed to progress as far as we wanted in our collective training plans at home station. .....read more
On the eve of the 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive, analysts viewed the operation as at a crossroads: “The next phase of the war will hinge, in part, on the ability of Ukrainian forces to retake territory by moving from attrition to maneuver warfare and to shift the offense-defense balance in favor of the offense.”1 From June to November 2023, however, multiple Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) brigades failed to penetrate the Russian Surovikin line along the Orikhiv-Tokmak Axis in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, advancing approximately 20km at the cost of 518 vehicles, including 91 tanks and 24 engineering vehicles.2 The wake of the failed 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive left more than the loss of life and equipment. It reinforced the notion currently in vogue that maneuver warfare is dead.3....read more
How To: A New Platoon Leader’s Guide to MaintenanceImagine you’re a second lieutenant (2LT) in an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) and you’ve just been placed in charge of your first platoon. You’re now responsible for not only a few dozen Soldiers, but also a platoon’s vehicles and ancillary equipment. How does a leader ensure these vehicles and supporting equipment function as designed? The broad answer is an effective maintenance program. At a minimum, maintenance must be managed at the platoon level. All platoon leaders should prioritize maintenance, as platoons train most effectively when their equipment is fully operational. Platoon leaders should become experts on their equipment status report (ESR), maintain effective platoon maintenance standard operating procedures (SOPs), and know how to conduct maintenance in all environments.....read more
Risk-Decision MethodologyWhile teaching the military decision making process (MDMP), I found planners struggle with two unglamorous parts of it: risk management and course of action (COA) selection. And I can see why. Risk management, often relegated to slips, trips, and falls, feels tacked on, and COA selection feels redundant when staffs are remainder of this paper, I will show you what I mean by introducing the risk-decision methodology (R-DM). R-DM addresses a conceptual shortcoming in the evaluation of multiple COAs in MDMP by creating a logical linkage between risks (impediments to end state), counters to those risks, and selection of a COA based on its risk reduction. R-DM operates within the context of the MDMP and consists of the following steps:....read more
Like Moths to a False Flame: Lethality and Protection Through Deception OperationsThe ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated the deadly efficiency of modern battlefield targeting. Rapid sensor-to-shooter integration, enabled by signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) reconnaissance, has shortened kill chains to the point where detection often leads to immediate engagement. High-value assets, identified through electronic emissions or ground-based reconnaissance, face a severe risk of engagement and destruction. The prevalence of SIGINT collection, integration of UAS, and massed indirect fires in the doctrines of American adversaries represents a complex problem that can be mitigated by the use of tactical deception......read more
Tanks in the Cities? Preparing the Armored Force for the Urban FightThe events encountered during Rotation 23-08.5 are not one-off events. Each NTC rotation, Blackhorse spends days fortifying the urban training area of Tiefort City. In addition to the typical mix of infantry strong points, minefields, and mazes of barbed wire, Blackhorse integrates both IFVs and MBTs into the city’s terrain. These vehicles are used to shape the foothold fight, enable transitions, and serve as mobile strongpoints to anchor Blackhorse counterattacks. The integration of armored vehicles provides options for the defenders and dilemmas to the attackers. Further, tanks lead Blackhorse’s reinforcing attacks into the city to prevent consolidation by the RTU.......read more
Driving Efficiency at the Battalion LevelArmy leaders have a duty and vested interest in running their organizations efficiently. This article is a compilation of various techniques to drive efficiency within a battalion, organized along Lean’s 8 Wastes categories. Regularly used in manufacturing and office environments, Lean’s 8 Wastes categorize ineffective use of resources and can be used by Army leaders looking to maximize the output of their units. Leaders can then reinvest the rewards in benefits across their people, training and equipment......read more
Training Management Systems to Sustain Readiness within a Band of ExcellenceA wise mentor told me that commanders are responsible for building and maintaining as much readiness as they can with the resources available to them at that time. Similarly, the 1st Infantry Division and 2nd Armor Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) “Dagger Brigade” commanders charge their leaders to train and prepare their organizations to execute within a band of excellence. Some leaders might reference the fact that the Army no longer uses the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM), but this change did not absolve commanders from having to maximize their unit’s readiness at any given time. There are certainly challenges to sustaining readiness – the first and foremost being the Army’s manning cycles – but leaders must achieve their readiness objectives regardless. This paper presents some common observations, challenges, and training management systems that the 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment and Dagger Brigade leaders are employing to sustain unit readiness within a band of excellence.......read more
The New Pentomic?Evidence of modern high-intensive combat in Ukraine highlights the difficulties on the modern battlefield of concentrating enough forces to achieve decisive success at the tactical and operational level. The ubiquitous nature of drone technology makes it increasingly difficult not to be rapidly identified and face effective and timely depth fire of increasing accuracy and flexibility. Along with cheaper satellite and electronic intelligence technology, as well as the rich information environment created by social media, these sources have created for the first time in military history an almost transparent battlefield for both sides....read more
Allied Spirit: Lessons Learned While Attached to a Multinational Brigade During Allied Spirit 22In January 2022, a US combined arms battalion consisting of one headquarters and headquarters company (HHC), two tank companies, one mechanized infantry company, and one forward support company (FSC) participated in exercise Allied Spirit 22 as part of a larger multinational brigade consisting of approximately 5,000 Soldiers representing eight nations. Exercise Allied Spirit is the Joint Multinational Readiness Center’s (JMRC) largest annual exercise at Hohenfels Training Area. The Rotational Training Unit (RTU) is typically either a US or multinational division headquarters with an allied brigade headquarters serving as the primary training audience. The brigade is typically comprised of a mixture of its organic battalions, a US Army maneuver battalion, and other multinational battalions from across NATO. During this unique rotation, the lessons learned at every echelon were indispensable to building partner capacity, enhancing interoperability, strengthening relationships, and enabling NATO’s preparedness for a future armed conflict in Europe......read more
Realizing a Cavalry Troop’s Place in the OPLAN“Fight Tonight and Win” is the watchword for Korean Rotational Deployments. The immediate months prior to the deployment include a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation, sustainment gunneries, qualification ranges, and a myriad of other events ensuring that units are administratively and tactically ready to fight tonight and win. From the Troop-level to the Division-level, commanders constantly deliver assessments of combat power and training in terms of our ability to fight the Operational Plan (OPLAN). A commander rarely assesses their unit as unable to fight the OPLAN, and there are always metrics that can be used to demonstrate readiness. However, due to OPLAN-specific requirements and training restrictions, readiness for the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) mission as a cavalry troop needs to be deliberately trained prior to or immediately upon arrival to Korea. Units may be ready on paper to “Fight Tonight” as soon as they conduct relief in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA), but true readiness takes weeks, if not months to achieve due to both the specific operational readiness required, as well as the unique hurdles related to fighting in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO)....read more
Critical Information for Informed Decision MakingFriendly force information requirements (FFIRs) are a powerful tool for informing decisions throughout an operation if routinely reviewed and refined as the fight evolves. During Warfighter 25-01, the 1st Armored Division did not review the FFIR until after the mid-rotation after-action review (AAR). The division’s initial approach to operations prioritized the speed of the armored brigade combat teams (ABCT) to gain a position of relative advantage compared to the enemy. After a difficult wet gap crossing that slowed the pace of operations, the enemy established their defense. They emplaced their long-range shooters and established a robust air defense bubble. The divisions emphasized speed as a key condition for success early in the operation. The division required a change in approach, but switching objectives for subordinate units would not suffice. The staff needed to challenge the assumptions that led to the prioritization of speed. After the first few days of execution the staff better understood the enemy but needed a better understanding of the necessary friendly conditions....read more
Fords Against Ferraris: How the Principles of Simplicity and Mass Can Guide the Army of 2040In 1986, GEN Donn Starry spoke at the American Defense Preparedness Association Conference at Fort Knox, Kentucky and discussed how “we remain outnumbered, outranged, and outgunned in new and impressive dimensions from armor to guns to missiles to helicopters to electronic warfare systems.” Nearly four decades later the U.S. Army faces similar challenges when considering how to fight outnumbered and win in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The U.S. Army can learn from Security Assistance Group – Ukraine (SAG-U) and other NATO partners on what is required to train, sustain, and reconstitute combat power during LSCO. The principle of simplicity, when carefully synchronized, enables the generation of mass. When the U.S. Army develops solutions for the Army of 2040 it must develop simple solutions like a Ford versus exquisite Ferraris that are expensive and take a lot of time to train, sustain and reconstitute..... read more