ATP 3-07.5

Stability Techniques

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Preface

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5 is the Army's doctrine for stability techniques. In conjunction with Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, and Field Manual (FM) 3-07, it provides doctrinal guidance and direction for Army units conducting operations heavy with stability tasks.

The purpose of ATP 3-07.5 is to provide leaders and Soldiers with the necessary knowledge regarding stability tasks. This ATP provides the conceptual framework for Army units to perform stability tasks across the range of military operations. It addresses stability tasks at operational and tactical levels.

The principal audience for ATP 3-07.5 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders and staffs at operational and tactical levels refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this manual.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 3-07.5 implements the standardization agreement entitled Allied Joint Publication-3.4.

ATP 3-07.5 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. For definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition. ATP 3-07.5 is not the proponent for any defined terms.

ATP 3-07.5 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (USAR) /Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), and United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 3-07.5 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States Army War College. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCK-D (ATP 3-07.5), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

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Chapter 1
Stability Framework

This chapter examines the various contexts in which Army units conduct stability efforts. It first discusses stabilization. This discussion covers the range of military operations, like challenges, the operational variables, and actors. Next, the chapter discusses stability tasks. This discussion includes the initial response, transformation, and fostering stability; the five primary stability tasks; and stability and defeat mechanisms. Lastly, this chapter discusses stability principles. These principles consist of conflict transformation, unity of effort and unity of purpose, legitimacy and host-nation ownership, building partner capacity, and rule of law.

SECTION I – STABILIZATION

1-1. *Stabilization* is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development (FM 3-07). Army units may precede an extensive presence of the Department of State or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In many situations, however, the host nation (HN) will have long established, existing programs from the Department of State, USAID, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Depending on the circumstances, Army units may or may not initially operate without significant interagency involvement and conduct transitions as other United States Government (USG) actors become more prominent.

1-2. Effective commanders understand the bigger picture in which they operate. This understanding includes appreciating the higher echelons' mission, commander's intent, and concept of operations. Commanders must also understand the area of operations (AO), including the various actors relevant to that operation. As operations heavy with stability tasks proceed, nonmilitary considerations become more important than the traditional military focus on friendly and enemy forces. To be effective, commanders need to understand opportunities and sources of resilience as well as the challenges, grievances, and sources of instability.

1-3. Military units performing stability tasks operate in a complex environment with and among many actors. Actors consist of partners, threats, and others. Paragraphs 1-84 through 1-102 discuss actors in detail. Understanding how actors operate enables mission's success, although understanding does not automatically translate into mutual cooperation. Organizational and cultural dynamics can create barriers regarding the relationships between U.S. forces and actors. However, without the presence of area security, no large-scale stability efforts can be successful.

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-4. The range of military operations is another fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity. JP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0 discuss the range of military operations in detail. The range of military operations includes—

- Major operations and campaigns.
- Crisis response and limited contingency operations.
- Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence.

Regardless of the operation, stability tasks will normally be a key part of an Army unit's activities. In some situations, stability tasks will initially be less heavily weighted than offensive or defensive tasks. Once

hostilities begin to end, units will begin to focus on stability tasks. In other situations, units will focus on stability tasks from the outset.

MAJOR OPERATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

1-5. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, National leaders may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. During major operations against regular forces, units often initially conduct operations heavy with offensive and defensive tasks. A *major operation* is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0). As they establish security in their AOs, units will likely have to address stability. Stability considerations become increasingly prominent among units when consolidating new terrain, for example, when a unit occupies a town. Effective units plan and prepare for future stability tasks. As commanders and staff consider the impact on future stability tasks, their decisions may influence current combat operations. For example, units may avoid targeting infrastructure they require for eventual stabilization and reconstruction. Units conscientiously avoid damaging cultural sites. Such damage violates international humanitarian law and potentially alienates the populace. Commanders and staff coordinate and plan early in an operation with partners experienced in integrating organizational elements. Occasionally these elements include composite organizations such as provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), field advance civilian teams (FACTs), or disaster assistance response teams (DARTs).

1-6. If an objective of a major operation is regime change, then Army units prepare to fulfill responsibilities as an occupying power under International Humanitarian Law. As hostilities abate, all units increasingly conduct or support stabilization and reconstruction. Civilian organizations assume the lead for these efforts as soon as possible, with Army units transitioning to a supporting role. Commands can require any Army unit to conduct stability tasks to include civil affairs operations. (Maneuver enhancement brigades in particular are uniquely designed and potentially task organized to conduct the key functions required for stability operations.) This role transition may occur while units still contend with security threats. Successfully conducting stability tasks ensures that the U.S. military does not "win the war, only to lose the peace."

1-7. A *campaign* is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). Stability in a campaign may require, in extreme circumstances, committing considerable resources for a protracted period. As civilian agencies and organizations fulfill their respective roles, this eases the burden of support by military forces. However, military forces are often called upon to support humanitarian response activities (such as Operation Iraqi Freedom), a specific humanitarian assistance, or a disaster relief operation.

1-8. Major operations and campaigns can include *irregular warfare*—a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will (JP 1). A successful counterinsurgency effort includes operations with a preponderance of stability tasks, when the insurgency develops after traditional combat operations and when it is a preexisting condition. (FM 3-24 discusses counterinsurgency in detail.) Security ultimately depends on the support of the people and their belief that the government can provide for their needs. In turn, the government's effectiveness depends in large part on achieving adequate levels of security. Figure 1-1 illustrates this basic interrelationship. This dynamic is valid at both the national and local levels.



Figure 1-1. Stability-security relationships

CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

1-9. A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which a commander must develop an operation plan or an operation order. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Crisis response and limited contingency operations during stability tasks consist of limited interventions, foreign humanitarian assistance, and peace operations.

1-10. A limited intervention is an action of defined and limited scope, often in response to a crisis. Some limited interventions do not require significant stability efforts when of short duration or conducted in rural locations. For example, commanders do not often factor in stability tasks during raids, noncombatant evacuations, or hostage rescue missions. Some limited interventions (such as Operation Just Cause) require stability efforts if circumstances disrupt host-nation governance or if the National leaders decide to take measures to avoid returning to conditions that originally prompted the intervention. In many cases, a limited intervention specifically attempts to achieve stability, particularly if the objective is to establish order or halt ethnic conflict. If an intervention seeks to address a situation's deeper root causes, rather than just the immediate symptoms, commanders place greater emphasis upon stability tasks.

1-11. Many circumstances prompt limited interventions. Often, internal or external events may cause a governmental collapse or regime change prompting limited interventions. Such events may require the intervening force to address the effects of a sudden removal of a dictatorial government or a longer-term absence of effective governance.

1-12. *Foreign humanitarian assistance* consists of Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation (JP 3-29). These activities relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters that might seriously threaten life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Army units provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in limited scope and duration and only outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. This assistance supplements or complements the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.

1-13. FHA emphasizes the stability tasks of reestablishing essential services, restoring infrastructure, and relieving human suffering. Generally FHA does not include transforming the political or security situations, as may be the case in other stability scenarios. In most cases, the role of providing direct relief belongs to civilian providers. However in extreme situations, military units provide direct relief. Normally units concentrate on maintaining a safe and secure environment, restoring critical infrastructure, assisting with transportation and distribution, and proactively identifying ways to enable other relief providers.

1-14. Crisis response and limited contingency operations also occurs during peace operations. *Peace operations* is a broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited

contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts (JP 3-07.3). In accordance with either Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, a UN Security Council Resolution legally authorizes peace operations. Such resolutions provide the framework for all other activities of the forces operating under their mandates and will be valuable references. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. See JP 3-07.3 and FM 3-07.31 for details on peace operations.

1-15. *Peacekeeping* is military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement (JP 3-07.3). Peacekeeping often supports UN mandates and usually supports multinational operations.

1-16. *Peace enforcement* is the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (JP 3-07.3). Within the UN, peace enforcement is generally understood to occur under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and is normally intended to compel the parties of a conflict to engage in a peace process. In such circumstances, forces may follow peace enforcement by peacekeeping.

1-17. *Peacemaking* is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to it (JP 3-07.3). Military support to the peacemaking process may include military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities to influence the disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

1-18. *Peace building* consists of stability actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (JP 3-07.3). It provides reconstruction and social rehabilitation, which offers hope to resolve the conflict and sustain the peace.

1-19. *Conflict prevention* is a peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring (JP 3-07.3).

1-20. Peace operations overlap significantly with stability tasks and often contain a sizeable stabilization component. Military contributions to peace operations may narrowly focus on a broader multidimensional response. For example, peace enforcement may require units to conduct combat operations to set conditions for other organizations to pursue nonmilitary stability objectives. Peacekeeping may be limited in task and scope to monitoring activities and separating belligerents. In such situations, unit tasks may largely consist of familiar operations such as patrolling. Even in relatively nonpermissive environments, civilians may be present and requiring units to appreciate a wider nonmilitary stabilization context.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION, AND DETERRENCE

1-21. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence are ongoing activities that establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (such as state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect U.S. interests at home and abroad. These activities can include exercises and programs, security force assistance, and military operations. As a group, these activities attempt to shape the security environment in peacetime. U.S. forces conduct these activities to support a combatant commander's theater security cooperation plan. U.S. units may in part be attempting to increase the capacity of host-nation security partners, which often includes the HN's ability to perform effective stability tasks.

LIKELY CHALLENGES

1-22. Often units conduct operations with a preponderance of stability tasks across the range of military operations. Although each situation is unique, most will reflect one or more of the following challenges to varying degrees:

- Fragile states.
- Conflict.
- Poverty and nonfunctioning national/local markets.
- Belligerents.
- Corruption.

1-23. These challenges are often related, and can combine to create a negative synergy. A narrow focus on one challenge could create unintended consequences if commanders do not address other factors. For example, international efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate fighting forces could change power relationships and, therefore, increase the possibility of conflict. Attempts to alleviate poverty could fuel corruption and, therefore, increased public resentment. Remedying these challenges require a comprehensive, multifaceted approach at all levels that entails various military and nonmilitary actors, performing military and nonmilitary actions, to achieve both military and nonmilitary objectives.

1-24. These challenges also subsume most risks that could undermine the overall mission. Effective commanders use risk management, embedding it into the military decisionmaking process, as detailed in FM 5-19 and ADP 5-0 to best develop and weigh courses of action, anticipate responses, and ensure actions are approved at the correct level. Identifying hazards may be complex as issues grow more interrelated. Assessing hazards and development of control measures to minimize risk are the most critical tasks and may require in depth knowledge of an operational environment. Commanders ensure each staff section incorporates risk management during planning and coordinates functions to best minimize unintended and unforeseen consequences, be they political, military, economic, social, information, or infrastructure related.

FRAGILE STATES

1-25. Units often perform stability tasks because a host-nation government is unable or unwilling to redress its challenges by itself. In some cases, such challenges result from military operations that brought down a previous regime. Often this results in a country that is a fragile state—a country that suffers from institutional weaknesses serious enough to threaten the stability of the central government.

1-26. Other political contenders inside the country or externally located may threaten a fragile state. A weak central government often cannot exert influence over outlying regions. Conversely, a nation may attribute its problems directly to a harsh central regime with a legacy of brutal repression. Such a regime could collapse because of internal power struggles, succession problems, revolt, a severe downward economic spiral, internal discontent, or outside influence. Fragility often occurs whenever the political system lacks proper checks and balances within the central government as well as between the federal, regional, and local governments. Different conditions may exist in different parts of the country. For example, the host-nation government may have firm control over parts of the country but limited ability to influence other regions. In such cases, NGOs or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may operate in these other areas under the principles of impartiality and neutrality. However, the lack of security in such areas may preclude effective operations by neutral and impartial organizations.

1-27. In a fragile state, Army units balance the use of pre-existing and functioning governmental structures, while avoiding the appearance of legitimacy on culpable members of the previous regime. Regardless of the reasons for host-nation governmental weakness, successful stabilization will likely require efforts to transform a fragile state into a stable one with adequate legitimacy and capacity at national, regional, and local levels.

CONFLICT

1-28. Units often perform stability tasks in a nation that experienced, or is experiencing, violent conflict. U.S. forces may be a party to the conflict or may be conducting peace operations to mitigate it. The conflict may be intra-state between ethnic, religious, or political rivals, or with a neighboring country, and may be a struggle for power, land, or resources. Conflict can dislocate populations, disrupt the economy, damage infrastructure, collapse social networks, break down the government, proliferate active militants, and reignite unresolved grievances that foster armed struggle. Stability tasks address the consequences of the conflict while preventing it from expanding or motivating additional conflict. The entire normalization process is a long-term endeavor, usually taking a generation for full recovery.

1-29. A few actors with distinct political objectives can orchestrate conflicts that manifest as civil wars, insurgencies, or revolts. Political conflict in an unsecure environment often accompanies criminality and gang activity disassociated from particular political goals. For Army units, the problem is not so much the conflict itself but the method to address it. Different forms of violence require specific responses and approaches, and it is often difficult to distinguish between purely criminal action and politically motivated crimes. An inappropriate response to a politically motivated crime may fuel more violence and may have a mobilizing effect against Army units.

1-30. Mass atrocities consist of the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or nonstate armed groups against noncombatants. Army units need to be prepared to separate warring factions, protect vulnerable victims, and possibly neutralize perpetrators. In addition, Army units may need to address complex factors such as the intentional destruction of homes or cultural heritage. JP 3-07 discusses mass atrocities in detail.

1-31. Widespread sexual and gender-based violence often accompanies conflict and indicates instability. For example, a victimized ethnic group can conduct a centralized campaign against women and children. Or prevalent conditions create an insecure environment that creates conflict for decentralized individuals or organizations. Chronic sexual and gender-based violence requires focused efforts to protect the population, bring perpetrators to justice, provide specialized treatment for its victims, and eventually create a normal environment with necessary levels of security. The victims often fear uniformed or armed personnel.

1-32. Armed conflict situations are governed by the law of war. Other situations of violence outside of armed conflict are governed by national and human rights laws.

POVERTY AND NONFUNCTIONING NATIONAL AND LOCAL MARKETS

1-33. Unstable and fragile countries often have widespread poverty and problems such as malnutrition, illiteracy, high mortality rates, disease, unemployment, and poor infrastructure. Stabilization will not immediately solve these long-term problems. In addition to requiring their own solutions, these and other problems may contribute to dissatisfaction among the population. Ironically, stability efforts may create more instability if expectations for improvement are not met or understood by the population. Excessive focus on poverty may overlook other more compelling factors. For example, persistent threats to public safety may result in long-term unemployment problems.

1-34. Whether from a single catastrophic event or long-term strategic failures, an operational environment is likely to lack functioning national and local markets for goods, services, labor, and capital. Such challenges impede Army forces and others from developing sustainable economic growth and essential services. When an operational environment has a prior history of a functioning market-based economy, restoring these markets must be a priority. When no such recent history exists, all partners in the stability efforts help build private markets.

BELLIGERENTS

1-35. Belligerent is a generic term for individuals or organizations that disrupt stabilization efforts through violence, subversion, and other provocations. Often, political ideology, the desire for revenge, religious beliefs, profit, or other interests motivate belligerents. They may include insurgents, criminal groups, hardliners, warlords, terrorists, vigilantes, and may directly seek to undermine a political settlement or indirectly do so because their actions create an insecure environment. Some belligerents may be convinced

to become part of a stable society, others may leave the country, and still others will remain on the fringe and may have to be defeated.

1-36. The real challenge is to capture the thinking, the logic, and the rationale for belligerents' actions. Some can be defeated by plain force, but some others plan to use the reaction of Army units to gain more popular support as a mobilizing factor against an occupying force. Thus, the more robust the response by Army and host-nation units, the more political advantage (and strength) the belligerents gain. While western military culture tends to prefer to "defeat" an enemy, some groups may consider fighting at any cost (including suffering total destruction) as a "victory." Failing to understand the belligerents' rationales may provide them not only the tactical initiative, but also the strategic initiative.

CORRUPTION

1-37. All countries suffer from some level of corruption, but unstable countries are particularly susceptible to corruption among officials at all levels. Such corruption often hinders satisfactory progress and fuels discontent. It can create significant friction in economic development, effective governance, and the efficient provision of essential services. Cultural norms in some societies leniently interpret what is permissible regarding gifts, nepotism, other favoritism, or the diversion of funds from their intended purposes. A fine line may exist between corruption, poor management, and wasteful spending. Some leaders may use money to establish or increase their influence over constituents through patronage. Although it is a form of corruption, it may obtain allegiance and gain cooperation.

1-38. Not all host-nation officials are corrupt. Even considering different cultural standards, some officials will be conscientious while others will be crooked. Persons with any authority—from a civil servant in a bureaucratic office to a police officer at a checkpoint—may abuse their positions and practice extracting payoffs. In some cultures, the recipient of a payoff provides part of the payoff to higher authorities or family members, thus institutionalizing the corruption.

1-39. Corruption during stability efforts poses at least three dilemmas for Army units. First, some corrupt officials may be otherwise supportive of U.S. efforts and effective in achieving results, particularly regarding security-related issues. For example, a local police chief may appear a helpful partner with Army units and apparently effective at maintaining stability and security but may simultaneously be conducting scams. These scams include extorting money from businesses and the population by apprehending people and demanding ransoms. Such individuals easily convince Army units that their opponents are simply insurgents or terrorists, and unqualified U.S. support may make the police chief seem omnipotent to others. The dilemma for Army units is what to do with a host-nation official who seems competent, aggressive, and useful but who may actually be undermining long-term stability and development. Opponents exploit any perception that Army units support corrupt officials or are involved in corruption by association.

1-40. Second, measures to reduce corruption can slow down the implementation of stability programs. Quick project implementation and rapid expenditure of funds, without close oversight and accountability, may result in corruption diverting money. Paradoxically, stability operations can create increased corruption. For example, host-nation leaders may receive lump-sum payments to provide a labor force or a security force, but they fill the payrolls with names of individuals nominally paid for the use of their names while leaders pocket the rest of the pay. If commanders delay projects until stringent accountability measures are in place, they risk unacceptably impeding progress. Commanders delay spending money until they understand the underlying causes of instability. Then they can pursue projects to mitigate the specific sources of instability.

1-41. Third, U.S. efforts to minimize corruption conflict with the imperative of having the HN take ownership of stability efforts and can undermine the authority of host-nation officials. Eventually, host-nation officials may have to remove authorities from power resulting in problems including disrupted personal relationships, a network of corruption that extends to high levels, or fear of retaliation. In some situations, Army units and their interagency partners can provide "top cover" for anticorruption efforts, potentially shielding the host-nation officials from retaliation.

1-42. Army commanders must determine acceptable corruption to move the process forward. They do this while continually setting the example, mentoring counterparts regarding professional conduct, factoring in what is acceptable to the local population, and complying with applicable U.S. laws and policies.

Establishing oversight bodies and mechanisms in the HN and from the United States can modify behavior early, so corruption does not become unmanageable.

OPERATIONAL VARIABLES

1-43. Commanders and staffs use operational and mission variables to help build their situational understanding. They analyze and describe an operational environment in terms of eight operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Generally these variables apply at all levels (national, regional, and local). Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission. They use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation and to visualize, describe, and direct operations. The mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). These variables inform and are informed by analytical tools such as the interagency conflict assessment framework (discussed in FM 3-07) and district stability framework (discussed in JP 3-07).

1-44. Commanders and staffs use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to help build their situational understanding. Upon receipt of a mission, they draw from an ongoing analysis of the operational variables the relevant information with respect to the mission that is required when using the METT-TC framework during mission analysis. Framing the mission statement is particularly important; in stability tasks. The primary focus of Army units varies among establishing and maintaining security to include defeating adversaries, building the capacity of host-nation security forces, conducting other stability tasks, or supporting other actors in their execution of such tasks. Units need a clear understanding of their intended purpose and allocate their efforts accordingly. For more information on mission variables, see ATTP 5-0.1.

1-45. Paragraphs 1-46 through 1-83 describe considerations of the operational variables that apply to operational environments of most operations with a preponderance of stability tasks. These paragraphs also discuss those aspects of the variables that leaders and Soldiers must understand. Understanding these variables will provide an appreciation of the multidimensional challenges, and the sources of resilience and positive opportunities that can be built upon.

POLITICAL

1-46. Stability situations are inherently political. Commanders desire a political settlement that convinces different segments of the population that peaceful means can adequately gain their legitimate interests. National, regional, and local political dynamics impact the setting and any resolution efforts. Political issues with neighboring countries or the rest of the international community may also be relevant. Unit leaders as well as the HN need to understand politically-related systems (including elections, executive administration, civil service, and judicial processes) and their dynamics, which may prove a challenge to outsiders given the complexities associated with cultural and political nuances. The current or future systems may also differ from those of the past.

1-47. Successful commanders understand the political context of stability efforts and various legal considerations. Army units conducting stability tasks operate under varying constraints. This section provides some political and legal guidelines and identifies some problematic areas. Resolution of these issues will likely be required at high levels of authority, but it is useful for tactical commanders to know them. See also paragraph 1-122 for short discussion of political primacy.

Political Guidelines

1-48. Political considerations include internal and external considerations. In some cases, tribal or religious leaders, rather than formally appointed or elected officials, may hold the real political power. Often, factions emerge from within political parties or power groups, developing intra-group conflict between rival contenders or between hardliners and moderates. These conflicts can be as violent as the struggle with outsiders. Units need to understand ideologies of different political organizations as well as the salient political issues.

1-49. In many cases, local actors care more about local political issues than national or philosophical topics, although issues such as secession or ethnic cleansing may be relevant at all levels. Political events may include elections, councils, caucuses, provincial council meeting, speeches, significant trials, demonstrations, anniversaries, legislation, and other occasions. These local actors include influential personages and elites who can impede or help achieve a political settlement. These may include governors, council members, elders, tribal or religious leaders, parliamentarians, judges, and prosecutors. Effective commanders engage with these political leaders in public and in private. Although public venues such as councils are valuable, many actors may feel obliged to perform a role of which other host-nation personnel will approve. Interagency diplomatic and development partners aid these efforts. The civilian leadership of these partners helps avoid presenting a wholly military presence to local populations, political leaders, and nonstate actors.

1-50. Host-nation sovereignty is normally respected, but in a failed or fragile state the HN may be unable or unwilling to exercise its sovereignty. Sometimes an intervention occurs against the wishes of the host-nation government. In such cases, the HN sets aside normal state functions (such as customs and immigration control over foreign forces, or judicial authority over its citizens). As the HN reestablishes governance and as an operation transitions from peace enforcement to peacekeeping, it regains more traditional state authority. Eventually the HN develops a status-of-forces agreement with the United States and other countries or IGOs. In time, the agreement will restrict Army units from getting involved in situations that pertain exclusively to host-nation personnel and property. The host-nation government will retain virtually all of its sovereign rights and responsibilities. U.S. forces will conduct operations with the approval of the host-nation government, concurrently building legitimacy in fledgling governments while respecting the will of the people.

1-51. External political considerations include issues with neighboring states that may include boundary disputes, the presence of refugees, or rebel groups in one country that have sanctuary in a neighboring country. The UN may authorize peacekeeping missions under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace and Acts of Aggression). Such mandates may apply to Army units even if they are not under UN control. Chapter VIII (Regional Arrangements) also permits IGOs such as the African Union, Organization of American States, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO) to take action when necessary. UN mandates typically include a protection-of-civilians clause that directs forces to protect unarmed civilians, in the forces' areas and within their capabilities, from imminent violence.

Legal Guidelines

1-52. International law holds that an occupation force assumes responsibility for governance and such matters as law and order when the host-nation government is incapable of doing so. In the wake of decisive actions that result in regime removal, Army units often act as a transitional military authority (TMA). UN mandates regarding interim governance of the HN may also apply.

1-53. Federal law may restrict or establish specific procedures for conducting certain actions that might seem appropriate during stability efforts, such as concluding international agreements; providing security force assistance to host-nation police forces; conducting humanitarian demining; and transferring U.S. property to host-nation forces. Under normal circumstances, the Department of State conducts many of such activities. Sometimes U.S. forces use Department of Defense (DOD) assets to conduct activities normally under the purview of the Department of State.

MILITARY

1-54. During stability efforts, U.S. forces have military considerations that concern security, such as police and border security. Efforts may address both internal and external threats. The internal security sector ideally should not be a military issue; however, the military may have to support domestic security until police forces can maintain internal security. Security-related systems include normal staff areas such as operations, personnel, intelligence, and logistics.

1-55. Military areas include bases and areas of responsibility (AORs) for U.S. forces; multinational partners; host-nation military, police, and paramilitary forces; insurgent operational areas; and other armed

elements such as international peacekeeping forces. In some situations cross-border considerations will also be important. Other locations include bases for threats and likely locations for skirmishes, ambushes, or improvised explosive device attacks based upon pattern analysis of previous incidents.

1-56. Military capabilities include personnel and support. Army units and their partners need enough personnel to adequately cover the AOR and perform duties such as patrolling, security, engineering, and sustainment. Supporting capabilities such as communicating with local personnel are also critical, and Army units may require augmentation with niche capabilities such as forensics analysis or signals intercept. Successful commanders understand the capabilities and limitations of partnered elements, particularly host-nation forces and police. The partnered elements often understand the local area and the people but lack technical capabilities such as night vision, explosive ordinance removal, and aviation. It is particularly critical to understand the capabilities of adversaries such as insurgents, terrorists, or other threats.

1-57. Key military actors consist of leaders in military and police organizations, including former members who retain influence. Some host-nation military leaders have little or no formal military education, and those that do may harbor disdainful attitudes towards those who do not. Military actors account for supporting and supported forces, partners (including police, military, and paramilitary forces of the HN as well as international organizations), and associated command relationships. Units may have challenging coordination requirements with special operations forces that operate in the operational area but report through a different chain of command. Adversaries may be unified or divided into multiple groups, without a permanent organizational structure.

ECONOMIC

1-58. Economic systems include trade, agriculture, manufacturing, investment, commerce, banking, monetary policy, and taxation. Illicit systems may include human trafficking, the black market, smuggling, drugs, extortion, and corruption. Economic drivers of conflict—such as low wages, exploited working classes or farmers, or unemployment—may require mitigation to foster stability. In some situations, migratory tribes may compete with sedentary tribes for the same land. Economic divisions may reinforce ethnic schisms. For example, a majority population may resent a wealthier merchant class comprised of an ethnic minority. Improved economic conditions in one area may attract an influx that results in heightened tensions. To understand and establish economic conditions, units may require expertise normally found in nonmilitary interagency partners or NGOs. Economic matters may also influence or be influenced by political favoritism.

1-59. Within a unit's operational area, economic considerations include agricultural regions, trade and bazaar areas, smuggling routes, trade routes, industrial areas, and regions with extractable raw materials. Legitimate economic-related areas may require special emphasis to become functional. For example, farm tractors may require prioritization for fuel to get crops planted, and farmers may need military or police escorts to get their products to the market and prevent drug lords from robbing them. Key economic facilities include factories, banks, warehouses, mines, businesses, marketplaces, and camps for migrant workers. Establishing operational enterprises creates employment, fuels investment and economic growth, and fosters a positive overall environment. Micro businesses develop in almost any environment, including dislocated civilian camps. Partners may provide low-interest loans, grants, seed money, or tools and machinery to get these entities started, and a secure environment is required to keep them operational and attract new businesses. Profitable enterprises in any situation are vulnerable to extortion.

1-60. An important economic capability is to provide for population needs, which may be done by humanitarian assistance, by central distribution from the government, or via a market economy. Stability forces deliver, distribute, and control humanitarian assistance to deter theft by criminal groups or other unintended recipients. In close cooperation with civilian interagency partners, Army commanders understand the region's ability to provide economic growth, employment, access to banks, and encourage investment. They may also provide assistance to develop agricultural capabilities including irrigation facilities, access to fertilizer, and withstand drought and minimize soil erosion. Other relevant issues include the capability to restrict illegitimate economic activities. Units take care not to undermine the local markets with humanitarian assistance. For example, free grain may ruin farmers and force them to engage with drug lords to grow illicit crops. Units also avoid implementing counterproductive assistance projects

that are not sustainable, may damage existing capabilities, or divert limited resources from achieving goals and objectives.

1-61. Economic actors include banks, large landholders, cooperatives, corporations, governmental agencies, international economic organizations and NGOs, and illicit organizations. Individuals can be significant, such as bankers, landholders, merchants, moneylenders, illegal facilitators, and smugglers. Some have the wealth or relationships to give them sufficient influence to be *de facto* political actors as well.

1-62. Hospitals and universities are key drivers of economic activity. Universities are not only a key source of human capital development, but they are also stable sources of jobs and investment. Additionally, they can play a central role in developing a more robust civil society and in enhancing the capacity of government. Hospitals must similarly be seen as more than providers of public health services. They provide stable sources of jobs, investment, and community engagement.

1-63. Droughts, harvests, business openings, natural disasters, currency devaluations, and the lifting or imposition of economic sanctions can affect economic development. These situations can exacerbate grievances. Even favorable events can aggravate conflict if they create envy and increase the divide between "haves" and "have nots."

SOCIAL

1-64. Social considerations include categories such as religion, tribe, ethnic groups, clubs, athletic organizations, or any other categories that causes an individual to identify with a group as well as or instead of the nation. Commanders attune to cultural practices in both homogenous and heterogeneous societies; Soldiers should avoid appearing disdainful, condescending, ambivalent, or arrogant with respect to differences in other societies. Soldiers treat everyone respectfully since they never know who wields authority; manner and dress do not always convey power and position. Other social issues include dislocated civilians, trends such as urbanization, literacy rates, and health matters such as malnutrition or diseases. Frequently social considerations affect other areas, such as the ethnic composition of security forces or the civil service.

1-65. The loyalties of some host-nation populations strongly associate with identity groups such as tribes, clans, and families. Unlike Western cultures, which tend to value individual rights, some cultures tend to subordinate individuals to collectives such as tribe, clan, village, religion, or family. Frequently these loyalties claim the main loyalties of individuals, provide a self-organization capability, and influence behavior. These loyalties may help build community-level progress or impede stability efforts because loyalty to identity groups is stronger than loyalty to the state or country. In some cases, conflict may have weakened or destroyed these societal authorities, and reestablishing these networks may be an immediate concern. Traditional leadership groups such as tribal councils may have an impact and have varying levels of formal organization or composition. Some communities may have or build existing social clubs or sports teams for normalcy. However, belligerents can draft recruits from these clubs. Some identity groups share areas with other identity groups, particularly in villages, urbanized settings, or areas with scarce resources.

1-66. The human terrain system provides sociocultural teams to commanders and staffs to improve their understanding of the local population. This system deploys two types of teams: human terrain teams and human terrain analysis teams. Human terrain teams fully integrate into unit staffs, conducting field research among the local population. Human terrain analysis teams deploy to support division-level commands. As part of the commander's staff, these teams conduct unclassified open-source and field research, synthesizes the information from human terrain teams, and analyzes human terrain information. (See http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/Default.aspx for details on the human terrain system.)

1-67. Other key social considerations include the strength of the societal structures and practices identified above and the level of tolerance for other groups. Societal influences can readily translate into political power. Societal groups can create a compelling narrative that inflames grievances and fuels conflict. Local actors will likely perceive the actions of Army units within the framework of such a narrative. Information capabilities, such as military information support operations (MISO), can provide an alternative narrative that emphasizes nonviolent means to address grievances and other ways to decrease instability. Army units coordinate and synchronize the narrative and all associated messages and actions with other information

capabilities to ensure consistency and mutually supporting efforts. For more information on MISO in stability tasks, refer to DODI 3000.05.

1-68. Individuals with social influence include leaders of ethnic, religious, or regional identity groups. Their stature often provides them political power greater than that of governmental officials. Sometimes key tribal leaders remain inaccessible to foreign forces and rely on intermediaries (with little decisionmaking authority) to dialogue with Army units. Often a population admires celebrities such as sports figures who can potentially influence attitudes and behavior. Military information support Soldiers train in interpersonal and cross-cultural communications. They can exert significant influence on local leaders and other communicators to achieve military objectives. These Soldiers also serve as advisors to commanders on the use of information and specific ways to influence individuals, groups, and populations within the area of operations.

1-69. Depending upon the culture, religious days, holidays, days of remembrance, and festivals may have a significant impact upon an operational environment. Such events could incite increased activism, requiring units to be on heightened alert. Other events promote relaxation, requiring units to scale back operations and maintain a low profile. Family events such as weddings, births, and funerals are important in most societies, and could be opportunities for engagement or targets of belligerents. Commanders use their judgment to determine whether or not U.S. presence at such events would be welcome; host-nation counterparts may provide the best advice in this regard.

1-70. Operations account for religious and other cultural sites. In addition to the desire to avoid damage by U.S. units, belligerents can target these sites to foment instability, particularly if people frequent the locations for communal activities.

INFORMATION

1-71. Information systems include widespread media such as radio, television, cellular networks, and the Internet as well as local methods such as posters, flyers, village loudspeakers, rumor, and meetings. Commanders consider telecommunications—such as broadcast stations, transmission means, and reception methods here—if paragraphs 1-74 through 1-78 do not discuss it. Usually U.S. units focus on local operational areas, but localized actions and messages can frequently receive much wider attention. Authorities at all levels may attempt to achieve centralized control of information efforts; however, this can limit the flexibility and responsiveness of lower echelons that attempt to address their own unique situations.

1-72. Commanders consider information organizations and their actors, including government and independent news agencies. Some organizations will be national or local, while others may be internationally-based. Many will strive for objectivity, most will emphasize sensationalist events, and a few will be extremely biased. Belligerents and other factions may establish their own information organizations and media, which could operate clandestinely. As in the United States, host-nation governments have information offices or public affairs offices at different levels with varying degrees of perceived credibility. Other organizations such as religious groups, NGOs, businesses, and councils also wield informational power. Information actors include media owners, political and religious leaders, leaders and elders in identity groups, and influential businessmen or celebrities. In many cases, a respected individual from one field may have referent power that commanders can harness to advance a political message. While the United States may have a sophisticated manner of marketing messages, certain host-nation representatives (such as newspersons, playwrights, entertainers, poets, or politicians) must assume the lead because they possess the cultural, linguistic, and social skills to connect with the people.

1-73. Significant information structures include radio, television, internet cafes, and cellular telephone stations, as well as other telecommunications infrastructure such as relay towers. The structures used by partners require dedicated security arrangements. U.S. forces need to eliminate or control structures used by threats. Other structures include print shops and office buildings used by information organizations. Opponents may target the latter. Relevant areas include those covered by information dissemination methods, as well as those which could be reached if actors develop a new source, such as a radio station. Some areas are widespread; others extremely localized. Some of the latter, such as traffic control points or

bus stations, may have a large population throughput and may therefore be good places for information dissemination.

1-74. A capable information source maintains a level of credibility with intended audiences. Ideally, an information organization's credibility is at its highest when it provides accurate, immediate, and entertaining or interesting news. In practice, sources often sacrifice accuracy so they can quickly present interesting stories. Other relevant capabilities include the literacy rate in the HN; the availability of electronic media such as televisions, cell phones, and computers; the viability of open media and its ability to report fairly and accurately; and the ability of different groups to deliver messages and have them resonate with their intended audiences. Social media effectively communicates enabling additional information capabilities as stability improves. Nevertheless, low-technology dissemination through religious and tribal entities can retain their influence. Army units and partners may need to be capable of refuting or disrupting adversarial information efforts. Adversaries often have an inherent advantage because the United States and its partners must verify events. Adversaries can disseminate propaganda more quickly and are rarely held accountable for lies. Effective commanders maintain contact with the local population to monitor such propaganda efforts and remain alert to sudden changes in the atmosphere. By distributing radios, commanders can connect the populace to government radio stations.

1-75. Most significant events are inherently informational, such as acts of violence, demonstrations, religious services, transfers of authority, elections, leadership changes, speeches by political leaders, press conferences, releases of reports, and meetings. Positive events, such as the opening of a school, can have a favorable informational impact. Similarly, the effect of negative events such as civilian casualties or misconduct by members of Army units can be magnified in the information realm. Army units and their partners must disseminate information effectively. Otherwise adversaries can manipulate public perceptions with their own plausible, information activities including misrepresentation.

INFRASTRUCTURE

1-76. Infrastructure systems include sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (SWEAT-MSO). Infrastructure closely relates to the physical environment. It also undergirds other operational variables, particularly the facilities required for political, military, security, economic, and information functions. In many cases, Army units will use the same infrastructure for operations and sustainment. This use may create resentment if the population has restricted access to the infrastructure as a result.

1-77. Infrastructure includes the networks of pipelines, power lines, sewage lines or ditches, roads, railroads, and irrigation means, as well as the locations of any key nodes. Key structures include facilities such as bridges, tunnels, dams, depots, water purification plants, sewage treatment plants, government buildings, hospitals, schools, port facilities, airports, refineries, and other facilities. Often a combination of stationary forces and patrols, as well as U.S. and host-nation security elements, provides required security from sabotage or theft. In addition to security threats to these facilities, Army units may need to monitor and help redress matters of capacity, sustainment, operational efficiency, and susceptibility to corruption. Some structures may be locally significant; for example, a small bridge over a ravine may permit vehicle traffic to a remote village. Others, such as airfields or seaports, may have operational or strategic importance.

1-78. Facilities may need to be repaired or upgraded. Army units may find it advantageous to occupy some host-nation facilities. Commanders carefully consider repairs or renovations of current infrastructure in terms of what the HN considers culturally acceptable and sustainable. Repair of infrastructure inconsistent with current host-nation standards or cultural acceptability may cause resentment and waste U.S. government funds. Chapter 2 discusses this in more detail.

1-79. The infrastructure capability addresses both the capacity to meet the intended needs of the population and the ability of the HN to operate and maintain the infrastructure effectively and to build new infrastructure as required. A related issue is the infrastructure's ability to support the operational and logistic requirements of Army units and other users such as NGOs. Heavy use may degrade infrastructure; armored vehicles may quickly destroy roadways and make them unusable for civilian vehicles. Some infrastructures depend on weather; rains or rainy seasons may make roads impassable susceptible to

flooding. Distribution networks such as power lines and water lines may be vulnerable to poachers who siphon off power or water to the detriment of users located further down the chain. In most cases, Army units consult host-nation authorities regarding additional capabilities. Benefactors avoid making unilateral decisions and overlooking previously subordinated peoples.

1-80. Infrastructure actors include government ministries and the personnel responsible for running infrastructure. These organizations may be hampered by corruption, appointments that result from patronage or nepotism, and involvement with a previous regime or extremist political party. Other actors include corporations and construction companies that can invest in and build new infrastructure, including foreign firms as well as domestic ones. Army units prefer to use host-nation companies. However, some major projects require levels of expertise and financial resources available only from foreign corporations. Successful stability efforts require hiring local labor for projects to gain cooperation and loyalty as well as to spur the local economy.

1-81. Key actors include ministry officials at the local, regional, and national levels; facility managers; members of local development councils; and owners of construction companies. Some may have low competence levels or may be corrupt; others may have ties to a previous regime or political party with a poor human rights record. In some situations such personnel may have been removed from office and replaced by individuals with little experience. Other key actors include representatives from USG agencies, IGOs, international organizations, and NGOs who can assist with infrastructure assessment, development, and operations.

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT

1-82. Geographical considerations can significantly affect the stability conditions in the HN as well as the stabilization efforts of Army units and their partners. Terrain such as rivers, mountains, and deserts can compartmentalize the country or provide the basis for conflict between groups. River areas may be primary sources of water and fertile agricultural land, as well as concentration points for population and, therefore, grounds for conflict. Mountains may regionally divide a country and make it difficult for a central government to exert effective control. Rugged terrain such as jungles and swamps can impede access by Army units and organizations while providing sanctuary to belligerents. Weather patterns also impact situation. Environmental factors such as desertification, drought, or severe storms can exacerbate normal seasonal variations. Harsh weather will slow progress by delaying projects, diminishing agricultural yields, blocking roads, and potentially increasing human suffering.

TIME

1-83. Several temporal issues may affect stability efforts. First, after a conflict or other crisis, a limited "golden hour" may appear in which the population has widespread optimism and expectation of improved conditions in the near future. This is an important time to organize stabilization efforts, integrate partners effectively, preempt the organization of resistance, and to set realistic expectations. A second set of considerations concerns cyclic events such as holidays, seasons, and lunar periods. Such events can create changes from normal patterns of behavior, potentially increasing or decreasing violent acts. For example, belligerents who operate primarily at night may do so during periods of good illumination, or they may prefer to operate during particular seasons. Finally, stabilization may have temporal parameters such as elections, transitions, and planned troop level reductions. Different time scales may apply to different desired results. For example, forces may quickly disarm and demobilize combatants but find reintegrating them into society a longer process requiring lengthy education and reconciliation. Changing gender norms in some societies will also require a lengthy evolution.

ACTORS

1-84. The relevant actors in operational environments broadly fit in three categories: partners, threats, or others. These are not fixed classifications, and a particular actor may shift between categories depending upon the circumstances. Successful stability efforts require a comprehensive approach that effectively integrates or coordinates with a range of actors who can make constructive contributions, while expanding the set of such actors. See also the individual operational variables for discussions concerning actors.

PARTNERS

1-85. Partners include individuals or groups that support U.S. forces and their actions. They consist of other units, multinational forces, civilians, contractors, host-nation forces and organizations, and others. An Army unit conducting operations with a preponderance of stability tasks may have other U.S. forces that are partners on a temporary or relatively permanent basis. These latter units fall under a different chain of command, generally with a different mission, and may include special operations forces, base operations units or garrisons, logistic units, and aviation or air forces.

1-86. Another set of partners may include multinational forces or allies that fall under a different chain of command. These units may conduct limited or specialized functions, or operate in the Army unit's area of interest. Even when these units fall under U.S. operational control, their respective national chains of command frequently retain some level of authority over their activities.

1-87. Effective commanders work closely with civilian partners, especially representatives from the Department of State, American embassy, and USAID. Civilian leadership provides both a civilian face to the host-nation public and officials and draws on the extensive expertise regarding development and diplomatic matters. USG agencies may operate in composite organizations such as PRTs, FACTs, or DARTs. In some situations they organize with and fall under the operational control of Army units. In most cases, however, they will take their directions from the American Embassy.

1-88. Army units view contractors as partners in many circumstances. Some contractors conduct security-related functions while others perform tasks such as transportation, training, construction, or explosive hazard clearing operations. Several actors require the services of contractors: DOD, Department of State, other USG agencies, the HN, or nongovernmental actors. While some contractors may operate independently of Army units, the host-nation population often perceives them as being allied with U.S. forces. In part due to this perception, opponents may target contractors, requiring Army units to consider their security requirements.

1-89. Host-nation partners may include military, police, border, intelligence, paramilitary, and other security elements such as militias or private security companies. Other potential partners may include host-nation government representatives and agencies, tribal leaders, and influential private citizens.

1-90. If present in the HN, IGOs such as the UN, African Union, European Union, and others can be valuable partners for stabilization and reconstruction because of their knowledge of the local situation, ties, and experience. They may have military or nonmilitary components and will operate under their own mandates and direction. Their forces may be best suited for a relatively benign peacekeeping role and less militarily capable than U.S. Army units, but they are generally perceived as legitimate by a wide range of actors. By maintaining a safe and secure environment, nonmilitary organizations—such as the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and World Health Organization—often prove vital in providing humanitarian assistance and development. Enabling such organizations may be one of the most important stability objectives.

1-91. Although U.S. forces often view NGOs as partners to be integrated, most NGOs prefer a clearly neutral posture and avoid being associated with any military force. Paragraph 1-98 discusses NGOs in detail.

THREATS

1-92. Threats include both adversaries and enemies. An *adversary* is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). An *enemy* is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). This category includes enemy forces that could include undefeated remnants from previous conflict, insurgents, opponents in a civil war, terrorist groups, and belligerents such as criminal groups, gangs, sectarian militias, warlords, and private armies. Some may pursue political change, others may act in self-interest through criminal acts that create an insecure environment, and still others may simply oppose the presence of U.S. forces. In some cases, opponents may be motivated by valid grievances such as a host-nation government or military that is abusive or corrupt.

1-93. Threats may ignore rules of war and national boundaries and are therefore less constrained than Army units. They may have sanctuaries in neighboring countries and receive support from outside sources.

Their strategy often consists of attacks on vulnerable targets, coercion by threats, intimidation, terrorist acts, kidnapping, assassination, and reprisals against collaborators. Threats undermine the HN's effectiveness or legitimacy and provoke the host-nation and Army units to overreact in ways that alienate the population.

1-94. Sometimes threats negotiate an end to their resistance When committed opponents negotiate, frequently they are under pressure from setbacks and seeking time to regroup. In such cases, they use negotiating merely as a stalling tactic.

OTHERS

1-95. Other individuals and organizations are not just a collection of marginal actors. Rather, they may be the most significant in determining the success or failure of a stability effort. Some will be positive influences, some will be negative, and many will be neutral bystanders. Army units pay attention to actors within their areas of operations while remaining aware of relevant actors located in other areas to include in other countries.

1-96. Members of the population sometimes adopt a wait-and-see attitude before committing their support to any faction, until they are sure that a faction will succeed. In many cases, a faction intimidates or coerces the population into support. A faction might organize the population by ethnic groups and then victimize those groups by repression or synchronized atrocities.

1-97. Host-nation individuals with positive or negative influences could include religious or tribal leaders, elders, family members, and prominent personalities. If convinced to support Army units or the host-nation government, they can in turn influence the actions of those who might join or leave insurgent groups or other adversaries. Even in some traditional societies publicly dominated by males, women (particularly mothers) may have significant private influence within their families.

1-98. NGOs may or may not share the same general interests as the USG, the HN, or local actors. Most NGOs strive for neutrality and avoid efforts to be coordinated by the military. Their participation frequently determines the success of stability efforts, although their agendas could counter the agendas of those actors who view them as Western corrupters of local societies. Relevant NGOs generally fall into three groups: humanitarian NGOs that provide emergency assistance; development NGOs that foster long-term growth; and human rights NGOs that monitor and report on political and judicial conditions. Many NGOs serve as executive agents or *de facto* subcontractors for international organizations, IGOs, or governmental organizations such as USAID.

1-99. NGOs coordinate internally and externally. To coordinate their own efforts, many NGOs self-organize into loose functional clusters according to the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee, as depicted in table 1-1. NGOs coordinate reluctantly with external groups. Army units often work through civilian representatives from USAID, the UN, or the HN when coordinating with NGOs. Humanitarian organizations avoid any blurring of the distinction between neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian action and development aid derived from political engagement, as the latter is potentially linked to security concerns or support to one side. An effective commander avoids publicly citing NGOs as information sources, as that might jeopardize their neutrality and invite retaliation by adversaries. Army units primarily use civil-military operations centers operated by civil affairs units to coordinate with NGOs.

1-100. Army units operating with NGOs follow these guidelines:

- Military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities.
- Military personnel make prior arrangements before visiting NGOs.
- Military personnel do not refer to NGOs as "force multipliers" or "partners" or other similar terms.
- U.S. forces respect a NGO's decision to not serve as an implementing partner.

For more information see *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments.*

Table 1-1. Inter-Agency Standing Committee lead agencies

	Function	*Lead Agency*	*Web Site*
Stability Issues	Agriculture	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	www.fao.org
	Camp Coordination and Management	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	www.unhcr.org
		International Organization for Migration (IOM)	www.iom.int
	Early Recovery	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	www.undp.org
	Education	Save the Children	www.savethechildren.net
		United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	www.unicef.org
	Emergency Shelter	Disaster—International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) Societies	www.ifrc.org
		Conflict—UNHCR	www.unhcr.org
	Emergency Telecommunications	Process—United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	http://unocha.org
		Data and Security Communications—World Food Programme (WFP)	www.wfp.org
	Health	World Health Organization (WHO)	www.who.int
	Logistics	WFP	www.wfp.org
	Nutrition	UNICEF	www.unicef.org
	Protection	UNHCR	www.unhcr.org
	Water Sanitation and Hygiene	UNICEF	www.unicef.org
Cross-Cutting Issues	Age	HelpAge International	www.helpage.org
	Environment	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)	www.unep.org
	Gender	United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	www.unfpa.org
		WHO	www.who.int
	HIV/AIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)	www.unaids.org

1-101. The media is another set of actors that can potentially have positive or negative impacts. Like NGOs, most media will try to avoid being beholden to or spokesmen for the military; however, American and other western reporters will often rely on Army units for logistic support. Host-nation media will likely be new enterprises and if nurtured can watch for corruption and inefficiency. However, governmental control or reprisals violent actors may restrain host-nation media.

1-102. Western societies often assume that governments that do not comment on their political or military operations are hiding something or are committing an illegal or immoral act. Therefore, Army units should have established talking points if media contact occurs. Talking points reinforce that Army forces are honored to serve the people of the HN and committed to a safe and stable environment. Soldiers should not answer questions with "No comment." Rather they answer, "We do not comment on future operations," "That information is classified," or "I am not qualified to talk about that." Soldiers should also be relaxed, positive, and polite, maintaining their military bearing—and mindful of operations security—at all times.

SECTION II – STABILITY TASKS

1-103. Stabilization frequently consists of short-term, mid-term, and long-range efforts that support five primary stability tasks. These tasks involve U.S. and multinational forces; USG agencies, IGOs, and international organizations and their implementing partners; and host-nation organizations.

INITIAL RESPONSE, TRANSFORMATION, AND FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

1-104. Stability tasks occur in three phases recognized in Army doctrine and by USG agencies. These phases facilitate identifying lead responsibilities and determining priorities. Different parts of the HN may be in different phases, depending upon the local conditions.

1-105. The first phase, initial response, begins as soon as possible when a U.S. capability is present and focuses on early efforts to establish basic levels of security, provide humanitarian assistance, and establish control over the AO. These efforts may begin when Army units still place the operational emphasis on defeating organized adversaries and before significant organizational or host-nation capacities exist to conduct these tasks. Consequently, Army units acting as a TMA may be the lead agent. These units integrate other partners as soon as possible to ensure unity of effort, achieve proper long-term progress, and facilitate transitions. Units seek clarity from their chain of command as to whether they have formal TMA responsibility and authority or they support a civil authority in its execution of stabilization and reconstruction.

1-106. The second phase, transformation, focuses on developing the host-nation systems required for security, governance, rule of law, economic development, and social well-being. These efforts may largely occur during Phase IV (Stabilize) and responsibility may begin to shift from the TMA (if designated) to a transitional civil authority under the control of the USG through the American Embassy, or to a transitional civil authority established by the UN or other IGO. Host-nation authorities become increasingly involved in decisionmaking at all levels.

1-107. In the final phase, Fostering Sustainability, the transitional civil authority transfers responsibility to host-nation authorities. At the same time, international organizations (including Army units, USG agencies, IGOs, international organizations, and NGOs) assume a supporting role as the country becomes self-sufficient. Security force assistance and other developmental programs may continue.

FIVE PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

1-108. Army units conduct or support five primary stability tasks (discussed in detail in chapter 2 through chapter 6):

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

These mutually supporting efforts encompass the military and nonmilitary efforts generally required to achieve successful stability and apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (see figure 1-2). These tasks are similar to stabilization and reconstruction frameworks used by other interagency and international partners. Normally Army units cannot expect to develop capacities that have never existed; this is the role of civilian agencies that Army units enable and, in some cases, support.

MILITARY ROLES

1-109. During stability tasks, the role for Army units varies greatly depending upon the security environment, the authority and responsibility of the forces, and the presence and capacities of other nonmilitary actors. In some cases, these other actors will be well established before stability tasks begin; in

other situations, Army units will operate before other actors have a significant presence. For their part, Army units focus on defeating adversaries and may not be able to devote much effort to the nonmilitary stability tasks.

1-110. Military forces focus on maintaining a secure environment so that other actors with the requisite expertise can perform economic, judicial, governance, and essential services functions. This ideal situation must ultimately exist before the HN can transition to a stable society. Army units remain actively involved in providing security force assistance to host-nation elements, including training, advisory support, and perhaps some highly technical capabilities.

1-111. Sometimes, Army units support and closely interact with nonmilitary actors. Interagency teams such as PRTs, FACTs, or DARTs then work closely with Army units or integrate with the teams while reporting through other channels. Civilians normally lead humanitarian and development operations. In these cases, sometimes Army commanders get heavily involved in decisionmaking about nonmilitary issues and use their forces to augment the operations of other actors. Augmentation ranges from providing transportation, communications, and security to assisting with specialized efforts such as medical support or engineering.



Figure 1-2. Stability tasks and stability principles

1-112. In extreme situations, particularly when ending major combat operations, Army units conduct the full range of stability tasks without the benefit of civilian partners. A unit may be formally designated as the TMA in an area with responsibility for governance, providing essential services, and law and order. Sometimes, the unit will not have a formal TMA designation but still act in this capacity because no other authorities exist. Units rely heavily on civil affairs personnel and carefully selected host-nation representatives for advice when involved in conducting civil affairs operations.

1-113. As part of a joint force, Army units may be subordinated to Marine Corps, Navy, or Air Force headquarters or may in turn have units from other Services subordinated to them. This may require a familiarity with applicable joint doctrine and that of other Services.

STABILITY AND DEFEAT MECHANISMS

1-114. Commanders and staffs determine the appropriate combination of stability mechanisms (compel, control, influence, and support) and defeat mechanisms (destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, isolate) to achieve desired results. Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ stability. When military forces intervene in an unstable situation, forces use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions enough to protect the civilians. In a stability context, U.S. forces employ nonlethal means against nonmilitary individuals or organizations in part by acting against their motivations, not just their capabilities. Commanders consider stability and defeat mechanisms concurrently as units simultaneously counter belligerents and build the HN. FM 3-07 discusses stability and defeat mechanisms in more detail.

SECTION III – STABILITY PRINCIPLES

1-115. Units often conduct stability tasks that extend across time and space. Units at different echelons balance simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks while striving for unity of effort among diverse actors. Additionally, stability efforts attempt to transform conflict and retain legitimacy while building host-nation capacity and reinforcing the rule of law. These efforts mitigate fragile state characteristics prevalent at the national, regional, and local levels. Five basic stability principles undergird stability efforts and apply to all primary stability tasks:

- Conflict transformation.
- Unity of effort and unity of purpose.
- Legitimacy and host-nation ownership.
- Building partner capacity.
- Rule of law.

CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

1-116. Successful stability efforts transform the resolution of political conflict from violent to peaceful means. This requires reducing drivers of conflict, strengthening mitigators in all areas, and building host-nation capacity to manage political, economic, and social competition peacefully. Commanders consider motivations of groups and individuals, reasons they resort to violence, and sources of their support. Commanders also consider the sources of societal and institutional resilience and methods to reinforce peaceful mitigating factors. Significant upcoming events such as elections or trials can drive additional conflict or be carefully managed to avoid violence. Ultimately, effective governance and rule of law reduce violent conflict. Corrupt and incompetent governments and judiciary processes often contribute to more violence. A generalized intent to "do no harm" helps mitigate the possibility that stability efforts do not have the second-order effect of establishing conditions for future conflict.

UNITY OF EFFORT AND UNITY OF PURPOSE

1-117. Unity of effort includes a shared understanding of an operational environment and purpose, and refers to cooperative and synergistic measures by a diverse set of actors. *Unity of effort* is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Actors include U.S. forces,

USG development and diplomatic agencies, multinational partners, host-nation governmental agencies, IGOs, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector actors. These actors do not fall under a common authority, nor will their perspectives, priorities, and intentions align or sequence perfectly. In some cases, the best they can achieve is a common purpose or understanding. Nevertheless, other actors usually have much greater longevity in the HN, a deeper understanding of the broader context, and valuable and complementary contributions to long-term recovery. When exercising the mission command warfighting function, Army commanders and leaders apply adroit diplomatic and communications skills to build constructive relationships with these actors into a unified action.

LEGITIMACY AND HOST-NATION OWNERSHIP

1-118. Legitimacy has four dimensions: mandate, manner, consent, and expectations. The mandate addresses the authority behind the mission—which may be the UN or another IGO—as well as the political direction for the actors as determined by their respective government authorities. Equally important, the mandate either directly or through omission constrains the actors. Actors cannot assume authorization for actions. The second dimension, manner, pertains to the conduct of the operations, which should be professional and according to national and international law. Actors obtain consent from the HN and, in some cases, from other regional leaders and populations. Often these leaders and populations are divided as to the operation's legitimacy, desirability, impartiality, or effectiveness. Host-nation perceptions of legitimacy differ from those of outsiders because of cultural differences, self-interest, or other factors. Finally, actors perceive an operation as legitimate insofar as it meets expectations and shows demonstrable progress. Different audiences—host-nation population, leadership, subgroups, the international community, the U.S. Congress, participating Soldiers, and the American people—continually assess the operation's legitimacy. These audiences base their perceptions on the actions at the tactical levels and their subsequent effects. Military information capabilities, such as MISO, enable Army units to establish and maintain the perceived legitimacy of stability efforts among leaders and populations. These capabilities explain an operation, including its legal and authoritative bases, objectives, impartiality, and duration.

1-119. Stability tasks often begin because the HN lacks ownership of the problems, and it does not have the will or ability to resolve its own problems. These tasks will seldom succeed if the HN does not assume responsibility for solutions that it supports and can implement. U.S. forces cultivate host-nation ownership at all levels from the earliest stages, even when Army units and other USG agencies are making the significant decisions. Responsible and competent host-nation representatives incorporate outside advice and the rationale for decisions as needed. To provide HN leaders with peace and good governance, external agencies seeking to help develop relationships with host-nation actors with local knowledge and ownership. These relationships include extended mentoring while gradually transitioning authority and responsibility to the HN. The critical period occurs once the United States relinquishes decisionmaking authority and the HN takes ownership of resolving difficult problems, such as removing inept or corrupt officials. Throughout the process, commanders avoid the temptation to exclude host-nation leaders from decisionmaking and operations. While it may be expedient, such practices often create resistance and undermine the stability effort's long-term success.

1-120. Host-nation consultations should include members of civil society. It is important to obtain different perspectives on security needs and other issues from a broad spectrum of society, not just government officials. Vulnerable and marginalized populations in particular should be given a voice.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

1-121. Army units frequently engage in building partner capacity. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. Partners may include host-nation forces, other host-nation security forces, host-nation organizations including government agencies, or other actors such as USG agencies, IGOs, international organizations, or NGOs. Army units generally lead efforts to build the capacity of host-nation security forces and may provide enabling support for other actors.

RULE OF LAW

1-122. *Rule of law* is a principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. Successful stability efforts ultimately depend on fairness applied through the rule of law. Rule of law limits the power of government by setting rules and procedures that prohibit the accumulation of autocratic power. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decisionmaking, and legal certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness as well as promote procedural and legal transparency.

Chapter 2
Establish Civil Security

Civil security provides for the safety of the HN and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Without a reasonable level of civil security, other stability tasks are infeasible. This chapter describes how Army units initially establish civil security, how they maintain an acceptable level of civil security, and how they enable host-nation security forces to assume responsibility for this function.

CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES TO ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

2-1. Of the five primary stability tasks, establish civil security aligns closest with normal Army capabilities and responsibilities. Throughout the phases of each stability task (initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability), military forces will likely be the supported or executive agent, even when other nonmilitary partners have an extensive presence.

CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

2-2. Civil security requires five necessary conditions:

- Cessation of large-scale violence.
- Public order.
- Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence.
- Physical protection.
- Territorial security.

2-3. Stability requires the cessation of large-scale violence. Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt. Military forces separated and are monitoring warring parties, implemented a peace agreement or, and have managed violent belligerents.

2-4. Stability requires public order. Military forces establish public order by enforcing laws equitably; protecting the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals; reducing criminal and politically motivated violence to a minimum; and pursuing, arresting, and detaining criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks). Military forces also improve the cleanliness and order of important public places.

2-5. Stability requires legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence. Military forces identify, disarm, and demobilize major illegal armed groups. They have also vetted and retrained security forces so those forces can operate lawfully in a professional and accountable manner under a legitimate governing authority.

2-6. Stability requires physical protection. Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free from fear from grave threats to physical safety. Refugees and internally dislocated persons can return home without fear of retributive violence. Military forces protect women and children from undue violence. Military forces also protect key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure from attack.

2-7. Lastly, stability requires territorial security. People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb. Military forces protect the country from invasion and secure borders from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans.

2-8. Military forces can establish these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of stability (see table 2-1). During the initial response phase, Army units often execute the tasks on their own because the host nation (HN) lacks the capability. In the transformation phase, host-nation security forces and, potentially, intergovernmental organization (IGO) peacekeepers begin to contribute. Army units then focus more on security force assistance, particularly on the systems required to professionalize the host-nation security forces. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units transition to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. The HN assumes complete responsibility for its civil security with its military oriented on external threats while its police address internal stability and law and order. Some societies have strong cultural resistance against foreign or domestic military involvement in civil security. In such instances, U.S. forces explore other options or mitigate concerns about such involvement with inform and influence activities and engagements.

Table 2-1. Establish civil security subordinate tasks

• Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements
• Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services
• Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
• Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement
• Support identification
• Protect key personnel and facilities
• Clear explosive and other hazards

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

2-9. The efforts to establish civil security are reflected in the five stability principles described in Chapter 1:

- Conflict transformation.
- Unity of effort and unity of purpose.
- Legitimacy and host-nation ownership.
- Building partner capacity.
- Rule of law.

Conflict Transformation

2-10. Civil security is enhanced if rival factions become convinced that they can secure their interests through negotiation and a peaceful political process. To enhance civil security, Army units protect moderates and, if necessary, neutralize hardliners.

Unity of Effort and Unity of Purpose

2-11. Civil security results from and supports the efforts of Army units, supporting forces, multinational partners, host-nation security forces, other United States Government (USG) agencies, and host-nation governments at different levels. In some cases, IGOs also participate in civil security. While unity of command is unrealistic given the differing mandates and approaches of various actors, Army units strive to integrate their activities with those of other organizations. Together they determine the best way to divide labor and deconflict efforts so that partners do not work at cross-purposes.

Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership

2-12. Host-nation security forces prominently work on security efforts so local populations do not perceive U.S. forces as an invading force to be resisted. Host-nation security forces stay involved to promote the legitimacy of multinational partners, IGOs, and other actors. U.S. forces train and monitor host-nation forces to ensure the latter treats the population with respect. Security measures respect human rights; failure to do so undermines popular support for the host-nation government. From the operation's onset, U.S. forces enlist and consult the HN, taking as much leadership as possible regarding security efforts. Initially Army units may simply be a support apparatus or, contrastingly, may make most security-

related decisions and perform most tasks. Nevertheless, host-nation actors support and increasingly take ownership in such matters.

Building Partner Capacity

2-13. To achieve adequate civil security, Army units build partner capacity with the support of many organizations and individuals. In addition to partners with which unity of effort is pursued, Army units engage with the population, ethnic leaders, the media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Often Army units engage with out-of-area actors. For example, an Army unit and its host-nation counterparts work to deliver fuel to the area of operations (AO) from an oil refinery in another province. In some situations, engagement will be appropriate with adversaries. Army units protect independent or neutral actors diligently and avoid putting them at risk because of contact with Army units.

Rule of Law

2-14. All conflicts have a strong legal component, and many will not end until the actors have confidence that they will get fair and just treatment under the law. Military measures to establish security often prove inadequate if the HN does not address grievances fairly. Civilian control of the military often counters the HN's recent past and, to host-nation leaders in the middle of a conflict, may seem of secondary importance. However, Army leaders recognize civil control as a critical component of the end state and fairly reinforce it.

ENFORCE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, PEACE AGREEMENTS, AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

2-15. Conflicts and subsequent peace agreements can occur between nations, within a nation, and between more localized groups such as tribal militias. Occasionally, all belligerents genuinely want to end hostilities with a formal agreement. Army units then take the role of peacekeeping—monitoring, facilitating confidence-building measures, and investigating alleged violations. Usually parties to the agreement suspect a double cross by their adversaries and may validate each other's suspicions. Some provisions of the agreement may be vague or incomplete, and Army units may need to adjudicate disputes. Depending on the situation, the United States may be a belligerent party, support a belligerent, or be a neutral.

2-16. Army units involved in peace enforcement missions work with parties that have not agreed to end hostilities—normally pursuant to international authorization—to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. A stronger party may attempt to destroy its adversary while it has an advantage. A weaker party may continue the struggle, possibly because it does not trust its adversary to exercise constraint. Belligerents may require a combination of incentives and punitive measures before they elect to abide by ceasefire terms. Army units may be either neutral or extremely supportive of one side or the other.

2-17. Army units transition through the three phases to enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements (see table 2-2). During the initial response phase, Army units often execute four subordinate tasks. In the transformation phase, host-nation security forces and IGO peacekeepers begin to contribute. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units transition to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties.

Table 2-2. Phases to enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Enforce ceasefires • Supervise belligerent disengagement • Identify and neutralize adversaries • Provide security for negotiations	• Establish and control buffers • Build host-nation capacity • Coordinate as needed	• Implement additional measures

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-18. Army units prepare to perform the following tasks in the initial response phase:

- Enforce ceasefires.
- Supervise belligerent disengagement.
- Identify and neutralize adversaries.
- Provide security for negotiations.

Enforce Ceasefires

2-19. Army commanders first understand the terms of any ceasefire as well as the gaps and points of dispute. These terms include identifying nonsignatories (ideally part of the ceasefire process). Army commanders identify any contentious issues omitted in the negotiation process to address eventually. These issues include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); repatriation and resettlement; political representation; adjudication of disputed areas; compensation; and justice for cases involving war crimes or atrocities. Army commanders help host-nation leaders determine if a particular agreement is final or an incremental step.

2-20. Army units may have to develop and promulgate ceasefire terms unilaterally. Such declarations may include—

- A purpose (such as to end violence, protect unarmed civilians).
- Interim steps or stages (if any).
- Permitted locations, sizes, and activities of armed groups.
- Prohibited locations and activities for armed groups (such as demilitarized or buffer zones).
- A timeline for implementation.
- Consultative procedures.
- Control, monitoring, and reporting.
- NGO access.
- Procedures for entering or crossing buffer zone.
- Dispute resolution.
- A plan for future negotiations (participation, frequency, and issues to be addressed).

2-21. Third-party mediation may facilitate ceasefire enforcement. USG diplomatic experts, central government representation, religious leaders, a council of elders, or United Nations (UN) representatives may take this position. Absent other alternatives (and in rare cases), Army commanders assume the roles of honest brokers. They primarily focus on ending violence while protecting human rights.

2-22. Army units enforce ceasefires with measures such as patrols, guard posts, remote sensors, and checkpoints, possibly a focus on a buffer zone that separates belligerents. In particular, aerial patrols look for concentrations of armed groups preparing to conduct unauthorized activity. (FM 3-21.8 has additional information on patrols.) Rules of engagement address lethal measures. For example, Army units conduct strikes against armed groups that previously violated the ceasefire and are preparing to do so again. Army units also use nonlethal means, such as military information support operations (MISO) audio, visual, and audio-visual messages. These means provide information to Army units. From that information, Army units may detain violators of the ceasefire terms and any associated penalties.

2-23. As early as possible, Army units enlist responsible host-nation entities who can support these enforcement efforts. Units identify representatives from belligerent parties who can serve as points of contact for negotiations. Army units also identify host-nation military, police, or paramilitary units that can operate effectively at checkpoints and conduct patrols.

2-24. Ceasefire terms require continual adjustment based upon the circumstances. U.S. forces adjust the terms as they make progress or solve remaining problems. Army units consult host-nation representatives regarding such changes and clearly publicize new terms at engagements and via public media.

Supervise Spoiler Disengagement

2-25. Once actors determine the terms of a ceasefire, they begin to disengage from spoilers. Army units supervise this disengagement. They communicate the terms to spoiler leaders and rank-and-file members; host-nation national, regional, and local representatives; the population; and other relevant organizations. They communicate using meetings; audio, visual, and audio-visual messages; cell phones; and the media. A Web site works well in some environments. MISO, civil affairs, and the public affairs officer help disseminate this information. Some situations require frequent patrols to convince the population and conflict parties that a ceasefire is indeed in effect and that Army units are in control of the situation. FM 3-05.30 and FM 46-1 have more information.

2-26. Commanders and staffs manage and monitor disengagement events, provide timely analysis, and resolve disputes. In appropriate situations, they include liaison officers from spoilers and other organizations. Army units often restrict the movement of these liaison officers within the command post. Command posts require reliable communications with all relevant actors.

2-27. Once disengagement has begun, Army units begin occupying and patrolling the buffer zone. Generally, a buffer zone includes a demilitarized zone or buffer zone boundaries and controlled crossing areas that dislocated civilians (DCs), NGOs, or other actors use. Many situations will not have such a cleanly linear portrayal. Commanders consider combined reconnaissance patrols derived from Army units and spoiler representatives, civilian agencies, or the host-nation government.

2-28. As a critical step, disengagement will likely be the main effort for Army units, resulting in less emphasis on other stability tasks until disengagement has progressed satisfactorily. Eventually, Army units transition the monitoring of the separation of spoilers to other organizations such as UN peacekeeping forces. However, a ceasefire may not last if subsequent political developments do not continue the momentum for lasting peace. Army units prepare to handle deteriorating situations due to host-nation public perception of their political leadership. Audiences do not view political developments as separate from actions by occupying armies. FM 3-07.31 discusses applicable tactics.

Identify and Neutralize Adversaries

2-29. Even in the best circumstances, belligerents attempt to disrupt peace, impede stabilization efforts, or exploit problematic situations for personal gain. Conflict can occur between rival groups and within groups as hardliners attempt to thwart moderates. Sometimes Army units know the identities of adversaries and anticipate their actions. In others situations, they cannot determine the actual culprit because different factions accuse each other of acting in bad faith and of violating the political settlement. Army units prefer to maintain strong support for a peaceful political process rather than closely aligning with personalities, factions, or positions. This stance preserves impartiality that will facilitate Army unit engagement with the competing factions as other Army units identify and neutralize potential adversaries.

2-30. Commanders and staffs identify the adversaries' compositions, locations, objectives, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Additionally, commanders and staffs understand motivations and grievances—completely justified from the adversary's point of view. Special studies, target audience analysis, and other MISO analytical products address many of these aspects of operational environments. Military information support elements provide these products to intelligence staff sections as part of their contribution to planning and targeting processes.

2-31. Army units treat belligerents as individual criminals breaking the law rather than members of a political or social group. This treatment emphasizes the belligerents' lack of legitimacy and helps isolate them. Some adversarial actions are token efforts to save face or show strength in the face of a foreign power. Effective commanders do not take such actions lightly and avoid overreacting. Instead, they consider such actions as a possible root cause of perceived unrest when no other reasons for such action appear.

2-32. Army units neutralize an adversary with inclusive or exclusive measures. Inclusion involves persuading the adversaries that they can achieve their aims through the peace process. This may involve redressing legitimate grievances that have alienated the adversary. Exclusive measures include isolating, arresting, and defeating belligerents through lethal and nonlethal means. This may include attacking critical

vulnerabilities such as communications sytems that units can disrupt, known locations that units can strike, internal schisms that units can exploit, ideological inconsistencies that units can highlight, or popular opposition that units can encourage. Attacks on adversaries, however, may create sympathy for their cause, may make them more stubborn, or may result in collateral damage.

Provide Security for Negotiations

2-33. Negotiations enable partners to end hostilities, keep hostilities from returning, and secure the subsequent political settlement. Security is a fundamental prerequisite of negotiations. Without security, actors cannot reach stability. Talks disrupted by violence can be catastrophic to a peaceful political settlement.

2-34. Actors feel less apprehensive about a session that is part of a longer process rather than a single event during which many contentious issues will be raised. An extended process can build mutual trust and heightened expectations of future progress if previous sessions seem to have gone reasonably well. However, actors can also get frustrated if a long series of negotiations fails to yield results. Additionally, a predictable pattern of negotiations can give belligerents an opportunity to conduct a disruptive attack.

2-35. Negotiations occur at a secure location. Commanders chose a venue either at one place every session or a different place each session. A trusted security team arrives beforehand and inspects the area for irregularities. Delaying the announcement of the location until a few hours before the session promotes better security. A U.S. base might be suitable, but excessive protection measures may jeopardize the negotiations by embarrassing host-nation personnel or by excessively delaying their access to the base.

2-36. During the sessions, security forces consist of three rings. An outer ring limits access to the immediate area. The outer ring exists to respond to indirect fire attacks. Aerial patrols if available provide additional surveillance and response capabilities. An inner ring circles around the actual facility which hosts the negotiations. A third ring consists of a limited number of bodyguards in the actual room.

2-37. In addition to providing security, Army commanders often monitor, facilitate, mediate, or lead the negotiations, and potentially make decisions as appropriate. They summarize proceedings and identify what the actors did or did not resolve. Without such a summary, actors potentially depart with different interpretations of the results. Effective Army commanders follow up with separate, private meetings with individual actors, although other actors may be suspicious about these side sessions.

2-38. Army commanders increasingly collect intelligence before negotiation sessions, focusing on belligerents who may want to disrupt the talks. In most societies, meals would be appropriate and expected at such sessions. When serving meals, negotiators provide local food and invite U.S. representatives.

2-39. MISO, civil affairs, and public affairs assist in inform and influence activities related to these meetings. Commanders consider preparing press releases and conducting media interviews after the negotiations. Having the media in attendance during the negotiations often proves distracting. FM 3-05.30, FM 3-57, FM 3-07.31, and FM 46-1 discuss negotiations.

TRANSFORMATION

2-40. In the transformation phase, Army units continue performing earlier tasks but with a growing emphasis upon building the capacity of the HN to assume responsibility. In some cases, U.S. forces transfer responsibility and authority for peace enforcement to a longer-term actor such as the UN. During the transformation phase, Army units establish and control buffers, build host-nation capacity, and coordinate.

2-41. Army units establish buffer zones (if not already accomplished) and expand or improve those already in place. They improve, establish, expand, and control buffers, potentially including demilitarized zones. Army units often reinforce buffer zones with fencing, signs, road improvement, vegetation control, and semi-permanent guard posts or combat outposts. Soldiers occupy guard posts and combat posts in shifts or with forces that maintain a continuous presence. The latter case requires at least one platoon and provisions for billeting, meals, drinking water, electrical power, sanitation, robust communications, and 24-hour surveillance. Establishing and maintaining a buffer zone requires a sizeable force, which could provide a source of income for host-nation workers. Crossing lanes requires unique arrangements, such as control points, command posts, medical treatment facilities, and quick reaction forces. FM 3-05.230, FM 3-24.2,

and FM 5-103 discusses designing and building these facilities. DCs may flee to U.S. Army locations for protection and may require security as well as emergency assistance. See FM 3-39.40 for additional information on establishing and operating internment and resettlement facilities. Army units often expand the radius of their patrolling, facilitate access by NGOs, and provide population control.

2-42. During the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity to enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements. Army units integrate host-nation forces as soon as possible. Army units then begin shifting their emphasis from actual peace enforcement tasks to building the host-nation capacity to conduct these tasks. Army units accomplish combined missions with host-nation units, provide advice and overwatch, help develop and implement institutional systems, and fill host-nation capability gaps. Sometimes international peacekeepers conduct reliefs in place with Army units that conducted the initial responses.

2-43. During the transformation phase, Army units coordinate with host-nation armed forces and other security forces. Army units transition responsibility to long-term partners such as the UN and support other transitional authorities. Transitional authorities consist of respective nations' state department and intelligence services. Coordination involves facilitating broad unified action to rebuild the HN and its supporting institutions. Transition of responsibility occurs when Army units establish and control buffers, including demilitarized zones and monitor exchange of prisoners of war. Army units support transitional authorities by investigating alleged breaches of agreements, supporting and enforcing political, military, and economic terms arrangements, and supporting confidence-building measures among belligerents.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-44. Army units implement additional peace measures depending upon further negotiations. Conversely, the end state may be such that Army units gradually dismantle buffer zones to foster national unity and reconciliation. In this phase, Army units enable the HN to sustain the peace.

DETERMINE DISPOSITION AND COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL ARMED AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

2-45. Security forces potentially include the following:

- Military forces.
- Police forces.
- Border security forces.
- Various infrastructure protection forces.
- Intelligence organizations.
- Nonstate security actors.

2-46. Military forces include Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or special operations forces. These may be active duty or reserve, and units may be postured for territorial defense, a home guard function, or be more expeditionary and be expected to reposition either within the country or to other nations, for example for peacekeeping missions. Military forces are normally subordinate to a Ministry of Defense. Constabulary, gendarmerie, or marechaussee are forces charged with police duties among division populations. Depending on the country, these forces are sometimes no longer military, but still use the title for historic reasons. In some countries, they fall under the Ministry of Defense; in other countries, they fall under the Ministry of Interior, and in still other countries, the ministries share responsibility for military forces.

2-47. Security forces also include police forces at the national, regional, or local levels. Normally these forces focus on internal threats, law and order, and crime prevention and response. Specialized units may address issues such as terrorism, narcotics, organized crime, corruption, or human trafficking. Police forces are normally subordinate to the primary civilian official in their jurisdiction (for example mayor or governor), with national police normally subordinate to an Interior Minister. Police forces may have overlapping jurisdictions with other security forces, including military units.

2-48. Border security forces along the nation's boundaries are normally subordinate to the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Interior. They may include customs and immigration organizations, although these normally fall under a different ministry.

2-49. A wide variety of infrastructure protection forces may also exist. These forces have responsibility for securing power facilities, refineries, shipyards, telecommunications sites, and other locations. These protection forces may be subordinate to the relevant ministries, regional or local governments, or to the facility administrators.

2-50. One or more intelligence organizations may exist, reporting to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, a separate intelligence chief, or other organization. These organizations focus on foreign or domestic matters, or both.

2-51. Nonstate security actors may include tribal militias, private security firms, and other nongovernmental armed organizations.

2-52. In situations where partners work to reestablish a failed or fragile state, the roles, organization, and disposition of forces often evolve under a security sector reform (SSR) program. While higher-level partners make the relevant decisions, Army commanders and leaders provide valuable insight to influence these SSR determinations and are instrumental in the implementation. Additionally, they identify gaps and challenges, particularly those regarding relations between different security organizations, and help solve these issues. Sometimes, Army leaders have to make interim decisions about such matters until higher policies are developed. Commanders remember that SSR aims to reinforce civilian oversight of the military and respect for human rights. Additionally, SSR includes the military, other security forces, the court systems, civil society, and other components that comprise the security sector.

2-53. Army units transition through the three phases to determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services (see table 2-3).

Table 2-3. Phases of determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Implement a plan for disposition of security institutions • Identify future roles, missions, and structures • Vet officials	• Conduct security force assistance • Build host-nation capacity to protect military structure • Establish defense institutions	• Transition to an end state and advisory presence • Transform the host-nation military • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-54. During the initial response phase, Army units perform a comprehensive assessment of the security sector and subsequently prepare to perform the following tasks:

- Implement a plan for disposition of security institutions.
- Identify future roles, missions, and structures.
- Vet officials.

Implement a Plan for Disposition of Security Institutions

2-55. During the initial response phase, Army units implement a plan for disposition of host-nation forces, intelligence services, and other national security institutions. Initially, they retain host-nation security forces as currently disposed and organized rather than risk instability by disbandment. Disbandment would remove the security architecture and result in many unemployed and possibly armed combatants dispersed around the country. Army units attempt to gain influence over these forces, possibly in their capacity as a transitional military authority (TMA).

2-56. Some forces accomplish limited missions such as providing security for infrastructure. Other forces perform public works projects to keep them occupied while providing a limited and nonthreatening but useful function. Where using disposed forces is not feasible, U.S. forces often sets up payment or

emergency financial assistance for displaced former military or security force personnel. Underemployed, trained, and heavily armed populations tend to breed insurgents and other belligerents. A successful emergency assistance program has a definitive start and end date, eligibility criteria for payment, and a transition program for reintegration to assist former military or security forces. Without an effective transition, the program merely delays the unfavorable effects of a disgruntled population.

2-57. Most host-nation forces recruit locally in areas with boundaries that frequently align with political areas such as provinces, districts, or subdistricts. Normally, U.S. forces initially maintain this arrangement, although this limits some host-nation forces to one ethnicity and in their ability to deploy if needed. Changing a force's ethnic distribution or normal locations potentially increases friction and causes other problems best avoided early in stabilization efforts.

Identify Future Roles, Missions, and Structures

2-58. The TMA develops a mid-term (six months to one year) plan for host-nation security forces to identify their future roles, missions, and structures. The plan includes strong host-nation involvement, to avoid the host-nation officials and the population rejecting the plan as not legitimate. U.S. forces develop the plan in consultation with host-nation representatives and the U.S. country team. While the TMA develops and approves these plans at the national level, Army units provide relevant input, recommend modifications as deficiencies are identified, and may develop local interim plans in the absence of higher level guidance.

2-59. Army units clearly identify interim measures as such to host-nation representatives, so the representatives do not get too accustomed to having a certain level of power. Army units identify host-nation missions by establishing transparent entry, promotion, and retirement systems. Eventually, hasty arrangements evolve to permanent structures that include strong civilian control over security forces. The plan includes organizational structures and locations, accounting for internal and external security threats.

Vet Officials

2-60. U.S. forces vet senior officers and other individuals for past abuses and criminal activity. Leadership is perhaps the key variable in successful stability tasks. While Army units cannot replace all people in positions of responsibility, Army commanders can ensure that key individuals in their areas of operations are both trustworthy and capable. Such determinations factor past performance, current usefulness, and future appropriateness. Past performance includes participation in abusive or criminal activities. Current usefulness includes experience in the position and availability of alternative candidates. Future appropriateness includes potential, education and experience, and any requirement to diversify appointees by ethnic group or some other consideration.

2-61. Initially, Army units select host-nation leadership directly, particularly if the U.S. military is designated as TMA. In other cases, Army leaders indirectly exert strong influence over appropriate host-nation officials. Successful stabilization requires the population to view selectees as legitimate, based on the judgments of respected host-nation officials. Triangulation among different representatives is usually better than exclusive reliance on one source. Some host-nation representatives reluctantly give a frank opinion of a candidate if they feel that the candidate can potentially retaliate in the future.

2-62. Army commanders stress that any appointments are probationary, to include any officials staying in previously held positions. Commanders can extend subsequent probationary periods. For example, the initial period may be for one month, the second for three months, followed by successive six-month terms until the HN has a permanent mechanism in place. Successful stability efforts create an incentive for officials to perform well, while avoiding a situation enabling officials to use their positions for wealth. Commanders usually consider individuals who perform exceptionally well during a probationary period for positions of greater responsibility. For more information on security force assistance and SSR, see FM 3-07.1, FM 3-05.2, and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

TRANSFORMATION

2-63. The tasks described in the initial response phase continue to varying degrees through the transformation phase. As Army units become more knowledgeable about an operational environment, They

make necessary improvements to force postures, organizations, and leadership. Increasingly, however, Army units consult host-nation authorities less and enable those authorities to make more decisions. This implies, for example, that host-nation authorities will select officials whom U.S. Army personnel disapprove, while removing others that have U.S. support from positions of authority. In some cases, a transitional military organization such as a UN peacekeeping force may become involved and will require coordination.

2-64. Additional tasks during this phase include:

- Conduct security force assistance.
- Build host-nation capacity to protect military structure.
- Establish defense institutions.

Conduct Security Force Assistance

2-65. *Security force assistance* is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Security force assistance (SFA) improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. Foreign security forces are forces—including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and corrections personnel—that provide security for a HN and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission.

2-66. SFA is closely linked to SSR, for which the Department of State is normally the lead agency. SSR includes improvements in national-level organizations, systems, and measures to improve the military as well as other security organizations such as intelligence services and police forces. Army leaders ensure their units' efforts conform to Department of State programs and policies, as articulated through their chains of command, and do not exceed their lawful authorities.

2-67. SFA may orient on both internal and external threats, and occur in various functional dimensions including training, planning, operations, sustainment, or intelligence. Depending upon authorizations, potential SFA recipients include host-nation forces and institutions, police forces, other security forces, nonstate security actors (citizens' defense groups), partnered multinational forces, or IGO forces such as UN peacekeepers or peacekeeping forces from regional IGOs. Maneuver units, supporting units, multinational partners, special operations forces, advisory teams, or supporting contractors provide SFA. Often, SFA helps improve individual and collective military skills—marksmanship, first aid, unit tactics, and staff procedures—as well as professional skills such as civil-military relations. In some cases, codes of conduct, the protection of civilians, and respect for human rights require particular emphasis. SFA includes training and other methods to improve host-nation capability, such as infrastructure development.

2-68. Often the role of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the host-nation military differs from the role in U.S. military because of tradition, culture, experience, or education levels. Often a SFA priority includes building an NCO corps. Army units establish short courses to train host-nation NCOs. Army leaders occasionally have to first convince host-nation officers that a strong NCO corps facilitates addressing a wide range of shortcomings. A related imperative is to develop the host-nation capability to run its own military training programs as soon as possible. Combined operations and combined training cadres both apply to grooming the HN's capability.

2-69. Another challenge is that host-nation security forces have different equipment from Army units, varying in vehicles, weapons, radios, and other materiel. U.S. Soldiers assisting host-nation security forces may require their own training to become familiar with using and maintaining the host-nation equipment.

2-70. SFA methods may include advising and mentoring to develop host-nation expertise, to build partnerships between units conducting combined operations, and to augment host-nation units with specialized capabilities. Initially, SFA provides direct and focused benefits to host-nation units. For example, Army units train host-nation soldiers in medical, maintenance, marksmanship, or leadership skills. Ultimately, Army units focus on developing the host-nation to conduct its own training and specialized programs at the unit level, as well as its administration and logistic systems. For example, host-nation military personnel require an accurate personnel system supplemented with identification cards and

identification discs or tags to facilitate proper payroll activities, remains identification, casualty tracking, and compensation or condolence payments to next-of-kin. Similarly, while Army units provide fuel so that host-nation units can conduct mounted patrols, Army units also get the HN to make its own supply systems work correctly. In conducting SFA, Army units emphasize human rights and support civilian authorities.

2-71. Army units increase the role of SFA by taking advantage of the many Army units at all levels that primarily have support missions. For example, sustainment units on Army bases train host-nation forces in relevant or in general soldier skills. Whether they fill the role of full-time advisors or provide SFA in addition to their normal duties, Army personnel involved in these efforts often require additional training. This training includes cultural considerations, advisory techniques, and the topics they will impart to the HN. See FM 3-07.1 for more detailed information.

Build Host-Nation Capacity to Protect Military Infrastructure

2-72. U.S. personnel help build the role of the HN in protecting its own military infrastructure. U.S. Soldiers help host-nation representatives identify vulnerabilities of military facilities and train them in protection measures. Involved personnel often require specialized training and assistance for protecting technical systems. Some Army units augment host-nation capabilities with nighttime, overhead, or electronic surveillance. These actual capabilities do not transfer to the HN; rather, Army units provide the results to the HN. Army units observe and inspect host-nation procedures and provide suggestions for improvement. For example, Army personnel explain effective ways for security procedures to involve unit rotations, conduct reliefs in place, or change guard shifts. Procedures can include provisions for transferring responsibility for property accountability and serviceability.

Establish Defense Institutions

2-73. U.S. personnel help the HN establish defense institutions. Host-nation units reluctantly depart from interim processes that appear to work, particularly if their effectiveness depends upon U.S. involvement. Ultimately, the HN will implement and maintain suitable methods for recruiting, training, assignments, operations, reporting, pay, readiness, maintenance, supply, and medical services. While Army units work with partnered host-nation units, a wider reform of the host-nation Defense Ministry may be underway. Army units ensure their efforts support broader host-nation SSR and related issues such as civilian control of the military, accountability, transparency, and oversight. As the HN begins to develop its own administrative and logistic systems, Army units help their counterparts adjust to new procedures. They expect flaws in the new systems or their implementation. Army units identify problems and work to solve them with their counterparts. Army units also report issues up the U.S. chain of command when solutions require higher-level remedies. Lower-level units provide recommended solutions. New systems, particularly those involving resources, are often susceptible to corruption and abuse. Host-nation security forces may prove resistant to the concept of civilian control. Army units conduct oversight, report discrepancies, and encourage counterparts to take remedial action. For additional information on SFA and SSR, see FM 3-07.1 and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.*

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-74. To foster sustainability, Army units transition to an end state and advisory presence, transform the host-nation military, and monitor and report. Army units maintain an advisory presence that focuses on continuing professional development of host-nation forces; this may include greater ethnic integration, increased military focus on external threats, and greater host-nation capability for expeditionary missions to include participation in multinational–missions in other countries. Remaining Army units in the HN will perform an important role in identifying suitable candidates for such opportunities. As Army involvement moves past post-crisis stabilization and into a new extended phase of security cooperation, military-to-military programs such as exercises and host-nation participation in foreign education and training programs will be expanded. As the HN continues to maintain responsibility for configuring its armed forces, Army units continue to monitor events while conducting their own restructuring and redeployment.

CONDUCT DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

2-75. Effective DDR reduces drivers of conflict, builds a stable society, and creates a legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence. Army units transition through the three phases to conduct DDR (see table 2-4).

Table 2-4. Phases to conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Negotiate terms • Establish weapons control programs • Reassure disarmed factions • Establish a monitoring program • Establish demobilization camps • Ensure needs are met	• Disarm combatants • Reduce unauthorized weapons • Ensure safety of personnel and families • Reintegrate combatants and dislocated civilians	• Manage disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration effectively • Transition responsibility to host nation • Secure, store, and dispose of weapons • Develop host-nation arms control

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-76. During their initial response phase, Army units prepare to perform the following tasks:

- Negotiate terms.
- Establish weapons control programs.
- Reassure disarmed factions.
- Establish a monitoring program.
- Establish demobilization camps.
- Ensure needs are met.

Negotiate Terms

2-77. Army units negotiate terms with belligerents. Army units begin or conduct disarmament operations within a larger DDR process. Often, Army units with an extended local presence have the best position and a strong incentive to directly negotiate terms, particularly when negotiations require frequent informal sessions to resolve issues. DDR matters often fall into this category, as any original peace agreement may focus on the cessation of hostilities and avoid subsequent matters.

2-78. Belligerents are suspicious of their adversaries and reluctant to part with their means of self-defense. If they do not trust their adversaries, they often seek the chance to attack preemptively while they have the perceived means to do so. Aggressive belligerents look for an opportunity to destroy their opponents regardless of the latter's intentions. Additionally, if the United States is a belligerent party or supports a belligerent, it will limit the ability of the United States to be perceived as an impartial broker. Army leaders foster an extended process with incremental disarmament steps and confidence-building measures. Negotiation terms aim to achieve as much host-nation buy-in as possible, with a combination of incentives and threatened sanctions.

Establish Weapons Control Programs

2-79. In this phase, Army units establish and enforce weapons control programs, including collection and destruction. Generally, some level of weapons control enhances security in a fragile state. However, efforts at complete disarmament create destabilization if they eliminate or threaten the HN's minimum levels of self-defense capability. Army leaders consult responsible host-nation representatives regarding residual levels of weapons individually owned, held by local security forces, or stored in controlled facilities and accessible during an emergency. All options pose some level of risk. Unauthorized personnel can potentially commit acts of violence or vulnerable populations will have no way to defend themselves.

2-80. Control measures include registration, turn-in, limitations on possession and firing, or restrictions on the numbers of armed personnel that assemble. Army units create incentives for weapons control. They reward individuals for turning in weapons, although this sometimes creates incentives for new forms of illicit activity such as arms smuggling. Once established, Army units publicly disseminate a program's provisions with an adequate buffer time for compliance. Provisions clearly and carefully define weapons, limiting it to firearms. While implements such as knives and machetes can be weapons, they also have a legitimate use. Army units implement weapons control programs in stages. For example, Army units immediately implement programs in cities and only later in rural areas. Military information support elements address these issues in specific messages to elicit the desired behavior in groups and populations.

Reassure Disarmed Factions

2-81. During their initial response phase, Army units provide reassurances and incentives for disarmed factions. Before disarming, belligerents want credible assurances that it is in their interest to do so. In some cases, it is more important to address the concerns of the leadership; in others, the assurances will also relate to the rank-and-file. These assurances may relate to security, amnesty, justice, and basic needs. Belligerents need assurance that they and their families will have security. They also want amnesty for previous actions they may have taken. Often belligerents also want justice for negative actions taken against them. Lastly, they want Army units to provide them and their families with basic needs such as food and shelter. Army units provide positive or negative incentives. Positive incentives consist of jobs, monetary rewards, governmental positions, or incorporation in official host-nation security forces. Negative incentives include punitive measures if a party does not comply with disarmament programs.

Establish a Monitoring Program

2-82. Army units establish a monitoring program in the initial response phase. An effective monitoring program gauges DDR progress and helps identify second-order effects. The program indicates progress by decreased incidents of violence, reduced numbers of armed groups and individuals, greater freedom of operation for legitimate security forces, and an improved sense of security among the population. Second-order effects can be both positive and negative. Examples of the former include strengthened families and villages because former combatants have returned, and the employment of these individuals in productive activities. Negative repercussions include an increase in crime rates because of unemployed and dissatisfied returnees or the marginalization of other citizens because former combatants absorb a disproportionate share of resources.

2-83. Army units monitor using dedicated assets and receiving reports from general sources such as reconnaissance patrols. Some U.S. forces assign a unit with the primary mission to manage and monitor DDR throughout the area of operations. This unit tracks DDR progress and identify issues. It maintains records, conducts routine liaison with host-nation representatives, and conducts interviews and follow-up assessments with former combatants, representatives from the general population, and host-nation authorities. Additionally, other units with more general responsibilities report on DDR-related matters as part of their routine operations.

2-84. It is impossible to know whether any single action causes change in a society—especially within a complex context with multiple inputs, each trying to affect the situation. Monitoring not only enables forces to determine if belligerents are disarming, but also to determine why if they are not. Army units cannot attribute resistance to disarming efforts to the failure of any given message or specific Soldiers' actions. Instead, a number of events (both deliberate and spontaneous) influence and contribute to resistance. Perceptions of a lack of security, traditions of being armed as a status measure, and other cultural and environmental conditions affect the degree to which behavior changes. While monitoring these conditions prove useful for other reasons, Army commanders cannot assume change is the direct result of a disarmament process. In addition, U.S. commanders consider potential negative consequences of monitoring a community, including spotlighting it under very precarious conditions. Soldiers who have returned home nearly always try to avoid attention; focusing on them or their community can undermine their resolve to reintegrate.

Establish Demobilization Camps

2-85. Army units establish demobilization camps. These temporary camps process, billet, and educate former combatants. Army units also use these camps to turn in and store weapons and to issue items such as clothing or identification cards. A camp often exists as part of a larger World Bank or DDR-run operation United Nations Development Program. The camp design and content of a demobilization process is highly political. Only by those with extensive experience undertake the task following specific terms of the negotiated DDR agreement. Army units assisting in this process dedicate a unit for the administrative functions including recordkeeping, security, transportation, and health services. Early unit identification of requirements with the local contracting office during the planning effort helps mitigate gaps in capability. Specialists conduct interviews, de-briefings, and collect information. Army units incorporate host-nation personnel, especially those from the same group or faction as the camp's inhabitants, into the camp's administration as soon as possible.

2-86. Some particularly vulnerable demobilized soldiers, such as child soldiers, female soldiers, or disabled soldiers, require specialized treatment or handling when identified and throughout their reintegration. The camp needs adequate internal security measures to preclude gangs from forming and using it as a staging base for belligerents. Conversely, external security needs to protect individuals traveling to and from the camp and to prevent attacks against the camp (since belligerents may perceive a concentrated population as a lucrative target). See FM 3-39.40 for additional information.

Ensure Needs Are Met

2-87. Army units ensure belligerents have adequate health, food, and security. This task is an essential prerequisite for reintegrating former combatants into society. If accomplished effectively, it will greatly lessen the possibility that DDR efforts will fail. In many cases, U.S. forces extend the task to provide for the belligerents' family members and local communities as well.

2-88. When directed, Army units provide health service support and force health protection in support of this task including medical support for detainee operations. Army units may have to address cultural and linguistic issues, such as obtaining permission to treat female patients and having sufficient interpreters to communicate with patients. The Army Health System support plan aligns with the combatant commander's theater security cooperation plan to ensure that any humanitarian or stability activities are part of the regional strategy for the area of operations. See FM 8-55 and FM 4-02.12 and FMI 4-02.46 for additional information.

2-89. Although most adept at ensuring security, Army units ensure needs are met in a limited or temporary fashion. Partnering with local medical authorities and the HN Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture helps align support provided to the demobilizing combatants with host-nation health care standards, applied in an equitable manner, and sustained by the HN. Involving host-nation medical personnel helps Soldiers overcome language, cultural, or religious barriers and build or restore confidence in the host-nation government. Medical personnel must also understand religious, language, cultural, and other factors that may affect the provision of medical support. The involvement of other organizations will grow over the long term; these may include NGOs, IGOs such as the UN and, especially, the host-nation government as it becomes more capable. Effective Army leaders emphasize to HN counterparts that ensuring needs are met helps to prevent a relapse into conflict. Monitoring programs indicates shortcomings so that Army units can take remedial measures.

2-90. Coordination enables positive results and access to information. Army units coordinate with the American Embassy Country Team or HN Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, UN organizations, the UN Country Representative and NGOs serving in the region. With this coordination, Army units have access to assessments or other information available regarding the state of host-nation health care and agricultural infrastructure. By assessing existing host-nation capabilities, Army units ensure their focus and level of support meets the needs of the people and can be sustained by the HN. Units coordinate with other partners and NGOs to avoid duplicating efforts and to access medical support, food assistance, immunization programs, and other resources available in support of the HN.

2-91. Army Health System support plans and orders integrate general threats, health threats, and medical intelligence considerations. Medical personnel have training and knowledge of those threats and prevalent diseases. Army units inspect water sources and food storage facilities to ensure wholesomeness, quality, and sanitation of subsistence and food sources to identify, prevent, or deter contamination. Host-nation farm animals, captured wild life, and stray animals in the AO often require veterinary support. Examinations ensure epidemiological surveillance and control of endemic zoonotic and foreign animal diseases. Army units coordinate public health programs within the framework of existing host-nation government programs. If no such programs exist, host-nation personnel require technical assistance and training to establish sustainable programs they can maintain.

2-92. Army commanders consider other necessities demobilized personnel will likely have. In particular, those personnel need jobs so they can provide for themselves and their families. Absent a means of livelihood, demobilized belligerents often resort to crime or get motivated to regroup and renew the conflict. For more information on DDR, see FM 3-07 and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

TRANSFORMATION

2-93. During the transformation phase, DDR tasks undertaken temporarily by Army units transition to other international organizations, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. These institutions establish economic programs that support employment and the reintegration of former belligerents into the society. Host-nation organizations get increasingly involved in DDR processes and may actually control many of their elements. Regardless of the lead actor for implementation, DDR processes normally require detailed compliance reporting and the envisioned end state may evolve during this phase. Often, Army units provide close supervision and intervene or support as necessary.

Disarm Combatants

2-94. During the transformation phase, Army units disarm former combatants and belligerents. Combatants reluctantly trust other factions, but (if earlier steps have gone reasonably well) rival parties may have greater confidence to continue with disarmament. As the relative power of host-nation security forces grows, it will be increasingly critical that they operate in a legitimate and even-handed manner. Higher headquarters may have to provide guidance on steps to take regarding some belligerent groups.

Reduce Unauthorized Weapons

2-95. During the transformation phase, Army units reduce availability of unauthorized weapons. They progressively implement stricter limitations on weapons with more stringent enforcement and punishment. For example, they expand restrictions on weapons to rural areas and increase fines for violating weapons laws.

Ensure Safety of Personnel and Families

2-96. During the transformation phase, Army units ensure safety of quartered personnel and families. As more former combatants return to their homes or settle in other locations, this return sometimes creates additional possibilities for violence in a wider area. Army units and their host-nation counterparts expand reconnaissance patrols to maintain a frequent presence. Engagements with host-nation leaders and information engagement reinforce the theme that stability and successful reintegration of former combatants is in the nation's best interest.

Reintegrate Combatants and Dislocated Civilians

2-97. During the transformation phase, Army units reintegrate former combatants and dislocated civilians into society. Local host-nation leaders—such as politicians, military and police authorities, and ethnic or tribal leaders—can exert influence over their general populations as well as the former combatants. Leaders help set the conditions so that the population effectively receives former combatants. In some cases, leaders can act as *de facto* parole officers for the returnees and pay close attention to the latter's behavior. Army

units also integrate leaders into other managerial aspects of reintegration such as finding places to live, jobs, and educational programs.

2-98. Sometimes Army units synchronize DDR with a wider effort to repatriate and reintegrate dislocated civilians. Exclusive focus on former combatants may overlook other vulnerable populations' needs, such as employment, shelter, or food. Efforts to create a sustainable local economy facilitates reintegration. Such efforts provide space for former combatants and dislocated civilians and give them a credible alternative to criminal activities.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-99. The fostering sustainability phase aims for the HN to manage DDR effectively. DDR is a long-term program managed by experts in the process. The lead organization (for example the United Nations) works closely with the host-nation ministry in charge to ensure common standards and a smooth transition to host-nation management. Transition entails ensuring the HN has the capacity to manage DDR, as well as transitioning responsibility and authority to the HN. One condition is that the HN can handle security matters with its legitimate military and police forces, thus eliminating the perceived need for armed factions. In addition to managing DDR effectively and transitioning responsibility to the HN, two additional tasks receive emphasis during this phase: secure, store, and dispose of weapons and develop host-nation arms control.

Secure, Store, and Dispose of Weapons

2-100. As military forces accumulate weapons, they secure and store the weapons that could destabilize the HN or other countries. Securing and storing weapons prevents unauthorized personnel from obtaining them, committing violent acts with them, or selling them on an illicit arms market. A treaty may dictate collection procedures. Ultimately, the host-nation government determines the disposition of collected weapons. It may convert some for the military or police forces to use. Eventually it will destroy unauthorized weapons or convert them into scrap metal for other purposes. Munitions and explosives, including mortar and artillery shell casings, require special control and destruction methods to prevent their use as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Develop Host-Nation Arms Control Capacity

2-101. While the host-nation government oversees arms control functions and the American Embassy monitors these functions, the HN may create regional or local offices to support these efforts. Additionally, host-nation military units and police or border security forces may be assigned tasks related to a broader arms control effort. Consequently, Army units may require a familiarity with arms control measures and to help their HN counterparts to support these efforts.

CONDUCT BORDER CONTROL, BOUNDARY SECURITY, AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

2-102. Border security reinforces national sovereignty and prevents interstate conflict. This includes physical security provided by military, border, or coast guard forces while customs officials regulate the cross-border flow of people, animals, and goods. Border control measures regulate immigration, control the movements of the local populace, collect excise taxes or duties, limit smuggling, and control the spread of disease vectors through quarantine. When confronted with an internal threat, the HN secures its borders to prevent an influx of foreign fighters and other external threats and to keep insurgents from getting support or using neighboring countries as sanctuaries. In some situations, the HN secures its intranational boundaries to prevent factional conflict. Areas of responsibilities in which Army units operate may have international or provincial boundaries; such vulnerable boundaries require concerted attention even while the unit directs its focus towards interior areas. In addition to border control, freedom of legitimate international and internal movement is essential for normal economic and social interaction. Depending upon the situation, Army units may conduct border security operations, support HN efforts, or monitor the situation along the border. Army units transition through the three phases to conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (see table 2-5).

Table 2-5. Phases to conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Establish border control and boundary security • Establish rules of movement • Dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints • Ensure freedom of movement	• Train and equip border control and boundary security forces	• Transition border security to host-nation control

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-103. An Army unit often contains or even isolates its AO so that stabilization tasks may proceed with limited interference from internal and external threats. Initially, Army units may conduct these tasks with limited contributions from host-nation organizations. As soon as practical, Army units integrate host-nation contributions into these efforts.

Establish Border Control and Boundary Security

2-104. U.S. or host-nation units establish border control and boundary security in their AOs, or a dedicated unit could be assigned the primary mission to secure a border or boundary of concern. Units use guard posts, ground and aerial patrols, and checkpoints along major roads that cross the border. Units receive instructions regarding permissible cross-border traffic, requirements (such as identity cards or passes), prior crossing coordination, and rules of engagement. Units continually improve border security with fences, signs, and growing participation by host-nation forces. In situations where cross-border traffic is either not permitted or permitted only under select circumstances, Army units make arrangements to support security forces with quick reaction forces, fires, or other means.

2-105. Military police provide relevant capabilities to enhance border operations. Military police units are trained in access control and physical security measures that can enhance border checkpoint operations. Military police, customs and border protection personnel, or other appropriate personnel transfer their experience in law enforcement and U.S. customs operations to supporting host-nation customs requirements at entry points and other checkpoints. Military working dogs provide the capability to detect contraband being smuggled across state boundaries. Military police units can provide law enforcement expertise and work closely with host-nation border personnel to train and assist until the HN can assume full authority. Military police border control operations include—

- Integration of border control and customs efforts.
- Enforcement of regulations and restrictions on movement of personnel, vehicles, material, and goods.
- Cooperative efforts with adjacent border agencies.
- Detection and apprehension of—
  - Illegal trafficking across borders.
  - Criminals, including localized and organized criminal activities.
  - Movement of irregular forces, including terrorist activities and movements.
  - Enemy infiltrators.
  - Other threats to the HN and persons of intelligence interest.

2-106. Reconnaissance and other maneuver organizations assist military police and host-nation units with border patrol, border control, and boundary security to prevent criminal activity, smuggling, and human trafficking. Border patrol extends beyond static displays such as checkpoints or guard towers. It includes dismounted and mounted reconnaissance as well as manned and unmanned aerial surveillance. Refer to FM 3-07, ATTP 3-39.10, and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* for additional information.

Establish and Disseminate Rules Relevant to Movement

2-107. In the initial response phase, Army units establish and disseminate rules relevant to movement. The host-nation population often has many reasons to travel from homes and local areas. Such circulation is important in a normally functioning society. In a failed state or other situation requiring stabilization, other situations create movement. Large numbers of dislocated civilians fleeing a crisis or returning home, relief agencies circulating and belligerents attempting to conduct movements illustrate other types of movement. Army units have to conduct effective population resource control that balances legitimate circulation, manages dislocated civilians, and neutralizes belligerents.

2-108. Suitable rules may include requiring identity cards, travel passes, controlled convoys, curfews, movement time windows, off-limits areas, or on-the-spot permission for an individual to pass through a checkpoint. Effective inform and influence activities help disseminate these rules and gain acceptance by the population. Army units disseminate rule using radio and television broadcasts, signs, leaflets, loudspeakers, or engagements with local leaders. Effective rules explain the rationale behind them that includes supporting a safe and secure environment. MISO, civil affairs, and public affairs assist with inform and influence activities to support this task.

Dismantle Roadblocks and Establish Checkpoints

2-109. In the initial response phase, Army units dismantle roadblocks and establish checkpoints. Belligerents use roadblocks to establish control over an area, extort money or other valuables from transiting civilians, or identify and target victims. Such roadblocks directly challenge the credibility of Army units and the HN and should be vigorously searched out and eliminated. Large accumulations of stationary people or vehicles often indicate these roadblocks. Belligerents establish some roadblocks permanently and others temporarily in unsecured areas. Army units can use aerial patrols and Soldiers inquiries to identify roadblocks. When they engage with the population, Soldiers frequently ask about existing roadblocks. A gray area may exist between these roadblocks and those established by local groups to enhance their security. In some cases, physical roadblocks may be left over from a conflict. Army units may need to clear or repair the infrastructure so that unheeded travel can resume.

2-110. Checkpoints or traffic control points are important components of the stability framework frequently established by Army units and their host-nation counterparts. Army and host-nation units establish these points to control access to secure facilities or other key nodes, interdict activities by belligerents, relieve congestion at bottlenecks, and establish control over an area. These measures may be long term (often referred to as deliberate, fixed, or enduring) or temporary (hasty or "snap"). Long-term traffic control points provide for billeting, meals, sanitation facilities, insured communications including computer access to databases, surveillance, and (depending upon the threat) improved protection measures.

2-111. Since checkpoints and traffic control points will become permanent, U.S. and host-nation personnel maintain a professional bearing, treat civilians with respect, and avoid generating unnecessary resentment. Host-nation traffic control points require routine monitoring to ensure they are not extorting the citizenry or taking bribes from belligerents to allow passage. For more information on checkpoints and traffic control points, refer to appropriate tactical manuals such as ATTP 3-21.9, FM 3-19.4, FM 3-21.8, and FM 3-24.2.

Ensure Freedom of Movement

2-112. In the initial response phase, Army units ensure freedom of movement. Host-nation freedom of movement fosters economic development, meets population needs, executes transition processes, facilitates NGO operations, and potentially allows civilians to escape zones of conflict. Additionally, overly restricted movement may conflict with the HN's laws or constitutions. Effective units quickly identify impediments to the population's freedom of movement and continually reassess as these obstacles evolve. Civilians may stop travelling because of concerns for personal safety; threats may come from criminals, insurgents, members of other ethnic groups, or the host-nation security forces. If Army units determine that security-related concerns deter civilians from travel, Army units with host-nation security forces increase efforts to secure transportation networks with expanded patrolling, additional traffic control points, and aerial surveillance.

2-113. However, units balance the desire to ensure freedom of movement with the requirement to maintain security, including the integrity of checkpoints and traffic control points. Enemy forces often target checkpoints and traffic control points, particularly if highly visible to the local population. Such attacks undermine public confidence in the abilities of Army and host-nation forces to maintain security. If not mitigated by effective inform and influence activities, such attacks can create stricter measures that can alienate the population.

TRANSFORMATION

2-114. In this phase, host-nation security forces assume more responsibility and become more visible to the population. Army units support broader SSR efforts (managed by the Department of State). Units normally operate with host-nation counterparts, and host-nation police begin providing more internal security. U.S. and host-nation military units may begin to focus on external threats, and Army units may mitigate shortfalls in host-nation capability.

Train and Equip Border Control and Boundary Security Forces

2-115. In the transformation phase, Army units train and equip border control and boundary security forces. Specific host-nation units get assigned the mission to secure borders; these may be army units or a dedicated border security force. Army units train and advise host-nation units to perform their operational missions, such as patrolling and monitoring, while helping them to develop supporting administrative and sustainment systems. Army units encourage host-nation forces to obtain equipment necessary to secure and control borders, according to host-nation security plans and host-nation limitations such as training, literacy, and sustainability. Army units ensure that host-nation forces develop the necessary systems to maintain accountability, obtain necessary supplies such as batteries, and keep the equipment maintained.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-116. During the fostering sustainability phase, the host-nation government assumes complete responsibility for securing its borders and for internal movement control. Remaining Army units consist of advisors or, in some cases, forces positioned as a deterrent against threats from a neighboring country. Advisors may continue to help improve host-nation capacities as part of a larger SFA program. Potential external threats may cause U.S. and host-nation forces to conduct combined planning and exercises and, possibly, some operational missions.

SUPPORT IDENTIFICATION

2-117. Identification programs provide various functions, including the accreditation of military professionals and those in the fields of politics, medicine, and law. Identification programs document individuals but also include businesses and corporations. These measures support legitimate activity, enable government regulation, and generate revenue. Other purposes include ensuring legitimate political participation; adjudicating property disputes; restricting the activities of individuals who have perpetrated major crimes, atrocities, or abuses; and isolating or neutralizing belligerents. Effective population identification methods facilitate establishing a secure and stable environment for the population. Army units transition through the three phases to support identification (see table 2-6).

Table 2-6. Phases to support identification

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Secure documents • Establish identification program • Enforce identification program	• Develop mechanisms for dispute resolution	• Expand identification programs with government functions

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-118. The HN may already have an identification program in place. An existing identification system requires Army units becoming familiar with existing forms of identification. In some cases, such a program may not exist, but local relationships are strong enough that a host-nation leader, such as a village mayor, can vouch for and control all residents. If possible, the identification program uses multilingual identification cards so that both U.S. and host-nation personnel can understand them.

Secure Documents

2-119. In the initial response phase, Army units secure documents. These documents include documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, professional certificates, birth records, and driving licenses. To preserve elements of an existing host-nation identification system, Army units ensure the security of facilities that contain records. These facilities include administrative offices with documents regarding the population at large and membership in organizations, courthouses, military headquarters, party headquarters, police stations, prisons, bureaus, or security and intelligence offices. Securing these facilities may prevent attempts to destroy records to conceal identities, hide past criminal activities, or obfuscate property ownership. In some environments, relevant records may be computer-based or otherwise digitized. Army units secure locations until they can thoroughly document or investigate their contents. When possible, Army units identify these facilities and alternate sources of information before operations begin.

Establish Identification Program

2-120. In the initial response phase, Army units establish an identification program. In many situations, the HN will have a suitable existing identification system. In other cases, Army units create a new identification program that includes registering and issuing identity cards. Initially Army and host-nation personnel manually record information on forms and then transfer it to a database. Information can include identification number, card number, previous identification number, name, aliases, hometown or city area, address, parents, occupation, tribe, arrest record, military service, and other data. Units can issue interim identity cards to individuals over a certain age (for example fifteen).

2-121. Upon registration, Army and host-nation personnel give the individual an interim identification card. If feasible, this initial card should have a distinctive color and include a photograph and some personal data such as name and hometown. Too much demographic data can prove detrimental since belligerents can use the card's information to identify and victimize members of a particular tribe or religious group.

2-122. Eventually, Army and host-nation personnel replace the interim identification cards with permanent cards. Permanent cards include biometric data such as fingerprints and barcodes that are hard to counterfeit. Card replacement is resource-intensive. Effective units make it as error-free as possible. Army and host-nation personnel may implement a series of interim cards, for example, three months after the initial card, they require a replacement card. Sometime personnel distribute subsequent replacements to mitigate problems such as lost or counterfeit versions of the first issue, many people require an additional registration process, or development of a national system necessitates a reissue to comply with nationwide standards. Subsequent replacement cards require a visually distinctions from earlier versions, such as a different color and signature authority.

2-123. Any identification program enables monitoring population movements, recognizing patterns, and correlating movements. Such identification enables units to identify possible belligerents or criminals undermining current stabilization efforts or wanted for previous crimes. Once Army units identify belligerents, units can publicize the identities via wanted posters or postings on internet sites, possibly with rewards offered for information leading to their apprehension.

2-124. Although implementing an effective identification program requires considerable effort, it is indispensible in reestablishing population security. An identification program enables integrating the HN into stabilization efforts and employing large numbers of civil servants required to administer the program. Local leaders are involved in the process and held accountable for its accuracy.

2-125. While host-nation personnel do much of the actual registration work, Army units initiate the system and train host-nation supervisors. Army units also monitor the program for quality assurance and dissuading corruption.

Enforce Identification Program

2-126. In the initial response phase, Army units ensure individuals have personal forms of identification. Once Army and host-nation units issue identification cards, they use and check them routinely. The HN disseminates rules for their possession by all available information means such as posters, the Internet, radio, and television. In situations where few visitors and all inhabitants know each other, inhabitants will rarely carry their cards. Indeed, that a village leader can vouch for all inhabitants may be sufficient. In other cases, however, their use can become a routine part of life. The HN may require identification cards—

- At random checks by security forces. The frequency of such checks can be increased or decreased according to the security environment.
- At checkpoints and traffic control points.
- When making purchases at stores or markets.
- When seeking employment.
- When seeking government services, such as school registration, elections, licenses, pensions.
- When seeking services such as humanitarian assistance, medical care, cell phones, or automobile repair.

2-127. U.S. and host-nation security forces enforce routine checks politely and without antagonizing the population. They also should be familiar with the cards and know what discrepancies to look for (such as forged signatures or certain known wanted personnel). Forces may temporarily detain and investigate those persons unable to present an identity card. The HN needs a replacement system for lost or damaged cards. Without being abusive, this system should be an inconvenience to cardholders to encourage accountability.

TRANSFORMATION

2-128. The identification system often evolves and gets integrated into other areas such as DDR and property ownership. Host-nation authorities will eventually assume ownership of the system and attempt to modify it to their needs. If the initial system is accurate, simple, flexible, and efficient, it will minimize the later growing pains. Army units can advise and assist this evolution, and should discourage the creation of an unrealistically complicated system for the society.

Develop Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution

2-129. In the transformation phase, Army forces develop mechanisms for long-term dispute resolution. U.S. and host-nation security forces increasingly support and coordinate with host-nation political and legal authorities for definitive resolution of disputes that can fuel conflict. In many cases, these disputes pertain to completing claims of property ownership, particularly land, and require compensation. Military forces may have the influence and position to advance the settlement of these issues, but they will ultimately require political or legal adjudication.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-130. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units expand identification programs to support governmental functions such as taxation and social programs, as well as economic advancements including banking and investments. Civilian authorities increasingly gain control of identification programs with marginal host-nation military involvement. The primary military contribution consists of sustaining a secure environment in which these functions can flourish. See the Chapter 3 discussion about establishing public order and safety and refer to FM 3-90 for the conduct of area security.

PROTECT KEY PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

2-131. Throughout stabilization efforts, Army units ensure that high priority personnel and facilities have protection, which may include arrangements for emergency medical support. With relatively little effort, belligerents can eliminate a critical partner or destroy a complex facility; either event can significantly set back and undermine the credibility of the mission. However, Army units concentrate on the protection needs of the general population. For more information see ATTP 3-39.32, ATTP 4-02, FM 3-19.12, FM 3-37, and FM 3-90. Army units transition through the three phases to protect key personnel and facilities (see table 2-7).

Table 2-7. Phases to protect key personnel and facilities

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Protect stabilization and reconstruction personnel and resources • Provide emergency logistic support • Protect cultural sites • Protect and secure critical infrastructure and civil records • Protect and secure important institutions • Protect military facilities and means of communications • Identify, secure, protect, and dispose of munitions	• Build host-nation capacity to protect • Advise and assist host-nation security forces in protection	• Transition responsibility to host nation

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-132. Army units identify and prioritize the key personnel and facilities to protect, since they will likely have more potential vulnerabilities than resources available to protect them. Based upon the threat analysis, units create a critical asset list and defendable asset list.

Protect Stabilization and Reconstruction Personnel

2-133. In the initial response phase, Army units protect government-sponsored civilian stabilization and reconstruction personnel. Host-nation stabilization and reconstruction and USG representatives need security from insurgents or criminals to function effectively. Military forces coordinate early and frequently with civilian authorities regarding likely threats and possible countermeasures. Military forces provide security for U.S. civilians and supporting contractors on military bases and with escorts when civilian representatives travel through the local area. Commanders refer to the contract support integration plan and the contractor management plan. These documents provide overarching guidance on contracted support the force will acquire and manage as well as the government's obligation to provide support.

2-134. Since NGOs often arrive first in the area and can best assist the host-nation population, Army units often protect NGOs as well. Army units account for the activities and movements of all partners, protecting equipment, facilities, supplies, and personnel. In many cases, unity of effort can be improved when military and civilian organizations live, work, and travel together. However, it may also compromise the nonmilitary status appropriate for civilian agencies. In some situations, Army units employ an emergency notification method with a quick reaction force. Host-nation civilian representatives and their families may have similar protection; however, opponents may still indirectly target them by threatening their families. Consequently, host-nation representative may attempt to preserve anonymity to avoid such retribution.

Protect Stabilization and Reconstruction Resources

2-135. In the initial response phase, Army units protect contractor and civilian stabilization and reconstruction resources. Although they may have limited ties to either the USG or HN, many private citizens, businesses, and NGOs may be involved in activities that enhance stabilization. Such actors only reluctantly coordinate with military forces. They perceive coordination as inconvenient, unnecessary, or

potentially jeopardizing to the neutral stance they prefer to maintain. At a minimum, Army units attempt to maintain situational awareness of their activities and locations and consider them when planning and conducting operations. Army units attempt to share contact information, agree to reasonable security measures, and discuss contingency plans.

2-136. Contractors, including those that provide security, usually have complicated relationships with Army forces, other USG agencies, IGOs, international organizations, NGOs, the HN, and other contractors. Their activities often also cross operational boundaries. Army units determine responsibilities and authorities regarding contractors operating in their AOs. The civil-military operations center, under the supervision of the unit G-9 (S-9), provides resources to examine security requirements of civilian agencies and to pass on security-related information.

2-137. Acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) authorities under DODD 2010.9 authorize units to acquire, and in some cases to provide, logistic support, supplies, and services directly from or to eligible countries and international organizations. ACSAs provide two distinct legal authorities as follows: acquisition-only authority and cross-servicing agreement authority (that includes both an acquisition and transfer authority). Military forces negotiate ACSAs according to DODD 5530.3. Military forces accomplish the acquisition and transfer of logistic support, supplies, or services under cross-servicing agreements by implementing arrangements. Acquisition-only authority does not require a cross-servicing agreement or an implementing arrangement as a pre-requisite. Although a HN cannot enter into an ACSA, military forces may still provide support under an international agreement.

Provide Emergency Logistic Support

2-138. In the initial response phase, Army units provide emergency logistic support. Notwithstanding general limitations on support from the U.S. military to other actors, sometimes military forces assist with emergency fuel, transportation, or other logistic support. Army units may help arrange for host-nation security forces to provide such support to non-U.S. recipients.

Protect Cultural Sites

2-139. In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure places of religious worship and cultural sites. Belligerents target religious sites for sectarian violence and treasure seekers loot cultural sites. Army units ensure that forces secure both sites as part of the initial response phase, although cultural sensitivities may suggest that Army units quickly transfer these security efforts to host-nation organizations. Protecting such sites includes identifying and neutralizing would-be attackers, including thieves. When conducting operations, Army units avoid disturbing cultural sites, which could include poorly marker archeological areas. Army units identify archaeological areas, cultural sites and other arts, monuments, and archives before conducting operations. As the United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention regarding the guarding and protection of arts, monuments, and archives, Army units consult with experts such as host-nation archeologists or NGOs specializing in this field. If units must enter or search such sites, host-nation personnel rather than U.S. forces do so. Combined operations should facilitate this practice.

Protect and Secure Critical Infrastructure and Civil Records

2-140. In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure critical infrastructure and civil records. Critical infrastructure includes bridges, ports, dams, roads, power plants, and other facilities. Some infrastructure has only local significance but remains important to the population. Others will have broader relevance, particularly those related to natural resources. Securing hospitals, universities, business centers, and large companies in the initial response phase greatly minimizes disruption to the economy and society while providing a base for future economic growth and stability. As mentioned previously, Army units secure civil records as soon as possible to help resolve disputes regarding ownership rights.

Protect and Secure Important Institutions

2-141. In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure strategically important institutions. While perhaps requiring initial security from Army units, governance centers such as executive buildings,

legislatures, and courthouses return to responsible HN control as soon as possible. If the previous regime was unpopular, an angered population might target these facilities. Such situations put Army units in a difficult position. Although they should refrain from action against the population, such facilities often contain evidence and are necessary for future governance. Effective Army units solicit the involvement of local host-nation leaders who can help reduce the level of violence.

2-142. Over the long term, such institutions may also become targets for more deliberate, focused attacks by those who seek to undermine the host-nation government's legitimacy. In addition to building host-nation capacity to protect such sites through defensive means, Army units develop sufficient intelligence to map belligerents' networks, determine their capabilities and intentions, and preempt their actions.

Protect Military Facilities and Means of Communications

2-143. In the initial response phase, Army units protect and secure military facilities and means of communications. Army units often secure host-nation military facilities. Since these facilities probably contain weapons and munitions, Army units maintain control to prevent adversaries gaining their acquisition. Additionally, control over host-nation military facilities provides greater influence over and coordination with host-nation forces. Army units maintain control to preserve evidence, records, or other items of intelligence value. Finally, they maintain control so the host-nation's security forces can use the facilities in the future.

2-144. Army units find it advantageous to occupy some of the host-nation's military facilities rather than build their own. They prefer bases with airstrips or runways to those that do not have these resources. Upon occupation, Army units consider plans to transition the base back to the HN, whether as an existing structure or as a facility the unit built. While it may seem counterintuitive to consider transition during initial occupation, Army units establish protocols for hazardous materials—such as medical waste and petroleum products—scrap metal, trash, and other issues that can negatively impact the relationship with the HN and mission success. Some host-nation forces may have the primary task of securing their own bases, which also serves the purpose of keeping these forces gainfully employed until their ultimate disposition is determined. Even if host-nation forces disband in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, the incoming government may gradually recalled them to duty as the situation stabilizes.

2-145. Host-nation military communications networks may provide the only resident communications infrastructure. Initially Army units protect and maintain these assets including remote relay stations. Units include them in any spectrum management plans to avoid unintended interference or degraded capability. Army units also secure munitions storage depots to preclude the possibility that belligerents may obtain explosives from these sites.

Identify, Secure, Protect, and Dispose of Munitions

2-146. In the initial response phase, Army units identify, secure, protect, and dispose of munitions. Army units' areas of operations may contain munitions storage areas and caches already established by the host-nation military or belligerents. These caches may not necessarily be in or near former military sites. Army units prepare to search civic, public, or government buildings, schools, transportation venues, and sewer systems. These locations are ideal cache sites, as enemy forces know U.S. forces will not target such sites. Army units identify and secure munitions to prevent pilfering by belligerents or harm to civilians who might be looking for items of value. Depending upon the condition of the stocks, Army units use explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to destroy this material.

2-147. Often Army units require site assessment, characterization, and an exploitation if belligerents possessed or developed programs for weapons of mass destruction. Site exploitation—conducted by trained experts—involves gaining intelligence from a site to develop leads that can help locate other elements of the program. Units that identify potential sites report their locations and secure them until site exploitation teams can investigate. Some militaries have fielded chemical munitions and lost accountability of the rounds. Those military forces potentially mixed chemical munitions with conventional munitions. In such situations, EOD teams destroy stockpiles allowing for downwind hazards. For additional information, refer to JP 3-31, ATTP 3-11.23, and ATTP 3-90.15.

TRANSFORMATION

2-148. During the transformation phase, a transitional civil authority from the USG or an international organization assumes overall responsibility while host-nation security forces play an increasingly prominent role in securing critical personnel and infrastructure. Army units begin to focus on the following tasks:

- Build host-nation capacity to protect civilian stabilization and reconstruction personnel.
- Build host-nation capacity to protect infrastructure and public institutions.
- Build host-nation capacity to protect military infrastructure.

2-149. Army units advise and assist host-nation security forces in their performance of these protection tasks. This assistance includes helping host-nation security forces develop administrative and logistic systems and providing guidance on how to conduct staff planning (see FM 3-07.1). Host-nation forces combine or conduct operations with periodic U.S. oversight. Army units seldom conduct unilateral operations. Army units integrate host-nation police and forces to prepare the HN to perform most domestic security functions.

2-150. Host-nation and IGO civilian authorities increasingly determine policies related to protection. Army units often mentor their counterparts regarding the military professional's acceptance of civilian control of the military.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-151. Over time, host-nation security forces, particularly the police, assume complete responsibility and authority over domestic protection issues. As threats recede, security measures may lessen to levels appropriate to the environment. Army units primarily focus on their own protection measures, particularly with redeployment. Army units also continue to advise and assist host-nation military units, although the emphasis shifts towards defense against external threats and developing an expeditionary capability to participate in international missions as part of a coalition.

CLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND OTHER HAZARDS

2-152. Explosive and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards include unexploded munitions resulting from conflict, mines, loose munitions and stockpiles, illicit caches, dilapidated munitions, and weapons of mass destruction projectiles and components. Other hazards include unshielded radiation sources or toxic industrial material released from facilities. Army units aim to prevent adversaries from acquiring these items and to prevent these hazards from harming civilians and friendly forces. Ultimately, the HN takes the lead for CBRN hazard clearance. This requires Army units helping host-nation forces develop the capacity to do so. Army units transition through the three phases to clear explosive and other hazards (see table 2-8).

Table 2-8. Phases to clear explosive and other hazards

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Establish an explosive hazards coordination cell • Conduct emergency clearing of explosive and other hazards • Map, survey, and mark explosives and other hazards • Remediate hazards	• Develop host-nation demining capacity • Build host-nation capacity to export demining expertise	• Support the maintenance of a secure environment

INITIAL RESPONSE

2-153. Army units must continually identify known and suspected locations of explosive. Essential tasks include proper marking, safety notifications for civilians, preventing access by belligerents or civilians, and ensuring disposition of the material.

Establish an Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell

2-154. In the initial response phase, Army units establish an explosive hazards coordination cell (EHCC). These cells predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards that affect force application, focused logistics, survivability, and awareness of an operational environment. The EHCC establishes and maintains an explosive hazards database, conducts pattern analysis, investigates mine and IED strikes, and tracks unexploded explosive ordnance hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice for mitigating explosive hazards, including training updates to field units. The EHCC also coordinates explosive hazards teams, recommends their priorities, and tracks their status. See FM 3-34 for the capabilities and employment of an EHCC.

Conduct Emergency Clearing of Explosive and Other Hazards

2-155. In the initial response phase, Army units conduct emergency clearing of mines, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards. Army units conduct route clearance along operational routes, such as main supply routes. Occasionally, operational routes coincide with populated areas and routes traveled by host-nation personnel and NGOs. Army units are prohibited from conducting humanitarian demining such as that conducted in uninhabited areas, agricultural lands, or areas in which Army units do not normally operate. However, Army units can clear mines or other explosives to prevent belligerents from using the mines as IEDs.

2-156. Belligerents often choose clearance sites for complex attacks. Unit clearance standard operating procedures include protective cordons for EOD teams and provisions for quick reaction forces and casualty evacuation. Army units establish security to protect individuals who might inadvertently enter the clearance area and, in some cases, to prevent belligerent attacks on the clearing force. If units use explosive charges to destroy hazards, they may need to restore damaged areas. restoring damaged areas facilitates trafficability for military forces and the population, reduces the likelihood of belligerents using craters for future IED emplacement, and assists in restoring a normal environment.

2-157. Repairs entail lane closures or restricted road access for an extended time. Army commanders explain the rationale for these closures with host-nation personnel and discourage them from violating these restrictions. Conversely, Army units conduct closures with as little impact on local traffic as possible. They mark known or suspected unexploded explosive ordnance areas with international (nonverbal) signs to avoid accidental host-nation traffic or interference. While the population normally receives such clearance actions favorably, Army units still engage local leaders prior to detonations to prepare them for the process and allow them to express concerns.

Map, Survey, and Mark Explosive and Other Hazards

2-158. In the initial response phase, Army units map, survey, and mark mined areas, unexploded explosive ordnance, and other explosive hazards. Army units mark suspected areas not immediately cleared, record them on precise grid coordinates, and upload data to all applicable databases. Marking can be permanent, temporary, or improvised. Army units use engineer tape, stakes, and flags to make temporary markings. Units replace these markings with more durable supplies, such as fences and signs in the host-nation language. Units also inform local leaders of marking activities and sometimes hire local workers to emplace the durable fencing. Fenced areas encompass the blast radius of the suspected explosive hazards. Army units use MISO messages and actions to inform local populations on actions to take when they come across suspected explosive hazards, actions to avoid, and reporting procedures. See FM 3-34.210 for more information on marking and recording explosive and other hazards.

Remediate Hazards

2-159. In the initial response phase, Army units remediate hazards remaining from the release of CBRN hazards and radiological fallout as well as provide decontamination support. Army units in the local area secure known or suspected CBRN sites. Specialized teams investigate the sites, collect information, and conduct the necessary site reduction. Destruction of the materials often requires evacuating the local population. Announcements by civil affairs broadcast teams may have to suffice when time or security concerns do not allow for house-to-house notification. In environments in which routine detonations can

inadvertently release CBRN, Soldiers and any civilians in the area move upwind of the detonations. Tanks of toxic industrial chemicals such as chlorine can yield effects similar to those of weapons of mass destruction. It may be appropriate to assign a decontamination contingency task to a subordinate unit.

TRANSFORMATION

2-160. In the transformation phase, host-nation forces and contractors begin developing the capacity to clear explosive hazards and conduct CBRN and EOD defense operations. Army units shift their efforts to building host-nation capacity, monitoring clearance efforts, and identifying additional locations that require clearance. U.S. forces integrate international contributions to the effort to conduct large scale humanitarian demining that may have been deferred during the initial response.

Develop Host-Nation Demining Capacity

2-161. In the transformation phase, Army units train host-nation forces in identifying, reporting, marking, and securing locations. These tasks can be further inculcated as the forces operate in partnership with U.S. Army advisors and other units. Additionally, Army units develop host-nation specialist units to conduct EOD, decontamination, and large-scale consequence management. This requires creating the units, manning them, training the personnel, and providing necessary equipment. Because of mission requirements, Army units may train while operationally employed. Sometimes, Army units can conduct necessary training for these specialist units, but the effort may require that Army units be augmented with the expertise needed for the training. In addition to training the host-nation specialty units, Army units develop host-nation trainers and facilities and create a self-sustaining base. CJCSI 3207.01B has more information about U.S. involvement in demining operations.

Build Host-Nation Capacity to Export Demining Expertise

2-162. In the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity to export demining expertise. As host-nation units gain experience in this high-demand, low-density field, and have adequately reduced local hazards, they often deploy beyond their normal AORs. This may require deployment to other parts of the country or internationally as part of a peacekeeping mission or coalition. Partnered Army units may again have to shift their emphasis to support specialized host-nation forces in developing an expeditionary capability, while considering the implications if this host-nation capability is taken from the AO.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

2-163. Army units during the fostering sustainability phase have limited involvement with clearing explosive hazards and CBRN defensive operations. Units support the maintenance of a secure environment that enables clearance activities of host-nation and international organizations while monitoring incidents and operations. Army units also continue to build capacity in host-nation forces and assist them when fielding new clearance equipment such as robotic devices.

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Chapter 3
Establish Civil Control

Civil control centers on rule of law. It promotes efforts to rebuild host-nation judiciary and corrections systems by providing training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Civil control tasks focus on building temporary or interim capabilities to pave the way for the host-nation or international organizations to implement as permanent capabilities.

CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES TO ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

3-1. Civil control ensures that citizens live in a safe society in which individuals and groups do not take the law into their own hands. Rather, they respect the decisions of and adhere to the rule of law. Rule of law enables a populace to have equal access to a self-sustaining justice system consistent with international human rights standards and to apply access equally. This is a long-term process conducted by civilian entities. Nevertheless, Army units take initial actions to begin establishing some level of civil control in public order and safety. Initially, Army units are the only authorities capable of implementing some level of civil control and will likely be involved in building host-nation capacity. Army units quickly transfer the lead for these efforts to the U.S. country team.

CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

3-2. Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:

- Just legal frameworks.
- Public order.
- Accountability to the law.
- Access to justice.
- Culture of lawfulness.

3-3. Stability requires just legal frameworks. Laws are consistent with human rights norms, drafted in a transparent way, publicly promulgated, and ensure the separation of powers. Laws are fair, responsive to the needs and realities of the host nation (HN), and benefit the entire population, not just powerful elites.

3-4. Stability requires public order. Unlawful activity, such as criminal and political violence and intimidation, is reduced to an acceptable minimum. Enforcers of the law pursue, arrest, and detain perpetrators, and the local population can move freely about the country without fear of undue violence.

3-5. Stability requires accountability to the law. Laws hold the population and public officials, including military officials, legally responsible for their actions through legitimate processes, norms, structures, and sanctions. Accountability is achieved both horizontally (through state institutions overseeing one another) and vertically (by citizens overseeing the actions of the state).

3-6. Stability requires access to justice. People, including those from marginalized groups, can seek and obtain remedy of grievances through justice institutions.

3-7. Stability requires culture of lawfulness. The population generally follows the law and has a desire to use the justice system to address their grievances. Most people believe that formal laws are a fundamental part of justice and that the rule of law enhances their lives and society in general.

3-8. Military forces can establish these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of stability (see table 3-1). Initial response tasks focus on establishing interim mechanisms for the restoration of rule of law. During the initial response phase, Army units have to execute tasks on their own

because little or no host-nation capability exists to establish order. In other cases, host-nation security forces can maintain order and require little Army unit involvement. Transformation tasks develop justice and corrections systems that meet international standards of fairness, including the treatment of detainees, and that include viable processes for redress and reconciliation. In the transformation phase, host-nation police forces and, potentially, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) begin to contribute and Army units focus more on security force assistance, particularly on the systems required to professionalize the host-nation security forces. Fostering sustainability tasks emphasize the process of shifting control of the judiciary and corrections systems to host-nation personnel. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to host nation as well as monitor and report. They also transition to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. The HN assumes complete responsibility for civil control through its own justice institutions.

Table 3-1. Establish civil control subordinate tasks

• Establish public order and safety. • Establish interim criminal justice system. • Support law enforcement and police reform. • Support judicial reform. • Support property dispute resolution process. • Support justice system reform. • Support corrections reform. • Support war crimes courts and tribunals. • Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

3-9. When possible, existing methods of host-nation civil control continue since Army units do not likely have the cultural, language, and resource capacity to attempt a wholesale replacement of the host-nation system, which may also be beyond the scope of the mandate. Army units often operate many other actors when accomplishing this primary stability task. U.S. organizations include other military units (particularly civil affairs, other special operations forces, military police, and foreign area officers at all levels), the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State Global Peace Operations Initiative. In addition to military units, host-nation organizations include police forces, militias and other para-military groups, border security forces, host-nation government or private security forces, intelligence services, and judicial offices. International organizations may include United Nations (UN) formed police units, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational partners.

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

3-10. The five stability principles described in Chapter 1 reflect the efforts to establish civil control.

Conflict Transformation

3-11. Civil control is enhanced if rival factions become convinced that they can secure their interests through peaceful legal and political means. Therefore, Army units try to diminish the benefits of and motivations for violent conflict while fostering a respect for the law, eliminating a culture of impunity, and creating the means to pursue political and economic goals peacefully. Transforming the conflict this way necessitates that Army units protect moderates from violence and, if necessary, neutralize hardliners.

Unity of Effort and Unity of Purpose

3-12. Unity of effort refers to cooperation toward common objectives over both the short and long term, and implies a shared understanding of operational environments. Civil control results from efforts by many actors at different levels. Such actors include Army units, supporting forces, multinational partners, host-nation civil society, host-nation security forces and ministries, and United States Government (USG) diplomatic and development agencies. International and intergovernmental organizations including regional and UN institutions will also be instrumental. UN missions frequently include a police component as well as civilian and military elements. While unity of command is unrealistic given the differing mandates and

approaches of various actors, Army units strive to integrate their activities with those of other actors. Divisions of labor may be determined and efforts deconflicted so that different actors do not work at cross-purposes.

Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership

3-13. A crucial part of legitimacy is the degree to which the host-nation population accepts the government or the mission and its mandate. Army units initially enforce law and order, but host-nation actors support and increasingly get involved in such matters. Host-nation security forces remain prominently involved in law enforcement and rule of law efforts, or the population may perceive U.S. forces as an invading force to resist. Often Army units need to train and monitor host-nation security forces (and contractors) to ensure they treat the population with respect. Legitimacy also applies to the degree to which the government and its institutions adhere to accepted international standards of good governance. Security, law enforcement, and corrections measures respect human rights. Failure of respect undermines popular support for the host-nation government. Army units should be aware that a broad interpretation of the HN should account for and involve minority groups and females.

Building Partner Capacity

3-14. Army units consult and enlist host-nation representatives in civil control efforts to build partner capacity and to promote state legitimacy through programs. To achieve adequate civil control, Army units engage with and attempt to secure the support of a wide range of actors. In addition to partners with which unity of effort is pursued, Army units engage with the population, ethnic leaders, the media, and NGOs. In some situations, engagement is appropriate with adversaries. Engagement emphasizes the importance of the rule of law.

Rule of Law

3-15. Legitimate political authorities determine and enforce laws. Factions must believe that a peaceful political settlement best serves their interests, and political authorities must refrain from abusing institutions that maintain civil control. Military measures to establish rule of law, restructure corrections systems, or support law enforcement can be short-lived and inadequate if actors fail to achieve some degree of political settlement.

ESTABLISH PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

3-16. Public order is a condition in which laws are enforced equitably. The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected; criminal and politically motivated violence is minimal; and criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained. Public safety permits people to conduct their daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale violence. Long-term sustainability of reforms depends on the achievement of public order and safety.

3-17. *Policing* is the application of control measures within an area of operations to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population (FM 3-39). Policing, in general, does not depend on a legal structure and enforcement of specific laws or punitive regulations. Army forces conduct policing continuously to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, it also applies policing activities to host-nation populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent.

3-18. Army units transition through three phases to establish public order and safety (see table 3-2 on page 3-4).

Table 3-2. Phases to establish public order and safety

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Protect population • Ensure access to endangered populations • Perform civil police functions • Safeguard witnesses and evidence • Control crowds and civil disturbances • Secure criminal justice and security institutions	• Build host-nation capacity to protect military infrastructure • Build host-nation capacity to protect public institutions • Build host-nation capacity for emergency response	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support host-nation modernization

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-19. Depending upon the mandate, the effectiveness of existing host-nation systems, and their own capacity to conduct such tasks, Army units should be prepared to perform certain tasks as an initial response.

Protect Population

3-20. In the initial response phase, Army units protect vulnerable elements of the population. Units ensure vulnerable groups—minorities, women, children, small businessmen, farmers, professional classes, and the elderly—have protection from belligerents. Such groups may be easily victimized in fragile state conditions. Their protection may require extensive presence and patrolling and, when appropriate, incorporating reliable host-nation security groups. Some dislocated civilian (DC) camps and other concentrations require specific security with continuous presence, reliable communications with the endangered groups, or the ability to respond quickly. As threats recede, Army units can ease security measures to levels appropriate to the environment.

Ensure Access to Endangered Populations

3-21. In the initial response phase, Army units ensure humanitarian aid and security forces can access endangered populations and DC camps. Belligerents often attempt to interfere with humanitarian workers or others who provide support to vulnerable populations. These actions may be motivated to profit, to deny support to the population, or to disrupt stabilization efforts. Although many NGOs prefer not to associate with the military directly, Army units can escort humanitarian convoys. In such cases, Army units obtain movement information from NGOs and provide general route security and overwatch with air or ground assets. Military information support operations (MISO) noninterference messages state the consequences of interfering with these operations and a means for civilians to report on belligerents and their activities.

Perform Civil Police Functions

3-22. In the initial response phase, Army units perform civil police functions. Depending upon host-nation capability gaps, Army units may initially be required to police local areas until the HN establishes police organizations. Army units conduct policing continuously to maintain order within its communities and formations. When directed, it also applies policing activities to host-nation populations to restore order when the rule of law has broken down or is nonexistent.

3-23. Restrictive rules of engagement limit the application of force on a population or group. This constraint differentiates it from conventional military operations in which aggressive and offensive acts frequently occur. Rules of engagement in no way inhibit Soldiers from exercising self-defense and protecting themselves, their comrades, Army property, and civilians under their care. The protective aspect of rules of engagement puts the host-nation population under the protection umbrella, rather than under the list of potential threats.

3-24. Policing is a critical step in establishing civil security as a precursor to establishing civil control and the transition to the rule of law. Some local host-nation leaders help control the behavior of the population or create "neighborhood watch" programs that support a safe and secure environment. The population should have the impression that Army units and their partners are there to protect them and not to abuse them. Military police units distributed among other units provide advice and training.

3-25. Fragile states are particularly at risk from organized crime. An unstable state or a state in transition provides an ideal environment for organized crime to gain sufficient control to supplant the state. A post-conflict state often lacks an adequate capacity to combat crime, including organized crime. The most powerful transnational crime groups easily shift their operations into regions that have weak law enforcement and unstable economies. Due to their freedom of action and resources, these groups often have weapons, communications, and other technological advantages over host-nation security forces. Justice and law enforcement personnel working in fragile states rarely get paid well. In contrast, organized crime organizations are well funded and can offer large bribes, working their way into the judicial, law enforcement, economic, and legislative structures of fragile states in transition.

3-26. An early assessment of host-nation capacity to combat crime helps prevent belligerents from gaining prominence. Army units assess the police and criminal environment using the variables of **p**olice and prison structures, **o**rganized criminal networks, **l**egal systems, **i**nvestigations and interviews, **c**rime-conducive conditions, and **e**nforcement gaps and mechanisms (POLICE). See ATTP 3-39.20 for additional information. Once they assess, Army units develop a plan so the HN can protect itself from criminal activity and conduct specialized police functions such as investigations and forensics.

3-27. Transitional military authorities, transitional civil authorities, and host-nation forces use a multipronged approach to identify and dismantle criminal organizations. Organized crime networks in fragile states are typically part of larger, international organizations possessing vast resources, easily shifting personnel from country to country to avoid prosecution. Host-nation forces take responsibility for the problem of criminal organizations operating within their borders.

3-28. Combating crime requires initially enforcing anticorruption laws and removing corrupt officials at all levels. Effective enforcement requires close cooperation between law enforcement, corrections, and judicial personnel, host-nation and international intelligence personnel, and police and local host-nation leaders. International organizations, such as the International Police Organization (known as INTERPOL), can provide useful intelligence and help conduct investigations. This multipronged approach enhances the investigation and prosecution of violators and sends a message that standards of conduct will be enforced. See STP 19-31B24-SM-TG and *The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* for more information.

Safeguard Witnesses and Evidence

3-29. In the initial response phase, Army units locate and safeguard key witnesses, documents, and other evidence. Army units often discover witnesses or evidence instrumental in judicial proceedings for recent events or serious incidents that occurred prior to the military operation. These proceedings enable the HN to achieve long-term justice and reconciliation. In some cases, units conduct investigations to locate such resources. Evidence—documents, remains, facilities, or weapons—requires temporary local security until Army units can safely transfer custody to organizations that have processing expertise. Army units keep identities of witnesses confidential and sometimes relocate witnesses to secure locations.

Control Crowds and Civil Disturbances

3-30. In the initial response phase, Army units control crowds, prevent looting, and manage civil disturbances. Generally, Army units prevent incidents of looting and civil disturbances early so they do not just get worse. Units secure key facilities, detain violators, and apprehend any identified instigators of violence. Engagement with local leaders positively affects mass behavior. MISO loudspeaker messages and mass-media broadcasts assist with crowd control. Vehicles with mounted loudspeakers work particularly well with large crowds. However, individual vehicles are still vulnerable to attack, so Army units implement a coordinated approach. Army units or host-nation leaders can address demonstrations caused by legitimate grievances. For further information see FM 3-19.15.

Secure Criminal Justice and Security Institutions

3-31. In the initial response phase, Army units secure facilities, records, storage equipment, and funds related to criminal justice and security institutions. When forces removed an unpopular regime, they quickly secure facilities used by its security forces and civil control institutions. These facilities often contain useful evidence and information needed for a future exploitation. Army units immediately protect these facilities to prevent perpetrators from removing evidence or to keep angry actors from destroying the facilities. For more information on establishing civil security and the rule of law, see FM 3-07, FM 3-19.13, and *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*.

TRANSFORMATION

3-32. Although external partners can retain authority for civil control in the transformation phase, actions emphasize building host-nation institutions such as police forces, courts, and correction institutions. Depending upon the internal threat, host-nation forces become involved in maintaining public order. Army units continue to monitor the initial response tasks as the HN increasingly performs those tasks. Many priorities during the transformation phase are tied to national-level security sector reform.

Build Host-Nation Capacity to Protect Military Infrastructure

3-33. During the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity to protect military infrastructure. They help host-nation partners to develop their own capability to protect military facilities, including remote sites. Security measures should be integrated into broader programs that foster good order and discipline, including personnel accountability, property accountability, and maintenance. Security measures include controlling access, local defense, quick reaction to direct and indirect fire attacks and infiltration, countersurveillance, and local patrolling. Military facilities should have adequate security, which includes 24-hour situational awareness and operational response, and Army units can assist host-nation units in developing their tactical operations center procedures.

Build Host-Nation Capacity to Protect Public Institutions

3-34. During the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity to protect public institutions. Units transfer security of key host-nation infrastructure to host-nation organizations as soon as possible. Host-nation military units may temporarily be committed to securing public infrastructure, but eventually police forces or dedicated security organizations conduct this function. Although Army units primarily focus on developing their host-nation military partners, they still monitor and assist in building the capacity of these other security actors as appropriate. This includes helping them develop suitable administrative and logistic systems to increase their capability and professionalism. Army units encourage coordination between these different security organizations and help mediate any disagreements among them.

Build Host-Nation Capacity for Emergency Response

3-35. During the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity for emergency response. In addition to building host-nation capacity to maintain public order and safety on a steady-state basis, a security sector reform program develops a capability to respond to emergencies such as terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or major accidents. This capability includes acquiring robust capacities including communications, medical assets including evacuation, bomb disposal units, elite security forces, and the ability to mobilize manpower and equipment. Army units initially develop these capabilities for regions and major cities, so the HN can sustain them. Contingencies for emergencies include identifying the controlling authority during a serious incident. Emergency response measures include consequence management, such as determining how the HN will mitigate the loss of a major bridge. While many emergency responses fall within the domain of civil authorities, the host-nation military may perform a key supporting role. For more information, see FM 3-05.2, FM 3-07.1, FM 3-19.12, FM 3-37, and ATTP 3-39.32.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-36. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. As the HN institutionalizes organizations and procedures, Army units and

other international partners help identify modernization requirements and the means necessary to satisfy those requirements. Modernization includes establishing information technology networks to support the maintenance of civil order; however, Army units avoid wasting scarce resources on systems too complex for the environment. Army units transfer all public security responsibilities to host-nation police forces, including functions such as criminal investigations; arrest of suspects; crowd control; management of civil disturbances; prevention of looting; and protection of cultural and religious sites, museums, archives, libraries, and archaeological sites.

ESTABLISH INTERIM CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

3-37. Stability first requires restoration of a fully functioning criminal justice system—a significant challenge for Army units. When possible, Army units continue to use the HN's existing criminal justice system. In extreme cases, this restoration requires the efforts of a broad range of (preferably) nonmilitary professionals acting as interim authorities until host-nation professionals are prepared to take over essential tasks. Interim authorities pursue their work under a clearly defined legal authority. Except in rare circumstances, rule of law sections in civil affairs brigades and command—with the U.S. Departments of State and Justice and other competent international authorities—perform these tasks.

3-38. Army units transition through the three phases to establish interim criminal justice system (see table 3-3).

Table 3-3. Phases to establish interim criminal justice system

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess the current legal framework • Deploy interim justice personnel • Establish review mechanisms • Enact interim legal codes • Assess host-nation capacity to combat crime	• Develop host-nation justice institutions • Expand justice systems as necessary	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support host-nation training and growth

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-39. Army units prepare to perform five tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess the Current Legal Framework

3-40. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the current legal framework. Army units enlist legal personnel to assess the existing legal framework, including the need for modifications or excisions. Units use internationally accepted model codes as templates if current legal framework needs extensive modifications. For more information on assessing host-nation legal frameworks, see *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.*

Deploy Interim Justice Personnel

3-41. In the initial response phase, Army units deploy interim justice personnel to complement host-nation criminal justice system. When Army units act as the transitional military authority or can otherwise strongly influence the decisions of host-nation authorities, judge advocate general (JAG) personnel assist them. JAG personnel determine those interim justice positions to create that complement the host-nation criminal justice system. Positions include court administrators, corrections staff, defense advocates, prosecutors, and judges. JAG personnel also help develop vetting criteria with which to evaluate prospective interim justice personnel.

3-42. During this process Soldiers ensure that people selected to fill interim positions understand the temporary nature of those positions. A belief that the positions are intended to be long standing or permanent may lead to dissatisfaction and divisiveness when the HN dismantles the interim system for more permanent arrangement. Faulty beliefs encourage locals to try improving their situations by bribing justice system personnel, particularly if a culture of corruption prevailed in the previous justice system.

3-43. Army units best develop processes for creating interim positions, publicizing those positions, establishing vetting criteria, and interviewing prospective personnel in consultation with local host-nation authorities. Working closely with local leaders throughout the process of deploying interim justice personnel increases the chance that local leaders will accept the process. Local involvement while developing the interim system substantially increases long-term viability of the new justice system.

Establish Review Mechanisms

3-44. In the initial response phase, Army units establish mechanisms to review the legality of detentions and minor cases to minimize pretrial detention. Army units apply mechanisms to prisoners in minor cases as soon as possible. The design mechanisms to minimize pretrial detention, particularly in cases of minor or nonviolent crimes. Army units consult local host-nation leaders regarding appropriate disposition of cases and monitor the activities of released individuals.

Enact Interim Legal Codes

3-45. In the initial response phase, Army units enact interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law. International legal specialists help determine the scope within which legal codes may be modified or enacted. JAG personnel and international legal specialists help draft interim legal codes and procedures. Army units ensure that enacting legal codes and procedures falls within the mandate of the mission and is supported by international law.

Assess Host-Nation Capacity to Combat Crime

3-46. In the initial response phase, Army units assess host-nation capacity to combat crime. Host-nation capacity to combat crime depends on available resources such as personnel, equipment, facilities, training, and on integrity, including the absence of widespread bribery or extortion. Assessment of host-nation capacity to combat crime includes continually evaluating law enforcement, the court system, and corrections. Assessment also examines these elements from the vantage points of both effectiveness and integrity.

TRANSFORMATION

3-47. During the transformation phase, Army units develop host-nation justice institutions under the control and supervision of transitional civil authorities. Army units may not be directly involved, but they monitor developments and report concerns through their chains of command. Army units expand justice systems to jurisdictions that were previously not under control.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-48. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer complete responsibility to the host-nation justice institutions as well as monitor and report progress. During this phase, Army units also support HN training and growth. The host-nation criminal justice system is considered fully functional once it is self-sustaining. Once Army units train host-nation personnel, Army units begin withdrawing their support. Training includes a phase during which Army specialists observe and advise without active participation. Once host-nation personnel have developed capacity to take responsibility for host-nation institutions, Army units gradually decrease their advisory participation.

SUPPORT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND POLICE REFORM

3-49. Law enforcement and policing operations comprise an essential component of civil control. Typically civilian agencies provide support for law enforcement and police reform. In failed states, sometimes host-nation (civilian) police forces succumb to corruption, and locals distrust them. As a result, U.S. or host-nation forces with law enforcement experience fill the void and provide this support until civilian agencies or organizations can do so.

3-50. Army units evaluate police-related civil considerations through an assessment of the police and criminal environment using the POLICE variables discussed in paragraph 3-26. This assessment includes the existence of organized criminal elements, crime-conducive conditions, and general criminal activity.

3-51. Fragile states in transition to democratic government are particularly at risk from organized crime. An early assessment of host-nation capacity to combat organized crime helps prevent transnational criminal groups from gaining a foothold in the HN. Once Army units assess host-nation capacity, they can develop a plan to protect the HN from organized criminal activity. Community interface forums help foster law and order at the local level and monitor the effectiveness of police forces.

3-52. Army units transition through the three phases to support law enforcement and police reform (see table 3-4).

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-53. Army units prepare to perform six tasks in the initial response phase while continually assessing host-nation police capabilities. Civil control efforts require an accurate assessment of existing and required host-nation police capabilities. Before beginning the reform or rebuilding of host-nation police, Army units conduct a thorough assessment of the police to establish attainable goals and objectives. See ATTP 3-39.10 for additional information on assessing host-nation police.

Table 3-4. Phases to support law enforcement and police reform

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Identify evidence of crimes • Identify and detain perpetrators • Support vetting and accounting • Deploy police trainers and advisors • Assess police facilities and systems • Identify and dismantle criminal organizations	• Train and advise host-nation police forces • Establish police academies • Develop community interface forums • Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support a functional judicial system

Identify Evidence of Crimes

3-54. In the initial response phase, Army units identify evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity, transnational crime, and corruption. Army units train host-nation personnel to recognize such evidence of these crimes. Host-nation personnel participate as much as possible in identifying, securing, preserving, and processing evidence.

3-55. Crimes include terrorism, organized crime, financial crimes, and trafficking in humans and narcotics. These crimes occur domestically and involve host-nation actors. Transnational or international crimes include organized crime limited to a particular region in the HN or international networks with connections to the HN. Transnational crime includes narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms trade, illegal cultural trade including antiquities, and other activities. Corruption also provides an avenue for transnational crime. These activities not only create regional instability, but also often contribute to financial and other support to terrorist groups and other belligerents. Host-nation units train to process evidence of financial crimes, drug trafficking, and human trafficking. For more information on evidence and investigations, see FM 3-19.13.

Identify and Detain Perpetrators

3-56. In the initial response phase, Army units identify and detain perpetrators of these offenses. Army units assist host-nation law enforcement personnel to identify suspected perpetrators. Army units ensure that arrest and detention of suspected perpetrators follow international standards. Often detention procedures lack proper documentation of the detention. As appropriate, Army units have a warrant for the arrest, properly detaining the accused with consideration for the safety of the accused's family, their property, and their dignity. Army units document a proper chain of custody for the detainee and all evidence collected. Army units emphasize standards for detainee treatment with host-nation security forces.

3-57. Typically law enforcement personnel are the first line of defense against terrorism and international crime. As such, they run the risk of becoming involved first in questionable interrogation techniques, corruption, and bribery. Improper interrogation techniques or acceptance of a bribe at the outset of a case can lead to its dismissal later in the judicial process. Army units thoroughly train police to avoid these pitfalls. For additional information, see FM 3-39.40.

Support Vetting and Accounting

3-58. In the initial response phase, Army units support vetting, credentialing, and accounting for host-nation police forces. In fragile states, law enforcement institutions may have functioned as instruments of control rather than as sources of law and order. Consequently, host-nation populations associate law enforcement personnel with violence and corruption.

3-59. Army units carefully vet host-nation personnel hired to assist in law enforcement reform. Vetting ensures competence and placement of those whose past behavior will instill trust of authority among the local population. Army units account for law enforcement and police personnel. In cooperation with host-nation personnel, Army units obtain a roster of host-nation police and law enforcement personnel or, if those documents no longer exist, compile a roster based on intelligence derived from local or governmental sources. U.S. and host-nation forces use the roster to identify local personnel with law enforcement experience and with past activities in law enforcement that disqualifies them to participate in the reform process. Vetting of senior police officers relates to that of other senior officials as discussed in Chapter 2.

3-60. Army units craft police recruitment programs with local input from host-nation authorities, consider culture, and use themes that resonate with the population. They ensure recruitment programs properly represent all major demographic groups and consider female perspectives and involvement. U.S. and multinational partners encourage and support host-nation efforts to recruit from minority populations. Army units establish and enforce a clear set of appropriate behavioral, physical, and moral standards.

Deploy Police Trainers and Advisors

3-61. In the initial response phase, Army units deploy police trainers and advisors. Effective Army units properly train law enforcement and police personnel to avoid poorly conducted investigations, mishandled evidence, or mistreated prisoners. Civilian trainers and advisors may not be immediately available; in the interim, with special authorization, Army units train and advise host-nation police. Military police units have required technical skills to provide this training. Interim trainers and advisors with law enforcement experience may be drawn from U.S. or host-nation forces, or from civilian or international organizations.

3-62. Police trainers, advisors, and mentors having training in international policing standards to train host-nation police forces to operate up to those standards. If a UN mission is present, it normally includes a police component with training responsibilities.

Assess Police Facilities and Systems

3-63. In the initial response phase, Army units inventory and assess police facilities and systems. An inventory and assessment of police facilities determines whether to repair old facilities, build new facilities, or adjust the number of facilities in any given region. Chapter 5 discusses governmental facilities. FM 3-05.401 and FM 3-57 discuss the conduct of assessments. An inventory and assessment of police systems determines needed equipment—vehicles, computers, weapons—and whether administrative processes need to be developed.

3-64. An inventory of police systems includes police records, whether in hard copy or digitally stored. Such records include records on personnel, finances, prisoners, and cases. Army units conducting inventories of police records understand that such records constitute legal evidence. They secure and preserve the records with that in mind.

Identify and Dismantle Criminal Organizations

3-65. In the initial response phase, host-nation forces use a multipronged approach to identify and dismantle criminal organizations. Organized crime networks in fragile states often operate as part of larger,

international organizations. Such organizations possess vast resources and the ability to shift their personnel from country to country to avoid prosecution. Although the International Criminal Court investigates serious international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, it lacks the power to take suspects in custody. International Criminal Court investigatory authorities rely on the cooperation of law enforcement and police in countries in which transnational criminals operate. Host-nation forces take responsibility for the problem of international criminal organizations operating within their borders and use a multidisciplinary approach to combat organized crime. Host-nation forces identify, investigate, and, if appropriate, detain suspected members of criminal organizations. Enforcement of anticorruption laws and the removal of corrupt officials enable Army units to combat transnational crime.

TRANSFORMATION

3-66. Army units support law enforcement and police reform with four tasks in the transformation phase.

Train and Advise Host-Nation Police Forces

3-67. During the transformation phase, Army units train and advise host-nation police forces. Civilian law enforcement personnel train host-nation police forces. If civilian trainers are unavailable, Army military police units bridge the gap by providing interim training in law enforcement activities.

3-68. Police trainers and advisors develop training strategies to effectively train and develop effective police organizations. These training strategies consider the current state of police forces and the strategic goals established by military and civilian leaders. These strategies target identified gaps in capability and build upon existing capabilities. Army units conduct police training simultaneously from the most senior administrative levels to the ground-level police patrols. An effective host-nation police training program requires consistency and synchronization when applying training, policy directives, and logistic procedures.

3-69. Host-nation criminal justice institutions best combat organized crime by ensuring transparency and accountability. Transparency and accountability discourage corruption and, when they fail to discourage it, uncover it so that the HN can prosecute crimes. Vigorous prosecution of corruption cases and replacement of those found guilty of such crimes is essential.

Establish Police Academies

3-70. During the transformation phase, Army units establish police academies. Self-sustainability requires host-nation capacity to continue to train personnel. Army units engage international organizations and host-nation personnel to plan the establishment of host-nation police academies. International organizations and Army units provide expertise in law enforcement training and police academy administration.

3-71. In the case of a failed police system, academy programs may need to be tiered from basic-level training to more advanced follow-on training due to the urgent need to train and field as many host-nation police as quickly as possible. As early as possible, academy management and instruction transition to host-nation control, at first under U.S. and multinational supervision then gradually to full host-nation autonomy. As the environment matures, planners and trainers lengthen police academy courses to focus training on higher-level police training tasks.

Develop Community Interface Forums

3-72. During the transformation phase, Army units develop community interface forums. A forum enables people to voice their concerns to their local leaders and police publicly so community members can return to normal life. A forum also enables the stability of the community by increasing interaction and cooperation and by providing an open, nonviolent context in which to air grievances.

3-73. Local populations in fragile states often had no voice in the running of their governments and communities; speaking publicly proved unpopular or dangerous. Army units work closely with local leaders to develop opportunities for community members to speak freely and publicly. The support of these trusted leaders helps develop community interface forums. Excessive U.S. visibility in community forums lessens the legitimacy of host-nation leaders if the local population perceives them as too closely associated with a foreign military.

Rehabilitate or Construct Necessary Facilities

3-74. During the transformation phase, Army units rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities. Once Army units inventory and asses host-nation law enforcement facilities, they support plans for rehabilitating or constructing needed facilities. Host-nation authorities take the lead as much as possible to enhance the community's sense of investment in local law enforcement and police.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-75. In every fostering sustainability phase to support law enforcement and police reform, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. When Army units transfer responsibilities to permanent host-nation justice institutions, they also support a functional judicial system.

3-76. A functional judicial system, international standards of conduct for judicial personnel, and judicial proceedings free of political interference support reform of host-nation law enforcement and police. Without judicial reinforcement, any initial successes in law enforcement reform will not be sustainable. Army units fully integrate specialized and nonspecialized criminal justice institutions and personnel. Army units create a reinvigorated criminal justice system that provides effective civil control and integrates with international efforts to combat organized crime. Many societies have operated under a traditional legal and justice system for generations. Establishing a system that meets international standards may not function well initially if it does meet the justice needs of the population. It is important, therefore, to consider traditional law and the potential for integration of the two systems.

3-77. Host-nation police and law enforcement personnel engage criminal justice personnel and ensure that law enforcement and judicial institutions work together to achieve their goals. Complete integration of host-nation criminal justice institutions with law enforcement enhances transparency, encourages fair and professional criminal investigations, increases institutional legitimacy, and allows for the effective operation of checks and balances. Advisors and mentors to host-nation police include those who can assist host-nation personnel with reforming administrative procedures. Efficient and effective administrative procedures achieve substantive goals, such as accountability, transparency, and impartial court proceedings. Host-nation law enforcement requires new administrative procedures, including transparent entry procedures, promotion procedures, and sustainable retirement systems. Retirement systems provide for disabilities due to injuries sustained on duty and survivor benefits for family members of those personnel killed in the line of duty.

SUPPORT JUDICIAL REFORM

3-78. The reform or reconstruction of host-nation judicial systems is integral to rule of law and provides the necessary framework for broader security sector reform. Support provided to judicial institutions parallels efforts of police and security forces to bolster the HN's ability to maintain civil control and security. Under most circumstances, other agencies and organizations support the development of the judicial branch of government. In a failed state, however, military forces perform these functions until they can be transitioned to an appropriate civilian agency or organization. Army units apply an interim legal code, including a code of criminal procedure, pending revival of a local legal system consistent with international standards. Reforming the judicial system is a civilian function that transcends stabilization activities and usually takes many years. While Army units occasionally perform the function of a judicial system, usually such efforts are best accomplished with the re-establishment of local structures. Host-nation security forces support judicial reform by protecting institutions and personnel such as judges and attorneys. Supporting reform includes paying justice personnel adequate salaries so they do not resort to corrupt practices.

3-79. Army units transition through the three phases to support judicial reform (see table 3-5).

Table 3-5. Phases to support law enforcement and police reform

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Identify host-nation legal professionals • Identify leaders to incorporate into reform process • Determine gaps with human rights norms • Establish vetting criteria • Educate personnel on interim legal codes • Inventory and assess courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations • Deploy judicial advisors and liaisons	• Rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities • Support vetting of host-nation legal professionals	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Institutionalize the host nation's judicial system

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-80. To support law enforcement and police reform, Army units prepare to perform seven tasks.

Identify Host-Nation Legal Professionals

3-81. In the initial response phase, Army units identify host-nation legal professionals. U.S. and international legal specialists identify host-nation legal professionals to understand host-nation law and procedure. The official host-nation legal code may have existed alongside local tribal law, religious law, or local custom. The interrelation of these traditions may be complex, but U.S., international, and host-nation legal professionals need to understand and account for traditions when reforming the host-nation judicial system.

Identify Leaders to Incorporate into Reform Process

3-82. In the initial response phase, Army units identify actual and potential leaders to incorporate into reform process. Sustainable judicial reform requires the support of local leaders. As early as possible, Army units identify and seek out local leaders to participate in the reform process. Their knowledge—particularly advice about local laws and customs—and participation will help convince the local population to support the reform.

3-83. Current leaders, other community members, or Army units can identify potential leaders. Their ability to work with Army units as well as existing leaders drives future success of the reform. Often potential leaders have already made their presence felt in the community. Effective Army units identify any resentment or friction those leaders caused with actions or group affiliation. If perceived U.S. support of rivals alienates existing local leaders, the mission may fail.

Determine Gaps with Human Rights Norms

3-84. In the initial response phase, Army units determine gaps or inconsistencies with international human rights norms in legal framework. Army units help create a committee to identify host-nation laws that conflict with international standards for human rights. The committee may consist of host-nation, U.S., and international law specialists, as well as representatives from human rights and international rule of law organizations. Army units often redraft host-nation legal codes to bring them into line with international standards of human rights, refugee, humanitarian, and other international laws. If gaps and inconsistencies are too numerous or complex, Army units may forego attempts to retain the host-nation law. Instead they may create a composite code of host-nation law, tribal customs, and religious law. Alternatively, units may use a template designed for use by post-conflict states to draft a new legal code, such as one of the UN model codes of criminal law and procedure.

Establish Vetting Criteria

3-85. In the initial response phase, Army units establish vetting criteria. Army units work with host-nation judicial and law enforcement personnel to develop vetting criteria for judicial system personnel, addressing competence, criminal behavior, corruption, and abuse. Vetting processes often uncover evidence that merit further criminal investigation. Judicial personnel in fragile states are particularly susceptible to bribes from illegal sources. Therefore, personnel considered for judicial positions must be thoroughly vetted to ensure that the host-nation judicial system maintains international standards of conduct.

Educate Personnel on Interim Legal Codes

3-86. In the initial response phase, Army units educate criminal justice personnel on interim legal codes and international human rights standards. Army units engage personnel familiar with the interim legal code. these personnel educate criminal justice personnel on the operation of the code and on the international standards of conduct it upholds. This includes an understanding of international human rights standards. People familiar with the interim code include host-nation or U.S. legal personnel, UN representatives, or others who participated in drafting the interim code.

Inventory and Assess Courts, Law Schools, Legal Libraries, and Bar Associations

3-87. In the initial response phase, Army units inventory and assess courts, law schools, legal libraries, and bar associations. Army units assess the state of the existing judicial system before beginning reform. As an initial step, legal specialists in Army units conduct a basic inventory of host-nation courts, law schools, law libraries, and bar associations. Such an inventory includes information about the condition of the inventoried institutions: their current financial viability, enrollment, numbers of employees, the state of equipment (books, computers, and supplies), and physical condition of facilities. Engagement with law school administrators and leaders of local legal associations, including bar associations, provides further information on the state of legal research and education in the HN. The inventory of host-nation legal infrastructure also includes the status of libraries, archives, and other repositories of legal documents, such as religious sites, that provide the foundation for implementing decisions. Assessments include interviews with law librarians. Their professional positions provide them with contacts within the court system, bar associations, and law school faculties, making them ideal to assess the state of legal education in the HN. Legal specialist print laws making them readily available to lawyers as well as human rights and other civil society organizations that might represent the rights of vulnerable citizens. The U.S. country team often assists with this effort.

Deploy Judicial Advisors and Liaisons

3-88. In the initial response phase, Army units deploy judicial advisors and liaisons as early as possible. Personnel with expertise and experience in reconstructing legal codes in post-conflict societies deploy to assist in reform tasks. These personnel come from civilian USG agencies or other organizations. Liaisons deploy to facilitate and promote communications between host-nation personnel and appropriate specialists.

TRANSFORMATION

3-89. Army units support law enforcement and police reform with two tasks in the transformation phase.

Rehabilitate or Construct Necessary Facilities

3-90. During the transformation phase, Army units rehabilitate or construct necessary facilities. Army units evaluate existing judicial facilities, including law offices, libraries, and courtrooms, as early as possible. Units assess facilities for structural integrity and suitability for their purposes.

Support Vetting of Host-Nation Legal Professionals

3-91. During the transformation phase, Army units support vetting of host-nation legal professionals. Army units engage JAG personnel or international personnel with legal expertise to develop vetting criteria

for host-nation legal professionals. Army units also include host-nation legal personnel, if available, in this process as much as is feasible. These personnel often know local laws and customs. Including host-nation legal personnel helps build support for judicial reform and create legitimacy in the eyes of the host-nation population.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-92. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. Army units also institutionalize the HN's judicial system to incorporate international standards for jurisprudence while incorporating the HN's accepted traditions and culture. Army units use inform and influence activities—enabled by a responsible and open media—to gain the support of the population and host-nation leaders. Army leaders support these efforts during engagements with host-nation counterparts, monitor developments, and assess conditions in reports through their chain of command and with their partners.

SUPPORT PROPERTY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS

3-93. The judiciary branch resolves property disputes. Long-standing disputes over ownership and control of property often occur in failed states. Such conflicts include disputes over possession of livestock, water distribution rights, land ownership for farming or grazing, or ownership of homes abandoned by their owners and resettled by squatters. Transitional authorities implementing dispute resolution mechanisms early helps prevent escalating violence that often occurs when people seek to enforce resolution on their own terms. These authorities expect challenges when establishing a land registry with an agreed-upon documentation system to record and track land and property issues for long-term resolution.

3-94. Army units transition through the three phases to support property dispute resolution process (see table 3-6).

Table 3-6. Phases to support property dispute resolution process

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Implement dispute resolution mechanisms • Publicize dispute resolution mechanisms • Coordinate dispute resolution process	• Continue resolving disputes	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • provide guidance to resolve disputes

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-95. Army units prepare to support property dispute resolution process by performing three tasks in the initial response phase.

Implement Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

3-96. In the initial response phase, Army units implement mechanisms to prevent unauthorized occupation or seizure of land or property. Attempts to seize or reclaim land and property can complicate some stabilization efforts. Such complications occur when DCs return to their former homes or when other actors attempt to exploit an absence of effective governance. Army units become involved in property dispute resolution by providing security in locations where property disputes have or may become violent. In the absence of an effective court system, resolution requires negotiation or mediation by host-nation leaders and civilian experts. Units remain alert to these potential issues, attempt to prevent conflict, and—with host-nation involvement and guidance from the chain of command—attempt to support dispute resolution efficiently and fairly.

3-97. The legal framework in an unstable state may have operated as an instrument of state control rather than as a system to address grievances or disputes. Such a legal framework deemphasizes the rights of average people to benefit the wealthy and powerful. Army units then have to build entire judicial mechanisms to address property disputes.

3-98. Army units sometimes call on JAG personnel, international legal specialists, and professional negotiators or mediators to help develop negotiation and mediation procedures as property dispute resolution mechanisms. Army units work closely with JAG personnel and international actors early in the process of reform of dispute resolution processes. Although interim judicial mechanisms may later change, it is simpler, more efficient and, ultimately, more effective to develop interim mechanisms that may become permanent later on with only minimal modification. Army units work with JAG and international legal specialists to determine whether, and under what circumstances, Army units may institute legal mechanisms for redress in the area of property disputes. In some intractable situations, Army units develop and implement a system of compensation that satisfies dislocated parties.

Publicize Dispute Resolution Process

3-99. In the initial response phase, Army units publicize the dispute resolution process. Army units inform influential people, such as respected local elders, of the implementation of dispute resolution mechanisms. The local population accepts new procedures if respected local leaders support them. Army units publicize dispute resolution mechanisms using local media—including print, television, and radio—to mitigate the possibility of violence.

Coordinate Dispute Resolution Process

3-100. In the initial response phase, Army units coordinate the dispute resolution process to deter violence and retribution. Army units coordinating with law enforcement units and ensuring that law enforcement personnel know and understand new dispute resolution procedures. These efforts help ensure that local populations turn to judicial authorities rather than to violence to resolve their disputes. Army units sometimes call on law enforcement units to provide security for those designing dispute resolution mechanisms, or for those who choose to use the system to resolve differences.

TRANSFORMATION

3-101. In the transformation phase, additional disputes may emerge, and long-term solutions may be required to replace any interim measures. Emphasis shifts towards resolving disputes through a formal legal system rather than by negotiating through local leaders. Mechanisms for resolving property disputes need enough structure to ensure consistency and fairness but enough flexibility to achieve justice in many situations. Effective Army units involve local leaders when compiling a roster of contested property. Especially in the absence or incompleteness of written records, local leaders know the locations of contested properties and often can identify people involved in ongoing property disputes.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-102. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. Army units cooperate with international actors, developing mechanisms to adjudicate property disputes. In addition to the standard judicial channels, negotiation, mediation, and adjudication all work as feasible means to address property disputes. JAG and international legal specialists provide guidance regarding the legality of implementation of property dispute mechanisms by Army units.

SUPPORT JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM

3-103. Justice system reform activities aim to achieve broad institutional reform by updating legal statutes, encouraging citizen participation, and reorganizing fundamental justice system structures to ensure basic fairness and protect human rights. Stabilization requires the populace to perceive the justice system as legitimate, fair, and effective. While civilian agencies typically lead such reform efforts, military forces sometimes establish and maintain the security necessary to facilitate future efforts.

3-104. Judicial reform establishes the necessary legal and administrative frameworks to institute an interim legal code and paves the way for transition of judicial responsibilities to host-nation authorities. Judicial reform and justice system reform tasks may overlap. Reform efforts account for not only traditional or tribal law, but many cultural and historical factors. Justice system reform aims to prepare the host-nation justice system to maintain itself in the future as an effective and flexible system of laws and

procedures based on international principles of fairness. Justice system reform is a civilian task usually within USG agencies and other international organizations specifically mandated to conduct this task.

3-105. Army units transition through the three phases to support justice system reform (see table 3-7).

Table 3-7. Phases to support justice system reform

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Support rebuilding the justice system • Determine local due process • Communicate forums to the populace • Review current laws and their applicability • Abolish incompatible provisions • Assess court administration capabilities and resources	• Support efforts of legal professionals • Support judicial independence • Facilitate contact between justice and law enforcement personnel • Review the roles of actors • Help establish ethical standards • Help write host-nation interim code • Develop a strategy to assess court administration	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Act as advisors and liaisons

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-106. To support justice system reform, Army units perform six tasks in the initial response phase.

Support Rebuilding the Justice System

3-107. In the initial response phase, Army units support the development of a host-nation strategy to rebuild the justice system. Early development of a plan for rebuilding the host-nation criminal justice system is essential. Army units prepare for plans shifting to accommodate changing circumstances. A strategy needs enough detail to provide adequate structure, without being inflexible or cumbersome. Some other countries can provide helpful models or sources of expertise.

3-108. Army units also support the creation of legal aid organizations if none exists on the local level. These organizations help expedite cases, assist the host-nation population with legal issues, and build support for the justice system among the host-nation population. Human rights NGOs that specialize in legal issues, including legal aid, have the needed requisite skills. Local people often perceive such NGOs as fair and impartial, which will support the legitimacy of this effort. Army units provide advice and assistance to legal aid groups early in the operation. Focused attention on newly created legal aid groups helps ensure their long-term sustainability.

Determine Local Due Process

3-109. In the initial response phase, Army units determine local due process norms and expectations. Army units facilitate communication or act as liaison between the local population and those charged with drafting the interim legal code. Incorporating input from the host-nation population results in a legal code more compatible with local custom, which will enhance legitimacy. It will also obviate the need for changes later on, after the interim stage, when the HN will need to draft a permanent code of law.

Communicate Forums to the Populace

3-110. In the initial response phase, Army units communicate forums to the populace in local languages. Army units provide interim laws in local languages since people cannot conform to laws they cannot read. Army units enlist the aid of host-nation personnel to disseminate particularly important laws to local people. Social media, particularly the Internet effectively communicates interim laws. Before and after emplacing laws, Army units conduct information sessions to anticipate their social impact and practicality. These information sessions are opportunities to disseminate new laws in an official capacity. Official

dissemination avoids the spread of secondhand information by opponents and enables locals to ask questions. Opponents use such information to create deliberate misunderstandings. The host-nation population will suspect any new government operations, and transparency will help foster early support.

Review Current Laws and Their Applicability

3-111. In the initial response phase, Army units review current laws and resolve questions of applicability. Army units may facilitate communications among U.S., host-nation, and international personnel to determine whether current provisions of the law apply to the changing host-nation environment. Fragile countries often codify laws designed to prop up a failing state, and such laws rarely prove compatible with democratic self-government. The legal code of a failed state typically includes many provisions favoring corrupt leaders, their friends or relatives, and organized crime. Resolving questions of applicability involves abolishing the inapplicable law or merely redrafting it in altered form.

Abolish Incompatible Provisions

3-112. In the initial response phase, Army units abolish provisions incompatible with international standards of human rights. Legal codes of post-conflict states often include provisions incompatible with international standards of human rights. Army units abolish or excise such provisions from the host-nation code. Army units facilitate engagement among U.S., host-nation, and international legal specialists who can effectively eliminate provisions inconsistent with international standards and redraft new provisions compatible with internationally accepted standards. Legal specialists use internationally approved model codes as guides in the redrafting of host-nation laws.

3-113. The HN uses various sources of law. Codified law may be only part of the legal system and other sources—local custom, religious law and tradition, tribal law—may all contain practices inconsistent with international human rights standards. Legal specialists address practices violating international standards whether violations appear in codified law or elsewhere.

Assess Court Administration Capabilities and Resources

3-114. In the initial response phase, Army units assess court administration capabilities and resources. Assessment facilitates developing a strategy of reform of the host-nation justice system. Court administration assessment requires an inventory of written and computerized or digitally stored records. Legal specialists note records that are obviously missing and attempt to locate them. A post-conflict environment seriously affects any administrative capability, so legal specialists often reconstruct or establish new administrative procedures. Administrative capability also requires the presence of trained personnel. An assessment includes commentary on the availability of court personnel.

3-115. An inventory of resources includes facilities (buildings, offices, courtrooms), supplies, and finances. Army units inventory court records—including employee information, budgets, case records, e-mails, and administrative memos—carefully since such records may constitute legal evidence. Army units secure and preserve such records accordingly.

TRANSFORMATION

3-116. During the transformation phase, Army units support justice system reform. Support includes supporting the efforts of legal professionals, support judicial independence for a viable and sustainable justice system, facilitate contact between justice and law enforcement personnel, review the roles of actors in the justice system, facilitate communication for writing a host-nation law code, and assess court administration facility capability and resources.

3-117. Army units assist and support efforts of legal professionals, including provisions in the interim legal code that ensure judicial independence and transparency. Actions of court officials and court-appointed personnel remain subject to observation and, when appropriate, investigation to ensure transparency.

3-118. Army units support judicial independence for a viable and sustainable justice system. Judges and other judicial personnel operate independent of political or private control. Army personnel immediately

expose corruption as political pressure, bribery, threats, or extortion and vigorously prosecute it. The host-nation justice system can only become sustainable if it has the capacity to conform to internationally accepted standards of judicial conduct.

3-119. Army units facilitate contact between justice and law enforcement personnel to enhance the capacity of the justice system to maintain its independence and transparency. Open lines of communications between law enforcement and justice system personnel limits corruption, encourages transparency, and sends a message of adherence to international standards of conduct.

3-120. Army units review the roles of actors in the justice system to facilitate communication among appropriate legal authorities. Legal specialists review the roles of the primary actors within the court system, and make changes where necessary. Fragile states, in an effort to bolster the tenuous positions of political leaders, often diminish or limit the role of the defense lawyer. Defendants require competent and thorough representation if the host-nation justice system is to achieve international standards of justice and judicial fairness.

3-121. Army units assist host-nation judicial and legal personnel to establish ethical standards. The HN establishes and enforces ethical rules for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. Those rules conform to internationally accepted standards of ethical conduct. Sources of international standards include UN mandates and publications, model legal codes, foreign domestic codes known to meet international standards, and case law and commentary of international courts. As early as possible, the HN commits to endorse and enforce a set of professional ethical rules that hold justice system personnel to internationally accepted standards of behavior. Army units disseminate a clear and concise code of professional ethics to professionals as early as feasible. Army units assist host-nation personnel in organizing programs to educate host-nation professionals about ethical rules. JAG personnel and NGOs often help in organizing such programs and in providing instructors.

3-122. Army units facilitate communication for writing a host-nation law code. They act as liaisons among actors whose participation in such discussions is desirable. Organized discussions require facilities—buildings or appropriate outdoor areas in which discussions can take place, furniture, supplies, housing—and services such as food service, transportation, security. Army units provide facilities and services and facilitate initial contacts among discussion actors. In addition to discussions among legal specialists and host-nation leaders, open, public dialogue with the population at large proves important to reconstruction. Local participation in the reform process builds legitimacy and provides opportunities for brainstorming that may result in useful ideas for the reform program. Army units identify local leaders and take steps to ensure their credibility among the local population. Support for the reform program by trusted local leaders increases public support.

3-123. Once Army units assess court administration facility capability and resources, they develop a strategy to strengthen capacity in those venues. Army units assist host-nation personnel to locate, construct, or reconstruct suitable facilities, and to obtain necessary supplies. They facilitate communication with law enforcement and judicial personnel to determine the status of inventoried records. Army personnel work closely with host-nation judicial personnel to ensure competent administration of the court system. they create plans to establish efficient administrative procedures, vet prospective judicial personnel, and create judicial positions necessary.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-124. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN, monitor and report progress, and act as advisors and liaisons. Units institutionalize new structures and responsibilities as soon as possible to ensure the effective functioning of the justice system and to hasten the transfer of responsibility from U.S. Army to host-nation organizations. Institutional failure within fragile states results in unresolved cases. This backlog is likely to be daunting; consequently, Army units help the HN address unresolved cases as soon as feasible without compromising standards of fairness. Units also document progress of new mechanisms and procedures for training new personnel and promoting efficiency.

3-125. Army personnel support the legislative implementation of the new legal code by acting as advisors and liaisons. Facilitating communication between host-nation legislators and architects of the new legal code enables legislators to understand the need for legal reform, the necessity for the legal code to conform

to international standards, and the desirability of bringing the new legal code before the legislature without undue delay. Army personnel assist host-nation personnel in drafting legislation to implement the legal code. These personnel provide experienced advisors and enlist NGOs and international organizations to participate. By this phase, Army units withdraw to a largely advisory capacity. These advisors oversee and monitor legislative implementation of the new legal code to ensure transparency and adherence to international standards. Insistence on adherence to such standards is necessary to ensure legitimacy of the code, and long-term sustainability of the legislative and judicial systems.

3-126. Sustainability of the host-nation justice system requires procedures that facilitate communication with NGOs, international organizations, and governments. Army personnel act as liaisons between host-nation and other actors and moderate discussions. Discussions aim to develop standard consultative mechanisms and to ensure that justice system personnel properly record such mechanisms so they can access the mechanisms easily. Establishment of consultative mechanisms increases sustainability by providing an avenue through which the HN may obtain support and guidance after Army units withdraw.

3-127. U.S. personnel with expertise in banking and finance assist the HN in financing the reform plan. Army units enlist the participation of international actors in the finance sector to provide additional guidance and support.

SUPPORT CORRECTIONS REFORM

3-128. Corrections reform is an integral part of broader security sector reform, particularly when the goal is to criminalize a violent insurgency and prosecute insurgents. Corrections reform includes building host-nation capacity in the penal system by restoring institutional infrastructure, providing oversight of the incarceration process, and training host-nation personnel to internationally accepted standards. Tasks also include instituting a comprehensive assessment of the prisoner population, determining the status of prisoners, and establishing procedures to help reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process. Army units distinguish existing prison facilities and inmates who are part of the host-nation criminal justice system from other detainees who are linked to an ongoing conflict. For more information on corrections reform, see FM 3-39.40.

3-129. Army units transition through the three phases to support corrections reform (see table 3-8).

Table 3-8. Phases to support corrections reform

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Identify detention, correction, or rehabilitative facilities • Preserve penal administrative records • Assess prison populations and conditions • Implement humanitarian standards in prisons • Provide emergency detention facilities • Vet corrections personnel • Deploy penal trainers and advisors • Refurbish prison facilities at key sites • Coordinate jurisdiction and handover • Facilitate international monitoring	• Rebuild corrections institutions • Train and advise corrections personnel • Develop reconciliation and parole mechanisms	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support host-nation corrections reform

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-130. Army units support corrections reform by performing ten tasks in the initial response phase.

Identify Detention, Correction, or Rehabilitative Facilities

3-131. In the initial response phase, Army units identify and register all detention, correction, or rehabilitative facilities. Before reform can begin, Army units inventory and assess these facilities. Army

units accomplish this task with host-nation forces to build host-nation capacity and to achieve legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the host-nation population.

Preserve Penal Administrative Records

3-132. In the initial response phase, Army units secure and preserve penal administrative records and reports. Army units catalogue, preserve, and secure records and reports. In the future host-nation personnel may need personnel files, memos, and administrative and financial records to address unresolved cases or present as legal evidence. At this phase, Army units assume all files, records, and reports are legal evidence and treat them accordingly.

Assess Prison Populations and Conditions

3-133. In the initial response phase, Army units inventory and assess prison populations and conditions. Army units compile information on host-nation prisons, assessing both prison populations and prison conditions. Units review corrections records to identify persons held beyond their release dates.

3-134. Army personnel work with host-nation personnel to complete inventories of prison populations. Inventories and assessments of prison populations include statistics such as numbers of political prisoners, war prisoners, criminal prisoners; number of cells; names, addresses, and ages of prisoners; and charges filed. Prisoner inventories account for changes in the prison population as changes occur. Personnel can only evaluate the host-nation prison system after they have complied, secured, and stored accurate records.

3-135. Army personnel identify political prisoners for purposes of justice and for establishing the legitimacy of the host-nation corrections system. Army personnel determine the status of all prisoners in custody and investigate the state of each case—whether prisoners have been assigned legal representation, whether charges have been brought, when cases are expected to be tried. Army personnel separate prisoners by categories such as protected custody, pretrial and post-conviction prisoners, and juveniles.

3-136. An assessment of prison conditions includes inventories of facilities, equipment, and supplies. An assessment also evaluates the standard of treatment of prisoners. This evaluation checks living conditions, food, ratio of prisoners to guards, availability of medical care, and availability of legal representation.

Implement Humanitarian Standards in Prisons

3-137. In the initial response phase, Army units implement humanitarian standards in prisons. Army units act immediately if any facilities fail to meet those standards. Army units enlist the aid of international humanitarian organizations to redress inhumane conditions immediately.

Provide Emergency Detention Facilities

3-138. In the initial response phase, Army units provide emergency detention facilities. Army units ensure the availability of emergency detention facilities to house prisoners. Although such facilities house prisoners only temporarily, they should meet all internationally accepted standards for humane treatment of prisoners. As an initial step in the process of corrections reform, Army units locate, reconstruct, or construct emergency internment facilities. Army units engage host-nation personnel in this process to ensure legitimacy in the eyes of the host-nation population.

Vet Corrections Personnel

3-139. In the initial response phase, Army units vet corrections personnel. Confinement officer training program requires recruitment by the HN. The recruitment program accounts for local culture, using themes that resonate with the local population. It ensures that confinement officers represent all major demographic groups properly. Army units carefully screen corrections personnel to ensure competent and qualified officers. Proper screening prevents placing those who may have abused their authority over prisoners in the new corrections facility. The recruitment program establishes and enforces a clear set of appropriate behavioral, physical, and moral standards. Ideally, Army units centrally screen and induct recruits. Army units locate recruitment centers in safe and secure areas. All recruits undergo a basic security check and are

vetted against lists of suspected insurgents. As much as possible, host-nation agencies and personnel conduct this process.

Deploy Penal Trainers and Advisors

3-140. In the initial response phase, Army units deploy penal trainers and advisors. Army units train corrections personnel to handle prisoners competently, humanely, and without danger to the prisoners or themselves. Qualified corrections personnel deploy to train and advise host-nation personnel. U.S. corrections personnel work closely with host-nation trainers and advisors to establish vetting criteria, training programs, and administrative procedures, while considering both international standards and local customs—acceptability of thorough searches, the use of gloves, and clothing color variations among cultures.

Refurbish Prison Facilities at Key Sites

3-141. In the initial response phase, Army units refurbish prison facilities at key sites. Army units refurbish corrections facilities beginning with key sites. Army units engage qualified personnel—corrections specialists and engineers—to evaluate existing facilities and make recommendations regarding their reconstruction or refurbishment. Army units adapt refurbishments to local, sustainable standards.

Coordinate Jurisdiction and Handover

3-142. In the initial response phase, Army units coordinate jurisdiction and handover with host-nation forces. Handover to host-nation forces occurs as early as feasible and preceded by oversight by Army units. Army units conduct a pre-transfer assessment of prisoner treatment as well as some post-transfer monitoring of prisoner treatment.

3-143. If the handover process involves host-nation military and corrections personnel, Army units facilitate cooperation between those personnel. Army units conduct the handover to host-nation forces ensuring respect by the host-nation forces for the proper treatment of prisoners.

Facilitate International Monitoring

3-144. In the initial response phase, Army units facilitate international monitoring. Army units facilitate international monitoring of corrections facilities. NGOs, UN representatives, and international human rights groups participate in this process. Army units ensure that international monitoring has transparency and mechanisms exits to hold corrections personnel accountable.

TRANSFORMATION

3-145. During the transformation phase, corrections reform supports the HN's change from its previous problematic condition to a legitimate system. Additionally, persistent abuses in the corrections system often create popular resentment that undermines support for the host-nation government and Army units.

Rebuild Corrections Institutions

3-146. During the transformation phase, Army units rebuild corrections institutions. Corrections facilities often deteriorated, since leaders in fragile states do not place a premium on humane corrections standards or rehabilitation of prisoners. Consequently, corrections institutions will probably require extensive rebuilding. Army units carry out or coordinate with host-nation personnel the rebuilding of these facilities. These efforts account for local conditions and are sustainable for the host-nation. In addition to rebuilding corrections facilities, Army units work with host-nation corrections personnel to establish effective administrative processes. Army units build up and monitor rehabilitative capacities.

Train and Advise Corrections Personnel

3-147. During the transformation phase, Army units train and advise corrections personnel to internationally accepted standards. This training includes humane handling of prisoners, leadership capabilities, and understanding the need for transparency and accountability. Host-nation corrections

personnel may lack training on international standards for treatment of prisoners and will need to develop their professional skills and increase their understanding for adherence to such standards. Qualified personnel—U.S. or international—deploy first to train, then to advise host-nation corrections personnel.

3-148. Viability of the corrections system and, ultimately, sustainability of the justice system depend on competent and humane handling of prisoners. Incompetent or inhumane conduct by corrections personnel undermines legitimacy of the corrections system. Such poor conduct creates distrust in the justice system and law enforcement authority in general.

3-149. Army units coordinate with international organizations to establish consultative protocols for corrections officers. This coordination improves performance, simplifies international oversight, and enhances legitimacy.

Develop Reconciliation and Parole Mechanisms

3-150. During the transformation phase, Army units develop reconciliation and parole mechanisms. Review of prisoner classification and reconciliation helps establish credibility and legitimacy of the host-nation corrections system. Army units determine prisoner status—political, criminal, or security prisoners members of a previous regime—as soon as feasible. Army units enlist the aid of U.S. or international legal specialists to develop standards for reviewing the backlog of unresolved cases. Army units bring cases, especially those likely to be dismissed, to court and resolve them as early as possible. They release political prisoners not charged with any crime and prisoners held in violation of internationally accepted standards.

3-151. Army units work with international and host-nation personnel to reconfigure the probation and parole system. Resulting reconfiguration reflects internationally accepted standards. Part of the international oversight includes monitoring of probations and paroles.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-152. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress as early as possible. U.S. Army provides oversight and mentoring of host-nation corrections personnel subsequent to training. This assistance facilitates the hand-off of authority to host-nation authorities. Army units work with host-nation corrections personnel to develop a strategy to ensure continued funding and oversight of corrections facilities. Army units ensure that host-nation personnel understand the need for transparency, the necessity to meet international standards of conduct in their treatment of prisoners, and the need for rigorous enforcement of anticorruption measures. Army units evaluate host-nation corrections administrators, training them in management of corrections facilities, including budgeting and distribution of funds. Army units train host-nation personnel to instruct other host-nation corrections personnel to international standards. The corrections system builds in oversight and periodic evaluations of trainers.

3-153. Army units establish administrative procedures for host-nation corrections training programs. Host-nation training programs begin functioning prior to the withdrawal of Army units from their advisory position in the corrections system enabling Army units to assess host-nation instructional programs.

3-154. Funding for host-nation corrections training programs exists prior to withdrawal of Army units. Financial viability facilitates future sustainability of these programs. The continued capacity of the host-nation corrections system to operate at international standards depends on the quality of these programs.

SUPPORT WAR CRIMES COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

3-155. Although the international community oversees the conduct of war crimes courts and tribunals, Army units provide support for their activities as part of the broad process of justice system reform. Military support includes protecting witnesses; identifying, securing, and preserving evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and crimes against humanity; supporting the investigation, arrest, and transfer of war criminals; and coordinating efforts with other agencies and organizations.

3-156. Army units transition through the three phases to support war crimes courts and tribunals (see table 3-9 on page 3-24).

Table 3-9. Phases to support war crimes courts and tribunals

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Acquire secure facilities • Establish an atrocity reporting system • Document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities • Publish progress reports	• Assist in investigation of suspected war criminals • Support witness protection • Support media access	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Detect, arrest, and extradite suspected war criminals

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-157. To support war crimes courts and tribunals, Army units perform four tasks in the initial response phase.

Acquire Secure Facilities

3-158. In the initial response phase, Army units acquire secure facilities. Army units locate secure facilities in which to house prisoners suspected of war crimes, if requested. Army units secure these facilities against attack. Those accused of war crimes are often prominent leaders and, therefore, symbols of an insurgency, extremist movement, or rogue government.

Establish an Atrocity Reporting System

3-159. In the initial response phase, Army units establish an atrocity reporting system. As early as possible, Army units institute an atrocity reporting system for victims and witnesses to atrocities, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. Army units hand over this reporting to established organizations responsible for the tribunals and international courts. Army units employ MISO to show the populace the efforts made to establish an atrocity reporting system. Units use MISO to explain the reporting process through audio, visual, and audio-visual media.

3-160. Army units establish administrative mechanisms to more efficiently compile, secure, and catalog reports. A mechanism that allows personnel to take down reports by witnesses and victims alerts Army units to the possible presence of war crimes or atrocity evidence in particular locations. Army units then secure, preserve, protect such evidence (if located), and record its precise location in the file with the original report. Army units should secure, preserve, and protect sites of atrocities and restrict access to trained forensic personnel.

3-161. Army units train reporting system personnel to conduct refugee interviews. These interviews entail asking legally significant questions; determining, to the extent possible, precise dates, names, and locations; and identifying and describing any evidence possibly remaining at the site or in the reporting person's possession. In addition, reporting system personnel train to work with traumatized people and those needing humanitarian assistance.

Document and Preserve Evidence of Mass Atrocities

3-162. In the initial response phase, Army units document and preserve evidence of mass atrocities. Units keep separate records on mass atrocities, including specific site data. Specific data includes exact coordinates, methods of collection and maintenance of data or evidence, and an assessment of future requirements for forensic teams, facilities, and equipment. Army personnel date, sign, catalog, and index records of evidence and site data for future retrieval. Personnel secure sites of atrocities, keeping sites undisturbed with access limited to trained forensic personnel.

Publish Progress Reports

3-163. In the initial response phase, Army units publish progress reports. Since the prosecution of war crimes often have intense local interest, Army units to conduct inform and influence activities to supplement higher-level progress regarding war crimes and atrocities investigations. Army units publish all indictments and statements in local languages. Administrative rules specify intervals at which Army units

publish progress reports. In addition, Army units employ MISO to increase awareness among the populace about persons indicted for war crimes, directions to report sighting of those individuals, and any rewards for information leading to their capture.

TRANSFORMATION

3-164. Army units should be prepared to provide logistic and technical support to international courts and tribunals when necessary. Army units prepare to assist host-nation personnel in recruiting and vetting court staff.

Assist in Investigation of Suspected War Criminals

3-165. During the transformation phase, Army units assist in investigation of suspected war criminals to international courts. The struggle against human rights violations depends on the capacity of states to detect war criminals. Host-nation units often require Army units' assistance in the investigation of war criminals. Army units also assist, if appropriate, in transferring war criminals to international courts or tribunals. Army units also enlist other forces, including law enforcement, non-U.S. forces, or multinational forces, if appropriate.

3-166. Successful prosecution of war criminals and human rights violators requires information and intelligence sharing of investigations. Criminal investigators, U.S. Army personnel, host-nation police and military units, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, and war crimes tribunal personnel all share this information. Communications and intelligence-sharing enable agreements specifying the mechanisms by which intelligence-sharing can occur. Army personnel, particularly those with intelligence experience, can develop—or assist in the development of—intelligence-sharing mechanisms. If such mechanisms do not exist, Army units initiate their development.

3-167. Investigating war crimes, mass atrocities, crimes against humanity, and human rights violations demands the expertise of experienced specialists. Army units seek out appropriate personnel to help investigate; detect, gather, secure, and preserve evidence; and build a legal case against perpetrators. Intergovernmental organizations often help identify roles to fill as well as the best individuals to fill them.

Support Witness Protection

3-168. During the transformation phase, Army units support witness protection. Army units support host-nation efforts to secure the safety of witnesses involved in war crimes cases. Convictions of war criminals or human rights violators require testimony of witnesses. Witnesses must feel protected if they come forward with evidence from retribution. Witness protection may involve relocating witnesses—sometimes to other countries—and may require the protection, including relocation, of family members of witnesses.

Support Media Access

3-169. During the transformation phase, Army units support media access. A democratic government requires judicial transparency and a free press. Army units support media access to public documents and records and to hearings or trials open to the public.

3-170. Both host-nation military and law enforcement personnel are unused to permitting public access—especially media access—to court proceedings. Army units ensure that host-nation personnel understand judicial transparency and media access to public institutions build a democratic government.

3-171. Army units record and broadcast court proceedings. Host-nation sources need required equipment at their disposal. Army units prepare to locate or import necessary equipment to broadcast and record proceedings.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-172. In every fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. Army units bring cases to trial and resolution as quickly as feasible. Army units continue to assist the HN to detect, arrest, and extradite suspected war criminals. Adherence to

administrative rules and procedures throughout preparation, including the earliest stages of gathering evidence, ensures that the process goes as smoothly and as quickly as possible.

3-173. Host-nation units require U.S. Army units to help detect and arrest war criminals and to extradite war criminals to other states for domestic prosecution abroad or prosecution by an international tribunal. Army units also enlist other forces—law enforcement, non-U.S. forces, or multinational forces—if appropriate. Army units monitor that the HN publishes and publicly disseminates all court records and decisions in relevant languages, including local languages and dialects.

SUPPORT PUBLIC OUTREACH AND COMMUNITY REBUILDING PROGRAMS

3-174. The reconciliation process requires public outreach and community rebuilding while promoting public respect for the rule of law. The speed and effectiveness with which Army personnel perform these tasks directly correlates with the length of time required to restore stability to the HN. Initial tasks include developing public access to information and assessing the needs of vulnerable populations, such as women, children, and the elderly.

3-175. Army units transition through the three phases to support public outreach and community rebuilding programs (see table 3-10).

Table 3-10. Phases to support public outreach and community rebuilding programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Establish information programs to promote reconciliation efforts • Develop public access to information • Assess population needs	• Disseminate information • Work with organizations • Determine what information to release	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support efforts to disseminate information

INITIAL RESPONSE

3-176. Army units prepare to perform three tasks in the initial response phase.

Establish Information Programs to Promote Reconciliation Efforts

3-177. In the initial response phase, Army units establish broad public information programs to promote reconciliation efforts. Army units and civilian agencies work together to develop host-nation programs. To the extent possible, host-nation personnel lead the development and execution of such programs.

Develop Public Access to Information

3-178. In the initial response phase, Army units develop public access to information. Army units publish findings and documents produced by commissions in local languages including dialects. Dissemination needs to account for low literacy rates among the population. Surveys of local populaces can help determine if the populace receives the information in the target languages and understands it. Military information support (MIS) elements constantly update their information on local groups and operational environments.

Assess Population Needs

3-179. In the initial response phase, Army units assess needs of vulnerable populations. Army units understand the needs of the population as a whole. Units also identify vulnerable populations unable to provide for themselves, such as women, children, and the elderly, and form a strategy to address those needs. In some cases, other societal groups deliberately attack or discriminate against minorities.

TRANSFORMATION

3-180. During the transformation phase, Army units enlist the aid of NGOs or international organizations to inform the local population about the purpose of rebuilding programs. Local leaders discuss rebuilding programs and plan ways to market educational programs. Educational programs dispel myths and clarify objectives concerning U.S. military operations. Local populations often accept programs that trusted local leaders support and endorse reforms if they can participate in discussions and ask questions. Army personnel facilitate transparency as much as possible.

3-181. Army units ensure that the HN disseminates information in local languages, by word of mouth, and through direct contact. HN units coordinate with the public affairs officer and MIS planners to obtain specific themes and talking points for Army and host-nation patrols. Control measures ensure adherence to overall objectives and themes and help avoid undesired consequences from Soldiers miscommunicating with the local populace.

3-182. Army units work with NGOs, international organizations, and local leaders to publicize truth and reconciliation activities. They also assist NGOs and other organizations by providing facilities, acting as liaisons with local leaders, and providing security.

3-183. Army personnel determine what information to release to local populations. They sort available information, secure information deemed inappropriate for public dissemination, and decide the method to disseminate information. The release information via the local media—print, radio, or television—as well as via MISO products—visual, audio, and audio-visual—in the local language. MIS elements often have necessary materials in stock or can coordinate for their delivery where needed.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

3-184. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units transfer responsibility to the HN as well as monitor and report progress. Fostering sustainability to support public outreach and community rebuilding programs requires reevaluating reconciliation mechanisms and efforts to disseminate information. Army units work with international organizations whenever feasible. Working with other organizations involved in reconciliation activities establishes connections between U.S. Army personnel and international workers and helps identify areas of common interest. Such organizations operate with a certain level of impartiality and neutrality that allows the host-nation population to voice concerns that might otherwise go unreported. Army units avoid attempting to influence this neutrality. The HN publishes findings and documents produced by truth and reconciliation commissions in local languages.

3-185. Army personnel carefully translate findings so the local populace does not misunderstand the findings. Host-nation leaders and communities disseminate findings with the appropriate impact and gravity enabling the population to discuss the findings openly. These engagements also help assess whether the HN is achieving reconciliation and genuinely supports reconciliation.

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Chapter 4
Restore Essential Services

Restoring essential services addresses the fundamental needs of the populace, beyond the provision of security.

CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES TO RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

4-1. Normally, the host-nation government and civilian relief agencies work best to restore and develop essential services. In most cases, local, international, and U.S. civilian agencies arrived in country long before U.S. forces. However, when these organizations are not established nor have the necessary capacity, Army units execute these tasks until the other organizations can. These organizations advise Army units regarding the best way to perform these tasks. They aim to return to pre-conflict or pre-disaster situations. Sometimes, conditions are so poor that Army units develop, fundamentally transform, or provide more equitably the basic levels of essential services.

CONDITIONS TO RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES

4-2. The provision of essential services includes several necessary conditions:

- Access to and delivery of basic needs and services.
- Access to and delivery of education.
- Return and resettlement of dislocated civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons.
- Social reconstruction.

4-3. Military forces can establish these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of stability (see table 4-1).These tasks occur during all three phases of stability operations. During the initial response phase, Army units take the lead in providing for the population's immediate critical needs, supporting and enabling other actors as they become operational. In some situations, Army units provide minimal assistance since the other actors are already well established. The transformation phase occurs once the crisis is past and sufficient capacity begins to grow. This phase establishes the foundation for long-term development and resolves root causes of conflict that lead to famine, dislocated civilians (DCs), refugee flows, and human trafficking. In the fostering sustainability phase, the host nation (HN) makes the efforts permanent by institutionalizing positive change in society, ensuring it has the means to sustain progress. If the situation in the host-nation regresses, the HN may re-employ earlier stability methods.

Table 4-1. Restore essential services subordinate tasks

• Provide essential civil services.
• Tasks related to civilian dislocation.
• Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
• Support nonfood relief programs.
• Support humanitarian demining.
• Support human rights initiatives.
• Support public health programs.
• Support education programs.

4-4. Army units work with other organizations to restore essential services. These organizations include provincial reconstruction teams, field advance civilian teams, disaster assistance response teams (DARTs),

United States Government (USG) agencies—Department of State or Department of Agriculture—as well as host-nation organizations—national ministries and their regional office—local governments, and host-nation businesses and corporations. International organizations may also be involved. These organizations can include the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), regional organizations, and multinational partners.

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

4-5. The five stability principles described in Chapter 1 reflect the efforts to restore essential services.

Conflict Transformation

4-6. To restore essential services, Army units change an environment of violent conflict to a political settlement in which actors solve issues peacefully. Conversely, the provision of essential services can dampen conflict, while the failure to meet needs can be a grievance that exacerbates conflict.

Unity of Effort and Unity of Purpose

4-7. Army units have to coordinate closely with the partners, particularly since partners often have more expertise and resources to restore essential services on a wide scale and normally will be the lead agencies for these efforts. Army units can help by providing security, identifying needs, and occasionally providing support with transportation and communications.

Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership

4-8. Restoring essential services promotes legitimacy of the U.S. stabilization effort and, ultimately, for its host-nation partners. The population expects conditions to improve with the presence of Army units and civilian agencies engaged in stabilization and reconstruction. Any long-lasting critical shortfall in essential services eventually causes impatience and resentment. Similarly, host-nation authorities have to demonstrate their ability to restore essential services to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The HN gets involved in efforts to restore essential services from the outset. This can help provide the resources necessary to cope with otherwise overwhelming requirements and develop the host-nation capacity to maintain and expand essential services in the future. Army units include host-nation authorities in assessments and in establishing priorities. Any effort includes showing host-nation personnel how to the work, so they can continue to make progress.

Building Partner Capacity

4-9. Army units communicate with many actors to assess situations, identify problems, and implement solutions. Communication includes meeting with different offices in a ministry to find out why the population lacks an essential service. Army units overcome narrow perspectives of different host-nation actors and facilitate the cross-talk necessary to solve problems.

Rule of Law

4-10. In some areas, host-nation government and forces lack real control or even access. In such cases, other organizations operate under the principles of impartiality and neutrality. Essential services have political implications, as the distribution of scarce resources and services often causes resentment among those who do not receive them. Political actors often try to gain control over these efforts to expand their political power. Army units equitably provide relief efforts, with prioritization based upon human need. Occasionally, units withhold these efforts as leverage against stubborn actors. However, withholding could hurt the population and may place Army units at odds with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who provide most essential services. Sometimes Army leaders pressure host-nation military and civil authorities to convince them to improve essential services.

PROVIDE ESSENTIAL CIVIL SERVICES

4-11. Essential services fit in two categories. The first category includes immediate humanitarian needs such as food, water, shelter, and public health support necessary to respond in an emergency and to sustain the population until Army units restore or develop local civil services. While not equipped to provide a full range of relief capabilities, Army units get directly involved in these efforts because they have the organization, presence, communications, transportation, and many relief assets necessary to respond effectively. However, in a comprehensive approach, Army units probably work from the outset with other actors such as USG agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), international organizations, and NGOs. Sometimes these other actors lack the immediate capacity to address humanitarian demands sufficiently.

4-12. The second category includes the long-term services that civil authorities eventually provide. These are grouped under the acronym SWEAT-MSO (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations). Depending on the circumstances, "other considerations" can include religious requirements, transportation, communications, arts and culture, or recreation programs such as parks or athletics. While not matters of life-or-death, a functioning society requires these considerations. See Appendix C of FM 3-34.170 for information on SWEAT-MSO.

4-13. Army units transition through the three phases to provide essential civil services (see table 4-2).

Table 4-2. Phases to provide essential civil services

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Provide for immediate humanitarian needs • Ensure proper drinking water • Provide interim sanitation services	• Support other actors • Build host-nation capacity to operate and maintain essential civil services • Help establish civil services	• Support host-nation progress • Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support partners • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-14. Following an assessment to identify defense support of civil authorities requirements and the capabilities of potential partners, Army units prepare to perform three tasks in an initial response.

Provide for Immediate Humanitarian Needs

4-15. In the initial response phase, Army units provide for immediate humanitarian needs of the population. Units first determine whether they will bring the resources to the population or the population to centralized locations. Civilians prefer to stay in their homes and villages, but this may not be feasible when fleeing from conflict or natural disasters. Army units use leaflets, signs, radio broadcasts, and loudspeakers to instruct civilians, although literacy rates may limit the effectiveness of these measures.

4-16. Army units maintain adequate security to ensure that belligerents do not take supplies or that stronger civilians do not take food and other supplies from weaker ones such as the elderly, women, or children. Effective Army units maintain positive control over relief supplies as long as possible to prevent pilferage and to ensure that an adequate amount is available. In extreme cases, Army units use airdrops to get supplies. Those can cause panicky scrambles or injuries to people on the ground. Airdrops work best with a controlling authority who can supervise distribution after the airdrop.

4-17. Army units can distribute military rations such as meals, ready-to-eat (MREs) or humanitarian daily rations rapidly, but they are costly to provide over extended periods and stocks may be limited. Some MREs, however, may not conform to local religious or cultural dietary norms. The humanitarian daily ration dietary and nutritional requirements conform to international standards, such as the United Nations World Food Programme recommendations on nutrition in complex emergencies. Successful Army units develop an ability to provide easily mass-produced food—soups, rice, or porridges. Units can hand over these efforts to host-nation and other actors early. However, Army units will still provide utensils such as bowls, fuel, hygienic cooking facilities, and clean-up capability.

4-18. Some units transport and dispense bottled water, which allows for any form of transportation that carries pallets. Vehicles can off load pallets quickly and return for additional cargo. In most cases, however, units will deliver bulk water. This requires progressively smaller containers to support distribution, down to pails for individual families. When providing water, units often provide small tanks as well. Units convert some host-nation vehicles into makeshift water trucks by adding such a tank. However, dirty water vessels can contaminate potable water. Army units use reverse osmosis water purification units to tap into water sources located close to the intended destinations.

4-19. Army units sometimes provide emergency shelter. This includes tenting, blankets, and mosquito nets. Tents include pre-fabricated or improvised with tarps or large sheets of plastic. Units even use materials on damaged buildings as a temporary measure to make them habitable. If provided materials and other support, civilians can build their own huts or other traditional dwellings.

4-20. When directed, Army units provide emergency medical support to civilians suffering from injury, illness, or other conditions such as childbirth. To meet the immediate medical needs of the population, medical planners get involved early in the planning process. Army units coordinate with U.S. country team, host-nation Ministry of Health and Agriculture, and relief organizations such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme. Coordination prevents duplication of effort and ensures the availability and proper distribution of food, water, medical supplies, and other support. Medical personnel who normally work on U.S. bases augment patrols or other missions to give units increased capability.

4-21. U.S. commanders use language, cultural, religious, and regional subject matter experts to help medical personnel during planning. The experts provide medical personnel with training and knowledge of factors present in the HN that may impact the provision of Army Health System support. In some societies, religious or other customs force medical personnel to work on patients of the same gender, although such cultural norms are sometimes set aside in an emergency. Before providing medical support, medical personnel often obtain permission from the patient's spouse or a respected local leader. The chaplain or unit ministry teams supply information regarding religious practices to consider such as religious based dietary restrictions for hospitalized patients. Some host-nation personnel have medical experience and can provide additional treatment capability. U.S. units support these personnel with supplies. Medical personnel often provide technical assistance and training to aid in improving the host-nation health care system.

4-22. Army units coordinate medical intelligence and information related to health threats and diseases prevalent in the region to provide force health protection support for deployed forces and civilians in the area. Army units obtain medical information from the supporting intelligence element and other avenues such as the United States Army Public Health Command and National Center for Medical Intelligence.

4-23. U.S. forces pay expenses incurred to support stabilization (other than minimal cost humanitarian and civic assistance activities) with funds specifically appropriated for such purposes per DODI 2205.02 and DODI 6000.16. U.S. forces obtain prior approval before transferring or issuing U.S. medical supplies and equipment to the HN.

Ensure Proper Drinking Water

4-24. In the initial response phase, Army units ensure proper sanitation, purification, and distribution of drinking water. Most often, other agencies conduct the majority of this effort. Besides Army units providing emergency supplies of water from their own sources, they also address long-term water requirements. Humanitarian agencies carefully consider the most appropriate location and type of water source to avoid exacerbating conflict, ensure local relevance, and establish access to the most people. Sometimes humanitarian agencies ask military forces to assist in this effort, dig or repair wells, or restore pipelines. Other organizations such as NGOs and the ICRC will likely already participate. Their activities range from restoring the water supply system to major cities, to assisting host-nation staffs with the maintenance of water treatment facilities, to repairing hand pumps, to trucking water to points of consumption. In agrarian societies, the use of water to cultivate crops could diminish its availability for drinking and other purposes.

4-25. Army veterinary services and preventive medicine personnel provide support for inspecting U.S. military, multinational, and host-nation water sources. Such inspections include commercial sanitation

audits, storage facilities inspections, and food and water risk assessments to ensure wholesomeness, quality, and sanitation of subsistence and water sources. When tasked, Army units establish public health and sanitation training and education programs for the local populace.

4-26. Restoring essential services requires developing potable and nonpotable water sources. Dual sources conserve precious resources that enable purification of (as well as storage and transportation of) potable water. Nonpotable water is still valuable and used until the public has better purification methods available. Units use nonpotable water for hygiene purposes, vehicles coolant, "swamp cooler" air conditioning units at hospitals, watering nonfood producing animals, agricultural irrigation, and hydroelectric power generation (which only requires filtering foreign materiel and corrosive elements from the water). Units even purify nonpotable water for drinking purposes with additional filtering, boiling, or treating with iodine tablets.

4-27. Some host-nation personnel have the technical knowledge but lack direction or resources to develop potable and nonpotable water sources. In arid areas, Army units develop several regional hubs of potable sources from which to transport water to outlying villages. Army units evaluate the longevity of water replacement for the host-nation population, as well as the cost of alternate supplies and water transportation. Desalination methods may work well on brackish water, river water, or water with low salinity levels and may be more suitable than purification plants in the long run.

Provide Interim Sanitation Services

4-28. In the initial response phase, Army units provide interim sanitation, wastewater, and waste disposal services. Any collection of people requires an organized method of disposing of human waste. Army units designate and enforce latrine sites and build simple facilities. Depending upon circumstances—water tables, rockiness of the ground, and number of people—units bury waste, burn waste, treat it with chemicals, or use it as fertilizer.

4-29. Army preventive medicine personnel screen and analyze water for toxic industrial chemicals and materials, provide pest management and surveillance, apply pesticides, and conduct limited medical surveillance. When directed, preventive medicine personnel provide technical assistance and training as it relates to sanitation including management and disposal of wastewater and waste products. See AR 40-5, FM 21-10, and TM 5-634.

TRANSFORMATION

4-30. In the transformation phase, other organizations—NGOs, USAID, and other interagency partners—and the HN assume the responsibility for restoring essential services. Army units support these efforts by ensuring that security exists, identifying needs that have been overlooked, facilitating the activities of these other partners, and continuing to provide critically-needed humanitarian assistance.

Build Host-Nation Capacity to Operate and Maintain Essential Civil Services

4-31. In the transformation phase, Army units build host-nation capacity to operate and maintain essential civil services. This long-term effort requires significant coordination with UN agencies, the World Bank, and other actors. It requires technical expertise, equipment, infrastructure, money, other resources, and effective civil administration. Army units implement this effort at local levels, eventually integrating the policies and budgets of regional and national governments. Organizations such as field advance civilian teams, USAID, and OCHA have greater technical expertise than Army units and assume responsibility for this effort as soon as possible. When Army units design and implement essential services systems, they realize that the HN will eventually inherit the systems completely and will have to sustain them.

Establish Civil Services

4-32. When too few civilian agencies exist, Army units help establish civil services emphasizing effective organization and administration, and identifying and overcoming bottlenecks. Some Army personnel have relevant experience with municipal civil services and are reassigned to these efforts. However, reassignment diverts these Soldiers from their normal responsibilities. Host-nation officials previously involved in these systems can provide technical expertise, although they may be part of the existing

problem. Sometimes unit commanders find they are researching issues such as water distribution, sewage, and power generation; engaging with relevant parties; and developing and implementing solutions. In so doing, commanders coordinate with other U.S., international, or host-nation organizations to gather technical expertise and helpful guidance.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-33. In this phase, Army units support the HN as it begins to sustain essential service provisions on its own. When completely handed over to the HN, systems may collapse because of corruption, lack of competence, or inefficient supply and maintenance chains. Army units monitor these systems at the local level, identify and report problems through their chains of command, and engage the appropriate partners at the right level. For example, a village health clinic or school does not operate because the HN did not pay employees or provide supplies. Often corruption at the regional level causes these shortcomings. Attention from U.S. Army commanders can highlight and help solve such issues at the necessary level.

CONDUCT TASKS RELATED TO CIVILIAN DISLOCATION

4-34. In many fragile states, DCs can greatly complicate relief efforts. Violence, natural disasters, or environmental conditions such as drought or pestilence may force DCs to leave their homes. DCs are particularly vulnerable to starvation, dehydration, disease, or additional violence from perpetrators. Since DCs consist mostly of women and children, perpetrators often make them the target of sexual and gender-based violence and human trafficking. During all phases, Army units assist DCs, support assistance from other actors to DCs, and establish and maintain necessary security levels within their areas of operations, particularly within any DC camps. UNHCR or another UN agency usually takes the lead for DC relief efforts. For more information regarding DCs see Chapter 10 of FM 3-39.40.

4-35. Army units transition through the three phases to conduct tasks related to civilian dislocation (see table 4-3).

Table 4-3. Phases to conduct tasks related to civilian dislocation

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assist DCs • Support assistance to DCs • Support security to DC camps	• Assist DCs • Support resettlement and repatriation • Enable partners	• Transfer responsibility to HN • Support HN and partners • Monitor and report

DC dislocated civilian HN host nation

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-36. During the initial response phase, Army units sometimes act alone because other responsible actors are not present or have inadequate capacity to affect matters sufficiently. Unit efforts support other actors such as the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance who can better cope with DCs. Such situations will be especially difficult, with no clear enemy, potentially vague status and capability of host-nation forces, few or no allies, an environment conducive for belligerents, and nonmilitary challenges such as hunger, disease, weather, and overcrowding. Army units prepare to perform three tasks in the initial response phase.

Assist Dislocated Civilians

4-37. In the initial response phase, Army units assist DCs. Units continually assess numbers, locations, and needs of DCs as well as available support capacity such as host-nation organizations, NGOs, relief supplies, physical transport, distribution, and storage. Threats and DC vulnerabilities also change. Numerous DCs create sanitation challenges and threats of contagious diseases such as cholera, typhus, and dysentery. Army units coordinate these situational assessments with other USG agencies.

4-38. When needed, Army units provide immediate relief and security for DCs along land and maritime migration routes and at collection points. They provide relief and security with stationary checkpoints and

patrols by air and ground assets. In addition, units help transport DCs, control movements, provide information, distribute water and food, and provide emergency medical assistance.

4-39. DCs often move to Army unit locations for protection or humanitarian assistance. Units then expand security measures—such as expanded patrols and lighting—to impromptu DC camps. Units use host-nation personnel as much as possible in organizing and providing for the needs of the DCs. If DCs accumulate in the vicinity of a unit, units consider their impact on subsequent operations.

Support Assistance to Dislocated Civilians

4-40. In the initial response phase, Army units support assistance to DCs. NGOs, IGOs, international organizations, and host-nation organizations provide most assistance to DCs. However, these groups may have limited capability in certain situations. Units grant these humanitarian aid organizations access to DCs, which may require sharing limited infrastructure such as roads and flexibility regarding coordination. These organizations require transportation, basing, communications, or storage support; most importantly they need a secure environment in which to operate. When national police or internal camp community policing are not available, Army units provide internal security. Units conducting direct DC assistance hand over these operations as soon as possible with appropriate coordination. If Army units and their host-nation security partners establish area-wide security, humanitarian organizations can conduct their operations independently. If security partners cannot adequately secure the area, Army units provide close security with escorts or quick reaction forces.

Support Security to Dislocated Civilian Camps

4-41. In the initial response phase, Army units support security to DC camps. Units assisting DC relief efforts assess conditions of temporary camps for DCs, ensuring adequate protection of camps, monitoring of camps, and access of humanitarian aid organizations and security forces to the camps. Security threats originate from outside the camps. For example, perpetrators targeting the DCs often continue their attacks against their victims now concentrated in selected areas. Army units actively patrol and, depending upon rules of engagement, conduct operations including indirect and joint fires to hold opponents at bay. These actions have second-order effects; Army units war game the actions beforehand. Army units use military information support operations messages to elicit information (tips) from the local population on the location and activities of security threats. These messages include reporting procedures as well as rewards for tips as incentives to report this information.

4-42. Security threats also emanate from inside the camps. Perpetrators prey upon other DCs, or belligerents use camps as bases from which to conduct external violent acts. Normally NGO, international organization, or IGO camp administrators or host-nation security forces maintain law and order inside the camps. Sometimes, Army units have to perform these internal security functions.

TRANSFORMATION

4-43. In the transformation phase U.S. and host-nation forces continue to assist in establishing and maintaining order in DC camps while increasingly transferring the primary responsibility for this task to the HN. Peacekeeping forces from the UN or other IGO may also be integrated. Units ensure access to basic services, which will be expanded to include education and nonemergency health care. Often other organizations such as NGOs, international organizations, and IGOs provide basic services. Additionally, Army units and other assess damage to housing and other infrastructure and clear rubble.

4-44. Transportation-related problems exacerbate DC issues. Such problems include as gas rationing and gas station lines, road closures, disruption of rail and freight delivery, and a general lack of public transportation. Commanders facilitate host-nation transportation reconstruction projects where possible.

4-45. The main transformation task is the long-term resettlement or repatriation of DCs. Partners at the national level decide on repatriation and resettlement policies. U.S. and host-nation units may be involved in transportation, movement control, and providing additional security. U.S. and host-nation forces determine whether DCs return to their original homes or settle in a new location. With host-nation authorities, S. and host-nation forces carefully plan and prepare these efforts, particularly if conflict caused the DC crisis.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-46. In this phase, Army units continue the repatriation or resettlement of DCs, as well as any refugees returning from other countries. Army units and host-nation security partners maintain security with particular emphasis upon preventing violence against DCs or any acts of vengeance that former DCs may attempt. Units also ensure that developmental organizations have access to necessary areas and help the HN develop the capacity to respond to natural disasters or other situations that may cause DCs in the future.

SUPPORT FAMINE PREVENTION AND EMERGENCY FOOD RELIEF PROGRAMS

4-47. Fragile states risk famine, particularly during and after crises such as conflict or natural disaster. Scarce food sources such as land, crops, and livestock can provoke conflict between different groups. DCs separated from these sources are particularly susceptible to starvation. Famine is both a humanitarian concern and a threat to stability as people become desperate to survive and groups fight for food. Often USG and other programs will already exist. The United Nations World Food Programme usually takes the lead for food distribution with the support of United States Food for Peace. In addition to responding to security threats, Army units provide transportation or other logistic support.

4-48. Army units transition through the three phases to support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs (see table 4-4).

Table 4-4. Phases to support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Monitor food markets • Predict effects of conflict on food • Estimate total food needs • Assess the adequacy of food distribution • Provide emergency food aid as needed	• Provide security to food distribution networks	• Transfer responsibility to host nation

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-49. During their initial response to support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs, Army units assess population needs and capabilities of involved other USG agencies, IGOs, international organizations, and NGOs. Depending upon the existing programs and the need for military involvement, Army units prepare to perform five tasks in the initial response phase.

Monitor Food Markets

4-50. In the initial response phase, Army units monitor and analyze food security and market prices. Units need situational awareness of food availability, which includes security of food and the prices that civilians pay at markets. In extreme conditions, belligerents pilfer food, destroy food, or allow food to deteriorate. Belligerents steal food from families or warehouses, if only to increase their power. Belligerents attempt to destroy food supplies to increase instability or deny them to their rivals. If inadequate distribution means exist, pest infestation, weather, or natural spoilage can deplete food stocks.

4-51. Food scarcity causes market prices to escalate beyond affordable levels for much of the population. Food scarcity occurs if international actors pay high prices for locally produced food. Conversely, an abundance of donated food causes prices to plummet, eventually driving producers out of business and causing shortages when international food programs stop. Food purity and susceptibility to disease is a related consideration. An outbreak of disease or pathogen—e coli or bovine flu—can devastate food markets. An outbreak affects availability, prices, access, and storage of food.

4-52. Army units monitor food security and market price status by engaging with host-nation officials, NGOs, and the general population. Provincial reconstruction teams, field advance civilian teams, or DARTs maintain situational awareness of food security. Army units conduct periodic surveys and routinely

monitor selected prices for food staples. For example, units collect data weekly from different markets in the area of operations.

4-53. The Army Medical Department ensures wholesomeness and quality assurance of food for Army units and multinational partners. When asked, veterinary services personnel conduct food sanitation audits of storage facilities and food processing plants to ensure that personnel inspect subsistence and food sources for food safety, security, wholesomeness, and quality assurance. Veterinary personnel assess and issue guidance on temperature-abused foods. Veterinary personnel establish and publish a list of approved sources for procurement of subsistence from local host-nation commercial sources for Army unit and multinational partner consumption.

Predict Effects of Conflict on Food

4-54. In the initial response phase, Army units predict effects of conflict on access to food. Units should be alert to the potential impact of conflict on food access. Food access may be interrupted by the destruction of crops and livestock, interdiction of distribution networks, interruption of market activity, or an insecure environment in which providers and consumers are afraid to travel. By anticipating these conditions, units can take proactive measures to provide necessary security, restore infrastructure, or assist with transportation.

Estimate Total Food Needs

4-55. In the initial response phase, Army units estimate total food needs. Army units provide the population with its normal staples, which vary greatly between region and cultures. Although the population may not recognize the alternatives, Army units sometimes provide military rations or food aid from international sources readily available in large quantities. Food deliveries require preparation essentials such as water, water containers, fuel, cooking oil, and utensils. Unit ministry teams provide advice regarding religious considerations or dietary restrictions applicable to emergency food aid.

Assess the Adequacy of Food Distribution

4-56. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the adequacy of local physical transport, distribution, and storage of food. Often humanitarian organizations deliver large amounts of food that rot because internal distribution fails and stockpiles eventually rot. Units assess the availability and capacity of host-nation resources to provide end-to-end food distribution from wholesale storage points to the locations where populations prepare and eat meals.

4-57. When directed, veterinary personnel assess vulnerability of stored and transported foods. They ensure proper storage and handling of refrigerated or other temperature sensitive items, audit food sanitation, and assess water risks.

4-58. Units assess vehicles and the routes they travel. Civilian vehicles typically carry less than military vehicles and are seldom as rugged. Units develop estimated short-ton capacities for different civilian vehicles. They analyze routes to determine if roads require engineering work to support traffic. Additionally, units determine storage for food and water at different points along the distribution network, particularly at the destination if units intend for a delivery to sustain a population for an extended period. Assessments indicate if units need to build or improvise storage facilities.

Provide Emergency Food Aid as Needed

4-59. In the initial response phase, Army units provide emergency food aid as needed. While humanitarian agencies conduct food distribution, they may request by U.S. and host-nation military units deliver food to specific sites. Units secure food so that it reaches its intended destination and that at the destination the strong do not take from the weak. This implies that a responsible authority—a U.S. Army unit, NGO, or local host-nation leader—maintains positive control until people eat. In some cases, they divide delivery with civilian cargo trucks deliver dry goods while U.S. military vehicles provide water.

4-60. When possible, the HN increases involvement in delivery, security, loading, unloading, and cooking. This involvement helps establish the credibility and capability of the host-nation authorities. When Army

units deliver food aid, it sometimes results in belligerents targeting the recipients. Belligerents try to thwart U.S. efforts and intimidate the population into not accepting assistance from the United States. U.S. military helicopters may be the only assets able to deliver supplies to inaccessible locations.

TRANSFORMATION

4-61. In the transformation phase, other organizations such as NGOs or United Nations World Food Programme assume complete responsibility for emergency food programs, except for unique circumstances that may occasionally require U.S. Army participation. Army units concentrate on ensuring security to food transportation and distribution networks. Other actors begin long-term development programs to eliminate the need for emergency food aid.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-62. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units terminate emergency food aid programs as developmental programs take effect and the host-nation economy develops. The HN builds its response capacity in case of natural disasters or other sudden crises. Army units and other actors provide emergency assistance in these situations.

SUPPORT NONFOOD RELIEF PROGRAMS

4-63. Nonfood relief includes shelter from the environment, emergency medical support, and items such as soap, buckets, blankets, and hygiene kits. Areas damaged by conflict or natural disaster often require nonfood relief. Army units provide shelter using fixed facilities such as schools or temporary structures such as tents. Adequate shelter requires blankets and heat. Medical support includes medical personnel to treat emergencies and medical supplies such as bandages for use by host-nation practitioners.

4-64. Army units transition through the three phases to support nonfood relief programs (see table 4-5).

Table 4-5. Phases to support nonfood relief programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Secure distribution networks • Deliver emergency nonfood items	• Provide security • Rebuild damaged facilities	• Transfer responsibility to host nation

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-65. Other organizations such as the UN, ICRC, and HN have primary responsibility for nonfood relief. Army units fill gaps until other actors can operate fully. Consequently, Army units often have two primary tasks to support nonfood relief programs.

Secure Distribution Networks

4-66. In the initial response phase, Army units secure emergency nonfood relief distribution networks. Army units transported nonfood relief over the same networks as those discussed previously. Army units and host-nation security partners provide enough security that belligerents cannot interdict relief supplies. When needed, Army units convoy escorts to supplement area-wide patrolling. Some humanitarian relief agencies prefer to avoid close association with military forces to maintain their neutrality linked to independent humanitarian action. As with food aid, security measures at destinations ensure the relief supplies actually serve their intended users.

Deliver Emergency Nonfood Items

4-67. In the initial response phase, Army units deliver emergency nonfood items. When other organizations lack the capacity to meet the demand, Army units conduct actual deliveries of the items. Delivery entails distributing items at destination points and setting up shelters. Army units maintain situational awareness of the activities of other organizations to avoid duplication of effort. Army units coordinate these efforts with local host-nation leaders and enlist their support in obtaining host-nation

personnel to fulfill manual labor requirements. When feasible, Army units build family shelters; in some situations, they build separate shelters for males, females, or parents with children. Army units need proper legal authority before transferring U.S. supplies, including medical supplies, to host-nation personnel. Commanders pay expenses incurred for support with funds appropriated specifically for such purposes. See DODI 2205.02 for more information.

TRANSFORMATION

4-68. In the transformation phase, other actors lead in implementing long-term solutions for issues such as housing and availability of medical supplies. Army units and host-nation security partners concentrate on maintaining security as resettlement occurs.

4-69. When needed, Army units help rebuild damaged facilities. Army units work with other partners, particularly host-nation officials, to assess damage and determine recovery priorities. Although structurally unsafe, occupants may refuse to leave. They want to hold onto their property or have nowhere else to go. Army units permit host-nation officials to solve such issues. U.S. forces avoid evicting people from their homes. Army engineer units clear devastated buildings, particularly when debris interferes with movement along adjacent roads. If possible, units first allow owners to salvage valuable or useful items. Army units watch for hazardous materials and bury refuse carefully.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-70. Developmental programs and a stabilized economy should create a sustainable solution in which HNs no longer need nonfood relief programs. Recovery efforts begin to contribute to economic growth. Army units concentrate on maintaining the requisite security and help the HN build its response capacity in case of future natural disasters or other sudden crises. Army units and other actors also provide emergency assistance in these situations.

SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

4-71. Humanitarian demining includes mapping and surveying mined areas, marking minefields, treating initial injuries, and educating the local populace to recognize and avoid mines. See paragraphs 2-152 through 2-163. For additional references on explosives identification, see TC 20-32-3 and TC 20-32-4.

SUPPORT HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES

4-72. The UN identifies a broad category of human rights, including liberty, security, equal treatment, a dignified life, due process, education, and others. Army units accomplish missions intended to protect human rights; often stabilization efforts will fail until the host-nation government can and will provide for its population's human rights. Units prevent human rights abuses by U.S. Soldiers and preclude host-nation security forces and other actors from conducting such actions.

4-73. Army units transition through the three phases to support human rights initiatives (see table 4-6).

Table 4-6. Phases to support human rights initiatives

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Monitor vulnerable groups • Provide information and referrals • Deter abuses	• Expand human rights protection • Consolidate respect for human rights • Investigate previous human rights abuses	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support protection of human rights • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-74. From the outset, Army units stay alert for and prevent human rights violations such as atrocities or torture. Opponents or belligerents commit these acts, but sometimes host-nation security forces have a

record of conducting such actions. Army units have an immediate positive impact by performing three tasks in the initial response phase to support human rights initiatives.

Monitor Vulnerable Groups

4-75. In the initial response phase, Army units monitor vulnerable groups. Vulnerable groups include an ethnic minority, females, children, foreigners, or people with a political, economic, or tribal affiliation. Army units understand the identities, locations, and vulnerabilities of the groups and their likely perpetrators. Vulnerabilities denote the group's weakness: sexual and gender-based violence, mass atrocities, human trafficking, or ethnic cleansing and dislocation. Units gain situational awareness from the groups themselves, other host-nation personnel, the units' own observations, media representatives, and from organizations. Effective Army units identify responsible representatives who can speak on behalf of the vulnerable groups.

Provide Information and Referrals

4-76. In the initial response phase, Army units provide information and referrals to groups whose rights may be violated. Units conduct inform and influence activities to inform vulnerable groups regarding their rights and their recourses if rights are violated. Army units aim to protect people against threats to life and livelihood, but units protect others as well. A host-nation constitution may articulate many rights, such as gender employment equality, but local cultural norms may not meet such standards. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights helps by providing both information and recourse. Units have to refrain from creating unrealistic expectations and address extreme situations such as systemic or widespread violence. Group leaders identify their concerns when meeting with Army commanders, who then pursue these issues with host-nation government and military officials. Army commanders need to convince victim groups that Army forces will act without causing retribution to the group.

Deter Abuses

4-77. In the initial response phase, Army units act preemptively to deter human rights abuses. Units take several actions to improve the human rights situation in a HN. First, Soldiers demonstrate high levels of professional conduct at all times. Second, leaders at all levels emphasize respect for human rights as an inviolable norm with their counterparts, making it a matter of command emphasis in both U.S. and host-nation units. Third, Army units arrest and punish extreme violators according to judicial due process, both to deter and to provide justice. Fourth, Army units address rules of engagement when they forcefully intervene to halt human rights violations, which as a rule occur when perpetrators threaten life, limb, or eyesight of an individual. Finally, units conduct combat operations against known perpetrators declared hostile, whether or not they are currently involved in human rights abuses.

TRANSFORMATION

4-78. In addition to maintaining the security established previously, the transformation phase includes three primary areas of emphasis. First Army units expand human rights protection from protection against unlawful violence to political and social areas such as gender equality and freedom of speech. Second Army units consolidate respect for human rights in the HN. These two areas often require continual reinforcement during engagements with host-nation leaders to convince them of the importance of protecting human rights and to secure their buy-in. Third Army units investigate previous human rights abuses and pursue justice. This may result in the removal of some host-nation officials guilty of previous abuses or not currently supporting the institutionalization of human rights.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-79. In the fostering sustainability phase Army units support the maintenance of a secure environment that protects human rights, largely by helping host-nation security forces as they develop higher levels of professional conduct. Host-nation institutions—such as free press, civilian oversight of security forces, and checks and balances—mature so that respect for human rights becomes an irreversible part of the societal

fabric. Army units monitor and report exceptions to acceptable practices, which host-nation authorities then address.

SUPPORT PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS

4-80. Fragile states need to stabilize and then develop the health sector. During crises, health threats cause greater suffering and loss of life than conflict. Army units, in cooperation with other actors, provide emergency medical care to address short-term needs. Ultimately, host-nation medical services require infrastructure, medical staff, training and education, medical logistics, and public health programs.

4-81. Army units transition through the three phases to support public health programs (see table 4-7).

Table 4-7. Phases to support public health programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess public health hazards • Assess existing medical infrastructure • Evaluate the need for additional medical capabilities • Repair existing clinics and hospitals • Operate existing civilian medical facilities • Vaccinate	• Support improvements to waste management • Promote medical infrastructure	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support host-nation improvements • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-82. Civilian actors take the lead when present. Initially, Army units and interagency partners concentrate on assessing vulnerabilities and capabilities and determine the necessary actions to prevent existing health services from deteriorating further. As with other essential services, medical organizations such as NGOs, international organizations, or IGOs initially have an extremely limited presence. Consequently, Army units often respond first, perform initial response tasks independently, and begin coordination with other actors.

Assess Public Health Hazards

4-83. In the initial response phase, Army units assess public health hazards. Challenges include diseases that can result in epidemics. Insects, animals, other humans, or unsanitary conditions transmit these diseases, contaminating water and food. Inadequate sewage facilities or trash disposal cause widespread disease, and environmental conditions such as flooding can also contribute. Malnutrition and dehydration make victims even more susceptible to disease. Other potential dangers to public health include industrial hazards. Units and their interagency partners assess the problem's scope by consulting with local host-nation leaders, health officials, and any available medical experts from NGOs, international organizations, IGOs, or other USG agencies. Unit personnel take precautions if needed.

Assess Existing Medical Infrastructure

4-84. In the initial response phase, Army units assess existing medical infrastructure, health care systems, and logistics. Along with developing an understanding of health hazards, units assess current capacities to provide health care according to cultural and religious norms. Their assessment includes facilities and resources such as trained medical personnel, equipment, and supplies. Although Army units focus on host-nation capacity, units also account for available international resources. Units work with other USG health experts as well as host-nation and international health experts—for example, World Health Organization and World Bank—to develop this assessment. Army units sometimes assess specialized care such as psychological treatment for traumatized victims or veterinary services for livestock.

4-85. Health experts identify complex sets of multiple problems. Often the medical infrastructure has too little capacity to meet the needs of a large population or is too distant from remote population centers.

Other problems include dilapidated infrastructure; a shortage of doctors, nurses, and technicians; insufficient equipment such as ambulances or laboratory equipment; and insufficient availability of medical supplies. Corruption exacerbates existing shortages. For example, thieves divert medical supplies from authorized channels to the black market.

Evaluate the Need for Additional Medical Capabilities

4-86. In the initial response phase, Army units evaluate the need for additional medical capabilities. Although other actors can better evaluate the health situation, unit medical personnel help determine the additional capabilities to pursue. Additional capabilities include additional clinics, more trained personnel, or readily available equipment. Improving existing management and procedures yields better health care.

Repair Existing Clinics and Hospitals

4-87. In the initial response phase, Army units repair existing clinics and hospitals. Units provide limited assistance in emergency repairs to current facilities. This assistance includes repairing structures or providing clinics and hospitals with power, running water, heat, and sewage. When possible, Army units enlist host-nation personnel in these efforts to provide technical expertise.

Operate Existing Civilian Medical Facilities

4-88. In the initial response phase, Army units operate or augment the operations of existing civilian medical facilities. Host-nation facilities require assistance to begin or improve operations. Army units provide support with medical services, administration, logistics, pay, or security. In cases of conflict or natural or man-made disasters, health care may be the priority requiring significant involvement by Army units. Army units transition these functions to host-nation or international organizations. Units facilitate access to health facilities and minimize disruption from security operations, checkpoints, or cordons. Army units set up new hospitals or aid stations near population centers with reliable road access.

Vaccinate

4-89. In the initial response phase, Army units prevent epidemics through immediate vaccinations. Initial assessments identify diseases with epidemic potential such as typhoid, cholera, polio, or smallpox. Medical personnel coordinate with partners to institute disease prevention measures preventing epidemic outbreaks. Army units administer vaccines, if available, to counter the disease threat. Units also train on administering vaccines, recognizing and treating diseases, sharing information. Sharing information involves leader engagement and information activities that explain the necessity for the vaccinations and the procedures to follow. Army units give vaccines with personal registration measures, administering them in a battery of vaccinations because recipients have no record of vaccinations. When possible, host-nation or international medical personnel administer vaccinations. These personnel sometimes need military transportation to distribute and administer vaccines.

TRANSFORMATION

4-90. In this phase, the international community, the USG, or the HN transition any military-led efforts to civilian health organizations. Medical efforts shift from widespread emergency care to developing and expanding programs and institutions required for adequate host-nation health programs. Army units with their presence patrols and engagements identify health program shortfalls to host-nation officials and relevant actors. While Army units primarily focus on maintaining a secure environment in which health programs can improve, they perform two transformation tasks.

Support Improvements to Waste Management

4-91. In the transformation phase, Army units support improvements to local waste and wastewater management capacity. As discussed in paragraphs 4-28 through 4-29, this phase focuses on improving the host-nation capacity for managing waste and wastewater, as it directly relates to general health conditions. Units monitor progress, support efforts when appropriate, and report problems as identified.

Promote Medical Infrastructure

4-92. In the transformation phase, Army units promote and enhance the host-nation medical infrastructure. Army units rarely have any direct involvement in expanding host-nation medical infrastructure. Rather, they contribute with their host-nation security partners to ensure a safe and secure environment for other actors. Units monitor progress and share information with other actors, particularly regarding any problems they identify. U.S. Army advisors note the extent to which civilian health care systems apply to host-nation military personnel. For example, advisors note host-nation military casualties transferred to civilian systems.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-93. In this phase, Army units and other external actors have limited direct involvement in health programs as programs transition to host-nation control. This phase includes developing host-nation institutions to train and educate their own qualified medical personnel. Other actors remain in an advise-and-assist role, and Army units provide security for some actors, particularly representatives from the USG. As in the previous phase, Army units continue to monitor the progress of health programs and share information with other relevant actors.

SUPPORT EDUCATION PROGRAMS

4-94. Although host-nation norms account for education, Army units restore education programs as quickly as possible in many forms without changing them. Education programs indicate current stability, future development, and multidimensional capacity. Having children in schools provides a sense of normalcy, enables parents to work and accomplish other tasks, engages children in worthwhile activities, and prepares them to be future responsible contributors to society. Colleges, adult education, and training programs, including those for former combatants, impart marketable skills to improve the economy and redress societal gaps that require technical expertise. So not viewed as foreign indoctrination efforts, educational programs have support from the local population and involve host-nation personnel,

4-95. Army units transition through the three phases to support education programs (see table 4-8).

Table 4-8. Phases to support education programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Repair and reopen schools • Improve facilities • Obtain faculty and supplies	• Expand educational opportunities • Build schools	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support improved education systems

INITIAL RESPONSE

4-96. As with other initial stability efforts, Army units and host-nation security partners establish a safe environment that provides adequate protection for students, teachers, administrators, and education facilities. Army units initially lead efforts to repair and reopen schools until other actors are established.

Repair and Reopen Schools

4-97. In the initial response phase, Army units repair and reopen schools as quickly as possible. Units establish schools early as a way to gain the initiative and provide a meaningful focus for the local population. Until other actors can assume responsibility for education efforts, Army units work with local leaders to establish temporary schooling programs (for example, designed to last from three to six months).

4-98. Army units recruit temporary teachers, principals, and administrators from educated members of the population. These people want to serve and accept such employment until resuming their usual occupations. Army units identify and provide appropriate training to personnel who manage payrolls for these temporary recruits until Army units develop host-nation institutions.

4-99. Administrators systematically register and keep attendance records of students. They group students by age and in some societies (based upon the advice of local host-nation leaders) by gender. Some parents

have security concerns, cultural inhibitions, or prefer the children to work at home. Those parents reluctantly send children to school. Army units conduct inform and influence activities and engagements to inform the population regarding school programs and obtain their support. Army units use schools to disburse food and medical aid to children.

Improve Facilities

4-100. In the initial response phase, Army units restore or prepare school facilities. These facilities require structural repair, cleaning, power, lighting, heating, pest control, and doors and windows; however, some host-nation norms will require far less effort. Some situations require converting other facilities into classrooms or erecting new structures. Army units help develop plans for these initial efforts while involving host-nation representatives in the implementation as soon as possible.

Obtain Faculty and Supplies

4-101. In the initial response phase, Army units obtain faculty and supplies. Army units sometimes conduct short-duration adult education and training to build a work force of partially trained electricians, plumbers, carpenters, masons, equipment operators, health service providers, mechanics, and other occupations. Units may also assist in obtaining furnishings such as desks and marking boards, school supplies, books, and other school equipment. Army units acquire some of these items commercially or from the HN's existing stockpiles. USG agencies, NGOs, international organizations, or IGOs will provide most items. Army units help identify and communicate requirements and help transport supplies.

4-102. Often Army units use a school site (especially during nonschool hours) for other human capital or public health service provisions such as vaccinations, food distribution, job training, and community outreach meetings. Use of a familiar location reinforces the importance of primary education and reduces concerns among the local population. This approach has risks. It increases security concerns at the school and possibly causes the local population to associate the school with foreign entities. Regardless, USG, NGO, host-nation, and IGO personnel clearly understand this dynamic and operate accordingly.

TRANSFORMATION

4-103. In this phase, temporary, deliberate programs replace education programs developed by education experts from the international community and the HN. Army units identify and hire permanent teachers and administrators and properly train them in their responsibilities. Army units establish requisite security conditions, monitor and report on progress, and support the expansion of host-nation education.

4-104. In the transformation phase, Army units build schools. Initial education programs require expansion, particularly of new schools. USG and international developmental programs provide most required funding. If the security situation permits and they have available capacity, Army engineer units and their partnered host-nation forces actually build schools. Effective Army units maintain an assistance role so that the HN can develop the independent capacity to conduct such construction.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

4-105. In this phase, education programs transition to host-nation authorities with the requisite skills and resources to sustain them, such as Ministry of Education offices. Army units contribute by establishing requisite security conditions and supporting the expansion of host-nation education. Army units work to prevent previously built schools from sitting idle because the HN fails to pay teachers, provide supplies, or maintain facility. All these conditions can occur from corruption or incompetence when outside actors transfer resource chains to the exclusive management of host-nation officials. While civilian lead agencies have the responsibility for these transitions, Army units effectively support the effort by monitoring and reporting on school activity and in ensuring that adequate security exists for teachers and students.

Chapter 5
Support to Governance

Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government to maintain societal order and well-being, define and enforce rights and obligations, and allocate goods and services.

CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES TO SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

5-1. Stability efforts often occur in failed or fragile state situations or when the host-nation government has difficulty resolving stabilization and reconstruction challenges. In some cases, host-nation governments can function and exercise their sovereign responsibility. In these cases, international actors, including Army units, support host-nation government authorities. However, if the host-nation government is dysfunctional or absent, international law obligates intervening military forces to provide interim governance as a transitional military authority (TMA) until the host nation (HN) establishes a responsible civilian authority.

CONDITIONS TO SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

5-2. Good governance includes the following necessary conditions:

- Provision of essential services.
- Stewardship of state resources.
- Political moderation and accountability.
- Civic participation and empowerment.

For more information on TMA, see FM 3-07.

5-3. If acting as the TMA, Army units exercise the functions necessary to establish the above conditions. After governmental authority transitions to an interim civilian authority or to the HN, Army units support governance by accomplishing the subordinate tasks listed in table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Support to governance subordinate tasks

• Support transitional administrations.
• Support development of local governance.
• Support anticorruption initiatives.
• Support elections.

5-4. During the initial response phase, the U.S. military may be specifically directed to act as the TMA to establish governance. In other cases, Army commanders can influence civilian host-nation or other officials that have formal authority but little capacity on their own. In either case, Army units develop host-nation partnerships and quickly attempt to establish governance over their respective areas of operations (AOs). Even if U.S. forces have formal authority as a TMA, they work closely with host-nation representatives, gain their support for stabilization efforts, and prepare them to assume responsibility for governance.

5-5. In the transformation phase, responsibility for governance transfers to civilian authorities. This may be provisional under the control of the Ambassador, a United Nations (UN) mission, or some other temporary entity. In some cases, authority will be transferred to host-nation representatives that may or may not be the same host-nation government prior to the operation. As Army units develop host-nation institutions, they continue to provide good governance by advising, assisting, supporting, and monitoring other actors.

5-6. In the fostering sustainability phase, host-nation authorities assume complete responsibility and authority for governance, with limited involvement by Army units. Army units and their host-nation security partners focus on maintaining security, building capacity, and enabling the host-nation military to assume an appropriate role in the nation. Army units continue to monitor developments regarding governance and identify concerns to host-nation authorities and U.S. chains of command.

5-7. Army units support the establishment of good governance while working with various U.S., host-nation, and international organizations. As these organizations become more established, Army units assume more of a supporting role.

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

5-8. Restoring and providing essential services reflect the stability principles described in Chapter 1.

Conflict Transformation

5-9. Good governance provides a peaceful means of addressing grievances and conflict drivers. It persuades contestants that their interests are best served by operating within the political system.

Unity of Effort and Unity of Purpose

5-10. Army units have to operate with other U.S., host-nation, and international actors to foster effective governance by legitimate authorities. In particular, host-nation government officials (including civil servants at all levels) actively and positively contribute to good governance.

Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership

5-11. Governance must be established and maintained by appropriate means and retain the support of the population. Initially, mandates and political guidance may originate from outside the HN, but the population still must view the governing authority as legitimate. The population, or subordinate sectors, may not associate U.S. goals and objectives with legitimacy. Actions of Army units account for their effect on the operation's perceived legitimacy. During the initial response phase, Army units strike a difficult balance between exerting control and supporting host-nation exercise of governance. Exerting control supports stabilization and U.S. policy objectives. Supporting the HN supports the exercise of governance. Army units strike this balance while aligning operations within the authorizations and constraints of overarching mandates. Even if the U.S. military acts as the TMA, Soldiers in all capacities include host-nation representatives in decisionmaking and implementation. Successful Army units use a projected transition plan and timeline, developed with host-nation participation, to redress the HN's concerns about U.S. occupation, secure host-nation buy-in, and mitigate any tendencies to become overly dependent upon the United States.

Building Partner Capacity

5-12. In addition to partners with whom unity of effort is pursued, Army units have to interact with other independent actors not obliged to conform to U.S. policy goals. These actors include the media, host-nation tribal and religious leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and opposition groups with genuine grievances (some of which may be addressed by improved governance).

Rule of Law

5-13. Effective governance reflects an acceptable political settlement that peacefully resolves disputes, protects rights, and preserves law and order. Army units first focus on security, but this focus ultimately depends upon obtaining an effective political settlement acceptable to potential combatants.

SUPPORT TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS

5-14. Stabilization efforts, particularly in a failed state, incorporate a series of transitional governmental administrations until the HN establishes a permanent arrangement. In some cases, U.S. forces may initially

be assigned responsibility as a TMA, to be followed by an external provisional civilian authority controlled by the United States Government (USG), a coalition, or other intergovernmental organization (IGO). Responsibility eventually transfers to host-nation authorities. The HN assumes responsibility often in progressive phases. Figure 5-1 portrays how transitions may occur. U.S. forces plan multiple interim administrations to establish quick governance involving host-nation representatives who may or may not be suitable leaders in the long term. U.S. forces factor in and deliberately plan for events such as constitutional referenda and elections.



Figure 5-1. Example transitional administrations

5-15. Army units transition through the three phases to support transitional administrations (see table 5-2).

Table 5-2. Phases to support transitional administrations

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Vet host-nation officials • Reconstitute leadership at multiple governmental levels • Establish interim legislative processes	• Advise and assist transitional administrations	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

5-16. In this phase, Army units may be the only organizations with the capacity to govern and may be designated the TMA. Army units acquire the HN's cooperation to provide interim governance while preparing the HN to assume responsibility and authority, to include its capability to exert control.

Vet Host-Nation Officials

5-17. In the initial response phase, Army units vet host-nation officials. Host-nation personnel help Army units provide advice and administer essential services. Army units identify competent, honest officials with histories relatively clean of abuses or other misconduct. A HN or recently liberated area often has many officials and civil servants associated with the regime's previous activities. Army units retain all previous officials in their positions. Units balance several considerations when vetting host-nation officials. If the previous regime was corrupt or criminal, Army units may dismantle and discredit it. A wholesale purge of the previous regime may eliminate key technical, administrative, and leadership skills needed by the host-nation government while producing a disenfranchised and unemployable group of potential adversaries. Employment in the regime may have required membership in adversarial political organizations. Proper vetting distinguishes between simple membership and ideological affiliation.

5-18. Units incorporate surveys, screenings, and interviews to obtain information about prospective host-nation officials. When possible, Army units crosscheck information with multiple sources to form an

accurate personality folder of these officials, ensuring that descriptions are not skewed by those with grudges or ulterior motives.

Reconstitute Leadership at Multiple Levels of Government

5-19. In the initial response phase, Army units reconstitute leadership at multiple levels of government. Army units reestablish temporary host-nation leadership structures, including the ability to exercise command and control, at the national, regional, and local levels. Initially, units immediately focus on local governance using a bottom-up approach. Units identify and potentially designate interim local leaders to cooperate and support the TMA or to conduct actual governance if the HN retains responsibility and authority for doing so. Army units select initial leaders on the recommendations of social—tribal or religious—leaders or other knowledgeable personnel. Units approach good candidates and recruit them, rather than select only from prospects who contact Army units. Initial appointments have provisions and a limited term. Army units offer subsequent terms depending on the official's performance, the development of long-term host-nation institutions, and other considerations. Officials who perform well during these interim terms stand as good candidates for other positions of responsibility. Army units replace those who do not perform adequately. Such actions should be transparent and defensible based upon clear and logical standards to achieve legitimacy with the host-nation population and mitigate concerns of excessive external manipulation of host-nation affairs. Good performers also make logical candidates for positions in the host-nation government when it assumes responsibility for actual governance.

5-20. Units balance several competing considerations, which may include preventing a disenfranchised group of potential adversaries, retaining the technical expertise to continue governmental services, and providing opportunities to previously marginalized groups. Returning host-nation expatriates can run as candidates, although the population may view them as opportunistic outsiders and create opposition if expatriates get positions of authority.

5-21. Army units also reconstitute interim regional and national governments after the creation of most local structures. Candidate officials include personnel who demonstrated competence in local-level positions, suitable officials from the previous government, leaders from previous opposition groups, educated professionals, returning expatriates, or leaders of societal groups. As at the local level, effective units seek out and recruit qualified representatives.

Establish Interim Legislative Processes

5-22. In the initial response phase, Army units establish interim legislative processes. Legislatures usually pass laws, represent the population, and oversee the actions of the executive branch. Legislatures exist at all governmental levels (national, regional, and local). In a functioning democracy, the population elects legislative members they represent. The HN may already have a functioning legislature. When legislatures do not exist, Army units establish them. Initially, these legislatures do not enact laws, but they still represent the population, develop resolutions, provide advice and assistance to transitional administrations, and draft a new constitution and charters for regional or local governments. Additional information regarding the interim rule of law is contained in Chapter 3.

5-23. Elections take significant time and resources to organize and execute effectively. During the initial response phase, Army units create quasi-legislative bodies such as councils to represent the population's concerns, advise the TMA, and assist in governance. These councils meet regularly and represent a cross section of the population. In some cases, tribal affiliation provides an appropriate basis for membership. Rotating venues or roles such as chairperson make the councils more inclusive and avoid domination by a faction. These councils also form topical subcommittees to consider particular issues that relate to the five primary stability tasks, such as security, essential services, employment, business development, open media, or gender-related issues. Councils also pass resolutions the TMA considers.

5-24. Based on resolutions from host-nation councils, Army commanders acting as area TMAs promulgate interim laws to supplement or modify the HN's previous legal code. Army units integrate these laws with those of adjacent units or higher headquarters and involve the Staff Judge Advocate in administering this process.

TRANSFORMATION

5-25. In the transformation phase, Army units pass responsibility for governance to a civilian authority—an external governing body under the control of the USG or an IGO such as the UN. A capable HN assumes responsibility in some circumstances. During this phase, Army units emphasize establishing host-nation institutions that can provide enduring and legitimate governance. Once a civilian administration assumes control, Army units primarily advise and assist any transitional administrations.

5-26. Although a civilian administration gains formal responsibility for governance, Army units maintain a greater presence, organizational advantages, experience in and familiarity with the AO, and influence with host-nation security forces and other key actors. Army units avoid undermining civilian authorities, even unintentionally. This can easily occur if units do not accept a supporting role and allow transitional administrations to progress through their growing pains. Instead, units concentrate on maintaining a secure environment, building capacity of host-nation security forces, reinforcing governance priorities, monitoring the AO, and reporting issues through the chain of command and to partners.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

5-27. In this phase, Army units continue their supporting role as they transfer governance responsibility to an enduring host-nation authority. Units decrease leverage over host-nation internal matters, permitting off-duty Soldiers to circulate in the local areas and to comply with host-nation laws.

SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE

5-28. Normally, civilian agencies support local governance and building local capacity. Army units remain prepared to conduct this function when agencies are not present and support their efforts when agencies are present. Local governance provides the foundation on which to develop higher-level governance. Army units identify effective host-nation partners early and work together to develop local governance quickly. This coordination frequently occurs in an absence of guidance as the HN establishes higher-level host-nation governance levels.

5-29. Army units transition through the three phases to support development of local governance (see table 5-3).

Table 5-3. Phases to support development of local governance

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Establish local participation • Identify and secure facilities • Restore essential public services • Maintain essential public services	• Support partners • Advise local legislatures and civil servants	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report • Support local authorities

INITIAL RESPONSE

5-30. Army units and their civilian partners have a limited time to establish local governance and gain host-nation support. Army units carefully balance providing direction with involving the HN. Civilian partners maintain continuity so that Army units can become familiar with their areas and establish relationships. Generally, unit AOs align with host-nation political boundaries (such as provinces, states, and so on), which helps integrate governance with unit security efforts. Guerrillas, criminal groups or other organizations sometimes dispute control of areas or establish their own self-proclaimed area. Effective Army units align an AO with geographic, tribal, ethnic, linguistic, or other factors.

Establish Local Participation

5-31. In the initial response phase, Army units establish mechanisms for local-level participation. Sometimes Army units reconstitute host-nation leadership to provide advice regarding governance. Units implement other measures to get a wider cross section of the population involved. They create councils to represent groups such as neighborhoods, women, or other identity groups. These councils elect

spokespersons and vote on recommendations for the host-nation leadership or the TMA to consider. Army units seriously consider the council's actions and manage its expectations.

5-32. The responsiveness of the local governing body to pressing public needs determines the legitimacy of local governance. At the local level, important symbols of the quality of local governance come from the ability of a local body to convene, hold agenda-driven meetings in public, and attend to basic tasks, such as passing an interim budget. Once Army units establish an interim legislative process, they support local government in the conduct of the legislative and administrative processes.

Identify and Secure Facilities

5-33. In the initial response phase, Army units identify, secure, rehabilitate, and maintain basic facilities for the local government. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Army units and the host-nation leadership immediately identify locations for government facilities such as courthouses, police stations, jails, and public works offices. They often use the same facilities previously used. However, conflict destroys some or some may not exist. Army units avoid using such facilities for their own use. Army engineers repair or build facilities with host-nation companies and workers if possible. Similarly, Army units integrate host-nation organizations into security provision as early as possible.

Restore Essential Public Services

5-34. In the initial response phase, Army units restore essential local public services. Chapter 4 discusses the restoration of public services, which requires a civil service. A civil service may have previously existed, but Army units vet personnel before deciding to retain them. If acting as a TMA with the ability to "hire and fire" government employees, units use this leverage to motivate civil servants to perform satisfactorily. Army units eventually integrate local services with regional and national ministerial departments as they become operational. Army units with their chains of command and communications networks facilitate this coordination.

5-35. In addition to normal local governmental services—water, schools, trash disposal, and sewage treatment—other important service categories—radio, television, and telephone—require early U.S. involvement. Often private companies operate these latter services.

Maintain Essential Public Services

5-36. In the initial response phase, Army units provide resources to maintain essential local public services. As the HN begins to assume responsibility for local governance, Army units help provide resources to sustain the host-nation local government until it becomes self-sufficient. Required resources includes money for payrolls and operating expenses, expendable supplies including fuel for vehicles and power generation, equipment such as generators, or construction materials. Resources originate from many sources including U.S. military channels. When needed, Army units transport, store, secure, or distribute these resources. Units also monitor consumption and provide accountability to ensure the HN uses resources for their intended purposes.

TRANSFORMATION

5-37. In this phase, all local government functions become operational, although an external transitional civil authority may control the functions. Organizations such as or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), field advance civilian teams (FACTs), or other civilian agencies have primary responsibility for governance development while Army units concentrate on security and developing the capacity of host-nation security forces. With their widespread presence, units still support host-nation efforts to institutionalize effective governance.

5-38. In the transformation phase, Army units advise local legislatures and civil servants during administrative actions. As they conduct engagements within their AOs, units establish relationships with local government officials. These relationships do not conflict with those of PRTs, FACTs, or similar organizations. Army units often have a more prominent presence and supplement efforts of these other organizations. Because they circulate throughout the AO, Army units interact with multiple host-nation actors and help them coordinate efforts more effectively than actors might otherwise do on their own.

Generally, Army units conduct such engagements with their host-nation security partners. Army units work through their chains of command to resolve issues involving host-nation regional and national governmental organizations.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

5-39. Once the HN assumes complete responsibility for local governance, Army units carefully avoid undermining the legitimacy of local governments. Units concentrate on maintaining security and security force assistance. Still, they monitor the performance of local governments, report on progress and problems, and continue to engage with appropriate actors constructively. Often units let host-nation officials work out solutions, while units advise and assist with problems the HN seems unable to solve.

SUPPORT ANTICORRUPTION INITIATIVES

5-40. Corruption may prove to be the biggest obstacle to stability efforts, impeding economic growth, essential services, governance, the rule of law, and security. Corruption occurs as extortion, bribes, favoritism, or nepotism, diverting resources from their intended uses. Cultural norms regarding these practices vary between societies. Corruption creates resentment. If locals perceive corruption propping up a corrupt host-nation government, then they oppose stability efforts, undermining the U.S. military's mission. U.S. forces address corruption on two levels: the moral or ethical level and the utilitarian level. The moral or ethical level pertains to right and wrong behavior, while the utilitarian level entails a calculated assessment of costs and benefits associated with the behavior. The latter includes an official behaving responsibly to keep an adequately paying position, rather than losing the position and being prosecuted because of corrupt practices. Units implement anticorruption precautions from the outset while they establish governmental agencies and systems.

5-41. While acting as the TMA, an Army unit conducts a concerted effort against corruption. Army leaders foster an appropriate environment by setting an example and communicating expectations for proper behavior by host-nation officials at all levels. Unit leaders identify suitable formal and informal host-nation representatives to serve as officials and advisors to the TMA. Initially, these are provisional, short-term appointments. Army units only retain representatives who demonstrate effectiveness and reliability.

5-42. Salaries associated with these positions pay enough that officials do not need to use corrupt measures to make an adequate living, but instead have a compelling motivation to keep their positions. Army leaders convince each official that they will identify and punish corrupt behavior. Army leaders prepare to act without requiring an impossibly high threshold for evidence. However, leaders carefully avoid letting rivals who fabricate claims manipulate them and create adversaries who cause stability problems when removed from office. Army leaders handle initial incidents mildly with a warning or a brief suspension. Invariably leaders make a clear example of culprits to deter other potential abusers and to retain public support for the TMA. While leaders normally require flexibility, they avoid the appearance of being arbitrary or guilty of favoritism. Army leaders solicit the advice of trusted host-nation partners. Some circumstances oblige Army leaders to advocate for a weak sanction when other host-nation personnel are witnesses. In that case, an Army leader acts as the stern disciplinarian so host-nation partners avoid getting blamed by others.

5-43. Army units transition through the three phases to support anticorruption initiatives (see table 5-4).

Table 5-4. Phases to support anticorruption initiatives

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Implement oaths of office • Develop ethical standards • Ensure transparency of resources • Implement reporting procedures for corruption • Support witness protection programs	• Discourage corruption by counterparts • Provide reports and recommendations	• Discourage corruption by counterparts • Monitor and report corruption

INITIAL RESPONSE

5-44. During their initial response, Army units anticipate corruption as a potential problem. Units accomplish or support five initial tasks to forestall corruption.

Implement Oaths of Office

5-45. In the initial response phase, Army units implement or reaffirm government employee oaths of office. Government employees take an oath of office upon assuming a civil service position and renew the oath periodically. This symbolic gesture inculcates a proper attitude in civil servants and creates legitimate expectations among the population regarding the behavior of government employees. Figure 5-2 contains an example of an oath.

> I solemnly promise that I will loyally serve (country, province, or city) and its people to the utmost of my ability. I will always work hard to deserve the trust placed in me and will never betray that trust by abusing my office. I will perform my duties with diligence, integrity, and respect for all others.

Figure 5-2. Sample oath of office

5-46. Army units modify an oath as applicable to host-nation culture and traditions. Units translate it carefully and vet it with host-nation leaders. Some government offices prominently display the oath.

Develop Ethical Standards

5-47. In the initial response phase, Army units develop and disseminate ethical standards for civil servants. In addition to an oath of office, Army units develop ethical standards to foster proper attitudes among government employees. Before they are finalized, the TMA drafts and host-nation representatives review the standards. Regular training sessions reinforce the standards to maintain employee awareness, to include their understanding that violation of the ethical standards is grounds for dismissal or other punishment.

Ensure Transparency of Resources

5-48. In the initial response phase, Army units ensure transparency in the dispersal of government services. Transparency helps minimize corruption by providing accountability of a government's actions and use of resources. Potential monitoring agents include Army units, other USG or international organizations, the media, other agencies in the HN, and ultimately the population. Army units foster host-nation internal accountability with a check-and-balance system, including separation of powers and special organizations that conduct internal review, quality assurance, auditing, or perform inspector general functions. Government services maintain visibility on governmental budgets, expenditures, supply inventories, and projects. Army units crosscheck information at different host-nation governmental levels, possibly with efforts by IGOs and other entities. For example, if a provincial government documents that it provided an amount of funds to a subordinate district, units can verify that district figures support the assertion.

5-49. Methods to facilitate transparency include open publication of government documents (particularly budgets), council meetings, press conferences, interviews, legislative hearings, and inspections of projects. Army units publicize incidents of corruption that result in punishment (such as suspension, severance, demotion, fines, or prosecution) to shame culprits and serve as a deterrent for others. Units use broadcast media and Web sites to expand transparency efforts.

Implement Reporting Procedures for Corruption

5-50. In the initial response phase, Army units implement reporting procedures for corruption and intimidation. Victims and witnesses have several options for reporting corruption. Having these options provides its own form of checks and balances. First, victims can report to their political representative. For example, if a government official forced an individual to pay a bribe for a state service, could the individual reports the incident to the village mayor or legislative representative. Second, victims can report allegations to a designated agency to receive complaints and investigate allegations of corruption. Third, the media can

report allegations through journalistic investigations. Fourth, victims can call telephone hotlines to file complaints. This latter option has challenges. Telephone service may be sparse, the population may not trust unsecured lines, and such anonymous charges may prove insufficient to prosecute a culprit. However, anonymous tips also identify potential problems that merit deliberate focus. Finally, victims can submit anonymous statements to complaint boxes.

5-51. Army units may establish their own hotlines and investigative agencies and, if designated the TMA, may act upon allegations. For example, an Army unit may suspend or permanently remove certain host-nation officials from their positions. Units can tailor products for military information support operations (MISO) to increase awareness among the populace of these efforts and to enable the population to report violations. Army units coordinate with the assigned military information support staff officers to produce specific information products that increase awareness and reporting.

Support Witness Protection Programs

5-52. In the initial response phase, Army units support witness protection programs. Most witnesses require anonymity, which complicates due process and the prosecution of corruption allegations. Army units sometimes take testimonies from witnesses and sanitize them before providing to host-nation officials. If acting as the TMA, the actual testimony may stop at U.S. authorities who may decide to remove an official accused of corruption. Units interview numerous potential witnesses so that a particular one that provides valuable testimony cannot be singled out.

5-53. Relocating a witness within the HN proves challenging. Local communities are relatively static and close-knit with strong family ties. Some societies have enough movement that relocation with a different identity may work. Army units best protect witnesses when units deter those who might conduct acts of retribution.

TRANSFORMATION

5-54. In the transformation phase, Army units do not have their previous authority to act against corruption. By this phase, some government officials and key partners develop corrupt practices, exploiting situations for personal gain. With their extensive presence, however, Army units still influence host-nation partners to take corrective action. Since units primarily maintain security, this influence may impact some forms of corruption (such as police officers who extort money at traffic control points). Additionally, units provide reports and recommendations to the transitional civil authority or other partners (such as PRTs, FACTs, or IGOs) as well as through the U.S. military chain of command that can exert its influence at higher levels.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

5-55. In this phase, the HN has complete responsibility and authority for addressing corruption. Units can dissuade their host-nation security forces counterparts from engaging in corrupt practices and can monitor and report corruption they observe in their AOs.

SUPPORT ELECTIONS

5-56. Elections represent progress and stability. More importantly, they legitimize the government by reflecting the population's endorsement. Elections are one element of a functioning democracy; however, if not conducted properly, they can cause additional problems. Army units primarily establish and maintain secure conditions within which to conduct elections and any campaigning. Units also assist with the necessary preparation, conduct, and monitoring of elections by using information capabilities, such as MISO, to explain the elections process and procedures for voting. These informational messages avoid all appearances of favoring any particular faction, political party, or candidate. This is vital to preserving the legitimacy and impartiality of the process. Host-nation security forces receive public credit for securing the elections. Army units help plan and prepare for elections but maintain a low profile during the actual events to avoid the perception that the United States tampered with the electoral process.

5-57. Army units transition through the three phases to support elections (see table 5-5 on page 5-10).

Table 5-5. Phases to support elections

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Determine requirements for voter registration • Establish or verify voter registry	• Maintain a secure environment for elections • Provide security to ensure free and fair elections	• Build capacity of host-nation security forces • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

5-58. Large-scale elections rarely occur early in a stabilization effort, although some form of electoral process at low levels proves useful. For example, members of a council may elect a chairperson. HNs do not conduct a national or regional elective during the initial response phase, but preparations during this phase will be decisive later.

Determine Requirements for Voter Registration

5-59. In the initial response phase, Army units determine identification requirements for voter registration. When voters register, an identity card suffices for identification (see paragraphs 2-120 through 2-125). If voters lose their identity cards, Army units issue replacement cards. Army units make provisions to determine if an individual attempts to misuse a card reported as lost.

Establish or Verify Voter Registry

5-60. In the initial response phase, Army units establish or verify voter registry. Some circumstances permit voters to register during the identification card issue process (or some other event that requires citizens to be present). This convenience can increase the number of registered voters. Army units and their host-nation partners maintain registration lists at local levels and consolidate lists at higher levels of government. Registration lists should omit selected personal data such as ethnic group to avoid belligerents from using such information to target individuals. In addition, voter registration, registration lists, alignment with regional representation, and other factors must account for dislocated civilian and refugee populations.

TRANSFORMATION

5-61. As host-nation institutions develop, HNs conduct elections or referenda that permit the population to vote. Before and during these events, Army units and their host-nation partners maintain a secure environment so people can debate and resolve political issues without violence. Demonstrations and the exercise of free speech complicate matters, but U.S. and host-nation forces carefully exercise constraint except against belligerents who conduct violent actions.

5-62. In the transformation phase, Army units provide security to ensure free and fair elections. Election-related violence occurs before, during, and after the event as belligerents attempt to influence the results, disrupt the process, or retaliate against the outcome. Elections need an increased presence by U.S. and host-nation security forces, strong inform and influence activities to encourage participation and responsible behavior, and heightened security for polling sites, political rallies, media centers, international observers, and candidates. Army units avoid the perception that their actions support a political faction. U.S. and host-nation security forces increase security along routes voters use to travel and monitors use to collect, transport, and count ballots. Effective host-nation forces provide most of these measures with Army units monitoring their actions. Additionally, Army advisors to host-nation units watch for the possibility that the HN acts partially towards a political faction or that a political party attempts to manipulate the votes of host-nation soldiers.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

5-63. Once the HN assumes complete responsibility and authority for governance, it conducts elections on its own. Army units remain focused on building the capacity of host-nation security forces to maintain stability, which may be particularly challenging during an election. Units stay alert for indications of election-related violence, election fraud, and inappropriate involvement by host-nation security forces. Non-elected individuals such as tribal and religious leaders may still retain legitimacy among the host-nation population and should not be discounted.

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Chapter 6

Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

Long-term peace and stability in the host nation and surrounding regions require sustainable host-nation economic and infrastructure development. The desired end state is for the host nation to achieve a robust, entrepreneurial, and sustainable economy. All economic development actions build upon and enhance host-nation economic and management capacity.

CONDITIONS AND PRINCIPLES TO SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

6-1. In post-conflict and fragile states, host-nation actors, other United States Government (USG) agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and civilian relief agencies often have the best qualifications to lead efforts to restore and help develop host-nation economic capabilities. However, if security considerations or other factors make these actors incapable of assisting initially, Army units assist host-nation actors begin the process of achieving sustainable economic development. Ultimately, the goal is to establish conditions so that the host nation (HN) can generate its own revenues and not rely upon outside aid.

6-2. Preserving assets—such as production facilities, hospitals, universities, existing companies, and markets—dramatically reduces the time required to reestablish a sustainable level of economic activity. Many assets survive an initial conflict but subsequently wither in the instability of the aftermath.

SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS

6-3. Army units first gain and maintain comprehensive situational awareness. Units work with host-nation officials and others to gather and continuously update the information needed to accurately assess the HN. This assessment includes the status of the host-nation economy, infrastructure, civil society, and local communities. This initial socio-economic and infrastructure assessment forms the basis for developing and implementing economic and infrastructure development strategies that establish the following conditions:

- Employment generation.
- Macroeconomic stabilization.
- Market economy sustainability.
- Control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace.
- Functioning civil societal infrastructure and local community development.

U.S. and host-nation officials can and do pursue many of the strategies designed to establish these necessary conditions simultaneously, not sequentially. For example, Army units provide economic information that informs national policymakers' fiscal and monetary policy changes. Meanwhile, other Army units simultaneously assist with infrastructure reconstruction, security of trade routes and marketplaces, generating jobs, and other critical tasks. Army units generally establish these conditions of supporting economic and infrastructure development by accomplishing the subordinate tasks listed in table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Support to economic and infrastructure development subordinate tasks

• Support economic generation and enterprise creation. • Support monetary institutions and programs. • Support national treasury operations. • Support public sector investment programs. • Support private sector development. • Protect natural resources and environment. • Support agricultural development programs. • Restore transportation infrastructure. • Restore telecommunications infrastructure. • Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.

6-4. In the initial response phase, Army units take the lead in responding to immediate economic needs, including assessing the critical micro- and macro-economic conditions, ensuring they bring agricultural products and other goods to safe and secure marketplaces, and generating jobs they can fill with qualified laborers. Even in this initial phase, Army units begin to partner with relevant actors from the HN, U.S civil agencies, and international organizations. These partnerships include collaborative efforts to create, disseminate, and update a socio-economic and infrastructure assessment informed by these actors' insights and economic and societal information collected by Army units in the HN. These evolving partnerships and assessments significantly enhance transitioning the management of economic development tasks from Army units to USG agencies and host-nation actors.

6-5. In the transformation phase, Army units aim to firmly establish the foundation for sustainable economic development and to transition control of economic development to USG agencies, international civil agencies, host-nation economic officials, and entrepreneurs. During this phase, Army units focus on establishing host-nation institutions that can provide sustainable economic growth. Once a civilian administration assumes control, Army units primarily advise and assist those civilian officials. This phase also includes continuous updates to the socio-economic and infrastructure assessment and a transfer of responsibility for its maintenance and dissemination to civil agency or host-nation economic officials. In general, the transformation phase includes follow-on steps building on and reinforcing successes of the initial response phase.

6-6. In the fostering sustainability phase, Army units aim to institutionalize a long-term sustainable economic development program and to transition control of the economy completely to host-nation officials, entrepreneurs, and civil society. In general, this phase includes follow-on steps that build on and reinforce successes of the two earlier phases. Additionally, steps taken during this phase support sustainable economic growth based on a healthy society supported by healthy communities and neighborhoods. Army units primarily continue to advise and assist host-nation civilian economic officials.

STABILITY PRINCIPLES

6-7. Support to economic and infrastructure development reflects the stability principles described in Chapter 1.

Conflict Transformation

6-8. Conflict transformation guides the strategy to transform conflict into peaceful and sustainable stability. In the economic arena, Army units first identify and mitigate economic drivers of conflict, including illicit economic activity, excessive unemployment, lack of family sustaining wages, extreme income inequality, monopolist control of individual market sectors, and violent competition for scarce natural resources. Army units next strengthen the host-nation economic capacity and management ability, increasing the number of jobs paying family sustaining wages and implementing fiscal, monetary, trade, and regulatory policies that support sustainable economic growth.

Unity of Effort and Unity of Purpose

6-9. Achieving unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation amongst all actors, including those who represent many different organizations with diverse operating cultures. This applies to economic development efforts among agencies of the USG, between the USG and the international community, between the host-nation government and the international community, and between Army units and representatives of all the groups listed above as well as with host-nation leaders in government, business, education and training, service and nonprofit, and civil society.

Legitimacy and Host-Nation Ownership

6-10. The U.S. stabilization and economic development effort—and involved host-nation leaders—need legitimacy in the eyes of the HN, U.S. citizens, and the international community. Legitimacy requires accountability, transparency, and the production of quantifiable benefits arising from host-nation economic growth. The desired end state consists of the HN achieving a robust and sustainable economy that it owns, manages, staffs, and finances. All economic development actions build on and enhance host-nation economic and management capacity. Accordingly, Army units serve as catalyst, facilitator, convener, and partner for host-nation leaders in government, business, education and training, service and nonprofit organizations, and civil society. Army units consult broadly and create coordination mechanisms with the host-nation population to build trust, prevent dependency, and ensure host-nation ownership, paying particular attention to women and minorities with special needs. Small business development—particularly in the agricultural sector—builds on and enhances host-nation capacity. Even while peace negotiations continue, Army units start a dialogue with civil society and private sector representatives to build political consensus for the economic recovery program. Also, Army units recognize work accomplished by the population through strategic communications.

Building Partner Capacity

6-11. Building a sustainable host-nation economy with broad-based citizen support requires building partner capacity. This capacity engages host-nation leaders in government, business, education and training, service and nonprofit organizations, and civil society. Army units bring the right host-nation actors to the table and facilitate their discussions and strategic planning of collaborative economic development solutions.

Rule of Law

6-12. Politics pervades virtually every human endeavor. Additionally, almost every economic policy decision of any consequence produces winners and losers, potentially prompting resentment and political rifts between the actual or perceived winners and losers. Host-nation leaders from all relevant sectors and the former warring parties and marginalized groups participate in the discussions and decisionmaking regarding economic development strategies. Army units prevent powerful political actors from controlling the economic development agenda and planning process.

SUPPORT ECONOMIC GENERATION AND ENTERPRISE CREATION

6-13. Creating jobs is a keystone of any economic recovery program. Many activities fall under the rubric of job creation, including immediate, short-term opportunities that yield quick impact or the development of more enduring livelihoods in the civil service or private sector. Amy leaders distinguish these different activities, recognizing how implementing any employment generation program affects sustainability and long-term recovery. In many countries, the key may be simply to enable the population to return to their fields and resume farming.

6-14. Providing jobs is vital on many levels. Politically, employment opportunities give the population a stake in the peace process by providing men and women with alternatives to violence. Economically, employment provides income to poor families, revives domestic demand for goods and services, and

stimulates overall growth. Socially, employment also promotes social healing, encourages the return of dislocated persons, and improves social welfare in the long run.

6-15. Army units transition through the three phases to support economic generation and enterprise creation (see table 6-2).

Table 6-2. Phases to support economic generation and enterprise creation

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Implement employment initiatives • Create employment opportunities • Assess labor force • Assess market sector	• Implement public works projects • Establish a business registry • Provide start-up capital • Support small lending institutions • Develop financial institutions	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support partners • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-16. Army units prepare to perform four tasks in the initial response phase.

Implement Employment Initiatives

6-17. In the initial response phase, Army units implement initiatives to provide immediate employment. This initiative gets people back to work and gets money flowing, even if only temporarily. The emergency phase economic recovery aims to get labor and capital back to work quickly to show the visible benefits of peace. Army units create effective immediate employment by providing quick impact public sector jobs. Such jobs include collecting trash, cleaning up public places, installing generators, and rebuilding infrastructure—roads, bridges, and electric grids. Army leaders consult with the host-nation population on these efforts and communicate to the population that this is a partnership effort between international actors and the host-nation population.

6-18. Jobs that favor quick impact cannot substitute long-term livelihood creation. U.S. forces establish short-term job creation programs parallel with sustainable employment programs. As stability returns, the HN avoids offering military and police jobs as long-term employment solutions. The HN does not guarantee civilian job training or skill sets and may not be able to afford large security budgets.

Create Employment Opportunities

6-19. In the initial response phase, Army units create employment opportunities for all ages, genders, and special needs. During violent conflict, many women become heads of large households. They have acquired critical skills to adapt to food shortages and become micro-entrepreneurs in the informal economy. New employment opportunities accommodate physical disabilities of former combatants and civilians. Failing to address all opportunities potentially contribute to destabilization.

Assess Labor Force

6-20. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the labor force for critical skills requirements and shortfalls. Army units can assess labor force requirements by surveying local marketplaces, manufacturing facilities, agricultural sites, and individual micro or small businesses. Army units determine shortfalls and growth potential by comparing these requirements to the assessment of human capital in the labor market.

Assess Market Sector

6-21. In the initial response phase, Army units assess market sector for manpower requirements and pay norms. Army units assess the market sector by visiting local marketplaces, manufacturing facilities, agricultural sites, and individual micro or small businesses.

TRANSFORMATION

6-22. In the transformation phase, Army units pass responsibility for economic development to a civilian authority. This may be an external governing body under the control of the USG or an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations (UN). If it can, the HN assumes responsibility in some circumstances. During this phase, Army units emphasize establishing host-nation institutions that can provide sustainable economic growth. Once a civilian administration assumes control, the primary economic development role for Army units is to advise and assist those civilian officials.

Implement Public Works Projects

6-23. In the transformation phase, Army units implement public works projects. Their focus for creating public sector jobs shifts to initiating broader based public works projects. The latter projects have a larger scope and duration, such as building new infrastructure, recreational facilities, hospitals, libraries, community centers, and other facilities that help improve the health, education, and earning power of local residents.

Establish a Business Registry

6-24. In the transformation phase, Army units establish a business registry to register lawful business activity at the local or provincial level. To support community building, Army units develop a U.S-style chamber of commerce. These models or culturally modified equivalents enable establishing a business registry for lawful business.

Provide Start-Up Capital

6-25. In the transformation phase, Army units provide start-up capital for small businesses through small-enterprise grants. Army units use the commanders' emergency response program (CERP) and other Title 10 or 22, United States Code, funding sources to provide start-up capital for micro or small businesses. Often Army commanders have to balance the funding of start-up capital with funding for modernizing and expanding existing businesses. Like new businesses, existing businesses require capital, training, and additional resources. Existing businesses operating under sound business plans will more likely succeed and create jobs than start-up businesses.

Support Small Lending Institutions

6-26. In the transformation phase, Army units encourage the creation of small lending institutions. Army units support civilian agency efforts to facilitate the building and renovation of existing lending institution facilities and capitalize them using CERP or other dependable funding sources. The Support Monetary Institutions and Programs discussion in paragraphs 6-29 through 6-39 has more details.

Develop Financial Institutions

6-27. In the transformation phase, Army units enable the development of financial institutions. Civilian agencies start with creating an independent central bank. The Support Monetary Institutions and Programs discussion in paragraphs 6-29 through 6-39 has more details.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-28. Once the HN assumes complete responsibility for control of economic policies and institutions, Army units carefully avoid undermining the legitimacy of host-nation actors. However, as long as units remain in the HN, they continue to monitor the performance of host-nation economic officials and entrepreneurs, report on progress and problems, and engage with appropriate actors constructively. Effective Army units let host-nation officials work out their own solutions. Sometimes Army units selectively advise and assist with problems the HN seems unable to solve.

SUPPORT MONETARY INSTITUTIONS AND PROGRAMS

6-29. Economic growth requires stabilization of the economy. Empirical evidence shows that creating an environment conducive to higher rates of investment reduces the likelihood of violence. Economic growth positively correlates with job creation and higher living standards. In the end, government bonds are shown to be more stabilizing than grants or aid.

6-30. Macroeconomic stabilization is a condition in which monetary and fiscal policies are established to align the currency to market levels, manage inflation, and create transparent and accountable systems for public finance management. This condition requires an independent and operational central bank as well as a robust and enforceable legislative and regulatory framework. This framework governs property rights, domestic commerce, fiscal operations, foreign direct investment, central bank operations, international trade, and economic governance institutions.

6-31. Achieving sustainable macroeconomic stabilization requires civilian agencies from the USG and international institutions to establish foreign exchange facilities, develop a national budget, generate revenue, create a transparent system of public expenditure, and prevent predatory actors from controlling the HN's resources. Civilian agencies notify Army units of such efforts. Army units support the efforts when possible. Civilian agencies first stabilize the host-nation currency, which may require pegging the host-nation currency to another currency. This is a fragile arrangement. The stronger currencies reluctantly support the host-nation currency because it amplifies the perception of their own instability if other currencies are weakened when the strong currency loses ground in the global market and requires regular adjustments to currency values and levels. This pegging provides a higher degree of stability in the long term. Adjustments usually favor the host-nation currency when it does well, but protect it if it does not. While not a perfect solution, it is preferred to currency floating (especially for emerging economies). In a world of unlimited capital mobility, a partially floating currency lacks the stability of a peg and is insufficient to counteract market instability.

6-32. Army units transition through the three phases to support monetary institutions and programs (see table 6-3).

Table 6-3. Phases to support monetary institutions and programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Help assess central bank and Ministry of Finance • Help distribute currency • Help initiate essential bank operations	• Influence assessment	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support host-nation progress

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-33. Army units prepare to perform three tasks in the initial response phase.

Help Assess Central Bank and Ministry of Finance

6-34. In the initial response phase, Army units help assess the capabilities of the central bank and Ministry of Finance. Army units provide the coordination, transportation, and security needed. Personnel from organizations such as the Department of the Treasury, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund possess the training and expertise needed to establish or reform the central bank and fully assess the Ministry of Finance. The Department of the Treasury dispatches civilian experts along with or immediately after military forces to ensure adequate crisis management.

Help Distribute Currency

6-35. In the initial response phase, Army units help distribute currency to key banking outlets. Army units coordinate, transport, and secure key banking outlets in the HN. Units provide continual security to maintain order at the banking outlets over several consecutive days. Proper handling of financial affairs helps establish trust in the government and strengthen the currency. If banks exchange new currency for old

currency, then Army units ensure the banking personnel mark and physically alter old currency to avoid fraud or re-use by bank officials or other personnel. Such measures include dying or cutting the old currency. To mitigate stability threats at banks, Army units implement certain restrictions such as access to exchange sites by last name on certain days. The window for exchanging old notes lasts as long as possible, even though the HN needs to put the new currency into use as soon as possible. Some Army units use incentives to use the new currency, such as artificially inflated prices for using old currency. Finally, Army units verify and document that destruction of old currency occurred under secure conditions.

Help Initiate Essential Bank Operations

6-36. In the initial response phase, Army units help begin essential operations for the central bank. In the absence of any initial support from USG agencies, Army financial management personnel assist. They provide the expertise needed to initiate essential operations for the central bank, including controlling the emission of domestic currency, restoring the payments system, facilitating or serving as a market for foreign exchange, and supervising commercial banks.

TRANSFORMATION

6-37. During this phase other actors supervise monetary policy decisions made by the central bank, begin to institutionalize central bank and Ministry of Finance capacities and procedures, and modify monetary policies as needed to continue economic growth and maintain price, currency, and exchange rate stability. Local and regional assessments by Army units influence these measures. These assessments include findings that direct payments need to be made to the population, such as welfare, compensation, condolence payments, or pension benefits. Without making the population depend on aid or handouts, these payments allow people to continue their standard of living until they have sustainable employment or pension arrangements. This contributes to overall security, since most people support Army units and host-nation officials if they can provide for themselves. Conversely, some belligerent activity is financially driven. Some belligerents do not necessarily oppose stability efforts, but try to seek payment for insurgent activity because they have no other source of income.

6-38. If monetary aid programs provide most the finances, direct aid works best to address instability in former militarized autocracies with little institutional knowledge for generating jobs and business. As long as the HN administers financial aid according to a particular plan, with a predetermined achievable end state, this is not counterintuitive to earlier claims that foreign aid is not the way to address such issues.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-39. Army unit assessments continue help support relevant efforts undertaken primarily by other actors. The HN increasingly exerts autonomous control over this sector. For example, the Ministry of Finance accepts and disburses most foreign assistance.

SUPPORT NATIONAL TREASURY OPERATIONS

6-40. Army units transition through the three phases to support national treasury operations (see table 6-4).

Table 6-4. Phases to support national treasury operations

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Reestablish payment mechanisms • Establish capacity to process payments • Help assess revenue-generating activities • Identify sources of revenue • Facilitate audit functions	• Support broader efforts • Enable host nation and partners	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Support host-nation progress

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-41. Army units prepare to perform five tasks in the initial response phase.

Reestablish Payment Mechanisms

6-42. In the initial response phase, Army units reestablish government payment mechanisms to fulfill recurrent and emergency expenditures. However, generating funds to do this requires access to or control of host-nation assets and resources such as sale of natural resources. The HN has no International Monetary Fund to fund humanitarian grants, financial aid, or other funding sources. U.S. policy may not allow Army units to generate funds. If Army units generate funds, they manage them at the national level.

Establish Capacity to Process Payments

6-43. In the initial response phase, Army units establish simple and reliable capacity to process, record, and report payments. Army units support the efforts of civilian USG, international, and host-nation agencies to establish this capacity. Primarily, Army units verify that such measures exist and have transparency. Different host-nation echelons check on each other. For example, lower regions that have an incentive to identify discrepancies when potentially short-changed have access to provincial records.

Help Assess Revenue-Generating Activities

6-44. In the initial response phase, Army units facilitate assessment of revenue-generating activities for the national treasury. Army units can help assess these activities by deploying U.S. Treasury officials. Army financial management specialists assist civil affairs personnel to perform this function in the absence of U.S. Treasury officials.

Identify Sources of Revenue

6-45. In the initial response phase, Army units identify tax structure and sources of revenue. A tax base supports industry, sustains development, finances government operations, and links the people to their government. Sustainable growth occurs at a modest pace in agrarian and fragile societies because of the lower tax base. Army units help other partners identify the existing tax structure and determine the sources of revenue and their timeliness and general reliability.

Facilitate Audit Functions

6-46. In the initial response phase, Army units help establish basic audit functions to ensure officials use state and local government resources appropriately. Army units facilitate the transportation and security of U.S. Treasury officials. These officials help establish the basic audit functions needed to ensure that host-nation officials use state and local government resources appropriately. The host-nation treasury promotes predictability, transparency, and timeliness in paying civil servants and procuring goods and services. Improving budget management helps prevent belligerents from siphoning state funds for illegitimate purposes and promote spending consistent with the official budget.

TRANSFORMATION

6-47. Army units support broader efforts to institutionalize financial management and treasury payment and budget execution systems, strengthen government payment mechanisms, and develop host-nation capacity to manage grants and foreign assistance. Other potential steps include improving training and technology for financial reporting and management and developing an appropriate distribution system. While other partners undertake these actions, Army units know that they are taking place, facilitate them when possible, identify problems, and recommend priorities.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-48. Local and regional assessments by Army units continue to inform wider efforts related to host-nation treasury operations. In particular, Army units assess whether sufficient trained staff exists at the local and regional levels. Units support efforts to maintain transparency regarding host-nation revenues and expenditures.

SUPPORT PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROGRAMS

6-49. Army units transition through the three phases to support public sector investment programs (see table 6-5).

Table 6-5. Phases to support public sector investment programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Prioritize public investment needs • Plan resource allocation • Pay civil sector debts	• Create civil service reform commission	• Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-50. During their initial response, Army units perform three tasks.

Prioritize Public Investment Needs

6-51. In the initial response phase, Army units prioritize public investment needs. Army units collaborate with host-nation government, business, and civil society leaders, as well as participating U.S. and international partners. This collaboration enables units to identify and prioritize public investment needs, including public transportation and communications infrastructure, sanitation, mining and natural resource extraction, education, health care, and others. Partners leverage the existing socio-economic and infrastructure assessment and host-nation assets to identify and prioritize public investment needs.

Plan Resource Allocation

6-52. In the initial response phase, Army units develop plans to allocate available resources. Working in collaboration with the HN, other USG agencies, and international organizations, Army units support the development of budget plans that address the prioritized public investment needs identified earlier. As needed, these partners assist in the planning and execution of physically disbursing and securing these public funds. Additionally, they create mechanisms to monitor and report on corruption by government officials.

Pay Civil Sector Debts

6-53. In the initial response phase, Army units pay civil sector debts. As needed, units assist in physically disbursing and securing public funds used to pay civil sector debts. This assistance includes transporting currency, physically securing currency, and designing and managing the information technology systems that pay civil sector debts electronically. Units partner with USG, international, and host-nation partners in all phases of this operation, preparing to transition these tasks to their control.

TRANSFORMATION

6-54. Civilian agencies invest in critical projects neglected by the private sector. If not yet accomplished, Army units create a civil service reform commission.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-55. Army units form private-public partnerships when feasible and implement civil service reforms. The host-nation government implements mechanisms to monitor and report on corruption by government officials.

SUPPORT PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

6-56. Army units transition through the three phases to support private sector development (see table 6-6).

Table 6-6. Phases to support private sector development

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess private sector and enterprise creation • Identify obstacles to private sector development	• Enable market access • Strengthen sector with outsourcing • Provide protection and incentives • Enable legitimate financial activity	• Help establish a business environment

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-57. Army units prepare to perform two tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Private Sector and Enterprise Creation

6-58. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the depth of the private sector and enterprise creation. Army units and their civilian partners assess the private sector's ability to rebound from this crisis period. This assessment covers the industries, production, profits, trade, labor markets, debt, and links of foreign entities to the private sector. It determines if pre-crisis levels of production are feasible, the requirements to rebuild the market, and the possibility of bringing new investments to the HN.

Identify Obstacles to Private Sector Development

6-59. In the initial response phase, Army units identify obstacles to private sector development. These obstacles include barriers to entry, high export and import taxes, export and import restrictions, lack of business credit, lack of power, telecommunications, transport, nonrepatriation of profits, lack of international trust in the host-nation currency, or inflation. The HN's main export products may not have an overseas market or may lack sustainability potential for a large portion of the HN's gross domestic product and employment. Successful sector development generates markets based upon other products.

TRANSFORMATION

6-60. Army units transition through four transformation tasks to support private sector development.

Enable Market Access

6-61. In the transformation phase, Army units enable market access. Army units provide or enable security for markets and internal trade routes in the HN. As these ventures become profitable, they become vulnerable to belligerents (including corrupt officials and members of security forces) who rely on extortion or other criminal acts. Often insurgents and terrorists attempt to obtain their finances from unsecured markets and trade routes.

Strengthen Sector with Outsourcing

6-62. In the transformation phase, Army units strengthen the private sector through contracting and outsourcing. Army units outsource selected force~~s~~ support requirements with local businesses. However, Army units contract support requirements carefully, especially mission critical support requirements. Units complete a risk assessment to determine the risk of using local contract support capabilities compared to the potential positive impact on the local community. For example, local businesses may be incapable of providing the required support reliably, and local contracting may create security risks. Operational contract support-related risk assessments include an analysis of possible negative impacts related to the local national approach to outsourcing. For example, contracting for a specific service or commodity in the local area may inadvertently drive up the cost of these items or services and have a significant detrimental effect on the local economy. Finally, units accomplish all contracting actions according to Federal Acquisition Regulations, which precludes or complicates the desire to use local commercial sources.

6-63. Army units encourage host-nation contracting that imports necessary items such as foodstuffs or small business equipment to support the establishment of necessary businesses such as automotive and farm equipment repair. Army units guide implementation of government-regulated standards for training of

employees and operation. Once government regulation and official channels of supply exist, Army units cap prices to keep prices artificially low (under black market prices). Under the oversight of Army personnel and their partners, Army units develop sectors with the commander's intent to provide products and services preferred by the public and draw nonlegitimate workers to the government-regulated program. Army units and their civilian partners help establish host-nation acquisition channels so this system remains self-sustaining after U.S. personnel depart. Depending upon policies established by higher authorities, before Army units leave, they transfer equipment to the HN rather than pay to ship the items elsewhere.

Provide Protection and Incentives

6-64. In the transformation phase, Army units provide investors with protection and incentives. Army units collaborate with host-nation, U.S., and international actors to protect and incentivize both international and host-nation investors. U.S. forces reduce the risks to international investors by providing them physical protection while visiting the HN. Those same forces also secure means for transferring their investment funds to the intended host-nation private enterprises. Host-nation investors have access to secure means for transferring investment funds. Army units motivate host-nation and international investors by offering them investment-related tax deductions and participation in public or private partnerships. Investors seek assurances that they may obtain a long-term renewable exchange of goods. Investors want to make it worth their while to come to the HN, either for extended access to discounted commodities or a new market for their own products or services.

Enable Legitimate Financial Activity

6-65. In the transformation phase, Army units facilitate access to credit for legitimate banking and financial activity. Army units help provide physical security for the banking and financial facilities, secure routes to those facilities, and secure electronic access to the banking and financial services. As needed, Army units provide transportation and security to help deliver currency to those facilities. Additionally, units assist with training and equipping host-nation forces and firms eventually providing these services.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-66. While primarily the responsibility of other partners, Army units help establish a business environment for long-term growth. This may include promoting business growth through regulatory streamlining and sound macroeconomic policy, including tax and government spending policy. Partners facilitate the development of business associations, small business incubators, think tanks, and other entities to create a diversified economy.

PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT

6-67. Army units transition through the three phases to protect natural resources and environment (see table 6-7).

Table 6-7. Phases to protect natural resources and environment

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess vital natural resources • Secure vital natural resources	• Assess economic-based threats • Prevent the illicit revenues	• Help manage resources

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-68. Army units prepare to perform two tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Vital Natural Resources

6-69. In the initial response phase, Army units with host-nation, U.S., and international partners assess locations and amounts of vital natural resources. Vital natural resources include oil, gas, strategic minerals, diamonds, timber, and others. Units watch for indications that an illicit economy regarding natural resources may develop. Army units maintain natural resources as a part of—not the foundation of—a stable

and viable economy. Otherwise, development will be susceptible to variables such as fluctuating market prices, obsolescence through new technology, or resource depletion.

Secure Vital Natural Resources

6-70. In the initial response phase, Army units secure vital natural resources. Units collaborate with host-nation, U.S., and international actors to assess and secure access to vital natural resources, including existing host-nation extraction facility locations and capacities. Units provide physical security to extraction facilities and trade routes used to bring these resources to market. Units coordinate with financial institutions and government departments to control the rate of consumption for both renewable and nonrenewable resources. Artificial control, such as increasing taxes on the products, gives incentives to maximize utility or productivity and not squander them. Though it will not guarantee unlimited access or supply of the resources, efforts to maximize productivity and efficiency enable long-term resource sustainability.

TRANSFORMATION

6-71. During transformation, Army units perform two tasks.

Assess Economic-Based Threats

6-72. In the transformation phase, Army units assess the illicit economy and economic-based threats to stability. Army units assess the illegal trafficking, smuggling, extortion, and hijacking of state and private enterprises in their areas of operations. Additionally, they identify the finance networks of insurgent groups, transnational organized crime, terrorist organizations, and public sector corruption.

Prevent the Illicit Revenues

6-73. In the transformation phase, Army units prevent the illicit generation of revenues from natural resources. Army units collaborate with host-nation, U.S., and international actors to prevent the illicit generation of revenues from natural resources including minerals, energy, agriculture, animal habitats, forestry, or water. This may require securing access to the natural resources, resolving resource ownership issues, preventing the capture of the proceeds from the sale of natural resources, and interdicting the illegal transportation and sale of these resources.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-74. The HN, with the help of external actors, develops mechanisms to manage natural resources and the environment. Additionally, it creates an integrated, nationwide customs administration capable of minimizing corruption, protecting the rights of importers and foreign exporters, collecting the expected revenue from customs duties, and encouraging (through greater efficiency) the routing of trade through legal rather than illicit channels.

SUPPORT AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

6-75. A nation's agriculture sector serves as the foundation of food security, defined as including both physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs. Beyond supporting food security, a viable market economy relies on an integrated agricultural development with links through all levels of a nation's economy, thus providing crops, livestock, and other agricultural products vital to local markets and international trade. However, insecure land tenure, diseases and pests, difficulty accessing nearby markets, irrigation infrastructure, minefields, or unexploded ordnance hinder agricultural sector development. Outside development agencies prioritize and integrate projects with related tasks in other stability sectors to establish and institutionalize practical solutions to the long-term growth of the agricultural sector. While the military's contribution to agricultural development combines efforts, Amy units remember that farmers have a conservative attitude toward change when planning agricultural projects. Despite assuming multiple risks without the ability to influence them (such as weather, insects, and markets), farmers resist changes to

their tried and true farming practices—seed source, fertilizer, irrigation, crop choice. Consequently, Army units introduce change incrementally to have any chance of adoption.

6-76. The use of humanitarian assistance precedes agricultural development until the HN can achieve self-sustaining production. However, humanitarian assistance often includes food aid that has the potential to distort agricultural markets by driving down the price of local goods, discourage local production, and conflict with efforts to stimulate private sector development and agricultural employment. Given the proper incentives, agricultural production recovery and market development moves communities from relief dependency to independent livelihood security. Therefore, Army units reduce, as soon as practicable, the use of imported relief foods to allow use of locally produced relief supplies. This use mitigates the disincentives while providing an economic stimulus to the agricultural economy. However, Army personnel assess the availability of local food to minimize nutritional impacts and distortion of local market prices. Local purchasing of relief supplies rewards local farmers producing food because the farmers ask more for their product from outsiders than they ask from their neighbors. This pricing is not necessarily a bad thing since this extra money acts as further stimulus to the local economy when the farmers spend it.

6-77. Army units transition through the three phases to support agricultural development programs (see table 6-8).

Table 6-8. Phases to support agricultural development programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess agriculture sector • Secure facilities • Rebuild irrigation • Establish work programs	• Protect water sources • Identify constraints • Assess animals • Channel food aid • Establish networks • Encourage enterprise creation • Ensure access to markets	• Monitor and report • Support partners

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-78. Agricultural development entails a progressive transition from humanitarian assistance to self-sustaining production. Food aid potentially distorts agricultural markets by driving down the price of local goods, discouraging local production, and conflicting with efforts to stimulate private sector development and agricultural employment. Agricultural production recovery and market development moves communities rapidly from relief dependency to independent livelihood security. As soon as practical, Army units reduce imports of donor food and other relief supplies that local suppliers can produce. Army units prepare to perform four tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Agricultural Sector

6-79. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the state of the agricultural sector. During the initial response, Army units help the HN stabilize basic services central to the agricultural sector. Army units and their host-nation partners complete and evaluate an agricultural inventory and food security analysis to adequately understand the agricultural landscape prior to planning and committing support. The United Nations' World Food Programme (WFP) Web site has technical publications describing additional techniques for food security vulnerability analysis and mapping, including technical guidance sheet number 12, *Emergency Food Security Assessments*. Coordination with the American Embassy Country Team, the host-nation Ministry of Agriculture, and NGOs serving in the region ensures unity of effort and access to other information regarding the state of host-nation agricultural infrastructure. However, in the final analysis, the host-nation farmers, agribusinesses, consumers, and local officials supply the information for an inventory and evaluation of agricultural capabilities. Army units complete the evaluation to ensure that the focus and level of support they provide is sustainable and meets the needs of the local populace.

6-80. Inventory of the agricultural sector involves interviewing local market merchants, farmers (poor and wealthy), village elders, local leaders, and consumers. Typically, an inventory has five steps. First, Army forces make an initial visit to the local market. They assess the price and availability of food items, their

nutritional content and contribution to the daily diet, and other matters. Next, Army units collect data about seasonal changes in food supply and food availability from merchants. Third, units interview a cross section of consumers to identify at-risk populations. Next, Army units interview large and small farmers, farm workers, elders, local leaders and farm association leaders. Army personnel gather data about the area's primary agricultural issues, agricultural practices, farm mechanization issues, socio-economic issues, and supply chain and marketing issues (for both inputs and outputs). Army personnel also determine the extent of subsistence laboring and farming, including the methods of payment for labor such as quantity of food for a day's work. Lastly, Army personnel evaluate the level of agricultural production sophistication for the average farmer. Local farmers and elders inform Army personnel about traditional and current allocation of water resources, irrigation usage, status of irrigation systems, and maintenance arrangements for existing irrigation structures. Interviews identify traditional and current seed sources and supply; fertilization techniques, sources, and supply; harvesting techniques; storage facilities; and post-harvest processing plants, if any. A successful inventory identifies the farmers' physical access, including transportation networks, to markets. Markets are the key to an agricultural economy. Farmers use markets to sell or exchange their products and buy the inputs including seed, animal feed, and fertilizers they need to produce their crops.

6-81. Following local level inquiries, Army units inventory and evaluate existing host-nation capabilities upward through regional and national agricultural government representatives, including ministry and extension, agribusiness, and education/research interests. This is vital to ensure mission success and can assist in determining the potential impact of civil-military support operations on the host-nation economy. Army units include host-nation agricultural requirements in the infrastructure assessment. The more sophisticated the agriculture production system, the closer units study the infrastructure restoration requirements. Multiple teams from U.S. military and governmental agencies and multinational partners help assess and evaluate the host-nation agricultural infrastructure. These teams include civil affairs teams, agricultural development teams, provincial reconstruction teams, humanitarian assistance survey teams, and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) disaster assistance response teams. Army units also coordinate with the WFP for a crop and food security assessment mission. Coordination with other partners and NGOs ensures access to all resources available in support of the HN and prevents possible duplication of efforts. Army veterinary services personnel sometimes help determine the status of the host-nation agricultural production system.

Secure Facilities

6-82. In the initial response phase, Army units secure and protect postharvest storage facilities. Army units assist host-nation farmers and local officials to provide security or security expertise for securing and protecting postharvest storage facilities. In addition to the physical security and protection of postharvest storage facilities, Army units provide veterinary support to inspect storage sites to ensure wholesomeness, safety, and quality assurance of the host-nation food supply.

Rebuild Irrigation

6-83. In the initial response phase, Army units rebuild small-scale irrigation systems. Army units also support host-nation farmers and officials in repairing other small-scale infrastructure such as storage facilities, which could also improve agricultural production. However, units first reestablish and invigorate the traditional social infrastructure such as a water association to maintain these systems. Additionally, units use some CERP funds to help finance these low-level agricultural infrastructure projects. U.S. forces assist host-nation farmers and local officials to reestablish social infrastructure such as water associations, input cooperatives, and other institutions that provide local farm inputs. Army units provide security or security expertise for securing and protecting water resources.

Establish Work Programs

6-84. In the initial response phase, Army units establish work programs to support agricultural development. In rural areas unemployment and underemployment can be chronic. A significant amount of family income comes from casual labor or day labor. In a crisis, this employment often disappears. Work programs mitigate the impact of reduced demand for casual labor. Effective work programs and agricultural

development projects are coordinated with host-nation authorities and the Ministry of Agriculture to evaluate the potential economic impact of U.S. military support provided. Host-nation involvement helps ensure that the HN can sustain the programs and apply or distribute the aid equitably. Coordination with and involvement of host-nation officials when developing such programs and projects also helps build support for the central government, build aid in stabilization efforts, and foster self reliance. Army units facilitate the establishment of work programs that support agricultural development. Subsistence workers need daily labor since it provides them access to food, especially when paid in the traditional manner. Workers receive payment in cash, food, or a combination of both. Army units developing a work program use local wage rates to avoid disruption markets. When authorized, Army veterinary services personnel organic to civil affairs units and veterinary detachments support host-nation agricultural stabilization efforts.

6-85. When tasked, Army units provide engineering, veterinary services, transportation, and other capabilities to assist in agricultural development. They help other partners ensure that farmers have the minor necessities (equipment, spare parts, seed, fertilizer, pesticides) required for production. However, no military occupational specialty or area of concentration exists among the Services for horticulture or crop-related farming. Therefore, units rely heavily on the U.S. industrial base, other government agencies, multinational partners, and NGOs to provide consultation services and expertise in these areas.

6-86. While external expertise may be available and relevant to host-nation needs, the farmer can absorb only a limited amount of assistance. Successful Army units concentrate on providing basic needs that are both effective and cost efficient. They remember that outsiders cannot teach or do everything.

TRANSFORMATION

6-87. Army units perform seven tasks to support agricultural development programs during transformation.

Protect Water Sources

6-88. In the transformation phase, Army units protect water sources. Army units initially provide security for key water sources and then train and equip host-nation personnel to provide this security. Army preventive medicine personnel sometimes provide field screening and analyze water sources as well as technical assistance and training support for the HN.

Identify Constraints

6-89. In the transformation phase, Army units identify constraints to agricultural production. As part of the initial assessment, Army units provide economic information describing constraints. Examples include availability of water, ability to repair equipment, access to veterinarians (for beasts of burden or food source animals), limited post-harvest storage capacity, inadequate transportation, and the ability to reliably purchase seeds or other necessities.

Assess Animals

6-90. In the transformation phase, Army units and veterinarians assess health, diversity, and numbers of animals. Army units can get information regarding the state of agriculture and livestock in the region through the American Embassy Country Team or HN Ministry of Agriculture. Other USG agencies such as the Department of Agriculture also help assess the condition of the host-nation agricultural sector. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance provides teams to conduct situation or disaster assessments and needs assessments. These assessments enable Army units to determine the type and amount of relief needed during the initial response phase of a disaster. See the USAID's *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response* for additional information.

Channel Food Aid

6-91. In the transformation phase, Army units channel food aid to promote market activity. In responding to humanitarian emergencies, governments and relief organizations flood supplies of food into the country. Unless properly managed, this drives down local food prices by decreasing demand for locally produced

food. Food donor assessments identify the potential effects of food relief operations to ensure that food aid does not adversely impact domestic agriculture or marketing. Army units also identify as soon as possible if belligerents use food as a weapon such as withholding food from a population to subjugate them.

Establish Networks

6-92. In the transformation phase, Army units establish transportation and distribution networks. After helping with various infrastructure rebuilding projects in the initial phases, Army units continue to assist host-nation and USG agencies in planning and executing the rebuilding and upgrading of transportation and distribution networks necessary for the health and growth of the agricultural sector. Rebuilding enables farmers to access markets and improved small-access roads and bridges. A broad national plan does not always address these improvements, but initiatives by Army units can significantly impact their areas of operations.

Encourage Enterprise Creation

6-93. In the transformation phase, Army units encourage host-nation enterprise creation to provide goods and services to the agricultural sector. When directed, U.S. Army veterinary personnel provide technical assistance to the HN by developing alternate forms of agriculture and livestock production. This assistance includes establishing herd health and animal husbandry programs to produce income and encourage economic growth. Veterinary personnel also provide support for examining host-nation farm animals, immunizing livestock, and providing technical assistance or consultative services.

Ensure Access to Markets

6-94. In the transformation phase, Army units ensure open transit and access to local markets. Agricultural development programs will fail if farmers cannot transport their harvested crops to local markets. In some cases, the transportation infrastructure does not exist to support a viable agricultural sector, or natural disaster or conflict damaged the infrastructure. In other cases, routes exist but lack security due to criminality, disorder, looting, or insurgency. Insurgent forces often attempt to acquire agricultural products to sustain themselves. Belligerents often disrupt agricultural transit and access to markets deliberately to subvert governmental control. Army units address these threats to agricultural transit and access through security, management, and restoration of transportation infrastructure.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-95. In this phase, Army units monitor agricultural conditions, support other actors as necessary, and ensure that overall security can sustain agricultural industries.

RESTORE TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE

6-96. Army units transition through the three phases to restore transportation infrastructure (see table 6-9).

Table 6-9. Phases to restore transportation infrastructure

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess transportation infrastructure • Prioritize programs and projects • Repair or build facilities	• Help develop transportation plans • Begin transferring responsibility	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-97. Army units prepare to perform three tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Transportation Infrastructure

6-98. In the initial response phase, U.S. security forces assess overall condition of national transportation infrastructure—airports, roads, bridges, railways, and coastal and inland ports, harbors, waterways—

including facilities and equipment. For each infrastructure, security forces assess its management organization and facilities, maintenance, and security. Each transportation infrastructure has different susceptibilities to a disaster or conflict. Army units assess the infrastructure in terms of status, capacity, future requirements, and potential shortfalls, given damage from conflict, natural disaster, or neglect.

6-99. When a host-nation government exists, Army units assess copies of any records, maps, drawings, blueprints, or schematics detailing the transportation networks. Sources include former colonial powers, allies, or corporations. Army units validate this documentation with reconnaissance and imagery.

6-100. Army units assess the interrelationships of the different modes of transportation, such as the road or rail network leading to a port or airport. Army staffs assess how well the critical road transportation components—chokepoints, hazardous materials, routes, key bridges, and so on—interrelate. Additionally, they assess the weight and volume of traffic the infrastructure can withstand. Some transportation infrastructure share rights-of-ways shared with other infrastructures such as between road and rail or between roads and communications lines.

6-101. Assessment of the infrastructure includes assessing its vulnerabilities. This assessment focuses on critical infrastructure supporting the functioning of the host-nation government, services, and economy. An vulnerability assessment includes infrastructures with history of disruption. Army staffs identify potential points of failure that, if disrupted, could negatively impact the community. Army units assess the impact of adverse seasonal conditions, such as monsoons, drought, and sandstorms, especially on unimproved roads and highways. Enemies target infrastructure and transportation, such as hundreds of miles of railways or a water table that feeds the local water supply. Army units assess the susceptibility level of the road transportation network to sabotage. Army units support the local authorities' capability to detect, report, and respond to explosive threats.

6-102. After assessing the status and capacity of the host-nation transportation infrastructure, Army staffs estimate the current and long-term transportation requirements. These staffs identify the current volume based on civil displacement, emergency relief, ongoing security operations, or compensation for disruption to certain portions of the system.

6-103. Army units assess the management organizations and infrastructure to manage, maintain, and secure the transportation infrastructure. Army units assess what organizations and providers maintain the various modes of transportation networks. Maintenance includes both routine and corrective maintenance. Host-nation maintenance organizations conduct routine preventive maintenance and road inspections to ensure that the network remains in a reliable and safe condition to preclude operational failure, resulting from natural degradation. Security of road networks includes not only protection of transportation against belligerents as well as traffic control, particularly the enforcement of traffic laws.

6-104. After assessing the status of existing transportation infrastructure, Army units compare these capacities and vulnerabilities against current and projected future requirements to identify gaps in transportation capacity.

Prioritize Programs and Projects

6-105. In the initial response phase, Army units determine and prioritize essential transportation infrastructure programs and projects. In some cases, isolated locations with at-risk populations may drive infrastructure development priorities. In other cases, supporting the reestablishment of economic activity may drive prioritization of projects.

6-106. In prioritizing infrastructure investments, all investment projects make up a larger reform package that supports the national strategic approach to development. require that all investment decisions be made with this broader context in mind. When prioritizing investments, Army units consider limited resources and social, economic, and political factors integral to the conflict. Units sequence investments logically. Reconstructing ports, for example, comes after repairing transportation systems leading to those ports.

6-107. Geographic, demographic, and economic factors drive different priorities between the various forms of transportation. For example, roads and waterways link rural economies to urban markets. A major constraint to building effective governance was traditional hostility toward central government rulers by

populations in outlying areas. Army units expand the influence of centralized government and integrate national economic activity by having better roads.

6-108. Transportation priorities shift over time. In the initial response phase, the host-nation and Army units prioritize road construction to aid isolated regions. Factors such as cost, lead time, and delivery time are critically important when forming recommendations on undertaking transportation reconstruction activities. Repairing roads and bridges take priority when damage by disasters limits access. As stability and host-nation capacity improve, however, priority shifts to seaports or rail to harness natural resources, promote industrial growth, and foster economic development.

6-109. Additionally, Army units help strengthen institutions responsible for managing and maintaining established infrastructure. These institutions include those that manage electricity companies, the road networks, the rail system, and ports. Army units building institutional capacity by training staff and establishing mechanisms for corporate governance, management, and basic administration capabilities.

6-110. In developing infrastructure development priorities, Army units refrain from simply reconstructing destroyed transportation infrastructure. Careful assessments identify services that actually enhance economic growth. The equitable distribution of goods and services guide long-term structural changes.

Repair or Build Facilities

6-111. In the initial response phase, Army units conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to facilitate commercial trade. While transportation priorities shift, the HN still helps commercial trade to stimulate economic activities. This stimulation generates tax revenues, leading to development in other sectors. Army units help local governments identify the best repairs to foster the re-establishment of commercial trade. As these expedient repairs occur, Army units identity and recommend long-term development projects to expand commercial trade, open new markets, or connect previously disparate markets. In determining transportation networks to support commercial trade, Army units determine the types of commercial trade to reestablish or establish, then determine and prioritize transportation projects to support that trade.

TRANSFORMATION

6-112. During the transformation phase, Army units support civilian agencies advising the host-nation government on developing national and regional transportation plans. These units develop partnerships with local organizations to meet community needs and increase local capacity to develop and maintain transportation critical infrastructure. Army units support the development of aviation, port, waterway, road, and railway transportation plans.

6-113. Once Army units address major priorities during the initial response phase, serious transition planning begins for eventual transfer of authority. Army units face one major challenge of this phase: to accommodate requirements with limited resources. Regardless, units set priorities and sequences of activities that will last through a transition period and for the long-term reconstruction effort beyond. They base priorities on resources they expect to have. For the infrastructure reconstruction effort, units must establish the appropriate regulatory and management infrastructure for the host-nation governance process during this period.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-114. When fostering sustainability, Army units develop a sustainable national transportation system linking key nodal infrastructure that they transfer to the HN. They continue to implement and monitor transportation programs and projects for sustainable airport, road, highway, bridge, and tunnel operations. These units also continue to monitor and report programs for sustainable intra and intercity railway and terminal operations, as well as port and waterway operations.

6-115. All the requirements necessary to achieve an effective transfer of authority makes up the priority for this phase. Infrastructure reconstruction projects take long periods to complete. New regulatory and management structures also take a long time to create, test, refine, and institutionalize.

RESTORE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE

6-116. Army units transition through the three phases to restore telecommunications infrastructure (see table 6-10).

Table 6-10. Phases to restore telecommunications infrastructure

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess telecommunications infrastructure • Prioritize telecommunications programs and projects	• Advise host nation	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-117. Army units prepare to perform three tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Telecommunications Infrastructure

6-118. In the initial response phase, Army units assess the overall condition of the national telecommunications infrastructure. This assessment includes normal, historic forms of communications as well as modern ones. Sometimes, Army units assess a damaged or degraded sophisticated telecommunications network. Other times, they assess a less robust network in terms of redundant infrastructure and alternative forms of communications. Some HNs developed contingency plans to handle a loss of communications. Other HNs never had modern forms of communications. Low literacy rates or diverse languages and dialects between different groups of people limit the forms of communication available to a HN and its citizens. One Army unit can reach remote areas by sending news broadcasts via unencrypted military radio channels to another Army unit in that location so that host-nation personnel can listen.

Prioritize Telecommunications Programs and Projects

6-119. In the initial response phase, Army units determine and prioritize essential telecommunications infrastructure programs and projects. Security requirements, such as the ability of a HN to communicate with its security forces, often drive such programs. Humanitarian relief operations often require reestablished telecommunications or temporary, expedient communications as an interim measure. Army units consider all uses of the electromagnetic spectrum and actively manage those demands to avoid degrading communications. Army units restart or install cellular networks.

6-120. Army units recognize the interdependence of telecommunications infrastructure and other sectors. Telecommunications require electricity. Units string phone lines with power lines to prevent redundancy. Particularly where power lines do not exist, construction of cellular towers are more effective.

TRANSFORMATION

6-121. During transformation, Army units advise the HN on identifying and prioritizing long-term telecommunications programs and projects. These projects sometimes involve rebuilding previously existing infrastructure. Just as with transportation infrastructure, the HN's historic telecommunications infrastructure may have given support to a single ethnic group.

6-122. Army units vet supporting government agencies required to regulate telecommunications infrastructure, as well as maintenance providers and organizations. To avoid disruption or use by potential insurgent or criminal organizations, Army units carefully secure telecommunications infrastructure and projects.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-123. In fostering sustainability, Army units continue to monitor and support ongoing programs and projects that reestablish or build telecommunications infrastructure. They focus on developing the HN's

capacity to inspect, repair, and maintain its own infrastructure, regulate its use, and identify its own future requirements and programs.

SUPPORT GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

6-124. General infrastructure reconstruction programs include the production and distribution of fossil fuels, electrical power, engineering, and construction, and the provision of municipal and other services. These projects usually extend beyond the expertise of most Army units and are implemented by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USAID, the host-nation government, or large corporations. Army units help prioritize projects, ensure the requisite security, and provide limited oversight that identifies corruption and inefficiencies.

6-125. Army units transition through the three phases to support general infrastructure reconstruction programs (see table 6-11).

Table 6-11. Phases to support general infrastructure reconstruction programs

Initial response	*Transformation*	*Fostering sustainability*
• Assess energy infrastructure • Prioritize programs and projects • Assess power facilities • Assess natural resources facilities • Assess existing facilities • Assess local facilities • Repair or build facilities	• Support host-nation development	• Transfer responsibility to host nation • Help secure host nation • Monitor and report

INITIAL RESPONSE

6-126. During the initial response phase, Army units often encounter a lack of functional infrastructure and a shortage of available partners to restore it. Units often have limited ability to make immediate improvements, but they create situational awareness and, as additional partners appear, assist with their orientation and circulation. Army units prepare to perform seven tasks in the initial response phase.

Assess Energy Infrastructure

6-127. In the initial response phase, Army units assess overall condition of national energy infrastructure. Particularly after a conflict or disaster, units find nonfunctioning infrastructure. This failed infrastructure occurs because of damage, looting, broken components, or because key staff abandoned their positions. As part of their initial assessments, units inventory major infrastructure components, identify problems, and when feasible determine recommended solutions. Units often rely upon the expertise of others to make accurate assessments. These include engineers, host-nation officials, civil affairs units, foreign area officers, NGOs, or provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), field advance civilian teams (FACTs), or disaster assistance response teams (DARTs).

6-128. Energy infrastructure includes facilities to extract, process, and distribute fuel. These facilities include oil wells, coal mines, pipelines, pumping stations, refineries, and storage tanks. Infrastructure also includes hydroelectric facilities such as dams and turbines. Additionally, energy infrastructure includes the facilities to generate and distribute power to consumers.

Prioritize Programs and Projects

6-129. In the initial response phase, Army units determine and prioritize essential infrastructure programs and projects. Units prioritize programs and projects to undertake. The level of effort required, expected duration, cost, available funding, and benefit provided affect priorities. The extent to which the project helps resolve the conflict or contribute to other objectives, such as generating employment, also affects priorities. Army units consult host-nation leaders and other partners regarding such prioritization.

Assess Power Facilities

6-130. In the initial response phase, Army units assess conditions of existing power generation and distribution facilities. These facilities include power plants, transformer stations, transmission lines, and substations. These components form the power grid or network that services consumers. Grids cover national, regional, or local areas and have capacity limitations. Sometimes "upstream" consumers siphon off power to the detriment of those "downstream." Unauthorized poachers who tie into the network exacerbate the problem. Some networks are extremely localized. For example, some areas rely heavily on generators to provide power to specific facilities or villages.

6-131. When conducting assessments, units identify problematic conditions, such as incomplete projects, destroyed or dilapidated facilities, broken or missing components, a lack of skilled operators, and intermittent service. When power generation and distribution does occur, it often is hampered by over-consumption, instability with power spikes and lapses, and unsafe conditions. Networks, particularly those to which independent consumers make their own connections, are haphazard and dangerous. Additionally, corruption impairs the effective administration of the power industry.

Assess Natural Resources Facilities

6-132. In the initial response phase, Army units assess conditions of existing natural resources conversion and distribution facilities. These facilities comprise the network required to obtain, transport, and convert fuel or other natural resources into electrical power at power plants. Energy sources include coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear, wind, and solar, geothermal, or hydro-electric power. U.S. forces extract natural resources from the HN's territory or import it from other countries. Related facilities include mines, wells, ports, pipelines, transportation networks, and storage facilities. A shortage of required resources at the destination points causes various problems, including nodal throughput capacity, corruption, or inefficiency.

Assess Existing Facilities

6-133. In the initial response phase, Army units assess conditions of existing facilities integral to effectively execute essential tasks in other sectors. When assessing a particular sector, units note that sector's relationship with other infrastructural areas. For example, effective communications facilities depend on reliable power generation and distribution. Power generation in turn relies on a transportation network that can deliver sufficient quantities of fuel to consumption points. Units need a holistic and integrated appreciation of the different sectors. A broad understanding of the problems often helps in identifying possible solutions that would be difficult to achieve with a narrow perspective. In many cases, infrastructural sectors depend on the security of the surrounding environment.

Assess Local Facilities

6-134. In the initial response phase, Army units assess conditions of existing local, municipal facilities that provide essential services. Units conduct an early assessment of service-related facilities in their respective areas. These facilities provide essential services regarding sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations (known as SWEAT-MSO). Most partners naturally focus on facilities that have direct impact (such as schools, clinics, and water sources). Army units consider ancillary facilities such as office buildings, storage locations, and maintenance yards as well.

Repair or Build Facilities

6-135. In the initial response phase, Army units conduct expedient repairs or build new facilities to support local populace. Based on their assessments, units repair some facilities quickly or relocate services to other structures. Expedient measures include providing power, restoring structural integrity, providing heat, lighting, and plumbing, or installing doors and windows. troop labor, engineer units, or host-nation labor accomplish these actions. Prioritized facilities likely include schools, medical clinics, municipal buildings, water, and sewage facilities.

TRANSFORMATION

6-136. In this phase, other relevant actors assume a more prominent role in restoring general infrastructure. These include international and host-nation corporations, PRTs, FACTs, DARTs, relief and development agencies, and host-nation governmental organizations. Army units support their efforts by providing general security, ensuring that sufficient local security at project locations, and exchanging information with these actors. With their ability to have situational awareness over large areas, Army units help orient these actors, assist them in determining priorities, and assist in monitoring project status.

FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY

6-137. During this phase, the HN assumes responsibility and authority for maintaining and improving general infrastructure. Army units contribute primarily by assisting host-nation security forces in providing requisite levels of security. Additionally, Army units monitor developments, identify problems, and inform relevant partners as well as their own chain of command. Although formally limited in their authority and responsibility during this phase, Army commanders provide sound reports and advice to appropriate decisionmakers.

Appendix A

Sustainment Considerations During Stability

CONSIDERATIONS FOR SUSTAINMENT

A-1. The ability to support both Army units and the host nation (HN) with sustainment significantly contributes to conducting stability. U.S. forces weigh and measure the use of the nation's military power to ensure that desired effects correspond with associated costs. These costs are measured in direct and indirect costs. U.S. forces weigh these costs against the efforts of interagencies, intergovernmental agencies, and nongovernmental organizations working to positively assist the HN.

A-2. Supporting their own units as well as the local populace challenges sustainment personnel. Understanding the other partners within the area of operations helps alleviate the stress on Army assets while supporting the other partners. Sustainers operate across the range of military operations. Many elements of sustainment support found in FM 3-24 apply to stability efforts. U.S. Soldiers proactively attempt to relieve human suffering. Sustainers understand and balance the legal and financial implications of their support with available resources from partners better prepared to address the needs of civil society.

A-3. Army units request special military capabilities to assist the HN or other partners, such as maintenance, allied trades, recovery, medical, transportation, and financial management support. Normally, U.S. forces only use Army assets as a last resort and for short duration. U.S. forces closely manage and safeguard cooperation and coordination with supporting partners for legal and financial reasons, as well as, local capacity development.

LOGISTIC PARTNERSHIPS

A-4. Developing partnerships expands and extends the logistic capacity and expedites the transition of support back to the HN. The responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government or designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations. U.S. forces facilitate achieving unity of purpose among all organizations involved in supporting stability. Once achieved, organizations move towards achieving unity of effort. Some civilian organizations avoid collaborating. Cooperation with humanitarian organizations depends on the circumstances. For example, a relief operation for a natural disaster elicits more cooperation than for an armed conflict. Relief for an armed conflict requires coordination with Army units that links to the HN that other organizations oppose. This coordination jeopardizes the neutrality of the humanitarian organization. Most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) cannot risk associating with government representatives, in particular, military organizations. This association places their organization at risk because NGOs follow humanitarian principles such as impartiality, independence, humanitarianism, and neutrality.

A-5. Strategic-level logistic organizations recognize, understand, and have solutions for the challenges of sharing resources such as transportation and supplies. When commanders contact representatives of these organizations, they nurture positive relationships.

A-6. Many coordination and cooperation forums, such as the All Partners Access Network, have Web sites online. These forums enable international organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and NGOs to share information and develop a network of cooperation to acquire and deliver aid. Shared information provides the commander with situation awareness and allows for using military assets in areas inaccessible to international organizations, IGOs, or NGOs. Other useful forums include various Humanitarian Information Centres, Map Action, Civil-Military Fusion Center, and Stability Operations Lessons Learned and Information Management System.

A-7. Developing a synergetic effect in logistic support relies on Army and civilian logisticians sharing information and cooperating to deliver those logistic assets. Information sharing of relevant and reliable data provide civilian and military organizations the ability to assess, plan and manage limited resources in

support of the stability operations effort. Relevant and reliable data consist of data properly collected, analyzed, and disseminated to the community of interest.

A-8. Partnership with the host-nation government is also essential. The HN remains the authority of ongoing operations in the nation. Supporting host-nation priorities is a must. Coordination and cooperation with the host-nation military provides additional capabilities and assets in support of the operation.

OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT

A-9. Logisticians assist the command in understanding operational contract support within their regions. However, commanders understand that command authority does not equal contracting authority. Staffs assist commanders in achieving goals, working within contract law without having improper influence over the contracting process. FM 1-06 and FM 4-92 discuss operational contract support in detail.

A-10. The ability to leverage and properly integrate contracted support enables mission success. Logisticians work with other organizations to leverage contracted support. Army commanders balance operational contract support organization, support structure, and lines of authority to avoid competition for scarce resources, unethical actions, and operational inflexibility.

A-11. Aggressive contracting within the area of operations can have significant negative impacts. The capacity of Department of Defense contracting can overwhelm a region. Army units closely coordinate and cooperate with other organizations and local populace to avoid overwhelming a region. Contract development 'at all cost' often results in skyrocketing prices for limited commodities. For example, contracting actions for fuel prevents international organizations, IGOs, and NGOs from conducting ongoing relief operations. Blocking relief operations not only results in a negative view of U.S. forces, but forces Army units to assume responsibility for the IGO, international organization, and NGO relief effort. Cooperation with organizations that already have contracts in place results in mutually supporting arrangements in the relief effort.

A-12. If not carefully implemented, operational contract support results in increased corruption in the HN, which adversaries subsequently exploit. Proper integration of operational contract support enables establishing processes and procedures to help mitigate corruption. Providing well-defined vetting of contracted support during pre-award phases helps prevent corruption. Post-award phases include measures of performance that provide quantitative measurements. Subsequently, tangible data used to build qualitative measures of effectiveness discerns mission success in reducing corruption.

A-13. Contracting with the local populace positively impacts civil-military aspects of an operation. Contracts include labor-intensive projects such as construction or clean up, as well as routine services such as trash collection, maintenance, or security. This influx of work and finance to local businesses often has a long-term impact and provides positive reinforcement to building partner capacity.

A-14. Army units consider operational contract support matters when planning for relief in place and transfer of authority. Units fully integrate operational contract support into the pre-deployment site survey. Incoming units collect the following operational contract support information from the outgoing unit:

- References (such as planning guidance extracts, related fragmentary orders, and command policies).
- Copies of existing contracts, projected contract requirements, and contracting officer representative requirements.
- Local command contracting officer representative training policies and procedures.
- Any on-going operational contract support planning and requirements development documents.
- Information (such as names, location, and support relationship) of the relevant Army field support brigade personnel.
- Information (such as names, location, and support relationship) of supporting contracting organizations and team-logistics civil augmentation program forward personnel.
- Information regarding local and national contract worker access and security.
- Files related to the project purchasing officer, field ordering officer, and paying agent.

TRANSPORTATION

A-15. Transportation is the most influential logistic asset Army units provide to civilians during stability efforts. Army units react with the most responsive and capable equipment in the world. This reaction sometimes leads international organizations, IGOs, and NGOs to believe Army forces have an unlimited capability to support the effort.

A-16. Normally, the United States Transportation Command's Defense Transportation System provides air and sea strategic lift capability. The Defense Transportation System uses the same basic procedures in war that it does in peace, adjusting to fulfill the requirements of the situation such as more stringent lines of communications regulation or higher operations tempo in theaters of operation. The World Food Programme and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations also provide strategic lift. The United Nations maintains worldwide contingency contracting in place. Coordination between Army and United Nations representatives improve the port management and priority flow of relief supplies to affected areas. JP 4-01 discusses transportation systems.

A-17. Military forces provide aerial delivery of emergency supplies. Army units closely coordinate the available organizations with requisite capabilities and the agencies that own the materiel available for delivery. Planning requires a joint effort and includes forecasting the amount, type, and timing of aircraft required to support the delivered loads. Civilian organizations rarely understand military procedures or potential legal restrictions. Mission success requires Army units to incorporate civilian organizations into the planning and execution process.

A-18. Ground transportation by road or rail is also a key consideration, particularly for remote areas with limited or no access by aircraft or ships. Terrain, weather, or security threats further impair the limited capacity of the networks. Army units often need to improve these networks by allocating sufficient engineering and security resources.

A-19. Successful logistic response and follow-on development sustainment relies on providing supplies and services to the point of need quickly. The efficiency and effectiveness of multiple supply chains operating in concert or autonomously in either relief or development efforts affects the speed and quality of the assistance that Army units provide in both the short and long term.

MATERIEL

A-20. Logisticians understand the legal and financial implications inherent in providing materiel to the HN. Normally IGOs, international organizations, and NGOs have materiel available for relief of human suffering. The World Food Programme and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations have supply depots around the world for providing supplies and equipment. NGOs receive supplies and other assets directly from their contributors to support their specific relief missions. Understanding these specific missions and the need for the organizations to provide their niche capability ensure their survival. Using the United Nations and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as lead agencies in these efforts reduces the need for Army units to provide materiel.

A-21. Army units use integration meetings and Web-based tools to understand the focus of the IGO, international organization, and NGO. Units also use the tools to understand their requirements and allow a focus on those capabilities and requirements those organizations do not meet.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

A-22. Army forces are appointed the lead Service responsible for common financial management support. Army units' financial analysis and recommendations help the joint force efficiently use its fiscal resources. Effective financial management support provides the commander with financial resources needed to accomplish the mission. The financial management support structure provides the essential funding, banking and disbursing, and cost management functions to support contracting requirements and accomplish joint special programs.

A-23. Financial management during humanitarian and disaster relief operations ensures U.S. forces use and allocate scarce fiscal resources supporting complex operations and accomplishing the mission. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations usually last less than twelve months. When Army

forces and the other Services provide assistance to an area outside the United States, other nations participating in the relief operation often provide financial assistance. The United States incurs costs providing support to other nations. The USAID and the Office of Disaster Assistance address financial management issues related to reimbursement, burden sharing, assistance in kind, and cash contributions from other nations.

A-24. Army commanders ensure or build organic capability by nominating individuals to act as project purchasing officers and paying agents. Leveraging training provided by the local regional contracting center and financial management detachment enhances a unit's ability to develop a capability for quick response to emergent requirements.

A-25. Financial management units analyze the economic impact of using currency (U.S. and foreign) on the local economy. The analysis includes, but is not limited to, the cost of acquiring foreign currency, issues associated with creating a new host-nation currency, the threat of counterfeit currencies, the availability of banking services and banking infrastructure, acceptance of local currency by vendors, the impact of U.S. currency on the local economy, and review of treasury and other U.S. Government agencies reports on the local economy. Close coordination with civil affairs, American Embassy, Department of Treasury, and Department of State officials ensures accurate assessments. FM 1-06 discusses financial management support.

MEDICAL SERVICES

A-26. Medical personnel understand the impact of sustaining and supporting civilian populations. Stabilization offers unique medical challenges to military medical planners, medical logisticians, and health care providers. These challenges arise due to population characteristics that differ significantly from military forces (such as age, gender, chronic illness vice trauma, cultural considerations, and so on). Medical personnel give special attention to providing public health education and services to reduce the need for treatment capabilities. Additionally, medical planners ensure that the HN can sustain any initiated program, including education, training, equipment, maintenance, and supplies. See ATTP 4-02 and FM 8-42 for more information on Army Health System support.

TRANSITION PROCEDURES

A-27. Understanding when to transition sustainment procedures from the initial response tasks through transformation to fostering sustainability requires clear guidance from higher commands. Sustainers anticipate these changes in operational environments to ensure they have the proper resources and procedures for a seamless hand over to follow-on organizations or agencies.

A-28. Stability efforts leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority. The command ensures that support to the HN enables the HN's self-sustainment. When Army units support the execution of tasks normally conducted by the HN, they face situations in which the HN grows accustomed to such support, is satisfied with it, and reluctantly changes the status quo.

A-29. Transition requires sustainers understand capabilities developed with civil-military relationships and civilian partners' resources. The partners' expertise in developing and building capacity facilitate Army forces' ability to develop unity of purpose to develop unity of effort further. Many tasks identified in FM 7-15 direct Army units to support actions clearly not within their capability. Sustainers know where to find the expertise through the partnerships made with civilian representatives and understand how to support civilian representatives.

A-30. Many sustainers understand the basic elements of accountability, safeguarding, and maintenance without establishing these elements as a cultural norm. Many cultures overlook levels of corruption that includes skimming materiel and finances. Army units help train host-nation militaries with clear and concise procedures. Units work with the HN to build a simple sustainment system based on U.S. Army procedures and requirements, improving on the processes and procedures that already exist. Army units incorporate regional and sub-regional IGOs to develop sustainable procedures that would enhance the HN's probability of success. Army units coordinate for funding and resources to assist the HN in developing its own sustainment processes and industrial support base.

Appendix B

Assessments and the District Stability Framework

ASSESSMENTS

B-1. Assessment includes monitoring and evaluating operational environments and the progress of the operation. Based upon their assessments, commanders direct adjustments and thus ensure the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission. The district stability framework (DSF) supports the assessment process during stability operations.

B-2. Assessment is continuous and a routine part of stability. It precedes and guides unit operations and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Assessment consists of three broad activities. First, Army units continually monitor matters related to the five primary stability tasks. Second, units evaluate progress towards desired conditions. Finally, units recommend or direct actions deemed necessary.

MONITORING

B-3. Units maintain a running assessment of an operational environment based upon current information from various sources, including U.S. forces, host-nation security forces, other United States Government (USG) agencies, host-nation leaders, the population, media, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Army staffs use the operational variables—political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (PMESII-PT)—to structure the information during mission analysis. Staffs use the interagency conflict assessment framework and DSF to further distill information into key insights. Units watch for links between different PMESII-PT categories. For example, deteriorating economic conditions could create widespread discontent and desperation that results in an increase in violence.

EVALUATING

B-4. The principles discussed in paragraphs 1-115 through 1-122 and detailed by task in Chapters 2 through 6 normally comprise the end states for the primary stability tasks. Commanders evaluate progress towards these conditions using the staff's measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators that relate to the principles. Army units use these principles to analyze progress toward desired conditions and determine the reasons for the level of progress. This analysis provides the commanders with insights regarding future priorities and operations.

RECOMMENDING OR DIRECTING ACTION

B-5. Regardless of whether an assessment indicates that progress is favorable or unfavorable, Army units use the assessment to determine what future actions they take regarding the primary stability tasks. Forces often receive a change in mission focus or area. Sometimes commanders provide recommendations to higher authorities or host-nation counterparts. Commanders decide whether to transition authority or progress to the next stage of an operation in a given area.

B-6. New actions or recommendations balance several considerations including established partnerships, familiarity with an area or task, and the possibility that redirecting assets may jeopardize progress. When Army units make significant progress in an area, the appropriate response may be to reinforce that effort.

THE ROLE OF AUDITING IN STABILITY

B-7. Commanders take responsibility of resources provided by the American people. Good stewardship of resources instills public trust in the military and support for the mission. Contingency operations have an inherent risk of fraud, waste, and abuse because of immature processes and the limited visibility and control over wide ranging operations in a joint operational area. This risk applies to stability efforts as well.

The audit community significantly helps commanders exercise their oversight and stewardship responsibilities.

B-8. Within the USG, audit organizations help guard against financial loss and contractor mismanagement. Audit organizations external to the Army include the Government Accountability Office, inspector general offices from non-Department of Defense (DOD) federal agencies, Office of the Inspector General, DOD, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Within the Army, the Army Audit Agency provides internal audit support to commanders in a joint operational area. The auditor general oversees the Army Audit Agency and reports to the Secretary of the Army. The Army Audit Agency defines theater audit support in a memorandum of agreement between the Army Service component command and the auditor general. Theater commanders request audit support by following the protocols in the memorandum of agreement or directly contacting the auditor general. The agency's Web site lists established memorandums of agreement.

B-9. Commanders use audit support to—

- Assess the adequacy of control measures to mitigate fraud, waste, and abuse.
- Validate information used to inform decisionmakers.
- Identify gaps, bottlenecks, overlap, and conflicts with operational processes and procedures.
- Provide assurance regarding compliance with law and regulations.
- Identify resource imbalances within operations.
- Evaluate the award and administration of contracts within a joint operational area.
- Support investigations of corruption.

B-10. Commanders use audit support during stability efforts for the following:

- Reviewing sustainment contracts to make sure units properly awarded and administered them.
- Determining if units selected and properly executed the right projects to achieve objectives under the commanders' emergency response program.
- Assessing if units have adequate control measures in place and operating to ensure units authorize, record, and reconcile cash disbursements with cash balances.
- Evaluating if units properly controlled and accounted for sensitive items.
- Determining if units synchronized processes for retrograde of equipment with unit redeployment.
- Verifying if units transferred excess equipment to foreign governments according to guidance.

DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK

B-11. The DSF is a tactical-level analysis, planning, and programming tool specifically created to guide and support stabilization efforts. DSF assists assessments by helping users identify local sources of instability and design programs and activities to address these sources. It reflects stability efforts, counterinsurgency, and international development best practices by emphasizing the local population's perspectives, development principles, and measuring impact, not just output. The DSF supports unity of effort by providing implementers from various organizations with a common framework to—

- Understand operational environments from a stability-focused perspective.
- Maintain focus on the local population and its perceptions.
- Identify the sources of instability in a specific local area.
- Design activities that specifically address the identified sources of instability.
- Monitor and evaluate activity outputs and impacts, as well as changes in overall stability.

B-12. The DSF has four basic steps. To maximize effectiveness, all relevant partners and organizations in the area ideally stay involved in the entire process, participating in an inclusive stability working group. The four basic steps consist of situational awareness, analysis, design, and monitoring and evaluation. (See figure B-1.) DSF requires population-centric and stability-oriented situational awareness by examining an operational environment, the cultural environment, stability and instability dynamics, and local perceptions. In the second step, units analyze information from situational awareness to identify and prioritize the sources of instability in a given local area. In the third step, units use design to identify and refine proposed

activities to diminish the sources of instability against a series of stabilization fundamentals, design principles, and prioritization criteria. When monitoring and evaluating, units measure effort and achievements on three levels: output (activity completion), impact (effects achieved by individual activities), and overall stability. Units then use insights from this step to adjust and develop future stabilization activities.



Figure B-1. District stability framework

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

B-13. DSF does more than list facts about an operational environment. This framework identifies the relevance of the factors to the local population and an Army unit's mission. For example, the framework goes beyond identifying the fact that one tribal group dominates the local government. The DSF identifies that this inequity undermines the legitimacy and support for the government among other tribes. DSF emphasizes three subfactors to achieve a population-centric and stability-oriented understanding of an operational environment: culture, local perceptions, and stability and instability dynamics.

Culture

B-14. The cultural matrix in Figure B-2 identifies the factors about culture. The figure lists the tasks Army units achieve to determine the factors.

Cultural factors	***Analysis steps***
Major cultural groups	Identify the major cultural and tribal groups in the area of operations
Their interests	Identify the things these groups care about or consider to be valuable—both material and intangible
Cultural codes, traditions, and values	Identify cultural codes, traditions, and values that the major cultural groups live by
Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms	Identify the methods individuals and groups traditionally use to resolve conflicts
Traditional authorities	Identify the traditional authorities to whom the locals respect and normally turn to for assistance
Disruptions to mechanisms and authorities	Describe new actors or conditions that potentially disrupt the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and undermine the influence of traditional authorities
How malign actors or stabilizing forces leverage cultural factors	Describe how actors exploit these cultural facts to their advantage. Identify how stabilizing forces do or do not leverage these facts

Figure B-2. Cultural matrix

Local Perceptions

B-15. The population is frequently the center of gravity in stability. To be effective, Army units base stability efforts on a deep understanding of local conditions, local grievances, and local norms, rather than outsider assumptions. Units gain this understanding through several possible mechanisms, including population surveys, focus groups, key leader engagements, or polling conducted by external organizations.

B-16. Army units collect local perceptions using a tactical conflict survey. Army units on patrol, civilian agency implementing partners, and host-nation government and security forces use this simple, four-question survey. Personnel follow up each question by asking "why" to ensure they fully understand the interviewee's response and perspective. The four questions are:

- Has the number of people in the village changed in the last year? WHY?
- What are the most important problems facing the village? WHY?
- Who do you believe can solve your problems? WHY?
- What should be done first to help the village? WHY?

B-17. Mature individuals with good interpersonal skills, assisted with a good interpreter, conduct surveys. A poorly conducted survey program creates resentment, survey fatigue, unrealistic expectations among the population, and flawed data. Collectors document contextual information to facilitate further analysis, such as the location and the interviewee's characteristics such as ethnicity, tribe, age, and gender. Collectors aggregate and graphically represent the survey responses, allowing for a quick visual understanding of local perspectives—whether represented as a snapshot in time or as change over time. Military information support (MIS) personnel receive training and equipment to conduct surveys. These personnel analyze their results and provide the information to commanders and staffs, along with detailed studies of local populations and the factors influencing their behavior. Army units coordinate with the assigned MIS staff officer to conduct surveys. Figure B-3 shows a sample tactical conflict survey.



Figure B-3. Sample tactical conflict survey

Stability and Instability Dynamics

B-18. Finally, DSF identifies potential stability and instability factors in the local environment. Factors of instability include grievances, events, and key actors. Grievances of the local population come from various local perceptions data sources. Events create a window of vulnerability in which threats undermine stability. Key actors—individuals or organizations—foment instability with their means, motives, and actions. Factors of stability include resiliencies, events, and key actors. Resiliencies in the society—institutions and mechanisms—help the society function peacefully. Events present a window of opportunity to enhance stability. Key actors—individuals or organizations—help enhance stability with their means,

motives, and actions. Events are usually the same in both matrixes. Whether they end up reinforcing stability or instability depends mainly on how they play out. See figure B-4.

Factors of stability		
Resiliencies	**Events**	**Key actors**
What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further reinforce stability?	Which individuals or institutions in the society are attempting to preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?
Factors of instability		
Grievances	**Events**	**Key actors**
What issues or problems are the local populace concerned or upset about? Whom do they blame for these conditions, and how severe are they?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to undermine stability?	Which individuals or institutions are leveraging popular grievances and events o create instability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?

Figure B-4. Sample stability and instability dynamics matrixes

ANALYSIS

B-19. After gaining situational awareness, DSF provides tools to analyze and identify potential sources of instability, their causes, the desired objectives, and the impact indicators that measure progress in addressing each source of instability. The second step of the DSF, Analysis, consists of four steps: identify potential sources of instability, vet each issue against instability criteria, determine if the issue meets two of the three instability criteria, and prioritize sources of instability.

B-20. Analysis typically results in a long list of issues, needs, and grievances that potentially drive instability. In the first step, analysis narrows this list down to fewer issues that actually cause instability and local people really care about. To begin narrowing down the list, DSF groups closely related or logically connected issues in a symptom-cause relationship. For example, DSF groups the issues of poor border control, police corruption, and violent crime under the heading of "physical insecurity." If physical insecurity causes instability, the DSF breaks apart these issues to address them in detail.

B-21. Grievances occur because people believe stability efforts do not meet their needs or defend their interests. Grievances do not necessarily result in instability unless events occur to translate these grievances into action. These events act as windows of vulnerability that other actors potentially exploit. Partners counterbalance instability with stability factors such as resiliencies, windows of opportunity, and constructive actors.

B-22. In the second step, Army personnel enter each issue or group of related issues in the source of instability analysis matrix shown in figure B-5. Personnel vet each issue against three instability criteria:

- Does this issue decrease support for the government and legitimate governance institutions?
- Does this issue increase support for malign actors or belligerents?
- Does this issue undermine the normal functioning of society?

B-23. The first instability criterion is "Does this issue decrease support for the government and legitimate governance institutions?" "Support for the government" is based on what locals actually expect of their government rather than what outsiders might expect of their own government back home. "Legitimate governance institutions" refers to NGOs that help the society regulate itself, such as a tribal council.

B-24. The second instability criterion is "Does this issue increase support for malign actors or belligerents?" Usually support increases when the malign actors either directly help solve the problem or successfully leverage the issue in their propaganda. An example of helping to solve the problem can

include providing security to a community that the police never visit. A sample excerpt for successfully leveraging the issue can include "If we were in charge, we would reform and expand the police."

Potential sources of instability	*Instability criteria*			*Sources of instability*	*Prioritization*
	Does this issue decrease support for the government and legitimate governance? Explain.	**Does this issue increase support for malign actors or belligerents? Explain.**	**Does this issue undermine the normal functioning of society? Explain.**	**Does the issue meet 2 of the 3 instability criteria?**	**Is the source of instability a priority grievance for the local populace? If so, priority.**
Justice and conflict resolution (includes land disputes)	Yes. Formal and traditional mechanisms seen as ineffective	Yes. Spoilers increase their reputation by solving disputes	Yes. Traditionally solved by tribal councils, now a source of violence	Yes	Yes (#1)
Tribe A dominates	Yes. Undermines Tribes B and C support, increases resentment	No. Spoilers not taking advantage	No. Tribe A has dominated for several decades	No	No
Lack of healthcare	Probably. Provincial government healthcare excludes North	No. Spoilers do not provide healthcare	No. North has never had healthcare	No	Yes (#3)
Poor road infrastructure	No. Governor is working to build new road	No. Spoilers are not building roads	No. Road network has always been rudimentary at best	No	No
Civilian government corruption	No. Corruption complaints directed solely at police	No. No evidence that spoilers exploit this issue	No. Locals not concerned; apparently within normal bounds	No	No
Insecurity (includes police and civilian casualty)	Yes. civilian casualty, insecurity, police ineffectiveness reflect poorly on government	No. Spoilers also blamed for civilian casualty and do not provide security	Yes. Insecurity and police problems exceed local norms	Yes	Yes (#2)
Lack of education	No. Despite limitations, people grateful for education improvements	Yes. Spoilers promote radical ideology	No. Despite low levels education has actually improved	No	Yes (#4)

Figure B-5. Sample sources of instability analysis matrix

B-25. The third instability criterion is "Does this issue undermine the normal functioning of society?" The emphasis focuses on local norms. For example, if people have never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can hardly be undermining the normal functioning of society.

B-26. In the third step, Army personnel determine if the issue meets two of the three instability criteria. The final step on the source of instability analysis matrix prioritizes identified sources of instability using local perceptions. Normally practitioners focus first on sources of instability that are a priority grievance for the local population. Otherwise, locals perceive the stability efforts as disconnected from reality and focusing on problems that do not really matter to them.

B-27. After identifying and prioritizing a discrete number of sources of instability, practitioners fill out a tactical stability matrix (TSM) for each source of instability. As shown in figure B-6, the TSM helps further analyze and design activities to address each source of instability. It consists of nine columns. The first six support the analysis process while the final three support the design phase. Users fill out the columns in the TSM by identifying the following six elements that support analysis:

- The targeted source of instability.
- Perceived causes—how locals perceive this situation and why they think it exists. Usually presented as representative quotes from the local populace.
- Systemic causes—the root causes of the source of instability, such as the underlying conditions that led to the problem or allow it to continue.
- Objective—a succinct statement of the end state that addresses the source of instability. Often simply the reverse of the source of instability, adding in the who.
- Impact indicators—(also measures of effectiveness) changes in an operational environment that indicates progress toward reducing the systemic causes and achieving the objective.
- Impact indicator data sources—the source for the information to track the impact indicators.

Analysis						*Design*		
Targeted sources of instability	**Perceived causes**	**Systemic causes**	**Objective**	**Impact indicators**	**Impact indicators data sources**	**Activities**	**Output indicators**	**Output indicator data sources**
Lack of govt/ traditional conflict resolution mechanism	"Spoilers provide swift justice" "Judges support those who pay them the most" "Elders can't solve our problems" "Govt doesn't help the councils"	Formal justice system is slow, inefficient, hard to access Justice officials not paid in full/ on time Traditional conflict resolution structures are undermined	Foster conflict resolution mechanisms linked to govt	Increased # disputes resolved by govt - recognized entities Decreased # disputes resolved by spoilers Decreased violence linked to land disputes Increased # land deeds registered	Tactical conflict survey Govt records Public surveys Patrol reports Interviews Assessments	Support training for justice officials Facilitate judicial pay system reform Establish mobile govt dispute resolution unit Facilitate councils Link councils to govt IIA	# of justice officials trained Pay reforms enacted Mobile dispute unit established # of councils held # of councils with govt involvement # of IIA radio spots	Govt financial records Interviews Assessments Tactical conflict surveys Patrol Reports Radio
# number			govt government			IIA inform and influence activities		

Figure B-6. Sample tactical stability matrix

B-28. The remaining three columns in the TSM support design:

- Activities—things that will mitigate the systemic causes and achieve the objective (taken from Activity Design Worksheet in figure B-7 on page B-8).
- Output indicators—(also measures of performance) metrics that indicate progress toward the completion of an activity. Ask "How can I confirm that the activity is progressing or has been completed?"
- Output indicator data sources—the source for the information to track the output indicators.

DESIGN

B-29. In the third step of DSF, practitioners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. This process starts by brainstorming potential activities that address each systemic cause of the source of instability. Practitioners screen and refine these ideas using the three stability criteria, the seven design

principles, and resource availability. The activity design worksheet (figure B-7 on page B-8) helps to guide this process. The results then feed into the activities column of the TSM. The stability criteria essentially mirror the instability criteria in figure B-6. Practitioners eliminate any proposed activity that does not meet at least two of these criteria.

Design process		***Design outputs***
Possible brainstorming activities		Generate a list of potential activities that will address the systemic causes and contribute to achieving the objective for a given source of instability.
Stability criteria (must meet 2 of 3)	Explain how the activity increases support for government and legitimate governance.	Explain how the activity will increase support for the government and legitimate governance actors.
	Explain how the activity decreases support for malign actors.	Explain how the activity will decrease support for malign actors.
	Explain how the activity increases institutional and societal capacity and capability.	Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal capacity and capability.
Design principles	Sustainability Local ownership Short-term versus long-term results Leverage support from other organizations Culturally and politically appropriate Accountability and transparency Flexibility	For each potential activity that meets at least two of the three criteria, refine the proposed activity to make it meet as many of the seven design principles as possible.
Resources	Money Personnel Expertise Time	Do you or your partners have the resources to complete the activity? If not, eliminate the proposed activity.
Select	Decide if activity is realistic.	Based on the stability criteria, design principles and resource availability, should the activity be implemented?

Figure B-7. Sample activity design worksheet

B-30. Practitioners then refine proposed activities that meet the stability criteria using the seven design principles. To the extent possible, practitioners design or modify each activity such that it—

- Can be *sustained* by the local government or society.
- Maximizes local involvement to create *local ownership.*
- Minimizes the trade-offs between *short-term* positive effects and any potentially negative *long-term* impacts (unintended consequences).
- *Leverages or supports* the programs of other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and the host-nation government.
- Is *appropriate to the local political and cultural context.*
- Strengthens *governmental accountability and transparency.*
- Includes the *flexibility* to adapt if circumstances change.

B-31. Next, practitioners screen each proposed activity against their available resources—money, personnel, appropriate expertise, and time. Those activities for which the necessary resources exist are entered into the activities column of the TSM. Practitioners then complete the TSM by identifying output indicators and output indicator data sources that enable practitioners to determine whether each activity is proceeding as planned and, ultimately, when it has been completed.

B-32. Last in the design process, practitioners prioritize and synchronize the selected activities. They prioritize activities based on their anticipated impact on the source of instability; practitioners implement activities with more anticipated "bang for the buck" first). Practitioners synchronize activities in time and space to build upon and reinforce other activities and operations conducted by the stability working group. A synchronization matrix (see figure B-8) helps the stability working group.



Figure B-8. Synchronization matrix

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

B-33. The final step in DSF takes place during and after the implementation of stability activities. Army units conduct monitoring and evaluation on three levels: output indicators, impact indicators, and overall stability. The TSM includes the indicators.

B-34. Output indicators (measures of performance) simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, "Is the activity progressing?" and in the long term, "Is the activity complete?" Examples might include the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Army units monitor output indicators during the implementation of an activity, until they complete the activity.

B-35. Impact indicators (measures of effectiveness) measure the effect that an activity achieved. Examples include decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). Generally Army units evaluate input indicators only after they complete the activity.

B-36. Overall stability is the third level of monitoring and evaluation. Rather than measuring the impact of individual activities, it considers the stabilizing impact of all the activities conducted over a longer period as well as the influence of external factors. It simply asks, "Is stability increasing or decreasing?" Effective measurements of overall stability establish good indicators and track the indicators at repeated intervals, starting as early as possible.

B-37. DSF uses the monitoring and evaluation matrix shown in figure B-9 on page B-10 as a program management tool to help track the output and impact of individual activities. Most information comes directly from the TSM, with additional columns added to establish a baseline for the impact indicators and to measure change against this baseline.

Source of instability	*Activity*	*Measure of performance*		*Measure of effectiveness*				*Objective*
		Output indicator data	*Output indicator sources*	*Impact indicator*	*Baseline*	*Change*	*Impact data sources*	
Taken from the tactical stability matrix	Taken from the tactical stability matrix	Data for output indicators identified on the tactical stability matrix	Taken from the tactical stability matrix	Taken from the tactical stability matrix	Baseline data for impact indicators identified on the tactical stability matrix	Change in baseline data	Taken from the tactical stability matrix	Taken from the tactical stability matrix

Figure B-9. Sample monitoring and evaluation matrix

B-38. The best overall stability indicators reflect the local population's perceptions of stability, not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, "What will local people do or say differently if they feel the environment is getting more stable?" The following are seven suggested indicators of overall stability illustrated in figure B-10.

- Government recognition—how many locals take their problems to the government for resolution. This reflects trust and confidence in the government and its perceived legitimacy.
- Host nation on host-nation violence—a direct measure of insecurity.
- Host-nation security force presence—reflects security force confidence to range farther and more frequently into insecure areas.
- Freedom of movement—reflects security conditions.
- Security perceptions—a direct measure of perceived safety.
- Economic health—reflects freedom of movement and investor confidence.
- Governance perceptions—a direct measure of public confidence in government's competence, transparency, and relevance.



Figure B-10. Sample overall stability index

B-39. Finally, as practitioners monitor and evaluate these three levels, they identify lessons about what worked, what did not work, and what partners can do to improve their stability efforts as they repeat the DSF process in the future.

B-40. The DSF can support effective monitoring, evaluating, and decisionmaking. It focuses on the perceptions of the population and provides a common operational picture for Army units and their partnered civilian agencies. Furthermore, it helps inform and influence activities by identifying themes that resonate with the population.

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Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AO	area of operations
AOR	area of responsibility
ATP	Army techniques publication
ATTP	Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CERP	commanders' emergency response program
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
DA	Department of the Army
DART	disaster assistance response team
DC	dislocated civilian
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DODI	Department of Defense instruction
DSF	district stability framework
EHCC	explosive hazards coordination cell
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
FACT	field advance civilian team
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FM	field manual
HN	host nation
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IGO	intergovernmental organization
JAG	judge advocate general
JP	joint publication
METT-TC	mission variables are mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations
MIS	military information support
MISO	military information support operations

MRE	meal, ready-to-eat
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PMESII-PT	political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time
POLICE	police and prison structures, organized criminal networks, legal systems, investigations and interviews, crime-conducive conditions, and enforcement gaps and mechanisms
PRT	provincial reconstruction team
S-9	civil affairs operations staff officer
SFA	security force assistance
SSR	security sector reform
SWEAT-MSO	sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, other considerations
TMA	transitional military authority
TSM	tactical stability matrix
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WFP	World Food Programme (United Nations)

SECTION II – TERMS

adversary

A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

campaign

A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

conflict prevention

A peace operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and, when necessary, military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Activities aimed at conflict prevention are often conducted under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Conflict prevention can include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. (JP 3-07.3)

enemy

A party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. (ADRP 3-0)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 3-29)

irregular warfare

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. (JP 1)

major operation

A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. (JP 3-0)

peace building

Stability actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07.3)

peace enforcement

Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 3-07.3)

peacekeeping

Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 3-07.3)

peacemaking

The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to it. (JP 3-07.3)

peace operations

A broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts. (JP 3-07.3)

policing

The application of control measures within an area of operations to maintain law and order, safety, and other matters affecting the general welfare of the population. (FM 3-39)

security force assistance

The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

stabilization

The process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development. (FM 3-07)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action. (JP 1)

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31 August 2012

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