Counterinsurgency Operations:

The Two Sides of COIN: Applying FM 3-14 to the Brigade and Below Counterinsurgency Fight (Page 25)
An Innovative Approach to Combat Logistics: Airborne Resupply in Afghanistan (Page 10)
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GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army

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FEA TURES
25 THE TWO SIDES OF COIN: APPLYING FM 3-14 TO THE BRIGADE AND BELOW COUNTERINSURGENCY FIGHT
Major Jacob M. Kramer

32 ROUND 2 IN LEBANON: HOW THE IDF FOCUSED ON COIN AND LOST THE ABILITY TO FIGHT MANEUVER WAR
Captain Jonathan D. Zagdanski

36 MEKONG DELTA 1968 — COUNTERINSURGENCY THEN AND NOW
Russell A. Eno

38 THE BEAR WENT OVER THE MOUNTAIN: MORE LESSONS FROM THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

DEPARTMENTS
1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE
2 INFANTRY NEWS
4 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
4 MANAGING THE BRIGADE FIGHT: ASSET SYNCHRONIZATION
Captain Jeffrey Roberts

6 PERSONNEL RECOVERY: PROGRAM CAN HELP SOLDIERS PREVENT, RESPOND TO ISOLATING EVENTS
Wayne Heard

10 AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO COMBAT LOGISTICS: LOW COST, LOW ALTITUDE AIRBORNE RESUPPLY IN AFGHANISTAN
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Peterman, Major Paul J. Narowski II, Major Ernest Litynski and Sergeant First Class Edwin Clouse

14 THE HUMAN COMPONENT: TREATING HIDDEN INJURIES
Chaplain (Major) Tammie Crews

15 CULTURE: REASONS FOR FRIENDLY AND ENEMY ANALYSIS
Captain William Ault

17 ASSAULT GUN BATTALIONS ASSESSED: DO THEY HAVE UTILITY IN MODERN COMBAT, COIN OPERATIONS?
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Milen and Major (Retired) Richard L. Lavosky

21 AL-JAZEERA CORRESPONDENT REVEALS DETAILS FROM BIN LADEN INTERVIEWS
Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN

41 TRAINING NOTES
41 REAL BATTLE-FOCUSED PT: PHYSICAL TRAINING TAILORED FOR THE FIGHT
Major Mark Leslie

44 LVC TRAINING IN KOREA: THE ARMY’S TRAINING VISION FOR THE FUTURE, IN EXECUTION TODAY
Brigadier General John D. Johnson

48 SBL ENSURES SOLDIERS HAVE BEST GEAR AVAILABLE
Captain Shane Sims

51 BOOK REVIEWS
53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

We are an Army at war on the ever changing and complex battlefield of a counterinsurgency (COIN). Today’s infantrymen are the cutting edge of a lethal, offensive force, and hence must continually and rapidly execute across the full spectrum of operations and employ the latest technology, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to win the global war on terrorism. In this Commandant’s Note, I want to discuss the future for our infantrymen in counterinsurgency operations, the need for adaptive leaders and Soldiers, some new innovations, and the application of the lessons we have learned thus far.

The crucible of combat has taught us many lessons. As the Army has examined past counterinsurgencies, including our own experience, a transformation has taken place in our fundamental approach to COIN. Short duration raids projecting combat power from large forward operating bases to kill insurgents will have an immediate effect. But in the long term, the absence of complementary goals only limits complete success. There is no lasting positive influence on the population, and insurgents continue their campaign of compelling support by terrorizing the population. Infantrymen are skilled at killing insurgents, but to truly defeat the insurgency we must separate the insurgents from the populace and deny them the support without which they cannot exist. We achieve this through a partnership between the population, coalition forces, and local and national security forces. Building the trust necessary to create an effective partnership involves daily interaction, mutual respect, security, and a degree of economic progress which allows the local population to see a future they can claim for their own. Infantrymen find themselves operating longer in any given area. Every Soldier truly becomes a sensor and his observations contribute to the collection of information. The enemy is proactively countering the enemy’s propaganda with the message of truth, influencing the population and undermining the efforts of the insurgent by clearly and quickly presenting the facts.

The enemy is constantly adapting to counter our efforts and present new, dangerous challenges to infantrymen on the battlefield. We are equipping Soldiers with the tools they need to rapidly anticipate and defeat these asymmetric threats. New equipment, applied with the new organizations and systems available, provides a combat multiplier that enables our forces to survive, outmaneuver, and outthink our enemies. Our infantrymen are creative and adaptive in developing new TTPs to employ these systems, and share that knowledge across the force.

The U. S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) continues to man and equip our Army to win in a counterinsurgency. The Directorate of Combat Developments develops and fields the latest technologies available to support our Soldiers in the global war on terrorism. They are the lead agent for testing and fielding of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles. The MRAP will increase the mobility and survivability of our Soldiers and Marines in the field. We continue to collect and integrate lessons learned from the force through the Center for Army Lessons Learned, from focused collection trips, by our information sharing with Combat Training Centers, and at conferences and seminars. This keeps our instructors current and our courses relevant. The USAIS cadre is populated with combat veterans who freely share their experiences. We incorporated this experience into our course programs of instruction to meet the needs of the current fight, while maintaining the enduring skills of the warfighter. Small group instruction facilitates sharing among peers, as does shared training conducted between the courses at the Infantry School and across the Army.

Our success in COIN is due to the steady endurance and resolute effort our leaders and Soldiers have committed to the fight. Through challenging, relevant, and outcome based training, the U.S. Army Infantry School will continue to support the force with infantrymen able to adapt to the complexity of the counterinsurgency battlefield, and defeat the enemy wherever they find him.

Follow me!
UAS Video Terminal Connects
Boots on Ground to Eyes in Sky

KIM HENRY

The Army fielded its 200th One-System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) to Iraq and Afghanistan last month. Soldiers using an OSRVT can display the sensor feed from any of the Army’s unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and gain an unprecedented, instantaneous common view of the battlefield.

The OSRVT is a leap in capability from other UAS video receivers because it displays not only video, but also “metadata” that tell Soldiers exactly where the UAS is, which is essential for tactical combat decisions. In addition, the OSRVT constantly scans through its operational range for other UASs and displays them on a map of the area, allowing Soldiers to instantly switch to a UAS with a better view of a target.

“It is the only UAS video receiver that has metadata to improve situational awareness,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jennifer Jensen, Common Systems Integration acting product manager. “You know where you are in relation to the unmanned aircraft, so you know how far and what direction you would need to go to reach the area of interest.”

In this time where Joint UAS cooperation is critical, the OSRVT is unique in enhancing situational awareness, commonality and interoperability. The OSRVT provides the Soldier with not only near real-time sensor information from Army UASs, such as Raven, Shadow, Hunter, Warrior A, Micro Air Vehicle and the new Sky Warrior, but also the video and data of other services’ manned and unmanned platforms including the Marine Corps’ Pioneer and Air Force’s Predator and Lightning Pods.

“Everyone, regardless of the platform, receives the same information at the same time, leading to true interoperability, the

A critical skills-retention bonus (CSRB) of $25,000 or more is available to more than 16,000 regular-Army captains who agree to remain on active duty beyond their initial active-duty service obligations.

The bonus is part of a “menu of incentives” targeting officers willing to remain on active duty an additional three years. The other incentives include graduate school, military schooling, branch or functional area transfer, or post of choice.

An earlier version of the plan unveiled in May was reviewed by senior leaders. The final plan increases the number of officers eligible for the bonus (up from 7,000), and includes a higher basic bonus (up from $20,000) and targeted higher amounts for officers in critical branches.

The bonus is available to captains with dates of rank of April 1, 2002 or later, based on the original accession branches listed below.

- The basic $25,000 bonus is available to officers who were originally commissioned in air defense, engineer, finance, signal, quartermaster, nurse corps and select medical service functional areas.
- Officers commissioned in adjutant general, armor, chemical, military police and ordnance are eligible for a $30,000 critical skills-retention bonus.
- Officers commissioned in aviation, transportation, infantry, field artillery, and military intelligence are eligible for a $35,000 CSRB.

Additional CSRB information can be found in Military Personnel message 07-237, available online at https://www.hrc.army.mil

KIM HENRY

UAS Video Terminal Connects
Boots on Ground to Eyes in Sky

Soldiers can now get an unprecedented instantaneous view of the battlefield through the One-System Remote Video Terminal.

Army’s key goal,” said Lieutenant Colonel Adam Hinsdale, chief of the UAS Division, Department of the Army Aviation Directorate. “The OSRVT is a vital component of manned/unmanned teaming, allowing all elements, air and ground, to view the same synchronized area of interest simultaneously for coordinated engagement, with either kinetic or non-kinetic effects.”

PEO Aviation fielded the first of 1,000 OSRVTs in February, and the system will soon be common throughout the modular force. Laptop units are in use by ground combat teams, while 12 command and control UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters are already equipped with this system. OSRVTs have been integrated into 28 Strykers headed to Iraq, and the system will be in Apache cockpits by next summer.

“It is the link that brings it all together to the end user, the Soldier,” said Tim Owings, Army UAS deputy project manager.

(Kim Henry serves with PEO Aviation Public Affairs.)
Staff Sergeant Joshua Olson considers himself “very, very lucky.” At 28, he’s doing the job he dreamed of doing as a boy, growing up in Spokane, Washington. He’s Soldiering — “there’s no better job in the world.” And if the stars align just right, the former high school athlete will be the first active-duty Soldier to compete in the Paralympics.

Not bad for a man with one leg.

Olson lost his right leg — all of it — four years ago when his squad was ambushed in Iraq. What should have put an end to the only career he ever wanted turned out to be a blessing in disguise, Olson said.

“I try to find the good in everything, but sometimes it sucks,” he said. “When I get frustrated, I have a friend I call. He’s like, ‘Do a 360-degree turn Josh and look at where you’re at. How many people get to do that?’”

“That,” among other things, is Olson’s opportunity to compete on the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit. “The best-kept secret in the Army,” he calls it. After two and a half years on the International Rifle Team, he ranks eighth in the world as a prone shooter with his .22 caliber rifle. He’s training for the Paralympics next year in Beijing, and he hopes to compete in the 2012 Olympics.

“It’s pretty amazing when I think about it,” Olson said. “The places I’ve been and the stuff I’ve done — the opportunities I would never have had if I hadn’t got hurt.”

Master Sergeant Jock Olson, of the Washington Air National Guard, remembers his son playing Army at a very young age. Somewhere around the house, there’s a picture of the boy at 5 or 6 decked out in BDUs and green face paint.

Ten years ago, right out of high school, Josh attended basic training at Fort Benning. The Army was everything he thought it would be, his father said. Josh loved the discipline. And he loved to run.

After a couple of years at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, six months in Kosovo and a year in Korea, Josh shipped out to Iraq in 2003. He served as a squad leader with the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment. Eight months into his deployment, in October, he was leading a patrol “for the hundredth time” through the streets of Telafar, just west of Mosul, when they came under fire. Olson said he jumped out of the forward vehicle and returned fire.

A rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) struck the truck and knocked him to the ground. The impact knocked the wind from him, Olson said, but he told himself to get up and walk it off like he did in those high school football games.

He couldn’t muster the strength to rise, and from where he lay, stretched out on his back with a cumbersome plated vest protecting his torso, Olson couldn’t see the hole at the base of his right hip. It wasn’t until his Soldiers had squalched the attack and returned to his aid that Olson realized he’d been badly injured.

“The look on their faces, I’ll never forget it,” he said. “I knew it was bad then.”

Olson was bleeding profusely when they lifted him into a truck and retrieved his leg, but still he felt no pain.

“I remember thinking here goes — I’m not going to make it. I said a quick prayer; ‘Take care of Mom and Dad and let them know I didn’t feel any pain,’” he said.

When Olson woke up nine days later in Walter Reed, his mother and father had already been standing vigil by his bed for nearly a week. They flew to Germany first, where they found their son clinging to life. A collapsed lung and shrapnel wounds complicated treatment for his severed leg.

Jock credits “the good Lord” for saving his son, and Josh agrees. But they’re both quick to praise the staff at Walter Reed, also.

“What they did for him was truly amazing,” Jock said. “That’s one of the best hospitals in the world.”

As he healed and learned to walk with a prosthetic leg, Josh made lots of new friends at Walter Reed. Celebrities dropped in to visit. President Bush delivered his Purple Heart. Vietnam veterans, mostly amputees, shared their stories and listened to his.

But it was the other wounded warriors that impacted Josh the most. Together they learned to cope with their disabilities.

“When a bad day, you’d look around and see people worse off than you,” he said. “You see somebody with two legs but no arms or half a skull. You learn to be happy for what you have. It’s funny, but the general attitude among amputees is ‘I’m glad I lost this and not that.’”

Patients at Walter Reed are encouraged to participate in a program there that teaches them to enjoy outdoor sports again — fishing, shooting and such. A recruiter from the AMU recognized Josh’s potential as a shooter and offered him a chance to stay in the Army.

“I couldn’t believe it. I already had a job lined up when I got out,” he said. “Then I came here for an interview and I was in awe. I still am. We have the greatest coaches here, the greatest teammates, the best gunsmiths and facilities in the world. And I get to stay in the Army.”

(Bridgett Siter is the assistant editor of The Bayonet at Fort Benning, Georgia.)
**MANAGING THE BRIGADE FIGHT:**

**ASSET SYNCHRONIZATION**

**CAPTAIN JEFFREY ROBERTS**

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army has an enormous amount of maneuver forces and enablers conducting decentralized operations throughout the operating environment (OE). Whether the OE is large swaths of rural terrain or condensed urban areas, it is essential to keep track of what each unit is doing, when they are executing missions, and where they are in the OE. This not only provides situational awareness for the battle captain, but also allows the commander to rapidly reallocate combat power in the event of unforeseen events. Tracking the numerous units operating in the brigade area of operations (AO) can be accomplished in as little as 15 minutes a day using the following asset synchronization tools.

The purpose of the daily asset synchronization meeting is to give the brigade staff situational awareness of the major lethal and non-lethal operations. It also ensures that the missions do not interfere with each other and that the appropriate assets have been allocated to each mission. To do this, it is necessary to know what missions are planned, where the missions will take place, when the missions will occur, and what assets are requested. Here are some simple digital tools to track this information:

1. A daily matrix (on a shared excel file)

---

### Asset Synchronization Matrix*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Time Grid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BITT 4500 CONDUCTS RECON OF IRAQI BORDER PATROL FORTS (OPN ALPHA)</td>
<td>IOT FACILITATE THE TRAINING AND OPERATIONS ALONG THE IRAQI BORDER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>C/1-501 CONDUCTS AFRIDE IN BABAHANI (DAY 1)</td>
<td>IOT TO FAMILIARIZE NEW COMMANDER OF THE AO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A/423 CONDUCTS ROUTE SANITIZATION (OPN BRAVO)</td>
<td>IOT DENY AIR FROM EMPLACING IDES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RCT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>POSITION AT FOB ISKAN</td>
<td>IOT CONDUCT PCCA/PCCs; A/725 CLP WILL FOLLOW RCT TO ISKAN; CHRISSY, JACKSON, CLEVELAND TO ISKAN ISO OPN CHARLIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RO</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ROUTE SANITATION (OPN BRAVO) RTE AIBLE, BAKER</td>
<td>ISO 1-501 (F3-509)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>MISSION RECOVERY</td>
<td>SUSTAINMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>MISSION RECOVERY</td>
<td>SUSTAINMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MISSION RECOVERY</td>
<td>VEHICLE PERSONNEL SEARCHES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>A^0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ISO 15017T</td>
<td>OP FOX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ISO 15018T</td>
<td>OP BRAVO (1300-15000) &amp; OP FOX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CONDUCT SURVEILLANCE ISO 25777MT</td>
<td>OP ECHO 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Note that each unit has a task, purpose, time, and grid (grids deleted and operational names changed for security reasons).

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[4 INFANTRY September-October 2007]
that lists units and assets that are conducting missions, their task and purpose, hours of operation, and general grid or route that they are on. (See chart on page 4.)

2. A digital map (on powerpoint) of the AO with color-coded dots indicating where the unit or asset will be located.

3. A timeline at the bottom of the map with color-coded bars indicating when the units are conducting the mission.

4. Published concepts of operations (CONOPs) that have the details of the planned missions.

The responsibility of asset synchronization usually belongs to the future operations (FUOPs) officer. However, it requires the participation of all major staff sections in order to be effective and a useful tool. Once a day each staff section should go into the shared Excel file from their own workstations to update what their assets are doing. Then they open the Powerpoint map and place a dot to mark the position where the asset will be operating. In the afternoon or evening all staff sections meet in one location with dual projection capability where the map and the matrix can be displayed simultaneously. Each staff section briefs three days out using the map, matrix, and timeline. The FUOPs, having read the CONOPs, ensures that all planned operations are allocated the requested resources at the correct time and location. The map and timebar make discrepancies obvious. For example, if a convoy is on Route Red and the accompanying route clearance team is shown on Route Green, there is a problem. Likewise, if the time bar shows that Operation Strike is taking place from 0500–1200 but the attack aviation support is from 1700–1900, the offset time bars clearly indicate the problem. This process also highlights some of the smaller enabler units, such as psychological operations (PSYOPs) and Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (EPRT), who may have planned missions without the proper support or without an appreciation of the current enemy situation. A position dot in the middle of an insurgent support zone will be immediately noticed! And since all the staff sections are present, discrepancies like these can be immediately resolved. Once the outstanding issues have been resolved, the FUOPs confirms that the changes have been made and posts the asset synch at a shared location for current operations to use.

After using this process for 10 months, I have found the following to be most effective:

1. A knowledgeable representative from each staff section should attend. Recommended attendees are the maneuver planner, indirect fires, air liaison officer, engineer, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) manager, brigade air officer, military working dogs, logistics, PSYOPs, Information Operations, Civil Affairs, EPRT, Public Affairs, brigade commander’s assistant, and the brigade battle captain.

2. Only major maneuver operations should be displayed because every single patrol will clutter the utility of the product. Major operations are defined as missions that have assets, company or larger-sized missions, and battalion main effort missions. Usually three to six maneuver missions are briefed every day.

3. Having the battle captain or chief of operations attend gives them situational awareness of the planned operations.

4. The synchronization should go three to four days out.

5. If all staff officers update their information prior to the meeting, the meeting itself should be a 15-minute confirmation brief.

Here are some of the common problems that asset synchronization can prevent:

- Having the supply convoy drive down a route before route clearance;
- Having attack aviation show up for a mission that was cancelled; and
- Having close air support (CAS), helicopters, and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support a mission all at the same time while leaving other times unsupported.

With asset synchronization these problems can be identified and solved before the troops on the ground find themselves without the support they need.

**Captain Jeffrey Roberts** is currently the future operations officer for 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, which is currently serving in Iraq. He previously served as commander of B Company, 3rd Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne) and served in Afghanistan with Task Force 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment. He is a graduate of the U.S Army Ranger and Jumpmaster Schools.

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**SUBMIT AN ARTICLE TO INFANTRY MAGAZINE**

We are now accepting articles for publication in *Infantry Magazine*. Topics for articles can include information on organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques, and procedures. We can also use relevant historical articles, with the emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. If you’re unsure a topic is suitable, please feel free to contact our office and run your ideas by us. We’ll let you know whether we would be interested in the article, and we can also give any further guidance you may need.

A complete Writer’s Guide can be found on our web site at https://www.infantry.army.mil/magazine (will need AKO login/password). Please contact us with any questions or concerns.

**E-mail** — michelle.rowan@us.army.mil

**Telephone** — (706) 545-2350/6951 or DSN 835-2350/6951

**Mail** — INFANTRY Magazine, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31905

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September-October 2007 INFANTRY 5
Imagine that you are riding in the trail gun truck along with three other members of your platoon when your vehicle develops engine trouble and coasts to a stop. You try to establish communications with the convoy leader as you watch the convoy move farther away. Then you attempt to check in with a communications relay station. The vehicle commander suggests trying the “Sheriff’s net,” but no one responds to your calls. The gunner alerts you that there are armed men assembling and heading your way. They begin engaging your gun truck with small arms fire. The team begins to return fire and you begin working the radio frantically trying to raise a close air support (CAS) aircraft or any friendly unit. Nothing. You are becoming decisively engaged, so your leader uses the Blue Force Tracker to alert the Personnel Recovery Cell that you are in trouble. Unfortunately, you still can’t raise anyone on the radio.

Soon, you are running low on ammunition, and the enemy strength is increasing. Two of your team members have become wounded. Your leader evaluates the situation and decides that your best chance for survival is to evade and use the approaching darkness to break contact with the enemy.

The team scours the vehicle for supplies that might prove useful. You disable the heavy weapons and destroy the vehicle communications equipment. You begin moving out per the evasion plan of action (EPA). You pray that someone has received the Blue Force Tracker alert.

After you’ve successfully broken contact, you go into evasion mode. You are now isolated in enemy territory, outnumbered, low on ammunition, food and water; with two of your fellow Soldiers wounded ...with no one answering your radio calls for help.

Moving quickly, you put as much distance as possible between you, the vehicle, and the insurgents. The leader reassures everyone that the convoy leader will realize that something has gone wrong at
the next scheduled commo check. “He’s sure to turn around and look for us.” You try to eliminate the thought, “Yeah, but what if he’s too late.”

Your leader decides to halt for a map check. Everyone is listening for sounds of the enemy on your trail. You would like to believe that the enemy will be satisfied by capturing a vehicle, but somehow you don’t think that is likely. It’s time to move. The leader has decided on a hide site that is close by and provides cover and concealment.

As you settle into the hide site, you begin to take stock of your situation. You try to recall your pre-deployment SERE (survival, evasion, resistance and escape) instruction. How much ammunition do we have remaining? How much water? How soon will the convoy leader come for us? Has a unit been launched to recover us? How are they supposed to know where we are now that we’ve left the vehicle? What is our next step? How do we signal to friendlies where we are? What if...

What if this were to happen to you or a member of your unit? Do you know what to do? What does your SOP say about preventing and responding to isolating events? Is everyone in your unit fully aware of how to survive, evade, resist and escape and ultimately to aid in their own recovery? Does everyone understand how to set out a ground to air signal (GTAS) to alert friendly air assets that you are in the area? Do you know the procedures for calling for close air support? Do you, and every member of your team, know — beyond a shadow of a doubt — how to respond in an isolating event? These, and other questions, can be answered by developing and cultivating a comprehensive Personnel Recovery program in your unit.

**Personnel Recovery**

Although the title, Personnel Recovery (PR), is relatively new to the conventional Army, the Warrior Tasks and training associated with PR are older than the Army itself. The tasks associated with the Code of Conduct (COC) are all under the “umbrella” of Personnel Recovery. All SERE training is organized and conducted to help members of the military adhere to the tenets of the COC.

**Real World Personnel Recovery Story**

In Mogadishu, Somalia on October 3-4, 1993, elements of Joint Task Force Ranger were defending recovery forces, at “Super Six One” (Chief Warrant Officer 4 Clifton Wolcott’s aircraft). Later, in an interview, one of the M60 machine gunners reported that his gun jammed on three separate occasions that night. But, because of the relentless training that Corporal Jamie Smith had put the gun teams through, he was able to take immediate action and keep the gun in operation. At one point, when he had the feed tray cover up and was engaged in clearing a jam, enemy forces rushed his position. But, CPL Smith had prepared him for that, too. This Ranger employed accurate 9mm pistol fire to break up the assault. He then returned to the task of clearing the jam, put the weapon back in action and continued firing his M60 until it was destroyed by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).

With that as a starting point, it’s easy to see how Warrior Tasks have direct PR implications. For example, patrolling and even movement-to-contact techniques can be employed for evasion. In fact, the famous Roger’s Rangers Rules provide instructions regarding moving with stealth to prevent enemy forces from tracking your unit.

The same can be said for land navigation training, which facilitates our movement toward the enemy or an objective. It could prove to be a crucial skill when employed to evade the enemy and move to a recovery site.

Effective training and use of weapons systems can fall under the aegis of Personnel Recovery. Preventing an isolating event or a hostage-taking attempt may require us to employ one or several weapons systems. Not only is it important to be a good marksman, but Soldiers need to be able to perform immediate action on their weapons, while under stressful conditions, in periods of reduced visibility, during inclement weather, etc.

Pre-deployment environmental training provides a basis for surviving in different regions and climates. Cultural briefings supply us with knowledge necessary to avoid offending host nation personnel and, if held captive, may provide clues in developing the proper resistance posture.

You may be saying to yourself, all of these things are pretty obvious and intuitive, they’re the basic Soldier skills, right? The answer is yes, of course, but they definitely deem repeating in this context. Since you know what you need to do to prepare to survive enemy engagement, it follows that you know how to survive a break in contact and isolation. However, we don’t tend to spend a lot of time talking about and training for this particular part of the mission requirement. Deliberate pre-planning, rehearsal, and memorization of these key skills and how they apply to surviving, evading, resisting and escaping can mean the difference between life and death if you become isolated on the battlefield.

PR is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to effect the recovery and return of U.S. military, DOD Civilians, DOD contractor personnel or others as determined by the Secretary of Defense who are isolated, missing, detained, or captured (IMDC) in an operational environment.

Until recently, SERE training and other advanced Code of Conduct instruction, were limited to members of the military who were identified as “high risk of capture.” Those populations were generally special operations forces and air crews, who historically operated forward of the friendly lines.

Conventional Soldiers, and especially those in support occupations, were traditionally less likely to be captured. Occasionally Soldiers would become separated from their units and fall into enemy hands but not often. Captivity was usually the result of combat action when the front lines were ruptured as in the Battle of Bulge in WWII, or during a major retrograde such as when Chinese forces entered the Korean War.

These concepts have changed radically! The enemy we now face has chosen tactics that demand we change the way we train
and prepare. Now, combat actions are being conducted specifically to take hostages vs. captivity being secondary results of combat action.

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen and deployed Army Civilians and contractors all face the threat of capture on today’s battlefields. Once a primary concern of aircrews, secondary for ground troops, and a rare concern for Army Civilians, kidnapping and hostage-taking have become a powerfully sought means to satisfy insurgent’s desires for highly visible actions that they feel give the illusion of domination over powerful coalition forces.

In 2005, the Army introduced the useful doctrinal manual, FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery. Since the implementation of this manual, the Army has made great strides in developing and expanding the Army Personnel Recovery program.

In May 2005, General Peter J. Schoomaker, the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, directed that the Army ensure “every leader, Soldier, Army Civilian and contractor is trained to survive isolating situations and trained in actions to recover those lost. We must rapidly transform our past combat search and rescue (CSAR) concept into one that uses all of our air, ground, and maritime capabilities to rapidly report, locate, support, recover and return our Soldiers, Civilians and contractors to friendly control… It is essential TRADOC continue to advance doctrine and rapidly push forward to implement education in our schools.”

Even with the command emphasis on this vital training, disconnects and shortfalls continue to occur that need to be redressed. PR training is now mandated in pre-deployment requirements for COCOMs, and although “SERE 100” is the program most closely associated with PR pre-deployment requirements, it is hardly the only PR training required.

In June 2005, the Army G3/5/7, Lieutenant General James Lovelace, reinforced the CSA’s instructions with a few of his own. Some of the key points that the G3 included in his message are:

- Every leader is responsible for planning and preparing his unit and personnel for isolating events and support of recovery activities.
- Personnel Recovery will be embedded in all plans and orders as a routine objective.
- We must expedite PR transformation in the Army by producing changes in education and training.
- Incorporate PR events in all mission readiness exercises

Soldiers with the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division run down a street operations in Baghdad July 1, 2007.

Staff Sergeant Curt Cashour
If your convoy came under fire and your vehicles were disabled, do you know what would happen next if your Soldiers were left to fight it out with insurgents intent on taking an American hostage? ... These rhetorical questions are not to fill you with fear and doubt but to provide you with some important considerations that you will want to address before leading that next convoy.

Food for thought
Are you aware of the actions you can take that can help prevent an isolating event? If you were to become separated from your unit, alone or with a small team, what is your unit SOP regarding PR? What are you supposed to do? How will your unit respond? If a convoy taking you from Kuwait through Iraq to your initial forward operating base was hit by an enemy ambush seeking U.S. hostages, do you know who would join the fight to help recover your unit?

Small unit leaders, have you included PR in your troop leading procedures? Are your Soldiers trained to survive, evade, resist and escape capture? Do they know how to signal aircraft with GTAS—day and night? Have you reviewed the air tasking order special instructions (ATO SPINS) and recovery site protocols with your unit? What is your battle drill for a lost Soldier? If you discover that one of your vehicles (with three Soldiers) is missing after the last “head count,” what is your plan of action?

Senior leaders, are you including high-quality operations orders and operational support in your metrics for success, or are you limiting your “signals for success” to “number of trucks,” “on time SPs” and “tonnage hauled”? Have you made it clear to your subordinate leaders that as soon as they suspect someone may be missing they must report this immediately?

Are you routinely talking with junior officers and senior NCOs controlling convoys and other small unit combat operations to ensure that these young warriors are receiving top quality support? Have you asked them if they are in contact with the fast movers overhead and could call for and adjust CAS if needed? Have you ensured that the air tasking order—special instructions (ATO SPINS) are getting down to every echelon? Are you including PR exercises and rehearsals in every MRX?

Do you feel confident that your subordinates know the PR plan for a “missing transition team member,” and if that plan has been exercised and rehearsed? Have they back briefed their understanding of the plan? Are they prepared with equipment and a plan to prevent themselves from being taken captive? Are the Soldiers you consider at high risk receiving required training from certified personnel?

Colonel Arthur Stang, a former brigade commander in the 82nd Airborne Division had a 3x5 card on his desk that summed up his leadership philosophy. “Have you talked to the troops today? What about the wrench turners and the cooks? Remember, the only thing you lead from behind this desk is your pencil.”

Everyone has a role to play in Personnel Recovery training and operations. Have you done your part?

Wayne Heard began his career with the Army in 1972, serving in the 82nd Airborne Division. He was the Distinguished Leadership Graduate from his Officer Candidate School class and graduated from the Infantry Officers Basic and Advanced Courses, Ranger School, and the Special Forces Officers Course. In addition to the 82nd, he served with 25th Infantry Division, 5th Special Forces Group, Cadet Command and 10th Special Forces Group. He began his association with Personnel Recovery as the S-3 and XO of 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group. He is the Director of Personnel Recovery, and has worked in the HQDA PR Office since May 2005 as a contractor with TATE, Incorporated.
History has shown that without combat service support and sustainment operations, the warfighting capability of any unit is certainly diminished, and potentially leads to interruption of combat operations. Hence, the ability to develop innovative, adaptive combat service support sustainment processes remains a strong principle within contingency operations.

The 782nd Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) has brought such innovation to the modern battlefield of Afghanistan. Due to the expertise and initiative of the Soldiers of the 782nd BSB, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, the Army has a new aerial resupply capability in the form of the Thestral "Speedball" Low Cost, Low Altitude (LCLA) Aerial Delivery System.

The LCLA program is a new and innovative means of aerial delivery currently being employed throughout portions of Afghanistan. The program differs from the Air Force high velocity container delivery system (CDS) drops in that bundles are smaller in size and delivered at a very low altitude from a smaller civilian-style aircraft with almost pinpoint accuracy — usually within 20 meters of the established point of impact (PI).

CONCEPT

If you have never seen LCLA firsthand, you would not understand the true disposable nature of this system. This system is truly "low cost," based on parachutes made of sandbag materials, risers made of swingset plastic rope, and the total cost of the system is less than $100 each. These systems are truly expendable as well. In other words, there is no need to backhaul air items for reuse based on the high consumption rate. Ultimately, the Soldier on the drop zone (DZ) can cut the lashings, take the supplies, and leave the chute and lashings behind.

LCLA bundles can comprise virtually all classes of supply and have ranged in weight from 250 to 560 pounds. Bundles are constructed on 2-foot by 4-foot wooden skids using A-7A cargo straps to attach the loads to the skids as well as to hold the loads together. The three parachutes used in conducting the LCLA drops are the T-10 personnel parachute, the T-10R reserve parachute, and the Stalker (Cross) parachute. The T-10 parachutes are beyond their useful lifespan for personnel use and are taken from Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) inventories and utilized in this disposable fashion. They are a one-time use parachute and are "free of cost," per se. The Stalker parachute is made of extruded polypropylene (much like sandbag material) and is also considered disposable.

The LCLA system is designed to provide a "one-time" solution that is reliable and inexpensive. LCLA also was designed to require NO rigger support. The intent of LCLA was to improve the "speedball" method of airdrop and was intended for units that don’t have rigger support (non-airborne units). If this intent is maintained, then the requirement for rigger and jumpmaster (JM) support increases the opportunities for units that typically don’t have riggers/JMs. This is a topic of discussion amongst the test evaluators back in the United States. However, the 782nd BSB’s current stance is that LCLA missions should have one JM-qualified paratrooper on the aircraft to ensure safe delivery of the bundle. However, we do see utility of non-airborne units taking advantage of this method of aerial resupply. To bridge this gap we see some form of application training course being developed in one of the combat service support proponents.

FROM CONCEPT TO COMBAT OPERATIONS

The 782nd BSB is the only unit within the U.S. Army that has fully planned, tested, and executed LCLA operations in a combat
environment. With full testing at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the organization has gained approval from the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Center, Natick, Massachusetts, for execution within the Afghanistan area of responsibility (AOR). In the first six months of its deployment, the battalion conducted more than 55 LCLA resupply missions and delivered more than 620 bundles of all classes of supply. As a result of this capability, it is now common for maneuver units to plan, request, and execute LCLA operations during normal mission planning and concept of operations (CONOP) development.

The aircraft used to conduct LCLA drops in Afghanistan is the CASA 212. At home station and at Fort Polk, C-23 Sherpas were used. Changing aircraft necessitated adaptation of rigging procedures. The aircraft in Afghanistan are flown by Blackwater Corporation pilots, who primarily transported personnel and mail across the battlefield before getting the LCLA contract. The aircraft can carry up to six bundles and a jumpmaster team to deliver the bundles on the drop zone. Depending on the temperature, altitude and flight time, the total weight of cargo and crew is approximately 3,500 pounds.

Currently, LCLA aircraft teams consist of four airborne-qualified personnel, at least two of whom need to be qualified jumpmasters. During the flight to the drop zone, the jumpmasters will verify the loads are properly hooked up to the anchor line cable and prepared for delivery. As the aircraft approaches the DZ, the jumpmaster team positions the bundles to be dropped by pushing them onto the ramp of the aircraft. Two personnel hold the bundles in place while the other two prepare to push the loads. The loadmaster, in concert with the pilots, calls one-minute, 30-second, and 10-second warnings and then “execute.” Upon the command to execute, the jumpmaster team pushes the rear bundle along the roller systems on the floor of the aircraft which deploys all bundles and their parachutes.

The DZ setup includes a modified version of the raised angle marker (RAM). The modifications made to the RAM were based on the differences in delivery between the Air Force CDS and the LCLA. The standard RAM is designed for high performance aircraft to deliver the bundles from 800 feet above ground level (AGL), which gives the pilots visibility of the DZ a mile or so away. Since the CASA 212 is traveling at roughly 30 feet AGL during transit and 120 feet AGL during the drop, the RAMDA (Raised Angle Marker Developed for Afghanistan) is raised to a height of roughly 20 feet to ensure visibility and give the pilots maximum time to acquire the DZ. This DZ can subsequently be utilized in an omni-directional manner to minimize the enemy threat to aircraft during the operation.

An air mission briefing is conducted prior to the operation where the air crew is briefed by the battalion S2 on weather, terrain and any enemy threats, using past enemy patterns, drop zone imagery and current situation report (SITREP) analysis.

**PURPOSE AND BENEFITS (REASONS TO CONDUCT LCLA OPERATIONS):**

**Simplicity:**
- LCLA operations can resupply platoon-size units during missions when normal sustainment delivery means are impossible due to the factors of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians). Furthermore, the 782nd BSB has tailored these droppable bundles in a matter that allows for a two-man lift into the back of a trailer or variants of the HMMWV guntruck (M1025/M1151/M1152, for example).
- Bundle design that does not require de-rigging by the ground unit at the drop zone. This allows the maneuver unit to quickly receive the resupply with minimal exposure time at the drop zone.
- As an evolving process that has become quite refined by the 782nd BSB, LCLA operations are quite simplistic in nature. Hence, opportunities exist to cross-train other units in LCLA operations. Currently, the jumpmasters of the BSB are cross-training the 173rd Airborne Brigade (the other BCT currently deployed in CJTF-82) with the SOPs and lessons learned by the 782nd BSB over the last six months in theater.
- Based on the simplicity of the bundle design and parachute rigging, the system offers the sustainment organization an inexpensive and efficient system of aerial combat resupply.

**Versatility:**
- Small unit operations, especially
small units in maneuver (such as CJSOTF, ETTs and conventional platoon and below operations), are easily supported by LCLA.

- LCLA operations deliver all classes of supply, to include larger bundles such as Class III fuel blivets and Class V ammunition up to 155mm rounds, that would not be possible by other means due to the factors of METT-TC.

- LCLA operations do not require drop zone surveys prior to delivery. This allows these operations to take place in merely any terrain condition on the battlefield, to include drops on hillsides, mountain tops, and valleys.

- LCLA operations provide the U.S. Army the capability to conduct organic aerial resupply operations via Army fixed-wing (Army C-23 Sherpa or Casa 212) or rotary-wing (UH-60 Blackhawk or CH-47 Chinook) assets if other joint capabilities (Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps assets) are unavailable. The versatility of these airframes has proven to be a combat multiplier in the harsh and hostile environmental conditions of Afghanistan. Thus these airframes are subsequently proven candidates for the expansion of future LCLA operations within the AOR and other worldwide contingency operations.

- Similarly, using the CASA 212 aircraft for logistics missions has not only opened up a new means of aerial resupply, but has also decreased the operational requirements on military rotary-wing assets utilized in other operational and transportation missions. Contracted STOL (short take-off and landing) aircraft do not take the place of military air assets, but they allow the maneuver commander more options to conduct full-spectrum operations across the battle space.

**Risk Mitigation:**

- More than 620 bundles have been dropped to date (February-July 2007), and there have been no significant safety issues or parachute malfunctions based on the simplicity of the operation.

- Due to low altitude of the aerial delivery platform (actual AGL withheld to maintain operational security), the resupply bundle descends to the drop zone within seconds; this short descent time limits the ability of the enemy to observe the “glide path” of the bundle, reducing the risk and potential exposure of the ground element.

- With the development of a new marking system — RAMDA, LCLA operations are precise and have been within +/- 20 meters of the heavy impact point of impact (HEPI) on every delivery. Hence, this refinement makes the LCLA operation repeatable and reduces the risks associated with “misses” on the drop zone.

- Currently, the LCLA drops that have been completed have taken place during the hours of daylight. Future LCLA operations will include night operations with the Blackwater air crews flying under night vision goggles (NVGs). This will make this method of aerial delivery even safer from enemy threats. It will also avoid setting a pattern of delivery, allowing utilization of all hours of day and night for air drops.

**LESSONS LEARNED:**

Nearly every phase related to LCLA operations is a definitive lesson learned by the 782nd BSB, which is the only unit in the Army to successfully execute LCLA operations within a combat zone. Hence, all the SOPs, procedures, and appendices that accompany this observation, albeit in draft form, are in themselves lessons learned from the planning, preparation, and execution phases of LCLA operations both at Fort Bragg, and in the Regional Command – East (CJTF-82) AOR in Afghanistan.

Combat LCLA operations have grown exponentially and are now a common form of combat aerial resupply within 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. All the lessons learned, to include all documentation, are currently being transferred to the 173rd Airborne Brigade via “train-the-trainer” instruction between both of the brigades.

LCLA operations in the 4th BCT’s AOR are fully institutionalized and are now planned via normal air mission request procedures (to include all necessary documentation and coordination, such as CONOP development and approval).

**THE “WAY AHEAD:”**

The 782nd BSB is continuing to collect data after each LCLA operation. This data should be subsequently reviewed by appropriate proponents prior to institutionalization of LCLA operations by the U.S. Army. Furthermore, with maturation of the program, the potential clearly exists to conduct LCLA operations without a jumpmaster, which will allow non-airborne units (armor, mechanized and other light infantry units) to conduct LCLA operations within the GWOT AOR.

All drops currently being conducted in theater have been, and are still technically experimental. The only trained personnel in-theater include paratroopers assigned to the 4th BCT that are
currently conducting LCLA drops. Furthermore, the 782nd BSB continually reviews all safety notifications/requirements developed by the Airborne Special Operations Test Directorate (ABNSOTD), the U.S. Army Developmental Test Command, and the Natick Soldier Center; these safety issues are continually vetted in Afghanistan through the 4th BCT safety team and jumpmasters.

As a result of these efforts, the 782nd BSB has developed robust documentation that is has codified them as the “LCLA” appendix to the 82nd Airborne Division’s “Airborne SOP,” as outlined below:

**LCLA Operations SOP:**
- Chapter 1 – General Overview
- Chapter 2 – Unit Training and Sustainment
- Chapter 3 – Drop Zone Safety Officer
- Chapter 4 – Jumpmaster Duties
- Chapter 5 – Rigging
- Chapter 6 – Loading Aircraft
- Chapter 7 – Exiting Procedure
- Chapter 8 – Recovery of Equipment
- Chapter 9 – Reports

**LCLA SOP Appendices:**
- Appendix A – CONOP Checklist
- Appendix B – Joint Inspection
- Appendix C – Strike Report
- Appendix D – Load Data Card

**Other Documentation:**
- Chute Consumption: Growth of LCLA operations
- LCLA Jumpmaster Card
- LCLA Parachute Card
- Example CONOP from the Afghanistan AOR
- Raised Angle Marker Developed for Afghanistan (RAMDA) Instructions
- LCLA Training Standards
- LCLA Training Timeline

Within continued coordination with the aforementioned proponents, training and institutionalization of LCLA operations becomes applicable in global contingency and humanitarian assistance and relief operations (for example: natural disaster relief or NGO-support operations), when and where applicable. All individuals are encouraged to recommend additions and/or changes to improve the program and its current SOPs.

**CONCLUSION**

Although doctrine and field manuals exist for airdropping supplies, there are no publications related to the LCLA operational concept. Hence, the aforementioned documentation, lessons learned, and TTPs developed by the 782nd BSB are a valuable source of information and should be treated as such.

The LCLA program is and will continue to be effective throughout the region. The challenges of Afghanistan’s terrain, weather, and remoteness lend directly to this method of resupply. Whether it is a supply mission to a forward base or a platoon experiencing mechanical problems on the side of a road, the LCLA program offers the flexibility, responsiveness, and accuracy to greatly improve the ability to resupply our maneuver forces. The program is one of the quickest and most efficient means to get the supplies to the battlefield with minimal cost in terms of equipment and personnel.

LCLA demonstrates great application of logistics technology that will continue to maintain the tempo of our fight in this theater. Again, thanks go out to many who have provided this capability to the 782nd BSB team and the paratroopers of 4th BCT. The 782nd BSB will continue to partner with Blackwater Corporation, the CJTF-82 staff, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Center during the upcoming months to ensure all TTPs are documented for the team and the U.S. Army.

**Lieutenant Colonel Michael Peterman** is currently deployed to Afghanistan and assigned as commander of the 782nd Brigade Support Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in a variety of Airborne and Special Operations assignments. His combat service includes deployments as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.

**Major Paul J. Narowski II** is currently deployed to Afghanistan and assigned as the executive officer of the 782nd BSB, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in a variety of Airborne and Special Operations assignments. His combat service includes two deployments as part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and one to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Major Ernest Litynski** is currently deployed to Afghanistan and attached to the 82nd Airborne Division as the CALL liaison officer; he has worked extensively with the 4th Brigade Combat Team during the deployment. He has served in multiple Airborne assignments. His combat service includes deployments as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Sergeant First Class Edwin Clouse** is currently deployed to Afghanistan and assigned as the air NCOIC, 782nd BSB, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in a variety of Airborne assignments. His service includes six operational combat deployments to include Somalia, Haiti, two tours to Bosnia, and one each to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The authors would like to give special thanks to all the paratroopers, service members, and Blackwater aviators who have taken this conceptual idea through creation, documentation, and to current execution of combat-proven, LCLA airborne operations in Afghanistan. Airborne - All the Way.
A
n Achievable Vision: The Report of the Department of Defense Task Force on Mental Health was published in June 2007. That lengthy report continues to challenge the current paradigms of mental health care within the military services. The task force recognized the evolution of the military arts and the complex advancement of military technology, noting: “The military has thus far sought to improve human effectiveness primarily through better combat tactics, more highly lethal weaponry, and powerfully developed physical strength and endurance. Future combat, however, will demand more — more flexibility, more agility, and more resilience.” The latter statement reveals where the core of the study focuses — namely, on the human component.

The human component is not a mechanical, electronic, or cybernetic creation. We are not only simply a matter of flesh and blood, but are far more — human beings with physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual elements — and needs — that come together to create our unique personalities. If any one or a combination of these elements falls out of balance, all the elements become likewise disrupted in varying degrees. How do we maintain a mission ready force when we have Soldiers and family members who come to the Army with “hidden injuries” or who receive “hidden injuries” in the line of duty?

We have the technology to remove shrapnel or to set a broken bone, but it is not so easy to heal persons who have been forced to face situations beyond their capability to handle. It is not easy to bring back individuals who are so deeply ashamed by what life has demanded that they can no longer connect to their closest intimate attachments and significant others — namely, spouses and children. How do you bring to life again the human spirit and the human soul that has died or that is deeply wounded by life generally and/or by duty in particular?

As an organization, we legislate and implement a multiplicity of great programs. At the end of the day, what have our efforts accomplished? The caregivers across our post — chaplains, mental health providers, social workers, medical staff, and ACS and Family Advocacy staff have performed in an outstanding manner even with resources stretched to the limit. Yet, the needs and demands grow. And, the greater the demands upon individual care providers within the system to deal with the needs, the more daunting the task becomes.

The human component cannot thrive in isolation, nor can it thrive automatically. Neither can care of the human component be simply mandated in order for it to be effective. Care of the human component must be part of the core of who we are as an organization and as a community. Healing that brings wholeness is the duty of the whole community at every level. The task is to create an ethos that maintains the delicate balance between holding the individual responsible for the task at hand and providing the care that nurtures and

**Editor’s Note:** As we continue to examine the impact of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder as we did in the July-August issue of Infantry, we realize that the consequences of combat and other factors can cause Soldiers and Families to give more than they have to give. This article by a seasoned officer and Family Life Chaplain addresses yet another dimension of this critical ongoing initiative to alleviate the effects of those hidden injuries and where possible to avoid the injuries through timely intervention. This article originally appeared in the August 23, 2007, issue of the Fort Irwin, California, High Desert Warrior. Reprinted with the permission of the Fort Irwin Public Affairs Office.

“We have the technology to remove shrapnel or to set a broken bone, but it is not so easy to heal persons who have been forced to face situations beyond their capability to handle.”
cultivates the agility and resilience for the individual and the family to continue in the task. What will be the desired outcome that will indicate that we as an organization and a community have reached this praiseworthy ideal? We will know we have succeeded when we see the results of mutual caregiving throughout every level of our organization and community, from the top to the bottom and from the bottom to the top.

When I lived in England, in the early 80’s to the late 90’s, the milkman still delivered milk to my door and I paid him in person. The same was the case with the window cleaner. I knew my banker, postman, and the local shopkeepers. When I was too sick to go to the doctor’s office, the doctor came to my home. The local clergy, including myself, visited the homes of our parishioners and we were involved in the life of the community. Community activities and projects became times which brought individuals and families together for a common task. As I reflect back over that time, I think that there was something healing and healthy about it all. I felt that I was an essential part of the life of that community, both by my own participation and by involving others. The community and its activities gave a sense of belonging and identity even to the outsider who joined. In the presumption of health, I believe that many, though maybe not all, who faced “hidden injuries” found hope and healing in that environment because they were brought out of a sense of isolation to a sense of belonging and hope.

Within our current community, we have some individuals and families who have known nothing but isolation and disconnection for their entire lives, while others face challenges that are more temporary in nature. Professional caregivers work every day to bring healing to the “hidden injuries” of life, but professional caregivers cannot always provide all that is required for the task at hand. However, we can all work together to create organizations and communities characterized by agility, resilience, and — most of all — hope. This is how we take care of Soldiers and Families.

Chaplain (Major) Tammie Crews holds a Bachelor of Arts degree (summa cum laude) in Religious Studies from Trevecca Nazarene University in Nashville, Tennessee, a Master of Divinity degree (magna cum laude) in Biblical Studies and Theology from Nazarene Theological Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri, and a Master of Science degree in Community Counseling, specializing in Family Counseling, from Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia. Her military education includes the Chaplain Officer Basic and Career Courses and the Command and Service School. She has served as the battalion chaplain for the 189th Command Support Battalion at Fort Bragg, the 485th Corps Support Battalion in Hanau, Germany, and as a battalion chaplain in the 1-501st Aviation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. She has served on deployments to Haiti and Macedonia, and is currently the Family Life Chaplain at Fort Irwin, California.

**CULTURE:**

**Reasons for Friendly and Enemy Analysis**

**CAPTAIN WILLIAM AULT**

Embroided in insurgencies in foreign countries, the United States is struggling with adapting to the ever-changing environment as well as adjusting the response of our forces in order to succeed. Although the United States military is adapting and learning valuable lessons while fighting the insurgency in Iraq, time is running out. The clock is ticking with regards to the American population. I contend that the national will of the American population is the Strategic Center of Gravity for the United States. Here is where the real power lies that enables the nation to be a Superpower.

What is the United States military’s strategic Center of Gravity? In order to answer this, we must first define the term Center of Gravity (COG). In his book *On War*, Carl Von Clausewitz defined the term as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends.” The question that needs to be asked when trying to determine what could be a COG is, “What is it that alone could possibly cause the enemy to yield if it were attacked?” The COG represents a concentration of strength that is most vital to the overall accomplishment of the goal. This, if targeted, would be the most effective target to attack with the resources currently available. This term can be applied to any of the three levels of war, strategic, operational or tactical. Each level of war can have a different COG. Understanding what a Center of Gravity is allows the application of this term to the current environment.

The United States is currently engaged in fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. These low intensity conflicts (LIC) or operations other than war (OOTW) came about after a decisive conventional victory was achieved by the U.S. armed forces in each of these countries. The tactical and operational battle was quickly won and then the follow on operations began. The premise of these operations is to provide enough security to create a stable environment to allow regular civil and social activities to occur.

During this second phase the guerrillas or insurgents initiated a campaign of subversion to resist the stability effort. They quickly gained momentum and notoriety with the media. They opposed the forces that were attempting to secure and stabilize these countries after the collapse of the previous regimes in an indirect manner. There are many irregular groups fighting against coalition forces (CF) for various stated reasons in each nation. Focus of this article will be on Iraq for simplicity. The common immediate goal for insurgent forces is to expel the foreign forces from Iraq. Only then can they proceed with the individual plans that each group has in mind.

Based on the fact that the U.S. national will derives from an extremely impatient and isolated culture, there is a limit to how much hardship they will endure. The insurgents are exploiting this impatience and intolerance at that strategic level causing more rapid erosion of our staying ability. The military is attempting to learn and adapt at a rapid pace to achieve the
The insurgents know all of this. They have done their homework. They have seen where the United States failed in Vietnam, not because of any tactical or operational defeat on the battlefield, but because of a strategic defeat at the home front where popular support was eroded on the national and then political level. This erosion ultimately led to a reduction in the willingness to support the war effort and then the complete pullout of U.S. armed forces in that country. Ultimately this set the conditions for North Vietnamese success in invading and conquering South Vietnam.

Americans also became extremely casualty conscious after Vietnam. Resistance to the use of military units in small engagements began to proliferate. Attention and focus was emphasized on the Cold War and fighting the Soviet menace, a much more conventional threat. This emphasis tended to obscure any of the valuable lessons learned from Vietnam. Small wars were viewed as extremely undesirable and avoided for some time.

The insurgents also studied the engagements subsequent to Vietnam where the erosion of national and political will in the United States led to the removal of American presence. This occurred in Beirut where, after the Marine Corps barracks bombing, there was a clamor for the troops to be brought home. It also occurred similarly in Somalia after the engagement involving U.S. Army Rangers and Special Operations troops, now publicized in the book and movie Blackhawk Down.

It is this strategic attack on the very core of a large national power that eventually wins. It occurred to the Soviets in Afghanistan in a similar fashion. Even in a dictatorship, there can be similar centers of gravity. By prolonging the conflict and causing a steady but substantial cost, the enemy can be just as deadly in terms of causing a steady but substantial cost, the enemy can be just as deadly in terms of gravity. By prolonging the conflict and causing a steady but substantial cost, the enemy can be just as deadly in terms of causing a steady but substantial cost, the enemy can be just as deadly in terms of causing a steady but substantial cost.

The insurgents are a living and thinking enemy that has done his homework. They have seen where the United States failed in Vietnam, not because of any tactical or operational defeat on the battlefield, but because of a strategic defeat at the home front where popular support was eroded on the national and then political level. This erosion ultimately led to a reduction in the willingness to support the war effort and then the complete pullout of U.S. armed forces in that country. Ultimately this set the conditions for North Vietnamese success in invading and conquering South Vietnam.

The average citizen at that time had experienced tremendous hardships. Endurance was common and a dedication to getting the job accomplished right was prevalent. In many ways we have lost that insight and fortitude. The generation of today would be hard pressed to achieve the same results of our forefathers given the same circumstances.

The United States has become the world’s last superpower. Our ability to project force and our will around the globe and sustain it is without peer at this time. No one would dare oppose the conventional forces of the U.S. in open conflict. We have also acquired a penchant and desire for the comforts that an isolated wealthy society allows. The American people are a society that has become accustomed to being removed from the immediate impact of most of the world’s issues. Surrounded by two oceans and enjoying military supremacy since World War II, this comfort zone has become common.

America is a much different place than it was during World War II and even Korea. The average citizen at that time had endured the Great Depression and
One of the most powerful, versatile, and effective weapon systems of World War II is also the least known and certainly the least understood by Americans. To the casual observer, the German assault gun looks like just another tank or tank destroyer, and these two roles encapsulate the American Soldier’s main experience with assault guns. The German army’s original intent for the assault gun was far different.

Whatever their value during World War II, the larger question is whether assault guns have utility in modern combat, particularly in counterinsurgency operations. The validation of assault guns depends largely on weapon system design, doctrinal incorporation, and recognition of the psychological impact assault guns bring to the battlefield.

A host of specifications influence its design. Its armor and hull must provide adequate crew protection. Assault guns must possess the tactical mobility to accompany dismounted infantry in complex terrain, in various weather conditions, and through natural and man-made obstacles. Finally, strategic and tactical airlift must be able to accommodate assault guns.

Doctrinal incorporation is the basis for justification. Assault guns must provide unique capabilities for which other weapon systems (e.g., tanks) are not well-suited or optimal, e.g., in support of infantry operations. Moreover, the assault gun must be regarded as a weapon system primarily in support of the infantry and not as a multi-purpose weapon. Assault gun units must be integral to infantry organizations, train with them, and understand infantry tactics intimately. Only in this way can infantry optimize their use for various tactical situations.

The psychological impact of assault guns cannot be overstated. Their appearance on the battlefield should strike fear and dread into the enemy while conversely elevating the morale and confidence of friendly troops. In this sense, the main gun must be of sufficient size and power to intimidate the enemy, particularly as it demonstrates the capability to destroy all manner of fortified positions with pinpoint accuracy.

This article will first review the German army’s original intent for assault guns during World War II. It will also examine design specifications for modern assault guns so as to meet the needs of the military throughout the spectrum of conflict. Finally, it will assess the incorporation of assault gun battalions into infantry divisions. The conclusions will reveal that assault guns are perfectly suited for power projection ranging from low intensity to high intensity warfare.

The German Experience

The genesis of the assault gun arose from the debate during the 1930’s in Germany raging between the armor and infantry communities regarding the proper combat role of armor. In essence, the infantry community regarded the tank as an infantry support weapon for tactical operations, whereas the armor community viewed the tank as an independent arm for the swift attainment of campaign objectives. The dilemma for the German army was that both the armor and infantry communities were correct in their assessments. The infantry needed an armored weapon system with sufficient firepower and mobility to allow it to eliminate any enemy resistance quickly in order to permit a sustained advance. The armor needed infantry to secure its gains and protect its lines of communication. Both communities needed each other, but doctrinal accommodation was irreconcilable.

The German solution lay in the development of armored assault gun vehicles (Sturmgeschütz or StuG for short). During the rearmament of the Wehrmacht, a number of German officers, most notably Colonel Erich von Manstein, Colonel Walther Model, and Lieutenant General Ludwig Beck, proposed the need for self-propelled artillery to increase the offensive capabilities of the infantry to fill the void in armor support. In a 1935 memorandum to the chief of the general staff, von Manstein recommended that each infantry division have an organic assault gun.
battalion. Emphasizing their role as an infantry assault weapon, he made a clear distinction between tanks and assault guns, contending that assault guns were not to operate like armor. “They are not to attack like tanks, striving for a breakthrough, but are to assist the infantry maintain momentum by eliminating the most dangerous threats quickly with direct fire. They are not to fight like armor in massed formations but as a rule must operate in platoon formations.” Von Manstein concluded that assault gun units must receive their training with the infantry rather than with armor. “A pure separation of the two arms is necessary to preclude each developing improper tactical principals.”

Initially mounted on a Panzerkampfwagen III chassis, the Sturmgeschütz III A (StuG III) had the following specifications: a crew of four; weight of 22 tons; a height of 1.8 meters (no taller than a man); a speed of 40 kph, and a driving range of 95-165 kilometers depending on its payload; a 75mm L/24 main gun with a traverse of 24 degrees and a degree of elevation from -10 to 20 degrees respectively; and a maximum effective range of 1,000 meters, although a good crew could achieve good effects out to 2,000 meters. As the war progressed, the adoption of the larger Panzerkampfwagen IV chassis (Sturmgeschütz IV) permitted an increase in armor hull protection to 80mm, and eventual gun caliber to 88mm, matching the improvements in enemy armor capabilities. The main gun was installed directly into the chassis, which also gave the assault gun a lower silhouette and lower center of gravity. Of course, without a turret, the assault gun could not traverse its main gun quickly. Rather, the crew had to swing the entire vehicle around in the general direction of a target and then traverse the gun within its 24-degree arc to acquire the target. Despite this disadvantage, the crews were very proficient in acquiring and destroying targets with dispatch. Due to their gunnery skills, artillerymen became the natural choice as crewmen. As trained artillerymen, crews used fire bracketing to hit targets within three rounds. This method of engaging targets often proved quicker in practice than the tank method of tracking and engaging targets. Proportionally, assault guns destroyed more enemy tanks (20,000-30,000) than German armor could claim, and assault gun commanders attributed their domination of the battlefield to superior gunnery skills, often with first-shot kills.

During the war, the western allies had little opportunity to assess the attributes of the StuG as an infantry support weapon because it was used principally on the Eastern Front, where they distinguished themselves as high-value weapons. The infantry was quick to appreciate the offensive qualities of the StuGs, making them a high-demand weapon for eliminating of enemy bunkers, machine gun nests, strong points, and fortified lines. Moreover, when properly protected by infantry, they dominated the enemy in all types of terrain, whether in open, forested, mountainous, or urban.

Because of its effectiveness as a tank destroyer, greater survivability, and the high attrition of German tanks, LTG Heinz Guderian, newly appointed as the Inspector General of the Armored Corps, began diverting 75 percent of assault gun monthly production to select tank destroyer companies, armored battalions and special units in early 1943. Despite many battle reports decrying the use of assault guns in a tank role, Guderian’s decision reflected the realities of Germany’s flagging strategic position. Moreover, because the assault gun had no turret, it was cheaper and faster to produce than a tank.

By the time the U.S. Army engaged the main Wehrmacht forces from 1943 onward, American Soldiers saw assault guns employed mainly as tanks and tank destroyers, and not in their intended role. The Germans only deployed an average of three StuG brigades on the West Front from June to October 1944, and there after an average of six until the end of the war. Had the U.S. Army experienced the combined effects of an infantry-assault gun attack, it would have gained a greater appreciation of its impact on the modern battlefield and likely adopted it. Hence the force of circumstances obscured the role of the assault gun, and American Soldiers likely regarded them as just another tank, paying scant attention to one of the most effective combined armed teams of the war.

**Proposed Modern Assault Gun Design**

In order to meet the full range of challenges in modern combat, the assault gun must meet certain specifications for protection, mobility, firepower, and airlift. The authors offer an assault gun design, which provides superior specifications. (See Figure 1).

Given the requirement for airlift, protection must balance weight with defensive armor. The assault gun’s design can accommodate both using welded Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA), face-hardened steel for the entire hull and shaping the slope for supelative protection. The entire hull provides complete 12.7mm (.50-cal) ballistic protection, while the upper and lower front and the top deck provide 30mm ballistic protection. Moreover, the frontal 60-degree arc provides ballistic protection from 14.5 mm munitions. The bulkheads, front and rear, protect the crew and serve as an internal frame to stiffen and strengthen the chassis as well as to support the firing of the main gun. Finally, because of its proven durability, the drive train components were derived from the M113 family of vehicles.

The assault gun’s compact size provides profound advantages. Its low silhouette of 8.7 feet allows it to exploit the protection of terrain and makes it more difficult for enemy forces to detect and engage. Since the upper turret assembly is unmanned, the crew compartment within the hull has a height of 5.5 feet, providing even greater protection. As a result, the assault gun can assume a hull deflade position with minimum danger to the crew. The assault gun’s length of 24.5 feet and width of 8.3 feet permits greater maneuverability in complex terrain.

Tactical mobility is vital for meeting the full range of contingencies. Wherever the infantry goes, the assault gun must go as well. Assault guns must have the capability to traverse diverse terrain and in all types of weather. Soil strength, stickiness,
slipperiness, and weather all affect cross-country trafficability. Fine-grained soils, such as silts and clays, are highly susceptible to moisture, resulting in greater slipperiness and stickiness (mud clinging to the undercarriage), and decreased strength (the ability of the soil to remain firm). As more and more vehicles traverse the same area under these conditions, mobility becomes increasingly problematic.

In technical terms, the ability of a vehicle to pass over this terrain any number of times is called the vehicle cone index (VCI) with the number of passes noted subscripted (Figure 2). A VCI comparison with other vehicles illustrates the high degree of mobility of this assault gun. The lower the index, the greater the mobility.

The capability to negotiate slopes, cross trenches, climb vertical walls, and pivot tightly is an absolute tactical requirement. This assault gun is designed to negotiate a 60-percent slope directly and move laterally along a 35-percent slope. Its ability to cross a 2.18-meter trench and climb a one-meter wall unassisted is matched by few other vehicles. Pivot steering within a 5.3-meter turning radius allows the assault gun to maneuver in tight places, such as narrow streets, mountain roads, and forest paths.

The 105mm main gun provides highly accurate and devastating fires for the infantry to eliminate the staunchest enemy positions, including fortified buildings, bunkers, and strong points. The main gun’s maximum elevation of 20 degrees and maximum depression of 10 degrees provides superb engagement capabilities in urban and mountainous terrain (Figure 3). Even though a smaller caliber main gun may accomplish the same results, the 105mm provides an immediate psychological impact for both enemy and friendly troops. For the enemy, the dread and hopelessness generated from the destruction of even the most fortified positions without the ability to strike back prompts withdrawal or surrender. Conversely, the arrival of assault guns in friendly sectors provides an immediate lift in morale and perseverance. Often the appearance of such weapon systems during desperate moments is enough to bolster the infantry.

Additional enhancements on the basic assault gun permit greater versatility. A field phone with an IR source mounted on the rear panel permits infantry to talk directly with the crew without the encumbrance of a telephone wire. The main gun can fire munitions with colored markers to assist close air support and a mounted laser designator is effective for guiding smart munitions onto targets. A medium antitank missile (e.g., Javelin) mounted on the side provides immediate protection from enemy armor, but commanders should resist the temptation to turn assault guns into tank destroyers. The attachment of armor side panels, perhaps with reactive armor, would provide enhanced protection.

Different variants provide the infantry with a flexible mix of options. Flamethrower or thermobaric devices reduce hardened urban bunkers and mountain caves. For peacekeeping operations, crowd control devices (water cannon, tear gas, flash bang, sticky foam, acoustics, or rubber pellet canisters) combined with the psychological effect of the assault gun greatly assists in crowd control. A 120mm mortar variant with automatic loading capability would permit crews to render fire support while enjoying the protection and mobility of the carrier.

Lastly and most important, strategic and theater airlift capable assault guns provide
The Modern Assault Gun Battalion

A divisional assault gun battalion provides the requisite firepower, mobility, and shock derived from combined arms to overwhelm enemy resistance with precision fires in diverse terrain and weather. Additionally, assault gun battalions permit armor units to focus on their primary doctrinal tasks without the constant distraction of providing support to the infantry. The biggest advantage over the light infantry and airborne the immediate firepower for forced entry operations. The proposed assault gun has a C-130 compatible airlift weight of 37,089 pounds with no disassembly required. It drives on and off the aircraft immediately. Its combat weight of 39,715 pounds includes 18 ready rounds of 105mm for the main gun and 3,600 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition for the machine gun. The ammunition storage compartment in the hull behind the turret crew holds an additional 22 rounds of 105mm and 5,600 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition.

The assault gun battalion comprises three assault gun companies, a headquarters and headquarters company, and an assault infantry company for a total of 40 assault guns including one command assault gun for the infantry battalion tactical operations center. Each assault gun company is organized into three platoons for a total of 13 assault guns including the company command vehicle. Each platoon consists of four assault guns including the platoon leader’s vehicle. Moreover, each assault gun (excluding the platoon leader and command vehicles) has an ammunition resupply vehicle assigned to it. The basic M113 carrier makes an outstanding candidate for this role. It possesses sufficient protection and cargo room for immediate resupply of ammunition.

The assault gun crews are infantrymen with specialized advanced training in fire support and gunnery. Because of their background, 11C mortarmen possess the skills to conduct indirect and direct fire missions. Mortarmen also are trained infantrymen and understand infantry tactics.

The battalion has an organic assault infantry company, which provides security during halts and forms a combined arms team during attacks. The infantry rides on the assault guns during movement and dismounts prior to the assault. The infantry develops a close tactical relationship with the assault guns, developing assault tactics in differing types of terrain. The infantry’s fundamental tasks are to pinpoint enemy fortified positions, guide the assault guns into support-by-fire positions, and provide immediate security of the assault guns in the process. The infantry is particularly vigilant to suppress enemy anti-tank weapons and infantry tank-killer teams. Finally, the infantry conducts the final assault on enemy positions that the assault guns have destroyed or suppressed. The assault infantry travels with the assault gun either mounted or dismounted, depending on the circumstances. Each platoon has two M113s for the transportation of baggage, rations, water, and additional ammunition.

Conclusion

Assault gun battalions provide a significant combat multiplier for light and medium infantry units. They have a proven and effective historical record and deserve careful consideration for the Objective Force. Properly protected by infantry, assault guns perform superbly in urban, wooded, and mountainous terrain. Virtually no bunker, strongpoint, entrenched position, or light armored vehicle is a match for the assault gun. With its elevation and depression, the main gun can engage and destroy enemy positions on multiple storied buildings, ridges/hills and low-lying areas. In urban terrain, the main gun creates breach holes in walls and buildings for assaulting infantry to enter. Likewise, the main gun makes short work of wire obstacles, log cribs, abatis and so forth. The machine gun provides sufficient suppression of the enemy during the final assault. The mounted anti-tank missile is intended as a defense against immediate armor threats. Assault guns are not anti-tank guns and are used in this role only in emergencies. With their adoption in the U.S. arsenal, armor units may focus on operational objectives without fear of out-pacing the infantry. In this manner, both the infantry and armor communities become harmonized and more effectively doctrinally.

Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen is currently assigned as the director of European Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1982, was commissioned as an infantry officer, and has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Germany and Continental United States. He has also served as the U.S. Army Infantry School Liaison Officer to the German Infantry School at Hammelburg, Germany; Battalion Executive Officer, 3-502d Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Chief of Intelligence Section and Balkans Team Chief, Survey Section, SHAPE, Belgium. He served in Kabul from July through November 2003 on the staff of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, focusing on the Afghan National Army and the General Staff. Lieutenant Colonel Millen is a Foreign Area Officer for Western Europe. His book, Command Legacy, was published in April 2002. LTC Millen is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College, and holds an master’s degree in National Security Studies from Georgetown University. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in World Politics at Catholic University of America.

Major (Retired) Richard L. Lavosky is currently the president of Converting Solutions USA. He studied Advanced Weapons Systems Engineering at the U.S. Military Academy, graduated in 1982, and was commissioned as an infantry officer. He has held a variety of mechanized and light infantry assignments on both active duty and reserve component status. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the 8th Infantry Division in Germany and the 7th Infantry Division in the United States respectively. Additionally, he served as the operations officer and executive officer for the 415th Civil Affairs Battalion. He served in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January through May 1996 on the staff of Multi-National Division Southwest under the command of the 3rd UK Armored Division focusing on the integration of civil-military operations with operational and joint command functions.

A list of references in on file and available through Infantry Magazine.
Mohammad Muwafiq Zaydan, a journalist with Al-Jazeera and the Arabic daily Al-Hayat, had the rare opportunity of spending hours with Usama Bin Laden in October 2000 and in the early part of 2001. Zaydan has conducted multiple interviews with the Al-Qaeda leader, and he was the only journalist summoned to Afghanistan to cover the wedding of Usama Bin Laden’s eldest son Mohammad to Karima Muhammad Atef, daughter of the late Al-Qaeda operations chief Muhammad Atef (aka Abu Hafs Al-Masri), who was killed in a UAV strike during Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003, Zaydan published a book entitled, “Usama Bin Laden bila Qanaa, Liqaat Hazaarat Nashruha al-Taliban (Usama Bin Laden Revealed: Interviews the Taliban Warns Against Publication),” although the lead title would probably be best translated as “Usama Bin Laden Unvarnished.” It was published by the World Book Corporation of Beirut, Lebanon, a legitimate publishing house with its own Web site — www.arabook.com. The 215-page book offers readers a strategic, operational, and tactical glimpse of America’s number one adversary. It reveals Bin Laden’s thoughts on disseminating his message, the Taliban, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the U.S. military and much more. The following will highlight major strategic portions of Zaydan’s book and his interviews with Bin Laden.

This essay is an attempt to know our adversary. It is also an attempt to make Bin Laden’s perversion and destructive interpretation of Islam intelligible. For this to be accomplished, it is vital that Arabic books that highlight Bin Laden and his top lieutenants be translated, studied, reviewed and discussed among U.S. military leaders and planners. Bin Laden will eventually be neutralized or die of natural causes. However, his legacy will plague the region for a generation and will pose a major strategic threat to U.S. military and national security interests. Bin Laden’s objectives are long-term and that he considers a small accomplishment, such as an Islamic unified boycott against the United States, a major accomplishment for Al-Qaeda. Bin Laden mentioned that a book he was working on would address the methodology of wielding a united Muslim front at the street level and then institute Islamic law. Zaydan emphasized to Zaydan the three most important legacies he wished to leave:

(1) Unity under usul (traditions),
(2) Superseding (Islamic) divisions and being a whole community under God, and
(3) Affixing all Islamic protest and disputes under the manhaj (methodology) of the Salaf (founders of the 7th century).

To the uneducated, words like usul, manhaj and salaf basically connote Bin Laden’s mission of reuniting the Muslims under pure Islamic precepts and using this power to defend the rights of Muslims globally. This message resonates with the poor and emotionally charged on the street. What is missing is the reality that:

It is Bin Laden and his shura (council) that will interpret what is an appropriate recreation of 7th century Islamic Arabia.
Even within Islam there are different types of Islamic beliefs (manhaj according to Bin Laden) and practices. Only a small group would appreciate living under his militant salafi system. To impose an Islamic government is to then address the impossible task of determining which kind of Islam will be imposed upon the rest. Bin Laden’s militancy even within the Islamist movement has split the Muslim fundamentalists between those who wish to cooperate and work to attain power through elections, and those like him who desire to be in a perpetual state of war. Even within those Islamist militants who act out violently, there is disagreement between those who wish to attack the “near” enemy (Arab regimes) and those who wish to attack the “far” enemy (The United States and western democracies).

Zaydan learns later that the book Bin Laden claims to have written was actually published by Al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Hafs Al-Mauritani (The Mauritanian). This revelation is important for several reasons. It shows Bin Laden’s obsession with leaving a legacy. It also reveals his willingness to plagiarize ideas and pass them off as his own. Finally, it demonstrates that Al-Qaeda has more than just Ayman Al-Zawahiri as an ideologue. Bin Laden grew up Hanbali, and was radicalized by a mixture of Saudi Wahabism and Egyptian militant Qubism (a reference to Sayyid Qutb, a militant ideologue and a key founder of 20th century jihadism). Bin Laden intimates to Zaydan that Islamist politics represent one of two wings. One is charged with restoring Muslim self-confidence, and the other is his remedy of (violent) jihadist action.

Bin Laden betrayed his view of Islamists working within the political system to attain power in the latter part of the book by stating that there are global efforts to undermine the jihadist spirit, and this global effort must be confronted. Therefore, Islamist movements must unite to counter this vicious attack against the Islamic jihadic spirit. His reference to a unity of Islamist movements belies the question of whose Islamist doctrine or jihadist agenda to follow. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Algerian Islamic Salvation Front have strategically decided to work within the confines of their respective nation’s polity, which has earned them the wrath of jihadists like Bin Laden who want to continue pursuing the violent option of establishing an Islamist state. Bin Laden sees the unification of violent Islamist movements worldwide as an important objective and a legacy that he wishes to leave behind.

**Bin Laden’s Comments on the USS Cole**

It is best to frame this section with what Bin Laden told Zaydan in the winter of 2000 when the USS Cole incident was fresh: “We thank God for this brave operation that brought down America’s pride, and has made Americans to feel that the time has come for their withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula....” Zaydan assesses that Bin Laden struck the USS Cole because he did not feel that the United States was taking him and his message seriously when he undertook the coordinated attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Dar-es-Salam. Bin Laden told Zaydan that he expected an American response over the USS Cole (which occurred on October 2000) by January 2001. The strategy was to lure American conventional forces into tight mountainous terrain in Yemen or Afghanistan and recreate the tactics Bin Laden was familiar with in fighting Soviet Forces over a decade earlier.

Bin Laden told Zaydan that he expected an American response over the USS Cole (which occurred on October 2000) by January 2001. The strategy was to lure American conventional forces into tight mountainous terrain in Yemen or Afghanistan and recreate the tactics Bin Laden was familiar with in fighting Soviet Forces over a decade earlier.

Laden changed strategy and always seemed to fall back when the United States responded in an unexpected way. Initially he told Zaydan it was to get America to commit forces. When that did not work, he relied on bolstering the self-confidence of the Muslim community as a reason for the strikes.

Not being a cleric, Bin Laden cited fatwas (religious rulings) issued by clerics. He cited the fatwa of the late Saudi Sheikh Hammad al-Shuaibee and his 165-page book entitled, “al-Qawl al-Mukhtar fee Hammud al-Shuaibee (Edicts on Consulting Apostates).” Published in 1997 by Sahwa (Islamist Reawakening) Press in Lebanon, the book was among a chorus of calls from radicalist preachers calling for the forcible removal of the United States from Arabia. Bin Laden also discussed a sermon given by Saudi Sheikh Ali bin Abdulrahman Al-Huzaify at the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. The sermon’s location is important, for within the walls of this mosque in Medina, the first Islamic society was born. Even though content of sermons in government mosques like Medina is regulated by the government, it is virtually impossible to prevent a selected cleric from deviating from his submitted script. Bin Laden cited Huzaify as saying that Jews and Crusaders have invaded this land militarily and economically, and although not as direct as Bin Laden or Sheikh al-Shuaibee, intimates that a radical step must be taken to remedy this situation. Bin Laden then shifted from discussing Richard Nixon to Sheikh Safar Hawali in a geo-strategic amalgamation of modern history and militant Salafi interpretations to justify the importance of the Arabian Peninsula to the United States.

**Saudi Intelligence Requests Mullah Omar Surrender Bin Laden**

After the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, Zaydan’s book discusses the efforts of former Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal in getting Taliban leader Mullah Omar to surrender Usama Bin Laden. Mullah Omar rationalized his refusal of Prince Turki’s request by saying that no Saudis died in this event, nor did the attack occur on Saudi soil. By 1998 Mullah Omar was in a precarious position. His legitimacy and a main source of his...
then discussed an economic and globalization argument that Bin Laden gave Zaydan his full attention. Bin Laden was rarely interrupted during the interview,Bin Laden provided access to funds, fanatic fighters and had developed family ties through intermarriage between his entourage and Mullah Omar’s. Had Mullah Omar surrendered Bin Laden, it would have caused deep splits within the madrassas (religious schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan) and within its students that were inculcated to view Mullah Omar as a mythological figure. These students represented the new foot soldiers needed to sustain Mullah Omar’s war against the Northern Alliance.

**Bin Laden’s Concern of Foreign Government Infiltration**

Zaydan, while awaiting the Bin Laden interview, conducted a discussion with leaders charged with Al-Qaeda’s operational security. The book mentions two instances of penetration of the group. The first was a Syrian fighter with extensive military training who was an agent of Syrian intelligence. The second instance was a member of the Bidoon (literally “without,” and representative of a class of people in the United Arab Emirates who are without any citizenship status but permanently reside there). The Bidoon agent was a basic recruit, and according to Zaydan’s book, was commissioned by the Emirati, Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies for an assassination attempt. Whether true or not, the few pages devoted to these stories show the constant concern that Bin Laden has for foreign infiltration and for his own security by Arab and non-Arab governments alike.

**The Bin Laden Wedding**

Zaydan was among the few journalists to cover the wedding of Usama Bin Laden’s son Mohammad to Muhammad Atef’s (the late Abu Hafs Al-Masri, Al-Qaeda’s military commander) daughter Karima. Among the items of note during this occasion that occurred in the fall of 2000 were:

- Usama Bin Laden wore Saudi dress to include headdress emphasizing his childhood roots and the curved dagger of Yemen known as Jambiyyah as an open expression of his Yemeni ancestry.
- Usama Bin Laden’s mother and brothers attended, and came to the wedding from Saudi Arabia through a chartered Ariana (Afghan) flight under the cover of Afghans making pilgrimage. This cover made interfering with the flight religiously sensitive and provided the perfect cover, as Afghans make these flights frequently to Jeddah as the arrival point for their pilgrimage to Mecca.

**Bin Laden’s Economic Discussions with Zaydan**

Zaydan notes that when Bin Laden withdrew from the wedding to conduct further discussions with the journalist he had constant satellite TV, internet and media connections. Aides brought him the latest internet downloads that he would peruse, but during the interview, Bin Laden gave Zaydan his full attention. Bin Laden then discussed an economic and globalization argument that favored the Islamist militant call for a caliphate. All Arab and Muslim nation-states cannot be self-sufficient on their own. There is a subtle hint to the artificial borders drawn by the Sykes-Picot Treaty of World War I that carved former Ottoman possessions into the nations of the Arab world we know today. The only solution, according to Bin Laden, is to create a self-sufficient Islamic unity that will enable Muslims to be an independent block that is distant from the corruption of the west. This unity would then control its own destiny. Bin Laden told Zaydan that this was how Muslims existed for centuries before the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, and that the imposed artificial borders of the Middle East were designed to keep Muslims weak, divided and enslaved. The only path to this objective is (violent) jihad against the western powers that have imposed this division of the Muslim Umma (community).

**The Arab Street: Should it be Ignored? Bin Laden Does Not Think So**

Bin Laden then discussed the 2000 Intifadah (Palestinian uprising). His view is that the “Children of the Stone,” as he called the rock-throwing Palestinians, are embarrassing Arab regimes. He cited this as an example of the power of mass mobilization, and the fanning of the flames of a public media campaign designed to bring attention to and reveal the danger America poses to the Islamic world. Bin Laden was specific on the utility of the Arab street in forming a popular movement that is anti-western and anti-American. He said that the 2000 Intifadah in essence showed how policy is made by the street mob. In his mind, it prevented the United States Envoy (Anthony Zinni) from succeeding in his mission.

Bin Laden expressed frustration at the Taliban-imposed media ban, and Zaydan highlighted that Bin Laden lamented the many questions sent to him by foreign journalists via the Taliban Embassy in Pakistan. However, the Taliban refused to let him answer these questions despite his desire to do so. It is important to realize that some of the vital components of the Islamist militants’ strategy in this “long” war are public perception, media and information. This sentiment, reflected by Bin Laden, is echoed by his deputy Ayman Al-Zawahiri.

**WMD and Unconventional Weapons**

The most interesting part of Zaydan’s book is a discussion he had with the late Muhammed Atef on weapons of mass destruction. Here is a translated excerpt of what Atef told Zaydan:

> “Is it really difficult to get such weapons? We are in a region saturated with all manner of weapons of mass destruction; a quick glance at the map can show this clearly. Central Asian nations are filled with them, and possess all types of unconventional weapons that can be found in the black market for U.S. dollars. India, Pakistan, Iran and China have those weapons and within some quarters of their governments animosity towards the United...
States. American policy aids in our cooperation with these groups and we benefit from the animosity towards the United States and disunity among nation-states. Even if we discount nation-states and whether they are U.S. adversaries, there are non-governmental entities within those nation-states that share our views of American imperialism.”

The book continues with a discussion of how Al-Qaeda has absorbed many Uzbek, Tajik, Chechen and other Central Asians in their movement, giving them access to organized crime connections in these nations. There is no telling what would have happened had Bin Laden maintained his base of operations in Afghanistan post-9/11, increasing his ties to Central Asian gangs or sympathetic nuclear scientists.

**Bin Laden’s Silence on Iran**

When Zaydan asked Usama Bin Laden about Iran, its policies and their efforts to export their Islamic revolution, Bin Laden was extremely guarded in answering those specific questions. It is common knowledge that Bin Laden’s brand of militant Salafi Sunni Islam is incompatible with Shiite Islam. Zaydan’s analysis is that there is a form of convenient accommodation between him and Iran, that could be as subtle as guarding his answers to protect Al-Qaeda members detained by the Iranians. The only comment he would make about Iran at any great length was acknowledging his role and assistance with the Taliban in diffusing a 1997 crisis between Iran and Afghanistan over the Taliban’s massacre of nine Iranian diplomats. In 2005, two years after the publication of Zaydan’s book, a Zawahiri letter to the late Zarqawi in Iraq revealed criticism of Zarqawi’s boasting of the beheading of Shiites, and a reminder of the 100 senior leaders under house-arrest in Iran.

**Conclusion**

Zaydan’s 2003 book offers the most comprehensive and recent look at Usama Bin Laden’s strategic thinking. Arabic books on Bin Laden typically mythologize him. This, on the other hand, is an instance of a journalist conducting a serious dialogue with a prime adversary of the United States. To begin to attack Bin Laden’s ideology, it is important to deconstruct his arguments using Arabic sources and, more importantly, make an Islamic counter-argument to his methods, ideas and vision. This cannot be done without exploring Arabic books like Zaydan’s. Bin Laden’s legacy of destabilizing Arab nations and ushering in a just Islamic society may sound good as a slogan, but its impracticality must be exposed. Bin Laden argued that only God has sovereignty and that democratic institutions, like legislatures, place God’s sovereignty in the hands of mankind, which is heresy. This message can be countered by arguing that Shariah (Islamic law) that Bin Laden advocates must in the end be interpreted by mankind. There is no getting around developing institutions that will undertake this task. Another counter-argument is that if one ushers in an Islamic state, whose Islam will dominate Sunni or Shiite? Within Sunni Islam, will it be Usuli, Ashari, Twelvers, Fivers, Ahemdis, or Zaydis? The list for both Shiite and Sunni schools and theosophies goes on. If you alienate one, the others will be prone to resort to violence. Only a democratic model of representative government can balance the variety inherent within Islamic thought and practice.

Another strategic aspect of Zaydan’s book is Bin Laden’s emphasis on the media and his public perception campaign. Making the United States feel more and more uncomfortable in the Arab street is a strategy he has openly articulated in this book. The United States, with the help of its Muslim allies, should consider ways in which to counter this important element in Bin Laden’s war. This could mean taking the drastic step of featuring a constructive discussion on Islamic law, such as the importance of early Christians in Islam, the historical context of the 70-plus war verses in the Quran (Islamic book of divine revelation), or the origins of the Caliphate that is a pre-Islamic form of tribal governance. The United States could also exploit constructive interpretations of Islamic history, law, and commentary on such American-owned channels as Al-Hurra TV to challenge the destructive Islamic interpretations of militants. Yes, there are risks. But for now, the jihadists have stayed on point, saturating the airwaves and internet with messages of hate derived from selective as well as misquoted elements of the Quran and Hadith (Prophet’s sayings). We have much work to do. But exposing American military planners and policymakers to Arabic books of strategic significance is the first step in the ideological war against Islamist militancy, which threatens and murders Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

**Exposing American military planners and policymakers to Arabic books of strategic significance is the first step in the ideological war against Islamist militancy, which threatens and murders Muslim and non-Muslim alike.**

**Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein** is a Defense Department Middle East Analyst and served four years as Advisor and Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His understanding of Zaydan’s work represents LCDR Aboul-Enein’s personal views. All opinions are his own. He wishes to thank his colleague Mr. James Janis, Staff Assistant to the Director of the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism, for his edits and insightful comments that enhanced this piece. Thanks also goes to the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, D.C., and the R. W. Woodruff Library at Emory University in Georgia for making a copy of Zaydan’s book available for this review essay.
Units that deploy to Fort Irwin, California, to conduct training expect a world-class experience, and that is exactly what the National Training Center (NTC) offers. At any given time of the year, one look at the terrain provides inspiration, harsh beauty and a common thought: this is the place to train for war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The days of fighting the communist hordes at the NTC are long gone, replaced by the complexities of an asymmetric battlefield infinitely more challenging for every echelon of leadership. However, some units find it difficult to take full advantage of all that the NTC has to offer.

LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL OPERATIONS

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is about conducting both lethal and non-lethal operations (formerly referred to as “kinetic” and “non-kinetic”) in an equally successful and balanced manner. Most units arriving for a rotation have already spent time training lethal operations at home station. Upon arrival at the NTC, units seem to focus exclusively on training leaders and Soldiers for the non-lethal fight because of an inability to replicate these aspects of the contemporary operational environment (COE) at home station. By disregarding their lethal lessons from home-station training and focusing completely on non-lethal operations, units tend to miss the point.

This article attempts to provide:
* Understanding of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency;
* Recommendations for the integration of appropriate combat operations in a COIN environment at the brigade level and below; and
* Recommendations to adjust doctrine as it applies to the current and future fight.

This discussion is the result of a two-year evolution of coaching, teaching, and training company commanders and battalion staffs on the tip of the spear. Their experiences and input remain invaluable.
DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND

FM 3-24 is a good starting point for Soldiers and leaders attempting to understand and plan COIN operations. It effectively compiles older doctrine; selects important tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from across the Army; and applies new lessons and thoughts from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). It is important to understand that much of the doctrine already existed.

As already discussed, units at NTC often neglect the lethal fight in terms of planning and execution. By doing so in training, units run the risk of making the same mistakes in-country. As we seek to understand the non-lethal fight, we must also understand how to integrate it with the lethal fight. Understanding doctrine helps units achieve that goal. While doctrine is flexible and continuously evolving, leaders and planners should refrain from modifying or disregarding it until they understand the basics.

For a complete list of the doctrine and external sources that contributed to the development of FM 3-24, simply reference the book’s extensive bibliography. A few of the more important references for company commanders and battalion staffs include:

- FM 3-05.201, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Operations, 30 APR 03;
- FM 7-98, Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict, 19 OCT 92 (specifically Appendix C);
- FM 3-05.202, Foreign Internal Defense: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces, 20 SEP 94;
- FM 90-8, Counterguerrilla Operations, 29 AUG 86;
- FMI 3-34.119 / MCIP 3-17.01, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat, 21 SEP 05 (exp 21 SEP 07)

Senior Airman Steve Czyz, USAF

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment refer to a map during a mission in Taji, Iraq.
Insurgency. FM 3-24 and the other FMs listed above also do a good job of providing a basic understanding of all the different aspects of insurgencies. The doctrine provides a solid background for the development of insurgent thought and strategy, as well as providing historic and contemporary examples of insurgencies. For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to understand two things about an insurgency:

1. **The purpose of an insurgency** is to destabilize and delegitimize a government in order to force a radical change in that government in favor of an insurgent ideology.

2. **COIN mirrors insurgency** in almost every aspect, but with the completely opposite goal.

While an effective COIN will kill (or neutralize) an insurgency, the purpose of COIN is not to kill insurgents. According to FM 3-24, the purpose of COIN is to legitimize a nation’s government.

**Offense, Defense, and Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO).** FM 3-24 defines COIN as a full spectrum operation (FSO). “COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations,” and units must adequately plan for all three to achieve success.

**What is a LOO?** Two years or so ago, when the conventional Army really started talking seriously about COIN, most Soldiers and leaders at the NTC and in rotational units had never heard the term “line of operation” or LOO. Today, we throw that acronym around a lot. The problem is that most leaders, certainly your average Soldier, still have difficulty
understanding the concept of a LOO and its applications. According to FM 3-24:

- A LOO is a logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective (JP 1-02).
- A LOO is an operational framework/planning construct used to define the concept of multiple, and often disparate, actions arranged in a framework unified by purpose.

In layman’s terms, one can think of a LOO as a theme that helps to shape non-lethal and lethal operations to achieve both political and military victories against the insurgency. It consists of a group of sub-objectives that are not necessarily sequential but definitely related. A unit identifies and defines these sub-objectives as it sees fit. If adequately seized or realized, success of these sub-objectives will link directly to success of the overall LOO.

NOTE: The irony behind this entire discussion is that it is somewhat of a moot point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point. The term “LOO” traditionally referred to physical lines of operation, generating a point.

Figure 2 — Lines of Operation, FM 3-24 (Draft), June 2006

Figure 3 — Example Logical Lines of Operations for COIN

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Figure 3 — Example Logical Lines of Operations for COIN

Mission Statement as a Reflection of a Solid COIN Plan. Company commanders derive their mission and intent from two levels up (brigade combat team [BCT] level). Because of this fact, a unit’s mission statement (BCT, battalion or company level) is the first place to look when determining a unit’s level of understanding of COIN and the amount of analysis in the plan. Here’s an example of a typical, generic mission statement for a maneuver unit (BCT) at the NTC:

The 1/52d BCT conducts stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) in AO Bear NLT 01 0001 JAN 07 to defeat the enemy in depth and provide a stable environment for governance.

This is an example of an underdeveloped, incomplete mission statement that indicates a limited understanding of the complexities of the COE, and our role as a maneuver BCT, BN or CO in that COE. Now look at the next example.
The 1/52d BCT conducts COIN operations to neutralize the local insurgency in AO Bear NLT 01 0001 JAN 07 to legitimize the local government and prevent disruption by the enemy.

This example of a more developed, stronger mission statement indicates a solid understanding of COIN. The mission statement: defines COIN as the full spectrum operation; has a tactical task (neutralize); and has an appropriate COIN-related purpose. This mission statement will serve as the base for good BCT (and below) COIN operations. It gives subordinate commanders the freedom and flexibility to develop clear, COIN-related intent, concepts of the operation, and schemes of maneuver. It also allows BCT commanders the flexibility to develop and alter the intensity of offensive, defensive and stability operations as the situation in their AO changes.

**THE TWO SIDES OF THE COIN: Non-Lethal vs. Lethal**

Figure 4 explains to brigade staffs, battalion staffs and company commanders how (and why) to plan in a COIN environment. The remainder of this article addresses the “Two Sides of the COIN.”

There are two sides to the COIN fight: lethal operations and non-lethal operations.

**Non-Lethal Operations, the Decisive Operations (DO).** Without strong, successful non-lethal operations, units will lose the COIN fight and the insurgents will win. Non-lethal operations are decisive because they primarily target the neutral population to sway them to our side (the old “hearts and minds” adage), and because they can target the enemy through a process of co-opting them or dividing and conquering. When allocating combat power during planning, units should assign a main effort (ME), shaping operations (SHOs - replace the traditional supporting effort in older Army doctrine), and sustainment operations (SOs) for non-lethal operations.

**Lethal Operations, the Shaping Operations (SHO).** Units must learn to view lethal operations as more of a shaping effort that will continuously help to mold the battlefield, declining in frequency as non-lethal operations succeed. These are our “killing” operations, the bread and butter of the military machine. Units must always plan and remain prepared to execute lethal operations in tandem with non-lethal operations at every echelon of command. During planning, units should assign a ME, SHOs, and SOs for lethal operations.

There are countless examples of lethal and non-lethal operations and how both work together successfully. However, two common examples at the company level are raids versus cordons and searches, and trash collection versus counter-sniper operations.

A raid is a lethal offensive operation while a cordon and search is a non-lethal offensive operation. Leaders plan and execute raids with the intent of making enemy contact. More often than not, the objective does not have any enemy. In these circumstances, higher headquarters may require units to immediately conduct non-lethal cordon and search operations. In other situations, leaders plan cordon and search operations and unexpectedly make enemy contact on or in the vicinity of the objective. In these situations, units transition into lethal, deliberate attack operations similar to raids. Both scenarios require prudent leaders to plan and rehearse both types of operations (lethal and non-lethal) as contingencies of each other.

Trash collection operations provide another example. A currently deployed leader recently related how his unit developed an operation along the essential services LOE to clear trash from roads in town. This operation would clean up the town and provide jobs to otherwise unemployed civilians. Equally important, it would have the additional advantage of clearing garbage that could concealing IEDs as well as garbage that Soldiers might mistakenly treat as possible IEDs. Taking advantage of the opportunity to delegitimize the local government, insurgents began sniping (and killing) trash collectors. This forced the unit to develop and execute lethal counter-sniper combat operations concurrent with the non-lethal trash collection operations.

MEs vs. SHOs: One and the same, or separate? The answer is the cliché METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time). At any given time, a unit will conduct simultaneous operations, some of which are decisive, most of which are shaping. One unit could serve as the main effort for both the decisive (non-lethal) operations and shaping (lethal) operations that it conducts. On the other hand, one unit may be the ME for decisive operations and a SHO for shaping operations, while a different unit is a SHO for decisive operations and the ME for shaping operations. Situation dictates.

**The Defense: If we become FOB-centric, then we lose.** Defensive operations separate the two sides of the COIN. They are always shaping operations. They serve to protect our lines of communication and command and control. They must remain an economy of force effort. As FM 3-24 so aptly points out, extreme force protection measures will actually decrease security and increase the likelihood of failure. Consider the following:

It’s tough to influence the population when you have zero contact. Since the purpose of COIN is to legitimize the government, the biggest target is the neutral populace. We compete with the insurgents for the population’s support. If the majority of our forces are hunkering down behind concentric defensive rings instead of living among...
the people (as the enemy does), how will we effectively influence the masses?

The fallacy behind force protection ... The enemy has us right where he wants us! Big force protection-oriented FOBs from which smaller units operate present easy targets to the enemy. At best, when the enemy launches a couple of mortar rounds or rockets into a FOB, units tend to go into “lock-down” mode. Maneuver ceases, allowing the enemy to disrupt or deny COIN operations. At worst, should insurgent organizations such as militias or Al Qaida and associated movements (AQAM) become large enough and strong enough, these FOBs can facilitate transition to something similar to Mao’s Strategic Counteroffensive or a Vietnam-esque phase III insurgency (war of movement) in which a more conventional insurgent force can hold units in a FOB or block them from conducting COIN. The best force protection in COIN remains living, and planning, by your wits.

Risk Savvy vs. Risk Aversion. We are Soldiers. Soldiering is dangerous business. We are in a dangerous fight. Accept that fact. Plan and execute the operations necessary to win the COIN. It requires street-smarts, and leaders cannot be foolhardy; the possibility of fratricide or unnecessary collateral damage is greater in COIN than a more conventional fight. However, as long as leaders continue to conduct composite risk assessments, there is little excuse for conducting the majority of operations from mega-FOBs.

DEVELOPING NON-LETHAL OPERATIONS

Stability vs. Reconstruction – Which one can we affect? Most of our combat arms maneuver units cannot reconstruct anything. With respect to COIN, stability equates to security for the population. Units should focus their non-lethal decisive operations on stability.

The Decisive Operations. Non-lethal operations are DECISIVE in COIN. You may win the tactical fight all day (and you must), but if your non-lethal operations are ineffective, you will be ineffective. At every level, for every operation, leaders must have a non-lethal plan as well as a lethal plan.

Applying the appropriate LOEs. Plan non-lethal operations based off of the non-lethal LOEs: Information operations; train/employ HN forces; essential services; governance; economic development.

DEVELOPING LETHAL OPERATIONS

The Offense: Movement to Contact (MTC). Units struggle to train (and execute) COIN operations because they focus COIN training on their traditional weakness, non-lethal operations. They also find it difficult to identify what type of combat operations they should conduct and how to integrate those operations. Combat operations will shape the battlefield on a day-to-day basis. There may be times when a unit surges to conduct a massive attack (like Fallujah II), but during steady-state operations, offensive operations should focus on movement to contact.

The Shaping Operations. Lethal operations are always shaping operations in COIN. These are the operations where we close with and destroy the enemy. We have traditionally conditioned for these types of operations in which success provides the most personal satisfaction for Soldiers and leaders. We must always win the lethal fight. Unfortunately, lethal operations alone will not win in COIN. Often sloppy, with the potential for excessive collateral damage, they can generate a larger base from which insurgents can successfully recruit.

The Rest of the LOEs. Plan lethal operations along the lethal LOEs: Information operations; combat operations; employ HN forces.

The Appropriate Offensive Operation: Movement to Contact (MTC). Doctrinally speaking, there are two types of MTC: Meeting engagement (formerly approach march) and search and attack. Meeting engagement is a centralized MTC used when units have identified the enemy’s location and can define a specific objective. But what kind of offensive operations will identify the enemy?

Search and Attack: The Correct Technique. In COIN, not only do we not know the enemy’s location, but we generally do not even know WHO is an enemy and WHO is a friend. Search and attack (S&A) is the MTC that will identify the enemy and his location. S&A is decentralized and intelligence focused, making it a solid operation given that intelligence should drive our operations. S&A is the perfect combat operation for COIN.

Find, Fix and Finish. The three elements to a classic S&A operation are a find force, a fix force, and a finish force. The find force identifies the enemy. The fix force, by means of (or even just the threat of) direct and indirect fires, prevents that enemy from maneuvering or escaping. The finish force assaults and destroys the enemy.

Hunter-Killer. The Cavalry developed the hunter-killer concept years ago, and continue to train and use it today. It parallels the find, fix, finish of classic S&A, but in some ways provides for more flexibility. The main difference is that separate elements are not necessarily defined as “finders, fixers or finishers.” In hunter-killer, a leader may assign a unit to specifically be the hunter while another unit of comparable combat power is the killer. However, because of that comparable combat power, elements generally all start off as hunters, and then remain hunters or become killers as the situation develops. Traditionally a technique for armored scout and reconnaissance forces, it transcends separate elements of the combined arms team and is applicable to virtually any unit conducting combat operations in COIN.

INTELLIGENCE DRIVES OPERATIONS

The S2 lives in a proverbial cubicle called the tactical operations center (TOC). During the military decision-making process (MDMP), he conducts the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and based on his analysis of historical data, he throws down his best guess. Based on this enemy situational template (SITTEMP), planners then develop courses of action that counter the enemy. But what if the S2 is wrong? It is this question that requires subordinate commanders to assess the enemy situation at their own level, develop their own plans and confirm or deny the S2’s guess. Search and attack, in conjunction with non-lethal operations, will provide subordinate commanders with the data to bottom-up refine the S2’s top-down driven SITTEMP. This bottom-up refined intelligence will drive continued and future operations and require targeting.

Lethal Targeting. Intelligence that drives lethal operations requires lethal targeting. Two examples of lethal targets are indirect fire targets and insurgent leaders. Lethal targeting is effective, and the outcome of lethal operations will
provide additional intelligence that will drive future operations and shift targeting.

**Non-Lethal Targeting.** Intelligence that drives non-lethal operations requires non-lethal targeting. Examples of non-lethal targets are different leaders in the population and results from infrastructure assessments (i.e., poor irrigation, broken generators, dilapidated medical facilities, etc.). Non-lethal targeting can be effective, but positive results will not be as immediately visible as a fire-for-effect mission from a platoon of Howitzers.

**The Targeting Process: Linking the Two Types of Targeting.** The system that units use to feed intelligence, drive operations, and refine targets is known as the targeting process. Through effective management of the information cycle, subordinate commanders confirm/deny the S2’s enemy SITTEMP. They can also answer commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). All of this will drive decisions on future operations.

One important aspect of COIN is that lethal operations will often provide intelligence that can drive future non-lethal operations. Likewise, non-lethal operations can provide intelligence that will drive future lethal operations. This is an example of the importance of having both effective non-lethal decisive operations and lethal shaping operations.

**MANEUVER-BASED FIRES AND EFFECTS**

All targeting must support the maneuver plan, be it non-lethal or lethal. Targeting must achieve commanders’ desired effects. It is at this point that units really start to struggle with “the metrics” of targeting. I have watched targeting meetings last hours upon hours (just as readers of this article have probably participated in them) as staff members argue in circles about how to define successful non-lethal targeting.

The best advice from fire supporters, intelligence analysts, and maneuver staff officers is to not get frustrated about defining “the metrics” and drive on. The most important aspect of the targeting process is to define the targets! Once you’ve done that, assessment of a target’s status will develop on its own and with greater ease the longer a unit operates in COIN. However, if units really want to start somewhere, they should revisit the sub-objectives along their LOEs linked to the overall objectives. Progress and success with these sub-objectives may provide some initial definition of measures of success.

**FOR CONSIDERATION**

**A Third Type of Movement to Contact.** The two doctrinal types of MTC are both lethal. After careful consideration of COIN, it has become apparent that, knowingly or not, units use a third type of non-lethal MTC: Identify and Influence.

**Identify and Influence: The Non-Lethal MTC.** Units often direct their subordinates to “identify and influence” leaders and the population in their AO. This is nothing more than a non-lethal version of S&A. To identify local power-players, leaders must first “search for” and “find” them. Once identified, leaders non-lethally “attack” those power-players to influence the population in favor of the government. Units can use “identify and influence” as a framework in which to develop non-lethal operations. Army doctrine should develop and adopt “identify and influence” as a non-lethal and third form of MTC.

**A Recommendation to BCT Commanders.** BCT commanders maneuver companies. However, on a routine basis in a COIN environment, a BCT commander will not maneuver his formations in the classic sense of the word. “Enabling” is the buzz-word for maneuvering subordinates in COIN. Planning efforts should focus on maintaining flexibility within the formation to allocate combat power and provide additional resources as the fight demands. The BCT commander’s role becomes one of enabling subordinates to win at their level. Lethally, that could mean repositioning a platoon here, or a company there. Non-lethally, money is extremely flexible combat power. Just as he maneuvers companies, a BCT commander can maneuver money at the company level. Getting those dollars down to the company commanders and empowering them to spend it immediately and within CDR’s intent is crucial.

**Company commanders are the ones who can get the quick wins on a routine basis!** Company commanders are accustomed to searching and scrounging to recover even the smallest expense ... like accounting for 100 demisting shields for night vision devices during change-of-command inventories. Fiscal accountability is an ingrained part of the military culture among company-grade officers, and company commanders understand that. If BCT commanders give their COs the funds to achieve desired effects, COs will influence within the commander’s intent.

**IN CONCLUSION**

When planning for COIN operations, units must develop integrated non-lethal and lethal operations that work toward the same goal: legitimizing the government. COIN is an extremely complex fight with an infinite number of possibilities for effectively waging war on its asymmetrical battlefield. The first step toward success for leaders and Soldiers is developing a solid understanding of the doctrine. Comprehension must include both insurgency and COIN operations. Non-lethal operations are decisive in COIN and focus on the non-lethal LOEs. “Identify and influence” describes a possible new type of movement to contact that units conduct non-lethally in the COIN fight. Lethal operations are shaping operations. The appropriate lethal operation for COIN is movement to contact, search and attack. Both of these types of MTC remain relevant to today’s fight, especially in Baghdad as units continue to conduct COIN using a “Clear-Hold-Build” strategy. S&A operations to clear the enemy will work in tandem with identify and influence operations to co-opt or neutralize political competitors. Units must continue these types of operations unabated in the hold and build phases as S&A morphs into area security operations. Maintaining security levels during hold and build will allow coalition forces to strengthen political partners, emplace capable host nation forces, and prevent the infiltration of the enemy. Intelligence gained from both types of operations will drive future operations through the targeting process. In this manner, units will invent, adapt and overcome as the COE changes over time, allowing coalition forces to maintain the initiative over and sustain momentum against an increasingly skilled enemy.

Major Jacob M. Kramer just completed ILE (Intermediate Level Education) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Immediately prior to that, he spent two years as an observer/controller with the Light Task Force Trainers (Airborne) at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. He served as Tarantula-11 (Alpha Company Primary Trainer) and Tarantula-03A (Battalion TOC Trainer). He commanded B Company, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment from the 10th Mountain Division, which served in Iraq for a year as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom 1. MAJ Kramer also served as commander of HHC/4-31 BN for one year, and served as a rifle platoon leader in A Company, 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, which served in Albania and Kosovo in 1999.
Israel has defeated larger Arab armies repeatedly since its creation in 1948. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) enjoyed a reputation of invincibility among its Arab neighbors until last year. Israel got bloodied and bogged down in Lebanon by a stateless military organization: Hezbollah’s military wing, the Islamic Resistance (IR). The Israeli high command expected the air force alone to crush the IR. Instead, the air force killed many civilians and destroyed property but could not stop the IR rockets and missiles that rained daily on Israel. When IDF troops tried to push their way into a well-prepared defense, they failed. It seems that the Israelis have lost their ability to conduct high-intensity maneuver warfare. What happened to the IDF?

The Strategic Setting

On July 12, 2006, IR forces executed a deliberate ambush inside Israel against two IDF armored vehicles using anti-tank mines and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). The attack killed three and wounded two. The IR also captured two Israeli soldiers. The IDF immediately dispatched a Merkava tank and a mechanized platoon in order to free the two POWs. The tank hit a massive (500-600lbs) improvised explosive device (IED), which instantly killed the four-man crew. An eighth Israeli soldier was killed during a firefight with IR soldiers. On that day, the Hezbollah inflicted the highest fatality toll against Israel since 1987.

Since the mid-1980s, Israel has had border skirmishes with Hezbollah. In May of 2000, Israel decided to pull its troops out from southern Lebanon, thus satisfying one of Hezbollah’s key demands. Following the withdrawal, Israel warned the Hezbollah that any cross-border offensive action would result in full military retaliation. After six years of relative quiet on the border, Israeli political and military leaders grew complacent about the Hezbollah threat. Their focus was on destroying the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure within Israel?

In the meantime, IR forces had been building conventional defensive positions to counter any future Israeli incursion. Iran delivered large amounts of weapons to the IR and provided military training to IR forces. By the summer of 2006, the IR was no longer a rag-tag guerilla organization; it was a highly trained and combat-ready force capable of conducting a determined defense.

The Tactical Situation

Mission — The mission and purpose of the IR was to launch missiles at Israel in order to cause physical and psychological damage to the country. Israel’s mission was to stop Hezbollah from launching missiles while minimizing friendly casualties.

Equipment — Hezbollah was no longer a guerrilla force. The IR fighter’s individual weapon was the AK-47 assault rifle. IR fighters were also armed with individual anti-tank weapons such as the RPG-7, RPG-9, TOW, AT-3, AT-4, AT-5, AT-13, and the AT-14. The IR anti-aircraft arsenal consisted of the SA-7 Strela-2, ZU-23 AA guns, S-60 57mm AA guns, and possibly the SA-18 Grail. IR medium and long-range rockets consisted of the 122mm Katyusha, the 240mm Fajr-3, the Fajr-5, the Zelzal-2, and the Syrian-made Uragan missile. IR anti-ship missiles consisted of the C-802 and C-701. IR air assets consisted of the Mirdas-1 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is capable of surveillance and observation. On the other hand, the Israeli military is a modern, fully-equipped force with the latest weapons and equipment. Israel has a lot of U.S.-manufactured equipment and produces top-quality military systems of its own.

Terrain — Southern Lebanon is mountainous, and its canalizing terrain provides good concealment despite the sparse vegetation. IR forces had the advantage of terrain to emplace preplanned counter-mobility obstacles, such as tank ditches and mines. IR fighters knew the terrain of southern Lebanon; IDF soldiers did not.

Troops Available — IR forces committed 600-800 full-time fighters and 5,000 to 7,000 part-time fighters. Israel committed 8,000 ground troops.

Time Available — Israeli political and military leaders knew they had only a few weeks before the United Nations Security Council and world pressure intervened to stop Israeli military action in Lebanon. Also, long military campaigns are extremely costly to the Israeli economy. The Hezbollah, on the other hand, had no such time constraints. Quite the contrary, the longer the IR could withstand Israel, the more public support would be gained, especially in the Arab world.

Civilians on the Battlefield — The IR structured its defenses within civilian population centers. They designed their defense knowing the Israelis were reluctant to inflict high civilian casualties among its enemies. The IR’s defense forced the Israelis...
to engage in dangerous house-to-house fighting and suffer a high number of friendly casualties.

**Comparison of Opposing Forces**

The IDF — The troop strength of the IDF is approximately 125,000 active duty troops, of which 40,000 are career soldiers. The IDF can also call up to 600,000 reserve soldiers.

Israeli ground forces have nearly 4,000 tanks and 11,000 armored vehicles at their disposal. There are three active duty armored brigades and four infantry brigades. The infantry brigades are similar in training and organization. Every infantry brigade is made up of three infantry battalions, a signal company, and a reconnaissance battalion.

Prior to the war, the IDF chief of staff, General Dan Halutz, launched a new cost-saving logistical system called “regional logistics.” The initiative stripped units of their organic logistics support elements and proved to be a significant liability during the war.

Traditionally, the primary role of the IDF has been to defend Israel in a conventional high-intensity war. However, years of low intensity conflict with the Palestinians modified their training to focus mostly on urban counterinsurgency. The second intifada increased the operational tempo to the point that regular units had to significantly reduce their training time. Most training exercises involved only platoon and company-sized elements. Battalion and brigade-size exercises became a rarity. Severe budget cuts affected the training and readiness of reserve units. In 2003, reserve units did not conduct any training at all! Army leaders decided to limit large-scale training exercises for reservists to once every three years.

Prior to the war, Israel had demonstrated an impressive intelligence gathering capability against its enemies. However, now, the IDF attacked using limited and inaccurate intelligence concerning IR’s strength, activities and capabilities. Political and budgetary factors were the main reasons for the IDF’s lack of intelligence about the IR.

Since the “Yom Kippur” war of 1973, Israel has been mainly involved in medium and low-intensity conflicts. These types of conflicts are mostly fought at the company level and below. Therefore, junior combat leaders have had years of combat experience while senior leaders lack operational experience.

General Halutz, a former air force commander, focused IDF doctrine and training solely on counterinsurgency operations in urbanized terrain. He believed that “targeted killing” from the air was the preferred technique to fight terrorists. General Halutz diverted much-needed funds from the ground forces to the Israeli Air Force. Ground forces became secondary in importance in the fight against terrorism.

Despite this, IDF troop morale was high at the beginning of the war in Lebanon due to repeated successes against Palestinian terror groups. Israeli soldiers were eager to fight and defeat the Hezbollah once and for all.

**IR Forces** — IR forces numbered between 600-800 full-time fighters and 5,000-7,000 reserve soldiers. The Hezbollah could have called up to 25,000 reserve fighters.

The IR was the most technologically advanced para-military force in the world. IR fighters were equipped with advanced night-vision and communications equipment. IR forces use advanced technology to gather intelligence, such as the Mirsad-1 UAVs equipped with infrared cameras and GPS navigation. During the war, Israeli soldiers found rooms full of Iranian-made equipment including listening devices, computers, and communications devices.

Hezbollah’s supply of arms and equipment mainly came from Iran. Hezbollah used a complex of tunnels and bunker systems to store weapons, ammunition, food, water, and medical supplies. The intent of IR commanders was for every bunker system to be completely self-sufficient.

Hezbollah had an effective command, control, and communications system in place prior to the war. The IR divided southern Lebanon into different sectors, each consisting of 12-15 villages. IR forces used sophisticated fiber-optic communication equipment that resisted Israeli electronic jamming and countermeasures. Individual IR fighters used encrypted Motorola two-way radios to communicate with one another. Hence, every level of command had control of ongoing fighting and knew the status of adjacent fighting positions. The Hezbollah also made extensive use of the internet for information warfare and propaganda in order to promote their message and gain support throughout the Arab world.

Hezbollah had an advanced intelligence apparatus. Hezbollah gathered human intelligence mainly from Israeli Arabs and Druze who had served in the IDF. Thus, IR forces knew exact locations of certain military installations throughout Israel and targeted them during the war. The Hezbollah also used large sums of money and drugs to recruit informers within Israel. Finally, IR forces used UAVs to gather intelligence against Israel.

**The Action**

On July 12, the day of the ambush, the Israeli Air Force responded with air raids aimed at cutting IR supply lines. IDF ground operations started on July 17 in the vicinity of Maroun Al-Ras (See Figure 1, Inset 1). IR forces surprised the IDF with an effective defense consisting of bunkers, tunnels, and firing positions. It took six days of intense close-quarter combat for the IDF to secure the town of Maroun Al-Ras. The battle cost the IDF six KIAs and 18 WIs. Once secured, Maroun Al-Ras became the IDF’s launching site for follow-on combat operations against the towns of Bent Jbail, a large Shia town bordering Israel (see Figure 1, Inset 1). Prior to entering Bent Jbail, Israeli artillery hit targets in the vicinity of Bent Jbail with approximately 3,000 shells. Despite the artillery preparation, the IDF met stiff resistance. IR fighters conducted numerous IED and anti-tank ambushes while remaining concealed in the city ruins. They successfully destroyed a Merkava tank, killing two of its crew. The 35th Airborne Brigade was tasked to setup blocking positions north-west of the city but were unable to reach their objective. The Golan Brigade moved east of the city but came under intense anti-tank missile, RPG and mortar fire, which caused 30 casualties. The narrow streets made it
difficult and dangerous for Israeli armored vehicles to maneuver.

After eight days of intense fighting, the town of Bent Jbail was still not completely secured. Consequently, IDF ground commanders put combat in Bent Jbail on hold and shifted their focus to the town of Aita el-Shaab (Figure 1, Inset 2). There, too, IDF troops were faced with a solid IR defense. This time though, IR soldiers inside the town used hit and run tactics while IR soldiers in the surrounding hills conducted near and far ambushes.

On August 11, the IDF launched a major offensive against the village of al Ghandourieh in order to seize a strategic road junction south of the Litani River (Figure 1, Inset 3). A brigade of “Nahal” infantry troops conducted an air assault mission into the vicinity to provide security for an armored force approaching from the east through Wadi Saluki. The mission of the armored force was to destroy IR rockets, firing positions, and hidden bases. IR forces quickly deployed in the vicinity and setup ambush positions in the dense undergrowth. Once in position, IR forces detonated an IED which destroyed the commander’s tank. The detonation initiated a massive anti-armor ambush with IR fighters firing anti-tank missiles, RPGs, and mortars. The ambush killed 12 Israeli soldiers and damaged 11 tanks. Despite these setbacks, the IDF was eventually able to secure al Ghandourieh, which turned out to be of little tactical value. On August 14, all major combat operations ended, and Israel started to redeploy its troops back to Israel on August 16.

During most battles in Lebanon, IDF troops were operating with limited close air support (CAS) at their disposal. The Israeli air force (IAF) decided early on to limit the use of the AH-64 Apache helicopter and the AH-1 Cobra helicopter in Lebanon. This was due to a belief among senior IAF leaders that the IR had the capability to shoot down helicopters with the SA-18 Grail. Instead, the IAF used more armed UAVs to support troops on the ground. The IAF used fighter jets against deeper targets.

**IDF’s Failed Strategy**

It is important to point out that Israel never perceived Hezbollah as a threat to its existence. Unlike previous wars where large armies threatened to invade, Hezbollah’s sole aim was to harass Israel by shooting missiles into its territory. Therefore, the Israeli military adopted a strategy of gentle force escalation.

Initially, Israel tried to force the Lebanese government to take care of the Hezbollah problem. The IAF did this by bombing key Lebanese infrastructure. This tactic guaranteed the least amount of Israeli casualties since ground troops would not be involved.
However, it became quite clear that the Lebanese government was in no position to confront the Hezbollah.

The IAF’s next move was to heavily bomb the IR targets from the air. This tactic would also minimize Israeli troop exposure. Unfortunately, days of heavy bombardment proved to be futile. The damage caused by many countries to lose sympathy for Israel.

After days of failed results, the IDF decided to initiate limited ground operations using battalion-size combat elements. But, the lack of soldier training and preparedness in high-intensity warfare, coupled with the small size of units, undermined the success of these operations. It was only towards the end of the conflict that the IDF decided to use larger combat elements with more firepower into Lebanon. However, at this point, it was too little, too late for Israel. The world would not allow more fighting, and Israel was pressured to accept a UN-sponsored cease fire.

In sum, the overall Israeli strategy was one of escalating force. The Israeli escalation was slow and gradual, which gave IR fighters much flexibility and freedom to carry on operations. Ironically, by being so careful to prevent friendly casualties, Israeli’s feeble strategy probably caused more casualties than a robust strategy would have.

In retrospect, had the IDF secured a 40-kilometer area to the north of the Lebanese border, it would have been much easier to sweep the area and destroy IR targets within the area. IR fighters would have been trapped without the ability to escape north.

**IDF’s Failed Tactics** — Initially, the IDF thought that the IR’s main defensive line would be right at the border with Israel, when in reality, they were much deeper inland. IR forces baited the IDF into coming deeper into Lebanon. The IDF stepped right into the IR’s trap. Once there, IR forces unleashed their prepared defenses.

Israeli ground troops were often playing a cat-and-mouse game with IR fighters. Israeli forces would often capture an IR fighting position just to discover that its defenders had escaped to another fighting position. IR fighters moved around the battlefield quite freely.

During the war, the senior IDF commanders decided to use Israeli armor in a combat supply role instead of a direct combat role. Thus, Merkava tanks were often tasked to escort medical or supply vehicles at low speeds. This made Israeli tanks quite easy to target and destroy. For this reason, the IDF lost a significant number of tanks.

In retrospect, had the IDF taken the time to properly identify the IR’s main defensive positions, they could have flanked the strong points and overwhelmed them with precision fire while rolling up the flanks.

By failing to do this, the Israelis played right into the IR’s game and experienced a replay of Verdun!

**IR Forces** — IR forces succeeded in inflicting many casualties on the IDF by being creative and flexible in their tactics and techniques. The IR did not attempt to fight the IDF head-on with battalions and brigades of armored vehicles and infantry. Five Arab-Israeli wars have proved that fighting in the defense. The war was a psychological blow. More dangerously, the civilians died and Israel suffered a huge psychological blow. More dangerously, the war in Lebanon II gave terrorist states and organizations renewed hope that modern armies, like the IDF, can be defeated.

**Conclusion**

Israel relied too much on airpower alone to get the job done. After days of bombing southern Lebanon, hundreds of missiles were still raining on Israel. When the IDF high command realized that ground forces were needed, they launched them without proper training, equipment, and intelligence. Essentially, the IDF was set up for failure. The IDF had been focused solely on counterinsurgency for the past 16 years. Now, it was time to maneuver on regular terrain except the IDF was no longer trained for that type of combat.

The IDF discovered that terrorist organizations and armies adjust their tactics and doctrine based on the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses. The IDF now realizes that air power alone cannot win a war and that their soldiers should be fully trained in maneuver warfare as well as counterinsurgency operations.

Israel fought a stateless army, not a guerrilla force. Israel was surprised to find a versatile enemy that was comfortable fighting in the defense. The war was a definite wake-up call for Israel. It highlighted the dangers of specializing in certain war-fighting skills while neglecting other skills. Emphasizing only a particular type of training can be disastrous in combat. Military leaders should not focus all training to meet today’s threats, for tomorrow, the threat may change.

IDF soldiers could have been more successful on the battlefield had they been trained properly. The immediate cost for Israel was tragic: 117 soldiers and 41 civilians died and Israel suffered a huge psychological blow. More dangerously, the war in Lebanon II gave terrorist states and organizations renewed hope that modern armies, like the IDF, can be defeated.

**Captain Jonathan D. Zagdanski** is currently a Chaplain Candidate in seminary in Israel. He began his military career in 1996 when he enlisted and attended Basic Combat Training and Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia. He then served three years with the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. After graduating Ranger School, he attended Officer Candidate School and was assigned to Task Force 1-30, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division.

A list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry Magazine.
In June 1968, the month I reported for duty as a district assistant advisor in Vietnam, the Tet offensive by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (Viet Cong or VC) and the People’s Army of Vietnam (NVA) had been raging since the end of January. The offensive would last nearly until the end of September. Before the communists broke off the offensive, more than 4,300 U.S. and ARVN Soldiers had been killed in action and 16,000 wounded. Communist losses have been estimated at more than 85,000 killed.

I arrived during a war that had been increasing in its intensity since at least the early 1960’s, and for the next year my focus was to be on counterinsurgency operations in Thuan Hoa District, Ba Xuyen Province, in the IV Corps Tactical Zone (See map). This lunar new year’s offensive saw Vietcong and NVA soldiers attacking in force in more than 100 cities and towns, in province capitols, and in the nation’s capitol of Saigon itself. They were opposed by U.S and allied forces and those of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Trying to draw specific parallels between our experience in Vietnam and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan can be risky, but I want to share some thoughts on counterinsurgency as I saw it and touch on some of the considerations that are as relevant to Arab cultures today as they were in the Mekong Delta four decades ago. The geography may have changed, but the fundamentals of counterinsurgency have not.

First and foremost, learn as much of the language — and as much about the language — as you can. You may not develop a native proficiency, but do not let that stop you from trying. As you build vocabulary and learn the rules of grammar, you will be dismayed at how much you don’t know, but keep going; this anxiety is normal and provides a standard against which to measure your progress. Remember, at first your passive vocabulary and understanding will always exceed your active use of the language. Simply put, you will understand what people are saying, although at the time you may not be able to say it. But you will learn steadily and eventually amass an impressive level of skill and confidence. One way is to keep a radio tuned to a host nation station, only loud enough to hear the words and phrases. At first it will be totally unintelligible, but as you study and get accustomed to the tone and sentence rhythm you will gradually pick out single syllables, then words, phrases, and finally sentences. Repeat them aloud. In your interactions with host nation personnel you will also learn key words such as those related to weapons, explosives, vehicles, commands, and simple conversational phrases. Write them down phonetically and learn them. When your interpreter is talking to a local, listen closely to see how phrases and accompanying gestures are used. Your host nation counterparts will probably assist you in this, but don’t ask or expect them to become tutors; they have other things to do. You will be surprised at how fast you will be able to pick up snatches of conversation, so develop listening skills. Various dialects can be a problem, but do not get discouraged; keep trying.

Let’s talk about translators. Before going out to talk to host nation centers of influence or your counterpart, go over what you plan to say with the interpreter to make sure he understands your intent. Depending on the interpreter’s skill and familiarity with American English, you will want to avoid slang, jargon, and idioms that may throw him a curve. If he has studied English in school instead of picking it up on the street, it was likely standard English but did not expose him to idiomatic usage. If you want him to accurately translate your message, speak slowly and clearly, use short sentences, pausing after each phrase, and watch him. Give him time to translate. When he stops talking, go on to the next point, but remember that he has to absorb your message, translate the ideas, and communicate the intent and essence to your counterpart. Some conversations will be routine, unemotional, and easy for him to translate, but others will not. When emotions are running high, keep your cool and let him finish the message. Do not interrupt him; instead use the time to listen carefully and formulate what you’re going to say next.

While we’re on the subject of language, remember this: the locals understand far more than you think, even though they may be unwilling or unable to speak English effectively. By now, they’ve been exposed to a great many Americans, have heard the language, probably picked up key words and phrases — including negative comments about their nation and its customs — and have developed that same passive understanding I mentioned earlier. Make sure your subordinates understand this: a careless joke or insensitive cultural comparison can destroy your credibility. Every member of the team must understand this and take it to heart. You may be the most sincere, skilled negotiator on the planet, but another American’s muttered comment or smirk can undermine everything you’re trying to accomplish. The host nation’s people know far more than we do about the local enemy and the threats he can pose, and if treated properly will share that information with us.

Today’s cultural awareness training is built upon the strengths and weaknesses of the training that prepared us for service in Southeast Asia, although we received comparatively little on customs and courtesies, focusing instead on what we needed for the immediate requirements of the duties we would be performing.
Having been selected for advisor duty, I was fortunate to attend the U.S. Army Military Assistance Training Advisor course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Instruction was heavy on the Vietnamese language, U.S. objectives and current operations in Vietnam, the organization and training of regional forces, and the key roles played by the district and village chiefs. We also learned a great deal about explosives and demolitions and the detection and setting of booby traps.

Just as in Iraq today, the resourcefulness of the enemy in Vietnam and his supporters was remarkable. Their eyes and ears were everywhere. They employed a variety of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but their effects and sophistication were primitive compared to today’s IEDs. The VC would sometimes quickly move into the impact zone of a B-52 or other bomb strike, count the craters — they knew the payload of each type of U.S. aircraft — and start looking for the ones that had not detonated. Once dug up, these 750 and 500-pound bombs could be defused and hauled off to be used as truly impressive command detonated mines, but this was a comparatively rare event, due to the difficulty in excavating a 750-pound bomb from 10-12 feet of Mekong Delta mud, and because of the sheer logistics of moving their prize to where it could be wired for detonation and reburied with any of this being detected. A far more frequent form of IED was an artillery or mortar shell, either a fired round which had malfunctioned or one which had not been collected from the drop zone (DZ) following an airdropped resupply for the 105mm section at our district headquarters. VC would comb the rice paddy that was our DZ after dark, looking for the odd round that had sunk unnoticed into the mud. I was finally able to convince the district chief to have his troops conduct detailed sweeps of the DZ after all drops and cross-check the load list with the rounds recovered until all rounds were accounted for, something that greatly reduced casualties from command-detonated 105mm shells. This lesson is no less relevant to today’s global war on terrorism, where checking your area and litter discipline can literally be a matter of life and death. Just as in Vietnam, insurgents will use anything and everything against us. If something appears out of place, it is probably there for a reason.

Information operations, often pigeonholed under the category of propaganda in the 1960’s, have achieved a far greater degree of sophistication than I experienced four decades ago. Today, Al Qaeda and their surrogates are able to rapidly exploit local, regional, and international media — including our own — to communicate their message. When I first arrived in Vietnam, VC elements were still fighting in many of the major cities, and Saigon was packed with refugees fleeing fighting in the suburbs and countryside around the capitol. Our Braniff airliner was on its final approach to Tan Son Nhut air base, only to be diverted to Bien Hoa because of a VC rocket attack underway on Tan Son Nhut. Sappers and small teams of VC still roamed the city, but they were being ruthlessly hunted down and killed by U.S. and South Vietnamese soldiers, who went after them with the grim determination of men with a job to do. The air of uncertainty surrounding the capitol created an ideal growth medium for speculation and defeatism, and the aggressors did not miss the opportunity. The Viet Cong relied heavily on random attacks and word-of-mouth messages to create the impression that there were greater numbers of them in the city than was actually the case. This is no different in Iraq today, where the message of one Iraqi to another is the best and most credible sort of information operation, having greater credibility that any leaflet, broadcast, or other media image.

Just as today, the international media, including our own in the U.S., were intent on getting the news out ahead of their competitors, and repeated whatever they could get — either on their own or as Communist press releases — without elaborating on either the full extent of casualties suffered by the VC or the limited objectives they had actually achieved. Without committing extensive resources to their media effort, the VC and NVA were thus able to influence public opinion here and abroad, and it was this external feedback that created the sense of foreboding that pervaded Vietnamese public opinion during those first trying months of 1968. The South Vietnamese government sought to restore stability, both by its own public announcements and by denying the Communists access to media. Radio stations taken over by rebels soon found their power cut off. Our own province capitol of Soc Trang was penetrated, but ARVN units quickly sealed off access and egress routes and set about mopping up the sappers and rifleman who now found themselves with no way out. Sporadic gunfire was a part of the city’s routine until well into June 1968, but ARVN successes were well enough publicized to encourage the citizens to resume their day-to-day business. The press and broadcast operation seriously undermined the morale of the remaining VC and served to dry up what little support they had been receiving from sympathizers.

An advisor’s credibility is his stock in trade. Your counterparts must come to understand that your word is your bond, and because of this you must never promise anything that you cannot deliver. You control the assets available to you, but for anything else you need to coordinate before you find yourself in your over your head. People will ask for everything from money to assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, and if your response is going to be “I’ll try,” make sure they understand that this does not constitute a promise to deliver the goods, but that you will make an effort to resolve the matter. And this is why you need to know what you can count on before you enter into negotiations. A last comment: keep track of what you are asked to do, and what you agree to. Keep a pocket notebook, write it down, and keep the details of negotiations confidential. Faced with a cloud of conflicting demands, it is easy to lose sight of details, and that little notebook will save you a whole lot of trouble.

Don’t go in blind. Talk to your predecessor if at all possible. Find out who the key players are, whom you can trust and whom you need to watch, what ongoing unfinished business he’s leaving behind, where he has not been successful, and why. In many areas, his commitments may be your commitments, because the locals only understand that the U.S. Army promised to restore power or water treatment and that hasn’t happened yet. Changing attitudes and building credibility takes time, and you
will be reaping the rewards — and disappointments — of your predecessor’s work for a matter of months, just as your own successes may not become evident until well after you took those first tentative steps. What we see as small steps may in fact come across as giant successes in the eyes of the people we are trying to help. Continuity shows commitment, and your successor in turn needs to know what you’re leaving for him to accomplish. This is where your next higher comes in: he needs to understand and agree to the plan and what it will cost. It may be great to hit the ground running and launch all sorts of mind-boggling initiatives, but if they’re accomplished at the cost of projects the locals have been counting on, the net gain for U.S. credibility is zero. When we redeploy, the last thing we want to leave behind is the Middle Eastern version of the cargo cult, waiting eternally for the great plane load of largesse that never quite gets there.

Tact and diplomacy will be some of the most important tools in your bag. We are used to dealing and speaking directly and openly with one another, but other cultures do business differently. What we take for openness can be seen as bluntness. Our insistence on punctuality is baffling to those we are trying to advise, and may easily be interpreted as an attempt to impose our customs and priorities on them. If a meeting is set for 1400, be there, but don’t take it too hard if the counterparts show up a little later. We want to get right down to business, but they will want to sip coffee, pass the time of day, renew acquaintances, eventually get around to the subject at hand, and conclude when they feel they’ve accomplished enough. The agenda is good for a plan, but don’t be surprised if you don’t get to all the topics in the first sitting. They may want the same things we want, but they have a different way of getting to them. Patience is truly a virtue, and once we understand that we will become less easily irritated and frustrated, and our body language and facial expressions will reflect this. And our counterparts will notice it.

Counterinsurgency is not a simple matter, but all successful counterinsurgencies have recognized that the host nation population is where campaigns are won or lost. The guerrilla seeks to draw his psychological, financial, and logistical support from the population, as he always has. We have heard Mao Tse-Tung’s ‘water and fish analogy enough to understand it in light of the global war on terrorism, and we need to take it to heart. If we try to master — or at least learn — the host nation language and learn to use translators effectively, if we develop and sustain our credibility with local citizens and their leaders, and if we continue to expand our cultural awareness training programs and dismiss the idea that such subjects are too touchy-feely we will have taken a giant step toward defeating Al Qaeda and their surrogates, whatever names they may go by. The insurgency is crumbling. Our adversary is losing men faster than he can replace them, his support at home and abroad is dwindling, and we cannot afford to underestimate the enemy’s resourcefulness, his determination, and his ability to conduct effective information operations. The insurgent will pull over to the side of the road from which the enemy paid attention to mining the roads where convoys would pass.

The 9th MRC (3rd Battalion, 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment) was stationed six kilometers west of Ghazni with our parent regiment. On 5 September, our company commander was ordered to provide an escort on the next day for an 80-vehicle convoy from Ghazni to Kabul. On 7 September, we would off load the cargo and would return on 8 September. Two motorized rifle platoons were detailed to provide security and convoy escort. The company commander would command the detail on an R-142 radio set from the regimental communications company. (The R-142 radio system is actually an R-130 shortwave radio, two R-111 medium-range FM radios and one R-123 short-range FM radio mounted on a GAZ-66 truck. The R-142 can communicate over distance and with helicopter aviation [ed.].) The route is 160 kilometers long.

The only preparation that the troops had for the mission was drawing their ammunition and cleaning their individual and crew-served weapons. The drivers pulled maintenance on their vehicles by themselves.

My company commander decided to keep the convoy together in one single column. He put a BTR in the lead of the convoy and two at the tail. He spaced the remaining BTRs between every 15 or 16 trucks in the convoy. Altogether, he committed seven BTRs to the mission. In the event that the mujahideen would attack, each motorized rifle squad’s BTR would pull over to the side of the road from which the enemy was firing and return fire with all its weapons. Thus, they would provide covering fire for the trucks driving out of the kill zone. Once the convoy was clear, the BTRs would rejoin the column and reoccupy their positions in the march column. Under no circumstances were we to allow the enemy to stop the column. It would be very difficult to get the convoy going again should it be stopped.

The road march to Kabul passed without incident. However, there was a delay in refilling the fuel trucks that constituted
the bulk of the convoy back to Ghazni. The return trip was supposed to start at 0600 hours and finally got started at 1030 hours. We had sat on the outskirts of Kabul for four hours waiting for all of the fuel trucks. While we were waiting, individual Afghan trucks loaded with men and cargo continually passed by the entire convoy. When the loaded fuel tankers finally arrived, they took their place in the convoy. The commander gave the order and the march began. After driving for an hour and a half, we entered the minor Kabul river canyon, and traveled through a green zone. Three kilometers ahead of us was an Afghan Army post which guarded a river bridge. The presence of this post had a certain psychological effect and we relaxed our vigilance as we approached the post. The company commander’s BTR and the truck with the R-142 radio set traveled at the front of the column. Right behind them was a fuel truck towing a broken-down fuel truck. Once the entire convoy was flanked by the green zone, the enemy opened fire on the lead vehicles with grenade launchers at a range of 25 to 30 meters. The fuel truck towing the other fuel truck was hit. Simultaneously, the enemy opened on the tail end of the convoy and knocked out a trail BTR with a RPG.

The escort vehicles reacted as they had been briefed and returned fire. The truck column began to drive out of the zone while the enemy was rattled by the return fire. The company commander radioed for air support and 30 minutes after the battle began, helicopter gunships arrived. They hit the enemy and supported the motorized riflemen in their battle. The enemy ceased fire and began to withdraw to fallback positions. In this combat, we lost one soldier KIA and seven WIA.

**Frunze Commentary:**
This vignette shows insufficient preparation for the convoy duty and further insufficient preparation in its accomplishment. On the day before the mission, the company commander did not conduct training with his personnel including training on coordination of actions in the event of enemy attack. The prolonged wait along the road side permitted the enemy to closely study the convoy as he drove by the column. The use of helicopter gunships to cover the column from the air did not come soon enough to ward off the enemy attack. Reconnaissance was not used during the course of the march. Nevertheless, the high psychological preparation of the drivers and the selfless actions of the motorized rifle soldiers allowed the column to rapidly exit the kill zone.

**Editor’s Commentary:**
In this vignette, the commander is taken to task for not carefully supervising the preparation of his troops for the march. Part of this criticism is based on lack of trust of subordinates and the lack of a Soviet NCO corps. The commander is expected to personally conduct all training. In armies with a professional NCO corps, such training and preparation is done by trained, seasoned sergeants who understand the unit missions and train their forces to meet them. The commander checks his sergeants, but does not have to get involved in training to the extent that his Soviet counterpart had to. This leaves more time for carefully planning the action. The Soviet system overburdened the company grade officers and limited individual training opportunities.

The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished by the extra antennae and convoy commanders usually rode in the first vehicle of the main column. Other Soviet writings talk about strapping extra antennae on all vehicles before going into action and varying the commander’s position in the column. This did not happen. Consequently, when the commander’s vehicle was hit, communications were usually lost and the commander, if he survived, could not control the fight. In this vignette, the essential communications were in a soft-bodied truck, instead of an armored vehicle. The Soviets used radio almost exclusively to control the battle. Although the mujahideen had little jamming capability, once they have knocked out the Soviet vehicles with the multiple antennae they usually had disrupted the tactical control net.

V. I. Rovba served from 1981 to 1983 as the platoon leader of a motorized rifle platoon. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery.”

**A REINFORCED MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY CONDUCTS AN AMBUSH IN KANDAHAR PROVINCE**

*By Major V. I. Pavlenko*

Our separate motorized rifle brigade (the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) completed its road march to its new base camp in March 1981. Its movement was covered from the air by a squadron of helicopter gunships. At the same time, the squadron began reconnaissance of enemy forces located along the Kandahar-Shindand road.

The squadron commander reported that at 1820 hours, a truck convoy carrying supplies entered Musa-Kala village. Further, a number of enemy was concentrated at Musa-Kala, which is located about 20 kilometers from Kandahar. The brigade intelligence officer also confirmed this information.

We could not waste any time. The village of Musa-Kala is located close to the border with Pakistan and was a rest stop and a staging point for the mujahideen bases. Weapons and ammunition were brought through this village for distribution.
Throughout the country. Our brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. P. Shatin, devised the following plan. He would seal off the village from the north and the southeast with two motorized rifle battalions. Then he would use the air-assault battalion and some Afghan Army subunits to sweep the village. At the same time, in order to halt the northwest movement of the enemy convoy, he would fly a reinforced motorized rifle company ahead of the convoy to establish an ambush.

My battalion commander, S. V. Antonov, designated my 8th Motorized Rifle Company as the ambush company. I was a senior lieutenant at the time and the company commander. My brigade commander personally gave me my mission. My company had three motorized rifle platoons. The brigade commander reinforced my company with three AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers with their crews, three sappers with twenty mines, and two RTOs with two radios. Seven Mi-8T transport helicopters were to deliver my company close to the ambush site. I had two hours to prepare my company for the mission.

At 2055 hours, my company was loaded on the helicopters and at 2130 hours we landed five kilometers from the ambush site. The landing took place 15 minutes before dusk. After the landing, I assembled my company at the rally point which was located 500 meters from the LZ. We waited for the cover of darkness before moving out. I pushed out a patrol squad in front of the company. I had each platoon split into two groups and move side-by-side in two columns where they could be controlled by hand signs and visual signals. I had a patrol move in front of and behind each platoon. I had every squad and platoon conduct all-around observation and stop periodically to get their bearings. At 0020 hours, my forward patrol reported that they were at the ambush site and 20 minutes later, my entire company had closed into the area.

I put my platoons and squads into position. I placed forces to block the entrance and exit to the ambush site and concentrated the bulk of my force in the center of the ambush site. All-around observation was maintained on the site entrance and exit while my troops dug in and fortified their firing positions and then camouflaged them. The sappers mined the road at the ambush site. By 0430 hours, my company ambush was ready.

At 0500 hours, brigade subunits sealed off the village of Musa-Kala and began the sweep at 0530. The enemy, shooting at the Soviet forces in the village in order to slow them down, put their ammunition-truck convoy on the road and headed toward our ambush. At 0620 hours, my sentry reported that five trucks were approaching the site. The trucks entered the site and the lead truck hit a mine. The 1st and 3rd platoons immediately opened fire on the enemy. Two trucks turned around and tried to leave. We killed one with a command detonated mine and the 2nd platoon killed the other. The enemy was confused and his return fire was wild and disorganized. Some of the mujahideen tried to break out, but we cut them down. The battle was short.

The results of our ambush were 26 enemy killed and 20 captured. Eight of the captives were wounded. We destroyed five trucks loaded with ammunition and food. I lost one soldier KIA and five WIA.

Frunze Commentary:

The success of this combat was determined by the rapid decision to employ the ambush; the short time taken to organize the action; the rapid, concealed movement into the ambush site; the initiative and bravery displayed by all commanders, the uninterrupted control of the subunits and their fires, and the support and continual coordination with the subunits which were carrying out the block and sweep of the village.

Editor’s Commentary:

This book does not discuss the problem of fratricide, but this particular ambush seems to set the conditions for fratricide. Forces on low ground are positioned across from forces on high ground. The forces on the high ground fired through the convoy and maybe into friendly forces. The account states that the mujahideen return fire was wild and disorganized, yet the Soviets lost one killed and five wounded. Some of these Soviet casualties may have been from fratricide. Further, if the mujahideen had entered the ambush at night, the force on the low ground would have fired into the force on the high ground, since night firing is inevitably high unless bars and elevation blocks are constructed at each firing position. These field firing aids are hard to put in at night.

Although this ambush worked, there are still some troublesome details. There was apparently no control on traffic entering the kill zone from the west and inadvertently setting off a mine, spoiling the ambush. Further, the use of conventional mines on the road takes control away from the ambush commander. If the mujahideen had sent a patrol vehicle ahead of the main convoy, it might have triggered a mine and ruined the ambush. Command-detonated mines seem appropriate here.

V. I. Pavlenko served in the OKSVA from 1980 through 1982 as a motorized rifle company commander. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery.”
will be reaping the rewards — and disappointments — of your predecessor’s work for a matter of months, just as your own successes may not become evident until well after you took those first tentative steps. What we see as small steps may in fact come across as giant successes in the eyes of the people we are trying to help. Continuity shows commitment, and your successor in turn needs to know what you’re leaving for him to accomplish. This is where your next higher comes in: he needs to understand and agree to the plan and what it will cost. It may be great to hit the ground running and launch all sorts of mind-boggling initiatives, but if they’re accomplished at the cost of projects the locals have been counting on, the net gain for U.S. credibility is zero. When we redeploy, the last thing we want to leave behind is the Middle Eastern version of the cargo cult, waiting eternally for the great plane load of largesse that never quite gets there.

Tact and diplomacy will be some of the most important tools in your bag. We are used to dealing and speaking directly and openly with one another, but other cultures do business differently. What we take for openness can be seen as bluntness. Our insistence on punctuality is baffling to those we are trying to advise, and may easily be interpreted as an attempt to impose our customs and priorities on them. If a meeting is set for 1400, be there, but don’t take it too hard if the counterparts show up a little later. We want to get right down to business, but they will want to sip coffee, pass the time of day, renew acquaintances, eventually get around to the subject at hand, and conclude when they feel they’ve accomplished enough. The agenda is good for a plan, but don’t be surprised if you don’t get to all the topics in the first sitting. They may want the same things we want, but they have a different way of getting to them. Patience is truly a virtue, and once we understand that we will become less easily irritated and frustrated, and our body language and facial expressions will reflect this. And our counterparts will notice it.

Counterinsurgency is not a simple matter, but all successful counterinsurgencies have recognized that the host nation population is where campaigns are won or lost. The guerrilla seeks to draw his psychological, financial, and logistical support from the population, as he always has. We have heard Mao Tse-Tung’s water and fish analogy enough to understand it in light of the global war on terrorism, and we need to take it to heart. If we try to master — or at least learn — the host nation language and learn to use translators effectively, if we develop and sustain our credibility with local citizens and their leaders, and if we continue to expand our cultural awareness training programs and dismiss the idea that such subjects are too touchy-feely we will have taken a giant step toward defeating Al Qaeda and their surrogates, whatever names they may go by. And we cannot afford to underestimate the enemy’s resourcefulness, his determination, or his ability to conduct effective information operations. The insurgency is crumbling. Our adversary is losing men faster than he or his ability to conduct effective information operations. The enemy paid attention to mining the roads where convoys would pass.

The 9th MRC (3rd Battalion, 191st Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment) was stationed six kilometers west of Ghazni with our parent regiment. On 5 September, our company commander was ordered to provide an escort on the next day for an 80-vehicle convoy from Ghazni to Kabul. On 7 September, we would off load the cargo and would return on 8 September. Two motorized rifle platoons were detailed to provide security and convoy escort. The company commander would command the detail on an R-142 radio set from the regimental communications company. (The R-142 radio system is actually an R-130 shortwave radio, two R-111 medium-range FM radios and one R-123 short-range FM radio mounted on a GAZ-66 truck. The R-142 can communicate over distance and with helicopter aviation [ed.].) The route is 160 kilometers long.

The only preparation that the troops had for the mission was drawing their ammunition and cleaning their individual and crew-served weapons. The drivers pulled maintenance on their vehicles by themselves.

My company commander decided to keep the convoy together in one single column. He put a BTR in the lead of the convoy and two at the tail. He spaced the remaining BTRs between every 15 or 16 trucks in the convoy. Altogether, he committed seven BTRs to the mission. In the event that the mujahideen would attack, each motorized rifle squad’s BTR would pull over to the side of the road from which the enemy was firing and return fire with all its weapons. Thus, they would provide covering fire for the trucks driving out of the kill zone. Once the convoy was clear, the BTRs would rejoin the column and reoccupy their positions in the march column. Under no circumstances were we to allow the enemy to stop the column. It would be very difficult to get the convoy going again should it be stopped.

The road march to Kabul passed without incident. However, there was a delay in refilling the fuel trucks that constituted

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**Russell A. Eno** is currently serving as the editor of Infantry Magazine. As an infantry lieutenant, Mr. Eno served as an advisor to the 566 and 567 Regional Force Rifle Companies in the Mekong Delta, Ba Xuyen Province. He is a 1967 graduate of the University of New Hampshire ROTC program. He retired from active duty in 1991 and has been editor of Infantry since 1992.

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**THE BEAR WENT OVER THE MOUNTAIN**

More Lessons from the Soviet-Afghan War

**Editor’s Note:** We have selected two operations from The Bear Went Over the Mountain, Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, edited by Lester W. Grau, that illustrate an ambush and truck convoy operations in combat. These two actions are noteworthy because they discuss tactics commonly used by the insurgents.

**ESCORTING A TRUCK CONVOY FROM KABUL TO GHAZNI**

By V.I. Rovba

At the end of 1981, guerrilla forces were very active in the province of Ghazni. Especially bitter combat was fought along the Ghazni-Kabul and Ghazni-Kandahar highways. The enemy paid attention to mining the roads where convoys would pass.

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The convoy began to drive out of the zone while the enemy was rattled by the return fire. The company commander radioed for air support and 30 minutes after the battle began, helicopter gunships arrived. They hit the enemy and supported the motorized riflemen in their battle. The enemy ceased fire and began to withdraw to fallback positions. In this combat, we lost one soldier KIA and seven WIA.

**Frunze Commentary:**

This vignette shows insufficient preparation for the convoy duty and further insufficient preparation in its accomplishment. On the day before the mission, the company commander did not conduct training with his personnel including training on coordination of actions in the event of enemy attack. The prolonged wait along the road permitted the enemy to closely study the convoy as he drove by the column. The use of helicopter gunships to cover the column from the air did not come soon enough to ward off the enemy attack. Reconnaissance was not used during the course of the march. Nevertheless, the high psychological preparation of the drivers and the selfless actions of the motorized rifle soldiers allowed the column to rapidly exit the kill zone.

**Editor’s Commentary:**

In this vignette, the commander is taken to task for not carefully supervising the preparation of his troops for the march. Part of this criticism is based on lack of trust of subordinates and the lack of a Soviet NCO corps. The commander is expected to personally conduct all training. In armies with a professional NCO corps, such training and preparation is done by trained, seasoned sergeants who understand the unit missions and train their forces to meet them. The commander checks his sergeants, but does not have to get involved in training to the extent that his Soviet counterpart had to. This leaves more time for carefully planning the action. The Soviet system overburdened the company grade officers and limited individual training opportunities.

The mujahideen learned to take out command vehicles early in the battle. Command vehicles were always distinguished by the extra antennae and convoy commanders usually rode in the first vehicle of the main column. Other Soviet writings talk about strapping extra antennae on all vehicles before going into action and varying the commander’s position in the column. This did not happen. Consequently, when the commander’s vehicle was hit, communications were usually lost and the commander, if he survived, could not control the fight. In this vignette, the essential communications were in a soft-bodied truck, instead of an armored vehicle. The Soviets used radio almost exclusively to control the battle. Although the mujahideen had little jamming capability, once they have knocked out the Soviet vehicles with the multiple antennae they usually had disrupted the tactical control net.

V. I. Rovba served from 1981 to 1983 as the platoon leader of a motorized rifle platoon. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery.”

**A REINFORCED MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY CONDUCTS AN AMBUSH IN KANDAHAR PROVINCE**

By Major V. I. Pavlenko

Our separate motorized rifle brigade (the 70th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) completed its road march to its new base camp in March 1981. Its movement was covered from the air by a squadron of helicopter gunships. At the same time, the squadron began reconnaissance of enemy forces located along the Kandahar-Shindand road.

The squadron commander reported that at 1820 hours, a truck convoy carrying supplies entered Musa-Kala village. Further, a number of enemy was concentrated at Musa-Kala, which is located about 20 kilometers from Kandahar. The brigade intelligence officer also confirmed this information.

We could not waste any time. The village of Musa-Kala is located close to the border with Pakistan and was a rest stop and a staging point for the mujahideen bases. Weapons and ammunition were brought through this village for distribution...
Throughout the country. Our brigade commander, Lieutenant Colonel Yu. P. Shatin, devised the following plan. He would seal off the village from the north and the southeast with two motorized rifle battalions. Then he would use the air-assault battalion and some Afghan Army subunits to sweep the village. At the same time, in order to halt the northwest movement of the enemy convoy, he would fly a reinforced motorized rifle company ahead of the convoy to establish an ambush.

My battalion commander, S. V. Antonov, designated my 8th Motorized Rifle Company as the ambush company. I was a senior lieutenant at the time and the company commander. My brigade commander personally gave me my mission. My company had three motorized rifle platoons. The brigade commander reinforced my company with three AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers with their crews, three sappers with twenty mines, and two RTOs with two radios. Seven Mi-8T transport helicopters were to deliver my company close to the ambush site. I had two hours to prepare my force for the mission.

At 2055 hours, my company was loaded on the helicopters and at 2130 hours we landed five kilometers from the ambush site. The landing took place 15 minutes before dusk. After the landing, I assembled my company at the rally point which was located 500 meters from the LZ. We waited for the cover of darkness before moving out. I pushed out a patrol squad in front of the company. I had each platoon split into two groups and move side-by-side in two columns where they could be controlled by hand signs and visual signals. I had a patrol move in front of and behind each platoon. I had every squad and platoon conduct all-around observation and stop periodically to get their bearings. At 0020 hours, my forward patrol reported that they were at the ambush site and 20 minutes later, my entire company had closed into the area.

I put my platoons and squads into position. I placed forces to block the entrance and exit to the ambush site and concentrated the bulk of my force in the center of the ambush site. All-around observation was maintained on the site entrance and exit while my troops dug in and fortified their firing positions and then camouflaged them. The sappers mined the road at the ambush site. By 0430 hours, my company ambush was ready.

At 0500 hours, brigade subunits sealed off the village of Musa-Kala and began the sweep at 0530. The enemy, shooting at the Soviet forces in the village in order to slow them down, put their ammunition-truck convoy on the road and headed toward our ambush. At 0620 hours, my sentry reported that five trucks were approaching the site. The trucks entered the site and the lead truck hit a mine. The 1st and 3rd platoons immediately opened fire on the enemy. Two trucks turned around and tried to leave. We killed one with a command detonated mine and the 2nd platoon killed the other. The enemy was confused and his return fire was wild and disorganized. Some of the mujahideen tried to break out, but we cut them down. The battle was short.

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The success of this combat was determined by the rapid decision to employ the ambush; the short time taken to organize the action; the rapid, concealed movement into the ambush site; the initiative and bravery displayed by all commanders, the uninterrupted control of the subunits and their fires, and the support and continual coordination with the subunits which were carrying out the block and sweep of the village.

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V. I. Pavlenko served in the OKSVA from 1980 through 1982 as a motorized rifle company commander. He was awarded the medal “For Bravery.”
Physical Training (PT) has always been a passion of mine. Many years ago as a young NCO I had a wise commander who told me, “Leslie, sometimes the most important training we do in a day is PT.” I have always remembered that quote and often repeated it myself to my peers and subordinates when questioned about why I am so passionate about PT. PT is about training for combat — period — nothing else. It is not about the PT test, running a marathon, or doing a triathlon — it is about preparing the men in your charge for the rigors of combat. To deploy and fight for a year in Iraq is hard business physically, and often, for the men patrolling the sector — there is no regular schedule for PT. They take it when they can get it. I equate an Iraq deployment to a road trip across the Midwest. You want a full tank of gas before you start. Similar to an Iraq deployment — you want to have a full tank of gas, i.e. — be in the best shape you possibly can. Because during the deployment you will be using that gas, and there will be infrequent stops along the way to fill up.

The current Army PT test is a fairly good measure for gauging general fitness, but not combat readiness. That is exactly what it is meant to be. It was never meant to be a limiter or end all, vanilla, one-size-fits-all for PT.

To prepare for the rigors of combat in Iraq, we must first realize and understand the hazards and tasks that we will perform on a daily basis in Iraq. Endurance events are crucial; activities such as confidence and obstacle courses, grass and guerilla drills, foot marches, combatives, and general strength training are all things that must be considered when putting together a PT program. Many commanders will often think of their PT average when it comes to these events. They may wonder that if nothing is geared to the APFT, would their company’s average decrease? The answer is maybe, but not likely. Besides, what is more important — a high company APFT average or a company of physically fit, battle-focused warriors who are more likely to survive the rigors of combat?

Soldiers that are trained for the rigors of combat through a variety of challenging events are less susceptible to injury, more confident in their abilities, and more likely to correctly use escalation of force. In my opinion and experience, those that are of sound body are more often than not of sound mind and better equipped to endure.
I have outlined below a sample company PT program that I used as a commander of a rifle company and headquarters company, both of which were deployed to combat. This is an example of “A Way” — there are many great trainers, commanders, and NCOs out there that have similar programs. The most important thing to remember is to think outside the box and try new things and find what works for you and your Soldiers — we owe it to them.

**Ø Monday — Platoon run** — 20-30 minute run followed by upper body exercises and abdominal exercises. Upper body exercises should be a combination of push-up drills, pull-up/chin-up drills, as well as dips. Occasionally, throwing in exercises such as log drills, rope climbs, etc., when at the platoon level will help keep the monotony out of the routine. Abdominal exercises should be focused around the “abs 500” concept where a series of abdominal exercises alternating between ab muscle areas reach a total repetition count of 500. Ensure you do proper warm-up and cooldown stretching following the run, focusing a majority of the stretching effort for post run to prevent injuries. End every session with some type of buddy evacuation/buddy carry drills.

**Ø Tuesday — Platoon/Squad speed day** — This day is dedicated to developing speed and agility. It’s a good day for sprints, fartlicks, Indian runs, and confidence course timed runs. A good idea is to start off as a unit, run to get a good warm up, and then initiate the speed drills. Groups should also increase difficulty gradually as the run progresses. Things such as increasing distance of sprints and reducing time and distance in between sprints will help keep the runs challenging. Sprint work, not including warm-up time, should be at least 20 minutes in length. Abdominal exercises are a daily exercise as those muscles recover rather quickly. So go again into the “abs 500” routine that you develop, but over time increase this to “abs 1,000” on days that are upper body rest days. End the session with buddy evacuation/buddy carry drills.

**Ø Wednesday — Platoon PT** — There are a couple of options for this day. One option is to do battle-focused PT in boots and BDUs. Activities may include things such as grass or guerrilla drills, followed by a series of push-up chin-up/pull-up/dip exercises and the “abs 500” routine. Another option is to do strictly a combatives day with an intense pre-combatives and post combatives stretching routine. A third option is possibly a platoon run day focused on the “medium fast distance” train of thought (meaning about a three-mile run at the speed of the bulk of the platoon members’ ability) followed by an upper body and abdominal workout. If your unit is relatively new to combatives, this is a good day to start training it. Again, the session should end with buddy evacuation/buddy carry drills.

**Ø Thursday — Company foot march day.** Describe and lay out a route, mark a turn-around point, and let Soldiers go in platoon, squad, or buddy teams. They will be more challenged this way. Additional consideration must be taken in determining the Soldier’s load and uniform? Are we going in just OTV with plates, Kevlar and weapon or are we taking rucksacks, and what is the weight of the rucksack? There is no cookie cutter answer; it depends on your goal and the ability of the unit. Regardless, the load should resemble what they will be carrying in combat on patrol. Combat lifesaver bags and medic bags are mandatory and should not be a compromise. A progressive program works the best; start out with a four-mile march the first week of the month and add two miles every week, culminating with a 12-mile foot march every month. An assessment will have to be made by the company leadership to see if this is a realistic goal. Every foot march should be followed by a short supervised combatives session with every buddy team. This session should be conducted immediately following the crossing of the finish line of the foot march at the exhausted level in their full gear minus rucksack. Session should be ended with a buddy evacuation/buddy carry drill.

**Ø Friday — Company — 30-40 minute run.** This is basically a long, slow, distance run. Followed by an upper body work out and the abs 500 workout. This is a good day to let the first sergeant or other NCOs come up with alternate events for the upper body workout. Things such as sandbag drills, buddy press exercises, dips, push ups, rope climbs, chin ups, etc., can break up the monotony and make the sessions more fun.

**Notes on combatives and other events:**

Ø The U.S. Army Combatives School is an excellent school that conducts yearlong classes. The benefits of combatives training are unlimited. Not only does it instill the warrior ethos and technical fighting skills, but it also gives the Soldier confidence in his abilities and a viable, realistic option other than deadly force in the escalation of force ladder — a skill that is paramount in our current counterinsurgency fight. Unfortunately, not all units get the opportunity to attend this school or send trainers. That does not mean the end to your combatives program. It is guaranteed there are Soldiers in your unit with martial arts, boxing, or wrestling skills and experience. Use those internal assets and develop a combatives program suited for the needs of combat. Even if you have certified Army combatives instructors and...
train modern Army combatives on a regular basis, there is nothing wrong with increasing the repertoire of your Soldiers’ combatives skills by introducing a different set of techniques that are easy to learn and maintain. Guest instructors from your local area or Soldiers in your unit add variety and more “tools in the rucksack” that your Soldiers can call upon in the time of need. A good rule of thumb is to limit the techniques to those that can be performed in their combat equipment, and those that are easy to train and sustain. Additionally, a clear set of established limits, safety considerations, such as medics on site and a good risk assessment are crucial to a good combatives program. No program should regularly produce injuries or ever seriously hurt a Soldier.

- Foot marches and combatives training should be conducted in duty uniform. That means BDUs or ACUs. That is what they will be patrolling in and fighting in so they should train in this uniform. Foot marches should regularly be increased in difficulty and increased gradually as well as the load. Initial combatives training should be in BDUs, and then as Soldier proficiency increases, increase the conditions. Do combatives after foot marches at the reduced ability level, do combatives in combat equipment, multiple attackers etc.

- The Army quit running in boots years ago after prolonged, career Soldier were sustaining injuries caused by this. This is a measure in force protection and Soldier sustainability. That does not mean that once a month or once a quarter that with a proper risk assessment a unit cannot safely do a battle-focused PT session in full combat equipment involving a short run, guerilla or grass drills. After all — is that not the uniform they will be fighting in?

- Not every installation has confidence and obstacle courses, but that does not have to prevent leaders from conducting them. Initially, Soldiers could complete these courses in boots and BDUs, but as they increase in ability, leaders could increase the conditions by including combat equipment. Develop alternate “confidence course” events while wearing combat equipment. Be creative; develop circuit training based on confidence courses.

- Often when I bring the subject of bayonet training up, it gets guffaws and sly grins from those I am speaking to. The bayonet is a dead weapon they say; they are only used to open MREs. Maybe so, but the benefits of bayonet training are many. One — it is battle-focused training. It trains the full range of upper and lower body muscles and instills the warrior spirit. Additionally, the bayonet is not a dead weapon. Many times in Iraq I had my Soldiers fix bayonets when dealing with hostile crowds, guarding prisoners, or on regular patrols. Not only does it present an aggressive posture, but it also gives the individual Soldier another level of force to use on the escalation of force ladder before transitioning to deadly force.

- Develop a commander’s challenge program based on combat! Create a total fitness challenge based on the physical challenges and threats in combat and reward those that perform to a set standard. Some suggestions may be to get a score of 270 or above on the APFT with a minimum of 6 chin-ups, complete a 12-mile foot march within three hours, pass the Cold Weather Survival Test (CWST) or Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) swim test, complete a five-mile run in 40 minutes or less, and pass some type of combatives certification where the Soldier is not only required to perform but teach a certain move. This does not have to be done all in the same day; do one event a week quarterly and give the task to your company master fitness trainer to develop and track. Create a special award for those that meet this standard.

- Ditch the sports! No enemy in any of the four conflicts I have been in has the enemy ever asked me to play basketball or football. These are not good strength or endurance builders. I have never been in any unit, no matter how high speed, where every man was so fit that no one had any room for improvement in running, foot marching, swimming, or fighting. If you want to do sports, do it in the afternoon or as secondary PT. PT is training time for war — not athletic events.

- Finally, last but not least — encourage off-duty physical fitness! Soldiers who are involved in combat-related sports such as boxing, wrestling, martial arts, etc., should be afforded the opportunity to attend whenever possible. When there is no mission critical training going on and a Soldier has a practice for these events, either on or off post — do all you can to support him. Don’t forget those who train for triathlons, bike races, marathons etc. Although not our focus, they can be an inspiration to others in the unit. We have done it for years with unit softball, basketball, and flag football teams — let’s support those that will enhance our training and be trainers for our Soldiers.

Physical fitness training is the cornerstone of success for any disciplined, combat ready, battle-focused unit. Our approach to it should not be one of making events up the day of execution. The same care and approach should be taken as planning major training exercises. There should be a clear end state and definition of success. The goal, although never fully achieved, is constantly sought after — a never-ending quest. We are constantly conducting operations in the global war on terrorism; it is going to be a long road ahead. We owe it to our Soldiers to ensure they are starting this trip with a full tank of gas. They deserve to be prepared for the rigors of combat not just the APFT.

**Major Mark S. Leslie** is the chief of Training for the Stryker Transformation Team at Fort Benning. Leslie is a veteran of Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom. He has served as a Long Range Surveillance team leader, Ranger instructor and commander of A Company and HHC, 2nd Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, and as the Senior Iraqi Army Advisor for 2-7 CAV, 1CD.
The 2nd Infantry Division’s experiences using live-virtual-constructive (LVC) training techniques to train Core METL (mission essential task list) contains the seeds for the future of training in Korea, and may portend Core METL training methods for the rest of the Army.

The environment provided the ideal vehicle to perpetuate this Army-level initiative while achieving the battalion-level readiness necessary to fight and win any future conflict in defense of the Korean peninsula. The **live** portion of the LVC concept includes Soldiers training on real equipment in order to familiarize them with their individual and crew-level skills using their weapons and C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) systems. The **virtual** portion of the LVC concept includes Soldiers training on simulated equipment. The **constructive** portion of the LVC concept is defined as computer-generated and controlled units and systems that are tracked and commanded by the live and virtual components.

The fundamental challenge facing us was the capacity of the training areas. (See Figure 1). For those who don’t know, South Korea is an incredibly dynamic place to be stationed. With the tenth largest economy in the world, the country is awash in construction and modernization. As a predominantly mountainous country, level land is at a premium for construction of homes and businesses and for agriculture. As a result, there is ever-increasing development in what has historically been the primary training area along the Demilitarized Zone in South Korea.

The prime maneuver training area is a Republic of Korea Army controlled site called Twin Bridges Training Area (TBTA). The training area is approximately 2 kilometers by 5 kilometers. Very representative of Korean terrain, it equates to a company-sized maneuver corridor. Traditionally, battalion operations in this training area were limited to employing only portions of the battalion at any one time. Additionally, like any small training area, the Soldiers and leaders are inevitably led to the “approved” tactical solutions for how to fight at TBTA.

A second key training area in Korea, and one managed by the Eighth Army G3, is the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex. This complex holds the most modern and digitized ranges in Korea and supports up to Bradley and tank platoon live-fire qualification training. The usable maneuver training area due to terrain limitations and live-fire impact area restrictions is five square kilometers. The complex also holds a $27 million, state-of-the-art urban training area, the Combined Arms Collective Training Facility (CACTF). The CACTF has 29 buildings of every shape and size, is fully equipped with the best of video and audio capture capabilities, and many other training enhancements.

Common to both Rodriguez Live Fire Complex and Twin Bridges Training Area
and began to explore how we could bring the systems we had available into concert together to achieve a near-seamless training experience for our battalions.

There were some aspects of the training that occurred to us as imperatives. First, we were focused on training our battalions for combat, so there had to be complete harmony among the tactical scenario, the Core METL-driven training objectives, and the training resources we had available — we would not sacrifice achieving our training objectives for the sake of integrating a training device.

Second, each of the live-virtual-constructive environments had to be integrated so as to appear as one fight to the battalion commander, his staff, and his subordinate commanders. This meant that the live instrumentation (I-HITS), the virtual simulators (CCTT and AVCATT), and the friendly and enemy units in the battalion’s area of interest portrayed in the constructive environment (JCATS) all had to have a shared and realistic common picture of each other, without a discernable difference between training environments.

Third, the training feedback had to portray the fight back to commanders and staffs as one integrated fight. This was a particular challenge, since each of the training systems we used (I-HITS, CCTT, AVCATT, and JCATS) have their own stove-piped after actions review (AAR) support tools. (See Figure 2).

This common picture for a commander and his staff in his command post required that the LVC systems combine to populate the battalion’s Army Battle Command System (ABCS) command and control systems with an integrated reflection of the LVC fights — again, without discernable distinctions.

Units fighting on the virtual battlefield (CCTT and AVCATT), had to not only have access to the battalion’s common operating picture (COP) — Blue Force Tracker — but they had to be able to physically “see” any of the adjacent friendly or enemy vehicles or Soldiers that were within their field of view from their battlespace. This was a tall order, especially for the helicopters due to their extended range and ability and requirement to move between supporting different units in the fight. Units in the virtual fight had to be able to track and engage enemy in the live fight with direct and indirect fires.

However, the requirement for virtual fighters to be able to “see” their live counterparts was absolutely necessary to ensuring that both the live and the virtual forces participated in one integrated fight. It was imperative to generating the cross talk and coordination among companies and specialty platoons.

For the virtual fight, we achieved this by first causing AVCATT and CCTT to “talk” to each other, allowing participants in one simulator to see the friendly and enemy vehicles/aircraft being fought/portrayed in the other simulator. In this way, Soldiers fighting a Bradley or tank in the CCTT could look into the virtual sky and see the Apaches flying over the battlefield. Also, both systems could see, engage and kill in the other system. In this way, Apaches could engage and kill enemy ground systems generated in CCTT. Likewise, ground systems could see, engage,

is the close proximity of small towns and farmers’ fields which limit any staging areas for combat training short of the actual battlespace. This further limits battalion-level training and tactical scenario options.

To compensate for the limited ground maneuver training areas, Eighth Army has an impressive suite of virtual and constructive training systems. For virtual training systems, located at Camp Casey, we have the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) with 14 Bradley, 14 M1 tank, 2 Semi-Automated Forces (SAF) workstations, and other assorted support simulators. At Camp Humphreys, we have located the Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), with the ability to train up to six aircraft in any combination of AH-64 Apaches or UH60 Blackhawks. The AVCATT is situated in trailers that are contracted to be repositioned within Korea up to twice a year.

For constructive training systems, in addition to Corps Battle Simulation (CBS), we are supported by the Entity Resolution Federation (ERF), with its centerpiece — Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) (also located at Camp Casey). JCATS is the primary training tool for battalion and brigade command post training in the constructive environment.

It is worth noting here also, that we had access to an amazing new training device called Initial-Home Station Instrumentation Training System (I-HITS). The I-HITS system is essentially MILES 2000 with a mobile instrumentation package that provides CTC-quality battle tracking and training feedback for use in home station training. I-HITS includes real time tracking of each instrumented entity (soldier or vehicle), training unit communications capture, firing vectors and portrays and adjudicates obstacles and indirect fires.

During exercise design, it became apparent to us that we could mitigate some of the training area challenges for battalion-level training in Korea by integrating virtual and constructive environments into our live training. We were familiar with some of the Army initiatives to combine these training environments...
Second, to cause the virtual fighters to be able to see the live friendly and enemy (OPFOR) on the ground, the I-HITS digital data packages for each entity (vehicles or Soldiers) were shared with the CCTT and AVCATT. This was a major breakthrough, and allowed the virtual fighters (CCTT and AVCATT) to not only see each other, but to see the live fighters as well. In CCTT and AVCATT, live fighters were portrayed as friendly and enemy tanks, personnel carriers, and dismounted Soldiers on the virtual terrain.

We achieved this same effect with the Tactical Engagement Simulation System (TESS - the helicopter-mounted MILES training system designed for live force-on-force training). By causing the TESS data to be shared with CCTT and AVCATT, virtual fighters were also able to see live Apaches in the virtual battlespace as they executed live missions in the training area.

This sense of one contiguous battlefield was reinforced by ensuring that the live units’ BFT icons and graphics were shared in the CCTT’s Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) systems, and vice versa. No matter whether a leader was in a virtual combat vehicle or live on the ground, when he looked on his BFT/FBCB2, he saw the entire battalion’s icons and any obstacles, enemy positions, or messages that were input during the fight.

The live-virtual linkages were so realistic that in one instance, a virtual company led a battalion night attack, breaching an obstacle on terrain that was not actually in the live training area, then “passed” a live follow-on company through them to continue the attack. The virtual unit could see the live Bradleys and tanks deployed along the Korean roads and waiting to make passage, and “talked” them onto the live enemy vehicles they could observe on the live company’s objective.

The intensity and detail of the coordination between the virtual and the live company commanders about the obstacle breach location and passage point was as real as it gets. It became so real in the battalion commander’s mind, that later when we were trying to determine the cause of some real-world maneuver damage, the battalion commander initially believed it was caused by the virtual unit!

For the constructive fight, we achieved this by causing the live (I-HITS and TESS) and virtual (CCTT and AVCATT) to be replicated in JCATS. JCATS, in turn, populated the units’ ABCS systems (BFT, MCS-L, ASAS, AFATDS and others in the brigade command posts). This allowed the training battalion and the brigade command posts to see the live and virtual units on their ABCS, and also to see the flank battalions we had created and portrayed in JCATS. These constructive units were also portrayed on BFT to provide the situational awareness of a brigade-level fight.

The integrated live, virtual, and constructive portrayal in JCATS also allowed us to use a commercially made virtual unmanned aerial platform (Meta-VR). By transmitting the Meta-VR picture into the brigade tactical command post, we were able to simulate the unit’s own UAV systems and facilitate intelligence collection, targeting, and battle damage assessments.

This was especially important for training the brigade’s cannon artillery battalion, which was being externally evaluated at the same time as the maneuver battalion. The portrayal of the other units in the brigade on the constructive battlefield allowed us to place a realistic brigade-level demand for indirect fires on the evaluated artillery battalion. This stressed the artillery battalion’s systems and caused the training maneuver battalion to integrate indirect fires in the context of the larger brigade operation.

Portraying indirect fire effects across all three training environments was also key to providing a near-seamless experience for the battalions. The exercise design included a Fire Marking Control Cell (FMCC) that was represented in each of the training environments. On the live battlefield, fire markers used the traditional training method of marking fires with pyrotechnics, while I-HITS portrayed where and when the fires occurred and assisted in adjudicating losses. On the virtual battlefield, the FMCC transmitted friendly and enemy indirect fire missions to CCTT controllers, who then triggered the fires for the virtual fight. On the constructive battlefield, as indirect fires were executed, the FIRESIM system caused the effects to be portrayed in JCATS. Fires in JCATS thereby enabled firing vectors to appear on the MCS-L systems and in AFATDS and JDOCCS in the training units’ command posts.

The toughest requirement was to design the exercise so that the live forces, friendly and OPFOR could “see” as much of the virtual and constructive fights as possible. We’ve already described how we enabled the leaders who were live on the ground to “see” their virtual and constructive counterparts via ABCS systems, but this was not entirely sufficient to create the effect we desired.

In subsequent missions, we gave the mission to the battalion commander with several options for where the virtual company could fight. Once the battalion commander had formulated his scheme of maneuver, we selected the company who would fight a virtual fight. This ensured that the virtual fight played a decisive part.
in the battalion commander’s plan.

We also rotated the virtual unit every mission. The companies would stay in the field to receive orders, plan, rehearse and inspect the readiness of their soldiers. Only when the preparations were complete and the battalion prepared to conduct the operation, did we park the units’ equipment in the field and bus the company to the simulation center. This ensured that the majority of each company’s training experience was on their equipment, fighting a live OPFOR in the field.

One last technique we used to portray a realistic flank fight for the live units was to place reserve OPFOR units on cross mobility corridors at the edge of the live training area. In the event the OPFOR commander wanted a virtual enemy force to cross over from the virtual fight into the live fight, the reserve live OPFOR would be activated and enter the live fight at the time the virtual enemy was crossing the boundary. The same effect was possible from live to virtual because the virtual units could see the I-HITS instrumented OPFOR and the CCTT controllers would create virtual enemy icons that could continue the attack beyond the live training area and into the virtual maneuver space.

To help us in our April exercise, we enlisted the assistance of observer/controller-trainers out of the Joint Multi-National Training Center (JMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany. JMTC has developed a deployable OC package, and we brought parts of that package to Korea to assist us in achieving CTC-quality training feedback. The team consisted of a senior OC for each training battalion, some specified subject matter experts in key areas (Paladin combat trainers), and training analysts.

In the end, the AARs achieved our goal of CTC-quality training feedback. The I-HITS feedback product formed the basis of the AAR, with CCTT and AVCATT screen captures used as if they were video captures of live maneuver. For the big picture, we used the VISION 21 AAR suite, fed by JCATS, to show the training unit’s maneuver in relation to other adjacent friendly and enemy forces. Training feedback required the most energy and innovation because the training systems are not designed to interoperate. More work on this for the future will enhance the training value.

What does our experience portend for the future?

In Korea, the LVC framework offers significant options for expanding our training options. By formalizing the integration mechanisms and techniques, an LVC exercise template can be easily adapted for units stationed on the peninsula, training units transiting Korea or future rotational units. Having a system in place alleviates some level of the commander and staff energy and training resources that must be applied to achieve the desired effect. This is an especially important aspect because of the high turbulence rate in units assigned to Korea and because rotational or units on the peninsula for discreet training events cannot bring together all the participants needed in a timely or effective manner.

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 Eighth Army is now looking at models for how to source this type of training for the future.

With few exceptions outside Korea, the Army is focused on training for the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan and the directed METL required for operations there. As the Army is allowed to one-day scale back the commitment to these fights, there will be a requirement for units to train both core and directed METL in the context of the ARFORGEN rotational model. Resourcing training for both sets of METL will be a challenge, with directed METL probably taking precedence. To maintain the Army’s full spectrum capabilities, LVC training methods may be a resource effective way to train to some level of Core METL proficiency during the ARFORGEN training cycle, something that deserves additional thought.

A final thought. Creating a training environment that combines live, virtual and constructive domains has been portrayed as a Venn diagram of three intersecting circles, with each circle representing one of the training environments. The ultimate goal is to have the three circles overlap to the maximum extent possible — this is the point of achieving the fullest training realism. Future embedded training systems that are integral to our combat systems will allow us to approach this most realistic training.

Maybe the greatest compliment with respect to this LVC training was the comments from leaders and Soldiers who experienced the training. All felt that they had been challenged above and beyond any previous exercise and had gained valuable insights in how to better fight and win on the contemporary battlefield. This surely is the mark of success. Continued investment in training systems that are embedded in our combat systems will result in more realistic training with even greater realism and relevancy.

Brigadier General John D. Johnson served as the Assistant Division Commander (Manuever) of the 2nd Infantry Division. This article was written based upon his observations and work during the execution of the LVC initiative within 2nd ID.
Leaders conducting operations throughout the world have a myriad of issues on their minds at any given moment. The operational tempo of the Army is such that they cannot afford to waste energy worrying about issues beyond their control. Unfortunately, in the Information Age we operate in today, false information pertaining to Soldier equipment often inundates leaders and Soldiers, causing many of them to question if the Army has given them the absolute best equipment available. Loved ones of Soldiers and our political leaders also become rightfully concerned for the well-being of our fighting men and women when fed information through various media outlets. For various reasons individuals and organizations outside the DoD will insist they have material solutions that are far better than what the Army has issued Soldiers and encourage media outlets to exploit their claims. It is time to help set the minds of our Soldiers at rest on this particular issue by providing insights into what one organization, the Soldier Battle Lab (SBL) at Fort Benning, Georgia, is doing to ensure that each Soldier has the absolute best gear available in terms of ballistic protection and enhancement.

**SOLDIER PROTECTION DEMONSTRATION 1 — BODY ARMOR**

Beginning in May 2006, SBL and the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) at the United States Infantry Center (USAIC), Fort Benning, teamed with Program Manager Soldier Equipment (PM SEQ) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to begin a series of experiments addressing the latest technology advances for Soldier protection devices. The need arose out of the concern leaders at USAIC and Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier had for ensuring the current equipment our Soldiers had was keeping up with the technological advancements within the industry in terms of ballistic protection. It has become apparent through years of operating with heavy equipment, that protecting Soldiers is not simply outfitting them with gear that will protect them against IED blasts, sniper fire and other hazards faced during missions. Leaders have to consider how the weight and design of that gear affects a Soldier’s ability to shoot, move and communicate in full spectrum operations. Finding the right protective equipment to outfit the entire Army is challenging, and it is a challenge that many organizations are intimately involved with on a day-to-day basis. It is not my intent to provide a comprehensive discussion of the work conducted throughout the entire Army and DoD to find the right protective gear for our service men and women. Nor does this article address every aspect the SBL is involved with in terms of increasing and improving current Soldier protection.

There is no doubt that the Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) worn by the force today is the best ballistic protection vest currently available to protect our Soldiers. This became evident when the SBL conducted a technology demonstration of IBA and six other body armor systems at Fort Benning from August 14-31, 2006, with the purpose of determining the best technical approaches for body armor, to identify the best solutions for interim fielding, and to identify future desired capabilities of body armor.

PM SEQ sent a request for information out to industry to find body armor available on the market, which included the current IBA. PM SEQ then provided the seven best...
body armor candidates available on the market, along with three systems that covered the legs and arms, to SBL to assess against stringent capabilities outlined by USAIC DCD. SBL used 42 Soldiers of various MOSs and combat experience levels from the Georgia Army National Guard (GAARNG) to serve as the experimentation force (EXFOR). Soldiers divided into seven teams of six Soldiers each. Each team wore a different body armor system daily for seven days. Each day consisted of Soldiers conducting various events such as a three kilometer foot march and a live-fire qualification range. SBL designed the events to understand how each body armor system affected a Soldier’s ability to shoot, move and communicate. The results of the seven day demonstration, titled Soldier Protection Demonstration Phase 1 (SPD1): Body Armor Assessment, concluded with the following findings:

With the current technology, body armor continues to be hot, heavy, and cumbersome. There remains an inverse relationship between protection and wearability. Although the candidate systems demonstrated some unique characteristics and features, they displayed no quantum leap in technology. Soldiers’ confidence in the current IBA indicates that no significant advances existed among the demonstrated systems.

However, the most promising findings from SPD1 were the desired characteristics from each of the body armor systems that Soldiers determined had utility. Soldiers wanted side openings to allow easy access to the front and back to facilitate casualty evaluation and extraction. They also wanted improvement in vest sizing to accommodate different body shapes for men and women. Some of the candidate body armor systems had mechanisms allowing Soldiers to transfer the weight of the body armor between the shoulders and hips. Soldiers felt that was an important feature to incorporate to improve the wearability of the system. Soldiers also wanted a simple, quick release and reassembly system incorporated into the vest. Lastly, Soldiers recommended different sizes and shapes of ceramic insert plates to improve mobility. SBL translated all of these desired capabilities into recommendations to DCD for future body armor requirements. PM SEQ took those recommendations and the knowledge previously gained from other assessments and developed the Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV), which some Soldiers are now wearing and assessing in theater for future improvements. The IOTV and its current assessment is another example of the Army’s willingness to constantly reassess our force protection equipment to ensure our Soldiers are wearing the absolute best equipment available.

It is important to note that SBL also conducted a limited assessment of extremity body armor during SPD1. Extremity body armor is an important element of Soldier protection as more than 53 percent of principal injuries in OIF and OEF have occurred in the upper and lower extremities. Though it was a very limited assessment, all of the systems caused Soldiers to experience heat build-up and they all extremely restricted a Soldier’s range of motion and mobility when dismounted. As a result, SBL concluded current extremity body armor as not adequate for dismounted operations. However, there are some positions such as vehicle gunners, personnel conducting vehicle check points, and personnel on EOD escort missions in which the extremity body armor may be worn with success. Leaders on the ground conducting operations can best decide when to wear extremity body armor, but they must understand the negative physiological effect of wearing such equipment during dismounted operations.

SOLDIER PROTECTION DEMONSTRATION 2: FACE AND NECK

The insights gained from SPD1 reinforced to leaders at the Infantry Center and PEO Soldier to continue conducting equipment demonstrations with the focus of ensuring that our Soldiers have the best equipment currently available on the market and to gain an understanding of how we can leverage developing technology to improve existing protection systems. Based on that guidance, SBL conducted SPD2: Face and Neck Protection in June 2007 at Fort Benning. In addition to assessing face and neck protection devices, PM SEQ also asked SBL to conduct a limited assessment of the IOTV.
PM SEQ provided eight face protection candidates and six neck protection candidates for assessment. Thirty-four Soldiers of various MOSs and combat experience levels, again from the GAARNG, participated as the EXFOR. Six of the Soldiers wore the IOTV for assessment; the remaining Soldiers wore the current issued IBA with OTV. SBL used SPD1 demonstration events as a model to address the issues of form, fit, and functionality. However, these particular devices covered the face and mouth, and events were developed in this demonstration to facilitate understanding if they would have any affect on the level of Soldier’s situational awareness while performing missions. Soldiers conducted various events over a nine-day period.

Again, the demonstration confirmed there is still going to be a trade off between survivability and mobility. The devices that offered the highest protection coverage received the lowest acceptance ratings from Soldiers because of the negative impact the devices had on mobility. This was specifically the case for the face protection devices. Soldiers felt they were not suitable for most dismounted operations requiring fire and maneuver and for drivers of vehicles because of the reduction in the visual field. However, the face devices did prove more promising for specific tasks such as exposed vehicle gunners, personnel at traffic control points, and EOD escort teams. These particular devices were also not compatible with the CVC helmets or with the M40 NBC mask. The neck protection devices were not as intrusive, but did interfere when Soldier’s had to conduct tasks that required them to tilt their head back, such as firing in the prone position. Again, for tasks such as vehicle gunners, traffic control points and EOD escort teams, the larger the area of coverage, the better the system. The recurring theme for leaders in the field to take into consideration when directing the uniform worn for their Soldiers is that not all of their Soldiers will require the same level of protection. Again, leaders on the ground are going to know best what level of force protection equipment their Soldiers require. The SBL experiments simply add additional information leaders must remember when they direct their Soldiers to wear force protection equipment. The general rule of thumb to remember with current force protection devices is this: the more area of coverage Soldiers have protected, the less mobile they will be and the hotter they will become which could significantly degrade their ability to successfully complete their assigned tasks.

The next iteration of Soldier Protection, SPD 3: Personal Cooling Devices, addressed the issue of cooling Soldiers while wearing hot, cumbersome protective gear. SPD 3 occurred August 23-30 at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment Soldiers serving as the EXFOR. PM SEQ identified two personal cooling systems for complete assessment and two additional developing technologies for side excursions. SBL will publish the final report to DCD and PM SEQ October 1, 2007. The goal of SPD 3 is to identify if existing personal cooling technology is ready for interim fielding to the force and to inform Army leadership and industry of the future personal cooling development requirements to meet Soldiers’ operational needs.

Meeting the needs of our Soldiers is at the forefront of everything SBL does. Soldiers can fight hard knowing they have the latest and greatest equipment available and rest assured that when new technology makes current equipment obsolete, their Army will get it into their hands as soon as possible. The series of SBL Soldier Protection Demonstrations is just one example of many outlining the commitment of the USAIC, the Army and the DoD to ensure our men and women have the absolute best equipment available to successfully complete any operation, anywhere in the world. Our Soldiers are the best trained and the best equipped military the world has ever seen and our Army will continue to adjust to changes in technology and in the world to ensure we remain the best fighting force in the world.

**SOLDIER PROTECTION DEMONSTRATION 3: PERSONAL COOLING DEVICES**

The next iteration of Soldier Protection, SPD 3: Personal Cooling Devices, addressed the issue of cooling Soldiers while wearing hot, cumbersome protective gear. SPD 3 occurred August 23-30 at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

**Captain Shane Sims** is currently serving as chief of the Futures Branch, Live Experimentation Division, Soldier Battle Lab, U.S. Army Infantry Center. Now an Acquisition Corps officer, CPT Sims previously served as an armor officer. He last served as a tank company commander with the 2nd Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom II) and during 3rd Brigade Combat Team’s deactivation out of the U.S. Army Europe theater of operations. Other past assignments include serving with the 3/3 Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) where he served as a tank and scout platoon leader and deployed to Bosnia (SFOR7).
Book Reviews


In this book, author Jerry Morton reminisces about his time in basic training and then Officer Candidate School (OCS) in the middle of the Vietnam War. His work is a pleasant stroll down memory lane for those who have experienced either basic training or OCS, or both.

Morton was one of the young men caught by surprise in the military draft of 1966. The preparation was geared for Vietnam. Morton vividly recounts his experiences first in basic training, then as an officer candidate in OCS. Although many advances were made through the years, many similarities still exist. Bayonet training is described in one chapter. Morton places the usefulness of bayonet training slightly behind learning how to clean the latrine. Cleaning the latrine well brought free time on Sunday, so was more valuable to most Soldiers. A good survey of average draftees during Vietnam is gained by reading this memoir. The big question of whether the Army adequately trained the officers and men who fought in Vietnam is never directly answered. Morton indirectly illustrates the social molding during training until most Soldiers did what was expected of them fairly automatically. The rewards of a no-hassle life, even for a little while, and the free time or a pass were more than enough to get cooperation out of a diverse group of people.

Morton does question the Army’s method of teaching Soldiers to shoot at traditional bullseye targets and then testing the same Soldiers by shooting qualification at a camouflaged silhouette target. He figures you should be tested under the same conditions you are trained, which makes sense.

Officer Candidate School brought other useful training events such as eating on the square. Through TAC Officer emphasis, a candidate quickly learned spit-shined boots, polished brass and a correct layout of equipment was more important than learning how to properly lay a World War II minefield.

The classes on laying a WWII minefield indicated the Army was a tad slow in adapting to new tactics and techniques in the 1966 and 1967 era. Reluctant Lieutenant is a pleasant and entertaining book with many familiar events for those who have gone through similar Army training. Anyone looking for a study on the effectiveness of Army training should look elsewhere.

Morton survived his basic training, graduated OCS to become a commissioned officer, and spent the rest of his obligation teaching at the JFK Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. That master’s degree in psychology came in handy after all. He later earned a Ph.D in psychology and spent 32 years as a school psychologist and educational administrator before writing his memoirs of his Army experiences.


Operation Homecoming is a phenomenal book that gives readers an inside perspective into what the men and women who serve in the U.S. armed forces are currently going through while fighting for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The book is more than just a collection of eyewitness accounts, personal journals, stories, and poems written by those serving in the military and their family members; it is also a narrative about the emotional effects of war. While our men and women in uniform are overseas fighting, we are at home debating whether the continuation of the war is worth their sacrifice. Many people feel disconnected from what the Soldiers are currently enduring both physically and psychologically and can only imagine what the deployments must be like. In the preface, Dana Gioia claims that, “No one who reads the entire book will emerge with his or her views on the war unchanged — no matter what those initial views may be,” which is true. Operation Homecoming provides readers with an array of viewpoints about the war, and the letters are taken from a diverse group of Soldiers without the political biasness.

The idea to have a collection of works written about the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan came from the National Endowment for Arts, which wanted to give military personnel and their families a way to voice and express their feelings through literary art. Workshops on writing were held by notable writers such as Tom Clancy, Mark Bowden, and Bobbie Nelson. Gioia, who is Chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts, states that, “Nearly 2,000 manuscripts were submitted for the anthology, totaling well over 10,000 pages...” And of that, only 5 percent made publication.

The collection of works documents the many facets of war. The first chapter of the book is about September 11 and Soldiers preparing to fight the war on terrorism. The first story, written by Captain William J. Toti, immediately captures the reader’s attention with a compelling anecdote called “Antoinette.” This story chronicles that horrible day as CPT Toti was working at the Pentagon on the fourth floor when the building was hit by American Airlines Flight 77. The following stories in the chapter discuss Soldiers’ preparing for deployment and transitioning to a life of war.

Other chapters focus on Soldiers’ experiences with Afghan and Iraqi citizens, the harsh realities of war, as well as the humor and boredom of deployments.

In addition to writings from Soldiers, there are some contributions from family members dealing with the absence of their sons, daughters or spouses stationed overseas.
The book also includes writings from family members dealing with the absence of their sons, daughters, or spouses stationed overseas. Many of these stories look at their everyday struggle to get through the day while stressed and overwhelmed with worrying about the endangered life of their loved ones. Some of the works published are actual letters and e-mails sent between family members and soldiers.

The last chapter is about the soldiers’ return home. Some personal narratives have happy endings, while others are heartbreaking. The personal narrative of Paula M. Anderson, “Writing for Shawn,” is about the emotional roller coaster and the life-changing adjustment that her family goes through upon the return of her severely burned husband. Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stroll recounts the honor he had of accompanying a fallen soldier back home to his family and the experience he shared with the community as they paid respect to the family and the fallen soldier.

If you’re looking for a book that gives readers an idea of soldiers’ experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan then read Operational Homecoming, but if you’re looking for a book that agrees or disagrees with the war then look elsewhere. The purpose of the book is to provide a public forum for the thoughts, opinions, and narratives of military personnel and their families to share with the general public through literary expression.


The Longest Night is a thoroughly researched account of the bombing of London on May 10, 1941. This was the climax of the Blitz, the German aerial bombing of London and the heaviest night of the bombing. During the Blitz most of the bombing brought upon England was concentrated on London, although the first major bombing was in the seaside town of Portsmouth. The Longest Night focuses on London with the story’s focus shifting between civilian life, the fire brigade and British Royal Air Force. The author also presents the German perspective from the bomber crews’ viewpoint.

The book begins with a brief introduction to the history of the Blitz. Preparation for the war actually began early. Children were evacuated from London and 600,000 were predicted to be killed in the autumn and winter of 1939-40. However there was no major bombing that winter which led to complacency, by springtime the children had been returned to London, only to be evacuated again as other European countries began to fall. By that summer the heavy bombing that defined the Blitz had begun.

By May 1941 bombings were a part of life for Londoners. The majority of The Longest Night focuses on May 10, 1941. The reader is taken across London from a long and horrific night.

After being introduced to the Blitz, the reader receives a glimpse of the Paris office of Fieldmarschall Hugo Sperrle. While looking at a map of London in his office, he made plans for the most devastating attack on London to date. The author gives the reader a step-by-step glance in the strategic planning of this attack.

After gaining an impression of the German perspective of the attack, the reader is returned to England. Here the book discusses life in London. The city has a changed landscape. We see that the famous Westminster Abbey and other London attractions are surrounded by sandbags. Some statues have been removed and stored in a safer location than the streets for which they were intended.

The Longest Nights reads more like a novel than a history book. This makes it an easy read. At the same time, the author, Gavin Mortimer, does not dumb it down so much that someone with a prior military background or knowledge of World War II would not enjoy it.

As May 10, 1941, progresses the reader gets a minute-by-minute account of London on that day. The day begins differently for some Londoners, for some it is a lazy Saturday and for others it is another work day. Despite earlier bombings, death, destruction and fear, it is still an ordinary day. The city still hustles and bustles. There is a sense of calm before the storm in the introductory chapters as people go about their day.

The characters in The Longest Night unfold as people with lives that march on ceaselessly despite the nightly threat which looms over them. The people discussed are presented objectively, which is not surprising considering Mortimer is a journalist. There are many people mentioned, which may be difficult to keep up with. There is a list of key characters at the beginning of the book though, which helps the reader who can reference this list while reading.

In addition to the civilian aspect of war the author gives readers balanced insight into the military perspective. When describing weaponry and tactics, the details are so intricate that one can tell that Mortimer has done his homework. The reader rides along with the British fighter pilots, whose primary job was to shoot down enemy bombers over metropolitan London.

Although an excellent read, The Longest Night is not perfect. A map of central London would have helped the reader to better envision the events and places, because so many streets and neighborhoods are mentioned. Readers unfamiliar with London could put the places described into better context if they could reference a map.

Gavin Mortimer obviously spent many hours researching and writing this book, and there are times when the reader may feel bogged down by the sheer details. Sometimes unnecessary information appears or a certain incident or thing is described in extremely overwhelming detail. While the details can be intimidating at times, they also give remarkable insight into life at this early stage of World War II, seven months before America was attacked at Pearl Harbor and entered the war.

Mortimer’s book is not only meticulous researched and written, but he has also written a book that will attract a wide range of readership from history buff to novice. Anyone can pick up The Longest Night, enjoy it, and learn something about that horrific night of May 10, 1941.
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