Urban Operations

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Urban Operations — Meeting the Challenges

Combat has always presented complex and varied conditions to the warfighter. Of all the types of combat faced by today’s infantry, few are as challenging as the urban fight. The last half of the 20th century has seen increased urbanization around the globe. Millions of people have moved into the cities and shantytowns. As civilians have moved to the cities, the guerillas and insurgents have chosen the urban environment in which to base their operations. U.S. and coalition forces have invested significant resources in perfecting command and control systems; precise, lethal firepower; logistical support systems; and the tactics to win the urban fight; and our enemies have been diligent in trying to adapt tactics that will mitigate these advantages. Operating in and around urban areas creates complex, short range engagements, restricts mobility and observation, and increases the potential for civilian casualties. With this in mind, our infantrymen are constantly adapting and must constantly evaluate courses of action. In this Commandant’s Note, I want to discuss the challenges of urban operations and the need for training, innovation and a continued combined arms approach as we prosecute the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

For well over 200 years and on battlefields around the world, the U.S. Army has conducted complex combat and non-combat operations in urban terrain. Today, in the urban areas of Afghanistan and Iraq, our infantrymen have continued adapting and perfecting the way they close with and defeat the enemy. The current GWOT fight continues this long tradition of U.S. infantrymen fighting amid the challenges of often unfamiliar terrain and a vulnerable civil population.

Much of the experience gleaned from World War II resulted in the first urban operations field manual “Combat in Fortified Areas,” published in 1951 which offers valuable lessons to this day. In recent years our urban operations doctrine has evolved in two major areas. First, although some tactical situations may require systematic clearing of an urban area, today’s infantry strives to avoid such a costly approach, seeking instead to attack key points of enemy strength or weakness focusing on centers of gravity and decisive points. This approach to urban warfare requires infantrymen to stay situationally aware, move rapidly, apply precision firepower, and maintain a complete understanding of the environment, including the disposition of noncombatants and enemy forces.

Unable to match our firepower our enemies increasingly seek asymmetric options to offset our advantages. Irregular warfare often takes the form of an insurgency and relies heavily on the support of the indigenous population. Our Soldiers must recognize the interdependent nature of the terrain, the enemy infrastructure, and the people. We can best assure ultimate victory by full consideration of all these factors.

The second area in which our doctrine has evolved is in the recognition and integration of full spectrum operations. Civil considerations impact victory as much as traditional military objectives, and they demand equal consideration in the execution of urban operations. From the need to learn new skill sets associated with cultural understanding, use of translators, and small-unit leader negotiations, to the efforts required to perfect challenging techniques like room clearing, the impact on the infantry has been profound.

The need to fight as a combined arms team remains the cornerstone of our profession, and this is true of the urban fight today. The urban fight does not belong to infantrymen alone and combat experience highlights the importance of the combined arms team. The complex three-dimensional battlefield demands the integration of armored forces, aviation, engineers, indirect fires, and air support. Today’s Soldiers are integrating even more assets at a lower level than ever before. In addition to the traditional combined arms team of the past, infantry units now must interact with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational forces. While the traditional combined arms team is critical to success in urban operations, it requires judgment in its application. Leaders must decide when they should enter and clear a building, and when it is necessary to destroy that very same building.

The Infantry School provides infantrymen the means and training to apply lethal firepower with precision. Future technology will continue to bring infantrymen increasingly precise weapon systems. Detection and target acquisition capabilities will continue to improve along with efforts to advance and synchronize our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We will continue to improve non-lethal capabilities for the future battlefield.

Infantry leaders have great challenges ahead as they work to integrate new technologies, tactics and techniques, and to train with varied and complex teams. While all these new skills compete for training time, the need to master fundamental warfighting skills remains. It is creative infantry leaders and a growing experience base in the force that has allowed our Army to face challenges head on, and maintain the world’s premier infantry force.

Mastery of the fundamental infantry skills, effective application of new technologies, a thoughtful planning process, and the application of battle command by adaptive leaders will allow the U.S. infantry to continue domination of the enemy wherever we choose to fight, even in urban terrain.

Follow Me!
Infantrymen expect to be given the toughest, most demanding missions and there are few that compare to the demands and challenges of urban combat. The sheer complexity and potential uncertainty of operating in an urban environment combine with normal environmental challenges to make urban operations uniquely challenging for our Soldiers and small unit leaders.

In the last issue of Infantry, we discussed the importance of physical adaptations to operating in mountainous terrain. I submit that there are few environments that demand more mental adaptability than does the urban environment. Whether taking part in large scale clearing operations or performing routine patrols through a familiar neighborhood, infantrymen have to be ready to shift along the full spectrum of conflict at any moment. A friendly cordon and knock could easily transition into a fierce firefight involving heavy casualties, yet Soldiers demonstrate remarkable resilience after making such a transition as they react to contact, neutralize the threat, and continue their mission. When faced with the problem of frequent, accurate, enemy sniper fire, adaptive Soldiers invent and fabricate vehicle mounted sniper screens and adjust their activity and exposure to forestall or counter enemy actions. Small kill teams (SKT) patiently study an improvised explosive device (IED) cell’s routine to better understand what markings and signals represent and how the enemy creates diversions. Soldiers on these SKTs demonstrate superb tactical patience when something seems out of place; he has the intuition to lift up a board buried in cow manure, discovering a huge cache, or to check an obscure mound with a metal detector — discovering a field full of buried munitions. These are just a few examples of infantrymen who readily adapt to their environment and do extraordinary things every day.

While in training we may never be able to fully replicate the complexity and size of some of the urban areas we are currently operating in, but we still can create situations in training that develop Soldiers’ skills and attributes that lead to superior performance in the complex urban environment. Infantry leaders at all levels, especially at the direct leadership level, should strive to develop the confidence, initiative, accountability, and responsibility of their small unit leaders, as well as all infantrymen and Soldiers under their charge. The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) has identified these attributes as of particular relevance to the global war on terrorism and refers to them as the AWG Intangibles. If we consolidate or centralize individual training at too high a level, will junior NCOs gain confidence in their ability to train their Soldiers? Can we hold them accountable for training we take out of their hands? Can we then expect them to take the initiative to train all the other individual tasks we decide not to centralize?

The complexity of urban terrain demands our infantrymen be proficient thinkers and problem solvers who maintain situational awareness at all times. While most infantrymen are adaptive in varying degrees by their nature, they should have ample opportunity during training to develop and exercise their thinking and problem solving skills. Most platoon and company level leaders have enough combat experience to develop relevant tactical decision games, vignettes, and even situational training exercises to force Soldiers to think through tough situations. Developing our junior leaders’ ability to think and adapt is arguably one of the most important things we can do; however, it is not quite as simple as the learning of a new tactic, technique, or procedure or how to operate a new item of equipment. We improve our thinking skills and adaptability through a combination of experience and education, and we can enhance them through creative training events designed to force Soldiers to arrive at creative solutions.

I encourage NCOs and all small unit leaders to review and use FM 3-06, FM 3-06.11 and TC 90-1 and Center for Army Lessons Learned web-based products as references for developing urban operations training plans. Additionally, the latest Leadership Field Manual, FM 6-22, is a valuable reference on adaptability and Soldier development. The Infantry Center’s Ranger Course and the Asymmetric Warfare Group’s Combat Application Training Course are superb courses that will assist with developing adaptable leaders. NCOs should pursue all available opportunities for self-development even as they train their Soldiers in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of urban combat.

Follow Me!
Crafted from the hard lessons in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army released an updated version of FM 3-0, Operations, February 28.

Army Chief of Staff GEN George Casey, Jr., said the manual is a blueprint for how the Army will conduct missions in the 21st century.

GEN Casey outlined the three biggest contributions of the updated manual. The first major change elevates “stability operations” to the level of offensive and defensive operations.

The Army’s top Soldier said when he was a division commander back in 2001, his main focus for training was conventional warfare. He doesn’t believe that’s necessarily the case for divisions and brigade combat teams any more.

“What’s clear to us is that every operation — whether it is major combat operations, irregular warfare or even peacetime engagement — will include some form of offensive operations, some form of defensive operations and some form of stability operations,” GEN Casey said.

The second major contribution is approaching hard military problems from an intellectual standpoint. He hopes this will take the Army away from a process-oriented decisions-making method. The updated manual describes how commanders must first understand the complex issues they have to deal with, he said.

They have to visualize it in a way that enables them to describe it to their subordinates, so they can direct the execution of plans and orders,” GEN Casey said.

The updated FM 3-0 also stresses the importance of information in the 21st century.

“Any operation that we conduct will be conducted under the unblinking eye of the 24-hour media cycle,” GEN Casey said. “That’s not a bad or a good thing. It just is. It’s clear that information is far more important now than it has been in the past.”

The new doctrine is not meant to affect the Army’s resources today or provide cookie-cutter solutions, he said, but rather, “it’s designed to spur debate and thinking about how we fight and how we will use it to adapt and how we develop our equipment.”

GEN Casey said that Soldiers still remain the center piece of the Army. “And they will remain our ultimate asymmetric advantage.”
You’re a company commander, deployed in Iraq. You have plenty to do already, and now the boss is pushing you to start a company intel cell, a “fusion cell,” because his boss is pushing him to do so. And though you’d like to “organize for intelligence,” in David Kilcullen’s words, you don’t have a lot of options. Daily patrols, debriefs, and planning consume the time of your platoon leaders and your platoon sergeants. Your fire support officer (FSO) runs around like a maniac between meetings with sheiks and five projects designed to boost the local economy. You look at your training room … and shudder. Where do you begin?

Or maybe you’re a platoon leader or a platoon sergeant. You’re trying to figure out what’s really going on, how the insurgent groups work together or don’t, where the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army fit in, and how these Civil Affairs projects are going to improve your neighborhood’s security. You don’t get nearly enough information from your boss on what’s going on, despite the hours of meetings he attends each week. You’re faithful with turning in debriefs, but no one’s ever responded to yours. Some weeks you get your target, some weeks he gets away. Attacks go up or down, based more off on weather, you think, than operations. Is anyone even trying to put the big picture together here?

Caveat
Much of what is written here will seem intuitive for officers and senior NCOs. However, no one gave me such advice while I was starting our company’s intel cell. What I learned from trial and error I want to contribute to the conversation, and perhaps others can start a few steps ahead of me. In his “28 Articles, Fundamentals of a Company-level Counterinsurgency,” David Kilcullen writes of established company S2 cells, and this, I believe, is how they might operate. The suggestions given here were effective for my company, but, as Kilcullen warns of his own commands, “Apply them judiciously and skeptically.” This article presupposes regular SIPRNET (secure internet protocol router network) access, a security clearance, and access to your battalion’s shared drive.

Structure
Who will run your company S2 cell? If your battalion has a surplus of lieutenants, I’d try to get one of them first. Most battalions don’t though, so as a second choice I’d recommend tasking your company FSO. Now, there’s an obvious trade-off here: if your FSO is going to deliver your company timely and significant targets, his economic projects, IO messages, and even patrolling need to take a back seat. He can probably still do them all, but something must give along the way. The biggest reason you want a senior leader in charge of your intel cell (besides his level of responsibility, organization and communication skills, and ability to analyze) is that rank helps get things done. An E-3, even if he’s smart, is going to get a lot less help in the battalion tactical operations center (TOC) than an O-2. If our company had questions about targets from the S2, or if I needed help with imagery for a future operation, it was easy for me to go to the TOC and gain clarification.
Furthermore, most junior Soldiers and NCOs don’t have the clearance needed to do the work of a company analyst. That being said, the company intel leader must be able and willing to delegate, especially to those in the headquarters platoon who generally don’t patrol.

Techniques

1. You need an M3 account. Let me say that again: you need an M3 account. If there is only one thing to take away from this article, take away the fact that you need an M3 account. The M3 system, which is set up on SIPRNET, is a search engine for a giant database of reports from the Department of Defense, CIA, and other government agencies. Was an interrogation done at Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda? In a few days it’ll be plugged sent to the M3 database. Even when document exploitation (DOCEX) is done back in the States, it gets a mention in M3.

You use the M3 system just like any search engine. Just type in the name of a person — or a town — and the results will flow in. Since the Arabic vowels (or lack thereof) cause such chaos when transliterated into English, use an asterisk in their place. So, if we were to look up my name in connection with Fort Drum, you’d type BR*ND*N C*L*S AND F*RT DR*M. In a few seconds, you’d get a smattering of results (or perhaps not).

The real power with an M3 account comes from its ability to automatically search for you and send the results to your SIPRNET e-mail address. By setting up a user profile, you can have the system e-mail you each report containing the name of your town, unit, or neighborhood. I had two profiles set for our town and received about 10 separate reports each day.

Now, there are other databases out there such as Pathfinder and Query Tree. They are worth your time to explore. But for the company level, you’ll do fine with just an M3 account. Your battalion S2 already has access and can set you up with one.

2. Be the company’s collective memory.

You’re the one getting the info. Eventually, you need to try and tie everything together. Be organized. Save every M3 e-mail you get unless it’s completely irrelevant. Set up folders to track the different insurgent groups in your town. Start making separate files for each insurgent, or track them on an Excel sheet. (Maybe you can delegate that to the training room.) Jump on your S2’s shared drive and see what he already knows and is tracking in your area, and save yourself some precious time. Get your platoon leaders’ debriefs and study them. Start your own significant action (SIGACT) trackers for areas in your city, times, dates, and types of attacks. What about the IPs — who works at which checkpoint on what days? You might find some interesting connections there, but only if you take the time and are organized enough to know how and where to look.

Once you get good at this, you will at least have a decent guess on when and where attacks will occur. In this fight, you’re rarely ahead of the insurgents — but being organized and starting to track what happens will make you walk a little closer behind them.

3. Know your turf. Obviously, you need to know the physical terrain. This is why you still need to patrol. When a platoon leader tells you that he had a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired at him on North Bridge by the mosque, you’ll know that he’s referring to the Al-Akbar mosque at the corner of North Bridge and Massachusetts (the same mosque that came up in an interrogation report last week).

You also need to know the human terrain. You especially need to know who, exactly, are the different insurgent groups operating in your area. During our rest-in-place (RIP) with the outgoing unit, we learned a lot about the insurgents’ tactics. But at the company level, the unit we replaced didn’t seem to have a clear understanding just who the insurgents actually were. Once we started doing company intel work, we learned that our town had at least seven separate insurgent groups, all with different motivations, tactics, and members. And once we figured this out, we could start to target specific groups and specific individuals, which leads me to my next point.

4. Link diagrams are critical. Just to show that you don’t need an MI degree to do this, I include an example in Figure 1. The nice thing about a link diagram is that it graphically depicts relationships that previously only existed on reports. It will keep your targeting on track and let you develop your fight on a more methodical level than simply driving out on what pretty much becomes a — I’m going to say it because it’s true — presence patrol (gasp!). The S2 will certainly have some link diagrams already made, but they won’t be enough, and it’ll work better at the company level when you start creating your own.

Figure 1 — Example Link Diagram

Insurgent Cell in Hawijah
Your link diagram doesn’t need to be pretty. A plain PowerPoint slide can get the job done. I put one together for our company based off a few interrogation reports. We used kinetic operations and what I’ll call harassing operations to work on the cell for a month. And within that month we detained half their members and rendered that cell ineffective. In fact, a few of the higher-ranking insurgents actually drove up to our forward operating base (FOB) and turned themselves in.

5. **Debriefs are your lifeline.** Since the company intel leader, of necessity, will patrol much less than others in his company, debriefs from the platoon leaders become more important. This is one area in which I could have done better. Sitting down with the platoon leader when the patrol was done, or sitting in on an after action review (AAR), and consistently reading the typed debriefs will keep the company intel cell closely connected with what’s occurring outside the wire.

Platoon sergeants aren’t generally writing the debriefs. But if you don’t talk to them, you will fail. They have more combat experience than the platoon leaders and have the best idea of what’s happening on the ground. Listen and learn from them.

6. **Use Falconview.** And talk to the Kiowa pilots or to your S2 imagery officer, S3, or anyone who can get you recent imagery of your entire AO. If it’s more than a year old, it is outdated. If it doesn’t already have a GRG (gridded reference graphics) system on it, make one and pass it out to the battalion and company and platoons. You need to be able to plot on Falconview, and get a better image transferred to a PowerPoint slide, which you can pass out to the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants who will actually be using it.

For larger objectives, such as a village, make a GRG for the PLs, PSGs, and SLs to use on the ground. Have your battle captain e-mail it to the pilots a few days before and keep a few copies in the TOC for reference. It’ll make operations much easier for everyone involved.

7. **Generate target packets.** Your job is to locate the enemy and give the platoon leader enough information to exploit the objective. You don’t need a PowerPoint Tab to put together a decent target packet. Here’s what I always tried to include:

- The target’s name and alias and why we want him;
- A physical description and occupation;
- A picture, if I could find it; and
- His MDCOA (most dangerous course of action) and MPCOA (most probable course of action).

I’d have at least three tactical questions to be asked while on the objective. I’d also include satellite or Kiowa photos of the objective. Sometimes I’d get the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) to fly by and snap a bunch of pictures about a week before the operation. Five or six slides in the presentation should cover everything. The platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and commander all get copies.

And save everything you make. You’ll eventually need it again.

8. **Setbacks happen.** And it’s particularly painful when they happen to you. When I was a platoon leader, I had no problems grumbling when passed bad intel. After I got hurt I was moved to being company fire support officer and intel cell leader. So I would sometimes end up being that guy — the guy who actually passed out bad intel, which was even more frustrating than just receiving it. Especially since my former platoon sergeant told me exactly what he thought after each operation.

Everyone already knows that it often takes a dozen or two dozen cordon and searches before netting a bad guy. But for some reason you’ll probably forget that after you become the company intel expert. You are tracking insurgents in your area. You, yourself, have figured out where that dude is, and you arranged for the air support and the SIGINT team to come out and everyone is watching the operation via Shadow in the TOC... and it’s the wrong house. Get over it. Keep targeting. Your company needs you, and you’ll get better with time.

9. **Learn the Arabic script.** Instead of doing Sudoku puzzles when you’re bored, spend two weeks studying the Arabic alphabet — and it can be done in less — and learn how to transliterate it into English. It will hurt your brain, but you’ll actually understand how Arabic names get sloppily mixed up into all of those reports you get from M3. It’ll help you improve at building and organizing files on your local insurgents, as well as searching for their information. Just trust me on this one. It’s worth your time.

10. **Read the GRINTSUMs (graphic intelligence summaries).** As painful as it may be. It’s kind of like taking your vitamins or working out even though you don’t feel like it. The people who publish the GRINTSUM have more intel experience and resources than you. You’ll learn the bigger picture within and outside of your AO. And you never know what tips you might pick up from the GRINTSUM that you would’ve missed otherwise.

When looking at GRINTSUMs, resist the urge just to study the battalion level. You certainly should start there, but you need to read what the brigade S2 shop has to say as well.

**In Conclusion**

After reading this article, you have no doubt realized that I am not a genius. I’ve never had formal Military Intelligence training, and I didn’t apply all of my ideas here as diligently as I could have. However, we have had some success with these techniques, and I hope that a few of these suggestions — in particular, the use of an M3 account — can help you as well. Happy targeting!

1LT Brandon Colas, an infantry officer, was commissioned from Cedarville University’s ROTC program in 2006 as a Distinguished Military Graduate. He served in Hawijah, Iraq, with the 10th Mountain’s 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry as a platoon leader and company fire support officer. He is currently a member of Fort Drum’s 3-85 Infantry Warrior Transition Unit, getting healed up to go back to the fight.
February 12-15 marked the beginning of a pilot program for peer counseling at Fort Irwin, California. Dr. Richard Long, a professor in the Department of Counseling, Educational Leadership, and Professional Studies at Columbus State University, Columbus, Georgia, and I conducted 23 hours of training to prepare 24 NCOs and company grade officers to function in the role of peer counselors. Units throughout the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Support Brigade, and U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, including the Wounded Warrior Transition Unit, selected Soldiers to participate in the peer counselor training. The commands who allowed their service members to attend the training demonstrated their commitment to their Soldiers and families, and those who completed the initial training program deserve recognition.

The training began with an evening on the theme “From Ground Zero” in which the participants examined a number of real-life scenarios from Soldiers who had returned from Iraq and were facing serious issues involving post-traumatic stress and other factors. The group had to work through the case studies and discuss how to handle each situation. At the end of the training, each small group again revisited the case studies, employing the new skill sets that they had acquired over the course of the training. The skill sets came alive as another means for looking at ways to assist Soldiers in need and/or in crisis during the training. The participants themselves recognized the enrichment of their own skills that had occurred as they made use of the new skill sets that they had acquired during the week.

At the closing ceremony, Chaplain (COL) David E. Bates, the command chaplain for NTC and Fort Irwin, underscored what the participants were discovering for themselves.

“One of the things that attracted me to this course was the potential benefit for a ripple effect in the community when Soldiers use the skills taught with their spouses, family, and friends,” he said.
What is a peer counselor?

The peer counseling concept is in some ways analogous to the combat lifesaver program in wide use among all Army units today. The combat lifesaver provides emergency care to Soldiers in forward units in order to stabilize them until they can be treated by trained medical personnel. Approximately 90 percent of combat deaths are due to loss of blood, lung collapse, or blockage of the airway, and combat lifesavers learn to intervene and treat those conditions and others. Likewise, a peer counselor is not a professional mental health care provider or a chaplain — nor is he intended to be a substitute for them. A peer counselor is an individual who has had at least 20 hours of training in some of the basic counseling skill sets such as a perspective on effective counseling, counseling as a process, building the counseling relationship, active listening and interpersonal skills for in-depth exploration, the nature of change and commitment to action, and termination and referral issues. The peer counselor is a resource for short-term and basic counseling at a peer level, and in this capacity he works in cooperation and in consultation with the Family Life Chaplain and other helping services. Peer counselors themselves are also a network for peer counseling resources and a conduit for other more formal/professional helping resources.

What type of person should be selected to be a peer counselor?

A candidate should have a commitment to help others and the ability to interact with individuals from a wide range of backgrounds and situations. He must be willing to accept professional and ethical standards of conduct to include protecting confidential information and maintaining an empathic and genuine stance of respect for the client. The counselor must never become an advice giver but must always honor the abilities of the client to make his own decisions. The counselor candidate must be willing to work within a community of other counselors, their supervisors, and professional caregivers. They must never work outside the philosophy and goals of the program or as an independent entity. The candidate must at all times keep in mind that he is “to do no harm” as per the American Association of Marriage and Family Therapists (AAMFT) Code of Ethics.

What are some of the competency skills that a peer counselor should have and how is that trained on a compressed timeline?

Of the 20 hours plus of training that our counselors complete, the students are immediately thrust into real-life scenarios about issues faced by Soldiers returning from extended deployments as well as scenarios from their own lives. The structure of the training is based on an adult learning model. Each skill set is taught in the following cycle:

* A period of theoretical instruction is followed by a live demonstration of the skill set by the instructors with observations, questions, and discussion following by the entire group.
* The students then break out into groups of three where a rotation of three roles — counselor, client, and observer — is performed by each participant using the skill set.

**PEER COUNSELING TRAINING AGENDA**

**February 12:**
1900-2100 — Opening Evening Session, Introduction, and Opening Remarks *
Skill Building: From Ground Zero - From Iraq to Home: In Search of What to Say

**February 13:**
0900 — Skill Building: Initial Discussion, Attending to the Soldier *
0930 — Skill Building: Attending to the Soldier and the Role of the Peer Counselor *
1000 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1030 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1200 — Lunch
1300 — Skill Building: Initial Disclosure, Emphatic Understanding *
1330 — Skill Building: Empathy Role Play *
1400 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1430 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1630 — Discussion of the Day’s Lessons Learned

**February 14:**
0900 — Skill Building: In-depth Exploration, Advanced Empathy *
0930 — Skill Building: Advanced Empathy Role Play *
1000 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1030 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1200 — Lunch
1300 — Skill Building: In-Depth Exploration, Confrontation *
1330 — Skill Building: In-Depth Exploration, Confrontation *
1400 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1430 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1630 — Discussion of the Day’s Lessons Learned

**February 15:**
0900 — Skill Building: Taking Action *
0930 — Skill Building: Taking Action, Application of Skills Taught *
1000 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1030 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1200 — Lunch
1300 — Skill Building: Making a Referral *
1330 — Skill Building: Making a Referral *
1400 — Live Demonstration and Discussion
1430 — Round Robin Skills Practice and Group Feedback
1630 — A Vision for the Future: Role of Embedded Training in Health Care Delivery

* Power Point Presentation
* The instructors move from group to group to observe and ensure that the groups are remaining on task and to offer suggestions. For example, group members practice active listening skills to create empathy and to build the professional relationship such as summarizing, non-verbal acknowledgment, reframing, restructuring, clarifying, open questions, role playing, and selective reflecting.

Other important areas covered throughout the course include crisis intervention, potential conflicts of interest and how to handle them, scope of practice, assessment for referrals, and so forth. By the end of the training, peer counselor students are able to use the basic elements of one of the brief therapeutic theories as a framework to assist potential clients in bringing their issues to resolution. Participants also discuss their firsthand experiences of the impact of the interventions that they are learning in a very positive and powerful manner.

**How did the concept of peer counselors come about?**

Peer counseling is a concept which began in the 1960’s and 1970’s in educational settings and was used to a greater extent in the 1980’s when educational budgets were beginning to be cut. Peer counselors became a means to enhance the services of the professional counselors and to take counseling services to a grass roots level. In the case of Fort Irwin in 2008, the helping services are stretched beyond the limits because of the needs of service members and their families, especially with ever higher percentages of service members experiencing prolonged and multiple deployments.

I attended the Cape Cod Institute in August 2007. The subject of the continuing education training which Dr. Long, our facilitator for the week, and I attended was Emotionally Focused Therapy, one of the latest therapy theories which has been proven to be effective in the treatment of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) both for the individual and the couple who are experiencing the disorder. As part of that training Dr. Susan Johnson, Professor of Clinical Psychology at the University of Ottawa and director of the Center for Emotionally Focused Therapy, talked about her work with the firemen in New York City and the trauma many of them faced after 9/11. Even as one group among numerous care providers, Dr. Johnson knew that she and her staff could not sustain long term therapy for these firemen from the geographical distance of her work in Ottawa, nor could they sustain the volume of care giving required. So, she worked with the firemen to develop a peer counselor program which proved to be very effective. Professional firefighters, as peer counselors who as insiders understood the needs of their peers, were enabled to convey a message of help and support in a very profound manner simply by acquiring training in very basic counseling skills.

As we have been looking for means to maximize helping services on Fort Irwin for our service members and their families, the concept of the peer counselor resonated with me. Who better to know the life of a Soldier than a Soldier peer or a leader who is often the first point of contact? What better way to take care giving to a more readily available level? Thus began a dialogue between myself and Dr. Long which has resulted in the pilot program for which we initiated the training of 24 first contact leaders. We are about making better leaders, better human beings, better husbands/wives, and better parents of already great leaders and of passing that legacy on so that no Soldier is left behind whether on the battlefield of conflict or on the battlefield of life. This is what Soldiers helping Soldiers is all about.

**What is the way forward?**

What is the vision for the peer counselor program at Fort Irwin? COL Joseph K. Wallace, the chief of staff for NTC and Fort Irwin, summed up the way forward in his remarks at the closing ceremony as, “What we are interested in is having you notice those patterns of behavior or thinking that may get a trooper or Soldier into trouble, and interrupting the pattern before the trooper becomes a problem. Because, when it gets to my level, it’s a PROBLEM.”

The vision of the Family Life Center for the peer counselor program is that many service members and their family members will find assistance and solutions to their
problems at a much earlier stage in the problem, and that
issues will be resolved long before professional care
services are required. Early intervention will give
us healthier and more effective Soldiers as well as
healthier and more effective families. I will be providing
ongoing monthly training and consultation for those
who graduated from our Peer Counselor Training
Program. As part of the discussions that came out of
the training, we will be in dialogue with the commands,
other helping services, and the peer counselors as we
continue to develop and implement the program. If you

Peer Counseling Training
I was one of the few people invited to
participate in the pilot training program for peer
counselors. As peer counselors, we are the
first line or could be the middle man between
the Soldier and trained mental health professionals or for Chaplains trained in
counseling.

Shortly after the training, I had to put my
training to the test. I wondered, “Did I learn
enough?” Well, my first day back to work I was
going to find out how much I had really learned.
I had to counsel a Soldier who probably could
not wait until the end of the month to see his
regular counselor. I went into the office and
started by asking him questions about his
situation. I began by asking round about
questions to get started. I did not want him to
know that I was counseling him. But that did
not work. One member of our team came into
the office and asked us, “What are you all
doing?” The Soldier replied, “I am being
counseled.” After he said that, I laughed
because I had not realized how much he knew.
I felt that I was getting closer and closer to the
root issue to determine if I should have his
regular appointment date moved up, and I
started using the different techniques and
questions I learned in school. Some of these
were: Using a scale of 1 to 10, how would you
rate your day? And, what would make your today
better than yesterday? Or, If you were to go to
sleep and wake up tomorrow and you noticed
that everything was perfect, what would make
you know that everything was corrected? Just
statements like that would get you to the point
where you can start asking all sorts of
questions. The one thing is that you first have
to gain Soldiers’ trust so they will feel
comfortable with you and telling you their
problems.

— SGT James W. Stephens, Jr.
68S Preventive Medicine

would like to talk to a peer counselor or if you would like more information
about peer counseling, please contact the Fort Irwin Family Life Center at (760)
380-4664 or DSN 470-4664.

Chaplain (Major) Tammie Crews holds a Bachelor of Arts degree (summa
cum laude) in Religious Studies from Trevecca Nazarene University in Nashville,
Tennessee; a Master of Divinity degree (magna cum laude) in Biblical Studies and
Theology from Nazarene Theological Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri; and a Master
of Science degree in Community Counseling, specializing in Family Counseling, from
Columbus State University in Columbus, Georgia. She has done work toward a
doctorate in Theology from the University of Sheffield, England. She has served as
the battalion chaplain for the 169th Command Support Battalion at Fort Bragg, the
485th Corps Support Battalion in Hanau, Germany, and as a battalion chaplain in the 1-
501st Aviation in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. She is currently the Family Life
Chaplain at Fort Irwin, California.
The Arab Perspective of the 2006 Israeli War with Hezbollah

The Egyptian Strategic Research Center
al-Ahram Annual Strategic Report

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Abou-Enein, USN

The United States has been involved in the global war on terrorism for more than six years, yet the importance of reading what Arab intellectuals, analysts and security officials are saying about regional conflicts remains elusive for many American military planners. It is vital that we assess and highlight Arabic books of military significance to understand not only our adversary, but also those Arab governments who assist in the fight against terrorism.

Egypt’s al-Ahram Center for Strategic Research based in Cairo publishes an annual report on the impact of crises, policy decisions both external and internal to the region, and changes of government that take an overall holistic approach to the problems stretching from Iran to North Africa. This Arabic tome is eagerly awaited by political and security analysts in the region and is read by serious Arab academics on terrorism, military affairs, and regional national security issues. The 2005-2006 volume will be the subject of this review essay and will focus on the eagerly anticipated chapter on Israel’s war with Hezbollah.

This article is designed to provide American military readers with the Arab perspective of this war, and it is highly recommended that Arabic, Hebrew, English, and European sources be studied and read to gain an overall appreciation of the 33-day conflict between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Shiite militant group Hezbollah. This is important because many experts believe this conflict will flare up again in the near future. Studying this particular conflict is important for American military leaders at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, as it represents the future types of insurgency warfare that has become the staple of the 21st century American way of war. There is no question that Israel’s adversaries — Syria, Iran, and Palestinian rejectionist groups — will eagerly study the reaction and response of Israel to Hezbollah’s tactics. Even as you read this essay, Hezbollah is likely rearming itself in preparation for a future confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah is acquiring weapons systems that no doubt will reflect what they have learned in fighting the Israelis. Arabic books of military significance represent the cutting edge of what should be the focus in educating America’s future military leaders; however, we ignore such books written by friends and foes of the region at our peril.

Lebanon’s Machiavellian Political Landscape

On the eve of the war between Hezbollah and the IDF, there were political stressors within Lebanon as a result of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. These stressors altered the status of Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and Lebanese politics coalesced into two major blocks, which were clearly evident within Lebanon’s Majlis al-Nuwab (Parliament). One faction was made up of the Mustaqbal (Future) Party led by the Prime Minister Hariri’s son Saad Eddine, the Socialist Progressive Party led by Walid Jumblatt, and the Action Party led by Samir Geagea. This block was unified by their anti-Syrian stance and the removal of Lebanon’s President Emile Lahoud, who simply ignored the constitutional precedent that set presidential term-limits and remained Lebanon’s president at the behest of Syria.

Opposing this faction was the Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, Hezbollah led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Amal led by Nabih Berri, and the Free Nationalists led by Colonel Michel Aoun. Their platform was to maintain arms and resistance as long as the Israelis occupy the Sheba Farms. Note that Lebanese Christians are divided into both camps, the Action Party and Free Nationalist, while the Druze, which were represented by the Socialist Progressive Party, are in the Hariri (Sunni) anti-Syria camp. Hezbollah and Amal both represent Shiite interests and are in the Lahoud pro-Syria camp. There are those in Lebanon, primarily within the current government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the anti-Syrian coalition, who believe Hezbollah attempted to break the deadlock between these two political blocks by introducing a new dynamic when it kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers.

Of interest is that when Hezbollah kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers (Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser), Lebanese politician Suleiman Franjieh, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Lebanese Baathists all...
expressed support for Hezbollah tipping the balance between the two coalitions. When Hezbollah engaged the Israelis by kidnapping two of their soldiers, the Lebanese government and its armed forces saw in this the opportunity to assert control over South Lebanon once Hezbollah was weakened by what was expected to be a route undertaken by Israeli forces.

Arabs in the region refer to the 2006 Israeli war with Hezbollah as the Sixth Arab-Israeli War. The kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers represented an opportunity to remove Hezbollah from Lebanon’s political equation, using force as a means of restructuring a weakened Hezbollah within Lebanon’s fractious political factions that were divided into anti and pro-Syrian camps. Israel tactically has to address the number of Hezbollah rockets fired in North Israeli towns and settlements. Israeli Chief of Staff General Danny Halutz, who rose through the ranks of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to become commander of the IAF, was heavily influenced by his service. His staff drew up a list of Hezbollah targets that included bases, electrical grids, media outlets, and water stations. After extensive IAF bombardment, ground forces would push Hezbollah north of the Litani River with armor and mechanized infantry. The IDF planned a 20-40 kilometer buffer zone, sanitizing the area and cutting off Iranian and Syrian resupply of Hezbollah.

Impact on the Wider Arab World

Hezbollah’s kidnapping and killing of the two IDF soldiers along the Lebanese and Israeli border led Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan to contend that Hezbollah initiated the war. These three Arab states stated that non-state actors cannot be allowed to drag sovereign nations into a war. Opposing this viewpoint were Syria, Iran, and Palestinian rejectionist groups that supported Hezbollah’s actions. The Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was blatant when he said, “Lebanon will not be an arena for proxy wars between Iran and Syria on the one side and Israel and the United States on the other.” This is a veiled reference to the mess Hezbollah had dragged the country into. Saudi Arabia and Jordan refused overflight of Iranian aircraft proceeding to Lebanon, despite claims Iran’s flights were humanitarian in nature. Perhaps the most tangible example of differences over Hezbollah’s precipitation of conflict with Israel is the July 15, 2006, Arab League Ministerial in which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, and the Palestinian Authority (Abu Mazen) were openly critical of Hezbollah. While Syria, Lebanon, Algeria, Yemen, Sudan, and Qatar justified Hezbollah’s actions, holding on to the same tired anti-Israeli rhetoric that characterizes past Middle East politics. While the Arab League is typically viewed as an ineffective instrument, such votes need to be noted by the United States as it develops bilateral and multilateral policies in the region. The 2006 Hezbollah war with Israel identified like-minded nations who see the unacceptability of non-state actors starting and bringing a war upon a nation-state and its citizens. From this, a regional multilateral alliance can be formed designed to prevent the destabilizing influence of destructive non-state entities like al-Qaida and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah Strategy

Hezbollah’s overall strategy is one of general defense, denying the Israelis an outright political and military victory in south Lebanon. The organization prepared offensive traps for advancing IDF units. These traps included establishing urban kill zones, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices.

The volume highlights that Hezbollah was surprised by the amount of ground forces the IDF committed. Hezbollah’s operational plans in support of the overall defensive strategy was to implement plans for psychological warfare, the attrition of advancing IDF ground units, and undermining the IDF’s logistical trail.

Hezbollah put much thought into IAF strikes and studied previous IDF ground operations like Peace for Galilee (1982) and outlined the problems over the course of two decades into how Hezbollah could absorb Israel’s potent aerial and artillery barrages. Other conflicts that shaped Hezbollah’s military thinking were Vietnam and the Soviet-Afghan War. This analysis led to a decision to find ways of dispersion, denial, and deception. It also led to the development of a strategy of prolonging the conflict, which they viewed as a military-psychological victory. Hezbollah constructed extensive tunnels, underground bunkers, secret hideouts for command and control, logistics, hiding Hezbollah leaders, and protecting arsenals. The success of Hezbollah in protecting their leadership is evidenced by the inability of Israel to target Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Not only was the Secretary General of Hezbollah successfully hidden between 12 July and 27 August 2006, he taped and gave 10 speech broadcasts to the Lebanese public and the wider Arab world. These announcements, coupled with the constant firing of rockets, became a symbol of the IDF’s lack of success. What is unique about the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli conflict is Hezbollah’s views of its rocket arsenal as a central strategic asset.

Arab reports presuppose Israel had many military contingency plans for Lebanon, and the conflict gave regimes, as well as terrorist organizations the ability to assess those plans and Israel’s reaction. There was much focus on the opening phase of the conflict, and how Hezbollah would absorb the punishing first-strike by the IAF. Israel understood Hezbollah’s weapons stockpile: its possession of Sagger-3, Spigot-4, and TOW anti-tank missiles. Israel knew the types of weapons Hezbollah had, but what the Israelis missed was how Hezbollah would tactically deploy and utilize its rocket arsenal.

IDF Military Strategy

The first phase of the Israeli military strategy was a combined IAF and IDF artillery barrage. The second phase was to merge the aerial and artillery barrage with a mechanized and armored advance
of IDF ground forces. These phases must not be viewed as distinct but regulated to provide the IDF maximum options in the achievements of military objectives. These objectives included leaving Hezbollah in a position of weakness vis-à-vis other Lebanese factions. Another objective was to expose the self-evident reality that Lebanon, a sovereign nation, was not in control of all parts of the country. This would in turn lead a significant portion of Lebanese to blame Hezbollah for drawing the nation into a war. The war would also expose the way in which Lebanon was a stage for a proxy war between Iran and Syria on the one hand and Israel on the other.

Hezbollah’s Objectives

Hezbollah reduced its primary objectives to active defense and attritional guerilla assaults on the IDF, retaining as long as possible the option of launching Katyusha and other rockets into northern Israel to demonstrate the IDF’s inability to defend its citizens. Another facet of Hezbollah planning was preparing for Israeli Special Forces raids. The issue of information denial and deception took on greater importance for this weaker adversary. Hezbollah understood the efficacy of Israeli aerial reconnaissance as a means for the IAF to conduct precision strikes; Hezbollah wanted to deny Israel this advantage and channel strike to maximize collateral damage to:

- Play to al-Jazeera;
- Outrage regional public opinion;
- Alienate the populace;
- Galvanize the region to Hezbollah’s advantage; and
- Demonstrate IDF failure by continuing rocket strikes and broadcasts from Sheik Nasrallah.

From Hezbollah’s perspective preserving its rocketry represented an ability to terrorize one million Israelis living in the north.

Israelis needed to focus on decapitating the Hezbollah leadership, destroy its weapons stockpiles and rockets, weaken Hezbollah light infantry, and retrieve IDF prisoners dead or alive.

Development of the Conflict

Concentrated IAF strikes beginning July 11, 2006, were designed to accomplish Israeli objectives, and three days into the conflict, the Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut was struck. Israel applied its target assassination tactics in specific areas known to house Hezbollah leaders, weapons, and command centers. The only impact this was to have in hindsight was to slow down Hezbollah’s ability to exercise command and control, but not entirely eliminate it. IDF units entering south Lebanon expected the same resistance seen in 1982, but instead encountered a new Hezbollah in which guerillas emerged from tunnels, urban strongholds, and densely packed towns to lay ambushes for IDF mechanized forces. An order to take the village of Bint Jebeel ended in fierce fighting, with Hezbollah using saturation RPG tactics and machine-gun fire to channel IDF armor towards anti-tank weapons. These are not spray and pray tactics, but a well thought out insurgency tactic of drawing IDF armor and mechanized infantry into kill zones.

On July 27, the Israeli cabinet decided not to push further north and withdraw its forces from Maran, Ras Aytrun and Bint Jebeel. On July 30, the IAF bombed Qana, wounding 60. The collateral damage of this particular town gave Hezbollah much propaganda mileage, since it is among the symbols Islamist militants use to amplify Muslim victimization, and even Usama Bin Laden has mentioned the town. In 1996, Israelis shelled a UN compound in Qana with 800 refugees causing 106 Lebanese deaths. The incident occurred April 18, 1996, and the war still raged on to April 2006, 10 years to the month. This would become a galvanizing public relations coup for Hezbollah.

On August 1, 2006, Arabic sources reference an Israeli Special Forces raid at the Dar-al-Hikmah Hospital in Baillek, where Israeli prisoners were being held. Five Lebanese were taken hostage, and airwaves were filled with propaganda and counter-propaganda as to whether the five Lebanese hostages were Hezbollah or simple citizens. It was then revealed that among those taken by the Israelis were individuals who had similar names to Hezbollah leaders; Israel released all five on August 22.

Between August 1-22, 2006, the IDF ground assault was widened with a plan to push 6-7 kilometers into southern Lebanon and the Litani River to reestablish the pre-2000 buffer zone. This was to seize the opportunity and provide United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) forces more geography that would satisfy Israel, as to strategic depth away from the range of most Hezbollah rockets. The IDF pushed only 3 kilometers from August 1-13 with some Israeli ground units making it 8 kilometers around Rehraah but not en-masse, and therefore the Israeli forces were subject to Hezbollah guerilla assaults, anti-tank weapons, and added firings of Katyushas on northern Israel.

From August 9-14 on the eve of negotiated settlement that would be UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, the IDF also attempted to destroy as much Hezbollah military hardware as possible. The fiercest fighting between Hezbollah and the IDF occurred between August 12-14.

Statistics from 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War:

* 15,000 Israeli Air Force sorties
* 100,000 bombs, mines and cluster bombs dropped in Lebanon
* 1,081 Lebanese civilian deaths
* 4,054 Lebanese civilians wounded
* 970,000 Lebanese displaced
* $6 billion in Lebanese property damage
* 534 Hezbollah fighters killed (Hezbollah claimed only 69 of their fighters died)
* 309 Hezbollah rockets launched
* 1,800 Hezbollah facilities damaged or destroyed (this figure contested by Hezbollah)
* 46 IDF tanks attacked, 15 tanks impacted by AT weapons
* 14 IDF armored vehicles attacked, 5
destroyed (Hezbollah claims 124 IDF tanks and 12 armored carriers destroyed.)*

* An Israeli naval patrol craft damaged by Hezbollah C802 missile
* Hezbollah claims 5 Israeli helicopters damaged or destroyed

Hezbollah Missile and Rocket Attack

Apart from increased sophistication in Hezbollah’s light infantry and guerilla tactics, the most troubling aspect of the conflict is the advancement in Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal. Israeli intelligence understood the types of missiles in Hezbollah’s inventory and that it was developing a strike capability against Israel. What came as a surprise were the quantities and tactical deployment of these missiles in actual combat. Hezbollah’s incorporation of missiles and rockets into their order of battle and combat doctrine was the single most surprising aspect of the conflict.

Hezbollah’s disinformation campaign and ability to conceal their rocket capabilities must be considered a counterintelligence success. During the 33-day war, 4,000 rockets were fired, an average of 125 rockets per day. The Arab report assesses August 3 as a saturation strike with five batteries of Katyusha rockets, over 50 rockets, fired in Kiryat Shmona; this would be the largest Hezbollah rocket strike on Israel in one day. This saturation strike was in response to the Israeli commando raid on Dar-al-Hikmah Hospital, in which five Lebanese were seized and later released.

Hezbollah timed the firing of their rockets to political-military events on the ground such as retaliation for heavy IAF strikes, and there appears to be a correlation between the amount of Hezbollah rockets fired and the ferocity of Israeli air and ground strikes. Hezbollah decreased its rocket attacks on July 31 in response to Prime Minister Olmert’s call for a 48-hour cessation of hostilities after the collateral damage inflicted on Qana. During combat Hezbollah attempted to increase the quality of its rocket strikes such as their attack on the Israeli airbase of Ramat David. Attempts were made by Hezbollah between the July 19 and August 4 to undertake rocket strikes on:
- Israeli command centers (rockets reached Thahannah Command center and the Ayn Hamur IDF Headquarters); and
- Staging areas for IDF forces.

Hezbollah intelligence understood the types of rockets and missiles in Hezbollah’s inventory and that it was developing a deeper rocket and missile strike force with farther reach into Israel. What came as a surprise were the quantities, tactical deployment, and ability to sustain those rocket strikes in over one month of warfare with the IDF. Another surprise was the amount of thought Hezbollah has given to the military operational impact of its rocket forces, as centerpiece of its strategy to fight Israel. The al-Ahram Strategic Report claims that Hezbollah had the following rockets and missiles before the 2006 war with Israel began:
- 12,000 Katyusha rockets with a range of 12 miles. These World War II Soviet-designed rockets are saturation terror weapons with no guidance.
- 500 Fajr-3 rockets with a range of 22-30 miles. These are Iranian manufactured artillery rockets with a 45-kilogram warhead that are mounted and launched from smaller trucks.
- Unknown quantity of Fajr-5 missiles with a range of 45 miles. These are Iranian manufactured, typically mounted in four tubes on larger trucks as an artillery rocket system. Hezbollah calls this system Khaibar-1.
- Unknown large quantity of Ra’ad missiles. These are the Iranian version of the Sagger AT-3B anti-tank missile, supplemented by European-made MILAN and the Russian-made Metis-M. More than 40 IDF troops were killed with anti-tank missile strikes by Hezbollah.
- Unknown quantity of Zilzal-2 missiles. These are Iranian versions of the Soviet FROG-7 missile with a range of 124 miles and warhead of 600 kilograms. It is estimated Hezbollah may have a dozen or fewer of these missiles.

Hezbollah monitored the Arab and international satellite media to see the impact their rocket strikes were having on a tactical and strategic public relations level. They paid close attention to how their strikes brought pressure on the government of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Hezbollah noted that Patriot batteries moved around the Israeli port of Haifa, which was designed to assure the Israeli population, but was in reality ineffective for Katyusha and artillery rocket strikes. The Patriot is only effective for larger, higher-altitude flying missiles and aircraft. When Israeli announced it had neutralized Hezbollah launch sites (both fired and mobile), Hezbollah responded with a July 19 barrage coupled with an announcement that they had a stock of rockets to last months. The southern Lebanese town of Soor was the focus for Israeli forces as it was believed rockets were being stored and fired from there; it was also seen as a logistical opportunity for Hezbollah to be resupplied from Syria. The assaults on the town did not seem to impact the tempo of Hezbollah operations.

Israel imposed a media blackout to deny Hezbollah the chance to adjust rocket fire and boost Arab morale. However, it was a gamble, as Arab media accused Israel of hiding the extent of damage done to Lebanon. It is unclear whether the benefits outweighed the risks and is a subject worthy of debate.

The book contains a wonderful outline of the conflict that reduces what Arab military planners and strategists consider of importance vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s use of rockets. They are:
- July 12-14 — The Arabs’ perspective of these two days was to feel the pulse of one another. Limited strikes were observed and Israel’s reaction and response were noted.
- July 14 — Haifa attacks with rockets landing 40 kilometers into Galilee in northern Israel in the settlements of Safad and Naharia. Israel threatens war.
- July 27 — Areas beyond Haifa are hit to include the settlement of Afula with Khaybar-1 artillery missiles, which are also known as Fajr-5. Striking 50 kilometers from the Lebanese border along the Tel-Aviv to Haifa road; Carmel, Safad, and Haifa are struck.
- August 2 — Hezbollah (Fajr-5) missiles land 68 kilometers along Israeli settlements bordering Jordan; the deepest strike into Israel of a Hezbollah missile was recorded on that day 80 kilometers from the Lebanese border and only 40 kilometers from Tel-Aviv. The response is a combined IDF and IAF strike on the IAF airbase of Ramat David.
- August 11-13 — 250 rockets and missiles launched within a 72-
hour window by Hezbollah.

Why didn’t Hezbollah use longer range missiles that could strike Tel-Aviv? The book explains that Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah threatened to hit Tel-Aviv if Beirut was invaded. Of note, Hezbollah did not fire the larger Zilzal-2 variants; the only complex guided missile they launched was the C802 that damaged an Israeli naval patrol boat. One of the unanswered questions is: if Hezbollah had missiles that could reach Tel-Aviv why did they not fire them during the conflict? Was this a strategic decision not to overplay Iran’s material support of Hezbollah in the international scene?

The book offers these theories as to why Nasrallah did not deploy longer range missiles:

1. Tactically, such missiles needed a larger predesignated launch pad, which was difficult to construct and maintain with Israel’s air dominance.
2. There were larger geo-strategic concerns to using longer range missiles that could widen the conflict and drag Lebanon into further warfare should an unprecedented missile strike on Tel-Aviv happen.
3. The firing of longer range missiles would deepen the United States support for Israel. In addition, the use of such missiles would clearly and unequivocally show the extent to which Iran has supplied Hezbollah.

Hezbollah rocket claims:
- 4,000 rockets fired;
- Rockets caused 41 deaths of Israeli citizens, 16 of whom were Israeli Arabs;
- Rockets caused the displacement of 1 million Israelis;
- Rockets caused hundreds of damaged Israeli homes;
- Rockets caused damage to 42 Israeli farms and fields;
- Rockets landed on 57 Israeli factories causing damage or disruption; and
- Rockets damaged 120 vehicles.

Israel’s vulnerability as a result of the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah is the failure to:

- Disarm Hezbollah;
- Deal with Hezbollah’s rocket forces during the battle; and
- Free or recover the two Israeli soldiers held by Hezbollah.

On the regional front, the Israeli performance in 2006:

- Rearranged the Lebanese political landscape to favor Hezbollah and make it among the premier rejectionist and radical movements in the Middle East; and
- Placed nations like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia who all criticized Hezbollah expecting an Israeli sweep, as having expended political capital that must be repaired. These nations must be rewarded by those nations who stand firmly against Hezbollah and their state sponsors Iran and Syria.

Conclusion and End State

The Arab report states that 1,500 Hezbollah fighters shattered and eroded the invincibility and deterrence factors of the IDF. Israeli forces could not advance at will towards Beirut as they did in 1982, and this is already being touted as Hezbollah offering a major deterrence factor to Israeli military movement towards the Lebanese capital. Arab articles and books on the war refer to this conflict as the Sixth Arab-Israeli conflict, which is indicative of the timeline by which the mass media in the region view its long-term wearing down of Israel. The fact that the Israelis leaned too heavily on airpower makes some wonder whether their planners had taken lessons from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Al-Qaida and Sunni militants are now under increasing pressure to make their presence felt in Israel and along Israel’s border. They cannot allow Hezbollah, a Shiite group to usurp the mantle as defender and avenger of Palestinian victimization. As of this writing, Lebanese forces are engaged in a struggle to eradicate the al-Qaida sympathetic group Fatah al-Islam. Iranian and Syrian strategy of indirect conflict and multiple insurgency attacks by Hezbollah will likely allow them to explore agitating other rejectionist groups. Finally, UNIFIL will likely not be able to disarm Hezbollah as mandated by UNSCR 1701, and the way the hostilities ended almost certainly will result in a renewed conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Both sides know this, and Hezbollah is likely rearming and taking valuable lessons from the 2006 engagement with the IDF. One could argue that it is in Israel’s security interest to seek a rematch with Hezbollah to regain military prestige and morale. In August 2007, Sheikh Nasrallah gave an anniversary speech, commemorating its clash with Israel saying:

Oh Zionists, if you think of launching a war on Lebanon, I don’t advise to do it. ... I promise you a big surprise that could change the fate of war and the fate of the region.” I will leave it to the reader to imagine what is meant by “big surprise.”
The need to train Soldiers on urban combat, something the U.S. Army has found increasingly necessary since the early years of World War II, has received even closer attention over the past three decades. It is a fact that many of the conflicts in which the United States has been involved have included the need to defeat insurgent forces within built-up areas. The history of urban operations is an interesting one, and each battle offers lessons of relevance to today's Soldiers.

City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam, edited by COL John Antal and MAJ Bradley Gericke, focuses on urban combat, and its detailed accounts of some of history’s salient city fights offer valuable insights into lessons learned at horrific cost in men and materiel, and are well worth the read. In this article, I want to discuss five historic battles on urban terrain, each of which offers its own lessons.

STALINGRAD, 1943

In City Fights, COL Eric M. Walters presents a detailed study of the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II. On August 21, 1942, the German Sixth Army under the command of Colonel General Friedrich Paulus and the Fourth Panzer Army under Colonel General Hermann Hoth launched an offensive to seize the city of Stalingrad on the Volga River in southern Russia. German forces managed to occupy most of the city west of the Volga by mid-November. On November 19, the Red Army commenced an attack code-named Operation Uranus by three complete armies on the Sixth Army’s flanks, and on the 22nd managed to sever the German lines of communication. The Germans continued fighting until their surrender on February 2, 1943.

Adolf Hitler and his staff underestimated the will of the Red Army, even as his field commanders already knew they were facing a tenacious, implacable foe. The main Soviet force attacking from the east was the Sixty-second Army led by Major General Vasili Ivanovich Chuikov, who was described both as a fatalist and as an inspiration to his troops. He played for time by allowing the Sixth Army to take key areas in the city, but each time the Germans won a contested area it was at a heavy cost of men and equipment. To compensate, the Germans would be forced to move troops from their flanks to the front lines, unwittingly weakening their defense against the Red Army’s planned counteroffensive. During urban operations time is a critical factor, and a problem with the campaign for the Germans was how the Soviets perceived time. The Germans wanted to quickly accomplish their objectives, but the Soviet defenders were more interested in dragging the conflict out as long as they could to whittle the Germans down both physically and psychologically.

From August 23-25 and on September 3, the Luftwaffe pounded the city from the air, but the rubble they created would ultimately come to haunt the ground forces tasked with clearing and securing the city, because the collapsed buildings made it difficult to maneuver the tanks and artillery pieces tasked to provide close support to German infantry. The rubble also made it difficult for the German forces to locate Soviet troops. Reducing a city to rubble may make impressive propaganda footage for the home front, but once the enemy infantry re-occupies the ruins the cost of dislodging him will be high in terms of both lives and the vast quantities of munitions the urban fight demands. Once Soviet forces were able to interdict the overextended supply lines on which the Germans depended, the outcome of the battle of Stalingrad and the fate of the Sixth Army were no longer in doubt.

WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING, 1943

The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, which began on January 18, 1943, illustrates another dimension of urban combat, one in which an ostensibly helpless populace faced with certain death rose up against its captors. As the Holocaust began to unfold across Eastern Europe, German forces first began concentrating Poland’s estimated 3 million Jewish citizens into the ghettos of selected cities, and then...
started deporting them eastwards to extermination camps. One of the worst of these was Treblinka, where close to 300,000 victims had been murdered in the two months preceding the middle of September 1942. The first wave of deportations was carried out relatively peacefully, since Jewish resistance leaders and their followers initially believed the German explanation that they were being sent to labor camps. As word of the extermination camps leaked out, those Jews still in the Warsaw Ghetto realized that resistance was their only choice. In City Fights, David M. Toczek describes the techniques used by Warsaw’s Jews in 1943. Two groups, the Jewish Combat Organization (ZOB) and the Jewish Military Union (ZZW), took charge and prepared to conduct operations inside the Warsaw Ghetto. In addition to fortifying key points within the Ghetto, they quickly executed those among them who were Nazi collaborators, including members of the Jewish police and actual German secret police (Gestapo) agents. They then waited for the Germans to attempt to deport them.

According to Toczek, when the Germans attempted this on January 18,1943, ZOB members pulled out pistols and began shooting, causing several German casualties. Even though the Jewish resistance was limited for the most part to small arms fire, the Germans were in shock that the Jews would fight back and made plans to crush the Ghetto. Their offensive began on April 19, 1943, and the forces led by SS Obergruppenführer Ferdinand von Sammern-Frankenegg included 16 officers and 850 men of the Waffen-SS, police, and Wehrmacht units, two armored cars, a tank, and 2,000 reserve troops. Toczek points out that as soon as they began to fan out to round up the inhabitants, the ZOB again opened fire with pistols as well as homemade grenades and Molotov cocktails. The Germans retreated and regrouped. Von Sammern-Frankenegg’s superior, Brigadeführer Jürgen Stroop, took control of the operation. He came up with a solution to their problem: they would use fire or explosives to get rid of the insurgents. Sewers were filled with poison gas or booby traps to keep the ZOB members from using them as a means of escape. The operation dragged on into May with no end in sight. On May 8, the tactical headquarters of ZOB was destroyed, but still they fought on. The operation slowed on May 16 after the destruction of Warsaw’s main synagogue.

Toczek points out that the Polish Home Army (AK) behaved in a similar fashion to the ZOB and that the Germans repeated their past mistakes. The leader of the AK, Tadeusz Komorowski, believed that the German presence in Warsaw was weak enough to defeat. They were also fearful that if the Red Army were to liberate the city they would put in place a Soviet-run government instead of Poland’s government in exile. Morale for the AK was high, even though weapons and supplies were low, because they believed that they stood a chance at freedom after five years of occupation. The plan, code-named Operation Burza (Tempest), was to coordinate a simultaneous attack on six city districts: Old Town/City Center, Zoliborz, Wola, Ochota, Mokotow, and Praga. The attack was to take place during rush hour at 5 p.m. to hide their movements as well as to give AK operatives a few hours of daylight in which to complete their missions. They were depending on speed and surprise to get the upper hand on the Germans.

The Germans knew through informants that an uprising was coming, but were still caught off guard when the action actually started. They quickly regained their senses and sent word of the attack throughout Warsaw. Fifteen minutes later, tanks and armored vehicles began entering the city. The AK found that they were unable to secure the locations that were needed for success, but they had nevertheless made some progress. Toczek describes how on the second day the AK managed to secure several districts of the city, gaining control over the gas, electric, and water works in the process. Using what limited resources they had, the AK also managed to destroy at least 12 tanks. The German garrison was in a panic. Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler was not pleased.

Himmler was given permission from Adolf Hitler to gather a force to “erase” Warsaw. It was composed of the entire Posen police force, augmented with some artillery and two brigades (Dirlewanger and Kaminski Brigades, named after their commanders). The units were put under the command of SS Gruppenführer Heinz Reinefarth. His instructions were to: “...destroy Warsaw completely...[s]et fire to every block of houses and blow them up,” according to Toczek. On August 5, Reinefarth’s units entered Warsaw. The plan was to split the city in two, attacking from the west through Wola and southwest through Ochota. The fighting was brutal, especially among the two SS units. Toczek asserts that the Dirlewanger Brigade was populated with condemned criminals and political prisoners and led by a man who had served a term in jail for molesting a child. He also points out that Kaminski Brigade was filled with undisciplined Ukraines and Soviets who were known for their excess during antipartisan operations in the Soviet Union. By the end of the day several thousand Poles were dead, but this act of genocide did not dishearten the AK. It did the opposite, strengthening their resolve. They wanted revenge for the horrors perpetrated upon their citizens.

The German forces received a new officer; one Himmler believed could get control of the city. The man was Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach, Hitler’s head of antipartisan combat units. He was given orders to use any means necessary to end the insurrection. Toczek says that instead of following his orders he devised a plan with “a political and a military part.” Von dem Bach relieved
Kaminski from command and placed a competent officer in command of his
brigade. Von dem Bach slowly stopped the executions and granted the Polish Home
Army combatant status to entice the Poles to surrender. He changed the ad hoc tactics
that were being used to quell the uprising to tactics that were more systematic and
organized.

The Poles nevertheless continued to fight. The greatest threats they faced
included the fortified buildings the Germans used for headquarters and the Panther and
Tiger tanks in and around the city. While they lacked the firepower needed to take on
the German fortified positions, they had some success in dealing with the tanks.
While they had some British PIATs (projector infantry antitank), a weapon that
fired a shaped charge to about a hundred meters, they mostly relied on filipinki
(homemade grenades) and Molotov cocktails. Taping several filipinki together and
tossing them at the tank’s tracks would cause an explosion strong enough to either
disable the track or destroy the tank’s suspension. As long as one grenade went off,
the others would follow suit. The Poles managed to capture a number of tanks with
this method, forming the 1st Insurgents Armored Squadron as a result.

Toczek notes that Molotov cocktails, bottles filled with a flammable liquid which,
when ignited and broken, would set anything it hit on fire. While some of the fluids were
ignited with a burning rag, most used gasoline. Others used a tissue that would
ignite upon striking a target. The drawback of the weapon is its bulky size. Several
would be used on one tank to increase the chances of it catching fire. Many Poles had
to carry several Molotov’s at a time and had to move with the flammable liquid sloshing
out. A group of Boy Scouts found a solution to this problem. By placing filled bottles at
barricades and along known vehicle routes, all the Poles had to do is carry the ignition
source with them. Between the use of homemade grenades and Molotov cocktails,
the Polish insurgents managed disable or destroy about 50 tanks in the first few days
of the uprising.

The Poles also constructed barricades to slow the German advance into the city.
Toczek notes that these barricades would be made from whatever was at hand, from
abandoned vehicles and furniture to paving stones reinforced with sandbags. In the
narrow streets of Warsaw, the barricades were very successful in halting German
progress into the city. Often the barricades stood firm even when rammed by German
tanks. But the Germans devised ways of getting around this obstacle.

When facing a barricade the preferred method used a small remote-controlled
tracked vehicle loaded with explosives called Goliath. The Goliath was connected
to the lead tank via a cord. When a barricade was found, the lead tank in a column would
stop, move the Goliath toward the barricade, and use its explosives to clear the way. Poles
learned to target the cord connecting the Goliath to the tank with filipinki, hoping to
sever the connection. Toczek explains that AK insurgents would then take the 500
kilograms of explosives from the disabled Goliath for their own use.

Another method the Germans used for dealing with barricades was to shield their
forces with Polish civilians. The belief was that the insurgents guarding the blockades
would not fire upon their own countrymen. Most of the time the Germans were correct
in this assumption; however, sometimes it didn’t always end as planned. During the
first week of the uprising, an AK machine-gun crew guarding a barricade along
Powazkowska Street saw a group of civilians moving toward them. The civilians
were moving in front of a German military police unit. The AK crew fired a warning
shot and then realized why the civilians were not dispersing. The civilians were tied to
a ladder that stretched across the width of the street. The AK members chose to fire into
the crowd to halt the German advance. Tactics like this only enraged the Poles to
fight even harder.

The AK used the sewers as a way to safely travel from place to place, much as
the Russian defenders at Stalingrad had done. The sewers were a way to move
supplies, men, and information. The Germans did not use what they learned
during the ZOB insurrection and only became aware of the AK’s use of the sewers
by accident. Fighting soon broke out over control of manholes. The Germans began
to booby trap portions of the sewers. Barbed wire was packed into some tunnels. One
method used grenades attached to tripwires stretched across thepipes. More often than
not, the concussive blast was deadlier than the fragments. Another technique was to
pump fuel down the sewers and ignite it, incinerating or asphyxiating anyone inside.

Lacking portable radios, the Poles were reliant on a group of messengers. To allow
the men to keep fighting, these messengers were normally women and children. The
radios they did have could not receive messages from each other, but they had the
ability to contact London, which became a relay station of sorts, sending out messages
ranging from status reports to viable sewer routes.

Communication problems were one of the main reasons why the AK base of
operations moved several times. Many logistics problems started to arise as their
supplies dwindled and their units began to be isolated by German forces. Because the
AK’s were unable to secure an airstrip, Allied resupply came in the form of
airdrops. U.S. and British air drops were not very accurate and few of the 288 supply
containers dropped actually made it into the hands of those who needed them. Soviet
airdrops were more accurate but, because their packages did not have parachutes, the
AKs often found damaged equipment in them, rendering weapons and ammunition
useless.

The Poles believed that the Red Army would come to their aid at any moment. The
Red Army had captured the suburb of Praga, and the AK constantly tried to get them to
cross the Vistula River to help them fight. While the Soviets did send over two
cross the Vistula River to help them fight. While the Soviets did send over two
battalions of conscripted Poles, they had little or no training and became more of a
hindrance when their food and ammunition ran out. When the AK was considering
surrender to the Germans near the end of September, there were still attempts to get
the Red Army to respond to their pleas. They received no response. With their last hope
gone, the Polish Home Army signed an armistice on October 2 with all organized
resistance ending on the two days later. More than 200,000 Polish Home Army
soldiers and civilians were killed or wounded in the uprising, while Germans
casualties were estimated at between 20,000 and 26,000 troops. After almost two months
of fighting, the Germans were back in control of Warsaw.

According to Toczek, the Poles were willing to fight so hard against the
technologically and numerically superior
Germans because they felt they had nothing to lose. The five years of occupation and the atrocities that the German forces had committed only spurred them on. Their enemy would offer no quarter, so the Poles made it clear that they would die before they would surrender or give up ground. Even when von dem Bach gave them combatant status in August, they continued to fight because they did not believe that was possible. Only when the Polish Home Army realized that Allied resupply efforts could not sustain them and that the Red Army would not cross the Vistula did they even consider surrender.

The Polish Home Army had a strong infrastructure. Toczek points out that whenever the Polish forces gained they moved in and started to organize both combatant and civilian movement through the area. Members knew their roles and when casualties started to climb, new leaders could be found quickly, maintaining a sense of unity throughout the uprising. Women and children played important roles, moving supplies and information, guiding other forces through the city, and often acting as combatants.

The Germans were overconfident in their abilities. Many didn’t realize what the Poles were capable of until it was too late. Without an organized plan of attack, the Germans often found themselves in very bad situations. When their efforts became more systematic, they began to make progress. Rubbling and burning buildings made some progress, but it gave the Poles the opportunity to circle back and occupy positions behind the lead units. The author points out that once small combat patrols were left between each unit the Germans began to get rid of the threat of Polish snipers.

The fighting in Warsaw is similar to the fighting going on today in the Middle East. A technologically superior force has to deal with a poorly equipped, well organized, and inspired insurgent force who would often rather die than surrender. The fight will be in the streets and in the sewers. Toczek says that the two techniques of disrupting an enemy’s resupply efforts and dispelling their belief in the assistance of their allies are as viable today as it was during the uprising in Warsaw.

AACHEN, 1944

As described in *Block By Block: The Challenges of Urban Operations*, edited by William G. Robertson and Lawrence A. Yates, the Battle of Aachen is unique in several ways. According to the author of the article on Aachen, Christopher R. Gabel, it was a part of Operation Overload, but the city itself was not a major industrial target. It was a part of the Westwall, a.k.a. the Siegfried Line. The city lay between two belts of bunkers and obstacles to the east and west, but the city itself was undefended. The city also lies in a valley with high ground surrounding it. The original plan was to break through the defensive barriers and continue to the Rhine River, but the city was more important to the Nazi ideology. Settlement of Aachen dated back to Roman times, and the city was the capitol of Charlemagne’s empire in the early Middle Ages. It was also the coronation place for the kings of the Holy Roman Empire from 813 to 1531. Since Hitler believed that the Holy Roman Empire founded by Charlemagne to be the “First Reich,” its capture by the Americans would be a blow to the morale of the Nazi Regime.

If everything had gone according to plan, the Battle of Aachen would never have taken place. The battle began on September 12, when allied force VII Corps, consisting of the 1st Infantry and 3rd Armored Divisions, began to penetrate the Westwall in a section south of the city. By the 15th, the divisions had managed to penetrate some of the wall’s defenses at a high cost in casualties. The going was slow. Rain hampered the off-road mobility of the Allies, and the cloud cover allowed the Germans enough time to reinforce the sector without having to worry about Allied planes. By the 17th the Germans had enough manpower to start a counteroffensive. With Allied forces facing a renewed enemy and having to deal with a lack of supplies, the plan changed on September 24. The forces were now to encircle the city.

Another Allied force, XIX Corps, began an attack on a portion of the Westwall north of the city. After a bombardment involving 26 artillery battalions and 432 tactical aircraft, the 30th Infantry Division crossed the Wurm River and headed for the Westwall. The artillery had little effect on the Westwall’s fortifications, so small groups of infantry had to break through with a combination of grenades, pole charges, and flamethrowers. The 30th Infantry
Division crossed the defenses on October 3. To secure their left flank, the 2nd Armored Division positioned itself east of their location.

On October 7, the 1st Infantry Division was told to move north to meet up with the 30th to encircle the city. The 18th Infantry Regiment draws the assignment as lead element. The 18th formed special pillbox assault groups built around flamethrowers, Bangalore torpedoes, and demolition charges. The regiment also had access to a battery of 155mm self propelled guns, a company of self-propelled tank destroyers, and a company of M4 “Sherman” tanks. Each battalion was accompanied by an air liaison officer.

The 18th was given the objective of securing three hills along the way. They captured the hill Verlautenheide on the morning of October 8 after a heavy artillery strike. That afternoon, Crucifix Hill fell in a similar fashion after bitter fighting. They reached the crest of Ravel’s Hill on the night of October 9. After clearing out pillboxes that they managed to bypass, they dug in and waited for the remainder of the 30th Infantry Division to arrive. Meanwhile, the Germans continued to receive reinforcements. These reinforcements included the 3rd Panzer Grenadier and 116th Panzer Divisions. The man in charge of placing these troops, General Friedrich J. Koechling, was forced to use them where they were immediately needed, instead of organizing them for a counteroffensive. Both the 1st and 30th Infantry Divisions managed to defend themselves against the German counterattacks with massive artillery and air support. This delayed the 30th Division for another week.

The First Army decided to proceed with taking Aachen even though the encirclement of the city was incomplete. It was believed that with Aachen in their hands the men surrounding the city would be free to counter German resistance coming from the east. The only available forces that could take the city were two battalions of the 1st Infantry Division. These came from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 26th Infantry Regiment.

The 2/26 was given the task of clearing out downtown Aachen while the 3/26 was given the tasks of securing two hills on the north side of the city. Salvatorberg and Lousberg. All civilians were to be evacuated from the area.

There was not much that the two battalions had to go on in terms of published doctrine on urban combat. The manuals only had a few pages on how to fight in villages and towns, with nothing mentioning city fighting. At best, it gave them an idea of what to expect. The manuals predicted that the enemy would defend the city throughout the town and that some buildings, especially those with cellars, would be made into strongholds capable of all-round defense.

Other than that, combat would involve a methodical, firepower-intensive approach. Strongpoints in the city would be taken care of with direct-fire artillery, followed by infantry. Frequent stops would be required to restore contact with the other units. When it came to armor support, the manual was vague as to how the tanks would aid in an urban combat situation, only that “opportunities will present themselves frequently where the support of tanks in such situations becomes desirable.”

From October 8-12, the two battalions worked their way to their respective jump-off positions. The 2/26 was securing themselves at the foot of the railroad embankment of the Aachen-Cologne railway. The 3/26 secured its position in the industrial area east of the city.

On October 10, the commander of the 1st Infantry Division, MG Clarence R. Huebner, sent an ultimatum to the garrison at Aachen explaining that the city had 24 hours to surrender. When the deadline came without a response, the Americans began a two-day bombardment of the city. VII Corps and 1st Infantry Division artillery fired 4,800 rounds into the city along with 62 tons worth of bombs on the first day. On the second day, 5,000 more rounds and 99 tons of bombs were used on the city. Because most Germans in the city had access to protected positions like cellars, basements and air raid shelters, the show of firepower had little impact on the population.

The two battalions began their operations at the same time. The 2/26 began its assault with artillery fire and followed it by tossing grenades over the embankment. When they made it to the top, they found that the embankment was not defended. The embankment was an obstacle for the tanks to get over. Two tanks did make it over the embankment by going through a railway station built into the embankment.

Before the operation began, LTC Derril M. Daniel, the 2/26’s battalion commander, prepared for operation. He began by reconfiguring his battalion by integrating combat arms at the small unit level. Each rifle company became a task force, augmented by two 57mm antitank guns from the regimental antitank company, two bazooka teams, one flamethrower, three tanks or tank destroyers, and two heavy machine gun. This gave each rifle company access to a wide variety of weapons systems for any situation.

To aid in communication Daniel set up a system in which all intersections and prominent buildings were numbered to speed up communication and to help coordinate the battalion’s elements. Daniel ordered a strong liaison between units at all times. There were mandated stops at designated checkpoints for reestablishment of contact along the line. Offensive operations stopped at night along designated main streets to avoid night combat.

Logistically, Daniel improvised a mobile battalion ammo dump. In order to transport wounded soldiers, he managed to obtain some M29 cargo carriers, known as “weasels,” whose tracks could easily traverse the rubble-filled streets.

The catchphrase for the operation was “Knock em’ all down.” There was not a second thought given to collateral damage. Daniel believed that the enemy wouldn’t be able to fight effectively if the buildings they were fighting in were crumbling around them. The plan was often to force German forces into the cellars where Allied infantry would finish them off with bayonets or grenades.

The strategy began with heavy artillery striking German lines of communication. Medium artillery was used on the lines. Most projectiles were equipped with
The 155mm gun demolished its target, which upon closer inspection turned out to be not a pillbox but a camouflaged tank.

On October 17 and 18, 2/26 continued to their objective. The 1106th Engineers continued to displace themselves to cover the battalion’s flank. As the 2/26 moved forward, their front widened, and Company C (1/26 Infantry) was added to Daniel’s command by 1st Infantry and would later be responsible for a zone on the battalion’s right flank. During this time period, the 2/26 came under fire from a church steeple that the Germans had reinforced with concrete. Small arms and tank destroyer fire were ineffective. The 155mm gun was brought out and it succeeded in knocking the entire structure to the ground. The author believes that this was a prime example of the “Knock ‘em all down” strategy.

On October 19, the 2/26 received another battalion, the 2/110 (28th Infantry Division) to fill a gap in the line. Some of the 2/26 went to assist the 3/26 in securing Salvatorberg. Gabel mentions that the right wing of the battalion hit heavy resistance on October 20 at the Technical School. It fell the next day, the 2/26 taking several hundred prisoners. Upon finding another railway embankment, the 2/26 repeated the same grenade technique employed at the beginning of the operation. While securing the other side of the embankment, the 2/26 received word that Colonel Wilck, the German commander, had surrendered to the 3/26.

The two environments that the two battalions fought in were vastly different. While the 2/26 fought mostly in urban combat, the 3/26 began operations in Aachen’s industrial area and moved toward the many resorts and hotels in the north side of town. They also had to contend with the best troops Colonel Wilck had on hand. The colonel knew that he could not afford to lose control of the hills, and hence made the 3/26’s job as difficult as possible.

The 3/26 began its operation on October 13, moving through the apartments and factories in northeast Aachen. They made steady progress up Juelicher Strasse until they came under fire from a 20mm cannon. Gabel states that this forced the infantry out of the street. As a result two tanks were left exposed to Panzerfaust fire; one tank was destroyed and the other damaged.

The 3/26 concentrated its forces on taking out a German stronghold held up in St. Elizabeth’s Church on the 14th of October. By nightfall the 3/26 had advanced to the edge of Farwick Park, only a few blocks away from Colonel Wilck’s headquarters in the Hotel Quellenhof. Wilck decided to move his headquarters to an air raid bunker 1,200 yards west of the hotel. Wilck received the only reinforcements that would make it to the city. They were members of the SS Battalion Rink and were, as Gabel puts it, “the best, most fanatical personnel that Germany had to offer.” While they had suffered significant losses passing through the 30th Infantry’s lines, the remaining troops would spearhead a counterattack the next day.

The 15th marked a good deal of progress for the 3/26, thanks to some 4.2mm mortars they had with them. When they reached the Hotel Quellenhof, the SS troops began their counterattack. The 3/26 was forced to fall back. This began a change in tactics for the 3/26, which would spend the next two days on the defensive. On the 18th, the 3/26’s offensive operations began anew. Contact was made with the 30th Infantry by a patrol sent out beyond their right flank. Afterwards they reclaimed the ground that they had lost on the 15th and began an assault on the Hotel Quellenhof. The Americans fought room to room and managed to force the German
defenders into the basement where grenades and machine-gun fire finally compelled the survivors to surrender. Farwick Park was now in the hands of the 3/26. Gabel adds that with the defeat of the SS Battalion Rink, the rest of the German defense would suffer.

For the final assault the 3/26 received assistance from VII Corps in the form of Task Force Hogan. TF Hogan comprised an armored infantry battalion and a tank battalion (minus a medium tank company) from the 3rd Armored Division. TF Hogan was to attack the northwest corner of Lousberg while the 3/26 attacked from the east. German resistance was weakening as the 3/26 quickly took Salvatorberg. By 1202, both TF Hogan and the 3/26 had linked up on Lousberg.

Wilck knew that it was only a matter of time. He issued an order to fight to the last man and bullet, though Gabel mentions that it is not known how many of his troops actually received this information. By October 20, TF Hogan and the 3/26 managed to eliminate the last enemy resistance. The Battle for Aachen ended on October 21. A small unit from the 3/26 was heading towards a nearby air raid bunker, not knowing it was Wilck’s headquarters. The battalion commander, LTC John T. Corley, was about to fire the 155mm gun at the structure when a white flag was raised. Wilck had sent out some American prisoners to surrender. Wilck sent out one final radio broadcast professing his dedication to Hitler and Germany and surrendered to the 3/26.

One of the problems that faced the American forces after the battle was collecting all of the German soldiers. With the German main lines of communication destroyed, the Americans were forced to take one of Wilck’s staff officers and drive him around in an armored car to let the remaining German troops know of the surrender. Another problem the allies faced was the 7,000 civilians found remaining in the city. During the operation, the civilians were moved to an open field where the Counter Intelligence Corps began screening them for German spies and high-ranking officials. Eventually these evacuees were relocated to a German army barracks located four miles from Aachen. It was a place where the civilians could wait while the screening and registration process took place.

Aachen was captured by Americans who had no prior experience in urban combat, but who used lessons learned during earlier phases of Operation Overlord to help them. Small, combined-arms forces were extremely effective. The lines of battle were easily distinguished, so that American forces knew where German soldiers were in front of them at all times. Gabel adds that in some ways the battle was handled much like other battles in World War II, with artillery and bombings weakening a position and infantry moving in afterwards. One of the most important lessons from the battle arose from the number of civilians found in the city. While there was a mandatory evacuation by Germany before the fighting and by the U.S. forces during it, around 1,000 civilians were still unaccounted for after Wilck surrendered. The lesson here is to never assume that all civilians have left a contested area.

SEOUL, 1950
Following the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces capitalized on their element of surprise, quickly overrunning South Korean units and seizing Seoul, the nation’s capitol, within three days. In City Fights, MAJ Thomas A. Kelley recounts and analyzes the actions before and during Battle of Seoul, in which the city was finally liberated on September 29, 1950. Kelley notes that one of the first problems in trying to liberate a city is determining how you’re going to get troops there. GEN Douglas MacArthur came up with a plan to land an amphibious force at the communist-occupied port of Inchon, facing the Yellow Sea. Because Inchon hardly seemed an ideal landing site, MacArthur believed that his troops would have the element of surprise, and he was right. The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) did not have a large enough force in the area to push back the amphibious assault and retreated in the face of the landings.

The main fighting force was the U.S. X Corps, commanded by MG Edward A. Almond, and comprised the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Infantry Division, corps artillery battalions, an engineer brigade, and an amphibious tank and tractor battalion. The landing at Inchon took place on September 14, 1950, and it wasn’t until the 25th when the forces succeeded in fighting their way to Seoul. Among the first objectives were to cut the main roads leading to the city. Units of the 1st Marine Division succeeded in seizing Kimpo airfield, cut the rail line into Seoul, and seized several key hills. The 17th Republic of Korea (ROK) Infantry Regiment and the U.S. 32nd Infantry Regiment advanced on Seoul from the south.

The Eighth Army, commanded by LTG Walton H. Walker, was having problems in breaking through the NKPA’s defenses. The breakthrough was important to MacArthur’s plan to retake Seoul and push the North Koreans back across the international border, so MacArthur directed his planners to begin looking for alternatives. Before a detailed plan could be formed, the Eighth Army, with the help of bombers and attack
aircraft of the Far East Air Forces, succeeded in breaking through
the North Korean lines. The breakthrough began on September 22
and by the 23rd, the Eighth Army was in pursuit of retreating enemy
forces.

While the Eighth Army was executing its breakthrough, the X
Corps movement towards Seoul slowed down. The North Koreans
were able to recover from the shock of the initial attack and started
moving reinforcements into the area. The 1st Marine Division
managed to inflict severe casualties on the North Koreans as the
United Nations forces advanced on three axes. The 1st Marine
Regiment was to clear the suburb of Yungdungpo, cross the Han
River, and then seize South Mountain. The 5th RCT would team
up with the South Korean Marine Regiment to retake the city. The
7th Infantry Division would protect the southern flank and push a
task force south to Suwon. The NKPA had dug defensive positions
into a series of hills west of Seoul and Yongdungpo, where they
offered stubborn resistance; the U.N. forces wouldn’t make it to
the city until the 25th of September.

When they reached the city, the U.N. forces chose not to surround
it. Kelley explains that this might have been a factor in liberating
the city so quickly. By leaving the enemy the option for withdrawal
it kept them from believing that they had to fight for the city to the
death or until they received orders to surrender.

Even though this might have helped the U.N. Forces to retake
the city faster, it did not make it any easier. The fighting in the
streets was brutal. The NKPA had committed countless atrocities
including torture, mutilation, and genocide. U.N. Forces often found
evidence of these war crimes and were appalled that civilian
noncombatants and military prisoners of war would be treated in
such a way. Modern soldiers encounter similar acts of violence
committed against civilians by terrorists, and while some soldiers
may be emotionally and psychologically able to cope, there will be
others who will find it difficult. This was the case with U.S. and

Allied soldiers who witnessed the aftermath of the North Koreans’
brutality, and as a result some soldiers had to be evacuated to receive
proper treatment of these unseen wounds or required further
treatment upon their return home.

Fire was another problem during the liberation of Seoul. Retreating
NKPA units set fire to large areas of the city to create
obstacles, deny U.N. forces access to infrastructure, destroy
supplies, or just to cover the extent of their war crimes or crimes
against humanity. Burning buildings, blinding smoke, toxic gases
released by chemical fires, and searing heat made it difficult for
soldiers to function properly. The enemy’s use of fire as a weapon
to impede movement, to generate refugees, or to destroy facilities
to keep them from being taken is a consideration for future leaders
as they contemplate the urban
fight.

Seoul was liberated on
September 28, 1950. More
than 65 percent of the city
was destroyed. According to
the reasoning of the NKPA,
the destruction of the city was
the best course of action,
regardless of the staggering
cost to Seoul’s citizens and
property, but it could have
been even worse. Kelley
points out that taking the city
by laying siege to it might
have resulted in “an even
more prolonged battle,
stronger defenses, and higher
civilian casualties.” By using
a judicious combination of
artillery and air support, the
U.S. Army and Marines
accomplished their mission
and saved the lives of many
on both sides.
Once Seoul had been liberated, the South Korean government quickly returned to the city. If the government had not reestablished control over its capitol, the U.N. forces would have stopped pushing the North Koreans back and instead had to deal with the humanitarian efforts to provide for the many refugees in the area. When a city is liberated, the aftermath often involves helping to restore order, food, water, clothing, and shelter to the civilian population, and this can place inordinate demands upon a military force that is trying to conduct combat operations at the same time.

HUE, 1968

The battle of Hue City occurred in 1968 and was one of the landmark battles of the Vietnam War. Vietnamese communist forces launched their lunar new year’s offensive on January 30, 1968, in a series of coordinated attacks by Viet Cong (VC) sappers and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regular forces down the length of South Vietnam. The ancient imperial capitol city of Hue was one of the first cities attacked. Two regiments of NVA and VC with a total of 7,500 soldiers advanced on Hue late in the evening of January 29th and were in position to attack by the morning of the 31st. Around 2 a.m. on the 31st, the NVA 6th Regiment linked up with its guides and seized a bridgehead into the Citadel, a castle-like structure that had been the residence for Annamese emperors since the early 1800’s. The NVA 4th Regiment joined the 6th Regiment and they raised their communist flag over the Imperial Palace. Their two main objectives were to seize control of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1st Division headquarters in the northeast corner of the Citadel, and the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) headquarters located on the south side of the Perfume River. By taking the Citadel, the VC had succeeded in splitting the two forces off from each other.

After receiving incorrect information on the attack, Task Force X-Ray, a forward headquarters of the 1st U.S. Marine Division, sent a rifle company — Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) — to aid the U.S. and Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces that were being overrun. The company met up with four M48 tanks along the way. Because the VC forces failed to destroy the An Cuu Bridge, the 1/1 managed to get close to the MACV compound before they were pinned down by enemy fire. Hearing the relief force was pinned down, BG Foster C. LaHue sent LTC Marcus J. Gravel, commander of the 1/1, along with Company G, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines to aid them.

When the two battalions linked up, they fought their way to the MACV compound, where they set up defensive positions around the headquarters, the navy’s boat ramp on the river, and the base of the Nguyen Hoang Bridge. The bridge, connected to Highway 1, was their way into the Citadel. The Marine battalions were given new orders from III Marine Amphibious Force to go to the ARVN headquarters and link up with its commanding officer, General Ngo Quang Truong. MAJ Norm Cooling, author of the account of the battle for Hue in City Fights, notes that the soldiers in this situation believed that III MAF was not fully aware of the situation, and hence this decision was not a good one. Gravel sent out Company G to secure the bridge; they managed to take it after a two-hour firefight, but they were forced back to the MACV compound three hours later in the face of a VC counterattack.

The III MAF sent the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry to a landing zone near Highway 1. Their mission was to disrupt the NVA’s lines of communication. They fought for several days but were unable to complete their mission. The NVA managed to receive reinforcements and strengthen their hold on the city. The weather began hampering airborne support, but Company F, 2/5, was able to complete an insertion onto the landing zone near the MACV compound on the second day. The next day Company H, 2/5, joined the forces at MACV.

On day four, LTC Earnest C. Cheatham, Jr., commanding officer of the 2/5, was given the order to move a convoy into Hue and assume command of the forces under Gravel. COL Stanley S. Hughes, asked to assume overall command of all U.S. Marine forces in the area by LaHue, was also in the convoy. The convoy was ambushed during the advance to the MACV compound. Hughes took command from Gravel and gave orders to begin eliminating enemy combatants on their side of the river. Cheatham was to move his men west of the compound towards the Phu Cam Canal. Gravels men would move with the 2/5 but would move along the Phu Cam clearing out hostiles and trying to keep Highway 1 open to the compound. ARVN troops that were inside the MACV compound at the beginning of the attack would deal with snipers and remaining pockets of resistance. They would also care for any civilian refugees found during the marine advance.

The Marines had been used to rural and jungle combat. Urban combat was an alien concept to them.

They learned lessons that would help them later in urban combat, but casualties were high at first. The only advantage the Marines had was their armor, and even then the VC and NVA had B-40 antitank rockets. Because of restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), U.S. forces were unable to employ artillery, naval surface fires, and aircraft munitions. Just as U.S. forces attacking...
Aachen in 1944 discovered numbers of civilians still in the city, so too would the Marines find themselves trying to clear enemy-held buildings filled with noncombatants. While the U.S. was under strict ROE, the VC and the NVA were not. The enemy did not hesitate to use noncombatants as human shields. On day five of the attack, the 2/5’s executive officer, MAJ Ralph J. Silvati, got several E-8 teargas launchers and gave them to the fighting forces. These nonlethal weapons made it easier to chase NVA and VC out of buildings while keeping civilian casualties to a minimum.

The Marines made steady progress in clearing out the enemy forces. The areas cleared included the treasury, the university, and the Joan of Arc School. By the 6th of February, most of the capitol had been cleared of communist fighters. By the 10th the south side of Hue was secure. It took several more days for the Marines to make sure all communist forces were eliminated from the area. The Marines also began to discover mass graves filled with South Vietnamese who had been summarily executed during the NVA’s control of the city.

On the other side of the river, Brigadier General Troung and his ARVN 1st Division began to try and take back the Citadel. After four days of counteroffensives, he requested American aid. MAJ Robert H. Thompson and his 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) received the mission. Their orders were to relieve General Troung’s ARVN 1st Airborne Task Force along the northeast wall and continue to clear the wall. They made it into the Citadel on February 13 and found that the Vietnamese 1st Airborne Task Force had left the area too soon and that the NVA were moving into the positions they left behind. The NVA engaged them and rendered Company A, 1/5 combat ineffective. It was now clear that the communist forces inside the Citadel were well fortified and camouflaged. Hughes began to argue for an ease of the ROE so that bigger and better weaponry could be employed to rout out the enemy. The request was approved and Thompson began to employ 5 and 6 inch naval guns, 8-inch and 155mm artillery, and fixed-wing Zuni rockets along the wall. Riot control gas was also used. Cooling writes that one possible explanation for the ease of ROE on the U.S. operations in Hue was that GEN Creighton W. Abrams, the deputy theater commander, had established a MACV forward command post at Phu Bai, eight miles south of Hue.

Even with the increase in firepower now available, it wasn’t until February 21 that the 1/5 could succeed in taking the Citadel’s northeast wall. The ARVN had problems with taking the southeast wall and the imperial palace. Thompson had to turn his battalion around and continue fighting. His fighting force was exhausted, so he turned to a group of Marines that had recently arrived: Company L, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines (3/5). During the 3/5’s assault, four battalions of the 1st Cavalry Division began an assault on an NVA supply installation in the La Chu Woods west of the city. With the communist’s lines of communications (LOC) severed, and little hope of supporting the remaining forces inside the Citadel, the NVA 6th Regiment began to withdraw on the 23rd. The same day, Thompson took the southwest wall and began to focus his attention on the imperial palace. An elite ARVN group, the Black Panther Company, performed the last assault and took the palace back. Final mop up operations began on the 26th with the operation ending on midnight on the 27th.

There are many lessons to take from this battle. First, the most important thing a fighting force can do is to secure their LOC. By securing the helipad and naval boat ramp near the MACV compound the Marines and Army units in the area assured that the soldiers would have supplies for themselves and for the growing number of civilian refugees. The rules of engagement were strict in the hope of preserving the historical city and avoiding civilian casualties. These ROE often kept the Marines from completely eliminating an enemy presence. One example of this was a group of NVA hiding inside a pagoda. The Marines had to contact their headquarters to request permission to fire on the structure. By the time they had received a response, the NVA had managed to escape. The ARVN, however, had different rules of engagement and they called in air strikes inside the Citadel. The ROE of any urban setting must ensure the safety of civilians and buildings of historic importance while being flexible enough to allow soldiers to do what is needed to prevent the enemy from withdrawing and regrouping.

Intelligence on the situation was lacking throughout the fight. One reason may be that there were poor communications and information dissemination across the board. The U.S. had learned that there was an increased military presence in the demilitarized zone and along the Laotian border, but they did not realize what this meant until it was too late. The communist forces managed to obtain the element of surprise. Also, there were problems with the bureaucratic structure of how information was disseminated. An NVA radio transmission was intercepted on January 30 by an army field radio intercept station mentioning a possible attack on Hue. Instead of informing MACV, the information was sent to Da Nang for analysis. MACV didn’t get this information until after the battle had started.

George Santayana’s dictum that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it” applies to the urban combat of today. Much of what Soldiers learn about urban combat was gained on the battlefields of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Today we are learning valuable lessons as well in Iraq and Afghanistan. The most important weapon on any battlefield is the knowledge of how previous generations operated in similar environments. By remembering and applying this principle, we can better prepare Soldiers for the challenges they will face on future battlefields.

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Listed below are a number of observations based upon my 15 months service as an airborne infantry platoon leader in and around Samarra, Iraq. I have tried to organize my thoughts into specific areas which include small kill team (SKT) operations, mounted and dismounted patrolling, raids, interaction with local nationals, sensitive site exploitation (SSE) and miscellaneous topics. My observations are based on common sense ... I think. During an assignment everyone forms his own opinions and develops his own techniques for doing things; these are the practices that have worked for my platoon and our particular way of conducting combat operations. Take what works for you and your area of operations (AO), or expand on my concepts to help prepare your platoon for deployment. Unfortunately, my company had a very bad relief in place and received almost no information or lessons learned from the previous unit. We spent the last year learning by trial and error what easily could have been passed on from our predecessors. This is my attempt to rectify those deficiencies and minimize the amount of practical knowledge lost between units.

**SKT Operations**

SKTs operations target ambushes, saboteurs, and those who attempt to emplace mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These insurgents are essentially the bottom rung on the ladder of importance of enemy personnel. Despite the low-level targets, these operations can still have a great effect on a company's AO. Neutralizing these individuals may not stop IEDs completely, but it reduces enemy manpower, increases the cost to the insurgents, makes it harder to recruit replacements, and creates lulls in activity, which lessens the danger to Coalition forces (CF). To stop IEDs completely, you must target the builders and financiers.
Destroying these personnel will have a more substantial effect on IED activity.

The enemy may use the same sites and techniques over and over again. This seems idiotic and would appear to make it easy to catch them, but it’s not. A unit’s sector can be extremely large, and it may be impossible to cover the entire region all the time. You have to do some time analysis to see when the best times are to target specific sites and find a pattern in the enemy’s activities, then target those specific times with your SKTs. The enemy still might not oblige you, but you never know. The other problem is getting your SKTs into sector without being detected. The enemy knows when we are in sector and when we leave. Their ubiquitous eyes and ears are very good at observing our movements, so you have to be creative in how you infiltrate teams. The biggest limiters to creativity are the adherence to long-used SOPs and the reluctance to accept risk. Don’t be lazy, try different approaches. For example, make your SKTs walk a few kilometers to their objectives rather than always being inserted by vehicle; they are less likely to be seen and compromised.

SKTs are a fairly new type of operation for line platoons to conduct. In the past, this was an operation that would be conducted by battalion scout elements. When I arrived in country, I received M14s and a .50 cal Barrett for my platoon. Any SKT operation that you conduct must have at least one “long gun.”

To be successful at SKT operations you must possess the right equipment. Good optics and good spotting scopes are a must. Do not waste time and money on cheap spotting scopes. My battalion bought lots of cheap spotting scopes, of which four came to my platoon. We took them on operations at first, but realized they were much less effective than our Vipers and regular binoculars. Now they just sit on a shelf gathering dust. I would trade the four for one good scope. If money is an issue, then get one really good optic that actually brings something to the fight. Two really great spotting scopes in the company would be more worthwhile and could be signed out by the platoon prior to their missions. It may be tough to win the quality vs. price fight; I know we sent up a request for specific, quality scopes and someone else made the decision to go cheap. Unfortunately, often the guys who decide what to buy and what you do and don’t need are far from the fight and may not understand your requirements. The need for good glass is not limited to daytime operations; along with day optics you must have the appropriate night optics for both the .50 caliber and smaller caliber rifles.

Sniper blinds or screens for windows are also required equipment for SKTs. When occupying an abandoned building, the Soldiers should hang blinds to break up their shapes and cover any movement inside. Obviously, do not hang the blinds in the window itself. Hang them a few feet back from the opening so that they blend into the shadow of the room. From the outside nothing will seem out of place, as long as no one walks up and looks in the window. Should this happen, just detain the person until the SKT operation is complete. Sniper blinds or screens are really easy to make; use the tan mosquito screen that is common or some other light netting that can be seen through. Have two types available. We have a screen that is painted mostly black for hides that have complete roofs and are dark on the inside. We also have mostly tan screens for those abandoned houses that are missing a roof. You can still hide in these rooms; you just need to ensure your screen matches the back wall. If you are in a mud brick house in the desert, the tan alone works great and is hard to detect unless you are close.

A unit looking to conduct SKT operations must also be able to hide in the open. To do so, you need a desert ghillie suit or ghillie blanket. In Iraq during the summer months, it is too hot for a team to wear a ghillie unless it is for VERY limited target hours. Using SKTs away from structures during the winter months will help to prevent overuse of a hide site, which leads to them being booby trapped or a complex attack on the position to capture the personnel. To maximize the number of times that a hide can be used, ensure that you discretely mark the site or otherwise keep track of when and under what conditions you used it. The standard composition for an SKT will vary depending on the hide, with more men needed for a structure having multiple rooms, or for using a house that is occupied. This allows for men to pull security on the local nationals and others to conduct the SKT. Using occupied homes decreases the likelihood of booby traps and gives unlimited locations for SKTs.

**Mounted Patrolling**

As light infantrymen we initially did little mounted patrolling. In the train up prior to deployment, we knew we would have some trucks, but the extent to which we would have to use them was definitely unknown. Conducting combat operations in up-armored HMMWs (UAs) required skills that my paratroopers did not have, but as is the way of the paratrooper we adapted quickly and became very proficient. The first of those skills that we needed to learn was proficiency with heavy weapons, especially the M2 .50 caliber machine gun. Only a handful of my men who had been in antitank platoons had ever used them. It is the main weapon we use when conducting mounted operations. We learned as we went and spent a lot of time and ammunition on the forward operating base (FOB) range. We also incorporated the MK-19 into our operations. Most of my sector is flat, open desert, and this weapon is great for reaching out and touching the enemy when they shoot at you from 800-plus meters. Soldiers need to become proficient with these vital crew-served weapons under as many conditions of employment as possible prior to their first combat mission; they should not be getting their first exposure to equipment during combat operations. You need to train on this equipment at home station. If you are light infantry, beg, borrow, steal — get it done. If you can get four turtle shells for the company to pass around and train on, then great — that’s the first step.

Again, using UAs was an entirely new experience for my platoon and company. A great lesson learned was how to task organize my platoon for the different operations that we conducted. What I learned was when conducting patrols with full trucks, it is better to have one squad man all the trucks and one squad to ride in
the back seats for dismounting. With this organization, you have a pure squad for dismounted operations. It makes accountability and command and control much easier than if you continue to have each squad manning their own trucks. In that situation, you have pieces of each squad dismounting and when shooting starts, maneuvering and accountability become more difficult and less effective. There is no substitute for an infantry squad; eight men dismounted and maneuvering as an organized unit cannot be equaled by twice their number of non-organic Soldiers who have not trained together attempting to do the same task.

Be prepared for as many contingencies as possible when conducting mounted patrols. Carry everything you might need in the vehicles as part of your vehicle SOP. One contingency that may occur often is the need to conduct a hasty raid. For starters, you have to get in, so you need shotguns. Have at least one on each patrol (I have one in each team). In addition, sometimes you run into steel doors, and a picket pounder is more useful to batter it in (though we usually shotgun those, too). Flash-bangs and grenades — have these available and use them when the situation merits. Also understand that raiding tools perform differently in different environments. Outside Samarra, a shotgun is usually all that is needed because the houses are not usually walled and the doors are mostly wooden. Another tool we always have with us on patrol are door charges. You never know what you will be getting into, so an explosive breach is a great way to disrupt anyone on the other side of the door. We use a mixture of flex linear and water impulse charges, mostly the latter. We also experimented with rifle grenade entry munitions (RGEM), which seemed like a great tool and great concept. We used them on the range, and they were impressive. It is an explosive charge that is shot at the door with an M4, like an old-school rifle grenade except designed for breaching doors. With these munitions the breach team does not need to approach the door to breach; they are quick and easy and will set off any booby traps before you move up to the building. After we used them on the range, we took them on a mission. The first shot was a dud; it just hit the door, broke in half and fell to the ground. We quickly gave them up and returned to the old reliable water impulse. If they could make the RGEM reliable enough to work every time, that would be our primary explosive entry tool. We have also used explosive breaches on the compound gate with a larger charge.

Always have all your night-fighting equipment with you (i.e. thermals, night vision devices and Tac light). The situation is always changing; you might go out on a short patrol early in the morning and get diverted to something that lasts all night — be prepared for it. If your unit has the equipment, put at least one thermal in each truck. At night, my gunners wear NVGs and have the thermals on and scan regularly.

Have a company vehicle SOP for equipment carried. Vehicles go down at the most inconvenient time, and you often have to borrow from other platoons to accomplish the mission. The other platoons should have the same equipment in the same configuration. One critical piece of equipment is binoculars. Every vehicle needs to have a good set of binoculars. In my AO, the trend for IEDs went back and forth between surface and subsurface laid. For the ones on the surface, the enemy will use trash, bushes, and even sandbags to hide them. After a while you learn what to look for, especially in your company AO, and you will see what is different. The binoculars will give you standoff for suspicious objects and allow you to assess whether it is an IED or not.

Fire blankets need to be on all vehicles in a standard location. IEDs often are artillery rounds with some kind of accelerant attached
They do this to try and burn the vehicle. The IED will probably not destroy the vehicle, but if the accelerant gets on the tires, it will burn the truck to the ground. The blankets will let you extinguish burning personnel and help you get them out of the truck.

Learn to use the Blue Force Tracker. It is a critical system that makes life so much easier. It allows you to track other elements and see what kind of air assets are in the AO. If nothing else, it lets you get to where you need to go with relative ease. Learn it. Ensure that no mounted patrol goes out without one.

Be very careful when driving on dirt roads. Don’t do it if you don’t have to. Dirt roads facilitate large catastrophic IEDs and allow the enemy to dig them in right under the vehicle. To help mitigate risks, do an assessment of the dirt road you want to use. Do local nationals use that road frequently or do they avoid it? Is it a road that only military traffic uses? If so do not use it; it will probably be mined. Can I get there a different way? Do I set a pattern when I use it? Ways to avoid getting hit are to vary your routes, dismount and go in across country, by air assault, through boat operations, etc … We also have mine rollers that attach to the front of our vehicles. They will work fine in cases where the IED is pressure wired and not offset from the mine. We have had one detonation on a mine roller from pressure wire; it did its job and stopped anyone in the vehicle from getting hurt; the mine roller survived also, but do not rely on them to mitigate all the risk of driving on dirt roads. We have also encountered deep buried IEDs on dirt roads that are command wired. The enemy uses these IEDs to keep us out of areas only accessible by a few dirt roads. These staged IEDs allow local traffic to use the roads all the time without incident and allow us to enter an area without incident.

Word spreads once we are in the AO, and the trigger man moves to the command wire to engage us on our way out. We have had one IED of this nature detonate on a patrol and another patrol saw the command wire for a second device. These IEDs were placed on strategic choke points for the AO — roads they knew we had to drive on to access the enemy of the region. If you must use a dirt road, do not use the same road twice; try and keep them guessing. Also, assess the enemy activity in that part of your sector. Are there lots of reports of anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) from that region? Are there lots of IEDs on the main supply route (MSR) adjacent to that location? Are there frequent of small arms fire attacks on combat logistic patrols and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) from that area? If so, then common sense tells us that the area is an AIF safe haven, and that the roads into it are more likely to be mined. These mines serve as both early warning to allow AIF to hide or escape, to deny us terrain, and to inflict casualties. Remember, the enemy is smart and adaptive; they have been doing this for five years and the dumb ones die quickly. The bottom line with dirt roads is be smart and vary how you operate; ask yourself “is the result worth the risk?”

When a vehicle does get disabled by an IED or mine, slow down and look for secondary devices before you move up to aid. Don’t rush up to them; approach with caution and make sure there are no more IEDs. Have an SOP for who will respond to the disabled vehicle; only send a few Soldiers to render assistance until you can clear for secondaries. I know the first instinct is to get to vehicle and assist, but you might get more troops killed by rushing. Think of it as walking into a mine field; you don’t just run across the field to get to the casualty, you clear to them so no one else blows up. Slow it down and do it right.

Don’t be afraid to dismount. Many units don’t want to get out of their vehicles and are afraid to do so. Luckily, my paratroopers prefer to be out of their vehicles. Vehicles limit you to roads, and roads are where IEDs are. They are also large and noisy, allowing the enemy to keep track of you easily. Moving dismounted in the dark helps us get where we have to go, and without being detected.

When driving on an MSR, control the civilian traffic. In my battalion’s sector, all civilian vehicle traffic will pull to the side of the road and stop when they see us coming in the opposite lane. It took a lot of “training” of the local populace, but I believe it makes the difference. Vehicles in front of our patrol traveling the same direction as us that try to stop are waved on with flags or we tell them to move on with the PA system. There are certain rules that we live by that are absolute in my platoon and company. The first is never pass by a stopped car on the shoulder of your lane and keep as much distance as you can from local vehicles. Again wave them on with flags or use your PA system. Make it clear, in no uncertain terms, that they will move that car immediately. If it is broken down, they will push it off the road 15 meters or more. We do this in case it is a vehicle-borne IED; one of our platoon leaders was killed passing a bongo truck that pulled to the side of the road to let the patrol pass and detonated on the lead vehicle. The second reason is that they could be trying to stop us in an IED kill zone to the rear of the car or trying to get us to cross the median where there could be mines or additional IEDs. Always see the possible threat and attempt to safeguard against it.

Make sure all extra ammo supplies for the
crew-served weapon are NOT inside the crew compartment. Keep them in the trunk, behind the blast doors, or make bustle racks on the sides of the turret. I like them on the turret; that way the ammo is at hand for the gunner, and in the event of an IED attack, the rounds will most likely be blown away from the vehicle, causing less of a hazard for everyone.

Because of the possibility of IEDs my platoon also revised the combat load we were carrying in the trucks. Then we rolled to a large vehicle engagement where we shot most of that combat load relatively quickly and changed it back. The combat loads we carry now seem to be a good compromise. What these events really taught me was to have battle drills ready for reloading ammo for crew-served weapons and to have that ammo in a uniform location so any Soldier reaching through the blast doors knows where to reach. Also, establish a minimum combat load and have a separate 100 rounds for test fire ammo. When your test fire ammo gets within 50 rounds of the combat ammo, put in an ammo request for another 100 rounds; that way you ensure your combat ammo is always available and has not been depleted by test firing.

Remember Soldiers and leaders can be lazy; put systems in place so you do not get caught in sector with less than your combat load. My system is that once a week, on our dispatch day, the ammo in a truck is counted and updated on a tracking board and dated. This count will include the test fire ammo and facilitate the platoon sergeant in giving a weekly consumption report to the XO and requesting more ammo when needed.

Ammo updates are done once a week on my platoon’s maintenance day. That day (operations allowing) all my trucks will get TI-ed by the mechanics and re-dispatched. The squad and team leaders will then ensure that the vehicle SOP for equipment is straight and that the ammo tracker is updated. Vehicle maintenance is absolutely critical for maintaining a high operations tempo. Our battalion mandates that all vehicles will be re-dispatched every seven days. This ensures that the battalion mechanics see every vehicle once a week and can stay on top of the preventive maintenance.

This system seems to work well; my trucks are rarely down for maintenance problems, and if they are it is for no more than half a day. I can not stress enough the importance of a good maintenance program for your platoon. I do not know anything about fixing vehicles, but my platoon has the best maintenance record in the battalion. On my maintenance day when all my trucks are in the motor pool, I am in the motor pool. I have a very good relationship with our chief. If a lieutenant is in the motor pool involved in his platoon’s maintenance, the chief may be more inclined to take care of you and your Soldiers. Sometimes a private will get the runaround from a mechanic about a problem with a vehicle. If you are in the motor pool, he can come to you and you can ask the chief. My chief, when I ask, will take me to the truck himself, check it out and talk to the mechanic working on it. You will then get a good answer on the problem that the private might not have received and have a good idea how long it will take to fix. Take ownership of your vehicles and pride in their repair; the mechanics will appreciate it and take care of you when you do have a problem.

Along with vehicle maintenance you must do the same with your weapons. I guarantee that most units do not regularly update 2404s on all their equipment in country, even though there is no more important place to be tracking your maintenance. Once a month, all weapons and electronic equipment in my platoon receive preventive maintenance checks and services, by the book, and results are logged in our platoon 2404 book. We maintain three platoon books: one is the vehicle log, tracking the 5988Es on all vehicles (updated weekly on dispatch day). The second is the platoon 2404 book which has all organic equipment tracked by system, and the third is a 2404 book tracking all the TPE (theater-provided equipment) that we received in theater.

**Raids**

Often in sector, we will receive a time sensitive target (TST) or a report of enemy activity and you have to go with what you have and prosecute the target. Everyone, including me, needs to be able to enter and clear a room. You also need to have the flexibility to confront multiple buildings and complex objectives with a small force. Be fast and be aggressive; that will usually cow most enemy and prevent them from offering much resistance. If you go in without confidence and fail to dominate the situation, then people might get hurt. Even if you only have limited manpower with you, the amount of fire power available to you far out matches the enemy. Use your gun trucks as your support-by-fire (SBF) element, if you have multiple buildings to clear; after the first is secure take the time to adjust your trucks to have that fire superiority ready if you make contact. Slow it down half a step and never move without having your SBF to cover the movement.

To be able to execute the missions we do, every weapon needs a Tac light and a PAC-4 or PEQ-2. We conduct raids on a
daily basis, both day and night. Tac lights are needed even during the day; an Iraqi home or barn is not usually well lit, all rooms do not have windows and the adjustment between light and dark is aided by the Tac light. For night you need both; you must be ready to go white light inside the house and NVGs outside. Your men must be able to clear large complex objectives with a small force, and at night that involves going in and out of many buildings. The ability to transition back and forth is something that must be trained and supervised by team and squad leaders. Some troopers don’t like NVGs very much, so they will not put them back on after the first house unless trained and forced to do so.

One technique that we use for a hasty raid is to stop short of the objective, quickly dismount the assault force behind the lead vehicle, and then approach the house. The lead vehicle rams the gate and continues to push toward the house. The remaining three vehicles move into cordon and ensure no evaders get out the back side. The assault force then moves past the truck and enters and clears the house. This technique works well, is quick, and maximizes fire power immediately available if contact is made.

The other technique we use, which is our preferred method in a more urban environment, is to dismount the assault a few blocks away and conduct a covert breach on the gate (with ladder and bolt cutters as stated earlier) then move the UAHs into cordon.

A tendency you may see as the deployment goes along is that platoon objectives get larger. Make sure that the objectives you raid are not too big for your platoon to effectively clear. Quite often you will be forced to clear objectives that are very large, and most of the time there is no resistance and it will not be a problem. But eventually there will be a fight and you may be too spread out on the objective to effectively defeat the threat. Do not allow yourself to get caught with your pants down. Ensure that no squad ever moves to clear the next building without having moved your SBF forward for support. Never move without overwatch; you must ensure that the appropriate fire power is available for all movements. Slow down, have the combat patience to allow the guns to readjust. It may slow down the movement through the objective, but it will be more secure and more effective if and when you do make contact.

**Intelligence/Local Interaction**

Whenever you talk to a local national get his full name. There will always be at least three — his name, his father’s name and his grandfather’s name. It seems tedious, but it is very useful. Through names we know who are brothers, cousins, uncles, etc. Their naming system helps to make connections between people. On top of names, you must understand the importance of tribe and sub-tribe. Everyone here is a member of a tribe, which is a large unit. What is important to know is his sub-tribe, the clan or group of families within the tribe. With this information and a person’s full name you can track most people down (or at least his house).

In addition to a person’s name ask for his nickname. Most insurgents go by their nicknames and will refer to each other by that name. The nickname will usually be “Albu _____”, meaning father of ____, and that will be how they are known. Making sure you get all the necessary details when cataloging information about a person can help identify AIF. You must be meticulous. Record names of all brothers and sons. That information will help you identify “Albu” whoever. Being successful in a counterinsurgency is in the details; I cannot stress enough the importance of gathering as much information as possible about an individual. Months later you might get information confirming that individual as AIF, and if you took the time to properly catalog that person you should have everything you need to now target him.

You must also understand the importance of sheiks and sub-sheiks. These men know the activities of everyone in their tribe or sub-tribe. If they say they do not, they are lying. They maintain a ledger that lists the names of all males in the sub-tribe with homes and occupations. Ask them to show you the “books;” it will tell you the extent of the sub-tribe and personnel that the sheik is responsible for. It will also undoubtedly have names of AIF that you are looking for. The tribe and sub-tribe system has existed for hundreds of years. They are well established and are very organized. Do not make the mistake of assuming these men are stupid or insignificant because of their appearance. They are the key to successful interaction with the local populace. If you can get these men to support you, either openly or in secret, it would be critical for your unit’s success. Remember, they know everything that goes on in their town or AO. They can tell you exactly who is involved in the insurgency and where to find them. The trick is getting them to tell you.

One way to win them to our side is to put power back in their hands. We need to throw out linear thought and what the Army solution would be, and create something that works. Life in this part of the world is not about right and wrong or good and evil; it is about power and influence. The concept
A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment sorts through documents found in a home during a raid June 11, 2007.

of hearts and minds is an example of an American solution and what we assume would win these people over. We clearly did not do our homework beforehand. You cannot force your beliefs or thought process upon another people and expect them to thank you for it. The same goes for democracy. For this system of government to work, the people need to be ready for it and demand it from internal sources. You cannot force it on them and expect it to succeed. This region of the world has been ruled by fear and intimidation throughout written history. They will not instantly forget what they know and accept another system, especially if it is not demanded from within. The typical Iraqi does not care about the overarching politics involved; what he does care about is having food to feed his family, electricity for his water pump to irrigate his fields, and to live in relative safety. As far as I can tell from the people in my AO, that is the bottom line. He does not care what system of government he has, be it with a king, a dictator or a prime minister, as long as it is a stable system that allows him to live his life as he did before.

The quickest way to stability appears to be through support of the tribal system, which is still in existence and working, only with less influence. Al Qaeda and other insurgent groups have eroded the sheiks’ traditional power base by competing for the loyalty of many of Iraq’s young males. We can use this reduction in power and influence to help gain their support. By placing the power back in the hands of the sheiks, we can enlist their help in countering al Qaeda. These men are territorial by nature; once we restore some of their power base, they will begin to see al Qaeda as competitors and attempt to counter their influence over the males of the tribe. To do so we must place the ability to grant local works projects and raise local militias or town police in their hands. With these powers would obviously come corruption and abuse of the system, and a certain amount of this must be tolerated as a cost of doing business in the Middle East. But with the correct Coalition force relationship and oversight by intelligent and clever company commanders, these men could begin to become a competing factor for al Qaeda.

Conducting meet and greets with local nationals, those with other than sheiks will almost always result in them telling you that their neighborhood is “a safe neighborhood and nothing bad happens here,” but you must learn to work around this and use simple questions to gain information. Only two or three times in 15 months has someone actually given me real info about the enemy. Use simple and harmless questions like asking who neighbors are? Then check that info when you go see the neighbors. Collect as much info as possible; it helps give you leverage and catch them when they are lying.

One way we used simple information to get great results was with a cache we found in an unused orchard. We stumbled onto the largest cache ever found in our division’s history by accident. But we used simple reasoning to lead us to another of equal size. When we found the first one, we grabbed the local sub-sheik and showed him what was within his area of influence, then used him to tell us who owned every piece of land from the river to a major road in the region. It turned out that the land the cache was on and numerous other tracts of land were owned by a father and series of brothers. We used this information to search other orchards owned by the brothers and found a second large cache. Seems simple, but most people would not have asked who owned all the adjacent land and put the family connections together. This allowed us to refine our searches to specific fields and orchards.

**Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)**

SSE is an absolutely critical task on any mission. After the objective is secure and security is established, your focus must be on SSE. This is a task you should push down to your squad leaders, but you must ensure that all leaders fully understand what is expected of them. When we arrived in country I directed this phase personally, but as I tackled larger objectives with multiple buildings I was forced to relinquish this task to my squad leaders. It was the right decision; it freed me up to focus on tactical questioning of local nationals. It took a few missions for them all to get on the same sheet of music for what I required every time we go into any house. I demand a lot from my squad leaders in this department; I have a basic SSE standards SOP for my leaders. It is a one pager that they can laminate and reference when conducting SSE. You should push this responsibility down to your squad leaders early; they will get good at it and do it automatically. Frankly the post operation products we provide now are better than when I did it all myself. My platoon SOP states that squads conduct SSE on all buildings they clear. This ensures that a building on the objective is not missed because it was assumed that some other squad was searching it.

Each building will have one slide in the final assessment. The slide will include the building number/objective name, the floor plan with labels and pictures taken. If the objective is a compound, there will be a compound sketch, with building numbers and vehicle locations marked. Seems tedious, but it is very effective and necessary to ensure the enemy stays in prison. These slides are created by my squad leaders. When we return from a mission, they immediately transfer their SSE to a slide for each building or compound they cleared. After a while it becomes second nature, and the products get better and better. It is better to be more detailed than less and answer all of S2’s questions before they ask.

Even if the objective is a dry hole and nothing is found, follow the same procedures and create the same products. I guarantee that you will go back to that objective within six months looking for someone else or the same guy again. With these products you now have pictures of the houses and floor plans for all the buildings. If
not your unit, then the unit you hand off the AO to will find the information invaluable. Create the record to give the next guy a great picture of what is on the ground.

Intelligence

Battalion-level intelligence and above has been generally less than useful. They have a very limited knowledge of my company AO and do not seem to understand it. All useful intelligence in the sector comes from the platoon leaders’ and commander’s interaction with the locals. Later in the deployment the tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team started to prove useful. They dedicated two guys to each company AO and began going on all missions with us. When they got boots on the ground with the boys and started collecting with the PL, they became a real asset. We need to place more emphasis on creating and running an intelligence cell at the company level. Use some of the smart guys in HQ platoon and have them focus on putting the pieces together. What would be great is if you can get an S2 Soldier or two from battalion to be the center of that cell, and they could liaise and exchange information with the other companies and battalion. Then they can focus on the targeting analysis for IEDs and tracking personnel, etc. Otherwise, battalion could be too busy looking at everything and miss the details of your sector.

One intelligence driven tool that could really make a difference in this war is the Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE)/Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) system. With this system, even units with weak counterinsurgency programs can make a significant contribution. This system, is essentially a cataloging system at the national level. It takes a photo, gets the fingerprints and retinal scans of the local national, then enters the information into an Iraq-wide database. What is important is that it matches a retinal scan and fingerprint to a picture, and these cannot be faked. We know that most al Qaeda members and other AIF have fake ID cards and change them on a regular basis. We can combat that with this system; the moment they are entered in as one name, they are stuck with it. The next time we meet that person the name will not match the picture, fingerprint, and retinal. That is enough for me to know the guy is using a fake ID and that I should bring him in to find out why. This will apply to all levels of enemy leadership. How many times a day do you think senior AIF leadership pass through a CF checkpoint? With this system, after they are cataloged the first time, changing their identity again would be a significant risk if they encounter CF. If nothing else it will lock them into using the one fake identity instead of 20.

In addition, having a database with fingerprints connected to pictures and names could help identify unknown prints from captured weapons and IEDs. It would also increase the significance of forensics. Quite often we capture IEDs and weapons, but the enemy evades capture. If we then lifted the prints from those objects and added them to the database as an unknown insurgent, eventually we will run into that person. Most of the guys we fight live in the towns we patrol and are the guys we interact with on a daily basis. With fingerprint evidence to make the connections between the man and the weapons, they would stop smiling at me very quickly as I came to take them away.

I do not know how well I have explained my view on the importance of this system. But I am sure that even if everyone in Iraq does not use it, and only a brigade combat team or even just a battalion uses it, it will contribute to the success of that unit. Most of the contributions the system will make will be to the fight inside a battalion-size area. So if one unit is using it, they will be better off. If everyone is using it, not only will local insurgents be tracked at the battalion level but possibly senior AIF leadership and their movements around the country.

Caches

When looking for cashes you have to be observant. They will be marked in every conceivable way. Remember that a cache must be accessible to the enemy. There is usually a path leading straight to it or there is a distinct marker that stands out. Once you find a cache or two, you will know the signs. Things we have often run into are green plastic water bottles lying near the cache, sandbags, shirts or rags in a tree over the cache, even had a shovel sitting right on top of one (we just picked up the shovel and dug it up). Another was a small fresh patch of grass growing in old growth. There are all sorts of things; just be observant and look for the things that stand out or do not belong. Remember, they have to find it, too. We also know they are lazy; in houses always move the large appliances and cabinets, we have found hidden compartments under the refrigerator and hollows in the wall behind pictures and mirrors.

Miscellaneous

We have several Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in our company, and I try to use them all the time. It does not take the best picture, but it does have thermal and gives you a good idea of the activity in your area. It is also very useful when planning raids/cordon and searches, etc. We have tried to photograph all the communities in our sector in great detail. When you plan an operation, it will be using Google or Falcon View imagery, which may be outdated and rarely looks like you imagined it. When you get an objective, you can look into your Raven photos of the area and find your objective. This will give you a great idea of what the objective really looks like, to include locations of doors, windows, sheds even what cars to expect on the objective, etc. Catalog everything early so that it is on record and ready for use. You do not want...
to do an over flight within a few days of the raid, or you will tip off the enemy and they will relocate. They know what UAVs are and that when they are overhead a raid is coming. So they leave. It is a useful asset that is at company level; the only problem is that you need 48 hours to get approval for a flight to de-conflict air space. Just remember it is there and plan ahead to use it.

Shoot as often as you can. You will not have the opportunity or ammo to shoot this often at home station. Every week my squad leaders take their Soldiers to the FOB range to conduct reflexive fire, long range marksmanship, and reconfirm zero (once a month). In addition to squad training every two weeks, we take the entire platoon to a range on an Iraqi Army FOB and fire all our heavy weapons. We conduct shooting drills stationary, moving and moving in sections. This develops individual marksmanship for gunners, team leader’s control of their vehicle’s weapon and designating of targets, and squad leaders’ ability to control both his vehicles. Designate targets to each and control their rates of fire. It is great training, and I try to do it as often as possible, especially since it is all based on skills needed every day on patrol.

I have several different headsets I use for my radio when operating dismounted. If I am conducting an air assault, I always use a Peltor; this headset allows me to hear all the traffic on the net despite the noise of the aircraft. It is also compatible with the headsets in the aircraft, allowing you plug in directly and talk to the pilots and crew. You will also know if there is a landing zone problem and have to land elsewhere, prior to getting on the ground.

I also require all my leaders to use a headset with their Icoms when operating dismounted. This is basic noise and light discipline; enforce it — don’t be that unit that you can hear around the block because of the ridiculously loud Icom chatter. Why give the enemy any indication of your presence, especially one that you can control.

When conducting air assaults or other dismounted operations, think about casualty evacuation (CASEVAC). Plan for it, have helicopter landing zones (HLZs) identified along your route in case you take a casualty. I dropped this ball on one air assault; we took contact at my last building on the objective and had two casualties — one litter and one ambulatory. After the fight, we had to move the casualties 400 meters to an established landing zone. This doesn’t seem far, but when you are loaded down with 60 pounds of combat gear, two wounded 190-pound men, their gear and people are trying to kill you, it gets a little difficult. That was the closest LZ I knew birds could land at, and battalion already had the grid. If I had done a better recon with the objective imagery for CASEVAC Lzs, then I would not have had to move so far. There was a suitable LZ within 200 meters. It is simple Ranger School stuff that I learned as a private. The moment you forget something or cut corners, it will come back to haunt you. So make an overlay of possible HLZs, number them and have the grids prepared. Make sure battalion or your company CP has the overlay (whichever you will be talking to from the ground), that way you can save time and effort during a hectic situation and just tell them to send the CASEVAC bird to “HLZ X-ray”, and they can get the grid from the overlay you gave them. It’s basic stuff; just remember to do it.

M203 smoke is great for signaling and aiding in the direction of aircraft. Sometimes it can be hard to talk aircraft in on a target area; remember everything looks completely different from the sky. A couple of M203 smoke rounds to mark the target can clear things up very quickly.

Some units will have SOPs for how you configure your equipment on the IBA; this reminds me of the old days with the LCE. There are more important things than everyone having the same setup of their gear, like how they fight. The only thing that might matter is the location of the medical pouch, otherwise it should be what is comfortable and effective for that Soldier. Many of my guys use rack systems instead of attaching directly to the armor. With all the combat gear we wear, it is very difficult to move around in the turret; being able to take the rack off allows for much greater maneuverability. It also makes it much easier to pass boxes of ammo up during a fight and to switch gunners if he is injured. It is not easy to lay in the prone in a grove for 18 hours with all this gear on, especially in the heat. Being able to remove most of the weight of the gear but still maintain the protection should keep most leadership happy and makes it a more doable task for the troopers.

Always look for and use good ideas from other units. Whenever you are attached to another company, find out what their SOPs are and see what they do differently. I guarantee there is something they do that is smarter or more efficient than your way. Have an open mind and be willing to change if they have a better system; integrate what works for your unit and AO and leave what does not.

A1C Stephanie Longoria, USAF

The author (at far right) questions an Iraqi man with the help of an interpreter during a mission in Samarra, Iraq, September 28, 2007.

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As the executive officer for Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), I participated in the battle of Haqlaniyah which was part of Operation River Gate on October 4, 2005.

In 2005, the Al Anbar province was a hotbed for insurgency. Foreign fighters would use the “rat line” from Syria and work their way towards Baghdad. Terrorists would enter near Al Qaim, which bordered Syria, and travel from town to town down the Euphrates River Valley. There, they would stay with sympathizers; receive weapons and missions; and move down to Ramadi, Fallujah, Samarra, and eventually into Baghdad itself. Follow-on operations — Operation Steel Curtain and Operation Steel Curtain II — would continue to push west. Operation River Gate was a joint U.S. Army and Marine Corps offensive to sweep up the Euphrates River Valley, to include Haqlaniyah, Barwanah, and Haditha.

Alpha Company’s mission was to attack to clear multiple high value targets (HVTs). Once all HVTs were cleared, the platoons would set up combat outposts (COPs) and begin to dominate the area through aggressive patrolling. Our infiltration plan was to take 16 x 7-ton trucks that could hold about 15 Soldiers per load and get dropped off five kilometers to the south of Haqlaniyah. I was in one of the rear vehicles since I would travel with 3rd Platoon, Bravo Company, which was attached to our company for the mission. Upon disembarking the vehicle, I took up the rear of the company formation with 3/B. The plan was for both Alpha and Bravo companies to infil via trucks; Alpha Company would attack from the south, while Bravo Company would move in from the west. Charlie Company was still positioned at the airfields in Al Asad and would conduct an air assault infiltration into the town of Bani Dahir. Bani Dahir connected with Haqlaniyah from the north.

The plan was for three structures to be destroyed at the onset of the mission by fixed wing aircraft: a suspected IED factory, the Haqliniyah Hotel, and the bridge that connected Haqliniyah to the town across the Euphrates. The Haqliniyah Hotel was a threat because it was a three-story structure that had great observation and fields of fire not only along river street in the town, but also to the south. The bridge was to be bombed because it would be the only egress route for the enemy, and the IED factory was to be bombed to take out the insurgents’ most preferred weapon. On the command to move out, I began walking in the rear of the platoon formation with SFC David Stewart. Shortly after we
began moving, we saw an enormous explosion to the northwest. Contact had been made, but we were not sure by who. My night vision optics kept flaring out from the secondary explosions. “Man, we really nailed that factory; look at all that ammo go up,” I thought. What I didn’t know, and wouldn’t find out until two days later, was that one of our anti-armor vehicles, with four paratroopers aboard, had hit an anti-tank mine while escorting Bravo Company into position. Three paratroopers were killed and the fourth suffered third degree burns over much of his body.

For the next two hours, we moved slowly and deliberately through the wadis of Haqlaniyah. None of us expected the wadi system to be as severe as it was to the south, and it slowed our movement incredibly. The company set in to an assault position at the last wadi system south of town. At 0200, the lead platoon picked up and began its infiltration in the town. Slowly, the other two platoons crossed Phase Line (PL) Japan, which was the southern road of the town that ran parallel to the city. “So far, so good,” I thought, “we’re at the southern part of the town and three platoons have already infilled without any problems.” I looked at my watch, it was 0230; “my wife’s picking up our son from school right now,” I thought. I watched as the platoon ahead of us crossed PL Japan and entered the city. The 3rd Platoon had to go a different route than the rest of the company since our targets were down the hill to the east whereas the rest of the company had to move further north. We needed to go across PL Japan and proceed through an alley that paralleled the cemetery, the rest of the company had used to its first target house.

First, 1st Squad went through the alleyway, then 2nd Squad, then 3rd Squad … all going smoothly. As soon as I crossed the road and got into the alley, I heard a single M-4 begin blasting away. I immediately felt the concussion from two to three grenades going off. At that point, the whole alley way just lit up. The point man had turned the corner in the alley and saw four to six insurgents sleeping against a house with their AKs laying across their laps. He immediately raised his weapon and started engaging the enemy. When this happened, the insurgents on a parallel rooftop opened up with a PKM and a few AK-47s. Both the lead squad and insurgents took cover; the insurgents in a house, and the squad, along with the rest of the platoon, took cover behind six rock piles about four feet high that were stacked in the alleyway. The gunner on the rooftop continued to spray automatic weapons fire down the alley, as the troopers returned fire and threw grenades to push the enemy back inside the house. At this point, the entire platoon, minus the weapons squad, was on the northern side of PL Japan. The weapons squad leader ordered a gun section to begin suppressive fire on the house to our east from where we were receiving fire. The other section came behind us and set up south of the cemetery, slightly to our west, and began laying suppressive fire on the insurgents on the rooftop. To our northeast, another insurgent began to engage us with automatic weapons fire from another rooftop.

I was behind the rear rock pile with SFC Stewart and the platoon medic. I had our company NBC NCO as my RTO. I grabbed the radio from him and called my commander, CPT Nathan Molica, and gave him a situation report (SITREP) on our contact. The alley to our front contained all three line squads, so the rear element was not able to engage any of the insurgents due to fratricide concerns.

We pulled security to our west and east and listened to 2LT Richard Chudzik take control of his platoon and direct his squad leaders. To my right (east), there was a fence covered in palm leaves. While we were paying attention to the contact in front, we did not, at first, notice the rounds coming through the fence, but they quickly got our attention. An insurgent was coming out of a house on our east and would sporadically fire his AK-47 in vicinity of the fence where he thought we were. The problem with this was we did not know where he was and could not acquire a target; all we saw were the tracers from his weapon. However, the weapon squad section that was covering the east was able to fire at the insurgent and prevent him from firing on the fence line anymore.

All of this happened within a few minutes although it seemed like hours. During the initial contact and ensuing firefight, the forward observer (FO) for 3/B was attempting to call in a fire mission for mortars and immediate suppression. Our mortar section had received the mission and begun processing the data and waiting for clearance. We were denied mortar fire because the mortars were not registered, and we were in proximity to the target and in an urban area.

As the lead squad continued to fire at the enemy, the rear squad realized that there was a street light behind us on the phase line, illuminating our position. The squad took aim at the lamp and shot the light out. When the light was destroyed, the M240B machine guns increased their rate of fire to provide cover for the weapon squad leader, SSG Quentin Campbell, who was moving to my position. Once SSG Campbell reached my position, he fired an AT-4 rocket in the roof of the building where the automatic weapons fire was coming from. We were not sure if this worked, but for the next few minutes, there was no machine-gun fire coming at us from that section of the rooftop.
Around this time was when Charlie Company air assaulted into Bani Dahir. While we were engaged in the alleyway, the CH-46 and H-53s flew to the landing zones north of Haqlaniyah. The insurgent gunner to our northeast decided the aircraft were a more lucrative target and transitioned from firing at us to sweeping his automatic weapons fire to the north, without taking his finger off the trigger. I had not noticed much of the tracer fire from our firefight yet, but when I looked up and saw a huge line of tracers sweeping away from us and toward the helicopters, I was just shocked. How has no one been hit yet?

During the entire operation, an AC-130 Spectre gunship was on station, but during the initial engagements he was engaging other targets. After Charlie Company’s air assault, the Spectre was allocated to our platoon. Our FO directed its fire on the house to the northeast, and once the Spectres’ powerful IR flood light identified it, the rooftop absolutely erupted, and the enemy gunfire was silenced.

As soon as the machine gun to the northeast was silenced, the lead squad leader was hit by grenade shrapnel in his mouth. He was passed to the rear where his mouth was packed with gauze. At this time, 2LT Chudzik realized that his platoon was unable to maneuver forward on the enemy. Although his platoon had fire superiority, it did not command any terrain and would be assaulting into an intersection with two road directions and three alleyways. We began to peel the platoon back to the wadi across the road. The weapon section to the east pulled security as 3rd Squad, with the wounded squad leader and the other weapon section moved across the street. After we were in position, 2nd Squad moved over, and then 1st Squad moved out. Once we were on the opposite side of the street, we called for a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

While we were pulling security waiting for the MEDEVAC, the insurgents went to a rooftop to our front and also tried to flank us from the east. Each time they attempted to flank, they were pushed back by the weapon section on the eastern side. There was one gunman on the rooftop who was hiding behind the roof and just placing his AK-47 over the crest and firing. Around this time, I suspect the insurgents were policing their dead and wounded and pulling them out of the engagement area. While we were waiting for the MEDEVAC, we received an AH-1 Cobra gunship to support us with the gunner on the rooftop. The AH-1 had to do a few fly-by’s before he could identify the target building. We fired a few 40mm M203 smoke rounds at the building in an effort to help the pilot identify the house. We also used the lasers from our PEQ-2s and PAQ-4 to help identify the house. Neither was too successful. Once the AH-1 could identify the target house due to the insurgent firing, he made two runs and fired one TOW missile each pass. The first TOW hit the left side of the building, and the second TOW missile hit the middle. After that, we received no more gunfire.

Almost immediately after the AH-1 cleared the house of gunfire, 3/B was on the offense again. 2LT Chudzik left me with a fire team for security as we waited for the MEDEVAC, and then 3/B went to clear the engagement area. Approximately 10 minutes after 3/B left, the MEDEVAC landed and took the wounded squad leader back to Al Asad CSH (Combat Support Hospital). After we loaded him on the helicopter, we rejoined the platoon.

As I walked in to the house that we had just engaged, I was amazed at how little damage the TOW missiles had done to the house. After firing 203 rounds at the front of the structure and putting two missiles in the house, there were two medium-sized holes and some rubble inside. While we were waiting for the helicopter, one squad cleared the house that we had been receiving much of the fire from. Inside the house lived a woman, a few children, and two men. Only one of the men claimed that the two were brothers; when we separated them and questioned them, we found out who the liar was and who belonged in the house. We found the AK-47 that the insurgent had used to fire on us; it had only a few rounds left in the magazine and was freshly fired. We detained that individual and brought him outside where the remainder of the platoon was. We were pulling security and clearing the other houses in the alleyway from where we received contact. The main building where the automatic weapons fire came from had only one radio, brass on the roof, and a water cooler in side. There were blood trails and drag marks, but not a single body or weapon. There was another radio left in the alley, but it looked suspicious so we left it be. We cleared the houses that were in the engagement area and then continued on to our target house. The insurgents pulled out whatever casualties they had and hid their weapons back in the caches before sunrise. We never found any bodies from that night’s firefight; all we got was signal intercepts detailing the action from their part that night. Once we got to our target house, we apprehended the HVT without incident. Inside his house were at least seven military-aged males, three of whom we were looking for. The rest of the house was filled with women and children.

**Hindsight**

After sitting here for hours writing the details of the engagement, a few things stick out now more than before. The rock piles that were in the alley were originally thought to be for a housing project in one of the houses nearby. After we AAR’d the engagement, we determined that we had hit an IED initiation/strike cell. They had overwatch of an intersection and were armed with radios and automatic weapons. They had used the rock piles as a blocking obstacle to prevent any vehicles from pushing through the alleyway and closing the distance with the insurgents. This also gave them their secured egress routes.

The ambush that we had been caught in was the “Inverted Closing U” ambush. This is an urban adaptation of the Vietnamese ambush Haichi Shiki, according to John H. Poole in his book *Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent*. The insurgents would pin friendly forces down in an alleyway and flank them from
one side and attempt to attack their element from the side with automatic weapons fire. The only thing that prevented them from doing this was our weapons section to the east, preventing the individuals in the courtyard from shooting through the fence; this technique was also used during the Battle of Fallujah.

**What I wish I would have done**

I had just become the executive officer of Alpha Company two weeks before we deployed. I was not too sure what the role of an XO in combat would be. So I focused too much on the logistics of supporting the company while we were in garrison. Had my commander been unable to continue to lead during this operation, I would have been caught flat-footed. I should have been more focused on the plan, not necessarily in the planning process, but in the details, such as the route, fires supporting me, and the other platoons' missions. As far as I was concerned, I was just attached to a platoon so that I could go to the firm base and get it established to conduct steady state operations. I wanted to make sure that I would not step on the platoon leaders' toes at the first sign of a firefight. I very much wanted to get up and start maneuvering squads and making radio calls, but it was not my place. I sat and pulled security. This was a good thing since 2LT Chudzik was an extremely competent platoon leader, but I took it too far.

Prior to the deployment, I did no researching or training on Iraqi insurgent TTPs. I wasn’t a platoon leader anymore; I was a the company logistics officer. That was the wrong mind-set to have. When I had my down time, instead of reading about Operation Anaconda, I should have been reading about the battles in Fallujah against a terrorist group in the Al Anbar province. Had I been more involved in the planning, I would have been able to ask for refinements during the planning process such as asking for a fires corridor which would have enabled us to fire the company 60mm mortars immediately. Again, hindsight is 20/20, but there were many things that I should have been on top of, and I might have been able to assist more in the battle.

The executive officer must always understand the plan, not just the platoons' or the company’s but the battalion’s. I was one bullet away from being a company commander, and I should have always been ready for that. As an XO, I wasn’t just the manager of the company headquarters and logistics, I was the senior lieutenant in that company. Faced with this situation, you should always be ready to assist the younger lieutenants and help mentor them as well; the company commander is not always going to be around. Before moving out on the mission, I should have coordinated with 2LT Chudzik and talked it over with him, just let him know that I was there not to get in the way but would help in getting any assets that he might need so he doesn’t have additional things to worry about. Previous communication with the platoon leader will help alleviate any confusion when the time comes to act.

Alpha Company and Task Force Blue Devil remained in Haqlaniyah from October 3-31, 2005. During that time, we lost five paratroopers but dealt the enemy a solid defeat. We accomplished our task in securing the town of Al Haqlaniyah for the constitutional referendum as well and denied insurgents the use of the town as a safe haven. We had more engagements with the enemy and accomplished our task. Task Force Blue Devil would continue to hunt insurgents through the Al Anbar province until the end of 2005.

I leave you with a quote given to us by our adversaries in the Euphrates River Valley. This transmission was picked up by an attached signal unit. It was a conversation between an insurgent leader in Al Haqlaniyah, we will call him (AH), to another cell leader across the river, we will call him (AR).

**AH**: “THEY HAVE US BY THE BALLS.”

**AR**: THESE GUYS (BLUE DEVILS) ARE SPECIAL, THEY AREN’T MARINES. THESE ARE CRACK SOLDIERS; YOU CAN’T EVEN GET CLOSE TO THEM. THEY ARE EVERYWHERE…

**AH**: YES, THEY REALLY HAVE US BY OUR BALLS HERE. IS IT LIKE THIS ANYWHERE ELSE?

**AR**: NO, THAT IS WHAT WE CAN’T FIGURE OUT, MY GUYS (OTHER INSURGENTS) IN BARWANA AND HADITHA ARE MOVING FREELY. WE CAN’T FIGURE OUT WHY HAQLANIYAH IS SO DIFFERENT.

**AH**: I DON’T KNOW EITHER, BUT WE CAN’T DO ANYTHING CAN YOU GET US OUT OF HERE?

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At the time this article was written, CPT Aaron B. Baty was attending the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is currently attending the Special Forces Qualification Course and will be assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group upon graduation in July. His previous assignments include serving as the executive officer and company commander for Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th PIR (now 1-508 PIR). CPT Baty graduated from Drexel University and was commissioned through Drexel’s ROTC program in 2003.
The Rheostat Adjustment Model

A Commander’s Tool for Combating Soldier Complacency

COLONEL WAYNE W. GRIGSBY, JR.
MAJOR DAVID G. FIVECOAT
CAPTAIN STEVEN M. HEMMANN
CAPTAIN MATTHEW S. CARMAN

The 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division developed a model to help the commanders in the Sledgehammer Brigade make adjustments within their units to prevent complacency during a 14-month deployment to Mada’in Qada, Iraq, and continue to focus on full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. The Rheostat Adjustment Model (RAM) identifies five major areas that each commander can make changes to keep their organizations sharp, ready to kill the enemy, and constantly growing. Specifically, the RAM forces commanders to make adjustments within their unit and to their approach to fighting, standards and discipline, leadership, training and maintenance, and caring. Figure 1 shows the RAM concept. By recognizing the existence of, and anticipating the risks associated with the complacency-prone, middle months of a deployment, commanders can constantly adjust the controls on the rheostat and avoid the dip in mid-tour Soldier performance.

The Middle Months: Experiencing “the Rut”

Most units conducting combat operations in Iraq will experience three phases during their deployment. The first four months of the deployment comprise the familiarization phase where Soldiers in the unit begin to operate in and eventually understand their new area of operations. The final three months of the deployment are the closeout phase where the unit is focused on completing its tour of duty, and the Soldiers’ attention may be on returning to their homes and families. The months between these two phases comprise the “rut” period. The first four months of the deployment are the “rut” months and are characterized by established routines and, in many cases, a sense of complacency and lowered job performance. The Rheostat Adjustment Model is a tool that can prevent the rut.

The Soldier’s inevitable excitement associated with the beginning and end of a combat tour is enough to keep his or her level of performance at a satisfactory mark. It is the middle months, however, where commanders need to be especially watchful as their subordinates grow more likely to make careless and costly mistakes on the battlefield. In previous deployments, the rut period extended for approximately four months — in between months 4 through 8. The 15-month deployment has almost doubled this phase, requiring commanders to be on guard against complacency from months 4 through 12.

Complacency can manifest itself in smaller offenses such as “finger-drilled” mission briefs or subpar post-operation reports. It can also rear its head in more serious and ugly matters such as affairs, rapes, or suicides. All these offenses hurt the credibility and morale of a fighting outfit. Keeping
Soldier complacency at bay directly affects combat power and, more importantly, affects the number of healthy soldiers a unit will take home at the end of combat operations. Commanders must prevent, or at least stifle, the deadly drop in Soldier performance during the rut period of a deployment.

Mitigating Complacency: The Rheostat Controls

A rheostat is “a resistor for regulating a current by means of variable resistances.” An adjustment to a rheostat changes the flow of energy by regulating the current to maintain optimal performance. Similarly, good commanders must be able to adjust the flow of energy associated with the five main currents within the unit they command: the fighting spirit, standards and discipline, leadership, training and maintenance, and the sense of caring. By adjusting the rheostat that regulates these currents, commanders can retard the drop in complacency that is often associated with the rut months of a deployment.

COL Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., the brigade commander of the 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID, distributed the Rheostat Adjustment Model to his staff and battalion commanders in July 2007, which was the beginning of the rut months for the brigade’s deployment in support of OIF V. He then asked the battalion commanders to develop a plan for their unit. After two weeks, the battalion commanders back-briefed the brigade commander on their ideas, so he could enforce and oversee their actions.

Mismanaged Currents Mean Poor Performance

When a M1A1 tank rolled over an Iraqi National Policeman, severing his leg in May 2007, there were many questions that came through the minds of the leadership.

“Where did we relax on standards and discipline?”

“What things could the leaders have done to possibly prevent this incident?”

“How recently had checkpoint negotiating TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) been rehearsed?”

“Would that have had an effect?”

Leaders and commanders are responsible for everything their units do or fail to do. All leaders think through these types of questions when things go wrong. What commanders need, however, is a system that enables them to ask empowering questions before an incident occurs. Whereas the after action review (AAR) process allows for units to make corrections after mistakes have been made, The RAM is a preventative thought process aimed to keep the negative incident from ever happening.

Using the Commander’s Rheostat

Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the commander’s rheostat. It shows the dip in Soldier performance that happens during the rut period, as well as the five major “knobs” that can be adjusted. Commanders must constantly look at the different areas and make adjustments to the rheostat as necessary.

The Fighting Knob

In combat, military units need to be aggressive, tenacious fighting organizations. Soldiers must take the fight to the insurgent and keep pressure on him and his networks at all times. Over the brigade’s 14 months in Iraq, 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID Soldiers killed or captured more than 660 insurgents, while suffering 200 casualties.

“When the enemy shows his head and decides to mass in locations, we must take all the firepower and technology that our Army and joint partners have to kill him and not allow him to fight another day,” said COL Grigsby.

To adjust the Fighting knob of the rheostat, the 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID used a variety of techniques: the Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) program, "blackening" of routes, the use of Sons of Iraq (SoI) during operations, terrain denial fires, kinetic strikes from Air Force bombers, military working dog teams, time sensitive target raids, and offset air assault operations. Three techniques that were particularly effective at adjusting the Fighting rheostat were the LEP program, “blackening” of routes, and the use of Solos during operations.

The LEP program attached retired senior law enforcement agents to Army units to assist in the counterinsurgency fight under a contract from Military Professionals Resources Incorporated (MPRI). The law enforcement agents who had worked for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Georgia Bureau of Investigations, Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug Enforcement Agency brought a new approach to the counterinsurgency fight through the eyes of a seasoned criminal investigator. The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID LEPs assisted in the capture and conviction of several brigade high value targets by matching fingerprints taken at apprehension to fingerprints captured from residue from a rocket attack on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Hammer in July 2007. Also, The LEPs focused heavily on improving criminal case files by ensuring that all investigative reports were properly

Figure 2 — The Law Enforcement Professional (LEP) Program

LEP A LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH TO COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

CASE FILES

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written and that the evidence was properly handled, which resulted in a higher conviction rate in the Iraqi court system. Additionally, the LEPs trained 3rd HBCT Soldiers in sensitive site exploitation and evidence handling procedures. Leading by example, several LEPs accompanied units on missions, so that the evidence was properly photographed, videotaped, documented, and collected on the objective. The LEP program increased the brigade’s ability to send captured insurgents to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq with prosecutable cases that would keep them off the streets.

On April 28, 2007, an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a patrol near the Tigris River killed three Soldiers and severely wounded a fourth. The brigade made an adjustment by “blackening” the route where the attack happened, which prevented any Coalition vehicle from traveling on that route without approval of the BCT commander. This technique allowed the brigade’s two route clearance teams to focus on a smaller number of routes, which ensured a more thorough IED clearance and more frequent passes on these routes. With the adjustment, the brigade increased the number of combat patrols on the routes, which forced the insurgents to hastily emplace IEDs which also reduced their effectiveness. This technique was a major factor in the brigade’s IED found/cleared rate increasing from 32 percent at the beginning of the tour to more than 51 percent currently.

The final Fighting knob adjustment that the 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID made was using Sons of Iraq (also known as Concerned Local Citizens) in conjunction with Iraqi National Police and brigade elements in combined operations. During combined operations, Sons of Iraq (SoI) would operate in support of route clearance teams and techniques and using all available assets to bring the fight to the enemy will constantly keep the enemy on the run and prevent him from attacking Coalition forces.

**The Standards and Discipline Knob**

Discipline is the cornerstone for everything an American Soldier does. It is what makes Soldiers do the right thing at 0200 when leaders are not around, and allows fighting teams to enter and clear a room in the middle of the night in a foreign country. Standards and discipline save lives in combat. Disciplined Soldiers continue to fight when the odds are against them. The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID command adjusted the Standards and Discipline knob through several techniques: the enforcement of proper pre-combat

**Figure 3 — Example Pre-Combat Checklist**

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GONG</th>
<th>PCG Item</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct long distance FM communications check</td>
<td>As applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct a hand held comma check (every vehicle must have hand held comma)</td>
<td>As applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Send and receive a BFT message through the S3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keys to BFT in the dispatch folder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keys to RADIO mms in the dispatch folder</td>
<td>To pull the radio if needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keys to storage area (in the dispatch folder)</td>
<td>To get NVGs and other equipment quickly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>License (must be applicable license for the vehicle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5988-E filled out, supervisor signature and FMC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicle dispatched</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water case filled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire extinguisher, charged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dispatch (order complete dispatch, 5988-E, accident forms, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Towing clevises (on the front)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Windshield clean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tow Bar operational</td>
<td>Only if tanked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASIP Radio FMC with the correct file</td>
<td>Only if tanked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel topped off</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seat belt extender present and functional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ARCD</td>
<td>Only if tanked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
inspections (PCI) and pre-combat checks (PCC), conducting health and welfare inspections of Soldier living areas, rewarding high standards, conducting regular urinalysis tests, holding leaders accountable to enforce standards, enforcing the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and sharing courts-martial lessons learned. Three effective techniques used by 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID were the enforcement of proper PCIs and PCCs, conducting health and welfare inspections, and holding leaders accountable to enforce standards.

During the rut of a deployment, complacency becomes a major issue commanders must overcome. A technique used by the brigade to combat complacency was to ensure units conducted deliberate and thorough PCIs and PCCs prior to going out on mission. PCIs and PCCs are conducted at the lowest level and spot checked by senior leaders. The patrol leader inspected all Soldiers to ensure they are in the proper uniform and all the vehicles to ensure proper load plans. The patrol leader then gave a thorough patrol brief and rehearses selected battle drills. The Soldiers then back briefed the patrol leader on their specific roles for the battle drill. This brief must be conducted properly whether it is the patrol’s first time out of the wire or its 200th patrol. A technique used by one battalion mandated that all patrols and convoys that were leaving the wire complete a checklist. The patrol leader had to turn in a checklist before departing that stated all the PCIs and PCCs that were conducted. Once this checklist was verified by the battalion operations officer, the patrol was cleared to depart for the mission. Proper PCIs and PCCs at the lowest level are an adjustment to the Standards and Discipline knob that will prevent complacency and ensure Soldiers are prepared for combat.

Another technique used by 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID was to conduct health and welfare inspections. These inspections can range from a squad leader spot checking on his Soldiers to a company commander conducting a full inspection of the unit. These inspections ensure Soldiers’ living conditions are clean and free of clutter and that they are not concealing contraband. Dirty living conditions are not only unhealthy, but they can be a sign of underlying issues the Soldier may be dealing with. The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID conducted a brigade-wide health and welfare inspection in January 2008. Approximately a week after the inspection, the brigade utilized narcotic search dogs to conduct an unannounced second inspection. These inspections enforced standards and increased discipline for the Soldiers. Soldiers who are disciplined and follow standards while they are off duty are going to do the same in combat.

The final adjustment that was made by the brigade was to hold leaders accountable. The chain of command demanded adherence to standards by leaders at an equal or great level than their Soldiers. Those leaders who did not adhere to the standards or did not enforce the standards in their units were reprimanded and in severe cases, replaced. The brigade did not tolerate indifference or ignorance of the standards. During a combat deployment, Soldiers’ lives are at stake and a lack of discipline can cause unnecessary casualties. For this reason, the brigade leadership aggressively enforced standards by holding leaders at all levels accountable for their own actions as well as their subordinates.

With a properly adjusted Standards and Discipline knob, a unit can rely on Soldiers to do the right thing no matter when or where. The adjustments made by the 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID ensured their Soldiers adhered to the standards and that the standards were enforced by leaders at all levels. Maintaining proper standards and discipline for all Soldiers will assure that they will not falter in their performance in combat.

The Leadership Knob
The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID is a leadership factory that continues to build leaders for combat teams and for the Army as a whole. Quality management, based on Army Values, Warrior Ethos, and selfless service to our nation, forms the essence of leadership in the Army. There are two aspects in the Rheostat Adjustment Model’s Leadership knob. One aspect involves a leader making changes to his personal leadership methods and habits, and the other involves assessing and modifying leadership provided by the subordinate leaders in his command.

The Leadership knob adjustments made during the 3rd HBCT’s Iraq deployment included conducting regular command climate surveys, executing company changes of command in theater, writing professional papers, sharing lessons learned, and conducting officer professional development and NCO professional development programs. Three of the more effective techniques at adjusting the Leadership knob were using command climate surveys, conducting company changes of command in theater, and the writing of professional papers.

The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID emphasized regular command climate surveys to provide leaders at all levels a snap shot of their unit. The surveys were given to each Soldier in the company, battalion, or brigade and asked the Soldier to rate his leader’s attributes and attitudes. The survey also asks the Soldiers to name three things the leaders do well and three things the leaders need to improve. One company commander took the surveys to another level by holding monthly sensing sessions with his Soldiers. During these sessions, Soldiers were able to air any and all issues with the company commander. The commander used these sessions to fine tune his leadership methods and to address issues in the unit in a timely manner. It was an opportunity to curb any rumors that may be spreading, as well as a forum where the commander received candid feedback from his Soldiers. With the results of the surveys, leaders were able to make specific adjustments in their units to not only better themselves as leaders, but to better their unit as a whole.

The 3rd HBCT made another adjustment to the Leadership knob by executing 15 company changes of command, out of 31 total companies during the brigade’s 14 months in theater. Putting new leaders at the company level changed leadership styles, brought a new perspective to the unit, and provided a new look at the counterinsurgency fight. The change of command mandated that the companies conduct a 100-percent property inventory, which helped to fix property discrepancies that inevitably occur during a quick deployment to Iraq and multiple months of combat. The new company commanders also brought new sets of skills including signal intelligence (SIGINT) based targeting...
experience, local leader engagement skills, perspective from their
time as staff officers at brigade and division, and greater knowledge
of the brigade’s enablers. The new skills and experience enhanced
the brigade’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations
immeasurably. The change also prevented commanders from
burning out from the stresses of command in combat and brought
frontline experience to the battalion and brigade staffs. Changing
command company in theater ultimately improved the unit’s ability
to perform in combat by bringing new skills to the front line, and
modifying the unit’s TTPs preventing the onset of predictability
and complacency.

To educate senior leaders, share TTPs, and relate experiences
with the rest of the Army, the 3rd HBCT commander required officers
to write professional papers. Three of the brigade’s papers were
published in military periodicals. *A Counter Improvised Explosive
Device Review at 270+Days: The Next Step Beyond 5 & 25*, by
CPT Rick Barnes, commander of E Company, 1st Battalion, 15th
Infantry, shared hard-won counter-IED TTPs and was published
on the Center for Army Lessons Learned classified Web site as well
as Joint Forces Command’s Knowledge and Information Fusion
Exchange (KnIFE) Web site. *TEAM ENABLER: Getting Civil
Affairs, Tactical Psychological Operations, and Human
Intelligence Collection into the fight during the execution of Full
Spectrum Operations*, by CPT David Smith and 1LT Jeffrey Ritter,
discussed the use of enablers in combat operations and was
published by *Infantry Magazine*. *Human Terrain Mapping “A
Critical First Step in Winning the Counterinsurgency Fight,”* by
the leadership of 1-15IN, discussed the importance of population
demographics in fighting and insurgency and was also published
by *Infantry Magazine*. Writing the professional papers not only
allowed leaders to share their knowledge with the Army, but it also
served as a personal development for the leaders.

The adjustments to the Leadership knob that 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID
made focused on senior leaders as well as junior leaders. The
brigade created an environment where leadership improvement was
regularly addressed throughout the deployment. Leaders assessed
their own leadership abilities and gave candid feedback to their
subordinates. Sharing their lessons learned with others created a
knowledge sharing forum where leaders at all levels could gather
information to address issues. These techniques worked well in a
counterinsurgency fight to allow units to stay one step in front of
the every adapting enemy.

The Training and Maintenance Knob

Training is the glue which holds a military unit together. Tough,
realistic, battle-focused training, conducted to standard, is what
allows us to accomplish our wartime missions in any combat
environment. Success in combat is directly related to individual
Soldier and small unit proficiency. As such, technical and tactical
competence in individual, leader, and collective tasks are essential.
Commanders must focus on Soldiers, squads, and platoons
performing fundamental tasks to standard. In order to perform
these fundamental tasks, 3rd HBCT worked diligently to maintain
its Soldiers’ proficiency and its equipment.

The challenge in theater is to continue to train while fighting.
The brigade made adjustments to the Training and Maintenance
knob by issuing quarterly training guidance (QTG), conducting
quarterly training briefs (QTB), conducting physical fitness
training on a daily basis, conducting marksmanship training,
performing react-to-contact drills, conducting medical
training and drills, executing preventive maintenance checks
and services (PMCS) of equipment, and training on new
equipment.

One particularly effective adjustment to the Training and
Maintenance knob was 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID’s publication of
QTG and the execution of QTBs. The QTG required each
unit to focus on two to three training events each quarter.
Each battalion conducted a standard QTB to the brigade
commander where they covered the training that they
conducted over the last quarter and the training that they
planned to execute during the next quarter. One unintended
result of the QTB was that it forced the battalions to look 90
days out both training wise and tactically every quarter.
The notes and lessons learned from each QTB were shared
with all the battalions in the brigade. During the tour, 3rd
HBCT, 3rd ID was fortunate to live next to the Bessmaya/
Butler Range Complex which allowed units to fire and qualify
on all weapons systems from individual weapons to the
M1A1 main battle tank. Units incorporated range time
during their regular rest and refit periods. By the end of the
deployment, each of the brigade’s combat outposts and
patrol bases had built a small arms range to maintain their
weapons proficiency.

During their 14-month deployment, 3rd HBCT units and
Soldiers conducted rigorous physical training (PT) on a daily
basis. The brigade conducted numerous Morale Welfare
and Recreation (MWR) sponsored events including 5K and

The 3rd HBCT executed 15 company changes of command during the brigade’s
14 months in Iraq.
10K runs, weight-lifting competitions, and football tournaments. The brigade emphasized the use of diagnostic Army Physical Fitness Tests (AFPT) throughout the duration of the deployment in order for leadership to evaluate their PT plans and to give Soldiers a snap shot of their physical fitness status. In order to build camaraderie with their Iraqi Army neighbors, the 3rd HBCT hosted several soccer games between brigade Soldiers and Iraqi Army Soldiers. The games encouraged bonding between the Coalition partners as well as provided a break to the rigors of combat for both units. All of these events gave Soldiers an additional motivation to conduct PT beyond the standard morning PT with their unit.

Another Training and Maintenance knob adjustment that the 3rd HBCT did was to conduct individual and collective medical skills training. The brigade conducted a monthly Combat Lifesaver (CLS) class to train individual Soldiers in advanced lifesaving techniques. By the middle of the deployment, over 30 percent of the brigade was CLS certified. For collective training, the brigade’s medical clinic conducted mass casualty (MASCAL) drills on FOB Hammer, which required the participation of all the units on the FOB. This drill enabled all of the units to rehearse mass casualty procedures at all levels. On July 11, 2007, 14 107mm rockets impacted FOB Hammer, killing one Soldier and wounding 15 more. Improved First Aid Kit (IFAK), CLS, and MASCAL training paid off as units and C Company, 203rd Brigade Support Battalion’s Troop Medical Clinic worked quickly and efficiently to treat the injured. Regular medical training is crucial for all Soldiers to maintain their ability to save lives.

The final adjustment made was the execution of thorough preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on all equipment. The harsh environment of a combat deployment can quickly and severely damage equipment that is left unchecked. PMCS is a step-by-step procedure used to ensure every piece of equipment is functioning and serviceable. It ensures that any faults are identified immediately and the problem is fixed in a timely manner. PMCS is conducted on every piece of equipment including weapons, radios and vehicles. A thorough PMCS is often overlooked in the middle of a deployment. Leaders need to ensure that Soldiers are conducting PMCS daily. The 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID employed a technique that required all vehicles to go through a fuel and maintenance check immediately upon return from missions. The vehicles first stopped at the fuel point and topped off all fluids. Their next stop was the motorpool where the unit’s mechanics conducted a Quality Assurance Quality Control (QAQC) check of each vehicle. This technique ensured that each vehicle was inspected by a trained mechanic to identify any potential faults that were corrected immediately or the vehicle could not go on mission until the fault was repaired. Proper PMCS will ensure that the unit’s equipment will function properly and not break down in the heat of combat.

Making adjustments to the Training and Maintenance knob is probably the most difficult for leaders on a combat deployment. In the rut of the deployment, leaders tend to overlook training and maintenance and focus solely on combat operations. Leaders must make adjustments to ensure their Soldiers stay physically fit and trained in all their essential skills, for both improved job performance and stress relief.

The Caring Knob
Caring for Soldiers and their families sustains a military unit. Soldiers who know that their leaders sincerely care about them and care about their families will always give their best effort towards accomplishing the mission. A fully committed chain of command, complemented by a functioning Family Readiness Group, ensures Soldiers and families are cared for, regardless of the situations that occur during a deployment.

Adjustments to the Caring knob need to not only focus on Soldiers, but their families as well. To adjust the Caring knob, the 3rd HBCT used several techniques: establishing a Care Team, recognizing Soldiers with awards, making improvements in the quality of life, and using the Freedom Pass Program and Qatar Pass Program. Three techniques that proved most effective for the brigade were the Care Team, recognizing Soldiers with awards, and making improvements to their quality of life.

The 3rd HBCT commander instituted the Care Team at the brigade level and within each battalion. The 3rd HBCT used the Care Team to identify problems, support the families of fallen Soldiers, and maintain weekly contact with and provide support to Soldiers wounded in action. During each contact, the team addressed specific needs of the wounded and fallen Soldiers in the brigade, while focusing on spiritual, physical, emotional, and professional aspects. This team concept is not new; the brigade previously used the Care Team during Operation Iraqi Freedom III. The OIF V version of the Care Team consists of the brigade chaplain, brigade surgeon, brigade mental health officer, brigade staff judge advocate, brigade adjutant, and brigade safety officer. The 2nd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment went one step further and built a Care Book with a page for each wounded Soldier. A page was dedicated to each Soldier with...
these additions created a place for Soldiers to relax and unwind. The ‘Soldier Center’ on FOB Hammer that included an Army Air Action Badge, Combat Infantryman Badge, and Combat Field Medical Badge recipients. Awarding Soldiers for their performance in a timely manner not only allows the entire unit to see that the command rewards excellence and heroism, but when then news reaches back home, families recognize the command’s commitment to their Soldiers.

Taking care of the families back home and keeping them informed are key tasks for unit commanders, especially during combat deployments. CPT Colin Donlin, commander of C/2-69AR, 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID, created several tools to keep his FRG informed and assist all the families back home. He created a flow chart that described the flow of command information from the forward unit through the rear detachment to the families. For the dissemination of command information, he mandated that his rear detachment Soldiers contact the families direct, in lieu of using key callers. This technique ensured all families were contacted with the command information and helped reduce the spread of rumors. For example, the redeployment information for the company was passed directly to the families from the rear detachment. With the unit making the notification, it maximized the amount of time for the families and ensured all the families were notified. Secondly, he created a mission essential task list (METL) for his rear detachment. The METL was given to the FRG so that the priorities of the rear detachment were clearly communicated to the families. Additionally, he developed tiers of assistance that plainly described the roles the rear detachment had in supporting families in need of assistance. Not only did these tools help the families stay informed, it allowed the rear detachment to function smoothly due to clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

Improving the quality of life for Soldiers was an adjustment that 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID continued to make throughout the deployment. When the brigade arrived in Iraq, it had to establish its own FOB, COP, and patrol bases. The living conditions were very austere for the first several months, but improved at an exponential rate. A dining facility was built on FOB Hammer and mobile kitchen trailers (MKT) were established on six COPs to ensure Soldiers received at least two hot meals a day. The brigade ensured that gym equipment, SPAR internet café and phone access were available at all COPs and patrol bases. The brigade created a “Soldier Center” on FOB Hammer that included an Army Air Force Exchange Service’s Post Exchange, gym, coffee shop, local gift shop, barber shop, Subway shop, and a Post Office. Mail was delivered to the Soldiers at least three times a week. All of these additions created a place for Soldiers to relax and unwind from the rigors of combat and maintain contact with friends and family back home.

Adjustments to the Caring knob ensured that 3rd HBCT, 3rd ID Soldiers and their families received outstanding support. During the rut of the deployment, it was essential to ensure that Soldiers’ morale remained high to maximize combat power. Maintaining regular contact with wounded Soldiers and the families of the Soldiers killed in action ensured that the brigade supported the entire Sledgehammer Team. With proper caring, not coddling, Soldiers will perform beyond expectations in combat. For Soldiers and their families to know that their leaders care, eases the stresses of the deployment for everyone.

Summary

Adjustments to the rheostat knobs during the rut of a deployment save Soldiers lives. Each knob deals with a specific unit and leader focus during the deployment. Adjustments to the Fighting knob prevent a unit’s TTPs from becoming predictable and Soldiers from becoming complacent in their war fighting tasks. Changes to the Standards and Discipline knob ensure that Soldiers continually do the right thing no matter when or where. By fine-tuning the Leadership knob, commanders modify their leadership styles in order to get the best performance from their Soldiers. Adjustments to the Training and Maintenance knob strengthen the back bone of a unit by ensuring that combat skills remain sharp and all equipment remains functional. Finally, changes to the Caring knob strengthen the Soldiers’ spirit which allows them to fully focus on the mission. In conclusion, the Rheostat Adjustment Model is a tool that allows commanders to gain maximum performance out of their units during a 12-15 month deployment. Using this tool gives commanders the ability to prevent the onset of complacency and decrease the drop in performance during long deployments.
Its 0830 on Range 10 at Fort Riley, Kansas, when the second transition team lines up on the firing line under the command of MAJ McGlaughlin. The seasoned team leader is no stranger to the range: he was stationed here as a young second lieutenant in the late ’90s. However, for this tanker there are no main battle tanks, no smell of cordite, nor the familiar sounds of tracks — just echoes of a bygone era. Today, they have been reduced to the subdued sounds of Short Range Training Ammunition (SRTA) popping off in the distance from the first run of the day.

The first transition team on the range is returning fire following a simulated complex improvised explosive device (IED) and small arms ambush that disabled the lead vehicle and injured the gunner. The small unit leader of the transition team is on the range establishing 360-degree security using direct fire to gain fire superiority while on the move. His next response is to begin to maneuver one his vehicles to an overwatch position and establish a hasty pick-up zone after rendering a 9-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) call simultaneously. The enemy has chosen to fight, and continues to engage the combat patrol from three directions to which the volume of return fire elevates at the leader’s direction (See Figure 1). This action is preparing teams for the chaos they may see on their deployments as transition teams. Satisfied with the outcome of the last engagement of five range scenarios, the observer/controller (O/C) calls for a hot wash and notifies the tower to prepare MAJ McGlaughlin for the next run down the mounted combat patrol live-fire lane using SRTA.

SRTA is 1st Infantry Division’s means to produce one awesome, realistic, and simple training event. Training with this ammunition provides a “free thinking” environment and demands quick reactions, rather than a predictable range or canned lane training events. SRTA allows for free thinking during training, complex training scenarios, and multiplies the lessons learned from range training. The transition teams are fortunate to participate in 1st ID’s innovative use of SRTA as a training method, allowing Fort Riley to meet the demanding training requirements for deployment into the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

The U.S. Army currently uses three types of SRTA. There is one type for each of three common infantry weapons — the M4/M16 rifle, the M240B medium machine gun, and the M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun. These rounds are lead-free and constructed of non-toxic plastic. While integration of a frangible round is ongoing, a thorough police call of the training area will leave far fewer hazards to the environment than the lead-based service ammunition currently in use.

SRTA allows for free thinking during training, complex training scenarios, and multiplies the lessons learned from range training. Given the pace of transition team operations, the volume of Soldiers requiring training, and the friction created by units competing for ranges and facilities, the 1st Infantry Division has enthusiastically
INFANTRY

TRAINING NOTES

embraced the use of Short Range Training Ammunition.

Only SRTA can provide free-thinking using fire and maneuver in a 360-degree training environment because of the surface danger zones (SDZ). The reduced maximum range of SRTA allows for the utilization of training land for LFX training previously unavailable, being restricted by the SDZ of traditional service rounds (see Figure 2).

This 360-degree training capability is what makes SRTA unique as a training munition. Soldiers train while completely immersed in the scenario and the threat could come from any direction. This capability provides a level of realism unmatched on any standard weapons range. Dusty and sweating from his just-completed convoy live-fire exercise, one Soldier from 1st ID’s 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment commented that in all of his years in the Army, he’d never been on a more satisfying range; “its more satisfying,” because SRTA is as close as you can get without “being there.” In addition to enhanced realism, SRTA use also allows training with limited available space.

After completing convoy live-fire training, one unit commented in its after action review that use of SRTA allows trainers to “condense the battlespace to ranges less than 200 meters and at varying heights from ground level to 2nd or 3rd floor windows or engagements on overpasses. On a standard range, elevated engagements again would be prohibitive or shut down adjacent ranges based on the ball ammunition SDZ.” In addition to this added flexibility, SRTA also exacts a lesser toll on range facilities such as shoot houses and urban clusters, decreasing overall range maintenance costs.

“This round gives our Soldiers an opportunity they couldn’t get any other way: firing live rounds, seeing the ricochet, feeling the kick of the rifle just like they would with service ammunition,” said LTC Frank Zachar, former commander of 1-16 IN and current assistant chief of staff, G3, 1st ID.

The realism of SRTA training allows for complex lessons learned. The scenarios include realistic target presentations more consistent with engagements that transition teams will encounter in theater. The 360-degree mounted combat patrol (MCP) live-fire exercise (LFX) scenario also forces transition team crews to quickly coordinate between crew members and exercise more disciplined target discrimination. The O/Cs can integrate into the convoy or move to an over watch position based on the engagement to capture adequate notes for the after action review. Both the team gunners and O/Cs reap the benefit of using up-armored vehicles to observe each others’ actions during the fight. The subsequent AAR will capture crew drills, target handoff, fratricide avoidance, direct fire response, and other training objectives.

The battle drills trained by SRTA are easy to transfer from one range to open installation maneuver area, based on demands for competing resources. The opportunity for resources that SRTA creates increases training productivity. While planned range expansion on the installation is ongoing, 1st ID at Fort Riley currently has only four locations within its available range complex and training areas that can support required transition team (TT) MCP LFX training. Two of the four training locations are multipurpose range complexes (MPRC) designed for tank and Bradley fighting vehicle gunnery; the others are open maneuver space.

Today’s environment is one nested in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) concept. This model places units into a continuous deployment cycle and requires vast resources to keep pace and balance with the increased demand from light, wheeled, and heavy units. The 1st ID is using SRTA to accommodate for limited time and space that ARFORGEN demands. Use of SRTA allows trainers to convert the maneuver space into ranges.

SRTA ranges can be created from maneuver spaces. This conversion can provide engagements less than 200 meters and at varying heights from ground level to 2nd or 3rd floor windows or engagements from overpasses. On a standard range, elevated engagements would be prohibitive or shut down adjacent ranges based on the ball ammunition SDZ. In addition to this added flexibility, SRTA also exacts a lesser toll on range facilities such as shoot houses and urban clusters. Without SRTA, Fort Riley and the U.S. Army TT trainers would face significant and difficult obstacles in ensuring that all transition team members receive the very best training the U.S. Army has to offer prior to their deployment in support of the GWOT. The 1st ID has seized the SRTA opportunity, developing new in a constrained training environment without sacrificing realism.

Using SRTA, 1st ID has created 360-degree cloverleaf MCP lanes. This design significantly increases the capability of the transition team trainers to train and certify members of a transition team (See Figure 3). The benefit of SRTA is that it allows trainers to use the vast maneuver spaces available across the installation.

Because of the increases in land resources the training tempo has increased. This equates to firing approximately 60,000 rounds of SRTA in support of TT training. This training supported 31 transition team classes, all of which are now deployed or are preparing to deploy in theater. Plans for FY08 are to fire approximately 410,000 rounds of SRTA in support of continuing TT training for the 1st Infantry Division.

The training ammunition requires some additional resources to be compatible with standard issue weapons. The weapons need adaptors that modify the weapon system to be capable with the rounds. Most of the additional equipment is available at TASC. Additional information for this equipment can be found in Appendix
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The massive land area of Fort Stewart is a defense asset that has supported many varied missions over the past 66 years. The installation was initially built to support anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) training during World War II. Since that time there has been a general misconception throughout the Army about Fort Stewart’s inability to support maneuver by a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT). This misconception seems to emulate from the WWII cartoon that named a deep south installation “Camp Swampy,” describing the poor drainage, standing water, insects, and other poor conditions there. This moniker for Fort Stewart is undeserved, because extraordinary efforts have been made to increase the maneuverability of its large land area.

Recently, considerable progress has been made to thin the standing timber to permit unimpeded cross country movement of heavy forces. The management program to enhance the habitat for the red cockaded woodpecker (RCW), which is a federally-listed endangered species, is one of the Army’s success stories. Management efforts have focused largely on improving the RCW’s habitat which consists of reducing the thickness of the forest through prescribed burning and forest thinning. This also assists maneuver training on Fort Stewart because the type of forest the RCW likes and that foresters and wildlife managers are creating is also good for cross country maneuver. In addition, maneuver lanes have been improved by constructing or improving additional combat trails, roads, timber thinning, and clearing to maximize the ability of our maneuver lanes to support heavy BCTs. The proof of concept for this effort was recently tested when Fort Stewart successfully supported two home station mission rehearsal exercises (HS-MRE), one concurrent with the 3rd Infantry Division’s 4th Heavy Brigade Combat Team’s pre-NTC “Vanguard Focus” exercise.

Doctrinal changes based on lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom have resulted in a different maneuver posture at the installation. To accomplish these goals, the installation has increased urgently required urban facilities using O&MA (Operations and Maintenance Army) funds. The intermediate range MCA program and these urban facilities will provide a capability that will greatly improve the Installation’s ability to support heavy brigade maneuver in the urban environment.

The strategic location of the Fort Stewart complex contiguous to the military operational airspace on the Georgia coast provides a unique combination of training battlespace that will facilitate any number of maneuver scenarios for joint forces. The largest wholly owned Army installation east of the Mississippi with more than 279,000 acres of maneuver space and range area, will continue to provide the outstanding maneuver support for not only heavy brigade teams but other combined arms training.

In recognition of the installation’s efforts to support maneuver and live-fire exercises, the Department of the Army awarded Fort Stewart the Outstanding Sustainable Range Program Tier I Installation and Range Control Team Awards for 2007.

The numbers are staggering: 26,277 U.S. Soldiers dead and 95,786 wounded in a battle extending 47 days and involving 1.2 million men. Yet, despite the sheer magnitude of this battle, the brutal fighting in World War I’s Meuse-Argonne has remained virtually ignored by military historians over the years. Author Robert H. Ferrell has finally filled this void with his superb volume, America’s Deadliest Battle: Meuse-Argonne, 1918. It is a book long required in the realm of military literature.

In the area of World War I history, Ferrell has established himself as one of today’s foremost historians of The Great War. Past books such as Collapse at the Meuse-Argonne: The Failure of the Missouri/Kansas Division and Five Days in October: The Lost Battalion of World War I are highly acclaimed by readers and critics alike. These volumes were characterized by exhaustive research, crisp, descriptive writing, and the ability to fully engage and inform a reader. His latest effort, America’s Deadliest Battle shares each of these qualities.

Within Ferrell’s pages, he details the planning, preparation, and execution of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) during the battle of the Meuse-Argonne. During this discussion, the author displays the unique talent to seamlessly shift between the operational and tactical levels of war (with additional discussion of the strategic situation). This enables the reader to put in perspective the actions at the foxhole level and its relationship to the higher levels of war. Most impressive is the author’s ability to provide this to his readers in just over 150 pages. Ferrell is able to accomplish this by his mastery of the subject area and his aforementioned writing skills.

Obviously, as the book’s title suggests the focus of the book is on the battle of the Meuse-Argonne. However, Ferrell does an excellent job of concisely outlining America’s entry into the war and the days prior to the battle. This truly sets the conditions for the reader to better understand the performance of the AEF during the battle and puts the battle in perspective in the overall framework of World War I. Additionally, at the conclusion of the book, Ferrell provides analysis on what the battle meant to the thought process of military and civilian leadership in the inter-war years.

America’s Deadliest Battle is not simply a rehash of the events comprising the battle or a play-by-play dialogue. Throughout his narrative, Ferrell interjects numerous instances of candid opinion and analysis on decisions, leaders, and tactics employed as they relate to the specific battle and to World War I as a whole. These include the following:

1) The Wilson Administration’s performance in preparing the country for war.
3) The AEF use of machine guns in the Meuse-Argonne.
4) The AEF’s adaptation of tactics during the battle.
5) The U.S. military’s ability to utilize lessons learned from the Meuse-Argonne in the upcoming years.

Strengths are numerous within America’s Deadliest Battle. First, Ferrell includes 25 highly detailed maps to assist the reader in understanding the battle. The author inserts the maps to coincide with his subject material which is of great value and convenience to the reader. Second, Ferrell has included over 40 photographs complementing his words perfectly. Readers will find his photograph section to be well-thought out and of relevance to better understanding the Meuse-Argonne. Finally, the volume concludes with a highly detailed notes section. This section provides further detail to sources and gives refinement to points stressed in the book. This portion of the book is almost as beneficial to readers as the body of the volume.

It is hoped books such as America’s Deadliest Battle will spark interest in not only this incredible battle, but in World War I itself. Unfortunately, it appears today there exists a relatively small number of authors and readers with an interest in the war. Truly, there is much to be learned from a battle and a war that exemplified the human dimension of war to such a great extent. Robert Ferrell is doing his part in opening this part of military history to a new readership.


David Glantz, one of the leading scholars on the Second World War’s Eastern Front, has published another fine study with his book Red Storm Over the Balkans: The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring 1944. Here, Glantz analyzes a more difficult subject than many of his earlier works, as he attempts to make sense of the “forgotten” Soviet Spring 1944 offensives into Romania. They are “forgotten” because, as clear Soviet failures — tactically, operationally, and strategically — they have either been hidden from public view or misrepresented when discussed in the victor’s accounts. Glantz cuts through the foggy historiography of these operations to give an accurate representation of the fighting on the southern reaches of the Eastern Front from April to June 1944.

During this period, following Soviet successful campaigns along the Black Sea and southern Ukraine during the winter, General I.S. Koniev’s 2nd Ukrainian Front and General R. Ia. Malinovsky’s 3rd Ukrainian Front conducted near-continuous operations from 8 April to 6 June, 1944, attempting to break German defenses and push into Romania. In all cases, these attempts were not only rebuffed, but soundly defeated by German
forces, and in some cases were driven back miles from their starting positions. The embarrassment of these operations led Soviet historians to downplay not only their significance, but also their relationship to the overall Soviet war strategy at this crucial juncture of the conflict.

Glantz emphasizes that, strategically, these were not minor, off-hand operations, but important offensives that, with Stalin’s personal endorsement, were designed to break German resistance in Romania, a perspective directly contrary to prevailing Soviet historiography, which views the operations of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts during this period as minor, regional actions only. Tactically, Glantz illustrates clearly how and why German forces were able to defeat the Soviet advances. He conducts excellent analysis, most clearly indicated by his ability to merge Soviet unit histories, German unit histories, and other archival sources — all of which contain strong biases — into a coherent account of the fighting. Although he resorts frequently to lengthy excerpts from these sources, it is never without purpose, and his conclusions are sound and illuminating.

By studying these offensives, and placing them into the appropriate context of operations, the overall progress of the war on the Eastern Front becomes clearer, particularly in the confusion between the post-Kursk winter offensives and Operation Bagration. Glantz’s study is a welcome addition to the collection of work on the Eastern Front. Although most students of this theater will be unfamiliar with these battles, Glantz’s account not only provides an excellent account, but demonstrates the relationships of these campaigns into the overall panorama of the Eastern Front.


Cavalry, the old cavalry (the one with horses) always fascinated me as a boy. Seeing Errol Flynn or John Wayne in charge after charge, sabers level, grim determination etched in their faces, stirred my young heart. So when I finally went into the Army I choose … Infantry. It had occurred to me, sometime during high school, that the Army had dispensed with its horses many years ago. I adjusted my choice of branch accordingly.

But the horses are back! Thousands and thousands of them, and they are being ridden back into battle in the pages of Digby Smith’s excellent book on cavalry actions during the Napoleonic campaigns.

Perhaps the most useful part of the book is the very first chapter in which Smith differentiates the types of cavalry at the time of Napoleon and explains their missions: Heavy Cavalry, Light Cavalry (Hussars, chasseurs a cheval), Line Cavalry (Dragoons, Carabiniers, etc), and Lancers (Uhlans). Just as interesting is his discussion of cavalry tactics. Although modern cavalry doesn’t mount charges as in the 18th and 19th centuries, much of how modern cavalry is used mirrors how old cavalry was employed: reconnaissance, screening, flank security. And he is quick to debunk Hollywood images of cavalry: “…cavalry regiments did not always move at a gallop. This would have exhausted even well fed, healthy horses within a very short time. Charges started off at a walk and only progressed through a trot to a gallop when within 200 paces of the enemy line.”

The author then gives a very detailed treatment to 13 major campaigns of Napoleon, from Marengo to Waterloo. Unfortunately, two minor defects keep this book from being great.

First, on occasion, Smith goes into too much detail about the battle itself, or related topics, and spends too little time with the aspect of cavalry. There are sources he could have consulted which contain remembrances and opinions of Soldiers who fought in these battles and participated in the charges. He does, in the final chapter, quote from a letter written by a French cavalry officer (it goes on for 5 and a half pages) at Waterloo, but not much else.

Second, and more important is the quality of maps: they are inferior and too few. One cannot discuss battles like Austerlitz or Waterloo with one map as a reference. What would have been more desirable is for each battle, especially the larger ones like Waterloo, to have had at least two, or better, three smaller scale maps showing the movements of squadrons, brigades, and divisions as the battle progressed. Paging back and forth narrative to map and back is fatiguing and ultimately makes the reader lose interest. Less narrative, please, and more maps. Readers are smart enough to figure it out.


This is an outstanding U.S. Army official history, despite the many critics who continually argue that no official history can be a truly outstanding work of military history. One can turn to the Army’s official World War II “Green Volumes” for what I mean.

As I said this is an official U.S. Army History Volume. It is one in a series of like volumes being undertaken by Dr. Andrew J. Birtle. This particular volume is his second in the series, while his third — U.S. Army Activities in Vietnam between 1961 and 1965 — is underway.

In his forward, the chief of Military History, Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, points out “the U.S. Army has been heavily engaged performing counterinsurgency and nation-building missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.” These and other like missions past and present, Dr. Clarke suggests, “have kindled a strong interest in the Army’s past experiences in combating irregulars and restoring order overseas.”

As a result, Dr. Clarke decided to put several of his historians to work in studying and writing about “the evolution of counterinsurgency and related doctrine in the U.S. Army.”

In brief, then, the author “explains the past” and “helps understand the present.” He emphasizes during the several periods covered by this volume how the Army continually changed its organization and doctrine “to suit civilian policy directives.” Too, “the Army counterinsurgency and constabulary issues throughout the period.”

There are many more strong points the author makes, and overall it is an official history that should not be overlooked by today’s military members.
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