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Full Spectrum Operations

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FRONT COVER:
A Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment stands along the bank of the Pech River during a patrol through Asadabad, Afghanistan, on 19 August 2009. (Photo by SSG Andrew Smith)

BACK COVER:
A Soldier with the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment radios in a report during a mission in the Maywand District of Afghanistan on 7 September 2009. (Photo by SSG Justin Weaver)

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FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Understanding the Implications of Diversity

Change is an ever-present part of our profession, and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has significantly altered the way we train and fight. The nature of the enemy and today’s operational environment indicate that the future will be one of persistent conflict. The Army recognizes that virtually all operations are now full spectrum operations and has adapted to operate under any conditions, against any adversary, and anywhere across the spectrum of conflict. The mix of cultures, customs, and nationalities; the variety of family, clan, and tribal interests within a given society; and the asymmetrical nature of present warfare demand degrees of adaptability and innovation that we last saw in the Philippines and Vietnam. Our Soldiers’ exposure to beliefs and value systems widely divergent from our own will continue to demand high degrees of preparation and flexibility. The mass population movements that removed noncombatants from harm’s way in conflicts such as World War II, the Korean War, and to a large extent, in Vietnam, are no longer likely. Even as we have adapted to warfare against an innovative, committed enemy, we have taken measures to protect the civilian population among whom he has chosen to hide. In this Commanding General’s Note, I want to talk about full spectrum operations and cite examples from the articles in this issue of Infantry to illustrate how we train for and conduct them.

Conducting simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in an era of persistent conflict is no easy task. A stability operation can quickly degrade into a combat operation, and our response must always take into consideration noncombatants as Soldiers move to develop and stabilize the situation. Fortunately, the training practices we followed prior to the outset of the GWOT provided a firm foundation upon which we have developed the tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the challenge of an innovative adversary. Recognizing the broad combat experience our Soldiers have gained in multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders have been quick to leverage this expertise as they develop training plans. These training plans need to include the actions that will complement combat operations and contribute to the stability and support operations that facilitate transfer of responsibility to civil authority. An important element of full spectrum operations is being able to recognize the conditions that require transition between offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations and take the actions necessary to ensure success. Those best qualified to accomplish this are Soldiers and leaders who are proficient in their core competencies; who possess the cultural awareness and understanding to come up with innovative tactics, techniques, and procedures; and who can operate with joint, multinational, military and civilian agencies to achieve our objectives.

A feature article in this issue, The Revitalization of Samarra, illustrates the transformation of that Iraqi city, with particular focus on the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment’s actions between April and November 2008, after priority had shifted from fighting. This article shows how an innovative battalion commander maintained the initiative as he set about linking his officers with Iraqi counterparts to restore civil government and the infrastructure necessary to provide the essential services to bring economic stability. Another feature article, COIN Operations in Afghanistan, describes three successful approaches to COIN: gaining the trust of the indigenous population; distribution of humanitarian aid and infrastructure development; and mentoring government forces as they develop the skills to aid their own people.

During the Cold War, we and our NATO partners trained to face the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Today’s threat is, instead, multiple enemies employing asymmetric tactics, often with varying agendas and command structures, and who understand our aversion to collateral casualties well enough to hide and fight from within the civilian population. The enemy is media-savvy and attempts to quickly exploit civilian casualties. Unpredictability is their strength. The challenges the Army is likely to face can be traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive, and their causes can come from nation-states, organizations, groups, or even conditions causing instability in which dissidents see opportunity to pursue their own agendas. Recognizing the diversity of the threats, our operational training domain is now placing emphasis on COIN in developing the highly adaptive, mentally agile leaders the Army needs to conduct decentralized full spectrum operations.

Cultural awareness is essential to COIN and helps us understand nuances that may vary from district to district, city to city, and even village to village. T. E. Lawrence spent years in the Middle East learning Arab languages, dialects, and customs before his success advising and leading Arab irregulars against the Turkish and German forces in World War I. He read extensively, and so must we. This issue of Infantry includes a Professional Forum translation of Arabic documents on the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that offers cultural insights into seldom seen aspects of one of our most notorious enemies. This biography reveals divisions within the networks of Sunni militants and the networks and connections they used to sustain their operations. Full spectrum operations are the way we prosecute the GWOT, and as we refine our training and assimilate the experience our Soldiers are gaining daily, we draw ever closer to finally bringing an end to an era of persistent conflict. This is our goal, this is our mission. Follow me!
GEN (Retired) John W. Foss and CSM (Retired) Jimmie W. Spencer are the 2009 recipients of the Doughboy Award in recognition of their contributions to the Infantry.

The National Infantry Association honored the two during a dinner on 22 September in conjunction with the Infantry Warfighting Conference at Fort Benning and Columbus, Ga. It’s the highest award the chief of Infantry can present to an infantryman.

Past recipients include former Secretary of State and GEN (Retired) Colin Powell, Sen. Daniel Inouye, Ross Perot, Bob Hope, and former Sens. Robert Dole and John Tower.

“To be nominated is a great honor and to be selected is just overwhelming,” Spencer said. “You go on a list of names with people that are real American heroes. I’m just honored to be mentioned in the same breath with them.”

Spencer enlisted in the Army in December 1961. During 32 years on active duty, he had various assignments with Infantry, Special Forces and Ranger units. He completed two combat tours in Vietnam — first as a squad leader and platoon sergeant with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Airborne) from 1965 to 1966 and then as a military adviser to South Vietnamese forces from 1969 to 1970.

“That was the most satisfying feeling to come back after that first tour, as a combat Infantryman, knowing I was up to the task ... because it came very early in my career,” he said.

Spencer held numerous command sergeant major positions, including stints with the 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey, South Korea; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command in Alexandria, Va.; and U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, N.C.

He now lives in Alexandria and retired from the military in 1993 to become director of the Association of the United States Army’s Noncommissioned Officer and Soldier Programs. In 2004, he was inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame.

“I always wanted to be one of those Soldiers who would volunteer in times of need and emergency. I always thought of myself (as) willing to step up and do my part,” Spencer said.

Foss, meanwhile, has a rich heritage of Army service. His father, Peter, was a combat Infantryman in World War I. An older brother, Pete Jr., graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1951, and Foss followed suit five years later. The two siblings later served as battalion commanders at the same time in Vietnam.

Foss, 76, began his career as an enlisted Soldier in the 136th Infantry of the Minnesota National Guard in April 1950 and joined the regular Army the following year as an Infantryman. After gaining his commission, he went on to hold numerous command and staff positions in the U.S. and overseas.

He wound up completing two combat tours in Vietnam. His stint as commander of the 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry, turned out to be the most memorable in his career, he said.

“Commanding a battalion against the North Vietnamese was a challenge and among the greatest rewards I could have,” he said.

Foss was the Infantry School’s 37th commandant and served as commanding general at Fort Benning from March 1984 to January 1986, arriving just as the Army launched its Light Infantry concept.

Foss also commanded the 82nd Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he deployed units on emergency operational missions to Honduras, Panama and the Persian Gulf.

Foss spent four tours in Europe and four in the Far East. He also was commanding general of the Seventh Army Training Command in Germany, deputy chief of staff for Army operations and plans, and commanding general of Training and Doctrine Command.

Foss retired from the Army in 1991 and was inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame four years later. He lives in Williamsburg, Va.

“It humbles me very much,” Foss said of his selection as the Doughboy Award’s officer recipient. “All these great Infantrymen I served with through the years — I think about them, and those not with us anymore ... the great NCOs and officers.

“It means I’ve been recognized by the people I consider the best Soldiers in the Army, the Infantry. It’s a very humbling thing.”

(Vince Little writes for Fort Benning’s post newspaper, The Bayonet.)
SOLDIERS RECEIVE NEW GRENADE LAUNCHER

Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division received the first of the Army’s new 40mm M320 Grenade Launcher (GL) June 16 and began the process of training with the weapon for combat deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The M320 is the much anticipated replacement for the M203 grenade launcher that has served the Army since the late 1960s.

Soldiers were very impressed with the M320’s innovations and improvements over its predecessor. The M320 can be attached to M4 and M16 rifles or fired as a compact, stand alone weapon — a capability especially useful in the confined urban battlegrounds where our Soldiers are often fighting. Additionally, the M320 has a side opening breech that can accept longer and more advanced projectiles, an advanced day/night sight, a better located safety switch, and a double action trigger.

The M320’s development and fielding has been managed by Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier, the Army acquisition office responsible for everything a Soldier wears or carries. Because PEO Soldier views the individual Soldier as the center of the Army’s strength, it is dedicated to producing the best equipment possible and getting it into the hands of Soldiers as quickly as possible.

For additional information on PEO Soldier, visit www.peosoldier.army.mil.

ARE YOU A COMBAT-EXPERIENCED MORTARMAN?

If you are a combat-experienced mortarman, the chief of Doctrine for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) would like to invite you to help capture the hard-won lessons you learned and provide them for others to use in the future.

The MCOE is revising the field manual on tactical operations by mortar units. This project will update FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars, which was written by the Infantry School in 1992. Many things associated with mortars have changed since 1992, and new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with them have been learned during combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This new publication is presently being worked on by experienced contract and military doctrine writers, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Infantry Mortar Leaders’ Course instructors at the Infantry School, and the fire support instructors from the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. Research supporting its development comes from the experiences of the U.S. Army in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan. It also will include the experiences of other armies around the world.

This manual is intended to be written with a mortar platoon/section focus. It will be used by brigade planners, but the primary audience is small-unit leaders at the troops-in-contact level of the mortar squad leader, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, and up to battalion commander.

Anyone wishing to share experiences or to provide TTPs on mortar combat operations can e-mail Arthur Durante, the MCOE’s deputy chief of Doctrine, at arthur.durante@conus.army.mil. He can also be reached at (706) 545-7114.

In addition, those interested can be added to a mailing list to receive a draft of the manual and offer comments, recommendations and feedback directly to the manual’s authors.

Become part of the solution and help write doctrine for the future!

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment fire mortars during combat operations in Afghanistan on 12 July 2009.
The Evolution of Survivability in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team

In 2003, the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Wash., was the first unit transformed into a SBCT and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since then there have been eight SBCT deployments to OIF. The 3/2 SBCT looked much different than the SBCTs in OIF today. The current SBCT has evolved to include multiple survivability kits or systems. These include retrofits to the Stryker family of vehicles (FoVs), the addition of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, and the improved situational awareness Land Warrior system, which has become the cornerstone for future ground warfighter systems.

As the SBCT’s main platform, the Stryker vehicle’s tactical mobility requires it to sustain hard surface speeds of 40 mph with no degradation to braking when loaded with its mission equipment package (MEP). Since 2003, the list of improvements and retrofits to the Stryker FoVs continues as the enemy adapts and modifies its methods of attack.

Prior to the 3/2 SBCT deployment to Iraq in 2003, rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attacks highlighted the need for an increased survivability solution. As a result, the Stryker vehicles were equipped with an interim solution of “slat” armor until bolt on armor could be designed and fielded. Slat armor resembles a cage surrounding the vehicle. The original slat armor added additional width to the vehicle, limiting maneuverability. Slat armor has since been redesigned to reduce the kit weight without decreasing the level of protection. Stryker Reactive Armor Tiles (SRAT) were developed for various Stryker platforms while providing the same level of protection as heavier armored vehicles. Currently, PM SBCT is developing a lighter SRAT with additional protection.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) are responsible for many of the more than 2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since OIF began. The Drivers Enhancement Kit (DEK), Hull Protection Kit (HPK) and the Blast Protection Kit (BPK) were developed to enhance the Stryker’s survivability against explosive devices.

Another concern considered after the deployment of 3/2 SBCT was survivability of exposed personnel. To increase protection for exposed crews, some units on their own built wood platforms over the ramp to hold sand bags to protect the rear hatch, and ammunition cans filled with sand and sand bags were placed around the gunner’s hatch. Eventually, these ad hoc items were replaced by the combat and materiel developers with the Common Ballistic Shield (CBS). Later, the Squad Leader Integrated Protection (SLIP) kit was placed inside of the Common Ballistic Shield to improve vision while maintaining the same current level of protection as CBS. A ballistic driver’s windshield was developed to allow drivers to maneuver vehicles with the hatch open.

To increase the survivability of non-Stryker units in the SBCT, the MRAP vehicle has been added as theater-provided equipment (TPE) to the formation. The MRAP allows the commanders use of a vehicle more survivable than the HMMWV (M1114) or MTV 5-ton. Commanders can use this vehicle to transport Soldiers and equipment as a patrol vehicle for units inside the SBCT that do not have Strykers and conduct traditional Infantry missions. TRADOC Centers of Excellence (CoE) along with the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) are analyzing data to integrate the eight MRAP models into the brigade formations.

Not only have survivability enhancements been made to the Stryker vehicle itself, but also to the equipment used by the SBCT Soldiers on the ground and in the air to enhance situational awareness. This enhancement increases a Soldier’s mobility and lethality, which makes him more survivable. The addition of the Land Warrior system changed the entire dynamics of ground operations for these units.

“It was like having an FBCB2 or a FalconView in your face. It made us much faster and more lethal,” said one staff sergeant with the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 4th SBCT, 2nd Infantry Division. “It made us more confident because we had the ability to see where we were, to track what we were doing, and to have complete control, because we knew where our forces were. We never got lost. We never missed a turn. We never missed a house.”

After 4/2’s success with Land Warrior in Iraq, another SBCT will deploy with an entire brigade set of the Land Warrior systems to Afghanistan. These sets will consist of a newer, lighter version of the Land Warrior system, one that weighs 7.2 pounds less than the approximately 17-pound system used in Iraq by 4/2 SBCT. This will be the first Stryker brigade to deploy to Afghanistan.

In conclusion, as a result of lessons learned from the SBCT deployments, the TRADOC Capabilities Manager SBCT (TCM SBCT) and the U.S. Army continue to aid in the tactical mobility, lethality and survivability evolution of not only the Stryker FoVs but the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Soldier. Soldier feedback is the backbone behind TCM’s continuous development of new and improved survivability equipment for the SBCTs. To access information for Soldiers and Leaders, the Stryker Warfighter Forum (SWfF) portal was developed to encourage Soldiers to provide feedback at https://strykernet.army.mil.

(MSG Brad Kelley and MAJ Michael Davenport are assigned to TCM-SBCT.)
Army Moves Forward with Plate Carrier Vest

The Army is poised to introduce a plate carrier vest to provide Soldiers more lightweight gear in the challenging operational environments of Afghanistan.

An $18.6 million contract for 57,000 plate carriers was awarded on 8 October to KDH Defense Systems. The fielding schedule calls for the first plate carriers to be delivered to the Army in December after testing and be fielded to Soldiers soon thereafter, and for deliveries to be complete in March 2010.

Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier has worked closely with the U.S. Army Infantry School, the Army Test and Evaluation Command, North Carolina State University, the Army Research Laboratory’s Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate, and the Rapid Equipping Force to assess the performance of commercial-off-the-shelf plate carriers. The objective of these assessments was to gain a thorough understanding of plate carrier performance, both from the perspective of Soldiers who have put a number of plate carriers through rigorous exercises and through the perspective of scientists and engineers who have examined ballistic, burn, and survivability data.

The primary objective in providing Soldiers with a plate carrier is to reduce the weight of their body armor and to significantly reduce heat stress, enhancing Soldiers’ combat performance.

“We have listened to Soldiers, and we understand that in certain operational environments such as the mountains of Afghanistan, mobility is key to Soldiers’ effectiveness against the enemy,” said BG Peter Fuller, Program Executive Officer Soldier. “It’s a lot to ask for Soldiers to conduct missions in hilly, rocky terrain at high altitudes, wearing the full complement of body armor,” he said. “The plate carrier will give the commanders of those units a more lightweight alternative for their Soldiers.”

The full-up plate carrier (including front and side hard armor plates) represents a weight reduction of 10 to 15 pounds compared with the full-up Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV) with front and side hard armor plates.

The plate carrier initiative goes back to December 2008, when the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division requested 1,500 plate carriers. In January 2009, the Army asked industry to present possible designs for a plate carrier. Of 16 interested vendors, four were chosen to participate in Soldier Protection Demonstration (SPD) VII, an 11-day field test in May at the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona.

Three-dozen Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vicenza, Italy, took part in SPD VII, putting eight plate carrier vests through a variety of exercises: the four commercial vests; the U.S. Marine Corp’s Scalable Plate Carrier; the Modular Body Armor Vest used by Army Special Forces; and an IOTV with no attachments as a baseline for comparison.

The Soldiers provided exhaustive feedback — more than 10,000 pages of comments — on the form, fit, and function of each vest they tested, in roadmarches, obstacle courses, weapons familiarization, ingress/egress drills, and room-clearing exercises. They also tested each plate carrier’s compatibility with Land Warrior, a Soldier-worn computer system that increases mission speed and effectiveness and decreases risks to the unit by providing state-of-the-art situational awareness. The results of SPD VII helped the Army define its requirement for the plate carrier vest, while vendors’ proposals formed the basis for the Army’s contract award.

Following the SPD, the Army conducted ballistic and flame testing on the plate carrier candidates to ensure that they could provide Soldiers with vital protection in theater. Those results, combined with the results of SPD VII, contributed to the Army’s course of action on the plate carrier.

As the Army develops a longer-term solution, the plate carrier to be procured by PEO Soldier will have certain design features that Army combat developers consider critical. These include, among other features, a drag strap, ease of donning and doffing, and compatibility with Soldiers’ weapons and other equipment.

(Debi Dawson works for the PEO Soldier Strategic Communications Office.)
It has become so common to claim that more than conventional military operations are necessary to win a counterinsurgency that it is hard to remember a time when any military officer may have seriously thought otherwise. In testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee in September 2008, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen summed up the idea that conventional operations are not sufficient when dealing with an insurgency by saying that, “we can’t kill our way to victory…” While most Army leaders would agree with Admiral Mullen’s statement, it seems that we too often simply give lip service when allocating maneuver assets in direct support of “non-lethal missions.” If the missions of Civil Affairs, Information Operations, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and others are ultimately intended to be the primary focus in a counterinsurgency, then these operations should be appropriately resourced. Though there are many ways that we can improve resourcing for these efforts, this paper will solely address the issue of increasing transportation availability for these units.

This paper argues for the creation of composite civil-military platoons (CMP) in theater. These Platoons will provide dedicated transportation support for non-self-mobile non-lethal personnel and while also giving the battalion commander an additional maneuver unit that can focus on civil-military operations at levels above company. These Platoons would be formed around a core of the battalion’s attached Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Soldiers and be augmented with Soldiers detailed from within the battalion. Though it may seem counterintuitive, taking a small number of Soldiers from maneuver companies to form these Platoons will actually increase the ability of a company commander to execute his mission by reducing the demands placed on his company to support battalion movement requests and creating another non-lethal enabler that he can draw upon. As a result, he will be able to place greater focus on his core counterinsurgency tasks of providing security and training host nation security forces. Just as importantly, by taking advantage of their ability to move across the battlefield independently, non-lethal personnel will have more flexibility and predictability in planning their missions, ultimately leading to enhanced effectiveness.

Though it may sound novel, the CMP model is an evolution of battle-tested concepts that originated with the 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division. The 3-1 CAV effectively utilized their “Team Enabler,” a combination of Civil Affairs, PSYOP and Human Intelligence Collection Teams in Mada’in Qada. The “Team Enabler” model was further refined in summer and fall of 2008 in Iraq’s Diyala Province by the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment. This unit successfully formed and employed a “non-lethal platoon” from the assigned vehicles of attached Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams as well as the squadron’s Full Spectrum Effects Platform (FSEP) variant Stryker. This paper advocates codifying these models in such a way.

The author (left) and a U.S. Army linguist discuss the progress of a power generation project in the south Dora neighborhood of Baghdad in February 2008. By making civil affairs teams and civil-military personnel more mobile, they will then be able to conduct more frequent and better inspections, which will help increase the accountability of contractors.
way that all types of maneuver units can take advantage of this concept.

A battalion CMP can be utilized for a number of missions that are usually tasked to maneuver companies. The most obvious example is that now Civil Affairs teams are able to inspect the status of their projects more regularly and at more appropriate times than would otherwise be available if they were dependent on other units for transportation. In addition, with the use of a battalion CMP, Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) will have greater control over the time and place that their products are disseminated. Instead of always having to integrate dissemination into a maneuver company’s patrol schedule (which can certainly be an effective technique and should not be abandoned completely), TPTs will be able to conduct pinpoint dissemination much more often and produce a greater effect on the target audience. In addition, for battalion-level key leader engagements not requiring the commander’s presence (such as meeting with medium-sized business owners, city council members, etc.), the CMP can provide transportation for a battalion S-5 or other staff member without further burdening a company commander. A CMP could also be used to meet many brigade movement requests, such as brigade level key leader engagements, that might otherwise be passed onto a land-owning company.

**Assumptions**

This proposal is based on the following assumptions. The author asks readers to submit any comments that challenge the validity of these assumptions:

* Combat patrols require three vehicles and 12 personnel;
* Battalion has attached one Civil Affairs team with four personnel and one MRAP/M1114;
* Battalion has attached one PSYOP team with three personnel and one MRAP/M1114;
* Battalion has a staff member whose primary duty is civil-military operations (BN S-5/S-9); and
* Battalion has sufficient linguist support to provide CMP with interpreter.

CMP patrol requirements will be less than for a typical line company and likely be expected to complete three-to-five missions a week of short duration (under four hours) rather than six or more patrols a week of 6-10 hours that most line platoons conduct.

Based on these assumptions, we have a shortfall of five personnel and one vehicle that must be overcome from within a battalion. The issue of the vehicle shortfall can be solved in a number of ways (such as using MRAPs or M1114 from a battalion headquarters company that are typically used mostly for battalion combat logistic patrols), and this article will not go into this issue in depth. The more controversial and difficult to solve problem is how to come up with five Soldiers from an already overtaxed battalion. Below are a number of ways that units can come up with this additional manpower without taking away too much combat strength from line companies.

**Manning Methods:**

1) Have a dual-hat battalion S-5/S-9 serve as CMP patrol leader.

   By having the battalion’s non-lethal officer serve in the additional capacity of patrol leader, we are able to provide leadership for the platoon without taking away additional combat power from a line platoon. This course of action may seem unrealistic and could be viewed as an overburdening of an already stressed staff officer, but it actually has a number of advantages and has been proven successful in combat under 3-2 SCR. First, because the battalion S-5/S-9 is probably the officer driving most mission requirements for maneuver support of non-lethal operations, he would be on most missions that the civil-military platoon would execute anyways, even if he was not dual-hatted as the patrol leader. In a manner similar to the way that most company commanders lead their own tactical command posts (TACs) without issue, the battalion S-5/S-9 should be able to handle the additional stress of being a patrol leader. In addition, the extra work load that will come from being a patrol leader and a staff officer will be mitigated by the unique nature of the CMP. The CMP’s small size — likely less than 15 Soldiers — will reduce the amount of administrative work the patrol leader must conduct. This demand will be further reduced by the fact that at least half of the CMP’s Soldiers will come from attached, rather than assigned, units such as Civil Affairs and PSYOP. Furthermore, because many S-5/S-9s are senior lieutenants and junior captains who have already served successfully as platoon leaders, they can be expected to better handle the stress of wearing two (albeit large) hats.

2) Draw Soldiers exclusively from headquarters companies.

   This technique would draw upon Soldiers who serve in staff sections to perform additional duties as members of the CMP. Many readers will raise the concern that Soldiers who are serving on staff sections already have enough duties without the additional responsibility of conducting patrols. While this is a valid possibility, I believe that it is mitigated by the expected shorter duration of most CMP patrols and the greater degree of predictability that non-lethal missions afford. Careful planning and a rotation schedule should allow the utilization of 3-5 members of a headquarters company for missions with the CMP without taking away too much from their primary duties.

3) Each company can release one Soldier for duty with the civil-military platoon.

   A preferable technique would be to task each company in a battalion with providing one Soldier to serve in the CMP. These Soldiers could either serve in the CMP in a long-term capacity (and possibly be attached to the battalion HHC as a result) or could only serve for a week or a month and then return to their parent unit. Each technique has its own drawbacks and strengths and the best method is based on the particular Manning situation of each unit. In order to promote unit cohesion and proficiency, many Army leaders prefer to avoid moving Soldiers around unnecessarily, but this may not always be possible. (It may also be worth considering that duty in a CMP, where patrols are
expected to be less frequent and of shorter duration than most maneuver platoons conduct, could be considered a way to give some tired Soldiers an opportunity for less taxing duty without taking them out of the fight completely.)

4) Utilize Tactical HUMINT Teams as permanent or semi-permanent parts of the CMP.

This technique was used by 3-1 CAV in support of their Team Enabler concept. They used their Human Intelligence Collection Teams in a manner similar to the way I recommend the utilization of CA and PSYOP units. While this method was successful for 3-1 CAV and does address the manpower shortfall, it degrades the ability of THT to support combat operations. It is a technique that I recommend only be used with caution as it is likely that a THT can contribute more to mission success directly supporting combat operations in an intelligence collection capacity than as part of a civil-military platoon.

5) Only create one or two CMPs per brigade combat team rather than a single CMP per battalion.

This technique would significantly reduce the manpower taskings necessary to man the CMPs on a per battalion basis. While it is certainly preferable to have two CMPs per BCT as opposed to having none, it would have the obvious, but manageable, drawback of increasing the number of missions the CMP must support. More importantly is the issue of how to coordinate the actions of the CMPs across battalion boundaries. Careful planning and extensive coordination will be required to ensure unity of effort across all logical lines of operation.

Utilizing a combination of the above techniques, I recommend the CMP task organization illustrated in Figure 1 for most units. METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilian considerations) analysis could result in a significantly different organization, however.

Challenges

While many readers may believe that the CMP concept does not have sufficient combat power, many units have been frequently forced to conduct combat patrols with just as many Soldiers or even fewer. As a comparison, a 12-Soldier composite non-lethal platoon would have the same number of Soldiers as most military transition teams (or more in many cases). If METT-TC analysis suggests (or higher headquarters dictates) that more personnel are required for the CMP to safely conduct their mission, the addition of, say, two Soldiers to the CMP would only be a relatively small increase to the battalion manning burden.

One of the dangers of utilizing a CMP is the possibility that some company commanders will now assume that they no longer have to take responsibility for civil military tasks. While the CMP concept will reduce the burden of transporting battalion level non-lethal personnel around the battlefield, companies still need to continue to conduct sphere of influence engagements, mentor security forces and monitor essential military tasks. While the CMP concept will reduce the burden of transporting battalion level non-lethal personnel around the battlefield, companies still need to continue to conduct sphere of influence engagements, mentor security forces and monitor essential military tasks. While the CMP concept will reduce the burden of transporting battalion level non-lethal personnel around the battlefield, companies still need to continue to conduct sphere of influence engagements, mentor security forces and monitor essential military tasks.

It is also equally important to ensure that the actions of the CMP do not conflict with the efforts of the companies. For instance, I previously pointed out that a CMP would make it easier for PSYOP to conduct independent dissemination. Without coordination, this technique could easily create conflicting messages across a battalion’s battlespace. Careful utilization of the targeting process will help prevent “information fratricide” and ensure unity of effort. Having the battalion S-5/S-9 also serve as the CMP patrol leader will help alleviate this concern as he is the staff member with the best situational awareness of non-lethal efforts across the entire battalion area of operations.

Conclusion

Though the CMP is certainly an unorthodox technique, the challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan require such unconventional solutions. While force protection is an obvious concern, the unique way in which the CMP will be employed will go a long way to obviating this potential problem. Though many commanders are understandably reluctant to give up any combat power, detailing a few Soldiers to a CMP has the possibility of greatly enhancing their efforts and the effectiveness of the battalion’s civil-military operations.

Author's Note: This article was written primarily with Iraq in mind, and while it is certainly possible to transfer the CMP concept to Afghanistan from a pure task organization standpoint, I feel that the conditions in Afghanistan will likely mean that this concept will be less applicable. The absence of roads and lower levels of security in many parts of the country do not create the more permissive environment that is required for the CMP to be effective. I invite more knowledgeable readers to comment on the applicability of the CMP to the current situation in Afghanistan.

CPT Sean P. Walsh is currently a student at Special Operations Language Training at Fort Bragg, N.C. He previously served in Iraq as a rifle platoon leader and battalion civil-military plans officer with the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment out of Vilseck, Germany. His most recent duties were at the National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at Fort McNair. He is a 2005 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.
Over the past five years, the Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CCS) at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J., has been called upon repeatedly to respond to urgent requirements from the field. They have also seen the number of programs they manage more than double in the same time.

According to COL Raymond Nulk, Project Manager PM CCS, “We’re fortunate to have many of our systems actively supporting warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some of this is due to our being in synch from a warfighter, a requirements, and an acquisition perspective — something we’ve worked hard to achieve. Beyond that,” he continued, “we are addressing the users’ immediate needs by urgently fielding critical warfighting capabilities and providing vital training.”

PM CCS is also putting together long-term production contracts that will be flexible enough to support dynamic changes in both warfighting and training requirements. They are actively pursuing technologies to produce smaller, lighter, more lethal munitions to ensure increased mobility to the full spectrum of current Army forces and those envisioned for the next 20 years.

Leading the Way to the Intelligent Battlefield
Several networked munitions systems out of PM CCS are redefining how Soldiers shape the battlefield and protect the force. Drawing on revolutionary technology, these systems empower frontline Soldiers with intelligence information and protection capabilities to minimize risk while enhancing operational effectiveness.

The first of the networked munitions to be fielded, Spider, is an advanced man-in-the-loop area denial system that offers remote-controlled force protection. The system’s Munition Control Unit (MCU) is fitted with six munition launchers, each covering a 60-degree sector. When the trip wire is activated, a signal is sent from the MCU to the Remote Control Unit where an operator chooses to detonate the grenades or take other actions, thus providing scalable application of lethal and non-lethal means, from M18A1 Claymore munitions to the non-lethal Modular Crowd Control Munitions (MCCM). The system can be recovered and deactivated on command to enable safe recovery or passage of friendly forces. This antipersonnel landmine alternative meets National Landmine Policy by incorporating the self-destruct/self-deactivate features.

Formerly known as the Intelligent Munitions Systems, Scorpion combines detailed battlefield intelligence with precision munitions to attack targets ranging from light-wheeled to heavy-tracked vehicles. It has the ability to deny the enemy freedom of maneuver while enabling friendly maneuver through a robust command and control system. Scorpion can also sense enemy presence, collect battlefield data, and relay it to an operator. It supports full-spectrum operations in both open and urban terrain.

New Systems Fielded to Defeat IEDs
To help Soldiers combat one of the greatest threats in theater — improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the Product Manager IED Defeat/Protect Force (PM IEDD/PF) procured the Self-Protection Adaptive Roller Kit (SPARK). The kit, a modular IED roller system designed to be mounted on a wide range of tactical wheeled platforms, consists of roller banks that attach to the front of the vehicle. The roller banks make contact with the ground causing IEDs to detonate on the roller, forcing the blast down and away from the vehicle, as opposed to underneath where it could do more damage. One of the most effective weapons in our arsenal against IEDs, SPARK has saved many lives and continues to prove its effectiveness.

“You have to be on point with our Soldiers, talking with them, and implementing fixes,” stated LTC Karl Borjes, PM IEDD/PF. The SPARK program has been successful in part because his team visits Soldiers in the field, actively soliciting their feedback to bring back to the office and incorporating changes into the next procurement. SPARK upgrades based on this feedback include installing additional lights for better visibility and improved control and braking for the severe terrain of Afghanistan.
Another IED defeat system, the Rhino Passive Infrared Defeat System is also making news and saving lives. Featuring a universal bracket so it can be mounted on any vehicle platform, Rhino detects and defeats a subset of IEDs. Used in concert with SPARK or Cyclone, a powerful blower system, Rhino provides additional protection and flexibility to the Soldier. According to LTC Borjes, almost 20,000 Rhinos have been delivered to theater. PM IEDD/PF continues to explore new technologies to defeat this ever-changing and adapting threat.

Detecting IEDs: A First Line of Defense

Product Manager Countermine and EOD (PM CM&EOD) has contributed a number of products in support of current contingency operations. In addition to the well-known and heavily used AN/PSS-14 Mine Detecting Set, two new products are searching out IEDs — the Vehicle Optics Sensor System (VOSS) and the IED Interrogation Arm.

VOSS is used by Army combat engineers for route clearance and by Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, which rely primarily on visual detection of suspected IEDs.

According to LTC Pete Lozis, PM CM&EOD, VOSS gives them the ability to detect IEDs from a greater standoff distance than previously achievable. “That’s a tremendous advantage when you’re talking about safety for the Soldiers operating this equipment,” he said.

In response to Joint Urgent Operational Needs from both Iraq and Afghanistan, PM CM&EOD procured, shipped, and installed over 200 VOSS systems and trained Soldiers in their use. VOSS was recognized as one of the Army Top 10 Greatest Inventions for 2007. The IED Interrogation Arm provides standoff detection of IEDs using a probing/digging tool to expose objects and a metal detector/camera to identify targets.

Non-Lethal Capabilities Provide Range of Options

In addition to providing commanders with increased safety while reducing noncombatant fatalities and collateral damage, PM CCS develops effective non-lethal systems. These systems support Escalation of Force (EOF) procedures and allow Soldiers to react with an appropriate level of force based on the situation.

PM IEDD/PF is leading the fielding of the Non-Lethal Capabilities Set (NLCS) to active duty and National Guard brigades throughout the Army. The set provides a variety of capabilities, including checkpoint operations, dismounted operations, convoy protection, and crowd control/detainee operations, as well as counterpersonnel and materiel systems. The modularity of the NLCS allows the commander to tailor equipment needs based on a specific mission or threat level.

The Full Spectrum Effects Package (FSEP) is the first integrated package of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to support EOF on a Stryker platform. Components include the non-lethal remote weapon station with Long Range Acoustic Device, Bright White Light, the GBD-III Laser Dazzler, and a shotgun that fires non-lethal ammunition. The lethal remote weapon station includes a 66mm launcher, 360-degree cameras, projectile detection, and cueing. FSEP has demonstrated its effectiveness by successfully resolving several conflicts with noncombatants.

PM CCS also manages a variety of non-lethal munitions in 40mm and 12 gauge families that are designed to act as warning or deterrent munitions. The M1006 Point Target Round, better known as the “Sponge Grenade,” and the M1029 Crowd Dispersal Cartridge are intended for close quarter engagement, can engage three or more targets at once, and are fired from a standard M203 Grenade Launcher. The M1012 Point Round and the M1013 Area Round engage targets at close range only and are fired from the standard issue Mossberg 500 series shotgun. Additional non-lethal munitions include the M84 Stun Hand Grenade, that produces a flash-bang effect for
Grenade Enhancements Focus on Soldier Safety

Having played a role in warfare for hundreds of years, grenades continue to increase combat effectiveness and survivability. PM CCS supports a host of grenades that range in effect and mission, from non-lethal to lethal, from hand-thrown or launched from a 66m or 40mm launcher, and those used for training. PM CCS is currently implementing a Confidence Clip to the fragmentation grenade.

“The Confidence Clip fits between the grenade fuze and body,” explained Kevin Wong, PM CCS’ Force Application Division Chief. “It securely fastens the pull ring in place to prevent the accidental removal or rattling associated with a loose ring, thus eliminating the practice by some Soldiers of “taping” their grenades for perceived safety or to reduce noise.”

Battlefield Simulation and Illumination

The Pyrotechnics Division of PM CCS manages flares, signals, and simulators that provide important warfighter capabilities such as communications, illumination, training, and protection against advanced air-to-air and surface-to-air weapon systems. The family of hand-held signals consists of the M158 Star Cluster and M127A1 White Parachute, used by downed airmen or others needing emergency escapes, and battlefield and ground effects simulators that produce battle noises and battlefield effects for training. Significant work has been completed to enhance training through these various battlefield effect simulators. Additionally, environmental improvements were made through the development of a unique flashlight replacement in the M115 simulator. These changes lessen the impact on the environment without changing the function of the simulators.

Enhancing SLM Training and Capabilities

Shoulder Launched Munitions (SLMs) provide Soldiers with capabilities to defeat light-armed vehicles, bunkers, and other field fortifications. A greater understanding of SLM capabilities and their operation have significantly increased the weapons’ usage and success in combat. Using a “train-the-trainer” approach, PM CCS in conjunction with the U.S. Army Infantry School, has a pre-deployment training team that is dedicated to training deploying units on existing SLMs.

“We conduct surveys after each training event,” said Gary Barber, SLM and Special Projects Division Chief. “Soldiers have provided value-added feedback, which we have used to further refine both our training approach and our training strategy for the future.” To date, the training team has provided classroom instruction and field firings to more than 1,100 Soldiers worldwide.

Current disposable SLMs available include the M141 Bunker Defeat Munition (BDM), a man-portable system that is highly effective against field-fortified targets and is capable of breaching masonry walls and neutralizing light armored vehicles. The M136A1 AT4 Confined Space (AT4-CS), replacing the M136 AT4 Light Anti-Tank Weapon, is another disposable SLM that can be safely fired from enclosures or protected fighting positions, thereby increasing the Soldier’s survivability in urban conflict.

The future SLM will be small, lightweight, and multi-purpose. PM CCS is developing an acquisition strategy to field the next generation SLM — the Individual Assault Munition (IAM). The strategy will involve the integration of new and innovative technologies in the areas of warheads, explosives, fuzing, propulsion, lightweight materials, and low-cost sights in a single munition. The IAM will ultimately replace both the M141 BDM and M136A1 AT4-CS as the Army’s primary, multi-purpose SLM for light Infantry.

Assured Demolitions

PM CCS Special Projects Division focuses on products employed by Special Operations Forces who rely on self-sufficiency, stealth, and close communications. The Radio-Frequency (RF) Remote Activation Munition System (RAMS) gives Soldiers the capability to remotely control demolition charges and other items of equipment. The Magneto Inductance (MI) version of the RAMS can initiate remotely controlled demolition items through natural or man-made structures where RF signals cannot travel. The MI-RAMS is not vulnerable to the reflection, refraction, or scattering encountered by radio, optical, or acoustic waves and enables trans-medium communications, giving Special Operations Forces the ability to establish reliable communications to initiate demolitions and munitions under the most difficult battle conditions.

Maintaining the logistical and operational edge requires more than just enhanced weapons; it requires innovations that mitigate the enemy’s capabilities. Across its wide range of lethal and non-lethal munition systems, PM CCS’ commitment to providing warfighters with the tools necessary to defeat the enemy and execute the mission effectively is second to none. PM CCS is dedicated to the sustained success of today’s Army and the continued dominance of the future force.
It is vital that America’s military leaders be introduced to Arabic sources that detail present and former adversaries. They provide the cultural insight, inventory of myths and occasional undiscovered aspects of our enemies. Despite the successful strike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, in June 2006, we must retrace his biography as it reveals networks, connections, and even divisions within the Sunni militant Islamist movement. We cannot simply mark Zarqawi as killed or his cohorts as captured and ignore the tactics, biography, and ideology that inspires a new generation of militant Islamist operatives.

Gamal Rahim published an excellent Arabic biography of al-Qaida deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. He also published a 205-page biography of Zarqawi entitled Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Sheikh al-Qaida fee Bilad al-Rafidayn (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Leader of al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers). Rahim is an investigative journalist who specializes in militant Islamist movements. He is the author of several Arabic books on al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden and militant Islamist ideology and maintains a blog site at www.gamalrahim.blogspot.com. Rahim's biography of Zarqawi was published by al-Arabiyah Publishing, which is located in Cairo, Egypt. This book represents what Arab counterterrorism experts are reading and what America’s military planners and counterterrorism specialists should explore, debate and discuss along with Western sources. One of the best Western biographies of al-Zarqawi is the French Zarkaoui, le nouveau visage d’al-Qaida (Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaida), which was translated into English and published by New York’s Other Press in 2005.

Zarqawi’s Early Life

Ahmed Nazal al-Khalaylah was born in 1966 on the outskirts of Amman, in the hamlet of Zarqa in a three-room home from the Khalaylah Clan of the Bani Hassan Tribe. This tribe is an important supporter of the Jordanian monarch and in 2005 disowned Zarqawi after the Amman Hotel Bombings. Gamal Rahim writes that Zarqawi’s father rented seats, tables and space for weddings and funerals, but could not make ends meet, raising three boys and six girls. Zarqawi would attend King Talal Elementary School and would drop out of the 11th grade with a respectable 87-percent average, choosing to support his family. He loved soccer and his first indication of leadership was organizing a street soccer team that played in the Usum Cemetery. In the cemetery, the young Zarqawi would connect with criminal gangs and was involved in city crime, fights, and petty theft. His lifestyle would lead to his firing from a municipal job after one month for fighting. Jobless, he took to crime and undertook a personal self-examination of mosque literature that focused on fragments of Islam woven into a narrow militant Islamist ideology. Zarqawi, like many, was not guided through the process of Islamic studies, and gravitated to those who aggressively proselytize Islamist political theory and violent militant ideology.


In 1989, Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan and received training in explosives and weapons at Bait al-Ansar. While there he met the Palestinian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who immersed him in Qutbism (militant Islamist theories of Syyid Qutb, who was executed by Egyptian authorities in 1966.) Zarqawi would serve as an organizer for al-Qaida of Palestinians, Jordanians and Syrians arriving in Peshawar and Afghanistan.

Zarqawi was recruited in 1988 by Abdul-Majid Majali, also known as Abu Qutayba al-Irduni (The Jordanian). Majali opened a Jordanian branch of Maktab al-Khidmat, the facilitation organization supporting the Islamist resistance to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and became a representative of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam in Jordan. Azzam is the spiritual founder of al-Qaida and formed Maktab al-Khidmat as the earliest Arab-Afghan logistic and processing center in Peshawar to fight the Soviets. Majali was an experienced, well-credentialed militant who spent two years in Afghanistan (1986-1988) and returned to Jordan with a mandate from Azzam to raise funds and recruit.

Majali recounts that Zarqawi joined the Soviet-Afghan jihad after attending a fund-raising event in which the main speaker was Abdul-Rasul Sayyaf, one of the most prominent and militant Afghan warlords of the Soviet-Afghan War. Majali said he processed Zarqawi among the thousands of recruits destined for Pakistan. Zarqawi was not an exceptional figure when Majali first encountered him in 1988. Zarqawi was channeled into a pipeline of Jordanians, Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians who were grouped into battalions for training in Khost in 1989. In Afghanistan, Zarqawi was close to:

* Saleh al-Hami, who created the magazine Al-Jihad for Abdullah
Azzam. The book discusses how Zarqawi was involved in evacuating a seriously injured al-Hami across the mountain passes and into Pakistan.

* Abu Harith al-Sulti, who was emir (leader) of the Mujahideen group of Levantine fighters who provided him tactical and leadership training.

* Abu Muaz al-Khosti, a Palestinian who was killed in 1989 in an assault on Kabul.

Zarqawi Returns to Jordan (1994-1999)

Zarqawi arrived too late in the conflict to participate in combat against the Soviets and returned to Jordan in 1994, linking up with Maqdisi and forming a cell called Jaysh Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army) that was also referred to as Jamaa al-Tawheed al-Salafiyyah (The Unified Salafi Group). Maqdisi and Zarqawi began inciting in mosques and distributing Maqdisi’s radical writings in pamphlets, eventually evolving into a group that began planning terrorist attacks, first against Israeli interests in Jordan and eventually to attacks along the Israeli-Jordanian border. The group even plotted to assassinate the late King Hussein of Jordan. Once they crossed into attack planning, the Jordanian authorities moved against the group arresting Zarqawi, Maqdisi, and 26 others, also capturing weapons and explosives. They were given 15-year sentences and also capturing weapons and explosives.

In 1989, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan to receive explosives and weapons training.

Zarqawi Returns to Afghanistan (1999-2001)

Upon Zarqawi’s release in 1999, he immediately set about planning attacks in Jordan and fled to Afghanistan when authorities attempted to re-arrest him. In Afghanistan, Zarqawi would be shaped by a host of other al-Qa’ida leaders and ideologues, but what distinguished him was his refusal to swear allegiance to Bin Laden. Zarqawi always attempted to maintain his independence. Attempting to trace Zarqawi’s associations in Afghanistan provides insight into who would later join him in managing what would evolve into al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). One of the main AQI insurgents and leader of the Fallujah sector was Umar Jumaa Saaleh, also known as Abu Anas al-Shami, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship who was born and raised in Kuwait. From the age of 14, Abu Anas had mastered the complexities of the Arabic language, and a year later memorized the entire Quran. He would pursue his Islamic studies at Saudi Arabia’s Medina University, where influence from Muslim Brotherhood ideologues, but what distinguished him was his refusal to swear allegiance to Bin Laden. Zarqawi always attempted to maintain his independence. Attempting to trace Zarqawi’s associations in Afghanistan provides insight into who would later join him in managing what would evolve into al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). One of the main AQI insurgents and leader of the Fallujah sector was Umar Jumaa Saaleh, also known as Abu Anas al-Shami, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship who was born and raised in Kuwait. From the age of 14, Abu Anas had mastered the complexities of the Arabic language, and a year later memorized the entire Quran. He would pursue his Islamic studies at Saudi Arabia’s Medina University, where influence from Muslim Brotherhood exiles began to shape his views towards Islamist politics. It is unclear if he completed his studies.

The Late Abu Anas al-Shami: The Zarqawi Representative in Fallujah

Sponsored by Abu Hammam al-Filisteeni, a recruiter, Abu Anas al-Shami left for Afghanistan in 1990 before Operation Desert Storm. There, he took a three-month weapons and explosives course at the Farouk Training Camp and swore fealty to Bin Laden. In the summer of 1991, unable to return to Kuwait as Palestinians were collectively punished in Kuwait for PLO leader Yasser Arafat’s stand with Saddam Hussein, Abu Anas returned to Jordan, where he became imam of the Murad Mosque in Suweileh, a suburb of Amman. He would network with like-minded clerics in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf who preached against the American troop presence in Saudi Arabia. Abu Anas was inspired by the sermons of Safar Hawai, Salmon al-Awdeh and Nasser al Omar, three Saudi clerics often called the Awakening Clerics who led a general Islamist reform movement in Saudi Arabia. Abu Anas traveled to Bosnia, where he served as a cleric for Islamist fighters and then returned to Amman. Abu Anas would be arrested by the Jordanians in March 2003 for inciting against the Jordanian government for its stand against Saddam in the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was released within months and refocused his sermons from preaching against the Jordanian government towards calling for jihad against the United States in Iraq. Abu Anas entered Iraq in September 2003 and joined Zarqawi’s Tawheed wal Jihad (Monotheistic Unity and Jihad) group, becoming its spiritual leader. In April 2004, he was injured in an airstrike. That September, Abu Anas was killed as he was about to conduct suicide operations with 30 operatives. Abu Anas’ legacy can be found in militant Islamist Web sites, where his published day-by-day account of the battle of Fallujah that appeared on the internet journal Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) can be read.

Author’s Assessment on the Nuances of the Threat

Rahim has an excellent chapter that discusses the divisions within radical Salafism, what is called al-Tayyar al-Islami (Islamist Trend). One of the benefits of reading Arabic books is their identification of such ideological and militant philosophical divisions through which
Zarqawi had to operate. They can be classified as:

* **Ikhwanī** (Muslim Brotherhood): Those wanting to attain an Islamist state through participation in government and parliaments, as well as through grassroots means such as social services and evangelism. Today, their slogan is reform not revolution.

* **Salafi Ilmi** (Practical Salafists): These are Salafists who wish to attain an Islamic state exclusively through dawa (evangelism), but who do not favor participating with corrupt regimes. They feel their perfection of an Islamic society in neighborhoods and hamlets speaks for itself. They do desire an Islamist fundamentalist regime administering government and also wish to impose a single brand of Islam, but they wish to do it through financing mosques, schools, and evangelizing.

* **Salafi Jihadi** (Salafi Jihadists): These are militant Islamists who desire the attainment of an Islamic state through violent means, like al-Qaida. In addition, they utilize their brand of Islam not for any moral purpose but to instill fear on a population.

Of note, these classifications are useful in narrowing down the most immediate threats originating from Sunni Islamist actors. It is also important to realize that a person or group can splinter and travel between these three subsets of the Islamist trend, as the book refers to them. These three classifications of Islamist groups may have a regional focus or a global view. Gamal Rahim lays out this explanation to attempt to explain the evolution of the militant Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, which is located in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq.

### Evolution, Ebb and Flow of the Kurdish Militant Islamist Group Ansar al-Islam

In 1988, a group of Kurdish Islamists established **Haraka Islamiyah** (The Islamic Movement) based on the successful Muslim Brotherhood model and negotiated with such Kurdish groups as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The group was led by Uthman Abdel-Aziz. A splinter group from Haraka Islamiyah emerged that rejected working with the PUK and KDP, called a **Nahda** (Renaissance). This group is best classified as Salafi Ilmi (Practical Salafist) with little tolerance for Kurdish diverse political beliefs and religious Islamic practice. Both Nahda and Haraka Islamiyah would merge in 1999 into **Haraka Wihda Islamiyah** (Islamic Union Party). In 2001, those members wanting to pursue direct armed action split and established **Jamaa Islamiyah** (The Islamic Group) and **Jund al-Islam** (Army of Islam), these can be classified as Salafi Jihadi. Other Salafi Jihadi groups that formed between 1999 and 2001, were Hamas Kurdiyah, Haraka Islamiyah (Halabja), Jamaa Islamiyah, and Harakat al-Tawheed.

On 10 December 2001, three of these groups — Hamas Kurdiyah, Jund al-Islam and Harakat al-Tawheed — merged to form Ansar al-Islam under the leadership of Sheikh Falih Krekar. These groups were influenced by an amalgamation of Saudi Salafi ideology, Qutbist political thought and Egyptian Islamic Jihad methodology. They started with five committees: Security, Shariah Court, Shariah Studies, Military, and Media. Their communications practices eschewed cell phones and electronic communications in favor of couriers as a security precaution. Their tactics adopted al-farr wal karr, a tribal Arab practice of harass and retreat, to wear down a force, and mountain guerilla warfare. Ansar al-Islam made enemies with both the PUK-Talabani and KDP-Barzani. Ansar al-Islam denies any formal alliance with al-Qaida, but the book by Rahim does not rule out individual relationships. Although similar in ideological outlook, among the differences between al-Qaida and Ansar al-Islam are their regional versus pan-Islamist outlooks, and Ansar al-Islam’s political line is similar in outlook to the Muslim Brotherhood, which al-Qaida considers heresy. Ansar al-Islam, created in 2001, is important to Zarqawi as its members helped exfiltrate al-Qaida members, including Zarqawi, from Pakistan to Iran and into northern Iraq. A Kurdish group that splintered from Ansar al-Islam in 2003 was **Jaysh Ansar al-Sunnah** (Army of the Partisans of Muhammad’s Path), which is totally ideologically aligned to al-Qaida and rejects any attempts to introduce a Muslim...
CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein is a subject matter expert on militant Islamist theory and senior advisor at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism in Washington, D.C. He wishes to thank Greg Elder and Eric Matthews for their edits and discussions that enhanced this article. Special mention also goes to the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, D.C. and the Emory University Library in Georgia for providing Gamal Rahim’s book for this article.

Zarqawi in Iraq (2003 to 2006)

After infiltrating Iraq through Kurdish territory, Zarqawi developed his Salafi jihadi group al-Tawheed wal Jihad. When Zarqawi formed this group in April 2003, Rahim’s book pegs the membership of the group at 1,500, its estimated low point. He estimates the high point for this group was around 5,000 as it evolved into AQI. Of interest is the book’s discussion of the concentrations of the initial 1,500 Zarqawi fighters as follows:

- 500 in Fallujah
- 400 in Mosul
- 150 in al-Qaim
- 60 in al-Anbar
- 50 in Baghdad

Zarqawi attracted a few talented individuals into his organization; among them is Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the current head of al-Qaida in Iraq, who was better known as an experienced bomb-maker. Others mentioned in the book include an officer in Saddam’s former army who was a rocketry expert with the ability to improvise, launch, and maintain a myriad of ground attack rockets like the Katyushas. A Lebanese with formal explosives training in the Lebanese Armed Forces also conducted training, disarming and arming of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Conclusion

Although Zarqawi pledged fealty to Usama Bin Ladin in October 2004 and changed the name of his organization to al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers, he still maintained his independence. Zarqawi’s unilateral actions led Ayman al-Zawahiri to write a 10-page letter in mid-2005 questioning the public way Zarqawi was killing Shiites, as well as his unconstructive titles like Sheikh of Butchers (www.dni.gov). It is unknown if Bin Ladin considered Zarqawi an opportunity to give al-Qaida relevance in the war in Iraq or if Zarqawi sought Bin Ladin’s endorsement for access to donors and recruits. What is known is that Zarqawi had known Bin Ladin since 1989 and initially refused to pledge fealty to him. Zarqawi’s attack on three Amman Hotels in 2005 left him even more isolated, outraging the Jordanian public, leading Islamist parties to distance themselves, and leading his own Bani-Hassan tribe to disown him. Zarqawi’s orchestration of attacks beyond Iraq’s borders include such operations as the August 2005 firing of Katyusha rockets on USS Kearsarge and USS Ashland, which were docked in the port of Aqaba in Jordan. There are questions as to whether Zarqawi was betrayed by fellow insurgents for his activities that alienated more and more Iraqi Sunnis.

Like Bin Ladin and Zawahiri, many books have to be read before we can begin to attain a clear picture of Zarqawi. Rahim offers a general biography of Zarqawi, coupled with a nuanced look at the evolution of the Kurdish group Ansar al-Islam that aided in his escape from Afghanistan into Iran and then northern Iraq. There is little discussion on the 1990 eviction of Palestinians from the Persian Gulf after the PLO’s siding with Saddam Hussein that flooded Jordan with refugees, many sought haven in Islamist and militant Islamist groups. Rahim also does not discuss the camp Zarqawi established in Herat, Afghanistan, a Shiite area, with the aid of the Taliban, as a proxy fighter to kill Shiites and undermine Shiite commander Ismail Khan or the finance network that originated among Syrian militant Islamists in Europe, as well as Jordanian contacts in Jordan. Despite these shortcomings, a broad reading of Zarqawi both in Arabic and English is needed to understand the intricacies of the movement and the early formation of al-Qaida in Iraq.

MG William B. Caldwell points to a photo of the safe house where terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed during a coalition air strike on 7 June 2006. Caldwell said fighters dropped two 500-pound bombs on the building, killing Zarqawi, his spiritual advisor and four others.

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A Primer on Exterior Ballistics for Infantrymen

CPT Wesley Moerbe

“Through his vision to precision and is a very powerful weapon. To attain the maximum of its effect it is necessary that he who assumes to direct or control its use should study its powers and limitations...not only of many rifles fired on the testing grounds, but of many rifles fired by and considered in conjunction with the human, error-introducing Soldier who will use it in war.”

— CPT H.E. Eames
The Rifle in War, Staff College Press, 1908

Too often, we as Infantry leaders are content to simply know that something works and are not especially curious with why or how — until there is a problem. The study of ballistics is similarly neglected. The intimidating mathematics married to this science can deter the otherwise interested marksman. Thus, the purpose of this article is to elevate the understanding of ballistics among line Infantry leaders and stimulate a thirst to master the science of marksmanship. Learning the how and why of projectile behavior is a practical endeavor for the modern Infantryman. The various climates, terrain, and enemies our Soldiers encounter on deployment demand a higher order of understanding to properly employ our direct fire weapon systems. In response, I have prepared an abridged primer on basic exterior ballistics. Being an introduction to ballistics, we will only scratch the surface of this topic, but hopefully create an itch to further its study. The point is to make the fundamentals of exterior ballistics accessible to Infantrymen to improve marksmanship and lethality in situations that are difficult or impossible to be replicated in training; and to suggest a methodology for educating junior NCOs and officers in this science. For reasons of familiarity, the M855 — the Army’s primary service cartridge — will remain fixed as the standard example throughout this article, but the principles discussed are universal and apply to all Infantry small arms.

General Ballistics

The Ballista was one of the earliest missile weapons widely employed in warfare and subsequently gave its name to the science of projectile motion, according to Robert McCoy in his book Modern Exterior Ballistics. Over time ballistics coalesced around three major subdivisions of study — interior, exterior, and terminal ballistics. Interior ballistics is the science of projectile behavior from the beginning of movement to the moment it exits the muzzle of the firearm. Exterior ballistics is the study of projectile behavior from the time an object exits the muzzle until it reaches the point of impact and helps describe a bullet’s trajectory. Terminal ballistics focuses on the behavior of a bullet as it strikes a target and the subsequent effects on that target. The remainder of this article will focus exclusively on exterior ballistics.

The following terms and definitions are from Charles S. Cummins’ book Everyday Ballistics and are necessary language to know when discussing trajectory:

Point of Impact — the actual location the bullet strikes at the end of its trajectory.
Line of sight — the extended line from the eye, through the optic or sighting mechanism to the target.
Line of departure — the notional line that extends from the center of the rifle’s bore straight out.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

A Primer on Exterior Ballistics for Infantrymen

CPT Wesley Moerbe

General Ballistics

The Ballista was one of the earliest missile weapons widely employed in warfare and subsequently gave its name to the science of projectile motion, according to Robert McCoy in his book Modern Exterior Ballistics. Over time ballistics coalesced around three major subdivisions of study — interior, exterior, and terminal ballistics. Interior ballistics is the science of projectile behavior from the beginning of movement to the moment it exits the muzzle of the firearm. Exterior ballistics is the study of projectile behavior from the time an object exits the muzzle until it reaches the point of impact and helps describe a bullet’s trajectory. Terminal ballistics focuses on the behavior of a bullet as it strikes a target and the subsequent effects on that target. The remainder of this article will focus exclusively on exterior ballistics.

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Line of departure — the notional line that extends from the center of the rifle’s bore straight out.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Bullet path — the arcing trajectory of the bullet from muzzle to target.

Bullet drop — the distance measured between the bullet and the line of departure as the bullet falls.

We will first develop the elementary concepts of bullet trajectory and describe how they relate to the process of zeroing and qualifying with a service rifle at the range. If a rifle was fired such that the line of departure was completely horizontal to the ground, the bullet would rapidly plummet to the earth without reaching its 600-meter effective range. Its trajectory would look something like the one seen in Figure 1.

Therefore, to be able to engage targets at practical ranges, we must slightly elevate the weapon so that the bullet path arcs above the horizontal plane and comes back down at a known point, the target. This angle of elevation is so subtle, only a couple of degrees, that it is probably unnoticeable to the casual observer. To make this process easily repeatable, adjustable aiming devices were added to the weapon system in the form of iron sights and optics. When the rifleman looks through his correctly aligned sights, he will see the center of mass of his target. The line from his eye through the sighting apertures to the target is known as the line of sight, henceforth the LOS (see Figure 2). We may now describe the act of zeroing in ballistics terms.

Most riflemen zero based on the 25-meter standard prior to qualification (although there are strong arguments for using a 200-meter zero). The purpose of the 25-meter zero is to bring the line of sight into alignment with the bullet path at both the 25-meter and 300-meter marks. To overcome gravity, the rifle is angled slightly upward, but the LOS is not because, by definition, it is a straight line from the eye, through the sight aperture or optic to the target. The result is the intersection of the LOS and the bullet path at two locations. It occurs once when the bullet goes above the LOS near the muzzle and again when it reaches the target (In Figure 2, the differences are exaggerated to make them obvious).

Initially, beginner marksmen are taught to aim at the target’s center of mass when qualifying. While it is possible to score hits on the qualification range by aiming center of mass on every target, one may increase the probability of a hit by knowing the location of his bullet along the path of its trajectory and altering the point of aim to compensate. Figure 3 displays the distance in inches from LOS at 50-meter intervals along the practical trajectory of the M855 bullet. Once a minimum level of proficiency is acquired, leaders can transition a Soldier into the more advanced practice of “holding off” based on the known trajectory of the M855.

Effects of Drag

When a bullet exits the muzzle of a standard service rifle, it reaches a velocity of about 3,025 feet per second (fps) before beginning to decelerate rapidly, according to Technical Manual (TM) 43-0001-27, Army Ammunition Data Sheets for Small Caliber Ammunition. In .86 seconds the velocity drops by more than half from 3,025 fps to 1,478 fps. The force of drag accounts for this rapid deceleration. While gravity’s effects are reasonably predictable and change very little based on the location, drag may change the M855’s trajectory in the same firing position from one day to the next.
Drag is the force that works opposite the bullet’s direction of travel. It is affected by many factors. Bullet diameter and shape are factors of drag, but they are unchanging quantities and do not require correction. The speed of sound, altitude, humidity, and temperature all affect drag because they are components of air density, and since atmospheric conditions change often this can ultimately cause bullet strike to be higher or lower than expected, according to Professor Gilbert Ames Bliss in *Mathematics for External Ballistics*. To conceptualize atmospheric conditions affecting bullet behavior, it may be useful to think of air as a fluid. In fact, physicists consider gases and liquids to be fluids (*World of Physics*, ed. Kimberley A. McGrath). Imagine the resistance on a marble if it were dropped in a kettle of hot maple syrup and then again in cold syrup. You would probably expect a different amount of resistance in each case. The concepts that govern drag’s effects on a bullet traveling through air are similar and require some consideration as Soldiers deploy from one climate to a markedly different one.

Table 1 shows that as altitude increases, air density decreases. This occurs because air molecules are more widely distributed at higher altitudes and create less resistance for the bullet to pass through, thus drag too, decreases. The net effect is higher bullet strike than the firer expects. At lower temperatures air is denser since air molecules tend to become less active as the temperature drops. Again, the result is lower bullet strike. If any of these conditions is changed, the air density changes proportionally as seen in Table 1. Consider these effects when deploying or even during missions where changes in atmospheric conditions may be severe.

### Uphill/Downhill Shooting Explained

From a ballistics perspective, one of the most striking features of the current operating environment is the possibility for uphill and downhill engagements. In Afghanistan, combat outposts are frequently perched on the summit of the dominant terrain feature in the area and in the urban terrain of Iraq’s cities high rise buildings create metropolitan mountains and valleys. High or low angle engagement scenarios are largely unfamiliar to Infantrymen because they are not replicated in home station training leaving them ignorant of the ballistics changes that occur in such situations. The unfortunate result is that Soldiers are then baptized by fire in the valley floors of Afghanistan or narrow streets of Baghdad without appropriate training experience to draw from. Thus we must make an effort to address the physical difference in uphill and downhill marksmanship and how leaders can impart this knowledge to troops.

The reader should first take into account the forces that act on a bullet in flight. The most significant force in high or low angle scenarios is gravity. Over the entire course of a bullet’s path, the force of gravity is constantly pulling the bullet directly toward earth. In contrast, drag is acting directly opposite the direction of travel. Figure 4 demonstrates this relationship.

The effects of gravity become more or less pronounced based on the distance a projectile travels *horizontally*, not based on the *actual distance* of the bullet’s path, according to Cummins. When a bullet is fired in a relatively flat trajectory like a qualification range, which does not exceed four degrees of angle, these two distances are virtually the same (*Mathematics for External Ballistics*). However, if a target is elevated or depressed at a large angle, these distances can become considerably different.

The downward force of gravity acting on a bullet is less at trajectories that are angled high or low and therefore alters the trajectory at these angles. Consider a Soldier who is engaging an enemy in a hillside bunker that is at a 45-degree angle above his position. The Soldier is zeroed for 300 meters and has correctly estimated the range to target as 300 meters. He properly applies the basic rifle marksmanship principles he learned in basic training.

### Table 2 — Distance Above Normal Aim Point Needed To Compensate for High/Low Angle Fire (Calculated for the M855 Cartridge)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (meters)</th>
<th>30 degrees</th>
<th>45 degrees</th>
<th>60 degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.33 in</td>
<td>0.72 in</td>
<td>1.23 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>1.43 in</td>
<td>3.13 in</td>
<td>5.35 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>3.51 in</td>
<td>7.71 in</td>
<td>13.19 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
<td>6.87 in</td>
<td>15.09 in</td>
<td>25.82 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>11.91 in</td>
<td>26.16 in</td>
<td>44.76 in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>19.18 in</td>
<td>42.1 in</td>
<td>72 in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drag is the force that works opposite the bullet’s direction of travel. It is affected by many factors. Bullet diameter and shape are factors of drag, but they are unchanging quantities and do not require correction. The speed of sound, altitude, humidity, and temperature all affect drag because they are components of air density, and since atmospheric conditions change often this can ultimately cause bullet strike to be higher or lower than expected, according to Professor Gilbert Ames Bliss in *Mathematics for External Ballistics*. To conceptualize atmospheric conditions affecting bullet behavior, it may be useful to think of air as a fluid. In fact, physicists consider gases and liquids to be fluids (*World of Physics*, ed. Kimberley A. McGrath). Imagine the resistance on a marble if it were dropped in a kettle of hot maple syrup and then again in cold syrup. You would probably expect a different amount of resistance in each case. The concepts that govern drag’s effects on a bullet traveling through air are similar and require some consideration as Soldiers deploy from one climate to a markedly different one.

Table 1 — Environmental Conditions’ Relationship to Air Density and Drag

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
<th>AIR DENSITY</th>
<th>DRAG</th>
<th>BULLET STRIKE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase Altitude</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Altitude</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Temperature</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease Temperature</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4
The Soldier fires and sees dust kick up several inches above his target’s head. Why? When the Soldier zeroed his weapon, the terrain was flat, but now the target is at a significant angle and the effects of gravity on the bullet are reduced because the horizontal distance to the target is less at 45 degrees than at zero degrees when he zeroed. This would also be true if the target was at a downward angle of 45 degrees. (Some minor differences do develop between high and low trajectories of the same angle due to changing air densities and gravity conditions; however, they are so minute as to be negligible.) To visualize the difference these angles can make, compare the trajectories depicted in Figure 5.

The equations needed to correct these errors are not especially difficult, but it is not practical for an Infantry Soldier on patrol to attempt such calculations under fire. Rather than demonstrate the math and suggest the use of tactical mathematics, it is best to furnish these tables for the rifleman to study and visualize the compensation necessary to bring his rounds on target quickly. The chart can be recreated, laminated, and attached to the weapons’ butt stock with the Soldier only needing to estimate the angle and range to use in such a situation (See Table 2).

Returning to our example, our Soldier who is engaging the enemy bunker at 300 meters away at a 45-degree elevation can see that his bullet will strike about eight inches higher than his optics indicate. He lowers his point of aim by eight inches, squeezes the trigger, and kills the enemy. It is worth reiterating that this holds true for a 45-degree decline as well. In fact, gravity’s effect on trajectory is identical whether the large angle is up or down hill.

**Just a Few Inches**

After describing the kinds

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![Figure 5 — Variation Bullet Path Values for Custom .224 M855 Ball](image5.png)

![Figure 6 — Given Data and Formulas](image6.png)

**Table 2: Grouping Error Caused by a 2 Centimeter Group at 25 Meters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance (Meters)</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>300</th>
<th>400</th>
<th>500</th>
<th>600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.15 in</td>
<td>1.145 inches</td>
<td>2.29 inches</td>
<td>3.43 inches</td>
<td>4.58 inches</td>
<td>5.72 inches</td>
<td>6.87 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.30 in</td>
<td>2.29 inches</td>
<td>4.58 inches</td>
<td>6.87 inches</td>
<td>9.16 inches</td>
<td>11.45 inches</td>
<td>13.74 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.45 in</td>
<td>3.43 inches</td>
<td>6.87 inches</td>
<td>10.31 inches</td>
<td>13.74 inches</td>
<td>17.17 inches</td>
<td>20.60 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.60 in</td>
<td>4.58 inches</td>
<td>9.16 inches</td>
<td>14.80 inches</td>
<td>19.44 inches</td>
<td>24.08 inches</td>
<td>28.72 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.74 in</td>
<td>6.87 inches</td>
<td>13.74 inches</td>
<td>20.60 inches</td>
<td>27.46 inches</td>
<td>34.32 inches</td>
<td>41.18 inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.89 in</td>
<td>9.16 inches</td>
<td>18.32 inches</td>
<td>27.46 inches</td>
<td>36.60 inches</td>
<td>45.74 inches</td>
<td>54.88 inches</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of errors that are prone to develop under unique terrain or weather conditions, the reader may consider them to be small and therefore inconsequential in the larger scheme of things. It is true that these errors are sometimes measured in only a few inches and it might be tempting to dismiss them as beyond the scope of necessary marksmanship training. Understandably, the concepts above probably are too advanced for a beginner rifleman, but to ignore them completely is an unhealthy approach to marksmanship for a few important reasons. The occurrence of rifle wear and tear, ammunition inconsistency, and the fleeting nature of rather small target dimensions in combat situations can erode probability of successful target engagement.

Non-human Causes for Inaccuracy

While the rifleman is often responsible for poor shooting accuracy, there are other factors that will adversely affect the weapon’s potential to shoot accurately. Ammunition inconsistency and weapon wear can both detract from accuracy. Due to these factors, the Army considers a dispersion of two centimeters at 25 meters with no human error to be acceptable. It is useful to calculate and tabulate the effects of that standard out to the edges of the weapon’s practical ranges. The calculations in Figure 6 demonstrate that an Infantryman can expect a high degree of error at the farther reaches of the M4’s range.

First, we are looking for the angle between the shooter and his shot group assuming a 2-centimeter group at 25 meters. Afterward with some conversions and then some multiplying, we can mathematically demonstrate the expected size of a shot group at all ranges along the trajectory.

The reader can see that without any human error whatsoever, the Infantryman’s shot group is the size of a dinner plate at 300 meters. The smallest of errors is magnified downrange, thus leaders must train marksmen to intuitively eliminate as much human error as possible.

The Target

The desired end-state of engaging another human being with lethal fire is incapacitation, which may be defined as a “sudden physical or mental inability to pose any further” threat to friendly forces, according to FBI Special Agent Urey W. Patrick in Handgun Wounding Factors and Effectiveness. To incapacitate, the Soldier inflicts a wound that either destroys the central nervous system, damages it too severely to function, or causes blood loss so rapid and severe that the central nervous system fails. A rifleman does so by engaging the lethal and immediate incapacitation zones.

The areas designated as lethal zones are called so because of the high probability of rapid incapacitation if the bullet strike is within these zones. Strikes outside of the target area can be equally deadly; however, the probability for rapid neutralization is significantly diminished. While the human head offers the only target for instantaneous incapacitation, it is too small to be rapidly and accurately engaged in most situations. The average target area in the human head is only about 8 inches high and 7 inches wide.

By doctrine, Infantrymen are trained in the concept of incapacitation by targeting a human enemy’s “center of mass.” The size of the target area is obviously dependent on the individual anatomy of the target, but the torso of an average-sized man would present a target area 23 inches high and 21.5 inches across assuming he was standing up straight and facing the rifleman. Aiming center of mass allows between 10-13 inches of error in any direction. However, the target area becomes smaller and less accessible to the firer if his target is fighting from a covered position or laying in the prone. Considering the relatively small size of the optimal target area, a few inches of previously unconsidered error can be of enormous importance.

Conclusions

Long range engagements are a challenging reality of the Infantry experience in the current operating environment. Error, both human and mechanical, accumulates and is particularly evident at these longer ranges. Moreover, the enemy is loath to expose himself and is likely to break contact after only a few shots. Cross winds, moving targets, inaccurate range estimation, heavy breathing, poor sight picture and dozens of other factors, some of them not even combat related, reduce hit probability in the field. For the Infantry to incapacitate the target, there is little time for “trial and error marksmanship.” Getting on target quickly is imperative, and knowing the science of our trade equips the willing student to do so. While the inexperienced marksman may not initially be ready for the lessons proposed in this article, they should eventually be a part of his development and absolutely must be a consideration for tactical leaders whose responsibilities include directing fires in combat. It is appropriate to close with the remainder of the quote that began the essay. They are thoughtful words from an officer who understood the necessity to impart a curiosity in the science of our profession to thinking combat leaders.

“He...who seeks to perfect himself in marksmanship must study the rifle itself and from a certain class of experiments and data arrive at conclusions upon which to base his actions. He, on the other hand, who as a leader of troops in battle will reap the reward of success or shoulder the blame for failure of a tactical decision ‘where fire is everything, the rest of small account’, must study the rifle and the Soldier in an inseparable union, and from the study of this combined weapon and of data quite different from that above considered, he must arrive at conclusions which will govern his actions in the moment of supreme trial.”

— CPT H.E. Eames, The Rifle in War

CPT Wesley A. Moerbe is currently assigned to 199th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, Ga., and is a student in the Maneuver Captains Career Course. His previous assignments include serving as a rifle platoon leader, anti-armor platoon leader, and assistant operations officer all while serving with 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). CPT Moerbe was commissioned in 2004 through the United States Military Academy.
Initially designed as an anti-armor missile, the Javelin has proved to be extremely effective for today’s unconventional warfare and is actively defeating not only armored threats but also other vehicles, fortifications, and urban targets in theater. Employed at the Infantry company level in U.S. Army brigade combat teams, Javelin is playing a prominent role in both Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF).

“Javelin is ideal for the Infantry Soldier,” according to LTC Erik Simonson, Deputy Product Director for Javelin Weapon Systems, Close Combat Weapon Systems (CCWS), Program Executive Office Missiles and Space (PEO MS). “They can reach out and touch the enemy faster and farther than the enemy can touch them without the need to wait for close air support.”

The warfighters agree. “The Javelin missile was an invaluable weapon in defeating enemy armored forces and reinforced positions to include bunkers, building, and revetments. There is no other weapon that can support dismounted infantry in fighting against these types of engagements,” states the after action report of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Javelin is the first “fire-and-forget” shoulder-launched, anti-tank missile fielded to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Replacing the wire-guided Dragon missile system, Javelin consists of a missile in a disposable launch tube and a reusable Command Launch Unit (CLU), which houses the daysight, night vision sight (NVS) and controls. The CLU allows for battlefield surveillance, target acquisition, missile launch, and battle damage assessment. Training is supported by three components that are fielded with the system: the Missile Simulation Round, Field Tactical Trainer, and Basic Skills Trainer.

The Javelin Basic Skills Trainer provides training in field surveillance, target locating and acquisition, and fire mission control in the classroom, garrison, or aboard ship. It features preprogrammed training scenarios that are available through a color LCD display embedded in the simulated CLU.

A Marine with Task Force 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment fires a Javelin missile at enemy targets during an assault on a Taliban-held compound in Afghanistan in August 2008. LCpl Gene Allen Ainsworth III, USMC
Operational switches and controls perform exactly like the actual equipment.

Javelin offers a top-attack flight mode to defeat armored vehicles, as well as a direct-attack mode for use in urban terrain against buildings or fortifications. The Javelin’s fire-and-forget guidance enables the gunner to fire and then immediately take cover, greatly increasing survivability. Additionally, Javelin’s soft launch reduces the visual and acoustic signature of the missile, making it difficult for the enemy to identify and locate the gunner. The limited back blast also enables gunners to safely fire from enclosures and covered fighting positions.

A man-portable system, Javelin is the only close combat missile system that can be operated primarily in a dismounted role. At less than 50 pounds, Javelin is designed to take the fight to the enemy and give dismounted Soldiers the ability to deal with a host of unexpected threats. Its imposing lethality, high reliability, and small logistics tail make Javelin ideally suited to rapid deployment.

Modern History

In 1989, the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command awarded a contract to the Javelin Joint Venture (JJV) for the development of Javelin as a replacement for the M47 Dragon anti-tank missile. The JJV was formed by Texas Instruments (now Raytheon Missile Systems) of Dallas, Texas, and Lockheed Martin Electronics and Missiles (now Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control) of Orlando, Fla. The CCWS Project Office, part of PEO MS at Redstone Arsenal, is responsible for the Javelin Missile System and its lifecycle management. In 1994, Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) of Javelin was authorized, and in 1996 the first Javelins were deployed with U.S. Army units. Full-rate production began in May 1997.

More than 25,000 missiles and 6,600 CLUs have been sold to the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and international customers. Javelin has been selected by the armed forces of 11 allied nations: the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Norway, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Taiwan, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and the Sultan of Oman. Another six nations are currently considering the Javelin system.

Production of the Block I missile upgrade began in 2006, with successful qualification firings taking place in January 2007. The Block I missile upgrade features an improved rocket motor that reduces the missile’s time of flight, improved probability of hit/kill at 2,500 meters, and an enhanced performance warhead that increases Javelin’s lethality. Full materiel release for the Block I missile was received in 2008 and the first production lots are now in the U.S. Army stockpile.

The Block I CLU upgrade received full materiel release in 2007 and fielding to units began that same year. A significant performance improvement in the Block I CLU is an increase in target identification range through use of a larger afocal lens (12X vs 9X) plus the addition of electronic zoom capability. Surveillance operating time was increased through a combination of longer lasting batteries and CLU power management. Additional improvements include improved software processing, a digital display with menu-driven access to features, the ability for the gunner to select between a “black hot” or “white hot” display, and an RS-170 standard video output to allow remote viewing of the gunner display. Units deploying to theater have priority for being fielded CLUs with Block I upgrades.

These improvements are geared at maintaining Javelin’s lethality against the latest armor, while developing greater effectiveness against irregular threats. Future modifications include a multipurpose warhead featuring shaped charges for armored vehicles and fragmentation for anti-personnel effects. Army laboratories have contributed a significant investment to ready the multipurpose warhead (MPWH) for productionization. The cut-in of the MPWH into the Javelin production line, when funded, will represent a significant increase in capability against the type of irregular targets that our warfighters are currently pitted against and will continue to face in future fights. The MPWH will not only be very effective against bunkers, snipers, insurgents placing IEDs, and other soft targets, but it will also maintain its lethality against the world’s best armored vehicles and tanks.

CCWS is also looking to develop precision terminal guidance (PTG), which would allow the gunner to redirect the missile mid-flight, and advanced networking capability to provide and transmit real-time tactical data for operations or surveillance.

In Theater

A Javelin-equipped commander not only controls the tempo of the battlefield but also influences its shaping.

“A few well-placed shots with the Javelin will bring an enemy’s approach to a halt,” said MAJ Bill Venable, assistant TRADOC Capability Manager, Infantry Brigade Combat Team (TCM-IBCT). “The enemy commander is forced to reconsider his approach and...
the array of forces he is presenting to the U.S. force.”

Since its fielding, Javelin has changed the way enemy armored forces plan assaults on suspected U.S. Infantry areas of operation.

“A single Javelin team of two Soldiers can hide in a concealed location more than a mile and a half away from an approaching tank formation and kill the best tanks in the world with proven effectiveness,” said MAJ Venable. Battlefield comments from Iraqi soldiers who were in tank formations that were engaged by U.S. Soldiers corroborated that the Iraqis were not able to detect the launch or approach of the missiles. Tanks in the formation started exploding around them before they knew anything was happening. Javelin was also critical in the taking of Baghdad Airport and in the Battle of Debecka Pass, where 30 U.S. Special Forces who were pinned down by an advancing Iraqi armored column used the Javelin to stop the enemy in its tracks and sustained no casualties.

Following the neutralization of the armored tank threat in the early days of OIF, Javelin continues to see extensive use in the unconventional battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, and British allies are effectively employing Javelin against a wide range of secondary targets including light-skinned vehicles, bunkers, buildings, and other fortifications as well as personnel.

“Javelin was also critical in the taking of Baghdad Airport and in the Battle of Debecka Pass, where 30 U.S. Special Forces who were pinned down by an advancing Iraqi armored column used the Javelin to stop the enemy in its tracks and sustained no casualties.

The CLU, used in the stand-alone mode for battlefield reconnaissance and target detection, has also proven effective in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The most powerful man-portable sensor on the battlefield below battalion level, it provides dominant surveillance capability to the dismounted Soldier. The CLU is employed at the front lines of combat formations and is likely one of the very first sensors to detect an enemy target. Its long-wave infrared sensors can see through today’s complex battlefields, characterized by sandstorms, smoke, dust, explosions, fog, and obstructions; and enables night surveillance from more than two miles away. The CLU’s stand-alone surveillance capability makes the Javelin ideally suited for peacekeeping and stability operations as well.

Proven in combat, Javelin boasts an operational readiness rate of greater than 98 percent.

“Our Soldiers report complete confidence in the performance of the system. Its reliability, both from a maintenance and lethality perspective, contributes to that sense of confidence,” said MAJ Venable. “It works when you need it, it hits what you’re aiming at, and it kills anything it hits.”

As Javelin continues to receive positive reviews from the front lines of ongoing operations, the lessons learned in theater are actively shaping the program. Javelin offers a strong growth potential due to the system’s modular construction, CLU software enhancements, and adaptability to a wide range of platforms. Its combat-proven effectiveness as a precision man-portable system ensures that the Javelin will be a key weapon system for many years to come. Our warfighters will continue to take the weapon forward into the fight wherever it is needed — whether it is the crowded, urban neighborhoods of OIF or the remote, austere terrains of OEF.

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There are many factors that dictate success or failure in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and these outcomes are largely determined on how the unit handles the specific opportunities presented in its unique battlespace. As Infantrymen, we are asked to do many very disparate tasks, which requires that we develop a large skill set so that those tasks can be accomplished. Traditionally, an Infantryman’s job is to close with and destroy the enemy. This role changes significantly in a counterinsurgency fight. The Infantry Soldier is asked to not only find and kill the enemy, but to train an indigenous force, help establish a stable government, assess village living conditions, pass out humanitarian aid (HA), treat sick or wounded locals, build structures, fix roads, utilize engineer and construction abilities, along with the myriad of other responsibilities that come from properly building and maintaining working relationships.

There are three basic tools that have proven successful in managing all these tasks and “winning the hearts and minds:”

* Gaining trust through building relations with the indigenous population;
* Distribution of humanitarian aid coupled with infrastructure development; and
* Mentoring the various government forces so that they can provide security for their own people.

These three premises are dependent on each other; one must do all three well in order to have impacting effects in the battlespace.

Building the Relationship

A unit’s leaders build relationships through constant interaction with the local populace and Afghan forces. The establishment of a strong relationship requires more than just an occasional village visit; it is imperative that leaders get to know the people as individuals. The unit leadership should know the village elders’ names, their tribe, and their unique tribal history. I would also encourage leaders to learn the names of some of the children, local shopkeepers, and farmers; they will prove to have useful information from time to time. The more locals that recognize the leader as a familiar friend — one that is committed to them and not someone they or their children should fear — then the better the chance the leader has to build a bridge between the host nation government and its people. By genuinely listening to the people and addressing their concerns, leaders can help actively facilitate relationship building. It is important that the unit, not just the leadership, act in kind — have the gunners wave to the locals as the convoy passes through the villages (see how many locals actually wave back and use that as a measurement of support over the months).

When the lead truck stops to search a vehicle or while setting up a hasty traffic check point (TCP), the leader needs to speak with the individual, treat him with respect by thanking him and shaking his hand, and wishing him well on his journey after the search is complete. Through these types of interactions, the unit will slowly...
have success, and individuals will begin to come forward with valuable information about the situation in the area of operations (AO). Be an expert on the history of the assigned battlespace by knowing the tribes, sub-tribes, village origin, family disputes, etc; the more a leader knows and the more knowledge he has, the more ground he will gain.

Before conducting a leader engagement, ensure security is established and an overwatch position is in place covering all possible exfiltration routes out of a village. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) — whether that be the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Border Police (ABP), or the Afghan Security Group (ASG) — should request for the village elders to escort the unit into the town. If it is or becomes necessary for the unit to conduct a search through the compounds while the leadership is meeting, permission should be requested first. Success in leader engagements has been created by knowing the villages and occasionally quizzing the children on school curriculum before discussing the talking points with the adults. It is vital that the leadership be seen as men first and Soldiers second, so that tribesmen and the unit leaders can share common ground as individuals in order to make progress towards building trust and relationships.

Once the leaders of the village have opened up, a smooth transition into village assessments and issues can be made. These issues and assessments include potential future projects, security, education, active participation and support of the government through joining the police force, ANA, and attending Shuras. Most village elders do not mind if pictures are taken and their information is recorded, but always ask permission and explain why (so that they can be identified by name and to help better build on the relationship between his village and the unit).

At the bare minimum have at least one ANSF leader present during the engagement. This consideration will not only put an Afghan face on the meeting, but it can lead into recruitment and a question and answer session with a government representative. The relationship displayed between the coalition and Afghan leaders is as important as that of a platoon leader and platoon sergeant or a company commander and first sergeant. When an engagement is finished and the unit leaves the village, the Afghans talk. It is human nature to want to be part of a strong team or community, one that takes care of each other and provides opportunity. By showing this united front with strong bonds, Afghan tribes will not only be interested, but it will stir inspiration among those who want to better their lives and those of their families. Always rehearse the talking points with the Afghan counterpart to ensure the values and vision are shared.

The long term effects of winning a COIN fight are how these people will remember the footprint American Soldiers left in their country. It is about our character, our kindness, and our generosity. The Afghans have strong feelings of distrust and anger towards the Soviets. We must consider how we want to be remembered. If we help construct the base infrastructure for each district to build upon, we will always be recognized for the help and community development that we provided.

It is important that a leader have an area of operations that is not bigger than what he can influence. Visiting a village in the battlespace once a month is hardly winning the COIN fight; it requires tireless effort, an almost “campaign trail” approach in trying to visit each village at least once or twice a week if possible. Gomal is the largest district in the Paktika Province. It is impossible for one platoon to control and develop Gomal in its entirety. If this is the case in any given battlespace, determine what sphere of influence the unit is possible of having and seek to achieve effects in that targeted area.

Ensuring that the unit has enough dismounts available to engage and interact with the local populace, while still maintaining sound security, is of the utmost importance. Remember, the more a leader believes he is protecting his force by staying grounded to the forward operating base (FOB), the less secure he and his force really are. To truly protect his unit, the leader must get out and live amongst the people and use the FOB to refit and grant down time when necessary.

Be patient with the tribal elders, they have been around long enough to fight and survive for generations. The leadership needs them on their side — that being said, they still have strong beliefs in tribal law and often will not recognize the governmental laws of Afghanistan. The military leader needs their advice, opinions, and support at the weekly Shura meetings. While many of them make overly broad requests, tolerating them with a congenial attitude is what gains ground. For example, at a Shura in the Gomal District, a village elder told the Afghan leadership that the tribesmen will punish people as they see fit, be it killing a man, burning his home down, or killing his family and livestock, depending on the severity of his crime. The Afghan and coalition leadership countered his argument by reinforcing how this only causes deeper tribal tension among villages; in a culture rich in honor and revenge, such acts could be fought over for generations. By allowing the Afghan government to uphold an equal law for everyone and objectively pursue those who disobey, the people do not have to continue the internal
conflicts that run deep in their history.

The weekly Shura should be an organized and efficient meeting, and rest assured it will take time until this landmark is reached. They are accustomed to disorder and chaos, but with coalition mentorship they can become a successful group. Unit leadership must address the issue of representation for each village or tribe in the district (at least one village elder); otherwise, some areas will prosper while others continue to struggle. If there is not a sub-governor or Shura president, then encourage them to elect both. Help get the Shura established by teaching them about how to run meetings, conduct business, and work together. Always have an agenda, set SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, realistic, and timely) goals, and plan tasks for the follow-up meeting. Provide Shura member ID cards for the elders, military ID cards for the local forces, and write memorandums for the sub-governor and police chief (conduct a follow-up on the memorandums with the American counterparts such as provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs] or embedded tactical trainer [ETTs]). Once they grasp the concept, allow the Shura president, sub-governor, and military or police leadership to lead the meeting. Once things seem to be running smoothly, teach the sub-governor, police chief, and Shura president about task organization. Sub-governors are often so overwhelmed with requests, demands, and issues that they can hardly get anything done; so with the support and vote of the Shura, elect members for cabinet positions at the district level (i.e. minister of education, finance, development, agriculture, etc). This gets everyone involved in some aspect of district improvement and allows the sub-governor to manage the Shura rather than being the backstop for complaints. However, be mindful that each elected cabinet minister will naturally look out for his village and sub-tribe before any others in the district (be prepared to counter this). Remember, U.S. forces are guests at the Shura meeting, so encourage the Afghan leaders to conduct the engagement and empower them through battalion and company resources. U.S. forces are there for mentorship, security, and to aid in reconstruction projects. The tribal leaders will never be successful if we do not allow them to be independent; the leadership should quietly support them, but avoid making the locals dependant on the coalition forces for everything. Utilize battalion resources to empower the sub-governor, Shura president, and police chief. There are many resources available at the battalion level so keep organized notes of meetings and requests, and be persistent in getting aid to the district.

Remember to use extreme discretion, caution, and care with both direct and indirect hostile intent fires (HIF); every unit has more firepower than it will ever need in any village, so use disciplined control measures to determine the best course of action if it ever goes kinetic in a populated area. Tactical patience is one of the most important attributes a leader must have in combat. A new unit in country was out on a patrol in a district; they were in an observation post (OP) overlooking a road into the valley, when they spotted two individuals with a shovel down near the road. They immediately took these two locals for insurgents trying to emplace an improvised explosive device (IED) along the route and engaged them, killing one and wounding the other. When they moved down to the engagement area, they came to see that the wounded individual was just a boy and the one killed was his father. They were attempting to fix a wash out in the road when they were shot. This is the easiest way to lose the trust of the people and possibly never gain it back. This village and sub-tribe will certainly not support the government or coalition forces, and there is a good chance that his son and others may join sides with the insurgents.

**HA Distribution and Projects**

Humanitarian aid distribution is the most popular and successful way to create a positive image for a unit. Many of the women and children fear coalition convoys as they roll by, but when the vehicles stop and Soldiers distribute supplies or give medical treatment, these locals no longer see the unit as foreign invaders or infidels whom they need to fear. With few exceptions, most of the village elders will not be swept off their feet by the American guests in their country. This lack of support can be helped by focusing on the next generation that will become elders. By gaining ground with them, the ideals of the coalition and Afghan government can flower. If this generation of children remembers us as positive representatives of freedom — individuals that they want to emulate — then the hard work we have put in will have borne good fruit. Get as many supplies and resources from your battalion as possible, and encourage the American public to get involved. Supporters back home have sent a wide variety of goods such as school supplies, candy, toys, dolls, children’s clothes, shoes, and games (anysoldier.com, soldiersangels.com, USO, etc). Wheat and corn seed distributions are vital for economic growth in any district, so go the extra step and provide fertilizer as well. The mosque refurbishment kits are not only accepted with open arms by every village, but provide concrete evidence that we support Islam and

*Afghan National Army soldiers distribute winter clothing in the Spera District.*
are not here to threaten it or its people. This attention will help in the information operations (IO) campaign by not giving the enemy propaganda to use against us.

Giving out HA is one of the more enjoyable experiences for Soldiers. After security is in place and a defendable and safe site is established to conduct the distribution, the leader should afford Soldiers the opportunity to switch out if they want to hand out any supplies. In order to keep things organized, bring the villagers and children in through one search checkpoint and send them out another. As they enter the perimeter, have the children sit down and keep them separate from the adults. The Soldiers can then give the children toys, clothes, school supplies, and candy, while the adults receive the plant seed, flour, sugar, mosque kits, etc. One of the more memorable distributions was when we had a Soldier lead a personal hygiene class for the children. He taught them how to brush their teeth and use soap and shampoo. Every time we visited that village in the future, the children would come running out grinning ear to ear with their toothbrushes in hand.

It is important to keep an accurate inventory of humanitarian aid and the villages in which it has been distributed. After conducting an initial assessment of the size of a village, cater the HA loads to meet the number of individuals in a village. A leader should always carry HA in each vehicle; it should become part of the vehicle load plan. The unit leadership will come to learn that most villages keep the same list of priorities for HA. The mosque refurbishment kits and solar panels are always highest on the list, followed by cold weather gear and boots in the winter, wheat and corn seed during the harvest months (as well as fertilizer), school supplies for areas with teachers and facilities, and then the rice, beans, flour, hygiene kits, dolls, candy, etc. Allow the ANSF forces on the patrol to distribute the HA also; this courtesy will not only give power to them, but allow the people to physically see that their government supports them.

Once the leadership has identified the most important development/reconstruction needs of the village (be it a well and hand pump, floodwall, irrigation dam, or school) write up a proposal for the S9 and/or provincial reconstruction team (PRT). Something we were not fortunate enough to have but would have been ideal is an embedded PRT Soldier or liaison with us at all times or even once a month to assess these projects and get things in motion through their channels. Ensure not to allow the villagers to believe they are getting these projects until the contract has been approved; otherwise, the village will quickly lose faith and interest in their government. Follow up on these contracts and provide a timetable to the village so they know when to expect the project to begin. These developmental projects will clearly display to the local populace how the government’s actions coupled with the people’s cooperation will benefit them.
Development of Indigenous Forces

Developing the indigenous forces is the single most important task in counterinsurgency warfare. It is their nation and the amount of time we spend here in the future depends on Afghans’ ability to act and operate independently and allow their government to become stable. Training the Afghan soldiers, regardless of ANA, ANP, or ABP, is not just the job of the embedded training team mentors. If a unit works with them, goes on missions with them and interacts with them, then it becomes their job as well. Do not neglect this duty, because it is paramount to their success. Without constant guidance and supervision at the beginning of the relationship, the Afghan unit has a much greater chance to fail, be it because of ineffectiveness or corruption. Many units lack education, military doctrine or leadership, and proper planning techniques. Treat these soldiers as part of the team by taking care of them and by remembering to teach, coach, and mentor them.

When the unit stays at a district center, combat outpost or small firebase with an indigenous element, it is essential to include them in classes and joint meetings. Allow them to give a class to the unit’s men on Afghan customs, courtesies, and culture; in turn, coalition soldiers can give them a class on how to properly conduct searches, raids, and set up traffic control points. Leaders should eat with them (if they can handle the food) and invite them to eat with coalition forces when possible. Teach them about personal hygiene, weapons maintenance, and individual soldier discipline; pair them up with squads for these types of educational classes. The trust and bonds gained through constant interaction will help keep the coalition and Afghan soldiers alive.

Afghans have a culture rich in honor; they will feel obligated to protect the unit as their duty. Train the indigenous element on varying the routes and times of travel, and ask them about enemy signs such as stacked and marked rocks because they know the culture and hidden signs much better than we do. In one district, supportive locals would place a circle of rocks in the road to mark improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for coalition and Afghan convoys; these simple acts of courage undoubtedly saved Soldiers lives. In another district insurgents used rock formations to indicate to the locals where the IEDs were; they also used these rock stacks as aiming stakes on when to initiate an attack or detonate a buried explosive. The unit leadership must train Soldiers to recognize these tactics; they must be alert and aware of the situation at all times regardless whether they are driver, gunner, or passenger. The Afghan soldiers can train the American counterparts to identify such signs while on joint patrols; many from the indigenous element know the terrain and the way the enemy thinks better than anyone in the unit, utilize these individuals because the insight they share is invaluable.

After these missions, build pride within their team by expressing satisfaction for any good work and conducting after action reviews (AARs) with their leadership. Discuss the value of having them on the patrol and give them things to work on before the next mission. If they did something to jeopardize the lives of anyone on the patrol, be sure to mentor the Afghan leadership in proper discipline measures so that it never happens again. Encourage them to conduct local patrols on their own so they can sharpen their skills and become proactive; these patrols are the first step in making them operate independently. It is important to understand that the host nation forces doing some things tolerably is often better than the coalition forces doing it well.

While back at the FOB or police center, teach the Afghan counterparts about accountability. Under the leader’s supervision, the Afghan leadership should conduct an inventory of all unit-issued equipment at least once a month and hold them responsible for anything missing or not collected from any soldiers who quit. Afghan officials, both soldiers and sub-governors, tend to believe government-issued equipment is their personal property. If someone is fired or quits, they will attempt to keep the weapon, vehicle, uniform, or documents provided. It is imperative that the coalition leadership keeps an eye out for these issues because the equipment can be sold to insurgents, and the vehicles and uniforms can become instruments for suicide bombers and vehicle-born explosives.

Make contact with their higher headquarters’ American counterpart so that the Afghan element can get the support they need. Help fill out supply, wood, fuel, and ammunition requests so that they can be properly equipped on a monthly basis. Never promise the Afghan counterparts anything that cannot be delivered (this goes for the locals, too!). Use the local forces to spread the word on small rewards program for weapons caches and enemy information; occasionally, villagers will feel more comfortable talking with the police chief than the Americans. If the information he provides to the police chief turns out to be accurate, ensure that anonymous informant is paid so others will see how much money they can make by supporting their own government.

These are a few of the techniques we have found success with in the last 15 months. If one of these works one week, it may not the next; if it is well received in one village, it may not be in the next. Each village will be different, and the leadership must tailor their approach based off their initial observation. Because these situations are always fluid, a unit leader must bring dynamic solutions to each individual problem. If the unit leaders and Soldiers bring the proper tactics and attitude coupled with energy and efficiency to their area of operations and do not simply go through the motions, it will be a highly rewarding and successful deployment for both the locals and the unit. The coalition forces are the ambassadors of freedom for their battlespace, once the locals get a taste of the opportunity for a better life, they will inevitably crave the possibilities to have such. However, stay committed to the cause because success is only granted through tireless effort.

CPT Brad Israel recently attended the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, Ga. He was previously assigned to the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Vicenza, Italy. While with the unit, he served as a rifle platoon leader, heavy weapons platoon leader, and scout platoon leader. CPT Israel was commissioned in August 2005 through Officer Candidate School.
THE REVITALIZATION OF SAMARRA

Samarra sits on the eastern bank of the Tigris River, about 175 kilometers north of Baghdad and 50 kilometers south of Tikrit. While Tikrit is the capital of Salah al Din Province (and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein), Samarra boasted the largest population in the province (approximately 300,000 before OIF I and a meager 100,000 when we arrived). Samarra is a 99-percent Sunni city with one of the holiest Shia shrines, the al Askarya Mosque (better known as the Golden Mosque). Al-Qaida nearly started a civil war in Iraq by blowing up the Golden Dome of the mosque in 2006 and then attacked its minarets in 2007. For good measure, they also executed a complex attack on Samarra’s main Iraqi Police station in 2007, killing one of its few effective police officers. That IP station was only a few hundred meters away from a U.S. Army patrol base where we would eventually live.

Unlike most of Iraq, Samarra did not benefit from the surge or the Awakening. The surge drove insurgents north out of Baghdad to Diyala and then into Samarra. The Awakening in Anbar Province drove them east to the Jazeera Desert and Samarra. These two insurgent forces took control of Samarra by the spring of 2007. Insurgents openly paraded and patrolled the streets. They kidnapped and executed National Policemen at the city’s second largest market during the day. They moved freely into and out of the city, through the Jalam and Jazeera Deserts, and in the surrounding villages. They had a key media hub in al Rega and an in-processing and training center in Jazeera. To control a city in the context of counterinsurgency means to control its people. Despite its having been cleared four times by the U.S. Army, insurgents controlled Samarra.

An augmented Charlie Company of 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), assumed responsibility for the city in October of 2007. A few months before, several hundred National Police, Iraqi Police, and Iraqi Army moved into the city, and their presence helped. But for the most part, despite a valiant fight by the outgoing unit, the 101st found a city with no government, no economy, no essential services, no security, and no hope.

In a period of 14 months, 2-327th Infantry and the people of Samarra transformed the city. Security is vastly improved, with few attacks on Americans and even fewer on Iraqis. Empty roads sport vehicles again. Closed shops are open. A new mayor and city counsel president are working to get the city functioning again. The transformation began with hard close combat, aided by physically closing off the city to insurgents. Months of respectful but fruitless interaction with the people finally began generating intelligence. Targeted, restrained raids led to key detentions. In March Samarra began its own awakening, coupled with a thorough census and emplacement of concrete T-walls to secure neighborhoods. Throughout the process, we spent hours each day asking locals how we could help, and then trying to help when we could. It is probably an overstatement to say that the locals liked us, but they certainly sided with us, and together we changed their city.

This article focuses on 2-327th’s actions between April and November 2008, after most of the fighting had ended. The city was secure, but it still lacked a government, essential services, and economic stability. Our battalion commander (LTC J.P. McGee) and S3 (MAJ Jim Deore) realized that security gains would quickly erode if we did not begin to make progress in these areas. Our battalion created the No Slack Revitalization Team (NSRT), a group of officers paired with Iraqis with the mission to restore government, essential services, and economic prosperity to Samarra.

While we found it fulfilling to improve the lives of locals, NSRT was still a piece of the counterinsurgency fight. Counterinsurgency is a political and social fight, with the military accounting for only a fraction of the effort. We chose to try to fix every school and pave every road in order to reward or entice a neighborhood’s support.

Figure 1 — Samarra’s Biggest Market in December 2007

Figure 2 — Samarra’s Biggest Market in December 2008
Every local who benefited from these improvements was another potential source of intelligence and another defense against the insurgents’ return.

I worked on the rule of law in Samarra, an area in which we made great progress. I will use the rule of law as a case study of the overall system for rebuilding a city’s, province’s, or country’s government, essential services, and economy.

The No Slack Revitalization Team succeeded in restoring the rule of law to Samarra because we treated revitalization as the main effort in our counterinsurgency fight and used an active partnership with local counterparts, instead of a passive advising role. The active partnership succeeded due to the amount of time we spent engaging the locals, our organic mobility and security, our location on a small patrol base in the city, and our commitment to accountability.

NSRT Overview

CPT Juan Garcia, the battalion fire support officer (FSO), led the No Slack Revitalization Team, which consisted of four platoon leaders, a civil affairs officer (CAO), a civilian law enforcement professional (LEP), and our battalion surgeon. Our satellite provincial reconstruction team (PRT) member also attended most meetings, and our battalion commander and S3 oversaw the team. Eventually we added a member of the military transition team (MiTT) responsible for escorting fuel from Bayji, the local IRD representative (a private company associated with the U.S. Agency for International Development that was completing projects in Samarra), and three more platoon leaders who came to our company later in the deployment. In the last few months our company commander, CPT Joshua Kurtzman, who had intimate knowledge of almost everything going on in the city, joined the group. He had been focused on security, but the battalion commander realized that he should have been a part of NSRT from the beginning, due to his connections and involvement in all of the city’s affairs.

We each assumed responsibility for an essential service or an aspect of government. Our initial areas of responsibility included electricity, water, rule of law, education, agriculture, health, industry/minerals, municipalities, and microfinance. After a few months we added fuel, due to its huge value to the locals and the vast amount of corruption surrounding it. Each officer partnered with the local counterpart responsible for that aspect of government. Some officers had more than one area. NSRT Six worked with the city council president and director of municipalities. The PRT representative worked with the mayor. The civil affairs officer and NSRT Six handled the money, project paperwork, and liaising with brigade and higher. The team met weekly with the battalion commander and S3.

We partnered with locals; we did not do things for them. The one area in which we did act unilaterally was money. We encouraged the Iraqis to use their own funds when possible, but did not delay action on any project due to lack of Iraqi financing. We did not hesitate to use American money. We worked with the locals; we advised them and supervised them. At times we suggested to the city council and mayor to replace incompetent people. We took a very active role in revitalizing the city.

The Iraqis largely rose to the challenge, but it is important to note that it required constant attention and supervision on our part to ensure that the Iraqis did what they said they would. Americans provided an incorruptible force in a corrupt society. We supervised to make sure the money (or fuel or detainees) went where it should, without corruption. We provided motivation where they lacked it. We provided a capacity for planning, foresight, and organization that the Iraqis lacked, especially at the municipal level. We provided support when a local director or politician might come under pressure, whether from insurgents or other politicians. We provided pressure on provincial politicians when the locals were powerless to do so. We always presented our efforts to the public as Iraqi projects, and the locals largely responded well. But, the local leaders were not ready to do this on their own.

NSRT members evaluated their essential services, set goals, and worked toward achieving them. As for electricity, we realized that we could not generate more power for a city wallowing in less than four hours of electricity a day. We could emplace transformers, however, to improve distribution and target them to certain market areas or neighborhoods. We funded and built a water treatment facility. We renovated several schools. We funded and fixed the city’s asphalt plant with the intent that it would be used to pave the city’s roads. We fixed the city’s vehicles so they could begin garbage and rubble removal. Then we continued to supervise these projects after completion to ensure that the vehicles removed garbage, the city maintained its water treatment facility, and
that the roads were paved.

Different sources and amounts of money required different approval mechanisms and authorities. At times, brigade and division also supplied people with expertise that we lacked. We also developed contacts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Person nel at the brigade partnered with Iraqi provincial politicians and technocrats, because our brigade headquarters was at a COP outside of Tikrit. Our local counterparts worked with these Iraqi provincial leaders, while we worked with their American counterparts. With the exception of the local PRT representative, some e-mails and a visit by an American electrical expert, we never made contact with Iraqis or Americans in Baghdad working on a national level.

The Main Effort

Battalion Main Effort — FM 3-0, Operations, defines main effort as “the activity, unit, or area that commanders determine constitutes the most important task at that time. Commanders weight the main effort with resources and priorities and shift it as circumstances and intent demand.” Charlie Company was our battalion main effort. The battalion commander augmented our company with the scout platoon, a Delta Company section, a tactical human intelligence team, a law enforcement professional, a CAO, an intelligence officer, and eventually the NSRT.

When NSRT began, it became the battalion main effort. Just as our battalion augmented Charlie Company for its kinetic fight, it gave NSRT the people and resources it needed to complete its mission. The battalion commander and S3 were busy men but came to our patrol base weekly to lead two to three hour-long meetings. The battalion commander also spent most of his reconstruction money in the city, rather than spreading it throughout the battalion AO. Just as the city was the center of the kinetic fight, it became the center of the revitalization effort.

The battalion commander held us to the same high standards to which he held his primary staff. We set targets and tracked milestones. He expected flawless, professional slide presentations. He taught us quickly how to develop systems to plan and track our areas of responsibility. We had short, medium, and long-term goals. We backwards planned. We assessed where

and how we could be effective, and then we executed. We did not spend much time talking or debating. He also gave us freedom. When either we or our counterparts wanted to do a project, he supported us. He set priorities and funded those accordingly, but we each felt a sense of ownership over our areas. Infantrymen are competitive by nature, and just like we each wanted our platoon AO to be the most secure, we each wanted to make the most progress in our area of government.

By spending time with us, the battalion commander made it clear how much NSRT meant to him. By holding us to professional standards several ranks above our own, he forced us to take NSRT seriously. If our local counterpart or agency missed a deadline or failed to complete a project, the battalion commander held us responsible. If we failed to secure the funding we needed, he personally engaged the brigade commander. He took time to engage all of our local counterparts, and if they were consistently under-performing, he used his influence to motivate or replace them. He designated NSRT the main effort and then manned and resourced it accordingly.

Platoon Main Effort — NSRT also became my main effort as a platoon leader. That meant that if my platoon had a patrol and I had a meeting, my platoon sergeant took the patrol and I went to my meeting. As an Infantryman, I did not like this. As a counterinsurgent, I understood its importance and executed my mission. Less of a combat environment and a group of outstanding NCOs made this arrangement possible. We could not have made NSRT our main effort without the hard fight of the first six months of the deployment.

NSRT as main effort also meant that it consumed a great deal of my non-patrolling time. Meetings with counterparts lasted for hours sometimes, and we met several times a week. I would spend time prepping for my meetings, just as platoons rehearse for operations. Then, I would take time after the meeting to record its results and analyze their implications. Sometimes this took a few minutes, sometimes a few hours, depending on the meeting. Preparing for NSRT meetings also took time, because we had to present professional slides. I spent time discussing issues with my company and battalion commander, battalion FSO, S2, and LEP. NSRT was a full-time commitment.

Rule of Law

Background — The full story of the rule of law in Samarra would take too long to tell and delve too deeply into Iraqi law. Instead, I will use some examples from the rule of law to illustrate our approach to revitalization.

When we arrived, Samarra had no rule of law. It had no judges or judicial investigators. It had a jail, but it was completely corrupt. Detainees had no opportunity for trial, whether they were insurgents or innocent civilians rounded up for bribes. Some detainees lingered in jail for two years with no trial. Instead of a trial, a committee of Iraqi National Police (NP) and Iraqi Police (IP) decided whom to release. In order to

LTC J. P. McGee, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, meets with a local Iraqi army officer in Samarra, Iraq.
secure a detainee’s release, family would have to pay $3,000-5,000 to the IP and NP. For an insurgent, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) received $30,000-50,000. In January, insurgents and corrupt ISF took advantage of an uninformed National Police Transition Team (NPTT) member and released more than 30 al-Qaida operatives, resulting in an increase in significant activities (SIGACTs). ISF investigators and jailers were chosen for political connections or their ability to deliver bribes for releases. Abuse occurred regularly in the jail. Detainees did not receive regular food and water and received no medical care. The courthouse, judges’ residence, and jail all needed significant refurbishment. Each day on patrol, local citizens would pass us the names of sons and fathers in jail, begging for their release.

Iraqis are no different from Americans in that they want a fair system, but Samarra had no system of rule of law at all. This was not only difficult for the locals, but it hurt our counterinsurgency campaign. We worked with the ISF, but the locals viewed them, especially the NP, as corrupt. We sent detainees who did not have enough evidence for U.S. detention to the Samarra jail, where they could be abused or released for bribes. The jail hurt the locals, but it hurt our standing in the community as well.

Long before the kinetic fight ended, the battalion set the stage for re-introducing the rule of law. The local government asked the province for judges to come back to Samarra, and the battalion commander and FSO lobbied their counterparts at the provincial level as well. They sought money to refurbish the residence and courthouse, damaged and looted for years. Our battalion leadership showed great foresight in making these moves early, so that when the security situation improved, we could begin working immediately. In April, when the city was more secure than it had been in years, things began to change.

Between April and November of 2008, we made great strides in the rule of law. We brought back four judges and four judicial investigators. We replaced the corrupt jailers with professional, honest men. We secured financing to repair the courthouse and judicial residence. We improved security at the courthouse, and worked with USACE and U.S. Marshals on a large project to upgrade the courthouse and jail’s security. We worked with the Police Transition Team (PTT) and civilian police advisers to improve the investigative competence of the IP and NP. We worked with the judges and jailers to release innocent detainees and send insurgents to trial in Tikrit. We almost completely stopped jail corruption.

Between April and November, the judges released more than 800 detainees with no increase in SIGACTs. The NP ran a jail with regular food, water, and medical care. We registered and tracked every detainee, whether from a U.S., NP, IP, or Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) raid. We improved the efficiency of the legal process, and by November, it was functioning almost up to Iraqi constitutional standards. Then we worked with the judges and jailers to implement a unique reconciliation system. In April, the jail held more than 400 detainees, nearly all of whom were detained for terrorism and only 31 for non-terror crimes. When we left, the jail held 149 detainees — 76 for terrorism and 73 for criminal acts, and 10 of those were pending release. Civil suits are now a common occurrence. On patrol, no one complains about the rule of law anymore.

The legal system in Samarra still has many problems, chief of which is the difficult interaction between the government (ISF and judges) and the CLC. The ISF and judges want to arrest many CLC members and leaders for their past insurgent acts. To do so would be completely legal and is probably required under Iraqi law; however, it would also jeopardize peace in the city. The head of all ISF in Samarra still maintains release authority, which is in complete violation of the Iraqi Constitution. As such, the threat of corruption remains. Also, the National Police runs the jail, but eventually the local IP will take over. They do not have the same competence as the NP yet. The IP and NP still lack investigative skills. Only 9 percent of detainees sent to Tikrit for trial are convicted, usually because of a lack of witnesses who do not make the trip from Samarra or from lack of physical evidence. Despite the role that we gave the Iraqi judges in our reconciliation program, most ISF view it as an American effort and reserve the right to arrest those who have reconciled. Despite the problems, we set the system up to continue to improve in the future.

The Parties Involved — We realized early that we could not separate the jail from the rule of law. Only by working both systems could we succeed. Charles Storlie, a law enforcement professional, took the lead on the jail and engaged the NP that ran it. I worked on the legal system, courthouse, and relations with the judges.

The civilians and Soldiers in Tikrit played an important role in our efforts, but should have been more effective then they were. I cannot speak for every essential service or the civilians and Soldiers that strove so hard to improve Iraqi lives. I only speak here about my experiences in the rule of law. However, I think that these experiences reveal lessons that apply in many areas. The PRT had a civilian rule of law expert from the Department of Justice who operated out of the COP in Tikrit. The division also assigned a JAG officer for rule of law issues. At times, other Soldiers who worked with the PRT or Civil Affairs would briefly enter into our efforts, but the main people I dealt with were the civilian expert and the JAG.

Active vs Passive Partnership — The best way to help the Iraqis is to work hand-in-hand with them. We did not do anything for them, except secure American funding. However, it is not enough to just teach them and then let them work on their own. Herein lies the greatest difference between our approach and that of others working on the rule of law in Salah al Din. We took a much more active, involved, and insistent approach.

Some people could object that we sacrificed long-term success for short-term gain by taking an active role. They could say that by not allowing the Iraqis to try and fail on their own, we deprived them of a learning experience. We might have developed a stable system in Samarra, they could say, but the minute that we leave, the system will fall apart. They recommend the slow, passive approach, wherein we talk to the Iraqis and let them work it out on their own.

In my opinion, the active approach actually did more for the long-term success of Samarra’s legal system than passivity would have, while also gaining short-run successes. We gave credit to the Iraqis, even when we played a major role in a project. Platoons carried talking points throughout the city, praising the local...
achievements. Moreover, we always operated behind the scenes.

Further, the locals learned how to do things the right way. Providing an honest, hard working, thoughtful, respectful example may do the most for Iraq in the long-term. What could the local judges, investigators, and jailers have learned from a passive approach that involved us talking to them at times and watching them struggle? Not much. Also, when the passive approach allows the Iraqis to fail, they do not learn from their mistakes as much as get frustrated. No matter how active or passive a role we play, the Iraqis will blame us for any failures. We might as well do all we can to achieve success.

The Iraqis were not ready yet to do things on their own. They did not have the experience, training, or education. Some did not have the commitment or will to see things through. Some were dishonest, and others were grossly inept. Too often Americans allowed them to get away with the omnipresent excuse: “in’shallah” or “God willing.” To pretend otherwise is wishful thinking and always leads to wasted time, wasted money, frustration, and failure.

Moreover, we do not have the time to allow the passive approach to succeed or fail. My American counterparts in Tikrit stressed that they wanted to build Iraqi systems and let them work things out for themselves. This strategy takes time, and they felt that I was too impatient. I firmly believe that their approach will not work, even if given 20 years. But the point is moot, because we do not have 20 years. They could never understand the urgency with which we pursued our goals. Soldiers died to secure Samarra; NSRT existed to prevent insurgents from coming back. We had to succeed in the short-term, or there might not be a long-term. Now that America is pulling out of Iraq, whatever window we have throughout the country is closing. I would rather leave them with the best systems we could actively achieve, than with a legacy of frustration and failure and only their neighbors in the region to teach them differently.

**Time and Resources** — The active approach required an immense amount of time and energy. Here, the Department of Justice expert and JAG were at a great disadvantage. They had to serve the entire province, whereas we only worked on our city. I can only imagine how successful our involvement in Iraq would be if each major city had its own rule of law expert and JAG, instead of a police advisor and Infantryman. We should have surged civilian and military experts into Iraq, not just combat arms and support.

We spent many hours engaging our local counterparts at the jail and courthouse. I met with the judges once or twice a week after court ended so as not to disturb their work. I also met with them whenever a crisis arose. I had an Infantry platoon to move and secure me wherever I needed to go, and with the courthouse and jail in Samarra’s green zone, I could take a small dismounted patrol to my engagements between my combat patrols. I also stayed in phone contact with them through our interpreters. Our LEP or I visited the jail daily. We did a daily detainee headcount to ensure no one physically released a prisoner without the judge granting a release. We inprocessed new detainees weekly and conducted bimonthly medical checks with our medics and Iraqi doctors. We gained trust by making small promises, then following through. When Mr. Storlie could not obtain financing to fix the jail’s sewer system, he found PVC pipe at the patrol base, scrounged a little money, and made it happen.

When you are always around, you are around when something happens. Several times we stopped the ISF’s attempt to release detainees without the judge’s consent or our knowledge. We could do that because we were there when it happened.

The legal expert and JAG were constrained by a lack of vehicles and security, and by having to work with judges all over the province. I estimate that the PRT’s rule of law expert and division JAG met the provincial judge once or twice a month. They had no visibility on what went on in the provincial legal system. Tikrit had a three-percent conviction rate when I left Iraq. Was it because of corruption, lack of evidence, or poor work on the part of local judges? No one knows. Tikrit was the home of the province’s Amnesty Committee, a product of Iraqi legislation. The PRT and JAG did not once engage this committee to see if it was legitimate or not, to see if it needed help or security, or even to see who was on it or how it worked. As such, we never allowed Samarra detainees to go to the committee, angering our local judges.

That is why Iraq needs more experts and America needs to give the experts and PRTs dedicated assets, so that they can use the active engagement technique. Without constantly engaging the locals, you cannot revitalize a legal system or anything else.

The location of our small patrol base located in the city not only facilitated engagements with our counterparts, it...
provided other benefits over larger FOBs. Small patrol bases foster a flexible, resourceful mindset. The PRT rule of law expert and the division JAG lived at a large FOB. They had schedules and routines. They were not alone; everyone on large bases falls into a pattern. My platoon sergeant had a broken wrist and caught a logistics patrol to the COP where the PRT and JAG lived. He tried to see a doctor, only to learn that the doctor did not work on Saturdays. In the same way, when we asked Soldiers and civilians at the COP to do something outside of their routine, like engage a provincial judge about computers for the Samarra courthouse, they were reluctant to do so. We had no schedule at our patrol base. We were used to four-hour patrols lasting 14 due to contact or unplanned raids at 0200. That mindset allowed us to be flexible with any issues that came up at the courthouse or jail.

**Accountability**

We held the locals accountable where the PRT and JAG would not. First, we only made promises we could keep, and then we kept them. That meant that we could hold the Iraqis accountable. We did not allow the Iraqis to lie, and we called them out when they did. We forced them to commit to dates and timelines. We strongly encouraged the local leaders to fire incompetent subordinates. For example, we convinced the ISF commanders to remove the officer in charge of the jail and an intelligence officer for corruption. They grudgingly did so. Replacing them with an honest NP, who had a background in detainees, was a huge step forward for the rule of law.

We also forced locals to commit. Anyone who has been to Iraq knows that Iraqis speak differently than Americans, and Iraqis do not always expect to keep their promises or for you to keep yours. Promises are sometimes polite ways to say “no.” This is not a cultural judgment; it is a product of the language. As such, I would not allow “in’shallah” or God-willing promises. I would force the local to commit, and then hold him to it.

One example is very telling. We lacked judicial investigators, which are key players in the Iraqi legal system. I encouraged the local judge to write a request, then obtained a copy (ensuring he actually did it), translated it, and sent both to our provincial counterparts. Then I supervised on both ends. When it became apparent after a month of stalling that no one would help us, I asked the PRT and JAG if the local judge and I could come to Tikrit and engage the provincial judge personally. They made excuses. Replacing them with an honest NP, who had a background in detainees, was a huge step forward for the rule of law.

After the meeting the JAG told me that they did not force the locals to make promises and that they were more interested in building Iraqi systems. I do not know if he really believed this. What I do know is that not only is our active method more effective in each instance (investigators, getting money for the courthouse, installing plumbing in the jail, etc.), but in the end, by our example and our commitment, we taught the Iraqis the right way to do things and allowed their system to develop correctly. Samarra went from having no legal system to having one of the province’s best. The judges saw the right way to operate, and the citizens saw what an uncorrupt system looked like. Even after we leave, they will remember what right looks like. If we had taken a passive approach, none of this would have occurred.

In the end it is all about effort. Whether it is playing a football game, charging a machine gun position or fixing the rule of law, the unit that wants to win the most will usually win. We would not let the locals fail. We let them do things on their own, but we actively helped them. The active approach leads to short and long term success.

**Coordinated Efforts**

We would have had even more success had we had a better relationship with our civilian and military counterparts at the provincial level and higher. My experience in dealing with civilians and military at the provincial level was that they did not understand the urgency of what we were doing in our AO. We had a small window in which to improve essential services, thereby solidifying the people’s support, and cementing the security gains for the first time in five years. The experts said that they wanted to build relationships and processes and let the Iraqis do it themselves. More experts in more locations, living on small patrol bases, would allow them to better understand the people and places that they came overseas to help. By virtue of their proximity to their counterparts, I believe that they would take a more active approach, and therefore achieve more.

From my perspective, we lacked a unified approach. Our battalion, a PRT in Tikrit and Samarra, the PTT and NPTT, IRD, the brigade and division, USACE, and eventually the UN all worked in Samarra. However, no one controlled all of these various groups. The groups did not even coordinate their actions. We could have been much more effective if someone was directing all of these groups toward a single goal, synchronizing their plans, reducing double efforts or massing forces at different times. There may have been, it just did not appear so to me, at my level, in the rule of law.

As an example, USACE’s headquarters was just a few hundred meters from our brigade headquarters on the COP, yet for almost the entire deployment, they never coordinated with us when they did projects in the city. Only late in the deployment were we able to develop a relationship with them, just before USACE was about to spend $500,000 to upgrade the jail and courthouse security. We managed to form a strong relationship with them, which allowed them to improve their plan. They originally proposed metal gates that rose out of the ground and closed circuit television cameras, without knowing that Samarra still lacked electricity 20 hours a day and that any generators would likely not receive the fuel required to run the cameras and gates. We used Hescos instead. By working together, from recon to planning to contracting to execution to supervision, we spent less money, got more out of it, and developed what I hope is a lasting relationship for the follow-on unit.

**Lessons Learned**

Here is a list of successful tactics for implementing the active engagement technique:

- Use a good interpreter, even if he is not your usual interpreter. Some of the conversations will be highly technical. Large amounts of money are involved. It is important to communicate effectively.
- Use interpreter cell phones. Use CAT 2 terps, or the local ones that you trust. It makes life easier to be able to call to set up a
meeting, to verify it, to admonish the local that missed the meeting, to pass on a small piece of information that would otherwise require a patrol to take you somewhere in the city, etc. The local can also call you through the interpreter if there is an issue or problem, and they will. This now improves your overall relationship with the local.

- Meet your counterpart early and often. Like all engagements, you will need to spend time just getting to know the individual. It will take several engagements before the local really forms a relationship with you.
- Meet them when it is convenient for them. Unless it is a time-sensitive matter, understand that they have jobs, appointments, and a life. If you barge into their day unannounced or at its peak, do not expect a fruitful engagement.
- Treat an engagement like a mission — plan for it. I would write out some key talking points on an index card and mark them off while we spoke. I would have a goal for each meeting and would not leave without either accomplishing the goal or trying to and realizing that I would not accomplish it.
- Treat Iraqis with respect, but hold them accountable. Iraqis will tell you what you want to hear. They are incredibly concerned with face, with outward appearance, and with praise. Hold their feet to the fire, make them give concrete answers and set concrete dates; do not accept “in sha’a’allah.” Then, check on it and keep checking until they do what they promised.
- Find the right person for the job. If your counterpart is inept, consider finding a new one. At times there is no one competent for the job, but you can always look. Still treat him with respect, treat him like a man, and hopefully he will respond as one. But if he does not, look to someone else.
- Try to understand the bigger picture. Samarra has the largest population in Salah al Din Province, but the power lies in Tikrit, the provincial capitol. Even under Saddam, Samarra was a neglected city. Then, when Iraq had elections a few years ago, Samarra did not participate, and so has no representation on the provincial council. Tikrit still views Samarra as unsecured, and Tikrit does not trust its leaders. So, it is hard to get provincial support or funding for Samarra projects.
- Work both the Iraqi side and American side. Have the Iraqis send a request for whatever they want through their Iraqi channels, but get a copy from them, translate it, and send it to our (U.S. Soldier or U.S. civilian) counterparts who engage the province. That way, everyone is on the same page and if the province does not uphold its end, the Americans at provincial level can hold them accountable.
- Engage Iraqis at the provincial level by actually going there, using your American counterparts to set the meeting up and introduce you.
- The system is very hierarchical and Iraqis do not usually use initiative. So, it is common to hear an Iraqi say he cannot do something without provincial approval or even approval from Baghdad. Sometimes it is an excuse, but sometimes it is true. Most of us were unable to make contacts in Baghdad, but that is the next step and would be worth trying. At the least you will work with the province.
- Dedicate the CA team to working on Iraqi Commander’s Emergency Response Program and other CF methods to get money for your projects, because the Iraqis will not always come through with money. We had projects requesting money and always had more ready when those were fulfilled or denied.
- Have a short, medium, and long-term plan, and work all three simultaneously. It is too easy to get caught up in the short-term difficulties. Until the locals are able to do it themselves, you must help them realize their vision for the future and work to secure it.

**Conclusion**

NSRT was successful, but could have been more so. A group of lieutenants and captains trained to fight suddenly found themselves as electrical engineers, agriculture experts, and municipal planners. On top of that, we still had to execute our normal combat patrols and raids. If the military is only part of a counterinsurgency, and if all of these other aspects that NSRT addressed are the real main effort of our fight, then the U.S. government should have had experts in these fields ready to work with locals to get their cities back on track. Indeed, a few of these experts worked with us at times, but there were far too few and they were too spread out. They lacked organic movement and security forces, severely limiting their effectiveness. Their location on large FOBs, stuck in routines, away from the people they try to help, further limits them.

Beyond these limits, the basic difference between the civilian and military experts we worked with and us is use of active versus passive approach. We all agree that we have to teach Iraqis to do things on their own, and that we cannot do things for them. But we disagree on how to teach them, or how far along in the learning process they are, or their level of competence and integrity. Hard as it is to accept, the officials in Samarra were not ready to do this on their own. A few were competent but inexperienced. A few were honest but could be easily strong-armed or bypassed. A few were motivated but not enough to bring the rest along with them. To operate under the false pretense that we have to let the Iraqi system operate is a cop-out. It is only through the exertions of U.S. Soldiers, every day, that we made progress in Samarra. Not only does the active approach lead to short-term gains, I believe it leads to long-term, lasting, system-building success as well.

Without our effort and supervision, little to nothing would have occurred. This is absolutely true with regards to the rule of law in Samarra. I believe it to be true in cities across Iraq, at the provincial and national level, in all areas of government. I believe this to be true in other countries. If the U.S. does not put the effort into Iraq, who will? If we do not take the lessons we have learned in Iraq and apply them to Afghanistan and elsewhere, then we have no one to blame but ourselves.

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In May 2008, I assumed command of a Cavalry troop (Alpha Troop, 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division), which was slated for deployment to Iraq. Prior to deploying, my troop completed a monthlong intensive training cycle (ITC) and a rotation to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La. In between the training events and our deployment, officers attended various counterinsurgency (COIN) seminars emphasizing the non-combat fight. My COIN training and a relationship management perspective were the largest factors in preparing me for the challenges I would face in Iraq.

In Iraq, the squadron assumed a variety of lines of effort (LOEs) focusing on the dynamics associated with the Rusafa operating environment (OE). Squadron LOEs included: Partnering with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) — Decisive Operation, Security — Shaping Operation, and Building Civil Capacity — Shaping Operation. Actors in our OE included: Government of Iraq (GoI) officials, Sons of Iraq (SOI) leaders, Iraqi Army (IA) leaders, Iraqi Police (IP) leaders, cultural leaders such as sheiks, Imams, Sunni and Shia personalities, and the general population of Baghdad. It was no longer our war; coalition forces assumed a different posture after the new security agreement took effect 1 January 2009. The IA and GoI took the lead on all fronts, and coalition forces (CF) were now guests in Iraq. The security agreement served as a catalyst, changing not only the way CF conducted business but redefining the relationships between CF, IA, and SOI.

Pre-deployment Training

Preparing for war encompasses so many factors, each one focusing on its own crucial role on the battlefield. Our training plan was as follows: ITC, JRTC, COIN seminars and Soldier readiness. During the squadron’s ITC, we focused purely on the employment of combat systems: crew-served weapons, dismounted movement techniques, mounted movement techniques, and battle drills.

The battle drills we concentrated on were out of FM 7-8: react to contact, movement to contact, maneuver and knock out a bunker, enter and clear a room — close quarters battle. The first two weeks of ITC focused on battle drills, and we ran our platoons through live-fire exercises daily. Each event was framed appropriately, allowing for the leadership to observe, guide, mentor and teach each paratrooper on the right way of executing the drill. The squadron commander (SCO) provided overwatch but allowed for troop commanders and first sergeants (1SGs) to lead. The SCO’s role was to maintain continuity within the squadron, while the commanders’ and 1SGs’ roles were to adhere to the standards. In
addition to battle drills, other operations included: platoon-mounted movement to contact, reconnaissance operations, and air assault operations. The final portion of ITC incorporated civilians on the battlefield (COB).

The COBs were actual Iraqi citizens who would run the platoons through a variety of scenarios. I was impressed by the brigade’s support of our training activities, and the cost of hiring civilians proved to be a great investment. Each leader was exposed to not only the language but the culture of Iraq. We had three scenarios: enter a village and conduct a key leaders engagement (KLE); maneuver to a building for a tactical call out of civilians in a building; and movement to contact conducting a KLE with an IA soldier. Throughout each event, commanders and 1SGs were the observer/controllers for the scenarios, not only evaluating but also providing critical feedback to platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. It was a well-framed and successful ITC. Paratroopers were exposed to combat and non-combat methods of employment. Each engagement was critiqued and all deficiencies were corrected. Exceptional performances were recognized as well.

Our JRTC rotation was another significant training event that prepared us for Iraq. Like ITC, the first few weeks were combat training opportunities as well as specific events preparing the entire troop for the COIN fight. Platoons were treated to a complex live-fire, mounted movement range where they navigated through improvised explosive devices (IEDs), direct engagements, and coordinated with aviation assets to engage targets. In addition, leaders practiced KLEs in a variety of scenarios with Iraqi role players. KLE topics included medical situations, basic conversations, and intelligence collection.

JRTC was the first opportunity to provide troop-level operations orders (OPORDs). All OPORDs and troop leading procedures (TLPs) were critiqued by the JRTC cadre. It was my opportunity as a commander to brief a troop plan to my paratroopers. Applying all the skills I learned at the Maneuver Captains Career Course, I briefed thorough OPORDs to the entire troop. I found that a well thought-out plan briefed to everyone participating in the operation allowed for flexibility on the battlefield. By having all participants present for the OPORD, each paratrooper was provided a foundation from which to pivot if and when the plan changed.

Our successes were directly attributed to our preparation prior to missions. Our well-prepared OPORDs and rock drills proved key. JRTC not only allowed us to exercise our abilities as paratroopers, but facilitated the growth of the unit; we left Fort Polk with confidence.

In between ITC, JRTC and our deployment, officers and key leaders wanted to learn as much about COIN operations as possible. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, served as a starting point. The COIN fight is a nebulous entity with a battlefield that is anything but clearly defined. Regardless, my fellow commanders and I embarked in absorbing as much as we could from every forum in order to be armed with the tools necessary to be successful in our upcoming deployment. The brigade and squadron leadership did an outstanding job in providing us with a variety of learning opportunities. Professors from the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill instructed us on governance, and we studied history and attended a weeklong counterinsurgency seminar conducted by a Cambridge professor.

The basic premise of our studies was that the enemy was an obstacle and not the objective. The objective in a COIN fight is the population; provide security and help them develop into citizens that support their government. We dove into the irregularity of the battlefields of Iraq and went over a few example paradoxes of COIN operations that were presented in FM 3-24:

- Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.
- Sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.
- The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well.
- Sometimes the more force is used, the less effective it is.
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.

We drilled extensively on the application of our kinetic weapons systems, but then openly discussed the second and third order affects associated with their employment. Even though a scenario may call for a Soldier to pull the trigger, the outcome may be detrimental to accomplishing the primary task of population security. Forward operating bases (FOB) serve as great protection for the force, but the benefits associated with living among the people cannot be discounted. Living in the area you are trying to secure allows for “jointness” in the security effort. When the residents realize that you are there for them, your ownership of the process facilitates a synergism that cannot be achieved if we lived in FOBs and drove to work. I drilled my men extensively on appropriately applying force and treating all citizens with respect and courtesy. Sometimes you will address a situation with a smile and a helping hand, but the day may come when the situation will require that you fire your weapon. When that day does happen, use only the force necessary to neutralize the situation.

Imagine being an 18-year-old private whose entire military experience has been focused on the lethal application of weapons systems. He is now faced with a multitude of deciding factors, each determining when to engage. It is this 18-year-old whom I think of each time I give orders.

Overall, I was impressed and appreciative for the institutional effort put forth in ensuring that we diversified our training in order to best address the asymmetric battlefield. These efforts helped prepare me for dealing with the situations I faced in Iraq such as one with an Iraqi warlord.

The Warlord

Adel (I will refer to him by his first name only) was a gangster who, empowered by the U.S. Army, became a warlord. His climb to power stemmed from an opportunity created by the current stage of the war. When U.S. forces began executing the surge in early 2007, there were an average of 180 attacks a day against coalition forces. In February, there was at least one car bomb a day in Baghdad and at least eight helicopters were shot down that month. Unable to control the Sunni area of Al Fadhil, CF partnered with Adel, whose background was allegedly nefarious one. He was reportedly involved in kidnappings, assassinations and ransom acts against CF earlier in the war. He had also been partnered with a sheik, who was the head of the “Army of supporting Sunna.” In early 2007, the sheik reportedly received a contract worth $600,000 for kidnapping six government contractors. Adel asked the sheik for his portion of the proceeds, and the sheik denied his request which catapulted the two into a feud resulting in an assassination attempt.
against Adel. He then went into hiding before being approached by coalition forces for a partnership. Reconciliation with Adel was intended to reduce attacks against CF, IA, and the main markets in Rusafa. Initial meetings were productive. In accordance with the partnership, Adel agreed to stop his attacks against CF, IA and the neighboring markets.

Adel began a campaign of terror that mirrored the homecoming of Odysseus. He systematically began clearing the mohallas of Al Fadhil, ridding the areas of the sheik and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). His group cleared the areas from Zabeida and the Lion’s Squares towards the Manawra Khatoon Mosque/Girls High School. They destroyed AQI, including killing the newly appointed leader of the sheik’s AQI cell. Adel’s group found caches of weapons throughout the area and continued their battles, ultimately resulting in control of key terrain — the Manawra Khatoon mosque. In a role of glory, Adel walked through Al Fadhil with a loudspeaker claiming victory and asking people to come out to celebrate. His triumph created a partnership between CF and his group of warriors, which would later be known as the Sons of Iraq. The SOI was designed as a neighborhood watch program that was funded and trained by CF. The SOI would secure Al Fadhil ensuring that AQI/insurgent forces would never return. Al Fadhil SOI continued to be paid by the Army under the CF-sponsored program until the GoI assumed responsibility in the fall of 2008. In addition to paying the SOI, the GoI also assumed control over all SOI programs adopted throughout Baghdad and Iraq. The January 2009 security agreement also redefined the relationships between CF, IA, and SOI. I could no longer pick up the phone and call Adel for a patrol; I would have to coordinate all operations through the Iraqi Army. This is when our relationship with Adel began to change.

He and I met on 24 January for a KLE. I had requested it after the previous day’s sheik counsel meeting, which contained a lot of anti-American sentiment. I spoke on how my predecessors had spent a lot of time working closely with SOI, but now U.S. forces were in a supporting role. We were now focused on a partnership with ISF in areas we thought posed a threat to elections. For the first time Adel openly admitted fighting (insinuated killing) Americans. He proudly stated that he used to be CF’s number one target and that he was an expert in urban operations. Throughout our conversation over lunch, Adel maintained a subtle threatening tone; he said “do not believe what you hear, because you do not want things to go back to the way they were.” He knew I was aware of his malicious activities and affiliations, but Adel believed we would do nothing; the U.S. could not suffer the consequences of starting combat operations this late in the campaign. We ended the KLE with a positive mutual understanding and respect for each other’s position; he would not target CF but would continue his close relationships with CF enemies.

Over the next few months, he and I would continue to meet. Our relationship was odd. He was like a favorite uncle, warm and affectionate, always going out of his way to ensure we were all well taken care of anytime we entered Al Fadhil. Professionally, however, I was aware of the multiple malicious activities he was involved in through informants and human intelligence collected by brigade and other sources. He was a warlord, and Al Fadhil served as his safe haven.

He was like a favorite uncle, warm and affectionate, always going out of his way to ensure we were all well taken care of anytime we entered Al Fadhil. Professionally, however, I was made aware of the multiple malicious activities he was involved in through informants and human intelligence collected by brigade and other sources. He was a warlord, and Al Fadhil served as his safe haven.

that it was the first ever IA raid in Al Fadhil. The operation was planned and executed with the IA in the lead; our only role was a little coaching on the plan and support of the operation with a platoon and an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset, intended to provide overwatch of the operation. Adel maintained his usual warm demeanor, but his right-hand consult, Qassim, was unusually excited with overt disappointment. He stated that this was “a very bad operation,” but, ironically, the general populace was happy. I maintained my pro-Gol posture and relayed to both men that we need to have faith in the system; the BOC (Baghdad Operations Center) had ordered the arrest of the target because he was an AQI cell leader. The positive side to the operation was that the IA was able to come into Al Fadhil and make an arrest without incident. His only question was “what if they continue to arrest Al Fadhil residents?” He stared at me with his steely brown eyes waiting for my answer; I grabbed his shoulder and looked him in the eye. I said, “... there exist things that some people have done in their past that they will not be able to run from. It is the GoI’s right and responsibility to bring those individuals to justice.”

Adel then stated that we could not control Al Fadhil for one day, and I told him that concerned me because all the influence he holds needed to be handed over to the GoI for the betterment of Iraq. This was the only way Iraq would prosper.

He settled and realized that I was not at all intimidated by his remark. Qassim chimed back in by saying that it was bad when IA comes into Al Fadhil and makes mistakes. I told them that they needed to have faith in the GoI, and that mistakes will be made but the GoI is trying to do the right thing.

Qassim then asked directly, “What if Nakeeb Raad makes a mistake?” Nakeeb Raad is my adopted Arabic name since Rodriguez is too hard to pronounce. I answered, “I am here because I believe in Iraq and the GoI, and I am not perfect, but the decisions I make are for the betterment of Iraqs.”

It was clearly a cat and mouse conversation intended to intimidate and cause blame, but it didn’t work. I left that afternoon having felt that each side held their cause close to them.

The GoI’s posture on Adel was very...
clear; the prime minister had ordered Adel’s arrest on various occasions. Ultimately, however, the arrest never occurred because of the potential consequences a battle in Al Fadhil could bring. Instead, coalition forces launched a campaign designed to defeat Adel. We took a look at the entities which made him powerful and began removing them. What empowered Adel in Al Fadhil was: security (SOI manned all the checkpoints), freedom of maneuver (IA never patrolled in Al Fadhil), and population support (residents always went to Adel with any problems — the Godfather). To combat his strengths, we increased IA patrols deep into muhallas, blitzed the area with Civil Affairs programs such as book distributions and trash pickup, and combined checkpoints with IA and SOI. Operation Schwey Schwey (little by little) was working, but not fast enough, and the prime minister again ordered the arrest of Adel on 20 March 2009.

**The Arrest**

Not backing down, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) Emergency Response Brigade (ERB) followed through and arrested him on 28 March 2009. It was a daylight operation, and the ERB blocked off and surrounded Adel’s vehicle as it traveled. The arrest took less than a minute, leaving everyone who watched awestruck. Not one round was fired, and Adel left Al Fadhil in flex cuffs. Within minutes of ERB’s departure, small arms fire could be heard resonating from the Al Fadhil AO. My interpreter gave me the news that Adel had been arrested, and I was caught a bit by surprise. We had heard the order come down several times before, to the point of crying wolf, but this time they carried out the order.

Afterwards, I was sitting in my room working on some reports and was interrupted by my interpreter holding my cell phone. Ali, one of Adel’s close associates in charge of security, was on the phone and angry. He said the situation was horrible, and asked how could I have betrayed them like this. Anticipating the conversation, I relayed to the interpreter to calmly tell Ali that I didn’t know who arrested Adel, but coalition forces weren’t responsible, and that I would call him once I found out more information. I then quickly transitioned to organizing the troop in preparation for the uncertainty to come. As I updated my Soldiers and gave instructions, we began to hear audible small arms fire in the background. I immediately began coordinating with the IP and requested that they reinforce joint security station (JSS) security, restrict access to the police station, and place all policemen on high alert throughout the district. I then called Ali back and relayed to him that it was the MOI ERB that arrested him. I was very clear that it was not CF but GoI. I asked him to stand down the SOI and ensure they do not retaliate. The associate frantically expressed that it was now out of his hands, and he could not control his men. I then phoned another SOI leader in the area and informed him of the arrest. I told him to control his men and remove them from the Al Fadhil AO.

The phone calls continued. Anticipating what would come next, I contacted the 1st IA Battalion commander, who asked for our immediate assistance at the battalion headquarters. I mustered the troop and joint coordination center (JCC) leadership in order to pass clear and concise guidance. I wanted the JCC supervisor to inform us of all combat activities and then began delegating tasks and allocating resources. We discussed a basic scheme of maneuver and split up; the urgency of the situation was only enhanced by the amount of fire that was resonating outside the walls of the JSS. This was it, and there was no discounting the situation we had been presented. As Blue Platoon and I left the JSS for the 1st IA Battalion’s headquarters, gunfire foreshadowed the impending firefight we would face.

When we arrived, we were told that the 1st Battalion’s commander was at the intersection of Routes Yuengling and Wild and that he requested our immediate assistance. It is easy to get caught up in the situation at hand and overlook the basics of planning so I made a conscious effort not to. I quickly spoke with the platoon leadership; our task was to secure IA, and our purpose was partnership...
in order to quell the uprising. The quiet tranquility of a late warm summer afternoon was erased by the volley of fire that could be heard originating from our destination point. We departed the IA headquarters for the commander’s location and saw IA forces pinned down at the northern entrance to the Shorja Market. They were taking effective fire from the east and on both north and south sides of the eastern portion of Route Yuengling. We arrived, blocked Route Wild and immediately began receiving sniper and machine gun fire. I dismounted under heavy fire and moved quickly to the IA checkpoint to determine their disposition and gather a situation report. I spoke with the 1st Battalion’s XO and 4th Company commander. They told me that 2nd Company was pinned down in Zaibeda Square, and that the 1st Battalion and 4th Company had attempted a rescue. The group was turned back by overwhelming fire as they traveled down Route Yuengling. They now requested our assistance in rescuing the isolated 2nd Company personnel. I agreed to the rescue mission and couched them with a plan. Once we arrived at 2nd Company’s HQ, we dismounted a section and cleared just enough of the building to exfil the IA soldiers. I emphasized that once we committed, there would be no turning back. Five IA vehicles along with a Blue Platoon crew would execute the rescue. During the planning sequence, we continued to receive effective small arms fire; rounds could literally be seen skipping off the ground around us and off of the vehicles in blocking positions. Blue Platoon’s crew-served weapons were engaging targets with precise lethality as were the platoon’s dismounts who were covering my movement. The volume of fire at this point was very intense; all guns were talking. Our fire power allowed pinned down IA personnel freedom of movement and facilitated the infl of additional IA forces as well as exfil of injured and KIA IA soldiers.

My fire support officer and I again made our way back to brief Blue Platoon on the rescue plan. In order to traverse the open ground between CF and the IA, we both had to engage enemy personnel firing at us from a building at the southwestern corner of Al Fadhil. The rescue plan was: Red Platoon would assume our current blocking positions. An air weapons team (AWT) was unavailable due to weather. Blue Platoon would follow IA vehicles into the square. One section from Blue Platoon and I would dismount in the square, and then enter and clear the IA HQ building, facilitating the exfil of IA personnel. Red Platoon would establish a support-by-fire position and cover movement down Route Yuengling. I relayed the information to the first sergeant and briefed him on the plan. I also relayed information to the company XO and had him push it to higher. I briefed the squadron commander on the rescue plan and he approved. The company XO then relayed that we had fixed wing assets available, and I requested a low fly-by as a show of force. A few minutes later, the aircraft arrived on station but had little effect; the volley of fire quieted but then resumed again.

As we waited for Red Platoon to arrive, we continued to work the crew-served weapon systems, engaging targets in and around Al Fadhil and down Route Yuengling. North on Route Wild, an individual pushing a cart approached. He was an older male who seemed oblivious to the situation. We initiated escalation of force (EOF) procedures, and after several warning shots he turned away. A few minutes later, he showed up again on the western side of Route Wild, again walking towards us pushing his cart. The volume of fire at this point remained at a sustained intensity, but the man seemed oblivious. Blue Platoon’s gunner fired three flares at him and he still wouldn’t stop. Realizing that he was mentally or physically challenged and not a threat, another Soldier and I ran across open terrain in order to turn him away and save him from being engaged. He ultimately turned around and went away. (I met him the following day — he was half blind and deaf-mute).

When Red Platoon arrived along with the first sergeant, we readjusted security, placing Blue Platoon and my vehicle in the middle to allow for Blue to re-arm. As Red Platoon blocked Route Wild to the north and Route Yuengling to the east and west, 4th Co IA held Wild to the south. Once Red assumed blocking positions, key troop leaders met me in the middle for a last review of the rescue plan.

At that time, AWT was still unavailable. We sat waiting while the IA organized themselves, and I was eventually forced to walk out behind cover and marshal IA vehicles into position. Everything was set

The author (left) takes a drink of water as Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers prepare to search a building during a mission on 18 February 2009 in eastern Baghdad.
with Red Platoon in blocking positions, and IA vehicles in line with Blue Platoon’s vehicles behind. We moved east on Yuengling with Red Platoon working their crew-served weapons providing us support.

As the convoy left the intersection and was then completely on Route Wild, the volume of fire became so intense that clouds of dust and rounds enveloped the vehicles. We were receiving fire from the 9-12-3 o’clock, super-surface, inter-surface and surface positions; enemy personnel fired from both sides of Route Yuengling and from the square.

When we arrived at Zaibeda Square, the IA vehicles moved to the IA headquarters building, and Blue Platoon assumed blocking positions on Route Kansas to the north and south. My crew pulled to the front of the IA building; the FSO and I dismounted and followed the IA into the barriered-off section of the facility. My crew and Blue Platoon’s vehicles worked crew-served weapons engaging targets in a 360-degree fan. Blue Platoon dismounted a section and maneuvered under fire to the building adjacent to the IA HQ. Blue’s dismounted section stacked on the door and I remained co-located with IA as we ran into the building to pull out isolated IA personnel. During this entire time, all elements were decisively engaged by enemy forces with fire coming at us from every direction.

The IA soldiers came out almost immediately after they went in; one IA soldiers ran out and stated that the SOI had kidnapped seven other 2nd Company IA personnel. The IA battalion commander said he wanted to hold the terrain and not exfil. Although I wanted to hold the key terrain as well, the situation did not allow it. The adjacent building was engulfed in black smoke that blew over onto us and clouded our field of view. Holding the terrain required clearing another building which would not have provided the appropriate force protection. Blue’s dismounted section provided security while the IA XO and I conversed. After several minutes of heated discussion, I convinced him that tactically, our best option would be to exfil the hostages, wait for AWT and then re-attack the square with the intent to seize and hold. I told Blue Platoon to prepare for exfil. On the exfil command, we left in the same direction we entered. Several IA vehicles limped on flat tires and had mechanical problems, a result of multiple bullet impacts, but we were able to provide enough fire support to exfil safely. Our exfil of the square mirrored the infil; although high, the volume of fire was not as dense as infil but did originate from all directions. Once we returned to the IA checkpoint, we began planning again for seizure of the square.

AWT assets checked in and I coordinated with IA on a new plan. This time the IA battalion commander would accompany the elements into the square. As we prepared for infil, we received phone calls that negotiations had begun in order to release the hostages. Qassim wanted us to stop engaging SOI. We used AWT assets to clear super-surfaces of enemy personnel as well as a reconnaissance platform reporting on enemy activity. Many of the vehicles were damaged from the initial infil and departed back onto Routes Yuengling and Wild, meeting minimal resistance. Once we arrived, we held the entire area and established a secure 360-degree perimeter using AWT assets. Harassing fires remained but subsided during the negotiations. I began negotiations via cell phone with Adel’s associates and remained dismounted, along with a section of Blue Platoon, at the northernmost portion of the square. Qassim was worried that we would come after him. I said that he would not be harmed, but it was imperative for the safety of the Al Fadhil residents to release the IA captives. Negotiations continued for roughly 60 minutes. At approximately 2200 hours, the hostages were released. Our medic examined the hostages, and the first sergeant readjusted security in order to maintain our “stand and hold” posture.

I remain convinced that the only reason dismounted personnel were not injured was because of the lethality and accuracy of fire of the crew-served weapon systems. There were approximately 15-20 enemy KIA, 4 IA KIA, 4 IA WIA and no CF WIA or KIA. The IA would ultimately flood the area with additional forces achieving Malcolm Gladwell’s “Tipping Point” (The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference). Al Fadhil residents were given a firsthand example of the Gol’s commitment in assuming the responsibility for security in the sector. Over the next week, IA and my troop conducted clearance operations through all the muhallas. These operations yielded numerous caches and retrieval of hundreds of weapons, munitions, mines, rockets and ammunition.

There was finally a feeling of relief, but we proceeded with caution. We flooded the area with food donations, medical care, wheel chairs, sewage maintenance, power projects, and even soccer fields. In doing so, residents passed along information to IA and CF locations of additional cache sites as well as spoke openly of the oppression they lived under Adel’s rule. The troop/squadron/brigade was careful that the programs intended to benefit the citizens were managed by the Gol — District Advisory Council (DAC) and Neighborhood Advisory Council (NAC) members. By building capacity in the Gol, we advertised that the Gol was not only there to provide security but address the needs of the residents. It was Gol, not CF, tending to the needs of its citizens. It was also evident that our ability to quickly recover from the violence was due in large part to the proper application of firepower.

Adel was initially empowered by CF and the perfect storm of circumstances. During his reign as a warlord, he controlled residents through oppressive rule, continued extortion and had terrorist ties. Al Fadhil served as a textbook example of a COIN fight with insurgents as the obstacle and the people as key terrain. What we learned during ITC, JRTC, and our COIN seminars prepared us for dealing with this situation. All the battle drills and weapons training to condition our paratroopers worked for two reasons: accurate and precise fire and confidence through discipline. We emphasized positive identification (PID) of targets. Once PID was obtained, engage it with enough force to neutralize it — nothing less, nothing more. We remained disciplined and neutralized only those that were firing on us or our IA partners, and we did so precisely with lethal effects. Our COIN studies allowed us to recognize that the true prize was the general public and not the attrition of enemy personnel. Success in Al Fadhil was achieved through disciplined paratroopers who applied enough force to quell an uprising securing residents and a Gol that stood ready to fill the void left behind by Adel and his men. Present-day Al Fadhil has Iraqi security forces providing security and NAC/DAC members supplying services addressing the needs of the populace.

CPT Frank A. Rodriguez is the commander of A Troop, 5th Squadron, 73rd Cavalry, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, which recently returned from a deployment to Iraq. He was commissioned in 1999 from the University of North Carolina - ROTC and in 2006 received his master’s degree in International Relations from Oklahoma University.
The Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB) Testing Support Office (TSO) at Fort Benning, Ga., has announced that new changes are in store for EIB testing.

Dubbed EIB XXI, the new testing process will help commanders evaluate how well their Soldiers are being trained on basic skills.

EIB XXI training and testing will be rigorous, mission-focused and conducted under realistic conditions. A menu-based test enables units to develop unique scenarios that test an Infantryman’s expertise in the fundamentals and his ability to solve problems under stressful conditions. For these reasons the EIB XXI is appropriate for the run stage of individual soldier task training in preparation for a unit’s leader and collective task training.

To meet this intent EIB XXI has been designed to run in the same format as a squad situational training exercise (STX) lane. The lanes will all be run simultaneously to provide added noise and stress on the candidates. The lanes are also designed to be modular to help units meet their specific mission essential task list requirements.

The Testing Support Office supports Infantry units in conducting EIB testing. The TSO can:

- Validate a unit’s test site.
- Research and develop new test standards.
- Develop and distribute related materials.
- Investigate/report test deviations.
- Maintain Army-wide statistics.
- Enforce the standards set forth in PAM 350-6.

### EIB XXI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current EIB</th>
<th>EIB XXI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Testing site would consist of 30 stations</td>
<td>* Testing site would consist of three lanes and test between 30-36 tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Between train-up and testing, the process would take roughly a month</td>
<td>* Entire process will take 10 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Relies on graders to train candidates</td>
<td>* Relies on squad leader to train his Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* As of March 2009, need a minimum of 73 Soldiers to run EIB for a battalion</td>
<td>* EIB XXI for 400 candidates will need only about 35 personnel to run EIB testing</td>
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Figure 1 — Current EIB vs EIB XXI

EIB XXI has three lanes with 10 tasks run continuously through the lane. You have a five-day train up in a round robin format that can be held at the individual company area and then five days of testing. The testing lanes are not to be utilized for training; this will add an element of uncertainty for candidates during testing. For EIB XXI you will have three board members, a minimum of three personnel to run the EIB Ops Center, one MSG as NCOIC, two SFC for quality control, and one grader per 15 candidates.

Units are able to design their test lanes within the parameters of the task menu. The test could, potentially, improve with each successive test cycle. The Infantry Center will provide an outline for the test, allowing our NCO leadership the opportunity to be innovative and adaptive to their mission requirements and the test environment.

Our goal is to produce a test that complements the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and is relevant, realistic, and tough. We want a test that commanders want to execute because the tasks complement collective training and mission readiness. With the help of units providing feedback through AAR’s, we can continue to improve the EIB for years to come.

The current Testing Support Staff is MSG Octavis Smiley and SSG Phillip Sanders. As the proponent for EIB, the Testing Support Office is continuously developing working relationships with units and assisting them with developing and planning of their EIB testing program.

More information can be found through AKO Knowledge network at the following link: [https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/602620](https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/602620). At this site there is information on upcoming EIB tests and links to e-mails of the TSO staff, who can answer questions and provide more information.
In June, the U.S. Army began fielding the newly standardized Close Combat Mission Capability Kit (CCMCK) that enhances Soldier, leader and unit prep-for-combat training in the close fight. When struck by CCMCK projectiles in a less protected (legs/arms) location, Soldiers experience a “pain-penalty” for mistakes such as failing to use suppressive fire, cover, concealment, and proper individual movement techniques (IMTs). The Army’s standard CCMCK is now in place at Training Support Centers (TSCs) located at Forts Bragg, Campbell, Riley, and Stewart. Fort Benning’s fielding is scheduled for August 2009. Follow-on fielding to other installations/TSCs is to be completed by end of October 2009.

Components of CCMCK
The CCMCK system allows Soldiers to temporarily convert their go-to-war weapons with “drop-in” conversion bolts for M4/M16s and M249s and “drop-in” barrels for M9 and M11 pistols. Converted weapons allow for normal weapon employment functioning, for example, aiming (with or without mounted optics/accessories), loading, firing, ejection, immediate action, re-loading and clearing procedures. Soldiers gain immediate target feedback through force-on-force, interactive live-fire scenario tasks, and mission execution rehearsals.

Once weapons are cleaned (projectiles fly best through brush-cleaned and dry barrels) and converted, they can fire the force-projection element of the system — the CCMCK 5.56mm and 9mm marking ammunition — using standard weapon magazines. The red and blue marking projectiles distinguish red-force and blue-force shot placement and travel at velocities of several hundred feet per second, thus requiring Soldiers to wear the face protection that is also a component of CCMCK. Once temporarily converted, weapons cannot fire standard service ammunition until restored to original configuration.

Proven Value
Pre-standard versions of CCMCK-like capabilities have been in use by Army conventional forces, Rangers, and Special Operations Forces, as well as by training centers for several years. Pre-standard CCMCK versions have also been used by the Maneuver Battle Lab and during the Best Ranger Competition at Fort Benning. The pre-standard versions were procured at unit expense directly from commercial vendors, thus attesting to its recognized value and effectiveness toward the preparation of Soldiers for combat. Soldiers commonly refer to these pre-standard versions as “UTM” and “Sims” (ultimate training munitions and/or simunitions) based on the vendors that produce the conversion kits and munitions. After using these pre-standard versions, Soldiers/units provided feedback to the Small Arms Branch, U.S. Army Infantry Center, that was instrumental in defining the key performance capabilities needed for Army operational requirement documents. Soldier participation in follow-on evaluations and testing further supported the down-select and acquisition processes toward Army standardization.

Proven Effectiveness
The CCMCK capability was specifically identified as a contributor to OIF success by the 82nd Airborne Division during an after action review presented by the division’s chief of staff at an Infantry Warfighter Conference. The CCMCK improves...
Army-approved objective capability requirements and feedback from Soldiers provide the basis for follow-on improvements under consideration for CCMCK. Some of the improvements include more realistic, weapon recoil and noise signature, improved functioning with MILES, longer shelf-life for ammunition, and more reliable functioning at extreme temperatures. Improvements Ahead

Army-approved objective capability requirements and feedback from Soldiers provide the basis for follow-on improvements under consideration for CCMCK. Some of the improvements include more realistic, weapon recoil and noise signature, improved functioning with MILES, longer shelf-life for ammunition, and more reliable functioning at extreme temperatures. When the improved munitions are ready, current capability munitions are consumed in training pending new munitions production/fielding.

How To Get CCMCK

Similar to MILES, units may draw, conduct training, and return CCMCK (bolts, barrels, protective masks) from local installation Training Support Centers. The CCMCK munitions (similar to blank and other training ammunition), must be STRAC (Standards in Training Commission) allocated in support of unit training and/or institutional programs of instruction (POI). For organizations needing to retain CCMCK hardware, the bolts, barrels and protective masks may be requisitioned via CTA 50-970 Expendable/Durable Items, maintained at unit level and documented on unit property books.

Summary/Synthesis

Additional must-know information regarding safety, rules of engagement, maintenance, and the technical function and performance associated with CCMCK is available at the AKO Web site: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/566738

SOLDIER + TRAINING + OPTIC + WEAPON + AMMUNITION = EFFECT

The following quotations are typical of the hundreds of comments provided by Soldiers after using the CCMCK:

“The TTPs (hallway clearing) originally developed using MILES resulted in 100-percent casualties within my squad when rehearsed with CCMCK ... It forced us to re-examine and modify our how-to-fight SOPs.”
— Staff sergeant/squad leader, 75th Ranger Regiment during mission rehearsal and shoot-house prep.

“No more guesswork with a beeping MILES sensor. That blue mark and stinging welt on the back of my arm is fratricide .... My fire team is not in-sync yet .... We need another run-through.”
— Sergeant/fire team leader, 3rd Infantry Division

“We have to triage and treat the casualties where the marker rounds impact ... it’s more realistic than an arbitrary (casualty) card pulled by an OC (Observer/Controller).”
— Specialist/medic, 10th Mountain Division

“My Soldiers are better shots now.”
— Sergeant first class/platoon sergeant, 3rd Infantry Division during hot-wash from the CCMCK evaluation run by Maneuver Battle Lab.

Based on unit prep-for-combat/training objectives, the Close Combat Mission Capability Kit is intended to augment and complement Engagement Skills Trainer, MILES, and other live-fire training methods. Battlefield effect is gained via a synthesis of Soldier, Training, Optic, Weapon, and Ammunition. The Army’s standard CCMCK is now providing a different dynamic addition to realism and training with the fighting tools in the warfighter’s toolbox.

MAJ (Retired) Charles Pavlick is contracted as a project officer for Small Arms Branch, Soldier Requirements Division, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Ga. He was commissioned through OCS. His active duty tours included serving with 5th Special Forces, 1-52nd Infantry/1st Armored Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 501st Military Intelligence Battalion, The Infantry (test) Board, and Infantry Combat Developments.
**Jump Start Your Professional Reading Program:**

*A Six Pack of Books for Platoon Leaders*

MAJ SCOTT SHAW AND CPT KELLY JONES

Authors’ Note: We are die-hard readers. We love reading, especially anything that can help make us and our Soldiers more effective leaders in this profession of ours in which learning is an absolute imperative. We’ve incorporated professional reading into our personal development, and we’ve integrated it as a fundamental part of our leader development program in our units. Additionally, over the past four years we have led the “Pro Reading” part of the platoon leader and company command online professional forums, which members can find at http://ProReading.army.mil. In that role, we’ve been exposed to what other members of the profession are reading and what books are making an impact on leaders across our Army.

If one thing is clear about our current fight, it is that junior leaders are being given much more autonomy than many of us ever had. In order to deal with the ever-increasing responsibilities of today’s platoon leaders, we — the company commanders and field grade officers of our Army — must give these young bucks the tools to succeed. This includes the nurturing of analytical skills (Troop Leading Procedures) in conjunction with the intuitive leadership skills that are necessary in combat, and the ability to deal with the aftermath of combat as well. The question is how to do that without breaking the bank. When the price of a platoon leader learning his trade could be the life of a Soldier or several Soldiers, then we owe it to those Soldiers to educate their leaders before entering the fray.

One powerful way to develop your leaders is through a professional reading program. The fundamental assumption in forming this article is that professional reading is critical not only to individual development but also to collective learning and development in our units. Many of you are undoubtedly saying, “It’s too hard. My platoon leaders aren’t interested. And, I don’t have the time to do it when I am in between deployments.” We hear what you are saying and counter it with, “If we could figure out how to do it, then you can, too.”

A dedicated professional reading program costs the unit less than a hundred dollars (if you have a library near-by, possibly nothing) and builds the mental Rolodex of a platoon leader.

To jump-start a reading program, you have to start out with some sort of “What do I want to get out of this?” question. That may seem intuitive, but many leaders just throw out random books, and the result is less than desirable. With the hundreds of books and multitudes of reading lists out there for a platoon leader, how do you narrow down the scope of your reading to what is applicable to you? We don’t have the answer, but we would like to share some suggestions. Based on our experience, we offer six books that we believe are classic volumes to give to platoon leaders to start discussion on issues from the tactical to the ethical and everything in between.

The PL Six-Pack
We selected books that appealed to us and others on both personal and professional levels. These books are constantly revisited on the Web site, commented on, and discussed. They are perennial favorites of ours and many others. They are combat focused and are listed in no certain order.


The Killing Zone is the story of a platoon leader in Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry as part of 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division during 1967. Downs goes through a growing period from green lieutenant to seasoned platoon leader. This book enables you to put lieutenants into a situation that they are comfortable with — a tactical situation not unlike something that they did in ROTC or at West Point. It presents ethical, moral, and tactical challenges such as asking what they might do in certain situations. Several company commanders have used it as a primer for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.


This book is a look inside both the intelligence world and the world of tactical advising. It shows how one man was able to break into the Vietcong at the local level. Herrington’s description of the “usual methods” and then his later use of cultural knowledge, language, and charm are brilliant and something that a platoon leader on the streets could emulate. This book shows why the step “Understand” was added to the battle command process.


This book, by two amazing captains of cavalry, presents a modern day look at countering insurgency. It is “The Defense of Duffer’s Drift” using Iraq as a backdrop and includes that book as well — one of our favorite books. This short read takes LT Phil Connors (of Groundhog Day fame) from the receipt of his first mission — control the town of Jisr al-Doreaa — and
**THE PRO-READING CHALLENGE (FREE BOOKS!)**

**To company commanders:** Choose a book and the Pro-Reading team will mail you copies to read and discuss with your platoon leaders. Part of this includes creating a space in the online forum specifically for you to discuss the book.

When you and your leaders read together with an eye toward practical applications, the conversations that result will improve your unit’s performance. The emphasis of the pro-reading challenge is on the conversations about the reading, which happen when the leader creates space for it — during a meal, around the HMMWV hood, and online.

Leaders who participate in the Pro-Reading Challenge are very intentional about choosing books that tie in with what they are trying to accomplish. They choose books that reinforce what they are already doing, and they situate the program and the conversations in the “now” experiences of their leaders. In other words, they focus their leaders on the “So what, how does this apply to us as a unit?”

If you are interested, visit http://ProReading.army.mil and write Niel Smith, who is stepping up to lead the Pro-Reading forum (pro.reading@us.army.mil). Alternate email: cocmd.team@us.army.mil.

follows his actions through the six times that it takes to get it right. The book by itself is an excellent discussion primer, and the accompanying Web site (http://www.defenseofjad.com) includes the dreams in a series of vignettes that leaders can use, free of charge, before or after reading what LT Connors did. It can be an, “I can do better” or a “Here’s what this guy did” for your officers.


*Platoon Leader*, the story of 2LT James McDonough and his platoon in the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam, is the narrative of a platoon leader assuming command in combat. It is an intimate look at complacency in units and the aftermath of that complacency. McDonough’s book is open and honest to the point of him freely admitting the mistakes he made that would be natural to any platoon leader.


This book is a classic study of one unit from its inception to end and illustrates how much leadership matters. *Band of Brothers* (and the corresponding HBO series) follows one American airborne infantry company from its formation at the beginning of World War II to its deactivation at the end of the war. Other books such as *Beyond Band of Brothers: The War Memoirs of Major Dick Winters*, by Dick Winters and Cole C. Kingseed ISBN-10: 0425213757, and others written by Don Malarkey, Buck Compton, David Keynon Webster, and Bill Guarnere serve as material to understand other viewpoints on how Soldiers view their leaders at all levels within a company.


*On Combat* is an “examination of what it takes to perform, cope and survive in the toxicity of deadly combat,” according to the Killology Research Group’s Web site. This book offers a look at PTSD from how to survive and cope with its symptoms to helping others who may be suffering. As a book, it is particularly valuable to understanding what is happening to both the leader and those being led in combat.

**An Added Bonus** — *Once an Eagle* — Anton Meyer (ISBN-10: 0060084359)

Hailed as the book that re-defined our values as an Army after Vietnam, *Once an Eagle* is the story of Sam Damon from his enlistment in the Army prior to the Punitive Expedition into Mexico through two World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. This book provides a look at the hard ethical choices that our leaders must make in and out of combat and is a good primer for discussion within a company. It’s a little long, but the read is worth it.

**What Else Is Out There?**

There are thousands of books that a company commander could pick up to start a professional reading program: *The Thin Red Line, Fields of Fire, With the Old Breed, In the Company of Soldiers, Chewing Sand, Modern Warfare, Counterinsurgency Warfare* and *The Crime Fighter* to name but a few.

**The Payoff: The “Me” factor**

Sometimes in the end it all comes down to “the me” factor. What is in it for me, the commander? Why should I invest this time and effort when I could invest it somewhere else? The benefit for you will be well-rounded platoon leaders with the skills and depth of knowledge to execute the missions assigned to them. The professional reading program will also help your platoon leaders develop their subordinates, the trickle-down effect if you will. The operating environment we are in requires thinking leaders at all levels, and a reading program can help.

The book the commander chooses can reinforce the training objectives for the company, covering a broad range of subjects from cultural awareness to ethical and moral dilemmas faced by platoon leaders. We have distilled the list for you from countless sources to streamline the process of developing a professional reading program for your subordinates. The rest is up to you.

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“Train ‘em How You Want ‘em to Fight!”

Five Principles for Nurturing Initiative Before You Get to Combat

MAJ CHAD FOSTER

“Make your plans fit the circumstances.”
“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”

— GEN George S. Patton, Jr.

On today’s battlefields, initiative and adaptability are paramount. Victory in war has always required that our individual Soldiers and junior leaders possess these traits, but the burden has never been heavier on the shoulders of our young warriors. The immediate actions by a single private can have consequences that reach all the way up to the theater commander or even the President. Before the age of 24-hour news coverage and instant communications, lapses in judgment by young Soldiers or their first-line leaders might go unnoticed. Warfare in the 21st century, however, does not allow us this luxury. Although the enemy that we face today has difficulty matching us in direct tactical engagements, he adapts quickly and confronts us asymmetrically. Most commonly, he launches propaganda campaigns that attempt to erode our nation’s political will, undermine international support for our efforts, and to turn the local population in the combat theater against us. When he does choose to engage us directly, he strikes hard at a detected weakness and then fades away like a ghost. The enemy is adaptable, flexible and smart, and we have to match him!

Of course, training is the key. This is how we prepare to fight, both individually and as units. The way in which we train goes a long way to determining how our Soldiers and leaders will perform when confronting the complex problems of the battlefield. In places such as Iraq and Afghanistan (and any other theater of operations to which American Soldiers will likely deploy in the foreseeable future), our young warriors will have to rapidly adjust, make decisions and act without the benefit of a field grade officer or a company commander looking over their shoulders to provide direct guidance. Soldiers, sergeants and junior officers will often be on their own in dealing with extremely complex situations. In this environment, they must be able to adapt their decisions and actions to new conditions using fundamental principles and the higher commander’s intent as guides. Junior leaders will not be able to wait for instructions ... they will have to act! But how can we expect this of our privates, sergeants, lieutenants and captains if we fail to prepare them during training?

In order to get our young leaders and Soldiers ready to fight and win on today’s battlefields, we must exercise mission command at all times in our training. FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, describes mission command as “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.” Put more simply, mission command is the art of balancing clear guidance in planning with flexibility in execution. As the conditions on the ground change, the original plan, either in part or in its entirety, quickly becomes invalid. The only thing that remains constant is the desired end-state (the outcome that the commander wants to achieve) and
the reason why the unit is executing the operation (the expanded purpose of the mission). It is within this context that subordinates must operate, exercising initiative as needed in the ever-changing chaos of combat.

The Principles
Mission command is the Army’s preferred method of command and control (C2) on the battlefield, but far too often do we see micro-management (officially known as detailed command) practiced during training and, as a consequence, on the battlefield. Each time an observer/controller emphasizes a doctrinal process over a successful outcome during a tactical training exercise, initiative is crushed and the “let’s just do things by the book instead of thinking” mentality is rewarded. Doctrinal tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) have their place in training, of course. A tactic usually entails the employment of one or more techniques and/or procedures. Tactics and procedures differ in that the former is descriptive while the latter is prescriptive. Procedures are done in a very specific way or sequence usually because of some technical reason. None of this is under contention, but the problem lies with the fact that many trainers teach TTPs as if they were dogmatic rules that units must follow in every situation. They teach TTPs without also teaching the “why” behind them. This is a lazy, unthinking mentality that serves only to stifle innovation and encourage rigidity in decision making. In order to counter this, we must do the opposite: require that all our Soldiers and leaders think creatively and act with aggressiveness and common sense in the absence of exact orders. The emphasis must be on developing the judgment to take appropriate action rather than on training only to efficiently execute battle drills or doctrinal processes. Soldiers must, above all, be relentless problem-solvers that are capable of accurately determining what must be accomplished and then formulating effective solutions that are appropriate to the specific time, place and enemy. (FM 3-0, Appendix D tells us that doctrine consists of three components: [1] fundamental principles that guide future action and decision-making, [2] established TTPs that are meant to serve as examples of “how” to accomplish specific missions, and [3] terminology and symbols. In general, most trainers focus on the latter two and almost completely neglect the first. To make matters worse, trainers often go about teaching TTPs as the “approved solutions,” implying that deviation from them is somehow wrong. Nothing could be more detrimental to the development of adaptable leaders and Soldiers.)

A central prerequisite is the ability to understand the higher commander’s intent and then adjust one’s actions in accordance with that intent as the situation changes. In order to accomplish this, both the leader and those being led must understand the responsibilities inherent in the senior-subordinate relationship. Should either fail to do so, mission command is impossible. On the one hand, the commander must clearly articulate an intent that is detailed enough to be useful in guiding the decision-making of subordinates but that is also flexible enough to allow those subordinates the freedom to exercise creativity and innovation. From the opposite perspective, the subordinate must live up to the trust placed in him by ensuring that his actions never violate the commander’s intent. This two-way obligation can be understood as “contracts” between senior and subordinate. (William S. Lind’s Maneuver Warfare Handbook gives the best description of these “contracts,” describing them as the “short-term contract” [senior’s agreement to refrain from micro-management and allow subordinates the freedom to maneuver] and the “long-term contract” [subordinate’s agreement to refrain from violating the senior’s intent as he exercises the initiative allowed him by higher headquarters]).

The exercise of mission command, however, is an art that must be developed over time. If a commander wants to practice mission command in combat, he must prepare his officers, NCOs, and Soldiers to exercise the type of disciplined initiative described in FM 6-0. To do this, leaders must “nest” mission command into all aspects of training, especially collective training events. Only by doing this can they ensure that subordinates will be accustomed to exercising disciplined initiative and can do so during actual operations. In fact, training events should not allow initiative... they should require it! The end-state is to build confidence in decision-making, soundness of judgment, and the habit of “making the call” in a timely manner instead of waiting around to be told what to do. However, the question remains: how is this done? How do we put the concept/theory into practice? The short answer is that there is a multitude of ways, but it always begins with the application of some basic fundamentals. Below are five simple principles that, if applied, will inject mission command into unit training events and ensure that those events nurture initiative in our Soldiers and junior leaders:

(1) “Before you start the trip, determine the destination.” Mission command starts at the top. If a commander wants to train his subordinates in this manner, he must discipline himself to do it. A clear articulation of his intent is the first step. After all, how can subordinates effectively operate within the commander’s intent if that intent is unclear? Before one can build a quality training event, he must determine the desired outcome. This outcome constitutes the commander’s intent for training. Most will quickly say, “That is what we already do!” In reality, however, a large number of leaders start “the trip” before they have put sufficient thought into the intended “destination.” Merely identifying tasks that individual Soldiers and units will execute is not enough. Those tasks must be put into context so that unit training does not devolve into “practicing for rehearseable solutions.” In order to get to the end-state of producing competent, adaptive Soldiers and leaders, unit commanders must ensure that they begin by clearly defining what they want to get out of each training event. (The concept of outcomes-based training and education [OBT&E] offers a useful guide for building training objectives that go beyond the minimalist approach of the traditional “task, conditions, standard” methodology. Currently, the Asymmetric Warfare Group [AWG] is the leading agency in advocating OBT&E for the Army, but many units throughout the Army are successfully implementing this approach in their training programs.)

(2) “WHY is just as important as HOW.” Any fool can follow instructions without
Thinking. If our current wars have taught us anything, it is that we need thinking leaders who can train and lead thinking Soldiers. Too many officers and NCOs approach training as if they were only teaching their subordinates how to execute a specific process, procedure or drill without ever focusing on the “why” behind each action. This is akin to teaching a person to say a sentence in a foreign language without also teaching them what the words actually mean.

For a Soldier or a leader to be able to adjust in a changed situation, he has to be able to do more than execute the steps of some rehearsed drill. Soldiers that are trained only in the precise execution of drills without an accompanying focus on the purpose behind what he is doing are conditioned to expect exact instructions. They will naturally want to be told what to do and exactly how to do it. They will not act without detailed instructions or, if they do, their actions will likely be inappropriate because they are not accustomed to thinking and working independently within the intent of higher headquarters. Instead, Soldiers must be well-grounded in the “why” behind what they are doing so that when the situation changes (as it always does) they can properly adjust to the new circumstances. Without this grounding in the “why,” initiative is impossible ... and without initiative on the part of Soldiers and leaders at all levels, mission command is impossible! (The Boyd Cycle — more commonly known as the “OODA Loop” — is a model for understanding the type of rapid decision-making that is required in combat. Originally developed after a study of fighter pilots in the Korean War, the Boyd Cycle reflects the need for warriors, especially leaders, to rapidly take in information, make sense of it, and focus on what’s really important in determining their next action or decision. The danger is always “sensory overload” as one tries to focus on the massive amount of information on the battlefield. In order to be successful, one must “orient” on what’s vital to the decision that must be made, using that information to determine the appropriate action. The side that can do this most rapidly and effectively invariably wins in combat.)

Applying this principle has significant implications for leader certification programs at all levels. Long a part of the Army’s training methodology, leader certification now becomes even more important in the preparation for a training event. The old “turnkey” method of instructing will no longer suffice. Merely showing up and reciting a rehearsed script will not serve to nurture initiative or adaptability. When a Soldier asks, “Why do we do that?” the reply cannot be “Because that is how we always do it” or “Because the manual says so.” All of these responses really translate to “I don’t know what I am doing.” This exposes the trainer as a fraud to those that he is supposed to be training. The natural reaction of the Soldier will be confusion, and the supposed trainer will have lost legitimacy.

Instead, instructors must have the ability to explain not only how to do things but also why things are done. They must have the patience to let trainees struggle, experiment, and even fail at times in an effort to learn on their own through experience (within reason). Additionally, they must have the skill to lead highly effective after action reviews that bring the intended lessons to the forefront of discussion. Therefore, the selection of instructors/trainers and their accompanying certification are absolutely critical. Without the right types of officers and NCOs in charge, the training event will devolve into the unthinking execution of drills or processes without any broader context.

(3) “Take away the safety blanket.” Remove the senior officer and NCO leadership at key points during training and have junior leaders take charge. What better way is there to inspire the exercise of initiative? This sounds simple enough, but far too many senior leaders refuse to “let go” and force their subordinates to step up. Commanders or their designated observer/controlllers should remove the “safety blanket” from the first-line leader by deliberately cutting off communications with higher headquarters in selected situations where the circumstances have changed dramatically from what was originally anticipated. It must be such that quick action is necessary in order to remove the option of delaying until communications can be re-established. This requires the junior leader to exercise initiative in the absence of precise instructions. The young officer or NCO must clearly understand the higher

Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment set up a local support-by-fire position during a combined arms live fire at Fort Bragg, N.C., on 17 September.
headquarters’ intent for the operation so that he can make a sound judgment in response to the new situation. This technique works especially well during missions where the junior leader is dealing with civilian figures such as a village elder, tribal sheik, or possibly even members of the international press. Experiences such as this during training get young officers and NCOs accustomed to the idea of taking action and making decisions without a senior leader looking over their shoulder. They also learn the importance of conducting themselves in accordance with the rules of engagement, the guidelines of the current IO campaign, and the intent of higher headquarters. These are the types of challenges that await them in combat today.

(4) “Get rid of the script.” Collective tactical exercises should not follow a choreographed script. If events unfold the same way regardless of the actions taken by the Soldiers and leaders on the ground, then it implies that their decisions have no consequences. Nothing could be farther from the truth, especially on today’s complex, politically-sensitive battlefields. Fixing this problem necessitates the elimination of discrete “lanes” or, at least, making these lanes transparent to those being trained. Too often the transition from one “lane” to another becomes an “administrative move,” and the actions taken during the last engagement are all but forgotten as units move quickly on to the next task. There must be an over-arching scenario that includes not only tactical objectives but also operational objectives from higher headquarters. This allows leaders at all levels to place their actions and decisions into context of the “big picture.” A free-thinking set of role-players posing as the enemy and the local population is also required. If the training “lanes” are not interconnected, units do not experience the long-term consequences of immediate actions or decisions. The context, usually embodied in the higher commander’s intent, is essential for the execution of disciplined initiative and, therefore, vital to the exercise of mission command.

(5) “Let’s make sure we really understand what discipline is!” Perhaps it is easier to first define what discipline is not. Doing things blindly without question is not discipline. Any fool can follow orders even when those orders are overcome by events and no longer make sense. True discipline is doing the right thing no matter the circumstances. Sometimes the “right” thing is to follow the last order given. At other times, it is to disobey the last order and adjust to the changed situation. Soldiers must follow the intent of their leaders, making adjustments whenever the situation on the ground makes deviation from the “plan” necessary.

Unfortunately, leaders too often equate discipline with a clean and polished appearance or with uniformity, but neither of these necessarily equates to true discipline. For example, having a standard load plan for all combat vehicles in a company makes sense because it allows everyone in the unit to quickly locate critical equipment on every vehicle. However, it makes no sense to reprimand a deviation from the load plan on a vehicle crew when there is a valid reason to do so. In fact, a commander’s standing rule for subordinates should be this: don’t call and ask for permission to do something that you already know is the right thing to do . . . instead, call and inform me that you have already done it!

Conclusion
The five principles described above are not definitive. Any intelligent leader might think of others to add to this list, and there are many different (and better) ways to describe the ones already included. However, these five simple principles constitute a solid foundation on which to build. If we, as leaders, want to execute mission command with our units in combat, we have to do our part before we reach the battlefield. We have to nurture disciplined initiative in our subordinates through our approach to training. We have to effectively communicate our intent and then set our subordinates free to operate within that intent. This is what will occur in combat, so why not start now?

Nothing stated above is really new, and these five principles are completely consistent with existing Army doctrine. However, there is a tendency among many officers and NCOs to “dumb down” training. Risk aversion and a lack of understanding of what it takes to fight and win on today’s battlefields at the lowest levels are the root causes of this problem. If trainers treat Soldiers as if they cannot be trusted to exercise good judgment, then this is exactly what the result will be! On the other hand, if Soldiers are, from the beginning, made accountable for their own actions and required to think on their feet, this will produce warriors that are capable of exercising disciplined initiative without the benefit of a senior leader directing their every move. The stakes are high and the pressure is heavy on the shoulders of our young warriors, but higher level commanders cannot realistically hope to mitigate risk by micro-managing the actions of squad leaders and platoon leaders. Brigade, battalion, and company commanders cannot be everywhere, so the only way to mitigate this risk is to properly prepare our Soldiers and units for the challenges that await them. Regardless of whether you are leading an Infantry platoon, cavalry troop, or forward support battalion, the burden of victory will be carried by young Soldiers, sergeants and junior officers. We cannot micro-manage them during training and then expect them to fight with aggressiveness and initiative once we get to the combat theater. Tough, realistic training has always been imperative for Army leaders, and in order to meet today’s challenges, we need only to keep this in mind. In short, the solution is to train ‘em like we want ‘em to fight!

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R. Stephen Humphreys is a History professor at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Finding condensed volumes on the complexities of the Middle East is challenging, and this book is tailor made for those wanting a quick primer on the region from an economic, social, military, and religious perspective. Humphreys wrote the book as a series of interlocking essays designed to stand on its own. The book opens with the dual problems of population growth and economic stagnation. Readers learn that the city of Cairo had six million people in 1973 and by 1997 it had grown to 15 million. This increase led to a complete collapse of the socio-economic infrastructure, which brought ever-increasing challenges to feed, educate, and employ Egyptians. Humphreys lays out the modern histories of Egypt, Iran, and Syria as well as a quick orientation into the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. You get into the mechanics of how in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Council of Guardians and Parliamentarians cannot agree on what an Islamic social order looks like. Add to this, there was a disagreement between clergy on how intrusive their role should be in the Iranian polity.

One chapter delves into the rise and fall of Pan-Arabism, which had its heyday with the rise of Nasser, and his 1958 union with Syria called the United Arab Republic (UAR), which only survived until 1961. The UAR would be mismanaged by Egyptian leaders, who treated Syria as a secondary province. Nasser would also usher in the one-man rule, that survives today as one-party rule in Egypt. Pan-Arabism would be discredited by the 1967 Six-Day War, and thus add to the sense of disappointment leading to a segment of the population seeking refuge in Islamist radicalism.

The chapters entitled, “Islam as a Political System,” and “Jihad and the Politics of Salvation,” introduce readers to the complexity and debate of what constitutes an Islamic state. It also discusses the success Islamist militants have in seizing the podium of public discourse, but in essence offers no tangible remedy to the stagnation of the region. Debates that have been going on in Islam’s 1,400 year history include the basic question, “Is there a distinction between religion and politics in Islam?” On a general and broad level the author says no, but on the level of concrete goals and political institutions that execute policy, the answer is ambiguous. This then opens the question, “whose Islam?,” as this faith of one billion is not monolithic or homogenous. This book is recommended for those deploying to the Middle East.


“American paratroopers — devils in baggy pants — are less than one hundred meters from my outpost line. I can’t sleep at night. They pop up from nowhere, and we never know when or how they will strike next. Seems like the black-hearted devils are everywhere.’
— Diary extract from a slain German officer in the vicinity of the Carroceto, Italy, February, 1944.”

Phil Nordyke has done it again. If you read Four Stars of Valor, detailing the exploits and heroism of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment in World War II, you would be justified in thinking that no sequel, no tale matching the 505th PIR’s combat record, could be possible. With no disrespect intended for members of the 505th PIR, I must say that you would be wrong.

But what more could be written about this colorful, valorous unit? Didn’t Ross Carter cover the subject in his book Those Devils in Baggy Pants more than 20 years ago? And what about Jim Magellans’s book All the Way to Berlin? And let us not forget T. Moffatt Burriss’s remembrance of the same unit in his personal history Strike and Hold. Well, the answer is: plenty. Although Nordyke covers much of the same ground as the authors above (and he uses, liberally, quotes from Carter, Magellas, and Burriss), he does so with expanded quotes from dozens of 504th PIR veterans which lend not just legitimacy to his narrative, but, at points, turns historic narrative into something almost resembling fiction. The exorcising detail in his book can at times be overpowering. This is a Soldier’s tale told by (numerous) Soldiers. The other books cited above are excellent sources if one seeks to explore one man’s experience with war; Nordyke tells his story from dozens of perspectives and his accounting makes the 504th live today in a way that makes history accessible to all.

In picking up a book such as this, one expects to read of the tales of extraordinary heroism. The book does not disappoint. But the reader finds eye-opening mishaps in Allied planning and execution, typified by the 504th’s jump into Sicily on 11 July 1943. The previous day, the 505th PIR had jumped into designated drop zones and were actively engaging German forces. The 504th PIR was rushed to reinforce them. As they took off from Africa and crossed the Sicilian coast line, they encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire; fire from ships anchored off the coast of Sicily as well as batteries on land. But this fire came not from German ships or AA units, but from American ones. Somehow the word did not filter down to Naval and land forces on Sicily that additional American forces were to be dropped to reinforce the 505th PIR. American ships and shore batteries assumed that the planes carrying the 504th PIR were German paratroopers being dropped to reinforce the Axis garrisons on Sicily. This incident of friendly fire cost U.S. forces 81 paratroopers and 60 air crewmen killed.
But far more costly were the regiment’s subsequent engagements in Italy, Holland, and Germany. This review’s length does not permit a recounting of all the heroic actions fought (and won) by the 504th. The slogging through the Siegfried Line, the bloody action in the Huertgen Forest, and other challenges are dealt with both compassion and precision. The crossing of the Waal River in Nijmegen during Operation Market Garden is treated with strategically precise and gory anatomical detail. How these troopers endured and continued to bring the fight against the Germans is the stuff of legends. And, always, the story is told by the narratives of individual Soldiers, not detached academicians.

Names one will remember when the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment and its exploits are recalled will include not just Carter, Magellas, and Burrell, but others like MAJ Julian Cook, and, especially, the regiment’s commander, COL Ruben Tucker.

Do not think the history of this regiment has finally been written and that no further study is necessary. The bravery of the men assigned to the “Devils in Baggy Pants” is almost limitless in its extent. Nordyke’s book is the best comprehensive study of the 504th PIR to date, but given the valor of its individual Soldiers and leaders, its endurance in the face of hardship, its enthusiasm and embodiment of the Airborne spirit, plenty of material exists for further studies yet.


Not since Alexander the Great has there been such a wide divergence in the evaluation of a famous general as in the case of Douglas MacArthur. Much has been written about him, largely favorable but a fair amount critical or revisionist. This effort is wrapped in the cloak of objectivity but comes across as sensationalist iconoclasm, laced with loaded words. There is, however, some mix of praise and criticism, and the book is easily readable as it is intended for popular consumption.

The book is part of Palgrave’s Great General Series, which is intended to provide concise but comprehensive biographies of eminent U.S. military leaders. Because of the constraints imposed by the design of this series, there had to be selective coverage of a long and rich career. The choices are well balanced for the general reader and even include events often neglected in other accounts. There are no startling revelations, but some conclusions may differ from those in other histories. A new work on a subject may be useful because it fills a particular niche, exploits fresh sources, or has a new or different perspective and viewpoint.

New to me (and I’ve read a good amount of what has come out about the War in the Pacific in the past 66 years) is his version of the adoption of the “Bypass” strategy and his naming two of the key SWP staff officers involved — the G3, MG Stephen Chamberlin (which he misspells twice), and the assistant G3 for plans, BG Bonner Fellers. He also has an interesting take on the Dual-Axis approach which makes more sense than some I’ve read. He gives more attention to the proposed and actual Aussie operations in the Netherlands East Indies. His story continues after V-J in the Occupation, and there is good coverage of that, which gives equal and appropriate credit (and blame) to those involved. There is no bibliography but the notes give a clue as to the limited number of sources used. As this is an introductory work, it’s too bad that suggested works for further reading weren’t given. There are some careless mistakes in the book. The most egregious is the too frequent use of “Ultra” where “Magic” is correct.

For anyone knowing nothing about MacArthur, this is a good start and should be read with caution. The author has strong opinions and convictions, and some of his conclusions are not only not universally accepted but may be in the realm of speculation. Nevertheless, there is much good, factual material.
Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment keep watch during an early morning battle in the Korengal Valley of Afghanistan 13 August.

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* Company Fusion Cell Operations