Closing the Ring

Unchallenged as the greatest historian-statesman of our age, Winston Churchill writes, more personally than before, of the thunderous year between Tunisia and D-Day.

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Armor Magazine
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Washington 6, D.C.
LETTERS to the EDITOR

Mobility's Rememberance

Dear Sir:

In the July-August issue you published an article on Army I am glad to learn that you are proud of its equipment. It is indeed a point of pride that the Army has the most effective fighting force in the world. I would like to see the same equipment used by all branches of the military.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]

Dear Sir:

I was very interested in the article on Army mobility. It is evident that the Army is well equipped and well trained. I would like to see more articles on this subject in the future.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]

Dear Sir:

I was intrigued by the article on Army equipment. It is clear that the Army is prepared for any type of conflict. I would like to see more articles on this subject in the future.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]

Dear Sir:

I was very interested in the article on Army mobility. It is evident that the Army is well equipped and well trained. I would like to see more articles on this subject in the future.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]

Dear Sir:

I was intrigued by the article on Army equipment. It is clear that the Army is prepared for any type of conflict. I would like to see more articles on this subject in the future.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]
The Association Presidency

When the 65th Annual Meeting of the United States Armor Association (continuation of the United States Cavalry Association) opened on January 11th at Fort Knox, the fifteenth president in the history of the professional organization of mobile warfare was presiding.

In this issue bearing the report of the largest meeting in the Association's history it seems appropriate to look back over the years and round up for the membership some of the story surrounding the group of distinguished soldiers who have served in this important post—for few of us have been around long enough to know the tale at first hand.

On November 9, 1885, when a group of forward-looking cavalry officers got together at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to put under way this first of the combat arms associations, our band was quite small and its members were scattered around the country. However, a home base was set up at the Service School at Fort Leavenworth, and Colonel Abraham K. Arnold was elected the first President.

The wide distribution of cavalymen and the somewhat more restricted communications of the time inspired the establishment of branches of the Association at West Point, New York, and Fort Reno, Indian Territory. Each of these was presided over by a Vice-President and Secretary.

The practice in the early years of meeting was for the members to assemble and read original papers on various military subjects, which were taken under discussion by the membership. Distribution of this material resulted in the publication of the first journal to serve as the medium to reach all members. The Journal of the United States Cavalry Association was launched in 1888.

General Wesley Merritt became President of the Association in 1887, a post he was so proud until 1907. His 20-year tenure is the longest period of all in the position.

Undoubtedly several mathematically inclined members have been scratching their heads over several things by now. For example, the Association was organized in 1885. That makes it 66 years old this past November. Why is this the 65th Annual Meeting? The magazine was put under way in 1888. That makes it—let's see—64 years old. Then how come this issue is the first of Volume LXII? And if the present President is the fifteenth, why do these two sets of seven photos line up to each a balanced fourteen?

All of this is an interesting story. To take the last item first, a check of the captions next to the photos on this page will show that General Carter played a remise engagement. Like Cleveland, he had split terms.

The matters of meetings and volumes are based in the same reason. The Association simply ran into difficult times occasioned by something with which we're all familiar—war. Not much over a dozen years ago, it came up against the Spanish-American War. The results—all members busy with primary duties requiring the sacrifice of annual meetings and publications for the years 1900 and 1901. The first World War produced another blank year in 1919. Thus we have three years deducted from the 66 years of organization, to make 1951's Annual Meeting the 65th. And three years chopped from 66 since the appearance of Volume I, Number 1, leaves us with LXI.

The Spanish-American War lapsed a crisis in Association life, and it was only a strong letter from General Merritt, written at sea, and the efforts of a few members that kept things going.

It is interesting to note that six of the Association Presidents were Chiefs of Cavalry—Generals Holmes, Hdbrink, Cobb, Craig, Henry, Kramer and Herr.

One of these, General Maitlin Craig, was Army Chief of Staff from 1945 to 1955, succeeding General MacArthur and preceding General Marshall.

Only one of the Presidents served a tour as Editor of the magazine. General Carter, who served the split terms in the Presidency, as Captain Carter held the post of Editor-Secretary from 1892 to 1897.

The Presidency of the Association is an important position. Elected by the membership from among the senior professionals of the mobile arm, the President's guidance and prestige are reflected throughout the organization.

The contributions made by the fourteen men whose pictures appear on this page is immeasurable. As a group they represent the traditions, the mission and the accomplishments of their arm over a substantial period in the history of the United States Army.

The demands on the time of these soldiers are well known to all. Their efforts on behalf of the Association are an indication of their high interest in this special field and a tribute to their qualities of leadership.

The Association is fortunate again in having Lt. General Willis D. Crittenden as its President for 1952. His career in the mobile arm is in concert with everything the Association stands for. Of special significance has been his lengthy association with the development of mechanization in the United States Army.

Through sixty-six years the members of the Association have set a high standard in the selection of their Presidents, establishing a precedent to inspire the organization through the coming years.

The Editor
Armor personnel from around the country joined the great concentration of branch members at The Armored Center at Fort Knox on January 14th for a truly memorable gathering of the mobile arm—the 63d annual meeting of the United States Armor Association. The largest assemblage of members in the history of the professional organization of mobile warfare was on hand for a program climaxcd by the address of the Army's Chief of Staff. Two thousand officers heard General Collins give the official and intimate story of our tank program in these very critical years before

The United States Armor Association
that our infantry divisions now have 140 medium tanks, or more medium tanks than we had in our light armored divisions during the early stages of World War II. One of my acts as Chief of Staff was to order the establishment of a tank group. This is composed of the Army Armored Center to button up all the loose ends of the tank program; the Army tank program, in large measure, is based upon its findings.

Now I want to discuss this opportunity to tell you something about the Army's tank program, but I am happy to have been invited to address such a fine assemblage of leaders. In my opinion, the successful operation of an armored force requires great qualities of leadership.,-action, swift execution, and training. Since I have mentioned leadership, I should like to make a note to pay tribute to one of our greatest leaders of World War II—Major General Maurice Rose of the 3d Armored Division.

In March 1945, our 7th Corps, in the First Army, had captured Cologne and closed in on the Rhine. The 7th Corps was given the northern section of the Remagen bridgehead and was told to attack to the east. I decided to attack the German line directly with armor instead of planning a costly operation through west with infantry. The 3d Armored Division was to lead out over the whole corps front, followed on the right by the 10th Division and on the left by the 1st Division. I ordered the 3d to attack on the 2nd day of the operation as the lead division, but with the distant objective of the 1st Division. Our general plan for the 3d Armored was to give it successive objectives in the form of a ladder of objectives, with each step higher than the last. At dawn the next day, the 3d Armored moved to the attack. It encountered only light resistance at the start, but by afternoon had run into a series of roadblocks and minefields, which we disposed of by using smoke and small-arms fire. As we advanced, we disposed of more minefields and increased our speed. The 3d Armored was to attack to the north, and the lead division was to coordinate advance to the center to push the American Ninth Army which had crossed the Rhine to the North. As usual, the 3d Armored was to lead the way but, as the front was too great for one division, we decided that for the rest of the columns, which was cut off by the Germans. He was killed that night.

I had difficulty, even now, concealing my surprise at his death. A few days before, I had gone to see Maurice Rose. He was one of our best armor commanders; one of those great leaders who are always up front. I think he exemplifies the true spirit of armor.
We took steps to develop a family of engines and transmissions that could be used in all types of military vehicles. This is known as the AV-1700-3 engine and transmission that could be used in all types of military vehicles. This is known as the AV-1700-3 engine and transmission that could be used in all types of military vehicles. This is known as the AV-1700-3 engine and transmission that could be used in all types of military vehicles. This is known as the AV-1700-3 engine and transmission that could be used in all types of military vehicles. This is known as the AV-1700-3 engine and transmission that could be used in all types of military vehicles.

In general, the availability of production materials is improving considerably under the Controlled Materials Plan and due to expansion of basic material manufacturing facilities. There are a few critical materials, such as nickel, which remain in short supply and which must be carefully allocated by the National Production Authority. While it is not expected at this time that a shortage of materials will delay production, the close margin on which our program is operating leaves no reserve to meet unforeseen problems which might arise.

Few of us fully appreciate the magnitude of our program to obtain the strategic raw materials needed for our tank production. In each M47 tank there is a striking and thought-provoking example of the size and complexity of that program. Each tank requires:

- 1,915 pounds of chromium of which 99 per cent of the ore is imported.
- 950 pounds of manganese of which 92 per cent is imported.
- 520 pounds of nickel of which 92 per cent is imported.
- 100 pounds of tin of which 78 per cent is imported.
- 6,512 pounds of bauxite (the ore of aluminum) of which 65 per cent is imported.
- 1,484 pounds of copper of which 29 per cent is imported.

And there are many other examples, which are equally as impressive.

The availability of machine tools will also continue to be a key factor in our efforts to meet production objectives. While the Army has made maximum use of governmental reserves and is diverting machine tools from lesser important programs, the only real solution to the machine tool problem lies in the delivery of new tools from the machine tool industry. It appears as though it will be at least another year before any appreciable supply can be expected from this quarter.

To give you some idea of the coordination required in producing a tank, let me quote you some figures on the number of separate components involved in furnishing different assemble and supplied by the new light tank being produced by the Cadillac Corporation. The prime contractor has let contracts to 3,000 different subcontractors who, in turn, have let contracts to an additional 9,000 firms. The chain of manufacture and supply for this one tank alone reaches 24 states.

We hope our tank program is now on a firm production basis. There were difficulties, but we knew there would be, and we met them. We took some risks, but we were calculated ones, and they have paid off. We resisted the temptation of immediate production gains in order to establish a firm basis for a balanced long-range tank program, and I am still confident that it will pay off.

I think Korea has proven again that our concepts and doctrines are sound. Our experiences there have confirmed the need for organic armed units with our infantry divisions. Even though Korea is not considered good tank country, our commanders at all levels have lauded the accomplishments of our tank units and have emphasized the importance of armor in the ground combat team. I think the Army's current thinking on armor is reflected in last year's budget which allocated more funds to armor than to any other single Army item.

I have talked at such length about hardware this morning that I fear that there may have arisen a misconception in the minds of some—that equipment is everything. In the Army, however, there is more an important element—the man. To you, officers of the Army, I make this appeal: let us be leaders in the world—the American soldier.
The Sixty-third Annual Meeting of The United States Armor Association

"It is the first time, as far as I know, that the Chief of Staff has addressed us. It is the first time we have gathered in the field and the first occasion of the occasion with the on-the-ground development of the arm." Thus spoke Lt. General Willis D. Crittenberger, President of the United States Armor Association, in opening the 63rd Annual Meeting of the organization of mobile warfare, held this year at the Armored Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, on January 14.

Four hundred and five active members of the Association were on hand in Theater Number 1 when the meeting was called to order. In addition, another 943 were represented by proxy, for a total voting strength of 1,257. This was the largest attendance in the entire history of the Association. The total representation was the more surprising in view of the fact that both host and hostess around the world were in no position to respond to the call for the meeting.


Major General I. D. White, Commanding General of the Armored Center, host to the meeting, opened the day’s program with a word of welcome, and the introduction of General Crittenberger. The President regarded that the members of the Executive Council join him on the stage, and the meeting was called to order.

During the year the Council and a special committee of Armor officers at Fort Knox made a study of the Armored Combat Training Area, which resulted in the recommendation that the Armored Combat Training Area be established as an independent command.

The next order of business was the election of officers. General Crittenberger turned the meeting over to Major General D. W. McGowan, Chairman of the Nominating Committee which included also Colonel William J. Bradley and Colonel Herbert H. Mees—one member representing the Regular establishment, one the National Guard and one the Reserve. A slate was submitted for consideration. Nominations were opened, and Colonel C. W. Albens was elected unanimously by the membership.

The new slate in substitution for a Council member of the previous year. A motion to close the nominations was seconded and the slate was unanimously carried. The distinction and strength of the governing body augured well for the coming year.

Colonel Albens then proposed that the Association entertain the possibility of sponsoring a movement to use the term “armored” in place of ordnance in association of all designations to the armored division, the Armored Center, the Armored School,
The Armored School then entered the program with a presentation on the subject of 'Trends in Armor,' given by Lt. Colonel Edwards of the Command and Staff Department. The material, which represents the School's thought along general lines appears in articles elsewhere in this issue.

Atmosphere now switched from Theater Number 1 to Sardis Aircraft Building. Upwards of 2000 officers converged upon this point to fill the building to capacity for the feature event of the Association's 63rd Annual Meeting—the address of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

General Collins was received with full honors upon his arrival at the Field House, where smoothly turned out troops, band and artillery were formed for the firing of the salute and the presentation. The Chief of Staff, accompanied by the Armored Center commander then entered the Field House and an impressive 3d Armored Division, hours Guard and move down the center aisle to the front of the house at the assembly mood at attention.

In introducing General Collins Gen. Crittenberger took note of his well known interest in armor, his broad experience with it on the battlefield, and the highly important post he holds in the defense of our country and the free world and of the fact that "his presence here, in his very busy schedule, is an indication of the recognition he accords Armor's place in modern combat." Concluding his introduction of the Chief of Staff, Gen. Crittenberger and assured that "the United States Army Association, in its Annual Meeting is entirely conscious of the fact that he does so, and of the vital importance of his views on an subject is of significance to all of us." The impression of General Collins' remarks is evident in the wide coverage accorded them in the press. His address appears as the lead article in this issue of ARMOR, where it may be studied by all members of the using arm as the official story in our field of primary interest, thus receiving the full attention that is deserved. Touching upon such key matters as the family of tanks concept, the need for the armored division, the role of the tank in the future, and the importance of Armor's role in the ground picture, his remarks are an inspiration to the Armor Branch.

The afternoon portion of the session dealt with the role of the Weapons Department opened the session with a demonstration of the Tank Crew Proficiency Course. The initial crew through the course was composed entirely of lieutenants attending the Officers Course at the Armor School. Using live ammunition, they ran the course to take under fire all possible types of targets, including air and ground. Visitors, including General Collins, rode along in the bed of a 2 1/2 ton truck immediately behind the tank to observe the course. A second crew was made up of Weapons Department crewmaning the M47.

From here the action moved to a point several miles away for a demonstration by Board Number 2 of all types of vehicles. Light, medium and heavy tanks, personnel carriers and trucks were displayed, including the firing on targets at open ranges. Various new weapons and equipment devices were displayed and described, and visitors were able to see most of the vehicles. Much of the Board presentation was in the classified area.

A closed conference attended by General Collins and senior Armor officers took place in private session, at which time some of the highly classified material was covered.

In the evening the official dinner was, held by the Association and ranged on "Major General J. D. White and The Armored Center," and the many guests at the dinner. Among those attending were many distinguished guests including individuals who contributed to the program.

The 63rd Annual Meeting of the United States Army Association was an event and an outstanding success. The members of the organization of mobile warfare look forward to carrying on the precedent next year and in years to follow.

ARMOR—January-February, 1952

MEMBERSHIP IN THE ASSOCIATION

Active Junior Honorary

ACTIVE: The key phrase concerning your eligibility, as stated in the constitution is... "assigned to, detailed to, or serving with," Officers of any branch and all components whose status meets one of these provisions, are eligible for active membership. This includes assignments to troop units, The Armored School, The Armored Center, The Armor Board, a staff assignment. It includes all retired personnel whose commissioned career was in the mobile arm.

ASSOCIATE: All present and former commissioned officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers of the Armored Services, are eligible for this class of membership. Although not wanted to serve or hold office, associate members are entitled to attend meetings, take part in discussions, and receive book department benefits and other membership privileges.

JUNIOR: This is a special class of membership to special military students who are in pursuit of professional careers. The students are enrolled in such schools as West Point, VMI, Valley Forge, Culver, The Citadel, Texas A & M, and so on. Open for this membership, the junior member may also attend meetings and take part in discussions.

HONORARY: The Executive Council selects persons distinguished in military, naval or air service, or in learning, to honorary membership.

Every Armor officer should be an active member of his branch Association. Regardless of whether ARMOR magazine is readily available through an unit subscription or by other means, the Armor officer should be an active member and contribute his strength and assistance to the organization in its aims and purposes, while receiving the benefits of professional association in return, as well as a personal copy of the magazine.

Anyone may subscribe to ARMOR
ANNUAL REPORT
To the Members of the United States Army Association:

Submission of this report, as required by the Constitution, is the report of the Secretary for the year 1951, covering the general affairs of the Association and its publication:

GENERAL

The Association

The passage of the Army Organization Act and the outbreak of war in Korea came in the same month of 1950. Both were of great significance to the mobile branch of the ground forces, and both guaranteed the importance of the United States Army Association and its mobile warfare.

The Association was ideally suited as a result of its constitutional aims and its professional standing, to promote certain adjustments arising from the change of branch name. The consequent change in Association and Journal names made necessary a general dissemination of information, a maintenance of continuity, a perpetuation of history and tradition, the elimination of certain differences, the fostering of elements and the setting of innovation. The Association's publication was the primary carrying instrument.

The opening of 1951 brought the new branch insignia. Full coverage was given through the magazine of the Association, and advertisements, which were procured and one set presented by the President of the Association, were in half of the membership, to the Commanding Officer of every tank battalion in the Army, including those in Korea.

As a further contribution to the solidarity of the arm, a cable was sent from the President to the Commanding Officer of each tank battalion in Korea, expressing on behalf of the entire membership of the Association a message of confidence and pride in the excellent performance of duty by these battalions, and their contributions to the high standards of U.S. Army.

With an eye to the professional grounding of the specialties in mobility, and in order to perpetuate the highly valuable history and traditions from the mobile arm, the governing body has considered several proposals as appropriate. Association projects among them the establishment of a mounted service museum, and the publication of a history of cavalry. These are in preliminary stages only, and will be presented when held, and the new tank battalion in course when some sort of working base should be set down.

During the year a special committee of Army officers made a detailed study of the constitution of the Association. Although fundamentally sound, the 66-year-old document required a revision beyond its periodic amendment, to make it a tool worked in a new field of 1,554 acres of today. A proposed revision was presented to the membership with the call for the annual meeting, to be a subject for the meeting.

In the belief that a substantial library at Association Headquarters is necessary and necessary, and can be of great service either administratively or in membership, the Secretary put under way during 1951 a campaign to enlarge the very limited existing library, to the extent of many gaps exist along the lines of material on mobility. As a result of this, the editorial reference file of standard reference

ARMOR—January-February, 1952

FINANCIAL REPORT
UNITED STATES ARMY ASSOCIATION

Case Receipts & Expenditures

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Total Receipts: $27,864.21
Total Expenditures: $27,864.21
Net Value of the Association (31 December 1951): $9,615.07

SUMMARY

In the light of its mission, the Association is carrying out its responsibilities. Its financial condition is sound and improving. Accomplishments resulting from expenditures in the last 18 months are such that it should find a gradual strengthening of the financial base with no sacrifice of the carrying out of all responsibilities. The American government's support of professional organization in a highly important field. The end of 1951 discloses a strengthened and welded organization of sound financial standing, with great potential for future and a defense need. There should be no limit to the year ahead.

The Bank Deposit

The tale of books through the Bank Deposit represents the only source of income for the Association other than the principal one of membership-subscription. Book publishers have given the Association permission to use their publications ranging from 10 to 40%. The average is probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 25%.

The Bank Deposit is able to supply any book in the English language, if available. But book business is very light as a whole. The additional means available to the Association for correspondingly involves the most important elements of operation—time, money and personnel. Very close to the maximum use of these three ingredients obtains at the present time.

A discount, prepublication price advantages and postage payments are made in an independent to use the book service. Thus they help themselves while helping the organization. The degree of value of the book business to the Association is evidenced to all.
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMOR ASSOCIATION

CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE I. Name.

The name of this Association is the UNITED STATES ARMOR ASSOCIATION.

ARTICLE II. Headquarters.

The headquarters of this Association is Washington, D.C., or such other place as the Executive Council shall determine.

ARTICLE III. Object.

1. The aims and purposes of this Association are to disseminate knowledge concerning the military art and sciences, with special attention to mobility in ground warfare; to stimulate the professional improvement of its members; and to promote harmony among the Armored Forces and between the Army, Navy, and Air Force of the United States.

2. There shall be no capital stock, and no distribution of profits to members or officers, but the income accruing from the Association shall be applied and used in the conduct of its activities and in furtherance of its object as set forth in Article III, subparagraph 1.

ARTICLE IV. Membership and Qualifications for Membership.

1. Members of the United States Armor Association are classified as follows:
   a. Active Members.
   b. Associate Members.
   c. Honorary Members.
   d. Junior Members.

2. Membership in the United States Armor Association are as follows:
   a. Active Members: All officers of the Regular Army or Army of the United States, and all officers and other persons appointed to hold office, or serving with the Army shall be eligible. Excepting general officers, any change in official status from any one of the above described classes who desire to remain Active membership on the last day of the calendar month within which said change has occurred, and the individual concerned shall be eligible.
   b. Associate Members: Those transferred from Active membership and all other present and former commissioned officers and warrant officers of honorable service in the military service or in the service shall be eligible. Such members shall not have the right either to vote or to hold office, otherwise they shall have the privileges of members, including the privilege to attend meetings and to engage in the work of the association.
   c. Honorary Members: Persons distinguished in military service or in the military service connected with the Army of the United States. Such members shall not be subject to the obligations of active or associate members as outlined to the right either to vote or to hold office. Otherwise they shall have the privileges of members, including the privilege to attend meetings and to engage in the work of the association.

3. The ruling of the Executive Council on all applications for membership shall be final.

4. Membership in this Association may be terminated for cause at any regular or special meeting of the Association upon motion of three-fourths of the members attending said meeting; and if the member concerned has been advised by written notice of said proposed action at least twenty days prior to such meeting, which notice shall have been mailed to his address of record retained in the office of the Association, and only after said member has been given an opportunity to be heard at said meeting, said member shall be given an opportunity to be heard at said meeting, if the member indicates his desire to the Secretary-Treasurer prior to said meeting.

5. Active members only shall be entitled to hold office and to vote. Each active member shall have one vote which may be cast either in person or by duly executed proxy.

ARTICLE V. Officers and Their Election.

1. The officers of the Association shall be as follows:
   a. President, First, Second and Third Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer, and fifteen (15) elected members of the Executive Council.
   b. President, the three Vice-Presidents, and the fifteen (15) elected members of the Executive Council shall be elected by secret written ballot at the annual meeting of the Association. A plurality of the votes cast shall be required for election.
   c. The Executive Council which initially shall consist of the President, the three Vice-Presidents and fifteen (15) elected members of the Executive Council shall appoint the Secretary-Treasurer and the Editor before the close of the month in which the annual meeting is held. Upon appointment, the Secretary-Treasurer and Editor shall become members of the Executive Council.

2. The term of all officers shall begin immediately after their election or appointment and shall continue for one year or until their successors have been duly elected or appointed.

3. The Executive Council shall manage the business and property of the Association in accordance with law and the by-laws of this constitution; shall have power to make and amend the by-laws for its own government, which by-laws shall not be inconsistent with law or this constitution; and shall have the power to provide in the by-laws for the appointment of such officers, agents and/or employees as it shall deem necessary and proper, and to prescribe their duties and compensation.

4. If a vacancy occurs in the office of the President, the unexpired term shall be filled by the First, Second or Third Vice-President, in order. If a vacancy occurs in any other elective office, it shall be filled by election at the next business meeting of the Association. The President may, however, make an interim appointment pending said election of a successor.

ARTICLE VI. Meetings.

1. The annual or regular meeting of the Association shall be held on the fourth Monday of each year.

2. Special meetings may, and upon the written request of twenty (20) members, shall be called by the President at other times.

3. One month's notice of regular and special meetings shall be given. Such notice shall be deemed to have been given when published in an issue of ARMOR at least one month before such meeting, and a copy thereof mailed to each member at his address of record retained in the office of the Association.

4. Five per cent (5%) of the active membership of the Association, present in person or by proxy, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, provided that at least ten (10) active members are present in person.

ARTICLE VII. Amendments.

1. This constitution may be amended or repealed by a vote of two thirds of the active members of the Association present in person or by proxy at a regular meeting of the Association, provided that the notice of such meeting shall contain a notice of intent to amend or repeal and as well as a copy of the proposed amendment or repeal. Recommendations for amendment or repeal shall be presented to the Secretary-Treasurer in writing signed by at least thirty (30) active members of the Association at least two months before the date of the meeting at which the proposed amendment or repeal is to be considered.

BY-LAWS

ARTICLE I. Object.

1. In furtherance of its aims and purposes, this Association shall publish with such frequency as may be determined from time to time by the Executive Council, a professional and scientific journal to be known as ARMOR which shall be a book登ook department of the said Association, and shall contain books, maps and periodicals to its members and to the general public of the Association.

2. The object of this Association may be further promoted by such other lawful means as the Association or its Executive Council from time to time shall deem proper.

ARTICLE II. Membership.

1. For the determination of eligibility for active membership in this Association, the designation of 'officers and warrant officers of the Army' is hereby, or serving with the Army of the United States shall include the Regular Army, the National Guard and the organized Reserve Corps. (emphasis added)

2. Any person desiring to become an active or associate member shall make application to the Secretary, which application shall set forth facts establishing his eligibility and be accompanied by the payment of at least one year's dues, the amount of which shall be fixed from time to time by the Executive Council. The applicant's eligibility appearing, the Secretary may grant the membership. (emphasis added)

3. All active and associate members shall receive the journal, ARMOR, without cost other than the annual dues. All honorary members shall receive the Journal, ARMOR, without cost other than the special membership fee.

4. Any member may withdraw from the Association at any time by giving written notice of withdrawal; and membership shall lapse ipso facto upon failure to pay the annual dues; but such withdrawal or lapse shall not operate to relieve any such member from liabilities said member may have incurred prior thereto as a member of the Association.

5. Any person or organization may become a subscriber to the Journal, ARMOR, upon the payment of a subscription price equivalent to the annual dues of the Association, and all such persons who are not regular members and admitted and entered as active, associate, junior or honorary members shall be considered merely as subscribers.

ARTICLE III. Officers.

1. The office of Secretary-Treasurer and Editor may be held by one and the same person.

2. The duties of the officers shall be such as usually pertain to their respective offices. The officers may receive such compensation for services performed as these by-laws may prescribe.

ARTICLE IV. Executive Council.

1. The President shall ipso facto be the chairman of the Executive Council, and in the absence of the First, Second or Third Vice-President, in order.

2. In the event all four of the above officers are absent, the senior council member present shall act as chairman of an Executive Council.

3. Two-thirds of the members of the Executive Council shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business.

4. A majority vote shall govern in all matters acted upon by the Council.

5. The chairman of the Executive Council will provide any committee chairperson with such information as the Council deems necessary to carry out the provisions of the Constitution and By-laws:
   a. Nominating committee.
   b. Auditing committee.
   c. Editorial policy board.
   d. By-laws committee.

6. It is to be noted that the number of members of the Executive Council be residents of the vicinity of the headquarter of the Association.

ARTICLE V. Amendment.

These By-laws by amended or repealed by a majority vote of the members of the Executive Council.
The Adjustment to Atomic War

by MAJOR LAMAR MCFADDEN PROSSER

In the age of atomic weapons, the principles that guided the conduct of war in the past may have to be modified. The tactics of attack and defense must be rethought in the light of the new realities. The traditional concepts of war, based on the premise of total destruction, are no longer applicable. The new form of warfare requires a new strategic and operational philosophy. The old ways of war have to be replaced by new ones that take into account the unique characteristics of atomic weapons.

The development of atomic weapons has ushered in a new era. The ability to inflict massive destruction has changed the nature of war. The old idea of victory through total annihilation is no longer viable. Instead, the goal is to achieve the maximum possible damage while minimizing the loss of one's own forces.

In the context of atomic war, the concepts of attack and defense must be redefined. The traditional idea of an offensive attack is no longer sufficient. The attacker must consider the possibility of the attacker being the defender as well. The defender must also consider the possibility of being attacked.

The new form of warfare requires a new strategic and operational philosophy. The old ways of war have to be replaced by new ones that take into account the unique characteristics of atomic weapons. The traditional concepts of war, based on the premise of total destruction, are no longer applicable. The new form of warfare requires a new strategic and operational philosophy. The old ways of war have to be replaced by new ones that take into account the unique characteristics of atomic weapons.
SOVIET ARMOR TACTICS

Although Russia was our ally in World War II, her military affairs were characterized by a certain amount of secrecy. The readily available information on Soviet armed forces was little more than a collection of data and statistics. As a result, it would be perilous to rely on any enemy German order that was to be conducted against Army Group South. The available data would be insufficient to make an accurate assessment of the enemy's capabilities.

The situation was similar in the case of the Soviet Union. Although the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, the available information was incomplete and unreliable. The Soviet Union's military doctrine and tactics were based on a combination of recent Western military thinking and a unique national history.

In the case of the Soviet Union, the available information was incomplete and unreliable. The Soviet Union's military doctrine and tactics were based on a combination of recent Western military thinking and a unique national history.

SOVIET TANKS VS. ATTACKING GERMAN TANKS

Several weeks after the German invasion of Russia in 1941, the 3rd Armored Division attacked the border town of Slabina and prepared to attack the city of Smolensk.

The armored regiment was tasked with attacking the town of Slabina, located about 50 kilometers south of Smolensk. The regiment was reinforced with infantry and artillery units, and had to cross the Dnieper River to reach its objective. The division was tasked with securing the bridge over the river and preparing to attack the city of Smolensk.

The regiment moved on the night of July 24 and reached Slabina on July 25. The regiment then crossed the Dnieper River and began to advance towards Smolensk.

The regiment encountered strong resistance from the German 90th Infantry Division, which was defending the city. The German division was reinforced with other units, and was able to put up a strong resistance. The regiment was able to advance, but at the cost of heavy casualties.

The regiment had to retreat on July 26, after losing many of its tanks in the fighting. The regiment was able to regroup and prepare for another attack.

The regiment launched a renewed attack on July 27, and was able to advance further. The regiment then took Smolensk on July 28, after heavy fighting.

The regiment was able to hold Smolensk, despite the heavy resistance from the German division. The regiment was able to secure the city, and was able to reinforced with other units, and was able to advance further.

The regiment was able to secure the city, and was able to reinforce with other units, and was able to advance further. The regiment was able to hold the city, despite the heavy resistance from the German division. The regiment was able to secure the city, and was able to advance further.

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WINTER COMBAT FOR ROUTES AND VILLAGES

In January of 1942 the German

force in Russia was approximately 50

percent that of 1941. Extensive Ger-

man divisions were employed in broad

actions, occupied and held under con-

stant threat of harassment.

German troops were experiencing the
terrorist tactics of the winter for the

first time. Deep snow covered the ground,

and temperatures dropped to 30°

below zero. A soviet swept across the

ground.

The terrain east of Kursk was not

suitable. Observation was extensive, as

were the sounds of combat. The mem-

orability of the valley landscape was

lessened only by a great number of

villages, which were occupied.

Frost and snow accumulated on the

ridge was battered by heavy snow

flakes. The German troops, not yet

familiar with the winter warfare con-

ditions, did not find it easy to

fight the forces of nature. Car, truck

and tank motors failed frequently, as

did the various supplies. The large

area of wood prevented the construction

of permanent buildings. The forces that

were lost cannot be calculated accurately.

With fewer resources, the Russians

exploited their greater experi-

ence and resources to their winter

conditions by launching the German

front through minor attacks and local

gain of territory.

In the sector of one division, the

Russians skillfully reconnoitered a

pressure between two regi-

ments, and succeeded in breaking

through with armor and infantry

along the highway leading to Kursk. An

armored formation of about

twenty-five T-34s with mounted

infantry broke through and dashed in the
direction of the city, where a rail-

way and highway vital to German

forces was also smashed in the front.

The village along the highway leading to Kursk, containing only sup-

ply troops and trains, were quickly

captured by the Russian tanks.

On the second day they met quickly
called German security forces about

10-15 kilometers in front of Kursk.

Attempts to close the gap in the main

line on the front with weak local

forces failed. Additional Russian

forces, about two to three armored

battalions, partly on trucks, marched

through the gap. They kept the vil-

ages along the road occupied.

A Russian maneuver of about 22 tanks, released from an-

other sector, advanced into this area.

In a surprise raid they reconnoitered the

weakly occupied village of Vybohla

on the enemy’s supply route, and the

flow of Russian troops was secured.

The German armored

battalions supported by ten tanks.

At two points near Reference Point

395 the tanks and infantry overran

German strong points and broke into

the front. Artillery fire concentrated

on the forces forced them to retreat.

The Russian infantry, losing its sup-

port, made no further headway. The

German reserve battalion was com-

manded, repelled the Russian infantry,

and remained in the village position.

On the 24th several attacks on the

road and, for the first time, on the

left flank of the 1st Battalion, were

repelled. No tanks were committed

on this day.

On Christmas morning the Rus-

sians again attacked east of the

road with about two battalions of

infantry. They were stopped by artillery

fire. Shortly afterward, they attacked

the 1st and 3rd Companies from draws

northwest of the village. Both of these

attacks, supported by mortars and 1900

shells, were repulsed. But a Russian

armored column, about 12 tanks and

almost bare of woods, with many vil-

lages in the area. Snow covered the

ground and temperature was about

15°.

Between the 18th and 22nd of De-

cember the enemy deployed his forces

before the new position of the 203rd

Infantry. The German outposts were

forced back in the area of Kursk, but

the Russian attack was impending. In

the evening of the 22nd, the Russian

armored column, in apparent battle,

attacked the 2d Battalion’s position

for the first time. Although the attacks

on both sides of the road from Lisi-

zhan were stopped by the defensive

fire, further south, the 6th Company

was overrun. Elements pushed forward

into the village almost to the battalion

command post. At that point the bat-

talion reserve was committed and

the position restored.

On 23 December, several attacks in

cast to battalion strength along

both sides of the road were repelled

by the 2d Battalion. As darkness fell,

the Russians attacked the east of

the road. After a march, the Ger-

man tank crews had been shot out of

action by AT guns, they were turned

back.

In a counterattack, the 10th Com-

pany cleared the village area. The

units of the 5th Battalion, under the

command of General Yegorov, were

ordered forward from Belogorsk and

employed. By 2200 the Russian fighting

force, nevertheless, was broken and the

line of resistance reoccupied.

In 1943 reorganized as a reorganiza-

tion of the 203rd Regiment, and the
cavalry battalions were assigned adjoin-

ing positions, each keeping one company

in reserve.

Before daylight on 26 December, the

Russians began an attack to the

area between the village and the

railroad to the west.

On that day the 1st Battalion, accom-

plished by two to three battalions of

infantry, ran toward the village. The

2d Company was attacked by tanks

and the Russians attacked the rail-

way as well. The 1st Battalion was

stopped by effective antiaircraft fire.

Further to the east, tanks appeared

in a line of battle, but they never

knew. An 88mm antiaircraft battery

south of it shot one tank out of action

before being smashed itself. On 18 218.5, which offered no cover, the
WINNER COINBET BETWEEN TANKS AND INFANTRY

In the course of the winter battles of 1941-42, the Russians arranged an encirclement of the city of Kharkov from the south and west of the city. Since the Russian forces were heavy, the snow was deep, especially in low places. At the end of February, the Russians were ready to attack in close formation with vehicles along the road from Bragado-

![Diagram](image)

In early morning of February 5th there was another Russian thrust against the German lines, which was not repelled. The advance was westward from the northeast direction. However, the enemy was in Tarnawice attacked by dive bombers.

A night attack against the northern part of Tarnawice was repulsed. On the afternoon of the 6th, another attack supported by few tanks, succeeded in penetrating the village, but was eliminated in a counterattack.

Resumed attacks by heavy forces were obviously the 7th, with the Russians trying to break through on other points, hitting the right flank. Attacking forces were assembled in large draws and rushes and its patches of forest south of Bragado and advanced by a ski battalion to the vicinity of the road, where defensive positions were prepared. Meanwhile, German forces were reinforced by a second battalion.

Early next morning strong Russian reconnaissance patrols advanced to probe for weak gaps around the southern part of Tarnawice. In late morning the new German battalion attacked out of this area and reconnoitered the former MGB. Tarnawice was attacked by the Russians against Strong Point No. 5 with five tanks were beaten off. Two days of quiet followed except the weather turned warmer and thawing set in. Exploiting this weather, the Russian forces launched a counterattack, which was sharply repulsed by the Germans. The situation was critical.

Four heavy tanks fired upon the village and retired toward the line of stretches near the rail with the aid of friendly tanks. Toward noon of the 12th of February there was increased Russian pressure on the German-held town, reinforced by rocket shells, antitank and mortar fire and at night fire from regimental Russian rear paratroops at the outskirts of the village.

Before the break of the 13th the enemy started an attack from a Y-depression, with one battalion breaking with heavy losses to the northwestern sector of the village. Counterattacks by two companies to close combat destroyed the enemy.

On the 14th of February four heavy tanks fired upon the village, and an attack came with an armor support. Having launched an attack on the Russian lines, the enemy had not been successful and although attacks were continued the following days, their force had been blunted and a breakthrough prevented.

**Loomson**

The action is characteristic of winter combat, which highlights the importance of villages. The troops stick to them and defend their winter quarters with tenacity.

The Russian command showed, as it did in the majority of instances in this phase of the war, an astonishing dispersal of its attacking forces. This dispersal also applied to tanks. In this action they were used to accompany the infantry attacks. On the whole, without accompanying tanks the Russian attacks were stopped. It is likely that the village could have been accomplished more easily if the Russians had the tanks needed to cover it. A threat to the dominating Hill 218.5 would have drawn off the village from its position and thus rendered its defense ultimately impossible.

The excellent cross-country mobility of the Russian T-34 tanks permitted them to accompany the attacks in the actual sense. But in this attack they were able to maneuver well in the terrain in contrast to the German assault guns, which were hampered off the roads and had to be wary of drifts.

**THE RED ARMY TODAY**

by Col. Louis B. Byly

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by Gen. Augustino Goulmomo

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by Uddell Hart

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Order from THE BOOK DEPARTMENT
BATTLEFIELD TANK RECOVERY IN KOREA

A tank costs a sizable piece of money these days. To get our money's worth out of it requires the maximum use. Thus our battlefield recovery, although far from being a glamorous undertaking, becomes a highly important operation. Here is a picture story of a recovery operation by the 70th Tank Battalion in combat in Korea.

The object of the picture recovery operations, a medium tank, M4A3E8, had been the favorite expansion of soldiers gone, bad it? The tank, along with three of its fellow tanks, had been in an infantry company's patrol base perimeter one memorable night when the Chinese decided to liquidate the patrol base and tanks. During the ensuing fight, in which three Chinese companies were soundly thrashed, this tank slipped off in a rice paddy while maneuvering in the darkness for a better firing position. The gasoline tanks were full, since the tank had been refueled the evening before, and gasoline was poured from the gasoline cap into the hole. The Chinese wounded over the missed tank and were promptly shot off by one of the other tanks covering his helpless buddy. At this point, enemy machine guns seemed the only chancery the Chinese had for the Farmers Great Big Hero Award with Sildes, Oaks, and Buseli (controllers). He exploded a bomb charge on the rear deck of the tank (not any idea of the covering tank which had rendered all Chinese (in the vicinity not only useless but completely disinterested in the night's festivities. After the tank had cooled off (it was a couple of days) it was recovered, since some parts, mainly tracks and suspension system, were still in usable condition. The maintenance platoon of the 70th Tank Battalion (Heavy) undertook the job.

After removed from the rice paddy, the turret was transferred by crane and the tank was towed to the Battalion Maintenance Area. Here it was turned over to a Recovery Company for transport to the turn area for salvage and possible rebuild. Who knows, this tank, or parts thereof, may yet see another battlefield. —LEW. COX. CAMPBELL, McFALL, Jr.

Additional captions dates Major Roger L. Toepfer

Surveys the recovery problem. Members of the mainte-

nance platoon pass a towing cable around the tank turret.

View looking through the commander's hatch into the burn-

ning fighting compartment. Gun and round just visible.

A second M4A3 is attached to the front of the tank in an attempt to pull the tank forward, but all to no avail.

As one M4A3 moves, the forward pull is not enough to do the job, so M4A3 medium tank is hooked to it by lines. All together... Sugar! Stripes and hose-lower pay off as the tank is pulled out of the hole and headed for salvage.

Towing cable is attached to snatch block and M4A3 which cable is passed through block, for lifting sideways pull.

The fire burns the engine compartment, a mess of melted metal with exploded 30 caliber ammunition inside outside.

ARMOS—January-February, 1952

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ARMOS—January-February, 1952
Training Tank Crews

by COLONEL L. L. DOAN

The tank is a complex and potent weapon whose operation requires the ultimate in teamwork on the part of crew members. The tanker is a specialist who must know mechanics, maintenance, communications, gunnery and tactics—things which the American soldier, by virtue of his national background, is most adaptable. One thing ties the whole together—training! Here's one story of how it's done.

In the heart of Texas at Fort Hood, home of the 1st Armored Division, Major General Holmes G. Clarke has built into his Individual Tank Commander Course all the experience of his years of training armored soldiers and their tanks. The principle of the course is that of a 100-mile drive through the enemy's rear area, to determine theVi lites of the...
TRENDS IN ARMOR

A Presentation of The Armored School to the Annual Meeting of the Armor Association

THROUGHOUT time, armors have constantly strived to produce a weapon or arm in a combination of three fundamental attributes — fire power, mobility, and protection. Armor provides all three.

Any misgivings as to the role of armor have been dispelled by the record of armor in World War II and again in Korea. The lessons learned during these encounters give conclusive evidence that our basic armor concepts of tactics and techniques are sound and realistic. Changes in tactics and techniques are generally made necessary only because of changes in the types of terrain on which we must fight.

Armor, having proved its value in present-day fighting, can look forward to playing a prominent role in any future war.

To qualify this statement, let us analyze the present-day situation and see what it reveals.

First, in any future war we will likely fight a numerically superior enemy. We will lose all probability, be well trained and equipped and have available a great quantity of mechanized and motorized combat units. Second, on the basis of our national policy, we will never start a war by attacking our adversary. The offensive until our offensive power has been developed.

Third, we will probably be faced with limited operations and limited activity on a larger scale than we have heretofore experienced.

Fourth, we are now in an atomic age and are confronted with mass destruction weapons.

Based on these facts, why, then, do we make the statement that armor is destined to play a prominent role in the future?

We can explain this decision only if we adopt the following detail into what the tasks of armor probably will be. We can, for purposes of discussion, tie together the first two points of numerically superior opponent, and initially a defensive type action.

Assuming we must fight on the defensive, perhaps for months or even years, we must not allow our army to generate a defensive mentality. To do this is to play into the hands of an aggressive enemy. Although the reason for defending a place or area is to gain time or to prevent the enemy from occupying it, such a defense must also always aim at containing as many enemy troops as possible. In doing this, the enemy’s main offenses are hampered and our own operations assisted.

Therefore, our offensive operations should be in the form of offensive-defense operations.

In the offensive-defense, armor seems to have a major role. In this type of action, success is based on utilization of a highly mobile tank using a spiderweb type defense—a system which aims at netting, weakening, slowing, and eventually immobilizing the attacker, backed up by the counterattack which aims at the enemy’s defeat and destruction.

Let us examine how armor might operate in the defense.

There are two major problems in defense—standing the initial attack, and stopping the forces following the initial attack.

The job of holding the defensive system will fall mainly to the infantry division with its organic armor.

The main armor strength should be concentrated under central control in rear of the defensive system since their best role is the counterattack against such enemy forces as succeed in breaking through that system.

Enemy attack of our defensive system can only win real victory, if in addition to his penetration his counterattack and against atomic attack, the armored division can capitalize upon its mobility by dispersing casualties and reducing area. In communications and training permit it to be rapidly massed into a
The target puller has a sled on which is mounted a six-foot target, and will operate over any type of terrain. Tank firing is thus very effective.

**ARMOR**—January-February, 1952

The inventive genius of S/Sgt Anderson H. Nunnally has made tank weapons firing at moving targets a reality for members of the 9th Armored Cavalry Division. With the help of the 8th Ordnance supply, Sgt. Nunnally secured a modified GHE 57-mm engine and transmission, and a chassis from an M-18 tank. With a few other parts, the result was a dash for the Service Company N.C.O., the chief welder.

**9th Armored Cavalry Photos**

N.C.P. Nunnally has been in the service. During World War II he served as a welder for the 117th Regiment, of the 6th Division.

In conjunction with tactical use of atomic weapons, armor appears to be the ideal teammate. Now that we can improve armor so as to better cope with future war, the requirements include the provision of better guns, improved accuracy, and increased cross-country mobility. In increasing the cross-country mobility of armor, all full-track vehicles must be added to the armored division. For pre-plant division is not in the full sense armored; some nine-tenths of the vehicles are of the wheel type. This means that the present armored division has only a small armoredhead with a long wheelbase. Thus the head must separate from the tail when an obstacle is reached, because most wheeled vehicles do not have the cross-country mobility of full-track vehicles. This situation is being partially corrected by addition of an armored personnel carrier. Thus the final armored track element will be added to the tank-infantry-artillery-armor team. Further, this type vehicle may be used for supply transportation, completing the picture.

The inherent free-power characteristic of armor will be available to carry the fight to the enemy to follow up friendly use of atomic weapons, or to complement tank fire in the area, adding the unique use of atomic weapons. This factor is of utmost importance since any tactical movements of armament supply and equipment must be logical in conjunction with a ground attack.

The action in Korea has emphasized the need for a weapon system of greatly increased mobility which may be used to supplement the move in any of the areas. A means of transportation which may be used to supplement the movement of heavy weapons appears to be a logical weapon system which may be used to supplement the movement of heavy weapons.

In Korea, the need for a weapon system of greatly increased mobility which may be used to supplement the move in any of the areas. A means of transportation which may be used to supplement the movement of heavy weapons appears to be a logical weapon system which may be used to supplement the movement of heavy weapons.
Cooperation in COUNTERTHRUST

by Lieutenant Thomas W. Stockton

I jumped off into Bluehead the following morning. The tanks were "very snug," and we made good time. In search of the Commend Group, which followed number 2 and number 3 Companies.

First objective of our force was 10 km off, and we took it without a fight. Number 3 Company passed to the lead with our group right behind.

Up Against Resistance

About 5 km further down the road 3 Company was stopped by infantry and AT guns in strong positions. Colonel Butler called Captain Radcliffe of 3 Company and told him to direct me to pass one section of tanks in the woods on the west of the road to cover by fire the withdrawal route of the enemy. The entire section was to carry 3 Company into the woods east of the road and support their attack on the objective.

We loaded all the infantry we could carry and made the two miles to the woods in short order. Here the infantry de-tanked and hiked the route, with our tanks 50-70 yards behind. Captain Radcliffe rode my tank, which kept him in a good position to control his platoons. The infantry reconnoitered tank paths through the woods, and we picked up 50 yards short of the open on the flank of the woods.

We took a quick look at our objective from there, and spotted two tank trails coming out of the village. Captain Radcliffe decided to swing left with his infantry through a long neck of trees, snatching up the tanks supported by fire from their present positions.

Failing to contact my other section, I went to the tank line from the Centurion tanks of the Blues, while 3 Company went onto the objective in 30 minutes. My section got credit for two Bluehead Centurion tanks, while the other picked off two AT guns and some two dozen withdrawing infantry.

After taking the objective I moved my platoon forward and placed it to cover likely areas of armored concentrations. Since we were poor platoon leaders on no jeep, I put another two miles on my boots checking positions.

I was a bit late getting to one of my tanks, with the result that he was knocked out when his inadequate crews lost his cover and gave a Centurion a neat side shot at 800 yards.

An unpardonABLE mistake prevented further movement forward on that day, as Colonel Butler ordered me to leave one section with Radcliffe and to take the other to the 2 Company area 3 miles back and attack on another route. Tanks led on this next move with infantry following in trucks. Major Basset (2 Company CO) stopped me after 5 miles of road motoring, complaining that I was running this tank 1 obtained permission to move the tanks another 500 yards to a point from which I could come in areas to the forest while infantry closed up. (Oh for a jeep!). Upon arrival at this point I reconnoitered and then contacted the infantry and moved the tanks forward for blackout refueling.
his both sides of the road, putting myself in the middle and running down the 500 feet. When we arrived at the base of the bridge, I
was amazed to see the size of the work we had done. The bridge was
100 feet long and 20 feet wide.
Capitan Raffelike and I talked to the officer in charge before we
arrived. After discussing the plan with him, we decided to
attack on both sides of the road, main effort on the right, and
left flank positions. We divided our forces into two groups:
one for the left flank and one for the right.

The battle was fought with a mixture of hand grenades, machine
guns, and mortars. The enemy put up a fierce resistance, but our
troops managed to advance and repel their attacks. The battle lasted
for several hours, but in the end we succeeded in capturing the bridge.

After the battle, we searched the bridge for any signs of
enemyliaison officers. We could not find any, but we did uncover
several IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) that we disposed
of safely.

In conclusion, our successful attack on the bridge was due
to the cooperation and coordination of all our forces, and our
ability to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield.

— Capitan Raffelike, 11th Infantry Regiment

Additional notes:

— The battle was fought on a clear day, with good visibility.
— We suffered some casualties, but the enemy suffered more.
— The bridge was damaged during the battle, but it was
still usable.

— Operation Order (O-2) for the battle was signed by the
brigade commander and distributed to all units.

— We noticed that the enemy had set up a fake radio
station to communicate with friendly forces. We managed
to disrupt their communications by attacking their
radio equipment.

— Our forces were reinforced by additional troops from
the neighboring division, which helped us to consolidate
our position and prepare for any further attacks.

— The battle resulted in the capture of several enemy
commanders and a large number of prisoners.

— We lost some of our troops in the battle, but they
were replaced by incoming reinforcements.

— The bridge was repaired and reopened to traffic a few
days after the battle, allowing our forces to
continue their advance.

— The battle was a success, but we knew that we
had to be prepared for any further attacks by the
enemy.
**ARMOR NOTES**

**New Henry Tank**

A pilot model of a heavy tank of entirely new design was first announced in the Chrysler Delaworke Tank Plant in late August and early September. This tank is intended to be the latest and most advanced in its class. The Chrysler Motor Corporation, which owns the tank plant, has recently decided to build the tank in this plant. The first Chrysler-produced tank will roll off the assembly line in December and will be ready for shipment in January.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans**

that the new tank will be considerably larger and more powerful than the current Army's existing tanks. It will be equipped with a new 75-millimeter cannon and a new type of armor. The tank will be used by several divisions in the European Theater of Operations.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for high power**

that the tank will be the most powerful in the world. It will be able to penetrate the armor of any tank made today.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for weapons**

that the tank will be equipped with a new type of weapon that has never been seen before. The weapon will be able to penetrate the armor of any tank made today.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for speed**

that the tank will be the fastest tank made today. It will be able to reach speeds of over 50 miles per hour.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for maneuverability**

that the tank will be the most maneuverable tank made today. It will be able to turn on a dime and be able to maneuver in any type of terrain.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for protection**

that the tank will be the most protected tank made today. It will be able to withstand all types of attack and will be able to withstand all forms of damage.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for mobility**

that the tank will be the most mobile tank made today. It will be able to travel on any type of terrain and will be able to travel on any type of road.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for endurance**

that the tank will be the most enduring tank made today. It will be able to operate for an indefinite period of time without needing repairs.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for reliability**

that the tank will be the most reliable tank made today. It will be able to operate without any problems and will be able to withstand all types of conditions.

**Fire-Chrysler-announced plans for economy**

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The question of German rearmament and its position in Europe, coupled with closer identification of the civil and military areas in America as a result of her position of world responsibility, makes this story of recent experience in Germany's history of interest to all.

Reichswah and Republic

by LEUTENANT G. W. TRABER, JR.

The problem raised by the recent issue of rearmament in Germany concerns the right of nations to self-defense. More than any other in the world today, nations are threatened by forces which, while not as deadly as those of World War I, are more difficult to meet. The German Army and the nation's defense are under constant scrutiny, and the question of Germany's right to rearmament is becoming more pressing. Germany is seeking ways to develop a military force capable of defending itself against potential threats.

In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was signed, imposing severe restrictions on Germany's military capabilities and limiting its ability to arm itself. This treaty, however, was not strictly enforced, and Germany began to develop its military strength slowly. In the 1930s, under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, Germany began to accelerate its rearmament efforts, culminating in the outbreak of World War II.

Today, the question of Germany's right to rearmament is once again at the forefront of international relations. The United Nations and other international organizations are grappling with the issue, and the future of Germany's role in world politics hangs in the balance.

The article discusses the history of Germany's rearmament efforts, the challenges it faces, and the implications of its ongoing military build-up on the global stage.

The Army was called an opportunity, and the move towards a more modern military force. A Free Corps of militiamen was formed to carry the banner of the new Germany. The policies advocated by Wilhelm Geiger were met with resistance from the Allies, who saw them as a threat to the stability of Europe. Geiger was arrested and sent to a prison in France. This was a critical time in the history of Germany, as the nation faced a choice: to continue on its path of militarism or to seek a peaceful resolution to its problems.

The conclusion of the article states that Germany's right to rearmament is a complex issue, requiring careful consideration by all nations. The article ends with a call for continued dialogue and cooperation among nations to ensure a stable and secure world.

ARMS—January-February, 1953

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The positions of the United States as a leader of the free world in its fight against communism seem to be increasingly dependent upon military force. Perhaps German experiences can offer us a sense of civil-military relations valuable to us in our own responsibilities.

The theme chosen is especially relevant for three reasons. In the first place, Germany is essentially a Western problem. In the second place, it has been the focal point of the development of our civilization, with a rich and colorful history that has shaped its identity. Germany is the cradle of modern civilization, and its influence on world events cannot be underestimated. Germany's history as a nation has been marked by a struggle for greatness, which has often led to conflict and war. Germany's military history is a constant reminder of the dangers that come with nationalism and militarism.

The military forces were considered Germany's ability to form a united nation and to resist external threats. Germany's strength is derived from the unity of its people, its culture, and its history. The German military was a symbol of its power and its ability to defend its territory. The military played a crucial role in maintaining the nation's stability and its place in the world. Germany's military was a source of pride and a symbol of its power and its influence on the world.

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applied when he wrote that this "non-political soldier follows his friend Schlieffen like a well-trained hound." Rightly, it was to serve as a stimulus, always ready to re-
strain the excesses of the state. The good of the state dictated the less abstract policies of capitalistic
strategies and arms against the less serious danger of
military situation, and of avoidance of force in countering the popu-
lar unrest. Thus, von Seekt as a military author-
ized all his political efforts and strategies, and Schlieffen was only able to gain his task when he was
bound to the state as the concept around which to rally the loyalties of the best. In the case of the
chief, he himself personally the strengthening of the
military forces of the nation by all practicable means, including political isolation and collaboration with
the Russian. Schlieffen showed his idea by emphasizing the aspect of popular support for the Reichswar-
ch by the advent of total war. The strongest elements of the social structure were the places to look for
this popular support. Thus he followed the trend of the voting from the leftist Social Democrats in 1918 to the
radical right Nazis in 1932. Finally, he showed his idea in the non-political sphere. H. Seekt, who seemed
to feel that the determination of this reason of State
in order to better left out of the German discussion, not a really proper topic of discussion among true members of his
political and constitutional parties.
It will be useful at this point to classify the methods utilized in purs-
uit of the implementation of these aims. The first method was by direct contact with the other officers of
government, such as the Groener, Ebert and Groener-Beckedorff-Ham-
merstein. This capitalistic idea was in the same time
native for an expert as well as the traditional defen-
se of the military in the American Civil War. The military
society and the official philosophy over the limits of Versailles. A second source of conflict grew from the
position of the President of the Republic. This position was never that of a mere figurehead and when it was
filled by the senior soldier of the nation, the relations between Groener and the President became quite close. This
relationship was especially influential in the government-bourgeoisie powers emerged, for then the Chancel-
minister Groener, it required that a unity
be attained by the state. By placing the army above the reach of the popular unrest, it was to serve as a
stimulus, always ready to restrain the excesses of the state. The good of the state dictated the less abstract policies of capitalistic
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SITUATION 1. One of your platoons of M-46 tanks is damaged by enemy action. Damaged are the three rear road wheels, the auxiliary idler, the two rear support rollers, various mounting brackets, and shock absorbers on one side of the tank. The disabled tank must be evacuated to the rear using the minimum number of the remaining platoon tanks. The type of terrain over which the vehicle is to be evacuated has a mixture of soft, muddy, slimy and hard rock. What would you do to accomplish the evacuation in the best possible way?

SITUATION 2. During a road march one of a platoon of M-46 tanks falls to make a turn and spins on its side just off the shoulder of the road. The road is only 20 feet wide, is bounded on one side by a sheer cliff 50 feet high and on the other side by a 45-degree slope covered with large rocks and trees; it would be impossible to get any of the remaining vehicles off the road. Because of the rough terrain, the disabled tank would have to be on the road before it could be released from any back-up that might be. Realizing that it would be impractical to use self recovery, you, as a platoon officer, decide to use the 122 recovery vehicle to recover this tank. How would you do it with the least amount of delay? The equipment you have consists of the two coffins and pioneer tools from the platoon tanks, and the 122's own equipment which includes two snatch blocks. You of course also have available such natural facilities as logs and trees.
THE SHOCK ACTION OF CAVENDY

L. J. MASON BLIGHT

Several years ago, a cavalry officer of the Reserve came to Fort Riley and attended the Reserve Class at the Cavalry School. This officer had always been impressed with the fact that he left Fort Riley strongly imbued with the teaching of the ideal cavalryman and his capabilities to the possibilities that had been opened for the use of cavalry as a result of the World War. Subsequently, he conceived the idea of a competitive test in "The Combat Leadership of Small Cavalry Units." The January 31, 1919, issue of the Cavalry Journal announced a prize essay contest to determine the best plan for carrying out this idea.

Fourteen essays were submitted. The judges were of the opinion that none was in itself complete, yet many concepts embodied decisions which were also served as a basis for the plan actually adopted.

In the fall of 1924, boards were convened at The Cavalry School and a test was prepared as had been designed. In 1925, it was successfully conducted within the 2nd Cavalry. The prize of $1000.00, donated by the sponsor of the idea, was won by the platoon from Troop 2, 2nd Cavalry, Lieut. J. W. Wolford, commanding.

The object of the test, as announced, was to encourage and test the training, courage, and physical endurance of the men and the officer and the utmost efficiency of the unit. The test was divided into two phases: the first, an individual test for both officers and men, the second, a test of the unit as a whole. Only rifle troops of the 2nd Cavalry were eligible to compete.

These were permitted to enter one platoon each, consisting of two rifle squads, one machine rifle squad, and platoon headquarters. The winner was to be that platoon scoring the highest number of points in both phases combined.

The 1926 Cavalry Leadership Test for Small Units
CAPT. W. B. BRADFORD

10 Years Ago

TOTAL WAR is glorious! We and our Allies are now convinced by a sinister, unbelief of an Englishman whose Nazi-Franco-Italy methods of waging war are particularly contemptible, repugnant and repugnant to our civilised minds.

The Axis nations have replaced the international lawlessness of the Central Powers by a new and bolder RUTHLESSNESS, under the guise of military audacity and magnificence.

The United States was still pleading for peace in patience and good faith, still offering Japan honorable friendship when the Tokio government, marching on the issue of a surprise attack upon an unsuspecting friendly population, struck with warning. It indispensably was premeditated. Thus, the treachery was complete.

In total war we fortunately know what to anticipate. Since this war apparently is to be not a war of expedient, but a war of how to wage it. If we cannot accept the gauntlet, we must include the words other forms of known weapon, sabotage, and submarine. This far, the use of ideology has been our best weapon...
THE GREATEST AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION IN HISTORY

Reviewed by J. R. C. Fulker

In this new volume of the United States Army in World War II, history is described with clarity and impartiality. What its authors try to achieve is a "dramatic" history of the Western Allies in Europe. Therefore it is the most important of the European series, an impression emphasized by the fact that, because both Allies are at peace, should they together become involved in yet another European conflict, the high probability is that repetition of their grand maneuver.

The Book Section

The greatest amphibious operation in history, the one from out of which it originated was, that though in 1940 Germany held the initiative on land, she was unable to work it from the British on the sea, and because she failed to do so, she was compelled to over-extend her armies. Actually, every new conquest was by her indirectly aided in British and later on American sea power, until by 1944 when she was everywhere in Western and Southern Europe, was so outnumbered that she should have no single point on the vast circumference of her initiative could they

withstand an adequately prepared and determined defense.

The point to note is that from the moment Germany struck at Russia she uncharacteristically placed herself between two fronts: the unoccupied British Dnieper front and the seemingly conquered Russian land front. Russia was her second target, a front altogether unfamiliar to the first because now provided numerically the first was directly unequalled. From the start and increasingly so as the war developed, the first front pinned down vast numbers of German soldiers who might well have tipped the scales in Russia.

Though inextricably intertwined with it, the invasion was precipitated by the Dutch railroad, it being not until the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor brought the U.S. into the war that it took conscious form as the "Aachen" Conference, which opened at Washington on the last day of December, 1941. The divisions arrived at were remarkably few and out of them sprouted the whole course of Western strategy. Germany was now to be worn down by bombing, Russia assisted, the northern coast of Africa was, and a return to the continental area across the Mediterranean, either from Turkey into the Balkans, or by landings in Western Europe, as "the prelude to the final assault on Germany itself." All this sprang from "Aachen," and the rest was Dr. Hart's aporia, the "problem of tailoring an ideal strategy to the changing political and military shape of a war in which the enemy at first had the initiative.

This changing shape was largely governed by events in Russia and North Africa. When Russia was conquered, a negotiated peace, the myth of Germany

Continued on page 52

The Author

The Reviewer

J. R. C. Fulker, Associate in History at the University of Chicago, with the U.S. Army in Western Europe, is the author of "The Western Front in the Second World War." He is the editor of "The Armies of the World."

THIRD ARMY FROM THE MOSELLE TO THE SIEGFRIED LINE

Reviewed by CYRIL FOLKS

This is the first volume so far published dealing with the European Theater of Operations in the series "United States Army in World War II." If the rest proves as good it will be excellent. Official military history never makes light reading. Maj. Gen. Harry J. Maloney says that one of the objects of the Department of the Army is "to help measure the thoughtful citizen's concept of national security." This series, if it ever begins, will succeed, but I expect the chief appeal to be to the professionals and then to veterans of the Third Army.

Yet this sort of history can be done in a lively and lucidly written. Dr. Cole's work is. It is also as fresh as it can be expected. When troops fall below their best they say so. When command seems to do virtually impossible tasks he clearly implies that he has been the case. He recites adverse German criticisms. I find, however, that he is a little too diffuse and that a gentle printing would have improved the work by making it more vivid.

The maps are clear and handsome. As regards the photographs, I regard some just as pleasant embellishments, but the obloquies taken from the air are first-class features. They have a genuine tactical significance-for the student the next best thing to a visit to the ground.

A mark of good military history is that, while the text's situation may be described more briefly than that of one's own side, it should always be made equally clear. Here this need has been amply met. The period is interesting from this point of view. Hitler had realized the danger from the west. He had created a number of new divisions and the full force of the German armies. He had turned over to the west broad-front Panzer formations equipped with tanks. The human material was for there, and some of the tanks were newer than some of ours.
The North African invasion was an unsung success, so much so that now historians and students of war set up between the two West Allies. These led to another conference, one of the most important of the year, and when on January 12, 1944, it was decided at Conferences, the shape of the battle should be a German attack. It was, therefore, decided on, namely that a cross-Channel planning staff known as "Cossack," should at once set to work, and that, directly Africa was conquered, in order to draw German forces away from Italy, Sicily was to be invaded.

The cross-Channel project now passed into its preliminary planning stage, but before it had gone far, the rapid conquest of Sicily and the fall of Mussolini once again changed the shape of the war and re-precipitated the Anglo-American wrangle. Italy was now to be invaded, and the forces needed for it called for a reduction of the build-up of "Overlord," as the plan of the invasion of North-western France in 1944 had by now been named.

This new wrangle centred not on whether "Overlord" should or should not be carried out, but on the date of its launching. As Mr. Harrison explains it: "The British said in effect. How can we sell what we should do six months or a year hence until we know how we come out of the next month's action?" The Americans reported, 'How do we know whether next month's action is wise unless we know where we want to be a year from now?' The argument was as unanswerable as that of which comes first, the hen or the egg'? Again it led to a half-measure: "Overlord" was not cancelled, but somewhat vaguely postponed while Italy was conquered.

CROSS-CHANNEL — Continued.

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At length a full measure was reached and through an extraordinary misunderstanding of Soviet strategy and intentions, there was a chance of a coordinated attack by U.S. and British military and diplomatic representatives with Russia at Lend-Lease. The American General John R. Deane became convinced that there were signs that Russia might prefer an immediate declaration of the campaign in Italy, or the launching of an invasion of the Balkans, to the "Overlord" project. Next, on November 28, at the Tehran Conference, this possibility was raised, and Stalin's answer was an emphatic "No!" North-western France was Stalin's choice, not only because it was strategically the right spot, but also politically the most distant from the Balkans.

With the appointment, on January 14, 1944, of General Eisenhower to the command of the Allied Expeditionary Force, the term of "Overlord" ended; from then on there was no going back.

The first step the Supreme Commander took was to widen the frontage of the initial assault from three to four divisions, and thus the Cotentin within the invasion area. As this demanded additional landing craft, not one but all of the invasion to be postponed for a month—a most unfortunate necessity, as it meant the loss of the very good campaigning weather—but every other maritime operation then in progress had to be crippled by the surrender of landing craft. Finally, June 4 was fixed upon as D-day.

From here, which brings the reader to less than halfway through this vastly instructive volume, space prohibits me touching upon more than three salient points.

The first is that, as the Battle of Cambrai in 1917 may be said to have introduced sea warfare on land, the invasion of Normandy, as also all previous invasion theory in which landing craft had figured, may be said to have introduced land warfare at sea. The tactical change was startling. Hitherto overseas invasions had been so difficult and risky that they were seldom attempted. Now, with the aid of landing craft, which tactically spanned the old gap between man and ship and shore, they became, comparatively speaking, so easy that throughout the war not a single one of them was abandoned.
CROSS-CHANNEL — Concluded.

The second point is: whereas in the past our land and sea services have been too far apart, such as to hinder communication and joint services, in order to prepare the way for the infantry battle, the Third Army must cross the English Channel, in a widely dispersed force, because the success of an offensive invasion — a land battle launched from the sea, as Dr. Cole observes, is too difficult to do so at any other time. On this vital point, important questions I concentrated on the Peninsular part of Chapter VI for careful study.

The third and last point is that all the factors of the latter half of this volume are evident and again in the attention of the reader. The success of a high-minded science and industry played no part in the conduct of the battle, as it was not in the art of the machine or weapon who triumphed—the thinker, the scientist, the engineer, the manufacturer, the leader, and finally the fighting soldier. Further still, my intention or purpose is not to go to make up the battle, as always, the unanswerable and inescapable evidence of the battle, but to explain more fully the manner in which the Second Army—Captain Ernest C. Wrenchy, a Comrade John D. Kelly in the British Army—did something God-ward.

Had the U.S. Army been a laboratory and not a military machine at the hindmost, this volume would not be possible. But if I expressed the marvels of the sea and the sea-gale, the wind, the very waves, the snow and mists. It is the might and mystery of man in war and its power which enabled the Western Allies to do more than pass the enemy's counter-attacks. Army power was the grand example of victory.

ARMOR-January-February, 1952

It is interesting to see how well the M-4 tanks did against the German Marks 4 and 5 on rough ground as long as the ground remained relatively dry. Later they did well enough, but only at a cost which balanced themselves and the enemy. The British rallied at the Stream, but

THE ARMY'S HISTORY PROGRAM

Cross-Channel Attack is the seventh volume to be published in THE U. S. ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, a 90-volume comprehensive history being prepared by professional historians under the supervision of the Office of the Chief of Military History. Within the series itself, a nine-volume subsection on The War in Europe is being prepared, of which Cross-Channel Attack is the second to be published, having been preceded by The London Campaign.

The History of THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS was prepared under the direction of H. M. Cole. The Cross-Channel Attack Breakout and Pursuit The Lorraine Campaign Siegfried Line Campaign Southern France and Alsace The Ardennes The Rhineland and Central Germany The Supreme Command Logistic Support of the Armies

were lucky that the United States had got them to give. It seems that as matters became stickier, in every sense of the word, the German generals got more and more split up and "died to the infantry." This is a horrifying state of things to anyone who understands the Godesen, whose book I have been reading, but it was the same thing with the Ger-
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Here, by an experienced American Army officer, Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, Armor, is the first full-length marshalling of the facts about the Chinese Communist Army. The book is the product of six unique years of service in Asia, spanning the critical period of World War II, the transitional time thereafter, and the brief blight that preceded the Korean War. During this time, Colonel Rigg observed the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, marched with both sides during the battles of the China Civil War, and was present at the repulsing and development of the shattered hordes that transformed itself into the huge, rough-and-tough People's Liberation Army that conquered China, then surged into Korea to do battle with the United Nations.

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In spite of the limitless masses of manpower and in spite of the high command's willingness to check off staggering combat losses as expendables, Colonel Rigg thinks this army can be defeated—and he suspects how.

In RED CHINA'S FIGHTING HORDES the military student will gain a clear picture of the Chinese Communist Army, through the eyes of a soldier-writer who has seen much of this army as attacker, observer, and even as prisoner; and who knows how to evaluate what he saw. Colonel Rigg is a sound military analyst who has performed a real service in writing this factual yet fascinating book.

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