

ARMOR

January-February 2007



ARMOR

The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-07-1

Editor in Chief
LTC SHANE E. LEE

Managing Editor
CHRISTY BOURGEOIS

Commandant
MG ROBERT M. WILLIAMS

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi-monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Disclaimer: The information contained in *ARMOR* represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems, organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a request to the editor in chief.

Authorized Content: *ARMOR* will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponentcy. That proponentcy includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all 19-series officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to *ARMOR* and to the author, except where copyright is indicated.

January-February 2007, Vol. CXVI, No. 1

Features

- 7 **Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction**
by Captain Daniel Helmer
- 12 **Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match?**
by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired
- 15 **Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency at the Armor Captains Career Course**
by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl
- 18 **The Challenge of Leadership during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations**
by Major Jon Dunn
- 20 **Building for the Future: Combined Arms Officers**
by Captain Chad Foster
- 23 **The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier**
by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell
- 26 **Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection**
by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III
- 35 **Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations**
by Major Mark S. Leslie
- 39 **Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor**
by Major Jeff Weinhofer
- 42 **Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success**
by Captain Ralph E. Elder
- 45 **Armor Advances Worldwide**
by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz
- 48 **Future of Armor**
by Captain Brian William Bradley
Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of ARMOR
- 53 **Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto**
- 54 **Mounted ManeuverNet**

Departments


- 2 **Contacts**
- 3 **Letters**
- 4 **Commander's Hatch**
- 5 **Driver's Seat**
- 6 **1st Armor Training Brigade**
The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers
by Captain Daniel Trost
- 50 **Reviews**



Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, ARMOR, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

USPS 467-970



“From My Position...”

“The training of troops when intelligently directed is the greatest of morale builders, as they are quick to sense that they are being prepared to meet effectively any emergency that may arise.”

— Major General John A. Lejeune
Reminiscences of a Marine, 1929

The armor force’s participation in the long war has forced it to quickly adapt institutional and unit training so that tankers and cavalrymen can more effectively meet the daily emergencies General Lejeune referred to. Soldiers departing the Armor School for operational tours leave Fort Knox with a much wider and, in some cases, a much deeper understanding of the critical skills necessary for them to succeed on today’s battlefields than was the case just a few years ago. Understandably, unit training has focused specifically on the unique challenges awaiting soldiers in theater. As a result, some of the combat skills we took for granted just a few years ago are not as sharp today as they once were.

To put this situation in perspective, some of our tank companies and cavalry troops will soon be commanded by captains who have never participated in company-level maneuvers. Some of our tank crews will be led by staff sergeants with only limited experience with Tank Tables VIII through XII, and vague memories of their last mounted combined-arms live-fire exercise. In the short term, this situation is manageable because enough institutional knowledge currently exists within the force to properly address any near-future contingencies. Over time, however, the armor force could begin to lose its proficiency in the core competencies that define the unique contributions we bring to the fight.

Some could argue that given our opponent’s limited capabilities, we really do not need to be as proficient in these skills as once thought necessary to prevail in a high-intensity conflict. After all, we have yet to encounter an enemy who can match our firepower, technology, training, or leadership. What happens though when we encounter a highly trained, disciplined, and well-led, but no less asymmetric, enemy? Although many initial spot reports turn out to be false, it appears that the Israeli army encountered this unnerving situation during its most recent combat operations in Lebanon this past summer.

In his article, “Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces on Israel’s Operation Change of Direction,” Captain Dan Helmer describes an Israeli army that entered Lebanon as a highly effective low-intensity conflict force. Its soldiers were highly proficient at conducting raids, fixed-site security, and cordon and search missions, among others. This proficiency, however, came with a price. For a number of seemingly valid reasons, many armored units were unable to maintain their proficiency in tank gunnery and combined arms maneuver. As a result, what began as a fairly straightforward mission to seize key terrain quickly became an exercise in casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery, and improvisation.

Most military professionals understand that the U.S. Army has been very successful in conducting counterinsurgency operations. Although many of these successes are very controversial by modern standards, they nevertheless are helpful in understanding the current conflict. The U.S. Army’s successful campaign in the Philippines at the turn of the century is one of those history lessons that we cannot afford to ignore simply because of some uncomfortable truths associated with the conflict. As professionals, we must learn to apply lessons that transcend time while avoiding the heavy-handed excesses of the past. In their article, “Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection,” Lieutenant Colonel Jayson Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John Cardillo, and Major William Stowe III provide us with a large list of valuable lessons gleaned from one of our first overseas experiences with counterinsurgency.

Balance is the key to providing our soldiers with the means to effectively meet the complex emergencies they will face today and the unpredictable emergencies of tomorrow. We can neither completely abandon the hard-won lessons of our experience with counterinsurgency in favor of dealing with a conventional threat, nor can we allow core “kinetic” competencies to completely atrophy in an effort to defeat current irregular enemies. The intent of both of these articles and others included in this issue is to provide a small portion of the common intellectual basis necessary to begin the discussion that must occur if we are to strike the proper training balance; future success depends on the outcome of this discussion.

S.E. LEE

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Joyce E. Morrow
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

0630303

Points of Contact

DSN prefix – 464-
Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices

Editor in Chief
LTC Shane E. Lee 4087
E-mail: shane.lee@knox.army.mil

Managing Editor
Christy Bourgeois 4582
E-mail: charlotte.bourgeois@knox.army.mil

Editor
Vivian Oertle 2610
E-mail: vivian.oertle@knox.army.mil

Art Director
Mr. Jody Harmon 3923
E-mail: jody.harmon@knox.army.mil

Editorial Assistant
Kathy A. Johnson 2249
E-mail: kathy.johnson@knox.army.mil

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Word, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we accept articles as e-mail or attachments at:

ArmorMagazine@knox.army.mil

When sending articles via e-mail, please include a complete mailing address and daytime phone number.

SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time.

GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, but will accept electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.

ADDRESS CHANGES, PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS, AND ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription service, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards information, contact Connie Stiggers or Connie McMillen, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-mail: *Brightcg@bbtel.com*; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942-6219. You can also access the Association through their web site at *www.usarmor-assn.org*.

UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at *ArmorMagazine@knox.army.mil*; phone DSN 464-2249, commercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the official distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief.

EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: *ARMOR*, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Ste 373, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the *ARMOR* magazine web site at *www.knox.army.mil/armormag*.

ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force.

U.S. Army Armor Center

Commanding General (ATZK-CG)
MG Robert M. Williams 2121
E-mail: robert.m.williams@knox.army.mil

Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG)
BG Michael S. Tucker 7555
E-mail: michael.s.tucker@knox.army.mil

Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS)
COL Russell Cloy 1101
E-mail: russell.cloy@knox.army.mil

Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
CSM Otis Smith 4952
E-mail: otis.smith@knox.army.mil

Command Sergeant Major to DCG (ATZK-DCG-CSM)
CSM Raymond Chandler 7091
E-mail: raymond.chandler@knox.army.mil

Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA)
COL Marlin Levendoski 1315
E-mail: marlin.levendoski@knox.army.mil

Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development
COL Richard G. Piscal (ATZK-TD)
E-mail: richard.piscal@knox.army.mil 8247

TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS)
COL John M. Shay 7955
E-mail: john.shay@us.army.mil

Experimentation and Analysis Directorate (ATZK-UAE)
COL David Hubner 7809
E-mail: david.hubner@knox.army.mil

TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle Command/Combat Identification (ATZK-PBC-CID)
COL Alan Mosher 4009
E-mail: alan.mosher@knox.army.mil

Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
Aubrey Henley 5155
E-mail: aubrey.henley@knox.army.mil FAX 7585

Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (ATZK-UA)
Joe Hughes 5050
E-mail: joe.hughes@knox.army.mil

Assistant TRADOC System Manager Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS)
MAJ Bryan Salyers 3519
E-mail: bryan.salyers@knox.army.mil

U.S. Army Armor School

Director of the Armor School (ATZK-DAS)
COL Robert Valdivia 1050
E-mail: robert.valdivia@knox.army.mil

1st Armor Training Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
COL Peter D. Utley 8736
E-mail: peter.utley@knox.army.mil

16th Cavalry Regiment (ATZK-SBZ)
COL Robert R. Naething 7848
E-mail: robert.naething@knox.army.mil

NCO Academy (ATZK-NC)
CSM Samuel Wilson 5150
E-mail: samuel.wilson@knox.army.mil

Loss of Hetz Due to Political Restrictions

Dear *ARMOR*,

Mr. Warford's article, "The Secret Testing of M111 "Hetz" Ammunition: A Model of Failed Commander's Responsibility," which appeared in the September-October 2006 issue, is challenged by some Israeli officers and writers. The opposition proposes the loss of Hetz was a negative result ensuing from political restrictions; specifically, restrictions placed on the field commander's knowledge of the battle tempo and objectives and resulting action at Sultan Yakoub.

The 362d Battalion was a reserve unit, accompanied by younger orthodox infantry "draftees." They were not expecting to run or literally lager in the midst of an entire Syrian armored division.

Air support was unavailable; at that stage of development, surface-to-air-missile (SAM) batteries nullified Israeli Air Force support to ground operations. The disengagement of the 362d was a miracle in itself made possible by curtains of artillery protecting the withdrawing column's flanks. Movement in daylight before the withdrawal was nearly impossible as a single person could draw multiple rocket rounds. The night action was fought hand-to-hand with Syrian commanders.

The tempo of the battle's daily objectives was fed piecemeal once the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) gained the Litani River. Some suggest Sharon manipulated the events to invest Beirut a "fait accompli," allowing Begin deniability, and immobilize a cabinet that may have disappeared. The IDF was also more intent on recovering two soldiers missing in action who belonged to the tank on display; their corpses were returned in 2003.

The IDF commanders were limited by Sharon's military initiatives, which (for political purposes) were obscure. Loss of air cover was decisive and unlike the war in 1973, where aggressive ground action led by Sharon across the canal neutralized SAM batteries, Syria's air defense artillery was defeated by successful Israeli Air Force countermeasures.

I do not believe Sulton Yakoub serves the purpose of your essay; the battle on the Damascus/Beirut Highway is closer to the parameters of your paradigm.

TERRY M. STAUB

Future Force Structure Completely Wrong

Dear *ARMOR*,

The fundamental force structure of the U.S. Army in the Active, National Guard, and Reserve Components is completely wrong for the current 40-year war against non-state terrorism. And nothing in the current brigade-based transformation process will fix it.

At their heart, U.S. Army ground forces are still designed to defeat large, mechanized, enemy elements through the use of maneuver, shock, and firepower. They are not fundamentally designed to defeat an insurgency and win the hearts and minds of a terrorized local populace. Further, the operational tempo of this Global War on Terror (GWOT) is rapidly deteriorating the entire U.S. Army's force structure skills and recruitment focus. We are not structured or training for the current fight and no longer offer the soldier any real choice among components.

Bottom-line: the U.S. Army Active Component should be rebuilt, from the ground up, as a gen-

erally light force based around the M1114 and the Stryker family of vehicles, and trained to conduct primarily anti-insurgency operations while continually deployed. The Army National Guard should be reconfigured as the primary heavy force, based on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and field artillery platforms, and trained to break nations and destroy mass enemy forces as the national strategic fist. The Army Reserve should be reset as the support component, trained to rebuild places deemed worthy of rebuilding, and for low-density skills heavily required for occasional operations.

We are engaged in a GWOT that will boil and cool (much like the Cold War) over the next 30 to 40 years, topping a dictator here, blowing up some infrastructure there, and covertly whacking key bad guys hither and yon. Sometimes it may require heavy mechanized forces to totally break a country. Other times, it will be a few bombs or individual bullets. The number of young Americans desiring to be forward-deployed warriors on this long-term basis is finite, certainly not enough to sustain the current mobilization tempo of all three components.

The current war in Iraq notwithstanding, the GWOT will not typically require mass formations of M1s, M2s, and cannons. The Active Duty warrior should reflect this with training and skills as a street-walking, door-knocking, language-talking, anti-insurgency soldier. The Active Duty soldier should expect a career that sees him off to land on foreign shores again and again throughout his career; sometimes for a few days and sometimes for more than a year at a time. This soldier should enlist with the understanding that the Army of the 1980s and 1990s, and its normal civilian lifestyle, except with guns and gear, is a thing of the past, and he will be out the door and all over the world as a light, expeditionary ground-pounder, with his M1114 and Stryker to move him around and provide firepower. This Active Army will more reflect the expeditionary forces of the British Empire of the late 1800s, forward based around the world, and ready to move, shoot, and communicate at a moment's notice.

Entire careers will be spent overseas. It will not be a married Army with families — that will have to wait for 20 years and retirement. Critically, this force will specifically recruit young men and women who desire an active, busy, and aggressively mobile lifestyle with hopes of engaging America's enemies wherever they are, whenever they can.

National Guard recruitment will focus on young men and women who seek to serve their country at critical times, while maintaining a civilian lifestyle and career. Until the GWOT, this has always been the role of the National Guard. It is only the past five years that the National Guard has been totally mobilized, repeatedly, and it is showing wear and tear. Most people do not join the Guard with dreams of heading out the door every few years for 18 months at a time. They join in support of the Minuteman heritage with the desire to be there at the *strategic* moments in defense of the Nation.

Continued on Page 52


2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium *Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow*

The 2007 Armor Warfighting Symposium will be hosted at Fort Knox by the United States Army Armor Center from 29 April to 3 May 2007. The theme for this year's symposium is "Armor: Strong Today — Strong Tomorrow."

In keeping with this theme, the symposium will have a dynamic and varied agenda. Along with the normal vehicle and product displays, each day's agenda will have a mixture of subject-matter expert (SME) briefings and focused discussion panels. Many of the Army's top leaders will be invited as guest speakers for the symposium. Attendees will get a complete update on the current and future Army, as well as an update of the current status and future direction of Armor and Cavalry. Units are encouraged to send Soldiers to the symposium — the information they gain will more than offset their travel costs and time away from their unit.

The Armor Center will also award the Frederick M. Franks Award at the 2007 Symposium. This early reminder should make everyone aware of the opportunity to nominate a deserving individual for the award. Each year the Armor Center presents this award to an Active Duty or Reserve officer, noncommissioned officer, or Department of the Army civilian who has demonstrated a long-time contribution to warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Army. This award is a great chance to recognize someone who has worked hard to make the Armor Branch and the Army better institutions. Please give careful consideration to anyone in your organization who might be a good nominee. Details for submission of the Frederick Franks Award, as well as details on all aspects of the Armor Symposium are available on the symposium website at: <http://www.knox.army.mil/armorsymp>.

Major General Robert M. Williams
Commanding General
U.S. Army Armor Center



Maintaining Armor Core Competencies

The U.S. Armor Force has had certain characteristics throughout its existence that sets it apart from other branches as the “Combat Arm of Decision.” Speed, long-range fires, and the unique ability to cross the beaten zone, coupled with the Warrior Ethos that our Armor Soldiers and Cavalry Troopers have always displayed, make our branch unique and exceptional. This capability is not issued on graduation from Armor Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) III or one station unit training (OSUT), however. Strapping on tanker boots or donning a Stetson does not magically transform an average Soldier into a steely-eyed mounted warrior. Our unique capabilities, which we all train and drill on, require a set of core competencies. I am concerned, based on reports from the field as well as observations of training units, that the long war is taking a toll on our core competencies.

The broad branch core competencies for Armor include: command and control, gunnery, maintenance/combat service support, and maneuver. Reconnaissance is addressed as part of the maneuver competency. Due to the nature of current operations, we are receiving reports that these competencies are beginning to atrophy. Initial insights obtained from surveys of students and cadre at the Armor School, coupled with queries sent to brigade and battalion commanders from the operational force, indicate that maneuver, gunnery, and command and control tasks are indeed suffering. Maintenance and supply-related tasks have experienced some deterioration as well. What follows is a roll up of what we are seeing from the force:

- **Maneuver.** While our force is getting more proficient at cordon and search operations at platoon and company levels, battalion and squadron commanders are concerned about the fact that their units

rarely, if ever, conduct maneuver operations above that level. A generation of officers and Soldiers are becoming less familiar with offensive and defensive operations. On the plus side, reconnaissance skills are still quite strong due to the need for current, actionable intelligence in support of operations.

- **Gunnery.** Units are proficient with machine gun engagements; however, main gun engagement skills have been significantly degraded. Gunnery training from the standpoint of training management is also a skill that we are losing at the junior officer and senior noncommissioned officer level. In a recent survey of career course captains, who were assigned to Armor battalions, a significant number of officers reported they had never fired a full-up gunnery. We are losing not only the technical skills associated with destroying targets, but also the leadership skills associated with training technical procedures.

- **Command and Control.** While our junior leaders are being exposed to better integration of branches, services, and allied forces, there are very few maneuver operations being conducted above company level. Many operations are standardized and do not require a high level of dynamic retasking of assets, collocation of command nodes, or large-scale deconfliction of battlespace.

- **Maintenance.** Our Soldiers are doing a great job keeping their assigned equipment working, but we have defaulted to crisis maintenance management instead of preventive maintenance in too many cases. Time constraints and competing requirements remove junior leaders from planning and executing essential maintenance events such as services. Troopers have always ridden their horses hard, but they also take care of them because they


know that the horse keeps them alive in battle. In this technological age, we must not forget that greater care of our equipment is still important, which requires training on how to run a proper unit maintenance system.

What can we do to stop this degradation of our core competencies? The Armor Center and School are aware of this situation and are addressing some of these issues through course training. The Maneuver Captains Career Course, BOLC III, and NCO Academy continuously work to improve instruction on topics, such as gunnery training management, maintenance and supply, and tactical operations at the high end of the warfighting spectrum. We are investigating the possibility of reinstating a two-week tank commander’s certification course to address gunnery and maintenance shortfalls for Soldiers who lack depth and experience in this critical competency.

While I fully understand the requirements for training the Armor Branch to fight the current enemy, we cannot forget that we must always be prepared to engage and destroy the enemy in offensive and defensive operations across the spectrum, as well as conduct stability and reconstruction operations. In this issue of *ARMOR*, several articles highlight lessons learned by the Israeli Defense Force in its most recent conflict with Hezbollah, specifically lessons learned by its mechanized forces. I ask all leaders in our force to continue to find the time and resources to train our Soldiers and junior leaders on those tasks that make our branch unique and essential to our great Army and the United States.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

CSM Otis Smith
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center



Tanks Don't Float

The Armored Force has experienced several water-related armored vehicle incidents; this article focuses on one specific incident and discusses countermeasures that can save crew members' lives.

What could possibly go wrong? As an MIA2 system enhancement program (SEP) driver, he had done this many times. The mission was simple — a cross-country tactical road march over rough terrain, roads, and canals, following behind two Bradley Fighting Vehicles with another MIA2 SEP bringing up the rear. The route was well traveled, but there had been reports of enemy contact. There was also a known risk of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the route. This particular mission would start in late afternoon and continue into the night.

The pre-operational brief and preventive maintenance checks were part of the standard pre-combat inspection. Since there was the possibility of enemy contact and they would be traveling at night, the tank driver knew he was required to drive buttoned up and in blackout conditions. He also knew that he would need to install his AN/VVS-2(V) 2A night vision device (NVD). He remembered that he had experienced problems with the NVD before; it had even vibrated loose and dropped into his lap once while he was driving. The ever-resourceful tanker had the answer to that situation — he tightened the NVD support thumb screws attaching the NVD to the driver's hatch with his handy pliers. He now knew the NVD was secure and would not come loose.

As the mission began, the tank commander (TC) used his commander's independent thermal viewer (CITV) (another night vision device) to assist the tank driver and for his own situational awareness. As night fell, the tank driver used the tail lights of the Bradley in front

of him to guide him as he maneuvered across the rough countryside. Something felt wrong as the Bradley made an abrupt maneuver. The tank driver knew that his NVD did not give him good depth perception, so he asked for assistance from the TC. The TC glanced forward through the CITV and gave the command to proceed. Almost immediately, the tank driver felt the ground give way as the tank slid into the canal. The TC gave the evacuation command. The tank driver popped his hatch, but it would not open because the NVD would not come loose. The only other means of egress, the hell hole, was blocked due to the orientation of the turret. The TC saw the tank driver's problem and attempted both power and manual traverse of the turret. By the time the TC was able to move the turret, and get the tank driver through the hell hole, he had drowned.

Several events occurred, making a bad situation even worse. The following precautions could lessen the egress time and permit successful evacuation:

- Plan your mission — when vehicles are required to maneuver near or across water hazards, take precautions to ensure the crew understands where the vehicle is located in relationship to the hazards. Conduct a map reconnaissance of the route prior to the mission. And remember, weather and terrain conditions may change during the course of the mission — dry creeks aren't always dry.
- Conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) to ensure all exits are free and clear of any equipment that could block or degrade quick egress in case of an emergency. If you are required to use the AN/VVS-2(V) 2A NVD, ensure the thumb screws are loose enough to be removed quickly.

- Situational awareness — inside the tank, position the turret so the driver can egress through the loader's or tank commander's hatch in the event his hatch fails to open.
- Ground guides should be used as stated in U.S. Army Field Manual 90-13, *River-Crossing Operations*. This manual provides step-by-step procedures for crossing water hazards.
- Practice rollover drills and egress procedures constantly — especially at night.

Tank crews must always remember that when an evacuation incident occurs, safe evacuation of your entire crew is first priority — worry about shutting down the tank later. Tank crews must rehearse this drill regularly. Commanders must integrate crew evacuation drills into all gunnery and maneuver training; training must be performed until knowing what to do and when to do it is second nature. We owe it our soldiers to enforce these standards. The Armor Center continues its efforts to reduce risk to tank crews; however, tank crew members must know how to implement effective control measures to minimize risk to crew members across the board.

Special thanks to Mr. William D. Watson Jr., for his contributions to this article. Mr. Watson is the System Safety Engineer for Combat Developments at the U.S. Army Armor Center. We thank him for his dedication to training and supporting our troops.

“Teach our young Soldiers and leaders how to think; not what to think.”

The Evolution of Land Mine Warfare Training for IET Soldiers

by Captain Daniel Trost



Since the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003 by coalition forces, the U.S. military has combated the ever-evolving threat of improvised explosives devices (IEDs). Roadside bombs are not a new threat to U.S. forces; however, their effectiveness and use increases as we increase our effectiveness in closing with the enemy. As with all warfare, technological upgrades and tactical improvements by one army force the opposing army to adapt with varying results.

Soldiers in Vietnam were subjected to IED threats on their convoys and patrols much like units in Iraq and Afghanistan today. The solutions for IEDs in Vietnam were to heavily armor and arm convoys to massively increase their defensive posture and firepower. This proved effective in deterring the opposition from direct attacks, but was not the silver bullet in combating the IED threat completely.

Insurgent forces of today are less likely to stand and fight as did the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Rather, they seek to cause terminal failure of our tactics and equipment in an attempt to draw in a large reactionary force. Once they have accomplished this, they meld back into the populous and study our response. Our reaction is what drives their evolution in tactics and lethality.

The propagation of tactics and technology among our enemy is driven by the fact that they realize they will be successful as long as they continually change how they implement IED threats. These changes do not occur at theater level, but at the local operating level, and are often cross-pollinated within insurgent groups throughout theater. For example, a tactic that is effective in Baghdad may not be effective in Al Anbar, but it is guaranteed that as we counter the threat in Baghdad, established tactics from other areas of operation not seen in Baghdad for some time will reemerge.

The enemy is exploiting our ability to rapidly change our tactics; they rapidly alter tactics as our forces adjust to "current" enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. They do this by moving from command-detonated IEDs to high-fre-

quency radio initiators and alter how, when, and where they emplace devices. Soldiers, not just leaders, on the ground must now better understand our inherent vulnerabilities and how our standard operating procedures directly contribute to those vulnerabilities. Leaders must ensure that all soldiers realize that counter-IED measures start at their level.

The evolving IED threat brought about a complete restructuring of programs of instruction for all initial entry soldiers in basic combat training (BCT) and one-station unit training (OSUT). Previously, soldiers were taught land mine familiarization, mine identification, probing for mines, and conducted practical lane exercises to clear and negotiate mine fields. The training has transitioned from a strictly land mine curriculum to a combination of intensive land mine/IED exercises, which include reacting to an IED, identifying an IED, and reacting to an IED attack. Soldiers arriving at the land mine warfare site will immediately react to a simulated IED detonation, which not only serves as a practical exercise, but also as a wake-up call as they enter the training environment. During training, soldiers also learn the five "Cs" — confirm, clear, call, cordon, and control; five meter and twenty-five meter searches; IED identification; and IED reporting.

The land mine warfare training culminates in a collective task practical exercise where soldiers identify an IED, react to an IED, administer first aid, and properly report an IED. More importantly, this single-day training is just a small part of the IED immersion taking place throughout BCT and OSUT. The real training begins at the unit level with the integration of "every soldier is a sensor," where drill sergeants and cadre alter aspects of the training environment and task soldiers to identify the environmental modification. It can be simple exercises, such as emplacing cones along a road-march route while requiring soldiers to report the environmental discrepancies they notice. To challenge soldiers even further, IED training aids can be placed in and around soldiers to allow them to implement reactionary measures. This training greatly enhances a soldier's abil-

ity to recognize when things just do not look right. Using the "every soldier as a sensor" model, trainers are better equipping soldiers with the knowledge to better understand how and what to look for, as well as how to react when in contact with threat forces.

Each company in the 1st Armor Training Brigade now has a company-level IED training aid kit or "IED in a box." These kits are no cost and are a locally produced assembly of commonly encountered munitions and triggering devices. The kits offer units and soldiers a permanent training tool, which can be used during concurrent and opportunity training throughout the cycle. Also, IED training does not require commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products; simple products, such as the "IED in a box" provide units a great training value with minimal monetary and man-hour costs. Although the COTS products are outstanding at offering realistic scenarios with auditory and visual feedback, they should be used during capstone exercises to ensure soldiers have mastered their 10 level task sets. Not only does this afford soldiers the opportunity to experience a realistic attack, but it also sets conditions to test soldiers' tactical reactions. The "IED in a box" is one of the great and simple tools now incorporated into the IED training matrix, which will further enhance the combat effectiveness of newly minted soldiers.

The IED and its evolution as a battlefield condition is not a revolutionary tactic; the training we conduct to better equip our soldiers to meet this threat is revolutionizing our Army. Every soldier at every level will meet this threat with varying degrees of success. This training should not remain at the BCT level, but should be part of every unit's ongoing training program. Gone are the pre-deployment training days afforded many new soldiers; leaders and trainers must continue to provide the most combat effective soldier possible to the force while improving conditions to combat IED attacks. To alleviate IED attacks, we must continue to use the greatest asset available to us: the soldier on the ground; the training they have received and their will to fight will win this battle.

Not Quite Counterinsurgency:


A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction

by Captain Daniel Helmer

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah fighters, possibly led or directed by Imad Mughniyeh, once the world's most wanted terrorist, began a diversionary rocket attack on military targets in Northern Israel before launching a lightning attack across the border against Israeli soldiers in armored HMMWVs. The attack resulted in killing three soldiers, wounding two others, and capturing two prisoners. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) dispatched a quick-reaction force, led by one of the world's most advanced tanks, the Merkava. Hezbollah militants, armed with a proficiency they would demonstrate throughout the war, ambushed the quick-reaction force, blowing up the lead tank with a several-hundred pound pitchcharge-type improvised explosive device (IED). All four crew members in the tank were killed instantly (the tank re-

portedly was blown more than 10 feet into the air). One soldier was killed by Hezbollah sniper fire as an armored force with infantry support attempted to extricate the quick-reaction force.¹

These were the opening volleys in a month-long war in which Hezbollah demonstrated that the spectrum of warfare for which regular forces must be prepared is larger than the two poles of counterinsurgency and maneuver warfare. It is vital that we not regard Hezbollah's 30-day performance as a fluke unlikely to be encountered by the U.S. military. Indeed, while elements of the war are unique to the Israel-Lebanon conflict, such as Hezbollah's positioning on a border adjacent to Israel and its capability to terrorize the Israeli population with rockets and missiles, at



the tactical and operational levels, other enemies of the United States can learn much from the Hezbollah experience. The fact of the matter is that Hezbollah leaders, an avowed if not active enemy of the United States, who likely have agents working in our country, believe they have arrived on an exportable model of Islamist insurgency, and other terrorist organizations are already openly seeking to gain lessons learned from the conflict.² Given that there are real limitations on garnering a full understanding of what happened in Lebanon so soon after the 14 August 2006 ceasefire, this article, using interviews with a number of key observers and open-source reporting on the war, seeks to explain the possible lessons and implications for the mounted maneuver warrior of what Israel came to call “Operation Change of Direction.”

A New Model

Six years after Israel’s ignominious withdrawal from south Lebanon and six years after the beginning of the Second Palestinian Intifadah (the *al Aqsa Intifadah*), IDF forces remained woefully unprepared for a new fight in Lebanon. In the final 15 years of the occupation, only a small cadre of IDF soldiers experienced the terrible uncertainty of asymmetric war in Lebanon’s south. The rest of the IDF, according to two-time IDF Lebanon veteran and respected historian, Michael Oren, trained to win the conventional surprise encountered during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.³

Subsequent to the outbreak of the Palestinian Intifadah in 2000, the IDF leadership realized that it was ill-prepared for the fighting against Hamas, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and other extremist forces that held the hearts and minds of much of the populations of Gaza and the West Bank. “When the Intifadah broke out, the IDF went on a massive retooling [effort]... we went to be an urban anti-terrorism force, like a large SWAT team... and became the most advanced large scale anti-terrorism force in the world,” explains Oren.⁴ From 2000 through 2006, although skirmishes occurred from time to time on the Northern Border, including kidnapping and attempted kidnapping of several IDF soldiers, as well as shelling and sniper fire in the disputed Shebaa farms area, the Hezbollah threat went largely ignored. Responses to Hezbollah provocations were extremely limited, and similar to the United States’ focus on conventional war against the USSR after Vietnam, the IDF was determined to focus on a different enemy than the one to which it had just ceded an 18-year struggle.⁵

The core combat competencies required for the urban fight in the occupied territories were significantly different from those required for the fight in which the IDF would find itself in Lebanon. By 2006, the IDF excelled at conducting cordon and search operations, door-to-door searches, hasty raids, and identifying and capturing or killing suspected Palestinian terrorists and guerrillas. Through a network of collaborators exploited since the 1970s, the IDF gained extensive intelligence information on Palestinian terror organizations. Israeli control of the borders of Gaza and the West Bank meant that Palestinian fighters often possessed inferior weapons and were forced to fight in a virtually untenable situation. Israeli information dominance made training difficult for Palestinian forces. Meanwhile factionalization prevented a unitary military effort against the Israelis. In effect, the IDF, like the U.S. military, was a seemingly militarily superior counter-terrorist/insurgent force fighting a militarily inferior terrorist/insurgent enemy.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah, flush with their 2000 victory, did not rest on its laurels. Believing that another showdown with the Israelis was looming, it began the arduous task of exploring lessons learned from its 17-year open war with Israel, while simul-

aneously supplying inspiration, technical help, and weaponry to the Palestinians.⁶ According to a senior analyst with Defense News, understanding that a future conflict would likely be a defensive action against an Israeli incursion seeking to destroy them, Hezbollah leaders studied the historical model of the Viet Cong as inspiration for establishing an advanced tunnel network, extending through the main avenues of approach into southern Lebanon.⁷

Working secretly, Hezbollah built up weapons stockpiles, particularly short- and medium-range rockets and antitank guided missiles (ATGM), and developed reinforced, highly camouflaged bunkers throughout their area of operations — all in spite of extensive monitoring by UN observers and Israeli intelligence. Confronted after the war with the location of a football-field-sized bunker complex, with meter-thick, steel-reinforced concrete on an open hillside in Labboune, one UN observer remarked that Hezbollah must have brought in cement by the spoonfuls. The bunker complex was situated only two-hundred meters north of the Israeli border and only several kilometers from UN headquarters in an-Naqurah; neither the UN nor IDF realized the extent and sophistication of the bunkers, and the IDF was unable to destroy them or force the fighters to evacuate them during fighting.⁸ Unlike in the occupied territories, neither signal intelligence nor human intelligence could successfully penetrate Hezbollah before or during the war.

Throughout the six years of relative quiet, Hezbollah focused on extensive intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), monitoring IDF units to its south by eavesdropping on IDF soldiers’ cell phone calls; using criminal networks of mostly Bedouin drug dealers, other criminals, and malcontents to provide information on IDF movements and plans; and by inconspicuously taking extensive notes on Israeli movements for months at a time. As Timur Goksel, the former chief spokesperson for UNIFIL (the title of the UN observers), describes Hezbollah, “What was really significant is the amount or quality of staff work that goes into their activities that renders them different from any other guerrilla outfit.”⁹

Although Hezbollah launched the surprise raid on 12 July and “was itching for a fight and got a fight,” it did not anticipate the tremendous Israeli response to the kidnapping of two soldiers.¹⁰ As a result, the IDF possessed the initiative in the first hours and even days of the war when it focused excessively on the use of its air force. When the IDF launched its ground incursions, they anticipated (just as the U.S. anticipates in Iraq and Afghanistan) that when confronted with a regular force on the offensive, Hezbollah would essentially melt into the countryside. In fact, previous to 2000, this had been the doctrine of Hezbollah.¹¹ Yet, Hezbollah doctrine had evolved, and Hezbollah prepared to encounter the IDF unlike any guerrilla force in history. In the words of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, “The resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either...it [Hezbollah] was not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in between.” “This,” he said, “is the new model.”¹²

“We were caught unprepared.”¹³

The IDF encountered innumerable problems with Hezbollah’s “new model.” In a city that became a showcase for the IDF’s tactical failures during the war, despite repeated incursions and air attacks aimed at the Lebanese Shiite city of Bint Jbail throughout the war, the IDF was unable to take the city, allowing Nasrallah to claim it as Hezbollah’s Stalingrad. As Goksel puts it, “in one day in 1982 they [the IDF] reached Beirut; here, in six or seven days, they couldn’t go more than a few miles.”¹⁴ Among

the most disturbing concerns to U.S. Army armor and mechanized infantry forces should be the large losses taken by the IDF's much vaunted armor corps. During operations in Lebanon, approximately 10 percent of the IDF's 400 Merkavas were damaged by an enemy without a single armor or helicopter platform. Thirty tank crewmen, comprising 25 percent of the IDF's total dead, were killed during the war. Of the 40 tanks damaged, half were actually penetrated by ATGMs or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with tandem charges, resulting in the deaths of 24 of the 30 tank crewmen killed.¹⁵

While the exact details of Hezbollah's arsenal are difficult to determine, due to conflicting battlefield reports and the fact that both the IDF and Hezbollah held their cards close, various reports indicate that Hezbollah possessed either originals or Iranian versions of the AT-3 Sagger, the AT-4 Spigot, the AT-5 Spandrel, the AT-13 METIS-M, and the AT-14 Kornet-E, as well as the RPG-29. In addition, Hezbollah expertly employed various mortar and other antipersonnel systems, as well as command-detonated IEDs. Many of the weapons were provided or purchased from Iran or Syria, although a substantial cache of small arms and explosives were stolen from the IDF over the years.

Throughout the war, the toll taken on readiness by occupation duty in the West Bank and Gaza was evident. Infantry, artillery, and armor coordination, once the focal point of Israeli doctrine, was significantly degraded. Tactical expertise and innovation were almost entirely absent — all along the border, where Hezbollah had spent six years preparing for a defense in depth, IDF forces launched frontal attacks.¹⁶ The IDF reserves, on which the IDF relies heavily, had not received maneuver training since the inception of the Intifadah in 2000 — they were too busy with occupation duty. Even the active duty forces had not completed a major maneuver training operation in more than a year.¹⁷ During mobilization, reserve forces received three to five days of training. It should have been no surprise that the IDF performed poorly at the tactical level against its formidable enemy: its soldiers were, on average, 10 years younger than enemy forces, they had little experience or training, and faced an enemy who was extensively prepared for this moment.

Hezbollah demonstrated surprising tactical innovation. Knowing that the AT-3 was incapable of doing damage to Israeli armor, they used it effectively as an anti-infantry weapon. From distances well outside the engagement range of IDF infantry, Hezbollah would use indirect fire, including ATGMs, to scatter the infantry. As the infantry moved closer to the towns where Hezbollah fighters were fighting, IDF infantrymen would often take cover in barns and other buildings on the outskirts of the city. Hezbollah would then hit houses with the AT-3s; on 9 August 2006, nine IDF infantrymen were killed in Bint Jbail in a single attack using this technique.¹⁸ In addition, Hezbollah regularly employed snipers, a tactic they had not used prior to 2000. Artillery, which the IDF used to suppress Hezbollah fighters as infantry moved in, was ineffective against the bunkers and tunnels in which Hezbollah was fighting. In fact, undisciplined use

of artillery and close air support (CAS) in built-up areas, not only failed to achieve tactical results against Hezbollah, but also earned the approbation of much of the international community for the IDF's destruction of civilian areas.¹⁹ When artillery fire lifted, Hezbollah fighters took it as a signal that the infantry was about to move in and would commence firing on them.²⁰

Hezbollah units worked almost exclusively in their hometowns, thus allowing effective coded communications over unencrypted radios. A typical Hezbollah transmission might be no more than, "let's go meet by the house of the girl who broke your heart 20 years ago." The IDF, while able to hear and understand the communication, could gain no actionable intelligence from it.²¹



Photos courtesy David Eshel

"During operations in Lebanon, approximately 10 percent of the IDF's 400 Merkavas were damaged by an enemy without a single armor or helicopter platform. Thirty tank crewmen, comprising 25 percent of the IDF's total dead, were killed during the war. Of the 40 tanks damaged, half were actually penetrated by ATGMs or rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) with tandem charges, resulting in the deaths of 24 of the 30 tank crewmen killed."

Hezbollah, while possessing some night-vision equipment, accepted Israeli dominance of the night. To overcome this, they went to ground at night while the Israelis shot at designated targets; they would resurface at or after dawn (BMNT) with full knowledge of the composition of the IDF forces in the area.

On the morning of 10 August, Hezbollah fighters disabled two tanks withdrawing from al-Khiyam ridge with ATGMs just after dawn, killing one crew member. Hezbollah fighters then mortared the two tank crews and were sending an infantry squad toward the soldiers when the soldiers were rescued, almost an hour after their tanks were disabled. Evidencing the problems the IDF had during the war with training and coordination, the tank crews, which included a company commander who had operational radios, failed to call for suppressive fire on the ridge, despite knowing it was the source of the mortars.²²

The battle of Wadi Saluki from 11 to 13 August illustrates the tactical and operational problems faced by the IDF throughout the war. Eleven of the twenty-four Merkava IVs employed by the 401st Armor Brigade during the battle were hit by ATGMs or RPGs; eight tank crewmen were killed, as were four infantry-



"Hezbollah believed for a long time that the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh presented a likely avenue of approach for invading forces. Knowing that Wadi Saluki, and particularly the bridges that ran over the Saluki, provided a good choke point for an ambush on invading forces, they established permanent defensive positions overlooking the Wadi, including one west of Beni Hayan."

men of the Nahal infantry brigade, jointly accounting for 10 percent of all IDF killed in the war. The battle took place as a result of the IDF's desire to control the Litani River, the former high-water mark of their occupation zone.²³ Division 162 was ordered to take the town of Ghandouriyeh, a village at the intersection of a major east-west road, and a road leading to a bridge north over the Litani. The village also provided significant overwatch of the Litani, making it a key location for controlling south Lebanon.

Positioned in the vicinity of the northern Israeli city of Metulla, Division 162 had known for a week that it was to take Ghandouriyeh; however, its orders were canceled several times. The main axis from Metulla to Ghandouriyeh is on a major road that first runs through the village of Qantara; to move from Qantara to Ghandouriyeh, an invading force must cross Wadi Saluki. The area of the Wadi is covered with dense undergrowth, consisting of juniper bushes, scrub oak, and other thornbushes, confining vehicles to the partially built road that runs through the Wadi. The Saluki, a tributary of the Litani, runs through the Wadi and provides a natural obstacle for both tracked and wheeled vehicles. A couple of bridges run across the Saluki on the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh; the terrain does not allow for the bridges to be bypassed, except with great difficulty. The Wadi is surrounded by high ground consisting of limestone rock with many natural caves, and surrounding hills, which provide excellent fields of fire onto the Wadi.

Hezbollah believed for a long time that the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh presented a likely avenue of approach for invading forces. Knowing that Wadi Saluki, and particularly the bridges that ran over the Saluki, provided a good choke point for an ambush on invading forces, they established permanent defensive positions overlooking the Wadi, including one west of Beni Hayan.

Any element of surprise about the location of the IDF's advance on the Litani was eliminated by Division 162's week in waiting. When paratroopers of the Nahal Infantry Brigade performed an uncontested air assault outside the cities of Ghandouriyeh and Farun on the evening of 11 August, any remaining uncertainty in the minds of Hezbollah fighters as to the timing and direction of the attack was eliminated. They soon established a hasty defense of the Wadi using mines, ATGMs, and possibly some previously built-up positions.

Using the same methods as those used in the occupied territories, Nahal infantry soldiers claimed to have control of the high ground over Wadi Saluki after they had seized key buildings on the outskirts of the two cities in the early hours of 12 August.

The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of 24 tanks toward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF control of key roads. As the tanks maneuvered on the partially built road in the Wadi, Hezbollah fighters detonated a mine just north of the bridge on the road between Qantara and Ghandouriyeh, killing the entire crew of the lead tank, including the company commander. Hezbollah then launched swarms of rockets of all different types onto the Israeli tanks. As one crew member described it, "You should understand that the first missile which hits is not the really dangerous missile. The ones which come afterwards are the dangerous ones — and there always follow four or five after the first."²⁴ Hezbollah fighters used ATGMs, small-arms fire, and mortars to suppress the Nahal Brigade, preventing them from providing effective infantry support for the armor forces. Not a single tank crewman in all 24 tanks thought to deploy the tanks' smoke grenades while they



"Using the same methods as those used in the occupied territories, Nahal infantry soldiers claimed to have control of the high ground over Wadi Saluki after they had seized key buildings on the outskirts of the two cities in the early hours of 12 August. The 401st Armor Brigade sent a column of 24 tanks toward the town to link up with paratroopers and give the IDF control of key roads."

were being ambushed, further evidence of failing to train with their weapons.

Lack of coordination between armor, infantry, close air support, and artillery meant that initial calls for fire were denied because of the potential for fratricide. Only after all forces gained situational awareness on 12 August was the IDF able to synchronize its overwhelming firepower and take the high ground in Ghandouriyeh by the morning of 13 August. The IDF claims to have killed more than 80 Hezbollah fighters in the course of fighting; yet this claim seems based on battle damage assessments from close air support that dropped countless cluster munitions on 12 August. This time, as in much of the war, Hezbollah's dead proved as elusive as its living fighters. Hezbollah, which in the past has celebrated its "martyrs," including the son of Hassan Nasrallah, still claims that only 150 members were killed during the entire war. Israel claims it killed closer to 600 fighters.²⁵

When fighting ended on 14 August, fighters from Division 162 were ordered to withdraw from Ghandouriyeh, due to the ceasefire. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, walked away "astonished" and told the press that Hezbollah was the world's best guerrilla group.²⁶ Goksel says of the terrain at Wadi Saluki, which he visited innumerable times during his duty in south Lebanon, that "anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but a cook."²⁷ The 401st Armor Brigade could have bypassed the Wadi to the south or on the more northern road leading to Farun; its failure to do so allowed Hezbollah to win another propaganda victory in the last day of fighting.

Lessons for the United States

A number of issues for U.S. forces emerge from the IDF's experience in Lebanon. Obviously, the effectiveness of "swarming" ATGMs and RPGs against the Merkava is a tactic that should be of concern; using the AT-3 as an anti-infantry weapon is a tactic of which all cavalry and mechanized units should be aware.

While it is important that U.S. forces continue to dominate the night, Hezbollah has demonstrated the need to make certain U.S. forces do not cede control of the day. Also, if Hezbollah exports its sophisticated ambushes and combined-arms attacks, it could pose new challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The possibility must not be discounted; Hezbollah's leaders have provided arms and training to the Palestinians and publicly expressed a desire to export their "model" elsewhere. It is not impossible to imagine that in certain areas, such as Anbar Province, variants of Hezbollah's tactics may be developed by local insurgents as they await the reinforcement of the relatively small number of U.S. forces now in the area.

While the combined arms battalion (CAB) structure may naturally alleviate some of the coordination issues experienced by the IDF, it is vital that CABs train as such. Perhaps most importantly, the IDF's experience demonstrates the need to retain core combat skills, even as the United States takes on anti-terrorist missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army must carefully consider whether the training it undergoes to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan would result in tactical success against a determined enemy such as Hezbollah — an enemy that exists in the gray area between insurgents and the regular armies that U.S. forces traditionally train to fight.



Notes

¹Unless otherwise noted, all foreign media reports were accessed through OpenSource.gov (formerly the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service). All documents cited in this article are open source, available to the general public, not listed as for official use only, and unclassified. Reports on the Hezbollah kidnapping garnered from numerous sources, including "Hezbollah terrorist attack on Israeli's northern border: eight IDF soldiers killed and two abducted," Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel. Although all reports on Imad Mughniyeh are instantly suspect, he is as much of a boogeyman as exists in the world today, the report on his involvement comes from Ronen Bergman, "The Executor," *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (original in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, Israel, 16 July 2006.

²Maryam al-Bassam, "Interview with Lebanese Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah." Beirut New TV Channel in Arabic, date of interview unknown, aired 27 August 2006. On agents in our country and anti-American nature of Hezbollah, see Matthew Levitt, "Hezbollah Financing Terror through Criminal Enterprise," Testimony to the U.S. Senate committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 25 May 2005. On groups seeking lessons learned from the conflict, see Ibrahim Humaydi, "Abu Marzuq to 'Al-Haya': 'HAMAS' Discussing Cloning 'Hizballah's' [sic] Experience. Denied There Is 'Anything New' in Israeli Soldier Deal," *Al-Haya*, (original in Arabic), London, United Kingdom, 30 August 2006.

³Author interview with Michael Oren, September 2006.

⁴Ibid.

⁵For a discussion on willful blindness to the lessons of Vietnam, see T.X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2006.

⁶Hezbollah really only arrived on the scene in 1983, although Israel's war against the Palestinians in Lebanon began in 1982. Although helping the Sunni Palestinians might seem an odd task for Shiite Hezbollah, it is worth noting that Imad Mughniyeh, a Shiite Lebanese, began his long terrorist career working for the Palestinian al-Fatah, rather than for any of the Lebanese militant groups, and is believed by numerous sources to have had contacts with Osama bin Laden or other agents of al-Qaeda.

⁷Author interview with Riad Kahwaji, September 2006.

⁸Author interview and e-mail exchanges between author and Nick Blanford, September 2006.

⁹Author interview and e-mail exchange with Timur Goksel, September 2006.

¹⁰Interview with Hassan Fattah, senior Middle East correspondent for the *New York Times*, September 2006.

¹¹Reported by Ehud Ya'ari based on a translation of the doctrines transmitted by Haj Hallil, Hezbollah's 1996 director of operations, "Hizballah: 13 Principles of Warfare," *The Jerusalem Report*, 21 March 1996.

¹²Maryam al-Bassam.

¹³An anonymous soldier from the 401st Armor Brigade on the fighting at Wadi Saluki, as reported by Nava Tzurriel and Eitan Glickman, "The Canyon of Death," *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, Adam Keller (trans), published variously, including online at <http://www.kibush.co.il/>.

¹⁴Interview with Goksel.

¹⁵Information on casualties from author interview with Yaakov Katz, September 2006; and Yaakov Katz, "Wadi Saluki battle — microcosm of war's mistakes," *Jerusalem Post Online Edition*, 29 August 2006, online at <http://www.jpost.com>.

¹⁶Interview with Oren.

¹⁷Interview with Katz.

¹⁸Interviews with Blanford, Kahwaji, and Katz; and "IDF Report Card," *Jerusalem Post Online Edition*, 24 August 2006, online at <http://www.jpost.com>.

¹⁹Interview and e-mail exchange with Goksel, September 2006.

²⁰Interview with Kahwaji.

²¹Interview with Blanford.

²²Jonathan Spyer, "On the El-Khiam Ridge," *The Times*, 30 August 2006.

²³The purpose of the push to the Litani is an interesting question. Many in Israel see the battle for Ghandouriyeh as having had little strategic value, especially as the bridge crossing the Litani had been destroyed by the IDF earlier in the war. A number of soldiers have demonstrated against IDF leaders for what they believe was a wanton sacrifice of life for little strategic advantage; however, judgment on the strategic ramifications of the battle remain outside the purview of this article.

²⁴Tzurriel and Glickman, "The Canyon of Death."

²⁵Information on the battle remains unreliable. This narrative is based on a compilation of interviews and e-mails with Goksel, Oren, Blanford, Katz, and Kahwaji, September 2006; Tzurriel and Glickman; Katz, "Wadi Saluki battle — microcosm of war's mistakes;" and Amos Harel and Yair Ettinger, "Why did these soldiers die?" *Haaretz*, 23 August 2006, online at <http://www.haaretz.com>.

²⁶Interview with Katz.

²⁷Interview with Goksel.

Captain Daniel Helmer is currently at Fort Riley, Kansas, preparing for a Military Transition Team in Afghanistan. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and as a Rhodes Scholar, he received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States and while deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom.



Lebanon 2006: Did Merkava Challenge Its Match?

by Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, IDF, Retired

The so-called “second Lebanon war,” which opened on 12 July 2006, actually started on 22 November 2005, when Hezbollah attacked the village of al-Ghajar in an attempt to capture Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. The commanding general at the time, Udi Adam, noted in his after-action report, that “it was the first time Hezbollah used its entire tactical arsenal,” revealing that one of his Merkava tanks received no less than seven hits from various antitank missiles, none of which penetrated its armor while the crew escaped unhurt.

Iranian instructors had taken the al-Ghajar incident very seriously and reacted by sending antiarmor specialists from Tehran to their training base located in Lebanon’s Beka’a Valley. Iranian tank experts examined Hezbollah video shots that clearly displayed hits on the Merkava tank taken during the action at al-Ghajar. The Iranian tank experts carefully studied these displays, looking for “blind” spots in which Merkava could be vulnerable to AT-14 Kornet and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 29V fire, which

they planned to introduce in future engagements.

On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah was ready, its men fully trained to challenge Merkava tanks with the latest antitank weapons supplied by Iran and Syria. What followed in 33 days of battle was the ultimate test by western armor against third-generation antitank weapons from the arsenals of Russia, China, and even North Korea.

Assessing Merkava in Battle

Four types of Merkava tanks were in action in Lebanon 2006, including Merkava Mk4, the Merkava Mk2D (with its distinctive sloped turret), the standard Mk2 (mostly with reserve units), and Merkava Mk3Baz.

Toward the end of the fighting, Brigadier General Halutz Rodoi, the chief of the IDF armored corps, was asked to assess the performance of his tank force, and especially the lessons drawn from the fighting against advanced antitank missiles fired by Hezbollah on the coveted Merkava Mk4, which saw its first combat engagement in Lebanon. According to Gen-

eral Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were penetrated.

In an overall assessment, the potential risk to crewmen would have been much higher, if the tank had been more conventionally designed. Colonel Moti Kidor, commander, 401st Armored Corps Brigade, which bore the brunt of battle, mentioned in an interview that during the war, hundreds of antitank missiles were fired on his unit, and, in total, only 18 tanks were seriously damaged. Of those, missiles actually penetrated only five or six vehicles, and according to statistics, only two tanks were totally destroyed, both of them by super-heavy improvised explosive device (IED) charges. One officer, Lieutenant Yotam, reported that his Merkava Mk4 tank had been simultaneously hit by two unspecified antitank missiles. Miraculously, all four crew members evacuated unscathed.

The unique Merkava design uses special armor to minimize the risk of spall, which is generated by shaped charge plasma jets. All Merkava vehicles use fire retardant containers to store ammunition, preventing highly lethal secondary explosions. Furthermore, tanks are equipped with a rapid fire suppression system that eliminates sympathetic detonation of ammunition. As a result, only a few tanks encountered catastrophic fire hazards after suffering penetrating missile attacks on ammunition, substantially reducing lethal-burn casualties to crew members.

Some of the tanks, especially those outfitted with the low-intensity conflict (LIC) urban combat kit are equipped with bottom hull plates to protect against heavy mines and belly charges. Several Merkava tanks and heavy armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) encountered a number of these charges, some weighing more than 330 pounds. While heavily armored vehicles can hardly be expected to survive such an attack, the upgraded vehicle types demonstrated effective protection for the crew, which, in some cases, even managed to survive such an attack with only minor injuries. In one instance, a Merkava tank was hit by a belly charge carrying more than 330 pounds of explosives, which killed one crew member and wounded the remaining six (some traveling in the rear compartment). Despite the loss of one crew member, this incident is considered proof of the effective protection of the new Merkava Mk4.

To reduce this threat even further, the heavily armored D-9 bulldozer was employed to precede the tanks over high-risk tracks, blowing up IEDs with minimum damage to the bulldozers and clearing the way for the tanks to follow. The IDF Armor Corps has traditionally invested considerable effort in examining after-battle hit statistics on its tanks to establish new tactics and techniques. The founder of this procedure was Major General Israel Tal, "father of the Merkava" and a leading armor expert of worldwide renown.

After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, General Tal led a development team that studied Israel's unique battlefield characteristics and lessons learned from previous wars. On General Tal's orders, a special team of experts examined every single tank hit while the tanks were still on the battlefield. The team then conducted an in-depth investigation, which resulted in developing effective means for crew protection and formed the basis of the unique Merkava project. A similar investigation team has already recorded all hits on tanks received during the Lebanon crisis. A full report was made available for an assessment team of experts, who are ex-

amining these reports in detail and preparing to make necessary amendments without delay, pending the resumption of the conflict should the presently fragile ceasefire fall apart.

Assessing Hezbollah Antiarmor Tactics and Weapons

Hezbollah fighters used heavier, more capable missiles, including the Metis M and the AT-14 Kornet, to engage the Merkava Mk4. The Konkurs, Fagot antitank guided missile (ATGM), and RPG-29 were mostly used against the less-protected Merkava Mk3Baz and Mk2, while nontandem weapons, such as the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile, Fagot ATGM, and RPG were left to engage other targets such as armored infantry fighting vehicles. The least used were AT-3 Sagger and nontandem RPGs, which are considered obsolete, but proved quite lethal against troops seeking cover in buildings.

Overall, almost 90 percent of the tanks were hit by tandem warheads. In general, Hezbollah militants prioritized Merkava Mk4 over the Merkava Mk2 and Mk-3Baz, and in general, targeted tanks over armored infantry fighting vehicles. At the beginning of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, Israel's primary concern was a report that Hezbollah possessed Russian Kornet antitank missiles. However, Israel was also aware of the RPG-29 Vampir, armed with a tandem high-explosive antitank round that had stolen the show. There were even rumors that Hezbollah had received the notorious TBG-29V thermobaric rounds, which could not be confirmed in action.

An estimated 500 to 600 members of the roughly 4,000-strong Hezbollah force in

South Lebanon were divided into tank-killer teams of five or six. Each team was armed with five to eight antitank missiles, with a pre-stock stored in small fortified well-camouflaged bunkers, built to withstand Israeli air attacks. In another tactic, Hezbollah tank-killer teams would lay in wait in camouflaged bunkers or houses, having planted large IEDs on known approach routes. Once an Israeli tank would detonate one of these IEDs, Hezbollah would start lobbing mortar shells toward the attack to prevent rescue teams from rushing forward. This was also an effective method for outflanking Merkava tanks by targeting the tank's vulnerable rear zone with RPG fire. The IDF attempted to respond with heavy artillery fire, smoke, and by using special medical evacuation Merkava tanks to evacuate casualties. It took awhile for Merkava crews to change tactics, which included dismounted infantry advancing over high-risk ground, taking out enemy bunkers with close-in fighting, and using heavily armored D-9s for recovery action under fire, thus reducing losses from Hezbollah tactics.

Inadequate Tank Crew Training

During the past six years, in which the bulk of the IDF was constantly engaged in low-intensity urban counterterrorist warfare in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, all regular forces, including tanks crews, were retrained for small-unit infantry policing operations, mostly dismounted. This proved extremely painful when young conscripts, who make up the bulk of the regular IDF, were rushed into battle after hasty retraining. It soon became apparent to IDF commanders that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly prepared and well-equipped enemy, was a to-



All photos courtesy David Eshel

"According to General Rodoi, the Merkava proved to be well protected and designed to minimize risk, even when it was penetrated. The IDF employed several hundred tanks in combat. According to official reports, about 10 percent were hit by various threats, of which less than half were penetrated."

tally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperienced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conventional, collective and individual, combat procedures. At the beginning of the war, several tanks lost tracks due to driver inexperience, especially when traveling mountainous and rugged terrain, trying to avoid the heavily mined paved roads and tracks.

Moreover, during the Intifada, which began in September 2000, the armored corps did not receive top priority from senior defense establishment officials. Short-sighted budget cuts took a heavy toll on armored units. As a result, at the beginning of the war, tanks were lacking basic countermeasures such as instantaneous smoke canisters, laser warning detectors, and infrared jammers. While some of these devices were urgently supplied later in the war, the damage was already done. “Money kills” was the term used by several senior armored corps officers to express their frustrations over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring to the Trophy, which is a new and unique locally developed active protection system that creates a hemi-



“It soon became apparent to IDF commanders that tank combat in Lebanon, fighting a highly prepared and well-equipped enemy, was a totally new “ballgame” for the courageous, but inexperienced, soldiers of the armor corps. As a result, Israeli armor troops had to quickly relearn conventional, collective and individual, combat procedures.”

spheric protected zone around armored vehicles such as the Merkava Mk4 tank.

The Trophy design includes four flat-panel antennas and a search radar device mounted on the vehicle. When properly mounted, the combined radar view is a full 360 degrees. When a weapon is fired at the vehicle, the internal computer uses the signal from the incoming weapon and

calculates an approach vector. Once the incoming weapon is fully classified, computers calculate the optimal time and angle to automatically fire neutralizers. The response comes from two launchers installed on the vehicle, one on each side, which have a pivoting/rotating ability and are able to fire in any direction the computer directs. The launchers fire neutralizing agents, which are small metal pellets similar to shotgun shot. If such measures would have been available, Merkava tank crews would have fared much better against even third-generation weapons.

Summing up the performance of Merkava tanks, especially the latest Mk4, most tank crews agree that, despite losses sustained and some major flaws in tactical conduct, the tank proved its mettle during its first high-saturation combat operation. The overall consensus revealed that tanks with less armor would have caused much higher losses.



Retired Lieutenant Colonel David Eshel, Israel Defense Forces, is a freelance journalist and serves as a defense analyst for several military journals. Following his brief service with the British Forces during World War II, he became one of the founding members of the Israeli Armored Corps and served as a career officer with the IDF for 26 years. Educated at the French Cavalry School at Saumur, he later held various command and staff assignments and fought in all of the Arab-Israeli wars, including the 1973 conflict, when he served as the Armored Corps’ chief of signals.



“‘Money kills’ was the term used by several senior armored corps officers to express their frustrations over the defense establishment’s refusal to fund the installation of a rocket defense system on Israeli tanks, claiming soldiers were paying the price with their lives. The officers were referring to the Trophy, which is a new and unique locally developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles...”



Teaching and Learning Counterinsurgency at the Armor Captains Career Course

by Major John Grantz and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl

“This is a game of wits and will. You’ve got to be learning and adapting constantly to survive.”

— General Peter Schoomaker

As the U.S. Army transforms to prepare for the current and future fight, its professional military education system is transforming along with it. Over the past nine months, the cadre of the Armor Captains Career Course (ACCC), soon to be reformed as the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), has made significant efforts to enhance the study of counterinsurgency (COIN) in its warfighting curriculum. Lessons learned from this effort may be of use to units conducting professional development programs, as well as to formal officer and noncommissioned officer educational institutions.

The cadre of the ACCC constantly assesses the curriculum to ensure it meets the needs of the force and that the course provides current and relevant instruction.

The ACCC conducts extensive after-action reports with students and instructors throughout the course. The course also conducts surveys with students six months after their graduation.

Results from student surveys have revealed an increasing desire for even more COIN instruction. As all of the instructors at the course have operational experience, many wholeheartedly agree. It is important to note, however, that we must temper this with the fact that we cannot predict the future fight and must stay grounded in the core competencies of armor and infantry officers. Today, ACCC instructors are keenly aware that we must strike a balance between preparing our captains to fight the next high-intensity fight and preparing them to defeat insurgents in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

COIN is an enormously difficult subject; the new COIN Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, notes that it is “War at the

graduate level.”¹ In a recent lecture at the ACCC, Dr. David Kilcullen, chief strategist of the Global War on Terrorism at the State Department, said, “Simply put, today’s fight is a competition to mobilize the population.” This is the overarching theme of the COIN educational program at the ACCC. Every effort in this program is designed to help students discover and share tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting operations among the people while defeating the insurgent’s attempts to gain support of the populace.

To help ACCC captains understand the complexities of this kind of war, we have developed a five-pronged approach. Captains at ACCC write reviews of books from the ACCC professional reading list, read and present oral reports on articles from the ACCC “professional articles” list, participate in COIN and cultural understanding seminars, participate in a visiting COIN experts lecture series, and participate in practical exercises on COIN

Course Reading List

Learning to Eat Soup with A Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam by Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, Updated edition, September 2005

The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century by Thomas Hammes, September 2004

On Combat by Dave Grossman and Loren Christensen, September 2005

The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power by Max Boot, May 2003

A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam by Lewis Sorley, September 2000

Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula, Updated August 2006

The Philippine War, 1899-1902 by Brian Linn, October 2002

Islam: A Short History by Karen Armstrong, August 2002

The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror by Bernard Lewis, March 2004

Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse by Bard O'Neil, 2d Edition Revised, August 2005

Figure 1

operations. This article briefly references each subject.

Counterinsurgency Professional Reading Program

Students at ACCC read a book from the course reading list (Figure 1) and write a two-page summary of how the book applies to company commanders in the contemporary operating environment. The goal of this program is to introduce students to a self-paced study environment so that they become comfortable with individual educational development programs throughout their careers. While at the course, the reading program is the heart of the students' COIN study. The course cadre reviews and updates the reading list quarterly, or as necessary. Units wishing to use the ACCC reading list as a template for their own professional reading lists are invited to download the list from the Captains Career Course website on Army Knowledge Online (AKO), or the *Mounted ManeuverNet* Professional Forum on the Battle Command Knowledge System.

Counterinsurgency Articles

Students at ACCC read articles from the "professional articles" list (Figure 2) during selected weeks of the course. Students then write executive summaries of the articles, which are subsequently graded as part of the writing program. Students then lead discussions of the articles in a small-group seminar. The articles serve as drivers for discussion, which is where most of the learning is done. The ACCC is small-group centric, and the impact of

class discussions on the individual officer's educational experience cannot be overstated. In addition, these assignments reinforce the importance of effective written communications skills for commanders and staff officers.

Subject-Matter Expert Lecture Series

The ACCC has hosted a number of noted COIN theorists and practitioners, such as Dr. Kalev Sepp, designer of the Multinational Force I Campaign Plan and author of "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency;" Dr. David Kilcullen, author of "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency;" Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*; and Colonel T.X. Hammes, author of *The Sling and the Stone*, to discuss their thoughts and ideas with ACCC students.² Authors are willing to come and discuss their ideas if asked; so far, there has been no shortage of authors and subject-matter experts who are willing to contribute to the education of our captains. The course will continue the lecture series on a quarterly basis over the long term.

Cultural Understanding Program

Based on lessons that the Army has learned and relearned in the past five years on fighting an insurgency, a cultural understanding program has been added to the COIN educational program. In 4th Quarter, FY05, the Combined Arms Center directed that 13 hours of cultural un-

Professional Articles List

"The Fall of the Warrior King" by Dexter Filkins, *New York Times*, October 23, 2005

"Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency" by Dr. David Kilcullen, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2006

"Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations" by BG Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army, *Military Review*, November-December 2005

"Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full Spectrum Operations" by MG Peter Chiarelli and MAJ Patrick Michaelis, *Military Review*, July-August 2005

"Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare" by Robert Cassidy, *Military Review*, September-October 2005

"Best Practices in Counterinsurgency" by Dr. Kalev Sepp, *Military Review*, May-June 2005

"Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency" by Dr. John Lynn, *Military Review*, July-August 2005

"Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare" by Robert Tomes, *Parameters*, Spring 2004

"The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict" by Chris Donnelly, The Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, September 2005

"Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq" by LTG David Petraeus, *Military Review*, January-February 2006

Figure 2

derstanding be added to the programs of instruction for all captains career courses. The main goal of the program at the Armor School is not necessarily to create subject-matter experts on any particular culture, but to give our students an appreciation for how cultural understanding in their future companies and troops will affect their operations. The cultural understanding program is built on three pillars: classroom small-group instruction using the 2007 Iraq, Afghanistan, and Islam cultural training support packages, created at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; briefings with international military student officers and international liaison and exchange officers on post; and classroom time to conduct self-paced Rosetta Stone language training.

The intent is not to teach a language during the five-month ACCC, but to get captains started on the path to learning a second language, as well as expose them to a valuable training tool on AKO to use in preparing their future companies and troops for deployment. As has been proven in past deployments, the ability to speak another language and understand

other cultures has a positive impact on our ability to create a positive impression on the local populace and accomplish our mission. In the coming months we also plan to integrate the tactical language trainer.

Counterinsurgency Exercises

As we near the pilot date for MCCC, we have integrated several new practical exercises into ACCC. One of the primary differences in the new course is that students conduct practical exercises on realistic terrain using a variety of organizational platforms. In the past, all of our practical exercises have been based on Germany, National Training Center, or Fort Knox terrain. In the new course, we will conduct practical exercises on terrain in Iraq, Korea, and Kosovo, with a few exercises based on Fort Knox and combat training center terrain to facilitate training exercises without troops (TEWT) and computer program exercises.

The ACCC began creating this new material some 12 months ago, with the bulk of the work for MCCC being in the past six months. The most notable of these exercises is the Louisville TEWT, where students receive a task force operations order and are tasked to develop plans for four companies conducting raids, cordons and search, and deliberate attacks in an urban stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) environment against an insurgent threat. Students develop and brief their plans prior to the small group traveling to each of the objectives. Once on the ground, the learning opportunities are

endless; students discuss various training topics, such as how to avoid sniper and improvised explosive device (IED) contact en route to objectives, how to enter and clear rooms and buildings, and how to handle civilians in and around target houses.

The Louisville TEWT is just one example of how students are applying knowledge to tactical operations. As mentioned earlier in this article, ACCC cadre strive to strike a balance between high-intensity and COIN training; however, one difference is that now both cultural understanding and COIN are common themes, which students consider in all the practical exercises, regardless of terrain. Even during National Training Center exercises, students are forced to consider civilians on the battlefield and small population centers in their intelligence preparation of the battlefield. While in theory, this should be no different than what we have always done at the schoolhouse, in reality, those parts of the training have often been paid lip service in the past. With 98 percent of our students and 100 percent of our instructors having operational experience in the post-9/11 world, not talking about the current fight and the treatment of civilians on the battlefield would be a difficult task.

Continuing to Improve our Fighting Position

The ACCC COIN program greatly benefits armor captains because it teaches them how to think through a difficult way of war. We rely on student feedback,

which is uniformly and enthusiastically positive, to ensure we are training all aspects of the current operating environment. We are constantly re-examining our programs to determine what we may do better. Critical to the success of this mission is sharing ideas with other institutions and operational units. We are in daily contact with other centers and schools and subject-matter experts throughout the Army, Department of Defense, and State Department, sharing new ideas about how to train and educate this Nation's officers.

Leaders who wish to create their own COIN professional development programs are invited to make full use of the Army's numerous online training sites, such as the Battle Command Knowledge System, *companycommand.com*, and the Captains Career Course Forum available on AKO. We must share our ideas to make the Army a true learning organization. The Armor Captains Career Course is adapting to the demands of the contemporary operating environment, creating adaptive leaders for our Army and our Nation. These adaptive leaders will be on point as we take the fight to the enemy — and win.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 2006 (Final Draft).

²Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," *Military Review*, May-June 2005; David Kilcullen, "Twenty-Eight Articles, Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency," paper, Washington D.C., March 2006; Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, University of Chicago Press, 15 September 2005; and Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On Warfare in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, 12 September 2004.



"The intent is not to teach a language during the five-month ACCC, but to get captains started on the path to learning a second language, as well as expose them to a valuable training tool on AKO to use in preparing their future companies and troops for deployment. As has been proven in past deployments, the ability to speak another language and understand other cultures has a positive impact on our ability to create a positive impression on the local populace and accomplish our mission."

Major John M. Grantz is currently serving as course manager, Maneuver Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.A. from James Madison University. His military education includes the Infantry Captains Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include small group instructor, Armor Captains Career Course, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry (1-502 IN), 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, KY; commander, C Company, 1-502 IN, 101st Airborne Division, Mosul, Iraq; assistant S3, 1-502 IN, 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell; senior platoon leader, Infantry Officers Basic Course, Fort Benning, GA; and support platoon leader, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, Schweinfurt, Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl is currently serving as commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, Fort Riley, KS. He led a tank platoon in the 1st Cavalry Division during Operation Desert Storm, taught national security studies at the U.S. Military Academy, and served as the operations officer, Task Force 1st Battalion, 34th Armor, Khalidiyah, Iraq.



The Challenge of Leadership during the Conduct of Counterinsurgency Operations

by Major Jon Dunn

To the credit of our profession in general, and the Armor branch specifically, much has been written over the past couple of years on the subject of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the literature focuses on proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), or adjustments made to TTP in response to counteraction by the enemy. For obvious reasons, this is sensible and contributes to preparedness as units train to deploy in support of the Global War on Terror.

Conspicuously absent, however, is any discussion on how conducting counterinsurgency operations affects the nature of leadership, or conversely, how leadership can, for better or for worse, impact the counterinsurgency fight. As leaders, how do we train to kill insurgents, yet at the same time win the support of the local population? How can we reconcile the apparent contradiction of the need to have a plan to kill everyone we meet while simultaneously planning to win the support of everyone we meet? While far from professing to have the answers to all of

the questions, this article intends to generate discourse among professionals, which will help better prepare our soldiers for the current fight and for future counterinsurgency fights we are certain to encounter.

The U.S. Army exists to win our nation's wars. This fact has not changed since the inception of the Army in 1775. There has been, however, a significant change in the nature of the wars the Army is called on to win and the demands these wars place on junior leaders. Despite one's personal or professional opinion about the relevance of the peacekeeping missions over the past 15 years, there is no doubt that the missions conducted in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Macedonia (to name but a few), have strengthened the competence and confidence of today's junior officers and noncommissioned officers to operate with minimal guidance and even less direct supervision.

Today's modern battlefield is most often nonlinear and noncontiguous, and as

such, junior leaders are often required to operate independently during the conduct of combat operations. The young sergeants, squad leaders, platoon sergeants, and platoon leaders who led missions in the Balkans and beyond are today's senior scouts, platoon sergeants, first sergeants, senior platoon leaders, and company and troop commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. Collectively, they are extremely successful, adaptable, flexible, and operate with minimal guidance, but we must do better — we must prepare our leaders and soldiers to handle the unique complexities required when conducting counterinsurgency operations. Chance favors the prepared man — the *better* we train (the more realistic, stressful, and difficult the training), the more lives we save on the battlefield. Moreover, the complicated nature of the counterinsurgency fight demands a better trained army.

Counterinsurgency operations require the successful and simultaneous accomplishment of two distinct objectives: to kill the enemy (insurgents) and win the

support of the local population. It is critical to conduct the former without compromising the latter. Although the cliché is trite and worn-out, winning ‘hearts and minds’ is precisely what we must accomplish. Winning the support of the local population contributes to the defeat of the insurgency in two ways: a lack of popular support will eventually destroy the insurgency; and if the local population supports our mission and not the insurgency, it can provide actionable intelligence.

Killing insurgents is certainly the 25-meter target and most tend to equate winning the hearts and minds to a 300-meter target. However, it is probably better defined as 25, 50, 100, 200, and 300-meter targets — winning hearts and minds is a continuous objective. More to the point, it is the most important objective, because it ultimately brings success. Contrary to what many junior soldiers think, winning hearts and minds actually *enhances* our ability to kill insurgents. Working toward an objective to increase cooperation of the local population, or at a minimum, cultivate a neutral stance that develops a less active opposition toward us, is definitely a combat multiplier. Admittedly, it may not *always* lead to an enhanced ability to kill insurgents, but losing the hearts-and-minds fight will assuredly impede our efforts.

Killing and winning hearts and minds simultaneously requires two seemingly contradictory mentalities. On one hand, soldiers must be the steely-eyed killers they train to be — able to identify an enemy insurgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. Yet, at the same time, we expect the same soldiers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ locals, particularly children, sometimes even handing out candy or school supplies.

In an environment such as the one we face in Iraq, soldiers need to shift gears rapidly, often in a split second. Soldiers must constantly be on alert for enemy activity — we have been taught that complacency kills. More importantly, an alert and ready posture does have a deterrent effect. Not only must soldiers essentially wear two ‘faces’ simultaneously, often times they must conduct two fundamentally different missions with little or no time to ‘reset’ between the two. For example, after several weeks of high-intensity combat, the mission may require an opera-

tion with a civil affairs or psychological operations unit less than 24 hours after an intense combat. This is not easy to do and becomes even more difficult if the ‘soft’ civil affairs mission occurs in the same vicinity as the preceding high-intensity fight. This is a leader challenge and responsibility — ensuring units remain aggressive to destroy the enemy, but have the ability to refocus when the mission changes from high-intensity to stability operations.

Leaders cannot mentally stay in the high-intensity combat fight of yesterday or even three days ago. A leader must refocus himself and his subordinate leaders — this is paramount to successful mission accomplishment. If leaders are not flexible enough to refocus, it is certain that no progress will be made at the neighborhood (grassroots) level in improving quality of life. Grassroots progress is essential to obtaining actionable intelligence from the local population on enemy activity. Such intelligence from the local population often directly leads to of-


fensive operations and is the only way of maintaining the initiative against an elusive enemy.

In fighting an insurgency, we often will not be the one who strikes first. The enemy has the advantage of the initiative and gets to dictate when an engagement occurs, if at all. Even more frustrating, the enemy frequently will not show himself and thus there is nothing to fight back against. This frustration adds to the already difficult challenge, and necessity, of wearing ‘two faces.’ Unfortunately, it can get even worse — nothing boils the blood of a soldier more than seeing a fellow soldier wounded or killed, particularly if by an unseen enemy. Not surprisingly, one’s first reaction to such an incident is the desire to kill anyone who might remotely be the enemy. In an unlimited, high-intensity fight against a conventional foe, such reactionary aggression is, more often than not, quite useful. However, in a counterinsurgency fight, it is not difficult to see how such aggression could prove quite detrimental to accomplishing the mission, particularly in the long term.

Is it possible to ‘wear two faces,’ deterring possible enemy contact, yet simultaneously win hearts and minds? The answer is simple, it can be done; it must be done, especially if we want to claim victory in the fight against insurgents. This is much easier said than done; how do we train leaders and soldiers to kill the enemy while simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the local Iraqi people?

First and foremost, we need to provide tough, realistic training with scenarios that replicate going from ‘hot’ (high-intensity) scenarios to ‘cold’ (stability) operations. This training is currently being accomplished at the combat training centers as they prepare units for deployment. The training addresses the tactical problem and can be trained extensively, both at home station and at combat training centers. However, it only addresses half of the problem, and quite bluntly, the easier half of the problem. The more difficult aspect, and much more difficult to train, is the emotional side. At the end of the day, the ability to wear two faces depends on the ability to control emotions. We can never truly replicate a battle buddy being wounded or killed, nor would we want to.

Continued on Page 44



“Counterinsurgency operations require the successful and simultaneous accomplishment of two distinct objectives: to kill the enemy (insurgents) and win the support of the local population. It is critical to conduct the former without compromising the latter. Although the cliché is trite and worn-out, winning ‘hearts and minds’ is precisely what we must accomplish.”



Building for the Future: Combined Arms Officers

by Captain Chad Foster

The U.S. Army is undergoing a significant period of transition. As with many past conflicts, the Global War on Terror has hastened this change and the unpredictable enemies we now face have altered the notions that Army leaders had concerning the status of our military in the post-Cold War world. For example, the widely heralded demise of heavy armor forces was quickly forgotten as the battlefields of Iraq demonstrated the continued value of tanks working in close coordination with infantry. However, the winds of change are still blowing against the armor branch, especially its junior leaders.

There is no doubt that our soldiers and noncommissioned officers will remain specialists in very specific fields, retaining their technical expertise as tank crewmen and cavalry scouts. However, future armor officers are going to require a broader range of technical and tactical expertise. Although the time-tested principles

of combat leadership remain true, the tactical skill set expected of our company-grade armor officers has greatly expanded, highlighting the need to reexamine some aspects of officer training and professional progression. It is no exaggeration to say that today, and in the foreseeable future, armor officers are not just tankers anymore.

Not Just “Tankers” Anymore

The old (and misguided) notion of “death before dismount” has been completely invalidated by recent combat operations in Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained to tanks as they conduct counterinsurgency missions. Although tanks remain a vital tool in this fighting environment, the role of the armor officer has expanded beyond the confines of a tank turret, to include the vehicle commander’s position on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the patrol leader’s position on dismounted ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone

during air assault operations. Our lieutenants and captains are not just tankers anymore. Armor officers at the company level must feel equally comfortable on their feet with M4 carbines as they do in a turret behind a 120mm main gun.

This is hardly a new idea — armor lieutenants have long served as scout platoon leaders mounted in HMMWVs, and many of our captains have commanded light cavalry troops. However, with the advent of the combined arms battalion (CAB) we have reached a new stage in the evolution of our officer corps. The CAB provides maneuver commanders with a level of organic tactical flexibility previously unknown. By placing armor, infantry, and engineer units in the same battalion, the Army sent a clear signal that field-grade officers are expected to possess a level of expertise that allows them to properly train and prepare units for combat. In the days of temporary task organization, battalion commanders and op-

erations officers could get by with a basic knowledge of operations beyond the scope of armored formations. Of course, the best commanders and S3s always strove to master all aspects of combined arms operations, but now that our battalions are truly combined arms formations, such knowledge and experience must be the rule rather than the exception. Tomorrow's field-grade officers are being developed today — in combat theaters with young lieutenants and captains.

Observations from the Front

The strains of multiple year-long combat deployments have prompted many changes that would have been practically inconceivable just a few years ago. Junior officers are being asked to do things that few of us would have thought about early in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants and captains are rising to the challenge and accomplishing their missions with an almost unbroken record of success. The lines between the branches, at least on the tactical level, have not restrained our company-grade officers, as indicated by job assignments and performances.

Due to a shortage of infantry lieutenants, many new armor lieutenants are initially serving as platoon leaders for mechanized infantry. Despite the fact they were prepared to lead tank platoons, these young officers have generally performed very well. There is little difference between the amount of initial on-the-job training and mentorship for new armor lieutenants and that required for new infantry lieutenants. Combat leadership and warrior spirit are common to both branches, so the transition is not as drastic as one might initially think. Under close supervision of a seasoned company commander, young armor officers, who get the opportunity to lead infantry platoons, gain a valuable set of experiences that will serve them well throughout their careers.

Battalion commanders at the front are asking many senior armor lieutenants to serve as executive officers of infantry companies. Such assignments are the result of a clear understanding of the importance of the company executive officer. As executive officers, lieutenants learn their most valuable lessons, which will help them as future commanders. They have the chance to observe their commanding officers in a way that was not possible as platoon leaders. Most importantly, they become acting commanders in the absence of the commander. The benefits of an armor lieutenant getting to serve in an infantry company are immense

from both a tactical and logistics perspective.

There is no such thing as exclusively "armor" or "infantry" missions anymore. There are only missions.

Iraq presents our combined arms battalions with a complex battlefield. Due to the ever-changing threat, high operating tempo, and limitations in manpower and resources, it is not always possible to match up armor and infantry formations to their traditional roles. As stated above, our leaders at the company level must possess the flexibility to plan and execute any type of mission. This means that lieutenants and captains must get the widest set of tactical training and experiences possible, and they must maintain an aggressively flexible mindset that will allow them to think beyond the traditional confines imposed on armor forces. Of course, this does not mean that units should merely throw a platoon of 19K tank crewmen on a UH-60 and fly off on a mission (although with the proper training this is not impossible). It does mean, however, that armor officers who find themselves as scout platoon leaders, infantry platoon leaders, and maneuver company commanders (to include a headquarters company) can expect to perform a myriad of

different tactical missions, many of which will not be traditional tanker missions.

Scouts have long performed extensive dismounted operations, and armor lieutenants fortunate enough to lead scout platoons have greatly benefited from the experience. Tank platoons in Iraq often find themselves operating as motorized infantry, mounted on M1114 up-armored HMMWVs. An armor officer in command of a battalion headquarters and headquarters company can easily find himself leading an air assault operation with battalion scouts and 11C infantrymen from the mortar platoon. None of these tasks are traditional "armor missions." In fact, such labels are becoming obsolete. Different missions might demand different levels of force or different types of resources and combat power, but they are increasingly becoming merely "missions" that all tactical leaders, regardless of whether they are armor or infantry officers, must be ready to execute.

Implications for the Future

Flexibility is nothing new to armor officers — we have always been proud of our emphasis on combined arms warfare, integrating infantry, armor, artillery, aviation, and engineers into the fight. Therefore, the notions in this article should hardly be surprising. They are a natural outgrowth of our branch's inherent strengths



"The old (and misguided) notion of "death before dismount" has been completely invalidated by recent combat operations in Iraq. Armor officers are no longer chained to tanks as they conduct counterinsurgency missions. Although tanks remain a vital tool in this fighting environment, the role of the armor officer has expanded beyond the confines of a tank turret, to include the vehicle commander's position on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV, the patrol leader's position on dismounted ambushes, and the UH-60 landing zone during air assault operations."

and the ever-changing battlefield of the Global War on Terrorism. Combined arms battalions require flexible field-grade officers who understand the capabilities and limitations of every formation in the unit. Building this type of senior officer begins at the lieutenant and captain levels.

The line dividing armor and infantry officers in mechanized units continues to fade, and this trend is likely to continue. We should welcome this development and prepare for the future accordingly. It is impossible to say exactly what the future holds. Will the armor and infantry branches eventually come together to form a combined arms maneuver branch? Only time will tell. However, we can be certain that young lieutenants and captains require expanded tactical skills, which include missions that are not traditionally armor missions. The challenges of training and leading combined arms battalions demand that we prepare young officers today for what they will face tomorrow.

Many Challenges and Possible Solutions

Of course, there are many challenges with placing lieutenants in the right jobs within the ridiculously short time before they are promoted to captain. There is no way a newly arrived lieutenant can lead both an infantry and armor platoon, and serve as an executive officer or specialty platoon leader before he is promoted to

captain. To ensure lieutenants get the appropriate amount of experience and professional development, it is now common for officers to serve as executive officers or specialty platoon leaders following their promotion to captain.

Rarely do newly pinned captains attend career courses; instead, they stay in their battalions longer, which delays their attendance to career courses by months and sometimes even years. While this is often frustrating, it is necessary for new captains to learn everything they need at their first duty station. As long as battalion commanders track this closely and do everything they can to get young captains to career courses in a reasonable amount of time, there should be few problems with this arrangement.

It is not necessary for all new armor lieutenants to serve as infantry platoon leaders prior to leading tank platoons. It is also not necessary to add executive officer duty time in a company of the opposite branch as a standard in an armor officer's progression. This would hardly be possible; however, assigning an armor lieutenant to an infantry company should become something of a normal course of action, and only the very best armor lieutenants should serve as second-in-command of mechanized infantry companies (just as only the best infantry lieutenants should serve as armor company XO's). Such assignments should be seen as recognition of past excellence and clearly

identify potential, much in the same way that we think of specialty platoon assignments.

At the captain level, career courses must continue to evolve, putting emphasis on planning and executing operations, such as air assaults, dismounted infiltrations, raids, and all manner of urban operations. Post-command captains instructing at ACCC are bringing these lessons with them to the classroom, but there must be an official effort to codify such efforts within the schoolhouse. In this way, we can ensure that future staff captains and company commanders are fully prepared to plan and execute the myriad of operations that battalion commanders will demand.

Embracing the Change and Building the Future

Branch rivalry will likely be the biggest obstacle to making these very necessary changes. As professionals, all must overcome the petty jealousies and foolish prejudices standing in the way. The armor community must play its vital part and, along with our infantry and engineer brothers, step boldly into the future. We must train and prepare our lieutenants to be the best staff captains and company commanders possible, which leads to developing the strongest possible field grade leadership for our combined arms battalions in the years to come.

This discussion is important for the future of the armor branch and the Army as a whole. It is a discussion that involves all the combat arms branches, especially our own and the infantry. This article is written with emphasis on armor officers, but much of the information applies to infantry officers — we both have vital roles to play. The foundations of future excellence must be built today.



Captain Chad R. Foster is currently serving as commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor (1-66 AR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Taji, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 (air), 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 CAV), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA; scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV, 3d ID, Fort Stewart; and tank platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV.



"The strains of multiple year-long combat deployments have prompted many changes that would have been practically inconceivable just few years ago. Junior officers are being asked to do things that few of us would have thought about early in our careers. Despite this, lieutenants and captains are rising to the challenge and accomplishing their missions with an almost unbroken record of success. The lines between the branches, at least on the tactical level, have not restrained our company-grade officers, as indicated by job assignments and performances."

The Battalion Chaplain: A Combat Multiplier

by Chaplain (Captain) David Fell

The moral and ethical well-being of the command is extremely important to successfully accomplishing missions. Battalion commanders have an invaluable asset to support the moral and ethical well-being of soldiers, especially during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Commanders should assess how Chaplains can contribute to soldiers and their missions.

As a Chaplain, near the completion of a year-long deployment in Iraq, I realize every situation is unique, but many of the concepts and ideas in this article can be adapted to fit a unit's particular needs. This article is based on the experiences of a unit highly engaged in all aspects of the brigade combat team's area of operation (AO). To date, we have accomplished over 2,800 combat patrols that include regular contact with the enemy. The unit is made up of more than 600 soldiers, both organic and attached, representing over

50 military occupational specialties. The battalion has both kinetic and nonkinetic missions.

As per U.S. Army regulations, "Chaplains provide for the religious support, pastoral care, and the moral and ethical well-being of the command." This concept becomes a reality within the three major religious support functional areas — to nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the dead. This article focuses on nurturing the living and how the above-mentioned concepts have specific and practical application in forming a proactive ministry support program. While deployed, the focus is on keeping soldiers in the fight (spiritually and emotionally) and doing the right things.

The heart of ministry is relationships. Without relationships it is difficult to be proactive in preventing moral, morale, and ethical decline or providing early in-

tervention in such situations. Chaplains need to expend the time and energy to forge relationships at all levels in a battalion. Relationship building involves investing time and shared experiences. It is important that all elements of the unit receive attention — both inside the wire and outside the wire.

The Chaplain Outside the Wire

There are several primary tasks and purposes that a Chaplain accomplishes with soldiers outside the wire — some are proactive and others are more reactive. Every operation involves risk and these risks should be considered when deciding how to employ the Chaplain. A Chaplain is a noncombatant, like doctors and medics. Unlike doctors and medics, however, a Chaplain is not permitted to bear arms. A Chaplain's Assistant is an armed combatant and serves to protect the Chaplain while on missions outside the wire. To-

Father (Major) Edward J. Waters, a Catholic Chaplain from Oswego, New York, conducts Divine Services on a pier for members of the first assault troops thrown against Hitler's forces on the continent. Weymouth, England, 6 June 1944.





“Chaplains provide for the religious support, pastoral care, and the moral and ethical well-being of the command.’ This concept becomes a reality within the three major religious support functional areas to nurture the living, care for the wounded, and honor the dead.”

gether, they make a very effective team while accomplishing their tasks and purposes.

Religious support and services is a proactive task. Its purpose is to meet the religious and spiritual needs of soldiers by providing partial or full worship opportunities to those unable to attend services at the forward operating base.

Soldiers who remain spiritually engaged can continue to draw on the strength they receive from their faith. The visit provides soldiers an opportunity to interact as a group or one-on-one with the Chaplain. This also provides an opportunity to address several minor counseling issues.

Assessing the moral and ethical environment is a proactive task. Its purpose is to observe and interact with leaders and soldiers as they interact with each other and the local population.

This is particularly important during COIN operations where there is a lot of nonkinetic interaction with the local population. Patrols interact with the local people as they conduct their daily business of work, school, shopping, and playing. After contact with the enemy, it is natural for soldiers to feel animosity toward the local population. The most accurate

way to assess actions and attitudes of soldiers and leaders is with firsthand observation. A Chaplain can gain a general sense of their feelings by visiting with squads and platoons while inside the wire, but it is working alongside them when they are in battle mode and fatigued that the warning signs become clear. The purpose is not to single out any particular soldier or leader, it is to help them before they reach the point of necessitating significant outside intervention or attention.

Religious and cultural assessment and advisement is a proactive task. Its purpose is to assess and advise commanders and others on issues related to local religious and cultural considerations.

Chaplains are subject-matter experts on religion. This knowledge and experience is very important during COIN operations where religion plays a large role in the day-to-day life of the local population. They provide a general religious area

assessment based on basic research. By interacting with the local population and attending and observing meetings with local governments and contractors, the Chaplain can facilitate a better understanding of issues that relate to the area of operation and the local population.

Visiting the wounded at the combat support hospital is a reactive task with the purpose of providing comfort and spiritual support for the wounded.

Caring for the wounded is an important part of the ministry of a combat chaplain. This is not only beneficial for wounded soldiers, but it also lets other soldiers know that they will receive care in their hour of need.

There are other secondary tasks and purposes that the Chaplain and his assistant perform while outside the wire. The following tasks are definitely combat multipliers during combat operations.

Primary combat life saver provides first aid to wounded soldiers, and as a non-combatant prohibited from bearing arms, the Chaplain is a good choice to fill this role — especially in the absence of a medic. This frees up combat power to remain engaged with the enemy or provide security. Ideally, a Chaplain would only need to focus on the spiritual needs of the wounded soldier; however, experience has demonstrated the need to fill this role.

Ministry of presence provides comfort and reassurance to soldiers in harm’s way. It assesses the condition and recovery progress of soldiers directly affected by a significant event. As soldiers experience various losses due to combat, they grow weary and sometimes fearful. Many have faith in God and the presence of a Chaplain reassures them that they are not alone in their struggle. The Chaplain, as a leader, thus sets a standard of personal courage and care of soldiers. Ministry of presence also provides Chaplains the opportunity to assess how soldiers are coping with difficult situations, enabling him to provide or facilitate appropriate care.

The Chaplain Inside the Wire

The Chaplain’s experiences outside the wire, his demonstration of personal courage, and shared danger with soldiers provide



“Chaplains are subject-matter experts on religion... They provide a general religious area assessment based on basic research. By interacting with the local population and attending and observing meetings with local governments and contractors, the Chaplain can facilitate a better understanding of issues that relate to the area of operation and the local population.”

vide a foundation for functioning inside the wire. The Chaplain's Assistant plays a vital role in accomplishing these tasks.

Planning and operations. According to doctrine, Chaplains serve as advisors to the command in the areas of morale, morals, ethics, and religion. This relates to both planning and operations. The Chaplain's education, combined with firsthand experiences and observations, are valuable tools available to the unit during the planning and evaluation process.

During a deployment, there will likely be several opportunities for the Chaplain to participate in and contribute to the military decisionmaking process (MDMP). A Chaplain who has his finger on the pulse of current operations can provide invaluable insight on how a proposed course of action will affect the soldiers carrying out the plan. The Chaplain also provides an assessment of the impact on the local population in relation to the religion and/or religious holidays during the proposed operation. Firsthand knowledge and assessment of the area involved is very beneficial.

Workplace visitation. This is an effective way of being proactive in dealing with problems before they arise to the crisis level. Workplace visitations are an important part of relationship building and often involve informal chatting, looking at family photos, and discussing family issues. Many times a soldier who would not otherwise seek out the Chaplain will pull the Chaplain aside and ask for help with growing problems. At other times, the chain of command will pull the Chaplain aside and ask that he speak with a soldier who may be having difficulties — early intervention helps avoid crises.

Critical incident stress debriefing. When a traumatic event occurs in a unit, it is important to help soldiers who are most significantly affected process the emotions of the event. This is an important part of taking care of soldiers during combat. A Chaplain who is actively involved with the unit can help soldiers through this process by identifying those who may need additional care and facilitate that care with agencies that offer programs such as combat stress or mental health care.

Pastoral counseling. The importance of this should not be underestimated. At different times during a deployment, pastoral counseling can occupy a considerable amount of a Chaplain's time. This is most effective when a Chaplain has taken time to build relationships with soldiers and leaders. The day-and-night



"The Chaplain is also responsible for coordinating and providing (within a particular faith group) weekly religious services. This also includes oversight of other lay leaders of other faith groups and other activities such as Bible studies. Working together with other Chaplains provides soldiers a wide variety of worship opportunities."

availability of the Chaplain is a great resource for the unit. In this role, they can also help guide soldiers to the level of support they need. As per regulations, commanders should never expect a Chaplain to share anything told to them in their role as a counselor or spiritual advisor.

Religious services. The Chaplain is also responsible for coordinating and providing (within a particular faith group) weekly religious services. This also includes oversight of other lay leaders of other faith groups and other activities such as Bible studies. Working together with other Chaplains provides soldiers a wide variety of worship opportunities.

The proactive unit ministry team (UMT) is made up of the Chaplain and the Chaplain's Assistant. The UMT is a tremendous asset that proactively provides for the needs of soldiers and aids

greatly in mission accomplishment. It is difficult to objectively measure the success of taking a proactive approach. To date, my UMT has completed more than 100 missions outside the wire with soldiers, as well as hundreds of workplace visits. These proactive activities, combined with counseling, crisis intervention, classes/briefs, planning meetings, and religious services form a vital and active religious support program.



Chaplain (Captain) David Fell is currently serving as the battalion chaplain, 1st Special Troops Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Taji, Iraq. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M Commerce and a Masters of Divinity from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. His military education includes Chaplain Officers Basic Course. He received a Bronze Star Medal for his service in Iraq.

Practical Lessons from the Philippine

by Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, and Major William M. Stowe III

“I prefer a country run like hell by Filipinos to a country run like heaven by Americans. Because, however bad a Filipino government might be, we can always change it.”

— Manuel L. Quezon,
First President of the Philippine Commonwealth¹

When stripped of ideological blinders, lessons learned from the Philippine war can offer valuable insight into the complexities of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign influence.² The war contained one of the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns in the United States’ history. A critical examination of how its military interventions, civic action, and pacification operations and tactics fit into our joint doctrine of phase IV and V operations will offer additional insight into our

current and future counterinsurgency campaigns. It is important to realize that sound counterinsurgency theory, combined with a decent understanding of the conflict at hand, is essential for applying practices from learned lessons to a current or future campaign; what works in one counterinsurgency campaign can easily fail when directly applied to another.

Between 1898 and 1941, the U.S. Army transformed from a small-frontier constabulary army to the most powerful military land force in the world. During this evolution, the Army demonstrated how different counterinsurgency and pacification operational methods can be employed in separate geographic regions for a campaign’s overall success. In the end, these methods were skillfully executed through the combined application of force and politics by thinking “strategic captains and corporals” on



Insurrection

the ground; some of these methods are worth serious consideration in planning operations for future contingencies.

This article discusses the many similarities or parallels between past and current conflicts during phase IV and V operations. There are easily many more dissimilarities or converging factors, which do not translate well for modern application. However, some of the lessons learned from a U.S. campaign that began on foreign soil over 100 years ago are too obvious and important to ignore.

Philippine Counterinsurgency Operations 1898-1941

In May 1898, the United States declared a “splendid little war” with Spain that lasted only eight months.³ Although historians have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American

War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By December 1898, the United States successfully invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy forces across the Pacific and Caribbean.⁴ Although, by the time peace was declared in December 1898, it controlled only small portions of those islands.⁵ Individual islands, mountains, swamps, jungles, and bodies of water separate the island inhabitants; on Luzon alone the Ilocanos, Pampangans, Pangasinans, Tagalogs, and Bicolos all speak different languages.⁶ Relations among the tribal groups were often strained; the Muslim, or Moro, population of Mindanao and Sulu, resisted the incorporation into the Christian Filipino polity, often by force of arms.⁷ The defeat of Spanish forces in the Philippines was due in no small part to the support provided by Filipino revolutionaries, primarily of the Tagalog tribe, who seized the opportunity



The four-day battle of Bagsak Mountain on Jolo Island in the Philippines took place from 11 to 15 June 1913.



"In May 1898, the United States declared a "splendid little war" with Spain that lasted only eight months. Although historians have always questioned the reasons for the Spanish-American War, the war was initially a success for the United States. By December 1898, the United States successfully invaded Cuba, Puerto Rico, and portions of the Philippines, deploying Army and Navy forces across the Pacific and Caribbean."

provided by the Spanish-American War to rise up against their Spanish overlords.⁸ Unlike Cuba, where the United States had been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to disband, the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United States' authority over the islands.⁹ Although Spain dominated, it had never replaced the indigenous local cultures.¹⁰ A system of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed the surrender of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs.

The Philippine Insurrection

The late 19th century witnessed the emergence of a Filipino national consciousness.¹¹ The writings of Filipino nationalists, publicizing the abuses of the Spanish imperial system, advocated self-governance of the islands.¹² Following the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occupied Manila where they encountered nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo's Army of Liberation, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine political system of the Philippines led various factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces. Ultimately, due to the disorganized nature of the insurgency, the United States defeated the majority of Aguinaldo's forces. Despite their combat successes, U.S. commanders were continually frustrated by the dual task of occu-

pying and administering the islands while simultaneously fighting insurgent forces. Troop strength never seemed sufficient for both missions. Some of this inability was due to the peacetime thinking of U.S. commanders and political leaders who were more concerned about budgets rather than applying adequate resources to the conflict.¹³

Will of the People

The United States' victory over the remnants of the Spanish Empire in 1898 and the subsequent insurrection, fought from 1899 to 1902 by Filipino nationalists, found U.S. military and political leaders faced with the prospect of having to administer an occupied country without an established, legitimate government, while fighting a protracted insurgency. The United States recognized that political, economic, and information affairs would play an important role in achieving the pacification of the Philippines — a point President William McKinley made clear in the winter of 1898.¹⁴ Ironically, a military victory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 1899.¹⁵ Instead, they hoped to undermine the will of the U.S. population to continue the struggle by harassing the occupa-

tion forces in a protracted struggle.¹⁶ The insurgents, through the press and contacts in the United States, were aware of the opposition to the U.S. Government's forays overseas. Insurrectionist leaders consciously played to this audience, timing their offensives to coincide with the Presidential election of Novem-



Spanish Army prisoners, c. 1898.

"Unlike Cuba, where the United States had been able to persuade the indigenous rebel forces to disband, the Filipino revolutionaries refused to acknowledge the United States' authority over the islands. Although Spain dominated, it had never replaced the indigenous local cultures. A system of local governance and geographic isolation set the conditions for the insurrection that followed the surrender of Spanish forces, as local leaders believed they could administer their own affairs."

ber 1900, in hopes that a disenchanted electorate would replace McKinley with the anti-imperialist candidate William Jennings Bryan.¹⁷

The U.S. Army, in helping bring reform to Spain's former colonies, brought with it both the same *progressive* ideology that swept the nation in the late 19th century and a *can do* spirit that previously inspired the Lewis and Clark expedition and helped defeat the Confederacy in 1865.¹⁸ The desire to create a friendly ally amidst the colonial enclaves of the Western Pacific forced many U.S. political and military leaders to realize that drastic changes were necessary to transform the exploited oligarchies of Spain's former colonies into open societies. But the United States also wanted these changes to be a quiet, evolutionary process, one in which the government would provide as much of a level playing field as possible without infringing on anyone's personal or property rights.¹⁹ Although the United States managed to finally subdue the majority of the insurgency in the northern islands, the southern archipelago of Moroland proved tougher.

The Sultan of Sulu

Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule.²⁰ Not only were the Moros different in their religious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, and languages from the people of the Christianized north.²¹ The Moros were xenophobic and politically a patchwork of feuding clans.²² The United States was faced with an enemy that had no central government or leadership to influence. In developing an effective policy to deal with the Moros, two approaches presented themselves.²³ The United States could either strengthen the sultan of Sulu — the titular head of Islam in the Philippines — and rule Moroland indirectly, as the British and Dutch did in their Malaysian colonies, or it could attempt to directly rule.²⁴ Ultimately, U.S. officials opted for direct rule as neither the Sultan nor any other tribal chief had sufficient prestige to rule all of Moroland, and any effort to elevate one Moro leader over his peers would undoubtedly have resulted in civil war.²⁵

U.S. Army officers, with experience from both the Civil and Indian Wars, reasoned it made more sense to establish direct U.S. rule than to uphold some native autocrat.²⁶ Besides, the notion of ruling the islands through a despotic Asian potentate was distasteful to many in the United States.²⁷ After a short campaign to subdue the majority of the Sulu warriors, the United States began a system of rule where the local military governor was given full control of legal and administrative powers. Army officers were not so naïve to believe that they could rule without the assistance of the Moro sultan and the tribal chiefs.²⁸ Working with tribal chiefs, officers established a basic government, while introducing a set of reforms that included medical care, establishing schools, and land reform.²⁹ The United States was successful in pacifying the Moros until December 1941, and in 1946, finally allowed the commonwealth government to successfully concentrate on establishing an independent government following World War II.

Summary

By and large, the United States did a credible job of pacifying the Moros, using a combination of local tribal control and U.S.-led reform efforts.³⁰ Building on previous experience in the Western frontier and other parts of the Philippines, Army officers applied the well-worn creed of firm-but-fair treatment to establish a paternal regime that attempted to uplift the Moros without completely disregarding their political, economic, and religious heritage.³¹ Although relations were not always so smooth, some Moros came to regret the departure of the U.S. administration, which they considered more sensitive to their concerns than the



"Following the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. Army forces occupied Manila where they encountered nationalist Emilio Aguinaldo's Army of Liberation, which hoped to take the city and declare a Philippine Republic. A political and military stalemate developed that led to hostilities. Although the United States had no intention of getting involved in a protracted guerrilla war, the Byzantine political system of the Philippines led various factions into armed conflict with U.S. occupation forces."

Philippine government in Manila.³² But U.S. efforts were successful enough to allow the Philippine government a stable security situation to begin their own administration by 1946.³³

Philippine Phase IV and V Operations

A Six-Phased Campaign Plan

In the 2006 draft version of Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*, operational phases have been standardized. Planners are required to develop plans based on a new six-phase model that includes "shaping, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize and enable civil authority as main constructs."³⁴ A key consideration of these new phases is that they are mandatory for planning only.³⁵ If there is no requirement for a particular phase to occur, then that phase should not be addressed and the next phase considered.³⁶ Standardizing phases will assist in the deconfliction of combatant command and component plans.³⁷ This is the construct under which we will evaluate the later stages of military operations in the Philippine Islands and ultimately compare them to current operations in the long war.

Phase IV: Stabilize

Following the defeat of Spanish forces in late 1898, the U.S. military faced a new threat from the same insurgents who helped facilitate victory. Unlike the current situation in Iraq, U.S. forces opted for an offensive approach where the military assumed a greater role in the stability of the Philippines following the conclusion of major combat operations. Under the new Joint Publication 5-0, the stability of either the host-nation government or an interagency interim government, such as the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, is a separate and vital component to the termination of operations.³⁸

In the late 19th century, U.S. Army senior leaders turned to principles that had long guided the old Indian frontier constabulary.

Using the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) construct, U.S. forces secured the Philippine Islands sufficiently enough to allow a quasi-independent Philippine government to assume control. Initially, the U.S. Government understood that subduing the insurgents would require more than military force.³⁹ Commanders understood, and ordered their men to respect the people and their customs; they imposed strict discipline, forbidding looting and wanton destruction, and punishing those who committed such crimes. They paid cash for supplies requisitioned, opened schools, built roads, refurbished markets, and established municipal governments under native officials that were largely based on established Spanish traditions and laws.⁴⁰ Commanders also realized that information and impressions were more valuable than actual military size. U.S. forces were stretched thin and it was necessary for commanders to leave insurgents with the impression that they faced a more powerful military force than actually existed. "The Filipinos," wrote Brigadier General Theodore Schwan in the fall of 1899, "are in identically the same position as the Indians of our country have been for many years, and in my opinion must be subdued in much the same way, by making them realize fully the futility of armed resistance, and then win them by fair and just treatment."⁴¹ Field commanders pushed their subordinates to take the offense in the belief that psychological factors would play an especially important role in irregular warfare.⁴² Finally, the U.S. military was able to use the geography of the Philippines to deprive insurgents of their economic base.

The U.S. Navy conducted a blockade of the islands' unregulated coastal traffic — absolutely essential in an archipelago lacking roads.⁴³ The blockade prevented both foreign arms shipments and ended the inter-island trade necessary for the insurgents to raise funds.⁴⁴ A critical component of the United States' success in this phase was civic action, conducted while engaged in combat operations.⁴⁵ Building schools and roads, while conducting counterinsurgency operations, was more of a policy of attraction, rather than attrition, in the battle to defeat the insurgency.⁴⁶

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority

The final phase of campaign planning involves enabling civil authorities and disengaging U.S. forces from a conflict, which



"Moroland consisted of mostly Muslim people on Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago who were fiercely independent and never accepted Spanish rule. Not only were the Moros different in their religious beliefs, but they differed in their laws, customs, and languages from the people of the Christianized north. The Moros were xenophobic and political patchwork of feuding clans. The United States was faced with an enemy that had no central government or leadership to influence."

is sometimes a relatively easy affair, such as the transfer of authority in Grenada and Panama. More long-term examples of U.S. military involvement while enabling civil authorities are the Korean Peninsula and the Philippine Islands. Transitioning from U.S. military rule to civilian rule in the Philippines over a 48-year period serves as an example of successfully executing a phase V operation.

The United States established the Schurmann Commission early to help set conditions for Filipino self-determination, and recommended the establishment of the institutions for a civilian domestic government.⁴⁷ Even though by 16 March 1900, fighting in insurgency territory was still far from over, a second Philippine Commission was established to give the newly formed Philippine executive and legislative branches authority to administer the islands.⁴⁸

In 499 statutes issued between September 1900 and August 1902, the Taft Commission swept away three centuries of Spanish governance and installed in its place the laws and institutions of a modern civil state, establishing a code of law, a judicial system, and elective municipal and provincial governments.⁴⁹ The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 extended the protections of the United States' Bill of Rights to Filipinos and established a national bicameral legislature.⁵⁰ The lower house was the popularly elected Philippine Assembly and the upper house was the Philippine Commission, appointed directly by the President of the United States.⁵¹ Following U.S. practice, the Philippine Organic Act imposed the strict separation of church and state and eliminated the Roman Catholic Church as the official state religion.⁵²

The first elections to the Philippine Assembly were held in July 1907 and the first session opened on 16 October 1907.⁵³ The Jones Act of 1916 carried forward the Philippine Organic Act of 1902.⁵⁴ An elected Philippine Senate replaced the appointed Philippine Commission and the former Philippine Assembly was renamed the House of Representatives.⁵⁵ As before, the U.S. President appointed the governor general, responsible for the executive branch. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 established the commonwealth of the Philippines, which at the end of a 10-year transition period would become the fully independent Republic of the Philippines.⁵⁶ A plebiscite on the constitution for the new republic was approved in 1935 and the date for national independence was set for 4 July 1946. Aside from the onset of the Japanese invasion in 1941 and subsequent liberation by allied forces, independence occurred as promised.

Summary

By 1907, at the conclusion of major combat operations in the Philippines, the United States had gone to war against Spain ill-prepared, and had emerged as a major global player, modifying many of the constabulary tactics and strategies that were used against the Plains Indians.⁵⁷ When viewed from a military context 100 years later, the lessons learned from the Philippine war offer valuable examples into the complexities of localized insurgencies and indigenous resistance to foreign influence. More importantly, how the U.S. military conducted the war offers not a model, but indicators as to how a nation deals with complex military and political situations.

Lessons to be Learned

Force Size

Following Commodore Dewey's victory on 1 May 1898 at Manila Bay, using his fleet of 1,743 men against the Spanish fleet, the immediate question for President McKinley became "what next?"⁵⁸ Dewey's only directives were to defeat the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay and to invest in the city of Manila. This initial action was loosely consistent with the United States' new strategic policy of obtaining bases in the Pacific island chain (Oahu, Samoa, and Guam, following Manila), mapping a course to the untapped East Asian economic markets.⁵⁹

Following Spain's surrender of Manila to U.S. forces four months later, President McKinley did not gain an adequate appreciation of the developing situation in the Philippines. Conflicting reports advised him that Philippine revolutionists were fighting for annexation to the United States first and their independence was secondary. Initial Philippine enemy forces were between 80,000 and 90,000 regulars, with an additional estimate of 30,000 to over 300,000 people in local organizations throughout the Philippine provinces.⁶⁰ U.S. Army troop strength to begin the initial conventional war against the insurgency was over 20,000.⁶¹ It peaked at 70,000 men in 1900, and averaged 40,000 during the 1898-1902 periods.

State volunteers bore the brunt of the early conventional war in 1899; U.S. volunteers assisted with the ensuing guerrilla war, and the Regulars settled into full responsibility of the pacification effort only after struggling with counterinsurgency tactics during the first two years of the war.⁶² Virtually all Army Regular combat units during this time served in the Philippines.⁶³ Only 15,000 U.S. soldiers were required to garrison the islands by 1903, less than a year following the official end of the war.⁶⁴ This number steadily declined over the next decade, although U.S. forces were required to keep the Moros living in Mindanao (including the Sulu archipelago) in check until the start of World War II. Therefore, the United States dedicated an average counterinsurgency campaign force four times larger than the force required to topple the Spanish regime in the Philippines. This force size was consistent with the counterinsurgency tenet of bringing enough coverage to positively affect a given geographic area. Effective counterinsurgency campaigns are manpower intensive. John M. Gates' study of the Philippine war implies that even more U.S. forces committed to counterinsurgency operations may have shortened the length of the war.

Decentralized Counterinsurgency Operations and Individual Effectiveness

Native Filipinos were primarily of Malayan and some Indonesian descent, and could be loosely categorized into eight ethnic Christian divisions, two non-Christian groups (Mohammedan and primitive pagan in Mindanao, Mindoro, and Palawan), and Negritos, who were non-Malayan and located in the interior highlands over the whole length of the Philippines.⁶⁵ This is the country profile the U.S. Army was up against with native insurgent forces present on every major island group.

Through differing trial and error pacification practices, which were sometimes egregiously fatal for both sides, it took the U.S.




Aguinaldo and other insurgent leaders, January 1899.

"Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his allegiance to the United States, Congress authorized the President to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philippines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which focused on the real and perceived methods used by the U.S. military to execute the war, helped expedite the change."

Army until the final year and a half of the war to become proficient in executing its pacification policies. Although the U.S. military averaged 40,000 men in country, the dispersion of the U.S. Army over the vast archipelago was so great that the consequent shortage of officers usually permitted only one for each garrison. This officer was often times a young lieutenant who was required to perform a full range of duties, which included supervising municipal government, civil affairs, and police functions. His duties also included preparing forces to repel night attacks and/or mount offensive field operations against insurgents and ensuring the population did not support them. The young officer's troops were often recruits or volunteers with little or no military experience and training.⁶⁶ Some garrison commanders were able to devote most of their time to valuable civil projects; others were involved in daily, violent defensive and offensive clashes in the central and southern islands.⁶⁷ Other commanders experienced both ends of this spectrum and had to find middle ground from which to operate. It was often up to the individual commander's discretion and direction to identify the proper counterinsurgency and/or pacification tactics in his region to achieve overall campaign success — many little wars also occurred in the Philippines.

Extensive decentralization of the countrywide pacification effort from higher headquarters in Manila existed due to the island's geography. Again, this reality placed additional individual responsibility on the shoulders of young commanders. Even though benevolence was the official Manila pacification policy, young commanders became all important to determining what methods were actually employed. Overall, the policies followed by each region or garrison in the last year and a half of the war were effective.

Four lengths of at least one year greatly enhanced the ability of these young commanders to establish the required community relationships for executing the appropriate counterinsurgency and/or pacification tactics.⁶⁸ Autonomy for these commanders resulted in overall success. In the end, U.S. officers with minimal training functioned effectively in almost any assigned ca-



"The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification operations until they widely deployed and dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur's General Order 100, which provided security for townspeople from terrorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simultaneously, U.S. forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new vantage points, and increased the internal surveillance of their respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and supporters."

capacity when provided with proper guidance and permitted sufficient flexibility in making decisions based on their own initiative and judgment.⁶⁹

Transfer from Military to Civil Authority

Soon after Emilio Aguinaldo was captured and swore his allegiance to the United States, Congress authorized the President to proceed with establishing a civil government in the Philippines. Growing political pressure on President McKinley, which focused on the real and perceived methods used by the U.S. military to execute the war, helped expedite the change. William Howard Taft was installed as civil governor on 1 July 1901, providing him executive authority throughout the archipelago, except for the territory inhabited by the Moros.⁷⁰

The work of Taft's civil authorities' commission helped bring about conciliation between the Americans and the Filipinos. Most Filipinos desired some freedom from the restrictions of martial rule, which were easily invoked under the military's governorship. Ironically, the benevolent programs initiated by the civil government were almost invariably a continuation of efforts begun by the U.S. Army. At times, even to Taft's dismay, he had to rely on the remotely located garrison commanders, who often asserted authority Taft believed they did not legally possess, to execute his civil policies in the remote areas already pacified.⁷¹

Population Protection

The U.S. Army did not begin to succeed in pacification operations until they widely deployed and dispersed their units into strategic garrisons under Major General MacArthur's General Order 100, which provided security for townspeople from terrorism and intimidation from insurgents. Simultaneously, U.S. forces pressured and isolated the insurgents from these new vantage points, and increased the internal surveillance of their respective municipalities to detect agents, terrorists, and sup-

porters. The arrest and conviction of these individuals provided further evidence to the townspeople that the U.S. Army was capable of protecting them, and when they cooperated with the Army, protection increased.

The United States' pursuit of insurgents from these locations cut off their supply lines, kept them off balance, and detached them from popular support.⁷² Insurgents lacking popular support could not maintain operations against opposing forces. Their terrorist activities soon backfired as the population began to feel more secure under U.S. auspices.⁷³ Once this occurred, the Filipinos could support the United States without having to pay the previously inevitable consequence of being victimized by revolutionary terrorists. Separating the population from the insurgents was crucial to ending their influence in towns, thereby destroying the system by which they obtained sanctuary, supplies, and information.⁷⁴

Eventually, municipal police organizations manned with Filipinos were established, followed by the Philippine Constabulary, which was assigned to highly populated areas to provide for their own self-defense. This development further in-

creased municipal security, and because the Filipinos felt even safer, they were more likely to support the United States and withdraw support from the insurgents. Insurgent surrender rates increased remarkably.

Protecting the civilian population is a core counterinsurgency tenet, which is required before all other follow-on tactics can succeed within a campaign. For comparison purposes, in early cases of gains made in municipalities in 1900 through benevolent pacification policies, they were more than offset by insurgent terror tactics and the inability of the United States to provide protection. The protection given the population by the United States in 1901 made them understand that peace under American control was a reasonable alternative to continued war and the uncertain goal of independence. The native population became a U.S. weapon in the war against the insurgents.⁷⁵

Pseudo-operations⁷⁶

The effectiveness of the U.S. Army was greatly improved by the use of indigenous personnel. They were trained for and served effectively in the same Filipino-American units as U.S. servicemen.⁷⁷ Their use began in the first year of the war. Captured or surrendered enemy personnel, well treated, often became invaluable and loyal allies.⁷⁸ Many Filipino soldiers succumbed to the United States' offer of money for the surrender of their weapons.⁷⁹ The indigenous population was also used later in the pacification effort as popular support shifted to the United States and from the insurgency. Once protection for the towns increased, even more Filipinos were willing to aid the United States as guides, scouts, agents, and spies.⁸⁰

Operations in which friendly forces were disguised as the enemy were most productive.⁸¹ Of course, the most famous case of using friendly, former insurgent officers disguised as the enemy was General Frederick Funston's expedition to capture Emilio Aguinaldo in northern Luzon in early 1901. This event helped shift the momentum of the war toward achieving U.S. strategic

objectives. Passing himself off as a captured U.S. Army private, Funston led his operation on a grueling six-day, 110-mile journey to Aguinaldo's sanctuary; the deceit was so complete the revolutionary leader never knew what hit him as he became a U.S. prisoner.⁸²

Force Recommendations

Joint and individual service doctrine will continue to develop and change over time, which will require leaders to stay abreast of current models and phraseology. However, there are a few historical principles that if analyzed and implemented correctly, may lead to a successful military campaign. Although there is no one solution that applies from conflict to conflict, these basic observations will greatly increase chances of success.

Local ethnic, religious, and tribal beliefs. At the forefront of observation is the knowledge that leaders gain about the indigenous people of the country they are planning a campaign against, and how to include this knowledge throughout the planning and operational processes. Evidence from past conflicts, such as the American Revolution, Vietnam, and the war in Iraq, confirms that ethnic, religious, and tribal relationships existing in particular areas have crucial implications on determining how an operation progresses. This is extremely important when the operation advances to phases IV and V — during the initial stages of the operation if religious beliefs are discounted, pacifying the population will be difficult at best.

The religious beliefs and values of the area may dictate how to carry out operations in one area, which may be vastly different from that in another area of the same country. Operational planning must acknowledge the area's religious beliefs; however, there is a fine balance between satisfying the religious beliefs of the 'enemy' and not risking lives of friendly military forces. Taken one step further, if leaders understand a particular moral view of some religions, they will realize that some individuals are willing to die for their cause to meet a higher calling. Not only must the various religious beliefs and values be clearly understood, one must also understand the dynamic population makeup of the country as a whole. Discontentment within a particular country may be the root cause for operations being conducted in the first place. Just as is the case with religious knowledge, understanding the dynamics of a population may greatly alter one's course of action, especially when planning and conducting phase IV and V operations.

The will of the local people. The will of the people is also essential during the planning and execution phases of an operation — if the local populace does not believe that the United States has their best interests in mind, operational successes will be hampered. Regardless of the operation's purpose, the local populace needs to be assured and reassured that the United States will stick with it until the end, providing for a better future that is compatible with its values. Without the will of the local populace, peace will not easily be achieved, nor will it be enduring.

The will of the American people. The will of the local populace is not all that must be considered. Perhaps, more importantly is the will of the American people. This is perhaps the biggest area that insurgents can exploit and use to their advantage. While Americans are well educated in the facets of American politics, the American public at large is not content without a quick and decisive victory with minimal casualties. This is one area that the upper echelons of political leadership must aggressively attack and pursue to maintain the support of the U.S. populace at large. Politics are extremely important in running our great Nation, but ill-advised decisions can sometimes limit military effectiveness. If discontentment within the American pop-

ulace grows too great, a political decision designed to limit domestic uneasiness may be made and not necessarily in accordance with the military plan.

Safety and security of the local people. Both in the Philippines and Iraq, U.S. forces were initially viewed as liberators and had the support from the majority of the local populace. However, as soon as the safety and security of the local population dissipated, many persons transferred their allegiances to opposition forces to increase their chances for personal survival. Operational planning must guarantee the safety and security of the local populace. Planners must allow for the possibility of an insurgency to occur and use every option available to decrease the threat to the local populace. Again, peace will be difficult to obtain if the local populace is in opposition to the forces present.

Send an overwhelming force. Planners and leaders must acknowledge the fact that operations, especially when facing a possible insurgency, will be manpower intensive. Those forces sent forward must possess an overwhelming amount of force. This force is required to swiftly defeat an enemy and adequately provide safety and security to the local populace. This should be viewed as a prerequisite to entering phases IV and V; then, and only then, should smaller troop levels be considered.

History has proven repeatedly that insurgency operations will not end quickly. That said, military planners should not set a hard-and-fast timeframe for an operation. Allowances for lengthy operations should be the norm; anything less is viewed as a bonus. This concept must be emphasized and accepted at all levels of government and the U.S. populace at large, as it directly ties into the will of the people at home.

Combat tours should be maintained at a year, if not longer, especially during the end of phases III through V. This will ensure that relationships built between military troops and the local populace will have a greater chance of enduring, and thus ensuring the support of the local populace. This will also allow greater "corporate knowledge" to be maintained in any particular area, thus increasing the chances for success.

Joint force planning and operations are a very dynamic and fluid process. No matter what the operation is named or how the phases are labeled, there is one constant throughout time — each conflict is unique and there is no cookie-cutter solution to be applied. The observations listed above are constant throughout any military operation, to include possible insurgent activities. More importantly is the direct relationship that ties them all together — the relationship between people and time. Campaign planners and leaders must understand the people they are dealing with and provide them with a sense of safety and security. This serves to garner the support of the local populace, and more importantly, the support of the U.S. populace as a whole.

Perhaps the most important aspect of a professional military is ensuring those in the future learn from the past. Following the end to hostilities in the Philippines, U.S. President Taft blocked the publication of Captain John R.M. Taylor's five-volume book, *History of the Philippine Insurrection*, to avoid embarrassing the Filipinos who gave the Americans legitimacy.⁸³ This act by President Taft, no matter what the underlying reason, denied the U.S. military the ability to learn from past conflicts and better apply lessons learned in future military operations.



Notes

¹"History: Republic of the Philippines," *WWW-VL History Central Catalogue*, 20 June 2006, online at <http://lib.iue.it/history/asia/Philippines/index.html>, accessed 7 August 2006.

²Brian M. Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2000, p. 328.

³Neal Gaber, "A Splendid Little War," *Salon.com*, 21 February 2003, online at http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2003/02/21/maine/index_np.html, accessed 2 August 2006.

⁴Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 99.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Ibid.* As geographers have noted, the term *Filipino* is no more accurate in describing a people of one race and culture than is the term *American*.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 108.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, p. 15. Until the mid-19th century, Spanish rule remained concentrated in Manila, while in the countryside, the poor and undermanned imperial government ruled by confirming the authority of local chieftains and tribes.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 110.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷John Gates, *School Books and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902*, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1973, pp. 163-164.

¹⁸Birtle, p. 102.

¹⁹*Ibid.* Ultimately, U.S. pacifying efforts during and after the insurrection allowed the Philippine population a commonwealth status with their own president, legislature, and judicial system that set the foundation for a transition to full independence in 1946.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 159.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.* The Moro's strong beliefs in Islam led many to launch attacks against infidels with the assurance that death in combat would guarantee an entry into paradise.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 160.

²⁴*Ibid.*

²⁵*Ibid.*

²⁶*Ibid.*

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 161. The results of these reforms, which lasted right up to December 1941, paid long-term dividends to both the Philippine commonwealth government and the United States. During World War II, the Sulu islands were never completely occupied by Japanese forces and the Sultan of Sulu kept the Stars and Stripes flying over his headquarters during the conflict.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 168.

³¹*Ibid.*

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴Colonel Craig Bollenberg, "Standardized Campaign Phases," *Campaigning*, Volume 1, Issue 1, 30 September 2005, p. 2., online 4 August 2006, at http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/jaws/JOINT_ADVANCED_WARFIGHTING_SCHOOL_Newsletter.doc.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶*Ibid.* During the threatened U.S. invasion of Haiti in 1994, it can be argued that under the current-phase model that phase zero (shape) and phase one (deter) were conducted. Phase two (seize the initiative) and phase three (dominate) were not required due to the capitulation of the Haitian Military Junta. The coalition force then transitioned to phase four (stabilize).

³⁷*Ibid.*

³⁸Dr. Milan Vego, "Campaign Phasing and the New Joint Publication 5-0," *Campaigning*, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, *Journal of the Department of Operational Art and Campaigning*, Winter 2006, p. 5.

³⁹Birtle, p. 118. Army Brigadier General Franklin Bell explained at the time, "Government by force alone cannot be satisfactory to Americans. It is desirable that a Government be established in time, which is based upon the will of the governed. This can only be accomplished satisfactorily by obtaining and retaining the good will of the people."

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 325.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 327.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*

⁴⁷"History: Republic of the Philippines," *WWW-VL History Central Catalogue*, 20 June 2006.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹*Ibid.*

⁵²*Ibid.* In 1904, the administration paid the Vatican \$7.2 million for most of the lands held by the religious orders. The lands were later sold back to Filipinos. Some tenants were able to buy their land, but it was mainly the established estate owners who could afford to buy the former church lands.

⁵³*Ibid.* The Nacionalista Party of Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmena won the election and continued to dominate Philippine electoral politics until 1941. The political success of the Nacionalista Party was based on the skills of Quezon and Osmena in tying the traditional patron-client relations to the new institutions of the modern civil state.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷John P. Langellier, *Uncle Sam's Little Wars: The Spanish-American War, The Philippine Insurrections and Boxer Rebellion, 1898-1902*, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsbrug, PA, 1999, p. 8.

⁵⁸Jules Archer, *The Philippines' Fight for Freedom*, Collier-Macmillan, New York, 1970, p. 45.

⁵⁹William J. Pomeroy, *American Neo-Colonialism – Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia*, International Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 35.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶¹Gates., p. 78.

⁶²Linn, pp. 325-326.

⁶³Gates, p. 286.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 270.

⁶⁵Conrado Benitez, *History of the Philippines*, Ginn and Company, Manila, RP, 1954, pp. 1-9.

⁶⁶Gates, p. 284.

⁶⁷Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, *The Philippines and the United States*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, OK, 1951, pp. 137-145.

⁶⁸Gates, pp. 284-285.

⁶⁹Andrew D. Sens, *A Summary of the U.S. Role in Insurgency Situations in the Philippine Islands 1899-1955*, American University, Special Operations Research Office, Washington, D.C., 1964, p. 23.

⁷⁰Arthur S. Pier, *American Apostles to the Philippines*, The Beacon Press, Boston, MA, 1950, pp. 30-31.

⁷¹Gates, pp. 272-273, 282.

⁷²*Ibid.*, pp. 271, 278.

⁷³Sens, p. 24.

⁷⁴Gates, pp. 280-281.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 271, 277-278, 281.

⁷⁶Defined: employing either former insurgents and/or indigenous personnel to combat remaining insurgents using tactics of deceit (dressing and acting like the enemy).

⁷⁷Sens, p. 23.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷⁹Gates, p. 275.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

⁸¹Sens, p. 24.

⁸²Pier, pp. 20-24.

⁸³William Marina, *The Three Stooges in Iraq and the U.S.'s First Stooze*, The Independent Institute, Oakland, CA, 14 October 2004.

Lieutenant Colonel Jayson A. Altieri, U.S. Army, is currently a future warfare planner, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Reston, VA. He received a B.A. from Norwich University, and two M.A. degrees from Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base. His military education includes Joint Forces College, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air Command and Staff College, Jumpmaster Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Cavalry Leaders Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Airmovement Operations Course, Aviation Officer Basic Course, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations planner, Multinational Corps-Iraq, Camp Victory, Iraq; operations officer, 1st Battalion (Airborne), 159th Aviation Regiment, Iraq; XO, 1st Battalion (Training Support) (Aviation), 337th Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion (Airborne), 82d Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, NC; and commander, Aviation Detachment, Joint Task Force Safe Border, Patuca, Ecuador.

Lieutenant Commander John A. Cardillo, U.S. Navy, is a logistics action officer, J4, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, HI. He received a B.S. from Carnegie Mellon University and a M.S. from the Naval Postgraduate School. His military education includes Joint Forces Staff College, U.S. Army Logistics Management College, Naval Supply Corps School, and Naval Nuclear Power School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include supply officer, *USS Wadsworth* FFG-9; general supply and fiscal officer, Fleet Hospital Operations and Training Command, Camp Pendleton, CA; cargo officer and helicopter control officer, *USS Rainier* AOE-7, Bremerton, WA; and engineering watch supervisor, *USS Alaska* SSBN-732(G), Bangor, WA.

Major William M. Stowe III, U.S. Air Force, is currently a joint operations staff officer, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Joint Command, Lisbon, Portugal. He received a B.S. from Ohio State University, a M.S. from Lesley College, and an M.A. from the Naval War College. His military education includes Joint Forces Staff College, Naval Command and Staff College, and Squadron Officer School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include director of operations, 55th Air Refueling Squadron, Altus Air Force Base, OK.



Integrating Cultural Sensitivity into Combat Operations

by Major Mark S. Leslie

“Guerrillas never win wars but their adversaries often lose them.”¹

— Charles W. Thayer

When cultural sensitivity or cultural awareness is mentioned in regards to combat operations, it is often met with rolled eyes or groans from those who execute the orders. Many often think that cultural sensitivity is a weakness and is secondary to actual operations — this is incorrect. Cultural sensitivity incorporated into operations in Iraq is sometimes more valuable than other more conventional weapons in the U.S. Army’s inventory. Soldiers who are culturally aware and know how to apply that cultural awareness on the battlefield are 21st-century warriors. Integrating cultural sensitivity on the battlefield is something we all must do, and we must do it without putting soldiers at risk.

Being sensitive to the local populace and respecting their culture is not a weakness. Soldiers should realize that their actions, deeds, and words during operations in Iraq are powerful tools. For example, it makes little difference if weapons are found or anyone is detained during a search operation; your actions could determine whether the residents of the house you are searching stay friendly, remain neutral, or become an enemy.


The Army has come a long way on the subject of cultural sensitivity. All units deploying to Iraq are required a certain amount of cultural awareness training; soldiers learn a little of the language and a little about the culture. Units deploying also train traditional combat skills at the individual, squad, section, platoon, and company levels.

Prior to my last deployment, I had been in combat several times and assumed the only kind of cultural sensitivity I needed to understand was the rules of engagement (ROE), not to mention giving the enemy as little consideration as legally possible in regards to humanity; after all, he is the enemy, right? It did not take long to realize that I had the wrong idea. I spent the majority of my time in Iraq living, working, eating, and fighting with the Iraq National Guard (ING), 24 hours a day, and quickly came to realize that I had to change my thinking if we were going to be successful.

Through daily, often personal interaction, our soldiers saw U.S. units through the eyes of the Iraqis. This perception was not only from Iraqi soldiers, but everyone from the average Iraqi farmer to local “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, council members, and police chiefs. Our unit leaders spent many hours with local citizens in their homes, on the street, and at

our patrol base discussing various issues of concern. As a result of this new-found knowledge, we gradually adopted a more sensitive approach, and were very successful at not only finding and eliminating insurgents and caches, but also fostering and developing a good rapport with the local community. The intelligence we collected because of these relationships was incredible, and often we (the advisors) and our ING counterparts were the only people local informants would trust.

What worked for our unit is not a cookie-cutter solution for all situations and all units. However, a few common themes of cultural sensitivity, when integrated into combat operations, can greatly influence the desired outcome. Cultural sensitivity is not something that can be learned and then tucked away in a rucksack for use later — it must be instilled in your soldiers, it must be in your training plan, and it must be used in everything you do on the battlefield in Iraq. I am not advocating treating the enemy with kid gloves; when it is time to be brutal (when engaging the enemy), then it is time to be brutal and eliminate the threat. However, all soldiers must be capable of making a mature decision, at the precise moment, to switch back to nonkinetic or nonlethal force. Integrating training scenarios where soldiers must make these decisions in a



“Being sensitive to the local populace and respecting their culture is not a weakness. Soldiers should realize that their actions, deeds, and words during operations in Iraq are powerful tools. For example, it makes little difference if weapons are found or anyone is detained during a search operation; your actions could determine whether the residents of the house you are searching stay friendly, remain neutral, or become an enemy.”

few seconds will save lives on the streets of Iraq, not just American lives, but Iraqi lives as well. Below are suggested techniques for integrating cultural sensitivity into combat operations:

- **Cultural awareness training.** Soldiers must know what is culturally acceptable in Iraq.

- **Language training.** Invaluable skill that serves well throughout your tour. Every unit has its language training challenges, but anything is better than nothing. Knowing some of the language helps break down cultural barriers.

- **Leader training.** Develop scenario-based vignettes involving issues where force should or should not be used in training exercises.

- **Rules of engagement and escalation of force training (EOF).** EOF and ROE vignettes are culturally sensitive. Every soldier will have to make a life-or-death decision within seconds. Understanding ROE and EOF enhances soldiers’ chances of making the right decision. Put these scenarios in all levels of training.

- **Diversify training events.** Combine ROE, EOF, role playing, and civilians on the battlefield into all tactical exercises. Ensure there are consequences for cultural ignorance and rewards for incorporating cultural sensitivity into combat operations, without putting soldiers at risk.

- **Draw the line.** Emphasize that cultural sensitivity in no way jeopardizes the lives of soldiers. Ensure that soldiers understand that sometimes tactical decisions

that are not culturally sensitive must be made; but whenever possible, care toward civilians and treating the populace with dignity and respect is “the culture of our organization.”

- **Information operations (IO) training.** This training should be conducted at all levels, from private to battalion commander. IO is a powerful tool and grasping the concept of how to integrate it into daily operations is paramount. Knowing IO is the name of the game; incorporate it at all levels of training.

- **Every soldier is a sensor.** Every soldier is an intelligence collector and must understand that he could observe something important. Verbal engagements on the battlefield happen more than kinetic engagements and must receive the same amount of attention. Debriefings are critical.

- **Civil affairs training.** Conduct pre-deployment training on understanding public works and how city governments work — including trash collection, water works, and city council meetings. Columbus, Georgia, or Killeen, Texas, is no where near Mosul, Iraq, but they do provide leaders a working model on which to base their “nation builder” role. Leaders should attend local government meetings and observe how issues are brought up, discussed, and resolved in a small city government.

- **Embrace the culture.** Difficult, but not impossible. Understanding Iraqis and how they think, operate, and act is a combat multiplier. It also reinforces the idea

within your unit that neither the Iraqi people, nor Islam, are the enemy — insurgents are the enemy.

The importance of cultural awareness and putting that knowledge to use in the form of cultural sensitivity during combat operations in a counterinsurgency is put into perspective by Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. FM 3-07.22 defines an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” The manual goes on to state that a counterinsurgency is, “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.”² This should clearly point out to all commanders and soldiers that our role in Iraq and Afghanistan is far more complicated and challenging than past conflicts, which were clearly high intensity in nature.

Our mission in Iraq is defined by more than simple military objectives — every soldier is a warrior statesman; an ambassador of our intent in Iraq to make it a safe and secure environment for all Iraqis. The actions of every soldier during every engagement, verbal or otherwise, are critical in conveying this message. The actions of every soldier at every level during daily dealings with Iraqi citizens are critical. Perception is reality. If Iraqis perceive us as the enemy, with our only goal to eliminate the insurgent threat, we are doomed to failure. A counterinsurgency is a much more complicated war. Success is not defined solely by eliminating insurgents; in fact, it is impossible without the application of a much more complex and difficult approach. FMI 3-07.22 puts the warrior statesman duties into perspective by clearly defining the endstate and criteria of success: protect the population; establish local political institutions; reinforce local governments; eliminate insurgent capabilities; and exploit information from local sources.³ In our unit’s battlespace, it is up to the maneuver commander, with guidance from higher, to determine how to prioritize these goals. However, it is a mistake to think that all are not simultaneous events that must be juggled daily.

To correctly fight a counterinsurgency in Iraq, we must change the culture of many of our units. Traditionally, as an Army, we focus on eliminating the insurgent threat, which is the easy part and only one part of the equation. The other prongs of attacking a counterinsurgency are much harder and more difficult to accomplish. We must establish in our subordinates’

minds the whole concept of being there to protect the Iraqi people, much like the logo on domestic law enforcement vehicles, “to protect and serve.”

Often, soldiers spend entire tours in Iraq with the mindset that all Iraqi citizens are potential threats — which is true — everyone is a *potential* threat. However, every Iraqi citizen is a potential ally, potential informant, and potential friend. To only consider them a potential threat is a mistake and will severely limit the unit’s capabilities. To best ascertain if an Iraqi citizen is a potential friend or foe, pay close attention to how they behave. Keep in mind that our actions have a huge impact on their decision between friend and foe. A unit that is culturally ignorant and makes no attempt to use cultural awareness training on the battlefield during daily operations is doing more harm than good for the overall picture — regardless of how many insurgents they eliminate. A counterinsurgency is not about eliminating the threat, but more about eliminating support for the threat. If our actions, either knowingly or innocently, produce more insurgents, then we are not accomplishing the goals set forth for defeating an insurgency in FMI 3-07.22.⁴

Insurgents often create support for their actions by eliciting us to overreact, and we often unwittingly fall into their plans. For example, if an improvised explosive device (IED) attack is initiated on a U.S. patrol or convoy and a residence is located within a few hundred meters, what is the patrol’s first reaction? Based on personal experience and from talking with hundreds of other combat veterans, the normal response is to immediately raid that house. This is tactically sensible; if the IED was within sight of the house, then logically, the occupants of the house must be responsible or know something.

To ignore the residence would be irresponsible; however, our actions and how we conduct the search and questioning are more important. If we aggressively approach the house, kick open the door, conduct a search, and question the owner of the house, he will most likely claim to know nothing about the IED. Our overreaction has just humiliated the owner and proved to the local populace that the message the insurgents spread throughout Iraq is correct. One of the most common messages spread by insurgents is that “Americans have no regard for you or your property.”

Using the same scenario with a different approach can enhance conditions for successful information gathering. For example, assuming there is no direct fire



“Through daily, often personal interaction, our soldiers saw U.S. units through the eyes of the Iraqis. This perception was not only from Iraqi soldiers, but everyone from the average Iraqi farmer to local “powerbrokers,” such as sheiks, council members, and police chiefs. Our unit leaders spent many hours with local citizens in their homes, on the street, and at our patrol base discussing various issues of concern.”

threat from the house, isolate the objective. Use all the normal precautions when approaching the house, but instead of kicking open the door, simply knock. When the owner comes to the door, greet him and ask to search his house. He will comply because he realizes that there are no real alternatives. Ask him to move his family to one room, and assign security to that room.

We cleared houses according to standard operating procedures: we thoroughly searched one room, requested the owner move his family members (children and women) to that room, and placed the room under security. We then began a detailed search of the house and surrounding grounds. During the search, we asked the owner, or a male family member, to accompany us during the search to prevent any accusations of personal property theft. We also took great care not to “trash” the house; the average Iraqi does not have a lot of material wealth, and for us to destroy what little he has is not the way to demonstrate our concern for those we are there to protect.

While the search was underway, we would quietly move the owner to an area that his neighbors could not see and asked if he knew anything about the IED incident. The owner may not know exact details, or even be willing to share them with you if he does, but he may give you bits of information that will be useful in finding those responsible. He is much more likely to assist you if you show him dignity and respect. He is very unlikely,

in most cases, to be responsible for the attack because he realizes he will automatically be presumed “guilty by proximity.” However, if you find incriminating evidence, you have the option of detaining the individual.

This is just one example of integrating cultural sensitivity into combat operations. There are thousands of situations, but no cookie-cutter solution, as the tactical situation is different in every case. There are a few rules of thumb that will apply to many situations in Iraq when conducting operations similar to the one above:

- Assuming there is no direct fire threat, knock on the door, instead of kicking it in.
- Whenever possible, allow the head of household to give instructions to his family.
- Allow the women and children to stay inside in a central location (under security).
- Do not zip tie or question potential informants/suspects in front of family or other males to be questioned.
- If the decision is made to detain an individual, allow him to get personal items, such as medicine, shoes, and glasses (under security) — this serves well during tactical questioning; it shows you have humanity and are concerned for the welfare of the detained individual.
- Depending on the situation, a gift to the family may be appropriate. Maybe a box of clothes for the children or some



“...the gesture of good will and the care taken in searching his home, demonstrates respect for his property. Respecting the family and preserving the detainee’s dignity has far-reaching consequences in the community. The message that reaches the members of the community will confirm that a “bad guy” was detained, but his family and property were treated with respect and genuine concern was shown for the welfare of the family. This message supports one of the goals in defeating a counterinsurgency by ‘exploiting information from local sources.’”

other type of gift. This may seem very naïve, but the effect on the village and neighbors is surprising.

It is important to separate the detainee from his family (remember, he is not the enemy yet). Our actions determine which path they choose. For example, the gesture of good will and the care taken in searching his home demonstrates respect for his property. Respecting the family and preserving the detainee’s dignity has far-reaching benefits in the community. The message that reaches the members of the community will confirm that a “bad guy” was detained, but his family and property were treated with respect and genuine concern was shown for the welfare of the family. This message supports one of the goals in defeating a counterinsurgency by “exploiting information from local sources.” If the people of the community feel you are genuinely concerned for their welfare and interest, they are more likely to approach you with information on potential threats.

The fight in Iraq is not only with insurgents, but it is in the hearts and minds of

Iraqi citizens. It is not easy to win the hearts and minds of people, but it can be accomplished by demonstrating humanity and compassion in our everyday actions. Every soldier should embrace and understand his role as an ambassador and intelligence collector for his command. Every soldier must understand that we are not just in Iraq to fight against insurgency, but to win over the population, which is where the fight is won or lost.

More often than not, when insurgents choose to engage us with direct fire, we are clearly the victor. The enemy chooses to fight as an insurgency because he is incapable of defeating us militarily. He chooses instead to attack using hit-and-run tactics and then disappear into the population. To find such an illusive enemy, we must demonstrate through words, deeds, and actions at all levels that we, not the enemy, have the best interest of the Iraqi people in mind.

Our victory in Iraq is not to just eliminate the insurgency threat, but to establish an environment where the Iraqi people can affirm their loyalties to a new-

ly established government and pursue peace.



Notes

¹Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla*, M. Joseph, c.1963.

²U.S. Army Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., October 2004.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

Major Mark Leslie is currently the deputy chief, Training and Organization, Stryker Transformation Team, Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.A. from Troy State University and is currently pursuing an M.B.A from Touro University. His military education includes Infantry Captains Career Course; Ranger School; Long-Range Surveillance Leaders Course; Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion School; and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, observer/controller/trainer, 2d Battalion, 395th Training Support (AC/RC), Fort Hood, TX; task force senior Iraqi National Guard advisor, 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (2-7 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Fort Hood; commander, A Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood; and S4, 2-7 CAV, 1CD, Fort Hood.



Advice from a Former Military Transition Team Advisor

by Major Jeff Weinhofer

Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly aware of the mission to train Iraqi forces to assume security responsibilities for their country. To accomplish this mission, a military transition team (MiTT) embeds and trains with Iraqi forces, preparing them to be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, so that they can assume security responsibilities for Iraq.

This article focuses on the inner workings of a MiTT, building relationships with coalition partners, and the nuances associated with training Iraqi soldiers. As a MiTT team leader in Iraq, my team assisted the Iraqis in building a T-72 tank battalion from the ground up, and trained the unit to become operational in less than six months. After reaching transition readiness assessment 2, the unit participated in three out-of-sector deployments in support of coalition force objectives and assumed a small battlespace for the remainder of our tour.

Team Dynamics

The interpersonal group dynamics are different for every MiTT; some teams gel together as a single unit over time and some do not. Our team came together about three months into the deployment. The nature of group dynamics and team

camaraderie have a direct impact on its ability to accomplish the mission. If a team cannot work together effectively, it cannot successfully advise an Iraqi battalion. A MiTT functions much better as a team than a group of individual military advisors. Some teams naturally develop cliques within the team, and team leaders must be aware of this possibility and immediately remedy the situation if it occurs. If the cliques are hindering the mission, then remove the soldiers who cannot work together.

Team leaders must also be aware of team morale. As the deployment progresses, the frustration of working with Iraqis and the vast cultural differences take a toll on everyone. Each team will likely have one or two soldiers who do not like working with Iraqis and would much rather be a member of a coalition unit. In this case, team leaders must remember that the mission is training and developing Iraqi forces, but not *all* of your time and emphasis should be put into the Iraqi unit at the expense of your advisory team. Such a practice will only exacerbate tension that will naturally develop among some advisors toward Iraqis.

Team leaders must also find ways to maintain the team's morale so they stay

focused on the mission. A Special Forces officer recommended that we create our own private sanctuary (our living area) which no Iraqi soldiers could enter. In retrospect, this was a great idea that provided our team with a little bit of space to unwind and maintain our sanity.

Working with Coalition Forces

Part of the responsibility of MiTT soldiers is to educate local coalition forces on the capabilities and limitations of Iraqi units. Many coalition units have a wealth of experience fighting insurgencies in either Iraq or Afghanistan, but that experience does not apply to Iraqi forces. MiTTs embedded within Iraqi army units know more about those units than do local coalition forces. In the near term, military advisors must become subject-matter experts on Iraqi forces. Eventually, there will be enough officers and noncommissioned officers in our Army, who have served on military transition teams, to share their knowledge across the force when they return to home units.

Whatever the reason, MiTTs should avoid alienating senior U.S. commanders partnered in coalition units. While there may be decisions that we strongly disagree with made by coalition brethren concerning our Iraqi units, we are still on

the same team. Mutual understanding is required here. Team leaders must keep in mind that the job of field-grade commanders is complex in Iraq; not only must they fight against deadly insurgencies, but they are simultaneously responsible for developing Iraqi forces, including police and border patrol forces, in their areas of operation.

Coalition battalions have hundreds of soldiers, all with the necessary equipment and support assets, as well as a competent staff. A MiTT has ten personnel with three M114 gun trucks; we must also live on a third-world infrastructure. Building good relationships with coalition units will only benefit advisor teams. For example, coalition units provided our team with a generator (to maintain electricity during daily power outages), medical supplies, daily intelligence updates, and maintenance support.

Dealing with Iraqis

Dealing with Iraqis can be very frustrating; however, this is the MiTT's primary mission. Teaching Iraqis requires patience and the ability to establish relationships with counterparts. Such relationship building can be cultivated in a number of ways, such as talking business over dinner and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mission, or a simple exchange of gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force's performance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate independent operations.

Some military advisors have fallen into the trap of judging their successes by actions on the battlefield, such as the number of patrols conducted, the number of improvised explosive devices found, or the number of combat action badges awarded. This is the wrong yardstick to measure success. It is common knowledge that nearly all U.S. soldiers and officers are competent and quite capable of mission success. MiTT mission success must be viewed through a prism that assesses the growth and effectiveness of the Iraqi unit with which they work. Some advisors and coalition units are too quick to jump in and fix problems without attempting to teach Iraqi units the process, as well as the purpose, for performing certain tasks. The conventional Army can learn a few things from the Special Forces community regarding training indige-



"Every leader in the U.S. Army is keenly aware of the mission to train Iraqi forces to assume security responsibilities for their country. To accomplish this mission, a military transition team (MiTT) embeds and trains with Iraqi forces, preparing them to be self-sustainable tactically, operationally, and logistically, so that they can assume security responsibilities for Iraq."

nous forces to fight in counterinsurgency environments.

It is not uncommon for team leaders to serve as the Iraqi battalion commander's advisor. I quickly noticed the legacy of the Saddam Hussein regime and the old Iraqi army — centralized decisionmaking. Consequently, I focused the majority of my time on advising my counterpart and attempting to influence his decisions. Due to the complexity of working with Iraqis, this was not always successful — working with Iraqis is an art, not

a science. Good decisions from the top made everyone's life easier, especially the Iraqi *jundi* (soldier) at the bottom of the command structure. For example, if the commander made a decision that passed a common-sense test, despite better available options, I supported his decision because it was an "Iraqi decision." I challenged decisions during our private meetings that made no common or tactical sense.

Since its inception, Iraq has a history of being a warlike society, complete with multiple military coups and wars. Iraqis respond better to direct orders or an authoritative, confident tone, as opposed to passive suggestions.

When addressing the battalion commander, always show him respect in public. In private, it is acceptable to be more forceful with him in an effort to get him to follow a preferred course of action. Whenever the need arises to address lower-ranking soldiers, work through the commander or his designated representative.

Helpful Hints for Working with Iraqi Forces

- Iraqis will not always take your advice, but there is no need to get upset —



"Teaching Iraqis requires patience and the ability to establish relationships with counterparts. Such relationship building can be cultivated in a number of ways, such as talking business over dinner and chai, taking your Iraqi counterpart to visit his soldiers on a mission, or a simple exchange of gifts. With every mission or task, each advisor should constantly assess the Iraqi force's performance and devise a plan to gradually wean them from U.S. support so they can facilitate independent operations."

that battle is lost. Get over it and prepare for the next one. When this occurred, some of the advisors on my team became a little unnerved; I reminded them I was the battalion commander's advisor, not the leader of the 2d Tank Battalion.

- Do not be afraid to take an occasional afternoon *ejazza* (vacation). When not on a mission, Iraqis nap from about 1430 to 1730, give or take 15 minutes, and since they are rested, they work late into the night. A great deal of business takes place after 2000 hours. Most Army leaders, complete with our type-A personalities, would be aghast at such an idea, but it seemed to be effective. Applying American expectations to an Iraqi cultural trait will often result in disappointment. When not participating in this Iraqi tradition, I spent time doing physical training, catching up on paperwork, and conducting team meetings.

- The *jundis* frequently approach advisors and ask for favors or describe a problem they want addressed. The advisor should immediately take the issue to the soldier's chain of command and mentor them on how to handle the situation. You will probably have to protect the name of the soldier for fear of command repercussion since such action is still frowned on in the Iraqi military culture. Fixing the problem yourself, although expedient, is a step backward in developing the unit. Our goal is to build Iraqi soldiers' confidence in their own leaders versus the Americans. In theory, if you do your mission effectively, you will gradually work yourself out of a job as the unit's leadership matures and becomes more competent.

- Assign every member of your team an Iraqi counterpart. A team may tend to focus on the command group and primary staff of the embedded unit, but all team members need someone to advise. There is no downside to an advisor providing one-on-one counsel to an Iraqi soldier — this can only help with the overall mission.

- Never pass up an opportunity to train the Iraqis. In our battalion, personnel shortages, leave cycles, and mission requirements practically wiped out the chance of additional training, minus a few staff elements. Our S3 advisor started teaching officer professional development sessions on various military subjects. Admittedly, there were only about five leaders present, but it was progress. In theory, Iraqi forces present for the training can share what they learn with their peers and subordinates. The officer professional development sessions were generally conducted in the late evening



"Since its inception, Iraq has a history of being a warlike society, complete with multiple military coups and wars. Iraqis respond better to direct orders or an authoritative, confident tone, as opposed to passive suggestions. When addressing the battalion commander, always show him respect in public. In private, it is acceptable to be more forceful with him in an effort to get him to follow a preferred course of action. Whenever the need arises to address lower-ranking soldiers, work through the commander or his designated representative."

to maximize participation and accommodate afternoon *ejazza*.

- Training and mentoring the unit is the MiTT's primary role, but advisors must be vigilant to prevent the Iraqi unit from becoming too dependent on the team. There were several occasions where support was deliberately withheld because the team assessed the unit as capable of accomplishing a certain task with their own internal assets and institutional knowledge. Although this caused some friction between me and the Iraqi battalion commander, our relationship returned to its normal level in a day or two. In the long run, I am quite certain this was the right decision to facilitate the unit's independence.

- In preparation for out-of-sector deployments, advisors must be very involved in the logistics planning process. Iraqis tend to only take enough supplies to last a few days, versus planning for a long-term deployment. We learned the hard way not to give the unit a list of the recommended classes of supplies to take; instead, a precombat inspection must be conducted to see what they actually load in their vehicles and connexes.

Although there may be flaws in implementing the advisor mission, the transition team's mission in Iraq is our best hope for securing the country and beginning a

gradual drawdown of U.S. forces. Future advisors should embrace the culture and establish good relationships, constantly assess the performance of your embedded unit, and place some emphasis on maintaining the morale of your own team. Following these steps is easier said than done, but will certainly assist in enabling mission success in this very important mission and complex environment. My tour of duty as a MiTT was the most challenging, frustrating, and yet rewarding of my Army career.

The author welcomes any comments in regards to this article at jeff.weinhofer@gmail.com.



Major Jeff Weinhofer is currently an assistant professor of military science, Department of Military Science, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA. He received a B.S. from Slippery Rock University and an M.A. from Lehigh University. His military education includes Armor Officers Basic Course, Armor Captains Career Course, Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Ranger School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include team leader, Military Transition Team, 2d Iraqi Tank (T-72) Battalion, Taji, Iraq; commander, A Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; and liaison officer, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.



Arab Culture and History: Understanding is the First Key to Success

by Captain Ralph E. Elder

“I am not an Arabist, and history doesn’t matter here. We are rewriting history.”

— Unnamed staff member for the Coalition Provisional Authority¹

In military and political realms, the possibility exists that some of us do not appreciate the rich history and culture of not only the Arab people as a whole, but more specifically Iraqis. This deficiency cannot be allowed to continue, given the current battle in Iraq that we are waging to “win hearts and minds.” Think about that concept for a moment — how do you win hearts and minds? Overall, it takes a knowledge base of the culture and people with whom you will be interacting before you can begin to achieve success. Soldiers deploying to Iraq deserve, and need, training and education on the complex history and rich culture they will be facing once they arrive.

The current emphasis on marksmanship training for units deploying to Iraq is necessary; however, you reach a point of diminishing returns. Long, drawn-out gunfights are not the norm in Iraq these days; much time is spent interacting with civic and military leaders in an effort to rebuild infrastructure and establish the Iraqi army (IA). Additionally, the majority of the intelligence reporting that takes place does so at the local level. On a daily basis, company-level leaders need to be armed with cultural understanding, not just awareness, to be successful in Iraq.

The Role of History

Many Americans are not keenly aware of the history of the United States or its founding fathers; the opposite is true in the Arab world. With a complex history starting in the age of the Caliphs and progressing through the Ottoman Empire to

the current era in the Middle East, Arabs are extremely knowledgeable of what has brought them to this point.² Moreover, this history is primarily based on Islamic teachings and reflects their beliefs in the will of God. Since the majority of the Arab world is Muslim, this tie between history, culture, and religion is extremely important — nothing exists without religion.

For Iraqis, they have seen the results of working with the United States in the past. All too often, Arab nations and people have been supported by the U.S. Government, only to be cast aside when no longer needed. Simultaneously, we have supported authoritarian regimes that have at times committed crimes against their own people. Bottom line, the Arab world views us with a jaundiced eye and is suspicious of our intentions. The onus is on the Americans to make a good first im-

pression and show that we truly are there to help them. We do this by taking part in their culture, and by understanding, rather than simply dismissing, their perspective on history.

Cultural Immersion

While many units deploying to the Middle East do not have the time or inclination to study the culture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to begin to understand the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbial “olive branch,” we cannot truly hope to win hearts and minds.

The best opportunity for U.S. Army soldiers to become immersed in Arab culture is by serving on a military transition team (MiTT). During Operation Iraqi Freedom III, our troop was tasked to provide a MiTT to an IA company. We trained and mentored IA soldiers until they could take over responsibility for the area we controlled — we put an “Iraqi face” on the counterinsurgency fight. To accomplish this, our troop moved to the Iraqi compound.

For the foreseeable future, we would share the same sleeping arrangements,



“The current emphasis on marksmanship training for units deploying to Iraq is necessary; however, you reach a point of diminishing returns. Long, drawn-out gunfights are not the norm in Iraq these days; much time is spent interacting with civic and military leaders in an effort to rebuild infrastructure and establish the Iraqi army (IA).”

toilets, and occasionally food, with our counterparts. This commitment showed the IA soldiers that we truly were there to support them — they knew that if things got bad, we were not going to run and hide on our forward operating base (FOB) and eat ice cream. It also introduced our soldiers to Arab culture and Iraqis up close and personal. No longer were they yelling incessantly at the impatient Iraqi

at the checkpoint; they had to learn to communicate across languages and cultures to achieve a common goal. Moving our troop to the Iraqi compound gave us the opportunity to frequently get out in the community. This was essential; vital human intelligence was developed because local citizens were confident that we would protect them. Over time, more locals provided us with tips and leads that were previously unheard of in our area. Not only did improvised explosive device attacks decrease, but the number of caches discovered increased. Being present and playing a role in the community, while showing respect for the local culture, pays dividends.

Ultimately, accepting great tactical risk and immersing ourselves in the culture and community, our troop enabled our IA brethren to become the first company in its battalion capable of independent operations; they planned and conducted operations with minimal oversight. The simple fact is that during the period we lived in the IA compound, bonds were built that lasted throughout the deployment and all but guaranteed our success. Overall, immersing ourselves in Iraqi culture paid great dividends.

Training and Teaching

I was the fortunate one in my troop; the U.S. Army sent me to the Peace Operations Center in Zarqa, Jordan. This training afforded me the opportunity to immerse myself in Arab culture, as well as providing me the added benefit of consulting other Arabs on how to best handle



“While many units deploying to the Middle East do not have the time or inclination to study the culture or history of the people with whom they will be working, a quick fix is “cultural immersion.” This term is loosely used to relay the fact that personal risk has to be taken daily to begin to understand the complexities of not only the culture you are thrown into, but the people and tribes with which you will interact for a year. Without putting that foot forward and extending the proverbial “olive branch,” we cannot truly hope to win hearts and minds.”

sensitive situations. We trained on everything from cordon and searches with real Jordanians, not just soldiers in MILES gear, to after-hours language classes. This opportunity proved invaluable; I developed a baseline understanding of the culture, which enabled me to immediately immerse in theater. While not every unit has the time, money, or energy for this type of training, it is imperative that time and resources are devoted to developing a baseline cultural understanding at the noncommissioned officer (NCO) level and below. Overall, staff sergeants and sergeants will represent the unit on a daily basis.

If units are afforded the opportunity to send soldiers to some type of cultural training, they should seize the opportunity to develop their own “subject-matter experts.” For example, by sending an NCO to the training, the unit will have someone capable of educating its soldiers; not only will the NCO teach professional development classes to peers, but also to subordinates. Overall, by edu-

cating junior NCOs, we have the capability to infuse cultural understanding at the lowest levels within our ranks.

Once again, due to the reduced likelihood of high-intensity firefights in the current operating environment, a happy medium can be found between training for combat and teaching soldiers about the people with whom they will spend the next year of their lives. A good example, which has been somewhat effective, is using Kurdish-Americans at training centers. Some may think there is not enough training time to effectively interact with these “role players.” Always remember, every little piece of training that exposes soldiers to other cultures pays dividends in the long run.

Overall, there are officers and soldiers who resist the idea of learning about and understanding other cultures. A resistance to learning goes against the grain of a well-educated and professional army. It is imperative to train U.S. Army units on the culture and history of the Iraqi people. Furthermore, it is by immersion that

soldiers will gain an understanding of Arab culture, which will increase chances of success throughout Iraq’s communities and villages.



Notes

¹Walter C. Rodgers, *Sleeping With Custer and the 7th Cavalry*, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2005, p. 198.

²Bernard Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror*, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, 2004, p. xix.

Captain Ralph Elder is currently assigned to the Materiel Requirements Directorate, Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, TX. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Leaders Course, and Air Defense Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include, troop commander, B Troop, 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq and Fort Stewart, GA; and platoon leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery, 3d Infantry Division, Iraq, Kuwait, and Fort Stewart.

Leadership continued from Page 19

However, we need to throw emotional challenges at leaders and soldiers — the limit truly is our own imagination. For example, the Ranger School approach deprives soldiers of sleep and food to increase their level of stress while conducting hot and cold training scenarios. Leaders can think of many other ways to get inside soldiers’ heads and toy with their


emotions. Hopefully, this article will stimulate some good discussion on this specific subject.

Despite all of our best efforts to train leaders and soldiers for the rigors of fighting a counterinsurgency, it will not make us experts on emotional control — that is physiological. However, we need to ac-

complish at least two things: gain experience at simultaneously dealing with emotional stress and tactical stress (by rapidly changing between diverse missions); and leaders should know when they have reached the point of being unable to control their own emotions. Equally important, leaders should know when subordinates have reached their inability to control emotions. Armed with this knowledge, we will be better postured to accomplish the two difficult objectives of the counterinsurgency fight — kill the enemy and win hearts and minds.



Major Jonathan Dunn is currently assigned as an instructor of International Relations, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy and an M.A. from John Hopkins University. His military education includes the Armor Captains Career Course, Ranger School, Airborne School, and Air Assault School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Killer Troop, 3d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/2 ACR), Operation Iraqi Freedom; regimental S4/assistant S4, 2d ACR, Fort Polk, LA; support platoon leader, 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry (2-8 CAV), 1st Cavalry Division (CD), Fort Hood, TX; and tank company executive officer and platoon leader, C Company, 2-8 CAV, 1st CD, Fort Hood.



“Killing and winning hearts and minds simultaneously requires two seemingly contradictory mentalities. On one hand, soldiers must be the steely-eyed killers they train to be — able to identify an enemy insurgent and drop him (or her, as the case could be) with a single, well-aimed rifle shot. Yet, at the same time, we expect these same soldiers to be smiling at the ‘friendly’ locals, particularly children, sometimes even handing out candy or school supplies.”



Armor Advances Worldwide

by Professor Richard M. Ogorkiewicz

Current operational problems obviously deserve priority attention; however, there remains a need to keep an eye on what is happening to armor worldwide. This is all the more important in view of the number and variety of armored vehicles being developed and produced, including new battle tanks, which are being developed in the Far East by at least three different countries. South Korea has already produced about 1,000 K-1 tanks, designed by Chrysler Defense (now General Dynamics Land Systems), soon after General Dynamics Land Systems designed the M1 Abrams. In consequence, the K-1 resembles the M1 in some respects, but was designed to a Korean specification, which resulted in it being powered by a diesel engine instead of a gas turbine and equipped with a hybrid hydropneumatic suspension. South Korea is now developing a new tank, the XK-2, which will have a three-man crew and an autoloader for its 120mm gun, and it is to be powered by a 1,500-horsepower German-developed MT-883 diesel engine.

Japan is also developing a new tank, the prototype of which is expected to be completed in 2007. The current Japanese Type 90 is already an advanced tank with an autoloader, which was the first to be adopted in any tank designed outside the former Soviet Union. Type 90 was also the first tank to be produced with an autotracker in its fire control system.


The third country in the Far East to develop a new tank is China. This tank is a further development of the Type 98, which appears to be a mere clone of the Russian T-72 to the casual observer, but is actually a larger and much more advanced tank with general characteristics that resemble recent western tanks.

Russia is reported to be developing a new tank and has produced a number of T-90 tanks, which are a further development of the T-72 with modern fire control systems and powerful 840-horsepower diesel engines. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia still has more than

22,000 earlier tanks and approximately 400 T-90s, but their operational status is unclear.

Although India started to develop an indigenous tank, the Arjun, more than 30 years ago, its efforts have failed. In consequence, to modernize its T-72 tank fleet, India procured from Russia 310 export versions of the T-90 and the T-90S, with an even more powerful 1,000-horsepower engine, and will produce more under license. To counter India's tanks, Pakistan is producing the Al Khalid, which was developed in collaboration with China and is very similar to China's tanks. Like that of the Chinese Type 98, its general configuration follows that of Russia's T-72 and T-90, and it is also armed with a 125mm smooth-bore gun with a carousel-type autoloader and a remarkably compact 1,200-horsepower opposed piston, two-stroke diesel engine imported from the Ukraine.

Along with South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and Pakistan, Iran is producing a



"Russia is reported to be developing a new tank and has produced a number of T-90 tanks, which are a further development of the T-72 with modern fire control systems and powerful 840-horsepower diesel engines. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia still has more than 22,000 earlier tanks and approximately 400 T-90s, but their operational status is unclear."

new tank, called the Zulfiqar, which has much the same configuration as the Russian T-72 and is armed with a 125mm gun.

Israel is also producing a new tank, the Merkava 4, which is even better armored than the earlier versions of this unique, front-engine tank. Its 1,500-horsepower diesel engine makes it more mobile.

As for the United States and Europe, no new tanks are being developed and the production of earlier designs is drawing to a close. Only a few more Leclerc tanks are to be built for the French army to fill its order for 406. Similarly, only small additional numbers of the German-designed Leopard 2 tank are to be produced in Greece and Spain, which have adopted it as their battle tank, along with nine other European countries, and most recently, Turkey and Chile.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles

In contrast to tanks, new lighter tracked armored vehicles are being developed and produced in Europe. This applies in particular to infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), the most notable being the Swedish CV9040, which has a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain. This IFV was originally developed specifically for the Swedish army, but having proven itself superior to other IFVs in competitive trials, it has now been procured by five other European armies. However, the Swedish army version has a 40mm Bofors gun and the export versions have a 30 or 35-

mm Bushmaster cannon; although the Bofors gun model has recently been adopted for South Korea's new IFV.

Another IFV in production in Europe is a collaborative Austro-Spanish design armed with a 30mm Mauser cannon, known in Austria as the Ulan and in Spain as the Pizarro.

The most recent and significant IFV to appear, in prototype form, is the German Puma. This is the most heavily armored IFV to be built so far and consequently weighs as much as 89,500 pounds; although its weight can be reduced for air transport to 69,000 pounds by dismounting some of its modular armor. The only heavier infantry vehicle in use at present is the Israeli Achzarit, which weighs 97,000 pounds, but it is an armored infantry carrier, armed only with machine guns for self-defense.

Wheeled Armored Carriers

Although some effort has been devoted to IFVs, activity in Europe has been focused in the past few years on developing and producing wheeled armored carriers. The most successful of these carriers is the Piranha, developed in Switzerland by Mowag, a small independent company, until seven years ago when it was bought out by General Dynamics Land Systems. A total of about 8,000 Piranhas and their derivatives have now been produced, mostly under license in Canada, and they have been used as the basis for the U.S. Stryker.

Other 8x8 wheeled armored carriers recently developed in Europe include the armored modular vehicle (AMV), pro-



"As for the United States and Europe, no new tanks are being developed and the production of earlier designs is drawing to a close. Only a few more Leclerc tanks are to be built for the French army to fill its order for 406. Similarly, only small additional numbers of the German-designed Leopard 2 tank are to be produced in Greece and Spain, which have adopted it as their battle tank, along with nine other European countries, and most recently, Turkey and Chile."

duced in Finland and already adopted by the Polish and Finnish armies; the véhicule blindé de combat d'infanterie (VBCI), 750 are being produced for the French army; and the Pandur, which has been adopted by the Austrian, Portuguese, and Czech armies. Incidentally, the Pandur has the distinction of being produced by the world's oldest armored vehicle manufacturing company, Steyr-Daimler-Puch in Vienna, Austria (now owned by General Dynamics Land Systems), which built an armored car in 1905.

The Artec Boxer is the most recent 8x8 wheeled armored carrier for which a production order has been issued by the German and Dutch armies. It is also the heaviest, which has an adverse effect on its mobility in difficult terrain. The Boxer also has the dubious distinction of taking 25 years to develop. This, as well as its size and weight, can be ascribed to the ill-effects political interference has on international projects, which in this case involved German, French, British, and Dutch authorities; consequently, the Boxer went from a 53,000-pound 6x6 vehicle to the 72,600-pound 8x8 vehicle. Wheeled armored vehicles are also being developed in the Republic of China (Taiwan), Singapore, and South Korea.

Progress in developing wheeled armored vehicles has led some armies to believe they should confine themselves to armored vehicles, excluding tracked armored vehicles. For example, the Belgian army intends to use nothing in the future but wheeled armored vehicles and has already sold most of its Leopard 1 tanks to Brazil. Canada's army has been considering a similar policy but, very wisely, appears to have changed its view and has decided instead to continue operating, at least for now, with its Leopard 1 tanks, as well as wheeled armored vehicles.

Future programs

The British Army has not accepted the idea that future armies should only use wheeled armored vehicles. It has decided that its future rapid effect system (FRES), which will provide it with a medium force capability, should consist of tracked, as well as wheeled, armored vehicles. FRES is in some respects a more modest British equivalent of the United States' future combat system (FCS). At first, British army leaders insisted that armored vehicles, developed as part of its FRES program, be transportable in C130 aircraft. However, this requirement was aban-

doned last year for the sake of greater survivability, and FRES vehicles may now weigh up to about 53,000 pounds, which will still make them transportable in the A400M aircraft currently being developed in Europe as a successor to the C130. The first of the FRES vehicles are to be delivered to the British army in

cles, weighing between 44,000 and 55,000 pounds, and in all probability, wheeled.

A similar approach is being adopted by the Swedish army. In its case, the heavy force is based on Leopard 2 tanks and CV9040 IFVs. These vehicles will be complemented by a modular armored tac-



"In the meantime, the British army is retaining its fleet of 385 Challenger 2 tanks, which proved very effective in the capture of Basra in 2003, and form the core of the British army's heavy force. However, there are plans to modernize them by replacing, at last, their 120mm rifled guns with smooth-bore guns, which will make them interchangeable with other western tank guns."

2012, and will include 8x8 wheeled armored carriers and an unspecified number of tracked armored vehicles.

In the meantime, the British army is retaining its fleet of 385 Challenger 2 tanks, which proved very effective in the capture of Basra in 2003, and form the core of the British army's heavy force. However, there are plans to modernize them by replacing, at last, their 120mm rifled guns with smooth-bore guns, which will make them interchangeable with other western tank guns. The British army also plans to modernize its Warrior IFVs by replacing the 30mm cannon with a more powerful 40mm cannon.

The French army also intends to retain a heavy armored force, equipped with its current Leclerc tanks, but plans to complement its force in the 2015 to 2025 timeframe with medium-force engine blindé médian (EBM) multirole armored vehi-

cles, weighing between 44,000 and 55,000 pounds, and in all probability, wheeled. tical system, or Splitterskyddad Enhetsplattform (SEP), incorporating an interesting family of tracked and wheeled armored vehicles of about 38,500 pounds, which are to share many components, including engines, electric transmissions, and interchangeable mission modules. Two tracked and one 6x6 wheeled SEP technology demonstrators have already been built.

There is a lot going in armor around the world and the advances that are being made are well worth keeping an eye on.



Richard M. Ogorkiewicz is currently a professor, United Kingdom Defence Academy, Shrivenham, England. He received a B.S. and an M.S. from the University of London. He also serves as a member of the Defence Scientific Advisory Council, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, and as a consultant to several armored vehicle producing companies.

Future of Armor

by Captain Brian William Brady

(Reprinted from the November-December 1966 issue of *ARMOR*)

If armor is to have a predominant role in the army of the future, it must train its officers to fight and survive in any type operation, ... nuclear or non-nuclear wars . . . against “wars of liberation.”

Editor's Note: Although the author's view of full-spectrum operations clearly places this article in a mid-1960s context, he nevertheless argues for a broadly based approach to training. Given the current threat we are facing and the potential threats we may face, Captain Brian Brady reminds us that the issues we are struggling with today are neither new nor unique.

In view of the present world situation, this article is an attempt to stimulate the armor leaders of today so that there will be armor leaders of tomorrow.

“Armor is still fighting World War II on the European battlefields.” This statement was made by a guest lecturer to a group of Armor officers at the Armor School at Fort Knox.

Since the Second World War and the development of the atomic bomb, armor has placed its entire emphasis on the development of equipment and tactics for the nuclear battlefield. The training of its officers is also almost entirely oriented toward this type of warfare.

Armor must be prepared to fight not only on the nuclear battlefield of Europe, but it must be able to participate anywhere in the world in counterinsurgency operations. It must not only develop vehicles for these types of operations, but armor must train its officers to fight and survive in a counterinsurgency operation. The future of armor lies in its officers and noncommissioned officers, developing new concepts for its employment in limited war and counterinsurgency operations. If armor is not able to be employed in this type of role, it will find itself becoming less and less “THE COMBAT ARM OF DECISION.”

The development of ideas requires that an individual become exposed to the problem, its beginnings, development, and the lessons that were learned from operations against it. To be more explicit, I mean that in order to fully understand these “wars of liberation,” an individual must have an understanding of the theory and meaning of communism, of how an insurgency begins and sustains itself through its various stages of development. Of prime importance are the historical examples of combating an insurgency to draw upon the lessons that can be learned from them. A study of the use

Captain Brian William Brady was commissioned in 1961 from The University of Notre Dame. He graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course in 1962. He was then assigned to the 3rd Battalion 37th Armor, Germany, where he served as a tank platoon leader, mortar platoon leader, support platoon leader, battalion S4, and company commander.

of armor by the French in Indochina provides valuable information on how not to employ armor in guerrilla warfare.

The old adage, “if someone wants to learn it, they can do it on their own time,” does not seem appropriate to a subject such as this. The primary reason is that many posts do not have sufficient research facilities to permit a detailed study of guerrilla warfare and its associated subjects. The second reason is that of adequate time to pursue the subject while performing another primary job.

A service school, not a specialized school, must include instruction in counterinsurgency operations. This is needed not only to stimulate the thinking of officers toward new concepts, but for the survival of the individual acting in the role of an advisor or commander of a rifle company in counterinsurgency operations.

The instruction should start when the officer attends the Armor Officer Basic Course. This instruction should then be continued at all levels of his military education. By doing this, the officer is kept abreast of current doctrine and technological changes as he progresses in his career.

To cite what I believe is the unbalanced thinking of armor and its preoccupation with fighting a nuclear war in Europe, I will use my schooling and training as an example.

In 1962, when I attended the Armor Officer Basic Course, counterinsurgency operations were in their infancy. Nothing was included in the course of instruction concerning this type of operation. The course was entirely oriented toward fight a conventional war. After spending three years in Europe, I returned to CONUS to attend the Armor Officers Career Course. The course lasts nine months. Of these nine months, about forty hours are devoted to all the aspects of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. The remaining eight months and three weeks are spent teaching the traditional concepts of employment of armor and its associated weapons and communications systems. A nuclear weapons program, leading to a prefix five, is also included in the curriculum.

Is this enough to stimulate thinking and to learn how to fight in counterinsurgency operation. I do not think it is. The career officer must have a thorough knowledge of the current concepts of armor employment and

the utilization of the combined arms team in all types of conventional operations. The majority of instruction is rightly concerned with these concepts for they provide the foundation that the officer needs as he progresses in his military career.

But, a properly trained armored officer needs a detailed understanding of the employment and capabilities of infantry weapons. This training should not be limited to classroom instruction, but should include firing and field training.

Then, using the basic concepts of employment of the combined arms team along with an understanding of the capabilities of armor and infantry weapons, a detailed program of instruction on the history of communism and an analysis of past insurgent and counterinsurgent operations should be conducted. In the final phase, seminars or round table discussions between students and qualified instructors should take place. These forums would allow an exchange of new ideas on both tactics and vehicles between officers, which would serve as a sounding board for badly needed ideas for the employment of Armor in guerrilla warfare.

Besides tying itself to a conventional war in the training of its officers, the tanks of the future are being developed on the premise that the next war will be fought in Europe. The Sheridan and the U.S./FRG Main Battle Tank are being developed for such a war. Security restrictions prevent a detailed analysis of these vehicles. However, their weight alone precludes their employment in an area such as Vietnam.

Before proceeding with the type of vehicle armor needs to develop in conjunction with the Sheridan and U.S./FRG Main Battle Tank, I will make some generalizations that will apply to most areas where the United States may be called upon to fight in a counterinsurgency operation.

A country that is most vulnerable to an insurgency is an "underdeveloped nation." It is basically an agrarian society. Industrialization is very limited. Because of its poor economic structure, the land remains untouched once outside the large cities. The major road network is very poor and sometimes nonexistent. The majority of these countries lie in a climate that is either hot and rainy or cold and snowy. And within most of these areas, there is a combination of rolling plains, mountains, and swampy areas.

The point of this general analysis is to point out the flexibility that armor must attain to carry out its mission under varying conditions. These areas are entirely different from Europe. Roads which are essential for armor to attain its maximum effects from its firepower and shock effect would not support fifty-ton vehicles for sustained periods of time. Bridges are not built to sustain the weight of an M60 tank. Once off the roads, armor can expect to encounter terrain varying from jungles and swamps to snow-covered mountains.

To accomplish its mission in counterinsurgency operations, armor must develop an entirely new tank or tank-like vehicle. This vehicle should be light weight, weighing less than thirty-five tons and have an immediate deep-water fording capability. Its ground pressure must be small in relation to its weight to enable it to traverse swampy areas.

Armor protection would have to be sacrificed to gain this weight reduction. However, since it can be assumed that the insurgent will not present a tank threat, this is possible. Mobility must predominate over armor protection. The French in Indochina found that armor protection was not of prime importance. In an ambush when the first and last vehicles had a track shot-off, mobility was of paramount importance. The French tanks did not have sufficient mobility to break out, and they were literally killed at leisure by the communists.

This increased mobility is also necessary for the tank to be able to support the infantry mounted in M113s. Because of the trafficability of the M113 and future infantry carriers, the present-day tank could not support them in many operations in which armor could strike the decisive blow.

Because of the lack of an armor threat, the caliber of the main gun could be 90mm or smaller. This would also assist in weight reduction of the vehicle. The tank must include two highly reliable machine guns with a high rate of fire.

Both the number of rounds and types of rounds can be reduced. The tank should carry a HEAT round, for material-type targets, and a canister round for use against mass attacks by infantry and in ambushes where the exact locations of enemy troops are unknown. A more effective canister round must be developed. It should be effective at ranges up to fifteen-hundred yards and have a large dispersion pattern. The space that is gained by reducing the basic load of main gun ammunition should be used to store additional ammunition for the machine guns. This will enable the tank to conduct frequent reconnaissance by fire missions to avoid an ambush.

Traditional concepts of employment of armored divisions and brigades in huge armored operations must give way to concepts of employment of battalion- and company-sized task forces. The nature of the terrain and the enemy armor can expect to fight dictate this change. A closer working relationship with the infantry involving close mutual support of offensive operations and for security must be developed.

Security has always been a problem for tank units, and it is compounded in a guerrilla war. New ideas, both physical and electronic, need to be found. The possible employment of mounted surveillance devices, which would accompany the column as it moved, needs to be explored. To provide not only security, but to facilitate combined operations, the feasibility of a combined arms battalion should be investigated.

There is no doubt that armor will be a dominant force on the nuclear battlefields of Europe. But it must not place its entire emphasis on a war that may never be fought. If armor is to have a predominant role in the army of the future, it must train its officers to fight and survive in any type of operation. It must develop equipment for employment against "wars of liberation." It must be able to fight a nuclear and non-nuclear war in areas that are untrafficable to today's tank. The development of new tactical concepts is vital. Armor must be able to fight not only in a war in Europe, but it must be able to fight effectively in an area such as Vietnam, if it is to remain the "COMBAT ARM OF DECISION."

REVIEWS

Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges by Gabriel Weimann, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006, 256 pp., \$24.95 (hardcover)

In what must have been a significant undertaking, *Terror on the Internet* is the premier academic source documenting the relationship between terrorism and the internet. Gabriel Weimann led a project that targeted internet sites from 1998 to 2003. All told, 4,300 sites serving terrorists and their supporters were cataloged and analyzed.

In chapter one, Weimann quickly examines the history of the internet and fundamentals of terrorism, and then links the two. He examines how terrorist organizations exploit the internet and countermeasures available to combat terrorism. He establishes how terrorists rely on the internet to maintain their networked organization where members are organized into semi-autonomous cells with little control by a higher headquarters. Weimann catalogs numerous terrorist uses of the internet, including data mining; data collection of potential targets; enabling network organization; recruitment of fighters; supporters and sympathizers; instructions and online manuals; planning and coordination; fundraising; and for some organizations, critical attacks against other terrorists.

Chapter two explores the psychology of terrorism. Weimann uses psychology as a tool to understand terrorists, decoding their motives, strategies, tactics, and impact. He asserts the well-established dictum that the primary interest of terrorists is the impact of their exploits to a wider public. Following this argument, the internet allows opportunities for exerting mass psychological impact.

Chapter three, "Communication Uses of the Internet," is the most significant portion of his book. Weimann details numerous measures used by terrorists, specifically, supporter dialogue, which conveys religious and ideological views and presents their causes. He presents detailed analyses of several groups' websites, which include Hezbollah, Hamas, Ansar al-Islam, Al-Qaeda, Irish Republican Army, Revolution Armed Forces of Columbia, Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, and the insurgent groups of Iraq. Providing a very useful framework for analyzing website content, his analyses include the scope and content of terrorist websites and their targeted audiences. As the objective of terrorists is to generate publicity and draw attention to their causes, the internet allows uncensored and unfiltered versions of broadcasted events worldwide. His analyses uncover the expansive reach of terrorist propaganda.

The next task Weimann undertakes is answering, "How real is the threat of cyber-terrorism?" As in general terrorism research, "semantic precision" is lacking in evaluating cyber-terrorism. Coining the term "cyber-angst," Weimann suggests that the western media inflates its real significance and promulgates the fear it inspires. He establishes that terrorists generally lack the means and human capital needed

to mount attacks anything more than nuisances. Therefore, the threat of terrorists using the internet to launch attacks is more viable with the next generation, where hacking tools will be more powerful, simpler to use, and accessible.

In light of terrorists' exploitation of the internet, Weimann concludes with policy recommendations, considering current criticisms of government measures as abusive to privacy and civil liberties. Measures taken to combat terrorism on the internet include internet service providers providing oversight, self-policing (.org and .gov sites removing sensitive information), private citizens as internet vigilantes, government regulation and monitoring, and journalistic ethics.

Prefacing that terrorism will not likely go away soon, Weimann submits that societies will learn to live with some amount of terrorism. Therefore, governments must find the "golden path" compromise to prevent abuse and protect liberties. However, he still offers recommendations that include modifying the Patriot Act, self-policing, social responsibility, international collaboration, proactive government presence on the internet, and promoting peaceful use. Governments have used the internet to transform the conduct of conflict from traditional insurgencies to non-violent political campaigns. In an effort to promote peaceful uses of the internet, Weimann cites the example of the Iraqi government providing an email address for insurgents to communicate their concerns.

Dramatically well documented, *Terror on the Internet* has significant value as an academic resource. The sheer volume of source documents available made this seminal work an arduous undertaking. Moreover, supporting theoretical sources cite heavyweights in the study of terrorism research. However, the voluminous research needed to compose this project lent less time preparing the policy prescriptions. Unfortunately, the policy recommendations presented seem paltry in comparison to the threat imposed by the current threat.

JOHN P.J. DeROSA

Cleanse Their Souls: Peace-Keeping in Bosnia's Civil War 1992-1993 by Monty Woolley, Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., Barnsley, 2004, 232 pp., \$60.00

Cleanse Their Souls is a first-person narrative describing the experiences of a young British cavalry platoon leader in peacekeeping operations during the war in Bosnia, 1992 to 1993. The tale is very engaging, a quick and an enjoyable read, instructive, and entertaining all at once. The author was among the first British forces in theater, where they served the United Nations, ostensibly to ensure the safe delivery of food and humanitarian supplies to starving civilians (typically Bosnian Muslims). The author and his platoon covered quite a lot of ground, the place names of which would sound familiar to anyone with service in Bosnia. At different times, his missions took him to towns, such as Kladanj, Vitez, Zavidovici, Ze-

nica, as well as Tuzla and Tuzla airfield (where U.S. forces would later establish "Eagle Base" in 1995 and 1996).

When the Vance-Owen plan failed and the fighting escalated in early 1993, he was among the first westerners to see the effects of "ethnic cleansing" firsthand. As a result of his (and his platoon's) deeds on the ground in Ahmici, he was later called to testify at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia when the Bosnian Croat instigators were put on trial. These experiences, in addition to his service around the world in operations and places, such as Desert Storm, Northern Ireland, Germany, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and currently as the British Exchange Officer at Fort Knox, give him a unique and remarkably broad perspective on both peacekeeping and combat operations.

Of particular interest to *ARMOR* readers are the author's stories about and depiction of the British army in Bosnia. He details amusing and entertaining regimental traditions, as well as a few of the limited opportunities to unwind while in country.

Also of note is the fact that the author is very effective at establishing a rapport with representatives of all sides of the conflict. He successfully used his limited Serbo-Croatian to not just de-escalate situations with irate locals, but to win them over as well. He made a real effort to win the "hearts and minds" of both soldiers and civilians alike. Many times, these new-won friendships were valuable in helping him accomplish his mission, as well as provide creature comforts for him and his men. The points the author makes on what the U.S. Army would call "force protection posture" were especially informative.

In spite of what could be considered tactical successes by the author and those like him, the United Nations' mission in Bosnia was generally a failure, and the author admits it. In the book's final chapter, the author observes that European countries, which comprised the majority of forces on the ground, lacked the political will to commit the resources necessary to end the war. The alternative — to allow no-holds-barred warfare and let the war continue to its natural ending — was also considered to be politically unacceptable at home. Instead, as the author observes, the participating European countries attempted to find a "middle way," which tried to limit the war to confined areas and reduce the suffering of the population. To make this "middle way" work included compromises that were generally not accepted by all. The author claims — rightly so perhaps — that it was the planned division of Bosnia into ethnically-based regions by the Vance-Owen plan that served as one of the catalysts for the fierce round of fighting he witnessed in the spring of 1993.

The author observes this "middle way" also served to dash the hopes of Bosnian Muslims for western intervention on their side, as well as anger Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb leadership at UN (mainly Western European) meddling. It resulted in a gradual erosion of re-

spect for UN forces, which manifested in the non-compliance by entity armed forces with UN forces demands. This made it increasingly difficult for UN soldiers to accomplish even the limited goals of their charter. Events would later show that the failure to demonstrate resolve by UN forces in the face of repeated noncompliance eventually resulted in the capture of a battalion of Dutch peacekeepers a couple years later at Potocari, and the massacre of thousands of civilians in nearby Srebrenica.

The author's conclusion is that, despite the progress made to date in Bosnia, not much has really changed. He states: "Leave a Bosnian main road and travel a short distance along a track and you will journey back in time to a medieval land, where memories have not been blurred by a decade of enticements... The Balkans is not cured, it is in remission; the story is not over, another chapter has merely finished. How many years will elapse before this dormant volcano erupts again, before the inherent culture of this people is sparked to fight and settle old scores once and for all? The sentiments of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were probably right!" (Otto von Bismarck was quoted as saying, "The Balkans is not worth the life of one Pomeranian Grenadier.").

In conclusion, I enjoyed reading *Cleanse Their Souls*. It has interesting strategic and tactical lessons that demonstrate both what to do and, more importantly, what *not* to do. I recommend it to anyone who has an interest in the Balkans and as a good background primer for someone who is on his way there. Even if there is no Balkans deployment in your immediate future, the book deserves a place on the bookshelf of a soldier or a statesman.

ANDREW D. GOLDIN
CPT, U.S. Army, MDARNG

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, Zenith Press, St. Paul, MN, 2004, 336 pp., \$24.95 (hardcover)

Colonel Hammes has written an interesting and rather informative book about what he sees as the preeminent form of warfare in the 21st century — an evolved form of insurgency that he calls "fourth-generation warfare" (4GW). Defining 4GW as a form of war that "uses all available networks — political, economic, social, and military" to convince the enemy that his strategic goals are too costly, he notes that superior political will can defeat greater military and economic powers. Citing the importance of understanding this "new" type of warfare, he argues that 4GW is the only type of warfare we have ever lost. The possible lessons for our current struggle in Iraq are obvious.

At its best, the work provides cogent analyses of the insurgent efforts of Mao and the Chinese Communists, the Vietnamese, the Sandinistas (perhaps the book's strongest section), and the Palestinians, describing how each group contributed to the evolution of 4GW. The

soldier or student who wants a good introduction to these struggles will find a useful source here.

Unfortunately, the book is far weaker in its prescriptions for the future U.S. military. Hammes excoriates the Pentagon's *Joint Vision 2020*, criticizing its overreliance on technology and "network-centric" warfare as being out of touch with current realities. But one suspects that even the "geekiest" Pentagon staffer is now heavily focused on the Iraqi insurgency. And although technology may not solve all of our problems in Iraq, we would rather have it than not. Hammes also reveals a bit of parochialism when after blasting the U.S. Air Force for its single-minded pursuit of super-expensive jet fighters, he argues that the U.S. Navy needs more of its equally super-expensive ships. (How they might help in Fallujah eludes me.)

Nevertheless, Hammes' work does provide thoughtful insights into the problems facing us today in Iraq — and perhaps tomorrow elsewhere. His biggest problem may be that this work was published after history and has demonstrated that in many of his arguments, he was absolutely right.

WILLIAM R. BETSON
COL (Retired), U.S. Army

The African Stakes of the Congo War edited by John F. Clark. Palgrave Press, New York, 249 pp., 2002, \$75 (hardcover); also available in paperback, \$24.95

More and more of our time as military professionals is spent attempting to make sense of a multitude of conflicts around the world. In many ways, the post-Soviet world was less complex than today, where we have a world in which tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts have preoccupied much of America's military history in the past decade. This means finding a singular book as a primer on a conflict becomes that much more important, and Associate Professor John Clark has edited a one-stop shopping slim volume for a quick orientation into the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Why does the DRC matter? Although the U.S. military is not directly involved in the Congo, this is a conflict that is closely watched as it has devolved into the neighboring countries of Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Angola, carving out the Congo for its vast mineral riches. Overnight, Uganda became a leading exporter of gold in the late 1990s and others have shipped off lumber, cobalt, diamonds, and other natural resources. The UN peacekeeping force involves many of America's allies, such as Tunisia, Uruguay, Pakistan, Morocco, and over 40 other nations. What this means is that these nations involved in the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) have less troops to devote to other contingencies or to the war on terrorism. The origin of this book was a conference held in Entebbe, Uganda, in July 2000, which discussed conflict in the Great Lakes region; twelve ex-

perts on central Africa contributed one chapter each on various aspects of the conflict.

Crawford Young of the University of Wisconsin and author of two books on the Congo and Zaire (former name of the DRC) opens with a historical context of the conflict. He argues that the DRC is decolonization gone awry. The Belgians, intent on remaining dominant in its former colony, did not enable a stabilization of the Congo's first experimentation in democracy under Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. When Lumumba was assassinated, civil order was kept only by UN peacekeepers, leaving rebel forces and militia to incubate and spring to life when the UN left. Today's Congo sees populist movements not motivated by ideology, but access to diamonds, copper, and gold.

Jermaine McCalpin, a Ph.D. candidate at Brown University, discusses the hard birth the Congo had in June 1960. No sooner than independence was declared, the nation's army, the Force Publique, mutinied. This was due in no small part to the last Belgian military commander, General Janssens, who told his Congolese troops that independence meant no change for the military. This mutiny led to targeting Europeans and an exodus of Belgian skill and capital. The decrease is apparent from 110,000 Belgians in 1959 to 20,000 in 1961. In July, Moise Tshombe led a successful secession of the Congo's mineral rich Katanga province. Lumumba understood he could not survive economically as a nation with Katanga's secession and began courting the Soviets. This led to Lumumba's brutal murder and to events in which the Congo's first president, Kasavubu, was swept away in a coup by Colonel Joseph Mobutu. The author eloquently describes the kleptocracy of the Mobutu years. In 1996, a revolt by the Banyamulenge people (Congolese Tutsis) opened the door for Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda to push Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) on a march toward the DRC's capital, Kinshasa. It was easy when the ADFL seized metal mines in the cities of Goma and Kisingani, they had the ability to finance and outgun the Mobutu regime and his army.

Kevin Dunn is an assistant professor of political science and gives an excellent biography of Laurent Kabila and how his son, Joseph, who rules Congo today, failed to establish new networks of domestic power in the DRC. He relies on Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian forces to keep him in power, and with resources becoming scarcer, the Congo is a prize. It is as if the neighboring powers in the Arab world carved out the Persian Gulf oil resources to finance and fuel a civil war, while at the same time, leaving a little extra for their own domestic economies. This is an excellent volume for those interested in expanding their knowledge on the impacts of tribal warfare and regional conflict in Africa. Another reason to watch this conflict is that terrorism thrives in areas of chaos, and central Africa is in turmoil.

YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENIEN
LCDR, MSC, USN

LETTERS from Page 3

As Guard units demobilize now for the second time since 9/11, anticipate tremendous declines in retention and recruiting. Why should anyone join or stay in the Guard when they will not have the chance to maintain a civilian lifestyle? The current operating tempo (OPTEMPO) puts the Active and Guard Components head-to-head for recruiting young soldiers. If one is going to be deployed constantly, then one will just join the Active Army in the first place. The current OPTEMPO also cuts into prior service recruiting for the Guard. Soldiers will simply remain in the Active Component until their enlistment expires and then they will be done, not risking a series of deployments during their Guard or Reserve tours. Critically, this force will specifically recruit the young men and women who are willing to fight total war, most likely only once or twice in their careers, enabling them to build and maintain a civilian life.

Army Reserve service would be an intermediate position, attracting people willing to deploy more often than the Guard, but less than the Active Army. Their skill sets would be most useful in support of the Active Army on longer missions, but could be sent out for a few months at a time. Civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, transportation, engineering, and medical services are among the skills most appropriate for limited, but recurring, deployments. They would most likely use these same skills in their civilian careers and be trained to proficiency to reduce mobilization-site training.

Critically, this force will recruit specialists generally willing to deploy more often, but for shorter periods, not unlike the Air Force Guard and Reserve model.

No one would suggest emasculating Active Duty forces by stripping every heavy weapons system. Certainly tanks, Bradleys, and cannons are required in limited numbers at the right time to prevent a *Blackhawk Down* from recurring. Every light brigade could have an element of heavy support. It simply turns the paradigm upside down to say those skills become low density in the Active Army, while beefing up the Guard to be prepared to fight the total war. It may be wise to maintain several brigades of heavy combat punch in the Active Component as a rapid response force for high-risk operations, where heavier defensive response could be anticipated, but not more than can be floated to an appropriate beach within two or three weeks. If additional heavy equipment is required, then most likely, we will have time for a truly national response, summoning the National Guard to fight the big war.

Some will argue the National Guard will not be as proficient in heavy mechanized combat as the Active Army. That may be true, but it is also irrelevant. No force in the history of the world has ever been as proficient as our current full-time Army. The U.S. National Guard is currently second best, and with the enemies we are going to face in the GWOT, a heavy Na-

tional Guard with one or two months of heavy training after mobilization will perform superbly. If the time comes for the United States to face another industrialized and heavily mechanized and armored foe, then the Nation will invariably have additional time to prepare and train to an even higher standard.

Soldiers will remain in components longer, as they will be doing exactly what they choose. If they desire to serve shifts, there are two other distinct components as options: Guard and Reserve soldiers can rely on a stable civilian life until the time comes for strategic action, rather than just throwing bodies into the breach to take the load off of the Active Army.

Fundamental remissioning of the Active Duty, National Guard, and Army Reserve will provide real choices for volunteer soldiers, place the appropriate firepower in the appropriate component, and improve strength throughout the services by eliminating recruiting conflict between the elements. It will best position the United States of America to fight the GWOT, while both building the greatest expeditionary force and maintaining the best, most effective heavy, armored, mechanized force in the world.

ROGER T. AESCHLIMAN
MAJ, U.S. Army, KSARNG

Center Announces Writing Competition

The Army Center of Military History has announced the 2007 James Lawton Collins Jr. Special Topics Writing Competition. The Center invites Army officers in the rank of major or below, including warrant officers, to submit original, unclassified essays that describe the actions of a small U.S. Army unit or team, no larger than a company, engaged in the Global War on Terrorism. The essay should focus on a discrete action, such as a single patrol, firefight, battle, convoy, air support mission, advisory team operation, medical mission, or engineer support action, but the effort discussed need not involve combat. Papers should generally not exceed 5,000 words and may not have been published or submitted for publication elsewhere. Submissions from multiple authors will be accepted. The essays will be evaluated by a panel at the Center. The first prize winner will be awarded \$500 and the winner of the second prize will receive \$250. Both awardees will also receive a certificate of recognition signed by the Army's chief of staff, and their essays will be published in *Army History*. Submissions must be received by 1 April 2007. Competition enrollment forms and further information about the competition are posted at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/2007Contest.htm>.

Correction: Marine Corps Tank Battalion Commander List

The Marine Corps Tank Battalion listing in the November-December 2006 issue of *ARMOR*, page 47, reflects inaccurate battalion commander information. The information should read: commander, 2d Tank Battalion, LtCol Bianca; commander, 4th Tank Battalion, LtCol Winter; and inspector instructor, 4th Tank Battalion, LtCol Vuckovich.

<h2 style="margin: 0;">BEST SAPPER COMPETITION</h2> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/> <p style="margin: 0;">FORT LEONARD WOOD, MO</p>		
<p>Mission: The Sapper Leader Course hosts the Engineer Regiment's world-class Best Sapper Competition 1-3 May 2007 to determine the best Sapper team in the Army.</p>		
<p>Eligibility</p> <p>Two-person Sapper teams O-3(P) and below</p> <p>U.S. Army AC, Guard, or Reserve, serving in a 21 series MOS or graduate of the Sapper Leader Course</p> <p>Must furnish letter of preparedness signed by first O-5 in COC (see website)</p>	<p>Phase I</p> <p>Teams take non-standard physical fitness test</p> <p>Phase II</p> <p>Given a map, teams have 24 hours to find eight points/ events and complete tasks</p> <p>Phase III</p> <p>Given a marked route, teams have 18 hours to reach six stations and complete tasks</p> <p>Phase IV</p> <p>Teams run/walk a 9-mile course for time</p>	<p>Events</p> <p>Non-standard PT Test MOUT Ballistic Breaching Weapons Range Grenade Range Demolition Written Exam Poncho Raft Swim 9-Line IED Report Buddy Rappel Weapons Assembly Foreign Mine Identification Steel Cutting Demolitions Counterforce Demolitions Timber Cutting Demolitions AN-PSS14 Proficiency 9-Line MEDEVAC Report Prussik Climb Mountaineering Knots 9-mile Run with sub-events</p>
<p>Visit the Sapper Training Detachment website for additional information and to reserve your team slot</p> <hr style="width: 50%; margin: 0 auto;"/> <p>www.wood.army.mil/sapper</p>		

Army Seeks Recommendations for MCOE Patch, Crest, and Motto

The Army needs your design ideas for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCOE) shoulder sleeve insignia (patch) and distinctive unit insignia (crest) and motto. Over the next five years, the Infantry and Armor Schools will collocate at Fort Benning, Georgia, to become the Maneuver Center of Excellence. This Center will be responsible for all Army land-based maneuver training development, doctrine, capabilities development, and include both Armor and Infantry proponencies.

The Maneuver Center of Excellence will be an Army subordinate organization and needs a unique patch and crest. Personnel assigned to the Infantry and Armor Schools

will continue to wear current shoulder sleeve and distinctive unit insignias, but soldiers working directly for the Maneuver Center of Excellence will wear the new insignia.

Armor and Infantry possess time-honored crests and shoulder patches that reflect the contributions, sacrifices, and spirit of each branch in support of the Nation. The challenge of the new insignia design lies in capturing the historical essence of each branch and their collective embodiment of maneuver as a principle of war. Hence, individuals wishing to help this effort are encouraged to think beyond a simple merging of the existing Armor and Infantry insignia.

Submission Guidelines

Requirements: A clear, hand-drawn or electronic sketch of the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and a short, succinct motto. The motto must be written in English and is limited to 26 characters (letters and spaces). Any current or retired military personnel and Department of Army civilian may provide input. Individuals may provide a suggestion for just one or two of the desired items if they prefer.

Format: Designs should be drawn on paper or provided as electronic files. Electronic files should be in JPG or BMP format, and may be sent on diskette or CD-ROM via normal mail or as an e-mail attachment. All submissions must include the name, phone number, e-mail address, and mailing address of the individual submitting the designs and motto.

Submissions: Submissions will be accepted from 1 January through 31 March 2007 and may be sent via e-mail (no larger than 3 megabytes) to the following address:

MCOE_Insignia_Suggestions@knox.army.mil

Alternatively, input may be sent via normal mail to either:

ARMOR Magazine
ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A (MCOE Patch)
201 6th Ave., Ste. 373, Building 1109A
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721

OR

Headquarters, U.S. Army Infantry Center
ATTN: ATSH-ATH
Building 4, Room 451
Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000

Selection process

Submissions will be screened by the Maneuver Center of Excellence Board of Directors, which is chaired jointly by the Chief of Armor and the Chief of Infantry. The most suitable and acceptable concepts will be considered for forwarding to the Institute of Heraldry for final production of the patch and crest.

Acknowledgement

The individual(s) who submitted the shoulder sleeve insignia, distinctive unit insignia, and motto design that is selected by the board of directors will receive a framed final patch, while the top entries in each category will also receive an MCOE coin with certificate of recognition for top entries. These acknowledgements will be issued in the fall of 2008.

The Department of the Army (Army) will acquire ownership of all entries, and each submitter agrees that submission of a design constitutes (1) assignment to the Army of any and all rights in the design, including copyright, and (2) a disclaimer of any trademark rights. All entries become the property of the Army, and the Army will have the sole right, at its discretion, to alter or modify any submitted design. By submitting a design, the submitter warrants that the design is original; that it has not been previously published; and that it does not infringe upon the copyright of any other person or entity.

When was the last time you entered the net?



How to Log on

- Go to the Fort Knox homepage at www.knox.army.mil
- Click on the Mounted ManeuverNet link (right side of page)
- Enter your AKO username and password at the prompt
- Under the "Participate" section (left side of screen), click "Become a Member," fill out the form and submit. You'll have full access within 24 hours.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A
ARMOR
201 6TH AVE STE 373
FORT KNOX, KY 40121-5721

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Periodicals Postage
Paid at Fort Knox, KY, and
Additional Mailing Sites