Features

6 Cavalry for Irregular Warfare
   by William Van Horn

26 Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume V, Part 1 of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi
   by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Professional Review

14 Dismantling the Armor Force?
   by Major Aaron Lilley

19 The Case for Outcomes-Based Training and Education
   by Major Chad R. Foster

24 Partnership Predicament: Counterinsurgency Vignette
   by Captain Andrew G. Gourgoumis, U.S. Marine Corps

25 Translator Troubles: Ethical Vignette
   by Captain Andrew G. Gourgoumis, U.S. Marine Corps

35 MANEUVER: Fight the Enemy – Not the Terrain
   by Captain Robert L. Green and First Sergeant James J. Adcock

38 Reflecting on the Maneuver Captain Career Course
   by Captain Sean Walsh

41 Dragoons in Iraq: Combined Census Operations by Captain Bryan Frizzelle, First Lieutenant Daniel Wagner, First Lieutenant Jeffrey Gagliano, First Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi, and First Lieutenant Brian Murdock

47 Success Through Creation
   by Christopher T. Lovato

49 Charlie Mike! Continue the Mission: Tank Ranges at the MCOE
   by Sergeant First Class Vernon Prohaska

53 New Army Field Manual FM 5-0: The Operations Process

Departments

1 Contacts
2 Letters
3 General Frederick M. Franks Award 2010 Nomination Details
4 Commander’s Hatch
5 Driver’s Seat
5 Subscription Information
52 Reviews

November-December 2009, Vol. CXVIII, No. 6
Points of Contact

**ARMOR Editorial Offices**

**Editor in Chief**
Christy Bourgeois  4582  
E-mail: christy.bourgeois@us.army.mil

**Editor**
Vivian Oertle  2610  
E-mail: vivian.oertle@us.army.mil

**Art Director**
Mr. Jody Harmon  3923  
E-mail: jody.harmon@us.army.mil

**Editorial Assistant**
Kathy A. Johnson  2249  
E-mail: kathy.johnson5@us.army.mil

**U.S. Army Armor Center**

**Commanding General**
MG James M. Milano  2121  
E-mail: james.m.milano@us.army.mil

**Deputy Commander**
COL David A. Teeples  7555  
E-mail: david.teeples@us.army.mil

**Chief of Staff**
COL Jeffrey L. Davidson  1101  
E-mail: jeffrey.l.davidson@us.army.mil

**Command Sergeant Major**
CSM John W. Troxell  4952  
E-mail: john.troxell@us.army.mil

**Command Sergeant Major to DCG**
CSM Ricky Youn  7091  
E-mail: ricky.youn@us.army.mil

**Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG)**
COL David M. Pratt  1315  
E-mail: david.m.pratt@us.army.mil

**Directorate of Training, Doctrine, and Combat Development**
COL Michael N. Smith  8247  
E-mail: michael.n.smith@us.army.mil

**TRADOC Capability Manager for Heavy Brigade Combat Team**
COL Jeffrey B. Swisher  7955  
E-mail: jeffrey.b.swisher@us.army.mil

**TRADOC Capability Manager, Platform Battle Command/Combat Identification**
COL Dwayne Carman  4009  
E-mail: dwayne.carman@us.army.mil

**Office, Chief of Armor**
Aubrey Henley  5155  
E-mail: aubrey.henley@us.army.mil

**Assistant TRADOC Capability Manager**
Larry Hasty  3662  
E-mail: larry.hasty@us.army.mil

**U.S. Army Armor School**

**Director of the Armor School**
COL Michael P. Wadsworth  1050  
E-mail: michael.p.wadsworth@us.army.mil

**194th Armored Brigade**
COL David E. Thompson  8736  
E-mail: david.e.thompson@us.army.mil

**16th Cavalry Regiment**
COL Leopoldo A. Quintas  7848  
E-mail: leopoldo.a.quintas@us.army.mil

**NCO Academy**
CSM Mark A. Horsley  5150  
E-mail: mark.horsley@us.army.mil

**ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS:** Articles can be submitted as e-mail attachments to knox.armormag@conus.army.mil. Articles can also be submitted on CD or floppy disk with a double-spaced hard copy. Mail to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite 378, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721. For all submissions, please include a complete mailing address and daytime phone number.

**SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE:** Due to the limited space per issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and accepted for publication by, other Army professional bulletins. Please submit your article to only one Army professional bulletin at a time.

**GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS:** We will accept conventional photo prints and electronic graphic and photo files in no less than 300 dpi format. (Please do not send photos embedded in PowerPoint and Word.) If you use PowerPoint for illustrations, please try to avoid the use of excessive color and shading. If you have any questions concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above.

**UNIT DISTRIBUTION:** To report unit free distribution delivery problems or changes of unit address, e-mail us at knox.armormag@conus.army.mil; phone DSN 464-2249, commercial (502) 624-2249; or FAX DSN 464-5039, commercial (502) 624-5039. Requests to be added to the official distribution list should be in the form of a letter or e-mail to the Editor in Chief.

**SUBSCRIPTIONS:** Subscriptions to ARMOR are available through the Government Printing Office Bookstore for $27.00 per year. To subscribe, call toll free (866) 512-1800, visit the GPO website at bookstore.gpo.gov, mail the subscription form in this issue, or fax (202) 512-2104.

**EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS:** ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-DAS-A, Bldg 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite 378, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

**REPRINTS:** ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/reprinting permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in Chief, ARMOR, Building 1109A, 201 6th Avenue, Suite 378, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5721.

**ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE:** Visit the ARMOR magazine web site at www.knox.army.mil/armormag.

**ARMOR HOTLINE** — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the armor force.
Does the Hand Cannon Have a Place in the Ground Forces?

Dear ARMOR,

The hand cannon has always been primarily a naval weapon. We’ve all seen swivel guns mounted on the fore and after decks of wooden ships. Perhaps they have graced the walls of wooden forts, but I’ve never seen them. The largest hand-aimed cannon I recall is the 60-75mm weapon of the U.S. gunboats of the 1920s.

This letter is prompted by a hand-aimed and fired cannon that made a major contribution to the outcome of naval warfare in WWII — the 20mm Oerlikon. This weapon, with a 60-round drum magazine, provided a primary defense against air attack on most naval ships. In fact, the submarine on which I served had two 20mm guns on a single bicycle handlebar-type mount, aimed and fired by one man.

During World War II, the U.S. Army did not deploy small-caliber cannons in air attack or ground roles. Although offered, the 20mm Oerlikon was refused by Army officials because the gun did not have a locking breech; it had a “slam” breech. The German army used multiple small cannons (20-30mm) in mechanical mounts for air attack and ground applications.

In the official U.S. World War II history of the struggle for the town of Schmidt, during the battle for Hürtgen Forest, the historian describes the use of the four 20mm gun Flak PZ IV “whirlwind” as “pernicious.”

The question is: can a hand-aimed and fired cannon caliber weapon (20-30mm) make a major contribution to ground battle in the present arena of conflict? I suggest the 25mm cannon supplement the .50-caliber machine gun — maybe a better replacement would be a new long-range medium caliber gun.

The .50-caliber machine gun originated in World War I as an antitank weapon; it reached its high point in multi-gun configurations on U.S. aircraft during World War II. Somehow, it survived as an air attack and long-range machine gun; however, on today’s battlefield, aircraft fly too fast to be tracked by such a weapon. Aircraft and helicopters also have a variety of stand-off weapons that neutralizes such a weapon for air attack purposes. Limited to a ground role, the .50-caliber machine gun is logistically overkill.

To be completely effective, the 25mm cannon should be complemented with a long-range machine gun. The .50-caliber could be used, but I suggest a medium caliber machine gun to replace both the .50-caliber and .308-caliber machine guns now deployed. The caliber I suggest is either the .338 Lapua rifle, which already has a good reputation for long-range accuracy and lethal performance among our various special forces, or even better, the proprietary .338-caliber Excalibur or 8.59mm Titan cartridges, which offer increased performance. Logistically, the .338-caliber machine gun would offer three rounds for every one .50 caliber. It would also remove one type of ammunition from the battlefield.

Coupled with the 25mm cannon, the combination would provide mobile forces with open mounts on vehicles, such as HMMWV, Stryker, M113, and the Marine Corps AAV7A1, which would provide increased performance against light armored vehicles; urban structure and hard-point penetration; some helicopter defense; long-range interdiction; flush and kill capability; and increased lethality.

JEROME E. RANDA

General Frederick M. Franks Award
2010 Nomination Details

The 15th annual Frederick M. Franks Award will be presented at the 2010 Armor Warfighting Conference, which is currently scheduled for 17-20 May 2010. The award will be presented to a mounted active duty or reserve officer, noncommissioned officer, or Department of the Army Civilian who has demonstrated a long-time contribution to the groundfighting and warfighting capabilities of the U.S. Army. To qualify for the Franks Award, nominees should also have demonstrated two or more of the following requirements:

- Offered a vision for the future of the mounted warfighting force that significantly improved survivability, lethality, maneuverability, or mobility.
- Developed an innovation in equipment, materiel, or doctrine that significantly enhanced the effectiveness of combat arms mounted elements.
- Exemplified professional excellence in demeanor, correspondence, and leadership on issues relevant to mounted warfare.
- Displayed a love of soldiering through leadership skills, recognition of the sacrifice and achievements of subordinates, and attention to the intent and directions of higher commanders.

Nominations must be submitted to the U.S. Army Armor Center, (ATZK-DAS/Franks Award), Fort Knox, KY 40121-5256, no later than 1 March 2010. Alternate submittal is encouraged via e-mail to armor.conference@conus.army.mil. Submission packets will be evaluated in a competitive board process with the recommendation forwarded to the Chief of Armor for review and final approval. For additional information, please e-mail inquiries to armor.conference@conus.army.mil, or call commercial, (502) 624-5496/2832, or DSN 464-5496/2832.
Balancing the 21st-Century Army through Leader Development

I have been on the ground for more than 3 months as the Chief of Armor, and have realized that there are amazing amounts of actions, projects, and responsibilities that fall within the portfolio of my position. These areas cover a wide array of imminent undertakings, such as preparing cavalry and armor soldiers for combat; combat developments such as the new ground combat vehicle; and doctrinal updates such as the recently published U.S. Army Field Manual, 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team Gunner (HBCT). Although these things are extremely critical to our mission, one issue remains the most critical — leader development.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command General Martin Dempsey, has made it clear that his number one priority is leader development because the manner in which the Army develops and manages its leaders has a direct impact on the readiness and capability of the force to successfully perform in current and projected operating environments. The world in which we live and the environment in which we operate have significantly changed over the course of just a few years, and will rapidly continue to evolve over the next few years. Indeed, the Army must be capable of adapting beyond its ability to effectively react to its environment; however, the goal must be to not only catch up to, but stay ahead of, change.

Tactically and operationally, we are a very adaptive force. Our junior leaders are incredibly creative and intelligent, which is proven every day in Iraq and Afghanistan as they continue to find ways to successfully achieve missions and protect soldiers. Our battalions and brigades also demonstrate this as they deal with incredibly complex situations, which truly run the gamut of full-spectrum operations.

Until recently, we were falling behind in institutional mechanisms and strategies that focus on building future leaders of the Army; specifically, the tools and developmental opportunities that will lay the foundation for these young leaders to thrive in an era of ambiguity and persistent conflict. In September 2009, General Dempsey approved the Army Leader Development Strategy (ALDS) core document, “A Leader Development Strategy for an Expeditionary Army.” This document outlines a significant paradigm shift that the Army must make to ensure we maintain our ability to operate and succeed in competitive threat environments and dynamic situations of the future.

This strategy challenges many of our traditional leader-development concepts; however, we must remember that the past 8 years of war have been characterized by complex hybrid threats that promise to persist well into the future. We must outmatch our enemy and, to do so, we must broaden the capabilities of our leaders beyond irregular operations to truly account for full-spectrum operations. Over the past several years, our leader-development process has been out of balance; fortunately, the ALDS seeks to restore balance and prepare future leaders for a future of full-spectrum operations. The ALDS introduces a series of imperatives, which will become the “touchstone” for policies, processes, and resources to support our leader-development programs. There is no defined “end state” product or equation for the ALDS — it is not a mechanical process with defined paths like we had in the past; it is an outcomes-based approach to address the capabilities we need for the leaders of the Army.

The ALDS focuses on creating leaders that expect complexity and are capable of operating in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) setting. This is the logical evolution of the old concept of “leader pentathlete” when you frame the issue with how our forces operate and the complexity of what we require of our leaders. The things that do not change are the importance of essential attributes, such as character, presence, and intellect, or the core competencies of leading, developing yourself and others, and achieving mission success.

As leaders, we must take a much more holistic look at each individual and determine how we can set each soldier for success in their current position, shape their developmental experiences, and position the right person in the right job to best benefit the Army. This may include, for instance, sending a top-performing young captain to a combat training center as an observer controller or to the Basic Officer Leader Course to mentor new lieutenants, as opposed to giving them a second or third command. The more critical choices are majors and lieutenant colonels and the amount of time they are assigned to key developmental (KD) positions. For example, instead of assigning a top-performing officer to a KD position for 36 to 40 months, send him to become joint qualified or to another nominative assignment. We must make the hard calls and manage and develop our talent for the betterment of the Army.

Leader development is the business of every single member of the Army at the rank of sergeant and above. I encourage you, as a professional, to make it your responsibility to dig into the new ALDS concept and share your viewpoints through one of the Army’s numerous feedback forums.

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!
Greetings from Fort Knox and the Home of Armor and Cavalry! This article focuses on the one area that sets us apart from all other armies worldwide and makes us the premier fighting force on the globe — our Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). It is common knowledge that the U.S. Army has a very robust and deliberate education system for its noncommissioned officers (NCOs) — no other army in the world invests the money, resources, and time into educating NCOs. None.

More than our technology, weapons systems, and fighting platforms, our enemies fear our NCOs — they are educated and empowered to perform and lead missions on any kind of battlefield against any kind of threat — they are the envy of armies worldwide. Our enemies understand that our NCOs are not simply “ORs” (other ranks) like those of other armies. As my battle buddy at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Command Sergeant Major Earl Rice, always says, “PT allows our job to stay ahead of the learning curve. Even while deployed. With the types of things we are doing on the modern battlefield and the amount of equipment we are carrying, our duties demand that we have effective fitness programs to develop and maintain functional fitness and health wherever we are. A’s my battle buddy at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Command Sergeant Major Earl Rice, always says, “PT allows us to do all that we do as Warriors.”

The key to our successes — past, present, and future — requires us to continue educating our NCOs, constantly improving our education systems; the future belongs to the army that best educates its soldiers. Some may think that this is a simple task, but it does have its challenges in this era of persistent conflict. For example, our current backlog of NCOs who have not been to the requisite schooling for the rank they wear is huge. The NCO Academy at Fort Knox alone has seen about 10 percent of students attend the Advanced Leader Course and Maneuver Senior Leader Course show up overweight and fail to pass the Army Physical Fitness Test. Soldiers who cannot reach minimum Army standards before graduation will graduate with a “marginally met course standards” rating on their academic evaluation report (AER), which translates to about 10 percent of each class currently graduating with a poor AER. We also frequently have soldiers who fail to meet course standards on critical tasks that are needed to perform duties in full-spectrum operations.

These drop-offs in performance can be attributed to a number of things. First, with only a 15-month average dwell time for most units, it is challenging to manage the backlog. However, it is not impossible and senior leaders have to effectively manage their dwell time and make NCOES a priority. They have to understand that not sending an NCO to requisite schooling on time will have ramifications on a soldier’s career.

Second, when it comes to physical fitness, we must understand that, as an expeditionary Army, deployments are going to be a way of life, which means that physical fitness has to be the biggest cornerstone to combat readiness for leaders and soldiers. We have to ensure our soldiers are doing physical training, even while deployed. With the types of things we are doing on the modern battlefield and the amount of equipment we are carrying, our duties demand that we have effective fitness programs to develop and maintain functional fitness and health wherever we are. A’s my battle buddy at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Command Sergeant Major Earl Rice, always says, “PT allows us to do all that we do as Warriors.”

Last, but certainly not least, when it comes to academic standards, we must realize that our academics do not train soldiers to unit standards or focus on certain areas of operation. We train NCOs on the critical tasks required to fight and win in full-spectrum operations against a hybrid threat. When an NCO fails to meet the course standard during an NCOES course, leaders must examine why an NCO failed a particular course standard, not attack the standard itself. A few command sergeants major have requested that we throw out the standard for a certain critical task based on their soldier’s failure to meet the standard because the soldier did not perform that task during his last deployment in Iraq. A gain, full-spectrum operations mean just that. A soldier may not perform a critical task in Iraq, which they are tested on during ALC or MSLC, but it certainly will be a critical task against a peer-like enemy in a North Korea, China, or Iran.

Finally, we have to continually stress the importance of our NCOES to our NCOs. We have a great Army strategy to continue to improve our NCOs within the three pillars of education, assignments/experience, and structured self-development. Some of our NCOs believe that deploying to combat is all that is needed to excel and grow as a leader; based on this thinking, we would achieve about a 33 percent success rate. We also have NCOs who believe that NCOES is a waste of time — those are generally the ones who end up with the “marginally met course standards” on their AER.

Our Noncommissioned Officer Education System makes our NCO Corps the best in the world. As Army leaders, it is our job to stay ahead of the learning curve in our ever-changing world — we must be ready for anything. Many of you have been deployed so many times that your missions seem like second nature; however, you still have to deal with the onrush of change. As our environment continues to become more diversified, the more things will change and initiate new learning curves. Staying ahead of the learning curve will keep us ahead of the fight!

Forge The Thunderbolt!
**ARMOR** is the professional journal of the U.S. Army’s Armor and Cavalry force. Published bimonthly and available as a subscription from the U.S. Government Printing Office, the official edition of ARMOR focuses on the Armor and Cavalry soldier up to the battalion and brigade levels. It features incisive articles for the mounted soldier, discussing:

- Training
- Equipment
- Employment
- Leadership
- Historical background of mounted warfare

...and much more.

**ARMOR**, the oldest of the Army’s professional journals, provides valuable insights into contemporary thoughts on the functions and future of the armored forces of the U.S. Army.

Price: $27.00

---

**Order Processing Code:**
3556

**Easy Secure Internet:**
bookstore.gpo.gov

**Toll Free:** 866 512–1800
**DC Area:** 202 512–1800
**Fax:** 202 512–2104

**Mail:**
US Government Printing Office
P.O. Box 979050
St. Louis, MO 63197–9000

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qty</th>
<th>Stock Number</th>
<th>Publication Title</th>
<th>Unit Price</th>
<th>Total Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>708-109-00000-2</td>
<td>ARMOR</td>
<td>$27.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Check payable to Superintendent of Documents**

- [ ] VISA  
- [ ] MasterCard  
- [ ] Discover/NOVUS  
- [ ] American Express

**(expiration date)**

Thank you for your order!
American military experience has certainly taught us that irregular warfare demands extreme flexibility. Units must gather their own intelligence, have high mobility, and hit hard when necessary, and simultaneously serve as an area stabilization force while other elements, such as civil, military, and nongovernment organizations, are building local communities. Traditionally, these roles are filled by cavalry; however, our current modular organization lacks a unit with these capabilities. Given our current and probable future operations, the time has come to create a new cavalry organization that draws from our own military history to meet the needs of today and tomorrow — the medium cavalry squadron (MCS).

While the current emphasis within the Army is on task-based units, there are intrinsic benefits to be gained from the formation of dedicated units like the MCS. In addition to training together and honing its core capabilities, the modular composition of the MCS allows it to expand or contract with relative ease. Lighter than a brigade, the MCS can deploy more quickly than a larger unit and possesses enough organic firepower and reconnaissance capability to take the place of a larger unit in most irregular warfare situations and many higher-intensity conflict scenarios. If necessary, two (or more) MCSs can be combined to form a medium cavalry regiment (provisional), giving a corps commander a valuable asset in almost any combat situation.
WARFARE
J. Bryan Mullins argues that cavalry may need to separate again into a “medium/heavy” and “light” configuration, with light cavalry dedicated to almost pure reconnaissance and intelligence missions. This runs the risk of creating a force that is optimized for a single battlefield environment and dependent on high-tech systems that may or may not function in operational conditions. It also renders cavalry next to useless in an irregular warfare setting. While “boots on the ground” are necessary for irregular warfare, there is also a clear need for a force that can both find the enemy and, to paraphrase the famous Nathan Bedford Forrest quote, “Get there first with the most.” A light reconnaissance force might be able to do this, but a combined arms force with armor certainly can — and it has utility that is not limited to one region or conflict framework.

The MCS is not limited to irregular warfare environments, it serves well as a medium reconnaissance formation in any conventional conflict with the ability to deploy its air and ground assets to locate enemy formations and even launch limited strikes. With its training focused on battlefield reconnaissance and reaction, as well as the organic headquarters capability to conduct limited intelligence collection and development, the MCS provides commanders with a flexible response tool they currently lack due to limitations in the Army’s organization.

In his 2007 Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), Major George Stewart III examines the role of the armored cavalry regiment in low- and high-intensity combat and determines that it takes two different modular units (a heavy brigade combat team and a Stryker brigade combat team) to replicate the effectiveness of the armored cavalry regiment (ACR), and both of these units need organizational changes to fill the role vacated by one unit. The MCS provides one unit that can fill both roles and “hold the line” until an ACR or other major combat unit arrives on the scene.

Within the irregular warfare framework, a cavalry unit must develop its own intelligence and then act on that information. It should also be prepared to serve as a heavy reaction force in support of light infantry and military police-type units that often form the backbone of any counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. The famous “Blackhawk down” incident in Somalia is the most notorious example of what can happen to a light unit (no matter how elite) when it gets into a combat situation that requires more firepower and armor than it has on hand. A single MCS could have provided both rescue assets (its organic armored ground troops) and air cover and fire support (two air cavalry troops combined with the mortars assigned to the ground troops). Even with the present modular brigade organization, there is no single standing formation that could provide that level of support on short notice.

There has been much discussion regarding the role and organization of cavalry in the future force, including a proposal to convert cavalry to a purely reconnaissance force. These debates pay little attention to the cavalry’s role in COIN operations and irregular warfare, focusing instead on possible future near-peer competitors. Many analysts also consider cavalry in the aftermath of World War II and selectively draw on Vietnam, which ignores the bulk of U.S. military history regarding the use of mounted forces and their valuable role in many forms of conflict over the years. It also ignores the need for a multipurpose “heavy” force for irregular warfare (“heavy” is used in quotation marks because in an irregular warfare context, heavy does not always indicate a force with a large armored contingent). The MCS is, in some ways, a direct philosophical descendant of the powerful cavalry corps led by James Wilson in 1865. Composed of cavalry and horse artillery units, Wilson’s Corps cut its way
through Alabama, accomplishing a strategic mission previously thought unattainable by mounted units.5

Cavalry: The American Context

The role and “type” of cavalry within the U.S. military has been debated for some time. Most arguments look to Europe for definitions of cavalry roles and types, such as heavy, light, and dragoon, without examining the actual evolution of cavalry in the United States. Although given three different designations before the Civil War (dragoons, mounted riflemen, and cavalry), the few mounted regiments in U.S. service were more similar than not. Their roles remained surprisingly consistent, often at odds with the European terms and customs used to define them, and their own tactical manuals and drill instructions.6 This stems from their original operational role as explorers and mobile reaction forces. Instead of remaining in garrison training for the “next war,” the mounted units of the pre-1861 Army were in the field conducting hard service in roles ranging from exploration to peacekeeping and nearly everything in between. However, we must also look beyond the mechanization debate in the 1920s and focus on the role of cavalry (regardless of mode of locomotion) in the Army. Their role, at least in the context of the U.S. Army, has remained remarkably consistent in most combat situations — whether their mobility comes from horses or mechanized transport.

Mounted formations in the U.S. Army typically performed two functions: reconnaissance (either tactical or strategic) and serving as a mobile strike force. Although pressed into service for route protection (wagon train escort) during the Civil War, this was not a core cavalry mission on the frontier before or after the war. Cavalry provided frontier commanders with two unique capabilities: the ability to conduct area reconnaissance missions in most terrain; and a strong, mobile force to use against hostile concentrations. Although infantry had more staying power in the field, even critics within the Army admitted that only cavalry could realistically close with and engage a highly mobile adversary under most circumstances.7 Cavalry at this time also had enough firepower to get themselves out of trouble as quickly as they might have gotten into it, a legacy of lessons learned during the Civil War.

The historical role of cavalry as a reconnaissance force in the Army requires brief discussion because the MCS is in no small way shaped by the historical realities of the Army’s cavalry use. Many critics (both in and out of uniform) assert that American cavalry has rarely been used in its ‘true’ reconnaissance role because it is too combat capable.8 This statement ignores the realities that shaped how cavalry conducted reconnaissance in the field. Chronically understrength, the U.S. Army, both before and after the Civil War, had to make do with what it had.

In many locations, cavalry was the only force available for quick action and was not seen as an auxiliary or supporting force to a main effort. Rarely able to meet its opponent in traditional combat, such as mounted force-on-force engagements, American cavalry developed a style of operations stressing the ability to fight

“There has been much discussion regarding the role and organization of cavalry in the future force, including a proposal to convert cavalry to a purely reconnaissance force. These debates pay little attention to the cavalry’s role in COIN operations and irregular warfare, focusing instead on possible future near-peer competitors.”

November-December 2009 — ARMOR
mounted with pistols or (more often) on foot with carbines, if they
managed to find and fix their elusive opponents. They also came
to rely on information gathered and developed by civilian or In-
dian scouts, although cavalry did from time to time conduct area
reconnaissance (indicating where hostiles were not more often
than actually making contact).9

This divergence in cavalry roles and missions found its best ex-
pression in Vietnam. Large Army units were committed in a com-
bat role starting in 1965, with the stated objective of closing with
and destroying the main force Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army elements in South Vietnam. This, in theory, allowed the Ar-
my of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) time to secure the coun-
tryside and the population of South Vietnam. Although the na-
ture of this mission is outside the scope of this article, it does
have bearing on the story of American cavalry and the need for
an MCS. Under the division organization in force at the time,
the Army brought its cavalry to Vietnam as divisional squadrons
and a separate ACR. There was a great deal of opposition in some
quarters to the deployment of armor in what was seen as a jun-
gle conflict dominated by infantry, but armor quickly proved its
utility and value in such a conflict.10

Vietnam saw cavalry returning to many of its earlier roles — out
of necessity rather than choice. Cavalry units were route-protect-
tion forces, quick-reaction elements, and strike forces in terrain
originally determined impassable for armor. The ability of cav-
alty units to be tailored for almost any mission (and an overall
lack of cavalry units in the theater of operations) led to fragmenta-
tion, with squadron assets divided among a division’s various
brigades and separate battalions. Some commands also devel-
oped a fixation with using cavalry units for route security at the
expense of other missions (which was occasionally dictated by the
terrain in particular areas of operation; for example, the 4th
Infantry Division’s area of operations in the Central Highlands),
while others got the maximum possible use out of their cavalry
troops and squadrons.11

One major illustration of the cavalry fragmentation in Vietnam
is the air cavalry troop. Under the Vietnam-era table of organiza-
tion and equipment (TOE), a division cavalry squadron contained
three ground troops and an air cavalry troop. While in theory
this allowed ground troops to act on contacts developed by the
more mobile air troop, it also created the temptation for higher
headquarters to split off the air troop. This proved to be a con-
stant practice in Vietnam, with D Troop usually attached to a di-
vision headquarters or aviation battalion while ground troops
were parceled out to various brigades. Some squadron com-
manders complained about losing their main reconnaissance
force, as well as the ability to react quickly and strongly to any
enemy contacts, but their concerns were usually dismissed.12

MCS Organization

The notional MCS retains many of the basic aspects of earlier
division cavalry squadrons, organized most recently with three
ground cavalry troops and two air troops.13 In keeping with its
proposed role as an irregular warfare reaction force, the MCS
would contain five troops: two ground troops (A and C), two air
troops (B and D), and one headquarters troop with an attached for-
ward support troop. Like its Vietnam predecessor, each ground
platoon would contain a platoon leader’s vehicle, a scout sec-
tion (four scout vehicles), a tank section (three tanks), a rifle squad
(one vehicle), and a mortar carrier.14 With three platoons per troop,
the MCS would possess a robust ground combat capability based
on ample armored assets (nine tanks and fifteen armored troop
transports) and fire support (three mortar carriers).

Instead of the M2/M3 Bradley, the MCS could use light armored
vehicle (LAV) variants or a similar wheeled vehicle. Malone’s
study found that wheeled vehicles operated well in most irregu-
lar warfare environments; although they are vulnerable to tire
damage, there is agreement that they do less damage to road-
ways than most tracked vehicles.15 Alternately, the MCS could be
organized in tracked and wheeled variants. The idea is to provide

"One major illustration of the cavalry fragmentation in Vietnam is the air cavalry troop. Under the Vietnam-era table of organization and equipment
(TOE), a division cavalry squadron contained three ground troops and an air cavalry troop. While in theory this allowed ground troops to act on contacts
developed by the more mobile air troop, it also created the temptation for higher headquarters to split off the air troop."
as many mobility options as possible and not restrict deployment based on artificial considerations. Equipment for the MCS (except for aviation assets) would come from existing brigade combat teams (BCTs) where possible.

Adding a tank section and rifle squad to the MCS cavalry platoon is necessary for its function as a reaction force. Tanks have the ability to push through most roadblocks, move at night without lights, break trail for personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles in rugged terrain, and give the force "the ability to intercede without firing" based on the tank’s physical size and ability to absorb small-arms fire without taking damage or being forced to return fire. This intimidation and protection allows the MCS ground troops to go places HMMWV-mounted scouts or infantry would find too dangerous.

The rifle squad gives the MCS platoon the ability to put at least some dismounted “boots on the ground,” a major consideration in most irregular warfare situations. Foot patrolling and reconnaissance is essential — the rifle squad preserves each platoon’s ability to do both for at a minimum, local security. As the MCS supplements existing ground forces, and does not routinely occupy areas on its own for other than a short time, it is not critical that it have the ability to field large numbers of organic dismounts. For cordon and search missions, other ground elements would be attached to the MCS in its standard configuration, or the MCS ground element could be augmented with the air cavalry troop’s aero-rifle platoon. In either case, the proper role of the MCS would be as a quick-reaction force or supporting element for an infantry unit forming the cordon. However, it would still field more organic dismounts than existing cavalry or reconnaissance units.

The air cavalry troops are a combination reconnaissance and fire support asset, controlling both rotary wing and unmanned aerial vehicle assets to fully support the squadron’s activities and those of other units in the area. Specific platforms are not discussed here, although the MCS air cavalry troops would function well with either the OH-58D or MH-6 scout helicopter and the AH-64 or AH-1 attack helicopters. Based partially on experiences in Vietnam and the First Gulf War, each air cavalry troop is composed of a scout section, an attack section, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) section, and a lift section capable of transporting at least a platoon of ground forces. The lift section should be composed of MH-60s to allow for greater landing zone flexibility. Other outside air assets may be available, but the organic reconnaissance capability needs to be as flexible as possible. A combination of manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance assets, backed up with the firepower of attack helicopters, allows the air troops to function in almost any situation.

Each air troop in the MCS would also have a dedicated aero-rifle platoon on call to serve as either a rapid reaction force (to cover downed helicopters and quick reinforcements for MCS troops in contact) or a deep patrolling element. The aero-rifle platoon could also be attached to one of the ground troops, although this should be the exception rather than the rule. Lift for the aero-rifle platoon would come from organic MH-60s or other attached aircraft. The MH-60 option is preferable, and additional aircraft would provide airborne command and control for MCS elements. Organic lift assets would allow the MCS to react to far-flung contacts and information quickly without the lag that might be required to shift any attached assets to a proper response position. A lift section could also bring in attached ground units to help develop a contact initiated by either the aero-rifle platoon or another element of the MCS.

The aero-rifle platoon is trained to accomplish both basic light infantry tasks and specific reconnaissance and patrolling functions. Given the nature of the MCS, the aero-rifle platoon could provide reinforcements to a ground troop in contact, cover a downed helicopter, set up a hasty cordon around a village or quick vehicle checkpoint, and conduct limited patrolling from a base area on the model of Vietnam-era long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRPs), if required. The aero-rifle platoon gives the squadron additional “boots on the ground,” as well as a ground element that can develop its own intelligence, exploit contacts, or provide reinforcements as needed to ground troops.

As mentioned above, the air cavalry troop should also operate the squadron’s UAV assets. UAVs can act as additional scout helicopters and, in some configurations, as an additional attack el-
The air cavalry troops are a combination reconnaissance and fire support asset, controlling both rotary wing and unmanned aerial vehicle assets to fully support the squadron’s activities and those of other units in the area. Specific platforms are not discussed here, although the MCS air cavalry troops would function well with either the OH-58D or MH-6 scout helicopter and the AH-64 or AH-1 attack helicopters.

Although some might wish to place UAVs under the control of squadron headquarters, keeping them with each air cavalry troop preserves organization integrity and ensures that the assets will be available when and where needed without delays for coordination. The activities of the UAV section, and indeed air cavalry troops in general, may be coordinated by the intelligence section in the squadron headquarters element, but they should not be stripped from each air cavalry troop unless no other air assets are available, and even then it should only be done if absolutely necessary and on a case-by-case basis.

The headquarters troop and combat service support troop recognize the special needs of a mechanized unit configured for independent operations. A high concentration of mechanized vehicles and aircraft requires a robust support network, to include dedicated vehicle and aviation maintenance assets and tank recovery vehicles. Recent unit deployments have exposed weaknesses in the current organization of the headquarters and support troop, and the suggestions made by Major J.D. Keith, in his article, “3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry Up Front: Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned,” would work well with the MCS. Keith recommends increasing long-range communications capability, vehicle changes, and adding a forward area support company (FASCO) or team (FAST) to deal with the needs of cavalry in extended operations.

Some of these changes have already occurred, but it is critical for the headquarters troop to move with the rest of the MCS, protect itself, and provide in-house intelligence support to ground and air troops. This includes liaison personnel working with local law enforcement offices and various nongovernment organizations that are involved with relief efforts in many irregular warfare situations. The headquarters troop contains its own intelligence section, with teams pushed down to the troop command level as required by the tactical situation. This organic capability allows the MCS to develop and maintain a level of competency in intelligence operations that might prove lacking in any ad hoc force, or supplement the activities of a larger unit headquarters. The combat service support troop has an organic aircraft maintenance troop serving as a centralized support element for the two air troops, as well as sufficient resources to manage the squadron’s maintenance, supply, and service needs.

Although the MCS is an armored element, it has a relatively small logistics footprint when compared to other units that could fill its role. It is also designed to ensure its operational impact is at least as great as the effort required to field it in less-than-optimal conditions. With robust armor and air assets, and an organic intelligence collection and analysis capability, the MCS is effective in multiple dimensions of conflict, as opposed to a single capability unit. Designed to provide a major combat and reconnaissance punch in limited warfare situations, the MCS is a valuable force multiplier with firm roots in the American cavalry tradition.

Why Include Tanks?

Armor is no stranger to irregular warfare, serving in many roles before and after Vietnam. The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual, published in 1940, specifically states that, “the morale effect of tanks and armored cars is probably greater in small wars operations than it is in a major war.” Terrain is the only major limitation mentioned in the manual regarding the employment of armor. This is, however, one of those lessons that seem to need constant relearning, as Vietnam clearly demonstrates. The U.S. Army’s 1967 study of armored operations in Vietnam comments specifically on the psychological impact of tanks and mechanized forces. Armored forces have proven themselves capable of operating in a variety of terrain conditions, and the relatively light nature of the MCS (when compared to other mech-
organized units) makes it a natural fit for many operational areas that might otherwise be closed to heavy forces.

Including tanks in the MCS structure allows it to be used in situations other than irregular warfare without being too light to function. While mobile anti-armor platforms are effective, the battlefield survivability of the main battle tank is still beyond dispute. It remains relatively immune to rocket-propelled grenades and is unaffected by small-arms fire; the two major considerations in most irregular warfare deployments. It is also critical to remember the psychological impact of tanks in most combat situations, as well as their ability to remain among the best anti-armor platforms — the possibility of encountering hostile armored units in an irregular warfare situation cannot be completely discounted in today’s strategic environment. It is often forgotten that the North Vietnamese fielded armored elements after 1967, and it is always possible that rogue elements within a failed state could either buy or gain control of tanks (Africa is a prime example of this, although there are other possibilities as well). And in any situation that escalates beyond the framework of irregular warfare, the armored MCS would be able to develop intelligence and hold its own until the arrival of heavier units.21

One study consulted for this article evaluates the performance of armor (both tanks and infantry carriers such as the LAV, M113, and M2 Bradley), in operations ranging from Lebanon in 1982 through the 1994 Haiti intervention. Looking at both U.S. Army and Marine units, Major Jean Malone concludes that “[a]rmor is an exceptionally effective asset to have in MOOTW [military operations other than war]. It has an impact far out of proportion with the size of the units and the number of vehicles involved ... [i]t is a very effective tool to send a message or create a desired climate.”22 The study also highlights the possibility of designating “certain units to be the initial MOOTW contingency units.”23 This was a role once filled by cavalry and there is no reason why it cannot do so again.

Thoughts on Roles and Missions

An MCS organization would deploy to an irregular warfare situation as an independent unit. Given its four-line troop organization, an MCS can be broken down into two reaction forces, each with a ground troop and an air troop. With the ability to develop its own intelligence, the MCS acts on, or passes off, information to other elements for action. It can escort air convoys or respond to calls for help with equal speed and flexibility, bringing enough organic precision firepower to accomplish its mission with minimal collateral damage and maximum shock power. In short, it is a return to the historical model of American cavalry — a critical element we appear to be short of in today’s unsettled world.

As configured in this article, the MCS is not a traditional replacement for the heavy ACR, but it can serve in most roles covered by the ACR, and it is an ideal choice for many initial deployments. It functions better in an irregular warfare environment than the heavier ACR, and can hold the line in a high-intensity conflict until heavier units, such as the ACR, arrive. At five troops, it is slightly smaller than a traditional ACR, making it easier to sustain in less-than-ideal logistics situations. It does retain many of the capabilities of the larger ACR, and can take its place in many conflict environments. Given the structure of its air troops and a command troop that contains robust intelligence capabilities for its size, the MCS may even be a better fit in some environments and situations.

It is hoped that the concept for a medium cavalry squadron, however imperfectly it may be articulated in this article, spurs more serious discussion about the role of, and need for, cavalry in America’s force structure. Cavalry units in the U.S. Army must be prepared to fight for information, conduct a wide variety of combat operations, and serve as quick, hard-hitting reaction forces in a crisis. Any unit that does not have these capabilities is something less than cavalry and will fail to accomplish most traditional American cavalry missions — the MCS is only one part of the answer.

Notes

3Mullins, pp. 81-88.
5Starr, pp. 64-65, contends that “the last year of the Civil War was the high point for the cavalry, and the benchmark by which it measured its mission, tactics, weaponry, and self-identity.” I would question the sweeping nature of this assessment, but find the observation interesting.
6Starr, pp. 52-55, for a short discussion on scouts in the Frontier Army, both white civilian and Indian auxiliaries.
7There were also separate air cavalry squadrons, as well as those that were part of the two airborne divisions that eventually served in Vietnam. Pure air cavalry is outside the scope of this article, but it might be noted that it comes the closest to filling the traditional light cavalry role.
9Starr, p. 221.
10Starr, cites the need for integration of air and armored cavalry elements (as opposed to reorganizing units) makes it a natural fit for many operational areas that
11For an overview of the problems of doctrine faced by the Frontier Army; for conditions prior to the Civil War, as well as brief discussion on the European roots of U.S. Cavalry, see Starr, pp. 49-55.
12Given the nature of this assessment, but find the observation interesting.
13Starr, pp. 52-55, for a short discussion on scouts in the Frontier Army, both white civilian and Indian auxiliaries.
14Starr, p. 49-50.
15Starr, pp. 172-173.
17Major Jean T. Malone, “Armor in Military Operations Other Than War,” MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2005, pp. 26-27. In short, the subject of Taylor’s interview believes that a cavalry force that is augmented with more combat power becomes more aggressive and thus reluctant to carry out true reconnaissance missions.
18Starr, pp. 52-55, for a short discussion on scouts in the Frontier Army, both white civilian and Indian auxiliaries.
22Malone, p. 51.
23Malone, p. 51.
26Starr, p. 87.
27Starr, p. 87.
28William Van Horn is a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) administrative associate III, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT. He is currently pursuing a B.A. from Montana State University. His previous employment includes interlibrary loan technician, Montana State University; and researcher, U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, U.S. Cavalry Association, Fort Riley, KS.

William Van Horn is a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) administrative associate III, Montana State University, Bozeman, MT. He is currently pursuing a B.A. from Montana State University. His previous employment includes interlibrary loan technician, Montana State University; and researcher, U.S. Cavalry Memorial Research Library, U.S. Cavalry Association, Fort Riley, KS.
The U.S. Army is in advanced stages of discussion oriented around decisions to restructure the numbers and types of its brigade combat teams (BCTs). The likely outcome is a request for funding in future budget years to purchase more Stryker fighting vehicles and convert some number of existing brigade combat teams to additional Stryker brigades beyond the six already formed in the active component. This shift would reflect current thinking in the Department of Defense (DoD) and among senior Army leaders, expected to be validated by the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), that the force mix should be adjusted toward a force designed for medium-intensity conflict and away from the long-standing objective of fighting two high-intensity conflicts simultaneously. As a result, it is natural to presume that existing heavy brigades will be earmarked for conversion, leaving infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) unaffected. We should be concerned that reducing the number of heavy brigades in our force structure will jeopardize the U.S. Army’s capability to conduct major combat operations.

The total number of Stryker BCTs sought in the future force structure is the subject of this QDR study, but has not yet been revealed. However, we can take an educated guess by examining both the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and past comments of Army leaders. ARFORGEN places Army BCTs into ‘pools’ wherein unit readiness progresses over time from ‘not-ready’ to ‘train’ to ‘ready/available’ and ‘deployed.’ Our leaders have repeatedly stated the need to reach an eventual end state within the Army that supports commitments to enduring conflicts while giving soldiers 3 years at home station for each deployment. These two factors — ARFORGEN and the linked dwell time of our soldiers — leads us to reasonably expect the Army and DoD are seeking Stryker BCTs in multiples of four. There are currently six active component Stryker brigades, so the Army is probably seeking to add, or convert, either two or six brigades to the Stryker design. (See Figure 1.)

DoD and Army leaders currently believe that wars, such as the current foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will predominate the future. While this is likely true for the foreseeable future, it is not the only plausible scenario and properly preparing for the most likely threats does not necessitate significantly dismantling the armored force.

Current and Future Threats

Two of the four major conflicts, Desert Storm and the initial invasion of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), involving U.S. forces in the past 20 years were mechanized, high-intensity conflicts. Desert Storm came on the heels of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and was totally unanticipated — an easy il-
Illustration that not all conflicts fit the mold of operations forecasted in think tanks and decision centers of Washington. Further, a deliberate attack to liberate or regain territory, people, or assets — as seen during Desert Storm and OIF I — absolutely calls for both maneuverable and dominant forces. While the Stryker brigade provides exceptional maneuverability and its large number of anti-tank systems provide considerable firepower, the vehicle itself lacks protection and cannot face a tank. A Stryker brigade cannot take up the offense against any fairly equipped and organized enemy in the defense. Only the tank combines firepower, maneuver, and shock effect on a highly survivable platform.

While our current extensive involvement in counterinsurgencies/small wars/irregular warfare is obvious, and these commitments are expected to continue into the foreseeable future, for our Army to so single-mindedly plan, organize, and equip for this model comes at a great cost in capability for other scenarios. Defense policy critics have long assailed all armed forces for seeking capabilities beyond those of ‘peer’ or ‘near-peer’ threats. This shortsightedness rests on a fundamental fallacy of logic — we should not intend to design a force that lacks a decisive advantage. Parity is not good, dominance is. Our Army’s stated purpose is to fight and win our nation’s wars — not to tie. By focusing so doggedly on refining a force for low-end wars or unstable peace, we are reducing the price of conflict for near-peer competitors.

Flexibility

Contrary to currently fashionable criticisms, the heavy brigades are in fact highly flexible and adaptable organizations. All of the legacy and modular heavy BCTs, save one committed to Korea, have performed with distinction during at least one rotation to Iraq. Its ability to operate multiple fleets of Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, up armored HMMWVs, and eventually the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle, proves the heavy BCT’s ability to reconfigure, as needed, based on threat. Had they not been formed as heavy units and deployed with tracked vehicles, they would not have been able to ‘up-gun’ once in theater as the situation changed (scalability of violence/firepower). The 1st Cavalry Division’s first rotation to OIF in 2004 serves as a good example. Deployed without its tanks, the division encountered a fight hotter than expected and the Army had to rush to its aid and provide an emergency shipment of tanks to Iraq to marry up with the unit. This battlefield fix would not have been possible with the light units of the 10th Mountain Division or a Stryker brigade from Fort Lewis.

Heavy units can employ heavy, medium (MRAP), and light platforms across the spectrum of conflict thanks to the directed mission-essential task list (DMETL) training during the ARFORGEN cycle. Medium-weight units cannot do the same due to their military occupational specialties (MOS) and equipping limitations. Without tanks and 19K armor crewmen, units cannot adjust to lethal conditions greater than what are considered in the basis of the Stryker brigade’s design. Adding organic tanks to a Stryker brigade based on changing conditions would require new equipment fielded to non-armor MOS soldiers. This would be a painful and time-consuming proposition at home-station and impossible in combat. Conversely, countless 19K soldiers learned to drive the MRAP during brief stays in Kuwait before moving north into Iraq.

Opportunity Costs

Should heavy brigades be programmed to serve as advise-and-assist brigades or deploy as an embedded trainer team donor force, they can reorient to these missions in either the train or ready phase of the ARFORGEN cycle and deploy simply leaving their tracked vehicles in the care of Army Materiel Command field support units at home station. A light unit cannot reconfigure as a heavy force without a full-fledged BCT conversion, which the Army currently recognizes as a 2-year undertaking. BCT conversion removes the unit from its position in the ARFORGEN cycle, reducing the number of combat deployable brigades fielded by the Army.

Further Reduction of Combat Power

The combat power of the Army’s ground maneuver force has been significantly reduced over the past decade. As a lieutenant, I served in a legacy armor brigade of two tank battalions and one infantry battalion, totaling 12 tank and mechanized infantry companies. Today’s modular heavy BCT is comprised of two combined arms battalions, totaling just eight tank and mechanized infantry companies. Based on where we were 18 years ago, the reduction in the Army’s heavy force ground combat power has been severe.

No one should legitimately consider the armored reconnaissance squadron (ARS) in heavy brigades a fair substitute for the missing third battalion. Army force planners have explicitly acknowledged that the ARS was intentionally limited in design to perform surveillance activities and, as a result, is not sufficiently organized and equipped to perform reconnaissance in direct-fire contact with the enemy. Furthermore, it cannot perform guard missions without being augmented with forces from the parent brigade’s combined arms battalions.

### Army BCT Active Force Planned Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-FY10 Gates Budget</th>
<th>Gates Budget</th>
<th>HQDA Modeling / QDR Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IBCT / Airborne</strong></td>
<td><strong>IBCT / Airborne</strong></td>
<td><strong>IBCT / Airborne</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBCT x 23</td>
<td>IBCT x 20</td>
<td>IBCT x 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SBCT x 6</strong></td>
<td><strong>SBCT x 6</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Heavy BCT x 19</strong></td>
<td><strong>Heavy BCT x 19</strong></td>
<td><strong>Heavy BCT x 19</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(incl 1 x ACR)</td>
<td>(incl 1 x ACR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1
As the operations officer of an ARS deployed to Baghdad in support of OIF, I noticed that the unit’s cavalry mindset was very well suited to the counterinsurgency fight, and our table of organization and equipment (TOE) was adequate to accomplish tasks in low- to mid-intensity environments, as long as the brigade did not assign too much terrain. At the same time, I realized my squadron would not fare well in a Korea-based operations plan (OPLAN) or decisive operations in any potential theater of war. It is simply not a viable fighting force at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict. The squadron cannot fight for information against an enemy armored force equipped with even an obsolete generation of tanks or anything more than a smattering of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).

**Future Budget Challenges**

News articles in recent weeks have discussed instructions from Mr. David Ochmanek, Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for Force Transformation and Resources, to each of the military services to find $50 to $60 billion dollars in current budget programming to redirect toward new or expanded DoD irregular warfare efforts. This directive is evidently of the constrained budget environment the Army is entering into after a decade of steadily expanding funding. Because converting either a heavy or an infantry brigade to the Stryker configuration involves adding a third battalion, both courses of action will incur an aggregate manpower bill. However, the cost is not unusually large (1,000 to 3,000 soldiers, depending on the number of brigades converted), nor is it inescapable — force structure elsewhere could be trimmed in trade-off. But, adding Stryker brigades means buying more Strykers; there is no idle inventory of these vehicles resting somewhere within the Army. Each additional brigade will have a cost of around $1 billion dollars in Stryker vehicle acquisition alone. We can expect additional costs from sustainment needs and facility construction. In contrast, maintaining our existing heavy force does not ‘add’ any cost to the baseline budget, those funds are already programmed and the Army has an adequate inventory of tracked vehicles.

**Role of the Armored Cavalry Regiment**

Another cause for alarm is the potential end to the Brave Rifles of the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) if it is chosen as one of the units to be converted to a Stryker brigade. Threats to the heavy cavalry regimental organization are not new. Inexplicably, the 3d ACR has been a thorn in the side of Army headquarters — its unique organization as the sole-surviving ACR is a true square peg in a round hole for our leaders who view the heavy, infantry, and Stryker designs as the only three substantiated brigade combat teams in the force structure. They could not have it more wrong! The ACR, with or without an organic attack/scout aviation component, is absolutely the most lethal and capable formation in our Army today. Its weight and firepower should be embraced, not disdained.

My experiences as an S3 in an ARS modular heavy BCT compares with my captain time as a cavalry troop commander in a divisional cavalry squadron; the cavalry troop was identical to the squadron troops in the 3d ACR, but the difference in capability was vast. The ACR employs twice the number of tanks as the heavy BCT.

Only the ACR, with its extra punch, can adequately perform the advance guard mission in front of a U.S. Army formation on the offense during major combat operations, and only the ACR can adequately perform a cover mission in a defense scenario. The ill-formed heavy brigades in today’s Army need an ACR alongside or out in front of them on a lethal battlefield.

It is true that the ACR has not functioned as a guard or cover force, traditional cavalry roles, during major combat operations in this decade, which does not in any way invalidate the organization’s place in a proper force structure designed for more than just medium-/low-intensity irregular warfare. That the 3d ACR was uninvolved in the attack north from Kuwait to Baghdad in 2003 has nothing to do with

"While the Stryker brigade provides exceptional maneuverability and its large number of anti-tank systems provide considerable firepower, the vehicle itself lacks protection and cannot face a tank. A Stryker brigade cannot take up the offense against any fairly equipped and organized enemy in the defense. Only the tank combines firepower, maneuver, and shock effect on a highly survivable platform."
its design, which ironically was highly desired by planners of the ground invasion. It does, however, have more to do with the late arrival to Iraq, for the regiment and the 4th Infantry Division, after the government of Turkey denied a northern invasion route. In fact, it can easily be argued that the ACR successfully accomplished its tasks in 2005, in a counterinsurgency environment, across far-flung reaches of Iraq, solely based on its unique, robust organization.

**Shift the Center of Gravity**

Shifting the center of gravity of the Army’s brigades toward a medium force while adding to the aggregate capability of the Army, rather than reducing it, improves the overall posture of the Army. If the Army can surmount the budget challenge associated with equipping more brigades with Strykers, then it should move forward. There is plenty of positive feedback from several deployments to Iraq on the organization’s speed, agility, and depth (unlike the heavy and infantry brigades, the Stryker BCT has the sought-after third maneuver battalion). Its utility, in the appropriate operating environment, is proven. The right answer for the Army, budget conditions supporting, is to look first at light units as donor forces for Stryker brigade conversions. We will have 20 poorly armed and equipped infantry brigades in the Army structure following completion of the “grow the Army plan.” Is there conceivable utility for 20 such IBCTs?

The IBCT design does not succeed without the enormous hidden cost of a vehicle fleet that is not represented in the TOE. No IBCT has ever been successful in Iraq without a dramatic wheeled vehicle fleet augmentation (initially uparmored HMMWVs and later MRAPs). The contrast is stark — in certain environments (and not just the contemporary environment in Iraq), where a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) may have surplus capability, there is an entire range of the spectrum of conflict where the IBCT is unsuitable. Converting the one IBCT in Hawaii, the four brigades of the 10th Mountain Division, and the 3d Brigade of the 1st Infantry at Fort Knox, would generate significant medium-force capability for the Army without impacting a single one of the 10 airborne and air-assault/airmobile IBCTs. Our Army leaders should have to convincingly demonstrate why this is not a better course of action.

**Figure 2**

Three sound force mix options are depicted in Figure 2. (Options 2 and 3 reflect the continued commitment of one heavy BCT in Korea that falls outside the ARFORGEN cycle).

**Fix What Needs Fixing**

Drawing down the number of heavy brigades in the force mix underscores the need to expand the number of ACRs in the active Army from one to four. A force structure including four ACRs rests on the same ARFORGEN-based analytical underpinning behind the department’s push for more Stryker brigades, and it is every bit as applicable and appropriate. This should be done by converting three existing heavy brigades to the ACR design. With 19 heavy formations in the active component, the operational and tactical rationale for increasing the count of ACRs from one to four is already absolutely compelling. Should the number of heavy brigades decrease, the case for more ACRs only grows — building cavalry regiments from heavy brigade combat teams will reduce accepted risk in the overall force mix restructuring.

As a cost-saving measure, Brave Rifles and the additional three ACRs could be organized without an organic aviation component, thanks to the highly successful and proven design of the Army’s modular combat aviation brigade (CAB). A division maneuvering multiple BCTs on the battlefield also employs a CAB, and when the ACR serves as the main effort, it expects to receive weighted support from the CAB. In fact, the Army could use aviation assets now found within the 3d ACR as the cornerstone of a 12th CAB, thereby exploiting a retooling of the ground maneuver force to build up the Army’s aviation component to that magic ARFORGEN multiple of four.

Similarly, if the Army forges ahead with converting a number of heavy BCTs to Stryker formations, it must address the lack of the third combined arms battalion and the underweight reconnaissance squadron in the surviving heavy units, which is as important as the contemplated Stryker conversions. There is substantial documentation, such as commander comments, official U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) studies (at least one commissioned by the Chief of Staff of the Army), and other simulations modeling, both inside and outside the Army, repeatedly validating both the requirement for the third maneuver battalion and the need to add strength to the painfully small reconnaissance squadron. The squadron and the larger brigade organization simply lack both lethality and survivability. The drive for ‘flexibility’ and reduced shipping weight over the past 10 years has resulted in a design acknowledged as inadequately capable for major combat operations and inadequately sized for the contemporary counterinsurgency environment. Even the Government Accounting Office (GAO) has questioned the two-battalion design. With a reduced number of total heavy brigades in the Army following a large-scale Stryker conversion, remedying these two signature issues will become increasingly necessary.

By improving the reconnaissance squadron design, the Army could, in one stroke, restore the capability to fight like cavalry and generate a true third maneuver battalion in the heavy brigade combat team. The Army should replace the hybrid HMMWV/Bradley scout platoons with all-Bradley platoons and add two tank platoons to each troop, essentially restoring the squadron to the divisional cavalry design, minus the aviation component. Providing for additional dismounted scouts is another low-cost incremental improvement. With these changes, the cavalry could once again fight for information; conduct doctrinal reconnaissance and security missions without augmenta-
tion that robs other units of their power; and possess the larger manpower count needed to hold terrain and conduct operations in the counterinsurgency environment on par with the two combined arms battalions of the brigade combat team.

The expanded logistics support required for the redesigned ARS would be minimal — perhaps as little as three mechanics and a light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) shop van per line troop maintenance team; six mechanics and three M88A2 Hercules in the service/recovery section, replacing the existing four M88s across the forward support company with the Hercules; adding 12 soldiers and six additional fuel trucks to the class III section; and adding two soldiers and one palletized load system (PLS) truck and trailer to the five already in the class V section. In total, solving the problems of each heavy brigade’s reconnaissance squadron entails growing its tail by as few as 29 sustainer and a few vehicles (see Figure 3).

A step beyond these improvements would be to add an armor company and associated support to the squadron’s structure, but the potential for that development is likely quite remote, given the Army’s other needs and the requirement to stay within budget and manpower ceilings.

At some point, a diminished armored force will leave our Army unable to fight and win the Nation’s wars — we should reconsider current intentions and move in a different direction.

Major Aaron Lilley is the operations officer, 5th Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Fort Riley, KS, currently deployed to Iraq. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and Cavalry Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include operations officer, Special Troops Battalion, 2BCT, 1ID, Fort Riley; future operations officer, G3, 1ID, Fort Riley; XO, 1st Battalion, 310th Infantry (AC/RC Training Support Battalion), Fort Bragg, NC; and commander, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, TX.

“If the Army can surmount the budget challenge associated with equipping more brigades with Strykers, then it should move forward. There is plenty of positive feedback from several deployments to Iraq on the organization’s speed, agility, and depth (unlike the heavy and infantry brigades, the Stryker BCT has the sought-after third maneuver battalion). Its utility, in the appropriate operating environment, is proven.”
The Case for Outcomes-Based Training and Education

by Major Chad R. Foster

“To be a good soldier a man must have discipline, self-respect, pride in his unit and his country, a high sense of duty and obligation to his comrades and his superiors, and self-confidence born of demonstrated ability.”

— General George S. Patton Jr.

A Warning from General Patton

As a major stationed in Hawaii during the mid-1920s, George S. Patton Jr. spent much of his time writing and discussing topics related to leadership, training, and tactics. Although not an academically distinguished cadet at West Point, Patton was a voracious reader of history throughout his life and he sought to learn all that he could to make himself a better combat leader. One of the most admirable things about Patton was that his love for history was not chained to the thinking of past generations — he understood the lessons of history in context and applied them to contemporary times. In this way, he was a forward-thinker with the wisdom to heed the warnings of the past. It is hardly surprising then that his writings from this period illustrate some key insights that are highly applicable today.

In 1919, Patton wrote the first draft of a short lecture on the history and employment of light tanks. After considering his firsthand combat experiences and observations in World War I, he updated the lecture at some point in the early 1920s to include many of his own opinions and analysis. As he advocated the concept of mobile warfare using armored forces, Patton complained that too many officers were perfectly satisfied with resting on the laurels of past tactical details be bent to the employment of the instruments of combat … in the best way most suitable to kill the enemy.”

These statements were part of Patton’s efforts to champion the continued development of armored forces even as many of his contemporaries were saying that the tank was a short-lived gimmick that had no place on future battlefields. The coming years would confirm Patton’s foresight as the allies confronted the Nazi war
machine in Europe. However, at the heart of his message is a warning that we, as the trainers and mentors for our Army, must heed. The great temptation is to rely on what is written in a manual as if it were inflexible law or continue a practice because “we have always done it this way.” In this approach, creative thinking and decisionmaking are absent, just as Patton warned. This great commander understood that a soldier (and especially a leader) must adjust to changing situations on the battlefield. In short, Patton was saying that good leaders apply commonsense and fundamental principles to solving problems and making decisions. They do not bind themselves mindlessly to past practices without fully understanding their underlying principles. These fundamental principles, not the process or method, must serve as the guide for future action.4

The Traditional Approach to Training and the Need for Change

“We need to shift our culture toward one where we have thinking leaders who can train and lead thinking soldiers.”3

— Colonel Casey Haskins

In today’s traditional approach to training, soldiers and units train a task until they reach a minimum standard under a specific set of conditions. Immediately on demonstrating this baseline level of proficiency, they hurry along to the next task like a worker on an assembly line. In the vast majority of cases, this approach does not require soldiers to learn the why behind their actions or to advance beyond the minimum standard stated in the manual. They become very adept at performing the choreographed steps of an established process, but when faced with a drastically changed set of conditions, these soldiers can do little more than revert to the “rehearsed solution,” regardless of whether or not it is appropriate to the new situation. There is little or no emphasis on the development of judgment or initiative in our soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), or officers. This traditional approach is a not well-suited to building fighters who can think effectively and adapt to unforeseen changes on the battlefield.

The task-conditions-standard approach to training is the product of an industrial assembly-line mentality that was born out of the necessities of the Cold War. As the West faced the threat of a massive Soviet assault, we depended on the rapid mobilization of Reserves to fight a few titanic battles on the plains of Europe. In this type of environment, an assembly-line approach was a logical solution because it was (and continues to be) fast, efficient, and simple enough for masses of newly mobilized citizen soldiers with no previous military experience to quickly grasp. With a powerful, but predictable, adversary on the other side, time and efficiency were of far more importance than the development of true professionalism.6

The historical American distrust of a large professional standing army also played a role, and this traditional training approach was appealing because it very much resembled the “management science” applied by major corporations.

However, the contemporary operating environment bears no resemblance to the Cold War era. We are not facing the threat of a massive assault by enemy tanks in Europe. Instead, we are fighting adversaries that have no discernible doctrine and do battle with us asymmetrically, pitting their strengths against our weaknesses. In this type of combat, nothing is ever simple and our soldiers and junior leaders must rapidly adapt to unforeseen situations and unfamiliar environments. To prepare for this brand of warfare, it seems clear that a simple, assembly-line approach to training and leader development is woefully inadequate.

There exists a solution to this problem, which is starting to gain momentum throughout the Army — outcomes-based training and education (OBTE). This philosophy nurtures adaptability, initiative, and self-confidence by going beyond the minimalist mindset that today characterizes much of our Army’s training. In OBTE, the tasks, conditions, and standards found in our doctrinal publications serve as a starting point or baseline, not an end state, for training events. Instead, OBTE focuses on achieving a desired outcome that more closely resembles the proclaimed goal of every commander — excellence or mastery. Exactly how the soldier or unit gets to the desired end state is irrelevant as long as the solution is appropriate to the current situation. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) remain important, but they are not taught as dogmatic checklists that one must follow without question. Trainers explain the fundamental principles that underlie those TTP, which should guide future decisionmaking. Rather than merely memorizing the steps of a process or a battle drill, soldiers learn the why behind their actions, which gives them the ability to either choose an existing TTP that is appropriate or improvise as necessary.

Objectives, Outcomes, and the Exercise of Mission Command in Training

It is important to understand the difference between an objective and an outcome. According to U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 350-70, A Systems Approach to Training, Management, Processes, and Products, a learning objective is a familiar, three-part statement that describes what a soldier is supposed to be able to do “under specific conditions to accepted standards.” It consists of the task to be trained, the conditions under which it will be trained, and the standard to which it will be trained. As explained earlier, the standard articulated in most objectives is a minimum standard for performance. Ultimately, training objectives are concerned with competencies (a soldier or unit can do “task A” when provided with specific assets under specific circumstances). However, a desired competency does not get to the point of building the ability of individuals and units to do new things with different assets under any set of conditions. Competencies also do not account for those intangible attributes that are often critical in combat such as initiative, judgment, confidence, and personal accountability.

An outcome, on the other hand, provides a broader purpose for the training event. Conceptually, it fills the same role as training as a commander’s intent statement in a tactical operation. By articulating a desired outcome(s) for a training event, the commander can provide guidance on results he expects the training to achieve, regardless of any constraints that might emerge. For example, consider a situation where a commander wants to train his subordinate leaders to become effective in preparing and issuing a warning order. Figure 1 shows a training objective for this task taken directly out of Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-24, Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT), Warrior Leader Skills Level 2, 3, and 4. At best, this objective establishes a “training floor” for the task. At worst, it restricts the soldier by reinforcing the notion that the process or method that he employs is the most important consideration in determining success or failure in the training event. The obvious question is two-fold: does referencing the warning order at the beginning of the brief have any bearing on how effective the order really is; and does using standard terminology or a specific format ensure that subordinates get any value from the warning order?

In contrast, if a commander articulates his desired outcomes, such as those listed on the right side of Figure 1, it becomes clear what truly defines success in this training. The outcomes do not address the inputs by the soldier; they focus only on the results of the warning order as observed through the lens of the audience. The exact format and terminology used by the soldier are not important. All that matters is that the audience gets some value out of the warning order that allows them to effectively prepare for the upcoming operation. Of course, this does not mean that a trainer would never address possible techniques such as the use of the five-paragraph format or correct doctrinal terminology. With an outcomes-based approach, these techniques are viewed only as possible methods that one might employ within the context of the current situation.

This approach illustrates how OBTE encourages the exercise of mission command in training. Simply put, mission command, sometimes referred to as “mission tactics,” is the practice of clearly articulating an intent to subordinates and then charging them with the responsibility of figuring out exactly how to meet that intent. For a soldier or leader to be effective in this type of command atmosphere, he must be able to think and solve problems. He must have the initiative and courage to act without being told exactly what to do. For this approach to work, the commander must clearly communicate his intent, just as he must during a tactical operation. Outcomes allow him to do so while leaving room for his subordinates to exercise their own judgment and creativity. In fact, an outcomes-based approach not only allows thinking and initiative, it forces them to become requirements.

An Example: Warning Orders

Traditional “Input-Based” Approach

| Task | Issue a warning order * |
| Condition | Given preliminary notice of an order or action that is to follow and a requirement to develop and issue a warning order to subordinates. |
| Standards | Within time allotted, develop a warning order and issue it to subordinate leaders. Issue order so that all subordinate leaders understand their missions and any coordinating instructions. Issue it in the standard operation order (OPORD) format. |
| Performance Measures | GO | NO GO |
| 1. Said “Warning Order” | | |
| 2. Used standard terminology | | |
| 3. Used five-paragraph format | | |
| 4. Gave all available information | | |

* From STP 21-24 SMCT

Our Approach

Desired outcomes of a warning order:

1. Subordinates understand, and can explain, the nature and purpose of the upcoming mission.
2. Subordinates know what preparations they must accomplish for the upcoming mission, why they must complete those preparations and when those preparations must be complete.
3. Subordinates have maximum time to prepare for the upcoming operation.

These outcomes do not restrict the trainee in terms of methods or techniques that they can use to achieve “success” other than the requirement that they are appropriate within the context of the current situation and the higher commander’s intent.
OBTE: The Intersection of Education and Training

The fact that both training and education are included in this approach makes OBTE a source of anxiety and a target of criticism. The critics are always quick to point out that there is a difference between training and education, and they are absolutely correct. However, they are wrong in the notion that training and education cannot occur simultaneously within the execution of a single developmental event. “The ability to think logically, to approach problemsolving methodically, but without a predetermined set of solutions,” is inherent in education. In short, education is focused on how to think, not what to think. Training, on the other hand, is the application of education in the real world. It deals primarily with what to do and how to do it. The relationship between education and training is much like the relationship between the classroom and the lab. They are, therefore, mutually supporting efforts that one must view in close connection to each other. Attempts to frame these two things in isolation result in missed opportunities to develop soldiers, units, and leaders to their full potential.

In the traditional approach, there is no evident link between training and education. In keeping with the assembly-line mentality, trainers are encouraged to look at actions (tasks) discretely without regard to any larger context. The message is clear: get your soldiers to the standard (the minimum level of proficiency) and then move on to the next task. There is no focus on understanding the why behind each action. For example, an initial entry soldier might be taught individual movement techniques (low crawl, high crawl, and rush), but how much emphasis would be placed on understanding why he might choose to use each of these techniques? The soldier would leave basic training knowing how to execute a low crawl, high crawl, and a rush, but he would not necessarily be equipped to make rapid and sound decisions about when to use each under fire. This problem is largely due to the fact that the practical application of these techniques in training is often done on scripted lanes and ranges; for example, “you will low crawl from position 1 to position 2, throw your grenade at the enemy bunker, and then you will conduct a 3-5 second rush up to position 3.” This method does not require any thought on the part of the soldier. Instead, the soldier is merely following instructions shouted by a drill sergeant. This might make the soldier very proficient at executing the techniques, but he will not necessarily be able to adapt to a new situation where he does not have a rehearsed script.

In an outcomes-based approach, the trainer would teach the soldier not only the various movement techniques, but why he might chose to execute each one. The soldier would steadily progress to a “lane,” just as in the traditional approach. However, instead of a scripted scenario, the soldier would be instructed only to get into position to destroy the enemy bunker without being killed by hostile fire. In attempting to achieve this outcome, the soldier would be required to determine which movement technique is appropriate to the terrain and threat. This seemingly simple shift in approach does not allow thinking — it requires thinking! Because of this blend of thinking and action, OBTE sits squarely at the intersection of education and training, not just in one sphere or the other (see Figure 2 as an illustration). Therefore, it is more appropriate to think of the outcomes-based approach as development, a combination of thinking and action within the execution of an individual or collective task.

Patton’s Warning Revisited

General Patton rightly believed that “[n]o army is better than its soldiers.” Because he understood this truth, it seems clear that he would have embraced OBTE. Just as Patton grasped the potential of the tank as it emerged on the scene in the late stages of World War I, our Army’s leaders must now see that OBTE offers a far better alternative for soldier development than the traditional input-based approach. Unfortunately, advocates of OBTE encounter resistance just as Patton did as he advocated the development of Ameri-
The purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes: Has not changed during preceding 12 months.

**Publication Title:** ARMOR. **Publication Number:** 0000-2420. **Filing Date:** 23 September 2009. **Issue Frequency:** Bimonthly. **Number of Issues Published Annually:** 6. **Annual Subscription Price:** $27.00.


**Notes**

3. Ibid., p. 793.
4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0. Operations, Appendix D. clearly states that our doctrine consists of three components: fundamental principles, tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP); and terminology and symbols. In the past, we have done a fairly good job of emphasizing the latter two. Exercises at our training centers always focus on TTP and our schoolhouses, especially those that educate officers, are obsessed with the exact usage of our "professional language." However, the first component usually has been, at best, an afterthought. This is mostly due to the fact that memorizing drills out of a manual and the doctrinal definitions of terms is far easier than the thoughtful application of fundamental principles in decisionmaking within the context of new and unheated situations.

5. Colonel Haskins is the former commander of 198th Brigade Combat Team, Fort Benning, GA. In that position, he implemented an outcomes-based approach at every level within his command from basic training of enlisted soldiers to the development of captains at the infantry captain career course. He is currently the director of the Department of Military Instruction at West Point.

6. The ‘professionalism’ that I refer to involves a never-ending dedication to the study of the profession of arms with the intent to improve one’s ability to lead in combat. I am not talking about the ‘professionalism’ that many today characterize as ‘polished conduct or polished appearance. Many of the most effective military leaders in history were rough in appearance and speech, but they knew how to achieve victory. This is what we should be striving to instill in our soldiers, NCOs, and officers. ‘Spit and polish’ does not win in combat and a soldier with shiny boots is not necessarily the one that will be the best under fire.


10. Ibid., p. 41.
11. Ibid., p. 44.

Major Chad Foster is currently serving as course director, Military Science 300, Department of Military Instruction, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. He received a B.S. form the United States Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Captain Career Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Scout Platoon Leader Course, Air Assault School, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 66th Armor (1-66 AR), 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division (ID), Taj, Iraq; commander, D Company, 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood, TX; S3 (Air), 1-66 AR, 1st BCT, 4th ID, Fort Hood; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3/7 CAV), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA; and scout platoon leader, A Troop, 3/7 CAV, 3d ID, Fort Stewart.
Partnership Predicament: Counterinsurgency Vignette

by Captain Andrew G. Gourgoumis, U.S. Marine Corps

SITUATION

You are the platoon leader for 2d Platoon, E Troop, 2d Squadron, and your platoon is operating in partnership with an Afghan National Army (ANA) company in Helmand Province. Each month you send a patrol back to your squadron’s forward operating base (FOB) to collect the monthly salary from the civil affairs detachment for your partnered ANA company. You have been operating in this battle space for 5 months; the first 3 months of the deployment you had significant enemy contact and six soldiers in your platoon were killed in action. In the past 2 months, you have had virtually no enemy contact.

Your counterpart ANA company commander is 20 years older than you and has nearly 30 years of combat experience. The ANA soldiers are from outside of the province. Your troop’s area of operations is extremely large; your platoon is 70km from your troop’s combat outpost and you only see your troop commander about twice a month. About once a month, the civil affairs detachment visits to speak briefly with the ANA commander.

In the past 3 months, the ANA company has had a significant number of desertions estimated at about 25 soldiers. However, you have noticed that the amount of salary money you deliver to the ANA commander has not decreased. Also, one of your noncommissioned officers informs you that while on patrol, he witnessed the ANA commander passing money to influential members of the local community.

After pondering over where the ANA commander might be getting this money, you confront him. He tells you that he has been supplementing the local economy and leaders with the surplus salary money from the deserters to create stability and shield the people from the influence of the Taliban. He tells you that the salaries of the 25 deserted soldiers have done more for stability and security than he could have accomplished if he had those 25 soldiers. He points out the drop in violence proves his success. The ANA commander also tells you not to inform your chain of command or the civil affairs detachment because he will no longer receive the salary money and the results would be a disastrous return to violence and a resurgence of the Taliban dollar diplomacy. He reminds you that both your commander and his commander have been extremely pleased with the progress made in this area. He asserts that “this is how things work in Afghanistan … and this is what will defeat the Taliban.”

There is no way for you to know if he is distributing all of the excess salary money or if he is taking a cut for himself. You also begin to wonder whether the 25 ANA soldiers actually defected or if they were fired by the ANA commander as part of his plan to execute this strategy. What do you do, lieutenant?

SOLUTION

There is no perfect solution for this predicament. However, there is something to be learned about what techniques we are using across the counterinsurgency lines of operations, as well as what we are using as measures of effectiveness.

The ANA commander found a way to create short-term success in your area of operations, but is it a long-term solution?

What can you learn from this and how can you use it as an effective strategy? You now realize that local leaders have the real power to control the violence in your area of operations. Can they do this only with cash or has the purse just motivated them to exercise power and control? Is the money being used to stimulate the local economy and jobs to prevent Taliban recruitment? These are issues that need to be discussed with your commander — a valuable commander will use his experience and influence to help build on these revelations and successes while ensuring you do not get burned or lose the trust of the ANA commander.
Translator Troubles: Ethical Vignette

by Captain Andrew G. Gourgoumis, U.S. Marine Corps

SITUATION

You are a platoon leader with A Troop, 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, operating independently of your troop, and your battle space is dominated by a relatively large population center. Having the ability to communicate with the people in your area of operations is critical to your platoon’s success. Specific guidance has been pushed down from higher that interpreters are not to be armed.

Your interpreter has had several threats made against his life. Despite the security provided to him by your soldiers, he is refusing to leave the combat outpost (COP) unless he is armed. You have reported this problem to your troop commander; he emphasized that the policy stands, you will not receive another translator, and you need to use force of personality to get your translator out of the wire and earning his pay. Your 1st squad leader pointed out that there are some locally confiscated pistols and ammunition that could be given to your translator, which would suffice and meet his requests. You continue to conduct operations without your translator, but your ability to make any progress with the community is extremely inhibited by the language barrier.

UPDATE

Two weeks later, your translator informs you that he is willing to go outside the wire again, so you immediately begin taking him on patrols and sending him out with squads. Progress in your area of operations increases dramatically and the local community is functioning in synchronization with your squadron’s infrastructure objectives. About 6 weeks have passed when you are out on patrol with your 1st squad inside the village. You are looking at an irrigation pump with your platoon sergeant while the translator, squad leader, and a team of soldiers are a few houses down inspecting buildings and talking with locals. Suddenly, four shots are fired and you hear a woman screaming. You and your platoon sergeant run to the building and find your 1st squad leader arrived only a few seconds before you, and did not witness the incident.

Village elders gather at the scene and begin yelling at you. The translator attempts to calm them down, but since he is the only Pashto speaker, you have no idea what he is telling them and who he is blaming. You try to step in and talk with the local men; however, since the translator has a personal investment in what happened, you no longer trust the translator to be honest in his translations. After pacifying the situation, as well as could be expected, you and the patrol return to the COP where you call a meeting with your platoon leaders and demand to know how the translator got the pistol. No one answers, and in frustration, you dismiss them and discuss possible solutions with your platoon sergeant. Due to the seriousness of the incident and the repercussions it will have, you report it to higher.

Later that evening, your 1st squad leader comes to you and admits giving the weapon to the translator. He explains that he saw the platoon’s frustration with its inability to interact with the community and felt he needed to act. He felt he was protecting you by withholding this information. He knew that you would not be willing to disobey the commander’s orders, but you could not have any success unless the platoon could get the translator out of the wire. He felt that by having a weapon, the translator would feel safe and be willing to do his job. He also felt that he could mitigate the risk of him using it by staying close to him on patrols and emphasizing that his soldiers provide security for him.

Your 1st squad leader is a sergeant and an outstanding soldier who sets a great example for junior soldiers. He always does everything you ask of him with the utmost professionalism and he is on the upcoming promotion selection board.

REQUIREMENT

Your troop commander is demanding answers as to what happened and how he got the weapon. What do you do? What recommendations do you make to the company commander?

SOLUTION

Your sergeant made a mistake and owned up to it. He is willing to accept the consequences. You should report to the commander exactly what the sergeant told you and recommend the squadron appoint an investigating officer to conduct a preliminary inquiry. The translator should be confined to the COP under constant observation and supervision. You must request a new translator and support from the information operations cell to deal with the consequences of the incident. A plan should be formulated to keep local leaders informed of the investigation. By no means should you turn over the translator to any Afghan authority without orders from higher. You should assemble your platoon and discuss the incident. If possible, have the squad leader explain what he did and why it was wrong. Recommend non-judicial punishment for the sergeant due to the seriousness of the incident.
Part 5 of the ARMOR Series:

**Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Volume V, Part 1: Events Leading to the Outbreak of the 1920 Revolt**

by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

**Foreword**

Surely one of the lessons of the past decade is that basic familiarity with the tenets and customs of Islam is an essential prerequisite for involvement in a Middle Eastern country. Familiarity with the key events of regional history, and the way the memory of these events helps Middle Eastern people define themselves, is equally essential.

Many of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have served in Iraq know that Iraqis have an intense, if sometimes subjective, awareness of their history. The Iraqis, or at least their leaders, have shown in a number of key decisions since 2003 that they are not prisoners of their history; rather, they are consciously building on their historical foundation, with an emphasis on remedying the worst effects of recent history. In addition to providing a foundation, their history helps Iraqis define and orient themselves within their region, nation, and smaller community. The interpretation of past events may vary depending on the region or community to which a particular Iraqi belongs, but his or her sense of history helps shape self-perception. For this reason, the Iraqi understanding of their history is a major element of the human terrain on which counterinsurgency and stability operations are conducted.

Historical remembrance can divide Iraqis, whose nation is formed from a number of ethnic groups, faith communities, and tribes, which were deposited along Iraq’s rivers and in its northern mountains by successive tides of invasion and imperial struggle. For example, three contrasting recollections of events are at the heart of the unsettled status of Kirkuk. But Iraqis also proudly recall events that unified them, such as the events of the 1920 effort to expel the British. The 1920 revolt, for the first time in the modern era, revealed Iraq’s potential to be more than a disparate collection of tribes and sects. Even today, we sometimes get only fleeting glimpses of Iraqis’ aspiration for unity, but pride in the events of the early 1920s shows that a desire for “Iraqiness” to trump other loyalties is still there.

But how do we get the often complicated facts on the 1920 events to busy leaders and planners who need them? The extraordinary, multivolume classic history of Dr. Ali al-Wardi is typical in its lack of general availability. Enter Commander Aboul-Enein, who has made this key work accessible in a useful summary forum, and ARMOR’s production staff, who has published it. Anyone interested in Iraq should read what follows, and especially those who are serving or will serve again in Iraq.

Commander Aboul-Enein is dedicated to the principle that understanding any operational environment means knowing the religious and historical writings that are most important to the population — in this case, a largely Arab population. We may have other opportunities to stabilize countries with unfamiliar cultures and histories. Let’s resolve to apply Commander Aboul-Enein’s principle from the start.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel Christopher C. Straub
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Middle East (2008-2009)
Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: (1918-1920) of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Events Leading to the Outbreak of the 1920 Revolt (1918-1920)

The 1920 Iraqi revolt against the British is a seminal event in modern Iraqi political history. Wardi’s multivolume set devotes two full volumes to this incident alone. His fifth volume is among the most comprehensive examinations of this revolt from a religious, tribal, social, and military vantage. It is also an event charged with emotion, and Wardi recognized that books about Iraq’s 1920 revolt are biased in favor of one side or another. During the 1970s, Arab authors commented and wrote on this revolt through the lens of Arab nationalist movements.

The United States remains committed to the future development of Iraq, and as long as we have forces there, it is vital that we have an understanding of Iraq’s human terrain. Those who argue that the 1920 revolt was simply a continuation of tribal rebellions to central rule are dismissing the nuances of what would cause this revolt and sustain the insurgency against the British. The revolt began in the summer of 1920 and was not contained until the end of 1920, with sporadic outbursts until 1922. Wardi devotes more than 800 pages to dissecting the social, tribal, political, and military aspects of this event in his seminal six-volume work, Lamahaat Ijtimaiyah min Tareekh Iraq al-Hadeeth, or Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History. This article, Part 1, assesses the first 400 pages, which focus on events leading to the revolt. Volume V, Part 2, assesses the remaining 400 pages and focuses on how the British ended this revolt through a combination of force and compromise, and will be published in the January-February 2010 edition of ARMOR.

Wardi opens this volume with one question that leads into a 1,000-page explanation of the lead up, the events, and the conclusion of the 1920 revolt. In 1918, many Iraqis welcomed British occupation for various reasons — largely to escape Ottoman oppression and minimally to end the crossfire between Ottoman and British forces. During the revolt, 1918-1920, Iraqis submitted to an expression of the times, “may infidelity remain as long as injustice flees.” Wardi’s opening question is an attempt to explore why it took 3 years for the British to isolate a significant part of the Iraqi population — Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis.

Some of the societal issues that began eroding British authority were the granting of privileges to those on the fringes of Iraqi society. Examples include using Arab and non-Arab bullies, street thugs, and brigands to police the streets. The amount of money that flooded into Iraq to maintain British forces led to high prices for commodities and rents. This, in turn, led to a vicious competition among Iraqis for access to English funds. The British chose an opposite tribal policy from that of the Ottomans, choosing to unify tribes under one British-appointed official versus the Turkish policy of dividing tribes and clans in order to rule. The British chose a tribal elder, who was made responsible for an area of Iraq.

The British were attempting to mirror methods of subjugating Baloch tribes in what is now South Pakistan. These methods were short-term, but provided immediate chains of command and subdued large swaths of Iraq; however, the British were eventually seen as part of
the tribe, clan and sub-clan, in areas they chose to police and tribal backers of those they appointed. Incredibly, the British mirrored tribal succession from father to son or from brother to brother, instead of being sensitive to the tribal consensus used to select a tribal elder. The mechanics of the 1920 revolt were sustained in part by tribes seeking to punish tribes close to the British. Privileged tribes used their ties to the British to tax and lord over other tribes. Another problem was the insensitivity to Iraq’s customs such as the imposition of dogs accompanying British officers into the tent of Bedouins; the animal although used for hunting, guarding, and herding in Iraq, is considered unclean to bring into the home. Also, personal dignity was affronted in cases such as a British officer or official refusing to look up paperwork for an Iraqi.

Syria, Egypt, and Iraq’s Effendiah Class: Revolution in the Air

In Volume 5, Wardi discusses the Effendiah class, former Ottoman bureaucrats who hung out in coffee shops and stalls sowing dissent. Iraqis would first learn of Napoleon, the French Revolution, European nationalism, and much more through these bureaucrats trained in Turkey. Poets wrote anti-British odes in 1919 and 1920, introducing the Iraqi populace to the eviction of Faisal bin Hussein (of the Hashemite Dynasty), King of Syria, by French forces during the Battle of Maysaloun."

In Turkey, the Ottoman forces rallied around Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who began his defeat of French, Italian, and Greek forces in Anatolia, and declared the formation of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk’s earliest policy was to reverse the Ottoman policy of considering Arab nationalist movements as treasonous and support these efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East.

During World War I in Persia, the Germans conducted robust clandestine efforts to incite calls for jihad against the British and French. This Persian animosity, stoked by the Germans against the British, would remain beyond World War I, and support for insurgents would not only come from Syria and Turkey, but Persia. Of note, Russian Bolshevism replaced the Germans in continuing anti-British propaganda in Persia and Turkey. The Bolsheviks aided the Turkish Kemalists (named after Kemal Ataturk) in their efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East. Moscow spread anti-western leaflets in Syria from Iraq. When Prince Faisal proclaimed Arab independence in Syria and made himself King of Syria, many within his entourage were Iraqi officers, who created cells and independence movements within Iraq. For instance, the Al-Ahd (the Pact) Society, established in Syria, created its first outside branch in Mosul. Another external factor that provided momentum to Iraqis seeking outright independence was the 1919 revolt in Egypt. This revolt engulfed Egypt in rebellion for a week and was stimulated by the British arrest of Egyptian nationalist, Saad Zaghlul, and members of a delegation making their way to Versailles to seek Egyptian self-determination. It would eventually lead to quasi-independence for Egypt in 1922.

As a reaction to events in Syria seating King Faisal as ruler in 1918 and Egyptian agitation for self-rule, Iraqis seized the opportunity to declare their independence in March 1920. Those Iraqis called on Faisal’s brother, Abdullah, to assume the kingship of Iraq. These spontaneous declarations of independence in Syria and Iraq, as well as Egypt’s attempt to attain self-rule, would pose serious challenges to agreements between Britain and France to divide Arab Ottoman dominions into spheres of influence.

Impact of Turkish Independence on Iraq

"In Turkey, the Ottoman forces rallied around Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who began his defeat of French, Italian, and Greek forces in Anatolia, and declared the formation of the Turkish Republic. Ataturk’s earliest policy was to reverse the Ottoman policy of considering Arab nationalist movements as treasonous and support these efforts to undermine British and French influence in the Middle East."

...one could not divorce the nationalist dissent in Syria from Iraq. When Prince Faisal proclaimed Arab independence in Syria and made himself King of Syria, many within his entourage were Iraqi officers, who created cells and independence movements within Iraq."
and reading materials in Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Red Sea coast, known as “Hejaz.” Persian pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, as well as Persian students to these Shiite seminaries, brought with them Marxist ideology and literature. In these Shiite cities of Southern Iraq, one could find booklets entitled, *The Fundamentals of Bolshevism*, printed at a press in Aleppo, Syria.

So successful was Russian propaganda that Grand Ayatollah (Marja) and Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who would be a key figure in the 1920 revolt, would, in 1919, call Bolshevism, “a friend of Islam.” The first Bolshevist society was established in Iraq in 1920, and as early as 1919, Marxist rhetoric began to appear in Iraq’s newspapers. British security officials looked with concern as Arab and Turkish nationalists mingled with Bolshevik agents to plan challenges to England’s control of Iraq. Among the news circulating was the 1920 communist eviction of British forces from the oil city of Baku and port towns in the Caspian. If the British show weakness in the face of Bolshevism, they show weakness if challenged through Arab nationalism.

Wardi’s volumes are unique because of his ability to recreate the ideological strands that led to Iraq’s major conflicts. He marimates the reader in the mindset of the streets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. *Understanding human terrain on this level is necessary for any force operating in Iraq to this day.*

**Mosul to Syria Nationalist Pipeline**

Mosul maintains an important place in Iraq’s nationalist politics. According to Wardi, it contained many unemployed Ottoman bureaucrats, as well as a saturation of schools left by the Ottomans. The city of Mosul is strategically and geographically close to both Turkey and Syria. In 1919, many of Prince Faisal’s entourage were not just Iraqis, but Iraqis from Mosul. These officers stayed with Faisal in Syria and had tribal and family connections in Mosul. Al-Ahd, a secret society dedicated to Syrian independence, established its first external branch in Mosul that would make connections and garner members, connecting Damascus and Baghdad revolutionaries. Mosul ideologically intersected Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi, and Arab nationalist cells, as well as Bolshevism — all of which hated the British. In addition, demobilized Ottoman officers and soldiers of Iraqi origin began arriving at Mosul and started agitating and organizing nationalist cells.

Of credit to the British, both Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell were cognizant of some of these anti-British efforts and debated such ideas as placing one of the sons of Sharif Hussein bin Ali of Mecca, in whose name the Arab Revolt was conducted, as ruler of a British-mandated Iraq. Wardi assesses not only external influence leading to the 1920 revolt, but internal issues that may have contributed to the event, including the replacement of General McMunn with Lieutenant General Aylmer Haldane in 1919.

The new general in chief in Iraq loathed his diplomatic counterpart, British High Commissioner Arnold T. Wilson. Haldane did not take an interest in political reports, met only a few of Iraq’s political and religious leaders, and did not study or benefit from the experiences of his predecessors. He would spend months vacationing with his staff in the mountain resorts of Persia, leaving behind no command authority. Haldane would view the 1920 revolt, when it broke out, as a minor tribal revolt; however, when the revolt occurred, General Haldane was spending the summer in Persia. Another internal dynamic was the changing of leadership within the Shiites from Grand Ayatollah Karim al-Yazdi, who enjoyed good relations with British authorities, but died in 1919, to Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who detested British interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Despite several calls by Commissioner Wilson to Shirazi, each visit was met with frustration.

**London Attempts to Address Iraqi Rule though a Plebiscite**

In discussions between Bell, Wilson, and officials in London, the British decided to put the question of Iraqi rule to its tribal, religious, and city notables within Iraq’s major urban centers. London wished to pose the following questions to the Iraqi leaders: do Iraqis wish to have an Arab entity that would extend from Mosul to the Northern Persian Gulf around Basra; do Iraqis desire an Arab leader to rule this Arab independent entity; and if Iraqis want an Arab leader, who should this leader be? Wilson took these questions to notables within the nine regions that subdivided Iraq at the time. The British had the equivalent of an army major in each of the nine regions.

In his book, Wardi highlights only three major urban centers — Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. He describes how Commissioner Wilson posed the three critical questions and how the city notables of these three major centers made choices on who should rule:

**Najaf.** Wilson flew down to Najaf to meet with Grand Ayatollah Yazdi. The Grand Ayatollah indicated to Shiite leaders that he was political, but advised Shiite representatives to do what was in the best interest of the Muslims when they made their decisions about the questions. In Najaf, 21 leaders opted for direct British rule and ten for Arab independence.

**Karbala.** In Karbala, leaders presented all three questions posed by the British and some split, proposing that a member of the deposed Ottoman ruling family be made ruler. Shiites proposed that a member of the Qajar Persian royal family be made ruler. The majority in Karbala picked Abdullah or Zaid ibn Hussein, of the Hashemites of Mecca, to rule. In Kazimiyah, Ottoman agitators present, who were viewed as notables of the city, voted for Arab self-rule and a leader from the Hashemites.

**Baghdad.** Wilson considered Baghdad the driving force behind Iraq, where, as voted, the rest of Mesopotamia would go.
Baghdad was also the center of anti-British activity. It would have 32 Sunni and 24 Shiite representatives cast their votes on these questions. The majority voted for Arab independence for Iraq, extending from Mosul to the Northern Persian Gulf, and for the Sharif of Mecca to rule an Arab dominion as king, which would encompass Hejaz, Syria, and Iraq. Iraq would be directly ruled by a son of the Sharif of Mecca, as would Syria. Jewish and Christian minorities petitioned Wilson for direct British rule or construct, such as Egypt, which was a British protectorate.

1919: A Pivotal Year in Iraqi Political History

The year 1919 would be an important milestone in modern Iraqi political history. It marked the first time Iraqi leaders were asked what type of government they desired and which ruler they favored. However, many Iraqis were among the disempowered because the questions led the minority to express their desire for direct British rule, thinking the questions were a loyalty test designed to expose dissent. After 1919, a host of Iraqi and Syrian nationalist groups coalesced into two major national fronts in Baghdad. One was called Haras al-Istiqlal (guardians of independence), the second was al-Ahd (the Pact), which was first established in Damascus, branched into Mosul, and evolved a second large branch in Baghdad.

Haras al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd split over the issue of accepting British economic, technical, and military aid for any independent Iraq. Haras al-Istiqlal asserted that accepting British aid was tantamount to accepting British rule and that such aid should come from another European power. In 1919, Iraq’s leaders in Baghdad reopened middle and high schools that closed when the Ottomans withdrew from Iraq in 1918. The schools became a hotbed for political activity and involved the youth group, “Independence Guard Party,” a quasi-militia. Nationalist reading groups were developed from within these schools to educate a new generation of literate Iraqis in European nationalism, revolution, and the tactics of rebellion. By 1920, cells had been organized from Baghdad to Karbala and the middle Euphrates River.

1920 San Remo Conference and Ignoring the Iraqi Plebiscite

On 15 April 1920, details of the San Remo Conference were made public. This hastily organized session was designed to address the final details, such as the disposition of Ottoman Arab dominions, of the Versailles Conference, where the decision was made to make Iraq and Palestine a British mandate and Syria and Lebanon French mandates. Wilson was left to manage the Iraqi population. He issued a public announcement, directed at the Iraqis, stating that the British had been more just and efficient than the Ottomans and signs of progress were self-evident within Iraq over the past 2 years, to include safety under the rule of law. He further explained that a mandate was to guide Iraq toward a path of self-determination to be assessed at a future date. However, many Iraqis viewed the mandate in the words of newspapers as, “children needing guardians for our affairs.” The imposition of a British mandate over Iraq would do much to increase the pace of Iraqi and Arab nationalist movements.

Religion and Nationalism Commingle in Iraq

Like Baghdad, Karbala, in 1919, would see the emergence of a nationalist group that would mix Islam and Arab nationalism. Mirza Mohammed Rida created a secret society called the “Islamic Group.” Its goals were a rejection of British occupation, immediate independence, and the selection of a Muslim ruler in Iraq. The group was to receive a fatwa (religious opinion) from Grand Ayatollah Shirazi stating that a Muslim cannot select a non-Muslim to rule over Muslims.” The fatwa was endorsed by 17 other clerics and distributed throughout the middle Euphrates region. Karbala would be the earliest instance of religion and nationalism commingling, with slogans such as “Love of nation is a religious duty.”

Of significance, 20 days after the fatwa was issued, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi sent a letter to President Woodrow Wilson through the American minister in Persia. The letter, dated February 1919, outlined the Iraqis’ desire for self-determination and independence from British rule. Shirazi’s follow-on fatwa prohibited Muslims from seeking employment or working for British authorities.

"Grand Ayatollah Shirazi sent a letter to President Woodrow Wilson through the American minister in Persia. The letter, dated February 1919, outlined the Iraqis’ desire for self-determination and independence from British rule. Shirazi’s follow-on fatwa prohibited Muslims from seeking employment or working for British authorities."
A little known challenge to governing the middle Euphrates was changing the course of the Euphrates River, leading tribes to re-settle land to be close to the water, and with that, tribal warfare. Among the main sources of regular income in the middle Euphrates was rice crops, which so enriched landowners that they soon found time for discussing politics and engaging in the support of nationalist causes. An institution that kept tribes at peace was “Sadah” (singular Sayyid), or leaders that were a mix of religions and landed gently within Iraqi Shiism. Some Sayyids claimed descent from Prophet Muhammad and acted to arbitrate between tribes in Iraq. The Sayyids would play an important role in inciting jihad against British forces in the 1920 revolt.

**Seeds of the 1920 Revolt**

The seeds of the 1920 revolt are lost to history, but the village of Abi Sukhair, in the middle Euphrates, is considered the revolt’s birthplace and involved British army Captain Lyle insuring Sayyid Alwan al-Yasri, and the method by which he was thrown out of the captain’s office one day in late 1919. Being unable to bring village grievances after being insulted by British authorities, he began to call for armed rebellion. The al-Yasris were the Sayyids of the region of Iraq and were interlocutors between the tribes — the actions of Captain Lyle would slowly ignite a conflagration.

Alwan’s cousin was an even more powerful Sayyid Noor al-Yasri, who preached jihad against the unjust British; now the al-Ibrahim tribe would be offended and would bring in a neighboring tribal confederacy, the al-Fatlah. This tribe was upset by the British policy of supporting the older son of the former leader of al-Fatlah, versus the son’s uncle, as the agreed upon leader. These two tribes raised tributes to the al-Shalash tribe in Najaf and petitioned the King of Hejaz and Sharif of Mecca. King Hussein ibn Ali was reminded in these petitions of the tribes’ desire to be governed by one of his sons, and the British were delaying these desires.

Talk of revolution was so prevalent in April 1920 that growing tribal discontent, British grievances, the feeling that the British were delaying the installation of Arab rule, and the announcement of the mandate led to a secret conference in Najaf to discuss rebellion. The meeting affirmed the establishment of the Islamic Group, with unity and acceptance of Iraqis who were anti-British under this new organization; its leader would be Grand Ayatollah Shirazi. Fridays (the Muslim Sabbath) would be a day of strike to begin nonviolent resistance in Baghdad, Kazimiyah, and Najaf. Of note, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi was against rebelling toward the British due to his fear that the tribes would suffer massive casualties. Also, he would be bullied by the tribesmen, and realizing they intended to rebel and engage in resistance, the Grand Ayatollah simply said, “If this is your intention, you are unified in consensus, then may God aid you.”

**Events of Deir Zur**

Deir Zur is a town located in the Northern Euphrates and is geographically located between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Towns, such as Deir Zur and Albu Kamal, would pose problems in defining the edges between Syria and would evolve into the modern Iraqi state. The Ottoman withdrawal in 1918 left an administrative void that would be filled by merchants and tribal elders enforcing tribal law in place of nonexistent civil government. Upon hearing of the Arab Revolt under Prince Faisal’s declaring independence in Syria, the villagers wrote to the Hashemite ruler requesting their town fall under Syria. The Hashemite authority in Syria sent Marahi Pasha as their representative.

After a few months, the townsfolk of Deir Zur grew dissatisfied with Marahi Pasha, and lamented that neighboring towns under British control were receiving money, technical support, healthcare, and functioning administrative governance. The town elders convened a secret meeting, and without the knowledge of Marahi Pasha, sent a request to the British sharing their desire to be part of Iraq. Marahi Pasha only realized what the elders had done when a British armored unit arrived to take control of the town. He asked Shukri Pasha in Aleppo for guidance, who advised him to surrender the town to the British until its status was resolved through the Versailles Conference. Of note, the British brought with the armored unit technicians, civil servants, and administrators, who immediately set about bringing a functioning municipal government in Deir Zur.

**Syria Supports Iraqi Insurrection in Deir Zur**

In the summer of 1919, Iraqi members of the Damascus-based al-Ahd Party decided it would regain control of Deir Zur and succeed in getting Ramadan Shalash appointed military governor of al-Riqa, the closest village under Syria to Deir Zur. His primary mission was to sow anti-British dissent among the tribes; how much Prince Faisal knew of his objective or plans is unknown. Likely to maintain plausible deniability, Shalash was an excellent choice for military governor, and was an Iraqi from the Albu Sarai Tribe, who attended the Ottoman school for tribal administration. He began by shaming tribal leaders who opted for British administration, citing them as non-Muslims ruling over Muslims. He found tribes divided; those who felt the British were empowering clans at the expense of other clans and tribes at the expense of other tribes. He collected discontented tribes who felt they were not benefiting from British order to form a force of 500 Bedouins and raid Deir Zur in December 1919.

The British forces in the village withdrew in garrison, finally surrendered, and were taken hostage. The quick capture of Deir Zur led tribal loyalties to switch toward Shalash; with this momentum, he decided to raid the town of Albu Kamal, located along the undefined Syrian-Iraq border. Prince Faisal sent a cable from Paris, where he was negotiating at Versailles, saying the break down in stability along the Syrian-Iraq frontier could jeopardize negotiations in Paris. Prince Faisal informed the British general staff in London that the Arab Revolt had nothing to do with these events.

On 23 December 1919, British planes dropped leaflets containing Prince Faisal’s cable to Prince Zeid, which denounced Ramadan Shalash and warned that aerial bombing would commence if British hostages were not released within 48 hours. The threat worked and the hostages were released. Shalash remained in control of Deir Zur and Albu Kamal until he was replaced by Maoolood Mukhlis in 1920. Mukhlis would make it his mission to spread tribal insurrection and oppose the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, deeming the Habor River as the northern border between Syria and Iraq. British forces set about retaking Deir Zur and Albu Kamal. Mukhlis declared a jihad to resist these efforts and organized tribal levies, regular forces, and more than 300 Iraqi regulars in the former Ottoman service who trickled in from Syria to participate in the jihad. General Haldane sent a letter to Mukhlis threatening aerial assaults if tribal attacks did not cease. Mukhlis wrote appeals to jihad in Damascus and Aleppo. Answering the call for jihad was former military governor Ramadan Shalash; both he and Mukhlis had strong personalities and fought incessantly with one another.

In Cairo, General Edmund Allenby, commander in chief of British forces in the Middle East, received a note from Prince Faisal informing him that the situation in the undefined border between Syria and Iraq was spiraling out of control. Tribes were divided along the border demarcated by the Treaty of Versailles and a joint Anglo-Arab border delegation was being created to...
reconcile these tribal splits and redraw the border. Allenby agreed to the proposal and the issue of Albu Kamal and Deir Zur going to Syria was determined. Of note, Prince Faisal could not control the tribes of northern and middle Euphrates; nor could he keep tribes that demobilized from the Arab Revolt from continuing the tactic of raiding trains. British military logistics trains were attacked along the Mosul to Tikrit line — this included damage to the trains and rail line. The momentum of tribal raids along northern and middle Euphrates would lead to the Arab takeover of the entire region of Tal Afar and would trigger a British retaliatory response. An Iraqi advisor to General Haldane warned, “If you do not assert authority in Deir Zur and Albu Kamal, the tribes will be emboldened and you will face a full-fledged revolt in six months.”

On 8 March 1920, hundreds of Iraqi regular officers and troops, previously in the service of Ottoman forces, answered the call of the Sherif of Mecca and fought the Ottomans for Arab self-determination in the Arab Revolt. These Iraqi officers and troops had become disenchanted with French and British designs to carve the Middle East into mandates, and on 8 March, they approached Prince Faisal, then self-proclaimed King of Syria, and expressed their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Arab Revolt. They opted to leave Prince Faisal and answer the call for jihad in Iraq, fighting the British in Deir Zur. The group of Iraqi officers informed Prince Faisal that the Turks and Bolsheviks were ready to support any and all anti-colonial nationalist groups. Faisal drew 3,000 golden pounds (each gold pound was the size of a $5 gold piece), about $15,000 in gold coins, to give the group as mustering-out pay. The Iraqis raided one of Prince Faisal’s arsenals and helped themselves to weapons. They then proceeded to the Turkish-Iraq border to pick up hundreds of crates of ammo and guns, machine guns, and grenades before heading toward Deir Zur, along the Syrian and Iraqi frontier. Events would spiral out of control and the British would underestimate “tribal mischief” in what would become a full-fledged national liberation army.

Revolt in Tal Afar

Abdel-Hamid al-Dabooni served as assistant political officer to British forces in Tal Afar. He was gruffly treated by British officers who questioned his loyalty, so he resigned in disgust and departed for Deir Zur. Dabooni offered Maolood Mukhilis a treasure trove of human intelligence on British locations in the city of Tal Afar. He discussed British positions, defenses, personalities of the officers, provided information on spies within the Iraqi nationalist camp, and convinced leaders that this growing anti-British resistance movement could easily take Tal Afar. Learning of the amassing of forces in Deir Zur, the British took up the matter with Prince Faisal. The newly proclaimed King of Syria summoned representatives of the resistance movement at Deir Zur and was told it would be impossible to reverse the momentum of armed insurrection against the British in Iraq. Faisal asked that his relationship with the British not be compromised and that field guns not be used lest it betray Syrian collusion. The king was naïve and the momentum created by the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans that swept him from Arabia to Damascus and guarded the British right flank as it made its way from Egypt to Palestine and on to Syria to crush the Ottoman 4th Army, found its way partly in attacking British units in Iraq.

The assault on Tal Afar began not by assault, but by sending Dabooni to town to negotiate and incite a rebellion from within. He discussed the amassing of the Sherifian army of liberation on the outskirts of Tal Afar and convinced the leader of the Saada tribe
that all honor and glory would go to them if they led an internal assault on the paltry British presence in Tal Afar. The tribal leader consulted with an Iraqi police leader in Tal Afar; Daboo- ni convinced them both to rebel and participate in the revolu- tion. The British had three regular soldiers and seventy Iraqi levies; and the British major in charge was aided by an Iraqi lieutenant.

As the tribes attacked, they withdrew into their fortress and fired machine guns, ceding the town to the internal tribes and towns-people who revolted. When a tribal leader was killed, the Brit- ish major, who was captured outside the fortress, was killed in retaliation. Dabooni was in a precarious position having prom- ised the arrival of the Sherifian army of liberation; the leaders of the internal revolt suspected Dabooni had tricked them into rebelling and they would now bear the brunt of British vengeance. This was reinforced by British planes and armored vehicles approa- ching Tal Afar (three armored cars and several troop carri- ers with Indian infantry).

Barricades were set up around Tal Afar and rebels poured with- ering fire on the British relief force. When an armored car made it past the barricade and into Tal Afar, attempting to make its way to fort, women on rooftops dropped rocks on the car and rebels dropped grenades on its roof, which led to the capture of Indian soldiers. In one instance, an Indian solider, fearing cap- ture by the Iraqis, covered himself in gasoline and set himself alight. This was never before seen by Iraqis, who witnessed this self-immolation with amazement. One armored car made a hasty retreat and was pursued by tribesmen on horseback, who at- tempted to mount the car, killing one occupant. Upon pursuit, the car became disabled and all four soldiers made a final stand, firing into the approaching mounted tribal fighters. Of note, the fortress was taken when the Iraqi police forces, known as “al- dirk,” turned against the British, taking them hostage and open- ing the fortress to rebel forces. The Sherifian army arrived on 4 June 1920.

**Attempts on the City of Mosul**

As word on the fall of Tal Afar reached Mosul, British authori- ties, led by a colonel, were forced to reinforce defenses, impose curfews, and demand the surrender of all weapons to security forces, to include swords and daggers. Mosul was then surround- ed by barbed-wire boundaries and checkpoints set up on key access points of the city. Tribes emboldened by Tal Afar began joining the Arab Nationalist Revolt for a chance at gaining spoils. British convoys leading to Mosul from the north and west were attacked, and British armories and remote offices were raided.

Tribes and regular Iraqi forces, led by Jameel al-Midfai, made their way to the outskirts of Mosul on 7 June 1920. It was esti- mated more than 1,000 regular and irregular forces attacked the village of Abu Qadur on the road to Mosul. The British made a stand at Abu Qadur, firing a concentration of artillery on the waves of horse-mounted attackers. Fighting an offensive battle in open terrain with the British defending with artillery, rein- forced with two biplanes that dropped bombs and strafed tribes with machine gun fire, caused panic and fear among the irregu- lar tribal forces, which led to a retreat. British planes pursued the retreating army all the way to Tal Afar, dropping bombs on them. The harassment of Tal Afar with British planes led to gen- eral panic inside the city, with families leaving the city for Tur- key and Syria. On 9 June, British forces entered Tal Afar and took the city with minimal resistance, then set about dynamit- ing the homes of known rebel leaders, allowing 3 days of loot- ing to commence before restoring order. The British granted am-

**Ramadan Incidents in Baghdad**

Baghdad is unique in Iraq’s social history; aside from being Iraq’s center, it has experienced sectarian flare-ups between Sun- ni and Shiite Muslims since the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258 AD). The leaders of the 1920 revolt understood any nationalist movement must overcome this sectarianism even temporarily. Wardi highlights the methods used to achieve the merger of Sunnis and Shiites against the British. Ironically, these methods included labor strikes, which led to the proposal of merging the Shiites religious observance of Ashoura (commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein) with the Sunni religious observance of Prophet Muhammad’s birthday as a means of increasing participa- tion in mass strikes protesting British rule. Saaleh al-Hilli came up with this idea and added that the British would be re- luctant to intervene in a strike cloaked in religious observances. Of note, America’s Continental Congress undertook a similar tactic by declaring a day of fasting and prayer to protest British oppression in July 1775.

In the realm of civil disobedience, getting British authorities to react was a tactical victory; however, this reaction came when they detained a popular Iraqi poet. The Guardians of Indepen- dence Party organized demonstrations, and when these anti-Brit- ish demonstrations turned to riots, Iraq’s first national martyr emerged, a man from the al-Akhiras family. The Iraqi nationalists organized a funeral procession that included anti-British protests, which led authorities to monitor the procession using cavalry and from the air. British officials called on known instigators in Baghdad, verbally abusing them and threatening exile.

**Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s Message**

Ardent nationalist leader and Shiite, Jafar Abu Timen, wrote Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, leader of the Najaf Marja’ia (clerical cluster) and equivalent to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the current highest-ranking religious scholar in Iraq, appealing to the Shiite notion of speaking out against oppression and injustice. The appeal worked and Shirazi wrote a letter urging cooperation with Iraq’s nationalists in the noble project of Iraqi independence, and the establishment of an Islamic government. He wrote that all Iraqis must set aside sectarian differences and come together in this grand undertaking. His letter was mass printed and distrib- uted throughout Iraq. One can argue that this seminal document would place Iraq on a path of independence as it provided the ability of Iraq’s nationalists to unify and submit a list of com- mon demands to Commissioner Wilson in Iraq. Wilson called for the immediate formation of an Iraqi congress, representing Iraq’s people, to determine the fate of the nation, freedom of the press to express all of Iraq’s points of view, and removing mail and
telegraph censorship to allow the free exchange of views on how to establish and create an independent Iraq.

Wilson responded by lifting restrictions on Shiite and Sunni religious observances and offered to discuss Iraqi participation at the municipal level only. Another event that exacerbated tensions and was used by Iraqi nationalists during the 1920 revolt was the detention of Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s son, Muhammad Rida, who was a well-connected Iraqi revolutionary. Rida advocated replicating the Arab Revolt of Arabia that evicted the Ottomans in Iraq against the British. He had connections with anti-British secret societies in Syria and lobbied for Shiite clerical participation in Iraq’s nationalist movement. The British incarcerated him, which led not only to Shiite outrage, but caused the Sunnis to capitalize on Rida’s incarceration to unify with their Shiite brothers. In addition, his arrest led to Persia making diplomatic overtures to Britain to secure his release.

Rida would remain incarcerated, and his father, Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, would capitalize on this by playing up the sacrifices he was making, his son being detained in prison, for Iraqi independence. The British asserted and ran a counterpropaganda campaign advertising that they had brought order, rule of law, efficient rail, telegraph, and freedom from tribal chaos. This campaign was unsuccessful due to the British failing to address the long-term issue of the future of Iraq’s governance. This was the golden period — had the British seized and entered into negotiations over gradual independence, the revolt may have never taken place. Instead, their insistence at maintaining a colony through the fiction of a mandate with no clear end, led to the spark that ignited the revolt.

Politics or Tribal Insult: The Spark of the 1920 Revolt

The British obsession with rule of law led to an incident whereby Chief Shalaan Abu Joun owed the British 800 Rupees. He entered the garrison at Rumaytha to settle the issue and was handled roughly by British authorities. Chief Shalaan, leader of the Zuwailem tribe, warned British officers in Rumaytha, “Your policy will drag Britain into much animosity, knowing you are in Iraq and not Hindustan, Iraqis are not Indians.” A nationalist-coordinated raid on Rumaytha occurred, but the British blamed it on the tribes — chiefly, the Albu Hassan and Zuwailem tribes, which were struck by British forces without warning in July 1920. This only unified the Zuwailem and Albu Hassan, which conducted a mass raid on Rumaytha, overwhelming the British.

General Haldane cut short his Persian vacation and ordered the redeployment of forces, ordering one division to Diwaniyah to deal with the tribal chaos. British troops inside the fort of Rumaytha would be resupplied by aerial drops; they then planned an aerial bombardment on the town of Rumaytha to allow the British trapped inside the fort to escape, while the populace and tribal forces were taking cover. Village leaders in Rumaytha contacted both the British and Iraqi nationalists to spare them the bombing.

Iraqi nationalists would use the aerial strafing and bombing of Rumaytha, and the casualties generated, as a massacre to be avenged — much like America’s propagandizing the 1770 Boston Massacre. The nationalists seized the opportunity to make their demands and Said Muhammad, the designated representative from Rumaytha, carried the nationalist demands to British Brigadier General Frank Coningham, who commanded the division in Diwaniyah. The demands included the withdrawal of British forces and immediate independence for Iraq. General Coningham took the list of demands, threw it on the ground, and stomped it. He moved part of his forces toward Rumaytha, following the known train route from Diwaniyah to Rumaytha, where he was met by 5,700 tribal fighters. These tribes were defeated in the Battle of Ahdiyaat on 19 July 1920.

It makes little difference who wins the battle in nationalist and tribal insurgencies — the harassment inevitably continues. What the British failed to realize in the Battle of Ahdiyaat was that the tribal fighters were made up not only of the Albu Hassan and Zuwailem, but now included Bani Zareej, Bani Arid, and Ahajeeb, with Ottoman military advisers and former Iraqi officers, who were in the Ottoman service or the Arab Revolt.

Two weeks after the Battle of Ahdiyaat, tribal raids continued daily, with casualties mounting mainly on the Arab side, which led Grand Ayatollah Shirazi to call a cease-fire to be brokered between Iraqis and the British through the Persians. Commissioner Wilson rejected this proposal based on Shirazi’s inflamed letter calling for insurrection, and it appeared that the Iraqis felt the need to enter into negotiations because British tactics were working. The British failed to understand Iraq’s need for self-determination and resentment of the mandate, which led to flare-ups in other parts of Iraq. In the town of Abu Sukhair, a siege of British security forces was conducted by the Ala’ Fatla, Ghazalat, Ala’ Shibli, and Ala’ Ibrahim tribes; this siege was particularly distinguished by attacks on British logistics boats and armed riverboats such as HMS Firefly. On 17 July, a 4-day cease fire was negotiated and the demands included the formation of an Iraqi governing council and the release of prisoners, to include Grand Ayatollah Shirazi’s son. These demands were ignored and hostilities continued with the Albu Hassan tribe taking the town of al-Kifl on 22 July.

The British realized if their outposts, villages, and train depots fell to these rebellious tribes aided by nationalists that it would breathe confidence into the nationalists and lead to more tribes joining the insurrection in search of spoils. During the Battle of Ramijah, a British regiment, on its way toward al-Kifl and al-Hilla, was ambushed as its soldiers rested for the night. During the ambush, 52 machine guns and an 18-pound artillery piece were stolen, and 400 casualties were suffered. This battle would be a turning point in this growing revolt and lead to revolts east of Diwaniyah and attacks on trains by the Ufuk and Aq’a tribes, cutting off communications links of Diwaniyah.

General Coningham withdrew his forces from Diwaniyah to al-Hilla, using only six engines and 251 rail cars. His withdrawal would extend for miles and he would advance only 8 miles a day, dealing with tribes attempting to harass the rail column, but being beaten back by aerial escort that strafed and bombed the approaching tribesmen. The tribes foolishly attempted to raid al-Hilla, but it was heavily defended and they suffered a crushing blow.

Wardi’s Observations on British and Iraqi Strengths and Weaknesses

Wardi sees the 1920 revolt in three stages: the stimulus that was caused by events in Deir Zur, Karbala, Tal Afar, and Baghdad; the armed insurrection stage, which began with Rumaytha and engulfed all of central and northern Iraq; and the spreading of the insurrection into Diyala that garnered more tribal support. He writes the middle Euphrates was the spinal cord of the revolt, and where the most treasure and casualties originated. He criticizes the British for not having enough forces and relying too much on the new technology of aerial attacks; leaving post-World War I saturated with weapons, a German Mauser rifle, which cost 25 pounds during the war and 4 pounds during the revolt; failing to exploit the greed of tribes joining mainly for spoils, with independence being a secondary consideration; and

Continued on Page 46
MANEUVER: Fight the Enemy — Not the Terrain

by Captain Robert L. Green and First Sergeant James J. Adcock

Maneuver is the employment of combined arms forces through movement, in combination with fires and information to achieve positional and informational advantage with respect to the adversary to accomplish the mission; or according to U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, “the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.”1

This article shares the experiences of the troopers from Grim and Fox Troops, Sabre Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Iraq. These troops are equipped with nine M1A2SEPv2 tanks, thirteen M3A3 Bradley fighting vehicles, one Bradley fire support team (FIST) vehicle, two M1064 120mm mortar carriers, and maintenance and recovery tracked vehicles. Once in theater, we were equipped with M1114 and mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) wheeled vehicles. Without mobility support, these platforms cannot maneuver freely in difficult terrain.

The current operating environment in Iraq offers a diverse array of challenges in terms of physical and human terrain. The physical terrain includes open deserts, dense palm groves, large crowded cities, small villages, high power lines, jerry-rigged power lines, canals, rivers, plowed fields, lakes, hills, mountains, bridges, narrow crossings points over canals, huge wadi systems, paved roads, dirt roads, and thousands of culverts. This is not an all-inclusive list by any means — we cannot forget about ancient ruins, rubble, un-marked minefields, etc.

Important Maneuver Factors: The Terrain, Population, and Canals

During training, most of us experience various types of terrain. The majority encountered by the mounted force includes open fields and deserts, hills, ridge lines, and perhaps a few narrow passes. We tend to avoid close/restricted terrain as it limits the stand-off capabilities of our weapons systems and makes us more vulnerable to dismounted adversaries. Most installations have military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) facilities of varying size and configuration that enable units to exercise some training in close urban terrain.

In a counterinsurgency operation, the center of gravity tends to be the population — secure the population then isolate the insurgents and deny them access/safe haven among the local populace. As in most parts of the world, the majority of the population of Iraq resides in urban areas. In this instance, the area of operations for this unit included the city of Balad Ruz with a population of about 200,000. The town of Balad Ruz was relatively secure due to the robust presence of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which conducted daily patrols and manned dozens of checkpoints. The area south of town had dozens of small- to medium-sized villages, which had little or no U.S. forces or ISF presence or interaction.

In the area south of Balad Ruz lies what was once a fertile farming region. Because of the antiquated nature of irrigation in Iraq, this area has an intricate lattice of hundreds of interconnecting minor and major canals. These range from small branch canals that are easily stepped over to massive canals that are many meters deep and wide. This area has very few improved roads. Really, there is only one paved road and it is in poor condition with hundreds of potholes and old improvised explosive device (IED) craters. The majority of the roads are dirt, with little to no improvements. Most of these roads intersect or cross canals at primitive crossing points, making excellent choke points almost always laden with mines or IEDs.

To make matters more difficult, most of these canals have berms that run along both sides, ranging in height from 1 to 3 meters. Visibility is further obstructed by the growth of reeds in these canals that often eclipse the height of the berms by 1 to 2 meters. Combined, these factors cause the canals to be major obstacles for mounted movement and afford the enemy excellent covered and concealed avenues of approach. Without deliberate mobility improvement operations, using bulldozers and bucket loaders, or ‘shovels’ as the Iraqis refer to them, crossing with ve-
hicles is all but impossible. We were first introduced to this method by an Iraqi Army battalion with which we conducted combined clearance operations in another district involving a similar canal network.

When engineer assets are brought in to create crossing points and enable mounted maneuver, two factors emerge. First, these crossing points take time to construct to support the weight of our armored and uparmored vehicles. Using this method, you lose the element of surprise and allow the enemy to flee the area and/or make preparations for our arrival. Incorporating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets (unmanned aerial vehicle or rotary wing aircraft) can mitigate some of the risks associated, but not all.

The second factor is securing the crossing point. Due to the dispersed nature of the insurgents and local sympathizers in the area, their dispersion of tactical caches, and the ability to use the canals as covered and concealed routes, the insurgents proved able to reseed the crossing points once coalition and Iraqi forces had moved on. Even with friendly forces literally parked on the crossing point, insurgents could get within meters of the position due to the concealment offered by the canals.

"Due to the dispersed nature of the insurgents and local sympathizers in the area, their dispersion of tactical caches, and the ability to use the canals as covered and concealed routes, the insurgents proved able to reseed the crossing points once coalition and Iraqi forces had moved on. Even with friendly forces literally parked on the crossing point, insurgents could get within meters of the position due to the concealment offered by the canals."

Securing the crossing point requires planning, analysis, and decisionmaking prior to executing a mounted operation — do we/can we secure all of the crossing points or do we cut another route? To retain freedom of maneuver using a cut route, each crossing point has to be secured. The insurgents will find the one and only vulnerable crossing point and use it to replace an IED. Securing each crossing point consumes a large portion of available combat power. Another option is to cut an exit route out of the objective area. Relying on a second exit route temporarily isolated our maneuver element and added risk for resupply and casualty evacuation operations; it also drastically slowed the exfiltration of friendly forces once the actions on the objective were complete.

"The use of ATVs augmented the dismounted force by reducing the amount of water and other supplies the troops had to carry. Troopers mounted on the ATVs could also clear large open areas more quickly than dismounted troopers."

To clear these canals, the reeds and vegetation were removed. We used numerous field expedient methods to burn out the canals (M203 flares, hand flares, AWT flares, and good ol’ gasoline) to expose enemy caches and hiding places and reduce concealment for dismounted enemy approach. This is a time-consuming effort because many of the canals hold just enough water in the bottom to douse the flames before the canals completely burn out. It is important to note that using this method often reveals caches when the munitions begin to cook off, so keep your distance.

Once the canal was completely burned out, U.S. and Iraqi security forces would walk the canals looking for caches or weapons. This method was time consuming and deliberate, but yielded results. We discovered and eroded insurgent resources during every canal-clearing operation. Based on location and composition of these resources, we confirmed that insurgents in this area changed their methods and no longer used massive caches to store their resources, which was based on the success of previous units operating in the area and their ability to locate and reduce large caches. The enemy had been burned out multiple times when large stockpiles of materiel were located and destroyed, and thus adapted using the difficulty of the terrain and dispersion to reduce their risk of losing their weapons and ordnance. They were no longer putting all of their eggs in one basket. It was obvious that the insurgents were well dispersed, which allowed them access to caches, and enabled them to move to the point of attack without transporting their weapons, thus reducing the risk of attracting attention and increasing their speed of movement.

Dismounted Elements

We often employed dismounted elements to clear ahead and on the flanks of a mounted column. Due to the slow and deliberate nature of required mobility improvements to breach the canals and build crossing points, the dismounted elements were able to quickly outpace the mounted elements despite moving with full combat gear over broken, sun-hardened plowed fields in the heat of the Iraqi summer day. To assist maintaining some momentum, we developed a few methods. Mounted elements would traverse the large open fields between canals to conduct mounted reconnaissance to locate possible bunkers or caches, provide water resupply to the dismounted elements to reduce their load, and provide overwatch. Mounted elements were required to secure crossing points, as well as provide overwatch at the
breach side for the engineers, which made taxi service minimal. Depending on the distance and range of dismounted communications, the mounted elements also assisted in relaying communications between the mounted column and the dismounted elements.

Air Insertion

Air insertion was used extensively, especially when speed and surprise were required, during operations such as surrounding and isolating an objective and preventing egress of suspected insurgents. There were two drawbacks to this method: the lack of available aircraft and extraction. Rarely, was there enough aircraft to accommodate every soldier needed on every mission. Based on long lead times to obtain high-demand air support, missions had to be planned in advance. Extraction was also a huge disadvantage; either plan a not later than (NLT) end of mission time, which is often difficult to determine based on the time it takes to do thorough search and sensitive site exploitation (SSE), or have a ground extraction plan.

If you plan to insert by air and remain in the objective area, or march to another area, you must also consider how you will resupply. The preferred method was air resupply because creating a secure ground line of communications (LOC) could be time consuming, even if you do not encounter any IEDs or other enemy resistance. Two major considerations in using air resupply include the availability of aircraft and the weather forecast.

During one operation, we inserted an Iraqi Army battalion and our troop, minus one platoon (about 375 combined U.S. and Iraqi Army soldiers) to isolate a large village suspected of harboring insurgents, while isolating the larger objective area to deny enemy egress. There was no open ground resupply LOC — opening and securing a LOC took 48 hours due to multiple IED strikes, primitive road networks, and limited availability of engineer assets. Fortunately, weather permitted air resupply and evacuation of detainees until the ground LOC was open.

One of our sister troops incorporated all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) into its maneuver plan during a clearance operation in which troopers were inserted by air. The use of ATVs augmented the dismounted force by reducing the amount of water and other supplies the troops had to carry. Troopers mounted on the ATVs could also clear large open areas more quickly than dismounted troopers. This allowed dismounted troopers to focus on structures and canals similar to the discussion above using the mounted column.

To achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance, troopers had to rapidly expand their skill sets, revise their procedures, and demonstrate agility. These troopers conducted six major air insertion operations, during the day and at night. One of these air insertion operations was the largest during OIF 07-09, even though there was no prior training in garrison. These troopers conducted scores of dismounted patrols in urban areas to engage the population, mentor the ISF, and bring a sense of security to the people. They conducted dismounted clearance operations to clear hundreds of kilometers of farm land, canals, and villages to erode resources, kill or capture insurgents, and assist ISF in establishing security in areas where it did not exist.

When mounted forces think of maneuver, they tend to fixate on getting their platforms to the fight and maximizing their capabilities, which was not feasible or effective in this case. The 3d Armored Cavalry began its service to the Nation as a "regiment of mounted riflemen," which was an idea reinforced during the rotation as we used any and every means available to maneuver our troopers to the fight.

"When mounted forces think of maneuver, they tend to fixate on getting their platforms to the fight and maximizing their capabilities, which was not feasible or effective in this case. The 3d Armored Cavalry began its service to the Nation as a 'regiment of mounted riflemen," which was an idea reinforced during the rotation as we used any and every means available to maneuver our troopers to the fight."

Air Insertion

Air insertion was used extensively, especially when speed and surprise were required, during operations such as surrounding and isolating an objective and preventing egress of suspected insurgents. There were two drawbacks to this method: the lack of available aircraft and extraction. Rarely, was there enough aircraft to accommodate every soldier needed on every mission. Based on long lead times to obtain high-demand air support, missions had to be planned in advance. Extraction was also a huge disadvantage; either plan a not later than (NLT) end of mission time, which is often difficult to determine based on the time it takes to do thorough search and sensitive site exploitation (SSE), or have a ground extraction plan.

If you plan to insert by air and remain in the objective area, or march to another area, you must also consider how you will resupply. The preferred method was air resupply because creating a secure ground line of communications (LOC) could be time consuming, even if you do not encounter any IEDs or other enemy resistance. Two major considerations in using air resupply include the availability of aircraft and the weather forecast.

During one operation, we inserted an Iraqi Army battalion and our troop, minus one platoon (about 375 combined U.S. and Iraqi Army soldiers) to isolate a large village suspected of harboring insurgents, while isolating the larger objective area to deny enemy egress. There was no open ground resupply LOC — opening and securing a LOC took 48 hours due to multiple IED strikes, primitive road networks, and limited availability of engineer assets. Fortunately, weather permitted air resupply and evacuation of detainees until the ground LOC was open.

One of our sister troops incorporated all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) into its maneuver plan during a clearance operation in which troopers were inserted by air. The use of ATVs augmented the dismounted force by reducing the amount of water and other supplies the troops had to carry. Troopers mounted on the ATVs could also clear large open areas more quickly than dismounted troopers. This allowed dismounted troopers to focus on structures and canals similar to the discussion above using the mounted column.

To achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance, troopers had to rapidly expand their skill sets, revise their procedures, and demonstrate agility. These troopers conducted six major air insertion operations, during the day and at night. One of these air insertion operations was the largest during OIF 07-09, even though there was no prior training in garrison. These troopers conducted scores of dismounted patrols in urban areas to engage the population, mentor the ISF, and bring a sense of security to the people. They conducted dismounted clearance operations to clear hundreds of kilometers of farm land, canals, and villages to erode resources, kill or capture insurgents, and assist ISF in establishing security in areas where it did not exist.

When mounted forces think of maneuver, they tend to fixate on getting their platforms to the fight and maximizing their capabilities, which was not feasible or effective in this case. The 3d Armored Cavalry began its service to the Nation as a “regiment of mounted riflemen,” which was an idea reinforced during the rotation as we used any and every means available to maneuver our troopers to the fight.

"When mounted forces think of maneuver, they tend to fixate on getting their platforms to the fight and maximizing their capabilities, which was not feasible or effective in this case. The 3d Armored Cavalry began its service to the Nation as a 'regiment of mounted riflemen," which was an idea reinforced during the rotation as we used any and every means available to maneuver our troopers to the fight."

Notes

Notes


Captain Robert Green is currently a member of the concept writing team, Joint and Army Concept Development, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), Fort Monroe, VA. He received a B.A. from the University of Minnesota. His military education includes the Armor Captain Career Course, Scout Leader Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, G Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Hood and Iraq; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Fort Hood; regimental plans officer, 3d ACR, Fort Hood; and scout platoon leader, 1st Platoon, G Troop, 3d ACR, Fort Carson and Iraq.

First Sergeant James Adcock is currently the first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Fort Hood. His military education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Course, Basic NCO Course; Scout Leader Course; and Bradley Master Gunner Course. He has served in various positions, to include first sergeant, G Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Iraq; S2 NCOIC, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Iraq; observer controller trainer, 85th Division (Training Support), Fort Knox, KY; and platoon sergeant, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, Fort Hood.

First Sergeant James Adcock is currently the first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Fort Hood. His military education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Course, Basic NCO Course; Scout Leader Course; and Bradley Master Gunner Course. He has served in various positions, to include first sergeant, G Troop, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Iraq; S2 NCOIC, Sabre Squadron, 3d ACR, Iraq; observer controller trainer, 85th Division (Training Support), Fort Knox, KY; and platoon sergeant, B Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, Fort Hood.
Reflecting on the Maneuver Captain Career Course

by Captain Sean Walsh

While attending the Maneuver Captain Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Knox, I had a Ugandan classmate who very effectively summed up the Army’s current strategic dilemma with a Swahili proverb: “The Army gets the job it doesn’t want.” This concise statement encapsulates the U.S. Army’s institutional desire to focus on conflicts only distantly related to the reality of the post 9/11 world. Secretary Gates recently wrote in Foreign Affairs that “the Department of Defense (DoD), as a whole, is still too concerned with the theoretical conflicts of the future rather than counterinsurgency fights of the present, a phenomenon he calls ‘next-war-itis.’” To put this challenge in the terms of the military decisionmaking process, DoD is preparing for the enemy’s most dangerous course of action, as opposed to its most probable. From my admittedly limited perspective, the MCCC is still facing the same obstacles as the remainder of DoD in overcoming this institutional challenge.

First and foremost, the MCCC is a wonderful professional experience; the course is extremely well taught by officers who are concerned with preparing students for the future. The classroom experience provides a unique opportunity for networking with joint and combined partners, as well as the opportunity to continue the integration of junior officers into the Army as a profession. The pace of instruction gives redeployed young officers the chance to recharge and reconnect with their families. In short, the MCCC does precisely what it is designed to do: train maneuver officers who are skilled at high-intensity conflict and are basically familiar with stability and counterinsurgency operations. However, this design fails to reach the reality — fighting small wars in complicated places — its graduates will face the day they leave Fort Knox. The MCCC remains focused on preparing captains for future wars that we may fight tomorrow at the expense of training for conflicts that the Army is fighting today.

Graduates of the MCCC are much like Lieutenant Backsight Forethought, the fictional subaltern of The Defense of Duffer’s Drift, whose misadventures educated generations of British and American first-year cadets, who learned more about “Waterloo, Sedan, or Bull Run” than the life and death situation of modern combat in the Boer War. Graduates of the MCCC will most likely leave with more knowledge of hypothetical combined arms breaches at the National Training Center (NTC), divisional defenses at Korea’s DMZ, and other hypothetical situations, than they do about conducting the
real-life business of counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, unlike our friend Backsight Forethought, commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan do not have six chances to get it right — their mistakes are permanent and deadly.

This article outlines four key recommendations for improving the MCCC so it will better align with the realities of current operations.

Refocus Operations Orders

Most importantly, instructors should refocus a higher percentage of graded operations orders that require planning for tasks students are likely to face in combat. Our class spent a week studying how to defend high ground from a Soviet bloc division, but we never discussed how to properly occupy a combat outpost in an urban area. We practiced planning for a combined arms breach at the NTC, but neglected to train for a dismounted patrol in Afghanistan. We wrote an order for a company air assault against a mechanized infantry platoon, but never got around to a company raid on a five-man insurgent cell. We were tested on route reconnaissance, but not on route clearing.

A recently redeployed company commander, who was invited to speak to our class, provided insight into a possible solution to this dilemma. When asked how he prepared his company for the ever-changing operational demands in Iraq, he explained that because techniques and requirements change so fast overseas, it is better to focus on doctrinal fundamentals than on certain techniques that will be outdated before the unit actually gets in country. Based on his experiences, he explained, it is impossible to know how to conduct a flash traffic control point (TCP) without being briefed on the most up-to-date rules of engagement and escalation of force measures; therefore, units in garrison should train the traditional task of “hasty defense” because a flash TCP is simply a form of hasty defense.

This commander’s logic was sound and I certainly agree with his thinking; however, I have a different philosophy. If what this successful and experienced company commander states is true, then the reverse should also be considered sound — training for a flash TCP should make a unit prepared for the doctrinal task of hasty defense. By training conduct of a flash TCP, soldiers will be prepared for current operations and still have a basic understanding of the framework and doctrine related to the high-intensity conflict task of hasty defense.

I recommend this same logic be applied to selecting exercises that student evaluations are based on at the MCCC. This is the area where we could most easily adjust the course to make it more relevant to today’s fight without sacrificing too much knowledge of high-intensity conflict. For instance, a block of instruction on the principles and basic techniques of the defense should culminate with an exercise requiring students to plan how to occupy and improve a combat outpost in an urban area, rather than how to defend a battalion flank from an invading Soviet-equipped division. In such an exercise, the doctrinal principles of the defense, engagement area development, where to kill the enemy, where to place key weapons systems, and so on, are being taught; however, instead of practicing these principles for the free-for-all hypothetical high-intensity conflict that may never come, captains would instead be thinking through problem sets of the constrained environment in which our soldiers are fighting at this moment.

Consider the breach as another example of this logic. Students at the MCCC can learn and apply the principles of the breach, such as suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA), the importance of reconnaissance, or the incorporation of various engineer assets no matter where that breach is applied. So then why are our exercises taking place in a fictional country instead of a realistic counterinsurgency scenario? For example, in Baqubah, our unit conducted a multiday breaching operation to clear routes that had become impassable due to the level of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and house-borne IEDs (HBIEDs) along the roads. This operation used the entire range of engineer breaching assets, to include mine-clearing line charges (MICLICs), armored combat earthmovers (ACEs), and armored vehicle launch bridges (AVLBs), and required the application of all of the fundamentals and tenets of breaching. An MCCC exercise that planned for a similar operation would require students to apply all the principles of the breach they learn, but allow them to think through the application of these principles in scenarios that resemble those they could face after graduation.

Teach Students to Command in Combat

The MCCC should provide additional instruction and practical exercises on platforms that students are most likely to command in combat. The course devotes considerable time to discussing the organization and capabilities of every type of brigade combat team, to include armored and mechanized forces still configured doctrinally for high-intensity conflicts. However, the course fails to devote time to the proper use of equipment, such as HMMWVs and mine-resistant, armor-protective (MRAP) vehicles, that many, if not most, MCCC graduates will command in combat. Perhaps the platforms currently being used in combat should receive the lion’s share of attention when discussing relative capabilities and weaknesses of various formations in our Army. Also, additional attention should be placed on how to plan and lead the kind of long-range dismounted patrols that are increasingly becoming the norm in Afghanistan.

Reevaluate Necessity for Staff Rides

While the lessons of leadership and terrain analysis are certainly always of val-
ue, most of what students take away from a one-day staff ride they have already inculcated at the pre-commissioning level. Instead, the MCCC should take advantage of rare opportunities present in surrounding communities of Fort Knox, and meet with civic leaders and public officials to observe government in action. Although most students at the MCCC have enough experience to appreciate the importance of developing government capacity as a key component of counterinsurgency, few (myself included) have any real understanding of what "right looks like" when it comes to local governments. I understand that Radcliff, Kentucky, runs city council meetings differently from those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but if MCCC graduates want to move past just drinking chai with host-nation leaders and do real counterinsurgency work, they should have better frames of references than those currently provided.

Teach Critical Thinking

The course should devote additional education on how to solve tactical problems not covered by the traditional orders process. For instance, the challenge of managing a combat outpost is something we never discussed during the course. While many students attending MCCC have extensive experience in operating as platoon leaders and executive officers from combat outposts, there are numerous problem sets that are likely beyond this level of experience. For instance, how do you manage a patrol schedule to meet the requirements of guard, rest, and patrol? How do you manage property accounting when the entire company is located in multiple time zones? Though aimed at platoon-level leaders, I urge leaders to look into the excellent and illuminating work of Captain Michael L. Burgoyne and Captain Albert J. Markwardt, The Defense of Jisr al-Doreia, an update of the classic Defense of Duffer's Drift, which serves as an excellent example of critical thinking.

I am obviously not recommending that the MCCC completely abandon its instruction on high-intensity conflict or that it violate the Army’s maxim of “educate broadly, train narrowly” — to do so would be folly. However, I do advocate the ratios of instruction be reversed; instead of spending 75 to 85 percent of the course discussing high-intensity conflict and 25 to 15 percent on counterinsurgency and stability and support (a liberal estimation of the amount of time devoted to these operations), at least 50 percent, or perhaps even 75 percent, of the course should be spent preparing graduates for current and near-future operations. These recommended improvements would require only minimal effort and resources. Because the fundamental principles currently taught at Fort Knox will not change, there is no need to write or approve new classes (just additional lessons that focus on using current systems such as unmanned aerial and MRAP vehicles). The only modifications required would be the way these principles are practiced and evaluated; on the other hand, the time devoted to designing new exercises would pay significant dividends for future graduates of the MCCC.

Tomorrow, a company commander will order his lieutenants to conduct patrols in Iraq and Afghanistan using MRAPs; in contrast, I would bet the sum of my captain’s retention bonus that tomorrow’s sun will set and there will be no American forces engaging Russian-built tanks or breaching any trench lines. Even in the unlikely event this did occur (say in places such as North Korea), it would not prevent a large percentage of the Army from continuing its counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As my Ugandan classmate pointed out, sometimes the Army is given the job it doesn’t want, which doesn’t mean we should focus our professional officer education on the job we want instead of the job we have.

Notes

1Throughout this article, I refer to the MCCC; however, I can only speak from experiences at the Fort Knox MCCC. While the MCCC at Fort Knox and Fort Benning are intended to have common curricula, I understand that there are unavoidable differences between how each course is taught. Ultimately, my observations can only be based on the experiences of a single, small group during one MCCC class at Fort Knox, rather than an exhaustive analysis of the MCCC.


Captain Sean P. Walsh is currently attending the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, 3d Student Training Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Group, Fort Bragg, NC. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy and is currently pursuing an M.A. from Virginia Tech University. His military education includes Maneuver Captain Career Course, Infantry Officer Basic Course, Airborne School, and Ranger School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include civil military plans officer, 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR), Baghdad, Iraq; Stryker rifle platoon leader, 2d Squadron, 2SCR, Baghdad; and adjutant, 2d Squadron, 2SCR, Vilseck, Germany.

“As the lessons of leadership and terrain analysis are certainly always of value, most of what students take away from a one-day staff ride they have already inculcated at the pre-commissioning level. Instead, the MCCC should take advantage of rare opportunities present in surrounding communities of Fort Knox, and meet with civic leaders and public officials to observe government in action.”
DRAGOONS IN IRAQ:
COMBINED CENSUS OPERATIONS

by Captain Bryan Frizzelle, First Lieutenant Daniel Wagner, First Lieutenant Jeffrey Gagliano, First Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi, and First Lieutenant Brian Murdock

“Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district... Develop a mental model of your area — a framework in which to fit every piece of knowledge you acquire.”

— D.J. Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles of Counterinsurgency

In December 2008, D Troop, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry (Dragoons), 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, deployed to the city of Mosul in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A tank company by configuration, we had the distinct advantage of well-versed, experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who had returned from counterinsurgency operations in Samarra just 12 months prior to arriving in Mosul. Another benefit was learning several months prior to deployment that we would be operating in the west Mosul area of operations (AO), which allowed us to tailor our research and cultural awareness training to a very Mosul-specific program. We believed this training would be vital to our success in Mosul, which was largely regarded as the last stronghold of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

On arrival in theater, the Dragoons received a first-class battle handover from elements of the 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Three Iraqi Security Force (ISF) battalions secured ten densely-populated neighborhoods in our assigned AO, which were focused exclusively along the major routes through a system of mutually supporting checkpoints. However, our company leaders realized almost immediately that the ISF battalions did not know their turf — there was no human intelligence (HUMINT) network whatsoever. Worse still, the ISF had not identified local leaders or economic centers of gravity in their assigned neighborhoods. The reasons for this dearth of information were twofold: the ISF was heavily indoctrinated in a checkpoint-centric mentality, which prevented adequate forces from getting to the neighborhoods; and many of the ISF battalions had just recently rotated into the Mosul AO from other parts of Iraq. Therefore, during transfer of authority (TOA), the Dragoons determined that mission success over the course of the deployment would be directly tied not only to our own ability to rapidly understand the AO, but also enabling ISF understanding of that same AO.

To meet this requirement, the company developed a plan to immediately conduct sample combined cordon, search, and census operations throughout the AO with its
ISF brethren. A sample cordon, search, and census was designed to be completed during a scheduled 4-hour patrol and typically encompassed an objective area of 6 to 10 residences. The company intelligence synchronization team (COIST) worked with the ISF to develop an initial list of information requirements that each search team would gather from heads of household in the objective area. Our initial census forms included general information requirements such as numbers of occupants living at the residence, tribal affiliation, associated vehicles, and occupation of head of household.

The cordon, search, and census operations quickly evolved into a more in-depth process. After the first few iterations, the COIST and ISF added additional detailed information requirements, to be completed by combined search teams, which included occupant e-mail addresses, cell phone numbers, hours of electricity per day, and local-leader affiliations. These first few cordon, search, and census missions allowed the Dragoons and ISF to rapidly gain a picture of the people within their AO, making it much easier to effectively spread information operation (IO) messages and develop nonlethal projects to help the community.

Shortly after TOA, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was implemented and unilateral targeting of insurgents by coalition forces became much more problematic. The Iraqi criminal courts implemented rule of law across the country, a necessary step in the growth of democracy in Iraq. Obtaining a warrant prior to detaining an insurgent became essential. It quickly became apparent that Iraqi judges were more apt to issue warrants if ISF could provide an exact location or address of the suspected insurgent.

Although cordon, search, and census operations were used as a means for ISF and a new-to-theater coalition force company to learn the intricate dynamics of the AO, it rapidly became the cornerstone of our enduring campaign plan. It greatly enabled targeting within the existing capabilities of the ISF, thereby supporting the higher headquarters’ goal of ISF units capable of securing their AOs with Dragoons ultimately in tactical overwatch.

**Application of Cordon, Search, and Census to Warrant-based Targeting**

Our first step in conducting a combined cordon, search, and census operation was to “sell” the importance of census to our ISF partners. ISF conceptual buy-in was the point of initial friction; in addition to static checkpoint operations, the only time our partners desired to penetrate neighborhoods was during a middle-of-the-night raid. Compounding the ISF buy-in quandary was the fact that our first few combined sample census operations did not result in the “golden” cache find or immediately lead to the capture of a high-value target; these two types of significant activities (SIGACTs) tend to be the two most frequently used tangible metrics in gauging a successful mission.

During daily interactions with our counterpart ISF company commanders and platoon leaders, Dragoon platoon leaders stuck to the company talking points — developing a information database of residents in the AO will ultimately allow more successful lethal and nonlethal targeting. We continually reinforced the value of this offensive operation. However, for true ISF buy-in, a tangible benefit from a previous cordon, search, and census operation was needed as “proof of principle.”

The first demonstration of the utility of the cordon, search, and census method occurred in March, which was about 90 days post-TOA. We received intelligence derived from signal intelligence (SIGINT), which stated that a man named Mohammed, who lived in the Hay al-Tinek neighborhood and worked as a butcher, was constructing a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at his home. Prior to cordon, search, and census operations, an unspecific tip such as this would have led the ISF to either disregard it completely or conduct an operation to detain all middle-aged males in the neighborhood. Our first step was to share the intelligence with the ISF battalion that operated in that particular neighborhood.

Transparent targeting has become in vogue as the ISF actually move in as the security lead in its country. The method by which we obtained intelligence was irrelevant, but sharing it was vital. The ISF were just happy for any help they could get in defeating insurgency in its neighborhoods. As luck would have it, the ISF identified one census information requirements datasheet derived from a previous cordon, search, and census operation, which matched the key characteristics of our target, Mohammed Hay al-Tinek, who lived in the Hay al-Tinek neighborhood and worked as a butcher, who lived in house number A123. The ISF then referenced its AO geographical reference grid (GRG) system and determined exactly where Mohammed the butcher lived. After an abbreviated troop leading procedure (TLP) process, the ISF were ready to action the target immediately. However, we strongly encouraged them to obtain a warrant for the target’s arrest first; holding suspected insurgents more than 48 hours for questioning has become extremely difficult as Iraq moves toward rule of law.

The ISF battalion received intelligence from its brigade headquarters the very next day concerning a VBIED under construction in the vicinity of house A123. The ISF battalion S3 went to visit with an Iraq criminal courts judge in Mosul and obtained a warrant for the arrest of Mohammed the butcher. With warrant in hand, the ISF actioned the target unilateral...

"Transparent targeting has become in vogue as the ISF actually move in as the security lead in its country. The method by which we obtained intelligence was irrelevant, but sharing it was vital. The ISF were just happy for any help they could get in defeating insurgency in its neighborhoods. As luck would have it, the ISF identified one census information requirements datasheet derived from a previous cordon, search, and census operation, which matched the key characteristics of our target..."
ally and found large amounts of homemade explosives, as well as a white van being reconfigured for VBIED employment at the residence of the target. The target was arrested, and during tactical questioning, he shared valuable information with the ISF on the VBIED network in west Mosul.

The ISF quickly realized that it would not have captured this target or prevented the VBIED attack if it had not conducted the sample cordon, search, and census operations, which had provided it with a partial database of who lived in the AO. As the ISF battalion recon platoon leader responsible for Mohammed’s capture put it, “It was like we were in a dark room and you all turned on the light … now we will know every shop, mosque, sheik, imam, and school teacher in our neighborhoods.” Word rapidly spread throughout ISF units in west Mosul and our ISF partners asked us to support them in several more sample cordon and search operations; however, the ISF chain-of-command had something much larger in mind.

As part of Operation New Dawn, the 3d National Police Division Commander, responsible for security of west Mosul, ordered several battalion-sized cordon, search, and census operations of entire neighborhoods throughout the city. This created a new set of challenges in the evolving nature of the cordon, search, and census operation; while sample cordon, search, and census permitted up to 45 minutes per household due to the small objective size, the Iraqi chain of command now desired to complete a census of up to 3,000 residences in just a few days. We would have only about 15 minutes per household, so we had to develop a more efficient process to conduct cordon, search, and census operations.

During combined TLP with various ISF battalions, we decided on the “census light” method. Key tasks for the ISF included interviewing each head of household, completing census dataforms, and searching the residences. We decided on these tasks because they allowed an “Iraqi face” to be at the tip of the spear of the operation while gaining the added benefit of their comparatively better cultural awareness and language abilities. Conversely, key tasks for coalition forces included stenciling an address on each residence in accordance with our GRG system and taking digital pictures of each head of household and associated vehicles of each residence. These tasks allowed coalition forces to maintain situational awareness of the operation while using our comparatively better map-reading skills and technological capabilities.

Both Dragoon and ISF leaders now believed large-scale cordon, search, and census operations to be the most efficient method to rapidly survey the remaining

...key tasks for coalition forces included stenciling an address on each residence in accordance with our GRG system and taking digital pictures of each head of household and associated vehicles of each residence. These tasks allowed coalition forces to maintain situational awareness of the operation while using our comparatively better map-reading skills and technological capabilities.

By May, about 50 percent of the residences in our company area of operations — upward of 7,000 structures — had been entered into a combined census database, to include head of household interviews with associated digital media and each residence marked with a GRG address. At this point, the benefit of the cordon, search, and census operation began to expand exponentially. In the month of May alone, the ISF conducted precision raids on five insurgents with warrants in hand; identified and reduced several IEDs; and discovered multiple insurgent weapons caches with the help of human intelligence (HUMINT) tippers using the GRG address system. For the first time since the TOA, the ISF felt it had the initiative in its battlespace.

Transition to Unilateral ISF Cordon, Search, and Census Operations

Both Dragoon and ISF leaders now believed large-scale cordon, search, and census operations to be the most efficient method to rapidly survey the remaining

“Both Dragoon and ISF leaders now believed large-scale cordon, search, and census operations to be the most efficient method to rapidly survey the remaining residences and increase security gains. However, in early June, Dragoon received orders to change its level of partnership with the ISF from full-spectrum operations to ‘advise and assist.’ This change was due to Prime Minister Maliki’s request for all coalition combat forces to be ‘outside the cities’ no later than 30 June…”
residences and increase security gains. However, in early June, Dragoon received orders to change its level of partnership with the ISF from full-spectrum operations to “advise and assist.” This change was due to Prime Minister Maliki’s request for all coalition combat forces to be “outside the cities” no later than 30 June; therefore, our priority for the month of June was to enable the ISF to conduct cordon, search, and census operations with little or no coalition oversight. To rapidly expand the ISF’s capabilities required a great deal of teaching, coaching, and mentoring from our leaders and soldiers. The transition to unilateral operations occurred in several phases with varying results by ISF units.

The first point of friction in achieving independent ISF census operations, with little coalition forces oversight, was in its TLP process. We struggled to overcome the mental hurdle of planning an operation “our way,” then place ourselves in an advisory role. We first visited our partnered unit’s headquarters to plan the location of the operation. Once an objective area was selected, we helped them plan, covering everything from troops available to vehicle configuration and Class I for their jundis. Typically, we found that 2-hour key leader engagements, conducted at least twice, were necessary for an ISF battalion to completely plan a cordon, search, and census operation. While this is a heavy price to pay, since it subtracts from time otherwise available for a combined patrol, it paid great dividends in moving toward the ISF’s ability to conduct a unilateral cordon, search, and census operation with great results.

Developing IR Sheets/Materials/GRGs

As mentioned previously, the census information requirements datasheets changed for virtually every mission, depending on the type of neighborhood. However, the purpose of the datasheets was always to gain the most information, as quickly as possible, from each home. Our first census information requirements datasheet simply listed every question presented on the handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE). The datasheet began to evolve, to include relatives, make and models of vehicles, and even blank areas for photos. Digital media was the most important element of data collection, along with actual interviews of heads of household. Once all these information requirements were gathered and compiled on one census sheet, it took about an hour to conduct census in one household. In the beginning, this process served well as a sample census — each patrol’s objective area would encompass just a few houses and the ISF could interact at great length with each family. At the end of the census, the local population felt more confident of the ISF’s ability to protect their neighborhoods and families. Initially, all heads of household were entered into the HIIDE system, although subsequent large-scale operations did not include this task due to time constraints. The census information requirements datasheet evolved to fit the mission based on size of objective and time available.

There was one issue that continually hindered our cordon, search, and census operations — the GRG created by our COIST, using tactical ground reporting network (TiGRNET) imagery, did not always match up with the current landscape of Mosul, which, with a population exceeding two-million people, was consistently changing, especially along the western periphery due to squatter villages. This led to difficulty during census operations as each ground commander had to reference digital media to determine which house was specified on the GRG. Another identified hindrance was the familiar “fat-finger finder,” the method by which a HUMINT source attempts to show coalition forces or ISF where a lethal target is located using imagery. Typically, every fat-finger-based combined raid would encompass an entire block of houses, or a neighborhood, just to locate one target. The faster we could identify the target house, the less confusion, and the more likely we detained the right target.

We first implemented putting the GRG address physically on the house during a cordon, search, and census mission in an extremely poor neighborhood in west Mosul with a seemingly infinite number of squatter homes, which were not reflected on our most recent imagery. While the ISF searched each residence and interviewed heads of household, coalition forces observed the operation, recorded critical digital media, and stenciled GRG numbers on the houses. The census information requirements datasheet was marked with a corresponding GRG number and filed at the end of each day, along with the digital media, in our COIST database and ultimately into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet maintained by the ISF. On each house a number was stenciled (not free-handed), which made a huge difference when it came to credibility in future operations (insurgents have yet to figure out how to duplicate this numbering system without coalition forces being able to identify counterfeit). All houses were photographed with the owner of the house and any licensed vehicles.

The cordon, search, and census operation enabled several second- and third-order effects; the most effective being the operations forced ISF away from static
checkpoints and into open dialogue with the local community. The census information requirements datasheets were in Arabic and included questions about essential services in the neighborhood. We experimented with bringing humanitarian aid (HA) packets along during one cordon, search, and census operation; the reception by the ISF and local populace was phenomenal. The ISF distributed the HA packets based on level of poverty and cooperation during the census — the packets became a staple for subsequent missions.

Over time, several building-marking methods evolved; brick walls outside the courtyard were the preferred location for marking, but anywhere that the GRG address was visible from the street was sufficient. The stencils were professional, neat, and clean (a combination of letters and numbers) and some homeowners were actually proud of the address on their house. Stenciling addresses on each house forced the GRG to be updated, which was a tremendous benefit in planning future operations. The residents developed a sense of security, which came along with the whole-neighborhood concept and addresses on each house — our sources inside the neighborhood told us that local residents spread the idea that coalition forces and ISF now knew exactly who lived in each house, making insurgents afraid to move into the neighborhood or conduct operations there.

Plentiful in Mosul was the evidence of multiple combined clearing missions conducted over the span of the past 6 years. The evidence was clearly obvious as each house had multiple markings on the door or wall, each representing that the structure was cleared at some time in the past. Circles, dots, lines, or a single tagged letter — it was apparent in every neighborhood. Once the GRG address was stenciled and professionally placed on each house, the ISF finally took ownership of an operation, which worked to produce a neighborhood that had a sense of security and the ability to point out a specific house if there was someone in the vicinity conducting nefarious activities. It means something to the residents when they repaint their houses, but leave the stenciled address undisturbed, painting over every other marking.

One time-tested fact of forward deployed units is that the lowest-ranking American soldiers often develop the most ingenious tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). During a few of the “census en masse” operations, we learned that stenciling addresses was actually the limiting factor in the size of the objective we could census with the ISF. Changing stencils was a time-consuming task. PFC Maloney developed a “uni-stencil,” which is a single stencil that can be used to make any letter or number. Maloney’s innovation immediately became a company TTP that allowed us to maintain pace with our ISF census teams, making it possible to census larger objectives each time.

While our census information requirements datasheets were perfect for the residential neighborhoods, we faced a new challenge in Sinaa South. All structures in this neighborhood were businesses, primarily automotive chop shops frequently reported to be involved in VBIED production. Our leaders created a business information requirements census sheet, in conjunction with its partnered Iraqi army (IA) S3 shop, with specific information requirements such as hours of business, types of merchandise sold, and names of employees. The IA were so excited about the warrant-based targeting effects from the first sample business census that they were extremely receptive to completing a 100-percent business census of Sinaa South.

Lasting Benefits and Conclusions

On 30 June, coalition forces turned over security of the cities, including Mosul, to the ISF — a major step forward. General Odierno said, “This is the right time to transition security of the cities to the ISF, who are ready for this task.” The full census of our company’s AO has not yet been completed, but the ISF have repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and ability to complete this task in the next few months.”
completed, but the ISF have repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and ability to complete this task in the next few months. This desire is directly attributable to the ISF’s ability to obtain warrants using information obtained during cordon, search, and census operations. Additionally, their relationship with the local community has been significantly enhanced as a result of these operations as they are more adequately able to identify and work with local leaders.

During a recent planning session with west Mosul ISF leaders, they proudly showed us revised census information requirements datasheets currently being used in Mosul, which were derived from the original products we used during our combined operations prior to 30 June. More importantly, the west Mosul ISF has demonstrated its ability to unilaterally secure local neighborhoods following the 30 June handover — the most common type of mission remains a cordon, search, and census. Although a census of each neighborhood has been completed at one time or another, the ISF continues to update its resident database, which allows them to obtain warrants and target insurgents more successfully.

While the time for fully partnered cordon, search, and census operations in Mosul appears to have passed, this type of operation could be applied to a number of other areas where coalition forces are closely partnered with indigenous forces who lack sophisticated intelligence collection means and knowledge of their AO. We have not yet discovered an operation that gains intelligence so rapidly while simultaneously endearing indigenous forces to the community. By enabling the ISF to “know its AO” through cordon, search, and census operations, its timeline for assume security responsibility of Mosul was greatly expedited.

Captain Bryan Frizzelle is currently serving as company commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry (3-8 CAV), 3d Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Mosul, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and M1A2SEP Tank Commander Certification Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, and 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood; task force mortarmen platoon leader, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Baghdad, Iraq; and tank platoon leader, B Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Fort Hood and Baghdad.

Lieutenant Jeffery Gagliano is currently serving as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B.S. from Texas Christian University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Basic Officer Leader Course, Anti-Terrorism Level II, and Anti-Terrorism Level II Instructor Course. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq; instructor, Anti-Terrorism Level II, Sembach, Germany; instructor, Ground Combat Skills, Sembach; and noncommissioned officer in charge, Crime Prevention, San Antonio, Randolph Air Force Base, TX.

Lieutenant Brian Murdock is currently serving as platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Officer Candidate School, and Basic Officer Leader Course.

Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi is currently serving as a platoon leader, 2d Platoon, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Airborne School, Ranger School, Scout Leader Course, and Basic Officer Leader Courses II and III.

Lieutenant Daniel Wagner is currently serving as platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Officer Basic Course. He has also served as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood.

Works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from Page 34

underestimating the religious factors that breathed life into parts of the insurrection demoralized by superior British weapons.

Wardi writes the tribes were defeated because they joined and left the revolt as they pleased; money from spoils dried up quickly and could not sustain the revolt; spies and informants in the pay of the British permeated every level of Iraqi society; they waited until 8,450 were killed before they realized it was time to consider the prospect of some form of negotiation with the British; and many joined the revolt based on face and honor, and when the public waved in its support, their face and honor wavered as well, leading to some abandoning the revolt.

Spread of Rebellion and Conclusion

In Samawah, tribes and nationalistic forces attacked British armed riverboats H M S Stonely and Greyniffly. Within urban areas, such as Karbala, the city was divided into pro-and anti-British factions. Neighborhoods established provisional governments that were suppressed by the British. In retaliation, General Haldane cut water to Karbala, much to the objection of Wilson, who understood this would only unify the people of Karbala as they would endure common suffering.

In Najaf, the British allowed some self-government, and even an election of market officials occurred on 25 August 1920. A n aerial bombardment of Kufa led to damage of the mosque that was capitalized on by anti-British agitators. Wilson finally realized the only means of quelling this insurrection was not by force alone and began to consider discussing plans to transition Iraq into an independent entity. By August 1920, a stalemate developed whereby tribes controlled villages and the British controlled major urban areas. However, it would be a long road to the 1921 Cairo Conference that would develop the details of transitioning Britain’s Iraq Mandate to independence by 1932. Many more casualties would occur on both sides, but the next phase of the 1920 revolt would see increasing violence, as British and Iraqi revolutionaries postured for strategic advantage in world opinion and negotiations.

Wardi’s Part 2 of Volume 5 takes us from July 1920 to the conclusion of the revolt when it became clear that King Faisal would ascend to the throne of a newly created nation-state of Iraq in late August 1921.

Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B.B.A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M.B.A. and M.A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M.S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U.S. Naval War College, the U.S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC.

This work would not have been possible without the help of YN1 Gavin Iby for his edits and valuable comments and the help of the John T. Hughes Library and Library of Congress for making Wardi’s works available for study. A special thanks to the National Defense University Librarians, who devoted part of their lunch hour to help me.
The nature of conflicts in which the U.S. military is involved in Afghanistan and Iraq was first described in 1989, in the article, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” by William Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, Joseph Sutton, and Gary Wilson.¹ In describing the evolution of warfare, the authors touch on “elements that carry over” from one generation to the next, but do not expand much on these elements. Twelve years later, 9/11 became the hallmark 4th generation of war (4GW) attack and now we are involved in two protracted 4GW conflicts in southwest Asia. I would like to take the “elements that carry over,” expand on them, and show how we can use these elements as a path to success.

The 4GW possesses central ideas that evolved and were developed from previous generations of warfare: dispersion/decentralization, logistics, maneuver/train- ing, and focus. These ideas are the path to success in Afghanistan and Iraq.

To reduce vulnerability to the increased destructive capabilities of our modern armed forces, the enemy 4GW commander disperses to protect his force. The smaller and more hidden the force, the less likely it is to draw attention. Napoleon dispersed his forces as a means to increase his ability to forage, thus reducing his logistics train and increasing his freedom of maneuver. By dispersing, Napoleon separated himself from much of his force. To compensate for this separation and maintain unity of command, he developed a robust communications system and simplified his battle orders to intent, rather than instruction. With his forces dispersed, he was required to trust the energy, ideas, and talents of his subordinate leaders.

As a Nation struggling with 4GW conflicts, shouldn’t we consider what our 4GW opponents and Napoleon embraced? If our concentration of forces, or large logistics trains, proves to be a source of vulnerability, shouldn’t we also disperse our forces? Our unparalleled communications is truly an asset and can support such dispersion; but, are our subordinate leaders, lieutenants, and captains ready and properly trained to maneuver units while operating independently? Are our soldiers ready to rely on one another in a firefight and not on close air support (CAS) and indirect artillery fires that have caused so many civilian casualties? If not, we should endeavor to make them ready through training and education.

We should teach our junior officers about their opponent; we should teach them about themselves. In The Art of War, Sun Tzu wrote, “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
Against what do we maneuver? What is the “center of gravity” or “the point against which all our energies should be directed”? Our 4GW opponent uses dispersion to avoid creating high-value targets, such as troop concentrations and command and control assets, so what is left at the tactical level on which to direct our energies? Our opponents do have centers of gravity; they have them hidden in plain sight. The centers of gravity are the actual people of Iraq and Afghanistan, which are the key to success. If we can execute stability operations well at the tactical level, we will reap success at all levels of conflict — tactical, operational, and strategic.

The end state of stability operations is not tactical victory, but operational and strategic success. Stability operations seek to “establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.” If we are successful at the tactical level in safeguarding the local populace and its ability to achieve economic and political freedom, we take away our opponent’s base of recruiting and logistics procurement. By facilitating economic prosperity, we can eliminate hopelessness. When a parent develops hope for the future of his children, rather than despair, he is less likely to support insurgency or revolution. If he has hope, he is less likely to provide supplies, contribute financially, or volunteer to fight in support of insurgency or revolution. Stabilization operations are, in essence, a maneuver against our opponent’s center of gravity, seeking to erode his logistics, financial, and recruitment base. It is what Liddell Hart calls an “indirect approach.” By eroding operational and strategic assets, we can break our opponent’s resistance without fighting.

Destroying our opponent’s combat power through direct engagement is no longer the aim. Eliminating hopelessness is the aim with the desired end state being peace and stability. Succeed without destruction; succeed through creation. Will this be easy? No, but as stated in U.S. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, Warfighting, “the belligerent who first exploits a development in the art and science of war gains a significant, if not decisive, advantage. Conversely, if we are ignorant of the changing face of war, we will find ourselves unequal to meet its challenges.” Let us be unequal no more; let us learn 4GW and master it. The key is to know the enemy and know ourselves.

Notes

3The U.S. Army Soldier’s Creed.
4The Art of War, p. 17.

Christopher T. Lovato, is currently an instructor/writer, Army Logistics University, Quartermaster Basic Officer Leadership Course, Fort Lee, VA. He received a B.A. from Loyola University, New Orleans. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course, and Airborne School. As an active duty captain, he served as an instructor/course developer, Army Logistics University, Quartermaster Basic Officer Leader- ship Course, Fort Lee.

“We should train our soldiers how to fight at night — both with and without the use of night-vision goggles (NVGs). We should train soldiers how to use micro-terrain to mask their movements. They should be trained hard at the squad and platoon levels, so when they must fight, they know how their fellow soldiers will react and how they feel.”
By now, everyone in the armor and cavalry community is aware that the Armor Center and School will be relocating to Fort Benning, Georgia, where it will align with the Infantry School in creating the new Maneuver Center of Excellence. In addition to building an entirely new Armor Center at Harmony Church, ranges and training areas are also under construction. To support the move, tank ranges are currently under construction and existing ranges are receiving necessary upgrades and modifications to support future armor training. Final designs and the creation of range blueprints for the remaining ranges required are nearing completion. This article explores some of what it takes to build a tank range; the process is more complex than solving a crossword puzzle in the dark.

The decision to relocate the Armor Center and School has had an impact across the Army and its supporting agencies. One of the first steps was the development of an environmental impact study (EIS); two in fact were required, to encompass all the areas on Fort Benning that would be affected by the relocation. These EIS, coupled with lessons learned from two ongoing wars, have created a tightrope that all parties must follow to shape and mold future tank ranges. I have personally been involved from the beginning in the range process.

In March 2006, then 1st Armored Training Brigade Commander, Colonel Peter Utley, asked me to provide direction and purpose for a single stationary tank gunnery range, under consideration at Fort Benning, for 19K (tank crewman) and 19D (cavalry scout) one station unit training (OSUT) courses. I applied my understanding of the 2d Battalion, 81st Armor mission and extracted the cavalry side from 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry. Putting the two together, I could see the similarities, as well as the differences, in range requirements. Using the program of instruction (POI) associated with each training activity, I created a presentation for the chief of range operations and his range planner at Fort Benning. The briefing was informal, but it served as an eye-opener for both of them; they were under the impression that the Armor School required only a baseline range with no offensive capability or moving targets. The presentation helped lay the foundation for the stationary tank gunnery range and all other range projects.

There are several differences between the armor and infantry OSUT courses, which include ammo pad size requirements (ammunition needed to conduct 19K OSUT gunnery is much greater in size and total net explosive weight); limited offensive capability associated with 19K POI; and the incorporation of lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) from Iraq and Afghanistan (i.e., the use of urban clusters on ranges). After careful study of the course requirements, we determined that one range would not meet all the requirements and decided to build a second stationary tank range.

My initial range work led to a subsequent assignment to the Armor School’s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) planning team and an eventual move to Fort Benning to be on-site as the ranges were constructed. Over a 2-year span, we encountered many challenges along the way, but working with the units, we learned a great deal about individual training requirements. This knowledge enabled me to work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) design teams to ensure that all ranges, constructed or upgraded, support armor and cavalry POIs. We focused on developing one range, ST-1, which would support 19K, 19D, Master Gunner, U.S. Marine Corps, and even some Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) requirements. Despite our best efforts, one discrepancy will require future work to correct — the size of the ammunition holding pad.

“We focused on developing one range, ST-1, which would support 19K, 19D, Master Gunner, U.S. Marine Corps, and even some Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) requirements. Despite our best efforts, one discrepancy will require future work to correct — the size of the ammunition holding pad.”

An ammunition pad large enough to stock supplies for the entire rotation requires a 106’ x 17’ pad. This size is based on the number of rounds, size of ammunition pallets, and, most importantly, on my previous experiences. It is important to note that TRADOC units do not have a support platoon to move ammunition, so setting up single-day drops will be an added expense each time the range is used. The pad currently under construction is 10’ x 20’, and as a result of its much smaller size, it will negatively impact 19K OSUT. Once training commences on this range, it will not be long before a future project will have to be developed to correct this error. Before the second tank range and redesign of the Hastings multipurpose tank range (MPTR) were contracted, I ensured they had the appropriately sized ammo pads!

The original requirement for ST-1 range at Fort Benning was listed as a “stationary tank range.” This descriptive title was not entirely accurate; the POI for 19K OSUT requires a single offensive engagement. This lone task enabled me to leverage limited offensive capability on both ST-1 and ST-2 tank ranges, which are designed to be interchangeable as far as unit accessibility and scheduling. The standard policy of not dedicating specific ranges to specific units enabled both ST-1 and ST-2 ranges to have mirror capabilities. Over the past 3 years, I consulted with as many potential users as possible. From OSUT to BOLC, Master Gunner, and U.S. Marine Corps training, I made it my mission to share the design with other users and solicit input, which provided several sets of eyes on the proposed designs. The input has been extremely positive and future users feel these ranges are “awesome,” which proves the value of having Fort Knox personnel on-site, from the beginning of actual construction, to oversee the designs develop from concept to actual ranges. Everything man does needs a little tweak here and there and these ranges are no exception; however, our goal is to build ranges that will support each of our organizations well into the future.

The BOLC gunnery exercise is a massive operation that prepares our armor and cavalry officers for future assignments. The operation consists of two separate live-fire gunnery, which are conducted simultaneously — tank (armor) on one dedicated range and Bradley (cavalry) on a separate range. This requirement created the need for a true MPTR and a second to support the other half of the training rotation. Current Fort Benning ranges can almost meet both requirements, but at a much lower standard than ranges currently used by the Armor School at Fort Knox. To address this, a $17.5 million project was developed to design and construct an MPTR, but getting this project started proved challenging; several problems existed, starting with location. The location proposed by Fort Benning’s range division was just to the north and west of the existing Hastings MPTR. Hastings is an operational range that supports FORSCOM and TRADOC requirements, but is in need of repair.

The design firm hired to develop the plans for the new MPTR immediately identified several large problems with the proposed location. First, the land had significant low ground and a hilltop that created a tremendous intervisibility (IV) line. The designers tried every possible adjustment to the range layout, but their analysis concluded that it was too costly to design and develop an MPTR on that
location; the earthwork alone was estimated at $70 million.

The second issue with the proposed location was its impact on the red cockaded woodpecker, an endangered bird nesting in the area. After consulting with our team, Fort Benning range control, and master gunners from 16th Cavalry and 194th Armored Brigade, the USACE project manager requested that an alternate site be found for the range. It was determined that Hastings Range, based on its pre-existing status, could be modernized and restored with available funds and still meet the BRAC movement timeline. Hastings Range would be transformed by way of an extreme makeover into a modern MPTR, capable of supporting present and future gunnery exercises.

The third challenge that faced the MPTR planners and designers was how to incorporate the new heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) requirements, as well as the dictated ATSC requirement to support the current tank gunnery manual. Working with a draft HBCT gunnery manual and the already established tank gunnery manual, the planners and designers worked all angles to include the requirements of both manuals into the design package, with great results. Once presented with the coordinated design, ATSC acquiesced to supporting both the tank and HBCT requirements.

The fourth issue was environmental impact; Hastings Range has unique challenges due to poor soil composition that leaves a large portion of the ground poorly suited to support plant life. Without plants to hold the soil, the movement of tanks and Bradley’s would cause major erosion-control problems, adding to the already present erosion in the area, which is referred to as “mini grand canyons.” USACE environmentalists are working solutions to improve the soil composition, which include building hardened low-water crossing sites; seeding all disturbed soil areas; limiting drainage slopes to slow runoff water; and limiting stream crossing sites, as much as possible.

The fifth obstacle is line of sight and surface area danger zones. Hastings Range is located in the far northeastern corner of Fort Benning, critically close to post boundaries. The challenge lies in ensuring all surface area danger zone patterns and target locations are safely emplaced and do not exceed range or post limitations. The beaten zone for Hastings will change somewhat with the installation of new, modern targets. These changes must be approved by the ATSC, USACE, and Fort Benning’s environmental divisions, and meet post and range safety requirements.

The last piece to the puzzle is BOLC gunnery and the improvements that must be made to other existing ranges without the support of BRAC money. The internal Fort Benning range operations have begun effective upgrades designed to support the Armor School’s future activities. A second offensive lane and new target emplacements will be installed at Carmouche MPTR. This range is critical to certain training events because it provides the capability (although limited) to fire saboted light armor penetrator tracer (SLAPT) and 105mm sabot training ammunition.

Rome wasn’t built in a day, and building Armor School requirements at Fort Benning won’t be either. Understanding that our new home will require additional construction and changes to ranges in the future should not be that difficult. Like any new homeowner, after you buy the house you may want to add a deck or widen the driveway, and Fort Benning will be no different. Once the Armor School is on the ground, we will closely monitor all units and their training requirements to ensure we maintain a state-of-the-art training environment that prepares warriors for combat and keeps the Armor School on the leading edge of armor-focused capabilities.

Once your unit relocates and you find yourself a bit further south than Fiddler’s Green, enjoying the heat and humidity, you will be able to Charlie Mike!

Sergeant First Class Vernon Prohaska is currently serving as the tank gunnery range and operation lead, U.S. Army Armor Center, with duty assignment to U.S. Army Infantry Center, Fort Benning, GA. His education includes studies at Sullivan University and Central Texas. His military education includes Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, Primary Leadership Development Course, Recruiting School, M1A2 Tank Commander Course, Stryker RV Course, and Stryker MGS Course. His previous assignments include liaison officer, strategic planning cell, Fort Knox, KY; senior training management noncommissioned officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 2d Battalion, 81st Armor (2-81 Armor), Fort Knox; tank gunnery platoon sergeant, HHC, 2-81 Armor, Fort Knox; and tank platoon sergeant, E Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Iraq.
Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? by James J. Sheehan, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, New York, 2008, 304 pp., $15.95 (paperback)

Why didn’t the transformation and turmoil in Europe during the 1990s usher in a major war or crisis? Given the history of Europe during the first half of the 20th century, the events of the 1990s certainly should have. However, author James Sheehan argues the nations of Europe have transformed into societies where violence no longer plays a central role as a means of influence and the attainment of goals.

Sheehan’s work clearly and cogently spans the political, social, economic, and military histories of the European states and their interrelationships. The author makes a compelling argument that the absence of war since 1945 is linked to Europe’s unique history, which resulted in a new international system within Europe and a new kind of European state.

The book is well researched and provides a new and fresh look at Europe’s history and its future with the international community and the United States. It describes how the military, war, and society were intertwined at the start of the 20th century. European nation’s expanded their militaries and linked service to societal values and citizenship. World War I taught Europe that violence was an acceptable means of statecraft; during World War II, any civility between nations completely disappeared as the continent was once again plunged into war. After 1945, a devastated continent was weary of war and looking to pull itself back together. As the Cold War began, the European states concentrated their energies and resources on the areas that mattered most to their citizens — material well-being, social stability, and economic growth.

The author argues that the “bipolar order imposed by the superpowers, which essentially eliminated the possibility of war among the European states;” allowed changes in the relationship between the states and their citizens, which “redefined the states’ institutional structure and political purpose.” Economic success and providing social services were paramount to the nations of Europe, thereby changing military values and institutions.

Sheehan, a professor of modern European history at Stanford University, makes a compelling case that has implications for the international community during this century. He links his conclusions to issues involving the Balkans, the war on terrorism, and the potential of Europe as a superpower. This book will appeal to a wide variety of audiences, those interested in European affairs, international relations, foreign policy, history, and strategy. Well-written and easy to read, I highly recommend Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? to anyone interested in these topics.

ROBERT RIELLY
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired


Some might take offense at the implications of Stanley Weintraub’s boldly stated title. After all, three fleet admirals and one Army general (also 5 stars), were also named before the end of World War II — Leahy, King, Nimitz, and Arnold — and an argument might be made that they too had a hand in saving the “American century.” Nonetheless, it’s hard to imagine three American military men of that time of greater stature, more iconic, or more heroic than Generals of the Army Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Marshall. For that reason, books written about them continue to sell not only to students and historians, but also readers who still hunger for these stories about larger-than-life heroes, men who seem to exude even from this distance competent leadership, integrity, and selfless service. In that regard, Professor Weintraub’s latest book satisfies, but not entirely.

The subtitle of Weintraub’s book, “Three Generals Who Saved the American Century,” implies such heroic stature. Indeed, all the familiar stories are included: MacArthur’s defense of the Philippines during the early dark days of American involvement in World War II, his return to the Philippines, his supervision of defeated Japan, and his stubborn come-back invasion at Inchon in Korea; Eisenhower’s management of the grand coalition, his gutsy call to risk the invasion of France in the face of uncertain weather, and his eventual overcoming of Hitler’s last desperate gamble in the Ardennes to win victory in Europe and eventually the White House; and Marshall, the taciturn wartime chief who “organized victory” and later saved Western Europe, through his economic recovery plan, as secretary of state.

Weintraub attempts to especially illustrate the ties that bound these three men together as they progressed in their Army careers through the interwar years between world wars, through World War II, and into the postwar Cold War. In this regard, he perhaps succeeded better than anyone previously. Because so many histories of World War II treat either Europe or the Pacific, but not both, we sometimes forget that as separate as these theaters were, they were connected in time by strategy and personnel, none stronger than those of these three men. Superiors and subordinates, contemporaries, mentor and pupil, colleagues and rivals, friends and enemies — the shifting, complex relationship among these generals had a direct influence on American strategy during the war, and Weintraub well illustrates that events, which seem in scope and size beyond human influences, are still shaped by the forces of heroic personality and human frailty. One interesting aspect of Weintraub’s work is his effort to show how, under slightly different circumstances, any one of the three men, not just Eisenhower, might have become President of the United States.

Unfortunately, while Weintraub seems to promise heroics (generals who “saved” the American century), he delivers more frailty than some may like, which include stories such as MacArthur’s penchant for self-promotion and his aversion for the ugly realities of the front, and Eisenhower’s strength in alliance management, weakness in soldierly leadership and his dalliance with his wartime female driver. In fact, many, if not most, of the characters in Weintraub’s pantheon acquit themselves rather poorly in his estimation. Only Marshall seems to consistently exhibit the soldierly traits — competence, integrity, and perhaps most importantly, apolitical selflessness and self-effacement — that Weintraub (and presumably ARMOR readers) admire. Throughout, Marshall seems to stand on granite, contrasting greatly with all those with feet of clay. I can’t help but wonder if a more accurate subtitle might have been, “How General Marshall saved the American Century (and also MacArthur and Eisenhower, in spite of themselves).”

There are some other annoyances; for example, Weintraub refers to Philippine scouts, Filipinos who enlisted in the regular Army and were trained and led by mostly American officers, as being little better than “boy scouts,” perhaps confusing the scouts with the undertrained and poorly equipped Philippine army soldiers who made up the majority of MacArthur’s defending forces. Nonetheless, this seems an unnecessary and gratuitous slap at a group of brave and heavily decorated men, who were rewarded after the war with unquestioned American citizenship, if they wanted it. Weintraub also refers to medals, such as the Distinguished Service Cross, awarded for valor in combat, as “baubles.” Although his intent may be to disparage the award of these decorations to men he feels did not deserve them (MacArthur included), the effect is to trivialize the decoration and thereby dismiss both the undeserving and deserving.

Finally, Weintraub’s “Source Notes” chapter, at the end of the book, barely pays the required obeisance to scholarly documentation; serious students will find his notes vague and mostly unhelpful. However, his work succeeds at the level for which it seems intended — as a popular history of the relationship of these generals and how it contributed to winning World War II and beyond. However, serious students of American World War II history may find 15 Stars mostly repackages familiar tales, albeit with a few new twists.

STEVEN C. GRAVLIN
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired
New Army Field Manual
FM 5-0: The Operations Process

The new FM 5-0, *The Operations Process*, expands Army doctrine on the exercise of command and control during the conduct of full spectrum operations. No longer a manual strictly concerning planning, FM 5-0 now describes the relationship of all activities of the operations process – planning, preparing for, execution, and assessing operations.

In addition, for the first time in Army doctrine, the manual weaves “design” throughout the operations process. This version of FM 5-0 provides a guide for Army leaders in understanding, visualizing, and describing complex, ill-structured problems and developing approaches to solve them.

FM 5-0 will be available for download at the Combined Arms Center Web site: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM50

More information may be obtained by calling the U.S. Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) at: (913)684-2159/ DSN 552-2159