

ARMOR

September-October 2009



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ARMOR

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LETTERS

Three Hooahs for the new ARC

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read with great interest and excitement "Army Reconnaissance Course," by Major Robert Perry and Retired Lieutenant Colonel Kevin McEnery, in the July-August edition of *ARMOR*. As Colonel Teeple's points out in his "Commander's Hatch," in the same edition, there is an ongoing and highly constructive dialogue currently spreading throughout the Army regarding a new approach to training, commonly known as outcomes-based training and education (OBT&E). There are many misconceptions about OBT&E, and Major Perry and Lieutenant Colonel McEnery do a great job of describing these points of confusion as they outline their efforts at the ARC. Their point is well taken; this approach is not a completely new idea, but it is rather a return to the basic principles on which our training was meant to be built. Those who argue that we are already doing this across the board in the Army fail to see the forest for the proverbial trees. The traditional task, conditions, and standard approach, in its current form, suffers from built-in limitations that tend to stifle initiative and fail to nurture the attributes that all commanders agree are essential in combat. OBT&E does not, however, imply that tasks are not important or that standards have no place. Instead, OBT&E seeks to fully exploit the potential of soldiers being trained and the trainers who are leading them.

I have seen the outcomes-based approach at work and the results are undeniable. Regardless of which side of this debate you chose, all leaders should recognize that this discussion is healthy for our Army. The days of patting ourselves on the back and speaking of ourselves only in the superlative ("the best trained, best equipped, and best led army in the world!") must be put behind us. Constant improvement should be our goal as an institution, and ideas, such as OBT&E, are critical to this effort.

CHAD FOSTER
MAJ, U.S. Army

Brave Rifles: Defending the Heavy Armored Cavalry Regiment

Dear *ARMOR*,

I am very much impressed by Major Christopher Mahaffey's defense of the heavy armored cavalry regiment (ACR) in his article, "Maintaining the ACR and its Capabilities for the Force," in the July-August edition of *ARMOR*. His comparison of the ACR against the infantry brigade combat team, the Stryker brigade combat team, and the heavy brigade combat team is clear and well reasoned, so far as it goes. Unfortunately, such a side-by-side comparison against other brigade-sized units misses the fundamental doctrinal and organizational structure of how the U.S. Army fights.

The key error occurs in Major Mahaffey's misquote of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 17-95, *Cavalry Operations*. In his article, he writes: "The fundamental purpose of cavalry is to perform reconnaissance and provide security in

close operations. In doing so, cavalry facilitates the commander's ability to maneuver subordinate units and concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point..."

In fact, the second sentence in FM 17-95 states: "In doing so, cavalry facilitates the corps or division commander's ability to maneuver divisions, brigades, and battalions, and concentrate superior combat power and apply it against the enemy at the decisive time and point..."

This is a point that Army leadership has lost sight of. The ACR is not just another maneuver brigade, selected based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). The ACR is a corps commander's asset. The role of the ACR is to fight under the direct command of the corps headquarters in front of, in support of, or independently of, the other maneuver brigades and divisions.

The Army, until recently, had divisions with 10 to 12 maneuver battalions parceled among three divisional brigade headquarters and headquarters companies, and a "division base" of supporting brigades. Army leaders then imagined that they could break up those divisions and fashion five or so brigade combat teams from each. Since branch schools are the proponents for their respective battalions and brigades, it sort of all made sense at their level. But along the way, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) lost sight of the *entire rest of the Army*; the echelons above division: corps, Army, and theater forces.

If the Army's future is to simply generate brigade combat teams for delivery to the joint theater commander (service immaterial), well then we might as well get rid of the ACR. But if the Army is ever expected to fight with a corps, numbered Army, or theater Army, then we not only need to retain the heavy 3d ACR, but we need a lot more of them.

Forge the Thunderbolt!

CHESTER A. KOJRO
LTC, U.S. Army (Retired)

Stop Thinking in Branches and Start Thinking as an Army

Dear *ARMOR*,

I was extremely impressed by the article, "Maintaining the ACR and its Capabilities for the Force," written by Major Christopher Mahaffey (July-August *ARMOR*). It contained a few "eye openers," even for me, as one who follows issues regarding force structure very closely.

I recall similar ideas stated in a letter published in *ARMOR* several years ago that expressed a similar viewpoint. I have been unable to find that issue of *ARMOR* in my files, so I regret not giving full credit to the letter writer. Suffice to say, the shared belief is we need to stop thinking in branches and start thinking as an Army.

We must find the optimum place for assets. If that means heavy combined arms companies, if it means aviation assets organic to a light in-

fantry brigade, and even if it means that a branch or two disappears from the roles — so be it.

It is my fervent hope that the impending establishment of the Maneuver Center of Excellence is a right step in that direction. It will not be so, however, if an artificial barrier is erected on the road from Harmony Church to Infantry Hall.

CHARLES W. TREESE
LTC, U.S. Army (Retired)

The MRAPs Evolution: The True Course of Events

Dear *ARMOR*,

I read with interest the article, "Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle and the Contemporary Operational Environment," written by Christopher Geeding and Thomas Stafford in the May-June 2009 edition of *ARMOR*. In the interest of not allowing revisionist history to overcome the true course of events in the evolution of the MRAP as it is fielded today, and recognize the lack of leadership from some within the Department of Defense in providing the best protection to our soldiers in a more timely manner, it is important to note the authors missed some significant events in the MRAP's evolution.

In the fall of 2006, a new and very lethal threat was introduced by Shia insurgent elements in and around the eastern parts of Iraq — the explosively formed penetrator (EFP). It was widely understood that this weapon was being supplied by Iran and was generally limited to those areas where U.S. Army units conducted mounted operations. Soldiers were being killed and wounded in rapidly increasing numbers. The western provinces, which are predominantly Sunni areas, were besieged by underbelly improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, which were directed mainly against U.S. Marine Corps mounted operations.

In November 2006, the U.S. Army Rapid Equipping Force issued a quick response contract to an Arlington, Virginia, company to demonstrate armor technology for defeating EFPs with the materials mounted to the side of a tactical wheeled vehicle. This became known as the "ballistic protection experiment." No one at the time believed that an EFP could be defeated by armor light enough to be carried on a wheeled vehicle. The MRAP did not have EFP defeat on its threat requirements list; the U.S. Marine Corps Systems Command was the lead agency for procurement and Marines were not seeing EFPs in Anbar! Timing and circumstances for the Army could not have been worse.

In March 2007, the Arlington company teamed up with a vehicle armor manufacturer and delivered two commercial Ford F750 trucks to the U.S. Army Test Center (ATC), Aberdeen, Maryland. One vehicle was configured for destruction testing and went immediately to the range for EFP testing. The full details of the testing are classified, but the technology clearly and unequivocally showed the EFP armor solution worked — there was never a penetra-

The Pro-Reading Challenge Program

by Major Scott Shaw and Captain Kelly Jones

tion of the crew compartment of the test vehicle. The second vehicle was put on the ATC road course to see how it would hold up to the additional armor weight. Testing was stopped after approximately 500 miles, but there were no recorded problems and this was an off-the-shelf commercial truck chassis selected just for the demonstration.

In the same month, the government identified a workable solution for defeating EFPs, which corresponds directly with the increasing procurement requirements for MRAPs, but no one raised a red flag and stopped to assess what could be done to immediately improve the MRAP. With the test data accumulated at ATC belonging to the government, it was assumed that the leadership of the department would recognize the value of the demonstration and immediately attempt to field the MRAP, but that was not the case. In response to a public announcement in June 2007 on the availability of the technology to defeat EFPs, the upcoming Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement was briefed, still nothing happened.

By August, it was clear that the casualty rates for mounted soldiers were not decreasing, and under pressure from Congress and the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement's office, the MRAP program office issued a new solicitation for MRAP — the MRAP II. The reason this is significant is because not only did the new requirement incorporate the specific requirement for defeating EFPs, it increased the levels of protection against IEDs and direct-fire ballistic attacks to levels significantly higher than the original MRAP specification.

In December 2007, contracts were awarded for the MRAP II; however, the MRAP was in full production and still nothing was being done about providing EFP protection for soldiers. The MRAP II was delivered to the Army's test centers, at both Aberdeen and Yuma, where it underwent a full array of durability, mobility, and environmental and force protection testing, demonstrating its clear superiority in design over the original MRAP, but it was clearly too late. The course was set and there would not be any deviations.

As we fast forwarded to mid-2008, we saw the technology that was introduced in the fall of 2006 and early 2007, and purchased in December of 2007 for the MRAP II, finally make its way as a retrofit application on the MRAPs. Just like the add-on armor program for the HMMWVs early in the war, the MRAP vehicles initially suffered from a lack of weight-carrying capacity and provided only partial coverage to protect vital crew areas.

Currently, nearly all of the technology requested and delivered for the MRAP II has been retrofitted onto the original MRAP fleet — it's not as good as it would have been on an MRAP II, but soldiers and Marines will benefit from the effort. I just wanted the record to show that there was an MRAP II, which made the MRAP a more successful program than it would have been otherwise.

MARC A. KING
LTC, U.S. Army (Retired)

One thing stands clear about the current fight — junior leaders are given much more autonomy than ever before. To deal with the ever-increasing responsibilities of today's platoon leaders, veteran company commanders and field grade officers must provide junior leaders the tools to succeed, which include nurturing analytical skills (troop leading procedures), intuitive leadership skills necessary in combat, and the ability to deal with the aftermath of combat.

A tried-and-true method of developing junior leaders is through a professional reading program, which is not only critical to individual development, but also to collective learning and development in our units. The idea of "it's more trouble than it's worth," critically falls short of the value of a professional-development program. There are hundreds of books and a multitude of reading lists available for platoon leaders; however, there are six classic volumes that offer platoon leaders a place to start discussion on issues from the tactical to the ethical and everything in between. These six classics (known as the "platoon leader six pack") include *The Killing Zone: My Life in the Vietnam War* by Frederick Downs; *Stalking the Viet-*

cong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account by Stuart Herrington; *The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa: With E.D. Swinton's "The Defence of Duffer's Drift"* by Michael L. Burgoyne and Albert J. Marckwardt; *Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat* by James McDonough; *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest* by Stephen Ambrose; *On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace* by Dave Grossman and Loren W. Christensen; and as an added benefit is *Once an Eagle* by Anton Myrer.

As part of the platoon leader and Company Command online professional forum, "Pro-Reading Challenge" was developed to create a forum to assist commanders in integrating reading as a fundamental part of leader-development programs in their units. This program is readily available, free of charge, and takes the legwork out of research by streamlining the process of developing a pro-reading program for junior leaders. Please visit the website below for further information on the "Pro-Reading Challenge." Professional reading is a powerful way to develop leaders!

The Pro-Reading Challenge Program (FREE BOOKS)

Company Commanders: Choose a book and the Pro-Reading team will mail you copies to read and discuss with your platoon leaders. The program also includes creating a space on the online forum specifically for you to discuss the book.

When commanders and their leaders read together with an eye toward practical applications, the conversations that result will improve unit performance. The emphasis of the Pro-Reading Challenge is on the conversations about the reading, which results from commanders creating a time and place, such as meal time, around the hood of a HMMWV, under a tree, as well as online, to promote professional discussions.

Commanders who participate in the Pro-Reading Challenge Program are very intentional about choosing books that tie in with mission requirements. They choose books that reinforce what they are already doing and they situate the program and conversations in the "now" experiences of subordinate leaders. In other words, they focus their leaders on how the reading and discussion applies to their specific needs as a unit.

Commanders are encouraged to contact the Pro-Reading team at:

<http://ProReading.army.mil>

You may also directly contact Niel Smith, the program manager, at pro.reading@us.army.mil, or alternately at cocmd.team@us.army.mil, to become part of a collective learning and professional development process that provides invaluable training in an extremely time-constrained environment.

“Building the Team”

by Major General James M. Milano

ARMOR welcomes MG Mike Milano as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, and thanks COL (P) Dave Teeples for a job well done.

I am deeply honored to assume the position of the 44th Chief of Armor, and I am humbled to be serving our Nation and the Cavalry and Armor Corps during this dynamic time in our history. The Cavalry and Armor branch of the U.S. Army has a worldwide reputation for producing the finest officers, NCOs, and Soldiers in the modern profession of arms. We continually contribute to our Army's efforts at a level well above what our branch's size might lead one to believe. I see nothing on the horizon that will deteriorate this reputation. Make no mistake — the Armor Center has a no-fail mission in the creation of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, GA. The move to Fort Benning will overlay every aspect of our operations and we must continue to produce high quality members of the mounted force; design and oversee far-reaching changes to our formations in structure, equipment, and doctrine; and maintain the strength of the Cavalry and Armor branch. I am proud that I have been entrusted to lead the Armor Center team during this incredible period.

This is the first time that I have been back to Fort Knox since I attended the battalion-level pre-command course in 1994. I am astonished at the positive changes, not just in the training and missions we are responsible for, but how Fort Knox has changed. We have a world-class training environment that is highly sought after by units and civilian organizations across the United States. We are in the middle of the surge period as we prepare to bring in both Human Resources Command and Accessions Command and transition the Armor Center to Benning as part of the BRAC plan. Realistically, the Armor Center is clearly operating at a pace and capacity on par with many deployed senior headquarters organizations.

I am extremely grateful to Colonel Dave Teeples — and to CSM John Wayne Troxell — for doing a masterful job of taking care of the Soldiers and families of the Armor Center and Fort Knox. COL Teeples has been a tireless advocate for the needs of the Cavalry and Armor branch and has done more for the mounted force

in his short time as the Chief of Armor than many others would have been able to. I will ensure that we maintain our focus on our Soldiers and their families as we continue to set the bar high for the rest of the Army with our innovations and outcomes focused training and combat developments.

My number one task is to work with the Infantry Center Commander and my good friend, MG Mike Ferriter, to merge our two organizations into the Maneuver Center of Excellence. Together, we are preparing for the physical move to Fort Benning, and while there is still a great deal of work to be done with the construction of our facilities, we are now entering a new phase in this monumental operation. Each organization has more than 80 years of history, intellectual capital, and an emotional attachment to how we do things. We now must conduct an enterprise approach review of all of our systems and practices to form the MCOE — all while retaining the organizational identity of both the Armor and Infantry branches. This is as complex a problem set as I have seen in my 30 years of military service. There will be friction, disruption, and the occasional skirmish, but this is truly One Force – One Fight and we will come together and exceed expectations all while strengthening both branches.

While the BRAC movements and MCOE merger will affect all our actions here at the Armor Center, we have a charter to maintain the high standards in all our training courses. We are at the cutting edge of training and I could fill pages with the initiatives that the Armor Center team has conceived, developed, and implemented that keep our mounted warriors at the forefront of today's operating environment. Our captains and lieutenants are stretched mentally and physically with the latest combat scenarios, digital battle command equipment, and razor sharp focus on the outcome of providing our squadrons and battalions going into the fight with the best trained leaders possible. The NCO Academy is leading all of TRADOC with its implementation of the Maneuver Senior Leaders Course, the latest evolution of professional education for our noncommissioned officers. The young men we have coming into basic training and 19D or 19K OSUT are our Nation's best and most precious resource,

and their training and readiness are paramount to our Army's success in the short term and health in the long term.

As I look at our combat developments mission, again, I see us at a critical point in our Army's history as we are on the cusp of far-reaching changes to our force. We are the proponent for the development of the ground combat vehicle (GCV), a family of vehicles that will be fielded in 2015 and deployed in 2017. This program will affect all BCTs in some way and will maintain the United States' overmatch advantage in land warfare for decades to come. We are also deeply involved in the force mix and force structure redesign as we look to balance the Army and prepare to meet the challenges of the next several years. These restructuring efforts include the conversion of several of our HBCTs into SBCTs, the development of a reconnaissance, surveillance, and security regiment to replace the BFSB, and enhancing our existing Cavalry formations with new platforms and manning designs.

I invite all of you to participate in the 2009 Recon Summit here at Fort Knox on 19-20 November. We will be focusing on the reconnaissance, surveillance, and security requirements of the BCT, division, and corps echelons to identify capability gaps and develop collaborative solutions to address those gaps. We will bring in numerous speakers, to include GEN Martin Dempsey, TRADOC Commander, as well as a wide variety of displays and demonstrations from industry vendors. The success of these types of events is directly related to the participation of leaders and Soldiers who can provide the “voice of the field,” and I look forward to seeing you at Fort Knox and hearing from you.

Last, I will reiterate something that I said to the Armor Center the day I assumed command. I pledge to you as your Chief of Armor my unwavering commitment to the Cavalry and Armor branch, a relentless drive to accomplish a diverse and challenging mission set that will have lasting impacts on the mounted force, and my 100 percent dedication to the Soldiers and families of Fort Knox. I am proud to be on your team.

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT !

CSM John Wayne Troxell
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor Center



Comprehensive Soldier Fitness: It's all about Leadership

Greetings from Fort Knox! The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program is a new training program designed by the Army to help soldiers become more mentally resilient against the stresses of war. I recently attended the Army Training and Leader Development Conference in Washington, D.C., where I received an extensive briefing on the CSF program. I believe the CSF program is important, but the success of this program, like all soldier programs, hinges on leader involvement to ensure success.

The U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, General George Casey, defines CSF as "a structured long-term assessment and development program to build resilience and enhance the performance of every soldier, family member, and Department of the Army civilian." It is also designed to improve unit readiness and effectiveness; change cultural understanding of fitness, to include family, emotional, social, spiritual, and physical; and to institutionalize strategy that assesses and improves comprehensive fitness through institutional, operational, and self-development training. The program's vision is "an Army of balanced, healthy, self-confident soldiers, families, and Army civilians, whose resilience and total fitness enables them to excel in an era of high operational tempo and persistent conflict." The key word here is "resilience," which is defined as "the ability to grow and thrive in the face of challenges and bounce back from adversity."

As stated earlier, the key element to the success of the program is leadership. We

have been at war for nearly 7 years, and even though we are reducing forces in Iraq, we are increasing forces in Afghanistan, which means we will continue to live and serve in an Army of high operational tempo in an era of persistent conflict. Simply said, we will continue our mission as an expeditionary Army well into the foreseeable future, which means we will continue to deploy to protect our Nation from global threats and terrorism.

As leaders, we have a responsibility to continue the education of our soldiers and families; we must train them on the future and to be expeditionary, resilient Army families. This is where CSF comes in. One of the great quotes on CSF came from our current Army G3, Lieutenant General J.D. Thurman, who said "ultimately, soldier fitness in the comprehensive sense is, and has always been, the business of leaders." I wholeheartedly agree with LTG Thurman's insight.

As the CSF program matures, leaders must learn how to build resiliency into their soldiers. First and foremost, leaders must ensure soldiers are more than physically fit — they must be physically hard and tough. This is the foundation for CSF. All too often, leaders define "physical fitness" as the ability of soldiers to pass their Army Physical Fitness Tests (APFTs) and meet height and weight/body fat standards. However, a soldier who scores a 180 on an APFT and barely meets body fat standards, does not have the physical fitness required to conduct an 8 to 12km dismounted patrol in full combat gear, in

120-degree weather, over rough and uneven terrain, climb walls, clear multi-floor structures, and then possess the reserve to repel an ambush or defeat an enemy on the objective. We must physically challenge soldiers everyday to build the functional fitness required for the modern battlefield; training our soldiers solely to pass the APFT will translate into failure on the battlefield.

When it comes to emotional and spiritual fitness, leaders must educate soldiers on the toughest challenge we have all faced and will continue to face in this era of persistent conflict — the carnage and brutality of combat. We must train our soldiers psychologically for battle; we must incorporate behavioral health specialists into our training, and train as realistically as possible, under the most adverse and difficult conditions that replicate real battlefield conditions.

We must also include families into the process; as leaders we must keep our Army families informed of what our future holds and what they can expect in this era of persistent conflict.

Building resiliency in our soldiers and families is all about leadership. Leaders who genuinely care about soldiers and families will go that extra mile to challenge soldiers and hold them to higher standards, as well as take care of soldiers and families by building pride and resiliency into the family foundation.

Forge The Thunderbolt!

Major General John Buford — the Neglected Hero

by Kimber J. Forrester



Despite the large numbers of cavalry officers that served during the Civil War, only a handful are known by anyone other than the history buff; in fact, the average reader customarily calls to mind J.E.B. (Jeb) Stuart. The slightly more informed reader recalls notable officers, such as Philip Sheridan, George Custer, Judson Kilpatrick, Nathan Bedford Forrest, John S. Mosby, and John Hunt Morgan. In part, these men are remembered throughout countless books; a few, such as Custer, are remembered for their personalities. For other cavalry officers, their notoriety marks great successes or failures on the battlefield, such as Forrest and Kilpatrick.

However, there is one man commonly omitted from the list of notable Civil War cavalry officers; a man well respected by both the North and South, yet he remains relatively obscure. His most famous accomplishment came after years of service, but is considered by many to be a turning point in the war. Had this man not chosen and defended a piece of land with a fatalistic determination, the battle could very well have turned out very differently. The piece of land was a series of ridges, located west of a small Pennsylvania town called Gettysburg, and the man was Brigadier General John Buford.

Despite his heroic actions at Gettysburg, Brandy Station, Second Manassas, and numerous smaller engagements, Buford seems to have been neglected by all but the most ardent interest in history. Although considered to be one of the best Union cavalry officers by most historians, few have taken an in-depth look into this “hard man and hard fighter.”¹ Renowned Civil War historian, Edward Longacre, was asked to write a book about this relative





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August 1863, General Buford and staff.

unknown, but declined. For years afterward, he lamented his choice, stating, “I have often regretted my decision, for Buford, who never received a biographer’s tribute, manifestly deserves one, not only for his role in helping shape the pivotal battle of Gettysburg, but because of the major influence he exercised on mounted tactics through much of the Civil War and well into the twentieth century.”² After several years, Longacre finally decided to give the historical world its first full-length biographical study of Buford. This book, *General John Buford: A Military Biography*, stands in contrast to the multitudes of biographical studies of others such as *Jeb Stuart* and *Philip Sheridan*.

A lack of historical attention seems to stand at odds with the respect Buford commanded during his years of service, both before and during the Civil War. Several factors seem to offer an explanation as to why Buford has remained relatively unknown. The Civil War was, in large part, a war where political connections and an ability to self-promote were the best friends an officer could have. John Buford lacked these abilities; combined with his extreme dislike of the press and his untimely death, it is easy to understand why, despite his skills as a cavalry leader, his name faded into semi-obscurity.

During the Civil War, the Union cavalry earned a stigma that was never fully overcome. The Union was considered to be inferior to the Confederate cavalry commands of men such as *Jeb Stuart* and *Nathan Bedford Forrest*. Many factors contributed to this stereotyping, several of which revolve around the commanders and their lack of experience and/or their inability to grasp the role of cavalry in the new age. Buford stands in contrast to many of these leaders; he not only grasped the role of cavalry and helped pioneer many of the new tactics, he also excelled at implementing them. Based on these facts, it would appear that many of the criticisms aimed at Union horsemen cannot be aimed at Buford.

Since the beginning of the Civil War, it has been stated, often erroneously, that several factors played vital roles in the Union cavalry’s disadvantage, especially early in the war. Whether true

or not, one of the foremost among these was the idea that the men from the South had much more experience with horses than those from the North. One possible explanation for this gap in experience was that the South was “[a] region rife with wide open spaces and poor roads, but handicapped by a severe shortage of wheeled transportation.”³ The lack of good roads and wheeled transport forced the southern man to ride everywhere, thus increasing his ability with horses; whereas, in much of the North, the availability of roads and wheeled transportation led to the man’s loss of familiarity with horseback riding as a mode of transportation.

However, unlike many of his city-born Union compatriots, John Buford was not raised in an urban area. He was born near Versailles, Kentucky, which at the time was still an untamed region of the country.⁴ Like much of the south, it lacked quality roads and wheeled transportation, so most people had to ride everywhere they went. John Buford loved this and “he would ride everywhere that his fancy took him,” soon becoming an accomplished rider.⁵

Although Buford’s love of riding stands in contrast to many of his fellow northerners, it does compare favorably with the equestrian lifestyles of those living below the Mason Dixon line. *Jeb Stuart*’s great love for horses personifies his fine southern talent, and similarly to Buford, he “established himself as one of the best horsemen in his class” while at



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West Point. Stuart also found great pleasure in reminding students from the North about “the ludicrous performance of Yankee cadets on horseback,” in comparison to the proficient nature of those from the South.⁶ Although they were not West Point classmates, it is unlikely that Stuart could have leveled these same critical eyes at Buford, whose early mastery of equestrian skills served him well at West Point where he “excelled in every aspect of this [cavalry] course.”⁷

A military career seemed a predestined choice for John Buford as he “was born into a warrior family (the Beauforts, or Beau-fords), which traced its lineage to the Norman knights.”⁸ He “developed an abiding appreciation for all things military” due to his long military heritage, as well as his father’s love of military history and his brother’s, Napoleon Bonaparte Buford, choices for education and a career.⁹ Napoleon decided to attend West Point and seek a career in the military, which had an incredible impact on the much younger John. Like a baby duck imprinting on the first thing it sees, many of Buford’s earliest memories are of his older brother dressed in military regalia, which no doubt “stoked John’s martial ardor,” almost assuring that he would follow in his brother’s footsteps.¹⁰

In addition to their riding skills, an advantage often given to the Confederate military, particularly cavalry units, was the Union’s superior militaristic nature. Stephen Starr states, “The South had a greater fondness for peacetime soldiering and soldiering in general than did the North. [M]embership in a gaudily attired militia uniform, especially in a cavalry company... was a cherished adjunct of a southern gentleman’s way of life.”¹¹ In the North, however, there was little interest in the military and the



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local militia was “either nonexistent or it was an object of contempt and ridicule.”¹²

Union army companies had practical application, chasing runaway slaves, so their members took great pride in self-supplied training and equipment, as well as efficiency. In contrast, the militias in the North had little practical application; they were underequipped, underfunded, undercommanded, and undertrained. In essence, the interest in the military lifestyle in the North was nowhere near as high as it was in the South.



“John Buford learned early in his military career, after the Battle of Blue Water Creek (3 September 1855), that infantry weapons could have a great effect on mounted troops. The idea that ‘mounted men were no match for well-trained foot troops wielding rifles’ was one that he would take seriously. Buford was one of the first cavalry commanders to make considerable use of the dismounted trooper and he ‘shone as a master of dismounted tactics.’”



"Buford again found success with dismounted troopers at the battles of Upperville, Stevensburg, Morton's Ford, and a number of other smaller engagements during his time as a field commander. However, he used this tactic most famously in his defense of McPherson's Ridge on 1 July 1863 at the Battle of Gettysburg. Here, Buford's First Division of 3,000 held off Major General Henry Heth's Division of 7,500 for several hours through the brilliant use of dismounted troopers using Spencer repeating rifles."

The Union cavalry force lacked understanding of the modern use of cavalry; the commonly held belief was that the "strength of cavalry is in the spurs and the sabre (sic)."¹³ Up until this point, U.S. cavalry doctrine was based on European models, where the massed charge was the centerpiece of any cavalry attack. Unfortunately, several things made this less than ideal in the United States. First, the technological advancements in firearms made the charge, especially against entrenched opponents, a deadly mistake.¹⁴ Second, the broken, hilly, and wooded terrain of much of the eastern United States made finding adequate grounds for a massive charge difficult. Lastly, the lack of support for cavalry units proved a challenge in massing a charge with enough men and horses to be effective.¹⁵

John Buford learned early in his military career, after the Battle of Blue Water Creek (3 September 1855), that infantry weapons could have a great effect on mounted troops.¹⁶ The idea that "mounted men were no match for well-trained foot troops wielding rifles" was one that he would take seriously.¹⁷ Buford was one of the first cavalry commanders to make considerable use of the dismounted trooper and he "shone as a master of dismounted tactics."¹⁸ He first showed that this tactic could be effective when he dismounted the First Vermont and the First Virginia (U.S.) cavalries as support for several charging units at the Battle of Second Manassas.¹⁹ He also used this strategy to his advantage at Brandy Station where "his troopers dismounted and sought cover against the fast-arriving regiments of 'Grumble' Jones."²⁰

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This did not mean that Buford was adverse to the idea of a mounted charge. At the Battle of Blue Water, in addition to the

lessons above, he saw the physical and psychological effects of a massed charge when circumstances were right such as when the enemy was already on the verge of panic.²⁴ During the Battle of Brandy Station, Buford ordered several charges and countercharges in one of the greatest cavalry battles of the war.²⁵ Although none of these charges proved successful in forcing back the Confederates, they did serve to stymie several advances on the part of the rebels. The charges also helped "restore the status quo" on several occasions throughout the battle, most notably when Buford ordered a charge near Saint James Church, which forced the men of General Wade Hampton to withdraw, creating a lull in the battle.²⁶ This suggested that, despite his natural tendencies, he was flexible enough to let the battle dictate his actions, a trait that many did not have.

Buford showed time and again that he possessed strong military and leadership skills. For example, many Union officers considered Buford to be a master at gathering and delivering extremely timely and accurate intelligence, an essential skill that several cavalry units struggled to perform. Although his skills in this area were often ignored (much to his consternation), most of his men and fellow officers believed that with Buford in command, they could do just about anything.²⁷

Buford's counterparts declared him to be "able, reliable, imperturbable;" "a fine cavalryman, more tenacious than brilliant;" "weather beaten [and] battle wise;" and "one of the best officers in that arm [cavalry]... he is of a good-natured disposition, but not to be trifled with."²⁸ The men under his command acknowledged similar traits: "General Buford... was the best cavalry officer ever produced on this continent" and a "model commander."²⁹ Based on his abilities and praise from others, it is difficult to understand why he has not joined the ranks of the more famous Civil War commanders. However, further research reveals that General Buford possessed several traits that very easily could have impeded his accession into the ranks of the greats of the war.

In the minds of many, there is a certain preformed image of what a cavalry commander at the time of the Civil War was supposed to be. John Esten Cooke, Flora Stuart's cousin and a member of her husband's staff, brings that image to life when he describes his boss, Jeb Stuart, as a "gallant figure to look at. The gray coat buttoned to the chin, the light French sabre (sic) balanced by the pistol in its black holster, the cavalry boots above the knee and the brown hat with its black plume floating above the bearded features, the brilliant eyes, and the huge mustache,

which curled with laughter at the slightest provocation, made Stuart the perfect picture of a gay cavalier.³⁰

Stuart not only fit the image of the dashing cavalry officer, he was the mold from which the image of the “Beau Sabreur” was fashioned. When compared to Stuart, John Buford must have seemed like the ugly duckling. He preferred to remain plain and unassuming. Rather than fine silk-lined cloaks and hats with ostrich plumes, his taste in dress ran more to the ordinary. Colonel Lyman describes his attire when they met at Meade’s headquarters, stating that Buford’s “ancient corduroys are tucked into a pair of ordinary cowhide boots and his blue blouse is ornamented with holes.”³¹ This attire was an outward manifestation of Buford’s characteristics as man. He may not have looked the part, but like those worn leather boots, he was sturdy and dependable. The shirt may have had some holes in it, but when push came to shove, it got the job done, which was how Buford chose to live his life. He was a “man not of show, but of substance.”³²

Another facet of his unassuming nature that held him back was his dislike of the press. While many cavalry officers, such as Alfred Pleasonton, Judson Kilpatrick, and Stuart, were publicity hounds trying to remain as much in the public conscience as possible, Buford preferred to remain in the background.³³ Buford regarded those journalists that traveled with the army as “hacks, toadies to the high command, and meddlers in military affairs.”³⁴ This attitude certainly did nothing to advance his career, and while others parlayed their media exploits into positions and promotions, Buford was left to wonder why his accomplishments were not enough.

Additional evidence of Buford’s straightforward and quiet nature can be seen in his writing. While many officers took the opportunity to advance themselves and fill their reports with flowery language, Buford’s reports were very much the mirror to the man. The two following excerpts stand in stark contrast to one another. The first is an excerpt from a report Buford wrote on 24 June 1863, and the second was written by Jeb Stuart on 6 August 1863:

Buford wrote, “I have the honor to report that at 12 o’clock on the night of the 20th instant, the brigadier general commanding the corps gave me instructions to move my whole division at 2 a.m. on the 21st to Middleburg. The night was very dark. Nearly the whole of the division was on duty, very much divided and without rations or forage.”³⁵

Stuart wrote, “The gallant and spirited resistance offered by Hampton’s brigade to a body of the enemy’s cavalry, greatly superior in numbers, on the 1st instant deserves the highest commendation at the hands of the division commander. ... The division must mourn the loss of some brave spirits and the noble wounded, who, for a time, have left us, will, it is hoped, long be welcomed to our ranks to strike again for independence and victory.”³⁶

In a war, where political connections often translated into greater command assignments and rank, it is a testament to General Buford’s abilities that he advanced as far as he did. There were great numbers of “political generals with influence, but no military training.”³⁷ These “civilians with eagles and leaves on their shoulders” bothered Buford greatly, for he was a highly trained officer with but bars on his shoulders.³⁸ However, true to his nature, he did not complain and accepted this as it was.

Partially due to a “natural self-reluctance to promote himself,” Buford was not given a command when the war broke out.³⁹ He had no greater desire than to defend his country, so he forced

himself to overcome his reluctance and went to the War Department to exploit the few contacts he had.⁴⁰ Unfortunately for Buford, the few connections he had were unable to obtain a command for him. Most of his contacts were from Kentucky, a state where loyalties were questioned, which made it much more difficult for them to influence military matters.⁴¹

Based on careful research, it appears that General John Buford was, at times, his own worst enemy. While many outrageous characters were getting their names in the newspaper and adding stars to their shoulders, Buford was advancing at a snail’s pace, particularly for an officer of the Civil War, where it was common to be promoted from captain to brigadier general in a day.⁴²

No one questioned Buford’s abilities as a cavalry officer, yet he has received almost none of the lasting recognition that many lesser men have received. Due to their flamboyant and outgoing natures, men, such as Custer and Stuart, have remained at least somewhat in the public eye; whereas, the quiet, unassuming, yet highly skilled, John Buford remains in the background. While some exploited political connections to increase their rank or ob-



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tain better commands, Buford was mired in a staff position for more than a year at the rank of major because he refused to resort to such manipulations.

If not for an excellent work of fiction, *The Killer Angels*, it is quite possible that Buford would have remained virtually unknown outside the historian's world. Even after the book and the movie that followed, which is undoubtedly the greatest exposure Buford has received, he remains a distant memory as 'that cavalry guy' who was played by Sam Elliot.

Possibly the most career-damaging aspect of Buford's life was his death. For those generals who fell in combat, a certain amount of mystique followed their deaths. There is the heroic image of these officers going down fighting; however, Buford was felled not by a sniper's bullet, but by disease, a much more common killer during the Civil War.⁴³

In November 1863, the "strain of overwork, stress-fatigue, and prolonged exposure had so lowered his resistance" that after some exposure to typhoid, most likely from a contaminated water supply, he was unable to fight the bacteria off and contracted the disease.⁴⁴ After several weeks of suffering, Buford finally passed away late on 16 December 1863.⁴⁵ In just more than a year, Buford had made a name for himself as one of the most competent Union cavalry officers, and had he lived, who knows how far he would have risen. On 21 December 1863, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* paid tribute to the fallen general:

*No more to follow his daring form
Or see him dash through the battle's storm
No more with him to ride down the foe
And behold his falchion's crushing blow
Nor hear his voice, like a rushing blast
As rider and steed went charging past ... Buford is dead!*⁴⁶

Buford's character was addressed at his funeral where Reverend Ralph Randolph Gurley gave a fitting eulogy to this great soldier: "[General John Buford] was modest, yet brave; retiring, yet efficient; quiet, but vigilant; careful of the lives of his men with an almost parental solicitude, yet never shirking from action, however fraught with peril, when the time and place for such action had come. His skill and courage were put the stern and decisive tests on many hardfought (sic) fields, and they were always equal to every emergency."⁴⁷

Colonel Charles Wainwright echoed these sentiments in his diary on 20 December 1863 when he wrote "the army and the country have met with a great loss by the death of... Buford. He was decidedly the best cavalry general we had, and was acknowledged as such in the army... [He was] rough in his exterior, never looking after his own comfort... and in the supervision of all the militia of his command, quiet and unassuming in his manners."⁴⁸ Buford was a star on the rise, and had he not died, it is possible that his skills would have compensated for his naturally quiet demeanor and helped etch his name much more deeply into the pages of history.



Notes

¹Stephen W. Sears, *Gettysburg*, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 2003, p. 157. This attitude was pretty much shared by anyone that ever met Buford, especially those who met him in battle.

²Edward G. Longacre, *General John Buford: A Military Biography*, De Capo Press, Cambridge, 1995, p. 11.

³Edward G. Longacre, *The Cavalry at Gettysburg: A Tactical Study of Mounted Operations during the Civil War's Pivotal Campaign, 9 June-14 July 1863*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1986, p. 24.

⁴Michael S. Grogan, "Buford's valiant stand at Gettysburg," *Military History* 14, June 1997, p. 62.

⁵Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 20.

⁶Emory M. Thomas, *Bold Dragoon: The Life of J.E.B. Stuart*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1986, p. 24.

⁷Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 29.

⁸Michael D. Hull, "The Union Army's most innovative cavalry leader, Brigadier General John Buford shined at the Battle of Gettysburg," *America's Civil War* 10, no. 1, March 1997, p. 62.

⁹Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 18.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Stephen Z. Starr, *The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: Volume 1, Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861-1863*, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1979, p. 57.

¹²Ibid., p. 55.

¹³Ibid., p. 60.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁶Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 50.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Fairfax Downey, *Clash of Cavalry: The Battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863*, David McKay Company, New York, 1959, p. 53.

¹⁹Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 106.

²⁰Ibid., p. 163.

²¹David J. Eicher, *The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2001, pp. 310-311.

²²Noah Andre Trudeau, *Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage*, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2002, pp. 162-170, 580, 591. The description of the battle occurs on the first group of page numbers and the numbers come from the order of battle at the end of the text.

²³U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and the Confederate Armies*, Series 1, Volume 11, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1880-1901, p. 44, as part of the *Making of America* series, available online at Cornell University, <http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/moa/browse.monographs/ware.html>.

²⁴Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 50.

²⁵David J. Petruzzi, "Six Weeks in the Saddle," *America's Civil War* 21, no. 3, July 2008, pp. 26-32.

²⁶Longacre, *The Cavalry at Gettysburg*, pp. 67-73.

²⁷Ibid., p. 49.

²⁸Sears, *Gettysburg*, p. 33; Downey, *Clash of Cavalry*, p. 53; James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, p. 653; and Starr, *The Union Cavalry in the Civil War*, p. 293, which is part of a description by Colonel Thomas Lyman on his meeting of Buford; the two met at General Meade's headquarters in 1863.

²⁹Starr, *The Union Cavalry in the Civil War*, p. 293.

³⁰Thomas, *Bold Dragoon*, p. 128.

³¹Starr, *The Union Cavalry in the Civil War*, p. 293.

³²Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 88.

³³Longacre, *The Cavalry at Gettysburg*, p. 50.

³⁴Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 86.

³⁵U.S. War Department, *The War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, Volume 27, Part 1, p. 920.

³⁶Ibid., Series 1, Volume 27, Part 2, pp. 725-726.

³⁷Gary W. Dolzall, "A political general. Jacob D. Cox became 'a self-made soldier of sheer force of character,'" *America's Civil War* 14, no. 6, January 2002, p. 12.

³⁸Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 75.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 75-76.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 76.

⁴²Edwin B. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1968, p. 220. In late June 1863, General Meade promoted Captains Wesley Merritt, George A. Custer, and Elon Farnsworth from captain to brigadier general in the span of a few days.

⁴³Jack McLaughlin, *Gettysburg: The Long Encampment*, Appleton-Century, New York, 1963, p. 175.

⁴⁴Longacre, *General John Buford*, pp. 243-244.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 246.

⁴⁶*The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 21 December 1863, available online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Buford.

⁴⁷Longacre, *General John Buford*, p. 246.

⁴⁸Allan Nevins, *A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865*, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1962, p. 309.

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Changing Junior Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Skills

by Major Daniel Bard

As we continue to train and fight in an era of persistent conflict, the list of required skills and attributes expected of our junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) constantly shift. Not only are platoon- and company-level leaders expected to be technically and tactically proficient in their basic branch, but they are expected to be advisors, ambassadors, civil-military integrators, and negotiators. These new required skills have created a “learning creep,” which is apparent Armywide, even at the field-grade level.

Many tactical units are increasingly dipping into operational design due to the demands of the operational environment. Battalion and brigade combat team planners are required to develop campaign plans and lines of effort instead of focusing on courses of action and the military decisionmaking process. Much of the learning required to conduct this higher level of operations is acquired through experience and trial and error. While our military education system attempts to keep pace with current trends and needs, we often struggle to stay ahead of the curve. The Army spends a lot of money and time on a professional education system for our junior leaders, but are we teaching the right things and are we teaching them correctly?

Any discussion of modifying the officer or NCO education system inevitably in-

volves considerations of training time, assets available, funding, and troop strength. Having been assigned to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command for the past several years, I am intimately aware of the manning challenges and the need to limit the trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) account, so I do not intend to delve into an in-depth, statistical analysis of training time, course length, and number of student/instructor contact hours.¹ These areas are constantly reviewed by school staffs and commanders, as well as training developers. Instead, this article briefly discusses training versus education and the challenges we face as we forge future leaders.

While there are various definitions and mental images of what constitutes training versus education, common definitions highlight that education focuses on the development of the mind and intellect while training focuses on learning skills. As a task-based force, our strength lies in training versus education. We know how to develop skills in ourselves and in others; we understand the live, virtual, and constructive capabilities, and we understand leader, individual, and collective training. However, the contemporary operating environment demands that we become educated on cultures, lines of effort, economics, governance, and countless other variables. The real challenge lies

in our ability to prepare soldiers for this environment and how to make our training educational.

The Army’s professional education system generally operates around the principle of a student-centered, small-group, adult-learning model. This model requires soldiers in training to learn through the study of doctrine and other course material, which is followed by discussion and exercises facilitated by a qualified instructor. This differs greatly from an instructor-centered method where students receive lectures and professors offer examples based on personal experience.

While there are many benefits to the student-centered technique, the challenge grows as the student’s familiarity with the subject becomes increasingly distant. For example, it is much easier for a group of junior captains to learn company-level tactics through the student-centered technique than it is for them to learn the intricacies of the military decisionmaking process. The challenge usually lies simply with knowing “what right looks like.” If you have no experience as a staff member, it is difficult to learn how to correctly conduct staff operations, which is why there are many proponents of experiential learning techniques during which students experience hard lessons virtually so they can build mental models to confront real experiences later.

There are many subjects that officers and NCOs must be familiar with that are not taught in Army schools. Unfortunately, we have no way of identifying those subjects until we happen to stumble onto them. For example, as a reconnaissance troop commander in Iraq, one of my scout platoon leaders, out of necessity, became well versed in building roads and identifying damaged electrical transformers, skills which were not covered during training or educational events.



“...the contemporary operating environment demands that we become educated on cultures, lines of effort, economics, governance, and countless other variables. The real challenge lies in our ability to prepare soldiers for this environment and how to make our training educational.”

While we will undoubtedly continue to encounter challenges for which we are not trained, we will simultaneously attempt to develop leaders capable of dealing with uncertainty and what U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, refers to as “ill-structured problems.”² These types of problems are not easily defined due to a lack of information or misunderstanding of the situation; they are normally complex with no simple solution and are probably the types of situations that will become more and more frequent in the future.

To help add structure to these ill-structured problems, the Army developed a problem-solving methodology, known as the “military decisionmaking process (MDMP).” Added to this process is an emerging idea known as “design.” There is a field manual interim (FMI) currently being staffed, which explains the concept of design, and based on discussions from the Combined Arms Center Blog, this concept will be worked into the next revision of FM 5-0.³

Design will not replace the MDMP; however, it will assist leaders and staff officers with certain aspects of battle command, mostly the understand, visualize, and describe portions. Battle command in the contemporary operational environment — primarily counterinsurgency and stability operations — is challenging. However, the bigger challenge is to educate the force on the concept of design and how it fits into our doctrine. This is an example of the challenges we face when our educational system relies heavily on training.

It is easy to train a task using the crawl, walk, and run methodology. In most of our courses, that methodology equates to a day-one doctrinal discussion or slideshow, a day-two practical exercise, and a day-three graded event. We train ev-

erything from close quarters combat to MDMP in this fashion. Life (and education) gets much more complex when we attempt to train soldiers to be agile. The question, “what is an adaptive leader or an agile soldier,” has been extensively discussed. More important questions, however, are “how do we train our leaders and soldiers to be adaptive and agile; how do we train for uncertainty; and how do we educate our leaders to overcome uncertainty?”

The Army has historically wavered back and forth on the merits of a civilian education to the abilities of the leader. Currently, it seems many senior officers are in favor of our junior leaders obtaining civilian educations to broaden their skills. Officer candidates are encouraged to major in liberal arts and languages instead of traditional hard sciences and engineering. However, these educational opportunities will not reach the entire force. In an effort to reach the force with new ideas, not only must the Army add topics to current course programs of instruction, but also address how to appropriately teach these new topics. For instance, cultural appreciation and language training have been added to our career courses — do we have qualified experts to teach those subjects effectively; or are we attempting to train skills or develop part of our intellect? If we are educating, we need professors, not facilitators.

Balancing education with training in a resource-constrained environment with a current critical need and a future forecast of a different requirement is extremely difficult. Right now, the Army needs soldiers who can effectively operate in the current fight and win. However, we cannot lose sight of our long-term mission of defending our Nation against *all* enemies, foreign and domestic. We must maintain our preparedness for the future

fight and that requires education. The Army’s professional development model is based on learning from operational assignments, professional courses, and self-study. Currently, the first two portions of that model focus on training military occupational specialty (MOS) skills for the current fight, while the third portion is unguided. Without dramatically reshaping the Army personnel and manning policies, education can only be increased through a revision of generating force schools and a guided self-study program.

As our operating concepts become more complex, we must work even harder to properly resource our educational opportunities. Some concepts, such as design, cannot and should not be watered down or we risk losing the point of the concept all together — especially if it becomes part of the Army’s capstone doctrine, at which time, we must be prepared to teach it; otherwise, we risk misinterpretation. These current and future challenges demand a greater emphasis on increasing the intellectual proficiency of our schools. We have seen our leaders and soldiers develop out-of-the-box solutions to complex problems — we must provide them with the best education possible to rise to the ever-evolving challenges of the future.



Notes

¹Limiting the TTHS account is critical to the operational force due to the zero-sum nature of the U.S. Army’s end strength. The longer a student is held in a professional school, the longer an operational unit is absent a soldier for its mission.

²Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0 (FM 101-5), *Army Planning and Orders Production*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 2005.

³Combined Arms Center Blog is available at <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/>.

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PRESERVING OUR CORE SKILL SETS IN AN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT

by Captain Joe Byerly

The U.S. Army is quickly approaching a decade of being at war. During this time, we slowly and painfully relearned counterinsurgency operations and dusted off manuals on small wars. We have actually become quite proficient at counterinsurgency operations over the past few years and are now working to replicate similar successes in Afghanistan, which raises the question: "At what cost is this to our armored force and does it really matter?" Today's junior officers are of the mindset that the tank battles of the 20th century are gone and the days of large-scale maneuver warfare are over. This might be true; however, what may be on the horizon is a merger of asymmetric warfare and conventional tactics much like Israel discovered during the Second Lebanon War. Will the armor force be prepared to face this new hybrid threat if we continue

to substitute our core skill sets with dissimilar skill sets?

The Second Lebanon War

There has been a lot written on the Second Lebanon War, as it is called in the Middle East, which has been covered extensively in various military journals to include *ARMOR*. It is a subject of much importance for the armor branch, mostly because of the context of the conflict and the way it unfolded. Prior to 2006, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had been engaged mostly in stability operations for 6 years; therefore, very little focus was given to maneuver training or the integration of armor, infantry, and artillery.¹ In 1982, when Israel had one of the strongest conventional forces in the region, they reached Beirut in one day. When they attempted to invade Lebanon on 12 August

2006, in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, in the span of "...six or seven days, they couldn't go more than a few miles."²

Ever wonder what happened to Israel's maneuver force of the 1980s? It appears that Israel's focus on counterinsurgency had completely eliminated basic familiarity with core warfighting tasks — all the way down to the individual and crew levels.³ Israel was prepared to face an enemy, much like we have seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, who would dissolve into the population when faced with a direct-fire engagement. What they found was a well-prepared and tactically sound enemy, who was ready to fight, which caught Israel off guard. During operations in Lebanon, "approximately 10 percent of the IDF's 400 Merkavas were damaged by the enemy





“Since the current operating environment requires the majority of units to operate primarily at the company and platoon levels, there is a new generation of leaders in the Army who have never maneuvered at the battalion and squadron levels. This will not only affect our ability to carry out conventional-style offensive and defensive operations in the future, but it will also affect leaders’ abilities to command and control in high-intensity conflicts.”

without a single armor or helicopter platform.”⁴ In the end, by the terms of a ceasefire, Israel withdrew and an asymmetric force proved to be a formidable opponent.

Following the conflict, the Winograd Commission was formed by the Israeli government to conduct an internal review of the IDF to determine the reason for Israel’s loss. One of their observations revealed that, “The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low-intensity asymmetrical conflicts.”⁵

Israel truly believed that its days of high-intensity conflict were over and its military training reflected this notion. Over time, Israel’s ability to conduct conventional-style warfare had been eroded, causing its forces to painfully relearn skills once mastered in a previous generation.

Our Army’s Solution

The U.S. Army has recognized this training trend in its own force. In August 2008, General George W. Casey Jr. published

a memorandum directing training guidance for FY2009 through FY2011.⁶ General Casey presents a skeleton of an Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model that will develop over the next 3 years. He acknowledges that the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO) only allows for directed mission essential tasks list (DMETL) training, leaving core mission essential tasks list (CMETL) training to the commander’s discretion. DMETL are the tasks required for units across all branches to be successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. Examples of these tasks include detainee operations, sensitive site exploitation, and cultural training. His model is as follows:

“Units redeployed for less than 18 months will focus on training to achieve proficiency for their DMETL. They will not be required to conduct CMETL training, unless specifically directed. Commanders may conduct CMETL training at their own discretion.

Units redeployed for 18 months or more will devote time (approximately 90 days for active component) to regain CMETL proficiency in addition to training to achieve DMETL proficiency. Such CMETL training should be conducted at home station and leverage live, virtual, and constructive devices and facilities available there.

Units redeployed for 24 months or more will achieve proficiency in both CMETL and DMETL. They will plan for a CMETL focused ETC [exportable training center]

or CTC [combat training center] rotation and a mission rehearsal exercise for their directed mission.”⁷

It may be 2011 before units reach the first benchmark of 18-month stabilization at home, so there is a large probability that company commanders, platoon sergeants, and some field grade officers will become rusty at their core skill sets.

The Armor Branch

In his “Commander’s Hatch: Maintaining Armor Core Competencies,” January-February 2007 edition of *ARMOR*, Major General Robert Williams summarizes the armor force’s core competencies, which include command and control, gunnery, maintenance/combat service support, maneuver, and reconnaissance. He acknowledges that the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are beginning to produce officers and noncommissioned officers who are very proficient with the intricacies involved in counterinsurgency operations; however, he also notes that this shift away from conventional warfare is beginning to affect our force on several other fronts. Since the current operating environment requires the majority of units to operate primarily at the company and platoon levels, there is a new generation of leaders in the Army who have never maneuvered at the battalion and squadron levels. This will not only affect our ability to carry out conventional-style offensive and defensive operations in the future, but it will also affect leaders’ abilities to command and control in high-intensity conflicts.⁸

Major General Williams’ observations are significant due to the timing of his article. As the January-February 2007 issue of *ARMOR* arrived in our mailboxes, the President called for a “surge” of troops to Iraq. It’s been more than 2 years since this publication, and our time in garrison has been drastically reduced with units barely scraping the 16-month mark at home station. While it is easy to pay lip service to maintaining a training balance between DMETL and CMETL, in reality, it is extremely difficult to accomplish due to time and materiel constraints of the current operating environment. Below are a few options available for leaders at the battalion level and below to consider during their time at home station and while deployed. Most of these have minimal resourcing requirements and are not time intensive.

Brown Bag Lunches

Brown bag lunches provide an effective venue for professional discussions at the battalion level and should include guest speakers, open forums, presentations, and/or reading assignments. These lunches provide the perfect opportunity for leaders to examine the importance of maintaining core skill sets and the ability to operate anywhere in the spectrum of operations. Many have been sold on counterinsurgency and refuse to acknowledge the possibilities of company- and battalion-level maneuver on future battlefields. That said, history shows that as a military, we have a poor record of predicting the next conflict. In a recent speech at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Washington, U.S. Marine Corps General James N. Mattis called on our armed forces to “become a ‘hybrid force’ that expands its nonconventional means without sacrificing its classic warfighting competence. It is very important that we continue to enhance our skills from lessons learned of the two current wars, while still preserving our core skill sets.”⁹

Brief discussions, forums, and professional reading can assist leaders in understanding why the preservation of core skill sets is essential in preparation for future threats. Training value is maximized when leaders at all levels believe in its purpose and understand its importance. Brown bag lunches also create the opportunity for units to discuss and learn about the range of resources, which can be used for training, available to them within the unit and on post.

Training Support from the Armor School

The Armor School currently has a few training options for commanders with limited resources and unavailable manpower. The University of Mounted Warfare, an online internet-based training program, provides training modules, applicable to all ranks and positions, for individual soldier development under the Life Long Learning Center. Examples of the classes include land navigation, troop leading procedures, maintenance, and staff functions. While online courses are not ideal, we have to work within the constraints of limited time and assets available due to the focus of DMETL. Commanders can offer incentives to soldiers and leaders who complete these modules on their own time, or incorporate them into training



“Another low-level resource that is available is the traditional sand table or terrain model, which is used for rehearsals at all levels, but rarely used elsewhere. Leaders can plan operations, and instead of deploying the unit to a training area, key personnel can fight the fight using a terrain model in garrison. This is an excellent way to visualize and train offensive and/or defensive maneuvers with minimal resources.”

schedules and execute in computer labs on post.

The second option available is Mounted ManeuverNet on the Battle Command Knowledge System, which requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login. “The Mounted ManeuverNet Professional Forum has been developed to provide a professional forum for the Armor Center and School and all armor soldiers and cavalry troopers around the world to come together and share tacit and explicit knowledge with their peers. Mounted ManeuverNet provides an opportunity for soldiers in the field to seek assistance and provide best practices directly to the Armor Center and School, and for the center and school to drastically reduce the time to incorporate new knowledge into the center and school; thus reducing the “gap” between the TRADOC Generating Force and the FORSCOM Operating Force.”¹⁰

This option has the ability to become a great resource, but only if supported by the force, on which the site relies for the majority of its content. If units have standard operating procedures (SOP), memorandums of instruction for training exercises, and/or *PowerPoint* presentations, they should share this knowledge with the armor community.

The Armor School has spent years developing training support packages (TSPs), which are written for all training conducted at Fort Knox. The TSPs list required resources, thoroughly explain the mate-

rial, and are a one-stop shop for instructors. By providing these packages online, young leaders, who may not be subject-matter experts due to the current operational tempo, can use the TSPs to become familiar with particular tasks.

The last training support option is mobile training teams, which are comprised of Active Duty or contracted personnel, who travel to units to provide instruction and hands-on training for leaders on various core essential tasks. Nevertheless, this option should be “instituted only when the degradation of unit leader skills have atrophied to a level that the unit cannot refresh the trainers.”¹¹ The Armor School currently provides mobile training teams for master gunner, the Scout Leader’s Course, the Cavalry Leader’s Course, and Basic Noncommissioned Officer’s Course.

Low-Level Resource Exercises

Several training exercises can be conducted at the battalion level and below that are not resource intensive, yet still require staffs down to the platoon level to conduct mission analysis, develop courses of action, and issue fragmentary orders based on a conventional model. Examples of such training are the tactical vignette and tactical decision game, which offer tactical problems consisting of a short-written scenario, a sketch, a requirement, and a time limit.¹² Tactical decision games are available through the U.S. Marine Corps Basic School, and tactical vignettes are available on *ARMOR Magazine’s* web-

site. Consolidating these exercises on the Mounted ManeuverNet would provide easy access for leaders to provide training for their units.

There are several computer-based games and simulations that can be enhanced with leader involvement and planning. Gaming technology has been developed by the military, contractors, and third-party companies. *DARWARS*, which is currently used by the Armor School, is a game-based system that can be played on a laptop computer with networking capability that allows units to maneuver almost every platform in our Army's arsenal. Leaders can build scenarios in which their units must fight. There is also an indirect fire trainer that can be installed on unit-level laptops, which provides soldiers and leaders the opportunity to train, calling for mortar fire, close air support (CAS), and even naval gun fire, without using resources outside the unit.

Another low-level resource that is available is the traditional sand table or terrain model, which is used for rehearsals at all levels, but rarely used elsewhere. Leaders can plan operations, and instead of deploying the unit to a training area, key personnel can fight the fight using a terrain model in garrison. This is an excellent way to visualize and train offensive and/or defensive maneuvers with minimal resources. While nothing will ever fully compare to the opportunity to actually go out and execute training, conducting drills will at least allow soldiers to develop mental models and scripts to execute the same missions in stressful environments with greater ease.

Break from the Action

During the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry's 15-month deployment to Iraq in 2007, they took a platoon out of the fight for 7 days to refit and retrain. During this time, the platoon focused on personnel and equipment maintenance, weapons qualification, gunnery skills tests, administrative requirements, and rest. Depending on the unit's location in theater and operational tempo, adding an additional week provided an excellent opportunity to focus on maneuver and live-fire exercises. The Armor Center's Command Sergeant Major, John Troxell, observed a unit in Iraq that did exactly that and used the break to conduct platoon-level maneuver, live-fire exercises, and training that they were unable to accomplish while at home station. Keep in mind that this method may not support training core competencies until the operational tempo is drastically reduced.



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Our core conventional skill sets are the fundamental building blocks of which all other forms of warfare may be fought. It is important to continue to grow and adapt as an Army; however, we must not forget the basics. Without strong core skill sets, which some are quick to dismiss, we are a hollow shell of an Army that lacks an institutional base to draw on for innovation and asymmetric thinking.¹³

As leaders, it is sometimes difficult to step back from the present and look to the future; day-to-day requirements are not the same as those of leaders 10 to 20 years ago. It is not easy to conduct training management while simultaneously preventing soldiers and leaders from becoming burned out before the next deployment. Conditions are not optimal to train our core competencies; nonetheless, we have to think outside the box to accomplish the mission. Ultimately, to remain an agile and adaptive force, it is in our best interest to not neglect our core skills — we must always be prepared to face our enemies, regardless of where they fall in the spectrum of operations.



Notes

¹Daniel Helmer, "Not Quite Counterinsurgency: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Forces Based on Israel's Operation Change of Direction," *ARMOR*, January-February 2007, pp. 7-11.

²*Ibid.*, p. 7.

³Warren J. Sponsler, "Striking the Balance between Training High-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency: Maintaining Full

Spectrum Dominance in the U.S. Army," U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Master's Thesis, 2008, abstract available online at the Defense Technical Information Center at <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=hml&identifier=ADA490727>.

⁴Helmer, p. 9.

⁵Arutz Sheva, *Israeli National News*, "Transcript of Justice Elyah Winograd's Verbal Report from Winograd Commission Findings," 30 April 2007.

⁶General George Casey Jr., U.S. Army Chief of Staff, "Army Training and Leadership Development Guidance," Official U.S. Army Memorandum, dated 13 August 2008.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸Major General Robert Williams, "Maintaining Armor Core Competencies," *ARMOR*, January-February 2007, p. 4.

⁹John J. Kruzel, "U.S. Must Prepare for 'Hybrid' Warfare, General Says," *American Forces Press Service*, 13 February 2009, available online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=53089>.

¹⁰Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) website available online at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/BCKS>.

¹¹Lloyd Gerber, "Reset-Rebuilding FA Core Competencies for Future Full Spectrum Operations," *Field Artillery*, March-April 2007, pp. 14-18.

¹²James D. Gonsalves, "The Tactical Decision Game: An Invaluable Training Tool for Developing Junior Leaders," *ARMOR*, May-June 1997, pp. 35-38.

¹³E-mail traffic between author and Captain Louis Netherland.

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PRECISION TARGETING IN A MODERN COUNTERINSURGENCY

BY CAPTAIN MATT GALLAGHER

Perhaps no other principle of counterinsurgency (COIN) has proven as difficult to execute for conventional armies as precision targeting. Though simple and straightforward in theory — separate the insurgents from the populace — precision targeting, in practice, presents a litany of complexities unique to each and every local problem set.

Having just returned from a 15-month deployment to Iraq, 10 months as a cavalry scout platoon leader and five months as an intelligence support team (IST) leader in charge of lethal targeting in an infantry company, I experienced assorted successes and failures at the ground level with this vital COIN principle.

Throughout the tour and the various targeting processes that encompassed it,

many circumstantial factors, such as areas of operation, commander's intent, and purposes justifying the targeting in the first place, changed. One constant lesson transcended all of these experiences — the more finite and exact the initial targeting, the less blowback occurs with regard to secondary and tertiary effects. Conversely, the more sweeping and reactionary the targeting, the longer it took us to recover in the eyes of the local populace and regain the vital intelligence it produced. Further, the former approach tended to keep a higher number of targets detained, which spelled quantifiable success, even when analyzed from a more conventional, traditional mindset.

Throughout my time in Iraq, precision targeting remained a concept we never mastered, but did improve over time,

which required vigilant attention and constant awareness. Like a seesaw, it constantly teetered to and fro, with balance an intricate, and often fleeting, goal.

Using the Iraqi Security Forces

My first experience with the seesaw of precision targeting occurred in the opening month of our deployment. During my tenure in Iraq as a scout platoon leader, I lived at a joint security station in Saba al-Bor, an isolated, dusty town with many sectarian scars, located in the northwest outreaches of Baghdad Province. One of our first high-priority targets, a street thug known as Mohammed the Ghost, emplaced an explosively formed projectile (EFP) that struck one of our vehicles during the relief in place (RIP)/transfer of authority (TOA) process with the unit we





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replaced. We spent the better part of our first 30 days in theater tracking down Mohammed the Ghost, to no avail. We conducted large neighborhood cordon and sweep operations, block by block, finding nothing. We handed out thousands of handbills with his photograph to the Iraqi populace, which resulted in the unforeseen consequence of turning him into a local celebrity. We went out on patrols seeking to gather intelligence, rather than having intelligence initially driving our patrols in the first place. Nonetheless, as soon as we shifted our approach to pinpointing Mohammed the Ghost by incorporating both the Iraqi army and the Sons of Iraq security force into our targeting process, he was jointly detained by these Iraqi groups without any American oversight whatsoever. By sharing specific intelligence on a specific target with our Iraqi partners, they used their strengths very rapidly to achieve mission success.

The Mohammed the Ghost microcosm harvested a few lessons learned. First, on reflection, I realized that the neighborhood cordon and sweeps were the modern equivalent of the large jungle searches carried out by the British early in the Malayan emergency and the Americans over the course of Vietnam; neither historical paradigm was something we want-

ed to mimic, although we aspired to learn and adapt like the British in Malaya.

While completely eradicating such mission sets proved impossible, due to higher headquarters’ obsession with large-scale operations (not to mention the proclivity to give them unfortunate analogous nicknames such as “rolling thunder”), the company did its best to mitigate the effects of these sweeps. Rather than barreling through each house during mass sweeps, searching for weapons and



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fake identifications, my platoon stopped for chai and chatted with the men of the house. More often than not, if something were amiss in their neighborhood, the Iraqis let us know, but only after we ensured them that we did not believe they supported the insurgency. This deliberately patient approach inevitably yielded specifics that mad bursts of conventional raiding never could.

A vital second lesson learned in this targeting case revolved around the Iraqi security forces and its benefit. While they lacked our training and technology, we could not replicate their inherent strengths, no matter how much time we spent in Iraq. With every new report and fresh analysis, the temptation to not share intelligence, either because of classification status or we wanted to reap the rewards of our own labor, reared its head. However, sharing most, if not all, of what we gathered, generated both positive short-term and long-term effects.

Iraqi security forces cultivated deep relationships with the populace, due to a shared culture, religion, and language; in comparison, our interactions with the locals tended to be forced and cumbersome, no matter how well-intentioned. Based on its close-knit relationships with the population, Iraqi security forces tapped into human networks and sources that we could not access, and often produced prompt location and activity data on men for whom we only had names. In the long-term, such intelligence sharing emboldened and empowered the Iraqis, showing them that the goal of their total autonomy and self-sufficiency was more than just a presentation talking point. Obviously, leaks from the Iraqis were a necessary risk with such an approach, and leaks did occasionally occur. But rather than throw the baby out with the bathwater, my troop and company commanders informed Iraqi leaders about security breaches and allowed them to handle the situations privately. Such a tactful approach ensured that isolated seeds of mistrust did not blossom into something more protracted, and that our joint targeting gains did not regress.

Losing Sight of Secondary and Tertiary Effects

In the following months, our adherence to the principle of precision targeting steadily improved, as we consciously incorporated it into most COIN operations and tactics. Our progress was not perfect and,

as is often the case, we learned more from our mistakes than from our triumphs.

In late spring, my platoon conducted an early morning raid in a rural village, serving as the main effort for our short-handed sister troop, which established an inner and outer cordon with two of its platoons. Without firing a shot, we quickly detained our target and one person of interest, chasing them into the inner cordon like quails in the brush. The target was exactly where the intelligence said he would be, and we already had enough damning evidence in his packet that the pistol found on his person only added to it.

According to the troop commander's plan, after the sensitive site exploitation, our mission was complete; in quickly and out cleanly, like textbook counterinsurgency demanded. However, a different vision for our immediate future existed and a fragmentary order was pushed down to our level. We subsequently spent the next 14 hours at the village, searching every house and hut, questioning every able man, woman, and child. The stated intent of this new mission was to send a strong message to the people of the village that they could not harbor terrorists and not expect consequences. Our time in Iraq has taught us that holding the whole accountable for the crimes of the few only increased insurgency support — and we certainly were not the first unit to come to that realization. Despite canvassing the village again and again, the platoon found nothing in the village, not even the slightest hint of enemy propaganda. Nonetheless, we detained every military-aged male in the village for further questioning in the interest of gaining more intelligence. All persons detained were released within 48 hours, with little, if any, intelligence gathered from our extensive efforts.

This technique of a mass round-up contained a steep learning curve for those of us on the ground at the company level. While the initial intent of making a firm statement to the village as a whole had been met, it came at the expense of secondary and tertiary effects. Unintentionally, we had publicly humiliated every one of the military-aged males detained, guilty or innocent, in front of their families. One of the men detained, and subsequently released, turned out to be one of our human intelligence collection team's top sources; their relationship never recovered from the lost trust brought on by this incident. Any hopes of developing new sources within the area seemed unlikely and proved fruitless.

We learned firsthand that imparting fear, while a powerful and sometimes necessary tool, is something successful coun-



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terinsurgents only use when absolutely necessary. Even the prominent COIN tool of money could only repair so much after this blunder. The sheiks and contractors forgave and forgot; most of the populace did not, even if it benefited them in the long run. Fairly or unfairly, the average Iraqi rarely thought of U.S. forces when they saw a freshly paved road; however, they did think of us when they saw their eldest son blindfolded and flex-cuffed just for being a certain age and living in a certain village. By not adhering to precision targeting in this instance, the opportunities for future targeting of any manner in this area diminished.

How to Destruct a Cell of Insurgents

Once my platoon leader time was complete, I moved over to an infantry company, which was responsible for Hussaniyah, a mid-sized slum of a city located due north of Sadr City, on the east side of the Tigris River. During my first week there, an EFP struck one of the line platoons just south of the city, luckily only resulting in minor injuries to the soldiers. The source network in and around this area proved vast and thorough, a direct testament to the skills and efforts of the human intelligence collection team assigned to our unit.

Within 72 hours, the entire cell responsible for the attack had been identified and confirmed: two emplacers, the driver, the financier, and the cell leader/overseer. Bed-down locations for all five were provided and we raided all five locations in

one night, detaining three cell members; the other two were caught in the following two months. One of our new sources, eager to display his loyalties, marked a target's house by dropping an infrared chemlight on the front stoop. The whole mission set lasted less than 2 hours and the follow-on effects of our efforts were immediate. Locals came up to our patrols in the following days, expressing concern for the soldiers hit in the blast and thanking us for detaining the "Ali Babas." Three new sources stepped forward in this time period and were subsequently vetted and developed by our human intelligence collection team. All three provided vital intelligence in the coming months, often warning us of potential attacks before they occurred; thereby, mitigating the chances of a repeat attack.

The well of intelligence never runs dry for an anticipatory unit willing to be patient, as I learned firsthand in the first week of my new position. Although everyone's initial reaction in the aftermath of the EFP strike was to do something and do it quickly, cooler heads prevailed, ensuring proper use of the source network.

An unfortunate byproduct of accuracy was time; in the grand scheme of our deployment operations, 72 hours was nothing, although it didn't feel that way during the time. One of the arguments against waiting to strike back was the possibility of cell members fleeing Hussaniyah, as did one target not captured during the initial raids. This enemy course of action, though always feasible, paled in impor-

tance with accuracy; further, insurgents who moved around areas of operation seemed to almost always return, and due to our already excellent source network, we knew when and if that happened. Although multiple targets were detained in the EFP cell incident, just like in a mass round-up, any and all similarities between the two occurrences ceased there, as the later situation displayed model understanding and adherence to precision targeting. Although the family members of the cell members may have known something, our leaders determined they were not worth the effort and detaining them would only have wrought a negative perception for us in the greater community. Limiting ourselves to the specific men we targeted made it easy to explain to inquisitive local nationals and family members why they had been detained.

The Seesaw of Precision Targeting

Even with constant awareness and vigilant attention, precision targeting never felt like something the entire chain of command embraced wholeheartedly. So, when we conducted a higher-dictated air assault from helicopters on a retirement community in our final month of the deployment, many of us were not surprised. Our purpose for such a mission was “to show the Iraqis what we’re capable of.” Despite misgivings about show-of-force

missions being carried out nearly 6 years into the war, we executed, and on a totally visceral level, I had a fantastic time. The local citizenry did not share my enthusiasm and, at best, were confused about why we felt compelled to arrive at their homes in such a fashion; at worst, absolute panic seized their faces, terrified that their neighborhood was seconds away from turning into La Drang Valley.

We turned a crop field into a landing zone, something the local farmer did not seem to appreciate. We then conducted a village-wide cache sweep, finding nothing but the aforementioned elderly locals in various hyperemotional states. Then the helicopters landed on the crops again, picked us up, and whisked us back to our joint security station. If any lessons could be derived from this incident, they were imparted to our replacing unit, as after 15 months in country, redeployment rested at the forefront of our minds. While the purpose of displaying our operational capabilities had been met, the question remained as to whom exactly we proved such to and why.

In my experience, no doctrinal method or fluid system yields more gains in the Iraq counterinsurgency than precision targeting, both in the immediate and enduring realms. It was an up-and-down ride, and like the aforementioned seesaw, nev-

er seemed able or willing to stay steady. Every situation felt unlike the previous, every target demanded different tactics and techniques for our approach. Yet the concept of precision targeting remained, whether followed or not.

History shows that counterinsurgencies are not short, dynamic bursts of conflict, but rather, the exact opposite; as a result, secondary and tertiary effects should actually often take precedence over the immediate and pressing. Winning over the local citizenry can only be accomplished by abiding by both precision and restraint. A traditionalist might respond to such a statement by claiming that in war, it doesn’t matter what civilians think; in counterinsurgency nothing matters more.



Captain Matthew Gallagher is currently a member of the U.S. Army Individual Ready Reserve force. He received a B.A. from Wake Forest University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course and Scout Leader Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include lethal targeting officer/1st cell leader, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 2d Brigade, 25th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Schofield Barracks, HI; and scout platoon leader, Bravo Troop, 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 25th SBCT, Schofield Barracks.



“According to the troop commander’s plan, after the sensitive site exploitation, our mission was complete; in quickly and out cleanly, like textbook counterinsurgency demanded. However, a different vision for our immediate future existed and a fragmentary order was pushed down to our level. We subsequently spent the next 14 hours at the village, searching every house and hut, questioning every able man, woman, and child.”

Raid at Village X-Ray: Kinetic Vignette

by Captain Andrew G. Gourgoumis, U.S. Marine Corps



SITUATION

You are the company commander of B Company, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (Stryker). The squadron has been conducting counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan for 4 months. The dominant insurgent leader, Malik Abdul al-Musfidoon, has been operating in your task force (TF) area of operations (AO). Malik, an Arab foreigner, has been operating in Afghanistan for 1 year, after he abandoned his mission in Iraq. He is currently orchestrating significant Taliban offensive and terrorist operations in the squadron's AO. Malik travels with heavy security and each time the squadron receives intelligence of his presence in the AO, it encounters significant contact en route to its objective and cannot capture or kill him.

The squadron recently received signal intelligence (SIGINT) that Malik will be visiting Village X on the following day. The village is about 1 square kilometer and the exact location of the meeting is unknown. The squadron develops a scheme of maneuver, which replicates the hammer and anvil. B Company will serve as the anvil in a northern blocking position as two other companies clear from south to north. The terrain requires this operation to be conducted completely dismounted. The only mounted element is the squadron reserve, a Stryker platoon, which will be positioned south of the village.

The night prior to the operation, four plain-clothed Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers are sent by pickup truck on a recon to identify what type of security has been placed around the village to protect Malik. They were scheduled to return no later than 0600 hours; however, they failed to return. Due to the time-sensitive nature of the target, the decision is made to execute the operation.

At 0800 hours, the companies are in their objective rally points. At 0900 hours, they move to their blocking positions and release points to begin the operation. B Company has two platoons in blocking positions along each northern route and one platoon (3d) in reserve. B Company also has a scout sniper team in overwatch. The company is foot mobile, so class III is not available for blocking positions. All B Company has to reinforce its positions are spike strips.

Within 15 minutes after A Company reaches the edge of the village and begins clearing, it makes significant contact with an enemy platoon-sized element armed with small arms, RPK machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Within 5 minutes, 2d platoon, located to the east, reports it is receiving mortar and rocket fire and has sustained three priority and two routine casualties. As the commander, you report the contact and casualties to higher. Your fire support team (FiST) leader then informs you that the fire support coordinator (FSC) is reporting that the Apaches cannot pinpoint the location, but believe the indirect fire is originating from inside the village. The 2d platoon leader reports that the indirect fire is becoming more accurate and they are displacing to alternate blocking positions.

"Bravo 6, this is scout snipers."

"Scout snipers... Bravo 6."

"We have eyes on an Oxfam aid convoy traveling on Route 5. They have been attacked by an IED [improvised explosive device], which seems to have had catastrophic effects. They are under small-arms and RPG fire from our NW 900m and have at least four mobility killed vehicles."

You attempt to raise the squadron commander and operations officer, but they are preoccupied with the fight in the village, which has intensified and resulted in numerous urgent casualties.

Requirement 1

What actions do you take?

Do you relocate your CP?

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue a fragmentary order [FRAGO] over the radio. The FRAGO must be no longer than five sentences and capable of being transmitted in less than 50 seconds.

Update


Scout snipers report two vehicles heading north from the village along the eastern route.

“Bravo 6, this is White 1 [2d platoon leader]...the indirect fire has intensified, but we have received no more urgent or priority casualties. Doc is busy checking those that are routine and has stabilized the priorities. Recommend....STANDBY!”

You hear a large volley of M240 and M4 fire vicinity 2d platoon’s blocking position followed by a large explosion.

“6...White 1. We made contact with an SVBIED [suicide vehicle-borne IED] and I’ve got casualties...standby!”

A minute passes. “We had a vehicle hit the spike strips at about 70 kph. When it continued to close, we engaged and stopped it, but a second vehicle behind it made it to the blocking position and detonated...I believe my position is currently untenable! Bravo 99 standby for casualty evacuation [CASEVAC] request...”



Requirement 2

What is the enemy doing?

What actions do you take?

In a time limit of 3 minutes, issue a FRAGO over the radio. The FRAGO must be no longer than six sentences and capable of being transmitted in less than 50 seconds. Take an additional 2 minutes to send any reports to higher.

SOLUTION:

Requirement 1

“Guidons, guidons, Black 6 standby for FRAGO.”

“Situation: I think the enemy is trying to disrupt us by fire in order to locate or create gaps in our positions. Mission: No change. Execution: fires; FiST, I want indirect fire on the enemy ambush to deny them the ability to attack Oxfam. Scout snipers will observe. Tasks: No change; 2d platoon, continue to block from your alternate position. Bravo 99 is en route to evacuate the casualties.”

At this point, you cannot reinforce the Oxfam convoy and still ensure your ability to complete essential tasks. You must also assume that the enemy is using its indirect fire to draw your fire into the village and cause civilian casualties by your actions. Despite its casualties, you believe that 2d platoon is still capable of completing its task and do not commit your reserve, shift the main effort, or relocate your CP. Your snipers are out of direct-fire range of the enemy ambush, but you use them as observer controllers for your fires. You cannot reach War Eagles 6 (squadron commander) and even if you could, would not recommend committing the squadron reserve given the situation in the village.

Requirement 2

“Guidons, guidons, Black 6.”

“2d platoon, hold your current position. 3d platoon, push to BP 2. Stand by for FRAGO.”

“Situation: I think the enemy is attempting to penetrate 2d platoon’s position to allow Malik to escape. Mission: No change. Execution: SOM [scheme of maneuver]; main effort shifts to 3d platoon. Priority of fires to 2d platoon. Tasks: 1st platoon, block from BP 1 to prevent enemy egress. 2d platoon: on order, support by fire 3d platoon to protect their position. 3d platoon: main effort. Block from BP 2 to prevent enemy egress. Coordinating instructions: the trigger line to begin escalation of force procedures is now 500m south of BPs 1 and 2.”

“War Eagles 6, Bull 6.”

“I have snowstorm and an SVBIED attack at BP 2 and am conducting CASEVAC. I believe the enemy is attempting to penetrate at BP 2. I have committed my reserve to reinforce BP 2. Break. An Oxfam convoy is under attack vicinity grid 123456. We are using indirect fire to suppress the enemy platoon ambush vicinity grid 122459 to cause their withdrawal. Recommend pushing a squadron asset to assist the Oxfam convoy.”

At this time, you have chosen to commit your reserve. You will shift the main effort on their arrival at BP 2 because you believe that 2d platoon will be too burdened with CASEVAC to command and control the blocking position any longer. You must act quickly and have started to push 3d platoon to BP 2 while you finalize and issue the FRAGO. You do not believe that you can commit troops to the Oxfam convoy.

Part 4 of the *ARMOR* Series:

Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Volume IV: World War I (1914-1918), of the Multivolume

by Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Foreword

The late Dr. Ali al-Wardi's multivolume, "Social Aspects of Modern Iraqi History," is an indispensable work on the social, military, religious, and political history — from the early Ottoman era to the British-installed monarchy of King Feisal I after World War I — of the lands that became Iraq. The relevance of Wardi's study continues to present day, shedding light on the tribal nature of culture, politics, and power in Iraq, in addition to long-standing patterns of governance and insurgency. Through his work, America's military and diplomatic practitioners and policy analysts can gain insight into the sociology and anthropology — or what has recently been called the "human terrain" — of Iraq, perhaps, most importantly, the ties that link tribe, religion, place, and social structure.

The review essay that follows, by Commander Aboul-Enein, a valued advisor to leaders in the American national defense

establishment, covers volume four in the Wardi series, delving into the period of 1914 to 1918, a time when the British and Ottoman empires fought on what we now know as Iraq. A tenet of Commander Aboul-Enein has long been the imperative for Americans to see translated Arab works of significance in U.S. military and diplomatic journals, and he has opened the door by providing us with this gift. He does so not only for the benefit of American servicemen and women and diplomats, but for all who wish to understand and act wisely in a country and region in which the United States has been profoundly engaged for more than a century, and will be inextricably bound for decades to come.

— Dr. Jeffrey (Jeb) Nadaner
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Partnership Strategy and
Stability Operations (2004-2008)



Jamal Pasha surrounded by tribal leaders of the regions of South Baghdad.

Iraq's Social, Political, and Military History: Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Dr. Wardi begins this volume by discussing the state of political-military affairs of the Ottoman Empire before delving into Iraq specifically. He understands it is impossible to divorce the affairs of Istanbul from those of Baghdad and Basra. The Ottoman Empire was effectively run by a military junta that styled themselves the "Committee of Union and Progress," generally known as the "Young Turks."

In 1914, the Germans and Austro-Hungarian Empires were fighting the British, French, and Russians. World War I began with the Ottomans maintaining neutrality, but leaning toward Germany. Due to war demands, the British refused to transfer two battleships to the Ottomans, but the Germans offered the light cruisers, Breslau and Goeben, to the Ottoman navy. As German Admiral Souchon was scheduled to deliver the two battle cruisers, crewed and officered by Germans, but flying an Ottoman flag, he began the bombardment of Russian ports along the Black Sea beginning with Odessa, then turning his guns on Sebastopol and Novoransk. Ottoman Prime Minister Saeed Halim Pasha (honorific title equivalent to a British Lord) received word of these bombardments on 29 October 1914 while vacationing for the Eid holidays. Two days later, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. As German Admiral Souchon was bombarding Russian ports, General Liman von Sanders, head of the German military mission in Turkey and the senior officer in charge of training Ottoman forces, began the mobilization of Ottoman forces. For all purposes, the Ottomans were drawn into World War I by subterfuge and members of the Young Turks who wanted to ally themselves with the Germans.

The Process of Announcing a Jihad

Wardi's book is unique because it focuses on details such as the method and process by which the Ottomans drew up the *fatwa* (religious edict) for jihad. It also includes, in latter parts of the book, details of the management of tribes by both Ottoman and British forces in Iraq. *Khuri Effendi* (lowest title of honor given to Ottoman bureaucrats, junior officers, and clerics), the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Constantinople, drew up a November fatwa, making jihad *fard ayn* (individual obligation) for all Muslims of the Ottoman domains, as well as Muslims residing in the British, French, and Russian Empires. That same month, the Ottoman Sultan announced jihad, as caliph of all Muslims, to liberate oppressed Muslims and defend the empire.

The proclamation of jihad on 23 November 1914 was signed by notable clerics of the empire to protect Mecca, Medina, Karbala, Najaf, the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate Damascus, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad, and Muslims who were oppressed and enslaved for centuries by European powers. The Ottomans circulated millions of copies of their proclamation and concentrated their jihad propaganda on Egypt, Sudan, India, Persia, and Afghanistan. This overarching climate of the Ottomans, framing their conflict with Britain, France, and Russia as a religious war, led to the production of books in Iraq, such as Mu-

hammad Habeeb al-Mosuli's *The Rope of Unity and the Duty toward the Islamic Caliphate* in 1916, and *English Crimes against Humanity and Muslims in Particular*, which makes the case that England is not only the enemy of Muslims, but as the book discusses, Asians, in general. It encourages the uprising and disobedience by a number of Muslims in hostile nations: 70 million in Great Britain; 16 million in the British Protectorate of Egypt and the Sudan; 20 million in French and British Africa; and 20 million in Russia.

German Kaiser Wilhelm Plays Muslim Identity Politics

The German Kaiser did not object to being called "Hajj" (a title given to Muslims who made the pilgrimage to Mecca) or even "Mohammad Wilhelm." Like Napoleon Bonaparte, who, upon seizing Egypt in 1798, adopted Arab dress and claimed to have seen the Prophet Muhammad in his dreams, the Kaiser saw in these identity politics a means of undermining British and French influence in their Muslim colonies. The tactic predictably concerned the British and French and, in particular, British intelligence officers and military planners who expended great thought on how to counter this Ottoman call for jihad. Of note, the deposed Sultan Abdel-Hamid II wrote in his memoirs that his brother, Sultan Muhammad V, erred in calling a jihad. He felt that the Ottomans should have seized the initiative and attacked Russia instead of relying on the irregular mobilization of the *Ummah* (the worldwide Muslim community).

Germany attempted to incite an Ottoman jihad against its common foes; however, one aspect of its propaganda had a negative impact — the touting of the new technology of the Zeppelin. Ottoman subjects and many Iraqis had only heard of the Zeppelin; they saw it as a wonder weapon and assumed that their participation in a jihad was not necessary as German leaflets touted the ability of the Zeppelin to bomb the warships of the British Royal Navy. German agents in Persia incited Persians against allied diplomats — their safety and the safety of their families were in jeopardy.

Ottoman military thinking focused on the offense and

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neglected the defense, which led to their neglect of shoring up defenses on the Dardanelles and in Iraq. The Ottomans focused on attacking the Caucasus and the Russian front, due partly to Ottoman delusions of past grandeur that focused on the offense, and the need to bring their war to a quick and decisive conclusion. Wardi discusses four Ottoman fronts during World War I: the Caucasus, the Dardanelles, Sinai (in Egypt), and Iraq. However, this article discusses only the Sinai Front, which so worried British military leaders.

The Sinai Front

Jamal (Djemal) Pasha commanded the 4th Ottoman army, which was stationed in the Levant. He was charged by the Ottoman general staff to conduct attacks on the Sinai and the British-controlled Suez Canal. He left Istanbul for Damascus to assume command of the 4th Army in November 1914. In Damascus, he was given the premature title of "liberator of Egypt." Of note, the *al-liwa al-sharief* (prophet's banner) was kept in Medina and was sent to Damascus, arriving a few days before the arrival of Djemal Pasha. The banner was taken by special train from Medina in Arabia, stopping in Jerusalem, and arriving in Damascus; all part of inciting morale for the jihad. The banner would be used to lead the Ottoman 4th Army in its conquest of British-controlled Egypt.

Ottoman forces moved toward Palestine in November 1914 to enter the Sinai. Routes along the way were lined with Quranic verses from which the soldiers would march under. At some point, Djemal Pasha decided to move his entire army at night to conceal their intention and movements; however, all the fanfare made it difficult to conceal. The British knew the Ottomans were deploying toward the Suez Canal, but did not know when or where the attack would commence and how the Egyptian populace and its armed forces would react if they attempted to stop this invasion. Elements of the 4th Ottoman Army crossed the Suez Canal in wooden boats in February 1915. Dogs gave away the Ottomans and the British hurriedly brought machine gun units to the west bank of the canal, which was reinforced with a defensive infantry force from the town of Ismailiyah, where the main Ottoman effort was believed to be using steamships and transports. Before the assault, Djemal Pasha invoked the infamous Tarek ibn Ziyad speech, in which ibn Ziyad said, "before you is Iberia; we either conquer or perish." This became the force that would conquer Spain in 711 CE. The Mountain of Tarek, or Jebel Tarek, is currently the island of Gibraltar.


Only 600 Ottomans crossed the canal; many were killed or captured. To make matters worse, no thought was given to the logistics resupply for the Ottoman force. Ali Fuad Bey, an Ottoman officer present, wrote of the state of the demoralized forces when Djemal Pasha ordered a retreat. It is estimated 5,000 Ottomans were casualties, and Djemal couched his retreat as a victory, using some of the crossing boats in parades in the streets of Beirut and Damascus. Recollection of Saddam's infamous "Baghdad Bob," who maintained the fiction of Iraqi victory while U.S. forces were within sight, is not a new phenomenon in Middle East conflicts.

The Arab Revolt

On 10 June 1916, the Sherief of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad, declared an Arab revolt against the Ottomans, and with the aid of British intelligence, tied down 12,000 Ottoman troops in Mecca, Taif, Jeddah, and Medina. Wardi's work exposes the mechanics of how the British worked the Arab leaders of this revolt; many of these were Arab military officers in the service of the Ottoman army and included a number of Iraqis. These Iraqi Arab military officers would form the cadre of leadership when the British set up the Iraqi monarchy after World War I.

Sherief (Effendi) al-Farouki, from Mosul, fought in the Dardanelles campaign and deserted from the Ottoman army to the British. He was taken to Cairo, debriefed by British military intelligence, and used as an advisor to Sherief Hussein of Mecca to begin working toward declaring a revolt against the Ottomans. Al-Farouki would become Sherief Hussein's representative in Cairo. Nuri Said deserted Ottoman forces and hid in Basra, and when the British invaded Basra, he was interned in British India. Upon hearing of the Arab revolt, he volunteered his services and was moved to Cairo.

The British selected ten officers and 150 soldiers of Arab origins, who were captured Ottoman prisoners of war (POWs), and transferred them from India to Egypt, where Nuri Said met the



"Ottoman military thinking focused on the offense and neglected the defense, which led to their neglect of shoring up defenses on the Dardanelles and in Iraq. The Ottomans focused on attacking the Caucasus and the Russian front, due partly to Ottoman delusions of past grandeur that focused on the offense, and the need to bring their war to a quick and decisive conclusion."

ship and briefed them on the Arab revolt and the need to fight toward Arab independence from the Ottomans, who treated their Arab subjects as second-class citizens. The Arab POWs were unconvinced and asked if they were to be officered by British officers, like the French, who officered North African contingents. The British and members advocating an Arab revolt among the Syrians and Iraqis agreed that this Arab unit would officer themselves and form their own Arab unit. There was concern among the Syrians and Iraqis, represented by such sentiments as, "Are we Egyptians or Indians to be colonized!" Of the ten officers and 150 soldiers that departed Indian POW camps for Egypt, four officers and 15 soldiers refused to join the Arab revolt. The remaining landed in the port of Jeddah in August 1916; however, once these Arab military personnel interacted with the local population, they found public opinion against the Arab revolt.

The majority of townspeople in the Hejaz (the Red Sea coast of Arabia) saw in this revolt an allegiance with the infidel English. Roaming the streets of Jeddah, residents questioned these Syrians and Iraqis, asking how they could even conceive of fighting fellow Muslims. Nuri Said was appointed deputy commander in chief of the Arab revolt, and his first order of business was to isolate Arab military personnel selected to be part of the Arab revolt from the main population. The experiment to graft Arab POWs to the Arab revolt was an ultimate failure, resulting in only six officers joining Sherief Hussein.

In November 1916, British military officials moved a few Arab POWs from India to Rabigh along the Red Sea coast. The plan was to have them rally around Prince Ali, son of Sherief Hussein of Mecca, appealing to their pan-Arab sentiments. This netted a few dozen Arab officers and soldiers, but not the hundreds needed to make a difference in the revolt. Many brought from India to Arabia, who refused to fight the Ottomans, were shipped to Egypt and then back to India.

In Egypt, a lieutenant colonel, Jafar al-Askari, who was an ardent Arab nationalist of Iraqi origin, was used by the British to travel POW camps and convince Arab prisoners to join the revolt and achieve Arab self-determination. It was Askari who kept Sherief Hussein apprised of the disposition of the Arab POWs, as well as how many were recruited to the revolt. His reports led Sherief Hussein of Mecca to cease pursuing Arab-Ottoman military POWs for fear they would mount a coup against the Sherief of Mecca. Askari would be charged by Sherief Hussein to train a regular standing army in Hejaz in 1917.

Fakhri Pasha was Ottoman commander of Medina when the Arab revolt occurred and viewed the actions of Sherief Hussein as treason, an alliance with infidels, and a conspiracy against Islam and Muslims. He was a committed Ottoman, steeped in returning the Ottoman Empire to its previous glory, and was a practicing Bektashi Sufi Muslim. He mounted the podium of the Grand Mosque in Medina, containing the tomb of Prophet Muhammad, and publicly cursed the Sherief of Mecca and all Arabs who joined him in waging warfare against Islam.

Fakhri Pasha would continue to resist the Arab revolt and refused to surrender his post much like his peers in Jeddah, Mecca, and Taif. He would remain in a state of war even after the Turks and British concluded a truce in October 1918. Fakhri would re-

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fuse orders from Istanbul to surrender and he ignored the news of the November armistice from Ottoman officers in Medina, ordering that resistance continue. Two irregular armies of the Arab revolt attempted to dislodge Fakhri Pasha, but failed. Finally, in November 1918, he was overtaken inside the tomb of Muhammad and taken to the camp of Prince Abdullah. Fakhri turned to Ibrahim al-Rawi and asked, "Were you with us?" Rawi replied, "I was with you (in the Ottoman army) until his majesty (the Sherief of Mecca) declared independence and I went with my people." Fakhri was given full military courtesies and a gold pocket watch with a Bektashi inscription.

Iraq during the Start of World War I

On the morning of August 1914, Iraqis awoke to the beat of drums and pamphlets ordering the mobilization of Iraqis to arm and prepare for travel. Iraqis were to be mobilized to fight on the Russian front; however, among the defenses that the Ottomans neglected in their obsession with the offense was Iraq. Ottoman minister of war Anwar Pasha entered World War I with the premise that Turkey would expand its holdings and not necessarily defend the realm. Iraq had only four regiments in Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad, and Basra. The Mosul and Kirkuk regiments were sent to Damascus to merge with the 4th Ottoman army for its push toward the Suez Canal. At best, the Ottoman general staff saw Iraq as a secondary front and sent a telegram to Ottoman leaders in Baghdad ordering the organization of tribal militia. Of note, the Ottoman general staff was even more ignorant of Iraq than the British and failed to study its defenses, conduct military exercises, and according to Muqbal Bey, a senior officer in the general staff, Istanbul possessed only one map of Iraq, which was a 1:1.5 million scale.

In the years leading up to World War I, the Ottomans did nothing to respond to defensive shortfalls in and around Basra, the most likely area for any British landing on Iraq. Even when a large contingent left India and landed in Bahrain, the Ottomans did nothing. The British initially planned a small military expedition to protect the oil pipelines and refineries of Abadan in Persia, sending 4,500 troops. The British easily took Basra, taking southern Iraq in 34 days, and by 1915, stood at the outskirts of Baghdad.

In volume IV, Wardi discusses the reasons why the Ottomans were weak in fighting the British in Iraq. These reasons include military recruitment being viewed by the Iraqis as a tax which the tribes hoped, and worked hard, to evade. Many hid to avoid conscription, leading Ottoman officials to incarcerate male members of a family and not release them until draft dodgers conceded. Anwar Pasha signed a decree ordering the execution of

one-half of the captive draft evaders and sent the other half to the front. Wealthy Iraqis bribed their way far from the front or out of conscription. Others attempted to secure citizenship outside Ottoman domains and many took Persian citizenship. Hospitals and logistics support was inadequate and other problems were apparent, including the Ottoman government apparatus in Iraq being very corrupt (away from direct Ottoman central control, it was deemed by visiting officials to be a place to make a tidy fortune); tribal loyalties superseding Ottoman loyalties; war in Iraq, from Basra to Mosul, central Iraq, commonly known as al-Anbar, being mired in tribal warfare; and most Iraqis resisting conscription.

One reason thousands of Iraqis resisted the draft was because thousands of Ottoman conscripts died in the deserts of central Arabia, known as al-Najd, supporting the Ibn Rashids against the British-sponsored Ibn Sauds, the confederacy that would evolve into modern Saudi Arabia. The Ottomans, aside from attempting to pacify the Ibn Sauds, were troubled by their forcible spread of Wahabism (an austere and intolerant form of Sunni Islam) and the use of evangelizing Wahabism as an excuse to loot and pillage. Thousands of Ottoman conscripts died primarily as a result of disease, hunger, and thirst.

Planes over Baghdad

Before World War I, Baghdad residents had never seen a plane and many were astounded by the new invention; perhaps, like many who had never seen a plane, they wondered how wood and metal stayed aloft in the air. These planes were part of the British Expeditionary Forces, used primarily for reconnaissance. In October 1915, it is reported that tribes and residents on rooftops attempted to shoot down the contraption, not out of any military countermeasures, but out of sheer ignorance, thinking it perhaps a beast, or maybe the persons in the plane were spying on their family and women. These planes were stationed between Baghdad and Salman Pak. The British used their planes to cut Ottoman telegraph wires, flying from region to region to cut communications between Ottoman central government and its forces. During one of these operations, a British plane was intercept-

ed by Iraqi tribesmen on horseback, providing the Ottomans an intact plane and its two pilots. The plane was displayed in Baghdad along with the British captives. The Ottomans used this to weave a propaganda campaign for the Iraqis, touting that this was a victory from God, complete with poems, sermons, and leaflets. Note: In the Middle East, public perception is viewed as a tool of warfare and the result was to create a more challenging and hostile environment for the British. Al-Qaeda uses religious symbols, fragments of Islam, conspiracy theories, and actual news to weave a hostile climate for American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More British planes would appear in 1917 as General Maude attempted to take Baghdad. It was more a weapon of fear for Iraqis during this late period of the war. In January 1917, a squadron of British planes dropped seven bombs on Baghdad and during another operation three days before the fall of Baghdad, a British plane landed near the Dujailah-Baghdad rail line and packed it with dynamite. The Ottomans discovered and removed the explosives before they were detonated. The Ottomans in Iraq countered that the British Royal Air Force planes were an assault on the dignity of Iraqi women, as they could spy on them from the air, so women should remain covered inside their homes. This led to outrage and increased attempts to shoot down planes.

Ottoman Iraq Talks with Ibn Saud of Arabia

A rarely discussed aspect of World War I is the Ottoman and British cultivation of tribes to gain an edge on one another. In 1914, the Ottomans dispatched Mahmoud Shukri al-Alusi from Iraq to negotiate with Ibn Saud; a year later the Ottomans sent Moheiddine al-Naqib to Afghanistan. Both were to negotiate with tribes to undermine British influence in Arabia and Afghanistan respectively. In August 1914, the Ottomans sent a note to Ibn Saud stating that weapons and officers would be sent to organize his tribes against the British. Ibn Saud shared this correspondence with the British resident in the Gulf and British intelligence sent Indian agents, under the guise they wanted to join the jihad, to gather fresh intelligence on Ottoman defenses in southern Iraq, to include information on artillery dispositions.



"Fifteen days before the entrance of the Ottomans into World War I, the British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to protect oil interests in Abadan, Persia. If the Ottomans declared war, the tactical plan was to occupy Basra. It took 7 days to travel from Bombay to Bahrain — the force arrived in October 1914."

The discussions with the Afghans centered on sending advisors and troops not only to Afghan tribes, but Pashtun's in North India to foment an insurgency. It was deemed by British authorities, that the only way to counter this call for jihad would be through supporting nationalism — the early seeds of the Arab revolt were born. However, the Arab revolt was to encompass not only the Red Sea coast, but the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Levant. It would center on strong tribal personalities such as Ibn Saud in Central Arabia, the Sherief of Mecca (the Hashemites) for the Red Sea coast, Sheikh Said Taleb Naqib of Muhammara, Sheikh Khazzal in Southern Iraq, and Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah of Kuwait. When World War I broke out, the British consul in Basra relocated his offices in Muhammara tribal territory, the area where the port of Umm Qasr is today.

Wardi discusses the details of World War I counterinsurgency using tribes, which needs to be rediscovered in light of U.S.


involvement in Iraq. Sheikh Said Taleb would be offered the general governorship of Basra with the right to dispense patronage through city appointments. Taleb responded that he wanted to see an end to Ottoman rule and a new independent Arab enclave in southern Iraq. He wanted to achieve this result with only material aid from the British and then the establishment of a protectorate over this new entity like that of Egypt. The British refused.

Of note, the British had to balance the interests of Ibn Saud, the al-Sabah of Kuwait, Hashemites of Mecca, and the Muhammara confederacy of south Iraq. As talks with Taleb and the British broke down, the Sheikh received word of Ottoman intentions to place him under arrest. Taleb was given a cipher telegraph code to the Ottoman war ministry and proceeded to forge telegraphed orders from Anwar Pasha, making him envoy to negotiate with Ibn Saud in central Arabia. In October 1914, he arrived at al-Jahrah in Kuwait, a guest of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, where the British consul made him a final offer — the governor generalship of Basra, with the right to pass on the governorship to his heirs. Sheikh Taleb was to land with Sir Percy Cox on the Faw Peninsula with a British force as Governor General Taleb, along with Cox, his majesty's representative. He refused this final offer and Mubarak threatened to keep him in Kuwait until he accepted the British offers. Sheikh Taleb then said to Sheikh Mubarak that he had a pistol; one bullet was for the ruler of Kuwait and the other for himself, if he was not allowed to depart Kuwait immediately.

In November, he arrived in the city of Buraydah and was visited by the Emir of Najd, Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud, who, in 1932, would create modern Saudi Arabia. Taleb addressed the people of Buraydah, a Wahabi bastion, giving an anti-British speech, but both knew this was for public consumption as he despised the Ottomans, while working with British agents. They would ride together northward to respond to the jihad, but delaying their arrival in the hopes British and Ottoman forces would exhaust themselves. Arriving in al-Zulfi, word reached that the British had easily taken Basra and the decision was made to stop the expedition. Ibn Saud offered Taleb the governorship of the Eastern Province.

Fifteen days before the entrance of the Ottomans into World War I, the British dispatched an expeditionary force from India to protect oil interests in Abadan, Persia. If the Ottomans declared war, the tactical plan was to occupy Basra. It took 7 days to travel from Bombay to Bahrain — the force arrived in October 1914. The tribes cultivated by the British would pay dividends when the Ottomans declared war as the general in charge of the British task force consulted with the Emir of Kuwait on how best to take the Fao Citadel (see Map 1).

In early November 1914, HMS Odin silenced four artillery guns and took the citadel in one hour. The Ottomans received word from escaping residents and prepared a force of under 400 to repulse the landing. But it was too little too late. The British landed 17 boats carrying a regiment of infantry under the command of General Barrett. Seizing Fao, India sent orders to take Basra.



Map 1

Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military Academy

The Ottomans would stand in a place called "Kut Zain," across from Muhammara, building a hasty defensive line composed of 4,500 troops. These forces would face the British 6th (Indian) Poona Reinforced Infantry Division. A British tactic was to immediately set about cutting telegraph wires leading northward to deprive the Ottomans of instant intelligence on military maneuvers. The hastiness of the Ottoman defense and use of tribal levies mixed with regular forces led to a defeat at Kut Zain, which led to a collapse of morale, so Sobhi Bey ordered a withdrawal from Basra, ceding the city to advancing British forces. He scuttled three riverboats to delay the advance of British river forces up the Euphrates River.

In Basra, looting commenced and elders of the city proceeded to British warships at anchor, pleading for assistance to restore order. The British responded by shelling the city, landing a force that immediately caught looters in the act and executed them by hanging on-site, as a lesson to others. General Barrett and Sir Percy Cox, his political advisor, landed in Basra with the rest of the Poona (British infantry) Division. Cox was fluent in Arabic and gave a speech in front of the Ottoman governor's palace in the name of the commanding general. He indicated that Great Britain has occupied Basra in its war with the Ottoman Turks, saying, "We bear the people of Basra no ill will, harm, or retribution. The Turks have fled and in its place the Union Jack flies to which you all will enjoy its protection, freedom, and justice in your religious and worldly affairs." Orders were issued to British troops to treat the populace with courtesy. The ceremony ended with the raising of the Union Jack, the playing of "God Save the King," and the firing of the guns from warships and riverboats at anchor within the estuary in a dramatic show of British military power.

Occupation of al-Kurna

Sobhi Bey withdrew his forces from Basra to Kurna, located between the Euphrates and Tigris (Dijaila in Arabic) Rivers. General Barrett solicited permission from India to occupy Kurna. A



"Sobhi Bey withdrew his forces from Basra to Kurna, located between the Euphrates and Tigris (Dijaila in Arabic) Rivers. General Barrett solicited permission from India to occupy Kurna. A force under Colonel Fraizer was sent to take the village, Mazeerah, overlooking Kurna on the left bank of the Tigris."

force under Colonel Fraizer was sent to take the village, Mazeerah, overlooking Kurna on the left bank of the Tigris. With little Ottoman resistance, the village was taken and used to set up a logistics base within sight of Kurna, but more importantly to set up artillery batteries that would, in conjunction with river gunboats, pound Turkish forces from the riverbank with roving fire, leading into Kurna. The overwhelming firepower led Ottoman soldiers and officers to flee; some flung themselves into the Tigris to swim away from the pounding of shells — among them was Wardi's father, who served in the Ottoman army.

British forces entered Kurna and felt deeply let down, as this was the alleged place where Adam and Eve landed when they were cast out from heaven. The city was in squalor and consisted of mud huts and hovels. It is after the taking of Basra and Kurna that new goods, such as chocolates, mass-produced soap, detergent, tinned meat, pasteurized milk, and shaving items, flooded Iraqi markets. With the presence of the British army, profiteering began and the price of regular staples, such as sugar and rice, shot up astronomically, adding further pressures on British forces.

Ottomans Incite a Jihad

American military professionals must look not only at the actual tactics of battle, but discuss the hidden aspects that shape the battlefield environment. We cannot neglect or be blind to behind-the-scenes discussions among clerics and other power centers of a society, who, in their own way, create a climate hostile to our forces. The following discussion focuses on how the Ottomans attempted to work with Iraq's Shiites and Sunni religious leaders to incite a popular uprising against the British. Wardi's work highlights the hidden aspects of World War I that today are a part of how our adversary shapes and influences perception to create a hostile environment for security forces. A telegram arrived from Ottoman officials in Baghdad to the leading Shiite hawza (clerical seminary) in Najaf.

Shiite Clergy Convene a War Council

One Ayatollah declaring a jihad does not necessarily connote a general Shiite uprising. In this case, only those thousands who considered Yazdi their Imam answered his call. This, however,

pressured the other Shiite clergy to call a conference in Kazimiyah to reconcile Shiite differences on the issue of calling a jihad, and then reconcile Shiite and Sunni fatwas declaring a jihad and supporting the Ottomans. Some argued that this was exposing the Shiite flock to certain destruction, as the British had highly advanced weapons. Sheikh Mehdi al-Khalisi was among those who advocated jihad. He wrote epistles and fatwas in local newspapers, which can be compared to early 20th-century versions of internet fatwas, having printing presses at his disposal.

The clerics strategized on methods of getting their tribal flock to insist that tribal leaders take on the jihad against the British. Tactics included Ayatollah Yazdi travelling on Ashoura (Shiite holy observance of the martyrdom of Prophet Muhammad's grandson, Hussein) to recruit and generate momentum for jihad. The Germans and Ottomans expended much money for clerics to incite, recruit, and arm *mujahideen* (fighters). Some fabulously wealthy clerics, such as the Sunni, Muhammad Haboubi, gave his own money for the cause. It is after the Kazimiyah conference that the danger of a general uprising in Iraq would be very real, as the majority of the Shiite clergy endorsed the concept of declaring a joint jihad with the Ottomans.

When Basra and Kurna fell, Javeed Pasha, the Ottoman vali (governor) of Baghdad was relieved and made a scapegoat for the indifference and neglect of Iraq's defenses by the general staff. Wardi's Volume IV highlights Ottoman blunders in the defense of Iraq. Javeed Pasha was commander in chief of Iraqi forces and vali. After 1915, the two posts of governor and military commander were split: Suleiman Nazif Bey was made governor; and Suleiman Askari Bey was made military commander based on his position as lead advisor on Iraq to the Ottoman general staff in Istanbul. He had served many years in Iraq and this assignment would be disastrous as he was stuck in the offensive mode of thinking that permeated the general staff. While in Istanbul, he would advocate for an assault on Britain's Indian possessions by agitating the Muslim population in what is Afghanistan and Pakistan. Askari's first order of business on arriving in Baghdad was to execute the deputy governor of Basra who ordered retreat.

Battle of Rotawi (or al-Routah)

Askari Bey collected a force of regulars and tribal levies, dividing them into three divisions along three fronts of Shuaybah, Kurna, and Arabistan. He hoped to press into three fronts, linking all three divisions into Muhamarrah to seek retribution on its Sheikh for his pro-British stance. The division of what amounted to an army corps into three divisions, attacking separate objectives, only served to weaken Ottoman plans to retake Kurna. The Kurna force met a British force along a Rotawi canal, located 15km from Kurna. Wardi does not discuss the details of this engagement, except that the battle took 4 hours with the British, who were hoping that river gunboats along the Tigris and artillery fire would be a force multiplier for its smaller infantry force meeting the Ottomans at Rotawi.

Despite heavy Ottoman casualties, British defenses broke and a retreat commenced. The Ottoman force, unlike the defenders of Kurna and Basra, who retreated under heavy artillery fire,

stood and fought. For example, the commander of the division, Said Mahdy al-Haidary, remained with his force despite shells falling near and around his tent. The British faced several tactical problems in Iraq; the ease of their earlier victories led to overconfidence, dependence on technology, a need for a larger force, and detraction from their main mission of protecting British oil fields in Persia, which were now under attack from one of the three divisions allocated by Askari Bey.

Battle of Arabistan

The area of Arabistan, now Khuzestan, was an area of British national strategic interest; at the time, it was England's chief source of oil and refined gasoline. British forces dispatched from India before the declaration of war were sent to protect these interests; however, the ease of conquest led to the taking of Basra and Kurna — a decision made not only by British commanders on the ground, but by officials in British India as well. It was in Arabistan that tribalism became a crucial component of the Iraqi campaign. A message (along with the joint religious edict) was sent by the Shiite clergy to Sheikh Khazzal, the chieftain in charge of the Persian side of Arabistan, advising him to take the side of the Muslims against the occupying British army. They said their edict from Najaf applied to Ottomans and Persians, Shiites and Sunnis alike. The edict was signed by five senior Shiite clerics, with a separate telegram from grand Shiite cleric, Sayyid al-Yazdi. In addition, Sheikh Khazzal was close to one member of the Shiite clergy, Sheikh Abdel-Karim al-Jazairi, and he asked the tribal leader to lend his assistance and pledge his allegiance to the Ottomans. Participating in a jihad was not without risks to Khazzal. There was frustration among the tribes within Khazzal's confederation over taxes, therefore, this jihad could easily be turned against him; and a power shift from tribal to clerical might occur, in which Eissa Kamal-al-Din, the highest clerical authority in Arabistan, would take control of Khazzal's fighters.

In January 1915, an Ottoman force, under the command of Tewfik (Bey) al-Khalidi, arrived in Amarah and encamped 20 miles from Ahvaz, along with tribal levies from the Bani Lam, Bani Taraf, Rabiah, and Zarqan. Upon arrival, the Bawiah tribe joined the jihad. These tribes raided British oil interests and sabotaged pipelines; more importantly, they turned against the Bani Kaab tribal confederation and its chief, Sheikh Khazzal, for his allegiance to the British. With the help of English forces, the Bani Kaab tribe defeated the Bawiah tribe and General Barrett sent forces from southern Iraq into Ahvaz to protect oil interests. While making its way to Ahvaz, the British contingent was set on by tribes, leading to a withdrawal of the British force back toward Basra. The tribes captured two British artillery guns. The tribal chief of the Bani Lam offered a gold piece for every British or Indian head brought to him, which led the Bedouin to give their British prisoners no quarters.

The Impact of the Jihad on Kuwait

Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah was a close ally of Sheikh Khazzal and saw how the Ottomans, along with several tribes, threatened him, which encouraged him to aid his ally. However, a segment of Sheikh Mubarak's tribal confederation found fighting for the British distasteful; whereas, two clerics within Mubarak's inner circle considered fighting for the Ottomans a religious duty. With the momentum of Ottoman forces regrouping, tribes backing the Ottomans began to ascend, and tribal chieftains, such as Mubarak al-Sabah and Sheikh Khazzal, began to become precarious. The two clerics with al-Sabah's confederacy began to draw away fight-

ers, and Mubarak had to persuade clans that his alliance with the British provided autonomy from the Ottomans. However, this was to no avail and Mubarak al-Sabah had to fight Mohammad al-Shanqati as a side skirmish between British and Ottoman forces in the Battle of Shuaybah.

Battle of Shuaybah

Located nine miles southeast of Basra, Shuaybah was an old fortress reinforced by the British upon their landing in Basra. The British built extensive defensive works around Shuaybah. Askari Bey led a force of 6,000 Ottoman regulars and 20,000 tribal levies and opted for a direct frontal assault with the 6,000 regulars in the center and 10,000 tribal fighters on each flank, despite objections from tribal chiefs and even German military advisors, who recommended against a frontal assault. The proposal was to isolate Shuaybah from Basra and fight a harassing action combined with a siege of the fortress. This proposal was made easier by heavy flooding of the Tigris, which made Shuaybah accessible primarily by riverboat, while the Ottomans occupied the high ground. However, despite the odds favoring the Ottomans, the British barely etched out a victory using concentrated disciplined firepower and rumors that Askari Bey had been killed. The British firepower came in the form of sending several river gunboats to Shuaybah, along with land artillery to decimate the Ottoman frontal assaults. Askari, on hearing of the route and collapse of his forces, blamed Iraqi tribes and shot himself. The British buried him with full military honors.

The Ottomans suffered 4,200 casualties and 700 men captured. The Battle of Shuaybah was the first battle in which Muslim Indian contingents within the British forces showed signs of demoralization fighting fellow Muslims. Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait was able to rid himself of tribal threats, including contingents within his own confederacy that defected and fought alongside the Ottomans. Several factors contributed to the Ottoman defeat, including tribes impatiently seeking loot and then departing the battlefield once they obtained goods or when spoils were slim; antiquated weapons; inadequate supplies; and spies paid by the British to spread disinformation within the Ottoman camps — the most effective being the false report that Askari Bey had been killed. Add to this the personality of Askari Bey, a military commander applying 19th-century preindustrial-age tactics against the minds and technology of British commanders, who were steeped in the experiences of studying the Franco-Prussian and American Civil wars.

The front in Arabistan was the scene of an interesting development; a collapse not due to any British intervention, but petty jealousies over the distribution of payment to different tribes. The events of Shuaybah led to an order from Ottoman officials in Baghdad to retreat northward. The British initially began its takeover of Basra with only the 6th Poona Division, under General Barrett, after the Battle of Shuaybah, in which they suffered 1,200 casualties. The British would also send another division, the 12th, under General Nixon.

Nureiddine Bey Takes Command

In April 1915, the British put together a 9,000 troop force that was transported by land and riverboat to protect Ahvaz. With no Ottoman threats, the British decided to take vengeance on the Bani Taraf tribe that raided a British infantry formation, killing four officers. The Ottomans would never again threaten British oil interests in Persia. With the eventual suicide of Askari Bey, the Ottoman general staff decided to recombine the positions of governor and commander in chief under Nureiddine Bey. What

distinguished Nureiddine from Askari Bey was his studious military mind. Before taking his post in May 1915, he studied newspapers and reports about the Iraq front, gaining a sense of the battlefield he was about to take command over. As a result, his first order was to shut down Iraq's press, leaving just one pro-Ottoman newspaper open. His rationale was to impose a news blackout due to the impact the press had on the morale of Iraqis and their willingness to side with the Turks. Nureiddine then turned his attention to Iraq's Christians and Jews, viewing them as British fifth columns. Were it not for Sheikh Noman al-Azami and Fuad Daftary Bey, Nureiddine would have conducted massacres of these communities. Both Iraqis convinced the Ottoman governor that these were loyal and hard-working communities; instead, Nureiddine relocated them from Baghdad to Mosul, hence the large Christian population now in the north.

General Townshend and General Halim Bey

Soon after the Battle of Shuaybah and the arrival of the extra division, General Barrett turned over command of the 6th (Poonah) Infantry to Major General Townshend. These extra forces would be needed to accomplish the objective of securing British gains and reinforcing oil refineries in Abadan. Townshend was ambitious and coveted the rank of lieutenant general. He also was heavily influenced by Napoleonic tactics and attempted to mirror his deployments with those of Napoleon. The Ottomans had concentrated its forces north of Kutna, under the command


of General Halim Bey, a vain man who thought he was sent to Iraq in exile, who focused on amassing wealth and neglected his command.

Battle of the Riverboats

Wardi's book discusses how General Townshend used a combination of river gunboats, 500 local Iraqi canoes, and air support combined with ground infantry, to give him envelopment options for Ottoman forces and their tribal supporters. He began his expedition northward on 31 May 1915. Each Iraqi boat contained seven troops and this flotilla would be escorted by three large river gunboats and four smaller and faster riverine gunboats. The most demoralizing aspect for the Iraqis was the three biplanes strafing and bombing their forces. Many had not seen such a device and this led to a retreat that escalated and included a route of the Ottoman forces. Townshend used this tactic to take Kutna and Amara; he had made his headquarters afloat in one of the larger river gunboats, which allowed him to survey the terrain and make amendments to his tactics. Part of his staff included the political officer, the future Sir Percy Cox, an Arabic linguist and Iraq expert, who interfaced with tribes and negotiated surrenders, as well as security arrangements for the tribes along the Tigris.

The Ottomans were expecting a ground and river advance and could have fought a delaying action while swinging 2,000 regulars, withdrawn from Arabistan, to cut off this flotilla from the remaining 15,000 British troops bringing up the rear. But the heavy concentration of British firepower from canoes, river gunboats, and biplanes simply caused panic. It helped that Ottoman leadership was incompetent and corrupt. At the time the British attempted to take Nasiriyah, the Ottoman's had a more professional soldier in command and had built dams on the Euphrates River, which caused the British flotilla delay.

Although the British took Nasiriyah, inflicting 2,000 Ottoman casualties, they suffered 500 casualties. A tactical mistake for the British was dividing its forces on the way northward toward Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, instead of concentrating its ground, air, and river forces on the Tigris River, making for Kut and then Baghdad. Although the British did secure the Tigris to provide for the defense of oil interests across the border in Persia, which was its main mission, there seemed to be an overeagerness and overconfidence to drive to Baghdad. Despite the battles of Nasiriyah and Shuaybah, British generals were overconfident from the majority of battles that were easy victories and pressed forward. It was during these battles, between April and December 1915, that Iraqi officers in Ottoman service began splitting between loyalists and a yearning for Arab nationalist movements who would defect to the British.



Map 2

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"The British were experiencing problems, despite heavy Ottoman and Iraqi casualties, and lost 1,200 men in taking Kut. In addition, they could not press their attack on fleeing Ottoman regulars for lack of adequate cavalry. The 1,200 losses were in addition to the 500 lost in the Battle of Shuaybah, plus hundreds lost to disease and dysentery."

Kurna, Amara, and Kut Fall to General Townshend (1915)

The combination of massive firepower from the canoes, the river gunboats, and planes led the Ottomans to surrender Kurna, Amara, and Kut. In taking Kut, Townshend applied the Napoleonic principle of exploiting the weakness of the Ottoman lines in an area called "al-Sin." The Ottoman defenses of Kut were split between the left and right banks of the Tigris. Townshend used his river force to hold one bank and as a diversionary attack while his main effort of a division swung wide to envelop the other bank that was diverted, believing an attack would come from the river. The British were experiencing problems, despite heavy Ottoman and Iraqi casualties, and lost 1,200 men in taking Kut. In addition, they could not press their attack on fleeing Ottoman regulars for lack of adequate cavalry. The 1,200 losses were in addition to the 500 lost in the Battle of Shuaybah, plus hundreds lost to disease and dysentery.

Power Vacuums

As tribes observed the British winning battles, the technology of their weapons, the distribution of gold, and rumors cultivated and enhanced by the British, tribesmen began switching allegiances. Among the most creative instance of disinformation was using the 30th chapter of the *Quran*, "al-Rum" (the Byzantines), to spread rumor that the fall of the Turks, called "al-Rum" in Arabic, but really meaning "Byzantines," would be defeated as ordained in the first verse of this chapter of the *Quran*, which is to say that God promised the Arabs victory over the Turks to stoke rebellion.

The Ottoman and British empires struggled over Iraq, which left a power vacuum, causing the towns of Najaf, Karbala, Hilla, and the entire middle Euphrates villages and towns to rebel against Ottoman authority and attempt to gain autonomy. This upheaval

caused struggles among townsfolk and tribes, as well as clerics and tribal elders, as to who would control the cities. Wardi's book offers details of many internal engagements, such as the Bani Hasan tribe that fought the Najafi townsfolk over control of Kufa. Of note, Percy Cox was in contact with Sheikh Muhammad Kamuna, one of the leaders of Karbala, and Hajj Atiah Qalal, who represented leaders of Najaf to cultivate their support of Britain in return for autonomy. The British understood the need to dis-aggregate tribes and Shiites from the Ottomans, to divide them and then support those seeking autonomy.

Battle of Salman Pak

This battle had an inauspicious beginning for the British, who started to make their way toward Salman Pak in October 1915, with Lord Asquith, British prime minister, declaring in November that British forces were on the outskirts of Baghdad. This particular battle is a case study in how political pressures have an adverse effect on the progress of a campaign. Throughout October, General Nixon and his political advisor, Percy Cox, were eager to take Baghdad after the multiple defeats of the Ottomans, believing that taking this city was as politically significant as taking Constantinople.

General Townshend reconnoitered the defenses around Baghdad and Salman Pak and merged it with intelligence from Aziziyah, which revealed that the Ottomans were not only reinforcing this region, but were receiving reinforcements from Anatolia (Turkey proper). In addition, the logistics tail of the British would have to extend 400 miles from Basra; unfortunately, with the Tigris receding and water levels dropping, riverboat transport and resupply were problematic. Townshend insisted that two intact divisions were needed to take and secure Baghdad. In command, General Nixon's historical role models were Nelson and Drake, and he deluded himself with the idea that a few sharp



“Maude, who was armed with adequate troops and supplies, retook Kut and pushed into Baghdad in March 1917. By November 1918, Ottoman forces split into three defensive units or fronts along the Tigris, Euphrates, and Diyala rivers, each with a division. General Maude would not see the end of this campaign; he died of cholera in November 1918.”

blows would lead to an Ottoman evacuation of Baghdad; he did not have Townshend’s Napoleonic eye. The British government was eager for a quick victory in Baghdad to boost morale for the debacle in the Dardanelles and the static war in France.

Salman Pak is located 20km south of Baghdad. The area, named after Prophet Muhammad’s companion, Salman al-Farisi (the Persian), who was reputed to be Muhammad’s barber, was nicknamed “Salman Pak” (the clean). Nureiddine made a defensive line south of Persian ruins, which were being used to house supplies that were easily transported by river and rail lines from Baghdad. Nureiddine learned from his previous encounters with the British, particularly the Battle of al-Sin, and carefully planned defenses with trenches laced with razor wire and kill zones for rifle, machine guns, and artillery. Joining Nureiddine Bey was General Khalil Bey, uncle to war minister Anwar Pasha.

Since the Ottomans chose the place of battle, they printed leaflets in Hindi and Urdu, convincing Muslims in the British army to defect to their brothers in faith and remember they are fighting near the grave of Muhammad’s companion, Salman al-Farisi. This had an impact as the 20th Punjabi Battalion, which had to be removed from the British formation because a Punjabi soldier killed a British soldier. Townshend had to forbid his troops from uttering the name “Salman Pak,” lest to rouse Muslim sentiments within the British ranks. They would refer to the area as “Ctesiphon,” site of the Persian ruins.

The 3-day battle proved to be fierce; the first day going to the British, but the remaining 2 days, which included pockets of hand-to-hand combat, went to the Ottomans. Suffering 4,500 British casualties, Townshend retreated to Kut. The exhausted Ottomans lost 9,500 out of 35,000 troops. In Kut, the Ottomans reorganized their army into two corps and laid siege to Kut; from December 1915 to April 1916, Townshend and his army were surrounded and finally forced to surrender 8,000 troops. Tribes quickly switched sides and sought to gain from the siege of Kut. It would take the British nearly a year to recover from this humiliation, which echoes in the annals of Iraq’s tragic history to this day.

Inside Kut, the British were forced to contend with the local population trapped with them, which sapped their supplies. The women of Kut were fired on when attempting to gather water; not a small number of them were killed. The Ottomans rained artillery fire on Kut, demoralizing soldiers and locals alike. T.E. Law-

rence, then a junior intelligence officer, prior to his rise to Lawrence of Arabia fame, was dispatched on a special mission to bribe Khalil Pasha to lift the siege. He was authorized to offer one-million pounds sterling, an astronomical sum in 1916. He worked through the tribes to get word to Khalil Pasha, but the mission was unsuccessful. General Maude would replace General Nixon, as he and several other British flag officers were dismissed over the ongoing siege of Kut. Maude, who was armed with adequate troops and supplies, retook Kut and pushed into Baghdad in March 1917. By November 1918, Ottoman forces split into three defensive units or fronts along the Tigris, Euphrates, and Diyala rivers, each with a division. General Maude would not see the end of this campaign; he died of cholera in November 1918.

Wardi’s book is very unique due to the details he provides on interactions between the Ottomans and British, including the clerics, tribal leaders, and intricacies of Iraqi societal structures. However, Wardi is less than generous on the tactical details, troop numbers, and detailed deployments of forces. Also, Volume IV contains virtually no maps to follow the battles. However, he more than makes up for any shortcomings with the details on how the Ottomans incited jihad, who they talked with to elicit a joint Shiite and Sunni fatwa, and the political and military affairs of the Ottoman Empire.



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This work would not have been possible without the help of Captain Eugene Smallwood for his edits and valuable comments and with the help of the John T. Hughes Library in Washington, DC.



Mobilization Training Comparisons

Security Force Brigade Combat Teams Versus Full-Spectrum Operations Brigade Combat Teams

by James D. Kennedy

Since becoming a mobilization training center, the 177th Armored Brigade and Camp Shelby have served as First Army's Center of Excellence — training both full-spectrum operations brigades and security force brigades. Full-spectrum operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations conducted in an era of persistent conflict. Security force operations include executing security operations focused at specific base security and convoy security missions, and providing security forces in a particular area of operations.

Given the changes in today's Army, it is important that all leaders, officer and enlisted alike, are knowledgeable about these two types of operations. It is equally important to understand the differences between the two when developing mobilization collective training plans; the significant differences cover two major areas — theater mission set and organizational structure.

Theater Mission Set

The theater mission set for a full-spectrum operations brigade includes controlling a 3-dimensional area of operation and the responsibility for all activities within assigned areas. The full-spectrum operations brigade is the "landowner." Security force brigades typically do not own the ground on which they operate — they coordinate and leverage the landowner's assets to operate effectively. Assets critical to a security force unit's mission, which are typically leveraged, include intelligence, air support, artillery fires, and medical evacuation.

Organizational Structure

Organizational structure is the other major difference between full-spectrum operations brigades and security force brigades. Traditional full-spectrum operations brigades consist of a brigade headquarters and five to seven subordinate battalions. Two, sometimes three, of the

battalions are combined arms battalions tasked organized with both indirect fires and support assets. With the advent of the "status of forces agreement" in Iraq, traditional field artillery battalions generally deploy in a secondary role as a security force or even a landowner unit, rather than an "indirect fires" battalion. The brigade support battalion provides logistics, maintenance, and medical assets to the brigade, and finally, a brigade troops battalion, which functions as a battalion-level headquarters for the military intelligence company, signal company, and military police platoons.

Security force brigades are generally convoy security centric with a basic building block centered on a 131-man convoy security company. Brigade and battalion headquarters generally function as a rear area operations center (RAOC) or mayor's cell, actually commanding and controlling very few of their pre-mobilization organic battalions. Typical security force

brigades are organized with two battalions to provide command and control for companies in theater. Several of the companies will detach on arrival to theater to provide convoy security operations to other diverse organizations throughout the area of operations. A security force brigade's organizational structure is driven by mission equipment lists and deployment manning documents that support the security force structure. However, convoy security companies are branch/military occupational specialty (MOS) immaterial.

Detailed, mission-oriented, collective training prepares mobilizing units to deploy, fight, and win as a team. Developing training models for both of these organizations requires a basic level of competence in the art and science of operations and battle command. The development of training models must account for the differences in both mission set and organizational structure.

Development of training models for security force units is built around mission sets, which generally include convoy security and RAOC operations based on the unit's equipment and manning. Therefore, the training model includes counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) training, gun truck crew skills training, mounted combat patrolling, urban operations, and base defense operations. Within each




Figure 1. Example training model for security force brigade.

of these models, each unit will execute warrior battle drills, which include, but are not limited to, react to ambush, react to contact, react to indirect fire, react to road-block, react to IED, and vehicle rollover drills.

U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7.0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, requires brigade level and higher organizations to train core mission essential tasks list (CMETL) until provided a directed mission essential tasks list (DMETL).¹ Below the brigade level, units will conduct a mission analysis using the brigade's CMETL to develop their METL. Critical to developing a METL is ensuring METL tasks are nested with the higher unit's METL. For example, a company METL could include deploy the force; execute convoy security operations; execute force protection operations; execute counter-IED operations; execute escalation of force operations; and sustain the force.

Developing a training model for full-spectrum operations includes application of the principles of training. Unit commanders decide which tasks are most important when developing training plans. The battle command model of understanding the operational environment, visual-

izing the requirements, deciding the tasks to be trained, and directing the training plan is a process that enables commanders to conduct critical task training to either achieve a core capability or develop proficiency in a specific unit mission.

For example, the commander, 30th Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), which trained at the National Training Center (NTC), directed urban operations as the basic building block of his mobilization training plan. All collective training models integrated combat operations in an urban environment as the centerpiece training condition. Under his guidance, from squad to platoon, urban operations live fires and collective Bradley tables XI and XII incorporated urban operations tasks in their scenarios. The 30th HBCT's mobilization training model included:

- 3 days of urban operations (platoon – company collective).
- 3 days of urban operations live fire (4-man stacks, squad, and platoon).
- 2 days of Bradley Table XI and XII live fire with dismounted platoons clearing buildings.
- 8 days of platoon and company situational training exercise (STX), integrating urban operations tasks (cordon and search, raid, and presence patrols in villages).
- 7-day mission rehearsal exercise (battalion – platoon level).

Unlike security force brigades, full-spectrum operations brigades' mobilization plans include a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE), which is executed at one of the Army's combat training centers (CTC) — either the Joint Readiness Training Center or National Training Center. Security force brigades execute an MRE at their mobilization training center where conditions closely mirror the intensity and duration of a CTC MRE.

Following the principle “train as we fight,” the 177th Armored Brigade trains soldiers and units daily in individual and collective tasks under challenging, realistic conditions. Training models are enhanced by the use of training enhancements, which include, but are not limited to, mock IED devices, which replicate specific current theater enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures; the latest intelligence and logistics systems; and through use of civilians as battlefield role players.

Since early FY09, the 177th Armored Brigade has trained the 56th Stryker Bri-



“Developing a training model for full-spectrum operations includes application of the principles of training. Unit commanders decide which tasks are most important when developing training plans. The battle command model of understanding the operational environment, visualizing the requirements, deciding the tasks to be trained, and directing the training plan is a process that enables commanders to conduct critical task training to either achieve a core capability or develop proficiency in a specific unit mission.”

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gade Combat Team, Pennsylvania Army National Guard and the 30th HBCT, North Carolina Army National Guard how to conduct full-spectrum operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Currently, the 177th is planning mobilization training for security force battalions from the 48th BCT, Georgia Army National Guard, which will deploy to Afghanistan and the 155th BCT, Mississippi Army National Guard, which will deploy to Iraq.

As these forces transition, the 177th Armored Brigade and Camp Shelby Joint

Forces Training Center will continue to develop training models that recognize the difference between security force and full-spectrum operations. Concurrently, we will train units to sustain offensive and defensive skills while they simultaneously adapt to changes in the operational environment.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7.0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008.

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ELVIS AND UNIT DESIGNATIONS

by Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr., U.S. Army, Retired

Elvis Presley would turn over in his grave if he knew that 1st Battalion, 32d Armor, the tank unit he served in Friedberg, Germany, was now the 1st Squadron, 32d Cavalry. How could the armored battalion he made so famous on the front line of freedom during the Cold War have lost its tank designation and be assigned, of all places, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky? The 32d Cavalry is not even assigned to an armored division. During World War II, it was an armored regiment in the Spearhead (3d) Armored Division; it is now a unit in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).

Elvis and Armor

The connection between Elvis and the 32d Armor goes back to the late 1950s when Elvis was first assigned to Company A, 1st Medium Tank Battalion, 32d Armor. The battalion was stationed at Ray Barracks on the outskirts of Friedberg, Hessen, north of Frankfurt-am-Main, in Germany. The kaserne became the focal point for the Elvis Presley fan club, which still thrives today. Until 2008, there remained an American presence at the small post with its very restricted nearby maneuver area. The barracks was last occupied by elements of the 1st Armored Division, which are in the process of returning to the United States.

Why Ray Barracks was not closed years ago is conjectural; perhaps it was politically incorrect to close (until the last moment)

the one remaining vestige of Elvis' military service presence overseas. Economics, policy, transformation notwithstanding, was it that Elvis *must* still live in Germany today?

In actual fact, since most of Fort Campbell is located outside Clarksville, Tennessee, and Elvis is buried in Memphis, Tennessee, perhaps it is appropriate that the 1st Squadron, 32d Cavalry be assigned to the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell. Because Elvis spent most of his service time in Germany as platoon leader of the battalion's scout platoon (read *cavalry* platoon), is it not good reason that, as a former cavalryman in a tank unit, he be honored by having an appropriately designated cavalry unit stationed on his former stomping grounds?

Cavalry and Armor

It would seem that Elvis and the redesignation of the 32d Armor Regiment should really be of no significance; in fact, I would hope that there is none. But the unit redesignation, Elvis aside, does emphasize a point about armor and cavalry unit designations in a post-transformation army. But how are unit designations, such as 32d Cavalry, 33d Cavalry, 40th Cavalry, 61st Cavalry, 71st Cavalry, 73d Cavalry, 75th Cavalry, 89th Cavalry, and 91st Cavalry, determined? An inquiry to an appropriate authority revealed some very interesting information regarding the reasoning behind the redesignation process.

The 32d and 33d Cavalry Squadrons obviously allow the regimental designations of the now-inactive 3d Armored Division to remain "alive." But why could they not have at least remained tank battalions and their flags replace the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 81st Armor at Fort Knox? In 1963, one of the Armor School's supporting tank battalions was the 5th Battalion, 33d Armored Regiment, assigned to the 194th Armored Brigade. Is there good reason why the 33d Armor could not return to Fort Knox where new armored troopers could be associated with a battle-proven World War II regiment?

The 40th Cavalry derives its designation from the 4th Armor Regiment when it was constituted on 13 January 1941 and assigned to the 3d Armored Division. The regiment was redesignated as the 40th Armored Regiment on 15 April 1941. The 73d Cavalry retains the connection of the 1st Battalion, 73d Armor with the 82d Airborne Division. Anyone need replacement flags in the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) for the 32d and 33d Cavalry? Why not the 6th and 7th Squadrons of the 73d Cavalry Regiment? After all, the airborne/airmobile connection is still very strong. Let it be still stronger.

Why Not a 26th Cavalry?

Before we come to strange new unit designations, let us consider one famous cavalry regiment, the memory of which deserves to be perpetuated — the 26th Cavalry Regiment (horse) (Philippine scouts). The regiment was organized in 1922 with Regular Army officers and Filipino enlisted men. Horse mounted, the regiment was stationed north of Manila on the island of Luzon at Fort Stotsenburg.

The day following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the regiment deployed to positions on the Bamban River located close to the fort. On 21 December 1941, the troopers screened the right flank of the North Luzon Force, while the regiment fought delaying actions, covering the withdrawal of the Philippine 71st Infantry Division. It contested the Japanese advance from the town of Damortis, on the Lingayen Gulf, to Tayug in mounted combat — the last U.S. Army cavalry organization to fight on horseback.

At the beginning of January 1942, the regiment was forced to destroy its horses and withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula where the troopers fought on foot. The regiment was not reconstituted after the Philippine islands were lost in 1942. Certainly, its gallant action during the first days of the war in the Pacific earned the 26th Cavalry recognition when the post transformation designations were formulated.

The 899th Destroyer Battalion to Cavalry

The 89th Cavalry Regiment supposedly perpetuates the heritage of the 899th Tank Destroyer Regiment, the highest numerical designation for a World War II tank destroyer battalion. It appears, according to records in the National Archives, that during World War II, the 899th was also the highest designation for any tank destroyer unit, be it brigade, group, or battal-


ion (there were no regiments). It would seem a little difficult to pull the middle "9" out of the 899th to fit it into the cavalry lineage, but there was really no need to do that.

Actually, the 89th *could* trace its lineage back to the 89th Tank Battalion, a non-combat arms regimental system (CARS) organization, which was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War. The battalion, consisting of one company of M26 Pershing tanks and three companies of M4A3 Sherman tanks, was commanded in 1950 by Lieutenant Colonel Welborn G. Dolvin, who went on to become a lieutenant general and led the 191st Tank Battalion during World War II in support of the 45th Infantry Division.

Instead, the 89th Cavalry Regiment's two squadrons, now assigned to the 10th Mountain Division, trace their heritage back to the 2d Armored Regiment, connected through CARS to the 2d Armored Cavalry (now the 2d SBCT in Germany/Iraq). When the 2d Armored Regiment disbanded on 9 October 1943, the regiment's reconnaissance company was redesignated D Troop, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), with separate lineage. So the 89th Cavalry should trace its lineage, and source of designation, back to the 2d Cavalry, not the 899th Tank Destroyer Regiment.

The 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, nevertheless, is a unit well worth commemorating. It participated, at great cost, in the first and only battle where tank destroyer doctrine was executed as prescribed. In combat, near El Guettar in Tunisia during March 1943, a company of the 899th, along with the 601st Tank De-

"Before we come to strange new unit designations, let us consider one famous cavalry regiment, the memory of which deserves to be perpetuated — the 26th Cavalry Regiment (horse) (Philippine scouts). The regiment was organized in 1922 with Regular Army officers and Filipino enlisted men. Horse mounted, the regiment was stationed north of Manila on the island of Luzon at Fort Stotsenburg."



stroyer Battalion, the former armed with M10 tank destroyers, and the latter with M3s with 75mm guns mounted on half-tracks, fought the German 10th Panzer Division, using “aggressive fire and maneuver tactics.” The Germans lost some 50 tanks, but the company of the 899th lost seven of its twelve M10s.

The 899th also had the unique distinction of landing elements on Utah Beach on 6 June 1944. Attached to the 4th Infantry Division, A Company screened the left flank of the 22d Infantry Regiment as infantrymen sought to expand the beachhead from 6 to 9 June 1944. Alas, the official U.S. Army history, *Cross Channel Attack*, cites the battalion as the 899th Tank Battalion, not the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion. If that’s not bad enough, the situation map accompanying the text shows a symbol for the 889th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The battalion is not mentioned in *Breakout and Pursuit*, and was mentioned only once in *The Siegfried Line Campaign*, where a member was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for rescuing soldiers from burning tank destroyers. The battalion was in support of the 47th Infantry Regiment and attached to the 1st Infantry Division on 19 November 1944 during the Siegfried Line Campaign.

The 901st Tank Destroyer Regiment

The 91st Cavalry is especially mysterious — is it a descendant of the 901st Tank Destroyer Regiment? The 173d Airborne stationed at Camp Ederle, Vicenza, Italy, has assigned to it the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry; where did they get this designation and what is its lineage?

In Vietnam, the 173d Airborne Brigade had E Troop, 17th Cavalry, assigned to it. The 17th Cavalry is a CARS regiment and its lineage dates back to 1 July 1916, when it was constituted and organized at Fort Bliss, Texas. E Troop was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade on 26 March 1963 and activated that same year on 25 June in Okinawa. The troop fought as a component of the 173d throughout its deployment in the Republic of Vietnam, but lost its affiliation after the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. Nevertheless, historically, it would seem appropriate that in the post-transformation stage of the U.S. Army’s development, that a squadron of the 17th Cavalry should once again be a component of the 173d. There would be no need to organize a new regiment without CARS lineage.

So why, once again, did the 17th Cavalry not become a component of the 173d Airborne Brigade? There is no description of a 91st Cavalry Squadron or regiment in the *Army Lineage Series, Armor-Cavalry Part I*. Inquiry reveals that the basis for the designation was the adoption of the supposed lineage of the 901st Tank Destroyer Regiment (an organization that never existed). It appears that the numeric was collapsed from 901st to 91st, which makes for a tidy designation, but worthy of consideration for inclusion in the U.S. Army’s armor/cavalry lineage?

But wait, further investigation reveals that during World War II, there was a 91st Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized). Interestingly, in the summer of 1945, after the war in Europe ended, the squadron was located at Barbarano Vicentino, just a few miles south of Vicenza, Italy. This unit was not incorporated into the CARS. Perhaps the 173d Cavalry’s current location is the reason for designating its cavalry squadron the 91st, which is possible, especially if one looks askance at the 901st Tank Destroyer explanation. One can readily accept that the present-day squadron can trace its heritage back to a distinguished squadron that fought in World War II. At the same time, the 91st Cavalry, as an integral part of the present-day 173d Airborne Brigade, appears to be a good fit.

On 3 January 1941, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion was organized at Fort Bliss, Texas. On 8 May 1941, the battalion became the World War II 91st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), also at Fort Bliss, Texas. It was never assigned to a division or cavalry group; it served its entire time in the Mediterranean theater of operations where it participated in six campaigns. One of its troops was the first allied unit to meet up with American and British forces, breaking out of the Anzio beachhead on 23 May 1944. It ended the war sweeping into north Italian cities such as Verona (a short distance from Vicenza), Milan, and Turin.

At this point, we are left to find plausible explanations for the 61st, 71st, and 75th Cavalry Regiment squadrons. According to the Center of Military History sources, the 61st, 71st, and 75th Cavalry regiments all emanate from the 601st, 701st, and 705th Tank Destroyer Regiments, respectively. It certainly was easy enough to eliminate the “zeroes” and come up with three new cavalry regiments without any CARS lineage; there are still established regiments with squadrons that could be activated. Based on the assumption that each cavalry regiment can have up to twelve squadrons as part of its lineage, then it should be possible to designate the present day 61st, 71st, and 75th as squadrons of those already CARS-established regiments. There has to be a legitimate reason otherwise.

We’ll take a brief look at the three tank destroyer *battalions*, all of which were organized during World War II, fought in the Mediterranean theater of operations or the European theater of operations, or both, and were disbanded after the war along with the Tank Destroyer Command and all tank destroyer units.

The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion to Cavalry

The 601st was organized at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, on 16 December 1941, as a towed tank destroyer battalion. In 1942, the battalion received the M3 tank destroyers (half-tracks with mounted 75mm cannon) and became a self-propelled formation. It landed in North Africa in French Morocco on D-Day, 8 November 1942, as part of then Major General George S. Patton’s Western Task Force. The 601st subsequently fought the Germans in Tunisia. Among its battles in North Africa was El Guettar where, on attachment to the 1st Infantry Division, it helped blunt a counterattack by the 10th Panzer Division. Along with a company of the 899th, the battalion knocked out more than 50 German tanks, but suffered grievously in losing 20 out of 28 of its M3s.

The 601st compiled a very extensive combat record. It participated in the Sicily campaign and landed on D-Day, 9 September 1943, in the afternoon on Red Beach, Salerno, Italy. In the violent combat to follow, the tank destroyers supported the 36th Infantry Division’s 141st Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of the Sele River. In the advance up the Italian boot, the battalion was designated to participate in the crossing of the Volturno River with waterproofed vehicles.

It seems the 601st was a tank destroyer unit of choice because it also fought at Anzio beachhead. In the 23 May 1944 battle for the battered Italian town of Cisterna, its tank destroyers supported Company A, 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division. Breaking out of the Anzio beachhead, the battalion added the campaign streamer Rome-Arno to its colors. The 601st added another beachhead to its history when it participated in the landing in southern France, still attached to the 3d Infantry Division, on 15 July 1944.

Driving up the Rhône Valley, the 601st remained with the 3d Infantry Division until the end of the war. It participated in the Ardennes-Alsace campaign and then fought in Germany in the Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns. No doubt, the 601st earned a place in history, but as a truncated 61st Cavalry? It is

not easy to make the connection, no matter how good intentioned it might be.

The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion to 71st Cavalry

The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion was organized on 15 December 1941 at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and armed with the M3 half-track mounted 75mm cannon. The battalion's Company C landed at Mersa bou Zedjar in Algeria, with the western most task force (TF), TF Green, of Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, under the command of Colonel Paul Robinett, on 8 November 1942. A reinforced platoon of Company B, having landed as part of TF Red, participated in the "flying column," led by Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, to capture the key airfields at Tarraraoui and La Senia outside Oran, Algeria. The first time the battalion saw combat, however, was reputedly on 22 November during the race into Tunisia when the Allies were attempting to capture Tunis before the Germans could reinforce their forces there.

The battalion was badly beaten up in combat in North Africa; our P38 fighter aircraft attacked Company C outside Medjez el Bab, Tunisia, on 25 and 26 November, killing five soldiers and wounding sixteen more. On 11 December, Company C claimed it destroyed ten German medium tanks around Medjez el Bab, but was put out of action by elements of the Fifth Panzer Army. On 30 January 1943, Company A, as an element of the 1st Armored Division's Combat Command A, was driven off by the German 21st Panzer Division at the Faïd Pass. The next day, however, the company turned around and participated in an unsuccessful attack to relieve American forces at the same Faïd Pass.

Things went a little better on 3 February when reconnaissance elements of the battalion got to within six miles of the town of Maknassy in southern Tunisia. On 14 February, Company A was again in action when a 'heavy' platoon of the company took part in the battle for Sidi Bou Zid. The next day, the battalion, minus Companies A and C, participated in a successful counterattack against the same town. Throughout its combat in North Africa, the battalion, as did many of American armored forces, fought in fragmented pieces, often with platoons operating individually in coordination with other American troops.

The 701st Battalion's next stop was Italy, where, now equipped with the full-tracked M10 tank destroyer, it landed on 29 October 1943, but saw no offensive action until the spring of 1944 when it participated in the advance on Rome. Attached to Task Force Howze of the 1st Armored Division, Company B, assembled on 25 May, 3 days after the attack began at the Anzio beachhead, began to advance on the road junction at Giulianello. The battalion subsequently advanced on Rome and beyond, to be stopped at the German Gothic Line, along with the rest of the allied advance. Finally, on 14 April 1945, tank destroyers from the 701st supported the attack of the 10th Mountain Division into the Po Valley. The area in which the battalion's M10s operated was so heavily mined that it was impossible for the tank destroyers to stay close to the attacking mountain troops. As was often the case, the tank destroyers were employed in indirect firing missions or destruction of fixed enemy positions.



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The Germans did not have many tanks to serve as targets in Italy, where little "tank country" was to be found until the Po River Valley was reached. Then the German resistance was swiftly overcome, but there were so few tanks to be found as targets. So much for the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, a unit worthy of continued recognition, but as the 71st Cavalry; why not give the battalion its due as the 701st Cavalry?

The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion to 75th Cavalry

The third tank destroyer unit under consideration, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion was also organized at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 15 December 1941, but before it landed in France on 17 July 1944, it was equipped with the M18 "Hellcat" tank destroyer. The M18 went into battle with a new long barreled 76mm gun "...which would permit a duel on equal terms with most of the German tanks," according to the official U.S. Army History, the Center of Military History's *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*.

The battalion first gained recognition, along with the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, which was part of Task Force A, commanded by Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest, in its swift advance along the north coast of Brittany on the breakout of the Third U.S. Army from the Cotentin Peninsula. Headed for the heavily defended French port city of Brest, the battalion joined Task Force B, commanded by Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet, in the port's siege. On 21 August 1944, the battalion participated in destroying pillboxes and emplacements as it helped to isolate Brest and its strong garrison.

After the capture of Brest in early September, the 705th, now part of Ninth U.S. Army, moved into Luxembourg, and on 8 November, deployed north to join the north flank of 12th U.S. Army Group. At the beginning



"The third tank destroyer unit under consideration, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion was also organized at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 15 December 1941, but before it landed in France on 17 July 1944, it was equipped with the M18 "Hellcat" tank destroyer. The M18 went into battle with a new long barreled 76mm gun "...which would permit a duel on equal terms with most of the German tanks..."

of the Battle of the Bulge on 18 December, Lieutenant General William H. Simpson dispatched the 705th south to support the deploying 101st Airborne Division, which was moving into Bastogne. It was here that the battalion was attached to the airborne division, and along with combat commands of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, won eternal fame.

En route to Bastogne, the battalion skirted the German advance, leaving two platoons (some eight tank destroyers) to protect the unit's trains at the Ortheuville bridge site in Belgium. Most of the 705th closed in an assembly area near Bastogne by the night of 19 December. But almost immediately, a platoon went into combat as part of a counterattack force, consisting primarily of the 1st Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Team Desobry of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, was in a stubborn fight for the Belgian town of Noville. While in the process of trying to keep from being wiped out by an overwhelming force of German armor and infantry, the team blocked a key road into Bastogne. Two tank destroyers deployed south of the village on the flank of the German advance, and in the process, destroyed five German tanks at a range of some 1,500 yards.

The counterattacking force was badly shot up, but Team Desobry managed to hold on. The next day, on the 20th, a second platoon of tank destroyers was sent to Noville with another counterattacking force of paratroopers. When eight Sherman tanks in Noville ran out of armor-piercing ammunition with six German Panzers closing in, the tank destroyers broke up the German attack. Finally forced to withdraw from Noville with heavy losses, the tank destroyers pulled back into the Bastogne perimeter.

Other action before the German's final attempt to wipe out the Americans in Bastogne included stopping an attack on the nearby town of Neffe. When an American patrol discovered an evolving attack on the town, U.S. tank destroyer gunners and paratroopers gave the 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiment a severe beating. Employing ground flares to aim on, the tank destroyers destroyed three German tanks reinforcing the enemy attack. Such initiative was not uncommon in the defense of Bastogne. As the U.S. Army official history states, "A very heartening addition to the Bastogne force, of course, was provided by the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion."

On 24 December, before a violent attack on the western sector of the 101st perimeter defense, the 101st Airborne Division operations officer redistributed the tank destroyers in platoon packets among the paratroop and glider infantry units. The 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) got one platoon, the 506th PIR received two platoons, and the 502d PIR got two platoons, while the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment (GIR) received four platoons, which was equivalent to a reinforced tank destroyer company. The distribution proved fortuitous because on Christmas Day, a combined German tank-infantry force penetrated the sector of the 1st Battalion, 327th GIR. Two of the 705th's Company B tank destroyers were knocked out by the attacking enemy.

Help, however, came swiftly from the nearby 502d PIR sector as two tank destroyers of the 705th, backing up Company C, 502d PIR, destroyed three German Panzers while paratroop bazookas got two more. Then a combination of four 705th tank destroyers, Sherman tanks, and 463d Parachute Artillery Battalion cannon, along with paratroopers of the 327th counterattacked and eliminated most of the 1st Battalion, 115th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. This German attack was the last serious attempt to destroy the American force in and around Bastogne. For all intents and purposes, the siege was lifted the day after Christmas when advanced elements of the 4th Armored Division made its appearance southwest of Bastogne.

The 705th fought the battle for Bastogne in such a manner as to retain its tactical identity. Frequent detachment of tank destroy-

er packets to units of various sizes was normal throughout World War II. It was also normal to see one or more tank destroyer battalions attached to infantry and even armor divisions. But then it was not uncommon to see a tank destroyer company placed in support of an infantry regiment with the battalion headquarters reporting directly to the division.

The gallant stand at Bastogne of the 101st Division, supported by armor and tank destroyer units, such as the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, remains one of the salient memorable actions during the Battle of the Bulge. Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe's "Nuts" answer to a German demand for surrender is now one of the most famous words in American military history. The 705th shares credit for the defeat of the enemy at Bastogne. Is this the reason the battalion was chosen to have its heritage be the basis for the 75th Cavalry?

A Bottom Line

The fact that 601st, 701st, 705th, and 899th World War II tank destroyer battalions deserve to have their heritage designations reincarnated is legitimate. The idea that they should become two-digit cavalry squadrons, however, seems at best to be a half-measure effort. It's better to preserve the tank destroyer battalion numerical designation and have them become cavalry regiments. If the 1st Battalion, 32d Armor can become the 1st Squadron, 32d Cavalry, there is no reason why the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion cannot become the 1st Squadron, 601st Cavalry, which suits its true historical lineage.

Elvis, when he entered the U.S. Army, did his basic and advanced armor training at Fort Knox, Kentucky. This is where he began his 2-year association with the arm of decision. While Elvis probably never gave it a thought, would he not have approved of the 6th Battalion, 32d Armor Regiment — his regiment — being activated on 22 June 1966 and serving at Fort Knox, Kentucky, bringing Elvis and unit designations full circle in this post-transformation age.

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Brigadier General Raymond E. Bell Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, is a 1957 graduate of the United States Military Academy. He received an M.A. from Middlebury College and a Ph.D. from New York University. His military education includes the U.S. Army War College and the National War College. As an armor officer, he served in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, 32d Armor, 15th Armor in Korea, and 5th Cavalry in Vietnam. His last two assignments included the U.S. Army Reserve's 5th Psychological Operations Group and its 220th Military Police Brigade.

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The Fundamentals of a Light Reconnaissance Squadron's Targeting Methodology

by Captain Heriberto Perez-Rivera

Foreword — The Concept

Developing, and then articulating, your unit's targeting process can prove very difficult, particularly in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment where situational understanding can only be achieved in small measure. Many units tackle the targeting challenge by building informational tools that provide the commander data, with the goal of defining the problem. In most cases, these tools attempt to narrow the scope of the problem within the unit's operational environment to a problem statement — occasionally burdened with preconceived ideas about the nature of the problem. This method relies heavily on technical data, such as signals intelligence and substantial amounts of information, derived through different sources with varying levels of reliability. The commander or his representative then absorbs all of this information, and based on his knowledge, experience, and resources, defines the problem. Once the problem is defined, it is broken into several different components along lines of effort or operation. Our squadron targeting methodology evolved toward a different approach, adopted from several different doctrinal theories.

System of system analysis (SoSA), as defined by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC), Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 4, Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment, attempts to identify, analyze, and relate the goals and objectives, organization, dependencies and interdependencies, external influences,

strengths, vulnerabilities, and other aspects of the various systems. Using SoSA, we determined the most effective way to effect change in these systems using the integrated lines of effort as tools. Our input into these systems, in many cases, caused individual nefarious actors to rise above the 'line of detection.' Essentially, we used the effects-based operations methodology with its key components of knowledge superiority, an effects-based planning process, dynamic and adaptive execution, and accurate, timely effects assessment.

This article details the remaining steps of "one way" to conduct targeting at the battalion and perhaps brigade combat team (BCT) level. This method evolved over the course of about 6 months, and we acknowledge that it would be a challenge to create in a human intelligence (HUMINT) dry operating environment. The results following this shift to our targeting approach were encouraging; within 3 months, we increased our HUMINT-driven detentions by 33 percent and signal intelligence (SIGINT) by 70 percent. Most importantly, the evidence we collected against our detainees was sufficient enough to detain them at a rate of 85 percent, a number that will be difficult to achieve even in the current warrant-based targeting environment now required in Iraq.

— Major Carter Price
S3 Operations Officer
1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry

Organizing and Resourcing

In Northwest Baghdad, our unit found itself among strangers in a strange land with complex problems to solve with Iraqi partners. It was clear that with the absence of effective security arrangements, the insurgent networks increased their power and visibility on the streets of Ghazaliyah, Jowadeen, Rhamaniya, and Katieb. The presence of these insurgent cells testified powerfully to the inability of the Iraqi government to guarantee the personal safety of its citizens.

We noted that these insurgent networks were splintered along lines of turf, sectarianism, and ideology, thus making them less responsive to the political guidance of their leader or associates within the government. Mahdi and Sunni extremist insurgents were overtly organized and legitimized along sectarian lines. While we recognize that in a COIN environment these variables may not be the most important things, we aligned our units along specific problem sets delineated by sect, demographic, and insurgent affiliation to best affect the population and attack enemy networks. These separate problem sets called for the development of nuanced plans to target individuals and behaviors within the distinct operational environments.

Toward our northern boundary, B and C Troops fought Mahdi extremist insurgents and witnessed the Shia majority consolidate its political and economic gains to influence the government. Along our southern boundary, A Troop targeted the Sunni extremist insurgency and actions of al-Qaeda terrorists bent on regaining lost power and spreading global jihad. This alignment focused and synchronized our unit's efforts to lethally and nonlethally target networks offering both 'sticks and carrots.' As a result, organizing the unit boundaries in this way addressed not only the insurgency, but also sectarianism and Iraqi government efforts to gain legitimacy and support from its people. Once the boundaries were established, each of our units inherently knew that human interface was required to develop the common operating picture and situation. To this end, HUMINT is the most critical element to targeting insurgent cells and setting the conditions to meet the commander's intent.

We also learned over time three essential ways to break a network insurgency: empower and resource our troop and company intelligence support teams with generous access to intelligence databases to facilitate finding the right evidence or re-

port for target nomination; stage the time-sensitive targeting terminal guidance team at the joint security station (JSS) or with a recon patrol to optimize the reaction time to a target's established patterns of life; and work closely with troop intelligence support teams in preparing a troop-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan to improve surveillance on targeting objectives for that week. To this end, with the support from our brigade, we task organized one HUMINT team member to each commander. The combination of establishing optimal unit boundaries, resourcing company/troop-level intelligence support teams with intelligence tools, positioning terminal guidance teams near a target's established patterns of life, and task organizing HUMINT collection team members to support troop commanders, set the stage for our targeting successes.

The Right Forum to Solve Problems

The fundamental approach to COIN is recognizing that the people are the decisive terrain. We also realize that through human interface, or chai tea key leader engagements, we achieve a range of targeting objectives, from information gathering to changing behavior. A significant challenge is developing and maintaining a system to record engagements and patrol reports that can be quickly filtered into useful information. We used several

methods, some more successful than others, in capturing information, and ultimately decided that nothing beats face-to-face meetings between the staff and unit commanders.

Inherently recognizing that the majority of information needed to make decisions about targeting and applying resources was found at the troop/company level, our squadron targeting cell adopted a collaborative method to achieve the commander's intent — an intelligence targeting "round robin." While not easily achieved during split based operations, we found the targeting round robin particularly enlightening and force enabling. Each week, the squadron S2 and fire support officer (FSO), and on occasion, the assistant squadron S3, law enforcement officer, and civil affairs officer, met with the troop/company commanders and intelligence support teams at their joint security stations to conduct a pre-targeting meeting to discuss developing intelligence, potential targets, and community projects. This forum allowed the staff to work closely with the troop/company commanders to synchronize, prioritize, and achieve a unity of effort that met the commander's intent.

While we recognize that face-to-face interaction will not be possible in every case, this forum allows leaders to ask questions or present ideas not fully formed without



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“The fundamental approach to COIN is recognizing that the people are the decisive terrain. We also realize that through human interface, or chai tea key leader engagements, we achieve a range of targeting objectives, from information gathering to changing behavior.”

the concern of transmitting a less-than-perfect script over the radio or an under-appreciated slide over internet-based communications software. For the squadron, this weekly round robin was the essential input component to the operational battle rhythm. This small detail enabled the relevant depth of understanding required to appropriately glean motivations and operating environment relevance. Armed with this context, we then synchronized lines of effort (LOE) to address the operating environment problem sets, instead of identifying the problems within a LOE. This subtle, but important, distinction allowed the targeting team to methodically solve problems and identify achievable benchmarks.

Critical Node Targeting

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we learned that effectively targeting insurgents requires an understanding of the critical nodes of each insurgent network. Historically, critical node analysis was part of the targeting process used by the Strategic Air Command for strategic nuclear war focusing on Soviet communications in the 1960s.¹ To defeat the networks, we sought to find their most vulnerable points. By targeting these vulnerable critical nodes instead of a perceived leader, we had a greater disruptive effect

on insurgent networks because nodes, such as weapons suppliers or technical experts, have rare skills invaluable to the network. For example, in June 2008, we noted that there were many brigade- and

division-level resources, such as propaganda, analytical expertise, or intelligence assets, focused on targeting cell leaders. Over time, these high-value targets (HVTs) gained a bit of inadvertent




Figure 1

notoriety among local Iraqis as a result of such targeting and propaganda. Many of these leaders established low signature patterns of life, making them extremely resource intensive to detain, or they simply went into exile.

Meanwhile, attacks continued and, in an effort to garner higher echelon resources to apply against accessible targets within the squadron operating environment, we targeted key logistics nodes or second-tier cell members who were linked to the insurgent leaders on the HVT list (HVTL). The results were convincing. Such detentions had a greater disruptive effect in the squadron operating environment, as evidenced by more than 90 days of no improvised explosive device (IED) attacks along our northern area of operation. This not only affirms the comprehensive strategy that Martin J. Muckian argues in his article “Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary,” but also resulted in gaining more resources from our higher echelons and caused key leaders to break above the line of detection as they sought to re-establish control of the disrupted insurgent network.² The disrupted state of this insurgent network, coupled with key leaders’ attempts to regain a foothold, provided us with a window of opportunity to target the key leader and insurgent network with nonlethal information operations and propaganda. Naturally, a new challenge appeared — how to organize these critical nodes.

Prioritizing Critical Nodes

Whether it was a walk-in to the joint security station or an insurgent cell member, we were constantly seeking to identify what motivated an informant’s and/or target’s behavior, which helped identify resources and tools we could use to affect the population and attack enemy networks. We used both lethal and non-lethal resources to create conditions that would result in a target’s detention or reconciliation, and/or improve the stakes in favor of the Iraqi population and the community. The squadron targeting cell, consisting of the S2, assistant S3, FSO, law enforcement officer, and civil affairs officer, used tiers as a method of prioritizing targets and priorities of efforts for a given week. This served to focus efforts and synchronize all available resources to accomplish the commander’s intent. See Figures 1, 2, and 3 for examples of the squadron targeting meeting slides.

Within our weekly targeting meetings and face-to-face dialogues with the troop and company intelligence support cells, we examined an individual target’s motivations and contrasted that with the individual’s activities. Based on some of these factors, an individual was, for example, labeled as “logistics tier two” or “technical expert tier one.” This method, though




Figure 2




Figure 3

Author’s note: Examples of the regiment’s targeting decision brief are available at AKO-S Knowledge Center at <http://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/1166906> or AKO Knowledge Center <https://www.us.army.mil/suite/kc/16926375/>.

not novel, allowed us to identify if networks or targets were criminals simply motivated by money and illegitimate power; political figures motivated by political ideology and legitimate power; or hardcore terrorist motivated by a profound religious ideal or cause. By examining each target and his sphere of influence, our troops added certain adeptness to their tactical targeting by assisting the FSO in recommending and designing posters announcing a target's violent plans in an effort to change the target's behavior and motivations. Finally, referring to the well-known criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability, symbolism, historical significance, and political significance (CARVERSHP) method of targeting, we noted that the squadron could have the most-wanted terrorist in Iraq listed first on the HVTL, but if he's not accessible, it is not prudent to exhaust unit resources attempting to detain this target. Though we applied all aspects of CARVERSHP, accessibility was the one principle that our squadron/troop/company targeting team

members most stressed in our patrol, HUMINT, and SIGINT priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

Fundamentally, any successes 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, enjoyed in northwest Baghdad was a result of imaginative responsibility sharing within the unit, a willingness to more thoroughly analyze insurgent targets through collaboration, and a commitment to the efficient use of resources. By enhancing the capabilities at troop level and recognizing that the threat was not solely "terrorists," we realigned our existing resources to accurately identify, track, and eliminate individuals and organizations detrimental to security. Furthermore, by fully integrating the fundamentals of ISR, such as HUMINT collection, state-of-the art SIGINT targeting, and cultural engagement, into our tactical operations, we were able to identify and neutralize ineffective efforts and adapt them to environmental necessity. While conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to evolve, we believe that some of the approaches discussed in this

article will apply within COIN targeting, regardless of theater.




Notes

¹Bruce D. Berkowitz, *The New Face of War*, Simon and Schuster, 2003, p. 57.

²Martin J. Muckian, "Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies: Adapting to the New Adversary," *Parameters*, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Winter 2006-07.

Captain Heriberto Perez-Rivera is currently serving as S2, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. He received a B.A. from Augusta State University. His military education includes the Military Intelligence (MI) Captain Career Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S2, 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne (Air Assault), Fort Campbell; commander, B Company, 344th MI Battalion (Signals Intelligence), 111th MI Brigade, Fort Huachuca, AZ; assistant S3, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 201st MI Battalion (Signals Intelligence), 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA; and platoon leader, A Company, 201st MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon.



"Fundamentally, any successes 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment, enjoyed in northwest Baghdad was a result of imaginative responsibility sharing within the unit, a willingness to more thoroughly analyze insurgent targets through collaboration, and a commitment to the efficient use of resources."

REVIEWS

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 by Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 2006, 586 pp., \$51.50 (paperback)

They that dig foundations deep, fit for realms to rise upon, little honor do they reap of their generation, any more than mountains gain stature till we reach the plain.

— *The Pro-Consuls* by Rudyard Kipling

U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 is the second of two books written by U.S. Army historian Andrew J. Birtle. His first book of a similar title covered Army counterinsurgency operations from 1860 to 1941, a period of time spanning from the Civil War through the Philippine Insurrections at the beginning of the 20th century. In his latest work, Birtle describes how the Army developed counterinsurgency doctrine, which today influences both military and political leaders addressing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Following World War II, the U.S. Army had all but forgotten many of the lessons learned from the late 19th- and early 20th-century operations against insurgent enemies such as the Klu Klux Klan, Plains Indians, Mexican bandits, Filipino rebels, and Moro tribesmen. Many junior officers, including John J. Pershing, George S. Patton, and Douglas MacArthur, who fought these battles, went on to command great armies during World War I and II. These two wars, fought on a conventional scale never before seen in human history, convinced military planners that counterinsurgency operations were outdated and had little place on the modern *atomic* battlefield. However, events in China, Greece, Malaysia, Indochina, and Korea challenged conventional wisdom.

As the realities of nationalism and communism blended together under the leadership of names, such as Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Guevara, U.S. Army leaders and doctrine writers were forced to relearn lessons the old Army learned in previous generations, or adapt atomic battlefield doctrine to meet the threats faced in the latter half of the 20th century. Andrew Birtle paints a picture of the Army's successes and failures in dealing with these challenges. His book guides the reader through counterinsurgency experiences in the late 1940s and '50s and explains how these events influenced the development of strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine. He also shows how political theories and social engineering, overlaid on Army doctrine, created a conundrum for officers of the George Marshall mold who were apolitical in their thinking.

Birtle shows how, by the early 1960s, both the Army and U.S. political leaders had begun to cloak themselves in the counterinsurgency fashions of the day. While many of these principles were the same, which successfully al-

lowed the Army to deal with small wars of the past, political infighting, intuitional inertia, conceptual confusion, and cultural arrogance, they often proved counterproductive. This is especially true in Southeast Asia, where the Cold War was played out in the jungles and cities of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Ultimately, like passing fads of the 1960's generation, counterinsurgency doctrine and thinking gave way to realities of the European-focused Cold War and the nuclear arms race.

The application of Army counterinsurgency doctrine had mixed results in Indochina, but continues to have a lasting impact on today's counterinsurgency operating environment. Many of the principles contained in U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, published last year, reflect the doctrine of a previous generation. *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976* provides current military planners with much needed insights and examples of how to employ and develop counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures. Like any good historical survey, both volumes of *Counterinsurgency* are more descriptive than prescriptive. Nevertheless, they are useful for planners and many will see striking similarities to the challenges faced today in Baghdad, Kabul, and Kandahar. This book is a must read for every Army officer.

JAYSON A. ALTIERI
LTC, U.S. Army

Patton: Legendary World War II Commander by Martin Blumenson and Kevin M. Hymel, Potomac Books, Inc., October 2008, 160 pp., \$21.95 (cloth cover)

Patton: Legendary World War II Commander begins with an acknowledgement in the Preface, where coauthor Kevin M. Hymel comments that Martin Blumenson did not live to see the completion of this book due to his death in 2005. They did, however, work together on the book every Wednesday night until Blumenson could work no more.

The authors include in the book a handy chronology at the beginning, and the text is organized in chronological fashion. Adequate time is devoted to Patton's boyhood years and an overview of his family history. An equal amount of time is spent on his year at Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and then his years at West Point. It is here that Patton begins talking openly about his destiny, but at the same time, he writes to Beatrice Ayer (who is to become his wife) about his feelings of inferiority and his inability to study.

Along with dyslexia, it was somewhat surprising to see attention deficit disorder listed as a possible explanation for Patton's problems with his studies. There is ample evidence of his difficulty with writing, but nothing about his inability to maintain attention or concentration. In fact,

through sheer willpower, he pushed his way through school work, ending up just above the middle of his graduating class from West Point. He had, in essence, spent three years as a freshman; one at VMI and then two at West Point, where he had to repeat his plebe year. Only drive and intense application could make this possible.

Nothing about Patton's life appears omitted, and while exhaustive examination of some episodes cannot be pursued, nothing is glossed over. The authors examine his participation in Pershing's Punitive Expedition in 1916, going into Mexico to pursue Pancho Villa; his service during World War I, including his position as a tank brigade commander; his time between wars; and his time during World War II, including his successes in North Africa, Sicily, Europe after D-Day, the Battle of the Bulge, and his duties after victory.

Achievements, such as his developing a new sword for the Army and being appointed Master of the Sword are included, and during World War I, his contest for his men to design a new shoulder patch for tank soldiers, which ends up being the familiar triangle patch we all know today. Other events are also included such as slapping soldiers, Hammelburg, and Task Force Baum. Likewise, lesser known events are included, such as Patton's open apology to stable soldiers early in his career for being insulting to one of them. He did this of his own volition, as was the case with the slapping incidents and Eisenhower.

There are also revealing anecdotes, such as Patton changing his uniform as often as ten times a day to look sharp while at VMI, and testing his courage while at West Point by raising his head into the line of fire while working the pits on the rifle range.

While the book is not long, it does not seem condensed; it is not a "rushed" summary of high points. It is artfully done, distilling the whole Patton life story into a compact volume; it is complete, balanced, and very well-written. The production is good, and while the type is somewhat small, it is very legible with comfortable margins.

Readers familiar with the Patton legacy will recognize Martin Blumenson as the author of *The Patton Papers* and *Patton: The Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945*. Kevin M. Hymel is author of *Patton's Photographs: War as He Saw It*.

As well as the chronology, the book includes a useful index, notes, bibliography, and good photos, some of which I had not seen before. I finished the book in three evenings, but it could be done in one sitting. Little is taken for granted, so it is a good introduction to Patton's life for the first-time reader, yet I feel it will still be of keen interest to someone who has in-depth knowledge of Patton.

The message of the anecdotes and other background material is clear — one cannot understand Patton's battlefield successes without understanding the man himself. The book

correctly leaves one pondering two possibilities — was it Patton's destiny or his hard work that led him to overcome personal and professional barriers, ultimately leading to his successes? Perhaps the answer is a combination of both possibilities: Patton believed in his own destiny and his hard work made that destiny a reality.

We had in Patton a man almost desperately needed at the time and it is hard to imagine what the outcome of World War II in Europe would have been without him. German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt was once asked who the U.S. Army's best commander was; he reportedly replied, "Patton. He was your best."

PAUL S. MEYER

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General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War by Kevin C. Holzimmer, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 2007, 344 pp., \$39.95 (hardcover)

As time takes us farther away from the events of World War II, the battles and leaders of that great conflict grow dimmer in our collective consciousness. This is doubly true of the leaders and battles of the Pacific theater that labor in relative historical obscurity against their more famous counterparts in the European theater. General Walter Krueger is one of those Pacific theater generals largely forgotten. In *General Walter Krueger: Unsung Hero of the Pacific War*, Kevin Holzimmer examines one of the most instrumental generals of the war, and one of the least remembered.

Holzimmer wrote Krueger's biography to "fill a glaring gap in American military historiography" that exists with regard to Walter Krueger's life and World War II service. Holzimmer attempts this Herculean task and generally succeeds; however, it was difficult to write the biography of a man who left few papers, kept no wartime diary, refused to write his memoirs after the war, and whose letters between he and his wife were lost. Obviously, this was not an easy task, and Holzimmer must be credited with tenacity and fortitude for ferreting out what he could from a myriad of sources.

Holzimmer's book is divided into three parts: Part I covers Krueger's entry into the Army and his rise to commander of Third Army; Part II covers his service as 6th Army commander under MacArthur; and Part III covers the post-war years. It should come as no surprise that, due to the dearth of documentation left by Krueger, Holzimmer relied heavily on official documents found in the National Archives, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and in the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Holzimmer cogently and carefully extracts Krueger's official writings, memoranda, and correspondence from these sources, which lead to the strength of the book — Krueger's warfighting philosophy

in the interwar years and how it shaped the events in the Pacific from 1943 to 1945.

What sources do not convey, however, is much about Krueger the person. Therein lies the essential dichotomy of the book; it is a great tactical and operational study of Walter Krueger's warfighting philosophy and how it affected his command of 6th Army in the Pacific theater. Hence, the latter portion of Part I and Part II of the book show the strength of these sources. The book suffers, however, from the very thing the author could not overcome — Krueger's lack of a war diary, notes, letters, or even a post-war memoirs. The end result is a clear and coherent picture of the 6th Army and Krueger's role in the Pacific, but without much flavor of the man.

In Part I, Holzimmer is superb in examining Krueger's contributions to the U.S. Army in the years immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Krueger's command of the 2d Infantry Division in 1939 and 1940, and the tests conducted by the War Department and the Army as to the proper organization and how to fight the new triangular division, are fascinating. Equally well-researched and just as fascinating is Holzimmer's examination of Krueger's command of Third Army during the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941. This is the best and strongest part of the book and Holzimmer clearly shows Krueger's impact on the Army's organization and tactical and operational doctrine prior to America's entry into World War II.

Part II delves into the intricate details of 6th Army's participation in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific campaign from 1943 to 1945. From original official sources, Holzimmer creates an interesting portrait of Krueger the commander and how he applied his warfighting philosophy in some of the war's toughest battles. He succeeds, but cannot escape the aforementioned lack of Krueger's own writings, especially when it comes to interactions between Krueger and the other disparate personalities that inhabited MacArthur's kingdom. There is little Holzimmer can add to the feud that developed between Krueger and Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, or Krueger's relationship with the many other general and flag officers in MacArthur's command.

Part III is brief and deals with Krueger's generally sad post-World War II years and retirement. A solid conclusion wraps up a brilliant attempt to detail the life of a man who seemed determined to prevent just such an effort. Kevin Holzimmer's goal was to "demonstrate that Krueger's role in World War II was larger and more important than is usually acknowledged." He has done this and more, bringing to the forefront an outstanding soldier, a fascinating man, and an important part of the Allied victory in the Pacific in World War II.

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1 September 2007

"In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it."

—President Kennedy, 2 September 1963

“Cobra King” of World War II Fame Arrives at Fort Knox for Restoration



Combat actions within the European theater of operations revealed that the M4 Sherman was vulnerable to the firepower of the German Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger II tanks. To field an interim tank until the M26 Pershing heavy tank was available, the U.S. Army implemented the M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo program. A total of 254 Sherman Jumbos were produced, with records indicating that 250 were sent to the European theater of operations, and four were used for testing in the United States. They proved extremely useful in the fighting along the German borders in the fall of 1944.

The Sherman turret was completely re-engineered to include a commander's cupola and a loader's hatch. The sides of the hull and front glacis had additional armor plates fitted, and the transmission cover was also strengthened. While by no means immune to the powerful German 75 or 88mm main-gun rounds, this improved armor did increase the survivability of the crew, or at least gave the Jumbo the ability to take more punishment. The extra armor package also increased the weight of the Sherman from 36 tons to 42 tons. The Jumbos used the T48, 16.6" wide track with duckbill end connectors to provide improved mobility. The initial tank main gun remained the standard L38 75mm used on other Shermans, and the Jumbo was powered by the Ford GAA V8 (500 hp) engine, which was used in the M4A3 Sherman.

In accordance with the Army's distribution plan, 37th Tank Battalion, commanded by LTC Creighton Abrams, received 15 Jumbos, of which two were delivered to Company C (3083084 and 3083058). The M4A3E2 Sherman Jumbo, 3083084, became the company commander's vehicle, bumper number C6, and the tank was named "Cobra King" by the original company commander. Due to combat losses, 1LT Charles P. Boggess Jr. assumed command of C Company days prior to the final drive for the relief of Bastogne.

On 25 December 1944, Cobra King's crew became part of the historic relief of the besieged soldiers in the infamous Battle of the Bulge. The crew included the tank commander, 1LT Boggess; the gunner, CPL Milton Dickerman; the driver, PVT Hubert S. Smith; bow machine gunner, PVT Harold Hafner; and loader, PVT James G. Murphy.

Later in March of 1945, General Patton directed the modification of several Jumbos with the more powerful long-barreled 76mm main gun. Cobra King received this upgrade and fought in several other operations. At the end of the war, the Jumbos were kept under U.S. Army control, but as time improved models of tanks, such as the M26 and M47, Sherman tanks became spare-part vehicles. Cobra King shared the same fate and soon became a monument vehicle. Over time, the tank was moved from one location in Germany to another and its historic recognition faded away as did its original paint.

Through the joint effort of the U.S. Army's Center of Military History staff and support from numerous individuals, Cobra King was returned to the United States and arrived at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on 9 July 2009. After her arrival at the Patton Museum's Richardson Motor Pool, a complete physical examination and photographic record was taken of her condition. A phased plan was established to restore the tank to its condition on 26 December 1944, the day after the relief of Bastogne. A restoration team was selected from the museum's staff and volunteers, and the restoration project began. During the first phase of restoration, the restoration team removed damaged and rusted components, both internal and external; blocked up the hull and removed the track and suspension; pulled the engine compartment items; stabilized the internal metal and primed and painted the interior; prepped, primed, and painted the tank's underbelly; prepped the suspension components and repainted; remounted suspension, road wheels, final drives, and track (duckbilled); installed replacement Ford GAA engine and compartment items, such as fuel tanks, radiators, and exhaust pipes; replaced turret basket; reinstalled turret assembly into the hull; reinstalled 75mm gun shield; and marked exterior items to match its 26 December 1944 condition. Phase two will involve more internal restoration and focus on the replacement of missing parts.

After the armor collection moves to the National Armor and Cavalry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Cobra King will be an iconic symbol of armor history.

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