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Removing the Taint of the Horse from the Battalion Structure of the Newly Redesignated Infantry Regiments

Dear ARMOR,

I read with great sympathy Major Joseph Labarbera’s article, “The Eternal Foundation: Reorganizing the Regimental System’s Operational Framework to a Combined Arms Regimental System,” in the September-October 2010 edition of ARMOR. Many of the flaws described can be present in any organization regardless of whether it is described as a combat command, brigade, regiment, or legionnaire cohort. Yet, there is little sense in the way we do business.

I was recently tasked to present a 15-minute class, to anyone outside the U.S. Army, explaining why our outfits are designated as subordinates of a higher headquarters that does not exist. We have deliberately changed the level at which the Army resources force generation — from division to brigade. As a whole, this has been a positive change, but has significantly eroded the connection between the division and its subordinates. More than one soldier has remarked to me that the divisional “combat patch” is anachronistic, usually making a statement such as “of the three divisions I’ve served in, which patch shall I wear today.” Thus, if the brigade is a deployable unit, it makes good sense to make it the center of unit heritage. As an armor officer, I’m already comfortable with being assigned to an infantry-flagged combined-arms battalion. I think all the battalions in a brigade sharing a common lineage will, in practice, increase unit esprit de corps.

There are two other portions of the article that warrant comment. First, increasing repetitive assignments to a particular regiment would bear fruit for esprit, families, and budgets for household goods shipments. However, some mechanism must exist to prevent the development of dysfunctional climates and parochialism. Perhaps, as the British do, we might adopt a policy of “seconding” officers and NCOs to outside staffs and agencies to ensure well-rounded leaders. Secondly, I could not agree more with the idea that the current RSTA squadron is a mistake born of good intentions. Back when we were all discussing network-centric warfare, increasing the number of sensors on the battlefield was a crucial concern. What was collectively overlooked was the fact that inevitably a battalion-sized organization in a manpower-starved brigade will always become a land-owning unit. The present RSTA organizations are decidedly inferior to their combined arms battalion (CAB), line Stryker battalion, or infantry battalion counterparts in these missions; they possess neither the maneuver nor the firepower required. Better, in the case of the heavy brigade combat team, to find another CAB and return to the old recon troop. To provide mounted reconnaissance to larger formations, we must redeem the battlefield surveillance brigade from its present status of being an unresource bastard unwanted by either its armor or military intelligence parents. Perhaps, and I’m only half-joking, we can reform them as cavalry regiments in exchange for a promise to remove the taint of the horse from the battalion structure of the newly redesignated infantry regiments!

JOSEPH BERG
MAJ, U.S. Army

Forge the Thunderbolt —

at Least What’s Left of It

Dear ARMOR,

I had many misgivings about the merger of Armor School into the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, but I did not expect such severe repercussions so soon.

Originally, the armor force was a combined arms team unto itself with tanks, armored (mechanized) infantry, armored mortar carriers, armored assault guns, armored artillery, armored engineers, and so on. Of course, we lost much of that soon after World War II. With the Reorganization Objectives Army Division (ROAD) structure of the late 1960s, armor and mechanized divisions became organizationally similar, save for the number of tank and mechanized battalions (6:5 vs 3:7). Although still the proponent and combat developer of the Abrams tank, armor lost control of its APC-based vehicles (mortar, ATGM, etc.) to the infantry. The ill-conceived M114 command and recon vehicle was withdrawn and replaced by the M113. Once the future cavalry recon/scout vehicle was cancelled, armor was reduced to being the junior partner for the Bradley fighting vehicle. Then for light forces, such as the light infantry division and later the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), they created “light armor companies” with “tank platoons” though only equipped with HMMWVs. With Division ‘86, the armor and mechanized divisions became essentially identical, the difference being one tank or mechanized battalion (typically 6:5 vs 5:6). By that time, armor was merely the proponent for tank units up to battalion level; armor/mechanized doctrine through brigade level; and cavalry units through regiment. Higher echelons, whether ignorant or parochial, were free to ignore armor, and they have done so. Instead of reorganizing the 2d ACR back into a heavy regiment (Abrams and Bradley), it has instead converted into just another Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT), which is, in fact, simply a mechanized infantry brigade. Now that 3d ACR is also scheduled to become an SBCT, the “real” cavalry is almost gone, replaced by the shadowy and yet ill-defined battlefield surveillance brigades (BSSB). My letters regarding this issue appear in the January-February and September-October 2009 editions of ARMOR.

Compliments to Major Joseph D. Labarbera for his thoughtful article, “The Eternal Foundation: Reorganizing the Regimental System’s Operational Framework to a Combined Arms Regimental System.” Although the bureaucracy that passes for senior leadership has already ruled, perhaps his ideas will be recalled by a future generation of leaders.

Finally, I wish to draw attention to Captain Richard Marsh’s article, “The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Ideal for Counterinsurgency Operations.” He very precisely explains the stated reasoning behind the Army’s decision to eliminate the ACR from the force structure. His presentation appears to be precise and without editorial commentary. He leaves it to readers to ponder how senior Army leadership can start with the misguided presumption that a wheeled mechanized infantry brigade is universally superior to the tank-heavy ACR and then just discards the latter.

CHESTER A. KOJRO
LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

2d Cavalry Regiment Historical Note

In my article, “The Horse Regiment Heritage,” March-May 2010 ARMOR, I reference the establishment of the 2d Cavalry Regiment in 1855, which several readers believe to be incorrect, citing instead the creation of the 2d Regiment of Dragoons in 1836. However, these two units follow different lineage paths and are not the same. The 2d Regiment of Dragoons constituted in 1836. It remained a dragoon unit for the next 25 years except for a brief period configured as a dismounted rifle regiment. In 1855, the Army formed the 2d Cavalry, distinct in name and organization from the 2d Regiment of Dragoons. The Army retained both regiments until 1861. In that year, the cavalry regiment became the 5th Cavalry and the dragoon regiment became the 2d Cavalry. Today’s 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment traces its lineage through the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment back to the 2d Regiment of Dragoons — NOT the 2d Cavalry Regiment formed in 1855.

ROBERT S. CAMERON, Ph.D.
Preparation for an Uncertain Future Operating Environment

The U.S. Army Armor School is on the move! The annual Infantry Warfighting Conference was the highlight of activities this past month at Fort Benning, Georgia. This year’s focus was “Developing the Maneuver Force for Wide Area Security and Combined Arms Maneuver.” By all accounts, briefers, presenters, and facilitators “hit the mover” with plenty of frank, honest, and introspective discussion. I can confidently report that the Maneuver Center of Excellence is leading the development of doctrine that will address the uncertain operating environment that we, as an Army, face. To say the least, the Armor School stands ready to incorporate forthcoming guidance, which will continue to solidify its position as the Nation’s combat arm of decision!

To accomplish this, the armor force must study and reflect on operational lessons learned within the framework of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet (TRADOC PAM) 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept (USAROC), to prepare for an uncertain future operating environment. The Army is taking a hard look at possible future conflicts and enemy forces (commonly referred to as the “hybrid threat”) through the year 2028, and postulates uncertainty will remain a fundamental condition of any future conflict. If history is any indication of the future, chances are it may not turn out as predicted — planning for uncertainty is a pretty good bet.

Since uncertainty will dominate the battlefield of the future, the cavalry and armor force must aggressively work to prepare future officer and noncommissioned officers to prevail on an uncertain and ambiguous battlefield. Dealing with uncertainty does not mean our leaders will “wing it” to get the mission accomplished; it means they must not be paralyzed by lack of information. Our leaders must have the ability to seize the initiative and aggressively develop the situation through action to move to a position of “understanding.” Leaders and units confident in core competencies are key to reaching our objective.

In his remarks during the Infantry Warfighting Conference, General J.D. Thurman, commanding general, U.S. Forces Command, clearly stated his training guidance for FY11. His guidance clearly reflects the need to remaster our traditional warfighting competencies. General Thurman’s complete briefing is available for download at www.benning.army.mil/iwc2010/downloads.html; however, below are specific highlights I want to share with our forces:

- **Focus on live-fire operations.** The armor force needs to reignite its passion for gunnery. It has been a challenge to remain tactically proficient with our maneuver and fire platforms, while simultaneously participating in two persistent conflicts. However, precision fire is the backbone of the combat arm of decision. We must train our leaders to not only fight platforms, but incorporate air-ground integration in all training exercises, employing indirect fire, fixed wing, and rotary wing aircraft. We must develop these leader skills and then practice, practice, practice.

- **Train at night and like you might have to fight** (read: **fight in a chemical environment**). Our ability to fight in adverse conditions will prepare us mentally and tactically to remain flexible regardless of conflict type. To prepare, we must conduct 50 percent of our training at night, and reinvigorate and incorporate chemical defense training.

- **Training must have a combined-arms focus:** We must execute combined-arms operations at every available opportunity in live, virtual, constructive, and gaming domains. Training exercises must incorporate offensive operations, combined-arms breaching, and command and control on the move — integrating offensive live-fire exercises whenever possible.

In the future, we must remain confident in our ability to accurately respond to the ever-evolving unconventional character of likely conflicts. There is a strong possibility of a hybrid threat, one that consists of both hostile states and non-state enemies working either together, or separately, to attack our perceived weaknesses. Our enemy will adapt and change continuously; therefore, we must continually train and be prepared for these changes. We are currently seeing the Army’s shift toward honing its fighting skills to meet hybrid threats. For example, the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, will launch its first hybrid threat rotation this November. The Armor School will participate as guest observers to help gather lessons learned as we, as an Army, help break new ground in this arena.

Team — the mission is crystal clear: retrain lessons learned from the past 9 years of war while simultaneously rekindling core competencies as a maneuver force. We have the finest leaders and Soldiers in the Army; we are trained and ready to move out decisively in preparation to confront our adversaries on a complex and uncertain future battlefield. Teaching and training is the Armor School’s primary mission and I look forward to sharing this journey with you — it will undoubtedly be a wild and exciting ride. Driver, move out!

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!
Reinventing Excellence in Armor: Training and Retaining the Best

The Excellence in Armor (EIA) program is a tool designed to be used by leaders in the armor force as a means to bolster the selection and utilization of future non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Today’s armor leaders should take a serious look at the EIA program as part of this selection process.

In 1984, Command Sergeant Major (CSM) John Stephens, former CSM, U.S. Army Armor Center, developed and proposed the EIA program, which identifies outstanding soldiers in career management field (CMF) 19, one-station unit training (OSUT), cavalry and armor units. For the past 26 years, our leaders have used the program to develop the brightest and best NCOs in our branch. EIA became a program of record and received U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approval in May 1987. Since 2006, the Office of Chief of Armor (OCOA) has worked to bring back prestige to the EIA program by reviewing and revamping the program. Currently, there are 2,016 active duty EIA members and 976 National Guard — a total of 3,806 EIA soldiers have enrolled since 1985.

In recent years, we have seen an influx of soldiers enrolling in the program. One of the reasons for this is the incentives soldiers receive, such as job selection, board selection, and master gunner priority, when they join the program. Commanders and first sergeants can use EIA as a guideline to prepare the best CMF 19 soldiers for schools and leadership positions while simultaneously making their units stronger. A soldier’s first opportunity for selection to EIA is during 19D and 19K OSUT. At the 10th week of training, up to 20 percent of each class may be selected to compete to enter the program. These soldiers are recommended by drill sergeants, based on performance, motivation, and leadership potential. A battalion-level board, chaired by the battalion/squadron CSM, confirms this recommendation and admits soldiers into additional training programs. All candidates must pass the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) with 250 or more points; qualify sharpshooter or expert with their personal weapons; receive a “go” on all crewman/scout skills tests; and have no adverse actions pending or on record.

Historically, high promotion rates for EIA soldiers clearly show that EIA is identifying the best and brightest armor and cavalry soldiers; in particular, those with consistent exceptional performance levels. In FY 2006, the EIA program added four additional incentives for soldiers entering the program:

- The project development skill identifier (PDSI) code of “E4J,” which is annotated on the soldier’s ERB, enables commanders to immediately recognize incoming EIA soldiers.
- Once a commander submits the EIA nomination letter, OCOA requests a signed certificate of achievement from the chief of armor, which will be sent back to the soldier’s command and awarded in a public venue.
- EIA soldiers will be added to the EIA database, which can be viewed on the AKO website.
- Last, but certainly not least, is the new EIA coin, which was designed and created in 2007, by SFC Frank Johnson, 19D career manager.

The initial coins were issued in January of 2008 to CSM (Retired) John Stephens and Major General (Retired) Robert Williams, and are issued to soldiers who entered the EIA program after 2008.

The EIA program is a proven “combat multiplier” for leaders; however the program can only work if first sergeants and master gunners implement it in their companies and troops. The program is designed to assist leaders in developing great soldiers into leaders. It is a valuable program if unit leaders use it to train soldiers, enroll only the best soldiers and drop those who cannot maintain standards, and identify soldiers who are ready for accelerated promotion and additional responsibilities. First sergeants, this is your program; too many armor leaders do not understand the program, do not know it exists, and fail to recognize its value. We will retain the best soldiers only if we can excite them about the roles and skills of armor and cavalry leaders. Tough, realistic training and the promise of increased responsibilities, combined with accelerated promotions, will help keep our best young soldiers in commander’s hatches and stations.

Further information concerning the program can be found on the OCOA website at https://www.benning.army.mil/ocoa/index.htm. Please contact OCOA and/or SFC Frank Johnson at (706) 545-0670 with any questions or recommendations concerning EIA.

TREAT ‘EM ROUGH!
From the Boresight Line:
The Master Gunner Course: Back to Basics and a New Program of Instruction

by Sergeant First Class Michael Lucas

Over the past several months, the Master Gunner Branch has focused its efforts on armor core competencies and incorporating new changes. The reality of Army Transformation and ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan dictate the need for change. For more than 7 years, we have been completely focused on Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, and bringing a successful, peaceful end to war and conflict in the Middle East. During this time, the armor force was primarily committed to counterinsurgency operations and, as a result, its core competencies began to diminish. Fortunately, throughout history, the master gunner’s primary mission has been to aid and assist commanders at all echelons in planning, developing, executing, and evaluating crew-served weapons-related training. Therefore, the Master Gunner School is intuitively the best place to fortify deteriorated standards and produce expert master gunners for heavy brigade combat team gunnery and M1 Abrams main battle tank platforms. A graduate of the course is bestowed the title of “master gunner,” which certifies he is an accomplished armor noncommissioned officer, who is trained in advanced gunnery methodology, turret weapons system maintenance, and gunnery training management. His acquired skills and knowledge allow him to function as the unit’s master of gunnery, the tank commander’s mentor, and the commander’s gunnery technical advisor — the backbone of the armor force.

Our mission-dictated predeployment training has caused focus to shift away from basic tank skills. The Master Gunner School has identified the skills most often misunderstood, which include boresighting, armor accuracy checks, machine gun training, and threat vehicle identification. These tasks are found in the new Training Circular (TC) 3-20.21-1, Individual and Crew Live-Fire Prerequisite Testing, which replaces the old tank crew gunnery skills test and includes common gunnery skills test and gunnery table one, a prerequisite for attending the Master Gunner Course.

Program of Instruction (POI) Update

The Master Gunner Course is in transformation. The recent release of FM 3-20.21, Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery, the new vehicle crew evaluator exportable packet, and an Army Research Institute study motivated master gunner instructors and course managers to relook how the Army trains expert master gunners. Beginning in fiscal year 2011, the course will be 11 weeks in duration; the additional 2 weeks allows instructors to fully incorporate FM 3-20.21’s changes so students can fully master expected tasks. The new course begins 4 October 2010, and is made up of two phases: maintenance training and advanced gunnery training:

Maintenance training The doctrinal changes do not affect maintenance training as much as gunnery training; however, there have been some changes in this area as well. The new course includes an additional 12 hours of POI, which was added to the maintenance phase, and includes the commander’s weapons station and fire-control maintenance. The commander’s weapons station now includes the .50-caliber remote thermal sight, band adjustment, and equilibrator adjustment. Fire-control maintenance was updated to include troubleshooting with the maintenance support device computer and electronic technical manuals, gun stabilization tests, and scheduled services checks. A new 3-dimensional software program was also added to the maintenance phase, which allows students to interact and visualize training — a revolutionary experience. The Master Gunner Branch is currently exploring the option of adding the 3-dimensional software to its gunnery training program in the near future.

Advanced Gunnery Training. The new manual, FM 3-20.21, has dramatically affected advanced gunnery training; an additional 68 hours was added to the POI for detect, identify, decide, engage, and assess (DIDEA) training. The new POI breaks down DIDEA training to include adding 2 hours to the detect portion, or target acquisition; leaving the identify and decide portions, which cover fighting vehicle competing strategy and range determination, unchanged; adding 4 hours to the engage and assess, or conduct of fire; adding 2 hours to the tank mounted machine guns in the form of practical exercises; and adding 4 hours to ammunition, firing tables, and surface danger area diagram based on the probability that the HBCT master gunner will work with various types of ammunition, ranging from 5.56mm to 120mm tank and mortar ammunition. As a result of doctrinal changes, plan and conduct tank gunnery and training management have undergone the most extensive changes in the form of adding another exam point during the gunnery phase, which also added time to the course. We now have 6 exam points, as opposed to 5, within the 9-week curriculum. The updates to our current POI allow students more time to absorb and study presented material, which should result in a greater success rate without lowering school standards.

Undoubtedly, the U.S. Army has the best-trained armor units in the world. Over the years, the Master Gunner School has provided unit commanders with specific soldiers who are trained in current tank technology and crew-training techniques — the master gunners. To help prospective students arrive prepared, the master gunner website now offers an exportable master gunner training program to assist unit master gunners in training candidates for the course. This information is available for download at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/388218.
On 3 October 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, the U.S. Army’s elite Rangers and a Special Forces detachment engaged in a firefight with Mohamed Farrah Aideed’s forces. The firefight was so intense that the Task Force Ranger commander requested Pakistani and Malaysian M48 medium tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) to assist a 10th Mountain Division quick reaction force in rescuing the elite forces. Implausibly, some of the best forces in the U.S. military were trapped by a ragged band of fighters whose weaponry consisted of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), assault rifles, and machine guns. Immediately following the so-called ‘battle of Mogadishu,’ critics asked why U.S. mechanized forces were not available to extract the Rangers. In short, the reply revealed there were no U.S. armored forces in theater because then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin determined heavy armor sent the wrong message for humanitarian missions. In other words, armored units were not sent to Somalia because of political concerns, at the cost of lives.
The Army’s experience in the urban streets of Mogadishu provides an excellent example of how the firepower, protection, and mobility, provided by a modern medium tank, would have dramatically changed the outcome of the mission. Now, and into the foreseeable future, the U.S. military will be fighting forces that do not have a tank capable of destroying a medium tank. The U.S. military requires a medium tank to fill the capability gap between the Abrams main battle tank (MBT), which provides too much firepower, and the recently acquired family of wheeled and infantry fighting vehicles that fail to provide the precision firepower, protection, and mobility necessary to dominate a determined enemy. As the U.S. Army transitions to an expeditionary force, future operational requirements will drive the development of a modern medium tank, which will provide future commanders with the flexibility to fight, survive, and win in a variety of complex environments. A modern medium tank will provide commanders a flexible force multiplier that can rapidly respond to almost any situation in any environment.

The Inspiration for the Tank

The original inspiration for tank development stems from a need to cross the machine-gun swept and barbed-wire choked battlefields of World War I. The British developed the tank in response to the problem they encountered when infantry attempted to cross ‘no man’s land’ between the trenches, or ‘the beaten zone’ created by machine gun and artillery fire. From its debut at the
Battle of the Somme, in August 1916, to the daily engagements U.S. Armed Forces currently face in Iraq, the basic premise of the tank has not changed; it provides overwhelming firepower, protection, and maneuverability to enable military forces to fight and win in close combat.4

The German army learned from its World War I experiences and developed the tank into a weapons system that allowed its soldiers not only to cross the beaten zone, but operationally outmaneuver its enemies. The German combined arms approach, centered on the tank, allowed the Germans to dislocate the French army in 1940. The Germans, through superior maneuver, defeated the French army in less than 6 weeks despite being numerically and materially inferior.5

The tank was at the heart of the German “blitzkrieg;” its firepower, protection, and mobility permitted tactical and operational surprise. It was the shock of armored columns thrusting deep into their rear areas that overwhelmed the command and control capabilities of the French army, preventing them from reacting effectively to the speed of the German attack.6 The United States achieved similar results during Operation Iraqi Freedom; the Iraqis were often completely surprised to find a column of U.S. tanks attacking their defensive positions from an unexpected direction. During one engagement alone, more than 30 Iraqi tanks and vehicles were destroyed defending the wrong direction.7 While the United States used the Abrams to achieve this success, the German army used a light tank, the Panzerkampfwagon (PzKpfw) II, to achieve the same effects. The PzKpfw II comprised the bulk of the tanks for the German offensive of 1940.8 One lesson to be drawn from this experience is that the tank used within the context of maneuver warfare does not have to destroy every enemy tank on the battlefield; through superior firepower, protection, and mobility, it has the unique capability to destroy every other threat on the battlefield.

The Canadian army’s recent experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the need for a medium tank in a small-war environment and provides useful illustration regarding fielding a one-dimensional, lightly armored force, which relies on sensors and standoff weapons to dominate the battlespace against irregular forces. The Canadian army’s approach was to build a force able to maneuver against the enemy and strike from long range without having to close with the enemy.9 However, in October 2006, Canadian forces deployed tanks to Afghanistan, which was at odds with the Canadian army’s earlier decision to eliminate tanks from its army’s inventory.10 Fortunately, once the Canadians realized they needed the capabilities that tanks bring to the battlefield to defeat the Taliban, they shipped Leopard I tanks to Afghanistan.

The Taliban appreciated the futility of fighting NATO forces in the open and established sophisticated defenses inside villages, which could not be penetrated by the light armored vehicle (LAV) III or any other Canadian vehicle. To penetrate these defenses, the Canadians required a vehicle that could maneuver cross coun-
try, reduce berms, and penetrate the one-meter-thick walls of the compounds used by the Taliban. In short, they needed tanks. The Leopards enabled the Canadians to close with the Taliban and destroy it without the collateral physical and political damage caused by airstrikes. Moreover, the Leopards protected Canadian troops from the weapons the Taliban had at its disposable, almost exactly the same types of weapons used by Aideed’s fighters in Mogadishu during 1993. Indeed, “Leopard tanks and their crews, deployed to Afghanistan, have survived numerous improvised explosive device (IED) and antitank mine strikes, as well as recoilless rifle, RPG-7, and suicide attacks, which may have been catastrophic to other fleets of vehicles.”

The second battle of Fallujah (Operation al-Fajr) provides another convincing example of the effectiveness of the tank against irregular opponents, this time in urban terrain. U.S. forces in Fallujah used the tank’s capability to endure enemy fire and deliver precision fires to defeat a highly motivated enemy. The ability of the tank to move through and fight in highly contested and congested urban terrain was missing in Mogadishu. The 1st Cavalry Division’s M1A2 Abrams tanks faced the same weapons systems employed by Aideed’s forces in Somalia, with the addition of complex IEDs. Nevertheless, the Abrams broke through the defenses of the enemy and led the attack that led to the rapid recapture of Fallujah, a town with a pre-assault population of more than 350,000 people. The enemy was estimated to have more than 3,000 fighters, of which 1,200 were killed in battle and another 1,000 were captured. Interestingly, the Army’s most modern weapons system, the Stryker, was only used in a supporting role outside the city. The tank had proven yet again that its unique capabilities are still critical on today’s battlefields.

**War in the Future: General War and Small Wars**

“First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies.”

— General James N. Mattis, USMC

General and small wars will continue. Small wars will undoubtedly be the more frequent of the two; however, the U.S. military must remain prepared for major combat operations. In that regard, the enemies of the United States will continue to adapt to U.S. strategies and work to mitigate the strengths of the Nation and exploit critical vulnerabilities. Opponents who cannot match the material and economic strength of the United States will leverage small wars to defeat the will of the American people, while ‘peer’ opponents will seek to exploit the U.S. military’s overreliance on networks and airspace dominance. In both types of war, the enemy will use urban terrain to negate the strength of U.S. sensors and standoff capabilities. Urban terrain also places a premium on infantry, of which the United States does not have an abundance, to defeat enemy forces and produce casualties we cannot afford. To win either type of war, the United States will need systems that effectively operate in both types of wars.

**Small Wars**

As noted, small wars will be the most prevalent form of conflict. The efficacy of U.S. forces fighting these small wars, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, will directly affect performance expectations that the U.S. civilian population has of the military. The U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan was given the benefit of the doubt in the first few years of the war; however, as operations dragged on, American patience waned. The strategic ‘stopwatch’ that the public places on the duration of small wars is a significant planning consideration. In his briefing to the Joint Urban Warrior Conference, David Kilcullen described the strategic stopwatch as an “Electoral timeline, [sic] interacts with domestic political support, drives intervening government commitment, and directly drives troop levels.” As the influence of the Internet and communications technology grows, so will the role of the global mass media, which will dramatically change the battlefield dynamic. The most significant change is that American people will have access to more information from the battlefield. This, and other factors, will affect the way U.S. forces fight small wars.

Within the context described above, IEDs, explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), and RPGs will continue to be the preferred method of attacking U.S. forces. These weapons allow the enemy to hide among the people and negate the superior standoff capabilities of current and future U.S. systems. Moreover, these weapons produce dramatic images, which translate well in the global media environment and keep the war in the news cycle on the home front. The enemy will use these images to attack America’s center of gravity: the will of its people. In this regard, political considerations will drive U.S. decisionmaking, including more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). Given the need to minimize collateral damages, U.S. forces will be forced to close with the enemy, exposing them to direct fire before hostile targets can be identified and attacked. British forces in Afghanistan are already operating under such ROE; thus, in tactical terms, restrictive ROE will require the capability to first survive enemy fire and then return precision fire while in contact with the enemy. The tank is the only system that fulfills this requirement.

Casualties will continue to be a U.S. vulnerability that enemy forces continually seek to exploit. Casualties affect the morale of U.S. forces, as well as the will of the American people and political leaders. Likewise, the will of the indigenous people will remain a primary factor in winning small wars. To win over the will of a foreign population, U.S. troops will live among the
people in small, austere bases and combat outposts, which place them in contact with the people while simultaneously exposing them to greater risk of enemy attack. The enemy will make every attempt to destroy these outposts in an effort to get the dramatic news story in the global media. This occurred in Afghanistan recently when the Taliban attempted to overrun an outpost in the Helmand province. Several casualties were taken before the Taliban were finally beaten back. The Taliban attempted a similar attack on a large U.S. base in Khost just one month later. If the enemy destroys enough of these outposts, the will of the U.S. population may force a withdrawal of U.S. forces from among the people, eliminating the vital proximity within the local populace and providing a victory for the enemy.

General War

General wars will still occur; however, they will be less frequent than small wars. Nevertheless, the U.S. military seems to base its acquisitions programs and operational concept on two assumptions about the future: air superiority and information networks availability. The brigade combat team (BCT) modernization is the U.S. Army’s principal modernization program for BCTs from 2009 to the present. Its purpose is to build a versatile mix of mobile, networked BCTs that will leverage mobility, protection, information, and precision fires to conduct effective operations across the spectrum of conflict. Key to modernizing Army BCTs is to enable soldiers with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Unfortunately, the future battlefield is likely to be in urban terrain where the standoff capabilities of U.S. systems are severely reduced, if not completely negated. The importance of air superiority may matter little and information may be difficult to acquire.

To exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, a peer enemy would attack U.S. assets and information networks to destroy or disable the system of systems that U.S. forces depend on to see the enemy. For example, the electromagnetic effect generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion could render multiple networks useless. This would degrade the ability of U.S. forces to ‘see’ the battlefield and thereby dominate the enemy. In short, commanders would not know the exact location of enemy formations, thus creating the need to develop intelligence through the use of ground reconnaissance. However, current systems will prove vulnerable in carrying out this mission.

The most recently acquired armored vehicles employed by U.S. forces provide some idea of where the United States is headed with its future armored systems. Few vehicles in the U.S. military’s inventory are capable of surviving direct fire contact with Soviet-era tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and antitank (AT) systems, which will continue to be the choice of vehicles and weapons for future enemies. Moreover, current U.S. vehicles are designed around the assumption of air superiority and information dominance; with the loss of one or both, current and future land systems, except for the tank, will be extremely vulnerable to the older Soviet systems.

Antiarmor systems will continue to improve, but missile systems will still rely on chemical charges to defeat armor. Since the first tank appeared on the World War I battlefield, there have been antitank systems to defeat tanks at the tactical level; however, on very rare occasions can enough antitank systems be massed, much less maneuvered, to defeat enough tanks to make a significant operational difference. Additionally, current antitank systems lack the ability to shoot on the move, which severely restricts an antitank system’s ability to react quickly to an attacking tank formation in an unexpected location.

Since the next general war will be fought outside the United States, it is more than likely that U.S. forces will conduct offen-
Fitting a Medium Tank into the Future

During this critical time, when ground forces need a platform that does many things well and survives unexpected enemy contact, the United States may yet again be on the road to acquiring a system that is, at best, ready to fight the Cold War. The solution would seem to be a compromise — the medium tank, which would provide a unique balance of regular and irregular competencies to the operating environment. As a ‘system,’ the medium tank would need to provide 360-degree protection from high-explosive enemy weapons, the ability to close with and destroy the enemy with fully stabilized precision fires, the ability to penetrate and survive in highly contested and congested urban terrain, and the speed to exploit ‘breakthrough operations’ with a reduced logistics requirement.

The concept of 360-degree protection for a tank is revolutionary. The tank has always saved weight by sacrificing armor protection on the rear, top, and belly of the tank. In conventional war, this was not a problem because the enemy’s direction of attack was generally predictable; however, with irregular forces and in urban terrain, this is no longer the case. To meet these challenges, the tank must have 360-degree protection from chemical energy rounds and must have the ability to employ active countermeasures to defeat sophisticated antitank missiles. However, the majority of protection should come from armor protection, given that active systems are a threat to friendly infantry in the vicinity of the tank. This would be achieved through the combination of traditional armor and the use of explosive reactive armor, which would defeat chemical energy weapons, including antitank missiles, RPGs, and EFPs. Additionally, armor packages could be adapted to threat levels, which would permit rapid deployment and protection upgrades as newer armor becomes available.

As noted before, a key capability of the tank includes the ability to close with and destroy the enemy with fully stabilized precision fires and multiple machine guns. This capability, as demonstrated by the Abrams tank, benefits light forces fighting in urban terrain where tanks can be employed to cross the ‘beaten zone’ to destroy buildings or enemy bunkers, thus allowing friend-
ly infantry to continue forward. Moreover, with its cross-country mobility, the tank can approach towns and villages from unexpected directions, avoiding enemy defenses and kill zones. In rural areas, a medium tank, with the right gun and sight, could acquire and engage targets at ranges out to 3 kilometers in all weather conditions. Thus, a medium tank would add firepower and protection to isolated outposts, making them less vulnerable to enemy attack. Finally, the tank’s dynamic versatility in various environments provides numerous options to the ground commander, such as blocking streets, dynamic entry, or disrupting lines of communications, in either heavy contact or a security role. A modern medium tank could employ state-of-the-art power systems, which would significantly reduce fuel consumption and allow it to operate for extended periods of time (compared to a MBT) without the need for fuel. Combined with a modern hybrid power plant, the medium tank could travel extended distances with minimal refueling assets. A hybrid power plant that could potentially power a medium tank has already been tested.24 A reduced logistics requirement would provide the operational range to conduct deep envelopments, long-range pursuits, and raids— a capability the U.S. military does not currently possess.

Reduced logistics requirements would certainly make the use of the medium tank in an austere theater more feasible. This would allow the medium tank to be employed during the counterinsurgency fight, as well as stability and support operations, in areas such as Somalia or Afghanistan, where fuel resupply can be an issue. Another benefit of the medium tank is its size and weight— it is small enough and light enough to offset serious damage to the infrastructure of underdeveloped countries, enabling U.S. forces to operate without alienating the indigenous population. A medium tank is much lighter than a main battle tank; therefore, for instance, the U.S. Marine Corps could transport more tanks via amphibious ships than currently possible, which would provide Marine commanders with greater flexibility, firepower, and protection during forced entry operations.

The Benefits of the Medium Tank

As the U.S. Army transitions to an expeditionary force, future operational requirements will drive the need to develop a modern medium tank that provides future commanders with the flexibility to fight, survive, and win in the variety of complex environments that U.S. forces will deploy to today and in the future. These environments demand the need for a modern medium tank to fill the gap in capability that exists in the current inventory of U.S. ground platforms. The enemy U.S. forces face will continue to adapt to negate the U.S. advantage in air and standoff firepower. The enemy’s adaptations will force the United States to employ ground forces in close combat across the full spectrum of conflict. For the U.S. Army to counter the enemy’s ability to hide from the air and blend with the local population, the military needs a new ground platform. The United States needs a ground combat system that can withstand enemy fire, like the Abrams MBT, without the costs, weight, fuel consumption, and logistic issues that come with a 70-ton vehicle. Moreover, the U.S. Army needs a vehicle that can operate in the lower end of the spectrum of conflict to project power, protect the force, and preserve the infrastructure of the host nation.

The U.S. Army is moving forward with the brigade combat team GCV program as a solution to fighting and winning on future battlefields. However, in light of the recent future combat system program, the Army has yet to develop a combat system to replace the unique capabilities of the tank. The desired lethality and capabilities, such as the ability to kill from long range, passive armor protection, and the capability to close with and destroy the enemy, are not only foreseeable in a medium tank, but are key capabilities on the battlefields of today and well into the future.

A medium tank built for the battlefields of today and the future would provide all the capabilities of the Abrams MBT, with the benefit of reduced costs in logistics and weight and with only a modest loss of lethality and protection. A medium tank could be employed across the full spectrum of war, giving U.S. forces the firepower, protection, and mobility required to fight and win on current and future battlefields while requiring less support and minimizing collateral damage. It is time to drop the institutional prejudice against the tank and recognize it for the utility it provides— the ability to fight and win in any environment. In the end, mission success does not depend on how quickly forces get to the battlefield, it depends on their ability to dominate, survive, and complete the mission.

Notes

2Bill Gertz, “Aspin’s decision on tanks was political; Report says he gave in to U.N.,” Washington Times, 3 October 1995.
4Ibid., p. 52.
6Ibid., p. 345.
8Karl-Heinz Frieser, p. 42.
12Ibid., p. 12.
14Ibid., p. 105.
15Ibid., p. 109.
17Ibid.
21Jim Lacey, Take Down: The 3d Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2007, p. 142.
22HQDA, FM 3-0, Operations, p. 1-17.
23Ibid.

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Although the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) has been in the force since September 2006, its mission, organization, and capabilities are not fully understood across the Army. Additionally, with the impending decisions on military intelligence (MI) rebalance and the emergence of new Army concepts, the future role of this organization is not clearly defined. This article addresses both of these issues and identifies near-term required capabilities.

The BFSB is an established modular support brigade. Currently, there are three Active Component (AC) and seven Reserve Component (RC) BFSBs in the Army. All three AC BFSBs have served, or are serving, in Iraq. Two BFSBs (one AC and one RC) deployed this summer in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation New Dawn, respectively. These units have successfully answered division, corps, and joint task force (JTF) commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and they will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The Army has committed resources for more than 6 years to BFSB development and has recently approved U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-55.1, The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade.¹

Background
Recent U.S. Army concept documents describe future threats capable of quickly adapting their strengths to our weaknesses. Like the enemies we face today, they will conduct decentralized, asymmetric operations, using small elements to achieve strategic objectives. They will be located in complex terrain, dispersed among the population and highly networked. They will be skilled at information warfare and will often use commercially available technology to their advantage. Successfully defeating these threats will challenge the modular force, the Army as a whole, and homeland security. Of all the modular brigades in the Army, the BFSB is uniquely templated against these threats. The unit is employed as a network of combat information collection systems, both manned and unmanned, directly interfacing with the populace from which threat networks emerge.² It is a full spectrum, combined arms unit that has the capability to disrupt threat networks and operate inside their decision cycle by quickly adapting its strengths to the enemy’s weaknesses.
The BFSB is the only modular brigade whose primary purpose is collecting information to satisfy division, corps, or JTF intelligence requirements, especially PIR. It can identify, track, and neutralize threats within its own capabilities or pass intelligence to adjacent units to enable and support area security operations over wide areas. Although interim BFSBs have deployed in support of OIF since 2007, the first BFSB, organized as designed, deployed in support of OEF in late summer 2010. The current BFSB is the result of a long process, beginning with the development of the modular force in 2004:

- Summer-late fall 2004 — reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) brigade organized with MI battalion and reconnaissance squadron (later removed).
- March-August 2005 — General Wallace (commanding general, Combined Arms Center) directed TRAC and RAND studies, which identified requirements for BFSB ground recon.
- August-October 2005 — General Wallace directed the design of a battalion-level recon and surveillance unit for BFSB, and signed requirements determination for reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) battalion.
- October 2005 — R&S battalion requirement necessitates redesign of BFSB.
- November-December 2005 — General Petraeus (then CG, CAC) signed requirements determination for BFSB redesign, which was sent to Department of the Army for approval.
- February-March 2006 — Director, Force Modernization, proposed 3-star vetoing of BFSB design prior to vice chief of staff requirements approval brief; design approval modified.

Mission and Roles

The BFSB performs a multitude of functions for the supported commander. It performs two major functions in support of division or corps PIR, which include conducting reconnaissance and surveillance tasks (to include MI discipline collection); and reinforcing the collection capabilities of other modular brigades as necessary. It is the second role that makes the BFSB uniquely well-suited to support area security over wide areas. The BFSB’s human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCT), multifunctional teams (MFTs), signal intelligence (SIGINT) platoons, and counterintelligence teams support nearly every brigade in a division or corps area of operations (AO). The combat information they collect is not limited to answering brigade combat team (BCT) PIRs. When fused with information collected throughout the division or corps AO and analyzed by the BFSB’s fusion element, the resulting actionable intelligence supports area security operations, improves situational understanding throughout the AO, and allows the commander to make informed decisions and allocate appropriate resources to accomplish operational objectives.

Reconnaissance and surveillance tasks are not limited to the BFSB’s mounted troops and long-range surveillance (LRS) company; its HUMINT soldiers conduct human reconnaissance and surveillance and its SIGINT soldiers conduct signals reconnaissance and surveillance. Similarly, the BFSB’s counterintelligence soldiers conduct a form of counterintelligence directed against threat collection attempts. When formed into combined arms reconnaissance and surveillance teams, BFSB soldiers are capable of producing multiple and complementary layers of combat information. The BFSB’s combined reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and analysis capabilities provide a single source for information and intelligence previously unavailable to operational-level commanders.

BFSB roles. The BFSB is capable of serving in a number of additional roles directly related to concepts described in the Army Capstone and Operating Concepts. The most important roles include:

- **Early entry.** Among other tasks, BFSB elements can conduct population assessments, coordinate with host-nation forces, and conduct reconnaissance of host-nation infrastructure and transportation networks. The LRS company, teamed with other BFSB elements, can participate directly in joint forcible entry (JFE) operations.

- **Early follow on.** The BFSB has the capability to follow and support assault forces by assisting with expansion of the lodgment area; identifying potential threats; making contact with the transitional government; coordinating with joint, interagency, intergovernmental or multinational elements operating in the AO; and enhancing the situational understanding of follow-on BCTs as they occupy their AOs.

- **Economy of force.** The BFSB mitigates risk in AOs where BCTs are not otherwise available. The brigade identifies and neutralizes threats within its capabilities, provides early warning when threats exceed its capabilities, and conducts battle handover with maneuver forces as required by the situation.

![Figure 1. BFSB organization](Image)

Note: Active component BFSB’s have one organic and one assigned MI battalion

Other Army and joint reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities
Identifying, tracking, and defeating threat networks. Since the BFSB is a network, it is well positioned to identify, track, and ultimately defeat threat networks during stability operations. Its combination of target interdiction teams, mounted scouts, and MI assets allow it to neutralize threats using both lethal and nonlethal means and to develop additional intelligence for use by other modular brigades and BCTs.

Echelons above brigade (EAB) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration, synchronization, and technical exploitation coordination. The BFSB is organized to support ISR integration and synchronization tasks now performed by task force observe, detect, identify, and neutralize (ODIN) with limited augmentation. BFSB MFTs already trained, organized, and equipped for site exploitation, can enhance the technical intelligence (TECHINT) functions currently performed by Task Forces Troy and Paladin by teaming with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel.

EAB ISR command and control. The BFSB is a modular brigade designed to receive augmentations. It has a robust headquarters, comparable in size to a BCT, and provides the capability to command and control (C2) both organic and attached units, including maneuver, manned and unmanned aviation, fires, and echelons above division ISR assets. This C2 capability enables the supported commander (division/corps JTJF) to focus on planning and executing the overall operation rather than subordinate unit execution. The BFSB has the capability to C2 dispersed operations through the employment of a main command post and tactical command post.

Operational and Organizational Design

The BFSB’s operational principles provide a concise description of the current BFSB and how it operates:

- The BFSB is the only modular brigade whose primary purpose is collecting information to satisfy division, corps, or JTF information requirements, especially PIR.
- The BFSB collects combat information and, as directed, develops actionable intelligence for the supported commander consistent with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC).
- The BFSB is not designed to conduct reconnaissance in force. It can, however, perform all other reconnaissance tasks within the limitations of METT-TC.
- As a rule, the BFSB does not fight for information. When directed by the commander, however, small units within the organization may be required to fight for information at their level.
- The BFSB is a lightly armed organization. It normally avoids direct-fire contact with the enemy during reconnaissance and surveillance operations unless fleeting opportunities outweigh the risks of engagement; for example, observation of a high-payoff target that requires immediate engagement or capture.
- The BFSB is a modular brigade designed to accept augmentation. The intent of this augmentation, however, is to enhance the brigade’s core reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities rather than replicate a BCT’s capability for close combat.
- The BFSB is a dual-role force. It not only performs intelligence collection and reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, but also reinforces the collection capabilities of other modular brigades as necessary.
- While the factors of METT-TC vary widely depending on the operational theme, such as major combat operations (MCO) versus irregular warfare operations, the BFSB will generally perform the same types of missions across the spectrum of conflict.
- The BFSB is especially well suited to identify and locate irregular forces within an AO; its capability to identify and locate enemy conventional maneuver formations is limited by its force structure.

Changing these principles would require significant doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) adjustments. For example, the BFSB currently does not conduct reconnaissance-in-force missions. Organizational and equipment changes could enable the BFSB to conduct these missions, but may limit the unit’s ability to interact with the population to identify and locate threats operating in an AO.

Deployed BFSBs have already performed a variety of area security tasks over wide areas. The BFSB's employment along the Iraq-Syria border provides an excellent example. A task organized BFSB employed combined arms reconnaissance and surveillance to consistently produce high-quality actionable intelligence, which led to the successful interdiction of insurgent infiltration into the corps AO. This intelligence production capability, however, could be significantly enhanced with additional personnel for the unit's fusion cell.

The BFSB is neither an MI brigade nor a lighter version of an armored cavalry regiment. It is a full spectrum, combined arms (based on the expanded definition of combined arms) reconnaissance and surveillance unit that bears little resemblance to either of these two organizations. The BFSB consists of a reconnaissance and surveillance squadron, with two ground reconnaissance troops and a LRS.
company; an MI battalion, with a technical collection company; a collection and exploitation company; and a counterintelligence/HUMINT company. The BFSB is supported by a brigade support company and signal network support company; Active Component BFSBs have one organic and one assigned MI battalion.

**Mounted reconnaissance troops.** The BFSB’s mounted reconnaissance troops distinguish this unit from earlier MI brigades. They are the base on which combined arms reconnaissance and surveillance teams are built. Army of Excellence MI brigades lacked the ability to form these teams and relied instead on supported brigades to provide the security necessary to enable MI discipline collection. When task organized with assets of the MI battalion, these troops can collect a wide variety of combat information, ranging from threat locations to route classification data and population demographics, while simultaneously providing security for site exploitation and MI discipline collection.

**LRS company.** BFSB LRS companies are the only LRS companies in the Army. Unlike their predecessors in Army of Excellence MI brigades, the BFSB’s LRS company is fully motorized and can therefore not only conduct air and waterborne insertions, but can also insert mounted from relatively protected platforms, such as the mine resistant ambush protected all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV), which current BFSBs are scheduled to draw in theater. The vehicle is designed to offer the same level of protection as the MRAP, with the mobility of an HMMWV.

The LRS company generally conducts operations as individually deployed teams and detachments. Its features include 24-hour, all-weather, persistent surveillance and conduct combat assessment; emplace and recover sensors; target interdiction; and limited site exploitation.

**MI battalion.** The MI battalion is organized along functional lines to provide technical collection, exploitation, counterintelligence, and HUMINT support to the BFSB. Among other capabilities, MI battalion companies provide:
- Site exploitation through MFTs.
- HUMINT (including tactical interrogations, liaison and military source operations, a key component required for threat network identification and tracking).
- SIGINT.
- SIGINT terminal guidance.
- Document and media exploitation (DOMEX).
- Counterintelligence.

The Army will begin fielding Shadow tactical unmanned aerial system (TUAS) platoons to BFSB MI battalions in the FY 2013/14 timeframe. This aerial capability will enhance the BFSB’s ability to interdict threat networks through precision targeting (SIGINT), extend the BFSB’s ability to communicate over distance, and enhance the unit’s ability to conduct over-the-horizon reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

The BFSB can retain full control of all organic MI assets or, when necessary, task organize MI capability packages to support other division/corps support brigades, such as fires, aviation, sustainment, and maneuver enhancement, or provide additional assets to BCTs to thicken organic MI collection capabilities.

**Fires.** While current BFSBs lack organic indirect fire capability, they do have a robust fire support element (FSE) and an air defense airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE). The brigade can effectively plan, coordinate, and direct both Army and joint fires, including rotary and fixed wing assets, in support of its operations. It can also command and control attached indirect fire units as required. The U.S. Air Force has not resourced an organic tactical air control party (TACP) for BFSBs.

**Sustainment and C2/Communications Operations and Organization**

**Sustainment general.** The structure of the brigade support company (BSC) and

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the brigade sustainment staff, while austere, adequately supports the organic components of the brigade. Supported division corps commanders, however, must still ensure that any elements attached to the brigade report have sufficient organic sustainment capability.

S1: personnel services support and health services support. The BFSB is structured to provide the same management, planning, and mission execution functions found in other modular brigades. A pending force design update addresses shortfalls in these areas based on the addition of a third reconnaissance troop.

S4: sustainment. The S4 section performs the normal internal brigade sustainment planning and oversight functions for food service, maintenance, materiel readiness, and automated sustainment systems. In concert with the S3, the S4 is also responsible for support operations functions, which include the development and synchronization of sustainment operations, including resupply, transportation, maintenance, field services, and health services, as well as coordination with the combat sustainment support battalion/brigade (CSSB) as required. This function is performed by the forward support battalion in other BCTs and support brigades, and recent lessons learned indicate that this section would be more effective if moved to the BSC. Additional personnel for the support operations section may also be required to more effectively manage sustainment operations for any attachments to the BFSB.

The brigade support company. The BSC conducts sustainment for organic elements of the brigade only. The BSC is not organized to support attached elements, nor does it perform sustainment operations functions. Specifically, the BSC provides field feeding support; water; distribution (including POL); a supply support activity; maintenance support, which includes maintenance control; and recovery/evacuation support. The reconnaissance and surveillance squadron and organic MI battalion receive maintenance support from teams that operate in their field trains locations. The BSC can also organize forward logistics elements to help ensure uninterrupted sustainment of the battalion and squadron. The brigade’s organic capacity can sustain operations for up to 72 continuous hours and receives replenishment and higher echelon maintenance support directly from the CSSB and/or medical battalion/brigade. The BSC does not have a dedicated command post node (CPN) or joint network node (JNN) and relies on an existing node for connectivity with elements of the BFSB and supporting sustainment organizations.

C2 information systems and signal network support company. The brigade S6 supervises the employment, management, configuration, and protection of the brigade’s communications network and its interface with other Army, joint, multinational, and interagency networks and services. The section also organizes to form a network management team, a signal systems integration oversight/information dissemination management section, an information assurance and computer network defense team, and a communications security team. A relatively small (40-soldier) organic signal network support company provides the brigade’s connection to the Army’s LandWarNet global network enterprise. This company establishes and maintains connectivity via high capacity line of sight (LOS), satellite and joint network node services, including classified networks to the brigade’s command posts and BSC. The network support company also provides the brigade with the ability to extend internal brigade networks, such as the enhanced position location and reporting system (EPLRS), to ensure tactical line of sight and beyond line of sight (BLOS) network continuity to subordinate units during operations. Current equipment authorizations enable the brigade to function at a desired doctrinal level, but experience to date indicates the requirement for an additional command post node.

Capability Requirements, 2016-2028

Vision. As currently organized and resourced, the BFSB has limited ability to perform the full range of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and decide (F3EAD) tasks necessary to support operations across a corps or division AO. The future organization must be able to employ current and emerging surveillance assets, to include integration of joint assets, conducting physical ground and aerial reconnaissance, avoiding decisive engagements, and conducting MI discipline collection. The organization must also be staffed to accept additional combat multipliers, such as engineers, maneuver elements, and other supporting elements. To realize its full potential and enable the Army to meet the objectives outlined in the Army Capstone Concept, the BFSB will require additional reconnaissance assets, organic fire support, and additional diverse staff elements. The unit will also require a greater analytical capability based on the volume of combat information it collects and the scope of its mission.

Force design update (FDU) approval and resourcing. The Maneuver Center of Excellence’s mounted requirements division recently submitted an FDU to:

- Increase the personnel strength of the BFSB’s scout platoons to 36 soldiers mounted on six platforms per platoon.
- Add an additional mounted troop.
- Add a 120mm mortar section per troop.

The FDU recommends the minimum essential capabilities required to enhance the squadron’s ability to conduct the full range of tasks, which are required of all reconnaissance squadrons, and improve its ability to survive chance contact and avoid decisive engagement. This FDU is critical to ensure the BFSB is capable of operating and surviving under uncertain and complex environments, which are envisioned into the 2016-2028 timeframe.

Additional fusion and analysis capability. The BFSB’s downward reinforcing role is an important function that enables the BFSB’s wide area view of the AO. To fully realize the potential of this capability, the BFSB requires additional personnel to perform operational level fusion and analysis. Lessons learned from theater indicate that this capability is in high demand. Currently, BFSBs meet this demand through ad hoc organizations built from internal resources. Increasing the organic fusion and analysis capability will improve the effectiveness of the unit’s teams and resolve this problem.
Improved UAS capability. BFSBs are not scheduled to receive a TUAS platoon until 2013. The unit requires this capability now to add an additional layer of technical collection capability that can cover large areas more efficiently and complement the unit’s other manned and unmanned systems. Additionally, the BFSB requires long endurance, multi-role TUAS, equipped with a wide variety of sensor packages and capable of delivering cargo and conducting limited attack missions. This capability would improve the BFSB’s ability to resupply and support its LRS teams and increase the overall surveillance capabilities of the unit.

Staff enablers. The requirements for units assigned an AO vary depending on the situation, but generally include the ability to provide area security for tenant organizations within the AO, such as conducting civil-military operations and public affairs. Although the BFSB is generally not assigned an AO, it may require enablers, such as civil affairs, public affairs, psychological operations, and engineers, which enhance these capabilities. The BFSB may not require organic units to perform these functions routinely, but it does require staffs capable of planning and controlling augmenting units. The BFSB also requires additional liaison officers (LNOs). The BFSB will interact with nearly every brigade in an AO. Additional LNOs will improve the BFSB’s ability to perform area security tasks and enable area security operations across the division or corps AO.

Additional analysis. As the BFSB’s mission and roles mature, the Army must use a recognized process to determine appropriate DOTMLPF solutions to emerging Army requirements. A BFSB capabilities-based assessment (CBA), conducted in coordination with a reconnaissance and security (as well as other) functional CBAs, will provide the means to determine the optimal path forward. The BFSB CBA must be supported with appropriate Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) material on the 525th BFSB during its deployment to OEF, as well as appropriate experimentation information.

The BFSB’s potential as a force multiplier, capable of defeating threats on its own terms, currently exceeds its actual capabilities. Resourcing the improvements aforementioned in this article will bring the unit’s capabilities in line with its potential. The uncertain and complex environment characterized by persistent conflict requires an adaptable, flexible, full-spectrum unit, such as the BFSB, which is capable of setting conditions for the lasting achievement of the Army’s operational objectives.

The BFSB provides a valuable current capability as proven during both Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. The BFSB will have a significant role in meeting future Army requirements, to include security over wide areas. The ongoing warfighting function CBA will identify key capabilities requirements and potential gaps in the Army’s modular forces. Future roles and missions for modular brigades may evolve through this analysis. As we develop solutions for these modular brigades to meet the Army’s enduring requirements, we must ensure that the BFSB is analyzed and resourced within the scope of its mission.

“As currently organized and resourced, the BFSB has limited ability to perform the full range of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and decide (F3EAD) tasks necessary to support operations across a corps or division AO. The future organization must be able to employ current and emerging surveillance assets, to include integration of joint assets, conducting physical ground and aerial reconnaissance, avoiding decisive engagements, and conducting MI discipline collection.”

Notes

2Ibid., p. 3-1.
3Ibid., p. 2-1.
4Ibid., p. 2-2.
5Ibid., p. 2-4
6Ibid., pp. 2-1. 2-2.
7Defined as “the synchronized and simultaneous application of movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and control, protection, joint, interagency, intergovernment, multinational, and Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) capabilities — multiplied by leadership and complemented by information.”

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As we approached Patrol Base Doria, 25 miles south of Kirkuk City, austere and surrounded by Hesco concertainers, I was struck by the proximity of the Rashaad subdistrict council building, which served as the 4th Battalion, 15th Iraqi Army headquarters and the Rashaad police station. They “are all within 100 meters of your hooch,” Captain Jesse Prince, my predecessor, had written me in the weeks leading up to our relief in place (RIP).1 He was correct.

Although Doria was lacking some of the amenities the other troops of 6th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, would enjoy on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Warrior, I was grateful for the proximity of my troop’s new home to our soon-to-be counterparts. What Doria lacked in comfort, it would certainly make up for in convenience. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and councilmen were quite literally our neighbors. Captain Prince, the outgoing commander of Apache Troop, 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, seemed to have cracked the code on the direction in which the war was going. Shortly before our troop assumed authority for the area of operations, I asked him, “If you had to choose one thing that would make us successful, what would it be?” After a short pause, he answered quite simply, “partnership.”

I would soon learn that although the troop commander’s role in leading partnered missions had diminished considerably in Iraq since my two earlier deployments, there had never been a greater need for a transition troop commander who understood and built on basic relationships, used money as a weapons system, and took full advantage of attachments and reconnaissance capabilities to maximize the potency and effectiveness of combat enablers for our Iraqi brothers.

We’re Not in Fallujah Anymore, Dorothy

As a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I and III, my preconceptions of Iraq were formed in places such as Fallujah and Tal Afar. Fallujah, initially the “wild west” of Iraq, formed my early impressions in 2003 when the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s economy-of-force mission in Anbar Province translated to establishing law and order at the platoon and troop level. As a rookie scout platoon leader in 2d Squadron, without even a vague familiarity of doctrinal buzz words, such as full-spectrum operations, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between offensive, defensive, and stability operations.2 What I did know was that 

CAPITALIZING ON STABILITY TO LEAD TRANSITION IN THE RASHAAD VALLEY

by Captain Todd Hertling
returned to Tal Afar, in March 2005, after
ing as IEDs increased.

lieve him, but stability was clearly lack-
complacency that merely reflected a rule
the heart of Fallujah, with a passivity and
bers of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
blance of governance filling the power
of a collapsed regime, there was no sem-
working with sheikhs in 2003. In the wake
the tribal structure and the importance of
not fully appreciate the complexity of
one moment we were securing a vital
piece of infrastructure, such as a dam on
the Euphrates River, and the next, we were
engaging in something resembling a fire-
fight with looters directing suppressive
fire at us while attempting to make a quick
getaway with stolen benzin.

On 23 July 2003, I had my first experi-
ence with an improvised explosive device
(IED) and a blur of 10 months fol-
lowed, which were marked by raids, coun-
ter-IED route reconnaissance missions,
and fighting corruption and smuggling.
During these 10 months, we became per-
fectly aware that Iraq lacked a trained,
competent, and indigenous security force
to claim ownership of its country. We did
not fully appreciate the complexity of
the tribal structure and the importance of
working with sheikhs in 2003. In the wake
of a collapsed regime, there was no sem-
bliance of governance filling the power
vacuum. I remember newly formed mem-
ers of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
(ICDC) casually waving traffic through
the heart of Fallujah, with a passivity and
complacency that merely reflected a rule
of law and institutions that did not exist
—and probably would not for some time.
My platoon sergeant told me we would
be here many years. I did not want to be-
lieve him, but stability was clearly lack-
aging as IEDs increased.

During my second tour, our squadron
returned to Tal Afar, in March 2005, after
being redirected from southern Baghdad.
As we arrived, IEDs, small-arms fire, and
mortar attacks were obviously more prev-
alent than in 2003 — Zarqawi and al-Qa-
eda in Iraq were fueling sectarian ten-
sions by pitting Sunni against Shiite.
There were certainly more combined op-
erations with the Iraqi Army (IA) than
we had seen during OIF I, but the Iraqi
police (IP) in Nineawa had abandoned its
post in Tal Afar prior to our arrival; it
was clear that fear and intimidation —
not security — ruled the city.

These early experiences shaped my ex-
pectations long before deploying to the
Rashaad Valley, south of Kirkuk, as com-
mander of C Troop, 6th Squadron, 1st
Cavalry, in December 2009. The surge had
exceeded popular expectations in creating
a stable Iraq and setting the condi-
tions for parliamentary elections, which
would take place in March 2010. Security
was good enough to capitalize on bring-
ing essential services to the Iraqi people
in hopes of perpetuating additional secu-
rity, increased investments, and ultimate-
ly a better quality of life.

What was most surprising — and the
greatest change from earlier deployments
— was the level of independence with
which ISF, particularly the IA, were con-
ducting operations. Gone were the uni-
lateral U.S. raids and cordon and search
missions involving zip-strips and evacu-
ation of detainees to U.S. patrol bases.

We were now almost exclusively execu-
ting a follow-and-support mission, where
arrests required Iraqi warrants and com-
pliance with Iraqi law. “By, with, and
through the ISF” was the catchphrase as
we closed Patrol Base Doria at the end of
2009.3 It would remain the slogan until
the base closed in June 2010.

The Temptation of Mission Creep

“You are an enabler, not a battlespace
owner, no matter what anyone says. If you
understand that and own that role, you
will be very successful.” Captain Prince
had emphasized prior to his departure.4

Mission creep (the tendency to usurp
command authority from the IA leaders
we were supposed to mentor) was a chal-
lenege he had overcome with his troop,
whose role evolved after the security
agreement declared U.S. forces were to
follow the lead of the IA and do what the
Iraqi command wanted to do.5

Not even a month into our deployment,
I realized this would be my greatest bat-
tle. Assuming a smaller role is often very
difficult to accept for most aggressive
type-A combat arms officers, myself in-
cluded. But our Iraqi partners were clear-
ly in the lead, operating independently
and consistently, and doing so quite ef-
fecively. I was very wary of taking that
initiative away from them and injecting
myself into the equation, thereby induc-
ing the dilemma of cultural dependency,
which the U.S. had struggled to overcome
since the war began. But how could I con-
tribute to the cause as a “transition” troop
commander? With a more permissive en-
vironment that contrasted so sharply with
my previous combat tours, what was my
role?

David Kilcullen believes that “in coun-
terinsurgency, the initiative is everything.
If the enemy is reacting to you, you con-
trol the environment. Provided you mo-
bilize the population, you will win.”6

Clearly, the 4th IA Battalion had grasped
the initiative with the help of Captain
Prince’s troop. Now, we needed to main-
tain that initiative to facilitate a smooth
and successful transition and finalize IA
control of the operating environment
(OE). In an OE where a very proficient in-
digenous force was already largely hold-
ing the initiative for us, the next logical
step seemed to be to foster the relation-
ship with that force and reap the benefits.

To succeed, we needed to view the ISF
as a combat multiplier for our cavalry
troop, and they would have to see us as a
combat enabler, providing them with the
benefits of more technologically advanced
equipment and weaponry. Of course, a
transition commander cannot start a rela-

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“I would soon learn that although the troop commander’s role in leading partnered missions had diminished considerably in Iraq since my two earlier deployments, there had never been a greater need for a transition troop commander who understood and built on basic relationships, used money as a weapons system, and took full advantage of attachments and reconnaissance capabilities to maximize the potency and effectiveness of combat enablers for our Iraqi brothers.”
tionship with his counterpart under such icy 'quid pro quo' terms.

**Exercising a Common-Sense Approach**

As a simple gesture, we invited the 4th IA Battalion commander to dinner at our patrol base one evening. During dinner, he paused from his meal to address my soldiers and thanked them for their sacrifices. He then he talked about how the main supply route running through our sector had been the most dangerous in the Rashahad Valley until he had effectively shut down all IED activity! He promised more of the same for our team. Very quickly, a trusting relationship formed, paid huge dividends, and had us working as a team with our neighbors.

Such a partnership proved important during our first week in sector when our rapid aerostat initial deployment (RAID) surveillance camera monitor observed a man digging near a road during an odd hour of the night. Picking up the 'bat phone' (our direct land-line connected with IA and IP headquarters), we shared the six-digit grid with the 4th IA Battalion tactical operations center (TOC). Within the hour, Iraqi soldiers made contact with the man, who happened to be a farmer digging an irrigation canal during cooler hours of the night, not an insurgent attempting to emplace an IED, as we had suspected. The IA resolved the situation with only a grid from us. Had we reacted instead, we would likely have scared the farmer, immediately been isolated from the population, and yielded no results from a man who was trying to farm his fields with relief from the heat.

Like any good relationship, there had to be reciprocation. Logistically, the IA was still struggling to requisition fuel, ammunition, and repair parts, as it had during my previous tours. In this area, we hosted IA noncommissioned officer professional development classes, stressing the importance of paper trails and following up with higher headquarters on supply requests. Our mechanics also helped train the IA maintenance team in the basics of M1114 preventive maintenance checks and services.

There are many invaluable common-sense approaches to assist transitioning units. For example, insurgents fire on a Sons of Iraq (SOI) checkpoint and flee; however, the IA security officer manages to recover the shell casings. In this case, our unit would offer to send the casings to a lab for fingerprinting, which certainly aids in prosecution. In the meantime, the commander, 1st Company, detains two individuals he believes are responsible for the attacks. Our unit would arm him with X-Spray and show him how to test the detainees for explosives handling. We would also offer identity detection equipment and search databases for high-value target (HVT) matches.

We may have had gadgetry for diagnosing forensic evidence, but one of the most important factors that a competent, indigenous force, such as the 4th IA Battalion, contributed to our initiative was an intimate cultural and tactical understanding of the operating environment. While there was a security vacuum before 4th Battalion established a presence, its soldiers quickly grew to know the area intimately. More often than not, they found IEDs before we did, which was attributed to their close relationships with the local populace. The soldiers of the 4th Battalion were not just stumbling across these IEDs — they were receiving tips from sources. The transition commander who checks his ego at the door and understands this simple fact will do very well. It was a proud day when our Iraqi partners identified an IED, reported it to our unit and the Iraqi ordnance disposal team, and established a cordon until the explosive ordnance disposal team (EOD) arrived and dismantled the threat — all without help from their U.S. partners.

**Nonlethal Effects: Outbidding the Enemy**

Relationship building did not stop with our partners; transition commanders also spend a lot of time participating in key leader engagements. When I was not meeting with Iraqi battalion commanders and S3s to review weekly operations schedules, I was meeting with the Rashahad police and SOI contractors, who had effectively turned the tide of conflict by employing disfranchised, angry insurgents, making them responsible for security checkpoints throughout the Rashahad Valley. While not necessarily as trustworthy as the IA leadership, keeping open lines of communications with the SOI contractors was just as important as maintaining the relationship with the IA battalion commander and his leaders. Hearing their grievances over endless glasses of chai gave us an understanding of the nearly 2,000 SOI in the battlespace, most of whom would begin transitioning to government and police jobs in mid-2010.

Incorporating the IP chief into the meetings allowed us to focus on security. Although they were not the most productive meetings from an intelligence standpoint, they were critical to gaining a central understanding of what motivated the SOI to stay at their posts — a source of income. Reassuring the SOI that we and our IA partners were doing everything possible to keep them employed solidified our relationship and ensured the SOI remained decidedly opposed to the insurgent groups from which they came.

Catering to the self-interest of our partners also extended to the arena of local governance and the Rashahad District Council. Continuing with commander's...
With the 4th IA Battalion having seized the tactical initiative and making possible a permissive environment for public service delivery, our common interests were extensive. These priorities included repairing broken pipelines to enhance water delivery to Rashaad citizens, empowering council members by providing them with humanitarian aid packages to take to their villages, and sponsoring microgrants for Rashaad’s small business entrepreneurs, such as print shop owners, barbers, and grocers, to encourage economic development. We built trust with Rashaad’s representative council and they in turn gained the popular support of constituencies, leaving little room for insurgents.

Just as attachments can help shape a commander’s tactical advantage, they are also tremendous combat multipliers when tackling issues of civil capacity. The Kirkuk Provincial Reconstruction Team representative, with whom we worked closely, was a remarkable asset to our team as we supervised the Rashaad council’s government proceedings. With the help of the team representative, informed outreach to our local powerbrokers allowed us to capitalize on the stable environment by bringing technical expertise on projects and public services delivery.

Maintaining the initiative in this effort entailed being available to provide input on budgeting and project prioritization. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, describes initiative as it relates to stability conditions. As conditions improve, “Commanders identify objectives that may be nonmilitary, but are critical to achieving the end state. Such objectives may include efforts to ensure effective governance, reconstruction projects that promote social well-being, and consistent actions to improve public safety. All of these contribute to retaining and exploiting the initiative in stability operations.”

Under the terms of the security agreement, we could not be as proactive with money as past U.S. commanders had once been in Iraq. The Government of Iraq (GoI) and provincial government were the primary institutions responsible for procuring cash for the Rashaad council’s local budget. Just as the impressive independence of the 4th IA Battalion demanded a more laissez-faire leadership style from our troop’s leaders, legitimizing the Rashaad council in the eyes of its people required us to assume a hands-off approach. It was their budget, and these were their project priorities. A troop commander’s opinion did not matter as much as it used to in these areas. Still, a close partnership with the council chairman afforded us their confidence as respected advisors to their progress in representative government. While we were very careful not to usurp their authority as council members, we could still provide “a way” for the council to consider an issue.

**The Transition Commander and Reconnaissance: Validating the Cavalry**

Although our role as a lethal force was much more limited than it had been during previous operations; our new role as combat enablers for the 4th IA Battalion actually enhanced the need for reconnaissance and heeding its fundamentals, including gaining and maintaining threat contact. This became especially important with cumbersome platforms such as the mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. We were no doubt pleased with the increased survivability of our primary fighting vehicle; however, what we gained in survivability, we lost in flexibility and maneuverability. On the restricted and severely restricted terrain of the Rashaad Valley, even our ISF partners left us in the dust as they embarked on objectives in pickup trucks or M1114s. Also, our deployable task organization did not include the M3A3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) of the organic heavy brigade combat team’s reconnaissance squadron, so we had to adapt.

Protecting our lines of communications, with FOB Warrior 25 miles away, was a key task in our mission, regardless of part-
nership. Captain Prince’s unit had used the commander’s independent viewer (CIV) optics on their CFVs to maintain continuous reconnaissance on potential IED emplacers on the alternate supply route that ran through our area of operations. Although our lack of Bradleys meant no CIVs, we still had three long-range advanced scout surveillance systems (LRAS3) to use.

Having only the capability to mount the LRAS3 on M1151s, we needed to innovate. Our mechanics removed an M1114 turret from our fleet of HMMWVs, fabricated it to fit the LRAS3 and M240, and mounted it on our Caimans. This allowed us to conduct area and route reconnaissance missions with a tremendous scouting capability. By mounting one LRAS3 on each of our senior scout trucks, we compensated for the MRAP’s lack of maneuverability and turned a liability into an asset. The LRAS3 turret mount modification, used on an observation post in concert with OH-58Ds from the scout weapons team or the troop’s organic Raven unmanned aircraft system, was very effective in allowing our scout platoons to confirm or deny enemy IED activity with little need to action the clumsy, top-heavy trucks unnecessarily.

The RAID camera was without a doubt our most important reconnaissance and security asset. It was also a tremendous combat enabler for our Iraqi neighbors. Maintaining both infrared and daytime television zoom capabilities from a 107-foot tower, we had a conservative 6-kilometer radius for a clearly defined line of sight from the patrol base. In our enemy pattern analysis, we noticed that most of the activity in our operating environment was outside of the camera’s 6-kilometer radius. Apparently, the enemy knew its presence would be outside of the camera’s scope. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, notes that “The threat of detection often compels the enemy to limit or cease operations. This inaction allows friendly forces to seize the initiative. Interference with enemy command and control through nonlethal means can also limit enemy effectiveness and increase its exposure to attack.”

Through continuous reconnaissance, we could maintain the initiative. About midway through the deployment, we suspected a new enemy IED cell was operating in our area of operations based on activity we observed within the RAID’s security perimeter. One night, we watched two emplacers digging along our alternate supply route well within the RAID’s line of sight; only a new cell would have tested the camera’s powerful security bubble.

Our RAID operator in the command post recorded two insurgents as they approached the road, hid in a culvert, emplaced the IED, and ran toward an abandoned building. Meanwhile, we alerted our IA partners, spun up a combined quick reaction force (QRF) platoon, and took action on the threat with MRAPS and a scout weapons team based on a grid we obtained by lasing the building in which the insurgents hid. The next day, we shared the RAID recording with our IA S2 counterpart, who detained two suspects from a neighboring village within the week. Videos were found in the suspects’ home, which illustrated Naqshabandi training and propaganda; following this event, we did not observe any enemy activity within the RAID’s perimeter.

As helpful as technology was to the fight, it did not quite take the place of our best reconnaissance — the eyes and ears of our ISF counterparts. On one occasion, the IA battalion commander asked if I could coordinate a scout weapons team in support of a mission he was planning. Local sources had given him a tip on a HVT, again, information our troop would not have been privy to otherwise. His plan was to capture a slippery HVT by using civilian pickup trucks to conduct a raid and defeat the enemy’s intricate early warning system. He was concerned that his use of HMMWVs would give the enemy a chance to escape; whereas, locals would be none the wiser to loitering civilian vehicles carrying IA soldiers.

While Kilcullen believes that “the natural tendency is to build forces in our own image, with the aim of eventually handling our role over to them,” he also thinks “this is a mistake. Instead, local indigenous forces need to mirror the enemy’s capabilities, and seek to supplement the insurgent’s role.” The IA battalion commander was doing just that — his ingenuity and outside-the-box thinking only enhanced our ability to maintain threat contact and press the initiative.

Base Closure

On 4 June 2010, the Iraqi receivership secretary landed with a team of Hip helicopters at Patrol Base Doria to sign for the patrol base. The signing ceremony was the final milestone in our troop’s partnership with the 4th Iraqi Army Battalion, but we could leave knowing that our ISF brothers would be just fine in our absence. Placing trust in them and leaning on their competency, which had been foreign to me during my first deployments, we could hand over our patrol base with confidence. I now knew they had the training and ability to continue stability operations in the Rashad Valley, which was possible by creating a laissez-faire leadership style and giving them our trust from the beginning. The ISF were battle hardened and prepared for assuming responsibility for the area of operations because we had empowered them. The transition troop commander must understand the power of partnerships, how money can be used to bolster governance and de-legitimize the enemy, and the prominent role that reconnaiss ance plays as a combat enabler.

Leaving the isolated Patrol Base Doria, Hesco concertiners surrounding the IA battalion instead of us, I had the confidence not to look back.

Notes

1Captain Jesse Prince, e-mail, 25 November 2009.
4Captain Jesse Prince, e-mail, 25 November 2009.
5Leaders’ Guide to the Security Agreement.”
7Ibid., p. 5.
8FM 3-0, Operations, p. 3-3.
9I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Canfield, who first suggested to me that a transition commander requires a more laissez-faire leadership style vis-a-vis his Iraqi Army counterparts.
10Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, March 2010, p. 3-2. FM 3-20.96 describes the fundamentals of reconnaissance in greater detail: ensure continuous reconnaissance; do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve; orient on the reconnaissance objective; report all information rapidly and accurately; retain freedom of maneuver; gain and maintain enemy contact with the smallest element possible; and develop the situation.
11FM 3-0, Operations, p. 3-5.
12Kilcullen, p. 8.

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Echoes from the Past

by Command Sergeant Major Paul E. Thompson

“In the past 81 years, warriors in the Armor and Cavalry field have derived many good ideas. Unfortunately, as the lessons from Panama, Desert Storm, and Somalia get farther away with time, many fade into history, along with the totally forgotten lessons from earlier wars. These are the very same lessons we continually learn and relearn at the combat training centers (CTCs).”

This article is not tactical or doctrinal; it’s the cold hard facts of leadership. It comes from observations over the past 6 years, based on three different organizations and 28 months of deployment to Iraq.

Since 11 September 2001, we have raised a whole new generation of very capable combat noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Combat experience is more prevalent now than it has been since the Vietnam War, which is both good and bad. From a good standpoint, our troopers have become NCOs and we are passing on the hard lessons learned in combat to our newest troopers. However, from a bad standpoint, many of the basics that our senior NCOs learned from their predecessors are not passed on to new NCOs. Fundamentally, standards and discipline are among these critical shortfalls, as well as other things — now is the time to deal with these issues.

Standards and discipline are the foundation of what we do as an Army. When those standards and discipline are compromised, for whatever reason, the organization will suffer. The honest brokers for the organization have gotten lazy: “When unit leaders do not conform to established policies pertaining to the wear and appearance of the uniform, they take away authority from our junior NCOs to make uniform corrections on their soldiers.” The honest brokers are the senior NCOs in the unit. This quote originates from the same article where (now) Sergeant Major of the Army Kenneth Preston drew parallels between uniform discipline and other unit deficiencies such as wearing earrings and piercings in violation of Army Regulations, lax safety standards, deficient preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on equipment, and inattentive weapons accountability. Guess what? Over the past couple of years, the same problems he spoke of 10 years ago have raised their ugly heads.

The problem with enforcing standards and discipline boils down to three words found at the end of a quote from Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer, February 1988: “Much has been written about the supposed demise of discipline in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Cause of the deterioration has been placed largely at the feet of a permissive society. The feet do the walking — the head does the talking. Deterioration of discipline has one root cause… lack of leadership.”

This article poses that a lack of leadership recurs in conjunction mostly with wars that have dragged on or directly following the end of war. As it happens frequently, all leaders must apply leadership to make positive course corrections.

Besides uniform standards, many things suffer as a result of a lack of leadership. Various observations in many units at combat training centers have included disrespecting the flag, disrespecting officers and NCOs, hand-waving risk management, and committing safety viola-
tions, including speeding and not wearing seat belts. These deficiencies were often corrected by observer controller-trainers (OC-Ts), but should have been corrected by the NCOs in charge of these troopers.

Another universal casualty of deteriorating standards and discipline is maintenance. All you have to do is check an operator’s 5988-E to know whether or not maintenance is being performed. During one training rotation as an OC-T, it became so apparent that PMCS was being overlooked that I began asking to see operator’s licenses, dispatches, and 5988-E forms, which led to the discovery of 34 other M1151s that had not even been dispatched for the exercise. They had been ‘borrowed’ from another unit and never entered into the unit’s unit-level logistics system boxes. Although the problem was fixed within hours, it does not negate the fact that unit leaders failed to ask the right questions or put in place preventive measures to avoid these types of malfunctions. The morning following this incident, as I walked through the unit area in the brigade support area, I saw what appeared to be an operator performing PMCS on his vehicle. As I approached the soldier to congratulate him on his efforts, he gave me a funny look and told me he was not the operator. He clarified, “We are mechanics doing spot checks on vehicles because the engine in one of our vehicles seized up last night due to lack of antifreeze.” I sighed and told him to carry on. Later on, as I passed by again, the mechanic showed me a dry transmission dipstick, which belonged to a transmission that had a Class III leak that had caused the failure. This is indeed the ultimate deadline maintenance — the NCOs in charge did not check or supervise their soldiers in the conduct of a regular daily duty.

The lack of pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) is another frequent problem among units. This can be a single point of failure for an organization and can lead to serious predicaments such as running out of fuel before the mission is complete or running out of ammunition in the middle of a firefight. As leaders, we have all seen deployed units become complacent in conducting PCCs/PCIs; however, to reinforce productivity, leaders should spot check these things from time to time to reinforce the notion of “honest broker.”

U.S. Army leaders are moving at a very fast pace while simultaneously fighting two wars and continuing the Army’s transformation. While these things keep us very busy, we need to reestablish leadership of our units; there are no good reasons for abrogating our responsibilities as leaders.

Another critical discussion is leaders failing to hold subordinates accountable for shortfalls and deficiencies. During my tenure as command sergeant major (CSM) of 6th Squadron, 9th U.S. Cavalry, we built our squadron from the ground up. I was constantly and consistently making on-the-spot corrections, deficiencies that were happening in full view of NCOs. Instead of one deficiency, there are now several — in addition to correcting the original deficiency, there now exists problems with the NCO and his supervisor. We have NCOs at several levels of the Army to supervise at their levels and learn the next level of supervision (or higher). To reinforce the process of accountabili-
y, I enlisted the aid of my first sergeants, who enlisted the aid of their platoon sergeants, and so on, until we were down to the lowest level of leaders. This top-down approach made it clear to our troopers what was expected of them. I also introduced the tenet ‘don’t expect what you don’t inspect,’ into conversations with my NCOs, and soon the squadron CSM was making fewer on-the-spot corrections because his junior NCOs were getting the idea.

We also introduced an NCO professional development (NCOPD) program and the first class was made up of all NCOs in the squadron. It was on duties and responsibilities of the NCO and I interwove the squadron commander’s command philosophy into the class. It was lengthy, but drove home the point. Most soldiers do not go out of their way to do the wrong thing; in some cases, you just have to show them what ‘right looks like.’ As a general rule, I never propose micro-management; “The officer must guide his subordinates, answer questions, and supervise them. But over-supervision indicates a basic mistrust and creates undue friction. The officer must learn when it is wise to be present and when to be absent.” This is a quote by an officer about an officer, but holds true for an NCO supervising enlisted personnel. NCOs need to set the standard, teach the standard, enforce the standard, and retrain the standard as required. There are times that NCOs will be required to accomplish other missions concurrently and be present elsewhere. If subordinates know that NCOs will check their work, they will most likely do it right the first time. This process of trust builds better relationships and mutual respect between NCOs and soldiers, who will not only complete the mission, but consistently complete it to standard without direct supervision. This relationship is ideal for identifying new leadership prospects among E4s and below.

Supervising also implies that leaders will be present to check work; there should be only rare occasions when NCOs are not supervising soldiers and assisting them in mission accomplishment. This method has been tried and true for more

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“Standards and discipline are the foundation of what we do as an Army. When those standards and discipline are compromised, for whatever reason, the organization will suffer. The honest brokers for the organization have gotten lazy: ‘When unit leaders do not conform to established policies pertaining to the wear and appearance of the uniform, they take away authority from our junior NCOs to make uniform corrections on their soldiers.’”
Part 10

No expense should be spared when orienting our soldiers to a combat area of operations. In the case of Iraq, a critical part of our effort is to get inside the cultural context of both Iraqi partners, as well as adversaries. Only by putting aside our prejudices, suspending disbelief, and examining Iraqi history and culture from the inside, including the pervasive influence of Islam, can we begin to empower soldiers — Iraqi and American alike — in their efforts to stabilize the country and erode the appeal of militant Islamists. One way to accomplish this is to become familiar with what Iraqis know about their own history, as well as the writings of Iraqi scholars, who have influenced that knowledge. Although histories of Iraq, written in English by well-respected American authors are insightful, historical narratives in Arabic reflect the most authentically Iraqi perspective. Fortunately, through the linguistic and literary talents of Commander Aboul-Enein, we now have access, in English, to historical narratives written by Dr. Ali al-Wardi. Commander Aboul-Enein, besides being a regular guest lecturer in my graduate and undergraduate Middle East courses at National Defense Intelligence College, brings rare expertise that has helped us shape the understanding of a new generation of America’s defense intelligence professionals.
Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History:
of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Dr. Ali al-Wardi is widely read by Iraq’s intelligentsia and his works can be found not only on the book shelves of academics, but in Iraqi government offices, as well as in prison libraries. We cannot afford for American units to deploy to Iraq without being exposed to his ideas. Commander Aboul-Enein and ARMOR have provided a great service by highlighting Wardi’s work in this series of review essays. The current essay focuses on Wardi’s treatment of the delicate stage of Iraq’s founding — an unwieldy unitary state created to serve imperial British interests and composed of three distinct former Ottoman administrative districts. Readers will discover interesting historical details that shed light on current problems such as a 1922 fatwa (religious edict) endorsed by Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite clerics to address the threat from Wahabi renegades attacking southern Iraq. It is an example of Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis agreeing that the Wahabis were not acting out of religious conviction, but simply using evangelism as an excuse to loot, pillage, and murder. Perhaps it is a template for Iraqi cooperation in dealing with today’s Islamic extremists. It is my hope that this series will be used to educate units deploying to Iraq, and more importantly, stimulate discussion among our soldiers. I also see the series as a valuable resource for my students at the National Defense Intelligence College and look forward to the fresh insights these articles will stimulate.

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The 1920 Revolt was the first nationalist movement inspired by Iraqis and unified many disparate elements toward the concept of an independent Iraq. British officials came to the realization that they could no longer ignore public sentiment and at least shape events toward transitioning Iraqi independence. This essay of the ARMOR series discusses the sixth volume of Ali al-Wardi’s seminal, “Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History.” It is important to study this work as it delves into the mechanics and intricacies of creating modern Iraq in 1922 and its path to complete independence 10 years later. Aside from Arabic sources, Wardi spent part of 1973 reviewing original documents at the British Archives in London, which relies on the two volumes published in 1961 from the correspondence of Ms. Gertrude Bell. Wardi, as a sociology professor, used students at the University of Baghdad, who were pursuing Masters-level and Doctoral degrees in sociology and history, to supplement the research of his sixth volume. The author obtains diaries from Arab, Ottoman, and British officials, local newspapers of the period, and finally oral histories to capture the events of Iraq’s independence through the lens of tribal elders.

The current high commissioner, A.T. Wilson, left in September 1920, and Sir Percy Cox arrived in Basra within the week. Cox was met by Said (an honorific title connoting descent from Prophet Muhammad) Sheikh Taleb Naqib and Sheikh Khazzal, both major leaders in southern Iraq. Sheikh Taleb was a prominent figure who played off the Wahabis, Hashemites, Ottomans, and the British in a single-minded quest to increase and maintain his power. He was among those vying for kingship of Iraq, and led a movement called “Iraq for Iraqis,” attempting to thwart British designs to install Hashemite rule in Iraq. Volume six describes Taleb’s final act in Iraqi politics before disappearing into obscurity.

Sir Percy Cox and the Creation of the Iraqi Mandate

Wardi discusses the dynamism of Cox’s tenure. Landing in Basra, he spent a few days in southern Iraq, traveling by plane to Nasiriyyah, Amarah, Kurna and Qal’aa Saleh, making himself available to consult with tribal elders, religious notables, and officials. He took a riverboat, and then a train, from Basra to Baghdad, arriving in mid-October 1920 to a reception of Baghdad’s notables and General Haldane, command-in-chief of British forces in Iraq. The reception included a military salute and playing “God Save the King.” These ceremonies were designed to showcase the military might and government control of England, while simultaneously drawing closer those Iraqi revolutionaries who wanted a smooth transition toward independence and divorcing them from reactionaries who wanted a violent overthrow of the British mandate. Cox immediately got to business, assigning Ms. Gertrude Bell as his oriental secretary and entering into discussions on the prospects of establishing a provisional government.
In London and Baghdad, there developed an anti-Cox coalition, which sought to undermine his plans for gradual independence of Iraq. This group believed in the theories of social Darwinism, the white man’s burden, and the civilizing mission of England toward her subject peoples. This faction argued that it would take generations to expunge tribalism from Iraqi society. In 1923, Thomas Lyell published, “The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia,” whose central thesis insisted that Iraqis, specifically, and Muslims, in general, were incapable of self-rule. Lyell argued that the Islamic faith was not progressive and it would wreck any attempt at instilling national loyalty impulses. When reading this, think of regrettable statements made in the 21st century by so-called experts in the United States and Middle East who believe that Iraq can only be ruled by dictatorship and that Iraqis are incapable of democratic rule. This anti-Cox faction within the British bureaucracy and military was outraged at the pardon of political agitators, such as Yousef al-Suwaidi, and the Cox policy of reducing taxation in Iraq.

Cox pressed ahead with plans to form a temporary council of ministers and there was discussion of Sheikh Taleb as provisional prime minister. Among Baghdad’s most premier families, they settled on Abdul-Rahman al-Gaylani as prime minister. The temporary ministry included Jafar al-Askari as defense minister; Sheikh Taleb as interior minister; Sussoon Hasqiel as minister of finance; Mustafa Aloussi as minister of religious affairs; and Hassan Babji as justice minister. This provisional ministry lasted from October 1920 to January 1921; they created eight functional ministries, and 14 posts of ministers without portfolio, who provided major Baghdad families and tribal elders with a voice in the central government. The ministers met twice a week at the home of Sheikh Taleb, who played a major role in the formation of this temporary government and assigned a British aide or advisor to each minister.

The integration of Shiites into the temporary council of ministers was a challenge for Cox. This was due to anti-Shiite sentiment among Sunnis, as well as Shiite clergy dissenting Shiites from participating in the government, in any form, by decreeing that anyone who joined this government would be collaborating with nonbelievers. After much negotiation, Cox and Sheikh Taleb brought Bahr al-Uloom Tabatai in as the minister of education and health. The Kurds were represented by Ezrat Kirkukli as the minister of labor and transport.

Creation of Iraqi Institutions
Hashemite Prince Feisal Ibn Hussein of the Arab Revolt began a political campaign, lobbying to be named King of Iraq. He ran the newspaper al-Istiqlal (The Independence) and many of his Iraqi officers began returning to Iraq from Syria. Among those close to Prince Feisal was Provisional Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari. Between 1920 and 1921, 111 Iraqis in Syria were demobilized from the Ottoman army and returned to Iraq. Among the first appropriations of the temporary government were 75,000 silver rupees to repatriate Iraqis and their families. Cox invited many of the senior officers, such as Nuri Said, to lunch as a means of reintegrating them into Iraq’s emerging political and bureaucratic structures. Iraqis in Turkey began to return, including students, merchants, military officers, professionals, and bureaucrats. There began a slow transition from British and Indian bureaucrats to Iraqis and, on January 1921, the Iraqi army command was established with ten officers. This bureaucracy absorbed thousands of Iraqis as battalions of inspectors and logisticians formed. Cox, Lieutenant Colonel Jafar al-Askari, Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Said, and Sheikh Taleb oversaw the process of reintegrating Iraqis into the civil service, bureaucracy, and emerging government.

Shiite reluctance to collaborate with the British meant the army became overwhelmingly Sunni. The view of Grand Ayatollah Mehdi Khalsi was that an oppressive Muslim was better than a just infidel. During this period, pro-independent Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi died in August 1920, and was replaced as leader of the Shiites in Iraq by Grand Ayatollah Fathallah Isfahani. Isfahani died 5 months later, passing the mantle to Grand Ayatollah Shiraizi, who was avidly anti-British and wanted an immediate break with England. The new Grand Ayatollah refused to meet with Cox, much like Grand Ayatollah Sistani refusing to meet face to face with Ambassador Paul Bremer, and worked through intermediaries to communicate with American officials. Of note, Grand Ayatollah Khalsi, the leading Shiite cleric during Iraq’s formation as a nation-state, was an Iraqi who accepted Persian citizenship to avoid Ottoman military conscription. This nuance is significant in the struggle for leadership within the Najaf hawza (clerical hierarchy). Today, Muqtada al-Sadr is playing on his urubah (Arabness) in speeches to distinguish himself from Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who is Persian, but spent his life in Iraq.

The British Recruit a King: Prince Feisal and the Creation of an Iraqi Monarchy
After Cox completed the formation of a temporary ministry, he strove to undertake the difficult job of lo-

"Prince Feisal’s father, who was the king of the Hejaz and Sherief of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, demanded Feisal refuse the throne of Iraq in favor of his other brother, Prince Abdullah, who was camped in Amman, Jordan. The father wrote Feisal that his acceptance of Iraq would be construed as selfishness on his part and overt collusion with the British."

"In August 1920, British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, began making overtures to the French government, eliciting their views on the British making Feisal king of Iraq. The French had an extremely low opinion of Feisal; however, the British argued that a cadre of Iraqi leaders had expressed their desire for Feisal, and at the end, London could redeploy 70,000 troops currently used to keep the peace in Iraq."
the candidate would have to be acceptable to both the Iraqis and his superiors in London. Jafar al-Askari, who was a member of Prince Feisal's entourage, worked diligently to lobby for Feisal to be named king of Iraq; he was aided in his effort by Nuri al-Said and Gertrude Bell, Cox's oriental secretary. Wardi notes from his archival research that A.T. Wilson, Cox's predecessor, was the first to propose Prince Feisal as king of Iraq in a cable to London. Wilson argued this would be a decent consolation after Feisal had been forcibly removed as king of Syria by French Forces in 1920.

In August 1920, British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, began making overtures to the French government, eliciting their views on the British making Feisal king of Iraq. The French had an extremely low opinion of Feisal; however, the British argued that a cadre of Iraqi leaders had expressed their desire for Feisal, and at the end, London could redeploy 70,000 troops currently used to keep the peace in Iraq.

In November 1920, Lord Curzon wrote to Feisal, who was exiled from Syria to Northern Italy after his defeat at the Battle of Maysalun, and invited him to come to London for talks. Wardi recounts the meeting between Curzon and Feisal; the British foreign minister greeted Feisal and asked why he was not wearing his traditional Arab robes and headaddress. Feisal responded that "they (the French) stripped me of my country (Syria), and I have stripped myself of these robes." Curzon responded, "You will don better Arab robes than the ones lost." Feisal understood the offer immediately; with his dethronement as king of Syria, he would become king of Iraq. By the end of the month, Curzon dispatched Major Kinahan Cornwallis as Feisal's personal aide. His mission was to not only advise Feisal, but ensure that he accepted the concept of gradual independence for the Iraqi mandate, dissuade him from conducting any raids or retribution against French forces in Syria, and finally ensure the perception that he was not a pawn in British hands. In addition to French pressures against Feisal, the prince's own family added its own pressures.

Prince Feisal's father, who was the king of the Hejaz and Sherief of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, demanded Feisal refuse the throne of Iraq in favor of his other brother, Prince Abdullah, who was camped in Amman, Jordan. The father wrote Feisal that his acceptance of Iraq would be construed as selfishness on his part and overt collusion with the British. Major Cornwallis kept Lord Curzon informed of the father's correspondence to Prince Feisal and proposed that either Sir Cox hold an informal plebiscite to give voice to Iraqi desires for Feisal or Prince Abdullah depart Amman and assume the throne of Iraq. He recommended the second course of action, saying that organizing a plebiscite would be difficult in the short-run, but acknowledged that Feisal assuming the throne of Iraq would be in Britain's long-term interests. Feisal, however, refused to assume the throne of Iraq, unless his brother Abdullah publicly surrendered his claims to Iraq to him.

Winston Churchill, the 1921 Cairo Conference, and the Objection of Prince Abdullah

Winston Churchill became British colonial secretary in February 1921. The Middle East portfolio became his to solve and his first act was to create a Middle East bureau and bring in T.E. Lawrence to advise him. Churchill expressed his wish for a conference to be convened in Cairo that year to solve the remaining problems of World War I, which was the Middle East, in general, and Iraq, specifically.

The Cairo Conference convened in March 1921; delegates from Iraq included Cox, Gertrude Bell, General Haldane, Jafar al-Askari, and Sassoon Hasqiel. Churchill and T.E. Lawrence attended and it was agreed that Prince Feisal would make the optimal monarch for Iraq, which was acceptable to most Iraqis and the British. T.E. Lawrence, according to Wardi's book, proposed that the British Royal Air Force be the main arm used to subdue tribes and bring order, allowing British expeditionary troops to depart. Soon after the Cairo Conference, Churchill and Lawrence met Prince Abdullah and he was told of the decision to make his brother king of Iraq. The prince, encamped in Amman of present-day Jordan, took the news badly. It took weeks of negotiations, and the British used the carrot-and-stick approach with Abdullah. First, they cleared the territory in mandated Palestine, known as Transjordan, and created a kingdom for Abdullah to rule. Palestine proper would remain a British mandate until their withdrawal in 1948. They also affirmed that if Abdullah were able to successfully bring about a revolt against the French in Syria, London would not stand in his way, should he name himself king of Transjordan and Syria. They also threatened that without British military help, Ibn Saud, in Central Arabia, could arrive in Mecca and evict his father, who was king of the Hejaz. Prince Abdullah relented to the demands of the British for his brother to become king of Iraq, although he never was warm to the idea.

Said Taleb Agitates and Challenges Plans for Feisal to be Named King

Said Taleb felt his political marginalization when he was not among the Iraqis invited to the Cairo Conference. He used the absence of Sir Percy Cox to agitate and stimulate his “Iraq for Iraqis’ movement.” Taleb traveled around Iraq, lobbying that he

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be a candidate for king of Iraq, and promised, if selected, he would release political prisoners; newspapers denouncing Prince Feisal began appearing even before the return of the Iraqi delegation from Cairo. When Cox returned in April 1921, he found Iraq divided into the Sherifian faction (those wanting Prince Feisal or Abdullah as king) and the ‘Iraq for Iraqis’ faction under Said Taleb.

Cox held off announcing the main decision of the Cairo Conference, the selection of Prince Feisal as king, and addressed issues resolved in Cairo, which included military compensation of Iraqis, internal security of Iraq, border control, and general amnesty for political prisoners. He used his predecessor’s (A.T. Wilson) informal plebiscite, conducted in 1919, and revealed a desire for Hashemite rule with the understanding that it would remove the British from Iraq, to argue that the imposition of Prince Feisal was the will of the Iraqi people. However, this did not please the Said Taleb faction. Said Taleb met with the British editor of the London Daily Telegraph on tour in Iraq and threatened that the imposition of Feisal would lead to tribal insurrection, and that he would take his complaints to Paris, Cairo, and Istanbul. Assassination threats began to circulate against Feisal or Abdullah as king) and the ‘Iraq for Iraqis’ faction under Said Taleb.

The 21st day of August was specifically chosen by Feisal as his coronation date. It corresponded to Eid al-Ghadir, a holy day in Shiism in which Prophet Muhammad allegedly designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, successor. This was calculated to remind the Shiites of Feisal’s descent from Ali, despite his clearly Sunni upbringing in Mecca and Constantinople.

In late June 1921, Feisal received an endorsement from Grand Ayatollah Khalsi, and the British felt confident enough to hold a formal plebiscite in Iraq’s major cities, such as Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Karbala, and Diyala, garnering a 96-percent approval rating for Feisal as king. The 21st day of August was specifically chosen by Feisal as his coronation date. It corresponded to Eid al-Ghadir, a holy day in Shiism in which Prophet Muhammad allegedly designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, successor. This was calculated to remind the Shiites of Feisal’s descent from Ali, despite his clearly Sunni upbringing in Mecca and Constantinople. Feisal’s first order of business as king was the employment of as many Iraqis as possible into the bureaucracy; he opened schools and universities and formed a new council of ministers. Among his chief advisors, which was assigned by Cox, was the British oriental secretary, Gertrude Bell. Feisal also met Grand Ayatollah Khalsi halfway in appointing certain persons, such as the mayor of Samara, who was a Shiite. Perhaps fortuitously, a crisis stemming from central Arabia drew the Shiites closer to King Feisal, and offered a chance to unify both Shiites and Sunnis against a common threat. It also, however, altered the careful balance of British policy toward what would be the future states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

In August 1921, King Feisal was installed by the British as king of Iraq. As a member of the Hashemite clan, a Sunni descendant of Prophet Muhammad, he made overtures to the Iraqi Shiites. King Feisal had to balance his Sunni origins with governing a Shiite majority and his position was by no means secure; he imported many Arab Sunni military officers, who had served in the Ottoman army, to help him maintain order and government in Iraq. On 11 March 1922, the new Iraqi monarch faced his first real external threat when a large raiding party of Ikhwan (brethren), led by Feisal al-Dawlish, left the territory of Ibn Saud and, under the pretext of bringing a purer form of Islam, destroyed 781 homes, stole 130 horses, and hauled off thousands of camels, sheep, and donkeys south of Nasiriyah. Reports that they had butchered people like ‘goats,’ destroyed holy sites, and enslaved women and children arrived in Baghdad and Basra.

The Ikhwan were a fanatical group whose mission was to spread the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab by force. Both Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud and his ancestor, Muhammad Ibn Saud, used the Ikhwan as shock troops in their efforts to create what eventually became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. King Feisal was angered by this assault; not only was it an affront to Iraq, but it reopened the ongoing rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites. It is important to realize that in 1924, Ibn Saud’s forces would evict King Feisal’s father, Sherief of Mecca Hussein Ibn Ali, then installed as king of the Hejaz (the region in which Mecca is located). From Ibn Saud’s view, the British
ish had surrounded him with Hashemites (King Feisal’s brother Abdullah had been installed as king of Transjordan), yet Ibn Saud had to maintain his relations with the British. Sir Percy Cox managed this tangled web of intrigues as British high commissioner of Baghdad.

### The British Royal Air Force Responds

The British Royal Air Force (RAF) dispatched a reconnaissance plane to gather intelligence on the size of the Ikhwan force, which was shot down as it made a low-level pass over the encampments south of the rail lines linking Nasiriyah and al-Samawah. British military leaders in Iraq responded to the shoot-down by sending four planes to strafe and bomb the Ikhwan encampments. One of those four planes was shot down and the RAF sent another wing of four planes to continue its air raid of the Wahabi Ikhwan. Although the strikes contained the Ikhwan, it did not deter them. King Feisal expressed his outrage when he learned that Sir Cox had attempted to stop the RAF raids: the Iraqi monarch expressed a desire for stronger means to push the Ikhwan back into central Arabia.

### British Commissioner in Baghdad Balances Hashemites and Ibn Saud

Sir Percy Cox balanced British relations with Ibn Saud. He feared being drawn into the dynastic squabbles between the Hashemites and Ibn Saud, and wanted to calm tensions by sending a letter to Ibn Saud, asking for an explanation for the raids by the Ikhwan. Cox received an answer from the sultan of Nejd (then Ibn Saud’s title before becoming sultan of Nejd and king of the Hejaz in 1925 and finally king of Saudi Arabia in 1932), saying that Faisal al-Dawish acted on his own and would be punished; no mention of reparations appeared in the letter, which only outraged Iraqi public opinion.

Ibn Saud indicated that he had no issue with the RAF attacking this renegade group and more strenuous means should be taken to subdue Faisal al-Dawish. The street began spreading conspiracy theories that the British had engineered the entire incident and Shiite clergy attempted to gain popular support by seizing on Iraq’s outrage. King Feisal responded by sending a delegation made up of representatives from the defense, interior, and justice ministries to investigate the raid in late March. They filed a report at the end of the month with a damage assessment and determined that the Iraqi government was unresponsive, despite not only advanced warnings of the raid, but pleas from the citizens of Nasiriyah. This further outraged the Iraqi population as the report was published in several newspapers, including al-Istiqlal (the Independent) and al-Iraq. King Feisal used the report to remove five ministers from office. Sir Cox expressed outrage at not being consulted and discussed the loss of control over King Feisal with British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill.

### An Iraqi Sunni Fatwa Sanctioning War with the Militant Sunni Ikhwan

In early April 1922, a meeting of Sunni leaders and clerics, led by Sheikh Abdul-Wahab (no relation to the founder of Wahabism, Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahab) and Ahmed Sheikh Daud, was held to decide several matters, which included determining if the Iraqi Sunnis had the right to bear arms against the Wahabis, fellow Sunni co-religionists; if so, was cooperation with Shiites in common defense acceptable; and if a coordinated Sunni-Shiia effort was acceptable, who should represent the Sunnis at a meeting in Karbala to declare jihad against the Wahabi Ikhwan?

The text of the unique fatwa, drafted as a result of the meeting, is found on page 145 of Wardi’s book and is a single paragraph long. It outlines the questions asked and then issues a positive ruling on two of the three questions posed. This enabled attending Sunnis to discuss who would comprise and represent their delegation. On the two questions, it was ruled that since the Wahabis used the excuse of evangelism to sow destruction on fellow Muslims and giving no quarter, pillaging, murdering, and attacking the honor of families by enslaving women and children, then they are Khawarij (a fringe group outside the faith) on which war must be waged.

The term “Khawarij” (anglicized to Kharijites) has not only literal, but religious, historical significance. The Kharijites insisted on the right to revolt against any ruler who deviated from the example of the Prophet Muhammad. The Kharijites originated after Muhammad’s death and advocated for the succession of Ali before turning against him in 658 CE. From this essentially political position, the Kharijites developed a variety of theological and legal doctrines that further set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shiite Muslims. In modern times, Muslim scholars and governments referred to terrorist groups and brigands, who emphasized the practice of takfir (declaration of apostasy) to justify killing innocent people, as the “new Kharijites.” The text of the fatwa was published in newspapers — the author references al-Istiqlal, dated 6 April 1922 — and was signed by 12 Sunni clerics, including Sheikh Abdul-Wahab, Bahauddin al-Naqshabandi, and Abdul-Malik al-Shawaf. The group settled on a delegation of four, under the leadership of Ahmed Sheikh Daud, to travel to Karbala and endorse the declaration of jihad against the Ikhwan before a representative of King Feisal and other attending sects such as the Shiite hawza (clerical hierarchy) of Najaf.
The Karbala Conference: A Meeting of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites

The Karbala Conference convened on 9 April 1922, amidst 100,000 visitors to Karbala; more than 500 troops had to be dispatched to maintain crowd control. Sir Cox pressured King Feisal not to attend, a difficult choice, so the king, who endorsed these proceedings and saw this as an opportunity to unite Sunni and Shiite, sent his close advisor, Nuri Said. The Ulema (clergy) present, at what would be called the 10th of Shaaban Karbala Conference, witnessed both Iraqi Shiite and Sunni Ulema sanction war against the Sunni Wahabi Ikwan, if reparations were not paid and those involved went unpunished by Ibn Saud.

Cox and King Feisal disagreed over the Karbala Conference. The British commissioner not only had to balance British interests between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites, but Cox was concerned the findings of the Karbala Conference would be used to arm the tribes under the pretext of fighting the Ikwan — the same arms that could easily be turned against the British in Iraq. Cox was well aware that among the participants of the Karbala Conference were leaders and clerics who incited and participated in the 1920 Revolt, which took weeks to suppress with hundreds of British troop casualties. Cox worked to let the steam out of the Karbala Conference and engineered a series of talks between representatives of Ibn Saud and King Feisal.

The Muhammara Truce revived discussions over the borders between Ibn Saud’s Nejd and al-Hasa regions of central and eastern Arabia and Iraq. It eventually led to the late November 1922 Uqair Conference, which, in effect, took territory from the Saudis and gave it to Iraq, and then took territory from Kuwait and gave it to the Saudis. The modern borders between Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia began to take form, beginning with discussions by Sir Cox.

End of the Wahabi Incursions

Twenty-first century American military leaders can learn much from this undiscovered history. WARDI’s section on the Karbala Conference shows a precedent in which Iraqi Sunni and Shiites collaborated on opposing a militant Sunni presence represented by the Wahabi Ikwan. It is an earlier version of the cooperation seen today with the Iraqi Sunnis of the Anbar Awakening, fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. by Ibn Saud in 1929. The descendants of those killed at al-Sabila masterminded the takeover of the 1979 Grand Mosque in Mecca; the leader, Juhayman al-Utaybah, grew up indoctrinated with stories of this massacre.

King Feisal’s Credibility Erodes with British insistence on the Iraqi Mandate

King Feisal spent his entire tenure as king attempting to change the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to designate Iraq as an ally and not a country mandated by Great Britain. The problem of maintaining the mandate led to intertribal fighting between tribes who were pro-mandated, and those who wanted outright independence from Britain. This took its worse form in the Zhu Qar region of Iraq. From this lack of timetable toward independence, Iraq formed political parties, three of which had the eviction of the British as their main effort — they were the freedom, nationalist, and renaissance parties. Some ministers resigned, others were asked to resign, and Iraq’s early government was in chaos. When Kemal Atatürk defeated combined Greek, French, and British forces in 1922, consolidating what would be the Republic of Turkey, he stationed four divisions along the Iraqi border. Iraq’s Sunni clerics issued a fatwa prohibiting the fighting of co-religionists and declaring the British colonial infidels. Atatürk’s forces were posturing and dealing with consolidating their hold in the Kurdish regions of modern Turkey. The British insistence on maintaining the mandate led to the erosion of King Feisal’s authority and credibility; he lost the support of the Shiite clerical hierarchy in 1923.

Feisal imposed a compulsory military draft that was unpopular, but also developed the first highways linking Iraq’s major cities and providing a means for the development of Iraq’s oil infrastructure. In 1930, Wardi discusses how Feisal attempted to redefine Iraq’s status vis-à-vis the British, seeking a change to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by incorporating an end date to the British Mandate. This caused instability, which led to the British granting independence for Iraq in 1932, but Britain retained its military bases, rights for military transit, and oil concessions. King Feisal died in 1933 while visiting Switzerland.

This historical narrative by Dr. WARDI is important for America’s military planners as every negotiation with Iraqs is influenced by the events of the British mandate. Wardi’s books also contain helpful surprises, such as the cooperation of Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis to push back a renegade violent Sunni group radiating from Arabia. This history can be applied to bolster the stature of Iraq’s Sunni militant groups that have turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. It is vital that we educate America’s combat forces using direct Arabic materials, starting with the volumes of al-WARDI to gain a better perspective of Iraq’s human terrain.

Author’s Note: I wish to thank Lieutenant Jeffrey Pastore, U.S. Navy Reserve, for his edits and valuable comments that enhanced this essay.

Foreword

This is the eleventh and final essay in the al-Wardi series, which introduces U.S. military leaders to the writings and teachings of the father of Iraqi sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi. The first essay was published in ARMOR's March-April 2009 edition; essays two through 11 were published in succession. In these essays, Dr. Wardi does an excellent job of introducing Iraq's warriors, leaders, customs, traditions, and battles not regularly studied in western military schools. In previous articles, the landscape of Iraq's history from before the 16th century was drawn with precision and detail. Of particular historical relevance were the wars between the Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman Empire and Iraq's Shiites and Sunnis; the Ottomans and the British Empires; and raids from central Arabia and into Iraq by the Wahabis that began in 1802 and ended in 1927. Iraqis have also watched from the sidelines as events in Syria, Arabia, and World War I significantly changed and influenced their lives directly.

America's military leaders are lifelong and consummate students of history, culture, and warfare; the art of cultivating empathy for areas of terrain in which the U.S. Army operates will make the difference in engaging insurgents and cultivating the population. Commander Aboul-Enein has brought to life an Arabic multivolume work of military significance to our forces deployed or deploying to Iraq. ARMOR is not just a professional journal, but also a forum for ideas, which presents us a clear opportunity to use essays, such as this one, as valuable teaching tools for our forces. I would like to close this series by extending my sincere gratitude to Commander Aboul-Enein for taking the time to put “pen to paper” and bring to life this important work, and to our readers both at home and overseas, “Forge the Thunderbolt and Strike First!”

Christy Bourgeois, Editor in Chief, ARMOR

Dr. Ali al-Wardi, known as the father of Iraqi Sociology, devotes this final volume to a discussion on external characters, movements, and personalities that have shaped Iraq. Of his eight books, two full books comprise volume 5 on Iraq’s 1920 nationalist Revolt, and two full books represent volume 6 on the establishment of Iraq’s monarchy and the contents of this review essay, events in what is now Saudi Arabia. This final review essay focuses on Wardi’s historical chapters on Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (referred to as Ibn Saud) of the Nejd (Central Arabia), and his archrival Ali ibn Hussein of Mecca and the Hejaz (Red Sea Coastal Region of Arabia). Events, such as the rise of Ibn Saud and the fall of the Hashemites in Arabia, would have an impact not only in Iraq, which remained under Hashemite rule until 1958, but in the historical outlook of Jordan as well. The Jordanian is the only remaining Hashemite monarchy set up after World War I, with the current monarch, King Abdullah II. Studying this history from Wardi’s Arab perspective delivers you directly into the mind of the region. Our allies, as well as our adversaries in the Middle East, can use such recognition and appreciation of this vantage point in history to weave a mutual narrative. This will serve to cultivate a clear understanding of the human terrain of the region.

The Development of Ibn Saud

The chapter on Ibn Saud opens with his exile in the Empty Quarter of Arabia, under the protection of the Murrah tribe, and his exile later during childhood in Kuwait, under the protection of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, the emir. The Ibn Sauds lost their ancestral lands in central Arabia to the Ibn Rasheeds and their tribal confederation; this loss included the capture of Ibn Saud’s capital, Riyadh. Al-Sabah, who considered the Ibn Rasheeds his rival, cultivated the Ibn Sauds in a Machiavellian plan to throw the family back into central Arabia to keep the region unstable and thereby keep Kuwait free of central Arabian marauders. In late 1901, in a story told and retold by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and thus part of Saudi Arabia’s collective history, Abdul-Aziz would lead 40 horsemen to recapture Riyadh and defeat his archrival, Ibn Rasheed. On 15 January 1902, Ibn Saud and 40 horsemen, aided by tribes bearing animosity toward Ibn Rasheed and motivated by the opportunity for plunder, took Riyadh. In 30 years, through conquest, tribal alliances, and religious fanaticism, Abdul-Aziz not only captured his ancestral homeland of Nejd, but also became the undisputed leader of Arabia, creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In Wardi’s words, Ibn Saud was successful because:

- He learned and was a patient student of tribal politics; for example, he gladly accepted the mentorship of the sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah.
- He perceived tribal politics not simply as a vehicle to amass power, but as the art of the possible.
- He learned much in the court of al-Sabah; sitting for countless hours with rosary in hand, he absorbed lessons on compromise, justice, providing for tribal elders, dividing the spoils, dispersing benefits, and arbitrating disputes.
- He surrounded himself with advisors not only from Arabia’s different regions, but also from the wider Arab world.
- He selected advisors based on what they could teach him, soliciting direct and candid opinions from those advisors, yet retaining the final decision; other Arab leaders, by contrast, routinely surrounded themselves with courtiers and supplicants. Ibn Saud was given advice based on the reality of his world; today, we call this the practice of “realpolitik.”
- He spent much of his wealth for strategic advantage; court poets for Ibn Saud and his rival Hussein best explain this
Ibn Saud's army was composed of Bedouins, whose loyalty was exclusive to looting opportunities and spoils. Their military worth was not reliable and based largely on material gain. Ibn Saud initiated and led a revolution in tribal warfare for central Arabia. He understood that Arab leaders had increasingly cultivated regularly trained forces in addition to tribal levies. Ibn Saud studied the early Islamic period of Prophet Muhammad for inspiration. In Muhammad's time, people were divided into two groups: al-Muhajiroon (émigrés whose commitment to Islam and Muhammad led them to settle in Medina with him) and al-Ahrab (wandering Bedouins and al-Muhajiroon (émigrés whose commitment to Islam and Muhammad led them to settle in Medina with him). Using an interpretation of the Quran, al-Tauba, verse 98, Ibn Saud's Wahabi clerics argued this verse meant those who wanted to be true practicing Muslims should abandon the custom of the wandering Bedouin and organize into settled enclaves, much like Muhammad did in Medina, known as “the act of hijrah” (Muhammad’s migration to Medina). This changed the personality of the Bedouin, settling them in an environment created by and steeped in Islam, which allowed them to abandon the old pre-Islamic tribal values and embrace Islamic values.

Ibn Saud hoped to create a fixed core of settled Bedouins in central Arabia, allowing them to demonstrate their commitment to Ibn Saud by moving into these settlements, called “hejeiras” (settlements, but playing on the Arabic word for hijrah, giving it a religious symbolism). The first one created was in 1911 and called “Artawiyah,” between Kuwait and Qassim in Eastern Arabia. By 1921, Ibn Saud would have 122 settlements with more than 77,000 families settled. Each hejeira would have Wahabi morals police, al-Mutawain, which enforced morality and acted as agents for Ibn Saud. These settlements would receive subsidies from Ibn Saud to make them viable agricultural settlements. They called one another “Ikhwan” (the brotherhood) and were steeped in Wahabi ideology, a form of salafi (fundamentalist) Sunni Islam, which is considered among the most intolerant Islamist belief systems.

Ibn Saud would draw a fanatical group of fighters, committed to propagating Wahabism, by force from these hejeiras. They would be the frontline shock troops and skirmishers for Ibn Saud’s tribal army, raised on Wahabi zeal, and believing Ibn Saud’s commitment to propagate Wahabism as the only form of Islamic expression in Arabia. Ibn Saud revived and reinterpreted the bargain his ancestors made in 1744 with the founder of Wahabism that created the first Saudi state, which lasted until 1818. Balancing strict Wahabi values with the reality of the Saudi state in the 20th and 21st centuries would be a major component for Saudi Arabia’s rulers to govern the country even to this day. Wardi writes that unlike Muhammad’s Medina, which had the rational and commonsense personality of the Prophet, these settlements wallowed in what Wardi calls “tataruf” (extremism); for example, condemning all Muslims not living among them as being outside the faith. They ran around with scissors cutting long robes as a show of excessive consumption and believing fighting to uphold Wahabism would mean a just reward in paradise. Inventing new Islamic doctrines such as giving your back to the enemy and fleeing battle is apostasy, a complete abandonment of one’s religion. In 1919, the Wahabi Ikhwan would exert its might in raids against Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, and the Hejaz; its reputation for savage brutality and giving no quarter would strike fear among the population centers of Arabia.

Ibn Saud Assesses the Right Time to Strike the Hejaz

Ibn Saud’s forces took Turbah and Khurmah in 1924, and a standoff ensued between the Hashemites of Mecca and himself. It was Hussein ibn Ali (leader of the Hashemites), sherief of Mecca, and king of the Hejaz (adding the title of caliph to his résumé) that gave Ibn Saud the chance to pounce. Hussein’s decision to declare himself caliph of all Muslims alienated leaders in Egypt, angered the British, and alarmed leaders in Persia. The British dramatically reduced Ibn Saud’s subsidy, which further fueled his motivation to take the Hejaz. Ibn Saud gambled that the British reaction would be limited to verbal objections. He also sought to capitalize on the opportunity to increase the zeal of his warriors with the Hashemite’s banning Wahabis from making the pilgrimage to Mecca, a required pillar in Islam.

Ibn Saud organized a primary attack force to invade the Hejaz along the Red Sea Coast and a diversionary force that would drive toward Jordan. Tribes approaching Jordan and urban dwellers began fleeing the city of Amman, fearing Wahabi massacres. The British organized a rapid reaction force of armored cars and planes, which responded to the Wahabis with concentrated strafing and bombing — leading to a massacre of the Wahabis, resulting in Ibn Saud’s forces with 500 dead and 600 captured. The Saudi leader was concerned that he may have underestimated the British and their reaction. It is estimated that 3,000 Wahabi forces were amassing in Turbah for an invasion of the city of Taif, held by Hussein.

Tribal forces and the Ikhwan were not regular forces that could have been called back. Their leaders, Sultan ibn Bijad and Khalid ibn Luai, ordered the attack that ultimately led to a collapse
of Hashemite forces. They underestimated the power of the Ikhwan and waited for a British aerial strafing that never came, thinking they would expect the same treatment as in Jordan. Hussein and his son, Prince Ali, never comprehended the alienation they had received among British officials and that Jordan was strategically different than the Hejaz for British interests.

The Ikhwan executed a brutal massacre in Taif, killing hundreds of those deemed not to be Wahabi. It is here that Hussein, after weeks of discussions, agreed to abdicate as king of the Hejaz to his son, Prince Ali, thinking this would placate Ibn Saud. King Ali ibn Hussein of the Hejaz would remain on his throne for only 15 months before succumbing to the momentum of the Ikhwan and Ibn Saud. Only a few weeks into his coronation, the holy city of Mecca fell to the Wahabis. Hussein, Ali, and the Hashemites beseeched the British for help. The British position was clear: noninterference in disputes over Islamic holy sites.

The Wahabis entered Mecca, demolishing the tombs of Muhammad’s wife, Khadija, which was located atop her home. The Wahabi’s iron rule included an immediate ban on smoking and visiting cemeteries and forced “five times daily” prayer. Those found lingering in the tombs of Prophet Muhammad’s companions were arrested, and in the case of Indian subjects, the British had to pay a fine for their release. Ibn Saud closely monitored British newspapers, and although these papers arrived late via steamboat, he noted that the British labor government had fallen to a conservative government. He was gauging the British attitude toward his continuance of conquering the Hejaz. He amassed his forces and decided to invade the seaport city of Jeddah, where King Ali ibn Hussein would make his last stand. However, unlike Mecca giving up easily, Jeddah would provide solid resistance against Ibn Saud.

The Battle of Jeddah (1925)

Wardi is not renowned for laying out tactical details of battles in his multivolume history of Iraq; however, his description of the Battle of Jeddah in 1925 is an exception. King Ali ibn Hussein had drawn up an entrenched defensive line, made possible by Ibn Saud’s hesitation to capitalize on the momentum of taking Taif and Mecca. Had he pressed onto Jeddah, he would have easily taken the city without resorting to a siege. Ibn Saud was concerned that his uncontrollable Ikhwan would perpetrate massacres in Jeddah, as in Taif, leading to international intervention as many of the world’s powers maintained legations in Jeddah. King Ali’s war minister was Tahseen Faqir Pasha, a man with combat experience in the Ottoman army, who was sent by King Abdullah to reinforce his brother, King Ali, in retaking Jeddah. King Ali’s forces built a defensive line based on Ali’s experiences in defending Istanbul during the Balkan wars of 1912 to 1913. An Ottoman military engineer of Turkish origin, Narwas Bey, aided him in his efforts. The line, as mentioned above, extended 6 miles, with 20 artillery pieces, reinforced with 30 heavy machine guns, and further reinforced by barbed wire, mines, and searchlights, as the Ikhwan attacked at night and predawn. The army of the Hashemites collected to meet Ibn Saud; they were a diverse group of 1,650 men from Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, to include criminals, street thugs, and even slaves, all to defend the line. Ibn Saud’s army was 6,000 deep, armed with captured artillery; in particular, the cannons captured at the Mecca arsenal that had a longer range than those fielded by the Hashemites in Jeddah.

The battle began in January 1925, both sides exchanged artillery and the Ikhwan taunted tribes that allied with King Ali to defect and join Ibn, while firing artillery into trenches. Aside from the different soldiers imported from the Levant to fight Ibn Saud, several commanders undermined the Hashemite unity of effort. The commanders included Iraqi Jameel Rawi Pasha, Tahseen Pasha, King Ali, and a Syrian general. From an armament perspective, King Ali’s forces should have easily defeated the Wahabis — he had planes and armored cars. However, of his six Italian planes, he had two functioning aircraft and a Russian pilot, who had to be coerced to return to Jeddah and fly. Although they had two planes, and now one pilot, along with four Russian mechanics, they lacked proper ordnance, so modified artillery shells were devised. The pilot refused the idea of throwing hand grenades and a young Syrian, who sneaked onboard, detonated a grenade that blew up one plane in the air, killing the Russian pilot. Having the plane crash near the tent of Ibn Saud bolstered his reputation for being extremely lucky. A disagreement over promised pay led to Ibn Saud’s war spoil claim of King Ali’s coveted possession of four German aircraft (to include the pilots), equipped with machine guns and proper ordnance. King Ali’s armored forces were antiquated and in a state of disrepair, ultimately leading to Ibn Saud’s victory on the battlefield.

"The British dramatically reduced Ibn Saud’s subsidy, which further fueled his motivation to take the Hejaz. Ibn Saud gambled that the British reaction would be limited to verbal objections. He also sought to capitalize on the opportunity to increase the zeal of his warriors with the Hashemite’s banning Wahabis from making the pilgrimage to Mecca, a required pillar in Islam."
Final Confrontation in the Battle of Jeddah: King Ali ibn Hussein Departs

The largest confrontation in the Battle for Jeddah would occur on 14 March 1925; the Hashemites brought a long-range cannon from Medina and sent four regiments of troops on a front extending 2 miles, reinforced by five armored cars to push the Wahabi lines. The Wahabi lines held as they fought tenaciously; however, it was revealed during this fight with the Saudis that King Ali’s forces retreated after 5 hours of fighting, making their way back to their own lines. In the holy month of Ramadan, Ibn Saud and King Ali agreed to a truce. While Ibn Saud’s Ikhwan were more disciplined, King Ali’s forces complained for lack of funds, support, and seemed to want more and more goods in exchange for loyalty. King Ali’s forces finally refused to obey orders after the king did not pay their regular salaries. Egyptians complaining about nonpayment were allowed to return to their country. No provisions were made for the civilian populous, which starved before the eyes of King Ali’s forces. This led Jeddah’s notable families to negotiate on behalf of the starving population, which began to drain their army’s resources.

When it became impossible for King Ali to maintain control of Jeddah, the British consul in the city brokered a surrender and the Wahabis cut off access into Jeddah, except by sea. The British maintained their position of not interfering in the rivalry between King Ali and Ibn Saud. King Ali’s forces collapsed internally and Jeddah’s mercantile leaders wanted an end to the siege. On 22 December 1925, King Ali, through negotiations with the British consul, sailed away from Jeddah onboard four ships, which carried his entourage and personal belongings, to include Arabian stallions, his personal care, carpets, cash, and jewels. He agreed to leave Ibn Saud all weapons, planes, armored cars, rifles, and artillery. Of note, 21 of King Ali’s slaves were emancipated, turned over to the British consul and repatriated back to Africa. King Ali departed for Aden, then Bombay, and finally settled in Basra.

Ibn Saud and his Wahabi Zealots Offend a Wider Muslim World

Wardi discusses how Ibn Saud was now between the horns of a dilemma, balancing the management of the Islamic holy places and the interest of regional powers, to include Egypt, British India, French North Africa, Iraq, Jordan, French Syria, the Persian Gulf states, and the wider Muslim world, had in its control of Mecca and Medina. Wahabis and the Ikhwan living in isolation in central Arabia was one point of contention, but was tolerable; however, now the Ikhwan would be exposed to various Islamic practices that greatly angered them, which quickly lead to an international crisis. One early reported incident involved a group of Afghans praying near and in the cave of Hira (where Muhammad received the first revelations) who were shot by the Ikhwan. Their imposition of Wahabism was angering regional powers.

When Ibn Saud took over the Prophet’s city of Medina, they destroyed all tombs of the Prophet’s companions, Muhammad’s wives, Muhammad’s uncle Abbas, and Caliph Uthman’s tomb. Four Shi’ite Imams were also buried in Medina and their tombs were destroyed by the Wahabis, which led to objections from Iraq and Persia. In 1926, Ibn Saud moved against the Ikhwan when they began attacking and assaulting pilgrims such as the Egyptian consul, Dutch deputy consul (representing Muslims from their colony in Indonesia), and British Indian deputy consul. The Egyptian mahmal, carrying the annual cloth covering of the Kaaba (to Muslims a house of worship built by Prophet Abraham), was attacked and Egyptian troops, which staffed the guard contingent of this cloth, fired into the attacking Ikhwan, killing more than two dozen. This event led to a break in relations between Egypt and Ibn Saud, which lasted from 1926 to 1936.

In 1928, Ikhwan raiders assaulted Iraq and British planes, strafing them once again; it would be the final year in which Ibn Saud’s fanatical Ikhwan attacked Iraq. Eventually, this fanatical group turned against Ibn Saud in 1929. In that year, Ibn Saud sent his forces to pacify the renegade Ikhwan, led by Faisal al-Dawish and the old warrior, Sultan ibn Bijad, who had led Ibn Saud to victory in the Hejaz. Both would be killed and victims’ families of the massacre at Sabila would grow up with stories of Ibn Saud’s betrayal to uphold and spread Wahabism. Some of these descendants would lead the 1979 takeover of the grand mosque in Mecca.

Wardi’s final pages end with wars to contain Ibn Saud’s forces in Iraq, the Arab Gulf States, and Yemen. Khalid ibn Luai, the relative assaulted by Prince Abdullah ibn Hussein, who then joined Ibn Saud, became Ibn Saud’s governor of Mecca. However, Ibn Saud had become leader of most of the Arabian Peninsula and, in 1932, declared the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In less than 6 years, American engineers would discover the largest oil deposits in the known world, starting with Dammam Dome Number 7; Saudi Arabia would enter a new phase in its history and would now have the money to spread its distinct brand of Islamist beliefs.

My primary objective of this multipart expose of the father of Iraqi Sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi, is to enhance the reader’s perspective of Iraq and its neighboring countries. We can all agree that the best books and writings on any subject leave the reader wanting more and I certainly hope this series has accomplished its goal. If interested in furthering your understanding of Iraq, Phebe Marr’s Modern History of Iraq, Westview Press, 2003, is a good start. After getting a general idea of Iraq’s history, read Patrick Cockburn’s excellent biography, Muqtada, Scribners, 2008, on the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist movement he inherited from his father. There are a few excellent books on Shisim, most notably Vall Nans’ very well written The Shia Revival, W.W. Norton, 2006. In addition, if you encounter variants of stories recounted in Wardi’s volumes while serving in the field, do not hesitate to contact ARMOR and join the debate by submitting your story. A good essay or book stimulates robust debate, which then enhances the overall learning experience for all who participate. Finally, these essays are part of my advocacy to have Arabic works of military significance highlighted and made available for debate, discussion, and teaching among our combat forces and America’s military leaders.

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Author’s Note: I wish to thank Commander Scott Olivo, Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy, for his edits and comments that enhanced this essay. This work would not have been possible without the help of the John T. Hughes Library in Washington DC and the Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room.
Forgotten Frontier

Amidst Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, service on another edge of freedom’s frontier seems distant and forgotten. Coined the “forgotten war,” due to its proximity to the leviathan World War II, the Army’s current mission in Korea is relegated to a supporting effort as our Army focuses on tough fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, while academic pundits argue over our relevance in Korea’s burgeoning democracy and growing military power, our mission on the ground remains the same — remain relevant and ready to deter North Korean aggression and assist our South Korean allies to defeat North Korea should they choose to break the 54-year-old armistice.

Terrain in Korea

“The battalions and companies were scattered along the river in weird array, for this was no country for a modern, mechanized army. The hills were not high here, but they were endless. There were no side roads, and no flat spaces anywhere, where command posts, medical aid stations, or anything else could be set up. The hills ran into each other; they overlapped; they blocked vision and hearing in every direction.

Because the terrain was compartmented by the hills, some units stood too close to others; others were out of sight and hearing of those supporting them. Wire often did not reach; radios did not work. The units of the 2d Division were not far from each other in yards and miles — but each moved, fought, and worried in almost complete isolation, in a tormented vacuum of its own.”1

The defile fight is essential to success on the Korean battlefield as the terrain is made up of high ground coupled with low-level passage routes. Typically, a defile is defined as a narrow gorge or pass that restricts lateral movement. This restrictive terrain presented a distinct challenge to the armor crewman during the Korean conflict that continues to this day.

The majority of Korea is blanketed with hills, which is why tank platoons rarely maneuver in traditional platoon formations, such as the wedge, vee, and online, a source of never-ending frustration to the platoon leader assigned to Korea. Moreover, an armored company will never successfully employ a majority of maneuver techniques and tactics as outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90, Tactics.2 In fact, during the Korean war, most tank companies were relegated to infantry support and systematically attached to infantry units as platoons, sections, and tanks.

Dividing Korea’s ubiquitous hills are narrow, winding roads that connect most of the rural towns and farmland. In North Korea, many of these roads have unimproved surfaces that only allow the passage of one tank at a time. These meandering roads are key terrain because they provide the only avenue on which mechanized forces and lines of communications can travel quickly from one key city/town/depot to another.

This is not an ideal place for armor crewmen to fight; however, today’s hotspots are not ideal for armor crewmen to fight either. Whether it’s the urban areas of Fallujah and Baghdad, the jungles of Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the hills of Lebanon and Korea, or the mountains of Afghanistan, the armor branch must remain agile and adaptive to stay relevant and ready to decisively engage and destroy its nation’s enemies.3

Key Enemy Tactics during a Defile Fight

The enemy will employ numerous tactics to ambush, impede, attack, or destroy combat-arms formations, especially in areas that restrict lateral movement. He will...
employ various tactics, such as those below, repeatedly to gain the initiative:

**Using ubiquitous dead space for ambushes.** A defile provides the enemy numerous positions of advantage to ambush an armor unit moving through a narrow passage. Enemy forces will use spurs and heavy vegetation for cover and concealment and position themselves in draws, gullies, ditches, creek beds, and on hilltops for short-range antitank ambushes. Most engagements will be between 25 to 200 meters and occur at a tank’s flank, top, or rear to avoid heavy frontal armor. Vehicle engines will be turned off and antitank teams and infantrymen will lie behind cover to avoid detection until they are further obstacles along the route that impede your movement. For example, as the 2d Infantry Division withdrew from Kunu-ri Village near the Ch’ongch’on River in North Korea, as a part of a general United Nations withdrawal in late November 1950, they ran headfirst into multiple obstacles along a narrow road in the midst of a defile several miles long. On stopping to clear the obstacles from the road, multiple Chinese machine gun positions opened up on the column and engendered an abysmal number of casualties.

> “Instantly, Charley Heath knew that instead of holding a shallow block along the main supply route, the enemy held these ridges at least three miles deep, and they had held them for a long time. Long enough to implant machine guns, long enough to set up and register mortars. In a single sickening second, Heath knew the division was speeding into a trap.”

**Using obstacles to impede movement.** The enemy will employ numerous wire antiarmor obstacles along the defile road to impede the convoy’s movement and ambush it from multiple sides. For example, as the 2d Infantry Division withdrew from Kunu-ri Village near the Ch’ongch’on River in North Korea, as a part of a general United Nations withdrawal in late November 1950, they ran headfirst into multiple obstacles along a narrow road in the midst of a defile several miles long. On stopping to clear the obstacles from the road, multiple Chinese machine gun positions opened up on the column and engendered an abysmal number of casualties.

The possibilities are endless and the tactic is quite effective.

**Using an improvised explosive device (IED).** The North Korean military is studying the effects of IEDs used against U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and will most likely use them in a defile fight. Similar to an urban environment, a defile’s 3-dimensional battlespace makes it very difficult to pick up on signatures of an IED emplacement. Excellent positions for IEDs include a winding road, the declivity of a defile, and behind wire or mine obstacles. The numerous rocks, dirt mounds, and vegetation indicative of a defile will make it very difficult to detect IEDs.

**Using indirect fire.** Because a defile nullifies tank movement, it is very easy to employ indirect fire against an armor column. An enemy entrenched along a defile will maximize use of indirect fire against a column entering, or bogged down, in a defile. The enemy forces will have registered their guns to ensure they are hitting pre-plotted targets with optimal accuracy. The enemy will use indirect fire against an armored force at the defile entrance to attrit the column and separate the formation as it enters the defile. This tactic frightens tank commanders and loaders, which forces them to stay inside their turrets. Inside the defile, the enemy will employ indirect fires to neutralize an armored force when it is halted by a complex obstacle, or suppress the armored column so antitank teams can disable tanks from ambush positions. Using indirect fire limits target acquisition by producing obscuration and potentially damaging the tank’s optics. It will also severely limit the loader’s scanning propensity because he will likely be seeking protection from shrapnel within the turret.

**Using road craters.** Finally, the enemy may employ demolitions, such as road

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craters, to impede an armor platoon’s movement through the defile. If successfully detonated, the road crator would leave a hole in the road too wide and deep for a tank to maneuver around or through. Expect the enemy to position a road crator at a choke point along the defile where the road is at its narrowest. Also, count on the enemy overwatching this obstacle with an antitank ambush to neutralize the tank platoon as it tries to meticulously back out of the defile.

Techniques to Master the Defile Fight

Ideally, a combined arms battalion should wage the defile fight. However, combat is rarely fought in ideal conditions, so a company commander must handle a defile at his level. The Korean conflict is steeped with examples of armor companies trying to fight through a defile with little success. The following tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for fighting through a defile are from D Company, 1st Battalion, 72d Armor’s recent close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) exercises, mounted defile blank fire exercise, and a combined arms maneuver density at a local training area:

Task organization and mission analysis. Fighting through a defile adheres to mission, enemy, time, troops, terrain, civilians (METT-TC). A company commander must do a thorough analysis of the mission, his enemy, his available time, his troop and equipment composition and strength, the terrain, and civilian constraints. During the unit’s recent defile fight, METT-TC was assessed as follows:

- **Mission:** clear a defile.
- **Enemy:** infantry platoon, 3 antitank teams, 3 VTT-323s, 2 T-62s.
- **Time:** roughly 24 hours.
- **Troops/equipment:** 2 M1A1 platoons, 1 M2A2 platoon, 1 infantry squad, 1 M7 fire support team.
- **Terrain:** defile, heavy vegetation.
- **Civilians:** low probability.

Plan of attack. Zone reconnaissance; using fires; defile entrance fight; assault through the defile; and defile exit fight.

Zone Reconnaissance. Zone reconnaissance of the defile is absolutely pivotal for mission success. Initially, a battalion scout team conducts a zone reconnaissance of the defile high ground with priority intelligence requirements (PIR) “location of antitank teams and obstacles, presence of armored vehicles at the entrance and middle of the defile, and defensive or counterattacking positions at the exit to the defile.” We found it useful to have scouts establish alternate bounding observation posts to monitor the defile’s entrance, key terrain throughout the defile, and possible counterattack positions at the defile’s exit. During our mission, however, we had extreme difficulty communicating with the scout team. The scout team was operating on one radio, but was responsible for reporting on multiple nets — including our company. This rendered a lag in communications and effectively limited timely situational awareness of enemy activity.

Recommendation: Task-organize scouts to the company-team level for the defile fight. To mitigate lack of reconnaissance, we created two company organic reconnaissance teams. Our first team consisted of one-half of our fire support team (FIST) with a 2-man infantry security team for protection. Our second team consisted of the remaining 1(-) infantry squad. Both teams would conduct a zone reconnaissance on opposite sides of the defile’s entrance, middle, and exit. We decided this was an appropriate risk because effective reconnaissance impacted mission success much more than keeping the infantry squad for the main body defile fight. The infantry squad(-) had a mission of infiltrating along high ground to locate and destroy enemy armored vehicles in hide positions with either antitank capabilities or calling in close air support (CAS), rotary gunship fire, or field artillery. The dismounted FIST team was also charged with the task of identifying the PIR listed above, and used similar fire support to destroy armored vehicles nestled in various hide positions. The FIST team and dismounted infantry squad(-) were directed to avoid infantry positions and direct fire contact based on its limited firepower. The main objective was to destroy or neutralize antiair or capabilities within the defile, not to become decisively engaged along the perimeter.

Reconnaissance in the defile is essential for mission success. If you do not have access to battalion scouts, consider using a dismounted FIST team and infantry team/squad for reconnaissance purposes.

Using fires. After the FIST and infantry teams conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the defile, and the commander senses conditions are met to begin an armored assault, the commander must position reconnaissance teams in key overwatch positions, at the entrance and middle of the defile, to facilitate indirect fires for obscuration and suppression of vehicles that may move out of key positions to engage the main body. Suppressive fires on the defile will help facilitate the main body’s movement into the defile and degrade the target acquisition of enemy ambushes.

Recommendation: Do not use too much smoke to obscure movement into the defile. Smoke can obscure the enemy’s movement from hide positions in the hills, giving him the opportunity to engage you...
as you enter the defile. It also limits your FIST and infantry squad’s observation of key positions in the defile. Once the armored force has entered the defile, one reconnaissance team (preferably the FIST team) should move to another observation post at the exit of the defile to facilitate fires on any enemy defense, counterattack, or withdrawal.

**Defile entrance fight.** Ideally, the main body attack will begin with an infantry assault along the defile high ground. The M2A2s will provide support by fire at the defile entrance while the infantry dismounts and ascends the high ground to conduct clearing operations. However, if you are not endowed with enough infantry assets to clear the high ground (as in our case since we only had one infantry squad and used them in a reconnaissance role), you can use the M2A2 platoon to establish support by fire at the defile entrance or task organize them within a tank platoon as they fight through the defile. If a commander chooses to integrate the mechanized infantry platoon with an armored platoon for the defile fight, the armor platoon in the supporting effort should occupy a support by fire at the defile entrance.

**Assaulting through the defile.** Without infantry support, fighting through a narrow road in a defile becomes a difficult task for a tank platoon. As revealed above, an armor platoon will face many challenges in a defile. Below are some TTP, which were validated during simulation, blank fire, and combined arms maneuver exercises:

**Formation:** The tank platoon will only be able to fight in column formation; recommended order of march includes tank plow, platoon leader’s tank, tank plow (if available), and platoon sergeant’s tank.

**Load plans:** Each tank should have cables attached to rear eyebolts; tanks without plows should have cables attached to front and rear eyebolts. Similar to the confines of an urban area, a defile rarely allows tanks enough maneuver room to pass each other or pivot steer for recovery purposes. Tow cables facilitate a quick recovery, if necessary. Each tank should have two grappling hooks for removing concertina wire obstacles. If not enough grappling hooks are available, the tank platoon should consolidate them on the two front tanks in the column. Each tank should also have a method to mark breached obstacles; using connectors with white engineer tape makes it easy for the loader and tank commander to mark both sides of the obstacle while rolling through at a deliberate speed. Finally, each tank commander and loader should have an M4/16 readily available to fire into dead space.

**Sectors of scan for a tank crew:** Disciplined scanning should be consistent among the tank’s three independent weapons systems — M240, .50-caliber, and main gun or coax. The driver is absolutely vital for mission success and should scan for obstacles in the road, IED signatures, and antitank ambushes in the low ground. Gunners should scan at x3 power with the thermal imaging site; the scan sector depends on how the platoon leader decides to divide the platoon’s scan sectors. The loader’s scan sector is from the front left bumper to the right rear bumper and from the road to the apex of each hill. The tank commander’s scan sector is from the front right bumper to the left rear bumper and from the road to the apex of each hill. The loader and tank commander should anticipate potential ambushes in dead space and have their weapons systems focused on that area should an ambush materialize.

**Sectors of scan within a tank platoon:** The lead tank will have the most difficult sectors of scan. Since the lead tank will also act as a breaching tank, the crew must include your best soldiers. The lead tank’s sector of scan will vary depending on the location of draws within a defile. Similar to rooms in a hallway, the lead tank will cautiously pie each draw with its gun tube to ensure it fires the first shot against a suspecting enemy ambush. Staff Sergeant Stephen Krivitsky refers to this as the 3-to-6 second advantage. Whoever pulls the trigger first will most likely kill or disable his opponent. Gunners must anticipate each draw, training the main gun on it as the tank approaches the spur protecting it. The gunner should have his main gun ammo selected as ‘HEAT,’ (high-explosive antitank) and set on x3 power. The battle sight for HEAT and SABOT should be set at no more than 300 meters, and the gunner should not lase. Upon detection, the gunner should simply place the enemy within the center of his x3-power sight and pull the trigger. The lead tank should also consider dismounting the loader (METT-TC) to recon the draw behind the spur, or cause a diversion so the tank can preempt the enemy ambush (a miniature hunter-killer tactic).

The second tank in the column should scan off to the front left and low of the lead tank to kill any close-range antitank ambushes, which might be hidden behind berms or in creek beds, attempting to ambush the lead tank as it rolls by. The areas close in and low to a tank are per-
The M2A2s will provide support by fire at the defile entrance while the infantry dismounts and ascends the high ground to conduct clearing operations. However, if you are not endowed with enough infantry assets to clear the high ground (as in our case since we only had one infantry squad and used them in a reconnaissance role), you can use the M2A2 platoon to establish support by fire at the defile entrance or task organize them within a tank platoon as they fight through the defile.
commands should approach this tactical task with meticulous detail and ingenuity. A good approach to this defile fight is training key leaders first. We organized an officer professional development (OPD) session focused on armor platoon and company team TTP on fighting through a defile. We used a briefing put together by the battalion S3, which visually depicted the step-by-step process of a tank and tank platoon fighting through a defile. The briefing thoroughly covered the four tanks’ scanning techniques as the tank platoon moved through the defile; gave examples of how a recon by fire would look; and explained how enemy contacts are identified by using the graphical control measures discussed in this article. We ended our OPD by giving each platoon leader a tactical vignette of a defile in the Republic of Korea, which forced him to apply TTP he learned during the OPD. Each platoon leader had roughly 15 minutes to create a plan before individually briefing the group.

We also used the CCTT for simulations training on the defile fight. All three tank platoons were required to maneuver through a defile while the company commander acted as an observer controller. The company commander designed the defile scenario with CCTT technicians and emplaced enemy antitank fire in draws to see how platoons would maneuver and scan. Each platoon experimented with different formations and scanning techniques throughout the day and received a detailed critique from the company commander after each mission. By the end of the day, each platoon had conducted roughly four defile missions. Moreover, each platoon validated the TTP of fighting a defile with an armor platoon. The CCTT served as an invaluable tool for verifying maneuver and scanning techniques prior to training this skill in a field environment.

Next, we incorporated the defile fight into a level 2 gunnery rotation at a local live-fire range. On conclusion of our first gunnery on the new tank table VIII, our unit conducted a 2-day defile exercise on the multipurpose range complex that allows a unit to conduct CASEVAC, and how to incorporate a dismounted FIST into their operation. We concluded the defile exercise by emphasizing to each platoon the value of having combat multipliers such as infantry or aviation support. Platoons assembled in a company tactical assembly area outside the range to prevent them from viewing enemy positions. The opposition force consisted of troop and wooden vehicle targets, which were organic to the range, as well as a live opposition force (OPFOR) from the company headquarters, mechanized platoon, and sister engineer company. The OPFOR’s capabilities consisted of four RPGs, two IEDs, one M1A1 tank, one M998, one M113, 10 infantry dismounts, and three wire and mine obstacles. The commander placed the live OPFOR in numerous draws, bunkers, and the creek bed, as well as hunter-killer teams next to obstacles.

The first day was focused at platoon level on day and night dry-fire exercises; the second day transitioned into day and night blank-fire exercises. We changed the OPFOR and obstacles following each iteration to prevent platoons from reitating to prevent platoons from re-iterating information to each other after concluding runs. The company commander and first sergeant acted as observer controllers for each platoon and maintained contact with the OPFOR to ensure they reacted with a certain degree of hostility and surprise based on the proficiency of the platoon they were facing.25 Aside from receiving training on movement through a defile and scanning techniques, platoons received valuable training on reacting to wire and mine obstacles without engineer support, how to react to an IED, how to conduct CASEVAC, and how to incorporate a dismounted FIST into their operation.26 We concluded the defile exercise by emphasizing to each platoon the value of having combat multipliers such as infantry in the high ground. Each tank crew gained a better appreciation of the tank’s limitations and how infantry complements armor movement through a defile.

Fighting in restrictive terrain is the battle of the present and foreseeable future. Whether this restrictive terrain takes the form of an urban environment or mountainous terrain, today’s armor crewmen must mitigate the weaknesses of a tank in this environment. Technology certainly provides U.S. Armed Forces with a desirable edge over militaries of other countries, but the cornerstones of our armor trade will distinguish between success and failure. Armor crewmen must continue to master the art of target acquisition, scanning techniques, battle drills, and using other battle operating systems and personal ingenuity to be successful on this complex battlefield.

Notes
23R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, Brassey’s Inc., Washington DC, 1991.
24The lead tank will have the most difficult sectors of scan. Since the lead tank will also act as a breaching tank, the crew must include your best soldiers. The lead tank’s sector of scan will vary depending on the location of draws within a defile. Similar to rooms in a hallway, the lead tank will cautiously pie each draw with its gun tube to ensure it fires the first shot against a suspecting enemy ambush.”
25A defile limits the effectiveness of a tank’s target acquisition and frontar fry by presenting numerous hide positions in a 3-dimensional environment.
26In the Israeli-Hezbollah war of July-August 2006, Israeli Merkava tanks experienced tough battles in the hills of Southern Lebanon against Hezbollah guerrilla fighters with advanced antitank technology procured from Syria and Iran.
27Fehrenbach, p. 222.
28It is human nature to focus all of our senses on a threat that may be harmful. The hunter-killer tactic preys on this tendency in human nature by inducing crew tunnel vision (every crew member fixating on one target).
29North and South Korea could easily emplace tanks in certain keyhole positions on hillslopes overlooking a key area of the defile. These positions could be fortified and easily camouflaged.
30Fehrenbach, p. 309. On the afternoon of 24 April 1951, a battalion of Filipinos, led by American tanks was ordered toward Gloucher Hill. The column ground to within less than 2,000 yards of the British before the lead tank caught fire and blocked a defile. Lashed by unbearable fire, the column retreated. Later, the Filipino tried again, now accompanied by Belgians, some Puerto Rican infantrymen, and tanks from the 8th Hussars. They ran into thousands of Chinese in the hills and...
Fighting the Defile from Page 42

gorges, and fell back. Also see Fehrenbach, p. 217: a platoon of tanks from the 72d Tank Battalion and one company of the 38th Infantry were sent south to clear the (defile) area, this force was brought to battle along the road and got nowhere. As speed of a defile is its elevation scanning capabilities.

11Ideally, a company commander would want at least a scout section for a thorough zone reconnaissance of the defile. Howevert, our battalion could only afford to allocate one scout team.

12We took the risk of dismounting half of our FIST team because the M7 FIST Bradley is not an ideal platform for calling accurate fires during a defile fight. It is too loud, the platform is too high, and it cannot easily ascend Korean hills.

13Keep in mind the enemy is comprised of one infantry platoon — much greater than the 3:1 ratio required for an attack against an established defense.

14Using a dismounted FIST team and infantry squad (+) for reconnaissance measures requires tactical patience from the company commander. Infiltrating into a defile takes time and these two reconnaissance teams need to avoid detection to be effective. For most tanks, this means having the main gun in a hide position for 2 hours prior to being deployed into battle.

15Pay close attention to the temperature; inversions in the defile will keep smoke close to the ground for long periods of time.

16Similar to an urban environment, an M2A2’s strength in the defile is its elevation scanning capabilities.

17Staff Sergeant Stephen Krivinsky, “The Three to Six Second Advantage: Tank Combat in Restricted Terrain,” U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY, 1 April 1997, p. 21-24.17 This is a critical task when one understands the defender in the defile fight has the advantage of surprise over the attacker. He is holding strong defensive positions at extremely close range due to terrain restrictions. These battlefield annoyances can kill you while you fight through flashing ‘0000’s.’ This occurs when the laser range finder (LRF) cannot accurately identify a specific range to target between 200 and 4,000 meters when firing the coax machine gun. The wrong battle range setup for coax and HEAT will cost the gunner and crew time, which they cannot afford to waste. The defender will destroy the attacker once the attacker looses the three to six second advantage. For additional information on the 3-to-6-second advantage, see SSG Stephen Krivinsky, “The Three to Six Second Advantage: Tank Combat in Restricted Terrain.” ARMOR, March-April 1996, pp. 26-33.

18Student Text 3-20.12-1,Abrams Urban Quick Reference Guide, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 2002, presents an explanation of tank dead space and the importance of other vehicles of infantry providing covering fire in these areas.

19Krivinsky, p. 16. To conserve main gun ammunition, use tank mounted machine guns in reconnaissance by fire to cause a hidden enemy in the defile to react. The loader or gunner should fire a single burst from their respective M240 machine gun (20 to 30 rounds) while constantly observing for enemy movement, return fire, or a flashes. The gunner should conduct his recon by fire in 3X, allowing him further scanning of the suspected enemy emplacement. The tank commander should not perform recon by fire with the .50-caliber unless for obvious necessity. When loaded for combat, the .50-caliber has only 100 rounds ready available, and the rounds are typically armor-piercing incendiary with tracer (API-T). These rounds create a flash that could be mistaken for the rounds striking a threat vehicle, which wasting the unnecessary expenditure of a main gun round. Reconnaissance by fire is used when other means of enemy detection have been unsuccessful or are unavailable.

20Terrain index reference system (TIRS) is useful to predict ambushes in defile draws. Checkpoints are useful to portray suspected obstacles or IED emplacements along the route.

21A sketch map is an acceptable substitute for crew members if it is a better way to illustrate potential threats in a defile.

22FM 3-20.21; an emphasis on loader M240, TC 50-caliber, short burst, and battle-sight engagements in the new tank tables greatly assist a tank crew to fight a defile fight — not just an urban fight.

23Each platoon is different based on leader experiences and vehicle composition, for example, only two platoons possessed tank plows.

24After two iterations of using the M7 FIST, we quickly revalidated the importance of dismounting our FIST and using him as an active dismounted observation post (OP).

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Clausewitz’s Theories of Fog and Friction of War: Are they Obsolete in the Realities of the Computer Age?

by Major Aaron B. Dixon

Over the past 15 years, a growing number of opinions have surfaced in military communities to suggest that some of Carl von Clausewitz’s theories may no longer be valid. The purpose of this article is to determine the effect current technology has on the fog and friction of war. Despite increasing the precision of lethal effects and access to timely information, computer-age warfare remains subjected to Clausewitz’s theories of friction in war, in that modern armies still operate at the mercy of intangible and uncontrollable factors such as the weather, adaptability of the enemy, and fallibility of the human dimension, which Clausewitz illustrates in his definition of friction.

Despite popular notion, Clausewitz never actually defined a separate, distinct concept known as the “fog of war.” In On War, book 1, chapter 7, “Friction in War,” Clausewitz attempts to explain why real war diverges from the ideal war that strategists design on paper. In real war, there are immeasurable, uncontrollable factors that can alter the course of a campaign. These include adverse actions of individual soldiers, weather, responses of society, and counteractions of the enemy. Commanders will try to influence or mitigate these factors, but will never fully control them. Clausewitz categorizes this lack of control as “friction.”

Taking the entire chapter in context, the reader can deduce that Clausewitz was really describing the intangibles of the operating environment. He wrote that “friction… is everywhere in contact with chance and brings about effects that cannot be measured.” To illustrate this concept to readers of his day, Clausewitz describes the effect of weather on the battlefield.

Nineteenth-century military leaders would have understood how fog reduces the visibility of the enemy, causes weapons to malfunction, and delays reports to the commander. However, fog was just one illustration that worked for Clausewitz. What matters is how we interpret this illustration to understand his concept of friction; unfortunately, the popular argument is that an increased flow of accurate information on the battlefield and the precision of modern tools have reduced this friction. However, this interpretation of friction is too literal, too narrow, and ignores the ground truth.

The truth is that despite technological advances, armies of the computer age still operate at the mercy of the weather and other intangibles in the operating environment. It is true that communications technology has expanded our understanding of the battlefield and our weapons are more efficient in the modern age, but are still susceptible to the elements. For example, Blue Force Tracker and other digital assets fail without cooling systems in extreme heat; our attack aviation cannot fly in low-visibility conditions caused by frequent dust storms in desert environments; tracked and heavy combat vehicles find themselves mired in mud after heavy rains; tank targeting systems are rendered useless by fog despite thermal imaging; and most of our radio equipment is still affected by storms, line-of-sight terrain, and solar activity. Clearly, physical weather continues to have a considerable effect on our modern equipment. Even so, physical weather is just one example of the unpredictable factors of war.

Cyberspace contains its own virtual weather system. Clausewitz describes action in war like movement in a resistant element, like walking in water. The computer age has delivered massive flows of information that can become great tides of white noise through which commanders must swim to make sense of their operating environ-
ment. This would be tolerable if our automated systems kept up with our expectations, but they do not. Commanders are inundated by e-mail and other automation systems nearly as often as they are enabled by them. Still, weather and intangibles are just the beginning of friction. These abrasive points would be nothing, if they were not exploited by an enemy.

Armies of the computer age still face adaptable enemies. Our enemies have not only adapted to the physical battlefield, they have altered the battlefield in cyberspace. Even before 9/11, Osama Bin Laden understood that “rhetoric and satellite propaganda can be on equal footing with unmanned bombers and cruise missiles.”

When al-Qaeda’s base of operation in Afghanistan was physically squeezed, its terrorist network virtually expanded operations by increasing its global reach through cyberspace. Cyber-terrorists even have the ability to shut down emergency services and entire power grids in the Continental United States without firing a single shot. By exploiting our dependency on automated systems, our enemies can inflict deadly effects without detection. Our military effectiveness in cyberspace is still trying to catch up with our evolving understanding of the environment and threat. In contrast, we are quite comfortable operating in the physical environment and believe that advances in technology have given us a marked advantage over our enemies. However, adaptive enemy deception tactics have periodically mitigated our command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and precision weapons advantages. No one will deny the usefulness of modern enablers on the current battlefield. Nevertheless, precision does not necessarily equate to battlefield dominance.

In 1999, NATO flew more than 11,000 strike missions against Serbian forces. Using satellite and aerial imagery, NATO combat forces claimed they had destroyed 120 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 200 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 5,000 to 10,000 Serbian troops. NATO peacekeepers had a different story on the ground. Serbian forces used decoys and repositioned previously destroyed vehicles to deceive NATO air assets. In the end, the reality was that less than 20 tanks and a “few dozen” other vehicles were destroyed.

The enemy has also adapted by exploiting our reliance on using precision weapons to reduce risks in the commitment of ground forces. For example, at the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces (CF) targeted Iraqi ammunition supply points for precision strikes to reduce the threat of Iraqi artillery strikes on CF. Although the ammunition supply points were precisely hit and reported destroyed, the effects actually scattered munitions. Without the commitment of ground forces, these scattered munitions later became raw materials for improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Even with precision munitions, the effects can be precisely wrong. Likewise, we must remember that precision warfare is still conducted by imprecise humans.

Modern armies are still susceptible to the fallibility of the human dimension. In describing friction, Clausewitz argues that no component of war is made up of one piece and “each part is composed of individuals, everyone who retains his potential of friction.” In 2003, the adverse actions of a handful of soldiers at Abu Ghraib exploded across the internet and compelled more zealous foreign fighters to engage CF in Iraq. We are still feeling the effects today as more detailed evidence of torture is released. In 2004, despite modern communication equipment and state-of-the-art technology, Pat Tillman killed a member of his own unit. Pat Tillman has become a symbol of the camaraderie and sacrifice of our soldiers.

The notion that modern technology has rendered Clausewitz’s theories of fog and friction obsolete is unfounded. Intangible and uncontrollable factors, such as weather, enemy actions, and human failures, will continue to cause friction in the 21st century. As such, commanders must be able to exploit current capabilities, anticipate limitations in the operating environment, and safeguard technological vulnerabilities on the modern battlefield.

**Notes**


2. Ibid., p. 120.

3. Ibid.


9. 60 Minutes, “Cyber War: Sabotaging the System.”


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The Role of the HHC/HHT Commander in the Counterinsurgency Fight
by Captain Harvey C. Smith III

In the ever-evolving counterinsurgency (COIN) environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the biggest challenges faced by company/troop commanders remains resource management. Company-level commanders are overwhelmed with the immense size and complexity of their areas of operations, which are too large for their organic capabilities. This is exacerbated as these commanders are expected to conduct intelligence analysis using company intelligence support teams at a level consistent with a battalion S2 section. In addition, multiple enablers, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, are available but not resourced unless requested at the company/troop level. Additional combat power or enablers for these commanders are not efficient answers as most commanders struggle to effectively use currently available assets. There are no two ways about it — current operations require more commanders on the battlefield who can conduct the levels of analysis and execution necessary for success.

One option, which has been overlooked, is headquarters and headquarters company/troop-level (HHC/HHT) commanders. Both at the National Training Center (NTC) and in theater, battalion/squadron commanders have employed HHC/HHT commanders in various ways during COIN operations. This article provides several examples, conducts a simple analysis of the HHC/HHT commander’s effectiveness, and provides recommendations for improving the usefulness of an underutilized asset.

The role of an HHC/HHT commander is unique as he has very few soldiers he directly controls, especially during combat operations. The HHC/HHT commander must work in concert with various staff sections of the organization to provide support and leadership. He is also responsible for developing junior officers, most notably, mortar and scout platoon leaders in the combined arms battalion, the support platoon leader in the cavalry squadron, and the executive officer. In a COIN environment, his role often becomes even more nebulous, with battalion/squadron operations usually being conducted from a forward operating base (FOB) while maintaining a nonlinear area of operations. Many of the normal support functions of the HHC/HHT, including Class I, maintenance, and managing the battalion trains, are negated due to contractor support on the FOB. This leaves the commander with available time to assume additional roles, as designated by the battalion/squadron commander. The four examples below depict how different commanders have used HHC/HHT commanders and provides a basic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each method.

The HHC Commander as the FOB Mayor and OIC of Base Defense Operations

One battalion at the National Training Center used its HHC commander as FOB mayor and base defense operations cell (BDOC) officer in charge (OIC). The HHC was given an area of operations that included the FOB and an area outside the defensive perimeter, which was approximately 3 kilometers in all directions. The commander oversaw all FOB contracts and was responsible for the security of the base, including the entry control point (ECP). The company commander developed a base defense standard operating procedure (SOP) and issued all orders pertaining to base defense and FOB standards. Security manning of the FOB ECP was provided by the maneuver companies by way of a battalion tasking, and personnel were rotated daily. The mortar platoon was provided as a maneuver element, but was also tasked with providing one ‘hot’ gun at all times, limiting its availability. The scout platoon was unavailable as it was tasked as the brigade aerial reaction force (ARF). All Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) within the battalion were consolidated within the HHC to provide ISR capabilities in vicinity of the FOB. In addition,
a rapid aerostat initial deployment (RAID) camera was provided to observe historical and potential indirect fire point-of-origin sites.

The HHC commander was effective as the FOB mayor with no contractual issues during the rotation. He developed a solid BDOC SOP, which included a plan for mass casualties. Operations at the FOB ECP were a challenge, as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed each day were not always carried on by the next group of soldiers on duty. Also, the mortar platoon was continually tasked for last-second missions, including resupply missions to the retrans site and battlefield circulation of the battalion command sergeant major. This prevented them from being available to conduct patrols in the HHC’s battlespace, thus providing enemy forces freedom of movement. The Raven UAVs were minimally used due to a lack of trained operators (only one operator available) and difficulties with planning and requesting restricted operating zones. Ultimately, base defense, in the form of increased indirect fire, suffered due to insufficient assets. In addition, the commander’s duties as FOB mayor and BDOC OIC prevented him from observing his mortar and scout platoon leaders during troop leading procedures, thereby missing multiple opportunities to develop junior leaders in his charge.

The HHC Commander in a Base Defense-only Role

A second battalion at the NTC tasked its HHC commander with only the responsibility of base defense. He had no responsibility for AOs outside the FOB, although his area of interest included the main supply route, which ran along the western edge of the base and served as a historical location for indirect fire. The battalion staff tasked the company with providing manpower for the FOB ECP. The mortar platoon was unavailable because it was tasked as the battalion commander’s personal security detachment; the scouts were unavailable because they were tasked as the brigade’s ARF. Ultimately, the commander was forced to task members of the battalion staff sections to provide FOB ECP security.

Because the commander was not overtasked, he was able to observe his specialty platoon leaders, as well as take advantage of several opportunities to sit down and counsel them based on his observations. On the other hand, security at the FOB ECP was problematic. While the commander developed a solid plan for base defense, the security element at the ECP had no training prior to assuming its mission and struggled with several basic responsibilities such as guard mount. Often, shifts fell short of qualified soldiers to man crew-served weapons. On multiple occasions, local nationals approached the ECP requesting a tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team (THT) provide intelligence on enemy force activities. Due to the inexperience of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers at the ECP, coordination through the BDOC to send the THT was slow, resulting in one potential source leaving the ECP without providing information. Functionality of the battalion staff sections was also noticeably degraded.

The HHC Commander as the ISR Manager

A third battalion at the NTC made its HHC commander the battalion ISR manager responsible for planning and tasking all ISR elements based on targeting orders produced by the battalion. While this commander attended all targeting working groups and briefs, he also conducted his own meetings, ultimately rehashing the information already discussed at other meetings. While available ISR assets were used more effectively, this senior
The commander was unable to lead soldiers or develop mission orders. He also was unable to observe and mentor his subordinate platoon leaders due to other obligations.

**The HHC Commander as the FOB Mayor in a Counterinsurgency Mission**

This example uses the HHC/HHT commander as the FOB mayor in an actual counterinsurgency mission role. The 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Diyala Province, Iraq, in November 2007. The squadron established operations on FOB Caldwell near the Iranian border, and was responsible for a very large operating environment (OE). The HHT commander was appointed as FOB mayor, responsible for planning and executing all support missions, and given responsibility for the battalion quick reaction force (QRF). Unlike the combined-arms battalion HHC, the HHT of a ground cavalry squadron in an armored cavalry regiment has a support platoon, but does not have a scout platoon or mortar platoon. Security for the FOB was provided by Iraqi army units, as well as contracted Ugandans, who manned the FOB ECP. To adequately fill the QRF, the commander took cooks and mechanics and spent countless hours training them for potential contingencies. On occasion, he led the QRF, which provided another commander on the battlefield. During the deployment, he also served as the S3 when field-grade officers took leave.

The FOB mayor’s responsibilities were time-consuming for the first 4 months, but decreased over the length of the deployment. The HHT commander spent a great deal of time developing his executive officer and support platoon leaders, enabling them to execute with minimal supervision. The QRF developed slowly at first, but soon became a capable maneuver element. The result of these events was that the HHT commander had a great deal of time and was underused on a day-to-day basis later in the deployment.

Ultimately, there is no ‘right’ way to use the HHC/HHT commander. A battalion/squadron commander must weigh the mission, his battalion’s strengths and weaknesses, resources available, and experiences of his HHC/HHT commander to determine where maximum effect can be achieved. However, regardless of the type of role in which the battalion commander elects to use his HHC/HHT commander, he must provide him with the proper tools to succeed. The battalion S3 must task subordinate elements to support, but avoid overburdening, specialty platoons organic to an HHC. ISR assets must be made available and then properly used to support the battalion’s targeting plan. In conclusion, the HHC/HHT commander may take on a whole host of roles; however, he is still responsible for training and developing junior officers in his company. Time must be set aside for this duty, as it cannot be delegated or overlooked.

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than 200 years in the U.S. Army: “Sergeants operate where the action is, in direct control of men who get the job done. That is why they need that rawhide toughness they are famous for, and why they have human understanding.”

There are critical components to mission accomplishment; however too much supervision can also be harmful. First consider this definition: “An Army leader is anyone who, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.” Now, consider this definition: Supervising means “to watch over an activity or task being carried out by somebody and ensure that it is performed correctly.” The first portion of the definition includes motivation, inspiration, encouragement, and positive influence; however, the second portion could easily imply ‘micromanagement.’

Another and a very disturbing reason for the lack of mid- and lower-level leadership can be found in ‘officer-centric’ organizations. This might be due to a lack of leadership as opposed to a reason, but it is definitely something apparent in certain units. Many organizations exist where officers and NCOs work very well together to accomplish unit missions. The NCO Corps was established on the very idea that commissioned officers cannot keep a handle on everything; therefore, NCOs are key to the Army’s success as a whole. “Nothing happens in our Army unless a sergeant is involved.” Over the past 6 years, I have observed varying degrees of ‘officer-centric’ organizations, which vary in degree from single officers to entire formations being run by very busy officers. “Don’t bypass your noncommissioned officer to demonstrate how busy you are doing his job.”

Formations that over-supervise NCOs tend to be very dysfunctional organizations in many areas. They arrived at this point either led by superiors, who may have been slighted or experienced a disservice by an NCO (thereby teaching his junior officers this type of leadership) or who felt the need to take a stronger stance due to perceived NCO failures. In either case, sooner or later, many will do it simply because ‘they can,’ sometimes becoming downright abusive. NCOs can also be abusive due to a lack of training or stress, but it is not as common; this is not a new concept, as some patterns occur in cycles throughout our Army.

Lieutenant General John M. Schofield addressed the U.S. Corps of Cadets in 1879, “The discipline which makes the soldier of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than make an Army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such a manner and in such a tone of voice as to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he

"Much has been written about the supposed demise of discipline in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Cause of the deterioration has been placed largely at the feet of a permissive society. The feet do the walking — the head does the talking. Deterioration of discipline has one root cause — lack of leadership."
who feels, and hence manifests disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.”10

Following the Korean conflict General Bruce C. Clarke stated, “If you diminish an NCO in public, you’re cutting off your own legs.”11 In Army Digest in 1967, Sergeant Major John Stepanek sheds light on why an NCO might fail to provide his best in situations: “Remember one thing. Very few noncommissioned officers were awarded their stripes without showing somebody something, sometime, somewhere. If your platoon sergeant is mediocré, if he is slow to assume responsibility, if he shies away from you, maybe sometime not too long ago someone refused to trust him, someone failed to support his decisions, someone shot him down when he was right. Internal wounds heal slowly; internal scars fade more slowly.”12

Even Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union recognized the rifts between the officer and NCO Corps. In 1974, he said, “My many years in the Army have demonstrated that whenever confidence in NCOs is lacking and wherever they are continuously bossed by officers, you have no real NCOs and no really combat worthy units.”13 Are we at this point yet? Of course not; however, leaders must take action to fix what is broken in our formations to avoid dark periods such as post-Vietnam. That means NCOs must enforce and reinforce standards and discipline as set by officers, which means officers must include NCOs as part of the team and allow them to do their job. In Military Intelligence Magazine, Major General Julius Parker stated, “The success of the U.S. Army is directly related to the quality of the professional relationships between its officers and noncommissioned officers.”14

Throughout military history, specifically directly after the Spanish-American War, during the Pacification Campaign of Cuba, to relatively present times, there exists an undeniable pattern that reappears several years at the beginning of a war, at its completion, or within a few years of its completion. Here is how General Carl Vuono sees it: “Noncommissioned officers are the heart and soul of our force. They are the heart because they determine the pulse. …If you look at the history of our Army and you look at the peaks and valleys of the efficiency of our force, look at the status of the NCO Corps at that particular time.”15

In my opinion, we are in a draw, which leads down to one of the valleys that General Vuono spoke of in his collected works. In the following quote, General Creighton Abrams speaks on the improper use of the chain of command, which can be directly equated to over-supervision and lack of trust: “The Army’s readiness depends upon the effectiveness of its leaders and their ‘ready’ spirit. Our leaders function best when the chain of command is used properly. Thus, we must concentrate efforts on making it work; used properly, the chain of command is a lifeline; used improperly, it becomes a choker, snuffing out initiative; it will also throttle the Army’s effectiveness as a fighting force. To be fully ready, the Army must maintain a chain of command, which provides freedom for junior leaders, commissioned and noncommissioned, to make decisions, lead their units, and care for their men in their own way, consistent with professional standards. They must be granted a chance to operate without a senior looking over their shoulders, making decisions for them or second guessing them. …It has been my observation that senior commanders are often surprised at how well their juniors operate when given appropriate freedom. When it frees junior leaders, the chain of command multiplies and enriches their effectiveness. Our readiness to fight depends on the professional ability, experience, and self-confidence of all of our leaders, but especially our junior commissioned and noncommissioned leader, and the strong and responsive bonds of support and encouragement in the chain of command.”16 This passage was written toward the end of the Vietnam War, proving that micromanagement was a fact of life even then, which creates a basic mistrust and undue friction.

In 1921, Major B.G. Chynoweth stated, “During World War I, we lost our old noncommissioned officer group. They have become officers or they are gone. Did we appreciate them fully? We must surely do so now. It was they who helped make our tasks so easy before the war. It is their absence that so complicates matters now. …Now is the time to commence the building of the noncommissioned officer for the next war.”17 This statement was made between World War I and II. We currently have much of our NCO Corps intact, but are bleeding them daily. We currently have much of our NCOs and the new one takes over.

In 1954, at the end of the Korean War, U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 615-15, Enlisted Personnel, published this quote: “The position of respect and leadership accorded the noncommissioned officer in the chain of command depends directly on the degree of authority that he is allowed to exercise.”18 Senior NCOs are responsible for ensuring junior soldiers are held accountable for their mistakes so that we may continue forging that po-
ition of respect and leadership, which will be continued far into the future, no matter when we leave this old organization.

After World War II, the Infantry Journal had this to share: “Putting stripes on a man’s sleeve doesn’t in itself make him a leader with assurance. The promoted private may have given signs of having the stuff a NONCOM needs. But you, as the leader from whom he has received his authority, are still the man he must look to for his bucking and specific instances of the way to lead men. And some company or platoon commanders never seem to learn their own faults of leadership are usually reflected in those of their assistants, though many NONCOMs do rise above ineffectual or uncertain leadership. …A new NONCOM needs some words of encouragement and advice from you — and he should not have to seek them. As his leader, it’s your job to keep an extra close eye on him for awhile after he is made — and more for the purpose of finding things to explain and praise than to blame. …The way to help him most is by praise within the hearing of his men. …Nothing helps an uncertain leader more than a clearly spoken expression of appreciation.”19 If a leader encourages junior leaders and instructs them, disciplines in private, and praises in public, he can shape a diamond in the rough into a jewel to be admired and emulated by the enlisted men following him. If not, the following quote may not be true within the halls of your organization: “The normal desire of the veteran who has won his stripes by hard service is to support his officers and reduce the friction down below. Whatever is done to lessen his dignity and prestige, damages morale and creates new stresses in the relations between the officer corps and the ranks, and the military machine loses its cushion and becomes subject to increasing shock.”20

So whether it be by micromanagement, stifling initiative, laziness by not enforcing standards, not affording NCOs appropriate degrees of authority and responsibility, not training junior leaders how to lead, not giving NCOs proper resources, or simply not forcing junior NCOs to do the right thing, it all boils down to a lack of leadership on the leader’s part. This problem is nothing new; it has weathered decades of peaks and valleys for more than 235 years. Our NCO Corps is not functioning properly in some areas and many others are at risk; our junior NCOs need guidance and training. They deserve nothing less than what we have as we grew up in the Army. By putting in place a dynamic NCOPD program, paying attention to detail, or simply holding these young soldiers accountable, we can quickly overcome our shortfalls. It will take commitment from our senior NCOs and officers: Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk is quoted as saying, “More than any other group, NCOs ‘made me,’ and I’ll never forget that.”21 Let it always be so; let us heed these “echoes from the past” before the problem gets so out of control that we have to spend years to fix it.

“Take a look at your unit and assess your leadership. Are you moving into a valley, sitting in the draw, or on top of the peak? What will you do to start the climb to the high ground to ensure the professional and quality leadership of the NCO Corps that has given us, the United States Army, the ability to make it happen?”22

Notes


7Encarta Dictionary, English, North America.

8Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, “The Armed Services Officer,” the Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 27.


10Secretary General John J. Stepanek, “As a Senior NCO Sees It,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 3.


12Major General Julius Parker, “Vantage Point,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 39.


14General Creighton W. Abrams, “Readiness: To Fight A War, To Keep The Peace,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28.

15Major B.G. Chynoweth, “The Enlisted Apprentice,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 3.

16Sergeant Major John G. Stepanek, “As a Senior NCO Sees It,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36.

17General Frank E. Steiner, “Strategic Readiness and Privates of Infantry in the Army of the United States,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28.


19“Words of Wisdom and Tips for Success from Senior Officers and NCOs,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 3.


24General Creighton W. Abrams, “Readiness: To Fight A War, To Keep The Peace,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28.


27Funk is quoted as saying, “More than any other group, NCOs ‘made me,’ and I’ll never forget that.”21 Let it always be so; let us heed these “echoes from the past” before the problem gets so out of control that we have to spend years to fix it.

28Major General Julius Parker, “Vantage Point,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 39.


30Secretary General John G. Stepanek, “As a Senior NCO Sees It,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36.


32Colonel Michael F. Pappal, senior brigade observer controller-trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center.

Command Sergeant Major Paul E. Thompson Jr. is currently serving as the command sergeant major (CSM), Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Mustang Team, Hohenfels, Germany. He received a B.S. from Excelsior College and his military education includes the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include interim CSM, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; CSM, 6th Squadron, 9th U.S. Cavalry, Fort Hood; operations sergeant major, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, Schweinfurt, Germany; and first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 63d Armored, Vilseck, Germany.
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Armor and Cavalry Requires Ranger-Qualified Leaders

Armor leaders, the time has come to seize the initiative! For far too long, Armor leaders have not been encouraged or enabled to take advantage of the Army’s premier leader development training opportunities. With the advent of the transition to modular brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the movement of the Armor School to Fort Benning, we are poised to take advantage of these training opportunities at the Maneuver Center of Excellence.

By FY17, more than 60 percent of our 19-series positions will be in Infantry BCT (IBCT) and Stryker BCT (SBCT) formations. This significantly increases our requirements for airborne, air assault, jumpmaster, pathfinder, and Ranger training. Not too long ago, it would be an anomaly to find an Armor officer serving in the 101st Air Assault Division; today, with four fully modernized and modularized IBCTs, Armor soldiers are everywhere! To help prepare up-and-coming leaders to lead and serve in these formations, which require specialty training, we must do a better job of getting them into air assault, pathfinder, and Ranger school. Of special importance to our officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is the expanded requirement, and desire, by BCT commanders to have Ranger-qualified leaders. Like it or not, agree or disagree, the customers (BCT commanders) have spoken!

We must equip our 19-series officers and NCOs with the essential combat skills (air assault, airborne, pathfinder, and Ranger) required to lead effectively in heavy, Stryker, infantry, and battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) formations. Cavalry and Armor commanders should:

- encourage soldiers to seek these training opportunities.
- allocate time for soldiers to attend these schools.
- establish training plans to help prepare them for the rigors of these schools.
- recognize and reward soldiers who successfully complete these demanding schools.

Through this process, we will develop versatile and adaptive Cavalry and Armor leaders who have mastered the small unit leader skills necessary to lead soldiers effectively in today’s complex and ambiguous operating environment.

In its January-February 2011 edition, ARMOR will feature an article that expands on the importance of Ranger training in developing our Cavalry and Armor small-unit leaders. It will also describe each of the phases of training and outline a training plan that commanders can use to assist soldiers in preparing for the demands of the Army’s premier small unit leadership school. Additional, detailed course information is available on the Ranger Training Brigade website: https://www.benning.army.mil/rtb.

Colonel Ted Martin
Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

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Infantry and Armor Authorizations

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All COL BCT Commanders coded 02C (AR/IN/FA/EN)
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There are 408 total CMF 19-coded Ranger positions for Armor NCOs