

ARMOR

Mounted Maneuver Journal

January-February 2011



COUNTERINSURGENCY ON
THE AMERICAN PLAINS

ARMOR

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LETTERS

The Eternal Foundation: Building a Deep Sense of Unity and Heritage

Dear *ARMOR*,

Major Joseph Labarbera's article, "The Eternal Foundation: Reorganizing the Regimental System's Operational Framework to a Combined Arms Regimental System," in the September-October edition of *ARMOR* resonated with me deeply. I second his opinion that regimental units build an esprit and cohesion that brigade combat teams (BCTs), composed of disparate battalions with different regimental lineages, simply lack. Maybe that translates into combat effectiveness and maybe not, but it's definitely true. Having been an armor leader in both a "normal" brigade combat team, the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and a combined

arms regiment, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), I can say without hesitation that I am far more emotionally invested in the latter. The traditions and legacy of the cavalry, and the Blackhorse Regiment, in particular, are powerful. I still consider myself a Blackhorse Trooper and strive to conduct myself as such, even though my name is no longer on the rolls. Since I am now a functional area officer, I can wear my 11th ACR brass on my uniform for the rest of my career, which suits me just fine. Maybe I am alone in my enthusiasm for my old regiment, but I suspect not.

I fully agree with Major Labarbera's recommendation to "reflag" the current BCTs under

regimental flags. I think it would be appropriate to designate the infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs) as infantry regiments, the heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs) as armor regiments, and the Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs) as cavalry regiments. In any case, I hope Major Labarbera's ideas gain traction in the maneuver fires and effects community, and the Army at large, so the rest of the Army can share the same deep sense of unity and heritage that airborne infantry, armored cavalry, and Ranger regiments enjoy. Allons!

JOHN D. BOLAND
MAJ, U.S. Army

Pages from the Past:

CAVALRY ESPRIT

(Reprinted from the October 1920 issue of *The Cavalry Journal*)

Someone has said that "it takes esprit de corps to win objectives," and it is believed that this spirit, put into the work, greatly aided the cavalry in winning its recruiting objective in record time.

When the United States entered the World War, the difficulties of ocean transportation for horses and forage were so great as to preclude a large participation of cavalry in the conflict. Only three regiments were sent overseas, and they were mostly used in handling the Remount Service. However, one squadron of the Second and one troop of the Third were effectively engaged in the St. Mihiel offensive. Other regiments were converted into artillery.

The greater part of the cavalry was compelled to serve on the border, while their more fortunate comrades in arms were engaged in the great struggle overseas. Yet, notwithstanding the almost overwhelming bitterness of disappointment, they served where duty placed them, with characteristic cheerfulness and efficiency, in a situation oftentimes trying and sometimes critical.

When the demobilization sadly depleted their ranks, every man and officer heartily put his shoulder to the enormous and difficult task of recruiting up to the authorized strength, not merely with men, but with men of the type that will perform the exacting duties required of the cavalry arm.

The usual friendly rivalry existed between organizations, but when one regiment happened to

be less fortunate than another in respect to the allocation to states for recruiting purposes, the commanding officers and representatives of the more fortunate regiments took the broad view of working for the arm as a whole; consequently, the cavalry arm, almost as a single unit, has grown until today it is partially closed to enlistment, being filled to authorized strength.

Incidentally, it shows that men are still joining the Army primarily for the love of "soldiering." It is generally believed that on the Mexican border, owing to the nature of the duties and small garrisons, educational and vocational training cannot be carried on so effectively or extensively as in the larger garrisoned posts and cantonments.

Even so, the regiments stationed along the border experienced the least difficulty in recruiting to authorized strength.

Although the present cavalry recruiting phase is practically completed, it is imperative that the cavalry take a still wider view, considering itself as an integral part of the whole Army, in which it is vitally interested, and that the organization representatives, who helped the G.R.S. canvassers bring cavalry up to strength, should remain "in the field" for the purpose of carrying on teamwork of procuring recruits for the Army in general, and in order to be in a position to secure needed specialists for their own arm.

Let all arms get together as a team and push this recruiting campaign to a successful issue. Esprit will win.

COMMANDANT'S HATCH

COL Ted Martin
Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School



Armor and Cavalry Leader Development: Getting Out of the Comfort Zone

The number one priority of the Armor School is leader development. As the Chief of Armor, it is my responsibility to lay out the path and set the conditions so Cavalry and Armor leaders are fully developed and prepared to both lead and prevail on future battlefields. The by-product of a successful branch-oriented leader development program goes well beyond branch competency; it has the added benefit of preparing leaders to thrive in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational arena. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*, presents three pillars that support leader development, which include institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. This article describes how we intend, as a force, to develop Armor and Cavalry leaders through the use of operational assignments and to discuss their ties to the overall developmental process of Armor leaders.

The Army has changed considerably from when I was commissioned some 27 years ago. We have come a long way from being focused on service in heavy divisions and armored cavalry regiments (ACRs) with a smattering of tankers and cavalymen serving in the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions. Long gone are the days when a young Cavalry officer or NCO would dream about becoming a member of the prestigious "LUCKY 16" society. For those of you who have not been exposed to this rare breed of Cavalrymen, this honor was garnered by serving successfully in the 2d ACR, 3d ACR, and 11th ACR (2+3+11= "LUCKY 16"). Now we look for a broader developmental path for our Armor leaders, one that gives them experience in all types of brigade combat teams (BCTs) by the time they reach their sixteenth year of service, if at all possible, given operational constraints and the needs of the Army.

You have probably noticed, and I am proud to report for those who haven't, that Armor branch has successfully infiltrated every division and BCT in the Army's inventory. If you had told me back in 1983 that one day we would have six airborne cavalry squadrons in the active Army, I would have thought you were crazy! But the reality is that Armor and Cavalry troopers, NCOs, and officers have been fully integrated into every type of BCT (heavy, infantry, and Stryker) and the battlefield surveillance brigade. If the axiom "it's the man, not the machine" is accurate, and I believe it is, then we must relook the way we use operational assignments to develop our leaders so that they can succeed in all of these formations. After all, the fundamentals of reconnaissance, offense and defense, are conducted no differently in the HBCT, IBCT, or SBCT. Why wouldn't we want to give our leaders developmental experiences in all of these formations over the course of their careers?

I firmly believe that Armor leaders are agile and adaptable by their very nature. We would be selling ourselves short if we believed that we needed multiple tours of duty on the same platforms (such as tanks, Bradley's, Strykers, and mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles), and various dismounted roles, to master these weapons systems. We have already shown that Armor soldiers are adept at moving from tanks to armored HMMWVs and MRAPs with a short period of training. Certainly a 3-year tour of duty in a BCT is ample time to provide the training, education, and experience to master the tactics, doctrine, and "culture" unique to each type of formation.

Just think of the strength of character and breadth of experience that is built when we take a leader whose first assign-

ment was to a mobile gun system platoon in a Stryker infantry battalion and follow that with an assignment to a combined arms battalion. The leader continues to learn, grow and develop, but more importantly, the unit benefits from the cross-pollination that occurs when we mix the best experiences of service in both of these organizations. The result is an infusion of "best practices" and an overall growth in potential for everyone involved. In a perfect world, an Armor leader would have the opportunity to serve in all three types of BCTs prior to battalion command (officers) or duty as a command sergeant major (NCOs). This will not always be possible, but it is a worthy goal.

There are those who would argue with this developmental model — and that's okay. I look forward to reading your letters in the coming months. I think with some thoughtful study of the current operational environment and what we predict the world to look like 10 to 15 years down the road, you will likely come to the same conclusion that I did: we need to prepare our leaders to prevail in times of uncertainty, and this is best achieved by providing them with the skills and experiences necessary to develop holistically.

We live in exciting times. As the transformation of our Army continues, we must ensure we do not get too comfortable. Staying in a comfort zone is a sure sign that the leader development model may not be exploiting all available opportunities.

Driver, move out!

*CSM Ricky Young
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School*



Agile and Adaptive Tankers: Today's Soldiers, Tomorrow's Leaders

As force structure continues to change, the tanker community continues to get smaller; therefore, positions and promotions are not only becoming more competitive, but more difficult to attain. As a result, tankers must cast aside preexisting ideas and actively seek special skills that allow them to competitively serve in formations that significantly increase their chances of career success. For example, the planned conversion of 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division and 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment will occur between fiscal year (FY) 11 and 13. The conversion will decrease tank platoon sergeant positions by thirty-nine and tank companies by seven. This reduction could easily lead one to believe that while waiting around to become a tank company first sergeant, you may get passed up by peers who are more willing to broaden their horizons by acquiring skills that fit into all combat formations. This is not a call to turn away from core competencies or abandon heritage and traditions, it is just a realization that our armored force is changing and we must adapt to those changes or get left behind in the fog of irrelevance.

Many of our junior Soldiers have not performed core competencies since leaving their initial training courses due to the high operational tempo of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Attention to detail and technical competence have been long-standing hallmarks of the Armor Branch, and precision gunnery and expert mounted tactics will always be at the center of our profession, which require the technical expertise of master gunners at all organizational levels. Core competency skills taught at the Master Gunner School cannot be replicated at any

other professional-development school. Master gunners are accomplished Armor noncommissioned officers, trained in advanced gunnery methodology, turret weapons systems maintenance, and gunnery training management, which allow them to function as the unit's master of gunnery, the tank commander's mentor, and the commander's gunnery technical advisor. Master gunners conduct maintenance procedures used to identify and troubleshoot complex malfunctions that occur in the tank's turret electrical, hydraulic, armament, and fire control systems. The master gunner is a master of tank gunnery doctrinal and technical procedures needed to assess crew proficiency and identify crew procedural errors that cause a tank to miss a target, and provides training for crews to operate the tank to its designed capabilities. The most important role a master gunner plays is one of preventing the Armor Force's core competencies from deteriorating.

Soldiers in the 19-series career field need to focus on their future careers, contrary to popular belief that there are positions for a 19K in the Army's light organizations. Keep in mind, however, that most of these positions are 19Z, which should not keep young Soldiers from planning their futures. Young career Soldiers who chose the 19K career field should think about getting ahead of the game by attending a functional training course or two, such as Airborne School, Jumpmaster School, or Air Assault School, which provide Soldiers with essential skills to build future leaders. For example, several organizations where these skills are needed include the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 173d

Airborne Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the 18th Airborne Corps. These are the units where old tankers can be first sergeants of recon troops — fast roping out of helicopters in the 101st or jumping out of airplanes in the 82d. As a branch, Armor is as strong as ever, but its Soldiers need to face reality and broaden their horizons if they want to continue moving upward in our ever-shrinking Armor Branch.

To preserve the Armor Branch's core competencies, we must continue to educate our Soldiers through our institutional schools, such as the Master Gunner School, Army Reconnaissance Course, and Abrams and mobile gun system operator's maintenance and commander's courses. Other functional schools, such as battle staff, joint air operations, and senior noncommissioned officer joint professional military education are vital schools that certainly help develop well-rounded, highly knowledgeable professional Soldiers capable of leading successful units. Our Soldiers will always remain our primary focus; they are the centerpiece of all we do as an Army. Throughout our history, Armor Soldiers have answered the call to end tyranny, to free the oppressed, and light the path to democracy for struggling nations. Armor Soldiers, imbued with the Warrior Ethos, are, and will always remain, the foundation of the Armor force.

The Armor Center continues to be the supporting effort to the main effort — our units in the fight. We will continue to assist units with challenges and provide highly trained officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers who are flexible to change. TREAT 'EM ROUGH!

From the Boresight Line:

Preparation is Key to Success

by Sergeant First Class Joseph Davis

The Master Gunner Course is a tough and challenging 11-week course with 6 exam points. The sheer volume of information presented to students can be daunting, but course mastery can be achieved through hard work. Each exam consists of two portions, which include written and hands on. Written exams require students to achieve 90 percent on each exam to pass; there are no multiple-choice questions and all written tests require short response answers. Hands-on performance exams are scored using “go/no-go” criteria. Exam VI is the capstone event where students plan, develop, and present gunnery training calendars to a panel of three master gunner instructors. During this examination, students fill the role of unit master gunners briefing gunnery training plans to the chain of command and can be quizzed on all areas in which they have received instruction.

Course Prerequisites

The prerequisites listed below aid commanders and unit master gunners in selecting potential Master Gunner Course candidates. To qualify, candidates must:

- Be in the rank of sergeant to sergeant first class.
- Have 1 year experience as a tank commander.*
- Be qualified as a tank commander within 12 months; National Guard soldiers within the past 24 months.*
- Have a valid GST score sheet (within the past 6 months).
- Have at least a GT 105 and CO 110 (either GT score *or* CO score may be waived, but by only 5 points).*
- Have a secret (or interim) clearance, which is required to attend a non-testable class.*
- Have 10 months remaining in service upon graduation.
- Have battalion commander/command sergeant major (CSM) interview.

*Waivers considered by approving authority, commandant, Master Gunner School

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) volunteering for the Master Gunner Course must be carefully vetted during the battalion commander’s interview to ensure they meet course prerequisites and have the desire, motivation, initiative, and



mental ability to be a master gunner. The course is built on the soldier’s knowledge of and experience with the Abrams tank and weapons systems. Additional course information is available on the 316th Cavalry Brigade’s website at <http://www.knox.army.mil/school/16cav/mg4.asp>.

Preparing for the Course

It is highly recommended that prospective master gunner candidates attend sabot academy (pre-master gunner training) before attending the Master Gunner Course. Training and testing soldiers prior to attending the course, in accordance with task, conditions, and standards outlined in the course material, greatly increases chances of successfully completing the course. Ensuring that candidates are exempt from all unit activities/duties once training begins will aid students in successfully completing the course. Provide candidates with a place to study (away from home/barracks room). Successfully completing sabot academy does not guarantee soldiers will graduate Master Gunner School; however, it does effectively serve as a prep school for the course. Sabot academies resourced at brigade or battalion levels are invaluable unit assets. Unit master gunners applying their knowledge and experience of the course, along with training materials available on our webpage, provide realistic training that replicates what candidates will experience at the course.

Technology in Training

In the past, students were presented slideshows depicting the different tank components and a 2D model of their functions. Now, when students in process, they receive a copy of U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.21, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) Gunnery*, student texts, and a laptop equipped with the latest training

tool in 3D modeling. This new software greatly enhances the student’s ability to understand the tank’s component make-up by providing a 3D model of the tank’s internal components, as well as rotate and zoom options for better viewing. Students also have the ability to click a component and pull it from the model for a more detailed examination.

Another area where 3D modeling enhances training is in studying the M256A1 cannon. Students are no longer limited to using the breechblock trainer in the maintenance bay to enhance their understanding of the tank’s cannon. The new 3D software provides students with the ability to pause, rewind, or fast function as they view the cannon’s five phases of function in action. The software is intuitive, easy to use, and greatly enhances the student’s training comprehension during the Master Gunner Course maintenance phase. In the future, 3D modeling software will be expanded to cover other subjects taught at the Master Gunner Course.


Select future Master Gunners early

In today’s contemporary operating environment, armor units often deploy without tanks. While the armor community is highly adaptable and successful in these broad-spectrum missions, time spent away from serving on tanks erodes the unit’s functional knowledge. Even more functional knowledge is lost as leaders leave the unit and are replaced with new personnel. To help mitigate knowledge loss, commanders must lean forward in the saddle and identify future master gunners as early as possible. Provide the tools and time needed so potential candidates can successfully prepare for the course. Although the unit sacrifices an outstanding NCO for 11 weeks, the knowledge a qualified, trained master gunner brings back to the unit repeatedly pays huge dividends.

BATTLING BRAVO

COMMEMORATING THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF DESERT STORM

by Colonel (Retired) Bart Howard



In February 1991, coalition air and ground forces attacked into the defenses of the Iraqi army, and in a matter of 100 hours, Operation Desert Storm culminated in one of the most decisive operational victories in the history of modern warfare. It was a stunning victory, one that surprised both observers and participants alike. Many had predicted that the large and considerably experienced Iraqi army, the 8th largest in the world at the time, would not necessarily achieve victory, but inflict considerable casualties in a protracted campaign that would most likely include the feared introduction of chemical weapons. This scenario never materialized. The coalition had executed a lightning campaign that seemed to validate all the theories of “AirLand” battle, which had been preached in classrooms at Forts Leavenworth and Knox, and the desert valleys of Fort Irwin, California.

But like a professional boxer who plants a devastating punch in the first seconds of a world championship contest, the story may not be so much about the length of the match, but the years of disciplined training and conditioning that it took to enter the ring and be prepared to win so decisively. The 100 hours was not a lucky punch; it took a lot of sweat, blood, and sacrifice to reach this pinnacle of training.

This article, “Battling Bravo,” discusses one tank company and its experiences during Desert Storm. The experiences of B Company, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, 1st Tiger Brigade, 2d Armored Division, are not unique in the history of this era, they are similar to numerous small units that went to war in the winter of 1990. Battling Bravo is a microcosm of the Army’s experience as it learned to fight as combined arms teams in the mid 1980s, and reached a high mark of readiness at exactly the time it was needed to deploy and fight in the summer of 1990.

The story of Battling Bravo began in the 1980s as the majority of its 64 members joined the U.S. Army at a time of vast and pos-

itives changes. My own story was of joining the U.S. Army National Guard and attending one station unit training as an infantry private in 1981, while simultaneously enrolled as a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadet. At the time, I thought the training to be tough and realistic. My drill sergeants were all veterans of Vietnam and understood the importance of basic rifle marksmanship and physical conditioning. I had heard rumors regarding a lack of discipline in the Army as the popular movie *Stripes* portrayed, but it was clear that times were changing. We were introduced to a new physical readiness test, a new battle uniform, rations, and a greater emphasis on tough, realistic standards-based training. As we left Fort Benning, we caught a glimpse of the new Infantry fighting vehicle, known as the “Bradley,” which would complement the new Abrams tank.

As I progressed through ROTC, I was exposed to an Army focused on training and readiness. My ROTC cadre were combat veterans who took the time to mentor and prepare our class with a sincere belief that because of the Cold War, we would have to be prepared to join our units overseas and possibly “fight tonight.” Following my commissioning, Armor Officer Basic Course, and initial assignments, I was part of an increasingly disciplined Army that did not tolerate drug use and offered constant opportunities to validate training. It was not uncommon to spend weeks and months on end in “the field” replicating realistic maneuvers using new systems, such as multiple integrated laser engagement systems (MILES); training against a challenging and unpredictable opposing force at the blossoming combat training centers; firing countless main gun rounds in simulation on the newly fielded, miraculously high-tech, unit conduct of fire trainer (UCOFT); conducting live fire; or rolling out at a moment’s notice, unsure if it was another readiness test or the beginning of an actual conflict. Furthermore, it did not matter much where they had served previously, whether it was a tank battalion in Germany, Korea,

Fort Polk, Carson, or Hood, the standardization of doctrine allowed platoon sergeants or tank gunners to arrive with a common understanding of how a company was employed in the field. Everyone knew what “LOGPAC,” “travelling overwatch” and “staggered column” meant. Common language was important but most important was hands-on practice. Battling Bravo got plenty of scrimmage time in the summer of 1990.

Training

During one of the last return to Germany (REFORGER) exercises, the Pentagon announced that the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, would inactivate as part of the reorganization caused by the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. Many of us serving at the time were unsure of what our future role would be with the Soviets out of the picture. Soon we were told that our mission was, as it had always been — to train and be ready to deploy and fight. The 1st Tiger Brigade, of which we were a part, had been given the resources to continue to train as part of a previously scheduled rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Following this rotation, we would then tackle the tedious task of dismantling and inactivating our beloved unit.

In 1990, a rotation to NTC was an immensely significant part of a unit and individual leader’s credibility. It was nothing less than a test in which every scenario could be experienced, from a precarious night live-fire attack to the inevitable multi-hour replication of a persistent chemical attack, brought on by a training device dubbed “doctor doom.” No aspect of the battle was notional; casualties had to be evacuated to the rear, ammunition, albeit replicated as small simulators, was required to be brought forward in appropriately capable trucks. All of this replication to the overarching challenges of real battle was revolutionary for the time and unparalleled with any of our coalition partners.

Because of the intensity of the training, no time was wasted at the NTC learning the basics. Units were expected to arrive at the peak of readiness, which led Tiger Brigade to embark on a rigorous training schedule, which started with the smallest combat team and built up to a brigade-level force-on-force event, known appropriately as “Hell’s Forge.”

Live fire was a critical component of this training plan. A tank company was expected to maneuver well and employ devastatingly accurate fire. Our early model M1 tanks, although somewhat worn at the time, could still fire very accurately when properly boresighted by a disciplined and drilled crew. Battle Company, fully manned with crews from the inactivating 2d (St Lo) Brigade, progressed with high proficiency through the numerous tank gunnery gates, finally culminating in a combined live-fire exercise on 3 August 1990. Just after completing this capstone exercise, word arrived over a small transistor radio — Iraq had invaded Kuwait.

Although we had little knowledge of the region, we understood that there might be serious implications for the United States and even our small unit. While back in garrison, conducting the time-honored wash rack and recovery routine, I was called to the battalion commander’s office where I learned that we had been alerted for overseas movement to a combat zone.

Deployment

There was a high state of confidence as the company assembled the next day and began an intense period of maintenance

and inspections. The preparation for NTC had proved to be incredibly well-timed. The company had formed into a cohesive team that trained together and, most importantly, was stabilized, avoiding the disruptive permanent change of station (PCS) cycle, which inevitably damaged readiness. In Battle Company’s case, all tank commanders and key leaders remained in place for an unheard of 9 months.

For the next 3 months, the company fell into a routine of nearly 18-hour days, 7 days a week, accomplishing an increasing list of tasks that revealed the serious nature of our upcoming endeavor. The length of the work schedule was not an indicator of being ill-prepared, but was due to the ever-increasing availability of resources. Continental United States (CONUS) units usually did not have priority on class IX parts, and due to tight budgets, it was difficult to obtain some high-dollar end items. Soon, truck loads of track, gun tubes, fire-control components, tents, cots, weapons, radios, and basic load items appeared. All vehicles, which were once painted woodland camouflage, were converted to chemical-agent resistant coating (CARC) sand paint within a 24-hour operation.

Driving down the main roads of Fort Hood, one could see row after row of motor pools, illuminated by flood lights, revealing a state of constant activity. These preparations continued until, to the relief of the crews, the order was given to rail load and convoy the brigade’s hundreds of vehicles to the port of Beaumont, Texas. Once at Beaumont, vehicles and connexes were loaded on to commercial and military transport vessels, marking the end of an important phase of Bravo’s preparation for combat.

Having completed an enormous amount of training and now separated from our tanks, we were able to take a short respite. As we waited for the order to move forward by aircraft, we cleared the entire barracks of all personal items and left the garrison ready for occupation by follow-on reserve units as was the plan for general war. We felt that we were leaving for the duration of the conflict, a conflict which could last a matter of months or perhaps a year or more; it would be over when it was over. This uncertainty made me appreciate the feeling of previous



“Our early model M1 tanks, although somewhat worn at the time, could still fire very accurately when properly boresighted by a disciplined and drilled crew.”

generations of soldiers whose primary emotion was to get to the combat theater and get the job done.

In 1990, the only combat veterans in the brigade were a small scattering of Vietnam veterans whose experience spanned from intense small-unit combat to support activities in rear areas. For the vast majority of soldiers, there was a curiosity of what combat would bring. What would it be like? Would it be similar to combat training? All of these questions were yet to be answered as the brigade eventually received the order to deploy by charter aircraft to the distant and unfamiliar country of Saudi Arabia.

The arrival and staging of units into Saudi Arabia was a logistics undertaking of immense proportions. Although much has been written about what went wrong in the following months, it was only the institutional experience of exercises, such as REFORGER, that prevented deployment and staging in Saudi Arabia from being a total disaster. For a small unit, such as Bravo Company, the problems of theater logistics were of little concern.

We arrived late at night after a long flight and the inevitable “hurry up and wait drill.” We were bused to a large, foul-smelling warehouse alongside a pier in the port city of Ad-Damman. The huge building was predominately empty except for the presence of piles of Army cots. Soon the air was filled with the sounds of hundreds of cots being unfolded and noncommissioned offi-

cers (NCOs) establishing order. For the next 10 days, the company fell into a routine of physical training, basic survival skill training, and standard operating procedure (SOP) reviews. The conditions were fairly primitive, but compared to the usual experience of living on vehicles in the field, the availability of homemade shower stalls and two hot T-ration meals a day, the main complaint was inactivity. To note, this was a time when instantaneous communications was not expected; there were no phones available and the only method of connection home was through letter writing — not much had changed since our 2d Armored Division veterans landed in North Africa.

Once the ships carrying the brigade arrived in port, the units quickly disembarked all vehicles and moved by an eclectic array of civilian trucks and buses out to the Saudi Arabian desert. Although the move seemed to be chaotic, within 48 hours, Bravo company was set in a company assembly area in one of the most remote places on the planet. For the next 4 months, units lived in this most austere environment. Field sanitation training came into practical and critical use as small units built field latrines and showers, washed clothes by hand and ate a mixture of meals ready to eat (MREs) and T-rations for months on end. To maintain discipline and prevent training atrophy, a weekly training schedule was constructed. Rarely, had the U.S. Army been in such a position. There were no civilians, buildings, or distract-

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tions for miles around; there was nothing but endless miles of featureless sand, and for Bravo Company, tanks and weapons.

Due to concerns over maintenance wear and tear, mounted movement had to be limited. The loss of a major component, such as an engine, could result in a vehicle being deadlined for a number of days or weeks, as class IX parts were precious. Thus, training had to be creative. Leaders looked to time-tested methods, such as tactical exercise without troops (TEWTS), radio rehearsals, cross training, lectures, and rock drills to keep battle focus. One skill emphasized by Bravo Company was prep to fire boresighting, which became a twice daily event. Having come from Cold War deployable units, it was expected that if a fragmentary order (FRAGO) was given to move, the company could react in minimal time with combat loaded tanks immediately ready to fire.

Chemical training was the other area of expertise that needed little justification for inclusion. The most feared scenario was one of being hit by chemicals, whether delivered by artillery, mine, or aircraft spray. It took little imagination to visualize the potentially horrible outcome of not being prepared. Day after day, masks were donned, decontamination techniques were rehearsed, and a M8 alarm was constantly placed upwind of the unit assembly area. Contamination was not a theoretic scenario. Due to experience from the recent Iran-Iraq wars, it was thought that a chemical attack would be an inevitable part of the upcoming operation. Chemical officers and NCOs achieved a new status, as they were inundated with requests for information. The company gained a new-found urgency in chemical equipment maintenance.

By December 1990, as news reports exposed an ebb and flow of diplomatic efforts, the general feeling among soldiers was fatigue and the hope of getting on with whatever the future might bring. If it was combat, then the only way home was through the Iraqi army. That same month also brought the greatest boast in morale — the announcement that the company would receive brand new M1A1s, which would be arriving from prepositioned sites in Germany. The M1A1, with its 120mm smoothbore cannon, NBC filtration system, and vastly improved reliability, meant a huge leap in the company's survivability and lethality. The company moved back to Ad-Damman and within 48 hours, dropped off 14 M1s and received 14 brand-new, freshly painted, and literary "new-car smelling" M1A1s. Within days, the battalion conducted live-fire qualification and participated in a large-scale exercise, giving great confidence to the crews. The last piece of preparation had fallen into place.

The company had returned to its training routine when, on a cool January evening, a radio announcement confirmed that Desert Shield had transitioned to Desert Storm. In the sky above, hundreds of aircraft were moving northward into Kuwait and Iraq, only visible by their faint navigation lights. Within an hour, the distant horizon was marked by brilliant flashes and the dots of anti-aircraft fire. Although there were shouts of encouragement to the U.S. Air Force to "get some," the sobering facts revealed a shooting war and casualties on both sides.

Ground Combat

The start of the air war brought an increased intensity back to our preparation for combat. At this point, the operational scheme of war was unknown and meaningless. For Bravo Company, the world revolved around the actions of our battalion, 3d Battalion, 67th Armor, "The Hounds of Hell," and at times our brigade, 1st Tiger, from which we drew much pride due to its unique deployment identity as a separate formation without a division headquarters. One manifestation of this pride was in the 2d Armored Division patch, which we wore on the left front of our uniform,

as General George S. Patton had originally directed. This made us unique and we felt we were better than all other units, certainly better than the 1st Cavalry Division, which we had deployed with from Fort Hood!

In 1990, most heavy divisions in the U.S. Army were comprised of two active duty maneuver brigades and one reserve component "round out." With our parent brigade minus a deployable division headquarters, due to the ongoing inactivation, it just seemed logical that the Fort Hood maneuver brigades would deploy together to form a fully manned 1st Cavalry Division. Still, we wondered what our ultimate mission would be. At the company level, we heard the inevitable rumors. One such rumor had Tiger Brigade designated as the reserve brigade of the reserve division (1st Cavalry) of the 7th Corps. Being young and inexperienced, it was the general consensus that we wanted to be tested in combat and that such a role would not offer us the chance to be at the heart of the action. Another rumor indicated that we would somehow fight with the U.S. Marine division that had deployed to our west. We figured the Marines would have a prominent role in the assault of the ever-thickening Iraqi defenses. Ironically, this rumor proved to be exactly on target as we were informed during an operations order that the brigade would replace the British 7th Armored Brigade "Desert Rats" and become assigned to Marine forces. We were unsure of the implications of this change in mission, but were convinced that our ultimate role in whatever plans were being developed would be decisive.

The movement to join with Marine forces in the southwest corner of the Saudi-Kuwait border involved a long road march that stretched all logistics planning. Furthermore, due to operational security, the entire movement was conducted in radio listening silence. Looking back years later, it is still amazing how smoothly the operation went at the small-unit level. Without the use of radios, applying established road march SOPs and rehearsed techniques of short maintenance halts, Bravo Company, along with hundreds of other vehicles, moved the entire distance without incident and sighted the prepositioned fuel vehicles just as the low-fuel lights in our tanks illuminated. My own tank, B66, *Bounty Hunter*, took on 495 gallons of fuel. Some tanks ran out at the fuel point, but eventually, we arrived at our assembly area with all combat-ready equipment.

Bravo Company had not only moved physically, but also mentally, closer to war. At this point, we were only a few kilometers from the Kuwait border and the evidence of ongoing war was clear. Air strikes were clearly visible and occasionally a B52 mission would illuminate the horizon with its payload. We would feel the shock waves of immense bombardment and see the contrails of jet exhaust as they turned southward out of Kuwaiti airspace. At night, there was constant air activity and the sight of anti-airtracers firing randomly into the sky. We maintained a heightened state of readiness — 50 percent of the company remained ready to move 24 hours a day, with the remainder of the company prepared to follow within minutes.

On the evening of 29 January 1991, normal routine radio checks were broken by the battalion S3's electrifying report that large columns of Iraqi armor were attacking into Marine forces not far from our position at a forward observation point. The situation was clearly serious as the Marines had reported that at least one of their (LAVs) had been destroyed by direct fire (later to be realized an unfortunate fratricide). The S3 continued with the FRAGO, outlining the most challenging of all combat operations — night movement to contact. The battalion's mission was to conduct an attack to make contact with the Iraqi formation and destroy it. Bravo Company, as was SOP, would lead. It was a cool and nearly moonless night. In the darkness, the assembly area came alive with the sounds of equipment being hastily stowed

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and the unique sound of sponson boxes opening and closing. Within a matter of 15 minutes, the entire company was ready to move. Tension was palatable, but the overall mood was one of confidence. If the war was going to start — it was tonight — but under conditions nobody had predicted.

Even with all the advances in armored warfare technology during 1991, techniques in land navigation had changed little for a tank company since 1941. Looking at our paper maps, we set a magnetic azimuth and distance to the suspected enemy formation. Using a barely visible landmark in the night horizon, our gunners identified the point and then designated these lead vehicles as navigation tanks. They would keep their gun tubes in stabilization mode, orientated continuously on the landmark. The only technical solution came a few weeks later with a one-per-company issue of a commercial Loran boating navigation device. The Loran gave location in latitude and longitude measurements. I soon found the previously ignored ticks found on the margins of my 1:50,000 map for “lat and long,” and marked my map accordingly for a quick conversion to military grid reference system (MGRS). Although a bit clumsy, the Loran proved to be very accurate and became the single most important piece of command and control equipment in the war.

As we waited for the order to attack, we shut down our engines to conserve fuel and stand by for future orders. It was an incredibly long night as we waited to conduct a counterattack that never materialized. As the sun rose on the empty desert, the Marines gained better situational awareness, and air strikes began to attrite the stumbling Iraqi attack. We were ordered to stand down in a mixture of disappointment and relief. We were satisfied that if we had been called to attack, the company was ready.

Within a few more weeks, the long-awaited order arrived, describing our ultimate G-day or ground day (24 February 1991) mission. We received an operations order with a large map overlay and began the well-practiced drill of military decisionmaking. Each unit had sufficient time to issue its operations order, conduct rock drill rehearsals, and review the task and purpose for each unit. The overall plan directed the Marines to cut a wide breach into a multi-kilometer band of mines and obstacles along the Kuwait border and then pass the brigade on parallel lanes.

Time seemed to pass slowly on G-Day as the company awaited the call forward to holding areas short of the anticipated breach site. Eavesdropping on the progress of the Marine operation revealed that Iraqi mines were in greater density than anticipated, but resistance was light with occasional mortar fire. The most chilling moments were when the breaching force reported the presence of chemical agents. Already at MOPP-level 2, realizing that the impending battle would be fought in chemical conditions added to the tensions of waiting, but soon the first report was changed to indicate “all clear.”

Surveying the assembly area and seeing the quiet confidence of the untested company brought to mind the dedication of earlier generations of soldiers who waited to cross a line of departure in North Africa, Pusan, and Vietnam. No one fully knew what the future would bring, but each leader was consumed with a myriad of details and responsibilities that did not allow him to dwell too long on the potential hazards of a frontal attack into a defending enemy force.

By 1500 hours, the company received word to push forward and begin its attack. The initial sites of destroyed and damaged Marine equipment, and the occasional stray indirect fire burst,

brought the growing realism that this undertaking, although similar in sight to the many force-on-force exercises we had endured, was the “real thing” with the genuine possibility of injury or death. This realization was accentuated by the sudden blast of an anti-tank mine that easily blew off the track of a flanking unit’s tank. No crew members were injured, and as rehearsed, the lane was bypassed and the mission continued.

Time seemed to accelerate as the company completed its movement through the breach site, passed through the 6th Marine Regiment’s “Objective C” and on to the battalion’s first objective, “New York,” near an oil-gathering center. The sky was unnaturally dark as the now-infamous oil fires, caused by Iraq’s destruction of Kuwait’s oil wells, burned. The overall scene was best described as “Dante’s inferno” due to the black sky mixed with the fiery howl of burning gas.


Out of the darkness, a group of 70 Iraqis emerged in front of our position and slowly walked forward waving shards of white cloth. The group was quickly searched and organized for transport to the rear. The lasting memory was the look of resigned apathy on their faces. I thought how different it must be to surrender to Americans than Iranians. That evening, the company conducted its first combat logistics package (LOGPAC) operation exactly as rehearsed, to include a hot chili-mac meal, a promise from the headquarters and headquarters company commander to have “hot chow at the first objective.” The plan seemed to be going exactly as planned with resistance far lighter than expected. The company was ready to be unleashed and keep moving, but orders were to remain in position. Once again, we could not see

the bigger picture. We could not see the larger scheme, which had Tiger Brigade fixing many Iraqi units in position for the great “left hook.” In our minds, we were ready to go straight to Kuwait City.

The 25th day of February was marked by a pause, but once the order was given to attack in the afternoon, the company had a series of continuous contacts as it passed through the defenses of the 116th Brigade of the Iraqi 7th Division. At one point, 3 T-55s were engaged at a range of more than 2 kilometers — it was here that the incredible lethality of the M1A1 and its “silver bullet” service Sabot round was revealed. Direct hits were immediately followed by immense secondary explosions that blew turrets high into the air. By late afternoon, Objective Ohio was secured. Bravo had destroyed a number of enemy vehicles and began collecting more Iraqi enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), and awaited further orders. Darkness fell with the expectation of another day of attacks; although, we were eager to continue, no new orders came until the next day.

The 26th day of February was marked by a series of FRAGOs, which were modified due to rapidly changing opportunities on the battlefield. It was a classic environment for armored warfare. As long as we had a map, radio, and mission orders, we were comfortable “developing the situation” and working on the fly. The opportunity came at just around noon when, with little notice, we were given a new axis of attack and orders to seize a road intersection north of the Al-Mutla ridge. Along the way, the company would pass by Ali al-Salem airfield and attack from west to east. With a quick huddle and confirmation brief, the compa-

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ny began movement and immediately made contact with scattered vehicles and isolated pockets of shattered Iraqi soldiers. Due to the speed of the attack, these groups had to be bypassed. Mass and momentum was the essence of the attack. Due to the recent issue of mine plow kits, the company was able to conduct a hasty breach of a suspected minefield and continued to press forward, firing on the move at any enemy vehicles.

It felt exhilarating to break free and move quickly as the company, and then battalion, collapsed into a staggered column formation. No significant enemy defenses were encountered until the company crested a small slope and was presented with an unforgettable scene. The Al-Mutla ridge was the site of utter chaos as the Iraqi army attempted to flee in a mangled column of moving, recently destroyed, and burning vehicles. Tanks, trucks, and civilian vehicles were all mixed together. Although there was gruesome evidence of the recent air attack, there were many Iraqi military vehicles moving northward, oblivious to the sudden arrival of a tank battalion to their left flank.

The lead vehicles of Bravo engaged several T-55s and a 2S1 artillery piece at a range of less than 400 meters. The company then pushed forward to clear a path for the battalion's follow-on units. Secondary explosions filled the air with debris and added to the hellish atmosphere of the scene, which later became appropriately named "The Highway of Death." The battalion's attached mechanized infantry company subsequently passed through our chaotic position and proceeded to assault the nearby police building in a violent, close order fight. Although there was no organized resistance, small fire-fights and clearing operations went on throughout the night. It was in the midst of this chaos that we received the sobering news of the death of our battalion master gunner.

As the sun rose the next day, it revealed a scene akin to the Falaise Gap, where the German army was trapped and destroyed in 1944. There was little pity as almost every destroyed vehicle, military and civilian alike, revealed that the Iraqis had stuffed them with stolen Kuwaiti goods. Stacks of electronics, clothing, or anything that was not bolted down lay scattered on the road. It was not the picture of a military defeat, but the destruction of a pillaging band of thieves.

Bravo Company then received word that a friendly vehicle would approach from the north, and a short while later, an FV432 (armored personnel carrier) of the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards conducted the informal, yet official, linkup of U.S. Marine Central Command (MARCENT) and U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) forces, ironically performed by an allied and non-Marine unit. This was about the time we heard the news of the cease fire and the apparent end of hostilities over a short-wave radio. There was little interest in strategic debate — for the soldiers of Bravo Company, combat operations were over and it was time to focus on the long process of recovery and redeployment.

Legacy

There has been much written on the legacy of the First Gulf War, which inevitably includes debate on lost strategic opportunities. Those are debates for strategists. Desert Storm was a tactical war for the soldiers of Bravo Company, one in which they felt supremely trained and equipped to win. Expecting to fight in a campaign that might cost high casualties and carry on for months,



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the end result was a powerful knockout blow that few predicted. Years of tough training, high standards, and ever increasingly superior equipment had come at exactly the right time.

The sweat spilled at home station and training centers, combined with a process of self-examination, allowed the company to fight with great confidence in themselves and each other. The stabilization of personnel had built a strong, cohesive team that recognized each other's voice on the radio and shared a common experience on how to solve tactical problems. This is not to say there were no weaknesses — in an after-action review following the cease fire, the lack of military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) training was the number one training deficiency identified. There was a clear realization that the company would have been hard pressed to fight in an environment of multiple buildings, manage intermingling civilians, and be successful without interpreters. We clearly felt like we were unprepared for such a fight and were fortunate not to have encountered it. This deficiency would have to be dealt with in future exercises and ultimately a future generation.

For the time being, the soldiers of Battling Bravo reflected on the shared bond of comradeship, and using a few needles and thread, removed the 2d Armored Division patches from their spare uniforms and hand sewed them on their right sleeves, signifying their rightful moniker as combat veterans.

This article is dedicated to the soldiers of B Company and Tiger Brigade.



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Task Organizing a Heavy Brigade Combat Team to Achieve Full-Spectrum Dominance in *Any* Environment

by Captain John M. Zdeb



The Army's current task organization for the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) provides enough combat power to achieve success in offensive and defensive operations, but does not provide for unhindered success across the breadth of full-spectrum operations (FSO). For the HBCT to achieve full-spectrum dominance in an era of persistent conflict, its task organization must include three combined arms battalions (CABs) that include components of each warfighting function and additional supporting battalions that reinforce the CAB's combat power. The HBCT's current task organization (see Figure 1) permits brigade commanders to engage enemy forces during offensive and defensive operations with two CABs (one as the decisive operation), using the reconnaissance squadron, fires battalion, and brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) during shaping operations, and the brigade support battalion (BSB) as the sus-

taining operation. The lack of a third CAB to maneuver against an enemy force ultimately forces the brigade to conduct multiple passages of lines or use its reconnaissance squadron as a maneuver force against the enemy. Although this still allows limited success during offensive and defensive operations, it poses significant challenges in the arena of stability operations. While conducting stability operations in Iraq, most HBCTs assign an area of operations (AO) to the reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion to achieve success along their lines of effort.

While simultaneously managing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is seeking to increase the number of brigades in its inventory; however, the Army does not need more brigades, but needs brigades with greater capabilities to achieve full-spectrum dominance. The HBCT requires a task organization that includes

three combined arms battalions with infantry, armor, reconnaissance, engineer, and field artillery units (see Figure 2). It would also include a reconnaissance squadron that integrates cavalry and military intelligence assets for a unified collection effort, an engineer battalion to increase the brigade's survivability through prolonged stability operations, a BSTB with enablers to enhance the brigade's command and control and force protection, and a BSB capable of sustaining the enhanced brigade. The intent behind the proposed task organization is to create a HBCT that uses its three maneuver battalions as the primary effort throughout offensive, defensive, and stability operations. The proposed task organization also eliminates the need for the brigade commander to commit one of his supporting battalions, such as the reconnaissance squadron or fires battalion, to perform in the same capacity as a maneuver battalion





in either offensive or defensive operations (reconnaissance squadron) or stability operations (reconnaissance squadron and fires battalion).

The Combined Arms Battalion, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-90.5, states that, “The role of the combined arms battalion (CAB) is to fight and win engagements on any part of the battlefield.”¹ The proposed task organization for the CAB (see Figure 3) builds on the modularity inherent in the current task organization and reinforces full-spectrum domination. The major changes to the CAB task organization include:

- The headquarters company losing its mortar platoon, scout platoon, and sniper squad.
- The mortar platoon breaking down into two sections and each of the two mechanized infantry companies receiving a heavy mortar section.
- Offsetting the loss of the battalion scout platoon by adding the armored reconnaissance troop to the CAB.
- Adding the sniper squad to the armored reconnaissance troop.
- Increasing the armor company’s combat power to four tank platoons.
- Replacing one of the armor companies with an armored reconnaissance troop.

- Adding an engineer company (again) to the CAB.
- Adding a field artillery battery to the CAB and replacing mortars as the battalion controlled fires element.
- Formally adding the personal security detachment (PSD) platoon to the task organization.

Adding the artillery battery to the CAB requires removing the fires battalion from the HBCT task organization, but it provides each combined arms battalion commander with dedicated artillery support throughout offensive and defensive operations, as well additional combat power for stability operations. This addition also increases the capabilities of the infantry companies because they each gain a heavy mortar section to provide additional indirect fire support to use during dismounted operations. Adding the reconnaissance troop assists the CAB commander by providing an additional reconnaissance platoon, heavy mortar section, and a company commander whose main purpose is to conduct reconnaissance for the battalion.

Although the reconnaissance troop replaces one of the armor companies, the

loss of heavy combat power in the form of M1-series tanks is offset by increasing the number of tank platoons in the company to four. This allows the CAB commander to either mass the effects of 18 tanks against one objective or internally task organize tank platoons within his battalion without significantly degrading the combat capabilities of his armor company. Adding the combat engineer company to the task organization provides enhanced mobility and countermobility for the CAB across full-spectrum operations. The engineer company enables the CAB commander to breach enemy obstacles during offensive operations, emplace obstacles and establish battle positions during defensive operations, and provides a force that can provide deliberate route clearance and limited infrastructure classification during stability operations. Adding the personal security platoon to the task organization prevents battalion-sized units from using soldiers from the companies to create these elements and allows the battalion to appropriately train platoons in PSD tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The proposed combined arms battalion task organization would also change

how the battalion headquarters is organized and staffed (see Figure 3). The major changes to the CAB command and staff include:

- Adding a third major (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion effects coordinator.
- Adding a captain (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion fire direction officer.
- Adding a chief warrant officer 2 (field artillery) to the staff as the battalion targeting officer.
- Adding a sergeant first class (field artillery) to serve as the battalion master gunner for the M109A6 Paladin.
- Reclassifying the title of battalion liaison officer (LNO) to battle captain.

Adding the field artillery major prevents the CAB from struggling with span of control. His tasks would include supervising the battalion fire support officer (CPT), the battalion fire direction officer (CPT), the targeting officer (CW2), and command and control of the battalion's fire support elements. As the battalion effects coordinator, the major also controls

coordination and integration of the enabler teams and packages that a CAB typically receives throughout full-spectrum operations, which includes, but is not limited to, tactical psychological operation detachments, civil affairs teams, provincial reconstruction teams, additional engineer support, and military police support. Adding the Paladin master gunner ensures that the battalion S3 has a subject-matter expert to advise him on the training and employment of the M109A6 Paladin.

The final change, reclassifying the title of the battalion LNO to battalion battle captain, simply codifies what most units currently practice. The current communications capabilities within the HBCT essentially negate the need to have an officer serve in the capacity of liaison officer at the brigade level — the lieutenant serving in that capacity is far more valuable coordinating efforts in the battalion tactical operations center.

Overall, the proposed task organization allows the CAB to achieve dominance in offensive and defensive operations and allows it to continue dominance during transition to stability operations where the CAB commander has the organic assets

to secure and dominate his AO. Furthermore, the three-CAB proposed task organization allows the brigade commander to achieve unhindered success during offensive and defensive operations, as well as the ability to secure his AO without committing support battalions to fill the gap created by the lack of a third CAB that currently exists in the task organization.

According to FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, the reconnaissance squadron is, "designed to provide accurate and timely information across the AO."² The current task organization of the recon squadron, which includes three identical reconnaissance troops, is capable of accomplishing this task on its own, in a limited capacity, during offensive and defensive operations. However, the recon squadron is unable to accomplish this task and purpose during stability operations because the lack of a third maneuver battalion typically forces the HBCT commander to employ the recon squadron as he would a CAB. Furthermore, the operations and employment of the squadron are not necessarily synchronized with the efforts of the military intelligence company in the BSTB. The proposed task organization for the recon squadron (see




Figure 3




Figure 4

Figure 4) would allow the HBCT commander to have all of his reconnaissance and collection efforts synchronized within one unified battalion-level command. The major changes to the recon squadron task organization include:

- Removing all three armored reconnaissance troops (one sent to each of the three CABs).
- Adding one light reconnaissance troop with three platoons and a sniper squad.
- Adding one engineer reconnaissance company with two platoons.
- Adding two military intelligence companies: one focused on intelligence processing and collecting human intelligence and the other focused on collecting intelligence with tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV) and unmanned ground sensors.
- Formally adding the PSD platoon to the task organization.

This task organization synchronizes the efforts of the HBCT's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance under one command, instead of separating the efforts into two different battalion-sized elements and comparing raw data at the brigade staff level. The recon squadron would

have the capability to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance on enemy forces, areas, structures, local capabilities, organizations, people, and key events with the reconnaissance troop and engineer reconnaissance company. Including military intelligence companies in the squadron's task organization would allow additional collection using TUAVs and unmanned ground sensors in areas the reconnaissance troop and engineer reconnaissance company are unable to observe, using human intelligence personnel to gain additional information from the local populace, and integrating collected data into an accurate intelligence report by the analysis and integration platoon.

Similar to the CAB, restructuring the recon squadron would also require changing the structure of the squadron headquarters and staff (see Figure 4). The major changes, which are not uniform to the CAB reorganization, include integrating a military intelligence major as the squadron S3 and adding an engineer captain to serve as the squadron engineer. While an armor lieutenant colonel still commands the squadron and an armor major serves as the executive officer, replacing an armor major with a military intelligence major is indicative of the adjusted nature and scope of the squadron's duties, which would instead focus primarily on col-

lecting, analyzing, and interpreting data through various reconnaissance capabilities. This requires understanding the collection capabilities of military intelligence units that are significantly enhanced when executed in direct coordination with reconnaissance soldiers, and a military intelligence field grade officer should, by all rights, be the subject-matter expert on the employment of these capabilities. The purpose for adding the squadron engineer is to assist the squadron S3 with employing engineer forces and interpreting data collected on structures, local capabilities, and terrain. A reconnaissance squadron established with the proposed task organization would be capable of continually providing the HBCT with timely and accurate information and would also have the capability to synchronize the reconnaissance and collection efforts for the HBCT under one unified command.

The current task organization of the BSTB (see Figure 1) includes a combat engineer company, a military intelligence company, and a signal company. With the proposed changes to the task organization of the CAB and the recon squadron, the only element remaining is the signal company. The proposed task organization for the BSTB (see Figure 5) includes:

- Adding one field artillery battery that includes two combat observa-

and ability to conduct protracted operations without task organization packages from echelons above division level. The engineer battalion would be capable of building initial forward operating bases for the HBCT during offensive operations, significantly increase the HBCT's survivability during defensive operations, and have the capability to support the HBCT during stability operations by constructing numerous combat outposts/patrol bases, which are critical to success. Furthermore, the engineer battalion would provide expertise in several fields, which would significantly increase the HBCT's capabilities during civil support operations. Overall, adding the engineer battalion significantly enhances the HBCT's capabilities and enables it to achieve dominance during full-spectrum operations without relying on support from higher or adjacent echelons.

The only change to the BSB (Figure 1) in the proposed task organization is the addition of two additional forward support companies, which will support the engineer battalion and the BSTB. In the current task organization, the BSB does not provide a forward support company to the BSTB. However, given the increased size and logistics complexity, which is inherent in the proposed task organization for the BSTB, the need for a forward support company is readily apparent. The proposed task organization ensures that the BSB is still capable of achieving success in any type of supporting operation for the HBCT.

The proposed task organization does create some limitations and constraints on the HBCT commander in preparing for and conducting full-spectrum operations. The greatest challenges arise with the dissolution of the fires battalion and the significantly changed organization of the reconnaissance squadron. Dissolving the fires battalion and placing the field artillery batteries under the CAB limit the HBCT commander's ability to mass all of his indirect fires under one element of command and control. However, with the BSTB now led and staffed by field artillery officers, the HBCT could task organize the field artillery batteries under the BSTB if the situation required all, or a significant portion, of the HBCT's indirect fire assets to mass its fires. The same dilemma arises with the changed nature of

UNIT/RANKS	CURRENT TASK ORG	PROPOSED TASK ORG	GAIN/LOSS
Infantry PLTs	12	18	+6
Armor PLTs	12	12	N/A
Recon PLTs	8	11	+3
Engineer PLTs	2	12	+10
Artillery PLTs	6	8	+2
MP PLTs	1	4	+3
ADA PLTs	0	2	+A312
MI PLTs	2	4	+2
Signal PLTs	3	3	N/A
FSCs	4	6	+2
Infantry CO CMDs	4	6	+2
Armor CO CMDs	7	7	N/A
Engineer CO CMDs	1	7	+6
Artillery BTRY CMDs	2	4	+2
MP CO CMDs	0	1	+1
ADA CO CMDs	0	1	+1
MI CO CMDs	1	2	+1
LOG CO CMDs	6	8	+2
Infantry MAJs*	2	3	+1
Armor MAJs*	4	4	N/A
Engineer MAJs*	2	2	N/A
Artillery MAJs*	2	5	+3
LOG MAJs*	2	2	N/A
Infantry BN CMDs**	1	1-2	+1
Armor BN CMDs**	2	2-3	+1
Engineer BN CMDs	0	1	+1
Artillery BN CMDs	1	1	N/A
LOG BN CMDs	1	1	N/A

*Does not include BCT staff, only MAJs required at BN/SQDN level
 **Number for proposed BN CMDs depends on whether IN or AR LTC commands 3d CAB

Figure 6

the recon squadron and placing the reconnaissance troops under the CAB, which results in the HBCT commander losing the ability to conduct 'traditional' squadron-level reconnaissance or security operations. However, the HBCT could task organize reconnaissance troops from the CAB to the recon squadron, if mission success required a 'traditional' approach to reconnaissance or security operations. There is a fundamental difference between the current and proposed approach: the proposed task organization requires the HBCT commander to remove assets from the maneuver battalions to enhance his shaping or sustaining efforts; and the current task organization requires the HBCT commander to decide what assets to allocate from shaping and sustaining efforts to enhance his maneuver units. Overall, the challenges that the proposed task organization creates are not significant enough to prevent solutions to the HBCT's success in full-spectrum operations.

The HBCT has proven its success in full-spectrum operations with its current task organization, yet its success is limited by sacrificing the capabilities of its supporting battalions (specifically the recon squadron and fires battalion) when committing them to serve in the same capac-

ity as its maneuver battalions. If the HBCT is to achieve full-spectrum dominance, the future task organization must build on existing modularity by increasing the CAB's capabilities. Furthermore, increasing the number of combined arms battalions from two to three would prevent the HBCT commander from obligating his support assets to maneuver units to address the gap in combat power.

The proposed task organization would ultimately allow the HBCT to conduct combat operations in any spectrum. The HBCT could use its three combined arms battalions as its sole maneuver force and employ the recon squadron in its intended role, which is to obtain information on human and geographical terrain within the unit's AO. The engineer battalion would also significantly enhance the HBCT's survivability and provide increased interdependence throughout prolonged or enduring operations. The BSTB would continue to enhance the HBCT's command and control and increase its level of protection, and the BSTB would continue to sustain the HBCT. Overall, the proposed task organization would establish a HBCT that is fully capable of overwhelming dominance across the span of full-spectrum operations.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-90.5, *The Combined Arms Battalion*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 7 April 2008, p. 1-1.
²HQDA, FM 3-90.6, *The Brigade Combat Team*, GPO, Washington, D.C., 4 August 2006, p. A-2.

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Maneuver Commander Considerations for the Field Artillery

by Major Mark Barton

In today's operational environment (OE), field artillery units are commonly attached or assigned to maneuver units to support counterinsurgency operations. To get the maximum effect from a supporting field artillery unit, maneuver commanders and staffs should understand how a field artillery unit operates, to include its training and logistics support requirements, and fires capabilities and restrictions.

Firing Position Considerations

The field artillery's mission is to deliver and integrate lethal and nonlethal fires to enable joint and maneuver commanders to dominate their OE across the spectrum of conflict. To meet this mission, there are five requirements for accurate, predicted fires: target location and size, fire unit location, weapons and ammunition information, meteorological information, and computational procedures.¹ The firing unit must satisfy all five of these requirements to ensure accuracy.

In Afghanistan and Iraq, most field artillery units are located either on a forward operating base (FOB) or combat outpost (COP). Artillery firing position considerations on a FOB/COP should include:

- A 6,400 mils firing capability.
- A place to secure/store ammunition with adequate protection from the elements and incoming enemy mortar/artillery fires.
- A location for the fire direction center (FDC) to process fire missions for the howitzer, maintain a common operational picture and battle track, and maintain communications with the maneuver unit's tactical operations center (TOC). The FDC can be collocated with the howitzers or inside the maneuver TOC.
- Integrating the howitzer position/crew into the FOB/COP defense plan, defining security responsibilities/roles, and rehearsing FOB/COP defense plan/procedures.
- Identifying air clearance requirements/procedures around the FOB/COP.
- Establishing a primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) communications plan between the maneuver unit's TOC and the FDC.
- Identifying the process to obtain updated meteorological data.

- Establishing and rehearsing the sensor-to-shooter link and counterfire battle drill, with ground and air clearance from a Q36 radar, Q37 radar, or a AN/TPQ-48 lightweight counter-mortar radar (LCMR).

Understanding Personnel Roles and Responsibilities

The maneuver unit's mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC), along with rules of engagement (ROE), dictates how the field artillery unit is organized to support operations. Field artillery employment options include the entire battery, by platoon, paired/grouped, or single howitzer. The FDC can control the howitzers as one battery element, two platoons, in three/four pairs, or as single howitzers.

With a field artillery unit assigned or attached, the maneuver commander will most likely interact with the field artillery battery commander, battery first sergeant, fire direction officer, platoon sergeant, gunnery sergeant, and howitzer section chief, depending on how the unit is organized. The field artillery unit's manning



"The field artillery unit's manning strength determines how the unit is employed, potential emergency leave situations, and the environmental and morale leave program. Based on potential manning shortfalls, the maneuver commander might consider cross-training other than field artillery military occupation specialties (MOS) personnel to help with gun line and fire direction operations."

strength determines how the unit is employed, potential emergency leave situations, and the environmental and morale leave program. Based on potential manning shortfalls, the maneuver commander might consider cross-training other than field artillery military occupation specialties (MOS) personnel to help with gun line and fire direction operations. To help understand individual roles and responsibilities of primary field artillery personnel, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-50, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery*, describes some tactical duties of key personnel:

➤ *Battery commander.* The battery commander is responsible for all operational aspects of his battery, which include supervising and standardizing platoon operations, supervising safety during operations, and conducting risk assessment.

➤ *Battery first sergeant.* The battery first sergeant supervises platoon sergeants, gunnery sergeants, and section chiefs; coordinates administrative and logistics support; and monitors the health and welfare of battery personnel.

➤ *Fire direction officer (FDO).* The FDO is responsible for training and supervising FDC personnel, and ensuring that accurate and timely determination of firing data and accurate FDC records of missions fired are maintained.

➤ *Platoon sergeant.* The platoon sergeant supervises the firing platoon and maintains firing capability, supervises the overall maintenance of the firing platoon, verifies the completion of weapons record

data, and ensures ammunition is properly handled and protected.

➤ *Gunnery sergeant.* The gunnery sergeant lays the platoon, assists in sustaining 24-hour operations, computes the executive officer's minimum quadrant elevation (QE) for the lowest preferred charge the unit expects to fire, and supervises and executes platoon advanced party operations if necessary.

➤ *Howitzer section chief.* The howitzer section chief is responsible for the training and proficiency of his section, the operational readiness of his equipment, and the safe firing of the howitzer. He ensures the weapon is properly emplaced, laid, and prepared for action.

Artillery Skills Proficiency Test	
1.	Disassemble/Assemble the Breech Mechanism
2.	Prepare Ammunition for Firing
3.	Measure Site to Crest Using M-2 compass
4.	Prepare Ammunition for Transporting
5.	Emplace and Recover Close-in Aiming Points
6.	Record and Maintain Fire Mission Data on DA Form 4513 (Record of Mission Fired)
7.	Load and Fire a Prepared Round
8.	Prepare a Position to Receive/Emplace a Howitzer (Advanced Party)

Figure 1

The memory aid TLABSPAP will be used as a guide for accomplishing the following tasks:

- T:** Trails, spades, and/or firing platform properly emplaced.
- L:** Lay weapon.
- A:** Aiming point emplaced.
- B:** Boresight verified or performed.
- S:** Second circle, verification of lay performed with a second aiming circle.
- P:** Prefire checks on the weapons system performed.
- A:** Ammunition prepared.
- P:** Position improvement (site to crest determined, XO's report rendered, alternate aiming points established, azimuth markers emplaced, camouflage and defensive hardening of the position).²

Training and Certification Process

Training Circular (TC) 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, is a good tool for maneuver commanders and staffs to review and identify how to support a field artillery unit during its training and certification process.³ It discusses the field artillery individual section certification tables, which are intended to parallel maneuver tables 1 through 6, and is designed for artillery leaders at all levels to assess the proficiency of unit mission performance and sustain field artillery core competencies. The programs outlined in the circular also follow the concepts and guidance provided in FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, and the qualification methodology is certification + evaluation + artillery table VI = qualified crews.⁴ The artillery skills proficiency test (ASPT), which evaluates the howitzer section member's ability to execute selected crew skills and can also be used as a tool to assess section strengths and weaknesses, is shown below in Figure 1.⁵

The maneuver commander should ensure that howitzer personnel assigned as a gunner, ammunition team chief, assistant gunner, and key leader positions (regardless of MOS) are qualified. They should be skilled in laying the howitzer, aiming point reference (using the M100-series panoramic telescope), boresighting, indirect fire mission processing, direct fire mission processing, and initialing the howitzer.

In accordance with TC 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, the ASPT for FDC personnel is outlined in Chapter 6. All FDC personnel, regardless of MOS, assigned to a fire direction section should be given the 13D ASPT as shown in Figure 2.⁶

Training Critical Focal Points for Success

There are three things field artillery soldiers must do to be successful on the battlefield — shoot, move, and communicate. During recent field artillery training events at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), Hohenfels, Germany, special emphasis was placed on specific areas that help support the field artillery in its mission to support maneuver commanders:

- Digital troubleshooting the AFATDS, Centaur technical fire direction (TFD) system, and the gun display unit (GDU).
- Meeting the five requirements for accurate predicted fire, including target location and size, fire unit location, weapons and ammunition information, meteorological information, and computational procedures.
- FDC battle tracking and FDO plotting the target each time.
- Proper emplacement of W16 cables on the M777 howitzer system.
- Implementing shift change standards for continuous 24-hour “hot gun” operations and 24-hour FDC operations.
- Performing howitzer maintenance.
- Personnel (number of U6 qualified soldiers).
- Conducting pullover gauge and fire control alignment test (FCAT).

Using Methods to Reinforce Mission and Training

Maneuver commanders can continuously and successfully reinforce mission and training standards by:

- Creating a tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP) that addresses meeting the five requirements; troubleshoot-

13D Fire Direction Tasks for ASPT	
1.	Initialize the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)
2.	Maintain Unit Data in AFATDS
3.	Establish AFATDS Communications Configurations
4.	Compute Muzzle Velocity Variation (Manual)
5.	Compute Manual Safety
6.	Process Meteorological (MET) Data Using AFATDS
7.	Verify Fire Mission Data Using AFATDS
8.	Compute Safety Data Using Centaur
9.	Verify Centaur Initialization Data

Figure 2



“The maneuver commander should ensure that howitzer personnel assigned as a gunner, ammunition team chief, assistant gunner, and key leader positions (regardless of MOS) are qualified. They should be skilled in laying the howitzer, aiming point reference (using the M100-series panoramic telescope), boresighting, indirect fire mission processing, direct fire mission processing, and initialing the howitzer.”

ing, especially digital systems; and composite risk management (FDC and gun line safety).

- Ensuring certification is completed to standard; use TC 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, as a baseline, and involve the field artillery battalion in the process.
- Conducting hands-on training on all section equipment and teaching soldiers how to properly care for and place cables and digital equipment.
- Establishing and maintaining a firing safety training and certification program.
- Developing and conducting a digital system sustainment training (DSST) program.
- Requesting a U6 mobile training team from Fort Sill or sending soldiers to Fort Sill for training (ensure U6 toolkits are complete).

• Ensuring the maneuver unit S4, forward support company, or supply representative understands logistics requirements to support field artillery operations (munitions, powders, fuses, and replacement parts). Developing open communications with the field artillery battalion S4 or executive officer can help during this process.

This article offers a few suggestions that will assist maneuver commanders and staffs in getting the maximum effect from supporting field artillery units. It is imperative that maneuver commanders and staffs understand how field artillery units operate.



Notes

¹Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 6-40, *Field Artillery Manual Cannon Gunnery*, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 1 October 1999.

²HQDA, FM 6-50, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Field Artillery Cannon Battery*, GPO, Washington, DC, 23 December 1996.

³Training Circular (TC) 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*, Fires Center of Excellence, Fort Sill, OK, April 2010.

⁴HQDA, FM 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 December 2008.

⁵TC 3-09.8, *Field Artillery Gunnery*.

⁶*Ibid.*, Chapter 6.

⁷*Ibid.*

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OPERATION COOPERATION and the Need for Tanks

by Captain John P. Rugarber

KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The United States is to follow Canada's lead by deploying tanks to southern Afghanistan. The decision to significantly up the ante in the war against the Taliban by sending 68-ton Marine Corps M1 Abrams tanks to Helmand province comes as Canadian heavy armour plays a vital, but little known role, in the war.¹

Operations in Kandahar City will be the most critical battle in our 9-year struggle in Afghanistan. The outcome of this battle will determine the future of our involvement in that country. Failure to incorporate tanks into our battle plan against insurgents will make victory in Kandahar more difficult to achieve. This article advocates the need for Canadian tank involvement in Kandahar City and defines the Taliban's most dangerous course of action in its defense of the city. This article also addresses minimal disadvantages tanks bring to the urban fight. A thor-

ough synthesis and analysis prove the need to use Canada's Leopard 2A6Ms in Kandahar City in support of upcoming offensive operations.

Strategic Importance of Kandahar

Kandahar City is both strategically and historically vital to the Taliban's campaign in southern Afghanistan. "The strategically important road linking Kandahar with Tarin Kot, the capital of Uruzgan Province, runs through this district."² Historically, the city has always played a vital role in past conflicts and formation of the Afghan state. "It [Kandahar City] is a symbol of the Afghan's nationhood. It is their collective manhood."³ Kandahar is also the place where Ahmed Shah Durrani — considered the George Washington of his country — held a council meeting among the elders of all the Afghan tribes to determine who would govern the country of Afghanistan in 1747.⁴

Kandahar City remained Afghanistan's capital for the next 200 years, until the last shah of Afghanistan was deposed in 1973.⁵ The city, in addition to being the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban, is also home to many of its senior hierarchy. "The Taliban leadership was dominated by Kandaharis, and this did not change even after most of the country fell to the movement. Six of the ten men on the Taliban's supreme shura were Durrani Pashtuns, and several others, including Mullah Omar himself, were Ghilzais from Kandahar."⁶ The aforementioned makes Kandahar City the strategic center of gravity in southern Afghanistan and something that the Taliban will not yield without a fight. Due to Kandahar's role as home to many of the Taliban's leaders, it is possible that they will plan some form of defense against the upcoming International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Force (ANSF)



offensive, directed against their homes in an effort to bloody the ISAF and ANSF and convince civilian leaders and populace of ISAF's members that the war in Afghanistan is no longer worth fighting. The Taliban's multiple offensives and attempts to take the city only serve to strengthen this belief.

The Taliban's Recent Activity in and around Kandahar City

Since 2004, the Taliban has waged a series of offensive schemes in an attempt to reestablish control of Kandahar City. The first two offensives, in 2004 and 2005, both failed to capture, or significantly influence, Kandahar City, but the Taliban remained resolved to reclaim the city. In 2006, the Taliban attempted to enter the city through a northern approach by occupying the Zhari and Panjwai districts. In response to this occupation and various harassing attacks against Kandahar City, the Canadians launched Operation Medusa in an effort to run the Taliban out of the city of Pashmul. "After preparatory artillery and aerial bombardments, two Canadian companies attacked Pashmul from the south, crossing the Arghandab River and clashing with entrenched Taliban defenders. Taliban fighters replied to this initial assault with counterattacks from layered defensive positions."⁷ The Canadians responded by using armored bulldozers to destroy bunkers, fire trenches, and other fortifications, eventually gaining control of the city.⁸

The Taliban's defense-in-depth against the Canadians was a complete disaster for the Taliban. The severe losses the Taliban sustained during the operation caused them to change their tactics. When the Canadians attempted to force battle with the Taliban in a follow-up operation, the Taliban refused to stand and fight, and instead fought in small groups and blended in with the local population. They relied on a series of caches dispersed throughout the countryside, which enabled them to pass by the ISAF unarmed to their cache points, launch an attack against the ISAF, drop their weapons, and intermingle with the local population.⁹ These tactics proved effective against the ISAF and allowed the Taliban to retain its hold on the Zhari and Panjwai districts.

While the aforementioned tactics proved more successful against the ISAF, they are not always the Taliban's course of action. In response to the ISAF's operations against the Taliban in Shan Wali Kot and Khakrez in 2007, the Taliban launched attacks on the Chora District in Uruzgan,



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and the Ghorak and Mianishin district centers in an effort to spread Canadian forces thin and sidetrack them from their operations in Khakrez and Shah Wali Kot.¹⁰ Instead of mixing with the populace, the Taliban decided to stand and fight. "The Taliban's decision to stand and fight a sustained and costly engagement to defend Padah in Khakre against a coalition attack was unusual. Padah was reportedly the central stronghold for the Taliban's occupation of Khakrez. And the Taliban's refusal to evacuate the position confirms its importance."¹¹

The contrast between the Taliban's tactics during Operation Baaz Tzuka and its tactics in the defense of Padah demonstrate the Taliban's flexibility in operational planning, as well as unpredictability in its courses of action against the ISAF and ANSF. The defense of Padah also demonstrates the Taliban's willingness to stand and fight, even against Canadian Leopard 2A6Ms, which were deployed in support of clearing operations, when they determined an area to be of importance. Given Kandahar City's above-mentioned importance, it is probable that the Taliban will mount a strong defense to inflict high casualties against the ISAF and ANSF in an effort to verify that the war in Afghanistan appears unwinnable, which will meet the Taliban's strategic goal of ridding Afghanistan of foreign forces.

Current Situation in Kandahar City

Currently within Kandahar City, there are several subareas that the Taliban dominates. District Nine, where the Taliban is very active, contains Taliban safe houses

in which weapons, fighters, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and IED components are moved in from Taliban bases in Arghandab and Senjaray.¹² "General Sher Muhammad Zazai, commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 205th Corps, called it 'a precarious area which was used by Taliban fighters for attacking foreign and ANA soldiers,' and in 2008, ninety percent of the IEDs found or detonated in Kandahar City were in District Nine."¹³ Another Taliban hotspot within Kandahar City is the Mirwais Mena area. The Taliban uses this area as a final assembly area for vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) used in attacks within the center of the city.¹⁴ In addition to District Nine Mirwais Mena, the Taliban greatly influences the southwestern suburbs near the villages of Nakhoney and Belanday. These areas contain "IED factories, safe houses, weapons caches, and field hospitals" to attack the ISAF in Zhari and Panjwai.¹⁵ As of the summer of 2009, there has been only a limited ISAF presence in Nakhoney and Belanday, which has undoubtedly allowed the Taliban to operate within those areas with more freedom.

Despite numerous successful raids in the previously mentioned areas, conducted by Afghan Security Forces, which netted dozens of captured insurgents and numerous weapons, IED, and VBIED caches, our recent experiences demonstrated that a determined and ingenious enemy can overcome well-laid response plans and resupply an area with men and materiel it deems important. One only has to look at Jaysh Al Mahdi's continued ability to resupply and wage attacks in Sadr City, de-



“General Sher Muhammad Zazai, commander of the Afghan National Army (ANA) 205th Corps, called it ‘a precarious area which was used by Taliban fighters for attacking foreign and ANA soldiers,’ and in 2008, ninety percent of the IEDs found or detonated in Kandahar City were in District Nine.”

spite numerous offensives and cordon and search operations conducted by coalition forces and the Iraqi army. The Taliban’s dogged determination to take Kandahar City, through a series of offensives spanning 5 years, signifies it will undoubtedly continue to smuggle arms and bomb-making materials into Kandahar City; if not necessarily in the areas mentioned above, then in other areas of its choosing throughout the city. The Taliban will use these supplies and men against the ISAF and ANSF as they continue to assert themselves around Kandahar’s surrounding areas in preparation for the eventual push into the city proper. Given the Taliban’s operational unpredictability — as shown in the operational differences between the Zhari and Panjwai districts and Padah — one cannot say for certain how it will fight against the ISAF and ANSF in the coming offensive.


Advantages of the Leopard 2A6M

According to Stephen Biddle, a civilian advisor to General McChrystal, the outcome of the entire U.S.-Afghan war is riding on our success in Kandahar City.¹⁶ Thus, it is imperative that we incorporate the Leopard 2A6M into our planning process to dramatically increase the likelihood of our success during this operation. The Leopard 2A6M, currently used by the Canadians in Kandahar, includes a third-generation armor package similar to the modular expandable armor system (MEXAS) add-on armor kit, which protects the tank from armor-piercing rounds, shell fragments, armor-piercing, fin-stabilized discarded sabot (APFSDS) rounds,

and high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds.¹⁷ The tank also has added plates to protect against IEDs and other mines, blast-resistant crew seats, and revised ammunition storage.¹⁸ The Canadian 2A6M also incorporates armor to protect the vehicle against rocket-propelled grenades. All these features increase the tank’s survivability against insurgent weapons and have proven effective in operations around Kandahar City. In 2008, the commander

of Lord Strathcona’s Horse Regiment (LSR) spoke highly of the vehicle’s survivability when he commented on a soldier lucky enough to survive two IED strikes: “six weeks later, he hit a second IED, which was much bigger in the new tank [Leopard 2A6M]. Had it been a LAV [light armored vehicle] III there would have been many injuries.”¹⁹

In addition to the Leopard 2A6M’s armor, its 120mm smooth bore Rheinmetall main gun has also proven effective in operations around Kandahar City. “It has killed numerous insurgents at ranges of 150-3800m while mitigating the exposure of dismounted infantry soldiers to enemy direct fire.”²⁰ In addition to the Rheinmetall’s vast range, it also has tremendous penetrating power. In the past, insurgents have fought behind hardened structures, such as grape-drying huts and concrete walls sometimes measuring a meter in thickness, some of which are in Kandahar City.²¹ The Canadians state that “prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25mm fire from LAV IIIs achieved limited results against these structures,” while one main gun round “can punch a hole in excess of five-by-five meters through a grape-drying hut or compound wall, penetrating structures with reduced collateral damage to sur-



Canadian soldiers drive a light armored vehicle through Kandahar City during Operation Tazi, January 2010.

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“...evidence has shown that the Leopard 2A6Ms have decreased collateral damage by deterring enemy activity. According to a RAND Corporation study, the Taliban have a deep respect for the Leopard 2A6M’s firepower, therefore Taliban activity ‘drops considerably when tanks are operating in an area.’”

rounding infrastructure and less risk to our [Canadian] dismounted soldiers.”²²

Finally, the advanced fire-control system of the Leopard 2A6M gives it a distinct advantage over other direct fire weapons systems in theater. For example, a favorite tactic of the Taliban is deception, even at the tactical level: “In order to create a diversion, they engage from a concealed area and wait for the tanks to point their main armament in the direction of fire. At that point, concealed insurgents in a different area will engage with small-arms fire. The independent crew commander’s sight [a component of the tank’s fire control system] is therefore crucial in identifying [and engaging] threats coming from different locations.”²³ The LAV III lacks an independent crew commander’s sight, and the air gunners on the Strykers, while able to engage targets from multiple directions, must do so from exposed positions. Additionally, the tank’s fire control system “allows our [Canadian] soldiers to acquire and engage targets with precision and discrimination, by day and by night, thus reducing the requirement for aerial bombardment and indirect fire, which has proven to be blunt instruments.”²⁴ While the LAV III and

the Stryker can engage targets with the same precision and discrimination, the smaller calibers of their main weapons systems limit each vehicle’s effectiveness against hardened targets.

Disadvantages of Using Tanks in Kandahar City

Although offering many advantages, there are some disadvantages of using tanks to clear Kandahar City. First and foremost, the tank’s main gun may cause increased collateral damage when fired. Due to their size and weight, tanks also tear up roads, stress bridges, and draw a lot of enemy fire. During a counterinsurgency fight, it is imperative to minimize collateral damage by enforcing strict fire-control measures and escalation of force (EOF) criteria already in existence. While limiting the tank’s role in the urban fight, it still provides the ground commander the advantage of having an immediate direct fire support platform should he run into a situation that requires its use. It is certainly better to have a powerful weapons system accessible and not use it, than need it and not have it. As mentioned above, experience shows that the deployment of the Leopard 2A6M has actually

reduced collateral damage and civilian casualties during engagements. As of late 2008, “there has been no suggestion of civilian deaths attributed to tank fire during a nine month period of combat operations.”²⁵

Moreover, evidence has shown that the Leopard 2A6Ms have decreased collateral damage by deterring enemy activity. According to a RAND Corporation study, the Taliban have a deep respect for the Leopard 2A6M’s firepower, therefore Taliban activity “drops considerably when tanks are operating in an area.”²⁶ In addition to government studies, “numerous signal and HUMINT [human intelligence] reports confirm that low-level Taliban fighters are terrified of the tanks and their ability to maneuver, and are often reluctant to attack coalition forces equipped with integral armored assets.”²⁷ Albeit not an absolute, the deployment of the Leopard 2A6Ms in or around Kandahar City could cause the members of the Taliban to drop their weapons or surrender.

The populace’s perception of tanks is another concern over the deployment of armor in Kandahar City. According to

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Counterinsurgency on the *Examining the Army's Pacification*



American Plains:

of the Plains Indians by Anthony J. Saccavino





“The bloodshed was largely the result of increased pressure on resources, such as grazing lands and game herds, caused by a large influx of gold seekers following reports of gold strikes in the Black Hills and Rocky Mountains. Pressure was equally applied by settlers, drawn into lands previously reserved for Indian use by the Homestead Act of 1862.”

The American expansion westward began with the establishment of the first colonies on the Atlantic coast and continued on through the granting of statehood to Alaska and Hawaii. The period from 1860 to 1890, however, was one of the bloodiest in American history and rife with large-scale killings perpetrated by the Plains Indians, American soldiers, and settlers on the Great Plains and western mountains. The bloodshed was largely the result of increased pressure on resources, such as grazing lands and game herds, caused by a large influx of gold seekers following reports of gold strikes in the Black Hills and Rocky Mountains. Pressure was equally applied by settlers, drawn into lands previously reserved for Indian use by the Homestead Act of 1862. This national act “...opened the prospect of cheap farmsteads throughout the national domain; whatever the agricultural deficiencies of the Great Plains, more conventional agricultural lands were taken up, and consequently the homestead policy made the so-called ‘Indian country’ beckon.”⁷¹ As pressure increased, the native plains dwellers became increasingly combative toward the emigrants and the Army was forced into a long-term program of pacification. This program, which started well before the Civil War, was not managed by a specific doctrinal structure; instead, it developed over time and was influenced by both European and North American wartime experiences.

It should also be noted at the onset that the conflict between the Plains Indians and settlers was rooted in the differing cultures of the two groups. While the results of campaigns and outbreaks of violence were affected by the personalities of the individuals leading them, the larger conflict was essentially societal in nature. John Gray describes the nature of the issue in anthropological terms, “The real differences that rendered the white and red cultures so utterly incompatible were far deeper — so profound as to remain hidden in the subconscious. The red man’s ideal was to exploit nature...from these, bone deep, but opposite poles stemmed a thousand incompatibilities.”⁷² These differences manifested themselves in the combat tactics of both groups as well, with the Indians using what would become classic hit-and-run guerrilla warfare techniques and the Americans relying on force-on-force engagements.

For the purposes of this article, the term “insurgency” is used to describe the type of warfare enacted by the Plains Indians against both settlers and the U.S. Army. In a similar vein, “...the

term *counterinsurgency* embraces all of the political, economic, social, and military actions taken by a government for the suppression of insurgent, resistance, and revolutionary movements.”⁷³ While extensive archeological evidence has proven that the Indians inhabited the North American continent long before the European arrival, for the sake of clarity the terms “settler” and “army” will be used collectively to refer to those soldiers and settlers whose ancestry lay outside North America (such as Europe and Africa). Conversely, the term “Plains Indians” will be used to refer collectively to the inhabitants of the Great Plains, Black Hills, and other regions affected by America’s westward expansion.

The Army faced many challenges in conducting campaigns against the Plains Indians, including deficits in troop strengths, training constraints, doctrinal questions, and shortfalls in equipment and supplies. Following the Civil War, Congress mandated a drawdown of the armed forces to prewar levels. For the Army, this represented a maximum allowable strength of approximately 54,000 troops. On the surface, this would appear to be sufficient until one takes into consideration the sheer number of problem sets that those same troops had to confront. As Robert Utley describes it, “...the opening of new areas of settlement and launching of the transcontinental railroad had dramatically enlarged the western needs, now too, reconstruction duties would absorb up to one third of available manpower.”⁷⁴ The use of soldiers for peacekeeping duties during the reconstruction era lasted until approximately 1876. By that time, volunteer infantry and cavalry regiments, which had been created to backfill the gaps caused by redeployment of regular forces eastward, were in large part replaced by regular troops, again. In some instances, volunteer forces continued to be used on an ad hoc basis, particularly when local sentiments demanded citizens do their part.

Generally speaking, the training and quality of enlisted soldiers following the Civil War was poor. After an initial indoctrination period, which lasted approximately 2 to 3 weeks, recruits were shipped off to their duty stations where on-the-job training was conducted. For example, “...recruits received only the most basic instruction during their short time at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, the cavalry’s recruit depot. Training in marksmanship, horsemanship, and skirmishing — any practical lessons that Indian fighting might involve — was virtually nonexistent. For-

mal military training of recruits consisted mostly of elementary drill aimed at making a grand appearance at dress parade. After a week or two, at most, of close order drill and fatigue duty, they were sent directly to their units.”⁵ This resulted in both lost time and effectiveness at the unit level as these individuals had to be trained in the finer points of real soldiering versus parade ground soldiering.

While some of the post-war recruits, particularly those who were recent immigrants from Europe, came from honest backgrounds, or had wartime experience in either the Civil War or European wars, there were significant disciplinary problems, such as desertion within the ranks, due to the overall quality of enlisted troops. Unlike many Civil War-era soldiers, who enlisted out of patriotism and represented the broad spectrum of both Union and Confederate societies, those who enlisted following the war, generally did so because the Army offered meals, a steady paycheck, and, in some cases, a place to hide. Donovan describes the issue as thus: “As mediocre as the soldiers’ training and fighting ability was the caliber of their character.” One general officer said, “The enlisted personnel consisted largely of the dregs from the Union and Confederate armies and of recent immigrants from Europe.” One 7th Cavalry private, at the age of 16, abandoned his six months’ pregnant wife to enlist, claimed that “some of the hardest cases that I ever came across are at present serving in this company.”⁶

Training deficiencies were initially mitigated at the unit level through programs of acclimatization, centered on long marches and rides, to build both stamina and teach field skills. Exercises with experienced scouts acting as aggressors were also frequently used to teach tactical skills such as small unit maneuver and skirmishing techniques. By the late 1870s and early 1880s, the Army managed to revamp its basic training program for new recruits, to include more instruction on common tasks required for service on the frontier. Emphasis on marksmanship was finally stressed as well, “When target practice finally was given an important role in training, the Army took it up enthusiastically and marksmanship became as much stressed as it had become slighted.”⁷ The presence of an experienced noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps within the Army also facilitated a continuity of effort for the Army’s campaigns on the Great Plains. The majority of the Army’s NCOs were Civil War veterans who had chosen to make the Army a career. They were able to impart critical training in tactics and field craft to newer soldiers who, in many cases, were serving as mentors. As Rickey describes, senior troops were sources of knowledge for all things related to soldiering: “From their conversation, the neophytes soon learned about a wide vari-


ety of subjects not included in any book of drill or regulations. ...After spending a year or two in a company, most men seem to have made a satisfactory adjustment...except for those who chose to desert, the majority...served out their enlistments as regular soldiers.”⁸

Unlike training for the enlisted men, the quality of training for officers, and overall experience levels, was better; however, more emphasis was placed on the study and refinement of European-style tactics than on practical skills for war on the plains. The root of this emphasis on European tactics was the U.S. Military Academy at West Point where the curriculum emphasized the study of Napoleonic tactics and the philosophy of Baron Antoine-Henry de Jomini. Most of the credit for West Point’s emphasis on Jomini can be traced to the influence of Dennis Hart Mahan, who graduated from West Point in 1824 and joined its faculty in 1832. According to Weigley, “Jomini’s interpretation of Napoleon became the foundation of teaching strategy at West Point ... the cadets encountered his teachings in Dennis Mahan’s explication of the art of war in the senior course, which formed the principal introduction to the subject, for Mahan’s ideas were formed upon Jomini’s.”⁹ In addition to scholastic emphasis on European warfare, under General Sherman’s postwar leadership, the Army also undertook a systematic program of strengthening the service’s artillery and engineering programs, as well as infantry and cavalry study programs, based on the European tradition. “He created opportunities for officers to observe foreign armies and report on their practices. Under his patronage, Lt. Col. Emory Upton traveled around the world and set forth his findings in *The Armies of Asia and Europe*.”¹⁰ While useful in a general sense in the professionalization of the Army’s officer corps, none of those programs was of help in developing a solution to the Plains Indian problem.

The program at West Point was not entirely without merit, however. Small unit tactics and skirmishing were taught to the officers, as was marksmanship. Some of Mahan’s own writings and lectures did address the problem of warfare on the plains from a practical standpoint: “Mahan’s *Out-Post* and Colonel J.B. Wheeler’s, *A Course of Instruction in the Elements of the Art and Science of War for the Use of the Cadets of the United States Military Academy*, endorsed the use of winter operations, night marches, and dawn raids to surprise enemy encampments.”¹¹ Those concepts, along with attacks against villages, became the backbone of the Army’s strategy for combat against the Indians.

Compounding poor-quality troops and improperly educated officers was the issue of inadequate equipment and supplies. The end of the Civil War found the U.S. Army with warehouses full of uniforms and equipment, much of it cheaply made and unsuited to the wear and tear of frontier service. As a result, troops in the field frequently had the appearance of irregular forces, wearing combinations of uniforms and civilian dress or

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“The Sioux, for example, suffered bloody repulses at the Wagon Box and Hayfield fights of 1867 because of the deadly fire.’ Also highly effective were the Army’s Hotchkiss guns, which ‘provided the most popular and effective artillery piece for western service... it could be fired rapidly and accurately at ranges up to 4,000 yards. Above all, it was light and compact enough to be taken almost anywhere on a wheeled carriage.’”

combinations of hats, shirts, trousers, and boots from different uniform series groups. This was the case through the late 1880s, when khaki canvas uniforms were made standard throughout the Army. Rations also followed the same course of distribution as uniforms. Civil War stocks of canned meats were reportedly still in use well into the 1870s. Distance between posts also affected regular resupply efforts and many outlying detachments were forced to supplement meager rations with locally grown vegetables and fresh meat from hunting expeditions. Both were practices that took considerable time and available troops away from security patrols and pacification campaigns.

Weapons, on the other hand, did enjoy regular improvements. Most significantly was the shift from paper to metallic cartridges. Unlike paper, metallic cartridges were sturdy and waterproof, hence more suited to the harsh frontier environment. Breech-loading rifles and repeaters also provided a much needed edge against the Indians because they allowed a greater possible rate of fire due to shorter reload time requirements. Against moving targets, such as running Indians, this was a critical factor since Army marksmanship training was primarily focused on shooting at static targets with emphasis on methodical precision.

While the majority of Plains Indian-owned firearms were cheaply made single-shot rifles and shotguns, generally referred to as “trade guns,” some better quality rifles and repeaters made it into their hands. These rifles were likely obtained through capture in battle or via unscrupulous traders. According to Utley, “The improved firearms that suddenly appeared in the hands of the blue-coats at the close of the Civil War took the Indians by surprise. The Sioux, for example, suffered bloody repulses at the Wagon Box and Hayfield fights of 1867 because of the deadly fire.”¹² Also highly effective were the Army’s Hotchkiss guns, which “provided the most popular and effective artillery piece for western service...it could be fired rapidly and accurately at ranges up to 4,000 yards. Above all, it was light and compact enough to be taken almost anywhere on a wheeled carriage. ...The Gatling gun gave less satisfaction...the Gatling fired 350 rounds of rifle ammunition per minute. ...Gatlings ‘are worthless for Indian fighting,’ [General] Miles declared...the Gatling easily fouled with the refuse of black powder cartridges and jammed with overheating; rather than have his march slowed, Custer refused to take a Gatling platoon ...to Little Bighorn.”¹³

The Army also had the advantage over the Plains Indians when it came to transport. Unlike its opponents, who were limited to travel on foot and horseback, the Army used wagons and mule trains to keep its troops supplied while in the field. Also

frequently used were railroads and steamboats to deploy large groups of soldiers over great distances, “At the end of a rail journey, infantry customarily marched to their ultimate destination, but wagon transportation was not uncommon...Lieutenant Frank D. Baldwin charged and captured an Indian village...using his wagon-borne Fifth infantrymen in a combination horse and wagon attack that won him his second Congressional Medal of Honor. River steamers were used to carry regular troops on the Colorado, Red, Yellowstone, Missouri, and other navigable western rivers. The slow and tedious upstream travel often compelled soldiers to spend a week or ten days crowded on the decks.”¹⁴

As the Army began to suffer significant defeats, such as the Fetterman Massacre, allegations of Plains Indians possessing superior firepower in the form of Winchester repeaters began to appear in an effort to excuse poor tactical performance. While the Winchester was a well-designed and popular firearm prevalent throughout the West: “The number of warriors who boasted such weapons was greatly exaggerated. Most, if they owned a gun at all, had to content themselves with old trade muskets of doubtful utility or captured military arms. Too, ammunition was difficult to obtain, and few Indians became better marksmen than their soldier opponents. Nevertheless, enough repeaters found their way into Indian hands, largely through traders, to prompt speculation on the changing nature of Indian warfare.”¹⁵

Unlike Western society, in which warfare was a learned skill, taught to a relatively small percentage of society, conflict was an integral part of the Plains Indian way of life. Because they were essentially nomadic in nature, they required a huge area to support themselves. As a result, when tribes met, it was usually in combat over scarce resources or during raids on each other’s camps to capture slaves or horses. Those instances were governed by an unofficial code of conduct however, which stipulated that combat be conducted fairly. According to Utley, “...many of the western tribes shared certain fundamental characteristics. Whatever their environment, they lived close to it, finely tuned to its vagaries, able to exploit such food and other resources as it contained... They cherished the freedom, independence, and dignity of the individual, the family, and the group. With some notable exceptions, they exalted war and bestowed great prestige on the successful warrior.”¹⁶

This emphasis on independence and public democracy led to critical miscommunications, especially with respect to treaty validation between the Plains Indians and U.S. Government. Whereas, the soldiers and settlers viewed representatives to the treaty committees as being empowered to sign for all, the Plains Indians viewed the process differently. Generally speaking, they viewed treaties as being valid only for those individuals and their immediate families who signed them. Indeed, “The U.S. government never seemed to understand that the ‘chiefs’ who put pen to paper rarely represented their tribes completely, in the

way of traditional white representatives. Indians who did not sign a particular treaty felt no compunction to follow the treaty's dictates, much as the government expected them to. Since the government needed someone to sign each treaty, in some cases, government representatives anointed a chief if one did not exist... Faulty interpreters also ensured failure. Compounding the U.S. government's deceitful tactics was the fact that adherence to treaties was arbitrary."¹⁷

Indeed, beyond competition for resources from the settlers and the perceived invasion of their territories, the most notable cause of strife was the repeated violations of treaties. "In nearly every case, the pressures from the settlers — their demand for land, for boundaries, for rights of way, for minerals, for buffalo hides — touched off a conflict. The cycle repeated itself endlessly: an advance guard of settlers or soldiers moving into Indian country, usually in violation of a U.S. government-Plains Indian treaty; Indian attacks (often including arson, murder, and mutilation; a frantic call for protection and military reprisal; and a brief, bloody war that always, if not sooner than later, ended in an Indian defeat and another long step in the United States advance of the frontier."¹⁸

The so-called Plains Indian wars were, in actuality, a long series of incidents and responses, instigated by both sides. Some campaigns were extremely short, while others can be characterized as either long or consisted of flare ups of such regularity that they constituted single events. It has already been noted that conflict with the Indians began with the first European landings. However, the tensions between the groups reached an apogee during the 30-year period between approximately 1860 and 1890, during which time there were few periods of relative peace. The list of noteworthy campaigns against the Plains Indians includes:

- ▶ The Apache Wars (1861-1886).
- ▶ Sioux Uprising in Minnesota (1862).
- ▶ Navajo Conflict (1863-1864).
- ▶ Plains Wars of the 1860s: Cheyenne-Arapaho War and Sand Creek Massacre (1864-1865); Red Cloud's War (1866-1867); Hancock's War (1867); and Cheyenne Winter Campaign (1868-1869).
- ▶ The Modoc War (1872-1873).
- ▶ The Nez Percé War (1877).
- ▶ The Ute War (1879).
- ▶ The Sioux Wars: The Black Hills War (1876-1877); and Ghost Dance Campaign (1890-1891).¹⁹

For the most part, the U.S. Army's campaign strategy evolved into a combination of attacks against villages and withholding promised rations and other supplies to ensure compliance and rendition of warriors to prison facilities in Florida. The main thrust of all the campaigns involved attacks on villages. As a practice, this actually began shortly after initial European contact was made with the native inhabitants of the Americas. The practice was refined by the Union Army during the Civil War as an effort to destroy support for Confederate forces. As a result of the seasonally nomadic lifestyle of the Plains Indians, villages were not permanent, with locations changing with both seasons and movements of animal herds. The temporary structures that made up the villages represented the sum of all of the possessions of a given tribe (sans animals) and destruction usually resulted in the survivors becoming dependent on government largesse for survival. "The [typical] surprise attack on the village was total war. In such encounters, women and children were always present. They mingled with the fighting men, often participating in the fighting, and in the confusion and excitement of battle were difficult to identify as noncombatants. In engagement after engagement, women and children fell victim to Army bullets or were cast upon a hostile country, often in winter, without food or shelter."²⁰ This policy resulted in public outcry in the eastern part of the United States, as well as across Europe. Charges of genocide were levied against and denied by the Army frequently. Yet that was precisely the unofficial spirit which drove the western campaigns. For many settlers and soldiers, the era of North American Indian society was over and the only acceptable options to offer the Plains Indians were to assimilate or perish. Indeed, some politicians called for outright extermination. One such was Governor John Evans of Colorado. Following an outbreak of violence in 1864, the Governor called for the following: "I again appeal to you to organize for the defense of your homes and families against the merciless savage. ... Any man who kills a hostile Indian is a patriot."²¹ To his credit, the governor did point out the potential for increased violence, if friendly Plains Indians were killed by accident, but closed his proclamation by noting that, "Eastern humanitarians who believe in the superiority of the Indian race will raise a terrible howl over this policy, but it is not

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“...one particular treaty, which was made with members of the Oglala Sioux tribe, was first offered with the most unacceptable terms possible such as rights for settlers to trespass at will and confinement of the Oglala to a specific region (a reservation). Following the Oglala’s rejection, the treaty was modified in a Machiavellian manner in which contradictory clauses were deliberately placed into the text so that the government would retain its legal advantages in dealing with them.”

time to split hairs nor stand on delicate compunctions of conscience. Self-preservation demands decisive action and the only way to secure it is to fight them in their own way. A few months of active extermination will bring about quiet, and nothing else will.”²²

Evans’ proclamation was echoed in the U.S. Government’s actions with respect to its observance of many treaties enacted with the Plains Indians. By way of example, one particular treaty, which was made with members of the Oglala Sioux tribe, was first offered with the most unacceptable terms possible such as rights for settlers to trespass at will and confinement of the Oglala to a specific region (a reservation). Following the Oglala’s rejection, the treaty was modified in a Machiavellian manner in which contradictory clauses were deliberately placed into the text so that the government would retain its legal advantages in dealing with them. Gray describes the treaty as, “Here is a solemn treaty that cedes territory admittedly unceded; that confines the Indian to a reservation while allowing him to roam elsewhere; and that guarantees against trespass, unless a trespasser appears! The Indian was given to understand that he retained his full right to live in the old way in a vast unceded territory. ... The treaty does indeed say precisely this. The fact that it also denies it was no fault of the Indian. It was the [Peace] Commission that wrote in the contradictions. There can be only one explanation — they designed one set of provisions to beguile and another to enforce.”²³ Also, according to Gray, the aforementioned treaty was nullified shortly after President Johnson left office by the Army, wherein General Sherman approved the following policy change for dealing with Indians found outside of reservations: “Outside the well-defined limits of their reservations, they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority, and as a rule will be considered hostile. At that moment, the unceded Indian Territory became white territory, and Indians who continued to roam there were officially labeled ‘hostiles.’”²⁴

Treaties between the government and Plains Indians during this period always included provisions for the care and management of the Indians and their reservations. This came in the form of designated “Indian agents,” who were responsible for ensuring that food, clothing, tools and stipends were disbursed. Lack of serious oversight into the management of the reservations facilitated a great deal of corruption and malfeasance on the part of the agents. While not frequently raised to the public eye, one such incident resulted in the resignation of President Grant’s secretary of the interior, Columbus Delano, in 1875. More often than not, corruption went unchecked. According to Utley and Washburn, “Few government agencies lent themselves more readily to patronage politics and corruption than the Indian Bureau and none achieved a worse reputation. ... Despite some notable exceptions, most Indian agents were deplorably unqualified.”²⁵

As a means of controlling the Plains Indians, the reservation system was without par. By forcing them to become dependent of the government for subsistence, they lost their independence. Indeed, the reservation system has been credited, along with its adjunct village attacks, as destroying both the spirit and means to resist against the combination of settlers and the Army. Utley and Washburn describe the lasting effects of the system thusly: “By the 1880s, the reservation system had, in effect, deprived the Indians of the ability to hunt or make war — the two pastimes that consumed most of their energies and, more important, shaped their social, economic, political, religious and military institutions.”²⁶

Those individuals who resisted reservation life faced three choices. The first was to go north to Canada or south to Mexico. Canada however was dealing with its own Plains Indian issues in much the same way as the United States and Mexico only offered more inhospitable deserts to the north and unwelcoming established populations to the south. The other recourses were acceptance or continued fighting. Continued fighting generally had two outcomes, death or rendition.

In an effort to move troublemakers away from potential followers, a policy of rendition was enacted in which particularly dangerous troublemakers who were captured were removed from familiar territory entirely and sent to Florida. The site selected for this early version of Guantanamo Bay was Fort Marion. According to Utley and Washburn, “Early in 1875, the government decided upon a tough new tactic to break the resistance of the Plains Indians. The most dangerous warriors would be sent — without benefit of trial — to Fort Marion, a seventeenth-century Spanish prison in St. Augustine, Florida.”²⁷

Village attacks, population of reservations, forced treaties, and rendition were all by-products of military campaigns. Over the course of the 30-year period covered by this article, a distinct pattern emerged in which campaigns were predicated by uprisings which, in turn, were reactions to patrols and campaigns and other American actions. Among the more notable campaigns were the Navajo Conflict, Modoc War, and the series of Sioux Wars.

“Early in 1875, the government decided upon a tough new tactic to break the resistance of the Plains Indians. The most dangerous warriors would be sent — without benefit of trial — to Fort Marion, a seventeenth-century Spanish prison in St. Augustine, Florida.”

These three conflicts are representative of the overall conflict between Indians and Americans, in that they represent typical campaigns and their outcomes.

While the buildup to the so-named “Navajo Conflict” was typical in nature, in that it resulted from a steady increase in pressure from both sides, the actual campaign was relatively short. Starting in July 1863 and ending in January 1864, the campaign also had the significance of being one of the only major Indian campaigns of the Civil War fought by federal troops. The stated cause of the need for action was a combination of repeated incidents by both soldiers and Plains Indians, including an attack by approximately 1,000 Navajos on Fort Defiance, which led to the Army’s decision to relocate the Navajos. “In April 1863, General James Carleton informed the leading Navajo chiefs of his plans to deport the tribe onto the Bosque Redondo Reservation, along with the Mescalero Apache. Those of the 12,000 Navajo who refused to leave would be treated as hostile.”²⁸ Like other campaigns, the focus was on attacks on villages with the attendant destruction of crops and livestock to starve the Navajos into submission. Unlike other campaigns, however, the Navajos eventually got their land back because the Bosque Redondo Reservation could not support the combined tribes. “In the spring of 1868, [the Navajo chiefs] were allowed to present their case to President Johnson in Washington, D.C. On 1 June 1868, the tribe won permission to return to its homeland. A new treaty set aside 3.5 million acres of reserved lands.”²⁹


By contrast to the Navajo experience, the Modoc War resulted not only in the complete removal of the Modocs from their traditional home in northern California, but the death of General Canby. General Canby was shot in the face by Kintpuash, the Modoc chief, during surrender negotiations, “When Kintpuash



could not get Canby to promise to remove all the soldiers and allow the Modoc to remain in California, he drew a pistol and shot Canby in the face then stabbed him. (Edward R.S. Canby thus became the only U.S. general killed in the country’s Indian wars.)”³⁰ When captured, Kintpuash was hanged and General William T. Sherman ordered the surviving Modocs to be deported east “so that the name of Modoc shall cease.” The Army escorted the 155 surviving Modoc to no homes in Indian Territory. ... Their brief rebellion turned out to be the last Indian conflict in the California-Oregon border region.”³¹ The Modoc campaign was fought primarily against groups of Indians in fortified mountain caves and redoubts instead of against villages. During campaigns of this nature, lightweight cannons, such as Hotchkiss guns, were particularly effective weapons.

The Sioux War was actually more of a series of linked campaigns than an actual war. It began in 1862 with a bloody uprising in Minnesota. It flared up from 1876-1877 in the Black Hills and then again in 1890-1891 at the height of the Ghost Dance movement, which ended at the battle at Wounded Knee creek. Gray describes the Sioux conflict as being emblematic of the struggle between the Plains Indians and the U.S. Army. According to Gray, “The Sioux-Cheyenne War of 1876, in which General George Armstrong Custer figured so prominently and disastrously, epitomizes in a brief time all of the facets, both good and bad, that characterized the centuries-long conflict between the two cultures.”³²

The first significant event in the conflict was during 1862 in Minnesota. The uprising was purely the result of frustration. A small group of Santee Sioux, hungry and frustrated at not being able to find game, and angry at intrusions by missionaries and diversion of promised annuities into the pockets of unscrupulous government representatives, vented their anger by killing five settlers. This, in turn, galvanized the tribe into continued



“Among the more notable campaigns were the Navajo Conflict, Modoc War, and the series of Sioux Wars. These three conflicts are representative of the overall conflict between Indians and Americans, in that they represent typical campaigns and their outcomes.”

action and, "In a week of bloody horror, fully eight hundred settlers died violently in atonement for the wrongs done to the Santee, and but for the successful defense of Fort Ridgley and New Ulm, many more might have perished."³³ Following a largely successful counteroffensive by the Army, some 20 to 30 Santee warriors were hanged, but the chief instigators were able to flee to the relative safety of the Black Hills where they linked up with other groups of Sioux and continued to aggress against settlers and soldiers.

The Black Hills were the locations for arguably the two most well-known battles of the Indian Wars. The first was Custer's battle at Little Bighorn Creek, and the second at Wounded Knee Creek. The root cause for so much conflict occurring in the Black Hills can be summed up in one word — "gold." As early as 1874, the Army began sending reconnaissance patrols into the Black Hills as a cover for surveyors and prospectors, likely in an effort to inject cash into the country's economy following the post-Civil War recession that peaked the year before. As Donovan describes it, "...by early August, the nation's newspapers were headlining sensational reports that the Hills had proved to be a veritable paradise with 'gold in the grass roots.' If there is any purpose a financial depression can serve well, it is to escalate rumors of a gold strike into a full blown rush."³⁴

The gold rush in the Black Hills put the U.S. Government in a difficult position. It was obligated to uphold its treaties with the Sioux, protecting them against trespass, yet it also had to protect its citizens from the angered Plains Indians and reinvigorate its economy. By undertaking a calculated policy of no action against the miners, which incited the Sioux into rebellion, the Government was able to take steps to lay claim to the Black Hills.

Among these steps was a campaign to attack villages in the vicinity of Little Bighorn Creek, which was, from the Army's perspective, tragically unsuccessful. Instead of destroying villages and subjugating the Sioux, nearly all of the 7th Cavalry Regiment was exterminated by unforeseen numbers of very angry Plains Indians. This loss resulted in both an appropriations bill to increase the size of the Army's tactical footprint on the plains by nearly 2,500 troops and renewed calls to bring an end to the Plains Indian problem once and for all. The solution came in the form of a year-long series of campaigns, which began in 1876, and resulted in the majority of the Sioux becoming ostensibly pacified and, for the most part, living on reservations.

As was typical of the time, the Sioux reservations were mismanaged and starvation began to occur. Unlike past instances, however, instead of groups leaving reservations and going on the warpath again, a new factor developed, a religious movement called the "Ghost Dance." The Ghost Dance movement was first and foremost a form of religious empowerment that provided to its adherents a belief that, among other things, they could not be killed by the soldiers. As word about the new religion percolated through the Army and government, senior leadership moved quickly to put a stop to it. Messages, such as that from Indian agent Daniel Royer, were wired to Washington stating, "Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy. ... We need protection and we need it now," only served to speed the deployment of troops.³⁵ The conflict culminated in a battle at Wounded Knee Creek in December of 1890, which resulted in approximately 200 Indians killed in action. While there were some very small mopping-up actions throughout January of the following year, such as the surrender of the last of the movement's leaders, Kick-



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ing Bear, on the 15th, Wounded Knee is largely regarded as the final battle of the Indian Wars.³⁶ Victory on the battlefield was largely the result of "...four fast firing Hotchkiss guns [which] opened up, and in less than an hour, two thirds of [the Sioux present] had been wiped out."³⁷

The focus of the Army's counterinsurgency programs was not to keep Indian activity from affecting American territory, it was to pacify and force Indians into living in controlled environments of the reservations. While designed to provide sustenance by supplementing farming with both food allotments and stipends, the corruption endemic to the reservation system inspired many Indian tribes to embark on insurgencies as reactions to government control. The methods that they employed were in effect guerrilla warfare tactics, such as ambushes and swift strikes against soft targets like patrols and settlements. The initial Army responses were poor ones and only over time were effective measures developed. Because a lack of formal doctrine to deal with rebellions existed up to the 1920s, tactics, such as village attacks, came out of the wartime experiences of Civil War veterans and the employment of European-style small-unit tactics taught at West Point.³⁸ As Birtle describes it, "...while the Army had never developed a formal doctrine for Indian, it had gradually evolved a theory

that blended conventional with unconventional techniques to attack the social and economic resources upon which Plains Indian power rested."³⁹



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
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Broadening the Army Officer for a New Tomorrow

by Major Albert J. Marckwardt



“...the British army had become an institution that ignored most everything that characterized modernity because it had become an army too busy to learn.”¹

— Major General Robert H. Scales,
U.S. Army (Retired)


In February of 2010, during a conference on revitalizing America’s military officer corps, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), which is a Washington D.C.-based think tank, released a document stating that “to respond effectively to complex challenges, the U.S. military must develop and maintain a high degree of adaptability within the officer corps.”² The Army’s strength in its officer development system is that it first develops, from scratch, an outstanding leader in a very short time, and secondly, promotes a leadership culture based on understanding both the mission and the needs of

subordinates. The Army’s vision, according to *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, is to grow and develop “agile and adaptive leaders for 21st-century full-spectrum operations” over time.³ Unfortunately, at the field grade level, officers are bound by a system that restricts their flexibility in exercising options, creating an officer corps unable to pursue jobs that broaden thinking and allow them to achieve a high degree of adaptability. The officer management system should modify its rigid timeline-based system to provide the Army flexible leaders with broad and diverse experiences. The current officer development system functions well for junior officers, but is “out of balance in developing field grade officers.”⁴ A new, more flexible system, which is based on conditions and not time, that allows for valuable broadening experiences, is necessary.

Junior Development Success

The system to develop leaders in the Army is rooted in the Army values. The Army is unparalleled by any organization in its ability to create exceptional leaders at all levels, from a cadet, through commissioning, to the first years as a company grade officer. Countless examples abound of successful corporate organizations, which have developed similar systems for training executive leaders who began their careers after MBA degree completion. For example, General Electric, United Technologies, and countless other blue-chip corporations, hire MBA graduates and require them to spend the first few years developing their leadership skills. Using the United Technologies model, for example, MBA graduates “work in different departments or, in some

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cases, in different business units and gain a corporate-wide understanding of the company.”⁵ Otis Elevator’s “program is designed to broaden the participants’ understanding” by having their new leaders “rotate through two 12- to 15-month or three 8- to 10-month assignments.”⁶ These programs were created after observing the Army’s effectiveness in developing company grade officers as platoon leaders, company executive officers, battalion and brigade staff officers, and company commanders. A structured timeline for leadership development is very effective in ensuring that we arm junior leaders, in a short amount of time, with a basic understanding of our core competencies as an Army fighting and winning wars. However, once we promote company grade officers to the field grade level, we do not

change the structured leader development program in the Army.

Expanding Opportunities

Although the focus for training company grade officers is in creating leaders, the focus for training field grade officers should be in broadening leaders. The recent CNAS report reinforces this recommendation by stating, “In addition to demonstrating a high degree of proficiency in conventional warfare, officers must also develop a broader knowledge of politics, economics, and the use of information in modern warfare to cope with a more complicated and rapidly evolving international environment.”⁷ To meet the intent outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, “that DoD improve its capabilities for contributing to civilian-led activities and operations, supporting unity of effort,” the Army must ensure that all field

grade officers are afforded the opportunity to seek broadening jobs outside of traditional career fields.⁸ Broadened officers, as defined by *A Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army*, are officers who are “competent in their core proficiencies [and] broad enough to operate with a global mindset.”⁹ In other words, to ensure we develop multi-skilled officers, we must ensure they maintain experience in their career fields while also widening their knowledge of the Army. Therefore, it is important to define what jobs should be considered broadening. Such jobs would fall into one of three categories, which include joint/combined experience, educational experience, and dual-track functional career experience.

Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) assignments allow officers to become increasingly familiar with Department of Defense as a whole, and understand how varying orga-

nizations contribute to integrating the national forms (pillars) of power to support national strategic goals. “Just as maintaining America’s enduring defense alliances and relationships abroad is a central facet of statecraft, so too is the need to continue improving the Department of Defense’s cooperation with other U.S. departments and agencies.”¹⁰ These assignments include jobs at U.S. Army service component commands, higher-level commands, and jobs available through the personnel exchange program (PEP) where officers serve for 24 months with allied armies. Finally, they include jobs that allow officers to work in different government agencies, similar to the interagency fellowship program where officers attend a condensed intermediate level education (ILE) course prior to spending a year working for an agency such as the Department of State or the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The next broadening category allows officers to earn a master’s degree from an accredited institution. General Petraeus notes, “Few, if any, experiences ... are as intellectually stimulating, challenging, or mind opening as a year or two at a civilian graduate school.”¹¹ There are already

several available graduate degree programs within the Army, to include the advanced civil schooling (ACS) programs, fellowship programs, military faculty advisor programs, professor of military science programs, and school of advanced military studies programs. The Army should also offer an 18-month sabbatical program to allow officers to complete master’s degrees, which provides an opportunity to use various government/Army tuition assistance programs. Earning a graduate degree will help “bridge the gap between those in uniform and those who have had little contact with the military.”¹²

Finally, the last category allows officers to pursue a dual-track career within certain functional areas such as the strategic intelligence or foreign area officer (FAO). Allowing Army officers to pursue two career fields enables them to be experts in a specialized functional field while maintaining skills in a primary field such as armor or field artillery. Major General Scales observed, “Four stars who routinely advised subordinates not to become FAOs discover that, once in command, officers who understand alien cultures and speak their language fluently are essential multipliers when fighting irregular

wars at the strategic level.”¹³ The Army could implement this system by allowing officers to apply for functional careers and serve in one functional assignment, in each rank, after which they would serve in primary branch key-billet assignments. This system would allow them to meet the minimum requirements to be eligible for battalion and brigade commands. Exposing Army officers to different careers enhances cross-functional communications and facilitates the employment of all Army enablers.

Ensuring that field grade officers serve in at least one broadening assignment as a major and then lieutenant colonel, as defined by one of three categories (joint, educational, and dual tracking), will give the Army a more diversified pool of adaptable officers for selection to higher ranks. The Army, for the most part, however, is not lacking in broadening opportunities but in the available time career officers have to take on such jobs.

Removing Time Restraints

The structured timeline used so effectively to develop junior officers is not as effective for field grade officers and forces them to plan their careers under a rigid

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and inflexible timeline. Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, states that it is important to maintain “flexible timelines [that] enable officers to serve longer in developmental assignments, ensuring officers have adequate time to gain skills and experience and also support unit readiness and cohesion.”¹⁴ Field grade officers often do not pursue self-development assignments that promote diverse thinking because they feel, and are often advised by career managers, that doing so would limit their timeline and result in reducing their number of officer evaluation reports (OERs) in critical positions, which are required to be competitive for promotion boards. As a result, many majors feel limited in the broadening assignments they take on.

The paradox of career progression versus career broadening is the Army’s desire for field grade officers to be competitive for promotion boards, and to be competitive, they must have a minimum of two key-billet OERs, preferably three. Add in the year required to attend ILE and that leaves majors with little time to pursue broadening jobs, which would provide the Army a larger pool of broadened officers for lieutenant colonel and battalion command. This paradox could be broken by allowing field grade officers to determine when they have reached a level of professional maturity to compete for lieutenant colonel and command boards, instead of submitting files to the board based on years of eligible service. Under this new concept, officers would decide when they are ready to compete, as long as minimum requirements are met.

To be competitive for promotion, majors would be required to meet the minimum eligibility of 2 to 3 years in a key-billet assignment (in accordance with DA PAM 600-3); complete ILE, or equivalent school; have, as a minimum, one broadening assignment; and have a minimum of 5 years in grade (not to exceed 9 years before first promotion packet is submitted).¹⁵ Eligible majors would submit their packets to the board once they have reached a level of professional maturity to compete for the next rank. This allows officers ample time to complete all board requirements, as well as time to decide which broadening assignments would be beneficial without being overly concerned with assignment lengths. With these processes in place, majors who intend to complete an ACS program, pursue a joint credit, or dual track careers could do so without becoming noncompetitive for battalion command. Because majors would not be rushed to promotion boards, there would be more officers in the grade of major, of which the Army is currently short.

Of course, this could create concerns that the Army might fall short on qualified majors to compete for lieutenant colonel, thereby resulting in an eventual shortage of lieutenant colonels and an excess of majors. However, if the same system was implemented for lieutenant colonels, one could deduce that there would be approximately the same percentage of lieutenant colonels delaying packets to complete broadening jobs, thereby mitigating this concern. In preventing an excess of majors, there will always be officers ready for career advancement, thus precluding a shortage of officers competing at the next higher level. However, in an unlikely scenario where an overwhelming excess of majors were preventing captains from being promoted, the Army could convene boards similar to those used during reduction of forces to stay within Congressional-approved strengths and maintain high quality officers in the Army. Board members may tend to frown on officers who opt to delay board appearances, which can be easily mitigated by not including the officer’s year group or date of rank during the board. Officers would still have three opportunities to compete before the board, but instead of referring to these opportunities as “below the zone, primary zone, and above the zone,” they would simply be the first, second, and final opportunity.

Stabilization is an added benefit in allowing officers to make the decision on when to submit promotion packets to the board. Field grade officers with children (especially high school age children who would like to graduate with peers), or spouses with careers, would have more flexibility in stabilizing their families, thus improving family morale and potentially increasing retention.

Finally, there will be some concerns regarding how long majors are permitted to hold the rank of major and how it affects retirement. Overall, the rule of thumb requires majors to retire after 20 years of active duty *commissioned* service (or 10 years time in grade) if they have not submitted a promotion packet or have been passed over by a promotion board.¹⁶ Implementing this system allows the Army to select battalion and brigade commanders who bring a wide range of knowledge to their positions.

The Army is unparalleled in its ability to develop leaders. The current model, for the most part, is a “system focused more on the quality and range of experience, rather than the specific gates or assignments required to progress.”¹⁷ The Army should adopt a conditions-based career timeline system to meet the ever-changing operational environment. By allowing field grade officers the opportunity to

chose an ideal time to compete for promotion, the Army affords all officers the ability to pursue a multitude of broadening assignments, which are available without risking stagnation in career progression. In *Beyond the Cloister*, General Petraeus reminds us that, broadening “experiences are critical to the development of the flexible, adaptable, creative thinkers who are so important to operations in places like Iraq and Afghanistan.”¹⁸ Simply put, to implement a strategy of developing broadened officers, as recommended by several organizations and several studies presented in this article, the Army must adopt a conditions-based career timeline.



Notes

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¹⁵Ibid.

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THE ARMOR RANGER



by Sergeant First Class Todd M. Hutchings

On today's asymmetrical battlefield, small-unit, dismounted operations have quickly become the norm in places such as the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. The rugged, unstable terrain makes it difficult to use the full range of the capabilities of the M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, thereby necessitating the use of dismounted soldiers. Our combat-arms schools are committed to arming soldiers and leaders with the skills they need to fight in this exigent environment. The ability of our soldiers and leaders to quickly adapt to changing enemy tactics and train as they fight remains the foundation of our Army. As we prepare to meet an enemy on his own turf and in an operational environment that requires intensive training for dismounted operations, we rest on the laurels of the premier school in small unit dismounted operations — Ranger School!

Put aside all the tales and misconceptions you have heard about Ranger School. The truth is: Ranger School is first and foremost a leadership school, which focuses on mission planning and decisionmaking. Ranger School students plan missions, issue combat orders, and lead fellow students through some of the most unforgiving and austere conditions imaginable, all under the unblinking eye of the relentless, ever-present Ranger instructor.

Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Dennis Smith, Ranger Training Brigade, affirms, "The Army today is critically short of Ranger-qualified leaders, and maneuver soldiers of all MOSs are finding themselves fighting shoulder to shoulder. Ranger training bridges the gap and provides a common ground for soldiers and leaders in combat."

During 4th Quarter, FY 2011, the permanent home of the Armor School will be alongside the Infantry School as part of the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) at Fort Benning, Georgia. Once the Armor School completely relocates, 19-series soldiers and officers will have increased opportunities to attend Ranger School, as well as the added and unique opportunity to return as instructors. Even though there are no dedicated 19-series slots on the Ranger Training Brigade's table of distribution and allowances (TDA), there are currently seven 19-series instructors, five noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and two officers. The invaluable knowledge of our experienced officers and NCOs is critical to teaching and de-

veloping the next generation of leaders. These experiences are paramount, especially in today's environment, and becoming a Ranger instructor provides the ideal platform to teach and lead young soldiers while simultaneously maintaining and improving senior leaders' tactical abilities. An ideal time to be a Ranger instructor is between squad/section leader time and platoon sergeant/leader and company/troop commander time, which better prepares soldiers for future leader roles than any other instructor position.

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Evan Lewandowski has the unique opportunity of being a Ranger instructor with Charlie Company, 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Fort Benning. "Out of 12,283 (19Ds), only 72 are Ranger qualified; even fewer for 19Ks, out of 8,077 only five are Ranger qualified. That means only about .004 percent of the armor force is Ranger qualified. In the *Armor Enlisted Professional Development Guide*, Ranger qualification is a stepping stone outlined in the career progression table for skill levels 1 through 3 for 19D. The chief of armor has identified Ranger training as a key part of the professional development of young armor soldiers. With that in mind, why is such a small portion of the armor force taking advantage of the opportunity to broaden their leader abilities?"

SFC Lewandowski comments, "As a young cavalry scout, I was given the opportunity to attend Ranger School. This experience was the turning point in my military career. As a young scout, trained in the techniques of mounted and dismounted operations, Ranger School enhanced my ability in dismounted operations, instilling the principles of patrolling, troop leading procedures (TLP), time management, and the importance of unit cohesion. Along with the technical side of the course, the most important development was to lead, operate, and function outside my comfort zone.

"During my tours in Iraq as a section and platoon sergeant in the canals of the Diyala Province and the streets of the Rusafa District of Baghdad, I was tasked to conduct a wide range of operations, including everything from mounted screen lines to reconnaissance operations and small kill teams. While conducting these operations, I frequently relied on the experiences and training I received during Ranger School. Starting at the initial planning phase, taking into consideration tasks, such as movement, tactical load, enemy courses of action, and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) procedures, as well as the

execution of continuous operations, I found it calming and comforting to know that I had been faced with similar situations in Ranger School and was successful.”

“Often times, Ranger School may be the only place a scout or tanker receives the light infantry training he needs to fight in today’s operational environment. As a platoon leader fighting in severe terrain, I was required to patrol up and down mountains countless times,” says Captain (CPT) Colin O’Donnell, an armor officer currently assigned to the Ranger Training Brigade. “Prior to combat, Ranger School was the only opportunity I had to practice light infantry tactics in the mountains. CPT O’Donnell goes on to say that, “Although the missions and unit structure of Ranger School are based on the light infantry platoon, it would be incorrect to assume that Ranger training is incompatible with traditional tanker or scout mission sets. Lessons learned about managing a timeline, backward planning, and dismounted load plans can also be used by scouts setting up a screen line. Regardless of the situation, the five principles of patrolling are applicable in some way for every mission imaginable.” Recent 19-series Ranger School graduates share their experiences from the course:

First Sergeant (1SG) Michael Ames of the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, recently graduated from Ranger School. He states that, “Even though I came here as a 1SG, I learned a great deal about how an infantry team leader, squad leader, platoon sergeant, and platoon leader operate. I have some mortar and infantrymen in my company at Fort Bragg, and going through Ranger training allows me to understand their tactics and work with them more effectively. Getting back to the basics, such as by-the-book TLP, and going through the detailed planning and orders process is beneficial for anyone. I especially like the fact that the stress of training didn’t end when we returned from missions; we stayed in a tactical posture during most of the training, which made it realistic and challenging. This course really taught me that my body is capable, if my mind is willing. I pushed myself farther than I thought possible, continually raising the bar. When I get back to my company, I plan on sending as many of my troops to Ranger School as I can.”

Second Lieutenant (2LT) Devin Osborn, a recent graduate of the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course (ABOLC) and Ranger School, and on his way to the 1st Infantry Division states, “I was a heavy wheeled vehicle mechanic before I was commissioned and went to ABOLC, so this was my first experience with light infantry tactics. I feel Ranger School bridges the gap between my armor training and previous experiences and allows me to proceed to my next assignment with a solid and broad knowledge base.”

Staff Sergeant (SSG) James Gardner of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, says, “I’ve wanted to attend Ranger School since I came in the Army six years ago. When I was a Bradley crew member, there was no push or support from my unit to send me to Ranger School, but when I got to the 25th Infantry Division, all that changed and I finally had an opportunity to go. I think the training at Ranger School is very realistic. The medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) training we conducted came in very handy when, for the first time, I had to use a Skedco litter during combat when my team leader was shot. It makes an already stressful situation worse when you don’t know exactly what you’re doing. Now, I feel much better prepared to evacuate an injured person using anything from a Skedco to a jungle penetrator (JP) hoist on a helicopter. A part of Ranger School I didn’t expect was the mental strain; I was expecting the physical part, but was very surprised at how much information I was expected to retain to later use during missions.”

THE SCHOOL

Ranger School is a three-phased school, which includes the Benning phase at Camp Rogers and Camp Darby; the mountain phase at Camp Merrill; and the Florida phase at Camp Rudder, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Ranger training at Fort Benning, Georgia, began in September 1950, during the Korean War, with the formation and training of 17 Airborne Ranger companies by the Ranger Training Command. In October 1951, the commandant of the U.S. Army Infantry School established the Ranger Department and extended Ranger training to all combat units in the Army.



“The ability of our soldiers and leaders to quickly adapt to changing enemy tactics and train as they fight remains the foundation of our Army. As we prepare to meet an enemy on his own turf and in an operational environment that requires intensive training for dismounted operations, we rest on the laurels of the premier school in small unit dismounted operations — Ranger School!”



“Command Sergeant Major Dennis Smith, Ranger Training Brigade, affirms, ‘The Army today is critically short of Ranger-qualified leaders, and maneuver soldiers of all MOSs are finding themselves fighting shoulder to shoulder. Ranger training bridges the gap and provides a common ground for soldiers and leaders in combat.’”



Benning phase. The Benning phase is conducted in two parts: the Ranger assessment portion, commonly referred to as “RAP week;” and the patrolling portion, commonly referred to as “Darby phase.” Conducted at Camp Rogers in the Harmony Church area at Fort Benning, and located right next to the new Armor School, RAP week begins with the Ranger Physical Fitness Test (RPFT), which requires 49 pushups, 59 sit-ups, a 5-mile run in 40:00 minutes (or better), and six chin-ups. Following the RPFT, students conduct the combat water survival assessment at Victory Pond, the land navigation refresher training, and finish the day with hands-on instruction in modern Army combatives. Day two begins at 0330 hours with the night and day land navigation test. Following land navigation, Rangers are tested on common soldier skills such as weapons and communications training. Day two finishes with a 3-mile, 2-man buddy run, complete with ACUs, combat boots, fighting load carrier (FLC), and weapons, culminating on Malvesti confidence course, home of the infamous “worm pit.” The third and final day of RAP week consists of instruction on proper assembly and security of equipment, culminating with a 15.5-mile foot march to Camp Darby with each student carrying an average load of 60 pounds.

On conclusion of RAP week, only two-thirds of the class will continue on to the patrol portion, which begins with fast-paced instruction on TLP, principles of patrolling, demolitions, field craft, and basic battle drills focused on squad ambush and reconnaissance missions. Before students begin the practical application of what they learn, they must negotiate the Darby Queen obstacle course, which consists of 20 obstacles stretched over 1 mile of uneven, hilly terrain. Once students have completed the Darby Queen obstacle course, they conduct 3 days of ungraded squad-level patrols, one of which is entirely cadre led. After the last ungraded patrol day, students conduct 2 days of graded patrols, one airborne operation, and 4 additional days of graded patrols before moving on to the mountain phase of Ranger School; however, not all students will continue forward to the mountain phase.

Mountain phase. To move forward to the mountain phase, each student must demonstrate an ability to plan, prepare for, resource, and execute a combat patrol as a squad or team leader. Students must prove their ability to execute these tasks not only to Ranger instructors, but also peers, as the final hurdle to moving forward is peer evaluation. Only students who give 100 percent of themselves to their peers and squad

will likely become candidates to move forward to the mountain phase, ultimately earning their Ranger Tab.

During the mountain portion, located at Camp Frank D. Merrill in the North Georgia Mountains, students receive instruction on military mountaineering tasks, mobility training, and techniques for employing a platoon for continuous combat patrol operations in a mountainous environment. They further develop the ability to command and control platoon-sized patrols through planning, preparing, and executing a variety of combat patrol missions. Ranger students learn not only how to self-sustain, but how to sustain subordinates in adverse mountain conditions. The rugged terrain, severe weather, hunger, mental and physical fatigue, and emotional stress that students encounter afford them the opportunity to gauge their own capabilities and limitations, as well as those of their “Ranger buddies.”

Ranger students receive 4 days of training on military mountaineering. During the first 2 days at the lower mountaineering area on Camp Merrill, Ranger students learn about knots, belays, anchor points, rope management, and basic fundamentals of climbing and rappelling. Mountaineering training culminates with a 2-day exercise at Mount Yonah, applying the skills learned at the lower mountaineering area. Students conduct one day of climbing and rappelling over exposed high-angle terrain. The second-day squads perform mobility training to move personnel, equipment, and simulated casualties through severely restrictive terrain, using fixed ropes and hauling systems.

Following mountaineering, students conduct 4 days of combat techniques training. During this training, students receive classes and perform practical exercises on movement to con-

tact, patrol base, TLP, operations orders (OPORD), combatives, ambush, and raid, raising the training from squad- to platoon-level operations.

Students then perform 10 days of patrolling during two field training exercises. Combat patrol missions are directed against a conventionally equipped threat force in a low-intensity conflict scenario. These patrol missions are conducted during both daylight and nighttime hours, and include air assault operations and extensive cross-country movements through mountainous terrain. Ranger students execute patrol missions, which require them to use their mountaineering skills. Platoon missions include movements to contact, vehicle and personnel ambushes, and raids on communications and mortar sites. Students also conduct river crossings and scale steeply sloped mountains. The stamina and commitment of Ranger students is stressed to the maximum; at any time, a student may be selected to lead tired, hungry, physically expended students to accomplish yet another combat patrol mission.

At the conclusion of the mountain phase, students move by bus or parachute assault into the third and final phase of Ranger training, conducted at Camp Rudder, near Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.

Florida phase. Camp James E. Rudder, located on Eglin Air Force Base in northwest Florida, serves as home of the third and final phase of Ranger School. This phase focuses on the continued development of the Ranger student's combat arms functional skills. Students receive instruction on waterborne operations, small boat movements, and stream crossings on arrival. Practical exercises in extended platoon-level operations, executed in a coastal swamp environment, test the student's ability to operate effectively under conditions of extreme mental and physical stress. This training further develops the student's ability to plan and lead small units during independent and coordinated airborne, air assault, small boat, and dismounted combat patrol operations in a low-intensity combat environment against a well-trained, sophisticated enemy.

The Florida phase is a continuation of small unit leadership training through a progressive, realistic contemporary operating environment. Students conduct 10 days of patrolling during two field training exercises (FTXs). The FTXs are fast-paced, highly stressful, challenging exercises during which students are evaluated on their abilities to apply small-unit tactics and techniques during raids, ambushes, movements to contact, and urban assaults, which are required to accomplish assigned missions.

CPT Trevor O'Malley shares his Ranger School experiences, "As an armor officer, I've benefited greatly from the tenets taught at Ranger School. As a member of a light cavalry organization, many of my leaders were infantry and Ranger qualified, and having that common ground assisted greatly in my understanding the commander's intent." Referring to the lessons taught at Ranger School, CPT O'Malley remarks, "Many of the concepts taught at Ranger School are similar to what may be found at the Armor Basic Officer Leader Course or the Scout Leader Course, however the constant repetition of tactical tasks during immense physical hardship for 61 days ingrains certain warrior attributes and sets a man's ways like a furnace sets steel."

Soldiers wishing to attend Ranger School should be physically conditioned prior to reporting to the course. "If you are not in top physical condition when you show up for Ranger School, you will have a much more difficult time throughout the entire course," according to CSM Dennis Smith. He advises

that, "The common belief of putting on a few extra pounds prior to starting Ranger School is completely wrong. You will end up carrying those extra pounds on every foot march, over every obstacle on the Darby Queen, up the mountains, and through the swamps. It's like having unnecessary weight in your rucksack and will only serve to break you down faster." There is a comprehensive workout plan on the Ranger Training Brigade's website (www.benning.army.mil/rtb), which greatly helps any soldier get in shape and maintain the proper level of physical fitness before beginning Ranger School. CSM Smith advises, "If you only have a month to prepare, follow the 30-day program; two months, follow the 60-program; three or more months, follow the 90-day program."

The U.S. Army's Ranger School is the best life insurance policy in which a young leader can invest to ensure he and his soldiers are properly trained to meet the rigors of combat throughout the world, regardless of branch and MOS. Ranger School is the best leadership course in the Army. With the Armor School moving next door to Camp Rogers, the home of the Ranger Training Brigade, all you have to do is walk down the street to get the best combat leadership training in the world.

For additional information please visit our website at: www.benning.army.mil/rtb, or contact the Ranger Training Brigade at (706) 544-6445/6069/6980.



Sergeant First Class Todd Hutchings is currently assigned to the Public Affairs Office, Ranger Training Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. He received an A.A. from Upper Iowa University. His military education includes Ranger School, Airborne School, Air Assault School, Combat Diver Course, and Combat Diver Supervisor Course. He has served in various staff and leader positions, to include master trainer, 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Fort Benning; ranger instructor, B Company, 4th Ranger Training Battalion, Fort Benning; force protection officer, 173d Airborne Brigade, Afghanistan; platoon sergeant, B Company, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, Vicenza, Italy; and platoon sergeant, B Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, Fort Lewis, WA.



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Maintenance Management in the Heavy BCT

by Captain Eric A. McCoy

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Leaders at all levels of the Army emphasize the importance of logistics and the freedom of maneuver it allows tactical commanders in the execution of combat operations. Of the tactical logistics functions, maintenance is especially critical. Soldiers must have confidence that the equipment they use will function when they press the button, turn the key, or pull the trigger.

A commander must consider several elements, or “building blocks,” when developing a maintenance program for his unit. This article focuses on maintenance operations for the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) at both the forward support company (FSC) and the brigade support battalion (BSB) levels. It is meant to provide a commander with additional insight about his maintenance program before deployment to a combat training center or theater of operations.

Maintenance Management in FSCs and FMCs

The maintenance control officer, commonly referred to as the “shop officer,” is the senior maintenance officer in the maneuver battalion’s FSC or the BSB’s field maintenance company (FMC). He is responsible for providing field maintenance to his supported battalion or, in the case of the FMC shop officer, to specified HBCT units and backup support to the FSC. He also serves as the battalion maintenance officer. This gives him a great deal of responsibility.

Under the previous edition of Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, senior Ordnance Corps lieutenants assume the position of shop officer after 12 months of experience as maintenance platoon leaders. However, because of the manpower demands created by transformation and the Global War on Terrorism, lieutenants, some of whom are Quartermaster or Transportation officers, often are assigned as shop officers directly from the basic officer leader course.

Changes to the modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) of FSC maintenance sections also have resulted in growing pains for the shop officer. Sergeants first class are authorized in the positions of shop office maintenance control sergeant and company repair team noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge. However, the MTOEs do not authorize a battalion maintenance sergeant at either the master sergeant or sergeant first class level to serve as an integrator and direct assistant to the shop officer. As a result of their inexperience and lack of senior NCO support, many shop officers who deploy to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, have difficulty executing maintenance management techniques.

Shop Officer Responsibilities

Field Manual-Interim (FMI) 4-90.1, *Heavy Brigade Combat Team Logistics*, defines the responsibilities of the shop officer, or maintenance control officer, as follows:

“The maintenance control officer [MCO] is the principal assistant to the commander, both battalion and FSC, on all matters pertaining to the field maintenance mission. The MCO serves as maintenance officer for the maneuver battalion and FSC using SAMS-1 [Standard Army Maintenance System-1], SAMS-2, BCS3 [Battle Command Sustainment Support System] and FBCB2 [Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below]. He is also the senior person in the UMCP [unit maintenance collection point] and is responsible for the local security requirements and tying in with adjacent units. He is responsible to the commander for the management of the combined efforts of the maintenance control section, maintenance section and service and recovery section, and the maintenance system teams...”

The shop officer is responsible for the combat readiness of his unit. Therefore, it is essential that he be aware of his roles and responsibilities and the capabilities and limitations of his organization.

To ensure the successful execution of his company’s mission, the shop officer must do the following:

Evaluate and ensure the quality of all maintenance completed by the maintenance platoon. Having company repair teams embedded with their habitual maneuver companies increases the complexity of this task. The shop officer must coordinate primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency methods of communication between the UMCP — the location of maintenance Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS) — and forward locations on the battlefield. An effective way of accomplishing this may be to “redball” critical repair parts forward and send DA Forms 5988E (Equipment Inspection and Maintenance Worksheet) and changes to maintenance status by reverse LOGPACs (logistics packages).

Develop a training and cross-training plan for maintenance personnel. The shop officer and his maintenance warrant officers are responsible for ensuring the technical proficiency of maintenance soldiers in the battalion. Because commanders and senior NCOs are focused primarily on tactical training, technical proficiency in various aspects of main-

tenance military occupational specialties (MOSs) may be sacrificed. The shop officer and warrant officers must develop a plan for ensuring that technical competence is not degraded. Ways to maintain maintenance MOS proficiency include keeping critical MOS job books on each maintenance soldier, conducting monthly low-density MOS training across the battalion, and coordinating with civilian agencies to provide training.

Coordinate the recovery of battalion equipment. Lack of planning for primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency means of communication can cause a significant time lag between vehicle breakdown, request for recovery assets, deployment of recovery assets, and arrival of recovery assets at the breakdown site. In theater, the lack of an effective recovery plan may endanger the lives of mechanics and recovery vehicle operators. Shop officers should provide input to battalion planners on maintenance procedures during combat operations. This can be done by incorporating maintenance operations standing operating procedures (SOPs) into battalion tactical SOPs so that all personnel in the battalion know how to request, receive, and incorporate maintenance support into their tactical operations. These procedures should include battle drills for recovery asset requests, section precombat checks and precombat inspections, and communications among the supported unit, the recovery team, and the shop office.

Monitor the status of equipment undergoing repairs and determine the status of the repair parts required to complete those repairs. The shop officer must communicate daily with the BSB support operations (SPO) maintenance officer and supply support activity (SSA) accountable officer to receive updated status on repair parts. In high-intensity conflict rotations at the NTC, this communication frequently is hindered, resulting in an unclear picture of the HBCT's current and projected combat power. The shop officer, battalion executive officer (XO), and BSB SPO must ensure that daily updates are communicated vertically and horizontally to all maintenance managers in the HBCT. These updates should include improved SAMS-2 026 reports (Maintenance Summary by Battalion); DA Forms 5988E, turn-in and processing cycles; priority 02 (life or death or total mission stoppage), 05 (severe impact to mission, or reportable items), and 12 (routine) parts ordered by unit; and workable and nonworkable backlogs. [Nonworkable backlogs include equipment for which either the repair parts or the mechanics are not available to complete the work.]

Perform maintenance according to the priorities established by the maneuver battalion commander. With modularity, a significant amount of logistics capability resides in the FSC and, in most cases, the BSB commander no longer has the organic capability to provide support beyond the capacity of the BSB's assets. As a result, maneuver battalion leaders must be intimately involved in their maintenance operations. Current and upcoming maintenance priorities should be discussed as part of mission operation orders and unit battle update briefs. This ensures that maneuver company commanders are using their company repair teams according to the battalion commander's guidance. The shop officer must provide sound guidance to the maneuver battalion XO, who is the materiel readiness officer of the battalion.

Maintenance Management at the BSB Level

The principal maintenance operator for the support operations officer and BSB commander is the SPO maintenance officer. He

recommends the allocation of resources to the supported unit's chain of command and coordinates maintenance company operations. He also forecasts and monitors the workload for all equipment, by type.

The SPO maintenance officer is normally a senior logistics first lieutenant awaiting orders for the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course or a career course graduate in line for command of an FMC or FSC. He is assisted by a maintenance NCO, typically an MOS 63-series (mechanic) master sergeant or sergeant first class. The maintenance officer and NCO use SAMS-2 to collect and process maintenance operations data and assist in the management of maintenance operations. SAMS-2 processes the maintenance information needed to control workload, manpower, and supplies. SAMS-2 is designed to assist in both maintenance and readiness management.

The SPO maintenance cell also works with the SSA accountable officer to develop plans and policies for reparable exchange and class IX (repair parts) operations. The SPO maintenance officer monitors shop production and job status reports in the FMC and FSCs. He also monitors the combat spares and coordinates the status of critical parts with the sustainment brigade. For un-serviceable items, the Standard Army Retail Supply System-1 (SARSS-1), located in the SSA, generates disposition instructions based on the guidance of brigade and division commanders. Possible instructions include evacuation, cannibalization, and controlled exchange policies.

The SPO maintenance officer and brigade S-4 review backlogs of critical weapons systems. For any additional support requirements, the BSB SPO coordinates through the sustainment brigade's materiel management branch.

Ensuring Maximum Combat Power

The SPO maintenance officer must take several actions to ensure that maximum combat power is built in support of the HBCT commander's intent. He must do the following:

Monitor the HBCT's maintenance posture using SAMS-2. Properly applying and using the reports and matrices generated by SAMS-2 will help the maintenance officer execute his mission. HBCT shop officers must understand the timeline and standards for submitting STAMIS data. Meeting the established HBCT standard should not be an issue when the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) and SAMS are collocated with the shop officer. Typically, failure to achieve the standard results from a lack of command emphasis and insufficient systems training for automated logistics specialists. A way to counter this is for the maintenance officer to track and brief the status of unit STAMIS data transfer at a regular brigade maintenance meeting, allowing the HBCT XO and BSB commander to focus resources on the problem. The maintenance officer also should talk with the BSB command sergeant major to ensure that all SAMS operators in the HBCT have additional skill identifier B5 (SAMS operator) before they are assigned to a shop office or the BSB SPO section.

Forecast and monitor the workload for all equipment, by type. Because the HBCT maintenance meeting primarily focuses on tracked and wheeled combat systems, other combat systems typically are not discussed in detail or not discussed at all. Maintenance of power-generation and communications equipment and small arms can be just as critical to the success of the HBCT as

Roles and Missions for the HBCT Maintenance Meeting

Customers	Managers		Boss
<p style="text-align: center;">All battalions and separate companies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander's NMC report • Accurate reports • Priority 02 status • Face-to-face recon with FSB • ULLS hardware status • ULLS maintenance disk turn-in • AOAP status • PLL listing and zero balance • Fedlog — verify part NSN • Review ULLS DCR 	<p style="text-align: center;">MMC or LAO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 026 report with updated status (ASL/NSL/ILAP) • Main ASL list • Over-aged recoverable list • High-priority status • IPD-02 manifest status <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – NSL parts status • LAO present 	<p style="text-align: center;">SSA OIC, shop officers, and SPO maintenance officer</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 026 report • Attendance roster • High-priority parts status • DS jobs status • IPD-02 manifest status and tracking • Shop section summary (006 print) • SSA ASL critical stockage status 	<p style="text-align: center;">BSB commander, brigade XO, or brigade SPO</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chair meeting • Review 026 report • Interface with battalion XOs • Brigade ULLS maintenance/supply disk turn-in status • Provide mission or battle focus and priorities • Review and enforce commitments • Enforce compliance of brigade maintenance policies • Synchronize maintenance and class IX with sustainment brigade

Legend

AOAP = Army Oil Analysis Program	MMC = Materiel management center
ASL = Authorized stockage list	NMC = Not mission capable
BSB = Brigade support battalion	NSL = Nonstockage list
DCR = Document control register	NSN = National stock number
DS = Direct support	OIC = Officer in charge
FED LOG= Federal Logistics Data on compact disk	PLL = Prescribed load list
FSB = Forward support battalion	SPO = Support operations officer
HBCT = Heavy brigade combat team	SSA = Supply support activity
ILAP = Integrated Logistics Analysis Program	ULLS = Unit Level Logistics System
IPD = Issue priority designator	XO = Executive officer
LAO = Logistics assistance officer	

Figure 1

maintenance of an Abrams tank or a Bradley fighting vehicle. The maintenance officer should discuss shop workloads with shop officers weekly, including an extensive review of the SAMS-1 022 (Backlog Report). The maintenance officer should also track the number of jobs that have been closed out in SAMS-1 but have not been closed out in ULLS and the jobs awaiting pickup from the FMC.

Coordinate maintenance priorities with the brigade S-4. Just as the shop officer recommends and coordinates maintenance priorities with the XO of his supported battalion, the SPO maintenance officer and the brigade S-4 must recommend and coordinate maintenance priorities with the HBCT XO. These priorities should be reviewed in the brigade maintenance meeting to ensure that all units understand and comply with the HBCT commander's guidance, ensuring unity of effort among the maintainers of the HBCT.

Track and investigate class IX high-priority requisitions. One of the SPO maintenance officer's most important responsibilities is to track critical repair parts for the HBCT. Units that have trouble with parts research and tracking in the NTC tactical environment frequently look back to an echelons-above-brigade capability to track parts. Units tend not to prioritize the maintenance officer's efforts, which causes many hours to be spent ex-

pediting the order of a part for a noncritical combat system. The HBCT XO, in conjunction with the BSB SPO, must identify the roles of maintenance managers at each level in the research of critical repair parts so that the maintenance officer can focus on the critical parts that will directly affect the HBCT's ability to accomplish its mission. Figure 1 depicts a recommendation for the responsibilities of each maintenance manager in the HBCT.

Provide recommendations to the HBCT S-4 on how to redistribute FSC maintenance assets within the HBCT. Because maneuver commanders have their own FSCs, they tend to hold on to their assets. As a result, the BSB commander cannot directly influence the maintenance posture of the HBCT because the BSB's FMC does not have a robust reinforcing support capability. Therefore, the maintenance officer should monitor FSC workloads and be ready to recommend through the HBCT S-4 to the HBCT XO the reallocation of FSC maintenance elements if necessary. Maneuver units must transmit combat slants (the number of systems on hand versus the number of systems fully mission capable) and their maintenance status electronically to the brigade S-4 and BSB SPO. This allows the SPO to identify problems quickly and allocate resources more efficiently. FBCB2 also provides map graphics that portray unit locations, grid coordinates, and terrain features so that the SPO can track maintenance on the battlefield.

Brigade Maintenance Meeting

The single most important tool in the HBCT for identifying and overcoming maintenance issues is a regular maintenance meeting. The goal of the maintenance meeting is to provide a clear picture of the HBCT's current maintenance posture and to set the conditions needed to produce maximum combat power for the next mission. Several factors determine how effective a HBCT's maintenance meeting will be, but none has a more positive effect than the attendance and active participation of the HBCT's leaders. If maintenance is a priority to the HBCT leaders, it will become a priority to the units within the brigade.

Here are some factors that must be considered for the maintenance meeting to run efficiently.

Time. Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) will always drive the time of the maintenance meeting. However, the time must be set according to the established supply and maintenance data processing windows so that meeting participants have the most current 026 report possible. Units should try to use a 026 printout that is less than 8 hours old. The meet-

ing also should conclude soon enough to ensure time is available to request that critical class IX parts be placed on the evening LOGPAC from the sustainment brigade.

Location. Establish a standard meeting location, which will alleviate confusion if communications breaks down. Units will know where and, generally, when the meeting will occur. Having the meeting where the unit attendees can conduct other business, such as in the brigade support area, will help maximize the time that task force maintenance managers have to build combat power.

Agenda. Have a posted agenda that supports the HBCT commander's priorities for the next mission and focuses on building combat power. This will center the meeting's purpose. By briefing the administrative data for all attendees at the start of the meeting and allowing units to leave after briefing their task force status, critical players will have more time to build combat power. The information the attendees will be expected to brief, such as current slants, expected slants, and the number of circle X systems, should be specified on the agenda. (Circle X are systems that are not mission capable according to the technical manual



Soldiers conduct field maintenance on an M577 command post tracked vehicle during a rotation at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

but are placed temporarily in a partially mission capable status by the commander for a specific mission or event.) A HBCT sustainment meeting that includes representatives of other logistics commodity areas, such as combat health support and supply managers, should be conducted in conjunction with the maintenance meeting. Figure 2 outlines an agenda that has been effective for units deployed to the NTC.

Attendees. The HBCT XO should chair all maintenance meetings to be the “hammer” and ensure the meeting runs efficiently. As chairman, he speaks with the commander’s authority and can enforce standards on those units that either do not attend the meeting or are unprepared to brief their status. He can provide direct feedback to the HBCT commander on the HBCT’s combat readiness. Another key player is the BSB SPO, who is responsible for taking action on any shortcomings that surface during the meeting. Other required attendees should include the maintenance officer, a materiel management center representative (if available from the sustainment brigade), the brigade S-4 or his representative, each battalion or task force XO or shop officer, the separate company XO or motor sergeants, the SSA officer in charge, the BSB shop officer, the logistics assistance officer, the combat service support automation management officer, and a HBCT Army Oil Analysis Program representative.

Once the framework for a successful meeting has been set, direct support (DS) maintenance managers must not waste the time of the supported units by coming to the meeting unprepared. To ensure that everyone is prepared, a pre-maintenance meeting should be conducted by the maintenance officer, materiel management center representative, shop officers, and SSA officer. The following actions should be taken during this meeting: a through scrub of the 026 printout; update of the status on the nonstockage list of parts required; and identification of critical class IX awaiting pickup, required class IX available on the authorized stockage list, jobs requiring a DS work order or DS support, and units that may require organizational maintenance reinforcement. The goal for the pre-maintenance meeting is to synchronize DS efforts and resolve issues before the HBCT maintenance meeting.

The final “must have” during the brigade maintenance meeting is a contract. A contract, simply put, is a closed-loop reporting system. Contracts should specify who will take specific actions, when those actions will be completed, and who will report their status. Contracts should be tracked and briefed by the SPO or maintenance officer. Tracking contracts during the maintenance meeting, reviewing the responsibilities of personnel before they depart, and closing out contracts before and during follow-on maintenance meetings are fundamental to the success of the

maintenance mission. Not every issue should be considered a contract — only those requiring actions over and above normal, day-to-day operations.

Thoughtful preparation for maintenance management will pay dividends during a deployment, whether it is to the desert of Fort Irwin or Baghdad. Commanders should encourage the development of their subordinates and train them in the fundamentals of maintenance management so that they have confidence in themselves and their equipment. Commanders should ask themselves, “Would I stake my life right now on the condition of my equipment?” If the answer is anything other than an immediate “yes,” then improvements can and must be made within their formations. — **ALOG**



Captain Eric A. McCoy was assigned to the Army Student Detachment to complete studies at Georgetown University at the time this article was originally published. He was the brigade combat team maintenance trainer for the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, at the time he wrote the article. He holds a B.S. degree in mental health from Morgan State University and an M.S. degree in administration from Central Michigan University. He is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course.

HBCT Sustainment Meeting Agenda

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Roll call Opening remarks and commander’s guidance HBCT mission update HBCT S-2 update HBCT S-6 update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commo architecture update • CSSAMO update HBCT S-4 update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LOGSTAT feedback • Combat power slant • Contracting feedback and issues SB SPO update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSS synchronization matrix • CSS graphics • 026 feedback/issues to BN TFs • Class IX reconnaissance feedback and issues <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Class IX ORILs feedback and issues • AOAP feedback and issues | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CHS update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MEDEVAC/coverage plan update • Medical trends BN TF updates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combat slant • 5988Es: number turned in • Verification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -NMC report -Parts-received-not-installed listing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -PLL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintenance issues • LOGSTAT issues SSA update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Units with 02 parts for pickup Maintenance enablers update: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AOs, TSC, etc. HBCT XO conclusion: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summary of issues/contracts • Confirmation of next meeting |
|---|--|

Legend

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> AO = Area of operations AOAP = Army Oil Analysis Program BN = Battalion CHS = Combat health support Commo = Communications CSS = Combat service support CSSAMO = CSS automation management office HBCT = Heavy Brigade Combat Team LOGSTAT = Logistics status MEDEVAC = Medical evacuation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> NMC = Not mission capable ORIL = Overaged reparable item list PLL = Prescribed load list SB = Support battalion SPO = Support operations officer SSA = Supply support activity TF = Task force TSC = Theater sustainment command XO = Executive officer |
|---|---|

Figure 2

REVIEWS

Iwo Jima: World War II Veterans Remember the Greatest Battle of the Pacific by Larry Smith, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 2008, 345 pp., \$17.95 (paperback)

Iwo Jima: World War II Veterans Remember the Greatest Battle of the Pacific is third in a line of oral histories written by journalist Larry Smith. In it, he has collected the stories of 22 retired soldiers, sailors, and Marines who served at Iwo Jima. The book is not intended to be an academic exploration of how the island was taken from planning, preparation, execution, and conclusion, but is meant to put a face on and personal touch on the type of people who fought. However, Smith does structure these micro-level stories into seven parts that give the book a logical and cohesive structure on different unified themes of the campaign. This narrative construct allows readers to get several different perspectives on the same moment of time at different places on the battlefield as the campaign unfolds. A lot of attention throughout the book is devoted to the two flag raisings on Mount Suribachi and resulting controversies that surrounded the subsequent publicizing of the photo used to represent the event. But the author gives the reader so much more by just retelling some truly incredible acts of human bravery and endurance in the face of suffering displayed by both sides.

This work is a must have for any enthusiast of the Western Pacific campaigns of World War II, as it provides a complete sense of how this battle was fought at the level of those who had to dodge the bullets. For the more casual reader, Smith offers an approachable account of an important historical event for the non-historian that is an amazingly quick read and thoroughly engrossing.

JAMES E. SHIRCLIFFE, JR.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Osprey Publishing, 2008, 259 pp., \$27.95 (hardcover)

"We shall know how to fight them next time."

— General Edward Braddock's last words at the Battle of Monongahela

Counterinsurgency operations (COIN) have been the bane of Western politicians and military thinkers at least since the infamous 1755 defeat of General Braddock's column by a combined Iroquois-French coalition in the hills of Pennsylvania during the Seven Years War. Since that time, numerous nations have tackled, some not so successfully, the challenges associated with fighting an insurgency or terrorist campaign with conventional forces. Un-

derstanding insurgencies are a fact of life in the 21st century; Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian created a book that brings 13 separate insurgencies from the past 110 years into a concise perspective for readers.

To quote a recent blogger, "Western military men hate abstractions and worship the concrete. Indeed, the dream of powerful, industrial-age militaries — as epitomized by the U.S. Army — is to fight on a circumscribed battlefield empty of civilians, to close with the enemy, and then kill it through a raid maneuver of tanks, infantry, aviation, and artillery."

Unfortunately, the enemy does get a vote and insurgents usually don't study at the great halls of West Point, Maxwell, Carlisle, Sandhurst, or Saint Cyr. This inconvenient truth means conventional military planners must quickly adjust tactics if they wish to meet the objectives of political leaders at home. History has demonstrated that rather than adjust tactics to meet the new paradigm, many will simply try to solve the unanticipated challenges with overwhelming firepower or brute force.

Perhaps this was true, but we have also seen changes in the way U.S., NATO, and coalition doctrines are beginning to shift focus away from the purely kinetic fight. From Afghanistan to Iraq, documents, such as U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual (FM) 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*, are redefining how soldiers and Marine leaders on the ground operationally view insurgencies. Recent documents from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that highlight protecting the population at all costs, focus on the "flat and fast" concept of strategic communications, and building local, rather than national, governance are perhaps key to unlocking the door to successful COIN fights.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare offers no great solutions or insights, and any book that does should always be suspect. However, Marston and Malkasian highlight a fact that must not be lost on a fraction of COIN warfare — to be successful, the military must work hand in hand as part of a greater interagency process. The chilling example of German anti-partisan warfare in World War II clearly proves this point.

This book is very well written and the footnotes and bibliography make the book well worth the read for serious students of counterinsurgency warfare. The various authors who contributed to the book impart a wealth of COIN knowledge. Each examines a specific COIN campaign and focuses on how different strategies were developed — how they did or did not succeed is a useful tool for future planners.

What is missing from the book, and surprised this reader, was the relatively short discussion on Soviet COIN tactics in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. While obviously not successful, a discussion of how the Mujahideen, along with support from the United States and Pakistan,

successfully dealt with the Soviet invasion would have given the book more timely relevance. Perhaps in a future edition, a chapter by Lester W. Grau, *The Bear Went over the Mountain* and *The Other Side of the Mountain*, will be included.

JAYSON A. ALTIERI
LTC, U.S. Army

Tank Action: From the Great War to the Gulf by George Forty, The History Press, Gloucestershire, UK, 2009, 320 pp., \$26.95 (paperback)

Tank Action is a masterful compilation of more than 38 unique tank battles fought since the very first engagement when the tank made its presence known on 15 September 1916. George Forty correctly starts off the book with an introduction to the tank commander and the tank doctrine leaders of Great Britain, the United States, and Germany and how they each had their own unique way of training their armored force for future tank battles.

In the first tank versus tank battle (24 April 1918), George Forty writes how the German A7Vs (33 tons, crew of 18, armed with a 57mm Russian gun) and British Mk IVs (28 tons, crew of eight, armed with two 6 pounder guns) engaged each other at 400 meters. Forty goes into great detail explaining the battle and sums it up as: "Both maneuvered skillfully, despite their cumbersome machines. Their gunners equally deserve high praise. Anyone who has tried firing a tank gun with a gas mask on knows how difficult it is, but I doubt very much if there are many gunners alive today who have had to aim and fire their tank guns with their eyes swollen by mustard gas."

George Forty goes into incredible details on past low-level tank battles; he spends the majority of the book writing about tank battles during World War II, to include some not so famous battles that took place on the Russian Front. He ends the book with less published, but still important, tank battles of the Korean conflict, Vietnam conflict, Arab and Israel Wars, and finally, the Gulf War.

Throughout the book, George Forty pays special tribute to those tank commanders who fought courageously and were able to destroy many enemy tanks in their particular battle. He makes a note that they are tank aces based on his criteria of how well they fought.

Tank Action is an interesting, detailed, easy-to-read book that provides good historical insights into tank battles since World War I, which are rarely published. Any fellow armor crewman and *ARMOR* Journal reader will certainly enjoy this compilation.

SCOTT K. FOWLER
LTC, U.S. Army

Change 1 to Army Capstone
FM 3-0
Operations

**U.S. Army
Combined
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Change 1 to FM 3-0 incorporates lessons from continued operations and maturing discussions on Army doctrine. Key changes include replacing Command and Control with Mission Command as both an activity and a warfighting function, and replacing the 5 Army Information Tasks with Inform and Influence and Cyber/Electromagnetic activities.

Several other changes are also readily apparent: Hybrid Threats, Security Force Assistance is described within stability operations, CBRNE Consequence Management becomes an additional task within Civil Support, Chapter 7 is updated to include design.

Refer to the CAC web site for other changes and a more in depth overview of the changes to US Army Operational Doctrine.

The proponent for FM 3-0, Change 1 is the Combined Arms Center:
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/FM3-0/index.asp>



Operation Cooperation from Page 25

some sources, tanks are a symbol of oppression and occupation, and their use alienates the population. Yet others, including an armor officer, who served as second-in-command of the LSR in 2008, disagree with this assessment. Not only does he argue that “suggestion that the use of tanks has alienated the local populace more than other weapons systems has proven completely unfounded,” but he also points out that “the deployment of armor to Afghanistan has reinforced with the local populace the resolve of Canada and NATO to bring stability to the region.”²⁸ Also, the presence of tanks is not a new tactic or something new to the people of Kandahar Province. During a news interview, a trooper from the LSR stated that “every time one of the three [Canadian] infantry companies goes out, the tanks are right with them.”²⁹ An effective way to overcome these differences of opinion and ease the population’s concerns is through effective information operations (IO) campaigns, using psychological operations (PSYOPs) teams and ANSF commanders to explain to the people that the deployment of tanks was to deter violence and protect members of the ANSF, who will undoubtedly play a substantial role in clearing Kandahar City. These messages could be conveyed through special key-leader engagements, scheduled as close to the offensive as possible, or over loudspeaker during the actual operation, which would deny the Taliban sufficient time to plan for and implement antitank countermeasures.

Unfortunately, there is little solution to collateral damage caused from firing a tank’s main gun or from damages caused by enemy efforts to destroy the Leopard 2A6M. However, by not employing tanks, we run the risk of making the Kandahar

City battle an unnecessary fair fight between light infantries, which could lead to increased friendly casualties and cause many on the home front to question the need for continuing the war. Also, one should consider the effect the deployment of the Leopard 2A6Ms will have on the ANSF. According to the company commander of India Company, 2d Royal Canadian Regiment, the presence of the tanks “increased the soldiers’ [Canadians] confidence as well as the ANA. They [the ANA] love the ‘tank’ and they love that tank being next to them on the objective.”³⁰ Since the ANSF will undoubtedly play a substantial role in clearing Kandahar City, it is only logical to give them a weapons platform they admire, sanction, and comprehend.

The Role of the Tank

To plan against uncertainty, ISAF planners should incorporate Canadian tanks in the upcoming offensive into Kandahar City. Instead of leading the clearing operation with the Leopard 2A6Ms, the tanks could form an outer cordon around the city and use optics and weapons systems to acquire and engage targets ahead of, or identified by, the infantry in a hunter-killer capacity. Or, in the event the infantry should face a determined resistance or encounter strongpoints, the tanks could serve as an armored quick reaction force (QRF) and neutralize the threat by engaging multiple targets simultaneously, through the use of an independent crew commander sight, to provide the infantry alternate forms of entry into compounds and adobe walls, just as effectively done in the Zhari-Panjawi region.³¹ Due to narrow roads in parts of Kandahar City, the Leopard 2A6M will be unable to enter the fight to move with and support the infan-

try. Thus, the hunter-killer tactic from an outer-cordon position is more favorable.

Given the immense cultural and political importance of Kandahar City, it is unlikely that the enemy will offer a token defense, and tactics in areas, such as Padesh, show that the Taliban will stand and fight when in its operational or strategic interest to do so. The deployment of Canadian Leopard 2A6Ms will enable us to respond to, or potentially deter, the enemy’s most dangerous courses of action. Although tanks may increase collateral damage, we can minimize the effects with proven tactics, established techniques, and proper procedures, and achieve a decisive victory against the enemy. The advantages of using tanks in support of operations in Kandahar City far outweigh the disadvantages.



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
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The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for the 1st Cavalry Regiment on 27 November 1923. The Regiment was organized in 1833 as the Regiment of United States Dragoons. Many of its officers and men came from the Battalion of Mounted Rangers which had taken part in the Black Hawk War. The color of the Dragoons was Dragoon yellow (orange-yellow) and a gold eight-pointed star on the encircling belt was the insignia of the Dragoons until 1851. The motto translates to "Courageous and Faithful."

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