ARMOR
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SHAPING MANEUVER OPERATIONS
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**ARMOR Editorial Offices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editor in Chief</td>
<td>Lisa Alley</td>
<td>(706) 545-9503</td>
<td><a href="mailto:lisa.a.alley8.civ@mail.mil">lisa.a.alley8.civ@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Editor</td>
<td>Erin Wold</td>
<td>(706) 545-8701</td>
<td><a href="mailto:erin.e.wold.civ@mail.mil">erin.e.wold.civ@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Director</td>
<td>Jody Harmon</td>
<td>(706) 545-5754</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jody.a.harmon.civ@mail.mil">jody.a.harmon.civ@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial Assistant</td>
<td>Jenny Forte</td>
<td>(706) 545-2698</td>
<td><a href="mailto:jennedna.forte.civ@mail.mil">jennedna.forte.civ@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**U.S. Army Armor School**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Phone</th>
<th>Email</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commandant</td>
<td>BG Paul J. Laughlin</td>
<td>(706) 545-3815</td>
<td><a href="mailto:paul.j.laughlin.mil@mail.mil">paul.j.laughlin.mil@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commandant</td>
<td>COL John C Hermeling</td>
<td>(706) 545-3815</td>
<td><a href="mailto:john.c.hermeling.mil@mail.mil">john.c.hermeling.mil@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Sergeant Major</td>
<td>CSM Michael Clemens</td>
<td>(706) 545-2029</td>
<td><a href="mailto:michael.s.clemens4.mil@mail.mil">michael.s.clemens4.mil@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>194th Armored Brigade</td>
<td>COL Scott D. King</td>
<td>(706) 626-5989</td>
<td><a href="mailto:scott.d.king6.mil@mail.mil">scott.d.king6.mil@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Cavalry Brigade</td>
<td>COL David S. Davidson</td>
<td>(706) 626-8105</td>
<td><a href="mailto:david.s.davidson8.mil@mail.mil">david.s.davidson8.mil@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office, Chief of Armor</td>
<td>George DeSario</td>
<td>(706) 545-1352</td>
<td><a href="mailto:george.desario.civ@mail.mil">george.desario.civ@mail.mil</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Upon arriving into this job, it was evident that the Armor School remained immersed in the arduous process of reception, staging, onward movement and integration into the Maneuver Center of Excellence. Through the dedication of the MCoE and the Infantry School, they vigorously received our units upon our arrival at Fort Benning. Through a collaborative effort, brigades stood up, our Armor and Cavalry Soldiers and leaders began training, we improved facilities and ranges to increase capabilities, and we continued to update our doctrinal and organizational framework of our mounted force after more than a decade of war – all while honoring our heritage by establishing roots in a new location. The conditions were set for the Armor School’s continued onward movement and integration with our Infantry School counterparts, and I was humbled, honored and excited to lead the Armor School as we faced the year ahead.

Throughout the past year, our primary mission remained unchanged: train, educate and inspire Soldiers and leaders in the Army profession to be critical and creative thinkers, and develop the competence and confidence to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver as part of a combined-arms team in a complex hybrid environment. We have continued to improve ways to accomplish this mission and, in large part, these improvements have come from being at Fort Benning. Maneuver training in Armor and Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Courses, and the Army Reconnaissance Course, now regularly incorporates multiple live and virtual elements of the combined-arms team, enabling our leaders and Soldiers to experience the true power of the combined-arms fight.

We’ve also increased opportunities for Armor Soldiers to attend Ranger School. We are continuing to implement the Army Learning Model into our courses to improve the quality of instruction for our Soldiers and leaders, as well as making the instructors’ experience more valuable when they return to a Forces Command unit. We have successfully opened the Good Hope Maneuver Training Area for ABOLC training, and ABOLC started tank gunnery at the Hastings Range Complex in April. We still have more ground to cover in these areas, but we are on track. The quality of Armor training is the best we have ever offered to our Soldiers at Fort Benning and continues to improve.

Another critical task in the onward movement of the branch is continuing to shape the future force. We have made considerable progress on several doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development, personnel and facilities, or DOTMLPF, initiatives. First, we are in the process of improving reconnaissance and security for all echelons and formations. To address the organizational shortcomings of our scout platoons’ ability to conduct doctrinal reconnaissance and security missions, we are strongly advocating the transition of all scout platoons across armored and Stryker brigade combat team formations to a configuration of six like vehicles with 36 total 19-series personnel. We, with our U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command capabilities managers, remain committed to developing a long-term solution to get our scouts under armor, and we acknowledge that the humvee and M-ATV are not suitable platforms.

Concerning mobile, protected, precision firepower, we are working with our partners in the defense industry to improve the current M1A2 System Enhancement Package’s Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station (CROWS II) and increase engine technology to improve gas mileage, performance and reliability of our combat vehicles. In addition, we are aggressively pursuing acquisition of the new Sabot (M829E4) and Armor Multi-Purpose rounds to increase our firepower capabilities in the future. Finally, we are nearing completion of FM 3-96, The Armored Brigade Combat Team, and ATP 3-90.1, The Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team, manuals to ensure we maintain realistic, relevant and effective doctrine.

Over the past year, we’ve expanded efforts to implement and sustain Armor
and Cavalry traditions and heritage at Fort Benning. Many of you will be glad to know that we have established a Fiddler’s Green on Fort Benning, where many of the artifacts from Fort Knox adorn the walls, so we will not forget that portion of our heritage. We conduct regular Stable Calls, which have become quite popular across the community. Our active role on the memorialization committee has ensured that Fort Benning reflects the character and heritage of our great Armor and Cavalry leaders and culture. We are opening new chapters of the Cavalry and Armor Association at Fort Benning and at West Point to ensure we connect to our past and properly inculcate new troopers with our unique elan.

Finally, we are hosting competitions that are gaining international attention and are showcasing what our tankers and scouts do best. However, the real benefit of the Sullivan and Gainey cups is that our overall force gains expertise in maneuver warfighting skills and pride in the Armor and Cavalry units they represent. This pride has carried over to the Armor School Facebook page, which has reached more than 5,000 “likes.” While entertaining, the real benefit is the informal and direct two-way feedback link it provides with the force, so keep sharing thoughts and helping to drive change across the DOT-MLPF. Between this and the monthly Thunderbolt Blast, our connection to the force is strong and growing daily.

Sadly, the Army has called me to fill a new role, and this is my last note to you as the Chief of Armor. This has been a remarkable assignment, and I’ve had the opportunity to meet many of the amazing people who ensure success in training and combat throughout the mounted force. We’ve been able to improve training in our courses, improve our facilities and work on procuring the best possible equipment for our troopers and Soldiers. Most importantly, we’ve been able to safeguard and grow our heritage and traditions in a new location to ensure we remain mindful of our past. I sincerely appreciate the many active and retired senior officers and NCOs who assisted me with maintaining azimuth while here. It’s been an honor to serve as the 47\textsuperscript{th} Chief of Armor. I look forward to getting back to the force and seeing you all out on the ranges and on the objective as you focus on combined-arms maneuver training. Until then, giddyup!

Forge the Thunderbolt!

47 out
The purpose of this Gunner’s Seat is threefold. First, we bid a fond farewell to CSM Miles Wilson, who has served the armor and larger maneuver force as a sterling example of leadership in both peacetime and combat for more than 26 years, and many of us owe our success to the mentorship he has provided throughout his career. He continues this tradition of leadership and service in the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate of the MCoE, where he will help in the development of future cavalry and armor systems.

Second is a short introduction of myself. I am CSM Michael Clemens, and my most recent assignment was as the CSM for the 316th Cavalry Brigade at Fort Benning. I have served our Army for almost 24 years in every leadership position that a cavalry scout can hold, including drill sergeant time in the 15th Cavalry and as the 19D branch manager at Human Resources Command. It is certainly both a privilege and an honor to represent our cavalry/armor soldiers. My No. 1 goal is to ensure the continued development of mobile protected precision firepower and the reconnaissance and security strategy for the Army as a whole and to be a champion of the combat arm of decision to the rest of the force.

Lastly, I need to address the need for NCOs to return to your Armor School as instructors. Currently, Fort Benning is almost critically short of qualified instructors. I use the word “qualified” because we have an incredible amount of non-commissioned officers who arrive with many issues that prevent them from instructing. Things like being unable to get or maintain a security clearance, overweight, unable to pass the APFT or with a GT score that is too low to allow them to attend a course here even with a waiver. As we look to shape the future armor force, I am sure we can all agree that it is an imperative that the Soldiers entrusted to teach our lieutenants, Soldiers, reconnaissance and precision gunnery professionals are those who truly represent and model what we want to be as a branch.
Combined Arms –
Shaping Maneuver Operations Starts With Arguing Merits of Operational Concepts

by GEN Donn A. Starry

The combined-arms team and Armor are frequently thought of as synonymous. In some ways, they should be – the concept was introduced into our Army at Fort Knox, KY, not by anyone now on active duty to be sure, but by a small group of our distinguished predecessors. The concept has been developed, protected, husbanded, expanded and even criticized at Fort Knox. In fact, everyone who has served there has participated in at least some of those activities.

We might say all is well with Armor and the combined-arms team. We could mutually congratulate ourselves, smug in the knowledge that Armor has the inside track on all that is necessary to win the critical battles of the next war – a tempting security blanket, but not a real one.

The Army is not that homogeneous in its outlook, nor is the world in which it lives. In the Army today, parochialism exists that challenges and sometimes even denies many things about the combined-arms idea. That parochialism sometimes may concern leadership or tactics or administration, or any of a hundred other things. It is easy to get confused, even discouraged, on finding that everyone does not understand the message, as do those in Armor. It is also all too easy to join the throng that is quick to point out problems but offer no solutions.

Not all the question-asking is bad. It is a necessary part of Army dialogue – in progress for 200 years – and we probably should not want it any other way. Despite field manuals, how-to-fight and the other written paraphernalia with which we surround ourselves, approved doctrine on any matter is often the opinion of the senior officer present. Now, while that may give me no small measure of satisfaction, it does not help anyone else – nor did it satisfy me when I was younger.

However, it points out a strong feature of our system – we can and should argue the merits of operational concepts with which we intend to fight. Operational concepts are important; they set the framework for tactics, organization, equipment development and training. They are the guts of our Army; therefore, a consensus about them is important. However, be cautioned. A common starting point is necessary for any intelligent dialogue to proceed. Each “discussant” must recognize that everything for which the other stands is not inherently wrong. To believe that is folly, a folly that rejects the value of dialogue.

It is this failure to recognize the merits of a dialogue, and its bounds as well, that troubles Armor and the combined-arms team. Instead of listening intelligently to one another, we are dividing into two or three strident camps. In one, the tank is supreme. In another, it is the armed helicopter. In still another, it is the antitank guided missile. There is no room for compromise; rationality is not a virtue in any camp; all draw their best examples from the same source, the Yom Kippur War. Listening carefully, one wonders if in October 1973 there were several wars or just one.

While we chorus our huzzahs for the combined-arms team, in a quite parochial aside, we add “fine, but helicopters/tanks/ATGMs – insert one of your choice – is the real answer.” So, at this point, a summing-up seems appropriate, followed by suggestions for a perspective that might help cope with the dilemma in which we find ourselves.

The Armor combined-arms team in our Army was the creation of a few farsighted men – Chaffee, Van Voorhis and others – who persisted against a lot of entrenched tribal wisdom. Their victory was short-lived, but it lasted long enough to win World War II. Then, in a rush to get back to “real soldiering,” we disbanded our large Armor formations all we really needed was a few tanks to support infantry. Many still believe that. Today, this group would have us believe ATGMs have taken over and the tank is dead.

The antitank helicopter is a new and attractive dimension in battle. It is so new that those who understand it the least have made it the center of too much attention. Its singular advantage – the ability to move rapidly from one part of the battle to another – has given rise to mistaken notions about what it really can do. Ignoring the limitations of weather, terrain, air defenses and the inability to occupy ground, enthusiasts raise up the helicopter as the answer to the warrior’s prayer. Some would even trade battalions of tanks for squadrons of attack helicopters.

Then, there are the tank purists; after cursory study of the Yom Kippur War, they re-decided in favor of more tanks to the exclusion, or at least neglect, of other combined-arms team members. All we need is an elite, sophisticated, highly proficient tank force.

Versions of these arguments have passed by us all at one time or another. All contain some tempting arguments. Their failing is that they defy everything the combined-arms team was designed to be. Most alarming is that they interact most violently in the ranks of Armor. The Armor Soldiers of our Army seem unable to speak with one voice. Every one of us who has successfully commanded a unit of tanks, mechanized infantry, cavalry or attack helicopters is an expert at how those units should be organized, equipped and employed.

Unable to put aside the nearsightedness of personal experience and embrace a broader combined-arms team perspective, we debate endlessly. We continue to talk long after saluting would be a more appropriate gesture.

So my appeal is for perspective not parochialism, for rationality not rashness, for teamwork not lip service.

If the Yom Kippur War demonstrated anything, it strongly affirmed the utility of the combined-arms team with strong emphasis on the operative word “team.” A team that embraces a balanced force of artillery, mechanized infantry, tanks, air defense, engineers and
supporting arms and branches, and a team that draws its effectiveness from balancing the capabilities of these systems and from the synergism of their combined efforts. True, the balance is constantly changing, but it is always interrelated. Armor is part of this interrelationship. As legatees of the combined-arms team idea, Armor Soldiers have a special duty to ensure correction of imbalances.

We all must be willing to understand and logically examine each proponent’s advocacy in terms of what is best for the combined-arms team. If we don’t, I predict our detractors, aided by some well-meaning voices in Armor, will destroy or imbalance the team and ultimately jeopardize our chances for victory. The team, combined-arms team, deserves a better fate.

Reprinted from September-October 1978 edition of ARMOR.

Retired GEN Donn Starry graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1948 after having enlisted in the Army in 1943. His early career included command and staff assignments in Germany, Korea and Vietnam. Command included 1st Battalion, 32nd Armor, in Germany; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Vietnam and Cambodia; commanding general, U.S. Army Armor Center; V Corps, Germany; commanding general, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; and his last assignment, commander-in-chief, U.S. Readiness Command. His staff assignments included director of force management, Army Staff. As TRADOC's commanding general from 1977 to 1981, he is credited with formulating Air-Land Battle doctrine, which prepared the Army for warfighting in the 1980s-90s and early 21st Century. His military education includes Army Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College and Army War College. His awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, two awards of the Army Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, Bronze Star with “V” device, Soldier’s Medal, Purple Heart, Legion of Merit with two oak-leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross and Air Medal with nine oak-leaf clusters.

ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

| ATGM  | anti-tank guided missile |
| TRADOC | U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command |
Tactical units and civilian agencies cannot expect to accomplish strategic objectives in areas of conflict if we as professionals do not admit that tactical-level interagency relationships are strained and understand their importance in achieving a desired endstate. The Army’s strategic leaders are encouraged to use the “whole of government approach” when partnering with other agencies. At the tactical level, specifically battalion and below, are company and field-grade officers using the same approach? Although much attention has been given to the role of interagency relationships at the brigade level and higher, very little has been written or evaluated on the integration of civilian agencies at the battalion and company level.

The addition of civilian agencies – such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Transition Initiative, Department of Justice and Department of State – to battalion-sized task forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom exposed an operational gap in the Army’s ability to conduct interagency operations at the tactical level. This article illuminates an inherent operational gap, explains the relevancy of interagency relationships at the tactical level and proposes a three-tiered solution that addresses the causal factors of the interagency operational gap. Furthermore, this article raises awareness and promotes discussion within junior levels of the officer corps and U.S. government agencies about tactical interagency operations.

Inherent problems
The interagency gap at the tactical level ultimately stems from three factors: a lack of awareness of and exposure to each other’s capabilities; company-grade officers’ narrowed perception of stabilization and the operational environment; and the absence of a baseline model for tactical interagency operations and planning.

The largest factor behind the interagency gap is the lack of awareness and exposure between USG agencies and the military. Typically, battalion- and squadron-sized task forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were complemented with an assortment of civilian agencies, including DoS, DoJ, USAID, USDA and OTI. The amount of personnel and General Schedule “rank” varied among the various forward operating bases and task forces; nevertheless, these agencies became a permanent fixture for most units. Unfortunately, the battlespace owners viewed personnel from these agencies as a mere “supporting effort” and either relegat-
ed them to a menial unnested task or simply cast them to a back office and forgot them. Civilian-agency personnel often viewed their military counterparts as domineering and, at times, an impediment to many of their own programs.

No quantifiable metric can accurately depict the perception from both sides or how well integrated each agency was into their partnered task force’s campaign plans; however, several company- and field-grade Army officers and agency civilians throughout Afghanistan’s Regional Commands—South and East were canvassed about their experiences and perceptions about interagency involvement to support this claim. Many of these interviewees asked to remain anonymous. Typically, officers and civilians shared a mutual misunderstanding and ignorance of each other’s capabilities and expressed frustration with each other’s priorities and operations.

Frances Z. Brown further illustrates in a United States Institute for Peace study that military predominance in interagency planning, at high and low levels, was a key factor as to why the civil-mil Afghan surge was unsuited to accomplish sub-national transformation. Essentially, for most units operating in Afghanistan, unity of effort between USG civilian agencies and battalion-sized task forces was not established and ultimately detracted from achieving a desirable endstate.

The “battlespace owner mentality” and the egos of both agency civilians and Soldiers further compounded each of these issues. Predicated on the stated missions of maneuver units (both infantry and armor), the predilection for “lethal” tasks may appear counterproductive and misguided to personnel from civilian agencies and counterintuitive to programs for sustainable peace and stabilization. Likewise, the more diplomatic and time-consuming approach of civilian agencies appears “softer,” lacking in quantifiable yields and ultimately less important than pursuing lethal activities.

The next causal factor behind the interagency gap is junior officers’ narrowed perception of stabilization and the operational environment. Counterinsurgency operations is a paradigm that has pervaded company-grade officers’ tactical training over the past decade. COIN is comprised of three operational elements: offense, defense and stability. I would submit that company-grade officers are more familiar with the offensive and defensive aspects of COIN and that a systemic ignorance of stability operations exists within the junior-officer corps.

Though OIF and OEF have increased the awareness of stability operations within the Army, most officers lack a comprehensive understanding of stability operations, its tenets, and its holistic and integral impact in an operational environment. Also, Army officers and civilians do not share a common understanding of “conflict” and the nuances among stabilization, COIN, development and peacekeeping operations. Most company-grade officers cursorily assume that all types of low-intensity conflict conveniently fit into the COIN paradigm when the environment may resemble a greater need for stabilization, development or peacekeeping operations.

Further compounding the issue, company-grade officers compartmentalize stability operations as mere “non-lethal” tasks; however, the breadth of stability operations encompasses aspects that commonly blend with and affect offensive or defensive operations. Perceiving actors, actions or areas as either lethal or nonlethal is problematic because the operational environment is not a mutually exclusive system. Every factor within the operational environment—whether social, criminal, political or economical—has varying levels of mutual interdependence. For example, a Commander’s Emergency Response Pro-

gram-funded school refurbishment may present apparent political and social gains, but local leaders may use a large portion of those funds to placate destabilizing groups.

Many company-grade officers view governance and infrastructure development as tangible projects (roads, wells, refurbishments, etc.) and narrow-mindedly evaluate the projects’ success through quantifiable metrics such as CERP dollars spent or kilometers of road paved. Company-grade officers’ reliance on measures of performance obscures comprehensive subjective assessments that might lead to more effective governance and development efforts. Especially applicable to battalion S-9s in OIF/OEF, more or at least equal attention should have been paid to developing low-cost civic programs that improved governmental capacity and integrated existing tribal structures, rather than building an unsustainable road or hospital.

Currently, there is no baseline model for tactical interagency operations and planning. The Army thrives on order and an established chain of command, whereas other agencies lack the rigid structuring of personnel. Task forces simply assume these agency personnel are mere “enablers” or are there to solely support the battlespace owner. The Afghan “civilian surge” attached thousands of USDA, DoS and USAID personnel to military units; however, most task forces lacked a clear organizational model for civilian-military integration. As a Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction audit stated, “The consensus among both civilian and military officials we spoke with is that civilian-military integration relies primarily on individual personalities even at platforms where more formal structures exist.”

The audit further stated, “There are no clear lines of communication for civilians in the field on how to act with the military portion of their provincial reconstruction teams, or how to delineate ‘taskings’ from their military partners.” Though the merits of the Afghan civilian surge fall outside the scope of this article, if the military incorporated a doctrinally based integration model before and during the addition of these agencies, a stronger unity of effort in governance, development and security could have been achieved.

Relevance of tactical-level interagency operations

Tactical-level interagency operations are relevant for two primary reasons: future deployments and their requisite scope of tactical duties will necessitate interagency operations; and Army doctrine dictates that interagency integration is necessary for COIN, stability operations and security-force-assistance missions.

Though COIN and stability operations are not maneuver units’ primary missions, it would be naïve to assume that a future protracted military engagement would not pair civilian agencies with regular tactical units again, as was seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. If the multi-hued interagency operations of Panama, Haiti, Balkans and OIF/OEF serve as a barometer for future tactical operations, tactical units should embrace the prospect of training with civilian agencies for full-spectrum operations. As Dr. Frederick W. Kagan argues, “[W]e, the military – which will have always, I think, the primary responsibility for this task [Phase IV operations] – have to be reaching out and working as hard as possible to integrate with other agencies.” Though Dr. Kagan is probably referring to higher echelons of government, I would submit that tactical interagency relationships are just as important as they are at the strategic level.

Regardless of the level of conflict, tactical U.S. Army units will always be considered as a principle means to achieve a political
endstate. Company-grade officers, inescapably, are ultimately responsible for employing strategic policy at the lowest level. We would be remiss as an organization if we did not critically evaluate our interagency shortcomings at the tactical level and attempt to improve them for the next conflict.

Some may argue that Regular Army units are ill-suited for COIN or stability operations, which are better left to Special Operations A-teams, civil affairs or PRTs. Though these teams’ contributions have been crucial to the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, their area of operations is far less than what a brigade combat team can be responsible for, and a natural disparity of interests arises when these teams conduct operations within a task force’s battlespace. Furthermore, a regular unit that patrols regularly will have much greater situational awareness of the environment than the less-frequently-patrolling PRT or civil-affairs team. By integrating civilian agencies directly with battalions, as opposed to being attached to PRTs, civilian personnel will have greater accessibility to their areas and an increased understanding and involvement with military operations.

Doctrinally, the Army acknowledges the importance of tactical-level interagency relationships and planning in Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency; FM 3-24.2, Counterinsurgency Tactics; FM 3-07, Stabilization; and FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance. FM 3-24 addresses tactical-level interagency considerations with a 15-point coordination checklist that highlights important factors for company-grade officers to consider. FM 3-24.2 specifically states that companies preparing for COIN operations must “organize for interagency operations.” FM 3-07.1 states that interagency relationships and integrated planning are still important for tactical units deploying with a SFA mission.

It is important to note that these field manuals contain the collective expertise of civilian professionals and several high-ranking military officers with years of experience in interagency operations. As Army doctrine and previous military campaigns indicate, the roles of civilian agencies and the Department of Defense are inextricably linked, regardless of the type and level of conflict. Though civilian agencies specializing in development and stabilization have a limited role in high-intensity conflict, it should not preclude their integration into planning and operations before, during and after campaigns.

Three-part solution
We must address three issues if we expect to improve interagency relationships at the tactical level:

- The Army must increase awareness and exposure of each other’s organization and capabilities at company-grade levels;
- The Army must broaden company-grade officers’ understanding of stabilization operations; and
- Most importantly, the Army needs to establish a baseline as to how civilian agencies and personnel integrate into tactical units.

I propose the following recommendations as a potential course of action to address these issues.

A mutual lack of understanding of both sides is, undoubtedly, systemic and problematic for interagency relationships. Maneuver officers receive no interagency training at their basic courses or the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. It is not until officers reach the field-grade level and attend Command and General Staff College, participate in an interagency fellowship or attend the Joint War College that they receive any formal training on interagency operations.

Awareness and training for interagency operations should begin with each branch’s basic course. Initially, each officer basic course can feature blocks of instruction taught by civilian junior agency reps that describe their respective agency’s history, capabilities and organizational structure. The captain’s career course could also integrate an in-depth block of instruction into its curriculum about interagency operations and planning. For example, junior DoS foreign-service officers or OTI/USAID representatives (with field experience) can integrate into the battalion staff military decision-making process modules.

Also, at least one of the battalion-phase operations-order modules should feature a low-intensity scenario in which the students have to think critically about the human terrain and even more critically about the integration of civilian agencies into their plan.

Finally, civilian agencies can also integrate into the training rotations at the Combined Maneuver Readiness Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and National Training Center. Formal exposure and integration of civilian agencies should not wait until officers are at the field-grade level. By promoting awareness and integration in the nascent phases of an officer’s development, future leaders and staff officers will be more inclined to accept and incorporate civilian agencies in future deployments.

The broadening of company-grade officers’ understanding of stability operations is a daunting task that requires considerable time to accomplish. Specialized training from and with civilian agencies and perennial academic instruction are the most viable ways to broaden company-grade officers’ intellectual understanding of stability operations. Starting with the officer’s commissioning source, classes could introduce the basic principles and relevance of stability operations in a historical and political context. These initial classes would stress how often an officer’s scope of duties could potentially fall outside offensive and defensive operations. In officer basic courses, their intellectual development would continue with further exploration of stability’s doctrinal tenets: civil security, civil control, essential services, governance and economic/infrastructure development.

When developing OPORDs, platoon trainers would instruct and encourage lieutenants to weigh area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events equally with other factors such as weather, terrain and enemy situation. Finally, at the captain’s career course, officers would receive a class on Phase IV operations (stabilization) and how, historically, tactical-level units and USG civilian agencies have been integral in translating the success of military operations into political goals through stability operations. The career course could also feature forums featuring junior members of USG agencies that would encourage stimulating dialogue and help company-grade officers see conflict through a broader lens.

Academic and intellectual preparation should not be limited to professional-development courses. Company, troop and battery commanders should also stress the importance of stabilization operations to their subordinate leaders through professional-development classes.

Tactical interagency operations model
A proposed model for tactical interagency integration is the “tactical interagency operations model.” The TIOM is neither prescriptive nor solely applicable to OIF/OEF task forces. The flexibility of the TIOM structure can account for many agencies and is relevant to any tactical military formation regardless if
the DoD or DoS has the lead. For the sake of this model, this article will collectively refer to all civilian agency personnel as tactical civilian-agency counterparts. TCACs encompass individuals from USDA, DoS, USAID, DoS, DoJ, OTI, etc.

Before discussing the TIOM’s formation and processes, there is an important lesson-learned from my unit’s previous deployment that is essential to the TIOM’s formation and execution. During our initial months of deployment, TCACs were rarely consulted or integrated into our operations and planning cycles. Moreover, they were cramped within a small building that was isolated from our plans cell. By the fourth month of deployment, new buildings were established that featured multiple workstations in open-spaced rooms. The squadron commander and executive officer ordered all TCACs on the FOB to relocate to a room adjacent to our tactical operations center and plans cell. The consolidation of these individuals into one room provided two primary benefits: first, it increased physical and verbal interaction with the squadron military staff, and it forced the various agencies to interact with each other and share information. Though geographic proximity may sound trite, it is the first and most important step to ensuring interagency integration.

The TIOM is essentially self-contained, but each individual can and should have open discourse with two other entities: the battalion S-3 shop and the command teams. The open discourse serves only to foster communication and cohesiveness; however, it is not the primary means of planning or facilitating operations. The battalion S-9 acts as the primary conduit for integration and information flow among the S-3 shop, the S-2 shop, the TIOM and the commanders. Though often overlooked and not considered a “primary” staff position, the S-9 (usually filled by a junior captain or lieutenant on staff) should possess three skills: extensive knowledge in planning processes (district stability framework; MDMP; decide, detect, deliver, exploit and assess, etc.); basic knowledge of civilian agencies’ capabilities; and a high degree of emotional intelligence. The S-9 should understand that his ability to create strong relationships among the TCACs, the military staff and the commanders is the TIOM’s foundation.

The S-9 is not in charge of the TCACs and should not be responsible for their performance. The TIOM has no inherent command structure and functions as more of a collective thinking group. The TIOM consists of, at a minimum, TCACs, S-9, S-3, S-2 and company intelligence-support team representatives from each maneuver company. Although stronger personalities and biases may arise within the TIOM, all personnel, to include military, are equal members. The TIOM should meet daily to discuss their respective operations and priorities and to share information.

Once every two weeks, the TIOM should record their programs’ efforts and battlefield understanding on some type of running document (something similar to the DSF). This meeting serves as a forcing function to share information from patrols or field data and maintain a common understanding of the battlefield environment.

DSF provides a quite comprehensive system for analyzing the environment, identifying sources of instability and establishing/resourcing programs or projects to address those needs. (The TIOM is not bound to DSF; however, DSF is somewhat accepted and understood among civilian organizations.) On weeks that DSF is not discussed, the TIOM should have a working group that will take the DSF’s findings and incorporate them into the targeting process of the S-3 shop.

Task forces might refer to these meetings as “non-lethal working groups.” I submit that the term “non-lethal” is misleading and creates a disparity in priorities between TCACs and the military. Another term for this meeting could possibly be the “civilian operational nesting work group.” This work group would collectively assess the previous weeks’ operations and prioritize and nest efforts for future operations with the S-3 shop and company-level targeting officers. During this meeting, company representatives and TCACs could coordinate for future patrols or request various assets from each other.

Due to the level of lethal operations in an area, some units may decide to have a separate targeting meeting that focuses exclusively on raids, ambushes and improvised explosive devices. It is imperative that if military units hold separate targeting meetings, representatives from the TIOM or S-9 should be present to ensure that a conflict of interests does not arise. If a conflict arises, the TCAC should appeal with the maneuver company, then the battalion S-3 and, finally, if a compromise isn’t reached, with the task force commander or DoS official. The TIOM model does not assume the military will always be in the lead or will have the final say in operations or programming. The agency in the lead for the mission, and its appointed representative, will more than likely have the overall discretionary authority for tactical-level decisions. The TIOM’s structure and systems are not held to any set standard; however, the TIOM’s primary function is to ensure the integration of personnel, planning and resources.

Conclusion

The addition of USG civilian agencies to tactical-level Army task forces is crucial for stabilization in areas of conflict and post-conflict. Company-grade officers have to accept civilian agencies into their formations and be willing to integrate the agencies into planning and operations. We as an organization need to be critical of our tactical interagency shortcomings and scrutinize our own understanding of stability operations within the spectrum of conflict. Though increasing our formations’ lethality is our primary responsibility, the Army’s role in stability operations is imperative to transitioning military success into political goals. The strengthening of tactical interagency operations and relationships will help ensure the achievement of political goals in future areas of conflict.

In conclusion, three factors have contributed to the Army’s operational inability to effectively conduct tactical interagency operations: a lack of awareness and exposure to each other’s capabilities; company-grade officers’ narrowed perception of stabilization and the operational environment; and the absence of a baseline model for tactical interagency operations. To bridge the tactical interagency gap, the Army must increase awareness and exposure of USG agencies’ organization and capabilities within company-grade levels, broaden company-grade officers’ understanding of stabilization operations; and lastly, establish a model for USG agency tactical integration and planning.

CPT Marc Dudek commands Troop A, 1-61 Cavalry, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY. His previous assignments include assistant operations...
officer, squadron S-9 and squadron S-4 at Fort Campbell, KY; and rifle platoon leader with 1-14 Infantry, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. CPT Dudek’s military schooling includes Maneuver Captains’ Career Course and Infantry Officer Basic Course. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy in American history.

Notes
1 Joint Publication 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, June 24, 2011.
3 FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006.
6 FM 3-24.
9 I acknowledge that most USG agencies lack the resources and personnel to accommodate this training; however, the mutual rewards from this cross-training possess too much potential to remain unconsidered.
10 FM 3-24.
‘I’m Here Because We’re Leaving’: 18 Points for Combat Advising in Eastern Afghanistan

by CPT Spencer L. French

While many of the experiences of Team First Strike (1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment) are unique to the time, place and circumstances of advising in N2KL (north of Kabul) during Spring through late Fall 2012, some experiences are universal to advising in Afghanistan as a whole. Primarily when advising Afghans, personal relationships, either positive or negative, trump lessons-learned about effective advising techniques one might practice. The purposes of this article are to provide key points for how to build that relationship with one’s Afghan partner, how to effectively communicate with one’s Afghan partner and, finally, how to understand the perspective, actions and motivations of one’s Afghan partner.1

(1) “Your relationship is your greatest asset; cultivate it.” - 2/201 Afghan National Army Brigade adviser team.2

The adviser must first recognize that despite his position as an officer or senior noncommissioned officer in, by any standard, the most capable armed force on the planet, he enters his adviser position in a position of weakness. His ability to deliver results and contribute to overall mission accomplishment is entirely dependent on his relationship with his Afghan counterpart and with the multitude of other Afghan personalities with whom he interacts. Once established, his relationship and access to the Afghan National Security Forces can become a powerful force and contribute to not only the accomplishment of his own mission (professionalizing the ANSF) but also protecting the force as a whole.

The first step to establishing and cultivating that relationship is to be a student of Afghan history. This will be dealt with in greater detail in Point 18, but at a minimum, an adviser who does not have a basic grounding in the political/economic/cultural history of the last 35 years in Afghanistan cannot be effective. While The Bear Went Over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain are both excellent starting points, the purely tactical literature is not enough to navigate through in working with the ANSF.

Similarly, while it is not cost-effective to make every adviser both a Pashto and Dari linguist, the adviser must be able to hear the difference between the two tongues. While not necessarily a cultural faux pas, greeting an Afghan in his preferred tongue, and saying thank you using the proper language, implies a basic appreciation for the widely divergent “backstory” of Tajik and Pashtun ANSF personalities. Saying “tashakur” (Dari) rather than “thank you” to a Pashto speaker demonstrates that one is a gifted amateur trying his best. Saying “mannana” (Pashto) instead of “thank you” to a Pashto speaker at least implies that one might be a dedicated student of Afghanistan and thus a se-
rious counterpart. Once again, recognizing the sound of the different languages and responding accordingly has nothing to do with one demonstrating one’s linguistic skills; it demonstrates that the adviser knows “the nuance and difference … that one understands Afghanistan and that can help one make inroads.”

Likewise, use English carefully. Twelve years of war in Afghanistan has given almost every ANSF soldier/policeman at least a basic understanding of some English phrases. Even if they do not understand the words, most Afghans who have worked with North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces know the cadence of English, and many can even tell the difference between various types of English accents (British English vs. “television American English,” etc.). Thus, one cannot babbletalk the Afghans without them noticing the difference in cadence and realizing they are being “talked down to.” Having sidebar conversations with one’s English-speaking counterparts is likewise risky.

With the initial communication conditions set, the first real step is to prove to one’s ANSF counterpart that one does not have “any competing interests/alignment.” Afghans have a generally low level of trust in institutions and persons outside the greater family unit. Part of this is cultural, but much of it is due to the perception that over the past 35 years, the people of Afghanistan have been constantly toyed with and used by the superpowers and Pakistan (particularly Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence), among others. Furthermore, the constant threat posed both by “legitimate” Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan personalities and the insurgent elements keep ANSF personalities generally wary and suspicious. Proving that one legitimately has no ulterior motive and is “in their [the ANSF counterpart] corner” is an often overlooked portion of relationship-building. This “proof” could take the form of anything from sharing personal information to demonstrating a measurable degree of care over the well-being of the counterpart, his family or his subordinates.

Finally, “the Afghan stereotype of Americans is that we are brash and overbearing.” Defying expectations is critical to separating the adviser from whatever negative experiences the Afghan has had with Americans. This can be done by saluting superior Afghan officers (implying that the adviser sees the ANSF as an allied military rather than a client military to be bullied); establishing “two-way” communication with the Afghan counterpart from the beginning (“we will teach each other and I can be an honest sounding board for your ideas”), rather than “one-way” communication (“I am here to improve your performance”); and generally taking one’s time before making any major recommendations to one’s Afghan counterpart.

In summary, one’s relationship with one’s ANSF counterpart depends on trust, a trust continually reinforced by the adviser’s words and actions. One’s ANSF counterpart must trust that the adviser is at least somewhat knowledgeable about Afghan history and to believe that some of the advice the adviser provides is valid within the Afghan context. One’s ANSF counterpart must trust that the adviser has no ulterior motive and legitimately is seeking the betterment of the ANSF counterpart, both personally and from an institutional perspective.

Finally, one’s ANSF counterpart must have trust that the adviser sees the counterpart as an “equal” and that the counterpart’s experiences and thoughts are valid. Ensuring this happens falls squarely on the adviser’s shoulders.

(2) “Know the Afghan rhythm.” – 3/2/201 ANA Kandak adviser team (Team Regulators).

“It is especially important to know the background timing [the way another structures their actions in time], otherwise your strategy will become uncertain.” The adviser must understand the Afghan rhythm and, instead of fighting it, work at the same pace and rhythm.

Typically the adviser has completed at least one other combat tour. During this tour, the adviser spent nine to 15 months working 16-18 hour days (if not more), communicating instantly with email, chat and telephone. Following his tour, the adviser returned to the United States and took about one month of leave and returned to the garrison schedule for a time before making a permanent-change-of-station move for professional education or a new position.

This is not the Afghan rhythm. The ANSF are “in garrison” at the same time as being “at war.” Expecting one’s ANSF counterpart to match the adviser’s pace from his “last tour” is unreasonable. Due to the inefficiency of their personnel system, many ANSF personalities have been in the same position for multiple years; many of the higher-ranking personalities have been at war for almost 10 years straight. Thus, while not excusing laziness, the adviser must recognize that many commanders and their staffs are exhausted, both mentally and physically. ANSF counterparts will periodically take multiple weeks of leave during what the adviser sees as “important combat operations.” While every situation is unique, the adviser must ask himself, “Is this absence a product of legitimate laziness/dereliction of duty, or would my counterpart never get time with his family if he was around for every one of these ‘vitally important events’?”

Furthermore, the Afghan daily “battle rhythm” is very different from the American daily battle rhythm. Afghan days are built around prayer, the same way the Afghan year is built around eids (religious holidays). For example, expecting one’s ANSF counterpart to be available between 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. (prayer and post-prayer personal time) is unrealistic. Forcing the issue by visiting one’s Afghan counterpart during that time marks the adviser as inept. It would be as if the adviser went to visit an American counterpart at 6:30 a.m. on a weekday in garrison. The American counterpart would see the adviser as inept for attempting to visit during physical-training hours. Similarly, eids (particularly Small Eid after Ramadan and Eid-al-Adha about 1½ months later) are important social and religious “battle rhythm” events. Much the way the U.S. military would experience significant stress if Christmas block leave was cancelled every year for 10 years running, expecting the ANSF not to observe these holidays and their associated leave periods in their “war-garrison” environment is unrealistic.

The adviser, instead of becoming frustrated over these periods of seeming “inactivity,” should embrace the Afghan rhythm, recognizing that attempting to coach change to something as basic as the religious-cultural way an Afghan structures his day is both outside the scope of the adviser’s mission and impossible. Instead, the adviser should structure himself and his initiatives with an eye to the Afghan rhythm. Proposing new training, initiatives, methods and practices before the start of Ramadan, for instance, is not the correct timing.

Coaching one’s Afghan counterpart on some new practices or new methods after Big Eid (Eid-al-Adha) is more in keeping with Afghan rhythm. Seeking out one’s Afghan counterpart early in the morning, and making oneself available throughout the afternoon and early evening, is much more appropriate than visiting during the morning, breaking for lunch and coming back in the early afternoon.

In summary, it is very easy for the adviser to fall into the trap of associating ANSF failures with their battle rhythm. One might present a strong argument that the timing of prayers throughout the day hurts the ANSF’s ability to press home its operations and to plan meetings or training sessions, and that the periodic absences of ANSF counterparts for the various eids and other events lead to a certain degree of “attention-deficit dis-
order” on the ANSF’s part. Nonetheless, the adviser’s ability to affect this situation is very limited. Instead of fighting the current of the Afghan rhythm, the adviser should look to rectify other problems within his scope of control (i.e., working through the ANSF personnel system to assist in rotating out exhausted staff members instead of trying to encourage one’s counterpart not to take leave during a major operation).

(3) “Visit your counterpart like an Afghan.” – 7th and 1st Afghan Border Police Zone 1 Kandak adviser team (Team Cobra).

As with battle rhythm, when visiting his counterpart, the adviser must recognize that the Afghan style of conversation and culture of “visiting” is quite different from the American or Western style. All would-be ANSF advisers have heard the mantra “have three cups of tea before getting to work” or “open your conversation with talk of family,” but this, while effective as a starting point, is not the full story of how Afghans typically visit and interact.

Americans, particularly military Americans, hold a meeting or conduct a visit with an agenda or a list of specific points for discussion. Upon discussing each topic and coming to some resolution, the American moves on to the next point on the agenda and repeats the process. After business is concluded and the meeting closes, Americans are comfortable shifting topics to personal, non-business talk. Americans typically begin to feel that “time is being wasted” or some “unease” if the conversation stalls, if there are audible pauses, or if progress is not being made toward resolving one of the issues on the agenda.

Afghans, on the other hand, while having an agenda or a list of things they need to accomplish, rarely if ever proceed in this fashion. Generally, they are more comfortable skipping from one topic to another, backtracking to a previous topic and allowing audible pauses in conversation to occur, while interspersing all this with personal talk. Sometimes they will change location midway through a conversation to allow the conversation to continue over lunch or tea, or simply for a change of scenery. Participants in the meeting may come, go and come back again, depending on their schedule. In the end, like American conversations or business meetings, resolution is eventually reached on each issue or it is decided to table the issue for another meeting.

The effective adviser is one who is comfortable being “uncomfortable” with the (from a Western perspective) rambling nature of Afghan conversations. In fact, being slightly “uncomfortable” and feeling like time is being “wasted” is likely a good indicator that the conversation is proceeding in a way that is comfortable for one’s Afghan counterpart. Unfortunately, many Americans attempt to visit Afghans in the American fashion of having an agenda and not moving on to another topic until resolution is reached on each issue in turn. This causes most Afghans to “turn off,” or become disinterested or tired by the conversation. Often attempting to press on a certain topic until resolution is found results in the Afghan simply agreeing or providing “what they know you want to hear” to end the uncomfortably direct conversation.

The effective adviser does not have to open with personal talk and tea (sometimes the Afghan counterpart will open with work-related topics) but embraces the flow of the conversation as the Afghan moves the conversation to another topic. The adviser should have confidence and embrace the opportunity to take conversations off on a related tangent (especially if it is a personal or non-work-related tangent), trusting that eventually the conversation will return to the main topic. The effective adviser does not “fill” pauses in the conversation too quickly if it appears the conversation has tapered off. But again, and most importantly, the effective adviser has tactical patience and is comfortable spending 80 percent of a conversation chatting about personal topics and 20 percent of the conversation revolving around work-related topics intermixed with the personal topics and storytelling.

Spending two weeks of rapport-building before working with an Afghan as one would work with an American, or starting a visit with three cups of tea then having an American-style meeting, are not effective techniques. Instead the effective adviser understands the circuitous nature of Afghan conversations, has spent time observing how his counterpart meets with other Afghans, and is generally comfortable “wasting time” with his counterpart and allowing the conversation to progress in a way that is natural for the Afghans involved.

(4) “Both in fighting and in everyday life, you should be determined though calm. … An elevated spirit and a low spirit it is weak. Do not let the enemy see your spirit.” - Miyamoto Musashi (16th Century master swordsman and teacher).

The effective adviser is always patient, calm and relaxed around his counterparts. He never displays a heightened emotional state, never demonstrates a lack of composure, never appears uncontrollably frustrated, and rarely if ever appears to be hurried or anxious. He is friendly, open and personable by Afghan standards of conduct. This includes body language, tone of voice, content of speech and general demeanor.

As one team leader put it, “I can’t think of one instance in which I had to raise a voice or get upset; a logical explanation at an even tone worked best every time.” As an adviser, one’s patience is tested daily. The effective adviser stays calm and understands the background and reasons behind the conversations or events that are testing his patience and never rushes to action without bettering his understanding and letting the situation develop. Many times what is petty to the adviser is greatly important to the Afghan, while conversely, what is of great importance to the adviser is petty to the Afghan.

One example is casualty reporting. From the American perspective, it is incredibly important to know the type of injury, how it was caused and what treatment the casualty has already received. Americans often are disgusted and frustrated by the seeming lack of Afghan interest in tracking casualties, and read it as a flippant disregard for human life. The lack of medical training at lower levels and rapid/capable medical-evacuation assets mean that for the Afghans, detailed casualty tracking is unfortunately relatively useless, given their inability to truly assess the casualty and care for him until he arrives by ground casualty evacuation. In this case, and many others, the effective adviser is patient and mature and does not leap to conclusions or demonstrate frustration.

The effective adviser is generally positive, friendly and warm. By Afghan standards, this includes hugging, holding hands and what Americans would define as “flattery.” Telling an Afghan that he is a wonderful man, that you love him and that you are in awe of his many achievements is not hyperbolic or flattery by Afghan standards. Similarly, these “over the top” words, along with hugs and tearing-up of the eyes are not seen as a lack of emotional control by Afghan standards and are acceptable, whereas shouting or cursing (acceptable in some military situations) are seen as a lack of emotional control.

Finally, the effective adviser is not prideful. He does not demonstrate an undue sense of entitlement or superiority due to his nationality. Consequently, the effective adviser is as good a listener as he is a talker. He shows respect when Afghans are talking and is raptly attentive, even while waiting for a translation. The effective adviser practices this emotional balance not only to inspire his ANSF counterpart’s confidence but to maintain his own mental health through his time working with the ANSF.
The effective adviser recognizes that while Islam is a pervasive force within Afghan culture that touches almost every part of Afghan society and daily life, it is not the entire story. For almost two decades, Afghanistan was ruled by a Marxist-Leninist government. For the better part of another decade, the country was essentially occupied by the Soviet Union. As was typical within the Eastern Bloc during the 1970s and 1980s, the best and brightest of Afghanistan received schooling in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There they learned not only Marxist-Leninist ideology but valuable skills. And perhaps most importantly, as impressionable young men from a poor rural country, they saw the “progressive” and “modern” USSR. Many of these young men are now the senior leaders of the ANSF, and while they may have developed a more nuanced view of the USSR over the intervening years, the effective adviser cannot underestimate the effect these formative experiences had on many ANSF personalities.

Typically these “Soviet-influenced” officers are easy to identify. They are typically majors or higher in rank. Many wear a “Stalin-style” moustache and can still understand if not speak Russian. Beyond the superficial indicators of Soviet influence, some are much more substantial. For example, one ANA intelligence officer in N2KL watched Russian-language television on a daily basis. A National Directorate of Security officer explained at length to the author how he viewed the conflict in Kunar as a Marxist resource-conflict between the people of the province and a new bourgeoisie consisting of the insurgent leadership, local warlords and regional malign actors. Thus, even 20 years after the fall of the Communist regime in Afghanistan, the legacy of Communist and Soviet institutions/training remain within certain sections of the ANSF. For an adviser to be effective, he needs to expand his “cultural awareness” beyond Afghan culture and Islam to include Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Soviet influence is particularly evident in the ANSF’s military culture and among many of the senior leaders in particular. In general, the Soviet-trained officers are centralized and uncomfortable delegating power to lower echelons, particularly to noncommissioned officers. They are very bureaucratic as well, interested more in things being done the “right” way. For example, a Soviet-trained officer would deny a request for supplies if the form was not filled out correctly and with signatures obtained in the proper order, regardless of the urgency of the request. Furthermore, they are extremely hesitant to follow an order or take any initiative or action, for that matter, unless it is in a written order (a cipher). This is likely a way to “avoid blame” if something goes wrong. While this background does make some of these officers extremely rigid, many are very professional and doctrinally knowledgeable within their particular functional areas. The centralized system with which the Soviet-trained officers are more comfortable is also more conducive to maintaining operational security within an ANSF unit racked with leaks and enemy collection.

There is a significant divide between these older officers and the younger Kabul Military Academy officers. These new officers are trained in the Western/NATO style of military leadership. Typically they are more comfortable with subordinate leaders taking initiative, relying on their staffs and empowering NCOs. Generally, they are also more focused on problem-solving over process. Many of the Soviet-trained officers have a hard time seeing the difference between problems within their scope of control and problems out of their scope of control, and in many cases blame problems within their organization on national or ANSF-wide systemic problems. This could be due to
their “top-down” military culture that sees solutions/orders/information flowing from top to bottom.

Regardless, providing recommendations or feedback to higher headquarters is entirely out of the question for the vast majority of these Soviet-trained officers. Neither is soliciting bottom-up feedback from their subordinates seen as useful or acceptable, since they feel that they should know more than their subordinates at all times.20 Publicly, these new-generation leaders defer to their Soviet-trained and mujahedeen elders, but privately they criticize them and see them as outdated. Thus, even new Kabul Military Academy graduates are hesitant to provide input to their higher in mission planning or constructive criticism (or after-action review comments) after an operation. When their higher are not present, many of the younger leaders will perform more in the Western/NATO style.

The effective adviser recognizes that while it may be easier to work with the younger, Kabul Military Academy-trained ANSF leaders (because their military culture is more similar to the adviser’s), he still must work through the older Soviet-trained officers to achieve success. To interface with them productively, he must first understand that many of these officers may still have a deep attachment to the Soviet system and way of thought that produced them. While Islam may be the guiding force in their life, Marxist-Leninist thought may continue to shape many of their opinions or remain the “lens” through which they view the world. Their military training under the Eastern Bloc system continues to inform the way they act as military leaders. To work with these older ANSF personalities effectively, the adviser is not only a student of Afghan/Islamic culture but of Eastern Bloc and Marxist-Leninist culture.

(6) “Having a relationship with you should bring honor and prestige to your Afghan counterpart, not shame or embarrassment.” – 1/1/2014 ANA Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser understands that simply having an adviser assigned to him can be a point of pride for his ANSF counterpart, and that at no point should the adviser do something that would bring dishonor, shame or embarrassment to his Afghan counterpart. Having an adviser implies that the ANSF officer or senior NCO has a critical role within his organization and demonstrates to other ANSF personalities that he is deserving of respect due to the fact that he has direct access to coalition forces – and, more specifically, to the U.S. military. In addition to seeing an adviser as a status symbol, the ANSF rank-and-file believe that having an adviser confers upon the advised ANSF personality the ability to leverage CF assets, thus increasing the perceived power of the advised-ANSF officer/NCO. Thus, whether or not the advised Afghan believes he needs mentoring/advice, he is usually very positive about the increased status that having an adviser confers.

The effective adviser reinforces these feelings by ensuring that his ANSF counterpart feels like he has access and influence with the adviser and with the CF. This not only helps the advised Afghan take himself seriously, but causes other Afghans to take the advised Afghan seriously.21 This can be done in a variety of ways, including saluting one’s higher-ranking ANSF counterpart; using “commander sir (comandan sahib)/deputy sir (mu’awin sahib),” “staff primary sir (amir sahib),” “brigade command sergeant major (breedmal-e leeva),” “battalion command sergeant major (breedmal-e kandak),” “first sergeant (breedmal-e tooelay),” etc., when appropriate; and generally treating one’s ANSF counterpart like one would an American officer/NCO of similar rank.22 While the effective adviser never allows himself to be bullied into “working for” his ANSF counterpart, he does ensure that both his ANSF counterpart and other ANSF personalities understand that he both respects and is dedicated to assisting his ANSF counterpart.

The effective adviser is also continually on guard against actions/situations that could bring dishonor or shame to his ANSF counterpart. This includes never publicly criticizing his ANSF counterpart (this will be dealt with in more detail in further points) or publically implying that the ANSF counterpart does not have influence or access to you. While some ANSF personalities may attempt to “ambush” their adviser publically (i.e., “reminding” the adviser during a public meeting that he promised something he never promised), special care must be taken not to imply the ANSF has low influence with the adviser when denying their requests. Sometimes this can mean the adviser must publicly accept responsibility for making a mistake or for being unclear, rather than publically saying the counterpart is incorrect.

Most importantly, the effective adviser never publically insinuates, implies or gives the impression that he controls his Afghan counterpart or forces him into action/inaction. The simplest way to accomplish this is by being at one’s most aggressive or persistent in private with one’s Afghan counterpart, but at one’s most passive or quiet in public settings. Large meetings with multiple personalities are the incorrect setting for the adviser to encourage his counterpart toward a course of action, because ideally the adviser has discussed the issues with his counterpart privately beforehand. In general, though, the effective adviser understands that when Afghans are publically shown to be weak, to be under the influence of others, or without the “power” of access to or influence with others, they lose standing vis-à-vis their peers. The effective adviser is never a source of such loss of standing or face.

While force-protection standards should never be compromised, the effective adviser takes the time to understand the procedures in place and what steps can be taken with the CF base-security personnel. For instance, does the base allow ANSF to carry weapons? Drive on the base? Move unescorted? Enter morale, welfare, recreation/USO facilities? Discussing these issues before they arise with the ANSF counterpart can reduce the number of “loss of face” situations and thereby reduce the degree to which the ANSF counterpart feels that having an adviser brings him shame.

The effective adviser also works in advance to reduce the intrusiveness of force-protection procedures for trusted ANSF personalities. This could mean getting badges, passes or vehicle registrations for one’s trusted ANSF counterpart, providing photos of one’s ANSF counterpart to entry-control points, or simply ensuring that one’s ANSF counterpart knows to call his adviser if he needs access to the CF base at any time. Afghans recognize the “double standard” applied to their access to CF facilities as compared to CF access to ANSF facilities.23 While most understand the reason behind the “double standard,” reducing it when feasible can bring honor to one’s Afghan counterpart and improve one’s relationship with one’s Afghan counterpart.

Finally, the effective adviser observes and is cognizant of the preceding because he understands that Afghans typically avoid situations that cause them to lose face. If one’s ANSF counterpart associates interacting with his adviser with losing face, he will minimize his exposure to losing face by limiting his interactions with his adviser or not being open with his adviser.


The effective adviser accepts ANSF failure. He allows ANSF organizations to fail rather than forcing them to succeed, and acknowledges that ANSF failure does not necessarily mean his own failure. While this may seem counterintuitive, it is precisely what defines an “adviser” rather than a “patron-client” relationship. Furthermore, almost all learning models agree that progress does not take place unless there is trial and error. Mak-
ing failure impossible for one’s ANSF counterpart not only stunts his growth but actually reverses the process of making ANSF organizations independent by inserting the adviser into the ANSF organization as a key component to success.

ANSF personalities recognize that due to robust digital-communication capabilities and vast resources, CF – particularly the U.S. military – are, from a relative perspective, vastly more efficient than the ANSF are in accomplishing virtually any task. Thus, as a resource/labor-maximizing organization, the ANSF will regularly allow itself to approach the point its CF partners see as “failure” if it believes its CF partners will not allow such failure to occur. After some 10 years of working with CF, ANSF personalities generally understand where CF “red lines” are and are willing to allow CF to solve ANSF problems for them. Some believe that due to the perceived “patron-client” relationship between the United States and Afghanistan, this is perfectly acceptable. Only by ignoring those “red lines” and allowing ANSF entities to fail can an adviser force the ANSF to exercise its less efficient systems, grow as an organization and become more efficient over time.

Unfortunately, this translates in some cases with accepting the possibility of temporary damage to the relationship with one’s ANSF counterpart. The adviser must be capable of articulating to his highers why he is allowing the ANSF to fail and inculcate in his subordinates the same degree of acceptance of ANSF failure. As an advising organization, it must be understood by all that as ANSF organizations approach independence, there are no red lines for when CF advisers must force ANSF success.

By far the best way to mitigate catastrophic ANSF failure and reduce the likelihood of damage to one’s relationship with the advised ANSF organization without forcing success is to set clear timelines for when advisers will stop taking certain actions or performing certain functions for the ANSF organization. In one example, an adviser team’s decision to allow an ANA kandak to fail in the short-term resulted in multiple long-term improvements to the kandak’s warfighting capabilities. Since the adviser team had advertised in advance the date past which it would no longer be requesting air assets for the kandak, the damage to the relationship between the kandak and the adviser team was minimal, despite the ANA taking casualties.

However, accepting ANSF failure does not mean excusing oneself from advising or “washing one’s hands” of the consequences of ANSF actions. If an adviser can foresee a potential pitfall or danger, he should never hesitate to inform his ANSF counterpart of the potential danger. Ideally, an adviser should attempt to assist the ANSF in avoiding failure by helping his ANSF counterpart think through the consequences of his courses of action beforehand. After failure, the adviser should assist his ANSF counterpart in managing the aftermath of the failure, rebuilding/reparing/healing the organization after the failure and learning from the failure.

At its heart, accepting ANSF failure means not associating ANSF battlefield failure with CF adviser failure. The effective adviser understands that it is neither his responsibility nor place to become a key component in forcing ANSF success. If the adviser is essentially the linchpin in preventing ANSF from failing a task, he is out of place. The effective adviser doesn’t want ANSF success more than his ANSF counterpart.

(8) “They will come to you expecting supplies and material support because that is what has been happening traditionally. … Don’t be afraid to say ‘no.'” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 adviser team.

The effective adviser recognizes that over the last 10 years, the ANSF has received supplemental supplies, equipment and even real property from their CF counterparts, leading them to expect the same level of support from their advisers. ANSF leaders continue to view the relationship between ISAF (and particularly the U.S. military) and the ANSF as a “patron-client” relationship. Under this system, it is expected that the patron (the U.S. military) will provide protection, services and life support, and ensure the general well-being of the client (the ANSF). In return, the client will be generally obedient to the patron and reciprocate with support.

CF at all levels do not view the relationship in the same way, and the United States in particular is uncomfortable with the colonial overtones of being a “patron.” U.S. personnel see the relationship as a partnership, one in which both sides can share resources and support one another, but one in which there is no expectation that one side will provide for the other. Unfortunately, the experience of the last 10 years, during which the United States materially assisted the ANSF in establishing themselves, has convinced the ANSF that they are in a “patron-client” relationship with the U.S. military and that they are entitled to receive supplies/materials from their U.S. advisers. This can greatly frustrate the adviser, who often has little ability to provide the ANSF with the supplies they desire and also feels that he is being “used” by the ANSF. Thus, the effective adviser prepares himself both for ANSF expectations and to say “no” in a variety of forceful but respectful ways.

To get to the point where he can begin to say “no” to ANSF requests and help them stand on their own, the effective adviser starts where the outgoing CF unit has replaced him. Immediately changing the level of support after relief in place/transfer of authority leads to direct organizational setbacks as the ANSF experiences supply shortfalls they were not expecting; animosity on the part of the Afghans who see the new CF adviser team as intentionally undermining the ANSF; and the general view that the new advisers have nothing to provide the ANSF (either materially or intellectually). Ideally, the preceding CF adviser team would have followed the campaign plan to wean the ANSF off U.S. systems, and the new adviser team only needs to continue along that path at progressively lower levels of support. If this is not the case, the adviser team must start by generally saying “yes” to the ANSF before it can begin saying “no.”

The effective adviser team starts by laying out precise timelines for the ANSF for when various categories of support will be discontinued. This campaign plan for lowering the levels of direct CF support to the ANSF unit should have ANSF “buy-in.” Ideally, the ANSF leadership should know the reasons and has been part of the process of deciding the exact date the adviser team will not provide or assist in securing a particular category of support. If the senior ANSF leadership is part of the process, the effective adviser can leverage the ANSF leadership to promote the plan and accompanying positive information-operations messaging to the rest of the ANSF organization, thus better enabling the adviser to say “no” to lower-level ANSF personnel after the cutoff date passes. While securing ANSF key leader buy-in can appear a difficult task, generally ANSF leadership understand and respond positively to the argument that CF forces are drawing down. Emphasizing that CF presence below the ANSF corps/regional level will rapidly become less prevalent can help the ANSF senior leadership understand they must become more self-sustaining now or face significant shortfalls in the mid-term future.

Nevertheless, for the strategy of creating a campaign plan for decreasing levels of support to be effective, the adviser team must ensure that the decreasing levels of support are relatively similar across ANSF formations. For example, if an adviser team is advising an ANA kandak that is co-located with an ABP kandak, the levels of support provided to the ANA and the ABP should not be drastically different. This necessitates regular
cross-talk on the issue of support to ANSF on the part of co-located, neighboring and higher-headquarters adviser teams.

After the campaign-plan date for discontinuing support passes, the effective adviser remains firm in saying “no” to the ANSF. Yet the effective adviser also employs a number of techniques to assist the ANSF in solving their own support issues; in defusing some residual animosity from refusing to support the ANSF; and in convincing the ANSF of the need to solve their own problems. First, the adviser can directly assist the ANSF by helping them work through their own problem. This could be as simple as helping the ANSF in filling out their Ministry of Defence-14 supply-request form and forwarding a copy to the higher-headquarters adviser team to ensure that it is not lost, or calling other adviser teams to assist the ANSF in locating a particular item they require. This can be highly effective if combined with a straightforward explanation for why the ANSF are not being supplied/assisted by the CF in the manner requested any longer. Remaining firm, treating the ANSF like equals with a reasonable explanation, but offering to help them work through their own system, is most likely to gain the adviser the respect rather than the animosity of his ANSF counterpart.

In the event of some lingering animosity or feelings of “betrayal,” the adviser can defuse some of the feelings by acknowledging that the ANSF are not receiving everything they want or need but pointing out that this is not uncommon in the U.S. Army as well. Informing the ANSF about U.S. Army supply shortages in garrison often leads to an eye-opening moment for ANSF leaders, in which they realize that the United States does not have infinite supplies. This conversation can be continued by pointing out shortages suffered by the adviser team itself, and how if the adviser team were to give the ANSF items out of hide, it would result in further shortages for the adviser team. For example, one adviser team’s personnel, along with members of the battlespace integrator, slept in tents to free up space for ANSF personnel to sleep in hard-stand buildings. By illustrating these points to the ANSF, the adviser can demonstrate that requesting supplies from CF is not a “victimless crime”; in fact, it cuts into a limited stock of supplies.

Finally, the adviser can begin to help the ANSF see the necessity and the desirability of solving their own supply or support issues by influencing them to take pride in their independence. By directly linking their decreasing level of support to their increasing level of professionalism and playing on their pride in that status as a “first rate” or “professional” organization, the adviser can help the ANSF take pride in working through their own systems.

In summary, the effective adviser is comfortable saying “no” to his ANSF counterpart, having already prepared the battlefield by providing the counterpart with a clear timeline for decreasing levels of support. By directly linking their decreasing level of support to their increasing level of professionalism and playing on their pride in that status as a “first rate” or “professional” organization, the adviser can help the ANSF take pride in working through their own systems.

(9) “Offset the cost of having you around. …” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser understands that while it is essential to the long-term viability of the ANSF to wean the ANSF off CF logistical support, advisers consume ANSF resources themselves, and it is not only unfair but unwise not to compensate the ANSF accordingly. Adviser teams are, often without their knowledge, large consumers of ANSF resources. These resources include primarily food and security, but also may include luxury items and vehicles, not to mention time.

For instance, when adviser teams at remote locations eat with their Afghan counterparts, they consume foodstuffs that are carefully rationed due to the weakness of the ANSF logistical system. This can directly translate to an ANSF soldier not getting his daily ration of two eggs because feeding the “honored guests” is seen as more important. Thus, “if all you’re offering is advice, you start to become a drain.”38 While at larger installations closer to ANSF logistical hubs, the effect is less extreme, but the principle remains that CF advisers should ensure they offset their costs.

Most commonly, CF advisers will request copies of documents from the ANSF. CF advisers should ensure to offset the “cost of doing business” with paper, ink, etc. While it is important to force the ANSF to exercise their own logistical system, advisers will seem out of touch if all they provide is advice while expecting the ANSF to provide products/items.

(10) “The guy in charge is not necessarily the loudest guy in the room.” – 2/201 ANA Brigade adviser team.

When meeting with unfamiliar Afghans or judging the relationships between unfamiliar and familiar Afghans, the effective adviser always remembers that “the most influential person in the room might not be the highest ranking nor the most talkative.”39 For advisers who have Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation New Dawn experience, this may require some adjustment given the respect/dereference accorded to more “authoritarian” Iraqi leaders.40

At the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are masters of influencing and persuading, and often go about it more quietly than Americans. While an influential American likely sits at the head of the table, chairs a meeting and makes a decision, an influential Afghan may sit off to the side, speak little and communicate through proxies. Doing so allows the influential Afghan to orchestrate a conversation and decision, rather than become a target for retaliation (physical/verbal/etc.). This phenomenon, well documented particularly in rural civilian Afghan society, is less common in the ANSF but still observable.

For instance, the 2/201 ANA Brigade NDS officer proposed having an “intelligence shura" to the 2/201 ANA Brigade intelligence advisers. The NDS officer, with some limited input from the advisers, planned out quite specifically whom he wanted to have in attendance, what he wanted to discuss and what requirements he wanted to place on lower-echelon intelligence officers during the brigade intelligence shura. During the shura, the NDS officer sat to the side while the brigade S-2 parroted word for word what the NDS officer had discussed with the advisers. Multiple kandak NDS officers voiced their support for the brigade S-2’s statements. During the entire meeting, the brigade NDS officer said nothing except to briefly agree with the brigade S-2 and thank the participants for attending. It was obvious to the advisers that the brigade NDS officer had engineered the meeting, using the brigade S-2 and kandak NDS officers as proxies. He was the most influential individual in the room, but had the advisers not met with him a week prior, they would have assumed the brigade S-2 was the most influential individual in the room.41

Understanding who has influence over whom has great benefit to an adviser. With this information, the adviser can leverage influential individuals to assist the adviser in changing the behavior of a counterpart or in negotiating an end to an administrative or organizational dispute. As stated, like any military organization, rank confers a certain degree of influence. The quietly

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The adaptability of Soldiers and leaders manifests when posed with difficult problem sets. One such event occurred while preparing 1-4 Cavalry’s assault-command-post platoon for a major operation during National Training Center Rotation 12-05. The squadron’s ingenuity was challenged in adapting its protective-services detail for mobile mission command during this rotation.

“PSD” describes tactics, techniques and procedures that have been implemented for several campaigns but that became more significant during stability operations in the Balkans. The war on terrorism and subsequent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have emphasized the requirement to provide mobility, security and mission command in a highly fluid operating environment.

Due to the decentralized nature of counterinsurgency operations, it became clear the PSD needed to evolve into a mobile command post providing mission command supporting squadron-led operations. The ACP’s usefulness for 1-4 Cavalry manifested during NTC 12-05 with the development and implementation of our “mobile mission-command vehicle.”

The idea of creating an MMCV in 1-4 Cavalry stemmed from mission requirements while training at NTC 12-05. The ACP platoon sergeant took the baseline communications setup for an M577 Mobile Command Vehicle (M113 variant) and reallocated assets within the platoon to create the MMCV using a hardtop M1097 humvee. Based on the M577, the platoon installed an additional radio stack (for a total of four available frequency-modulation radios), a high-frequency system for long-range communication and a dismount-

The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division), implements the ACP for the first time during a named, combined operation in eastern Paktika, Afghanistan, in June 2012. (U.S. Army photo)
ed tactical satellite. The intent was also to install the One-System Remote Video Terminal into the vehicle; however, this did not happen due to the tactical operations center’s need to maintain control of the feed. Using simple tools from a mechanic’s toolkit, ACP Soldiers installed the additional radios into the vehicle.

Who’s needed
The ACP platoon has two primary tasks in the operating environment: provide security for the command group during battlefield circulation and secure MMCV personnel during named operations that require mobile mission command. Based on personnel requirements, the squadron commander or S-3 directs what personnel are required for a particular mission based on military decision-making process sessions. This can be, but is not limited to, the S-3 (or battle captain), fire-support officer, Joint Terminal Attack Controller and S-2 (or a representative).

In its simplest form, the ACP platoon provides security for personnel on the ground, and the MMCV provides C2 from the center of the formation.

Validating proof of principle
The primary intent for the ACP and MMCV was to operate doctrinally as an ACP. It was therefore necessary to facilitate creation of a platform-specific vehicle that met the doctrinal requirements to supplement the squadron TOC, allowing the squadron commander to C2 the battle from wherever the mission dictated. We used NTC Rotation 12-05 in February 2012 to validate the concept.

The squadron’s culminating mission was to conduct a deliberate attack in complex terrain with six companies or troops. Because of the ACP’s mobility, the squadron commander was able to move behind the main effort and maintain constant communication with both maneuver elements and the squadron TOC. Due to the rough terrain, communication was extremely difficult. Having direct-line-of-sight communication with ground forces allowed the squadron commander to develop the situation, provide guidance and make decisions as required. This proved even more useful when Grey Eagle Retrants moved off-station mid-mission, breaking all communication within the pass back to the squadron TOC.

NTC provided proof of principle that regardless of the platform, the commander must have the capacity to execute mission command on the move in any operating environment. Engineering the MMCV with essential communication equipment such as FM, HF, TACsAT and battle-tracking products, such as Blue Force Tracker and mapboards, allowed the squadron commander to track operations with greater situational awareness and understanding. Also, if there is a chance of poor communication between the TOC and maneuver elements, the ACP or MMCV can move forward to serve as a link between the TOC and the fight. The greatest asset the ACP brings to bear is flexibility to adapt to any mission. Given time and guidance, any platform can be manipulated to provide mission command to the forefront of the battle.

The MMCV provided the squadron commander with the necessary tools and skillsets to fight the squadron. While austere relative to the TOC to maintain mobility, the communication platforms and configuration of the vehicles worked well and gave the commander and key personnel capability for face-to-face discussion in a secure setting.

There were, however, many improvements to make to the MMCV based on lessons-learned. First, we needed to install an OSRVT to provide greater battlefield awareness, as the JTAC computer did not link in with certain Army platforms. Also, we needed a central battle-tracking board complete with map, enemy and friendly graphics to create a common picture among the staff. Lastly, the S-3 shop can develop an MMCV kit, which would contain the baseline items required to conduct any mission set such as markers, additional maps, butcher board and extra paper.

The creation and implementation of the MMCV added to the overall success of the squadron’s culminating mission during NTC 12-05. The capabilities the MMCV brought to the fight allowed the squadron commander to C2 the squadron, and the mobility the ACP provided allowed the commander to move anywhere on the battlefield. Most importantly, the use and validation of the ACP or MMCV as TTP provided a critical capability for our deployment to Afghanistan.

Operational performance
The ACP was a critical enabler the squadron leveraged in Afghanistan. The squadron, as the BSO operating in Western Paktika Province (with an area of operations larger than Rhode Island), would participate in a squadron-level partnered operation with the Afghan National Army in the most remote district of Territorial Force 1-4’s AO, far removed from an established TOC’s capabilities. The squadron commander required functionality for every communications system available, including the Installation Status Report feed and battle-tracking capabilities.

With guidance in hand and experience from NTC, the ACP began work on an entirely new MMCV built in an MRAP platform. The squadron would participate in several named operations in OEF 12-13 requiring MMCV functionality and finalized maturation of the concept. Beginning with “Version 1” and ending with “Version Final,” the MMCV contained all the original equipment from NTC 12-05, with more capabilities only available in the Ammunition Technical Officer Course.

The vision began with one goal in mind: create mobile mission-command capability using a MaxxPro MRAP platform combined with the latest in fielded technology. The S-6 noncommissioned officer in charge was an integral contributor to the solution, as he took personal pride in creating a modern mission-command platform.

“Version 1” required installation of a second BFT into the back of a MaxxPro, a mapboard hanging from the ceiling and a Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver fastened to the Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station with Velcro. The truck contained FM (line-of-sight, common net), HF (long-range, system-to-system link), TACsAT (long-range, common net) communication capabilities and the ability to establish network connectivity, with dismounted Distributed Tactical Communications System (handheld satellite push-to-talk system) and an Iridium satellite phone on hand for emergency backup. The truck proved to be an overwhelming success, but it required improvements.

For each mission, the ACP and “MMCV staff” determined shortcomings and improvements required for the platform, and also facilitated the installation of mission-specific equipment based on specified or implied tasks from the commander. After the initial squadron operation, the S-6 NCOIC mounted the DTCS and Iridium for mobile use through vehicle-installation kits or well-routed antennas and Velcro. “Version Final” allowed the commander and staff to manage assets such as close-air support, Army warrior tasks, ISR, nontraditional ISR and organic assets such as mortars and lethal miniature aerial-munitions systems.
Also, the ACP’s adaptability allowed the platoon and staff to operate independently or “plug and play” into other command posts or TOCs based on location and requirements while still maintaining the MMCV’s standalone functionality. This agility will be important for future BSI operations as coalition forces reduce force structure in Afghanistan.

Throughout its use, the MMCV proved a combat multiplier. By staffing the vehicle with the S-6 NCOIC, battle captain, FSO, S-2 and JTAC, the vehicle housed all the necessary functions to coordinate any BSO mission required.

The last inclusion within the ACP or MMCV was a radio tuned to the ANA net, which allowed cross-communication between the two partnered forces, enabling the BSO (TF 1-4) to track and push-and-pull information to and from the ANA.

BSI to BSI

As coalition forces in Afghanistan transition from BSOs to BSIs, the ACP capability must transition as well. The final squadron-level mission during our deployment to Afghanistan was used as a proof of concept for the shift to BSI. With the focus of SFAATs coming to the forefront, TF 1-4 looked to further emphasize its role in advising and assisting the ANA as the “way ahead” for the ANA.

As a capstone to the fighting season, the ANA corps and advisers planned and executed an operation spanning two provinces. TF Dragon (4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division) facilitated its capabilities through assisted planning and ISR coordination, as well as SFAATs moving with their ANA counterparts to facilitate cross-talk and asset synchronization. The TF 1-4 ACP staged to provide C2 for squadron elements forward for security or advisory roles. The MMCV was also co-located with the ANA brigade’s tactical command post, which provided the ability for added cross-talk capabilities and BSI training.

The ACP helped coach and mentor the ANA on battle-tracking, emphasizing the necessity for situational awareness. We explained that as we transition, the ultimate intent is to have the ANA call for assets, and the ability to do so hinges on their knowledge of their force array. Without an accurate picture of their forces on the battlefield, there can be dangerous consequences. As coalition forces continue the transition to BSI, it is imperative that the ANSF increase their basic C2 functions, and co-locating the ACP and MMCV with an ANA TOC facilitates information flow and training for the ever-improving ANA.

OEF lessons-learned

There are three critical lessons identified and learned for the MMCV implementation during OEF 12-13. The first improvement is the use of a larger MRAP platform to facilitate installation of more communications and battle-tracking equipment. The amount of extra equipment mounted into the Maxx-Pro platform proved taxing, not only on space but also on power consumption. A larger vehicle such as a Caiman would have streamlined further improvements.

The second improvement is using a turret platform instead of a CROWS. The CROWS, while a useful system, reduces the amount of passengers in the vehicle.

The last critical improvement is the earlier adoption of Afghan National Security Forces crosstalk capabilities within the ACP. The final solution was the platoon interpreter with a Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio on the ANA frequency, but a dedicated radio system would facilitate more efficient crosstalk.

The identification of system limitations through the after-action review process was the most important “sustain” for the MMCV. Because lessons-learned from each mission, subsequent operations brought about new and tailored equipment sets.

Also, the installation of another BFT in the vehicle’s rear allowed flexibility in reporting. The second system allowed the S-2 and FSO to receive and publish intelligence and asset updates, while the battle captain received and published operationally specific updates.

The final “sustain” was identifying and clearly defining roles and responsibilities for the TOC and forward ACP. TF 1-4 defined which mission-command element had primacy for control of enablers, requests to brigade, reporting from subordinate units and reporting to brigade. With the MMCV’s capability to “plug” into existing infrastructures (command posts/TOCs) or operate independently, it was extremely important to establish roles and responsibilities based on mission requirements.

Conclusion

The ACP or MMCV, or similar organization and capability, will be a critical asset in BSI to enable mission command. Regardless of echelon, the same basic package can be used to support BSI with SFAAT and security forces, or large-scale operations where the squadron commander requires mobility, mainly to provide enablers for the SFAATs, security forces and ANSF “in extremis.” The basic package can also provide situational awareness for the release of certain assets and weapon systems. This requirement will be critical while coalition forces retrograde and ANSF operations increase in size and scope. The way ahead for the ACP/MMCV concept is to train the ANA on integrating and training on a similar C2 asset that is a reflection of Afghan capability.

Through continued advising and mentorship, the ANA will become proficient enough to battle-track its forces and request Afghan assets as required. As we continue to push the transition from BSO to BSI, the ANA will become increasingly self-reliant but must work to develop its systems further to increase its overall battlefield awareness. The ANA is highly capable; however, Afghan soldiers must continue to make progress on their own as coalition forces draw down in Afghanistan. Through continued advisement in MMCV-related capabilities, the ANA can improve and develop into a self-reliant force capable of protecting the people of Afghanistan.

No matter the mission, whether it is stability operations in Africa, BSI in Afghanistan or future high-intensity conflicts, there will always be a requirement for mission command. Regardless of the future vehicle platform, the skills 1-4 Cavalry and the ACP developed through NTC 12-05 and OEF 12-13 will translate to new forms of MMCVs tailored for future operations.

CPT Zachary Mierva is an ACP platoon leader with Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-4 Cavalry, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Forward Operating Base Sharana, Afghanistan. His past assignments include troop executive officer, B Troop, 1-4 Cavalry, Fort Riley, KS; A Troop S-4, HHT, 1-4 Cavalry, Forward Operating Base Sykes, Iraq and Fort Riley. CPT Mierva’s military education includes Armor Basic Officer Leader Course and Basic Officer Leader Course II. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy in management.
Notes

1 The 1-4 Cavalry coined the term “mobile mission-command vehicle” during OEF 12-13 to describe a tactical truck built on a MaxxPro platform.

2 “Battlespace owner” indicates partnered operations conducted in coalition forces area of operations with a greater than 1:1 coalition forces to ANSF ratio. Coalition forces conduct unilateral missions as required and assist ANSF with supporting CF operations. CF develops concepts of operations with ANSF in support.

3 The “battlespace integrator” provides resources, enablers and intelligence reports to SFAAT in support of ANSF operations and provides security forces for SFAAT. BSI provides C2 and life-support functions for combat outposts. In BSI operations, there are minimal unilateral operations.

4 The “security forces advise-and-assist team” advises the ANSF kandak (battalion), assisting the ANSF in determining operational priorities and facilitating enabler support and mission command.

5 Field Manual 19-10.

6 FM 5-0.

7 FM 71-100.

ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN

ACP – assault command post
ANA – Afghan National Army
ANSF – Afghan National Security Forces
AO – area of operations
BFT – Blue Force Tracker
BSI – battlespace integrator
BSO – battlespace owner
C2 – command and control
CF – coalition forces
COIN – counterinsurgency
CROWS – Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station
DTCS – Distributed Tactical Communications System
FM – frequency modulation
FM – field manual
FSO – fire-support officer
HF – high frequency
ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
JTAC – Joint Terminal Attack Controller
MMCV – mobile mission-command vehicle
MRAP – mine-resistant, ambush-protected
NCOIC – noncommissioned officer in charge
NTC – National Training Center
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OSRVT – One-System Remote Video Terminal
PSD – protective-services detail
SFAAT – security forces advise-and-assist team
TACSAT – tactical satellite
TF – territorial force
TOC – tactical operations center
TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures
XM1069 Advanced Multipurpose Munition Concept Is a ‘Game Changer’

by Steven A. Peralta and Jeffrey McNaboe

In today’s operating environment, the Abrams main battle tank is a precise and lethal direct-fire platform employed against the wide variety of target types associated with the hybrid threat. To effectively engage the multiple targets inherent in such an operational environment, the Abrams has four direct-fire weapon systems. The primary weapon is the Abram’s 120mm smoothbore cannon, which uses a variety of precision 120mm rounds capable of destroying targets ranging from armored vehicles and hardened positions to obstacles and personnel. The Abrams also mounts .50-caliber and 7.62mm machineguns able to dispatch light-skinned vehicles and dismounted enemies as needed.1

While tanks have long enjoyed the capability of destroying a variety of target types, the continuous evolution of the hybrid threat, coupled with increased risk posed by the ever-present “battlecarry dilemma,” has brought about the need to further improve the Abrams’ main-gun ammunition capabilities in the interest of maintaining lethal overmatch.

“Battlecarry” is an approach in which tankers determine what type of round to chamber in anticipation of the next engagement. U.S. tank doctrine dictates that the commander will determine the type of round battlecarried based on his mission and assessment of the threat. The tank commander determines the most likely target in a given tactical situation and loads the appropriate round, thereby enabling the gunner to engage anticipated targets in the shortest period.

When the next target presenting itself is not the one anticipated, this creates a battlecarry dilemma. For example, if the crew is battlecarrying a canister round (anti-personnel) and a non-personnel threat appears, such as a lightly armored vehicle, the commander must decide whether to chamber the round or fire it to chamber the appropriate round. The additional time required to either fire or extract the chambered round, followed by reloading the main gun and engaging the target, puts the crew at a much higher risk of being first engaged by the enemy.

The Army is developing a fix to this, however: the XM1069 advanced multipurpose munition. The AMP round will mitigate the battlecarry dilemma by providing the crew with a single munition that can be chambered and fired effectively to defeat multiple target types.

Specific capability gaps that have emerged on the hybrid battlefield stem from engagement scenarios that existing ammunition will never support. There are two threats in particular that cannot be effectively defeated when firing currently stockpiled tank main-gun ammunition: enemy anti-tank guided-missile teams (this also includes dismounted personnel in the open at extended ranges) and the urban wall breach.

The M1028 canister round, designed to defeat a dismounted threat in the open, has a very limited range. This often leaves platform-mounted machineguns as the preferred option, even though they too have limited range and effect.

Also, in support of infantry, it is critical that the Abrams be capable of enabling dismounts to breach (enter) buildings or compounds. A successful breach allows a Soldier to pass through without any loss of momentum ready to engage any threat with his assigned weapon. This requires the need for a very precise warhead effect that can open a sizeable entry point while minimizing impact to the surrounding area. Current stockpiled munitions cannot meet this breaching requirement because they use shaped-charge warheads that were optimized for penetration at the expense of effectively creating a large opening in reinforced walls.

An additional and important concern associated with both shaped-charge and canister-munition usage in hybrid operational environments is collateral damage. The significant penetration capability of shaped-charge munitions increases risk associated with effects behind the intended target, while the muzzle-action nature of a canister cartridge increases risk associated with effects in front of the target.

In the past, the tank force adapted to new threats by developing new rounds specifically designed to defeat the new or emerging threat. Not only has this approach created an increased logistical footprint, it has also dramatically increased the risk to our tank force. AMP will change this approach.

BG Paul Laughlin, the 47th Chief of Armor and former commandant of the Armor School at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA, recently captured the essence of what every Abrams crewman knows when he said, “The new AMP round is long overdue.” Tankers have struggled for years with a growing number of main-gun rounds capable of defeating single types of threats; this resulted in a mix of ammunition types carried on board the tank that was always a problem. This is not just an issue of logistics; it creates both operational and survival issues. No one wants to get into a tank engagement and not have the right ammunition to defeat the range of threats that we will see on the future battlefield. The AMP round is a game changer that greatly increases our effectiveness. We need to make a very modest and affordable in-

[Photo illustration by Stewart Gilman, ARDEC]
vestment, spread over 30 years, to field a highly versatile and reliable round with the capabilities we will need for any future fight.”

AMP is a full bore, multipurpose munition designed to combine and improve the capabilities of four current 120mm munitions: the M830 (high-explosive anti-tank), M830A1 (multipurpose high-explosive anti-tank), M908 (obstacle reduction) and M1028 (canister). With a platform ammunition data link, the tanker will use the fire-control system to program the AMP fuze for one of three modes of operation: point detonate, point-detonate delay or airburst. This ability to communicate with the round and specify mode based on the intended target offers significant versatility and efficiency to the tank crew.

Whether the target is a lightly armored vehicle requiring a point-detonate fuze setting, a bunker requiring a point-detonate-delay setting or an ATGM team requiring an airburst setting, the versatility provided by the 120mm AMP round results in an unprecedented single-munition capability for the Abrams platform. Another benefit brought by AMP is reduced collateral damage. The nature of the programmable fuze, combined with a non-shaped charge warhead and full-bore design that requires no sabot petals (eliminating dangers of flying petals against dismounts or civilian populace) means that effects are delivered on the target with great precision.

The AMP round’s versatility in supporting infantry forces operating in urban environments and defeating ATGM teams at ranges of 50-2,000 meters with a precise and lethal airburst are essential capabilities needed to defeat future threats. Evidence of challenges associated with this emerging need to support urban operations was apparent during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Similarly, lessons-learned by the Israeli Defense Forces during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War revealed that Hezbollah fighters used ATGMs extensively to destroy Israeli tanks.

Hezbollah’s use of swarming ATGMs and rocket-propelled grenades against Israeli tanks was both shrewd and inventive. Of the 114 IDF personnel killed during the war, 30 were tank crewmen. Out of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged and 20 penetrated. It is believed that five Merkavas were destroyed. Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM tactics against heavy mechanized forces.3

Figure 2 is an operational vignette depicting various AMP target engagements in support of an enemy compound assault in search of a high-value target.

The U.S. Army debuted the AMP capability as an Armament Research Development and Engineering Center science-and-technology effort that ended in 2006 with a successful Technology Readiness Level 6 demonstration of the XM1069 line-of-sight multipurpose munition. By combining the use of a full bore, 120mm munition, a multimode programmable fuze with three modes of operation and an associated ADL, ARDEC was able to demonstrate the AMP’s capability against targets that included a reinforced wall, bunker, light armor, dismounts and an ATGM team.

AMP capability gaps were documented in a capabilities-development document and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee in 2008 following the successful completion of this S&T program. AMP is awaiting funding to enter into the en-
engineering and manufacturing-development phase of the acquisition lifecycle. AMP provides the armored brigade combat team commander increased tactical flexibility to defeat threats the ABCT was previously incapable of, effectively engaging and supporting infantry breaching operations by opening entry points to support urban-clearing operations. Most importantly, the new AMP round improves Abrams tank and crew survivability by dramatically reducing, if not eliminating, the existing “battlecarry dilemma.” By giving the Abrams versatility to operate across the range of military operations where mobile protected firepower is required, the ABCT will be a more lethal and more powerful formation than ever. Forces with these capabilities will have the ability to overwhelm and defeat enemies, which the ABCT encounters with operational mobility, increased survivability and lethal firepower. The ABCT is invaluable during operations in any environment – including counterinsurgency, stability and security operations. AMP will increase the synergy of the dismounted Soldier when operating in direct support of armor formations by providing the Abrams tank the capability for discreet direct-fire support with controlled effects, while at the same time reducing fratricide and collateral damage. The U.S. Army needs to make a modest investment to field a highly versatile and reliable round that delivers new capabilities, reduces the logistical footprint needed to support the armor formation and, most importantly, reduces the survival risk inherent in the “battlecarry dilemma.” The American Soldier deserves no less!

Steven Peralta is a combat developer with Capabilities Development Integration Directorate’s Mounted Requirements Division, Fort Benning. His previous assignments include combat developer, Fort Knox, KY, and Fort Benning; and training-systems developer, BAE, Minneapolis, MN. While in the military, he attended Master Gunner School. Mr. Peralta holds a bachelor’s of arts degree from Saint Mary’s University in business management.

Jeffrey McNaboe is AMP team leader with Project Manager-Maneuver Ammunition Systems, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. He previously served as mid-range munitions team leader, PM-MAS. Mr. McNaboe holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Rutgers University in mechanical engineering and a master’s of science degree from Stevens Institute of Technology in mechanical engineering.

Notes
1 Haight, David B. COL, Laughlin, Paul J. COL, and Bergner, Kyle F. CPT, “Armored Forces; Mobility, Protection and Precision Firepower Essential for Future,” ARMOR, November-December 2012.
2 Ibid.

Figure 3. XM1069 AMP capabilities. (Photos by Stewart Gilman, ARDEC)
Since Training and Doctrine Command is requiring commercial printing contracts for the professional bulletins to end with Fiscal Year 2013, ARMOR will take a printing hiatus after the July-September 2013 edition.

ARMOR is not “dead,” however. We will continue publishing via our Web operation, eARMOR; eARMOR will provide continuity for ARMOR and will continue to provide professional-development information.

One of our initiatives is that you are now able to read ARMOR on your mobile device. We offer the ability to read and download for iBook, Nook, and Kindle applications.

Hand-in-hand with our Web-delivery efforts is our goal to offer by full operational capability (eARMOR is in initial operational capability now) a Real Simple Syndication subscription ability for major areas such as each edition of ARMOR, the news and information section called “Armor in Action” and the “ARMOR mobile” feature. Currently we have in place RSS subscription capability for “Armor in Action” so the Armor community can receive immediate alerts when new information is available.

eARMOR’s major thrusts – in addition to delivering the Armor Branch’s professional bulletin – are searchability and access. We are working from our archives to place all editions on-line in a Web-native format such as Hypertext Markup Language. We are coordinating with Donovan Research Library to connect to its pertinent digital collections. As we build from IOC to FOC, our search capability will continue to strengthen.

eARMOR is more than just Web delivery of ARMOR, however – it is a portal made up of several sections that have specific identities and functions. They include:

- **eARMOR’s ARMOR section, or PB section.** The PB section is currently represented by the “Magazine” drop-down part of the menu and the “Featured in ARMOR” area, which rotates among several featured articles in the current edition. (Figure 1.) The PB section launches archived print editions and the PB’s current edition. As we build to FOC, published ARMOR magazines will be posted to the Web from the earliest available edition through current editions.

- **“Armor in Action.”** This area contains links to Armor Branch-specific features and news stories, locating Armor-related news in a centrally accessible place.

- **“ARMOR Heritage.”** This area exploits the wealth of historical knowledge ARMOR readers have through the “historical series” (featuring notable Armor leaders as well as Armor-related battles, battlefields and equipment, for instance). This area also consists of downloadable posters of Armor and Cavalry distinguished unit insignia or shoulder-sleeve insignia. Future content in this area may include features on famous Armor battles; basic Armor and Cavalry history with a timeline; or a virtual tour of the Armor and Cavalry museum.

- **“ARMOR images”** contains work by long-time cover...
artist Jody Harmon as well as Armor-centric photo collections and/or links to photo collections posted on Flickr. This area will also contain links to presentations posted on a site such as Slideshare.

- The plan for “ARMORcasts” is possibly to offer audio transcripts and podcasts of leader speeches and other broadcasts/audio casts. Currently this feature contains embedded videos and links to videos posted on popular video-sharing sites like YouTube and Vimeo. The intent of “ARMORcasts” and “ARMOR images” is to contain Armor-centric multimedia products such as videos and slide presentations to give visually oriented people information in the format they prefer.

- The “ARMOR mobile” area offers content for e-publishing such as to iBook, Nook or Kindle reader versions.

- “ARMOR feedback” links to a Web-based feedback form. The rest of this initiative, however, is transparent – we have links for emailing us sprinkled throughout the site, and each article in the most recent editions contain vote/like functions similar to Facebook. Readers may also vote for their selection of best writer of the calendar year from within each article.

The Web address for eARMOR is https://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR.

As discussed in eARMOR’s writing guidelines, authors must obtain operational-security and their supporting Public Affairs Office’s security-accuracy-policy-propriety clearance in accordance with Army Regulation 360-1. Those procedures remain the same as submission procedures for the hard-copy publication.

EARMOR’s FY14 publication dates and suspenses will be published later this year.

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<td>FY – fiscal year</td>
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After 2nd Cavalry Regiment returned from deployment to Afghanistan in Spring 2011, it spent more than a year preparing for and executing the Decisive-Action Training Environment in October 2012. This marked the first time any Stryker brigade has extensively executed conventional war operations; in the DATE, 2nd Cavalry Regiment faced an adversary that fought not with just counterinsurgency tactics but also with the conventional forces of a true national military.

Stryker brigade combat teams were fielded after the recent wars started. Consequently, although a decade of counterinsurgency has tested their modified table of organization and equipment, SBCTs have not yet participated in conventional-war training. Therefore the DATE and the yearlong preparation that preceded it offered a unique opportunity to evaluate the SBCT against the metric of conventional war. In this article, we will look at a subsection of that—we will look at sustainment abilities at the squadron level. Specifically, we will look at this through the lens of 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the reconnaissance squadron for the regiment.

Logistics support to squadrons in SBCTs is not robust enough to meet the demand of conventional war. A reconnaissance squadron in an SBCT has no MTOE support assets. The regimental support squadron provides all support to each squadron in the regiment. Traditionally, RSS provides 40- to 50-man logistical-support teams to each squadron for maintenance, transportation, supply, field services and distribution support.

Proponents of the LST concept like to use words such as “adaptive,” “tailorable,” “plug-and-play” and “creative.” These words give the reader the false impression that LSTs are like an adjustable wrench that can fit any need. This is hardly the case. Army Doctrinal Publication 4-0, Sustainment, states that sustainment consists of maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support and general engineering support. It lists integration, anticipation, responsiveness, simplicity, economy, survivability, continuity and improvisation as principles of sustainment.

In this article, we will evaluate the LST against the components of sustainment and the principles of sustainment. We will find that the LST is not robust enough an organization to fulfill the requirements of Army sustainment. Finally, we will discuss the adoption, implementation and proof in other brigades of the proper way to address this: the forward support company.

**LST failings: sustainment components**

Since the SBCT has no MTOE support assets, the method 2nd Cavalry Regiment used to conduct maintenance and distribution operation was through the creation and employment of LSTs built out of the RSS to each squadron. These LSTs are not MTOE creations in themselves—they are merely ad hoc assemblages from various paragraphs of RSS. For example, 4/2 Cavalry Regiment’s LST consists of a combat-repair team from maintenance troop MTOE, fuel and supply vehicle assets from distribution troop MTOE and a field-feeding team from RSS HHT, all led by a maneuver lieutenant from 4th Squadron (a non-MTOE position filled out-of-hide).

The CRT consists of about 20 maintenance technicians, including a warrant officer, two load-handling systems with forward repair systems and two M984A2 wreckers. The distribution section consists of seven to 10 Soldiers, two M978A4 fuelers and two M1120A4 LHS. The FFT consists of around 10 Soldiers with one refrigerated unit and one containerized kitchen. These numbers can vary by squadron but are generally the same across the regiment.

Upon deployment to the field, this LST further organizes into field trains, combat trains and a transport section. Field trains consist of the command and control, most of the dedicated maintenance assets and the FFT. The combat trains consist of recovery, expedient repair and emergency resupply. The transport
section consists of the two fuelers and two LHS. This is the LST.

To assess the LST, we will evaluate it against, first, the components of sustainment and, next, the principles of sustainment. The first component of sustainment is maintenance. Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 4-33, defines the purpose of maintenance as “to generate/regenerate combat power ... to enable mission accomplishment.” By this definition, LSTs are undermined. The chief warrant officer for 4/2 Cavalry Regiment performs the maintenance-allocation chart analysis for the squadron and found that 4/2 Cavalry Regiment’s MTOE currently requires 63,003.54 annual manhours.

With 4/2 Cavalry Regiment’s current “tailorable” package, the CRT can only support 36,192 manhours. “Plug-and-play” indeed; 4/2 Cavalry Regiment is operating at 57.44 percent MTOE vs. MAC. According to the paragraphs 4/2 Cavalry Regiment uses, the CRT needs five more 91Bs, two 91Ds, two 91Fs, nine 91Ses and one 94F. The Army (via the MAC) is clearly telling us what is required to perform the job for maintenance; the LST is performing only 57.44 percent of it.

Because the CRT has such a small amount of maintenance support, it is unable to provide field-maintenance teams to the individual troops (company-size formations). Upon deployment to the field, this means that maintenance cannot be fixed forward but instead must be brought to the combat trains and combat posts – or even the field trains and combat posts. This takes combat power out of battle.

Part of this problem is due to the “drying up” of the civilian contractors who used to perform much Stryker maintenance. Indeed, one early article touting the strengths of the LST concept stated, “The LST’s assets include LHSs with trailers, fuel trucks, medical personnel, Department of the Army logistics-assistance representatives and civilian Stryker mechanics” and again “a typical LST consists of one lieutenant, one [CRT] of 20 personnel, including a chief warrant officer 2 and five embedded contractors.” Those singing the early praises of the LST clearly did not take into account a situation where contractors would not be able to help with a significant load, such as in conventional warfare. Indeed, 4/2 Cavalry Regiment encountered this during the DATE when it operated entirely without contractor support.

Next we turn to transportation, distribution and supply. Transportation is the process of moving sustainment to the point of need. Distribution is “the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistics system to deliver the right things to the right place at the right time to support the geographic combatant commander.” LSTs can transport bulk supplies; however, they lack the ability to distribute supplies. Previous assessments of SBCT logistics have tended to reference SBCTs in counterinsurgency operations. These assessments found no problem with the transport and distribution of supplies; indeed many had high accolades for it. In COIN (typical Iraq/Afghanistan operations), LSTs are normally consolidated on forward operating bases. This allows them to deliver sustainment “in series.”

As 4/2 Cavalry Regiment found during the recent decisive-action combat training center rotation, during conventional warfare, sustainment must often occur “in parallel.” During conventional war, there are many more simultaneously occurring “points of need.” There are usually no issues with transporting and distributing Class I and Class V because each troop has one family of medium tactical vehicles and one water buffalo per MTOE. These travel with the logistic package to support the troops individually. However, where these “parallel” sustainment opportunities harm the squadron is with Class IIIIB; the LST has just two M978A4 fuelers. A reconnaissance troop uses on average 600-800 gallons of fuel every 24-36 hours during zone and area reconnaissance missions. One M978A4 fueler holds 2,500 gallons for a total squadron Class IIIIB capacity of 5,000 gallons. Simple math shows us that the LST can support the troops if it resupplies each one in series. The LST is not capable of resupplying more than two troops at one time. In the case of a zone recon or screen, the squadron could be operating on a very wide front. Several times during the DATE, the squadron was well over 25 kilometers.

Doctrinally, the SBCT is supposed to be able to screen a width of 20-30 kilometers and a depth of 10-15 kilometers. This means that the SBCT LST may have to support troops in an area as large as 450 kilometers. As 4/2 Cavalry Regiment found during the DA CTC rotation, this is not feasible with just two fuelers. Frequently, the squadron had to adjust its tempo to fit its logistics.

LST failings: sustainment principles

As demonstrated, on three of the critical components of sustainment according to ADP 4-0, the LST is at a great disadvantage. It encounters similar issues with the principles of sustainment. The first principle of sustainment is integration, defined as “combining all the elements of sustainment ... to operations assuring unity of command and effort.” With its ad hoc assortment from two squadrons and various troops within those squadrons, who often do not have the opportunity to train with each other, the LST lacks integration as to unity of command. Too often, the squadron had to request support packages from RSS that had never trained with the squadron before, limiting performance.

Another principle of sustainment is simplicity, defined as “clarity of tasks, standardized and interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships.” The LST fails the simplicity test for the same reasons as it does integration – the organization is too composite.

Two further principles are responsiveness and improvisation. Although LST proponents claim that it is both of these, this is not the case. ADP 4-0 explains responsiveness as “[t]hrough responsive sustainment, commanders maintain operational focus and pressure, set the tempo of friendly operations.” As has been demonstrated, the inability of the LST to distribute supplies simultaneously derailed the squadron’s tempo.

Finally, the LST has limited ability to improvise. Because its organic resources are very limited, whenever there is another sustainment requirement, the support-platoon leader or the Headquarters and Headquarters Troop executive officer must go to the regimental-support area and request more resources from support-officers officer. Due to the competing requirements of other squadrons and SPO’s natural inclination to hoard resources in the case of uncertainty, it usually is difficult to convince them to release resources.

As we can see, the LST fails many of the Army’s requirements for the principles of sustainment.

FSC advantages

With what should the Army replace this LST concept? A ready solution already exists: the FSC. Armored and infantry BCTs incorporate FSCs into their support-battalion MTOE. A common re-buke is that SBCTs are supposed to be light, mobile and readily deployable. Opponents claim that FSCs would hinder the SBCT’s mobility. If FSCs are light and mobile enough for brigades of 101st Airborne and 173rd Airborne,
why can the Army not make them light and mobile enough for an SBCT? It can. In fact, as 4/2 Cavalry Regiment found during the DA CTC rotation, nothing makes an SBCT more sluggish and immobile than lack of sufficient logistics and sustainment resources.

A typical FSC includes a five-person headquarters section, a 12-person FFT, a 21-person distribution platoon, a 41-person field-maintenance section, an eight-person recovery section and three field-maintenance teams of 10 persons each that are normally assigned to each line troop. This creates a cohesive company of 117 maintenance, support and recovery personnel – much more robust, integrated, simple and responsive. The FSC’s maintenance section is much larger than the LST’s. The additional personnel would allow the unit to achieve its MAC goals. Also, the addition of field-maintenance teams that can be assigned to each line company would allow more maintenance to occur forward rather than in the rear. Finally, the FSC brings superior leadership to the battlefront; just in the company headquarters, there is an O-3, O-2 and E-8 – all in the Logistics Branch.

The LST concept relies too much on having one stellar maneuver lieutenant. The 4/2 Cavalry Regiment had such a lieutenant, but in war people die. The LST leadership structure is too precarious. The redundant leadership structure of the FSC fixes this and adds sustainment experience.

As the Army considers this, it may become necessary or desired to decrease the FSC slightly to retain the freedom of maneuver the SBCT prides itself on. For example, one can argue the FFT is unnecessary in a rapidly deployable SBCT battalion. Soldiers can live on Meals Ready to Eat – hot meals are a SBCT battalion. Soldiers can live on unnecessary in a rapidly deployable. For example, one can argue the FFT is of maneuver the SBCT prides itself on.

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The 4/2 Cavalry Regiment had such a lieutenant, but in war people die. The LST leadership structure is too precarious. The redundant leadership structure of the FSC fixes this and adds sustainment experience.

The LST fails when tested against the constant operations, movement and sustainment demands of conventional war. Its maintenance section lacks the numbers to repair equipment quickly; its ability to distribute “in parallel” is limited; its organization is ad hoc; and its leadership is too dependent on one outstanding personality. The FSC fixes all these problems while remaining light, mobile and readily deployable. The Army should immediately incorporate FSCs into the Striker brigade design in an effort to take away the current logistical and maintenance handicap its MTOE design is providing.

LTC Chris Budihas commands 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, in Vilseck, Germany. He has more than 24 years of enlisted and officer experience in all forms of infantry operations and has served in assignments such as deputy chief of staff, Joint Multinational Training Center, Grafenwoehr; aide for the commanding general of Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS; brigade executive officer, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, GA; and battalion operations officer, 1st Battalion, 64th Armored Divi- sion, Fort Stewart. His military educa- tion includes the School of Advanced Military Studies; Ranger, Airborne and Air Assault schools; and Mountain Warfare School. His civilian education includes a bachelor’s of science degree in political science, a master’s of business administration from Webster University and a master’s in military arts and science from SAMS.

CPT James Fortune serves as HHT execu- tive officer in 4th Squadron, 2nd Cav- alry Regiment, Vilseck, Germany. He previously served as N Troop executive officer and L Troop platoon leader. He holds a bachelor’s of science degree from U.S. Military Academy and has served a combat tour in Afghanistan.

Notes
2 ADP 4-0. Sustainment, July 31, 2012.
3 MAC analysis performed by CWS Shawn Burns Jan. 9, 2013.
4 Butler and Van De Hey.
5 Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 4-0, Sustainment, July 31, 2012.
6 Ibid.
9 From a conversation with 4/2 Cavalry Reg- iment’s squadron S-4, CPT Van Ingen, Jan. 7, 2013. Van Ingen kept calculations of this metric each time the squadron deployed to the field over the course of a year.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
Training Your Company Intelligence-Support Team

by CPT Juan P. Feliciano

Many factors must be considered when establishing and training your company intelligence-support team. It is very important that you have your battalion or squadron commander’s support.

The first factor to consider is your CoIST’s modified table of organization and equipment. It is crucial that you have the right Soldiers for the job. The Soldiers selected must have analytical, briefing and quick decision-making skills, a penchant for working with computers and technology, and other desired skills the troop commander deems necessary.

The second factor to consider is CoIST capabilities. You have to determine what you want your CoIST to routinely accomplish. The simplest way to do this is to establish subtasks during prebriefs, mission phases and debriefing that the CoIST will be able to follow every time, thus creating consistency. Figure 1 is a suggested checklist to help establish consistency.

The last factor to evaluate during CoIST training is resources. As we shift toward a decisive-action environment, it is essential that we resource the CoIST with the proper tools to accomplish their mission. Using analog systems to back up digital capabilities is a must. A dedicated radio and Blue Force Tracker will allow the CoIST to mitigate communication issues and operate over large distances until on-the-move digital communications are part of your MTOE.

What should your CoIST look like?

To have an effective CoIST, you will need to select quality Soldiers who have longevity in the unit and will be a part of the CoIST for at least one year. The Soldiers selected as analysts should have no other duties other than CoIST. To facilitate this requirement, Soldiers should come from the company/troop headquarters platoon since these Soldiers will most likely man your command post. During our National Training Center Decisive-Action Rotation 12-05, the 3-1 Cavalry Squadron S-2 shop successfully used six-Soldier CoIST teams. The CoIST officer in charge was the troop executive officer, and the noncommissioned officer in charge was a sergeant from Headquarters Platoon. The troop also provided three more Soldiers to the CoIST to serve as analysts.

What made this CoIST different from all the CoISTs I have worked with was the addition of a 35F Soldier (military-intelligence analyst). Although resourcing the troops with intelligence Soldiers from the squadron S-2 shop severely degraded manning, providing the troop with an intelligence subject-matter expert produced results well worth the cost.

Another requirement is that all your CoIST members at a minimum possess a secret security clearance. This allows your CoIST access to sensitive and secret information. The CoIST’s ability to maintain constant communication with and provide progress reports to the company/troop commander is essential.

What should your CoIST be able to accomplish? This may vary due to the type of unit (infantry, Armor and Cavalry), mission, etc. Being in a Cavalry unit, I wanted my CoIST to be experts on intelligence preparation of the battlefield. I also wanted them to conduct prebriefs, debriefs, battle tracking, tactical questioning, and lethal and non-lethal targeting, and to know how to operate all our organic systems (Distributing Common Ground System-Army, Tactical Ground Reporting Net, robotics systems, One-System Remote Video Terminal, Biometric Automated Toolset and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment).

Being part of an armored reconnaissance squadron also meant that the CoIST had to learn about “passive” infrareds. We spent the first couple of months teaching priority information requirements, infrareds and indicators, and how they link to information collection. We also developed reporting formats that led to effective reporting the CoIST used to obtain information from their platoons to answer and develop new PIR for their prebriefs. The big training should be well

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**Figure 1. CoIST checklist.**
Our squadron trained our CoIST during sergeant’s time training – every Thursday we trained from 7:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. I was fortunate that my brigade has a Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Integration Cell. Their training capabilities included CoIST, Human Intelligence Control Cell, Al Taqaddum Airbase, biometrics (BATS, HIIDE, Secure Electronic Enrollment Kit), site exploitation, robotics, field-training-exercise support, IED/homemade-explosives awareness and handheld detectors. We used the C2IC team significantly and conducted joint training with other battalions as well. The best training for your CoIST is hands-on at the company/troop level.

CoIST should be involved in all your operational orders and rehearsals, not only in a field environment but in garrison as well. Use them to brief weather effects for ranges, gunnery, live-fire exercises and terrain analysis for road marches. Having them brief and prepare products as often as possible will only improve their skills. After training the CoIST, ensure they are involved in as much collective training as possible using your standard operating procedures to validate them. Employ them in all gunnery and field-training problems with specific training objectives nested with the company/troops.

This will allow you to finalize your SOP and have a quality product.

**Equipping your CoIST**

For your CoIST to be successful in any environment, it must have the proper equipment. This should be a mixture of analog products and other equipment that will allow your CoIST to maintain communication with all their elements. If your company/troop can acquire secure and nonsecure router-access-point terminals or Harris 117G radios – which will allow you to send and receive data while maximizing your frequency-modulation capability – you can rectify these problems. If this is not a feasible option, all you can do is optimize your current systems. Planning with your S-6 for re-transmit capabilities is necessary.

In an effort to cut down on radio traffic on the command net, we created an operations and information net. The operations and intelligence net should be used as the primary method of communication during operations for the CoIST.

Another great organic asset you have available is BFT. BFT is going to be your most reliable source of communication while on the move or out of FM communication range; the CoIST should own a BFT or have access to one at all times.

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Table 1. CoIST PACE plan.
CoIST should be able to create overlays, continuously populate significant activities and send reports and information. Furthermore, your SOP or Annex B should address the CoIST primary, alternate, contingency and emergency plan (Table 1).

Finally, as we transition into a decisive-action environment, revisit the analog tools. Your analog products should include maps, acetate, markers, notepads and site-exploitation equipment so you can transition to counterinsurgency operations. We gave our CoIST lapboards (Figure 3), which allowed them to conduct all their duties without relying on digital systems.

As our focus shifts from COIN to decisive action, you want to ensure that all levels, especially company/troop, have clear situational awareness and understanding of not only the present but what lies ahead as well. The fastest and most effective way of communicating this is through the CoIST.

There is no right or wrong answer when it comes to training your CoIST. With the right Soldiers, clearly defined CoIST standards, proper equipment and tough, realistic scenarios in a time-constrained environment, your CoIST will achieve success and enable the company or troop to perform at its full potential in any environment or mission.

CPT Juan Feliciano is the S-2 for 3-1 Cavalry Squadron, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Benning, GA. He previously served at Fort Hood, TX, as assistant battalion S-2, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; tank company executive officer, Delta Company, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division; and tank company platoon leader, Charlie Company, 2-8 Cavalry, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. His military schooling includes Cavalry Leaders Course, Military Intelligence Captains’ Career Course and Armor Basic Officer Leader Course. CPT Feliciano holds a bachelor’s of science degree from Florida International University in criminal justice. He is the recipient of a Bronze Star medal for serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom during 2009-10.

**ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN**

| BAT | Biometric Automated Toolset |
| BDA | battle damage assessment |
| BFT | Blue Force Tracker |
| CIIC | Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Integration Cell |
| COIN | counterinsurgency |
| CoIST | company intelligence-support team |
| DCGS-A | Distributed Common Ground System-Army |
| FM | frequency modulation |
| GRINTSUM | graphical intelligence summary |
| HIIDE | Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment |
| IED | improvised explosive device |
| LOGPAC | logistical package |
| MTOE | modified table of organization and equipment |
| NAI | named area of interest |
| O&I | operation and information |
| PACE | primary, alternate, contingency and emergency |
| PIR | priority information requirement |
| SOP | standard operating procedure |
| SSE | sensitive site exploration |
influential NDS officer mentioned was actually the highest-ranking individual in the room, although he was not chairing the meeting.

Personal connections, family status, service history and personal reputation all play a part in determining influence level as well. Some may have influence only over certain sections of Afghan society or the ANSF; some may be universally respected. Should the adviser be able to identify and leverage key influential personalities, it will greatly enhance the adviser’s ability to improve ANSF performance.

(11) “They’re really not that different. ... They’re country folks and use the same parables we do to explain things.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser is a storyteller who uses parables and stories to convey his point. Much is made of the differences between American and Afghan communication and learning styles, but Afghans, like Americans, are more likely to remember or take something away from a conversation if they can form a personal connection with the message or messenger. The U.S. military relies heavily upon lessons-learned documents, written accounts or vignettes from combat, etc. – these tools are simply professionally written and edited stories. The marginal difference lies in that perhaps Afghans are slightly more accepting of the use of stories or parables in a professional setting as a form of communication. The effective adviser leverages this to his advantage in getting his point across.

The first step in using parables and stories is to learn some of the Afghan sayings from one’s interpreter. While some sayings have slightly different Afghan equivalents (i.e., “You can’t take hair from your beard and make a moustache” is the rough equivalent for “You can’t mix apples and oranges”), many – like the story of the “Boy Who Cried Wolf” – are held exactly in common.42 Communicating through Afghan sayings and parables will not only expedite the process of explaining a concept in an intelligible way but will gain the adviser his counterpart’s respect.

Secondly, the effective adviser is ready to improvise by creating stories or parables of his own that fit the situation or concept the adviser is trying to describe. When describing how to accomplish a certain task, it is significantly more effective for the adviser to describe how he accomplished or failed to accomplish this task in the past, rather than describe step by step how this task should be or could be accomplished. Creating a story with the adviser as the protagonist creates a personal connection between the Afghan counterpart and the situation or task being described.

These stories need not be entirely factually or historically accurate. There is nothing wrong with fabricating a believable story or parable to get one’s point across.43 Primarily, though, the stories should signal that the adviser is open and has experienced the same difficulty/situation the Afghan is facing; thus believability and genuineness is key.

Finally, encouraging Afghans to exchange their own war stories or life experiences is an effective tool for helping them work through an issue or learn a new skill. For example, when teaching a class to Afghan soldiers on counter-improved-explosive-device techniques, encouraging the soldiers to describe their own experiences with IEDs can lead to a meaningful discussion on IED defeat, which the Afghan soldiers are more likely to remember than a stock CIED class.44 Generally speaking, exchanging war stories, especially if the adviser and the Afghan counterpart have combat experience in the same region of Afghanistan, is one of the best techniques for trust-building and advising throughout one’s rotation.
The effective adviser understands that to communicate clearly to his Afghan counterpart, he must know how to correctly use an interpreter. Much of using interpreters comes with practice, but to use an interpreter correctly, one must both ensure the interpreter understands what the adviser is trying to express and that the Afghan counterpart is receiving from the interpreter what the adviser is intending to say.

Ensuring the interpreter understands the adviser is best accomplished by briefing the interpreter on the purpose of the meeting before meeting with one’s Afghan counterpart. This includes going over any relevant terms, key phrases or numbers, as well as the general tone and purpose of the meeting. Trying to explain a concept or a word to an interpreter during the meeting often will break the natural flow of the conversation. While not necessarily catastrophic, and obviously not entirely avoidable, it is advisable to brief the interpreter beforehand. This can also be accomplished by matching interpreters with knowledge of a particular specialized lexicon to particular meetings. For example, a local-national linguist who previously served with the ANA as an artilleryman would be likely to perform well in meetings that deal with fires.

Ensuring the Afghan counterpart is receiving what the adviser is trying to say is more difficult. This involves the adviser understanding both how his interpreter translates (whether he speaks generally word for word or conveys the concept), and how Afghans themselves speak. English has a vast and technical vocabulary with a great number of synonyms, each conveying different nuances. Dari and Pashto both have a much smaller and less technical vocabulary. For example, the English words “reconnaissance” and “intelligence” are expressed in Dari using the same word, kashf.

Thus, especially when using technical terms or English styles of speaking that rely on some of this nuance (like dry humor or downplaying for effect), it does not translate as intended in Dari or Pashto. Exaggerating (by English standards) is trying to explain a concept or a word to an interpreter during the meeting often will break the natural flow of the conversation. While not necessarily catastrophic, and obviously not entirely avoidable, it is advisable to brief the interpreter beforehand. This can also be accomplished by matching interpreters with knowledge of a particular specialized lexicon to particular meetings. For example, a local-national linguist who previously served with the ANA as an artilleryman would be likely to perform well in meetings that deal with fires.

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Thus, especially when using technical terms or English styles of speaking that rely on some of this nuance (like dry humor or downplaying for effect), it does not translate as intended in Dari or Pashto. Exaggerating (by English standards) is often necessary as well to overcome some of the differences between English and Dari/Pashto and convey one’s true message to one’s Afghan counterpart.

Similarly, indicating meaning by providing context can ensure that the interpreter is conveying an understandable message in Dari/Pashto. For example, “intelligence drives operations” could be given context by saying “intelligence we have gained by doing things like talking to our sources drives operations.” Thus, the effective adviser thinks about what he is trying to say before speaking, using context, exaggeration and his knowledge of Afghan speech patterns to give his interpreter a message that will be clear when translated into Dari/Pashto.

As stated, using an interpreter effectively requires experience with interpreters and knowledge of the specific interpreter’s capabilities. Briefing the interpreter beforehand and understanding the differences between American military English and Dari/Pashto can assist the effective adviser in communicating to the interpreter and conveying a clear message to his Afghan counterpart.

(13) “Sometimes it comes down to convincing them to do what they don’t want to do.” – 2/1/201st ANA Kandak adviser team.

While the effective adviser understands that compelling behavior is not the same as advising, sometimes an adviser must convince the ANSF to accomplish a certain task or undertake a certain activity. Circumstances like security during CF retrograde operations in particular require the ANSF’s assistance, and it often falls on the adviser to convince the ANSF to behave in a particular CF-desired fashion. While in many cases the ANSF recognize that assisting CF is in their long-term best interest, some may be unwilling at first, particularly if they do not see what their organization is receiving “in return” for their compliance. Thus, the effective adviser employs a number of strategies to convince the ANSF to comply, none of which include tricking, threatening or extorting the ANSF.

Throughout, the effective adviser attempts to ensure that the final decision is an Afghan one. This means helping the ANSF leader develop the idea/compromise/plan so that when the ANSF leader executes what CF is asking him to do, the way he accomplishes it is “his” idea. The first and most simple method is to lay out the “pros” and “cons” of complying for the involved ANSF organization. This will help ANSF personalities understand how the adviser sees the issue and vice versa. Often there is information one party has that changes the calculus for the other.

Secondly, if the pros-and-cons comparison indicates the ANSF is giving up more than they are receiving from participating in the operation or completing the task, the adviser can seek to offset the cost for the ANSF. As discussed previously, this can be done by providing materials (sandbags to build an observation post the ANSF is being requested to construct on short notice for route security) or even personnel (while not a maneuver force, adviser teams have on occasion manned ANSF OPs to free up ANSF combat power for offensive operations).

Finally, if the preceding methods have not worked, the adviser can try a personal appeal by telling the ANSF leader that the adviser’s higher-headquarters is pressuring the adviser, or simply ask for a favor based on the strength of the relationship. While many advisers may be uncomfortable with the idea of putting stress on the relationship in this manner, or even uncomfortable with the idea of personal appeals in the first place, this strategy is quite effective, given a healthy relationship between the adviser and the ANSF leader. While at the risk of over-generalizing, Afghans are more comfortable with “favors” and “personal appeals” in a work-context than Americans. Thus, what an American adviser might see as an inappropriately forward request that mixes work with personal connections, the Afghan counterpart might see as a perfectly normal request that he feels required to carefully consider for the sake of the relationship.

Thus, the effective adviser recognizes that fundamentally, convincing the ANSF to behave in a certain way is tied directly to the strong personal relationships between advisers and the ANSF. If an adviser “knows his audience,” has created a relationship built on respect with his counterpart, and on occasion has done small “favors” for his ANSF counterpart, the adviser is much more likely to be able to convince the ANSF to behave in the particular way CF desires.

(14) “They just have to decide if they’re going with the old Soviet style (no NCO empowerment) or the American style (NCO empowerment). … They can’t be somewhere in between.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser recognizes that most ANSF organizations are currently struggling with defining the role of NCOs within their ranks. The effective adviser, especially if he is an NCO himself, understands that it is of critical importance the adviser assist the ANSF in defining the roles and responsibilities of the NCO within the organization, whether this
means embracing the old “Soviet model” or the new “NATO model.”

Currently, in most ANSF organizations, NCOs are higher-paid privates. Officers do not rely on them as repositories of experience and organizational knowledge. They are not delegated authority to accomplish tasks and are not empowered with the ability to take initiative within officer-defined guidelines. This is closer to the “Soviet model” level of NCO empowerment. Many ANSF officers are more comfortable with this model because empowering NCOs would force these officers to be accountable for what their subordinates did or did not do without direct officer oversight.53 Given that the trust of the NCO corps is lacking across the ANSF, this is seen as unadvisable. Some of the lack of faith in the NCO corps is justified, given that most combat-arms NCOs are functionally illiterate and have a much lower educational level than their officers. Yet, some of the readily apparent inflexibility of the ANSF can be traced directly back to the lack of NCO empowerment.

Some commanders are more inclined toward the “NATO model” of NCO empowerment. Many commanders see the benefits of moving their organizations towards the “NATO model” but are unsure of how to guide their organization in that direction.54 Regardless, the issue of NCO empowerment comes back to the organizational commander at every level, and the adviser must assist the commander in guiding his organization towards the level of NCO empowerment dictated by the ANSF organization’s higher headquarters.55 The current state of non-uniform levels of NCO empowerment within ANSF organizations is unsustainable, and it is the responsibility of the effective adviser to help guide ANSF organizations at all levels towards one model or the other, and assist the ANSF organization in enforcing these guidelines with subordinate organizations.


The effective adviser always criticizes his Afghan counterpart privately but praises him publically, while simultaneously remaining humble throughout. While shame plays perhaps an even greater role in Afghan culture than in American culture, the concept of “public praise/private criticism” is not alien to the U.S. military. Publicly criticizing a superior is almost never acceptable, and publically criticizing a subordinate is a strong rebuke. The main difference between Afghan and U.S. military cultures is that the Afghan military culture is even more polarized – public praise or criticism is stronger in Afghan military culture than in U.S. military culture. The effective adviser leverages this for his advantage while understanding the implications when Afghans criticize or praise one another.

If an adviser wishes to praise his counterpart to positively reinforce good performance, doing it privately is not as effective as doing it publically.56 Almost universally, CF opinions are respected, and when an adviser praises an Afghan, it reflects particularly well on that Afghan. Since CF opinions are held in high regard, when criticizing, the adviser should understand what CF criticism can do to an ANSF officer or NCO. In one case, after being publically criticized by advisers, an ANA officer went to the trouble of collecting every certificate of appreciation or training that he had ever received and presented this paperwork to the adviser team in an attempt to convince them to reverse their opinion of him.57

When criticizing, even in a private setting, the effective adviser is humble but honest.58 An adviser is not fulfilling his responsibilities if he is not able to constructively criticize his counterpart and help the counterpart learn from his failings. Thus, the effective adviser knows how to criticize without offending. First, the effective adviser does not begin to criticize his counterpart until he has developed a relationship with his counterpart.59 Much like in American military culture, one is unlikely to take the opinion of a newly met individual seriously and may even become offended.

Second, an adviser can attempt to highlight the failings of the counterpart indirectly by drawing the attention of the counterpart to failings the counterpart and a third party share.60 For example, the adviser could say “look at 2nd Kandak, they’re doing ‘X’ and it is not working at all,” implying that “X” is incorrect and drawing the attention of the counterpart to “X,” which he happens to be doing as well. By speaking through context and inference, the adviser can criticize without shaming or embarrassing his counterpart.

Alternately, the adviser can use a more direct route by periodical giving the counterpart a task-based counseling using measures of performance from the counterpart’s chain of command.61 Doing this not only helps the adviser understand how well the counterpart is performing from the Afghan perspective (rather than the adviser perspective) but limits the embarrassment experienced by the counterpart. Since the adviser is helping the counterpart understand his success/failure as judged by a third party, the adviser and the counterpart can move to correct the failures and reinforce the success as “teammates.”

In summary, the effective adviser is capable of providing constructive criticism to his counterpart either directly or indirectly, but always in private. Likewise, he leverages public praise to reinforce success or highlight models for others to emulate. Throughout, the adviser is humble and respectful, ensuring the ANSF does not lose respect for themselves or feel shame due to the adviser’s comments.

(16) “Very few actually feel like they need your help.” – 1/1/201 ANA Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser understands that to a certain degree, his Afghan counterpart feels he does not need the adviser’s help. Many senior ANSF officers and NCOs have been at war off and on for the last three decades. Even the younger generation of ANSF leaders have experienced conflict on a day-to-day basis since childhood. Except on rare occasions, the ANSF leader has more combat experience, is higher ranking and has more time serving within his warfighting function than the adviser. Thus, in most cases, while the ANSF leader may feel that his ANSF organization requires CF assistance, he may personally feel he does not need the assistance of his adviser in improving his own performance.

Thus, given that the ANSF counterpart does not feel he needs assistance in improving his performance, what does he expect to receive from his adviser? Some expect to use their advisers to raise issues/problems to their ANSF higher the counterpart feels uncomfortable raising himself. Some expect their adviser to provide them with material assistance – be it supplies, equipment, air support, etc.62 There are even some who attempt to convince their advisers they need extensive assistance so as to lessen their own workload (assuming their adviser is willing to not see them fail).63 Most are convinced, due to their pride and extensive combat experience, that they do not require advice, mentorship or training from their junior American mentor.64 Knowing this is the starting mindset of his counterpart can help the effective adviser begin to become value-added for his ANSF counterpart. Simply starting by earning the trust of the ANSF counterpart and becoming a “sounding board” for his ideas, or being available to provide an opinion when asked, is an excellent way to demonstrate the adviser has something to
add to the discussion. Playing “devil’s advocate” for one’s ANSF leader can also be useful to the ANSF leader who believes he does not need advising, since ANSF personnel rarely provide that for one another. Furthermore, asking the ANSF leader to teach the adviser is an excellent avenue for guiding the ANSF leader to discuss his thoughts on warfighting with the adviser, thus opening the ANSF counterpart to discussions on best practices.65

While a strongly entrenched senior ANSF leader may never believe he personally requires advising or improvement in his performance, taking some of the preceding routes may assist the adviser in subtly helping the ANSF leader improve. Furthermore, by becoming a trusted “sounding board” or friend, the ANSF leader will be more likely to take more straightforward advice later in the relationship based on the friendship alone.

In summary, most ANSF counterparts believe they do not need advising (at least the way CF envisions advising), and by recognizing this from the outset, the adviser can take action to subtly improve ANSF performance rather than coming across as “out of touch” by the more senior and combat-experienced ANSF leadership.

(17) “Don’t let the insider threat put up barriers between you and your counterpart. Draw your counterparts in close. Make them be your host. Tell them you feel safe because they are securing you.” – 7th and 1st ABP Zone 1 Kandak adviser team.

The effective adviser, while accepting that insider threats are real and seeking to mitigate them, does not let the insider threat either separate him from his counterpart or prevent him from accomplishing his mission. This means understanding both as an organization and as an individual that “risk is what right looks like,”66 because the insider threat risk can never entirely be mitigated, and attempting to do so only inhibits mission accomplishment. Instead, the effective adviser embraces the fact that his security is not entirely in his own hands, and he must rely on his Afghan counterparts to take some responsibility for securing him and his team. Essentially, creating distance or standoff between advisers and the ANSF, rather than eliminating barriers and building collective security solutions, is the incorrect method for dealing with the insider threat.

First, it is the responsibility of the adviser team to mitigate some of the insider threat by not allowing “unforced errors.” It is the responsibility of each adviser to ensure he doesn’t create any personal vendettas or grievances between himself and any Afghan.67 Minor disputes, misunderstandings or arguments should be promptly resolved so the involved Afghan feels he has satisfaction. Cultural or religious faux pas should not be allowed to linger, and advisers should take care to address any of these issues as soon as they come to their attention. While some advisers may feel it unnecessary or even insulting to have to apologize for acceptable stateside behavior, it is vital to do so to avoid allowing personal issues to fester.

Second, advisers should assist the ANSF in solving some of the root causes of insider attacks.68 ANSF leadership are equally at risk for insider attacks and thus are usually amenable to working with advisers to address root causes of insider attacks when they are identified. Some root causes include soldiers not being paid on time; soldiers not being allowed to go on leave regularly/being stationed at remote sites without being relieved for long periods; soldiers not regularly being fed/watered; and the remains of ANSF fallen not being processed in a timely manner. While none of these factors might be the deciding factor that causes an ANSF service member to kill, they are contributing factors that create environments that breed intra-ANSF and possibly anti-CF violence.

Third, advisers should cultivate “informers” within the ANSF organization with which they work.69 By being friendly and open with all ANSF personnel encountered, and taking the time to converse with and develop a relationship with large numbers of ANSF personnel, the adviser can develop a network of personnel who see the adviser as a human being rather than a generic ISAF soldier. This regularly results in the ANSF service member actively seeking out the adviser to alert him to danger.70 Simply put, as with counterinsurgency operations, the more an element knows the people of an area and has good relations with them, the more the local population is willing to assist the element in securing itself. ANSF service members, in addition to the adviser team’s direct counterparts, are the “local population.”

Fourth, advisers should take an ANSF-inclusive systematic approach to identifying potential insider-threat perpetrators before they attack.71 By working with the CF BSI S-2 section and the ANSF element S-2 and NDS sections, the adviser team can serve as a conduit of information as well as an intelligence customer. Soldiers going on leave to insurgency-dominated areas are particularly susceptible to insurgency efforts to “co-opt” the service member and influence them to conduct an insider attack. Helping the ANSF synchronize their counter-intelligence, personnel-management and force-protection efforts to prevent/mitigate occurrences like the “post-leave insider attack” not only assists in professionalizing the ANSF but also improves security for the adviser team.

Finally, advisers should not make themselves a fixed target when visiting their ANSF counterparts, changing their weapon and equipment load, number of personnel moving together, and arrival and departure times.72 Identifying a designated shooter or “guardian angel” is also prudent, yet this designated shooter should not be overt. The designated shooter should not be clothed differently from the rest of the team, nor should the designated shooter be in an obviously aggressive posture. The designated shooter should sit facing entry points and should not be engaged whatsoever in the dialogue going on.

Having an overt or aggressively postured designated shooter brings only marginal (if any) added security but adds a layer of tension to the proceedings, degrading the advisers’ ability to accomplish their mission.73 An effective adviser team trains continually throughout its deployment on how to engage targets in confined areas, areas with large numbers of civilians or after having to quickly draw one’s weapon.74 Effective training for the designated shooter will make him effective at securing the team without the designated shooter having to be in a rapport-degrading aggressive stance during adviser-counterpart interactions.

In the event of an insider attack or high-profile international incident (i.e., 2012’s “Innocence of Muslims” inflammatory video release), the effective adviser team does not disengage from its counterparts; the team pulls them in closer. Often, after insider attacks, even if they take place in a different ANSF organization or province, adviser teams are pressured to pull back from their Afghan counterparts. This is precisely the worst time to do so. The adviser team should visit its counterparts and observe the ANSF organization. The adviser team likely has the best idea of what “normal” looks like, and to secure itself and other CF personnel, it is the responsibility of the adviser team to see if the situation remains normal with the ANSF organization or if the environment may
have changed, possibly indicating unrest or sympathetic insider attacks.75

Furthermore, the ANSF counterparts must be reassured that the attack or international incident has not changed the relationship between the adviser and the counterpart. Instead of ignoring the issue, advisers should address it openly, relying upon higher-headquarters-approved messaging and one’s own knowledge of one’s Afghan counterpart. It is also the adviser team’s responsibility to leverage the ANSF leadership to ensure that this CF messaging reaches the service member level of the ANSF organization.

In the event the ANSF leadership advises the adviser team not to visit, the adviser team can accomplish some of the above goals (maintaining the relationship, determining the threat level and correctly messaging the situation) by inviting the ANSF to visit the adviser team at the CF facility.

In summary, the effective adviser team, while taking steps to mitigate risk on its own, invites the ANSF to act as its host and secure the team. This means working together to identify potential risks before they directly or indirectly cause casualties. Yet the adviser team recognizes and is comfortable with the fact that not all risk can ever be entirely mitigated. If a trustworthy and familiar Afghan service member suddenly decides to kill an American, tells no one, secretly obtains a firearm and is able to get close to the team, there is very little that can be done except ensure he is only able to get one shot off before he is killed. If an adviser team has taken all the preceding steps, is engaged in collective security with the ANSF and is only open to trading “man for man”76 in a random killing, the adviser team has successfully mitigated risk.

(18) “Know the ethnic-political history of your Afghan counterpart because this impacts how he will interact with you and other Afghans.” -2/201 ANA Brigade adviser team.

In addition to being a student of Afghan history, generally defined, the effective adviser is a student of the personal experience of his counterpart and his counterpart’s colleagues with Afghan history. A Westerner will never entirely understand the complex ethno-political milieu that is an Afghan kandak or brigade staff; however, by understanding the history and background of key players, and how those backgrounds relate to one another within the context of post-Taliban Afghan society, one can minimize the risk of sparking intra-ANSF personality conflict, leverage the correct leadership personalities to influence other ANSF personalities and, to a certain degree, understand the motivations of one’s own and other ANSF counterparts.

While it is obviously a generalization to say there are only three dimensions to analyzing the background of an ANSF personality, the following three dimensions are relatively easy for the adviser to identify, are simple to comprehend and, in many if not most cases, best help the adviser approximate the way other Afghans view the ANSF personality. The model described is less a scientific tool than a simple rule of thumb for advisers.

The first dimension is “ethnicity.” What is the ethnic background and birthplace of the ANSF personality? While the differences among members even of the same ethnic group hailing from the same district in Afghanistan can be vast, for the most part they share some defining characteristics (acents, dress, history and reputation) recognizable by other Afghans. The more fidelity an adviser has on the exact background of ANSF personalities, the better, but in general understanding basic ethnic and regional background is enough.

The second dimension is “with which side the ANSF personality fought during the jihad against the Soviets.” Did the ANSF counterpart fight with the mujahideen or with the Soviets? Did he receive any training in Pakistan or in the USSR? What was his position within the Communist regime or the mujahideen? Again, if the adviser can determine with which mujahideen party or Communist regime units the ANSF counterpart served, the better, but generally knowing with which side the counterpart fought is sufficient.

The third dimension is “where the ANSF personality spent the years of the Taliban regime and what he did.” Did the ANSF personality stay in Afghanistan as a civilian? Did he stay in Afghanistan and actively resist the Taliban? Did the ANSF personality flee to Pakistan or another country? Or, in the more rare occasion, did he work with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan?

One can analyze an ANSF personality and how other ANSF personalities view the first personality using these dimensions. Generally speaking, and all things being equal, ethnic groups will self-segregate for linguistic, cultural and historical reasons. Similarly, ex-Democratic Republic of Afghanistan officers will have more affinity toward other ex-DRA officers over persons with a mujahideen background. Those who stayed in Afghanistan and resisted the warlords and the Taliban or suffered as civilians under their tenure will naturally gravitate toward those with similar experiences, over those who fled Afghanistan and vice versa.

Persons who share none of the three dimensions are very likely to be antagonistic toward one another. Persons who share all three are highly likely to view each other positively. Surprisingly, often it appears that common allegiance during the jihad is the determining dimension when it comes to how Afghans view one another, trumped only by common ethnic subgroup (tribal or familial) affiliation.77

Understanding these three simple dimensions to Afghan officers can help the adviser navigate its interpersonal rivalries and pitfalls. This isn’t to say there are no rivalries or personality conflicts within a group of Afghans with a similar background. Yet, by understanding the potential historical reasons behind inter-organizational conflicts, advisers can better apply resources to correct staff friction rather than vainly attempting to resolve long-standing historical-personal conflicts.

Thus, the effective adviser takes time to understand and map the personal history of ANSF personalities with whom he works. Armed with this understanding, the effective adviser can apply influence and pressure more diplomatically.

The observations made by the combat advisers of 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry, should be familiar to those who have read the historical literature on advising, particularly the works of T.E. Lawrence. While the observations may differ in the details due to the vast differences between 21st Century Afghan culture and 20th Century Hijaz-Arab culture, both identify that the key to advising lies in fostering a healthy relationship with one’s counterpart.

Crafting this relationship is not the product of “cultural awareness” but of social intelligence. Socially-intelligent ad-
visers are honest, respectful, humble, calm, observant, adaptive and consequently effective advisers. Knowing the history and culture of Afghanistan is critical, but acting consistently in ways that reflect social intelligence is the deciding factor in being an effective adviser.

Yet even the most socially-intelligent adviser cannot be effective on his own. The most effective advisers are part of teams that work together, building relationships, leveraging them in concert and communicating to the ANSF with a synchronized and consistent message to assist the ANSF in developing their own ways to affect organizational change. Every member of a team must be a relationship-builder rather than a compeller of action, capable of communicating that he is there because we are leaving.

CPT Spencer French is the assistant intelligence officer with 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, KY. He also served in B Company, 2nd Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne, as signals-intelligence platoon leader and battalion intelligence officer. The Bronze Star recipient (one oak-leaf cluster) served two tours in Afghanistan. His military schooling includes Air Assault School, Campaign-Continuity Language Operators Course (Dari), Antiterrorism Officer Basic Course, Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Unit Commander and Staff Officer Course, Basic Officer Leadership Course II, Officer Candidate School and basic combat training. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Georgetown University in international politics.

Notes
1 Between September and December 2012, the author conducted about 20 hours of interviews with 85 combat advisers with 1st Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment; three United Kingdom civilian intelligence trainers; and two UK civilian Afghan cultural advisers/linguists. These advisers, trainers and linguists had worked at the kandak (battalion) and brigade level in Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, Laghman and Kapisa provinces for at least five months as of the time of their interviews. Some, including the UK civilian intelligence trainers, had worked in Afghanistan for more than four years. The UK civilian cultural advisers/linguists had been born and raised in Afghanistan. CPT French annotated trends (i.e., if more than two teams made a similar observation). The 18 points that comprise this article are a summary of the most commonly mentioned and salient trends described in the interviews.

2 Team First Strike deployed to the N2KL region, part of Regional Command-East, under Team Strike (2/101st Airborne Air Assault), Task Force Mountain Warrior (4-4 IBCT) and Combined Joint Task Force-1 in April 2012 with the mission of advising and assisting the ANA and ABP. The 1-502 Battalion team advised the 2/201st ANA Brigade at Jalalabad Garrison in Nangarhar Province and at FOB Joyce, Kunar Province. Team First Strike and Team Strike’s mission as a whole was unique in that 2/101 deployed advisers exclusively to N2KL while 4-4 IBCT conducted the battlespace-owner mission. Given that future BCTs will deploy advisers organic to the deploying BSI brigade, Team First Strike and Team Strike have accumulated lessons-learned and experiences unlikely to be duplicated during the rest of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan.


4 Author’s interview with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Regu-


6 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.


8 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.


10 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

11 Author’s interview with Headquarters 1-502 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) (Team Talon), Nov. 5-26, 2012, FOB Joyce.

12 Author’s interview with Team Regulators.

13 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

14 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

15 Ibid.

16 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

17 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.


19 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

20 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

21 Ibid.

22 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

23 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

24 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

25 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

26 Author’s interview with Team Regulators.

27 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

28 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

29 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

30 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

31 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

32 Ibid.

33 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

38 Author’s interview with Team Wardog.

39 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

40 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

41 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

42 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

43 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

44 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

45 Author’s interview with Team Regulators.

46 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

47 Ibid.

48 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

49 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

50 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Author’s interview with Team Wardog.

54 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

55 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

56 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

57 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

58 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

59 Ibid.

60 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

61 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

62 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

63 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

64 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

65 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

66 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

67 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

68 Ibid.

69 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

70 Author’s interview with Team Talon.

71 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

72 Author’s interview with Team Bulldog.

73 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

74 Author’s interview with Team Wardog.

75 Author’s interview with Team Hardrock.

76 Author’s interview with Team Cobra.

77 Author’s interview with Team Talon. Note: This information is not the result of an empirical study but the result of a series of observations.

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**ACRONYM QUICK-SCAN**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan National Security Forces</td>
</tr>
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<td>APB</td>
<td>Afghan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSI</td>
<td>battlespace integrator</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSO</td>
<td>battlespace owner</td>
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<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>coalition forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIED</td>
<td>counter-improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>combat outpost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRA</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operating base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC</td>
<td>headquarters and headquarters company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBCT</td>
<td>infantry brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N2KL</td>
<td>north of Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Gainey Cup 2013 Competition Reignites Cavalry Traditions and Honor

by Nicole Randall

Almost 70 years ago, Italian forces on horseback charged a field in the former Soviet Union. Armed with only rifles and 1,000 pounds of horseflesh beneath them, these cavalrymen galloped against an army that was using machineguns and mortars. Thus ended an era where cavalrymen were exemplified by horses, spurs and sabers.

“If entirely discarded now, in days to come, [the cavalry] will reappear,” COL John F. Wall prophesied in 1951. “It is indeed shameful that this day may be at such distance away that there won’t be anyone available to pack a saddle or to throw a diamond hitch.” This famous quote portrayed the desperate hope that the tradition and honor of the historic cavalry would someday reignite. The 95 cavalrymen who came to Fort Benning, GA, in early March 2013 dedicated themselves to exemplifying cavalry tradition and honor as they competed for the privilege to call themselves and their teammates the best cavalry team in the U.S. Army.

While the days of stallions and sabers are over, they are still used as symbols of the integrity and commitment instilled in all modern cavalrymen. Humvees have replaced the horses, and M4 carbines the sabers. However, to these 21st Century cavalry scouts, competing in the inaugural Gainey Cup was an honor, as the Gainey Cup competition tests the fundamental skills of cavalry scouts.

Disciplus validus

While tested to the max in reconnaissance and weapons training, Soldiers began this competition with a physical-training type of competition. Disciplus validus events tested both critical thinking and physical endurance. Every team member completed push-ups, sit-ups, pull-ups, dips, bench presses, tire flips and the rope climb as fast as possible, but the most strenuous and thought-provoking task was the “100 yards of hell.”

The teams started this arduous task directly following their five-mile ruck march. Teams pushed a humvee 50 yards, loaded with a Soldier and six full water jugs. After reaching the 50-yard line, the Soldiers opened the back of the vehicle, removed the water jugs and ran them the rest of the way to the 100-yard point for time. But it wasn’t over. At the starting point, the Soldiers also had a 140-pound dummy to transport to the end.

The teams received no specific guidance about how to get all of the items to their proper places. So, for the teams who thought of it, another option was available. While it made the humvee more difficult to push, some of the teams decreased their total time by placing the 140-pound dummy on the hood of the vehicle, removing an entire trip back to get it in the end. Disciplus validus ended when every team made it through the events.

“Just wanted to, if nothing else, set the tone right up front of what this competition was going to be about and what some of the physical and mental stress was going to be like, because you have to think to get through disciplus validus,” said CSM Michael Clemens of 316th Cavalry Brigade, organizers of the event.

Live fire and recon lanes

After target zeroing and an equipment issue, teams received the rest of the afternoon to plan for the next two days of events. Half the teams went to the direct and indirect live fire at Fort Benning’s Digital Multi-Purpose Range Complex, while the other half went to the recon lanes. The next day the teams switched. This made it difficult to determine along the way which team was ahead because none of them had officially completed all the same tasks.

Each team was issued an operations order and weapons as part of the live-fire tactical scenario. To make the scenario as realistic as possible, a Bradley Fighting Vehicle took the teams downrange, where they came into contact with the enemy. This tested the competitors as if they were in a firefight.

“Being a small element as 19D Cavalry scouts, we operate as three- to five-man teams, and that’s exactly what we’re doing out there in the call-for-fire range,” said SSG Carlos Rodarte, 504th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade. Calling for fire is a crucial part of any cavalry scout’s job, as it communicates information and intelligence along with the request for fires. Collecting and communicating accurate intelligence to and for the commander is a vital task for cavalry scouts, so this exercise was a test of their communications skills as well.
“You as a leader have to be competent in where your lane is, or you’re engaging indirect fires. And if you’re out there in the front of a main element calling for fire and you really don’t know what you’re doing, that’s very dangerous,” Rodarte said.

During the live-fire tactical scenario, scouts were able to test their shooting skills. Knowing which weapons to use for which target, and the engagement and disengagement criteria, were also part of this event.

After the live-fire mission was complete, the scouts were tested on their ability to disassemble, assemble and perform functions checks on the five weapons systems they used. Each team had a team leader who was responsible for assigning who performed these checks and on what weapons they performed them. These weapons systems included the M9, M4, M240B, M2, MK19 and Command Launch Unit. The live-fire tactical scenario and weapons-systems check events tested critical skills every cavalry scout should have.

“We wanted to create a situation a reconnaissance Soldier would find himself in,” said Clemens. “The Soldiers were established at an observation post. They were able to identify targets and use those assets on hand, not just direct-fire weapons but the ability to communicate with a radio [to call] direct and indirect fires. They coordinated all those assets to meet a commander’s intent or to shape the battlefield to provide information to a commander.”

While some of the teams performed the indirect and direct live-fire scenario, the rest of them worked the area reconnaissance lanes. The area recon lane, a massive event including tasks that used fundamental reconnaissance skills, took each team up to six hours to complete.

“We wanted to create a situation that both demonstrated and evaluated reconnaissance Soldiers on their ability to conduct tasks that have been common the past 10 or 11 years in the war on terror,” said Clemens. “We wanted [to test] their ability to perform as reconnaissance professionals, and be able to take a mission, and the commander’s critical information requirements and priority information requirements, and plan a mission that met those requirements.”

Teams started out at the recon-lane event base of operations, Checkpoint 38, where they planned their mission. Two recon lanes were set up with elements that added realism and ambiguity to each situation the scouts found themselves in. Army Reconnaissance Course experts developed the timed tasks, which were possible real-life situations these Soldiers were required to do. The recon scouts were dropped off with their “lane walker,” an instructor from the ARC, who kept their time and scored them, and walked to the start of their lane.

One of the first tasks required of the scouts was to perform the ABCs of first aid to an “injured person” or dummy. This test of evaluating a casualty included checking for responsiveness and an open airway, as well as applying a tourniquet and assessing the overall situation. During these scenarios, the teams linked up with “host nation forces” and were given bits of information to go from (but nothing that would help them complete their tasks).

After assessing the casualty, the scouts moved on to the next task: setting up an omnidirectional antenna. All the components to do this were set up and ready for them, but there were no tools. The scouts had to use adaptive skills and resourcefulness to set up the antenna using any means necessary. A common practice of the teams was tying the end of the antenna to a canteen or stick and throwing it into a tree to receive better signal. After ensuring it was fully functional, they were on their way to the next task.

These tasks were graded individually, not collectively. There was a maximum amount of time given for each task, and if the teams were unable to solve their problem and move on in that amount of time, they were given no points and the walker moved them to the next task.

Another task required of the teams was the Hasty Crater Charge. As they traveled the lane, they came upon more “host-nation forces” who requested their help setting up a trap for a small tank or vehicle. This was to be done using C4, which was mimicked using gray blocks, as well as a line charge and a detonator. The team leader, or a Soldier designated by him, had to look back into his memory to find a formula that would determine how far down each explosive needed to be, how far apart the holes needed to be dug and how much explosive would be required given the width of the road. This task was particularly important to practice because of how rarely it is seen in our current conflicts.

“It’s definitely something that’s a lost art that we haven’t been doing due to the fight we’re in right now,” said SSG Michael Potter, 101st Airborne Division. “But it’s definitely something we need to know before we go back to fighting conventional forces instead of an asymmetric fight.”

After completing the first three tasks, the teams started area reconnaissance. After they received a fragmentary order, they started their task with the goals and standards to maneuver to their named areas of interest, establish hasty OPs without being detected, collect CCIR and reach their destination. While doing this, they were presented with obstacles like avoiding or questioning (depending on their orders) a “host nation” mortar team they encounter and deal with the situation without getting off track of their original mission.

Once the team reached their destination, they were tasked to create a helicopter landing zone and calling in its coordinates. After measuring out the landing zone (without anything to measure with) and marking the center point for the helicopter to land on, the scouts called in its coordinates. Around the time the team leader called it in, white smoke was spotted close by and the team started their chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protocols.

Scouts from 1-108 Cavalry, GA ARNG, compete in the reconnaissance lane during the inaugural Gainey Cup competition at Fort Benning. (Photo by Ashley Cross/MCoE PAO photographer)
said SSG Justin Schmidt, 509th Infantry Regiment. “I don’t even know why I am, but we are. We’re really going to enjoy it.”

After performing an array of steps, including moving away from the smoke and putting on their protective masks, the students had completed the daylight portion of the recon lanes and returned to Checkpoint 38, where they were debriefed.

“Over the past 10 years, combat has been really focused on full-spectrum operations,” Hoisington said. “Here we’re really focusing on the basic scout individual-task level at the area-reconnaissance lanes. I think it’s very important to get back to the basics of what we’re trying to do here.”

**Obstacle course**

An event unlike any other, the inaugural Gainey Cup kept the competitors on their toes with its critical but taxing events. One additional, although unplanned, obstacle was the cold weather. The temperature dipped into the low 20s during the night while the teams were tasked to perform another reconnaissance task.

After sunset, teams were taken to a side road and released with an order and coordinates to set up an OP outside a particular site on Fort Benning. Each team was given a particular position to covertly occupy around the site. Failure to find the site at all cost them dearly. If any of the teams were identified, heard or seen, they immediately lost points.

All these tasks, from the land navigation of the area reconnaissance to the crater charge – and even setting up the antenna and HLZ – were fundamental skills for a cavalry scout.

After the teams completed their OP establishment, they were given a few hours off and then congregated about 6 a.m. on a landing zone near Bush Hill, Fort Benning. The scout teams started their day off with a cozy ride in a CH-47 Chinook. Several teams at a time boarded the aircraft and were transported to Todd Field, where they dismounted and started their five-mile ruck march to the obstacle course. After three days of intense, nonstop competition, you would think that the last thing these scouts would want to do was an obstacle course – but you would be mistaken.

“Most of the obstacle course required teamwork, which was perfect for the Gainey Cup. From wall climbs requiring a leg up or low crawls under barbed wire, the teams finished the obstacle course strong.

“I’m feeling strong. [We] helped each other get through it, pushed through, and we were fine. It’s all about teamwork,” said SSG Justin Schmidt, 509th Infantry Regiment.

**Final ruck march**

With only a two-mile ruck march left that ended up being a run for most of the teams, who were anxious to finish, Soldiers headed for the finish line – but not before some last-minute words of encouragement to their teams. SSG Justin Miller from 25th Infantry Division was heard supporting his teammates.

“I think we’re going to finish strong today,” Miller said. “Everybody’s going to give it 100 percent. I think we’re pretty strong ruckers, and we’ll be able to get through, no problem. I think our knowledge base is pretty well spread out throughout the group, so we’ll finish out today with almost max points.”

The teams were ranked when they were released after they dismounted the Chinook and started the ruck march. The teams with the least amount of points started first, and the teams with the most points started last. This created an intense excitement at the finish line as the “suspected” first-place team crossed the finish line last to cheering crowds and officers out at the competition to show support.

One special visitor present throughout the entire competition was the cup’s namesake, retired CSM Joe Gainey. Gainey spent most of the competition talking to competitors and yelling his support. As a legendary cavalry scout and the first senior enlisted adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gainey knows exactly what it takes to be a true-blue cavalry scout. With his Stetson, spurs and Texas boots, he visited the recon lanes, the live-fire and the obstacle course. Gainey also attended the initial PT competition, disiciplus validus, where he cheered the teams and congratulated Soldiers who got sick but kept going for their team’s sake.

“Have been here since Day 1, and it has truly amazed me,” Gainey said. “The dedication, motivation and drive of every single Soldier and Marine, I might add, is unbelievable.”

**25th Infantry Division wins**

After five days of running, rucking, reconnoitering, shooting and freezing, the 19 cavalry-scout teams that started the event waited to see where they ranked among their peers. CSM Miles Wilson, command sergeant major of the U.S. Army Armor School, acted as master of ceremonies. His wit and wisecracks incited excitement and anticipation among tired and hungry competitors.

Finally, Wilson announced the winner of the inaugural Gainey Cup. The team from Fort Richardson, Alaska – 25th Infantry Division – was named the best scout team in the Army.

“I feel ecstatic. I had a good team,” Miller said. “I never felt like I couldn’t do something because I had [them] behind me, and they always helped push me through anything.”
This accomplishment brought with it not only bragging rights; the winners received pieces of cavalry memorabilia along with coins and other prizes, including the Gainey Cup itself. The cup will travel to Fort Richardson and reside there until next year’s competition.

That wasn’t the greatest honor these scouts received. BG Paul Laughlin, former Armor School commandant, pulled out a saber and knighted each winner from 25th Infantry Division into the Order of St. George, a distinguished group inducting only the top tankers and troopers.

Great training experience

“[The Gainey Cup competition] re-established all the fundamentals of my job with me, and it was a great training experience,” Miller said. “I’ll take it back to my unit and teach it to my guys and make them a better scout team.”

As the last moments of the inaugural Gainey Cup wrapped up, the scouts talked with the people who made the competition possible, a team Clemens is proud of. “My team here – the Soldiers in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd squadrons – did just a phenomenal job,” Clemens said. “It is really the Soldiers, specialists, sergeants [and] staff sergeants who are out there on the lanes [and] who brought everything together that provided a challenging real-world event for Soldiers throughout the Army and the Marines to come here and participate in. I think they did great, and I am looking forward to doing it again.”

The inaugural Gainey Cup included scout teams from military installations all over the world. This competition, hosted by the Armor School, tested the abilities and fundamental skills of the scouts who competed. The real-world training the troopers received, and the added pressure to win the competition, will help them in the future as they continue the fight.

“In combat, cav scouts have very unique missions. And we know that we know our jobs; it’s called confidence,” Gainey said. “I feel very good about what I’m seeing here because they’re doing a task that’s going to save them in combat.”

While no horses or sabers were involved in this competition, all 19 scout teams proved themselves as carriers of the U.S. Army cavalry’s historic traditions.

Nicole Randall is news director at Fort Benning Television in the Maneuver Center of Excellence Public Affairs Office. Ms. Randall holds a bachelor’s of science degree in communications-journalism and a bachelor’s of science degree in English from Plattsburg State University.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym Quick-Scan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC – Army Reconnaissance Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIR – commander’s critical information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLZ – helicopter landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OP – observation post</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT – physical training</td>
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The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for the 5th Cavalry Jan. 19, 1923. It was redesignated for the 5th Cavalry Regiment (Infantry) Dec. 16, 1953. The insignia was redesignated for the 5th Cavalry July 10, 1959. It was amended to revise the symbolism June 23, 1960. The shield is yellow for Cavalry. The cross moline symbolizes the charge of this regiment on Longstreet’s troops at Gaines Mills in 1862; a charge which saved the Union artillery and which is characterized by the regimental historian as “its most distinguished service.” The cross moline is supposed to represent the iron pieces of a millstone (moulin, the French word for mill). The chief is for the Puerto Rican Expedition of 1898. The original name of the island was San Juan, named for the old knights of St. John, who wore a white maltese cross on a black habit. The partition line is embattled to suggest the castle on the Spanish arms. The crest is for the Indian campaigns of the regiment; the number of arrows corresponds to the numerical designation of the organization.
SHOOT-MOVE-COMMUNICATE