A Different Approach to the Scout Squad for the Mounted Force

by LTC John Horning, CPT Jake Kelly, SFC Brian Andrade and SFC Brian Ellis

The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT), 3rd Infantry Division, returned to the Republic of Korea (RoK) in February 2018 for the first time in 65 years as a regionally aligned force (RAF) rotational brigade under the command and control (C2) of 2nd Infantry Division. During the predeployment training cycle prior to its historic return to Korea, the Raider Brigade conducted two National Training Center (NTC) rotations, two brigade gunneries, two combined-arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXes) and a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) reorganization in less than 10 months.

The change to the cavalry squadron’s MTOE was significant as the unit moved from the 3x5 mixed scout platoon that had been in existence since the advent of modularity to the new standard 6x36 configuration with all Bradleys. Not only is the all-Bradley scout platoon more lethal than the 3x5 mixed version, this new configuration also provided us with the six-man scout squad for the first time.

When properly manned, each platoon has 18 dismounted scouts in addition to the 18 Bradley crewmembers. While the MTOE change was official and the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) published an operational and organizational concept on the scout platoon to describe it and the scout squad, there was not yet any “implementing doctrine” on how to employ the squad. Based on the conversion occurring just prior to the brigade’s second NTC rotation, a lack of doctrine and optimal personnel levels, we were not able to fully employ scout squads at NTC. However, that changed when we arrived in Korea.

Leading up to our deployment, the tensions between the United States and North Korea were at an all-time high, so the brigade was determined to be ready to “fight tonight” (the motto of U.S. forces stationed in the RoK). As we readied for deployment, the 3rd Infantry Division leadership ensured we were manned at sufficient levels to be able to fight and win as soon as we hit the ground. We were also augmented with RoK soldiers under the long-standing Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army Program. The net effect was that across the squadron, we had full 6x36 scout platoons with the full complement of dismounted scouts.

As we took over our mission in Korea from 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, and gained a full understanding of the operational environment (specifically the terrain), we quickly realized we needed to rethink how our cavalry troops and scout platoons had been trained to fight. The open environment of NTC cannot provide a unit with a sense of the Korean environment. We learned many valuable lessons at NTC, but we did not get an appreciation for the confining and isolated nature of the Korean terrain. NTC also didn’t prepare us for how sprawling urban areas with high-rise apartment buildings tended to sprout up anywhere there was flat ground in Korea. As such, we found we needed to relook how we trained and employed the dismounted scouts, and in particular the scout squad, that came with the 6x36 MTOE redesign.

Environmental challenges

The Korean Peninsula’s terrain near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is primarily heavily wooded, steeply sloped mountains with rivers and streams running between them. Flat terrain between mountains is alternately covered with built-up urban areas and adjacent agricultural fields. These agricultural areas tend to be relatively small and interspersed with urban areas. These are not the large farmlands typically seen in the Midwestern United States or the plains of Central Europe. Many RoK agricultural fields are used to grow rice, which makes them very poor for mobility most of the year because rice fields are covered in water and very muddy.

Overall, the terrain near the DMZ severely restricted our ability to take full advantage of the Bradley’s cross-country mobility and long-range target-acquisition capability. Movement was limited to improved roadways with tall buildings and mountains dominating almost every mobility corridor. Observation and fields of fire were also restricted due to the dense vegetation on the mountains, which can provide a dismounted enemy force advantages with freedom of maneuver not normally available in a more open NTC-like environment.

Our approach

Since the publication Strategy and Tactics 3-20.983 was rescinded, no doctrine has been officially published to explain how dismounted scout squads should move and maneuver. As a result, troop commanders and platoon leaders are left to figure it out and develop their own tactics, techniques and procedures. While there is certainly not just one correct answer, the
following describes the standard operating procedure (SOP) that 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, developed for dismounted scout operations to set a framework for future refinement and doctrine.

Prior to the SOP’s development, published doctrine did not adequately describe how best to employ the 6x36 scout platoon at all, much less in terrain such as our unit faced in Korea. As we assessed our MTOE, we recognized the need for an independent dismounted-scout-squad capability to support the mounted elements. Current infantry doctrine is built for nine-Soldier squads. Therefore, our SOP is a way of bridging the gap to account for six-Soldier scout squads.

With a different problem set than we faced in home-station training, at NTC or during the brigade’s previous RAF rotation to Europe, and coupled with a fully manned organization, we set about changing how we would define and employ the six-Soldier scout squad. In the past, the dismounted scouts in an armored-cavalry squadron were often thought of as the “guys in back.” They were not the focus of training or employment because vehicle maneuver and gunnery took precedence.

Another contributing factor to this was that units at home station are often not fully manned. As personnel turbulence takes its toll on Bradley crews, a dismounted guy is typically moved into a seat. When employed, the “guys in back” were primarily used in small team-sized elements that were tied to a specific vehicle. Each Bradley carried a team whose primary focus was the local security of that Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) or the establishment of a short-duration observation post (OP) within the limits of the individual vehicle’s supporting distance. With this technique, scout teams were used more as an asset of each vehicle commander rather than as part of an independent squad able to carry out missions of its own.

Given the restrictive nature of the terrain in Korea, we aligned the scout platoons into three two-vehicle sections. Each section had one dismounted scout squad that could act as an independent element with a designated squad leader who took guidance from the platoon leader just like in any mounted section. These three scout squads gave the platoon leader added flexibility to conduct zone and area reconnaissance and security operations in highly restrictive terrain (be it mountainous or urban) with the ability to establish three long-duration (more than 24 hours) or six short-duration (less than 24 hours) dismounted OPs for depth. Also, it provided an added level of control that six independent teams of “guys in the back” could not.

Figure 1. Comparison of scout squad and M2 crews.
The six-Soldier scout squad is comprised of two three-Soldier teams that include one noncommissioned officer (NCO) and two Soldiers. One NCO is a team leader and one is a squad leader. This is a key difference between the infantry squad and the scout squad. The infantry-squad leader leads two separate fire teams. The scout-squad leader is part of one of the scout teams. The current MTOE authorizations do not fully support every squad being led by a staff sergeant and a sergeant, so some Soldiers had to “serve up,” which is not different from many units and positions.

The scout squad’s organization:

- **Squad leader** – Senior NCO on the ground in the rank of staff sergeant/sergeant. The squad leader’s primary
responsibilities include maintaining C2 of the six-scout squad and ensuring the overall success of the assigned mission. As a dismounted squad leader, the staff sergeant must be an expert in the implementation of all weapon systems organic to the squad as well as other assets within the troop (mortars/Raven). While the squad leader should always stay within supporting distance of the two BFVs, the squad acts as an independent entity reporting to the platoon leader. With a primary mission that supports the maneuver or security of the section or platoon, the squad leader must be able to plan, emplace and execute both long- and short-duration OPs. The squad leader must also lead squad reconnaissance patrols in areas where mounted maneuver is restricted or impossible.

- **Team leader** – Junior NCO in the rank of sergeant or corporal. The team leader’s primary responsibility is maintaining C2 of the three-Soldier scout team. The team leader is second in command of the squad and must be trained and prepared to take command of the squad and its mission if the squad leader becomes incapacitated. The team leader must be able to plan, emplace and execute a short-duration OP and lead a team reconnaissance patrol.

- **Senior observer** – Point man responsible for route selection and forward security during squad movement. The senior observer should not have any other responsibilities to prevent any distraction as he or she is ideally the first to come into contact with enemy forces. Note: Some prefer to have the team or squad leader as the lead element. We decided on a senior observer to prevent distraction and allow the Soldier leading the squad to focus on the surroundings and identifying enemy forces before they come into contact.

- **Scout/assistant gunner/gunner** – Competent junior scouts have multiple responsibilities within the team and squad. These duties include, but are not limited to, M240 gunner, assistant gunner, Javelin gunner, route recorder, pace man and members of the aid-and-litter, enemy-prisoner-of-war and tactical-security-element teams. Like all scouts in the squad, they must be proficient in all weapon systems organic to the squad to continue the fight if a member becomes incapacitated. Use of the M240 or the Javelin is mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civilian considerations (METT-TC) dependent and may not be used on every patrol or OP.

![Figure 4. Scout-squad organization.](image)

**Team, squad formations**

The following movement formations will be METT-TC dependent. These formations were developed based on Army dismounted doctrine and refitted to meet the requirements of a three-Soldier team and the six-Soldier squad. While they are not the final solution, they can be used as a base product to refine based on a unit’s area of operations and mission requirements.

Team formations include the wedge and file. Regardless of the formation a team leader chooses, each Soldier must know his/her location in the formation relative to the other members. Each Soldier has a specified area for observation and direct fires as the team is moving. It is a team leader’s responsibility to be constantly aware of the team’s sector and to correct things as required.

The wedge is the primary formation used by a scout team. The interval between Soldiers should be about 10 meters. Team leaders, however, should modify the wedge based on terrain, weather or other factors that can affect C2. Unlike an infantry
fire team, the scout dismounted team leader does not physically lead the formation. The team, as well as the squad, is led by a senior observer. This scout’s sole job is to track his/her current route and focus on observing any enemy presence ahead of the unit.

The alternate formation is the file. It is used primarily when the terrain or visibility limit C2. A team leader may also use the file formation when time is limited and/or enemy presence is unlikely.

Scout-squad movement formations are based on Field Manual (FM) 3-21.8, *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*. However, we made adjustments to account for the size of the scout squad. Because the squad’s movement must be concealed from the enemy for survivability purposes, the scout squad normally moves through restricted terrain that provides concealment. Concealment is critical to any scout element because once it becomes decisively engaged, it is no longer conducting reconnaissance and providing information to the headquarters.

C2 of the squad through this type of terrain is difficult, thus the use of the file formation that provides easier control of the unit. However, as terrain changes, the squad leader should adjust the formation as appropriate for the circumstances. The squad file is a movement technique used when there is limited visibility due to vegetation or night. This formation is used like a team file to move through chokepoints and when contact is not likely.

![Figure 5. Scout team file and wedge.](image)

The squad wedge is used when moving through sparse vegetation, normally during daylight hours. This formation is similar to a modified diamond wedge used by infantry squads. The squad wedge is used when enemy contact is expected. Due to the formation shape, the squad is able to make contact with the smallest element possible and quickly react to contact from the front, left or right flanks and gain fire superiority.

The primary difference between the infantry- and the scout-squad formation is size and location of the key leaders. Due to limited personnel, the scout squad cannot conduct a squad column fire-team wedge but instead forms a larger, single wedge or diamond formation.

![Figure 6. Scout-squad wedge.](image)
Some readers may think of the “enter and clear a room” task and immediately argue that it is not a cavalry task. However, in any future war that takes place in a country like Korea or in any of the emerging megacities, scouts will not be able to avoid built-up areas. Specifically in Korea, it may be necessary for a scout squad to establish an OP or conduct counter-reconnaissance within a high-rise building. Even while establishing local security in an urban area, it may be required to clear rooms in buildings.

With this in mind, we developed an SOP for conducting room clearance by scout squads and teams. Doctrinally, entering and clearing a room is a four-Soldier team concept. However, due to the six-Soldier scout squad, we refined the concept into a three-person drill. Depending on the building’s complexity, having an entire squad clear each room can become too time-consuming. By adapting to a three-person procedure, a squad can clear two rooms at a time and speed up the process while still maintaining security.

The concept is not drastically different than the four-person infantry drill. The primary difference is that once the team or squad leader moves into the room and conducts the initial sweep oriented on the focal point, the leader will then turn around and pull security out the door where the fourth Soldier in the infantry drill would normally be. This allows the three-Soldier team to initially clear the room while still maintaining outward security.

![Figure 7. “Enter and clear a room” formations.](image_url)
Train as we fight
Aligning dismounted scouts into squads is only effective if you also change the way you train the overall formation. The primary focus of the armored-cavalry squadron and troop has rightfully been on mounted combat, which has led to scout teams being thought of as merely an asset of the Bradley rather than of the platoon. We learned that once we had full squads, we had to relook how we trained our dismounted scouts. As simple as it may sound, the easiest way we found to fix this was by implementing a well-resourced culminating training event focused on dismounted training similar in priority as squadron gunnery or a field-training exercise.

We planned and executed a squadron-resourced, troop-led, week-long dismounted squad training event named “School of the Scout.” It was based on a concept we borrowed from 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. Scout squads were taken to the field and run through various situational-training exercises that provided both the squad leader and team an opportunity to hone leadership and practice their military-occupation specialty 19D20- and 19D30-level (cavalry scout) skills.

It also provided a way to test all the scouts’ abilities in a field environment. Squad leaders led their formations while conducting zone and area reconnaissance on the actual terrain in Korea where they could be called on to fight.

Conducted each quarter, the training event was aligned with the squadron commander’s mission-essential task list focus for the quarter as outlined in the quarterly training guidance. Holding true to the mindset of “train as we fight,” the troops were not relieved of the tasks to train the mounted side of the fight. In an effort to tie both mounted and dismounted operations together, the Bradleys were incorporated into several training events that involved urban operations and area security, which was part of our mission set in Korea.

Because of maneuver constraints on the peninsula, the squadron got creative and maximized the use of the Close-Combat Tactical Trainer, combined with Virtual Battlespace 3, to tackle the problem-focused training at combined, mounted and dismounted levels. By linking both of the systems, we were able to conduct missions using the simulated-terrain database of the Korean Peninsula, with all mounted and dismounted elements at the platoon leader’s C2. This greatly increased the training value by making the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and other BFV commanders consider the dismounted-scout-squad elements.

Squad live-fire
The Infantry Branch has a long history and knowledge base of training fire teams and infantry squads. Cavalry and armor, on the other hand, do not. So as we entered into a training program for a scout-squad live-fire, we had to adjust the standard infantry tactics to account for a six-Soldier squad and the fact that the squad leader is a part of one of the teams vs. a separate C2 element.

The concept of the lane was fairly basic for a couple of important reasons. First, none of our Soldiers had previously had the opportunity to conduct this type of training. Second, the range we were able to use for the training was somewhat narrow and not overly long/deep. While that may seem like a limitation, it actually proved beneficial given this was our first iteration of this type of training. With this in mind, we designed a squad movement-to-contact wherein the six-Soldier scout squad – armed with M4s (rifles) and an M240 (machinegun) – would dismount from Bradleys and begin a reconnaissance patrol before beginning to make contact with dismounted enemy OPs while en route to their reconnaissance objective.

After destroying the enemy OPs, the squad continued to move and encountered two squads of enemy within dug-in positions. This represented their disengagement criteria. The squad then broke contact with teams providing covering fire as elements withdrew to prevent themselves from becoming decisively engaged. We also took the opportunity to work in reporting requirements from the squad leader to the platoon leader.

The training we conducted was excellent for a number of reasons, not least among them was the fact that this was new training for our scouts. Often in an ABCT, the dismounted scouts don’t receive the same focus as the Bradley crew members. Obviously, the armored vehicle is incredibly important to our mission, but the dismounted scout squads need similar focus on their ability to shoot, move and communicate. In planning and executing the training, we allocated enough time for dry, blank and live-fire iterations of the lane, which provided ample opportunity for all members of the scout squad to practice their particular responsibilities. Also, as time permitted, we ran additional live-fire iterations just to improve muscle memory and begin mastery of the fundamentals.

We have already started to plan the next iteration of the scout squad live-fire. The first step in that process was when all the commanders gathered to conduct an after-action review and identify lessons-learned to apply to the next event. Here are some of the takeaways that could benefit other squadrons and troops contemplating this type of training:
• Develop a scenario based on a cavalry mission set (i.e., a reconnaissance or a security mission). Do not execute typical infantry missions like attack or defend. Create scenarios where the scouts are on a patrol, conducting local security for a screen, conducting an area reconnaissance or in an OP.

• Incorporate the BFV as you are able. At a minimum, have the squad disembark from the Bradley before beginning the lane. If possible within range safety requirements, incorporate supporting fire. When operating in terrain like Korea, the dismount squads may be working to clear high ground or urban areas, and there may be times when supporting fire from the vehicle would be required.

• If the size of your range allows, create a scenario where the squad splits into two teams for a time and based on distance can only communicate via frequency-modulation (FM) radio.

• Incorporate all the weapons of the scout squad as you are able. This includes the M240 and anti-tank weapons such as the AT-4 and/or Javelin.

• Train your scouts to use their M4A1 on full auto. During basic rifle marksmanship and even most advanced rifle marksmanship, we do not use the full auto function of the rifle. Mostly that’s because we’re conserving ammunition. However, in a three-Soldier scout team, there are times when one Soldier has to provide covering fire for the two moving Soldiers. An M4A1 on single shot may not provide enough fire. It may be necessary for that Soldier to fire on full auto while providing cover fire. This is another difference from the infantry squad, which has a Squad Automatic Weapon available to its fire teams.

• Incorporate your rifle-mounted 40mm grenade launchers. These will also help to provide covering fire for displacements.

• Plan for a sufficient amount of smoke and train Soldiers how to use it to conceal their movements. It’s easy to train a Soldier how to pull the pin and throw a smoke grenade. Many of our Soldiers may have experience using handheld smoke for signaling purposes. However, that’s not the same when it comes to using it for concealment. We learned that our Soldiers were not initially proficient in choosing the best location to throw the smoke grenade, taking terrain and wind into account. Also, they tended to think that once the smoke was going, it was safe to move – regardless of whether there was enough smoke to actually provide concealment. This of course will vary based on wind conditions, but plan and train for more than one smoke grenade each time a scout team breaks contact to displace.

Going into our next iteration, we are developing scout-squad tables similar to what we are accustomed to using for Bradley gunnery. Preliminary tables may involve basic weapons proficiency and qualification per existing published standards. Subsequent tables could move to Engagement-Skills Trainer and Call-for-Fire Trainer scenarios. Next, we will execute a scout team live-fire and then a scout squad live-fire. For the culminating event, we will incorporate several performance measures into the design of the range similar to how master gunners use the required performance measures and targetry available to design our Table VI ranges for tanks and BFVs. We believe the culminating squad live-fire should incorporate the following scenarios in the engagements (not necessarily in order):

• Call for fire;
• Casualty evacuation (CASEVAC);
• At least one engagement with the entire squad together;
• At least one engagement where the teams are far enough apart to require FM radio communication;
• BFV incorporated into the scenario;
• At least one chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear engagement; and
• A break contact/displacement engagement.

If at all possible within range restrictions, this event should also incorporate the troop mortars actually shooting in support of the squad. With these established minimum standards, troop commanders in the squadron can now work with Range Control to develop their own squad live-fire scenarios. In addition to identifying initial required performance measures, we are working on a possible scoring methodology so we can have an objective measure of excellence. Using a pop-up target range that can register hit/no-hit along with engagement times, coupled with an observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T) to grade non-kinetic requirements, we can provide a score to each squad.

The result should be a trained and proficient scout squad that can be safely and effectively incorporated into a scout platoon’s Table XII and/or a troop CALFEX scenario. And more importantly, a scout squad that can operate effectively in support of the Bradleys and the platoon’s overall mission when called on to do so.
Scout skills test | Prerequisite training:
--- | ---
 | • Reports
 | • Armored Fighting Vehicle Identification
 | • Disassemble, assemble, function checks on weapons
 | • FM/HF radio communications
 | • Load radios with simple key loader
 | • Employ LTLM or LLDR
 | • Reload 25 ammo in ready boxes
 | • Reload tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile

Table I | Weapons qualification:
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 | • M4A1
 | • M240L
 | • AT-4
 | • Javelin

Table II | Medical-skills lane

Table III | Engagement-Skills Trainer:
--- | ---
 | • Individual scenario
 | • Team scenario

Table IV | Call-for-Fire Trainer:
--- | ---
 | • Grid mission
 | • Shift from known point

Table V | Team live-fire:
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 | • Dry/blank/live

Table VI | Squad live-fire certification:
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 | • Dry/blank/live

**Table 1. Scout-squad training progression.**

**Six-Soldier squad strength**

The six-Soldier squad as broken down in this article allows dismounted scouts action that is more cohesive. By focusing training specifically on Soldiers and leaders, the squad is able to become a platoon element, capable of accomplishing its mission in support of the platoon based on the commander’s intent.

The squad also provides a greater ability to establish security in depth. With more personnel and firepower, the squad is able to maneuver farther from the vehicle platform, thus creating more depth in security missions.

The squad’s size also allows a platoon leader the option of establishing either three long-duration OPs or six short-duration OPs. This has proved to be extremely valuable in Korea due to the terrain. The terrain restricted vehicle movement, but we still had the flexibility to deploy the squads into the higher, restrictive terrain for long periods.

The final strength lies in the additional-skill identifiers associated with the dismount squad paragraph and line numbers in the MTOE. When a unit begins to focus on its dismount capabilities, it begins to see Soldier and leader certifications and skill training that are lacking. By sending personnel to the appropriate schools (for example, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course, Heavy Weapons Leader’s Course, Ranger School, Pathfinder Course and Javelin Course), a unit builds its knowledge diversity and becomes a more flexible and agile fighting force.

In the end, the unit’s leaders and Soldiers will be better prepared to actually do the things they say they can do.

**Six-Soldier squad weakness**

We would be remiss if we failed to identify some of the weaknesses with the design of the six-Soldier scout squad. We don’t identify these weaknesses to discourage units from the concept but instead to allow others the opportunity to find ways to overcome them.

First and foremost is CASEVAC. In our opinion, if a squad receives one casualty and must conduct CASEVAC operations, that squad becomes combat ineffective. Between assessing and moving the casualty, along with providing security, the squad’s mission shifts from a reconnaissance or security focus to CASEVAC. The most constructive way we have found to deal with this weakness is by placing a deliberate focus on casualty-collection-point and ambulance-exchange-point planning. The
question you have to ask is, “How fast can we move the casualty back to a vehicle platform and return to continue mission?”

Another weakness we identified while in Korea specifically was with the weapons loadout. Scout squads have by MTOE more weapon systems than they can easily carry on an extended mission. With Javelins, AT-4s, M240s, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), Laser Target-Locator Module (LTLM), Advanced Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Improvement Program, high-frequency (HF) radios and ammunition, the six-Soldier scout squad can become overburdened very quickly. Therefore, platoon leaders need to specify a loadout based on what enemy forces they expect to encounter and the squad’s specific mission or task. Are they expecting an armored force where the Javelin will be necessary for survival or a dismounted fight where the M240 is a more appropriate weapon? The key to this is a leader who has the knowledge and sound judgment to make a decision on what equipment will increase the chance of mission success.

Finally, because the scout-squad leader is the leader and a member of one of the two teams, he does not have the same flexibility to observe, report and direct as his counterpart in an infantry squad. This can be a concern even though the scout squad’s primary mission should not be to conduct fire-and-maneuver in the same way an infantry squad does.

Way ahead

While the current opinions from MCoE seem to define the squad as the three crewmembers of the Bradley plus the three “guys in back,” we believe that an organizing method that creates independent maneuverable squads of dismounted scouts better supports the platoon’s mission in environments such as Korea or other urban areas. While this may not be the only solution, we believe it is a viable option right now with our given MTOE.

It’s a solution units that will be operating on terrain other than at NTC may consider implementing in their training cycle. We must prepare for the future fight that will involve all weapons and assets, including the dismounted scout squad. If we are going to have a 6x36 scout platoon across the force, we need to develop the ways to fight it.

We believe that this method of organizing, training and employing the scout squad is also an appropriate model for the Stryker cavalry squadron, where they cannot rely on the armor protection and firepower of the Bradley. We encourage other units to add their ideas to further refine this concept and share them with ARMOR magazine so we can help shape the future way we fight.

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**Acronym Quick-Scan**

ABCT – armored brigade combat team
AG – assistant gunner
BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle
C2 – command and control
CALFEX – combined-arms live-fire exercise
CASEVAC – casualty evacuation
DMZ – Demilitarized Zone
FM – frequency modulation
FM – field manual
HF – high frequency
HHC – headquarters and headquarters company
JMRC – Joint Multinational Readiness Center
LLDR – Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder
LTLM – Laser Target-Locator Module
MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence
METT-TC – mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civilian considerations
MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment
NCO – noncommissioned officer
NTC – National Training Center
O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
OP – observation post
RAF – regionally aligned force
RoK – Republic of Korea
SOP – standard operating procedures