Generating Incentive and Motivation in the Cavalry and Armor Community

by CPT Kyle D. Woods and CPT William C. Forrest

The U.S. Army must establish an elite armored reconnaissance and security (R&S) organization in a desirable location to retain top-performing individuals within the Armor Branch. In addition, fundamental structural reform is needed to reinvigorate the Armor community.

Infantry officers and Soldiers have a variety of career opportunities available to them. High performers can compete for slots in 75th Ranger Regiment or other elite organizations that possess superior equipment; are burdened with fewer training distractors; and maintain other fringe benefits that incentivize superior performance and effort. However, the Armor community has no such equivalent.

To properly incentivize Armor Branch’s top performers, the Army needs to combat organizational fatigue in its armored formations; establish a new, premier armored cavalry regiment (ACR); and leverage advances made by Human Resources Command (HRC) to manage talent effectively.

Organizational fatigue
Organizational fatigue is the greatest long-term issue facing the Armor Branch. Scarcity of armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs), repetitive combat-training-center (CTC) rotations and lack of career fulfillment are all driving factors for this fatigue.¹

Take, for example, 3rd ABCT from 4th Infantry Division. This brigade deployed to Iraq in 2015, has since deployed to Europe for nine months in 2017, and is currently deployed to Kuwait for another nine-month rotation.² From January 2015 to January 2020, the brigade will have spent about 27 of a possible 60 months deployed.³

The 1st ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division, is also representative of the army’s ABCT deployment trend. The 1/1 Cavalry Division deployed in Fall 2014 until December 2014 to Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. The brigade conducted a National Training Center (NTC) train-up and rotation in 2015 before deploying to the Republic of Korea for nine months, starting in January 2016. The brigade reset conducted a train-up culminating in an NTC rotation and again deployed to Europe for a nine-month rotation in Summer 2018, returning this past spring to Fort Hood, TX.⁴ That puts 1st ABCT at 22 months deployed of the last 60 months.⁵

ABCTs are currently too few to meet the Army’s need. The rise of globalization has prompted adversarial nations to develop weapons whose capabilities match or even exceed our own. The Russian Federation, for instance, has spent billions of dollars developing conventional weapons systems that represent an asymmetric threat to current U.S. doctrine. The Russian wealth of long-range precision indirect fires, long-range anti-tank guided missiles and superior air-defense-artillery systems negate historic U.S. advantages.⁶ In fact, the 2016 Russian Threat Study states that “to summarize Russian military capabilities ... [Russia] will achieve by 2025 overmatch of most Western military capabilities in the areas of air and missile defense ... artillery ... and ground attack aviation.”⁷
Russian doctrine also includes overmatch not only in distances for artillery available at the BCT level but in volume of fire. At the ABCT level, the Russian Federation can employ 36 tubes of cannon artillery and 18 rocket-delivered artillery systems, compared to the 18 155mm tubes available in a U.S. ABCT. The Russians possess 135 Infantry Fighting Vehicles to our 88 Bradley Fighting Vehicles per brigade and 53 tanks to our 58 tanks.9

Beyond the BCT level, Russian weight of artillery fire increases even more to an additional mortar division, artillery division, three more artillery brigades and additional rocket assets at their corps level.9 Moreover, our reliance on our own artillery and Army attack aviation is antiquated against this force. The result is that our ABCTs today are not properly equipped to handle this threat without significant augmentation.

In response to the rising parity of our international adversaries, the Army is slowly expanding its ABCTs and deploying them at a sustained rate one deployment every two to three years.10 The lack of ABCTs permanently stationed abroad in Europe and Asia as direct deterrents to adversarial aggression has forced our ABCTs into this endless cycle of CTC rotations, followed by long-duration deterrence deployments. Moreover, the Army’s failure to bolster training for mechanized forces during the past 16 years of combat has laid an inadequate foundation for fostering ABCT growth initiatives.
Exhaustive schedule

Every ABCT is either training for a CTC rotation at NTC, is deployed abroad or is returning from a deployment and preparing to begin a NTC training cycle. This exhaustive schedule is costly in repair parts, fuel and equipment. Furthermore, this cycle of deployment is physically draining on the personnel involved. This is especially true for tank crewmen, who experience this exhaustive cycle regardless of the BCT to which they are assigned; those who serve multiple U.S. Army Forces Command assignments in a row will successively experience the same cycle at each post.

The stress of these rotations, combined with a lack of fulfillment in Soldiers and leaders, contributes to the departure of top performers who can excel elsewhere. Our best Soldiers and leaders who entered the Army post-GLOBAL War on Terrorism (GWOT) will not remain in the Armor Branch if they are not given the opportunity for a sense of real accomplishment during their time in service. Deployments to Europe and the Republic of Korea do not provide our personnel with the sense of mission accomplishment and service that GWOT-era rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan did.

Several RAND studies have identified that a “sense of adventure” and sense of mission accomplishment are among the top factors for recruiting and retaining Soldiers and leaders. While it is true this sense of adventure correlates to deployments, every Soldier or officer has a line where they’ve deployed too much within a period of time. A study of re-enlistment prior to GWOT identified that Soldiers were more likely to re-enlist if they had deployed, but a study conducted in 2011 identified that retention dropped among individuals with multiple deployments in a short time span. Bright young officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are sometimes unwilling to leave their careers to chance and depart the force.

Lacking a sense of fulfillment or clearly defined path to career success, more bright young leaders will opt to leave the branch at a time when we are expanding our mechanized formations. Analysis conducted by Armor Branch indicates that of all operational-division branches inside the Army (armor, infantry, aviation, engineers, field artillery and air defense), the only branch to shrink since 2013 is Armor. Every other branch has increased in size since the end of sequestration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% change FY13-18</th>
<th>Armor</th>
<th>Infantry</th>
<th>Field artillery</th>
<th>Air defense</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Aviation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>140%</td>
<td>132%</td>
<td>126%</td>
<td>153%</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Total change in officer strength, Fiscal Years 2013-2018.

Fortunately, that sense of mission accomplishment and service continues for units like 3rd Cavalry Regiment, 101st Airborne, 82nd Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions, who continue to deploy to combat zones. The sense of career fulfillment and mission accomplishment is one of the few factors the Army can use to retain high-performing individuals.

The Army lacks the capacity to raise salaries like the private sector does or to immediately promote individuals in rank. Organizational fatigue is fueled by this lack of fulfillment, burning our leaders out at a high rate within the Armor Branch. To combat this fatigue, a new structure and organization is needed.

New ACR

During the GWOT’s height, the Army’s ACRs transitioned from forces capable of high-intensity conflict to infantry-based, urban-operation-centric counterinsurgency formations. These prestigious and storied formations were converted from R&S units capable of performing autonomous missions into Stryker-based formations. To meet the GWOT’s urgent operational need, the Army stripped these formations of their internal aviation assets and exchanged most of their R&S experts for infantrymen. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments of today are nearly unrecognizable from their former selves.

The Army’s return to decisive action frees our Armor Branch to focus on deterrence missions and provides an opportunity for the creation of a premier armored force focused on developing new tactics and fielding new technologies.
The 2nd Cavalry in particular is already engaged in conducting missions centered on the deterrence of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. If 2nd Cavalry Regiment returned to status as an ACR – along with the requisite modified table of organization and equipment – it would be able to provide an enhanced deterrent in Europe, thus reassuring our allies of our commitment to mutual defense according to Article V of NATO’s charter.\textsuperscript{14}

The inclusion of a charter such as Ranger Regiment’s would enable the permeation of these top performers throughout the branch after time served in the ACR. Leaders with a significant amount of time spent in this organization would be able to spread lessons-learned and raise the performance of the armored force. Junior Soldiers arriving in the ACR could be afforded the opportunity to stay there until reaching the rank of sergeant first class, offering geographic stability, which is a proven method of increasing retention numbers.\textsuperscript{15}

The Rangers were created for a purpose. They were chartered to perform operations other infantry organizations could not; however, no armored force was created to meet this same task. For example, in Operation Overlord, hundreds of Sherman tanks were outfitted with flotation devices, crews were given minimal training, and then they were sent to fight the Germans. More than 50 percent of these tanks sunk due to improper maintenance of the vehicles, poor weather conditions and lack of well-trained crews to operate them. The rough waters ahead of Omaha Beach resulted in the sinking of 27 of 29 tanks launched at sea to assist American forces in the seizure of that beach.\textsuperscript{16}

This example serves to prove that the Army needs a specialized armor unit to fulfill duties outside the normal range of Armor operations, and that unit needs the time and resources to identify and train these specialized tasks. A specialized armor unit could focus on training and developing tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) ranging from wet-gap crossings to urban operations. The operational environments of Europe and South Korea where we currently rotate ABCTs necessitate the capability to execute hasty, deliberate and covert wet-gap crossings. ACRs would be uniquely prepared to execute hasty gap crossings with their organic mobility assets, and deliberate crossings when augmented by maneuver-enhancement brigades from the U.S. Army Reserve.

Figure 2. American and Korean forces train on wet-gap crossings in the Republic of Korea.

Units could dedicate the time and energy that conventional ABCTs spend preparing for NTC in developing cutting-edge Armor TTPs for specific scenarios such as those previously mentioned, which would propel the Armor Branch into the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century and keep it relevant as the Army plans for future combat in the world’s megacities.

Armor Branch lacks a mechanism for its personnel to compete for attractive postings and assignments. If formations like 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany were assigned based on merit and performance in previous duty assignments, the Armor Branch’s efforts to retain its top performers would be more successful. Top-performing senior NCOs and officers currently have little say about to which location they are assigned when receiving
postings to BCTs. The establishment of an ACR forward-deployed in Europe, able to hand-pick its own leaders, would provide individuals the ability and motivation to compete for access to a top-performing unit in a highly desirable location.

**Leveraging HRC advances**

Commanders in the new ACR could leverage the Army’s new Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 (AIM 2) system to select and interview troop/company commanders, first sergeants, field-grade officers and command sergeants major, thus giving them the opportunity to shape their units. These ACRs should be given priority over other units for personnel requests, allowing top-performing officers and senior NCOs an institutional opportunity to translate their performance in the force into concrete rewards such as better locations, assignments or additional benefits, thus increasing the desire for top performers in the Armor community to stay Armor.

HRC has initiated several key reforms the past few years that would augment the ability of leaders in an ACR to select top performers from across the Armor community to fill key positions within the ACR, specifically the AIM 2.0 marketplace. In the marketplace, individuals can rank units and duty positions according to their own preference, and units can view personnel and indicate their own preference for those individuals.

Also available through AIM is the ability to volunteer for service in a security-force assistance brigade (SFAB). All officers applying for service in one of the Army’s new SFABs apply through the AIM portal. Individuals could easily use AIM for either the unit preference or to directly volunteer for service in an ACR. The ACR could then hold a selection-style event similar to SFAB or Ranger Regiment to determine from its pool of volunteers who would serve and in what capacity at the unit.

Finally, if Armor professionals are given the ability to do more than execute CTC rotations and consecutive deterrence deployments by participating in innovative doctrinal and technological experiments, branch retention would improve. If a resurrected ACR filled with top performers is given the time, space and resources to develop and test new doctrine, and field prototypes and new equipment, then innovative and adventurous Armor officers will seek this unit out in an attempt to push the branch and Army forward. Given the lack of red-cycle taskings, an ACR forward-stationed in Europe would be able to rotate squadrons through training with allied nations in Eastern Europe and conduct testing and training of new equipment and doctrine at training locations like Hohenfels, Germany.

**Conclusion**

Armor Branch’s history is filled with innovators who pushed the limits of their current technology and fought hard to develop new TTPs to keep the American cavalry and armor force the best in the world. We currently lack the freedom in our Army’s structure for this kind of innovation. Our Army’s ABCTs are stuck on increasingly rigorous operational tempo training schedules to keep them on rotations to NTC at Fort Irwin, CA, and keep them deployed abroad to South Korea, Europe and the Middle East in important deterrence missions. The resurrection of an ACR permanently stationed in Europe or another choice location capable of deploying on these rotations would meet this need for the nation to have ABCTs deployed forward 2) while providing a structural framework that encourages innovation and rewards top performers desiring to not only better the branch and the Army but to enjoy a higher degree of career satisfaction as well.

To retain the best and brightest personnel within the Armor Branch, and regain the overmatch our armored force formerly enjoyed, the Army must fundamentally restructure the Armor Branch through the reconstitution of an ACR posted in one of the Army’s most desirable locations, filled with the best officers and NCOs the branch has to offer.

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Notes
1 The following articles provide insight on how frequently ABCTs deploy in support of the missions in South Korea, Europe and Kuwait:
   - “Army Announces Upcoming 2nd BCT, 1st Cavalry Division Unit Rotation”; www.army.mil/article/225785/army_announces_upcoming_2nd_bct_1st_cavalry_division_unit_rotation.

3 See the articles presented in Note 1. The brigade’s deployment to the Middle East in 2015/16, rotation to Europe in 2017 and return to Kuwait (ongoing) result in the calculation of 27 months deployed out of a possible 60 months (five calendar years). This math assumes the brigade will complete its current deployment on time, returning after nine months in Kuwait.
4 The following Websites detail the lengths and locations of historic deployments of 1 ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division: https://1cda.org/history/history-1bde/, accessed Aug. 22, 2019, and “Department of the Army Announces Upcoming 1st Cavalry Division Deployment,” www.army.mil/article/198287/department_of_the_army_announces_upcoming_1st_cavalry_division_deployment.
5 Calculation done in August 2019. The 1/1 Cavalry Division deployment schedule as annotated in the previous note results in four months deployed at the end of 2014, 0 months deployed in 2015, nine months deployed in 2016, 0 months deployed in 2017 and a nine-month deployment split between the end of 2018 and beginning of 2019.
6 Worldwide Equipment Guide Vols. 1 and 2; Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2; 2016. Weapons data for Russian systems are found in the unclassified Worldwide Equipment Guide. Artillery references are found starting on Page 9 of Vol. 1, while Vol. 2, titled Air and Air Defense Systems, lists the wealth of Russian tracked and wheeled air-defense artillery systems in Chapter 7. Anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems are found in Vol. 1 and detail systems such as the 9P149 SHTURM-S, which has a range of 6,000 kilometers for high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds; ATGM 9 P162/KORNET-LR, with a range of 5,500 kilometers; Chinese Type 92B/Red Arrow-9, with a 5,000-kilometer range; Russian Boyevaya Razvedvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina-2 HOT 3 reconnaissance/anti-tank platform, with a range of 4,300 kilometers for its HEAT missiles; and T-90, which can fire the AT-11 (sniper) ATGM and has a range of 4,000 kilometers from its main gun. These ranges are all significantly longer than the currently established tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided anti-tank missile’s range of 3,750, also found in the Worldwide Equipment Guide in the ATGM chapter.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Some brigades, such as 3/4 Infantry Division, have been deployed nearly 40 percent of the time in the last five years, while others, like 1/1 Cavalry Division, are roughly at 33 percent deployed during the past five years.
Acronym Quick-Scan
ABCT – armored brigade combat team
ACR – armored cavalry regiment
AIM – Assignment Interactive Module
ATGM – anti-tank guided missile
BCT – brigade combat team
CTC – combat-training center
FY – fiscal year
GWOT – Global War on Terrorism
HEAT – high-explosive anti-tank
HRC – Human Resources Command
IBCT – infantry brigade combat team
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO – noncommissioned officer
NTC – National Training Center
ORB – Officer Record Brief
PCS – permanent change of station
R&S – reconnaissance and security
SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team
SFAB – security-force assistance brigade
TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures