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The United States Infantryman will be around for a long time doing what he has always done — fighting or standing ready to fight on the ground for the ground.
There has always been a well-known maxim in our Army: The Army is not a job; it is a way of life. And so it is with the Army's new physical fitness program. No longer does that program consist of a few repetitions of the 'daily dozen' or a warm up run. It has truly become a way of life - a lifestyle. If you will. One thing you can be certain of — physical fitness in the Army.

In today's Army, various physical fitness programs are being conducted in order to meet the needs of the individual. Physical fitness is recognized as being the prime ingredient of success in battle. Now, throughout the newly organized Army Physical Fitness Research Institute, Cadet Barracks and the U.S. Army Soldier Support Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, have been charged with developing individual and unit programs, a core of qualified fitness trainers, a comprehensive nutrition program, weight control and health standards, and human behavior research programs that, collectively, will help insure a well-rounded, physically fit soldier and, if called upon, success in battle.

At the Infantry School, fully support this increased emphasis on physical fitness. In fact, the School long has had a vital interest in this subject because no other branch places the same physical demands on its members as does the Infantry. The Infantry School, therefore, insists that its resident course students commit themselves personally and professionally to the highest standards of physical fitness, and further insists that its graduates be capable of immediately assuming leadership positions in even the most physically demanding infantry jobs.

All of the School's resident courses have specific physical fitness prerequisites. Thus, officer candidates and officers selected to attend the basic officer course must meet the standards established by the Army Physical Readiness Test (APRT) before they arrive at Fort Benning. Officers selected to attend the officer advanced course should arrive in good physical condition, because they will have to meet APRT standards before they graduate.

Enlisted men selected for either a primary, basic, or advanced noncommissioned officer course must have passed the APRT during the six-month period immediately preceding their reporting date.

The Airborne and Ranger courses have higher physical fitness standards than the other courses because their students must perform more and more varied and strenuous physical activity in a shorter period of time. Airborne students are tested during the first day of training in APRT events and are required to complete at least 45 pushups, 45 situps, and run 2 miles in 15:59 or less. In addition, Airborne students must also able to complete a minimum of 6 pullups and successfully finish the 2.5-mile runs that are conducted throughout the three weeks of training.

Ranger students, prior to their arrival at Fort Benning, should be certified by their unit commanders, as having passed the APRT and a combat water survival swim test of 15 meters. During their first day of training, students are tested in APRT events and are required to meet the same standards as Airborne students, including doing 6 pullups. They are also given another combat water survival swim test. During the course, students must successfully complete 2- to 3-mile runs.

Officer candidate, basic, and advanced officer course students are tested against the APRT at least once during their courses, and they must pass the test before they can graduate. Advanced noncommissioned officer course students are also tested at least once and they, too, must pass the test.

Primary and basic noncommissioned officer course students do not take the APRT at Benning because of the length of their courses, but physical conditioning forms a definite part of their schooling.

We recognize that there are competing forces and priorities that must be made compatible with the overriding need for every Infantryman to be "fit to fight." But we must never put more faith in machines than we do in the soldiers who operate them. For war, after all, is a struggle in which the mind and the body must work in utmost harmony. Accordingly, the physical aspects of soldiers must be as carefully nurtured as the technical ones of machines, if not more so.

Physical fitness means physical readiness, and physical readiness is an important part of unit readiness. Without it, our Infantry units will not be able to carry out their primary mission — to go to war it called on, and to win that war, no matter where or when.
THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS were furnished by the Directorate of Combat Developments, USAIS:

- **Army 86 Family of Studies.** Division 86, the study of the armored and mechanized divisions, has been completed for all intents and purposes. Much work remains to be done in transition planning. Infantry Division 86, the study of the infantry division, is in a hold status at the moment pending the results of the 9th Infantry Division's efforts to develop a high technology light division. The studies relating to Air Assault Division 86 and to Airborne Division 86 are still in progress.

- **General-Purpose Athletic Shoe.** The Infantry Board recently completed a test of the general-purpose athletic shoe. The Board used five commercially produced athletic shoes during its test. Three categories of test soldiers were used: 232 trainees undergoing one station unit training, 80 soldiers (40 men and 40 women) who did two hours of athletic activity daily for 50 test days, and 507 volunteers who wore the test shoes when they undertook athletic activities.

Foreign matter tended to build up on all the shoes, and there was little variation in traction from one shoe to another. No one pair of shoes was preferred over the others.

The purpose of the test was to determine whether an individual soldier could be given an all-purpose athletic shoe that he could wear while participating in physical training activities. The test results will be used by the Infantry School to recommend the selection of a candidate shoe for further consideration.

- **Combat Boot.** The Army is still seeking a better combat boot. Accordingly, the Army, together with the Marine Corps, has proposed turning to the commercial market place (domestic and foreign) to select boots that can be tested by both services. Screening and testing will begin once the candidate boots have been procured. The point of contact at DCD is Major Cummins, AUTOVON 835-7514, or commercial 404/545-7514.

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THE DIRECTOR OF THE Weapons, Gunner and Maintenance Department (WGMD) of the Infantry School has been designated the School's single point of contact concerning the Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV) and the New Equipment Training Team (NETT) concept of training for the ITV.

As such, the Director of WGMD will respond to all requests for ITV mobile training teams, provide training under the ITV NETT concept, update training manuals for both the ITV and the TOW, and develop new training manuals for field use.

WGMD's telephone numbers are AUTOVON 835-2417/2315, or commercial 404/545-2417/2315.

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THE NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM has recently completed its Presidential Collection. It now has important signed documents by each of the 40 Presidents of the United States, as well as pictures and other interesting memorabilia. The Museum has also published a brochure on the military service of the Presidents, which it gives to its visitors.

Seven Presidents have visited Fort Benning, and photographs that were made during their visits are on display. Also on display are the breeches worn during World War I by then Captain Harry S. Truman.

Another interesting piece is the duffel bag that was carried during the War with Mexico by then General Franklin Pierce, who became our 14th President.

There are many other items of interest in the Presidential Collection and throughout the National Infantry Museum, and everyone is invited to visit it. There is no admission charge. The Museum is open from 1000 to 1630 Tuesday through Friday, and 1230 to 1630 on Saturday and Sunday. It is closed on Monday, and on Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year's Day.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership, or $10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Curator, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

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A RECENT ADDITION TO FORT BRAGG's training areas is a Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) complex. It has been built by civilian contractors to train units up to battalion level in combat techniques in a city. The complex has 44 buildings, including a designated church and a town hall. It also has a sewer system that will actually be used for drainage and that can be used by soldiers as underground tunnels. The complex is the largest and most detailed of its kind in the military services.

In conjunction with the MOUT complex, a close combat course has
also been constructed. It is designed to teach the individual skills soldiers need in urban operations.

The MOUI complex will also be used for command post exercises, mass casualty exercises, riot control training, and fire fighting training.

The infantry school's Weapons, Gunnery and Maintenance Department's Mortar Division has produced a pamphlet called "Mortar Tips, Tactics, and Training." It is being issued to mortar men throughout the Army through the School's Extension Training Management and Support Division.

WGMD's point of contact for this pamphlet is Captain James Hood, AUTOVON 784-4308, or commercial 404/544-4308.

A TURBINE POWERED INDIVIDUAL lift device designed to take off vertically and enable a man to fly for 30 minutes at speeds up to 60 miles per hour has been successfully flown in a series of free flights by military personnel. It is known as the WASP II.

is conducting a concept evaluation program to determine the mobility of military personnel in the field.

The device has no wings or exposed rotors, and its small turboshaft engine produces thrust in the 600-pound class. The completely enclosed engine is mounted independently of and in front of the operator.

During flight, the operator controls the device by leaning in the desired direction. It can land on a four-foot square, foot area.

THE ARMY'S DIVISION AIR DEFENSE (DIVAD) gun system, now formally known as the Sergeant York Air Defense Gun, has been ordered into full production. It is a radar-directed automatic gun system that will be used to defend forward maneuver battalions, the new Abrams tanks, and the Bradley fighting vehicles against attack by fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

The Sergeant York system is mounted on a modified M48A5 tank chassis. Its armored turret contains two 40mm guns with search and track radar, a fire control center with a laser range finder, and a digital computer. It can search, track, and shoot while on the move.

The Sergeant York gun batteries will be part of the air defense battalion in each of the Army's armor and mechanized infantry divisions. The first battalion is scheduled for deployment in 1985.

PHYSICIANS AND OTHER

PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air Force have been learning the rights of field medicine during an eight-day Combat Casualty Care Course (C4) at Camp Bullis, Texas. During Fiscal Year 1982, more than 1,200 military personnel took the course, and came away with a far better appreciation of the unique and rigorous demands of combat field medicine.

The curriculum includes triage, nuclear-biological-chemical warfare, bandaging and splinting, and medical support during combat. It is expected that 20 classes of 120 students each will go through the course during Fiscal Year 1983.

Although most C4 students are active duty physicians, each class also trains a few nurses and dentists, as well as personnel from Army Reserve and National Guard units.

THE ARMY'S FIRST PATRIOT BATTALION, the 1st Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery, officially became operational in May 1982.

Plans call for the Patriot to eventually replace both the Nike Hercules and Hawk air defense systems. It is a tactical air defense system that is designed to attack and destroy several enemy aircraft while at the same time tracking many more.

The missile uses a concept called track-via-missile guidance. As the missile reaches the vicinity of an enemy aircraft, it tells the radar of its location in relation to its target. A computer then makes a calculation and directs the missile in a path that ensures a kill. The missile has a proximity-fuzed warhead and can destroy a target by passing close to it without actually hitting it.
MARINES AT CAMP LEJUENE recently tested two versions of a new weapon that has been specifically designed to be used against enemy bunkers and other heavily fortified positions. It is called the Shoulder-Launched, Multi-purpose Assault Weapon (SMAW).

The SMAW has a dual-purpose warhead that is particularly well suited for use in combat in urban areas, because it can modify its explosive power to handle a variety of targets. Thus, if the 81mm rocket-propelled warhead hits a hard target, such as steel or concrete, it will detonate immediately; if it hits a softer target, such as an earth or sand-bag reinforced bunker, its detonation will be delayed until the round has actually penetrated the target.

The SMAW weighs about 14 pounds and can be handled easily by a single soldier. It is designed around a reusable launching tube and an accurate sighting system that will permit trained gunners to hit even small targets at ranges out to 250 meters. The reusable launchers are also fitted with a spotting rifle that fires a tracer round to give the gunners an idea of their aim before triggering the main projectile.

FORT BRAGG WAS THE FIRST Forces Command post to receive the Stinger, one of the Army’s new air defense weapon systems.

The Stinger, a portable, infrared heat-seeking air defense guided missile, is shoulder-fired and is designed to shoot down high-speed, low-level, ground attack aircraft. It can also be used against other targets such as helicopters and observation and transport planes.

The weapon weighs 35 pounds and its launch tube is thrown away after the missile is fired. (See INFANTRY, May-June 1981, page 8.)

THE EXCEPTIONAL FAMILY MEMBER PROGRAM (EFMP) is a voluntary Army program to help soldiers with family members who require special education or medical services. It was formerly called the Handicapped Dependent Program.

All soldiers on active duty with exceptional family members are eligible to take part in the program. AR 614-203 outlines the program, and DA Pamphlet 600-8, Procedure 4-11, gives the application procedures.
A major malfunction that might occur in the process of developing company-level leaders will certainly occur when the leadership of a unit does not put enough effort into recognizing, emphasizing, and using THE DIFFERENCE.

Of the 169 men in a full strength company, 43 are officers and 126 are not. Therefore, 43 soldiers are in the leadership of the unit and 126 are not.

And that's THE DIFFERENCE. There is a line between them.

The line is totally unimportant in terms of making the 43 "better" individuals than the 126. Any one of the 169 can be as good a man as any other. The line is extremely important, though, in terms of making it possible for the leadership of the unit to lead the unit.

Any organized effort involving two or more people must have someone in charge. There must be leaders and followers, and leaders and followers do different things. Leaders analyze, organize, deputize, and supervise. Followers execute. The line establishes THE DIFFERENCE between the two. New lieutenants and new sergeants, just as they have a hard time balancing mission needs with men needs, also have a hard time learning THE DIFFERENCE between leaders and followers.

Somewhere among your young able and willing soldiers there’s probably one that you have started on the road to becoming a leader. You picked him out because he seemed to be the “main man” in one of those informal buddy groups that hang around together. Now, why do you think his buddies looked at him as the main man? It was because he knew, better than anyone else, what was inside his buddies, how they felt about the Army and about their jobs, what their attitudes were, what their needs were. And he was the main man because he, better than anyone else, could speak for them, and pass on their attitudes and needs to the leadership.

That’s what makes an informal
leader of either a good group or a sorry group. He knows his buddies' attitudes and needs, and they think he's the one who can most probably get something done about them. That's why they put him in charge, formally, of course. Then you come along and put him in charge, formally. You did right, because he's a leader, in your eyes and theirs.

This young man, as an informal leader, is an expert on the needs of his men. But at this stage, there is no way he can do the balancing between mission and men, which is so critical. He knows little about the needs of the mission. When you bring him across that line that separates leaders from followers, the needs of the mission are what he must learn. And then, when he's started learning those, he will begin to understand the price he has to pay to become a leader of men.

Nothing good ever comes for free. What he will learn is that never again, as a leader, can he be one of the boys. He has crossed the line. He has graduated. He is different.

Now that he's different, he's got to find some new buddy groups. He's got to hang around with leaders, and not with the boys. And that's why brand-new sergeants should be reassigned within their units. And that's why, in good units, there are separate areas in the mess halls where sergeants can talk about sergeants' business. And that's why, in good units, there are separate NCO clubs where they can talk about it some more. And that's why there are separate NCO rooms in the barracks and why there are separate NCO get-togethers, meetings, and activities.

All this has nothing to do with NCO prestige. The purpose of all this separating is to teach, to develop, to strengthen, to clarify THE DIFFERENCE between those who are part of the leadership and those who are not. The better the leadership of the unit does this separating, the better the unit will be led.

DANDRIDGE M. MALONE, a retired Infantry Colonel, has published numerous articles, books, and technical reports. He holds a master's degree in social psychology from Purdue University and has completed several military schools, including the Armed Forces Staff College. In addition to his Infantry leadership assignments, he also served in other staff or faculty assignments at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Military Academy, and the U.S. Army War College.

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ARMY AVIATION
An Insider's View

CAPTAIN KEVIN G. SCHERRER

Despite its growing importance as a member of the combined arms team, Army Aviation is still at times mistreated, misused, and misunderstood by ground commanders at all levels.

An aviation unit's effectiveness on the battlefield depends on the availability of its equipment, the proficiency of its aircrews, and its thorough and complete integration with the ground maneuver and fire support elements. Accordingly, ground commanders and their operations people must thoroughly understand a supporting aviation unit's capabilities, limitations, tactics, and methods of employment if they expect that unit to be of much help to them.

The first thing they must understand is that there will never be enough aircraft available to satisfy everyone's desires. This means that during peacetime training, ground units should request only those missions they would realistically ask for in an active combat situation.

Equipment limitation is something else ground commanders and their principal staff officers are going to have to learn to live with. For example, the cargo hook of a UH-1 helicopter is rated at 4,000 pounds. This does not mean the helicopter can carry two tons of ammunition. A UH-1 aircraft usually has an operating weight, before loading, of some 7,500 pounds. Because its gross operating weight is 9,500 pounds, the UH-1 can carry only 2,000 pounds, or one ton, of cargo. And even that figure might be reduced by such en-
vironmental conditions as temperature, wind, and pressure altitude, all of which significantly affect helicopter performance.

No one is saying that ground commanders must become experts on the technical aspects of their aviation resources. But during their mission planning they do need to understand and carefully consider the limitations of their supporting aircraft. They can and should get the technical assistance they need from the people in their supporting aviation units.

Sadly, coordination between ground and aviation units today is not particularly good, and it is usually conducted only on a case-by-case basis. (In a tactically "hot" situation, this sort of coordination might well be a day late and a dollar short.)

Flight platoon leaders and S3 Air officers must establish and maintain an extremely close working relationship so that the basic principles of employing Army Aviation resources are well understood before an actual mission must be flown. But this is a two-way street, and the flight platoon leaders must also understand the employment concepts and the task organization the ground unit will use.

As with any of the combat arms, the tactics used by aviation units are those that will allow them and their supported units to accomplish their missions and to survive on a mid- to high-intensity battlefield. An aviation unit, therefore, will be chiefly concerned with an opposing force’s anti-aircraft weapon deployment, because a large number of diversified and highly efficient air defense weapon systems have been developed and deployed by many armies during the past decade or so. In fact, it seems that every altitude and every kilometer of airspace above and around the front lines is covered by at least one such system.

This fact, more than any other, has led Army pilots to develop and refine terrain flight and net-of-the-earth (NOE) tactics to conceal their positions from the opposing force. No longer can an infantry commander realistically expect to fly convoy cover at 2,000 feet or expect his attached helicopter gunships to orbit the lead elements of his maneuver force.

Today, airmobile assaults should be planned to fly over heavily vegetated terrain at the lowest possible altitude, and the pilots must use draws, valleys, and ridgelines properly to gain the greatest possible tactical advantage. And while attack helicopters should certainly be integrated into the ground commander’s plan to supplement or support his available ground firepower, they must be given the freedom to choose their own battle positions as the terrain dictates. In short, effective terrain utilization is the key to survival on the battlefield for Army Aviation.

WEATHER

Perhaps the most misunderstood of all aviation-related phenomena is weather, but the popular notion that pilots take to the snack bar at the sight of a cloud is definitely not true. The minimum meteorological conditions required for flight are somewhat complicated in that they may vary with each command, at each airfield, or for each aircraft. Thus, minimum conditions in the United States differ from those in Europe, and a CH-47 can be flown in conditions that could easily call for grounding an OH-58.

It is also important to know that for flights under visual flight rules (VFR), visibility and ceiling minimums must be met at the point of departure, at the point of landing, and en route, while for flights under instrumented flight rules (IFR), only the origin and destination ceilings and visibility requirements need to be satisfied.

The list of factors that must be considered for each flight, regardless of the type of aircraft, are winds, outside air temperature, dew point, ceiling, visibility, icing, thunderstorms, turbulence, precipitation, humidity, and freezing level. A final thought: roughly one-third of all Army aircraft accidents are "weather-related."

Aviation maintenance is another problem area whose importance, though often overlooked by a ground commander, simply cannot be ignored. A complicated (and perhaps fragile) piece of machinery, the helicopter nonetheless is often subjected to some pretty rough treatment, and it requires the utmost attention if it is to be kept flying.

Aircraft scheduling — to ground commanders a thoroughly illogical business — is normally accomplished by an aviation maintenance officer, who really does have the best interests of the supported units in mind. A ground commander must appreciate
the aviation unit's problems in this regard and should never forget that its supporting aircraft are not properly maintained, they will be subject to failure in flight, a condition that usually brings with it undesirable results.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Army Aviation devotes more time, effort, and money to safety than does any other agency. Several safety-related items should be particularly noted by all ground units:

- The pilot-in-command is the final authority for the safe operation of the aircraft.
- Every Army flight is controlled and monitored by the use of flight plans. It is imperative that unless a flight plan is changed en route the aircraft remain on its intended route as filed on the original flight plan.
- Standards for scheduling crew rest must be adhered to, and ground commanders must acknowledge and support crew rest if they really want to prevent aircraft accidents.

The organizational changes that are now taking shape in the Army's basic structure will put Army Aviation side-by-side with its combat arms brothers, but aviation and ground units cannot wait for all of the TOE changes to take effect before they start working together more closely. They should be taking specific steps now toward tighter integration if their mutual potential is to be fully realized.

Education is the key to this integration; greater combat power is its inevitable result.

CAPTAIN KEVIN G. SCHERRER is a Field Artillery officer, is a UH-1 pilot and is a flight leader in the 603rd Aviation Battalion, 3rd Armored Division, where he previously served as Assistant Operations Officer. He is a 1977 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

**Attack Helicopters**

LIEUTENANT RONALD M. BUFFKIN

In recent issues of INFANTRY Magazine, Major General Sam Wetzel has concluded his Commandant's Note with "Practice Combined Arms.''

While many infantry commanders, fortunately, know the full meaning of these words, there are still others who do not. Too often, commanders fail to integrate and use all the elements that make up the combined arms team, and one of these neglected elements is the attack helicopter (AH), the Cobra. It is highly maneuverable, has great firepower, and can be used in a number of different ways.

The infantry commanders who may not be aware of the attack helicopter's value to the combined arms team should find these guidelines useful.

First, the commander has to decide when helicopters can be used to the best advantage. An Army helicopter company (AHC) performs best when it is part of the commander's overall ground scheme of maneuver, and it should be used when concentrated combat power and mass fires are needed. Its ideal target consists of large mobile armored or mechanized forces. It should not be used against well-fortified or dug-in positions; once a tank is nowhere worth one attack helicopter.

In situations where no effort has been made to suppress the enemy's air defense weapons, the AHC aero-scout should be allowed to use the unit's supporting field artillery or tactical air assets to neutralize any air defense threat he encounters when positioning the AHC.

The terrain also must be carefully considered in any decision to use attack helicopters. Cobras are thin-skinned and need terrain that will provide protection, a standoff capability, and covered and concealed routes in and out of the target area.

If the target and the terrain are suitable, if the AHC will be fighting in conjunction with friendly ground forces, if concentrated combat power and mass fire are needed, and if air defense threats have been suppressed, then the situation is ideal for attack helicopter employment. Rarely will all these criteria be met at the same time. But one unique capability of the AHC is that mobility makes it flexible in dealing with the rapidly changing requirements of the modern battlefield.

Once a commander decides to use
attack helicopters in a battle, he can improve this flexibility by providing them the time and the intelligence they need. Cobras are not magic dragons that appear on the scene by cruising forward at 120 knots with guns blazing. They have the same speed and security considerations that all maneuver units have.

Nap-of-the-earth flight, used to insure the helicopter's survival close to the enemy, is slow and deliberate. Because helicopters don't have the armor protection of ground fighting vehicles, they have to keep terrain between them and the enemy.

The best way for a commander to reduce the time an AHC needs to move and still be responsive to his needs is to put the AHC's aeroscouts to work as soon as it is practical. He should allow the aeroscouts to operate well forward early in the battle.

The aeroscout's primary mission is to see the battlefield, to gather targets, and to coordinate the movement of the attack helicopters. He needs to coordinate with the company team or the task force commander. He does this through either secure radio or face-to-face contact.

A third major consideration for the commander is weather and darkness. Of all the air assets available to a maneuver commander, Army aviation has the best capability for fighting in poor weather. Because of the helicopter's unique maneuverability, speed, and operating envelope, an AH can maneuver on the battlefield in weather conditions that would be impossible for other combat aircraft. While low ceilings are not a problem for the AH, visibility can greatly influence its effectiveness.

FIREPOWER

The 3,700-meter standoff capability provided by the Cobra's TOW gives it long-range antiarmor firepower. When the visibility drops below one-half mile, though, the AH's ability to acquire targets and use its standoff capability is reduced. The commander should be guided by various local directives. They provide for the maximum effective use of aviation assets and basically establish a time limit on how long each day an aviator can perform pilot duties. The AHC commander will keep the maneuver commander informed of the condition and availability of his air crews. It is important that the maneuver commander recognize this factor.

When the AHC is placed under the control of a maneuver element, the AHC will send a liaison officer to the supported headquarters. This officer will pass missions and tactical information to the AHC and advise the ground commander on the employment of his helicopters. The liaison officer is usually equipped with a quarter-ton or an M880 type vehicle complete with secure radio equipment for communicating with the AHC. This officer needs access to all the intelligence and operations information that is normally made available to other subordinate maneuver units. He should be located with the element that is fighting the battle at the time. This may be the brigade tactical operations center, the commander, or the S-3. In this way, the AHC can be most responsive to the commander. The liaison officer is the critical link in the chain of events that leads to the effective use of the AH.

If an Infantry commander understands these major points concerning the use of attack helicopters, and if he has a general knowledge of FM 17-50, Attack Helicopter Operations, he will be better able to use attack helicopters as part of his combined arms operations.
CACC System

CAPTAIN STEPHEN ORLOFF

In the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), an infantry unit commander must insure that the aviation resources he is given to support his particular operation are closely integrated with the requirements of his ground tactical plan. In the Division, it is usually an air assault company team that is assigned a tactical mission. This team normally consists of a ground element (an infantry company), a lift element (four to six UH-60 Blackhawks helicopters), a security team (one or two AH-1S Cobras), and a screening element (an air cavalry “pink team”). The team is quite mobile, has a considerable amount of firepower, and can react quickly to changing tactical situations.

To keep the control problems that can accompany this blend of ground and aviation resources to a minimum, the division has established the Combat Aviation Control Center (CACC) system. The senior officer in the center itself, usually referred to simply as the CACC, is an experienced aviator who centralizes air forecasts and acts as a liaison officer between the ground and aviation units.

At the battalion level, a CAP (Combat Aviation Party), which is also headed by an aviator, provides the same kind of assistance to the battalion as the CACC does to the brigade.

Finally, each maneuver element within a battalion has a CAT, or Combat Aviation Team. The CAT has from one to three pathfinder-qualified soldiers, and their chief function is to provide a direct link with the aviation elements for the ground unit commander. They also supervise and assist in preparing pickup and landing zones, and closely monitor all rigging and slingloading operations.

Because they provide their own combat aviation net (CAN), each member of the CACC team can swiftly adjust the aviation plan as required by changes in the ground plan of maneuver.

The CACC also plays an important role during the planning stages of an air assault operation, for the various aviators not only broaden the base of understanding with regard to the aviation side of the house, they are immediately available to clarify for the ground commanders what the aviation units can and cannot do. For the ground commander, the S3 Air, who is his movements control officer, must work closely with the CACC during the planning phases.

Once an operation begins, the CAT with the air assault team, using its own communication net, monitors and controls the air support and the air lift. At the same time, it passes to the company team commander any information pertaining to the aviation plan. This special communication loop frees the company commander from traffic that may not be vitally important to the operation.

The air liaison function performed by the various CACC personnel relieves the S3 Air from having to monitor air traffic once an operation starts, and this allows him to get ready to handle any subsequent movement requirements his commander may place on him.

The modern battlefield will have many challenges for all members of the combined arms team. Incorporating new technology and doctrine with age-old infantry fundamentals is one such challenge. Never before has an infantry commander had such a vast array of resources with which to conduct war. The CACC system can be regarded as a useful tool that a ground commander in an air assault unit can use to accomplish his mission.

CAPTAIN STEPHEN ORLOFF is now attending the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He is a 1978 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and recently completed an assignment as S3 Air of a battalion in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).
Communicating in Battle

CAPTAIN GREGORY J. PREMO

The U.S. Army is rapidly approaching a time when almost every soldier will have access to a tactical FM radio. One proposed Division 86 TOE would place more than 100 FM radios in a mechanized infantry headquarters company. This is a symptom of our excessive reliance on radios as our primary controller of soldiers in combat. As a result, the competition for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum on any future battlefield, on both sides, will be staggering.

In addition to deliberate jamming, unintentional interference between friendly and enemy emitters using the same frequencies will present a very real problem to the tactical communicator. A multitude of other communication disrupters — such as power generators, electrical power lines, and automotive spark noise — will contribute to the problem. To make matters worse, Mother Nature will also conspire to deny effective communications with dead spots, the terrain, and atmospheric anomalies.

But the real problem may be that few of our radios will survive to face these interference problems. Assuming that the next war will begin in Europe from a "standing start," we can also assume that, if we face Warsaw Pact forces, those forces will fire the first shots. In that hypothetical battle, these first shots undoubtedly will be directed against NATO command and control communications (C 3), because Soviet doctrine places command posts at the very top of its targeting priorities.

Commanders who believe that they will have effective command and control over their combat forces through the use of electronic communications after the start of such a battle are in for a shock. They need to reorient their thinking now so that they will have a more realistic idea of what is going to happen on that battlefield.

CONFUSION

For example, NATO's intelligence community should be able to give at least a 24-hour warning of an impending attack. As NATO forces deploy to their defensive positions, they will come under keen observation by Soviet human and electronic intelligence surveillance. Soviet radio-electronic combat elements should have little trouble in rapidly compiling an electronic order of battle, given the confusion such a rapid deployment would cause for NATO forces and the subsequent reliance of these forces on electronic communications to sort out that confusion.

It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Warsaw Pact battle plans include a preemptive nuclear blast at high altitudes over their own territory for the sole purpose of damaging and disrupting NATO's electronic equipment through the effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). (A nuclear armed antisatellite destroyer could produce similar results.) EMP from beyond the atmosphere would damage or disrupt electronic communications and computer equipment for hundreds, possibly thousands, of miles. Because it is most effective against semiconductor and transistor technology, upon which NATO's forces rely almost exclusively, EMP would have disastrous effects on NATO's communications equipment. (Of course, the later use of tactical offensive weapons by the Warsaw Pact nations could produce the same EMP effects, in addition to their traditionally recognized destructive capabilities.) The equipment that may escape destruction by fire and EMP will then be subjected to massive jamming and to artful deception.

At this point, there are several questions we must ask ourselves. Assuming that such a catastrophe occurs on that hypothetical battlefield, will NATO's forces be able to cope with it? How effectively can commanders control a battle if they have lost half of their communication assets before they even begin to fight? How can an already unwieldy logistics system, without effective communications, resupply the units? Unfortunately, the overall answer may be that NATO forces will be reduced to independently operational battalion-sized units, fighting until
they run out of both bullets and fuel.

Units whose soldiers have routinely abused communication security procedures and ignored the electronic warfare threat during their training are not going to undergo a miraculous cure when the battle standard is raised. If we expect to survive the first hours of this battle, we must learn how to protect our communication means before the battle starts so that we will stand a better chance of communicating and succeeding in the battles that will follow.

There are no secret formulas for protecting our communications. All we have to work with is what we have failed to emphasize from the start — training!

Without exception, our current tactics for engaging an enemy who is superior in firepower and in numbers require instantaneous and survivable communications. Yet at almost every level of tactical command, our planning and training are conducted without due consideration for the EW threat. We must, therefore, train our forces to use the equipment, the EW doctrine, and the combat tactics that we have in such a way as to reduce the enemy's ability to use our own radios and radars against us.

We must incorporate planning and training for the electronic battle into the programs of instruction of our service schools, into each doctrinal publication, and into all tactical unit training. We must develop a consciousness of EW in all echelons of command, and we must see that it becomes ingrained, right down to the infantry squad leader.

Here are some of the specific steps we can take toward that end:

- Study current EW doctrine. Every communication or radar user should be an expert in the philosophy and tactics of current electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM).
- Push for the immediate fielding of the directional antennas now under development. Train with and use field expedient directional antennas and antenna employment techniques.
- Reduce the amount of "on the air time" required by doctrine, such as artillery fire direction center (FDC) readback of calls for fire.
- Rely on alternate means of communication for pre-attack message traffic; a tactical FM radio should not be used until contact is made with the enemy.
- Recognize that it is highly unlikely that the research and development effort of the past 10 or 15 years can be turned around to come to our collective rescue in the nick of time with cost effective, survivable communication equipment and weapon systems.
- Incorporate EW training into every phase of training and at every level every time electronic communications and non-communications (radar) equipment is used.
- Penalize units that abuse electronic communication means during training.

The answer to immediate EW survivability does not rest with equipment black boxes and tricks. The answer lies in constant training and in overcoming a 30-year history of communication abuse. Until we make a firm commitment to correct these deficiencies, we will continue to abuse our electronic assets, and we will face the possibility of committing electronic suicide on tomorrow's battlefield.

CAPTAIN GREGORY J. PREMO, now assigned to U.S. Army Readiness and Mobilization Region VII was formerly assigned to the Command, Tactics, and Doctrine Department of the Infantry School. A 1972 ROTC graduate of the University of Georgia, he has also completed the Signal Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and has served as a communications platoon leader, an assistant S3, and a company commander.
URBAN SNIPERS

MAJOR WAYNE A. SILKETT

Nobody really wants to fight in cities and towns. Such operations are difficult, costly, and time-consuming. For this reason, built-up areas should be isolated and bypassed whenever possible. This is sound doctrine, regardless of who preaches it.

But the modern battlefield may not allow for the isolation and bypassing of built-up areas. This is especially true in Europe, where almost every day urban sprawl does away with more and more maneuver room.

Nevertheless, urban warfare can work to the advantage of an outnumbered defender. It not only provides an opportunity for greater mutual support and defense in depth, it can seriously slow the momentum of an enemy’s attack and substantially increase his losses.

One way to make it easier to fight outnumbered and win in such operations is to use snipers on a large scale. When they are integrated with all other means of urban defense, snipers can be one of the most mobile, lethal, and cost-effective defensive measures used in urban combat.

Snipers have always been misunderstood and generally neglected. They have been considered a psychological weapon with more nuisance value than anything else. Historically, though, this has been because their employment was on a small scale and because they were often used in a haphazard manner. The time has come to consider the advantages of using snipers in large numbers in urban warfare.

How many snipers would be needed? There should be at least two snipers in each rifle platoon, which is six per company, or 18 per battalion. Even this number may not be enough, but it is a starting point.

An urban battlefield is well suited to the use of snipers in such numbers, perhaps more so than any other combat environment. Cities and towns, intact or otherwise, provide excellent cover and concealment and are well suited to a defense in depth. And an urban battlefield is truly threedimensional, with sniping positions and opportunities virtually unlimited. This, in addition to his own high degree of mobility and knowledge of the area, makes the sniper less accessible to the enemy and less vulnerable than other defensive measures.

One sniper cannot be everywhere, obviously, but several snipers, perhaps dozens per defensive sector,
can be almost everywhere — or they can certainly seem to be. Numerous well-trained and imaginatively used snipers can achieve the following objectives:

- They can inflict high losses on enemy officers and NCOs, who can be expected to be on the front lines, particularly in urban combat, where decentralized operations require close contact and supervision.
- They can kill such critical personnel as reconnaissance and communication troops, infantry commanders, and exposed artillery crewmen.
- They can force vehicle crews to button up, reducing their vision and thereby increasing the vehicle’s vulnerability.

- They can slow an enemy’s advance and dilute his offensive capability by making him divert his resources for the clearing, denial, retention, and monitoring of likely sniper locations.
- They can cause heavy losses and increase the psychological strain on the attacker and damage his morale.

No one seriously expects snipers — in whatever numbers — to win every urban battle. The combined efforts of infantry, artillery, combat engineers, armor, and air power may not win every one, either, especially when the defending force is seriously outnumbered. But if an urban defense cannot always defeat an enemy, it can always delay him, disrupt his offensive timetable, tie him down, and inflict high losses on him.

Friendly forces may have to fight outnumbered, but they do not have to be outfought. A number of well trained, resourceful snipers, imaginatively employed, well-coordinated and well integrated into the overall defense, could help make the difference between winning and losing.

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**Arctic Airborne Mortars**

**STAFF SERGEANT JOHN E. FOLEY**

Alaska, a land of few roads with limited aviation support, lines of communication that are measured in hundreds of miles, and sometimes brutal weather conditions, represents a real challenge to the weapons platoon of an airborne infantry company. I know. I had three years of experience with such a platoon and went through everything Alaska had to offer during three mortar ARTEPs, numerous field training exercises, and year-round training in mountains and muskeg.

From this, I have come to the conclusion that the present MTOE for the weapons platoon in the airborne infantry company is not only unworkable, it is also unrealistic. The major problem areas can be grouped under three general headings: manpower, mobility and firepower, and antiarmor capability.

**Manpower**

Its current MTOE gives the platoon a total of 1 officer and 17 enlisted men. These 18 soldiers must carry three complete 81mm M29 mortars and, during the winter months, must tow a minimum of two akhio tent groups. In addition, each man must carry his individual weapon and a rucksack. When the unit goes to the field, every man carries either a radio or a major gun component, plus one round of 81mm mortar ammunition. The tent groups are critical during the winter months, and the rucksacks are a must during all seasons of the year. Unfortunately, when the platoon is engaged in a fire mission, no one is available to provide security.

The platoon needs at least eight additional soldiers — two radio-telephone operators in the headquarters squad plus two ammunition bearers in each mortar squad. These would give the platoon enough men to
switch off the heavy loads, to carry more ammunition, and to provide security during its fire missions.

Mobility and Firepower

The platoon now has four M880 series trucks, but it is not authorized any drivers for them. This is probably just as well, since the trucks are seldom used during operational missions. They cannot be air-dropped, their cross-country performance is only marginal, they break down frequently, and spare parts are hard to get. When they are operational the company usually takes them to use as resupply vehicles.

The M880 truck presents other problems as well: It is under-powered, it cannot carry a mortar, its crew, and its authorized ammunition at the same time, and a mortar cannot be carried mounted on the vehicle or fired from it.

Therefore, the platoon is badly in need of a suitable vehicle, one like the M125A1 mortar carrier or the Commando VO-150 armored car. The vehicle must be one with a good cross-country capability, one that a mortar can be fired from, one that can carry the portion of the basic load of ammunition that goes with the mortar (80 rounds), and one that can be air-dropped and sling-loaded by helicopter. The vehicle should also be equipped with two radios and should have a mount for either a machinegun or an automatic grenade launcher.

The most important thing is for the platoon to have vehicles that are suited to its mission; we should quit trying to fit the platoon's mission to its vehicles.

The right kind of vehicle would also ease the platoon's firepower problems. The platoon requires large quantities of ammunition when it is engaged in combat firing missions. Without appropriate vehicles, the platoon is now forced to rely on its own manpower and on airborne and airmobile sources of resupply. The latter presents great problems in Alaska, because of the distances aircraft have to fly and because of the bad weather conditions that often prevent aircraft from flying.

With vehicles that could be air-dropped along with the soldiers, the platoon's full ammunition load could be moved from its drop zones, and an adequate resupply effort could be established. As it is, even with airborne and airmobile support, the platoon simply has no way to move large quantities of ammunition when it moves from one firing area to another.

Antiarmor

Because an arctic airborne rifle company does not now have an authorized antiarmor section, I believe an antiarmor section should be formed and assigned to the weapons platoon. Initially, the section would consist of a section sergeant and three three-man gun teams armed with the six 90mm M67 recoilless rifles that the company does have. At a later date, the section could be equipped with the Viper antiarmor weapon and keep the same organization. Each man could carry four or five. The section, of course, would need its own vehicles, three at least.

Without these additional soldiers and these materiel and organizational improvements, the platoon will continue to be tied down to an area within a few kilometers of its base camp, and it will remain severely restricted as to the amount and kind of ammunition it can carry.

With the suggested additions and improvements, the increase in the platoon's mobility and firepower would revolutionize tactics and movement in the Arctic. The changes in manpower, mobility and firepower, and antiarmor organization would enable the platoon to move, shoot, and communicate anytime and anywhere in Alaska.
It's instructive to go back and look at your own ideas from an earlier time. It's sometimes embarrassing, too — "Is that what I really used to think?" It can also be dangerous if, for example, you start congratulating yourself on the great thoughts you had as a young officer.

As an Infantry captain I had the usual "basic load" of ideas, some good and some bad, about what I'd do if I were in charge of the whole dang outfit. One of those ideas made its way into the pages of INfanTRY almost twenty years ago (see the May-June 1963 issue, pp. 54-55). The subject was something called "chain training," which meant the use of the unit chain of command in training, with the leaders at each level serving as instructors for their immediate subordinates. There was a way, I thought, to achieve leader development and at the same time to tailor the training to fit the level of the recipient.

Our Army has always emphasized the importance of the chain of command in discipline, esprit, and successful operation in every unit. Further, the Army teaches leadership as well as military doctrine, and in a unit improving and strengthening Army leadership is as important as presenting classes.

Training could be passed down the chain of command — not all training, but some of it, depending on the subject. In this way you could tailor training to the needs of each soldier, no matter where he fitted into the chain of command. Offensive tactics, for example, ought to be taught in one way to a battalion commander and in quite another way to a squad leader.

Over the years I have tried this approach in various units, and I must admit it has grown somewhat easier to implement in my present job than it was when I was a company commander.

Chain training can begin at any level — even at division, where the division commander conducts training with his immediate subordinates (assistant division commanders, brigade commanders), who then adapt the instruction and present it to the battalion commanders, who in turn see that it is passed all the way down to the soldiers at the end of the chain.

On its way down, the subject of the training is adjusted in the same way an operations order is fitted to each level. Each leader is given only the amount of instruction and the coordinating details he needs to prepare himself and to teach his subordinates the same subject.

I gave a couple of examples in that INFANTRY article — examples that have a quaint and antique ring to them now:

Map reading, field fortifications and first aid are classes scheduled for a given day in garrison. At an opportune time a week ahead, the company commander briefs the platoon leaders on these classes. He points out that while certain other subjects (a new CBR alert class and a practice involving drill) will be in charge of a specific instructor and attended by the whole company, map reading, field fortifications and first aid will be
chain classes. He tells them the phase to be taught, the important points to be stressed, and what he expects the troops to learn from the classes. He discusses coordinating details: areas, training aids, reference material, times, etc.

The platoon leaders explain to their squad leaders the subjects of the chain classes, the level of instruction required and the coordinating details. A discussion class serves to refresh the squad leaders as necessary, and to bring out the details to be stressed. Rehearsal times are appointed if required. Responsibilities for training aids, supplies, and areas are assigned.

The squad leaders, assisted perhaps by key men in the squads, present the instruction. Platoon leaders supervise, with the emphasis on assistance in planning and coordinating activities before the class takes place, rather than on corrections after the class is over. The class, which was a discussion at the squad leader level and above, is now largely practical work.

BETTER TRAINING

So much for reminiscing. Since those bygone days, the Battalion Training Management System has revolutionized training, driving out a number of ills and providing for what I consider a magnificent jump in the potential for better training. Chain training follows the principles of that system: it is decentralized, hands-on, and performance-oriented. Most important, it is based on a commander's continual first-hand evaluation of his subordinates. As he works with them, he becomes more and more aware of their capabilities and their shortcomings, and he adjusts his training approach based on his running evaluation.

At each level, the leader trains his immediate subordinates in the selected tasks — individual and collective — that lend themselves to this kind of tailored instruction. Here are some of the ways we have used chain training techniques over the past year:

- In order to involve the CG, the ADCs, and the brigade-level commanders in MILES, we "suited up" and ran a squad attack and defense exercise, with the CG as squad leader versus the ADC-M as defending fire team leader. We learned that MILES is the greatest.
- Using Dunn-Kempf, half the key leaders (colonels and above) took on the other half. We learned what our lieutenants can get from this simulation.
- The top of the chain spent four hours together in a motor pool, followed by a couple of hours of PLL. We learned a bit more about what operators and first line supervisors are up against.
- All of us spent eight hours working on FM 25-2, with some imported help from the Army Training Board. We got our thinking together on BTMS.

These examples show what we "higher" did and what we learned; the same training was transmitted from level to level down through the division, fitted to the needs at battalion, company, platoon, squad, and soldier levels.

You have to be careful, of course, in evaluating the value and effectiveness of your own pet project, but I think that with command support and interest, we are:

- Learning at the top and all the way down.
- Tailoring the training better.
- Developing a greater sense of team spirit.
- Saving time — or at least, using time the way it should be used.

- Following the good advice of BTMS.

Chain training also fills an important gap — the comparative lack of individual training at levels above battalion. The Army Training Board and some other institutions have been working on this gap and I think some good things will happen soon. Right now I suggest that any echelon chain training is worth a look. You may, in fact, be doing this kind of training under other names and in different ways right now. If not, try it and see if it works for you.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. GALVIN is Commanding General of the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia.
The Future of the INFANTRY
Never before in our history have we in the Infantry faced as many changes in equipment, doctrine, force structure, and training as we face today. It has been said that today's technological change is so rapid that the art of war now changes as much in five years as it did in the period between World Wars I and II.

The advent of large-scale airmobile operations marked a significant change in the mid-1960s; the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 drastically altered our thinking, primarily on antitank warfare. By the late 1970s we were reasonably comfortable with our ability to stop first-echelon Threat forces and had begun to focus our attention on stopping second-echelon forces and on implementing the AirLand battle. We cannot help wondering whether this tempo of change will continue.

In the midst of such change, we always seem to be asking questions about the potential for survival of some of our systems — weapon systems and organizational systems — particularly as a result of the proliferation of highly sophisticated, extremely lethal weapons throughout the world. Can the helicopter survive in a mid-intensity conflict? Can the tank face the growing family of antitank guided missiles and still be effective on the battlefield? How can we mold today's Infantry into an organization that will be fit to fight on the battlefield of the future? Can the Infantry survive there?

There are even some people who question whether the Infantryman of the future will be able to perform his role in the combined arms team. They say that he is, in fact, no longer the nucleus of that team.

But it is the very unpredictability of the future that lends credence to the prediction that the United States Infantryman will be around for a long time. He will be around precisely because no one can predict when he will be needed or in what capacity. And he will be doing what he has always done — fighting or standing ready to fight on the ground, for the ground. In fact, as a result of the advancement of weapon systems and countersystems, future conflicts may be even more influenced by the Infantryman's ability to go and fight and endure where no machine or electronic system can survive.

The Infantry School has considered all these questions — these doubts and predictions — as they apply to various aspects of the Infantry system: doctrine, organization, training, material, and resources, and has learned that to develop a successful system for the future, the Infantry must have a purpose, a value system, and a philosophy from which to derive its direction and its goals. Any long-range goals, therefore, must come from an understanding of the Infantry's basic purpose and from a vision of how the various parts of the Infantry team contribute to the fulfillment of that purpose.

GOALS

The Infantry has certain broad goals that go beyond any specific combat scenario, goals that apply to all Infantrymen, regardless of component, major command, or duty assignment. Each part of the Infantry, therefore, participates in its unique way in fulfilling the overall goals; each has a piece of the action.

These overall goals drawn from the Infantry's mission (as stated in Army Regulation 10-6) are to “close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack,” and, in spite of the critics, to form “the nucleus of the Army's fighting strength around which the other arms and services are grouped.” An additional goal, when not in combat, is to maintain “a state of readiness in preparation for immediate combat worldwide.”

With the basic goals and purposes in mind, the Infantry School has begun the process of defining long range goals and objectives. These are expressed in the "Infan-

try Strategic Plan 2-82," published at Fort Benning in March 1982. While it does not pretend to be all inclusive, this plan takes into consideration the various types of war the Infantry may be called upon to fight in the future and lays out changes that may be needed in the elements of the Infantry system.

Obviously, Infantrymen will require equipment with still higher technology to meet these future needs, but their leaders cannot lose sight of the human dimension. Tomorrow's leader must train the soldiers to master the existing technology so that he can get the most out of what he has, because the next war will be won by people. The victory will go to the commander who can lead, motivate, and inspire. Small unit leaders — squad, platoon, company — will have to be imaginative and resourceful. They may find themselves isolated on a high-intensity battlefield with much of their equipment destroyed or rendered useless by an opposing force's sophisticated countermeasures. Or they may be alone on a security mission in support of regularly constituted civil authorities in an urban area.

No matter what new techniques of combat the Infantryman may be required to adopt and learn, he will not be able to discard any of the old ones. While the future Infantryman may race over the battlefield in a BIFV, float around in a helicopter, or strap himself to an antigravity machine like Buck Rogers, he will not be able to neglect the skills that have sustained him on the battlefield for more than 200 years — the use of terrain, camouflage, marksmanship and stealth, and the basic tactics of fire and maneuver. Whatever sophisticated weapons he may employ, it is a good bet that he will still carry an individual weapon designed for one-to-one combat with a foe.

TRAINING

The ability of small units to succeed will depend on their training. Historically, the strength of the U.S. Army has been the individual initiative exhibited by its soldiers, plus their ability to think on their feet and to cope with changing situations. In the future also, the Army's training must build upon and expand these human capabilities.
From the total corps of young men whose self-worth depends in part on their skills as professional Infantrymen, certain ones will — as always — prove more skillful, quicker to learn, and more able to lead, and they will rise above their fellows in terms of professional accomplishments. If these leaders can be given the time to mature, the Infantry should develop the finest, most professional officers and noncommissioned officers the Army has ever known. The competition for advancement will be keen, and the winners should be truly outstanding soldiers.

A bright aspect of the Infantryman's future is the steadily increasing value of his training. A dedicated professional who is offered the training opportunities already established and the ever more valid and realistic training techniques of the immediate future should easily achieve standards of professional competence never before approached. Today's training devices, simulator systems, evaluation programs, and heightened emphasis on "hands on" training, backed by substantive, usable training literature, give the future Infantryman a great training advantage over his predecessors.

The concept of preparing to fight outnumbered and win "the first battle" on a sophisticated battlefield has been the Army's training orientation in recent years. U.S. Infantrymen can realistically expect to go into battle outnumbered and, on a weapon-for-weapon basis, outgunned. To the individual Infantryman, this means that he must develop two basic skills to a high degree: The ability to survive in a very lethal environment and the power to inflict heavy damage on his opponent. In other words, he will be the better trained and the better equipped soldier on the battlefield.

Previous wars have shown how unexpected changes or new developments can determine tactics and strategy. The Infantry must be open-minded and innovative enough to take full advantage of those changes. It must also be farsighted and imaginative so that its doctrinal concepts can direct the development of the weapons and equipment it needs. Each organization must be considered a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Sound structure may be a prerequisite to an organization's health, but it is not health itself. What matters is not the brevity, the clarity, or the perfection of the organization, it is the performance of the people within that organization.

The Infantryman must be prepared to support the national strategy in the face of any future threat. As the most flexible, adaptable, and strategically deployable of the combat arms, we must be prepared to respond to the demands of present and future military operations.

The legacy for the Infantry of tomorrow is directly dependent on the efforts that are expended today. A strong foundation has been firmly implanted, but the changing scene can quickly outpace us unless we stay ahead of the changes. The Infantry Strategic Plan provides a framework that links our daily decisions into a coherent plan for the future.
COMMAND IN EUROPE
Commanding a company anywhere in the world today is challenging, but commanding a mechanized infantry company in Europe is especially so. In fact, this command may be the most challenging company-level job in the Army. It is important for the prospective commander of such a company to understand the special challenge and to take some steps that will prepare him to meet it.

There are essentially two differences between this type of command in Europe and the same job somewhere else. First, in the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), there is the ever-present General Defense Plan (GDP), which dictates almost everything the commander does — how he trains, where he spends his time, how he equips his unit, and how he organizes. As his soldiers are constantly reminded, their mission is to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

But the second major difference, Europe's unparalleled high-stress environment, makes it difficult for him to accomplish the requirements of the GDP. This means that although the commander must train his unit to fight at a moment's notice, he may not always have the resources he needs to accomplish that training.

A mechanized infantry company commander in Europe has to vie with other U.S. and NATO units for access to training areas — either maneuver right areas (MRAs), which are civilian sectors where off-the-road maneuver has been authorized by the German government, or local training areas (LTAs). With the exception of the annual REPORGER exercise, during which USAREUR units, on a rotating system, are given the opportunity to take part in cross-country maneuver, such training is too often curtailed or cancelled because of the prospects of maneuver damage.

Competition for live fire ranges is often even more frustrating than vying for MRA and LTA opportunities. The shortage of ranges is further complicated by the same training ammunition problems found in the rest of the Army. Then, when a commander does get access to the ranges he needs, he has to hope that the weather cooperates so that he can accomplish at least his unit's mandatory tasks.

A broad spectrum of administrative burdens, in addition to the usual ones, also go with the job in Europe. A major source of these additional burdens is the commander's role as monitor of most of the Army-supported needs of his soldiers and their families. He has to arbitrate problems that arise between his soldiers and the local nationals, beginning with those associated with landlords. The unsuspecting company commander often feels helpless when confronted with the structured German bureaucratic system, which pervades essentially all aspects of his unit's life.

The commander is even responsible for monitoring the registration of privately-owned vehicles, the issuance of driver's licenses, and the administration of punishment for both on- and off-post traffic violations. Periodically, he is called upon to inspect the off-post quarters of company personnel, to quell domestic disturbances in both government and economy quarters, and, frequently, to coordinate the cleaning and maintenance of government quarters. At the same time he is expected to support different community organizations such as dependent youth activities, scouts, chapel, German-American Club, Red Cross, and Army Community Service.

Another thing that makes this a high-stress assignment is personnel turbulence. First-term soldiers rotate every 18 months. By the time they in-process, go through weeks of the Headstart Program and other classes peculiar to USAREUR, participate in a major FTX, fire one or two densities at Baumholder, Grafenwoehr or Wildflecken, and take a well-deserved leave, it is almost time for them to start out-processing. Most of the noncommissioned officers as well are on two-year unaccompanied tours. When these short term tours are coupled with the numerous special duty requirements, the commander ends up with skeleton crews and inadequately prepared soldiers.

(Although the turbulence in Korea is worse, the environment there provides a major advantage in that almost everyone in the 2d Division is unaccompanied. In addition, the individual soldiers live in the remote camps with no POVs, and the training resources far exceed what is customarily available to the mechanized infantry company commander in Europe.)

The extended support environment also makes things difficult. Most of the combat units in USAREUR are separated into numerous small casernes, or installations, scattered throughout Germany. This often means that routine maintenance and administrative actions must be performed at more than one location, usually several traveling hours apart. Simple repairs and administrative actions often turn into day-long operations, and if something can go wrong it will; if someone forgets to take along a vital tool or piece of equipment, it often means trying again another day to accomplish the task.

These are some of the things a mechanized infantry company commander in Germany has to live with. But there are some steps he can take to make it easier. The following advice, from someone who has been there, includes suggestions on how an officer can prepare himself for the job and then on how he can succeed at it once he is there.

ADVANCED COURSE

The first thing a prospective mechanized infantry company commander should do is to resist the temptation to take a command before he has attended the Infantry Officer's Advanced Course. Too often a young and aspiring, but still inexperienced, lieutenant grabs the opportunity for a USAREUR command without fully realizing what he will be missing by not attending the advanced course first.

Specifically, he will be missing the hours of advanced course training on combined arms, maintenance
management, supply accountability, and the Battalion Training Management System, among other subjects.

So, in preparation for a command later on, he should attend the advanced course and immerse himself in combined arms planning, digging deep and studying barrier planning, combat communications, and the use of close air support and attack helicopters. He should become an expert in understanding and writing operations orders and fragmentary orders. And he should not neglect the force modernization classes that will acquaint him with the many combat systems scheduled for USAREUR units as a part of Division 86.

He should also become knowledgeable in maintenance procedures by getting his hands dirty while pulling an engine, changing a track, and performing a preventive maintenance check list. He should do an operator's checklist for the ITV, learn how to schedule Qs, check parts requisitions and driver qualifications.

Once he is assigned to USAREUR, and before he takes command, he should persuade his battalion commander to schedule him for the pre-command course at the 7th Army Training Center. This two-week course can put the finishing touches on his pre-command education.

In addition to educating himself, the prospective commander should also prepare himself to cope physically and emotionally. In Europe he is not likely to be making a lot of long road marches with a 50-pound rucksack, but he should not be fooled by the mechanized infantry "rider's" mentality.

Mechanized infantry soldiers require a different type of conditioning than do light infantrymen. They need to train their bodies to do heavy lifting over extended periods of time. Too, mechanized infantry soldiers need to be prepared to lift boxes after box of ammunition into their vehicles while suited in full MOPP protective gear.

USAREUR is no picnic physically. What a commander needs most is stamina, because his command will involve long hours and a hectic pace, with a lot of time spent away from the garrison and his troops and a lot of hours catching up when he returns to his office.

Precisely because of the hectic schedule and long hours, a part of the emotional preparation for this kind of command has to do with the commander's family, if he is married. He should understand the importance of this from the start and he should prepare his wife and children for his extended absences as well as for their own problems of living in a foreign country. (Planning ahead for trips and tours can help.) If he fails in this regard it
SUPPORT AGENCIES

As early as possible, the commander should get to know the support agencies he will be working with, because he will need them to help him solve many problems.

He should become familiar with the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) and the provost marshal’s office. Riding with a military police patrol on a payday, for example, will teach him a lot; it will enable him to become acquainted with trouble spots so he can brief his new soldiers on what to avoid. A couple of days of self-guided orientation through local support agencies and some time getting acquainted with service agencies such as the Red Cross emergency message service and Military Airlift Command (MAC) service will save him time later when he needs them.

He should also visit his tour and travel center to find out what tours might lure the “barracks rats” out into the sunshine. He might also want to consider arranging a company tour to Paris, Rome, or London over the Christmas holidays.

The final step in the preparation process is by far the most difficult — trying to learn to read people. It requires almost a sixth sense, and some people never learn it. But it helps if he can become astute at discerning his boss’s goals for the battalion — his prejudices and the things he feels strongly about.

Reading his subordinates is just as important. To get his job done he must be able to influence them to tackle their jobs with enthusiasm and determination. Getting the most out of key subordinates is often the difference between being a good commander and being an outstanding one.

These preparatory steps out of the way, and knowing what he is facing, the commander can start considering how he is going to go about commanding the company.

First, he has to set priorities on his time. Because he will be away from garrison at least 25 percent of the time, he cannot afford to waste what is left. He should develop a garrison schedule, designating certain times for administration, and then follow it. And he must not waste time on training that is not related to the GDP.

Next, the commander must organize his team. His soldiers must know their own jobs and how those jobs fit into the team. It is up to the commander to define the roles of his subordinates, trying to focus on individual interests and talents in the process, and this involves spending enough time with the men to be able to make the proper decisions. Once the team has been formed, the commander must provide clear direction for its members as he approaches the routine and the not so routine tasks — that is, AGIs, ARTEPs, and so on.

These subordinates must also be trained to do the jobs they are supposed to do, and it is up to the commander to provide the required instruction. One technique for giving them the necessary know-how is to encourage his subordinates to take advantage of each professional learning experience. Effective after-action reviews can be excellent tools for bringing out lessons learned and the best ways to alter individual or team behavior. The altered behavior should then be reinforced through repetition.

This learning and team-building technique should be aimed at preparing subordinates for their next step up the chain of command. These techniques can be supplemented with company-level professional development classes that contribute to professional credibility — maintenance training, for instance, tactical exercises without troops, reviews of field SOPs, and war games.

All of these steps lead to the most important task of all — giving the soldiers in the company first-class training. The commander may not always be able to do all the training he would like to do, but what he does do, he should do well. He must not allow the constraints of the environment to become an excuse for poor training.

What he should try to do, as a company commander anywhere should, is to plan thoroughly and then execute the plan professionally. Too often USAREUR training, amid all the turbulence, is well planned but improperly executed because of limited resources and general discouragement.

But a commander cannot afford to waste scarce resources on poorly planned or poorly executed training. A failure to plan properly can lead to meaningless training; a failure to execute properly is poor testimony to professionalism.

Success in command is often considered in terms of survival. Any commander who has common sense, keeps
things in perspective, and stays flexible can survive company command in Europe. But survival should not be the goal; and survival in itself is not success by any measure. Success is achieved through a positive attitude that is focused on several points:

First, the commander should remember that his company is not an insular unit, that it must work in concert with its sister units. This means that, in regard to the GDP, he must continue to update his plan, always conscious of his assets and liabilities and of the fluid planning process. He must ask: Where does my unit fit into the battalion, brigade, or division plan? How and from where will my unit be resupplied? Such questions will help him and his subordinates focus on the common goal of being combat ready.

Next, to earn the respect and the confidence of the men, the commander must be knowable in all aspects of his command. His soldiers expect him to be the resident expert in combat arms and company administration and they assume that he is, unless he proves otherwise. When he makes a mistake, he should admit it and correct it. His soldiers will respect him for it.

But nobody really expects him to be a superman and he should not try to be one. He should, therefore, learn to delegate authority and responsibility to his subordinates, then check periodically to make sure they are doing the job the way he wants it done. He should not give them more responsibility than they can reasonably handle, but what he does give them he should demand that they take seriously and that they learn accordingly. Frequent counseling sessions can be used to guide their progress.

Finally, the commander should encourage feedback from his subordinates and listen with a discriminating ear. More often than not, they, especially the senior non-commissioned officers, have been down the same path before and may know a better way to accomplish the mission.

EVALUATION

Even if a commander does all these things, survives, and succeeds to some degree, how does he measure his success? There are several ways, some more objective than others.

One of the most important measures of success is his satisfaction with his own performance. He might ask himself whether he accomplished what he had in mind to accomplish, whether he attained his pre-command goals, and whether his soldiers seem happy in the unit. A good measure of the soldiers’ satisfaction is whether they are re-enlisting for the same MOS or for their present duty assignments. Another is how much or how little they complain or how willing they are to go the extra mile when something needs to be done.

Another measure is the degree of maturity the commander has attained during his command. He might ask himself: Am I better able to do my job now than I was at the beginning? Are my key subordinates more able than they were at first? How did my soldiers perform on their SQI? Maturity is learning; if the commander can articulate what he has learned during the course of his command, then the chances are pretty good that, on this point at least, he has succeeded.

A third measure of success is unit discipline, because it is a reflection of the commander’s performance. Unfortunately, a unit’s track record is often a matter of public record, especially when the name of one of its soldiers appears on the morning blotted too often. The number of Article 15’s, chapters, and courts-martial the commander has administered or requested also has some bearing on how he and his unit are perceived.

Next is what do his soldiers look like? Are they known for sharp haircuts, military courtesy, and good-looking uniforms? At sporting events, are company teams supported by other soldiers from the company? All of these are indicators of unit esprit and discipline. Soldiers who know their own limits, their commander’s expectations, and their own roles on the team will generally represent the unit well.

One of the subjective evaluations of a commander’s performance is announced at the conclusion of each ARTEP or AGI. These evaluations provide feedback on how well he has prepared his subordinate leaders for their jobs. But there are less formal evaluations that are often better indicators of success: Do soldiers from other units frequently try to join the company? Does the unit have good reaction time, and are the men thorough in conducting the company’s readiness tests? How long does it take the company to load its tracks, empty the supply and arms rooms, and begin to move? If it improves each time, that is a positive indicator.

Finally, there are the tangible measures of success, such as early promotions, awards, and decorations, but these are scarce. The best criterion of success is the commander’s own satisfaction with the job he has done, because he is usually his own harshest critic.

But despite all the special frustrations associated with command in Europe, it is still the best and most rewarding command environment. Any mechanized infantry commander who goes into the job knowing what to expect and who approaches the job with enthusiasm, common sense, and a sincere desire to do his best, will have a good chance of living up to his own high expectations.

CAPTAIN ROBERT L. MAGINIS, now attending the Naval Postgraduate School, was formerly assigned to the 8th Infantry Division where he served in S3 and G3 assignments and commanded a combat support company. He is a 1973 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has completed several military courses, including the Airborne, Ranger, ITV Trainer, and Field Artillery Officer Advanced Courses.
One of the most important things an Infantry company, battalion, or non-separate brigade commander can do is to cultivate a good working relationship with the staff officers at higher headquarters. And nowhere is this sort of relationship more important for him than when he must deal with military criminal law. Because he does not normally have an attorney on his staff, he must turn to the staff of a higher commander for legal advice and for technical assistance in carrying out his criminal law responsibilities.

When he does this, he creates a commander-attorney relationship, which is probably unique among command and staff relationships. For the attorney, the effectiveness of this relationship is central to the accomplishment of his duties. For the commander, the relationship may not be central, but it is critical if he is to carry out his most sensitive responsibilities.

Several aspects of the commander-attorney relationship make it different from other command and staff relationships. One is the unusual extent of the direct, personal contact between the attorney — a subordinate member of a division-level staff — and commanders at all of the subordinate levels. (How often does a company commander, for instance, get to speak with a division's assistant G1?)

Another difference is the nature of the staff work that is provided by the legal officer. For the attorney brings a specialized knowledge to the relationship that is usually outside the commander's training and experience.

**LEGAL FRAMEWORK**

Understanding the commander-attorney relationship begins with understanding its legal and organizational framework. The legal framework is provided by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and by the Manual for Courts-Martial, whose provisions set out the commanders' responsibilities as well as those of the attorneys who work for them.

Company commanders must inquire into possible criminal misconduct, administer Article 15 punishment when appropriate, and forward charges when trial by court-martial appears appropriate. They have the authority to apprehend offenders when they have probable cause to believe an offense has been committed; they may order searches of the property of the soldiers who
belong to their commands; they have overall responsibility for maintaining law, order, and discipline within their units.

In addition to these same responsibilities, battalion and brigade commanders can convene summary and special courts-martial and Article 32 investigations. It is their duty also to provide command recommendations to the general court-martial convening authority (usually the division commander) concerning the disposition of bad-conduct discharge (BCD) special and general court-martial cases, and discharges under Chapter 10, AR 635-200.

At company through brigade level, the law requires little judge advocate participation in criminal and disciplinary procedure, although a judge advocate has to review certain Article 15 appeals, and to participate in the trial if a special court-martial is convened.

Military justice at these levels, though, has become increasingly technical, and the procedures required tend to change rapidly. For example, commanders often find it useful to obtain the assistance of lawyers in determining whether a search is legally appropriate, in drafting specifications, in preparing the papers necessary for pre-trial confinement, and in deciding whether to offer Article 15 punishment. In addition, an Article 32 investigation, although normally conducted by an officer of the command, involves the participation of two or more attorneys, one as a government representative.

Many of these requirements for a lawyer to assist the commander mirror the right of accused soldiers to have legal counsel represent them. In reality, the commander who is offering Article 15 punishment in a legally or factually complex situation often needs legal advice as much as the accused soldier, who is guaranteed by regulation the right to legal advice.

ORGANIZATION

To meet the increased need for legal services, legal staffs have been expanded. A division's Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), for instance, once consisted of five attorneys and support personnel, but it now commonly consists of 15 to 25 judge advocates, depending on local augmentation.

Recently, the defense counsel system has been reorganized as the Army Trial Defense Service, an organization outside the local chain of command and responsible directly to Department of the Army. By custom and regulation, the division's SJA is the legal advisor to the commander on whose staff he serves, and to the command. Because he usually does not give legal advice directly to subordinate commanders, this task falls to his own subordinates within his office.

In Europe, for example, most general court-martial jurisdictions have decentralized branch offices, in effect providing mini-SJA offices at the brigade and military community levels. The officer-in-charge (OIC) of these offices, judge advocate captains or majors, are responsible for advising the commanders within their areas. Sub-units within an area may be the responsibility of particular attorneys in an office — if it is large enough to have more than one — or the OIC may retain the "advice" function.

At military installations in the United States, branch legal offices are rare, but the job of advising subordinate commanders is commonly delegated to particular judge advocates within a post or division SJA office.

PROBLEMS

If advice to commanders were the only service required of military attorneys, the commander-attorney relationship might be a simple one. But a significant amount of authority sometimes is delegated to attorneys by higher commanders, and unit regulations as well may require commanders to consult with an attorney. An example of this is the authority to approve pre-trial confinement, which in some organizations is delegated to the SJA. Another is the requirement that a commander inform his servicing legal center when he places an individual on restriction. Such a rule is actually useful in avoiding later problems in court, even though it may seem an unwarranted intrusion upon a command prerogative.

Much of this day-to-day involvement with the processing of military justice actions takes place before a case is referred to court and before the attorney enters the case as a duly appointed trial counsel. Sometimes this involvement gives the attorney the ego-satisfying feeling of having total responsibility for his cases and can bring him into conflict with the commander. He may feel like a prosecutor, a military version of a civilian district attorney, and often will actively seek to take control of the processing of court-martial cases at the earliest possible stage. To the extent that his freedom of action is limited by the commander's authority, he may chafe under the restrictions. At the same time, the commander may resent the intrusion of yet another staff section into his business. (On the other hand, he may feel glad to have one less worry.)

Sometimes there is an underlying tension between the commander and the attorney simply because each has a different orientation. It may be no more than a suspicion on the part of one that the other does not really understand the ramifications of certain courses of action, but occasionally it may erupt into open disagreement.

For example, the appropriate disposition of a criminal matter may evoke conflicting opinions. There will be no problem with a case in which a soldier who has been a source of trouble in the unit is caught committing an offense, and the case is clearcut. The commander and the attorney will probably agree to take the case to trial at a level appropriate to the seriousness of the offense. Problems arise, though, when a commander wants a case prosecuted but the judge advocate feels that there are serious problems with it. There may be an important civilian witness in the United States, for example, who is unwilling
ing to travel to a trial in Europe or Korea. Or perhaps the judge advocate believes some of the critical evidence will be suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal search or an improperly taken confession.

From the commander's point of view, it is important to the discipline and morale of his unit that the offender be punished. At the very least, he feels the offender should go to trial. The judge advocate, on the other hand, may have difficulty understanding how unit discipline can be reinforced by taking a case to trial that is likely to result in an acquittal. (He also usually feels a strong personal stake in not "losing" prosecutions in court.)

Another example of possible conflict between an attorney and a commander is the case in which a soldier who, accused of a serious offense, is not a troublemaker but has a good record and the esteem of his supervisors. He may have participated in a larceny while drunk, or he may have "invested" in a drug-dealing scheme. If his commander sees him as a valuable member of the unit, he may not want to see him punished severely. The judge advocate, meanwhile, sees that an offense has been committed and that the case merits trial. (It is not unusual, by the way, in this sort of case for different commanders in the chain of command to disagree among themselves as to the appropriate disposition of the case.)

The difference in orientation also often becomes evident when a commander and the judge advocate evaluate a soldier's request for discharge for the good of the service under the provisions of Chapter 10, AR 635-200. From the judge advocate's perspective, it is often in the interest of the government to approve such a request when the case has serious problems with proof or when there are difficult motions that can be made by the defense. But a commander, and particularly a unit commander, tends to view the soldier who is given such a discharge as someone who has "gotten over." He may forget that the soldier will be separated as a Private (E-1), probably with an other than honorable discharge, which will cost him most of his military and veteran's benefits. He may also overlook the fact that if the soldier is tried and acquitted he can return to the unit with no punishment at all.

If a commander believes that a Chapter 10 discharge constitutes little or no punishment, he may consider it an appropriate disposition for the previously good soldier who is now in serious trouble, because it avoids the possibility of a court-martial conviction. But the attorney, giving more weight to the consequences of such a discharge, may disagree. The genius of the system is that both of these viewpoints must be considered in reaching an appropriate decision.

The different duties judge advocate officers perform also create confusion. Not all judge advocates serve the same function. Furthermore, the judge advocate who ordinarily serves as the commander's legal advisor and trial counsel may on occasion be placed in a role in which he
cannot advise the commander. He may be handling a legal assistance problem (such as indebtedness) for a member of the command, for example, and as such he must pursue his client's interest without regard to the commander's position.

A commander ordinarily will be well aware that he should not seek criminal law advice from a judge advocate who is serving as a defense counsel. But when a defense counsel, acting as an advocate for his client, contacts a commander, the commander may not fully appreciate that the defense counsel is not acting as his advisor. Since the defense counsel's role is that of an advocate advancing the interest of his client, a commander should carefully evaluate matters submitted by the counsel and seek help from his own legal advisor.

Another type of difficulty arises because an attorney must rely on support from persons under the commander for tasks that make up a large part of the military criminal law process. The battalion legal clerk's performance, for example, can be critical to the outcome of a case. If he does not properly prepare the charge sheet, it will have to be redone, and time itself is a factor that might result in the dismissal of a case. The battalion legal clerk is sometimes responsible for transcribing the Article 32b investigation. If the transcription is unduly delayed, the case may be dismissed.

The conflict arises when the legal clerk's time is taken up with other duties. He is in the uncomfortable position of having the judge advocate tell him that one action takes priority while the adjutant or his commander directs him to do some other task. Accordingly, if he is to perform the functions required by military criminal law procedures, the battalion legal clerk must have the full support of his commander.

The same is true of the Article 32 investigating officer. The commander needs to impress upon him the importance of his assignment, and also must allow him the time he needs to perform the investigation properly.

Important improvements in the commander-attorney working relationship are coming about. Because of some changes in personnel policies for JAG officers, more experienced JAGC personnel are available to fill the important slots in the field. This should mean they will be more familiar with commanders and their problems, which, in turn, should improve their ability to assist the commanders.

Even with these changes, the responsibility still rests with commanders and judge advocates in the field to make the most of the commander-attorney relationship. Much has been made of the need for good personal interaction. New judge advocates in training at The Judge Advocate General's School, or in orientations given by more experienced attorneys, are often encouraged to join in the activities of the command — to attend social functions, to be present at field training, and to visit major training areas. These are important steps that judge advocates should take. Commanders can help by providing them with the opportunities.

Probably more important than this "getting to know you" activity is the direct, personal interaction between commander and attorney concerning the business at hand. The reason for his mutual orientation and arrangement of priorities is simple: the commander-attorney relationship is ad hoc, and is less structured than the more traditional relations of commander-staff officer.

The judge advocate can do more to assist a commander than just process his cases and advise him concerning their disposition. They can help train his NCOs and officers in such subjects as search and seizure and apprehensions. The judge advocate and his staff can also be helpful in training the commander's legal clerks, especially in the common situation where the unit legal clerk lacks formal training in his MOS.

Whether bringing an attorney into the administration of criminal law at the unit level is desired, the system requires that commanders exercise their responsibilities knowledgeably and with a strong sense of the needs of their command. An understanding of their respective roles in the system, and a respect for the responsibilities and knowledge of the other participants in the military justice system, will create a stronger system.

MAJOR DANFORD F. CARROLL, now assigned as a staff attorney in the Office of the Judge Advocate General in Washington, D.C., previously served as trial counsel and Chief, Criminal Law Division, 3d Armored Division. He holds a law degree from the University of Texas.

CAPTAIN RITA R. CARROLL also holds a law degree from the University of Texas and also previously served as a trial counsel in the 3rd Armored Division. She is now an appellate defense counsel in the U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Falls Church, Virginia.
Being able to assess the leadership ability of your subordinates is an important part of being a leader at any level. I found that out several years ago when I became the commander of a battalion in an armored division in Europe.

I inherited a going outfit complete with five companies, two of which were in the same location, along with the usual set of company commanders, noncommissioned officers, and the like. I use "going" in the sense that the unit existed; where it was going was one of the things I would have to determine, and soon.

The battalion was about to undergo an IG inspection and what was then called a command materiel and maintenance inspection, reputedly a tough one. Additionally, my battalion was scheduled to furnish observers and umpires for another division's field exercise, which would just about wipe out the battalion staff and one company of officers and senior NCOs for about two weeks.

I suppose I should have taken some solace in the fact that no enemy was shooting at us and no tidal waves, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions were approaching, even if it did feel like something of the sort. (As a matter of fact, my change of command ceremony had to be held indoors at the last minute because the sky seemed to turn upside down, unleashing a torrent. Perhaps that should have been an omen for me, but I was too busy with more pressing matters to wonder about it.)

To make matters worse, I knew no one in the battalion or the division, and when I did meet the division commander and the assistant division commander for support, their only advice was to "get with it," which I assured them I intended to do, and that was that.

As part of my preparation for this challenge — and I was to appreciate the full meaning of the word later — I did visit the battalion and my predecessor one Sunday afternoon shortly before he departed for another assignment. After he gave me a brief rundown on the battalion and its key personnel, he asked me if I had any questions. So I jumped at the chance to ask him what he thought were the major problems facing the battalion. When, after a long pause, he replied that he could not think of any, I knew I was in trouble — and I was.

My first task was to get acquainted with my new unit as quickly as possible and particularly to size up its key officers and NCOs, and I did not have much time. I had to call on all my prior experience in working with others to help me assess the strengths and shortcomings of those on whom I would have to depend for the battalion's overall performance. While I will not go into detail on exactly what I learned and what I did, let me say that what I found was extremely disturbing. Essentially, the battalion was under severe criticism, was floundering, regarded as jaded, and rife with tension and fear. Somehow I had to change this environment.

In my later reflections about this experience, I have tried to reanalyze the events and the actions — things I
tried that worked and those that did not. All in all, I think the outcome was more than satisfactory — my successes outnumbered the failures by a good margin. In such after-action contemplations, though, the usual question is: What would you do differently if you were in a position to do it again?

For one thing, if it had been possible, I would have preferred to choose my own unit commanders and senior NCOs, rather than just accepting those who were present when I arrived, and I would not have selected several who were there. (Since no two units were co-located, I did not have the option of moving them around from one unit to another until I found a better combination.)

TECHNIQUE

But assuming I could have chosen them, how would I have gone about it? Is there a technique available that is easy to use and that provides useful information to help in making a selection decision? I think there is — one that involves some, but certainly not all, of the critical ingredients.

The technique that I propose includes an initial interview, followed by asking each “candidate” to take the accompanying test.

A MATTER OF IDENTITY

In a military organization, there are five individuals: Tom Smith, Bill Houston, Barbara Jones, George Blankston, and Harry Brown. These five hold the following positions, but not respectively: company commander, clerk-typist, first sergeant, mechanic, and drill sergeant. From the clues listed below, determine who occupies which position in the organization:

1. The clerk-typist bandaged the mechanic’s finger when he cut it using the former’s nail file.
2. While the company commander and the mechanic were out of town on a mission, the first sergeant put Blankston and Brown on report for leaving the area without authority.
3. The first sergeant was a sharp card player, and Smith admired his ability.
4. Brown invited the clerk-typist to lunch, but his invitation was not accepted.

This is a test that should take only a few minutes to finish. Try it and see for yourself. (The solution is presented farther along in the article). You may find it difficult or you may breeze right through it. In either case, you may be skeptical that anything so simple could reveal anything significant about leadership, but it does.

For one thing, I believe this test gives some insight into the method or technique each person uses to figure out the answers. As the applicants are working on it, you should walk around the room and observe just how they are going about it. All they have is one blank sheet of paper and a pen or pencil, but what they enter on that single sheet can tell you a lot.

Everyone in a position of leadership faces a seemingly endless parade of problems every day, and it is important for us to know what method a leader follows in trying to solve these problems. We should be interested in knowing whether he has the ability to separate fact from fiction, to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant facts, and to interpret the meanings and consequences of the facts. In
tion, a leader should be able to identify cause and effect relationships and should know the difference between a routine matter and an urgent one. He should know whether the means exist for him to carry out a decision and how much time he might need to do it.

Precisely how a person goes about making a decision is a matter of real concern, and although it is not necessary for everyone to use the same problem-solving approach, there ought to be some logic in whatever method each one uses. In this connection, we need to consider the part that assumptions play in this process. We all make assumptions, because it is easier than going out and gathering the data we need to approach the problem in some other way. If we do go out and search for data, we must decide what facts are needed, and then where and how to acquire them. Then we have to study them, sort them, discard some, and interpret the meaning of the ones that are left. It is understandable, then, that we just make some assumptions and proceed from them. And there are occasions when assumptions are not only acceptable, but essential, but hurriedly conceived assumptions are dangerous and the direct enemy of careful thought. (Few people would want to be tried in a court where the judge, at the opening moment of the trial, called out, "Bring the guilty man in!!!")

Returning to the test itself, usually about 60 percent of the people tested fall into the assumptions trap, assuming that Barbara Jones has to be the clerk-typist. They then try to force-fit the remaining "facts." Only a handful of people I have seen take the test will even try to set up a matrix and follow any systematic procedure. Most seem to use the pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey approach. As I go around the room looking at their papers, what I see most often is a mishmash of illegible scribblings, doodlings, erasures, mark-overs, and so on. Most seem content just to stab at it and hope for the best. Some, of course, don't even try, and others quit trying almost immediately.

What these observations reveal about the thought processes of the people is most significant if they are to be leaders — officers or NCOs. I believe that prospective leaders ought to be able to think clearly, concisely, and logically. They must develop a mental discipline through extensive practice so that when they are confronted with a major emergency they can act decisively, because they are prepared. And given the tools with which to assess the abilities of the leaders under him, so is their commander.

I surely do not contend that this is all there is to the subject of leadership, for clearly there is a great deal more, and I certainly agree with others who hold that leadership is an "intriguing and beguiling phenomenon."

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**SOLUTION**

This test lends itself to a matrix approach, using the process of elimination as a basic technique. Of course, this technique will not apply to all problems, but the point is that some systematic way ought to be employed in analyzing each problem.

For this instrument, the matrix can be set up as indicated below. The order of the names is immaterial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co</th>
<th>Clerk-</th>
<th>First</th>
<th>Mechanic</th>
<th>Drill</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cdr</td>
<td>Typist</td>
<td>Sgt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara Jones</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Smith</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bill Houston</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Blockston</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Brown</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By placing the clue numbers in each column, we have shown that the particular position is eliminated as a possibility for that person. The first clue, for example, establishes that the mechanic is male, so Jones cannot be the mechanic. As each clue is entered in the appropriate columns, we eventually get to the discovery of the first clutch of names with position: With all other possibilities eliminated, Brown is revealed as the drill sergeant. Then by placing an X in the drill sergeant column next to the other names, Blockston is shown to be the clerk-typist, and so on. Until we see that Jones is the company commander, Smith, the mechanic, and Houston, the first sergeant.
Mortars in Mountains

MAJOR THOMAS H. WHITLEY
CAPTAIN CHARLES T.D. GENDRON

Mountains that are militarily significant cover about one-quarter of the world’s land area. They are generally characterized by rugged, compartmented terrain with steep slopes and few natural or manmade lines of communication.

Historically, the focal point of mountain operations has been the battle to control the heights, and changes in weaponry and equipment have not altered this emphasis. Infantry mortars, with their light weight, simplicity, and versatility, remain the basic fire support element for units operating in mountainous terrain, and while they are immediately responsive to the infantry commander, he must understand how the severe environmental conditions can be expected to affect the capabilities of his mortar platoons. The following are some of the things he must consider.

First, in the mountains, fire support assets must be as mobile as the unit they are supporting. The M224 lightweight company mortar (LWCM) and the XM252 improved 81mm mortar (I-81) can be hand-carried from position to position. The 4.2-inch mortar, though, can be used only in positions near main roads. Commanders should also consider that when mortars must be brought in by helicopters they will also probably require additional airlifts for ammunition resupply and for displacement. All these operations are completely dependent upon the extremes of weather, which must be taken into consideration, too.

Command and control is more decentralized in mountain operations, which means that mortar platoons must be able to operate separately in sections. Because of the compartmented terrain, it may even be necessary to give operational control of a single mortar squad to an infantry platoon. This means that each section and each gun crew must be trained to operate alone. Hipshooting procedures become extremely important in such operations.

When it comes to fire support, high explosive shells with point detonating fuzes are very effective on rocky ground, because they scatter stones, which themselves become projectiles. Shells with proximity fuzes — except for the newer ones — are particularly effective on reverse slopes and in deep snow, but they lose their effectiveness when they are fired through dense clouds or falling snow. The new fuzes are not greatly affected by clouds or snow. Variable winds and steep mountain slopes do reduce the effectiveness of white phosphorous rounds.

Mortar fire is capable of reaching reverse slopes and neutralizing dead space. The 360-degree firing capability of mortars enables them to engage targets to the flanks and rear of their firing positions. Fire planning in mountains should also include narrow defiles used as routes of supply or routes of advance or withdrawal, along with any large masses of snow or rock that may be above enemy positions and supply routes. The possibility of avalanches or rock slides and their effects on the activities of friendly troops must be considered during the planning phase.

In mountainous terrain, mortar gunnery can be difficult because survey data is usually not available.
and even when it is, it is likely to be exaggerated by the slope of the terrain. It takes practice to compute elevation changes accurately. Meteorological data is rarely useful because of the need to relocate the mortars within 10 kilometers of a METT station (in mountainous terrain) and because of the requirement for a valid registration. Shifting winds and changes in air pressure will have significant effects on mortar rounds. If the Mortar Fire Control Calculator (MFCC) is adopted, it will be of particular assistance to fire direction computers in the mountains.

Some of these same difficulties will also affect the observation of mortar fire. Additional observers will be required, and observation posts (OPs) generally should be emplaced on the highest available ground, although low clouds or fog may require that they be located at lower elevations. In locating their FOs, commanders should remember that they themselves often use hilltops as registration points and usually include them as targets in a preplanned target list, and should expect that the enemy commanders will do the same. The use of observed, as opposed to unobserved, fires should be normal since the rapidly changing meteorological conditions and the generally poor maps can decrease the accuracy of predicted fires.

The conditions encountered in mountainous terrain will have a significant effect on a unit's fire support, but the value of infantry mortars to commanders should not be overlooked. In fact, they may be the only fire support means available.

MAJOR THOMAS H. WHITLEY, when he prepared this article, was assigned to the Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department of the Infantry School. He holds a master's degree from Georgia State University, and his assignments include a tour in Vietnam and command of a combat support company.

CAPTAIN CHARLES T.D. GENDRON was commissioned from the Officer Candidate School in 1975 and has completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course. He has served as a fire direction computer and as a heavy mortar platoon leader.
What Comes First?

CAPTAIN KENNETH A. SIEGEL

Way back, say around the time of Sargon the Great, when foot soldiers got the idea of hooking up some rather wild horses to a wheeled vehicle and then trusting their scantily clad bodies on it, the argument began — which comes first, the vehicle or the man? Through the ages — from chariot to elephant howdah, to Hussite wagon, to combat car, to halftrack, to armored personnel carrier, to Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) — the argument has continued.

And the argument is the same today — what about the mechanized infantryman? Is his vehicle first and foremost a fighting vehicle, or is it chiefly a means of getting him to the fight? One might think that the development of the BIFV would have settled that issue firmly in favor of the fighting vehicle concept, that the mechanized infantryman is first and foremost a mounted warrior who happens to have, in addition, the vital but only secondary ability to do his thing on foot.

Aha, say the dedicated mobile warriors, this is indeed the way to go. But there are others, the dedicated grunts, who say phooey and balderdash, that it is, instead, the way to instant mass incineration.

So where is the middle ground? What is the doctrine? How do we train the soldiers in our mechanized infantry units? What do we emphasize? And who decides what is most important? Is it being able to move and fight mounted in support of tanks as part of the combined arms team, or being able to perform all the functions of the infantryman, or being able to do both equally well?

Ideally, of course, the answer is the last of these — being able to do both equally well. But how do we do that, given the problems we always have M113A somethings, soon BIFVs (please Lord, very soon). These twelve vehicles, complete with weapons, communication systems, and great mobility, are the guts of the unit; they enable it to perform its mission.

The weapons platoon and company headquarters function pretty much the same as in a regular infantry company except that their mortars and TOWs are more mobile and their maintenance section is bigger and also more mobile.

The final consideration is that the mechanized platoons must be able to work with tanks as part of a combined arms team. This means they must

- Keep up.
- Enjoy somewhat similar protection.
- Be close enough to protect the tanks from enemy infantry.
- Be able to influence the battle by using weapons and maneuver.
- Be able to dismount to clear obstacles, dug-in positions and built-up areas, and to conduct patrols.

Note what comes last in this list of considerations — dismounted operations. The point is that if a mechanized platoon can properly man all its vehicles and weapons, it can perform the bulk of its missions. If a mechanized platoon can do an absolutely amazing imitation of a badger and build the finest defensive position in the world in twenty minutes, perform patrols that would put the Ranger School to shame, and slosh through swamp and thicket in
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absolute silence, but is weak on what makes the M113 or BIFV tick, it is a flat failure.

So, after going through this list of considerations, my company came to a decision on where the emphasis should be placed and at the same time came up with a method of training to support that decision.

We stress mounted operations, mounted maintenance, mounted marksmanship, mounted tactics, mounted everything, first, second and third. We always make sure the best people we have in the platoons — after the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants — are the assistant platoon sergeants (the platoon leaders' carrier commanders), the other carrier team leaders, and the drivers. No soldier gets to be a squad leader if he cannot perform as a carrier team leader.

The result is that despite extra details, understrength squads (the Reserve Components and the regulars suffer equally in this regard), and personnel off hitler and yon, we can still field four carriers per platoon and do most of the missions that a mechanized unit has to be able to do. If we have to go out with a platoon of only twelve men, we can still field four carriers, man four .50 caliber machineguns and three Dragons, and have the M60s sitting inside ready for use — and we can still work with tanks. We can dismount a fire team, if we must, to do some of the dismounted work that may be necessary and still keep two men in each carrier.

Training this way also guarantees that our platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, assistant platoon sergeants, and squad leaders get experience in performing the most important of their tasks whether they are doubling as carrier team leaders or actually leading squads. It also lets the company commander get experience in handling all his vehicles, which he needs as badly as anyone.

PRIORITIES

We use the accompanying chart of priorities in preparing for training. It shows the order of manning, including who carries which weapon. The chart runs from three men to ten, the most we are authorized, given the MTOE we operate under in the National Guard. Expanding it to eleven or twelve men would be simple enough but probably unnecessary given the reduction in squad strength that comes with the arrival of the BIFV. (An asterisk beside a position means that the soldier can also be part of a dismounted team.)

The Dragon may be assigned to any one of four men in the 8-, 9-, or 10-man squad, and in that squad, an M203 man is left with the carrier. (On the rare occasions when a squad has only one or two members available for training, these men are assigned to the squad with the next larger strength.)

Each squad, regardless of its size, always carries the full equipment authorized for the carrier and the squad. This includes pioneer tools as well as NBC, communication, and maintenance equipment.

We charge the assistant platoon sergeant with the responsibility for training the drivers. They work closely with the maintenance sergeant to see that the carriers are as ready as possible. Each driver and carrier team leader, in turn, cross-trains with our track vehicle mechanics.

I use my own carrier both as a mobile command post and as a maintenance contact team, and keep the communication repairman and a track mechanic on board. This avoids the unnecessary dispatch of our M578 and lets the recovery team concentrate on training for and performing recovery operations.

Every man in the company, regardless of his MOS, learns to drive and maintain the M113 vehicle. We believe that if we're down to the supply sergeant, the company clerk, and the cook's helper, they'll be in an M113 manning a .50 and a Dragon and looking for a tank to work with. (Even our mess section has placed first in a competitive .50 caliber machinegun crew drill event that we run often.)

Essentially, our choice is weighted heavily in favor of mounted operations, with infantry tactics coming second. The day — and may it never come — when we revert to foot infantry, we'll pounce on all the wonderful and esoteric niceties of being grunts. Meanwhile, we'll use our limited time to prepare for what is most important — being part of the combined arms team.

CAPTAIN KENNETH A. SIEGEL, when he prepared this article, was a company commander in the 2d Battalion, 181st infantry (Mechanized), Massachusetts Army National Guard. He is a 1972 graduate of Roanoke College and also holds a master's degree from Columbia University. He graduated from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course in 1975.
FDC Skills

CHARLES HARVEY

Suppose you have the responsibility for selecting a new soldier for training as a fire direction computer (FDC) for your unit. What information would you want that might help you in making your decision? You would want someone with keen eyesight and steady nerves, of course, but you would want someone with good mathematical ability, too. After all, a good bit of adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing is involved in measuring shifts right or left and in bracketing a target. Gross errors in these calculations could result from having the rounds come in where you don’t expect them. Your indirect fire could be ineffective, or friendly troops could be killed or equipment destroyed.

Wouldn’t it be helpful to have some indication of a soldier’s math ability and the extent to which he has sharpened his math skills? Some time ago the Evaluation and Standardization Division of the Infantry School recognized this need and developed a math skills diagnostic test to give a field commander an idea of the knowledge each soldier he gets in his unit has.

The test is a 22-item quiz. It includes sample math problems requiring the soldier to add and subtract whole numbers, decimals, and fractions; multiply and divide decimals; add positive and negative numbers; and figure averages. There are no trick questions, nor do they require much reading.

The instructions simply tell the soldier what to do with the numbers given. He may have to align the numbers in columns or convert a whole number to a fraction before he adds or subtracts, but these are math skills that are basic to any sort of calculation. For example, when he is told to “average” a column of figures, he is given only the figures. There is no explanation of what it means to average a group of numbers. He must already know that. There are no word problems on the test presently, but thought is being given to including a problem phrased just as it would be given to an FDC to see whether the soldier has any idea of the calculations he should make to adjust the indirect fire properly.

CORRELATIONS

Once the math test was developed, it was administered to a sample of MOS 11C soldiers in the ranks of private first class to sergeant first class/platoon sergeant who had recently taken the SQT. When selected hands-on and written test scores were correlated with the math test scores, correlations indicated a good relationship between a soldier’s mathematical ability and his SQT results. A 10-item rater’s criterion for FDC job performance was developed to establish a cut-off point and a GO/NO GO score. Fifty soldiers who were qualified in MOS 11C took the math test and each was rated by his fire direction chief, or equivalent, and his mortar platoon leader. Again, the correlations were significant, and the cut-off score was set at 14 correct out of the 22 items.

During One-Station Unit Training (OSUT) at Fort Benning, all MOS 11X (Infantry unassigned) and MOS 11C (Indirect Fire Crewman) soldiers are now being given the test. (In a recent six-month period, 6,650 soldiers were tested and only 3,597 scored 14 or higher.) Each soldier’s test score is given to his OSUT company commander for use in his initial entry training. The score is also recorded in Item 27 of the soldier’s DA Form 2-1, Personnel Qualification Record — Part II, for use by the gaining commander when the soldier reports to his unit. It is shown as “Math___,” indicating the raw score he made on the test.

The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), in a recent study, discovered that the high attrition rate in the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) classes was closely related to the soldiers’ lack of skills in mathematics. As a result, an NCOES preparation project has been initiated in which the math skills diagnostic test will be administered to
potential BNCOC students before their final selection. If a soldier cannot show a satisfactory level of understanding and skill in the basic mathematical processes, he will be given help through the Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP). Once he has improved his grasp of the mathematical skills, the soldier then can be reconsidered for BNCOC. This should alleviate the attrition problem in the course.

Although science and technology have given us smaller, hand-held computers that can do complex calculations in split seconds, the human operator still needs to have a basic understanding of the mathematical concepts to operate them. And there will inevitably be emergencies when the FDC must revert to using his own brain and a stubby pencil. When that happens, he needs to know how and when to add, subtract, multiply, and divide. If he can score 14 out of the possible 22 on the test, he has the potential for FDC training. Of course, the higher his score, the better the probability that he will succeed.

Used in combination with other factors, the math score can be of value to a commander in making his selection of soldiers for FDC training. He should choose the soldier who can do the right mathematical calculation with the highest degree of accuracy for such an important job.

So the next time you plan to conduct FDC training in your unit, check Item 27 of the soldier’s DA Form 2-1 to see what his score was on this test. If it was at least 14, check out his other desirable characteristics for the job. His keen eyesight, depth perception, and steady nerves may make him your first choice for FDC training, but if you don’t also check his math ability you could find that assigning him to adjust indirect fire could be hazardous to his health — and to yours.

CHARLES HARVEY is assigned to the Evaluation and Standardization Division of the Office of Infantry Force Management at the Infantry School. He holds bachelor's and master's degrees from Georgia State University, and is the author of "Pound Foolish," which appeared in the September-October 1978 issue of INFANTRY.
ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

OMPFs TO NEW SSGs

MILPERCENT's Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, has begun mailing to each newly promoted SSG/SP6 a copy of his Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) about 90 days after his promotion.

The idea is to introduce these newly promoted NCOs to the centralized promotion concept. Having their OMPFs early will give them time to review and update their files well before they become eligible for promotion to SFC/PSG or for selection to attend NCOES.

These soldiers will also be told that their next promotion or school selection will be under the centralized promotion system. They will be instructed to review their OMPFs and take them to their servicing MILPOS for updating.

This procedure is an effort to bring soldiers and their MILPOS together to make both aware of the centralized selection process, and it should lead to more accurate and up-to-date OMPFs.

ENLISTED LINGUISTS

The Army needs linguists in Career Management Fields 98 and 96, and this need is expected to continue to grow as new Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) battalions are deployed.

To meet the need for better management of enlisted linguists, the Language and Civilian Education Branch of MILPERCENT's Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate was created last year. It is responsible for the overall management of enlisted linguists, for projecting future requirements for training linguists, and for distributing linguists according to the Army's priorities.

To determine how many soldiers the Army must enlist and train to meet future requirements for specific languages in MOS 98G and 98C, a computer model was developed. The model was used for the first time earlier this year to project training requirements for fiscal years 1983 and 1984. It considers the Army's future needs, attrition from basic and advanced individual training and language school, and reenlistment losses. The use of the model better matches requirements and operating strength.

The branch, in conjunction with the Defense Language Institute (DLI), uses the Quota Management System (QMS) of the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). ATRRS allows the names, class numbers, and starting and completion dates of students who attend DLI to be entered into a computer terminal. This information is immediately available to DLI.

The system will also be used to keep track of students throughout their instruction at DLI. It will give the branch immediate information on class fill rates, student recycle, failures, and graduations.

The branch has also refined the procedure used to count enlisted linguists. In the past, linguists who spoke more than one language were counted in each of these languages. To solve this problem, a control language — the one the Army most needs — is developed for each multilingual and each is counted only in his control language, which is recorded on both the Enlisted Linguist File and the Enlisted Master File.

Using the control language concept, the branch can still count linguists in the other languages they speak, which may be needed to support future Army requirements.

Another important aspect of linguist management is keeping up-to-date records on the proficiency of each linguist. To determine proficiency, the local Test Control Officer administers the Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT), which linguists must take every two years to stay current. The score and test date are sent to the branch and recorded on the Enlisted Linguist File.

NCO OE CONSULTANTS NEEDED

A demand for NCO organizational effectiveness (OE) consultants is projected for calendar year 1983 and beyond, as the Army's force modernization program gets into full swing. Openings are expected at most CONUS installations.

NCOs are eligible to enter the voluntary program if they are in the ranks of SFC/PSG through SGM/CSM, with waivers possible for highly qualified SSG/SP6s. They must have 10 years of service, including troop duty, at least two years of college, and an otherwise exceptional record.

The applicants who are selected will attend 16 weeks of training in OE techniques at the U.S. Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School at Fort Ord, California.

Further details can be found in AR 5-15, and interested NCOs are invited to contact their local OE consultant or military personnel office for guidance. Applications should be submitted through command channels to MILPERCENT, ATTN DAPC-EPZ-O, 290 Siovall Street Alexandria, VA 22332.
BRANCH CHIEF'S NOTES

I leave the position of Infantry Branch Chief with a solid feeling that in the past 18 months we at Branch have strengthened our relationship with you, the field officers. For the most part, we have reconciled your professional desires with the overriding consideration, the needs of the Army.

I have traveled throughout the world to discuss with you the functions of branch and the processes involved in promotion and selection for military and civil schooling. I am somewhat concerned that the missions and functions of Infantry Branch are misunderstood by many of our 11,500 Infantry officers and would like to clarify some points.

First, of course, Army requirements dictate assignment practices. Infantry Branch only reacts to the priorities stated by DCSOPS and communicated to MILPERCEN by DCSPER. Second and most important, we do not become involved in the promotion board process, and we are not involved in the selection process for CGSC and SSC. In fact, we receive the selection lists the same day your commander gets his. And we do not conduct any "screening" boards.

A major function we do have is to assist you in preparing your records for the various boards. We can help you update your Officer Record Brief (ORB) and your official Performance Fiche (P-fiche), which are the two documents that represent you before any selection board.

Your P-fiche contains your official photograph and copies of your Officer Efficiency Reports (OERs). Close-out OERs that arrive at MILPERCEN after the P-fiche is drawn from the files (45 to 60 days before a board convenes) usually will appear before the board in "hard-paper" copy, and we can help you get an updated record before the board. But you must call your assignment officer and request assistance. We also may call you or your commander to obtain information for the President of the Board, normally only at his request. Information that frequently must be verified includes height, weight, awards, and decorations.

An important change during my tenure here has been the switch of propensity for Infantry personnel for management to the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC). An update on all issues was conducted in June 1982 at the first anniversary of the change in propensity. USAIC is now working on issues pertaining to Infantry Officer Professional Development.

We at Branch will also put together for USAIC the 1983 edition of the Infantry Branch newsletter, which will be available in January 1983. In it, we will spell out our tasks as we see them for 1983, and it will contain dates for selection and promotion boards and a by-name telephone listing of our assignment officers at Branch.

Finally, I sincerely want to express my appreciation for your cooperation and understanding over the past 18 months. We have not always been able to accommodate your personal desires, but where it wasn’t possible, at least we were able to tell you why we couldn’t do it. We tried to be honest and up-front, and will continue to be. We will tell you exactly what our best professional judgment is and why, because this is the only way to operate a personnel management system.

COL. JAMES A. SULLIVAN

CVI CHANGE

A recent change to AR 135-215 will affect many officers on active duty who want to enter the Competitive Voluntary Indefinite Program and compete for career status.

The revision establishes a two-year minimum period of active federal commissioned service for an officer before he is eligible to apply for a voluntary indefinite extension of active duty.

On the surface, this change appears relatively minor, but it does significantly affect officers who are on orders for overseas duty. Since most officers going overseas want to take their dependents, they must either apply for voluntary indefinite status (if they are eligible) or request an extension that is long enough for them to complete a full tour. The same could apply to officers who want special schools such as aviator training. These officers may have to apply for tour extensions to complete the obligation they will incur.

The intent of the change is to allow an officer enough time on active duty to build an in-depth Officer Military Personnel File (OMP) before a selection board renders a decision that could prevent him from pursuing a career. In effect, the change allows two types of tour extensions. First, the short-term extension remains for those cases requiring from one to 90 days for extreme hardship reasons. Second, a longer extension of 90 days to 36 months can be requested to meet obligations incurred because of training or overseas moves. The formats for the extensions are shown in Figures 2-4 and 2-5, AR 135-215.

Although the change does allow a tour extension in lieu of a voluntary indefinite status, the change was made on the assumption that anyone with more
than two years of active federal commissioned service would apply for CVI. Therefore, Combat Arms Division will not accept a tour extension in lieu of CVI when an officer will have more than two years of service at the time the extension would take effect.

Questions regarding the new regulation or OPMD policy should be addressed to DAPC OPE P (AUTOVON 221-0146/0147).

LIEUTENANTS UPDATE

Lieutenants often express concern about what positions they should seek and how they stand compared to their contemporaries.

The most important thing is for Infantry lieutenants to seek positions in which they can have their leadership skills honed and develop their proficiency in the tactical and technical skills associated with the Infantry specialty.

The objectives for all company grade Infantry officers are to get platoon-level experience, to command a company-sized unit for a period of 18 months (plus or minus 6 months), and to complete their officer basic and advanced courses. But there is no established order for achieving these objectives and no standard pattern of assignment that assures success. In fact, Army requirements sometimes prevent an officer from being assigned to a duty position that supports his personal preferences or his professional development needs. Platoon-level experience, for example, may not be available for a lieutenant who is initially assigned to the Training and Doctrine Command, gets a command, and then is not reassigned until after his promotion to captain.

But whatever the duty position, performance is the single most important criterion for advancement. The primary variable that determines overall potential for future service is the OER. It provides an officer’s manner of performance, his professional attributes, and his potential as demonstrated by the performance of specific duties for a specific period of time. Although there is a tendency to overemphasize various sections of the OER, the report must be considered in its entirety with no single section outweighing the others.

The Army’s assignment philosophy is predicated on the belief that all assignments are important. DA promotion boards are specifically directed to focus on an officer’s performance and not to be unduly influenced by the diversity or the level of his assignments. An officer’s entire record is used to determine his potential to perform in the next higher grade.

In summary, it is only natural for a lieutenant to be concerned about doing the “correct” job at the “correct” time. In terms of professional development, it is important for the Infantry Lieutenant to lay a strong foundation for future service as an Infantryman by serving in positions at company level. But it is even more important for him to perform all of his duties to the best of his ability. Through his enthusiasm and performance, his rater will best be able to identify his potential for future service and to convey that to promotion boards through his OERs.

USAREC DUTY

After completing the Advanced Course and commanding a company successfully, many captains find their next challenge in an assignment with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). You may be one of them, and it will be an opportunity to broaden your experiences and to command again. As the Chief of Staff of the Army has said, “Manning the total force is the major challenge the Army faces today,” and the branch-qualified Infantry Captain plays an important role in recruiting and retaining quality soldiers.

There are now 257 Area Commander positions within USAREC, of which 63 are designated Infantry Captain positions. An Area Commander serves for a period of 24 months in this demanding position. He commands a recruiting area staffed by enlisted recruiters and has the overall responsibility for actively leading, counseling, training, and supervising the enlisted recruiters. Additionally, the Area Commander coordinates with and briefs civilian educators and community leaders. He conducts analyses and inspections, and coordinates logistical and administrative support for the recruiting area.

If this sounds like a tough, challenging command, it is. That’s why the branch-qualified officer is called on to serve as an Area Commander. Except for his branch qualification, there is not a more important or more challenging job for an Infantry captain.

It appears, however, that many officers in the field think an assignment to USAREC may be detrimental to their career development, but this is not true. The key to success in USAREC, as in any other duty position, is positive leadership, effective time management, enforcement of standards, and thorough job knowledge.

So don’t listen to rumors or to someone else’s negative opinions concerning an assignment to USAREC. In the final analysis, even though command of a recruiting area is sometimes an exasperating job, the officers who are selected for these positions are highly regarded. As the slogan says, “Be all you can be.” Be an area commander.

SPECIAL FORCES

There is always a need for qualified company-grade Infantry officers to serve in Special Forces assignments. These unique and exciting assignments offer physical and mental challenges.

A captain’s stabilization will not normally be broken for an assignment to Special Forces; his full tour must be completed before his reassignment will be considered. But a lieutenant who has had an initial assignment in an Infantry unit in CONUS or Korea can apply and may be reassigned after 12 to 18 months on station.

An officer who wants to volunteer
for Special Forces training and assignment should submit a DA Form 4187 with substantiating documentation to show that the requirements outlined in AR 614-162 can be met.

SCREENING BOARDS ELIMINATED

Earlier this year, the Army eliminated screening boards for the promotion of officers to Chief Warrant Officers 3 and 4, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel, and for the selection of officers to attend senior service colleges. The only screening board that will continue to be held is the board for selection to attend the Command and Staff College, because of the large number of officers this board considers.

For promotions and senior service colleges, a single board will select officers from in the zone, above the zone, and below the zone of consideration.

The screening concept was introduced some years ago as a means of reducing to a manageable number the large number of officers under consideration. But two factors led to the elimination of the boards: First, the officer population is much smaller now and can be managed by one board. Second, there has been a change in the policy of giving officers repeated chances for promotion to field grades from below the zone. Majors now have only one opportunity for selection from below the zone, colonels have two opportunities.

The elimination of screening boards should also improve the credibility of the boards, since one board now sees all the records and makes all the selections.

The change will cause some minor adjustments in this year's board schedule, but it will not affect the zones of consideration.
The Battery Press of Nashville, Tennessee, has sent us five more of its recent reprints. In its airborne series are: FOUR STARS OF HELL: THE 501st PARACHUTE INFANTRY REGIMENT IN WORLD WAR II, by Captain Laurence Critchell (354 Pages. $18.95); THE WINGS OF PEGASUS: THE STORY OF THE GLIDER PILOT REGIMENT, by George Chatterton (282 Pages. $18.95); FREELY I SERVED, by Major General Stanislaw Sozabowski (203 Pages. $16.95); and NIGHT DROP: THE AMERICAN AIRBORNE INVASION OF NORMANDY, by S.L.A. Marshall (425 Pages. $18.95). And in the Press’s combat arms series there is the HISTORY OF THE 398TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN WORLD WAR II, edited by Bernard Boston (208 Pages).

These reprints, like all the others we have seen from this Press, are extremely well done.

We have also received the last volume in the Department of the Army’s Vietnam Studies Series. It is DIVISION-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS, 1962-1973, by Lieutenant General Charles R. Myer (Superintendent of Documents, 1982, 109 Pages. $5.00, Softbound). As its title implies, this monograph concentrates on the Vietnam communications experience at division level and lower.

From the Command and General Staff College’s Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth we have received two more in its series of Leavenworth papers: THE DYNAMICS OF DOCTRINE: THE CHANGES IN GERMAN TACTICAL DOCTRINE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR, by Timothy T. Lupfer (July 1981, 73 Pages, Softbound), and FIGHTING THE RUSSIANS IN WINTER: THREE CASE STUDIES, by Allen F. Chew (December, 1981. 51 Pages).

Lupfer’s study deals with a wartime evaluation of tactical doctrine and offers insights into the crucial role of leadership in bringing about doctrinal changes during battle. Chew’s study, which includes both World War I and World War II examples, illustrate certain common lessons, many of which are valid today and worth an infantryman’s study.

Finally, we have received from the Arco Publishing Company five compact but most useful reference books: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO WEAPONS OF THE MODERN SOVIET GROUND FORCES, edited by Ray Bonds (1982, 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO RIFLES AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, by Frederick Myatt (1982, 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO PISTOLS AND REVOLVERS, by Frederick Myatt (1982, 159 Pages); AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO MILITARY HELICOPTERS, by Bill Gunston (1982, 159 Pages); and AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE AIR WAR OVER VIETNAM: AIRCRAFT OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA CONFLICT, by Bernard C. Nalty, et. al. (1982, 159 Pages). Each guide sells for $8.95 and each contains numerous photographs and drawings, many of which are in color.

Here are a number of other books we want you to know about:

THE IMAGE OF WAR, 1861-1865, VOLUME II: THE GUNS OF ’62. Edited by William C. Davis (Doubleday, 1982. 460 Pages. $35.00). This second volume in what is developing into an outstanding pictorial history of the Civil War lives up to the high standards set in the first of the planned six-book series. This one concentrates on the “tinkerer’s year” — 1862 — “a year of almost constant turmoil in embattled America.” Using 650 photographs and nine tightly written essays, the editor and his publisher have produced another splendid volume. The photographic collection, in particular, is the cornerstone to the book; it is most impressive and represents one of the finest Civil War undertakings in this century.

GREECE AND ROME AT WAR. By Peter Connolly (Prentice-Hall, 1981. 320 Pages. $30.00). The author has three other books on ancient military history to his credit. He is also a recognized authority on ancient arms and armor and does his own illustrations, which, in themselves, are outstanding. He uses two other specialists — Brian Dobson and Roger Tomlin — to prepare separate chapters on the Roman Army during the empire. This is a superbly presented volume that can be of invaluable assistance to the student of ancient military matters.

THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898. By David F. Trask. The Macmillan Wars of the United States (Macmillan, 1981. 654 Pages. $29.95). It has been several years since a volume in this particular Macmillan series was published. We were particularly pleased to see this one appear when it did because this particular war has never received a great deal of attention from U.S. military historians and because of the rising interest in the entire Caribbean basin. David Trask is a U.S. State Department historian and calls his book a “military-political history.” He has good reasons for doing so, for he concentrates as much on the political and diplomatic aspects of the war as he does on its military happenings. In doing so, he offers interpretations that differ widely from those that we are accustomed to hearing and reading about.
This is one of those books that should be read and studied by all infantrymen. It is also a most worthy addition to the Macmillan series on the wars of the United States.

**THE IMPOSSIBLE VICTORY: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE FOR THE RIVER PO.** By Brian Harpur ( Hippocrene Books, 1981. 202 Pages. $19.95). The author served as a junior officer in the British Eighth Army in Italy in 1944 and 1945 and recalls quite vividly the terrible weather and terrain conditions under which the war in Italy was fought. He is particularly good at depicting the hard life of the frontline soldier.

And, yet, the title of his book is somewhat misleading. It is more a story of the events that led up to the battle for the Po River, and of the differing personalities, such as Mark Clark, Harold Alexander, and Richard McCreery, who occupied the highest positions in the Allied hierarchy and who were directly responsible for the final Allied victory in Italy.

Harpur, a British journalist, writes well, and his interviews with Clark and McCreery are classics of their kind. He may be partial to the British Eighth Army and its heterogeneous grouping of units, but none can doubt the depth of his feelings for the "poor bloody infantryman." This brief extract should show you what we mean:

"Make no mistake about it, the Infantryman had the worst job as well as the most important job in the whole war. At the end of the day, often a long, frustrating, and very frightening day when he saw his friends shot to pieces around him, and he knew it was his turn next, no ground was gained, no skirmish nor battle won, without that heroic and anonymous figure the ordinary infantryman winking out his adversary at the point of his bayonet."

**SOVIET ARMED FORCES REVIEW ANNUAL, VOLUME 5, 1981.** Edited by David R. Jones (Academic International Press, 1981. 329 Pages). Once again, David Jones has pulled together a mass of most useful information to give us an overview of the Soviet armed forces, the fifth time he has done so in this series of annual publications.

There are several excellent essays in this particular volume, some of which deal with nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare, subjects which are becoming of great interest in this decade. There are also the usual large number of tables and charts. All in all, this is a most useful reference work.

And here are our longer reviews:


In 1884, General "Chinese" Gordon was killed at Khartoum in the Sudan, far up the Nile. His death came as the climax of a career that was possible only in England's golden age of 19th-century Victorian imperialism.

Son of a general and with considerable family influence behind him, he was commissioned at 21 in the prestigious Royal Engineers, which launched him upon a life of restless activity, one marred by controversy, eccentricity, and megalomania. Because of his unstable character, it is fortunate that his service with troops was practically nonexistent. His talent as an engineer might well have been used to good advantage under close supervision, but perhaps as a bit of War Office wisdom he gravitated to independent advisory duties in the Crimea and then in China, attaining along the way some popular publicity, a flesh wound, and the nickname "Chinese." Urged on by his tremendous and immodest self-esteem and a hero-worshipping press, his star was in the ascendant.

Gordon seems to have had plenty of time for his self-indulgence -- a holiday visit to Constantinople and a chance meeting with the Egyptian Khedive Ismail brought about his involvement with the equatorial province of the Ottoman Empire, where he was sent by Ismail to be governor.

He warred with slave traders and weeded out corrupt and incompetent officials, but then quit for a post under the Viceroy of India, which he held for only two days. It was again on to China and then to Mauritius, in uniform as a Royal Engineer.

Eventually, unrest in the Egyptian Sudan, stirred up by the fanatic Mahdis, led to Gordon's appointment as Governor General under the intricate system of British overlordship of Egyptian rule. Arriving in Khartoum in February 1884, he was soon besieged by the Mahdis, although he managed to evacuate the considerable contingent of civilian residents by river steamers. Things went from bad to worse. Starvation, disease, unceasing attacks, and desertion took a rising toll, until in January 1885, after a siege that had lasted almost a year, the final enemy assault brought his death.

Gordon had accomplished little in his search for glory, which had brought out the worst in him. A hard drinker, vain, headstrong, conceited, a religious fanatic, and insubordinate, he had the habit of editing or changing his orders at his personal whim. With these character blemishes and a lack of administrative ability, Gordon had little going for him except a reckless courage, which, in the end, was his undoing.

This is a worthwhile study of Victorian colonial politics, and it illustrates the complexities of statecraft without close communications and government control. A greater man might have won success. Unfortunately, Gordon was not a greater man.

**WAR AND RACE: THE BLACK OFFICER IN THE AMERICAN**

From the Civil War until just before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, blacks served in the United States Army in war and peace as members of separate, segregated units. Although the black enlisted man found a place in such illustrious regiments as the 10th Cavalry and the 24th Infantry, prior to 1898 there were only three black officers in the entire Army.

In this scholarly work, Gerald W. Patton analyzes the role of the black officer in the Army from just before World War I to the beginning of World War II. The picture he paints is not a pretty one. Patton writes, for example, of the many injustices during World War I faced by the black officers who had been brought into the Army to serve with the two black divisions that were raised as part of the National Army. It is interesting to note that in Europe the French treated the blacks better than their fellow countrymen did, and that the Army's leaders considered the black officers unfit to be combat leaders because of "innate racial characteristics."

As a result, the Army viewed the World War I experience with black officers as a failure and after 1918 the role of the black officer in the peacetime Army was sharply curtailed. By 1940, in fact, there were only two black combat arms officers on active duty.

The coming of World War II restored the role of the black officer in the military services, although the Army's units remained segregated for the duration of the war.

Patton's book, another in the series entitled Contributions in Afro-American and African Studies, is a work for the scholar rather than for the reader interested in popular history. It has been intensely researched and contains a large number of detailed footnotes and a comprehensive bibliography. It demonstrates how the opinions and prejudices of a society can be used to distort the decision-making process of the U.S. Army.


Don't be fooled by the title of this book. It is not a collection of paintings and prints of the Red Guard in the Russian October Revolution or of Stalingrad and Kursk in World War II. The connection is there, however, because this is an excellent collection of Soviet writings on doctrine, strategy, and tactics that range from the 1917 Revolution up through the early 1980s.

The editors of this volume are eminently qualified to put together such a work. They served two tours with the U.S. Defense Attache's office in our Moscow embassy and currently possess the largest collection of Soviet writings in the United States.

Soviet military art bears no resemblance to any art-like field of knowledge, but forms one part of a hierarchical, scientifically-based area of study in the causes and conduct of war. The realm of military art contains Soviet strategy, operational art, and tactics. Each is concerned with the management of troop formations, logistics, and battle engagements at various unit levels.

While none of the writings included in this book pre-date the 1917 Revolution, there is a rich heritage of military thought and experience from the Czarist days that influences present Soviet military thought. The Soviets place a great deal of effort and time in the development of their military concepts and the thread of continuity is evident among these works.

This book will be an invaluable tool for all readers interested in examining the original works of Soviet military thought. This is the sort of basic information that will allow the reader in the West to gain a better understanding of Soviet policy and force structures.


The National Strategy Information Center's agenda papers are brief essays on important strategic matters. In this paper, one of America's leading experts on China focuses on the increasingly important China Sea and its environs.

The China Sea is a major artery of commerce and communication, and is of great strategic importance. Its economic importance is heightened by the strong possibility of there being significant amounts of oil under the continental shelf. The countries of the area are engaged in trying to settle conflicting claims over territorial limits, the rights to islands, and control over underwater resources. Local military tensions are exacerbated by great power rivalries, especially the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Since World War II the United States Seventh Fleet has been the prime force in the area, but this supremacy is now challenged by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Hinton contends that the U.S. must retain a strong presence in the area, and that a continuance of the country's post-Vietnam tendency to withdraw would only lead to more rather than less instability in the region. The U.S. has no choice but to remain a Far East power, and most of the nations in the area, including the Peoples Republic of China, consider a strong U.S. presence essential as a 'check' against the Soviets.

This short pamphlet contains nothing new or profound. But it is well written and spells out the issues for the layman.

THE SOVIET ESTIMATE: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND RUS-
SIAN MILITARY STRENGTH. By Jon Prados (The Dial Press, 1982. 367 Pages. $17.95). Reviewed by A.W. McMaster, Headquarters TRADOC.

This book is as difficult to review as it is optimistic in the task it establishes for itself in its title. Without a doubt it is factually impressive, and the author clearly has had access to a large amount of data. But he does not cover any new ground in this critique of our national estimate process.

A strong plus for the author, though, comes when he attempts to clarify where and why our estimates have frequently proven faulty. It is "misperception." This, in turn, leads to wrong guesses and also brings about a tendency to use assumptions that underscore the estimates. Thus, at one time our estimates said that the Soviets were seeking missile superiority when, in fact, they were desperately trying to catch up.

Two other interesting themes are surfaced in this volume. One is the military services' penchant to build weapon systems before having clear missions for them. The other is that of "competitive analysis." Here, CIA estimates on Soviet military capabilities were considered as one, corporate opinion. The so-called "B-Team," headed by Paul Nitze and including many expert, "conservative critics," produced a second opinion. In retrospect, the latter was deemed to have done a better job.

By the way, the Army's new Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS) has all but alleviated the problem of system acquisition without finite rationale. Headquarters TRADOC has moved the Army to a far more sensible, cost-effective, and integrative material identification and development program. Inadvertently, the Prados book provides some justification for this new management style.

Prior to the battle, the Army had suffered three defeats. As a result, General Philip H. Sheridan, who commanded the Military Division of the Missouri from his headquarters in Chicago, formulated a new strategy. Accordingly, General Crook and his men of the Big Horn and Yellowstone expeditions were ordered to subjugate the Cheyenne and Sioux in the area. Crook found that the Indians had scattered and that their trail led eastward.

Crook decided to strike out for the Black Hills. Hoping to overtake the Indians, Crook insisted that his men travel lightly, but the resultant lack of food aggravated the physical discomfort of the troops.

Initially, the infantry set out each day one hour ahead of the cavalry. But once across the mud flats of the Little Missouri, the cavalry lagged behind the infantry. The cavalrymen were eventually forced to abandon, and even eat, their exhausted mounts. When a detachment was sent ahead on the strongest horses to procure provisions from the mining towns in the Black Hills, it accidentally discovered a large Indian village at Slim Buttes. The battle began with a surprise attack on the camp, but most of the fighting took place among the bluffs south and southwest of the village.

The book, a scholarly account of the Slim Buttes episode, contains an excellent selection of photographs and official documents, a reproduction of Walter M. Camp's 1918 article on the battle site, and a splendid bibliography. Those interested in the history of the American West and its military aspects should enjoy this superbly written book.


This timely, interesting, and well-written book focuses on the intricacies of the national security process. The authors have prepared an excellent text that deals with the complexities and challenges associated with the national security matters that will probably confront policymakers in the years to come. They view national security as doing more than just protecting a nation's people from physical harm; they believe it also includes protection "through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state."

The book is composed of five major parts and includes appropriate figures and tables. Discussion questions and recommended readings are included at the end of each chapter. The end notes, assembled at the back of the book by chapter, provide an extensive bibliographic source for those who would like to continue their reading. A thirteen-page index concludes the book.

This book is highly recommended for the policymaker, the military professional, and the serious student.


The battle of Slim Buttes, which occurred on 9 September 1876 in the Dakota Territory, symbolized the decline of the Sioux and the Cheyenne as the dominant power on the northern Great Plains. It was the first victory for the United States Army in the Sioux War and the climax to General George Crook's campaign to compel dissident elements of the Sioux to return to their reservations in the southwestern part of the Dakota Territory.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED


IN THE WAKE OF WAR: MEMOIRS OF AN ALABAMA MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER IN WORLD WAR II ITALY. By Robert M. Hill and Elizabeth Craig Hill. University of Alabama Press, 1982. 150 Pages. $15.95.
FRIENDLY PROTESTS

Dear Sir,

As a reader of your excellent and highly interesting magazine, and as a citizen of France, I have to point out that the comments appearing on page 47 of the May-June 1982 issue of INFANTRY are unacceptable.

William Brooks, reviewing Anthony Mockler's book Our Enemies the French, wrote: "The French are probably the most politically perverse people in Europe, and they seem to become even more perverse when a discussion turns to World War II."

That insulting opinion has nothing to do with the book itself, which is very objective and has great historical merit. Brooks did not focus on what the author had actually written. A journalist should refrain from sweeping generalizations, especially when dealing with an allied nation.

Therefore, I consider it my duty to make a friendly but strong protest against such misleading reviews and I do hope you will be able to publish a correction as soon as possible.

JACQUES L. PONS
Colonel, GS
French Army
Fort Monroe, Virginia

Dear Sir,

In the May-June 1982 issue of INFANTRY magazine, I was surprised to read in the review of the book Our Enemies the French: Being An Account of the War Fought Between the French and British, Syria, 1941, a comment beginning with, "The French are probably the most politically perverse people in Europe, and they seem to become even more perverse when a discussion turns to World War II."

I do not intend to object to the reviewing of this book. History has to be studied even through such painful situations as when the Free French and the French Army of the Levant were led by the circumstances and by a different sense of their duty to fight a fratricidal war.

But I cannot consider that sufficient reason why all the French should be accused of perversity. Civil war, as everybody knows here, is not France's exclusive privilege. And I deplore that the serious and professional magazine INFANTRY accepts such an abusive generalization.

Moreover, this article was particularly inopportune, coming as it did at the very moment when our Army Chief of Staff, invited by General Meyer, was visiting your country.

Not wanting to suspect anybody of perversity in that matter, I simply prefer to think that the publishing of Mr. Brooks' personal anti-French resentments is due to an oversight.

I do not wish to dramatize this incident and I can assure you that it does not alter either my friendship for the United States and its Army or the good memory of my visit to Fort Benning in March.

M. de NORAY
Brigadier General
French Military Attaché
Washington, D.C.

EDITOR’S NOTE: We sincerely regret that one of our book reviews offended our friends the French. This was certainly not our intention.

GRATIFIED

Dear Sir,

I was particularly pleased to see two recent articles in INFANTRY, namely, "Sustainment Training" (May-June 1982, page 23) and "Individual Training" (March-April 1982, page 36).

Ever since 1968 I have been trying to convince the Army that major emphasis in training should be placed on qualifying the individual officer and enlisted man in all the individual and collective skills of his TOE position. If this were done, relatively less time would have to be spent in unit exercises.

It has been an uphill fight, but Army magazine finally published my idea in abbreviated form in the June 1982 issue. So I am gratified to see young officers who realize the vital importance of a fully qualified individual and who are headed in the right direction.

Keep up the good work.

DAVID W. GRAY
MG, USA, Retired
Golden Beach, Florida

THE ARMY .45

Dear Sir,

Has the Army covered all its other requirements so well that it has $100 million left over with which to change from an old (1911) pistol to an even older (1907) one?

The Surgeon General's book Wound Ballistics (1962) does not mention the 9mm round as having inflicted casualties on U.S. troops. It mentions the .45 somewhat more. Of the two, it seems from these reports that the .45 is from 10 to 100 times more effective than the 9mm.

If the Army has the money and wants a better pistol, why not improve the terminal ballistics? Why not use the Copperhead approach
We have the technology (I worked on it for five years). That technology would provide a lower recoil and an exciting increase in terminal ballistics. I was a rifleman in the Third Army during the time it took to go through the Siegfried line and to the Rhine. In seven weeks we had some 300 percent casualties, but, to a man, we were of the opinion that the 9mm round would bounce off our field jackets. Every German unit we went up against had thousands of Schmeissers (9mm submachineguns), yet none of us recalls that anyone was ever wounded by a 9mm round. Today my opinion is perhaps more realistic, but I would agree with the Surgeon General that nobody gets wounded by the 9mm, not when they are up against men who can shoot back with a .45.

ROBERT P. KINGSBURY
LTC, USAR (Retired)
Laconia, New Hampshire

ANGLICOS

Dear Sir,

Major William R. Jones' article "ANGLICO" (INFANTRY, May-June 1982, page 9) provides a good discussion of what an ANGLICO can do for the Army, but there are two omissions with which I must take issue.

First, Major Jones failed to mention the Third ANGLICO, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve unit based in Long Beach, California, which provides outstanding support to West Coast organizations. The company regularly supports elements of the 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), California Army National Guard, during CPX activities. (Some East Coast support is also available through a detachment of the Third ANGLICO in Florida. It would be a true disservice, both to the Third ANGLICO and to Army organizations in the western U.S., to leave the unit out of a discussion of the ANGLICO's capabilities, because it is an outstanding unit that actively seeks training opportunities.

Second, Major Jones didn't mention the fact that brigade platoons (and subordinate elements) are capable of assisting in the employment of attack helicopters and in airspace management in the main battle area.

Before I'm accused of picking nits, let me say that our brigade recently conducted a brigade CAMMS (computer-assisted map maneuver simulation), supported by a brigade platoon from the Third ANGLICO, and that the experience was most rewarding. Working with the brigade FSE and DS artillery battalion, the Marines added a depth of fire support coordination that helped to graphically illustrate the importance of effective artillery and air support all the way to the company/team level (battleboard player/controllers). CAMMS, I might add, is not known for a satisfactory level of fire support battle resolution. The fire support community deserves additional recognition for working through that disadvantage, with the ANGLICO sharing heavily in the credit.

JAMES T. BILES
MAJ, Infantry
40th Infantry Division
San Diego, California

EDITOR'S NOTE: Major Jones did mention the Third ANGLICO in his manuscript, but since he talked in detail of only the Second, an editor with an overactive blue pencil made the decision to drop his brief mention of the Third. This was an unfortunate decision.

GETTING THE WORD OUT

Dear Sir,

When a unit moves to the field for training some of the most often heard comments are, "I never got the word," "No one told me," or "We never saw the Unit Training Plan." This is not true when my National Guard unit goes for its annual training (AT) every summer. As Unit Training NCO, I have solved the problem of getting the word out to the men by giving each of them a pocket copy of the training plan when they arrive for annual training.

This pocket training plan contains each day's training highlights for the company, any special training, and the people involved in that training. It also includes specific times for things such as meals, sick call, and motor stables. It also includes memory joggers for the men, billet assignments, and anything else that is important to the unit.

A booklet such as this could be used by any Reserve or Guard unit at AT to get the word out to the men. Active units might also be able to use the same format when they are on extended field training. It takes a little effort, but the results are worth the effort. Everyone knows what, where, when, and who.

JOHN F. MINITER
SFC, Training NCO
HHC, 43d Brigade
Hartford, Connecticut

WHO ELSE CAN DO IT?

Dear Sir,

Some say that the appearance of high technology on the battlefield means that the role of the Infantryman has come to an end — that the pace of the modern battlefield does not allow for a weapon system that moves at two and a half miles per hour. They say that nuclear and chemical weapons render static and fortified infantry positions untenable and that long-range mobile weapon systems can out-duel any manportable weapon system.

If the modern battlefield could be expected to consist only of the steppes of Russia, the plains of China, the wheatfields of the midwestern United States, the pampas of Argentina, the sky above, or the vacuum in space, then Infantrymen would surely become ceremonial guards at state occasions.
But even this is not true, as Egyptian Infantrymen proved on the Sinai Desert. And have we forgotten the tough North Vietnamese Infantrymen who picked themselves up after intensive artillery and air preparations and were there to shoot when U.S. Infantrymen arrived to count their bodies?

Of course, the modern battlefield will not consist of wide open spaces alone; more often than not it will consist of rocky hills and mountains, the rocky rubble of cities, or forests, swamps, and jungles. There are many hiding places for a man on such battlefields. Can the enemy nuke or dust them all? And the direct fire ranges are short there, too. Can tanks and fighting vehicles use their superior range advantage? An Infantryman can slough through a swamp or pass between two trees or climb up a crevasse on these battlefields. Can a tank or a fighting vehicle use its superior mobility there?

The answers are obvious.

Some would say: Yes, but the terrain described would be associated with limited wars, and the American people will never fight such a war again. This argument is political, and politics change, but aside from that, it discounts the cities and forests of Germany and the woods and mountain passes of the Middle East. So why is the role of the Infantryman still questioned?

The Infantryman has borne the brunt of casualties in every war the U.S. has fought, but perhaps we are no longer willing to accept casualties. The Infantryman has the most physically demanding combat tasks on the battlefield, but maybe we no longer want to strain ourselves. The Infantryman has the closest contact with the enemy, but maybe we no longer want to actually see the enemy we kill. The Infantryman experiences terror and stress over long periods of time. His engagements are not over in minutes or seconds; he can fight for days over one building, mango grove, or hilltop. But maybe we no longer want to face fear.

No thinking man would say he really wants to do these tasks or face these situations. Perhaps this is the real reason why the role of the Infantryman is debated. It is a dirty, frightening, and deadly job. So let's do away with it!

But before we do, show me how we will defend Stalingrad, Bastogne, Jerusalem, the Suez, the Mitla Pass, or freedom in Afghanistan without the "poor bloody" Infantryman.

Until I've been shown this satisfactorily, I will take great pride in being an Infantryman and in doing the toughest, meanest, most demanding job on the battlefield, because it has to be done.

D. CHRISTIAN FRANDSEN, JR.
CPT, INFANTRY
San Jose, California

FOR NEW LIEUTENANTS

Dear Sir,

As commander of an IOBC training company at Fort Benning, I would like to offer a bit of advice to new lieutenants just out of the Basic Course — whatever their branch:

In your future assignments you will notice that some units execute their missions more professionally than others do. One way you can make sure your unit is among the most professional of these is to employ a thought process that focuses on three words — requirement, system, and capability.

As a commander or staff officer, you will receive requirements regularly — tasks or missions — normally from higher headquarters, either recurring or event-oriented. When you do, you should make sure you understand the specifics of each requirement — who, what, when, and where something must be done. For the purposes of management, it is helpful if you know the requirements early. Unfortunately, there will always be some that are short-fused, which will force you to do everything faster.

After receiving the requirement, you should visualize the system — the process or set of procedures that will be involved in satisfying the requirement. This process or set of procedures can be either complex (requesting supplies by air delivery) or simple (sick-call procedures). But whatever the system, you must understand it thoroughly if you expect it to work effectively for you.

Once you know the requirement
Stephen Bellene and John N. Davis.

Captain Mayfield makes some good points within the narrow scope of his article, but there are additional training issues that must also be considered.

and that the M16's thin barrel bends under a load. The product-improved M16 will have a heavier barrel, but until that hits the streets the weapon itself may contribute to poor marksmanship.

The same research showed that troops had trouble adjusting the rifle's sights. The ARI solution was to print job aids on an improved paper target. Obviously, units could have their training aids offices create stick-on job aids that could be placed on the rifle's stock. The improved target could also be printed on the bottoms of C-ration cases to give soldiers in combat, as well as in training, some means of sighting in their weapons.

Captain Mayfield's confidence in the procurement folks is surprising considering that Congress concluded that these same folks were guilty of "virtual criminal negligence" in the early M16 ammunition mismatch that killed American soldiers.

The most serious problem, however, is the apparent lack of content validity of the Army's marksmanship training and the presumed outcome—dead enemy soldiers. A soldier who must move and shoot while trying to hit a moving and shooting enemy has a task that is totally different from that of the
soldier who is sitting in a concrete foxhole shooting at standing targets from a known distance. Send an Army-trained rifleman goose or deer hunting, and he will likely starve.

Perhaps in the future we can procure human-engineered rifles such as the new British Enfield and get both higher performance and reduced costs. Although an Enfield-style weapon would cost more in initial hardware procurement, it could save more than $50 million in ten years in training costs.

On the subject of TOW training, Captains Bellene and Davis also make some excellent points. It is unfortunate that better simulation devices are not available. The Operational Test and Evaluation Agency (OTEA) tested the TOW (with the warhead removed) against real tanks with a driver, and if that could be done during annual missile firing, we could verify gunner performance much better against real, moving, and reacting targets.

The second problem with TOW training is that the simulation folks are so stuck in the high-technology mode that they have forgotten what the field is like. They typically produce large, complex, electronic, expensive, indoor, and maintenance-intensive devices. But what the field needs is small, portable, cheap, outdoor, and multi-use devices. Instead of a multi-million dollar computerized theater that troops can get into only once a year to train with the TOW, a platoon-set of 1/10 scale radio-controlled Russian tank models with mini-MILES sets could be procured. This would enable the entire TOW squad to train frequently on multiple, moving, and reacting targets at very low cost. A small smoke device attached to the MILES would provide instant feedback. This kind of device is especially needed in limited spaces (aboard ship) or on limited terrain (like the typical European square kilometer). In addition, training in other tasks (recognition, tactics, and command control) could be conducted with the same device.

Finally, I'd like to say that INFANTRY is the best single professional journal I have seen.

JAMES E. LARSEN
Hampton, Virginia

WORLD WAR II MPS

Dear Sir,

I am a military historian and author. For the past four years I have been involved in investigative research on the activities of the Military Police in Paris during World War II at the time of the Battle of the Bulge. I am interested in contacting any former members of the Military Police Corps who were stationed in Paris during December 1944 and January 1945 to assist in this research.

My address is Box 7361, Mississippi City Station, Gulfport, MS 39501.

DALLAS TITLER

MILITARY INSIGNIA

Dear Sir,

I am a collector of military insignia and would like to hear from any of your readers who might be interested in exchanging unit crests and foreign insignia with me.

My address is 8261 Blackburn, #C, Los Angeles, CA 90048.

MICHAEL PELL
From The Editor

In assuming the editorship of INFANTRY, I am both awed and encouraged by what this journal has evolved into — a professional journal for the combined arms team. In its forthcoming issues, INFANTRY will remain true to its stated purpose: To provide current information on infantry organization, weapons, tactics, equipment and techniques; to provide a forum for professional ideas; and to present relevant historical articles. In addition, it will continue to provide career notes of interest, book reviews, letters, and Infantry news items.

We at INFANTRY believe that the hallmark of a professional is to read about and to study his profession. This in turn leads to basic, solid scholarship in reading, thinking, and writing, areas that when developed and exercised help the infantryman become a well-rounded soldier. Therefore, we not only encourage you to continue reading INFANTRY, but ask that you consider putting your ideas and experiences in writing and submitting them to INFANTRY to be considered for publication. In this manner, then, the whole of the combined arms team can benefit.

As editor, I look forward to a challenging and rewarding time of service to you.

MDB
Let me now hear the battle, Lord,  
The terror and the pain,  
With fortitude and faith restored,  
And on my arms no stain.

Let me perform my duty well,  
Whatever it may be.  
On peaceful post, in battle-hell,  
In air, on land or sea.

And if, though striving for the right,  
Conflicting claims arise,  
Let Honor's burning beacon-light  
Show where my pathway lies.

Give me the grace and the constancy  
To love, my whole life long,  
The citadel of liberty,  
My Country, brave and strong.

Grant this, and I shall be content  
To rest beneath the sod,  
True to myself, my regiment,  
My country, and my God.

(By Richard Raymond)