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Volume 74, Number 1

ARTICLES

17 THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL
Lieutenant Colonel John A. English, Canadian Army

21 MCPHERSON'S RIDGE: A STUDY OF A MEETING ENGAGEMENT
Captain Michael A. Phipps

27 INFANTRY IN ACTION: LEIPZIG
Major Charles MacDonald

FORUM AND FEATURES

7 ADVANCED NCO COURSE
NCO Academy Staff

8 FAQAC: A "7X50" VIEW
Captain Timothy A. Scully

10 BRITISH AIRBORNE SCHOOL
Captain Eric H. Covner

11 A HEAVY MORTAR FOR A LIGHT DIVISION
Captain Arthur A. Durante

13 BATTLE FATIGUE
Lieutenant Colonel Brian H. Chermol

15 RECRUITING: A DUAL SPECIALTY
Captain David P. Miner

TRAINING NOTES

33 EXECUTION MATRIX
Major Nicholas G. Peaki III

35 WINNING AT THE NTC: RECONNAISSANCE
Major Vernon W. Humphrey

37 TOW JEEP MODIFICATION
Lieutenant Steven R. Pelley

39 PLATOON "Y" DEFENSE
Platoon Sergeant David J. Robbins

DEPARTMENTS

2 COMMANDANT'S NOTE
4 INFANTRY NEWS
40 ENLISTED CAREER NOTES
43 OFFICERS CAREER NOTES
45 BOOK REVIEWS
49 LETTERS

FRONT COVER

An American soldier is a special breed. He'll give all he's got to keep all he has.
THE INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)

For the first time in modern history we are going to have a truly light Infantry division as an organic part of our total force structure.

The idea itself is not new. Some 45 years ago, in 1938, our organizational people came up with a proposed 10,275-man Infantry division that was lean and supposedly mean. Unfortunately, because this particular organization had little combat backbone, it wasn’t very mean and it wasn’t adopted.

Again, at the height of World War II, in 1943, we looked at a 9,000-man light division that was supposed to be usable in any area of the world where only a small amount of equipment could be carried. But as with the 1938 version, this one also proved to have too little combat capability, and the Army dropped the idea.

The idea for a light division was valid then, and it is valid now. The major difference today is technology. In the ensuing 40 years, there have been spectacular advances in the effectiveness and lethality of the weaponry available for a light Infantry force. As a result, the Army will finally have organic, small, flexible, essentially footmobile, strategically deployable divisions that can respond to contingencies anywhere in the world.

The Infantry Division (Light) is a compact force of about 10,000 soldiers; it will focus on defeating light enemy forces in low- and mid-intensity conflicts, but will retain the capability for employment throughout the broad spectrum of contingencies. (The overall structure of the division is depicted on the opposite page.)

The nine Infantry battalions, grouped into three brigades, can look for immediate battlefield support from a division artillery comprised of three 105mm howitzer battalions with 18 howitzers each; an aviation brigade that has 36 Black Hawks, 29 attack helicopters, and 31 scout helicopters, as well as a military intelligence/reconnaissance unit; an air defense battalion equipped with 18 improved Vulcans and 40 Stinger teams; and a light combat engineer battalion.

All of the major elements found in our current Infantry divisions have been retained in the Infantry Division (Light). And to give it the worldwide strategic deployability it needs, the entire division can be moved in fewer than 500 C-141B sorties. It is a compact offensive force that can be augmented with additional forces, weapons, and equipment before deployment based on its mission, the enemy situation, ter-
rain, time, and troops available (METT-T).

If all goes as planned, the 7th Infantry Division will be converted to the new division structure in Fiscal Year 1985. Plans for the conversion of other divisions are still being discussed.

The new division is the result of a good deal of forward-looking thinking at Department of the Army and at TRADOC. Light infantry units can go where heavy Infantry units cannot go. Bad weather and darkness, instead of hindering them, will help them. Even in mid- and high-intensity conflicts, there will be many places where light infantry units can be employed quite effectively. For example, in the last issue of INFANTRY, I wrote about the growing urban sprawl in every area of the world and our need to master the complexities of fighting in a MOUT environment. This is the kind of fighting in which light Infantry units, with the proper support, will excel.

This new light division offers the Infantry leader many challenges and opportunities. Its units will have to be trained to operate in close terrain, MOUT, and heavily forested and jungle areas where foot troops and light weapons are essential to the task. They will have to be trained for air assaults, for raiding operations, and for counter-guerrilla warfare. And they will have to learn to operate with our heavy units, because they may be attached for special operations to a heavy unit, or a heavy unit may join them to create a combat task force.

How will we do all of this? By seizing every opportunity to train our units and our soldiers, by constantly working and studying, and by putting forth a disciplined effort — both in our service schools and in our units — we can create the finest fighting forces ever fielded in our Army.

At the Infantry School, we have formed a Light Division Task Force within our Directorate of Training and Doctrine to develop a training strategy for the new organization. The Task Force is now busy conducting a front-end analysis of tasks and is looking at a training strategy that will be oriented on low- and mid-intensity conflicts.

The March-April 1984 issue of INFANTRY Magazine will have a feature article that will cover in detail the organization and mission of the new Infantry Division (Light).
THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY SCHOOL recently designated the Director of its Weapons, Gunnery and Maintenance Department as the School's single point of contact for the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) and the new equipment training team (NETT) concept of training.

The Director's responsibilities include:
- Responding to all requests for BIFV mobile training teams and all requests from units that are equipped with the Bradley.
- Providing training as scheduled under the NETT concept.
- Updating or writing new training manuals for the BIFV. These responsibilities will be fully coordinated with other departments, directorates, and offices to provide units in the field with timely, accurate BIFV data.

Correspondence concerning the BIFV, therefore, should be addressed to:

**Commandant**
United States Army Infantry School
**ATTN: ATSH-W-BFV**
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

Important BIFV telephone numbers at Fort Benning are:

**BIFV Division, WGMID:**
AUTOVON 784-7116/6225

**Master Gunner Team:**
AUTOVON 784-6201

THE 1984 SKILL QUALIFICATION TEST (SQT) for the Infantry MOSs (11B, 11C, and 11H) will be conducted between 1 March 1984 and 31 May 1984.

The SQT is a written test only. It is designed to assess a soldier's proficiency in his entire MOS and skill level, not just his current duty position. The results of the test will be used in making personnel management decisions.

The tasks that are tested in the SQT are taken directly from the Infantry Soldier's Manuals. The SQT requires a soldier to know how to perform a task according to the standards in the manuals, not the shortcuts so often used today.

The 1984 Infantry SQT notices have been distributed to the field units. If you have not received a notice, you should contact your unit training standards officer.

EACH YEAR, MORE THAN 100,000 people visit the National Infantry Museum. A large number of Fort Benning's infantry trainees are given a glimpse of our country's history and traditions through scheduled visits, as are ROTC students and school children from throughout the surrounding area. Foreign dignitaries and official visitors to Fort Benning are also given a tour of the Museum when their schedules permit.

The Museum staff has recently compiled a complete inventory of its collection. With over 30,000 artifacts, this was a major undertaking. And the collection is increasing almost weekly as items are donated or purchased for addition to the collection.

The Museum, for example, recently acquired a rare infantry regimental drum that features a painted American eagle. The drum was lost by the regiment during the First Battle of Bull Run and was not returned to the U.S. Government until 1921. It is one of only a few painted U.S. Army drums known to have survived the Civil War.

Other recent Civil War acquisitions are a rare Civil War flag of the 1st Brigade, 2d Division, 9th Army Corps, and a silver pitcher presented to Captain H.V. Breneman by the men of Company B, 50th Regiment, on 15 August 1863.

Also added to the Museum collection was a sword made during the period 1750-1770 and carried during the Revolutionary War by Major Amos King of Peabody, Massachusetts. Major (Retired) Thomas H. Burt donated a collection of edged weapons used by the Moros and collected by his grandfather, Colonel James G. Hannah, during his service in the Philippines near the turn of the century. Major Burt also donated his grandfather's service sword.

Brigadier General (Retired) Oscar C. Hudson gave the Museum personal papers documenting his military and civilian service, including photographs, badges and insignia, unit histories, and mementos.

Finally, the Second Armored Division Association presented to the Museum a large framed color photograph of the Division's Altar of Battles, which the Association erected at Valley Forge and dedicated to those soldiers who served with the 2d Armored Division during World War II. James M. Burt, a Medal of Honor recipient, made the presentation.

The Museum enjoys broad support from many areas and appreciates this support, knowing that the National Infantry Museum could not be the tremendous historical repository and showplace it is without that support.

The National Infantry Museum

**INDEX**

The 1983 index to INfanTRY has been prepared separately and is available to anyone who requests a copy. Please address your request to Editor, INFANTRY Magazine, Box 2005, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905.
Society was formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support. It is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership, or $10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958 or commercial 404/545-2958.

THE AVIATION BRANCH was approved by the Secretary of the Army on 13 April 1983. Since that date, a branch implementation plan has been developed and approved by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a transition team has been established at the Army's Aviation Center at Fort Rucker to implement the plan.

Most of the previously unresolved issues have now been resolved and the public affairs office at Fort Rucker has been publishing numerous items of interest for all Army aviators. For example, a special edition of "The Army Flier" for 3 September 1983 contained a special feature on the new branch.

Additional information can be obtained from the Public Affairs Office at Fort Rucker; telephone numbers are AUTOVON 558-4117 or commercial 205/255-4117.

THE NEW AVIATION BRANCH colors and insignia were recently approved. The "crossed wings and prop" insignia symbolizes Army Aviation from its beginning. It will be worn by both officers and enlisted soldiers.

The officer insignia is a silver propeller between two gold wings that spread one and one-eighth inches. Enlisted soldiers will wear similar insignia, except that it is centered on a one-inch gold disk.

The colors for the new branch will be ultramarine blue and golden orange. The colors will be used for flags, guidons, and coats of arms of aviation units as well as for various uniform accoutrements — unit crests, shoulder patches, braid, shoulder boards and straps, and lapel facings.

THE INFANTRY BOARD HAS SUBMITTED the following news items:

- **Water Flavoring Powders.** Soldiers on extended field maneuvers or in combat may have to purify their drinking water by using iodine or chlorine pills. Some soldiers have gone so far as to use Kool-Aid or some other commercial mix to make disinfected water taste better. Unfortunately, the Vitamin C in some of the mixes has negated the purifying effects of the disinfectants.

  Accordingly, Natick Laboratories has developed a flavoring powder that is compatible with the disinfectant pills, and the Infantry Board recently tested it to see if soldiers liked the flavor, if they voluntarily drank the flavored water, or if they still preferred disinfected but unflavored water. The soldiers who took part in the test were trainees in their third week of one station unit training at the Infantry Training Center at Fort Benning.

  Natick Laboratories will use the test results to make a decision as to any further development of the flavoring powder.

- **Camouflage Face Paint.** The Infantry School and the U.S. Marine Corps have established a requirement for a product-improved camouflage face paint that incorporates infrared suppressive characteristics similar to those incorporated into the battle dress uniform.

  Natick Laboratories developed such a face paint, as well as a new compact container to hold the paint. Although the new face paint appears to be the same as the standard camouflage paint now in use, it is softer and easier to apply. It is in a dark green, reclosable, plastic container that has a stainless steel mirror inside its top and four compartments in the bottom for different colored paints.

  The Infantry Board tested the new paint and container in comparison with the standard camouflage paint stick. Ranger students and their instructors were used as test soldiers. The test was designed to address functional performance, human factors, and the test item's safety. The test lasted for six weeks, and data was obtained during the test by observation and by interviews.

  Natick Laboratories will use the data in formulating a production decision.

- **Infantry Remoted Target System (IRETS).** The Army needs a new target system for use in its marksmanship training. Its current Trainfire equipment is becoming obsolete, it is a maintenance liability, it lacks a moving target capability, and it does not adequately represent a dismounted enemy threat to the rifleman.

  The Infantry Board recently conducted a test of the Infantry Remoted Target System (IRETS), which is designed to overcome the inadequacies of the Trainfire system.

  IRETS consists of a range control station (a programmable computer located in a range tower) that controls pop-up stationary and moving targets,
night muzzle flash simulators, and hostile fire simulators. The desired target behavior such as sequence, exposure time, and direction of movement of the moving targets can be programmed to meet the user's needs. Additionally, target hit data is collected by the computer and a printout of each firer's results, by target exposure, can be provided after each firing order.

During the IRETS test, the Board obtained information to assess the training support effectiveness and operational suitability of the IRETS.

The Board considered training support effectiveness in terms of the capability to conduct instructional and qualification firing on an IRETS range using the same training programs and scoring criteria that are currently being used in rifle marksmanship training on the Trainfire ranges. Too, the test program compared the advantages of conducting moving target marksmanship training with and without the use of IRETS moving targets.

The Board's test of operational suitability addressed the operation of the IRETS components in their intended environment, their ability to meet reliability and maintainability criteria, and their response to the demands of the appropriate scenarios when operated and maintained by typical civilian employees. Suitability also addressed the adequacy of operator training, training for those responsible for maintaining IRETS, and safety and human factors associated with training, operating, and maintaining IRETS.

IRETS is designed to provide standard cost effective equipment to satisfy individual and collective rifle marksmanship and gunnery requirements to include Bradley infantry and cavalry fighting vehicle ranges; combined arms ranges; basic rifle marksmanship, annual arms qualification, and sustainment training; and individual tactical training.

IRETS will be distributed in various configurations: a modified field fire range to replace the current field fire range, with each lane having two stationary pop-up targets and three moving pop-up targets; a defense test range to replace the current record range, with each lane having 11 stationary targets and 6 moving targets; a fire and movement range to replace the current individual tactical training range, with soldiers moving downrange and engaging targets as presented, with each lane having seven stationary targets and four moving targets; and a multipurpose range complex that is a collective training range to support live fire exercises conducted by squads, platoons, and companies.

The Infantry School will use the test results to present an independent evaluation to an in-process review to determine whether to proceed with full-scale development.

- Hot/Dry Clothing and Equipment, Improved Fighting Load, and Mission Existence Load Systems. A major effort is under way in the Army to lighten the load of the individual soldier and to better equip him for the modern battlefield.

One concept that is being looked at is the elimination of unnecessary items, the development of items that weigh less and are less bulky, and the improvement of the load carrying system.

The Infantry Board recently conducted a series of tests on some of the proposed items to assess their military use.

The hot/dry clothing and equipment system (HDCES) that was tested is designed to provide environmental protection in the 110-degree to 40-degree temperature range. It is also designed to provide an informal sleeping system that will replace the current sleeping bag when it is combined with the clothing system. Its specific components were the current standard desert dress uniform; a desert parka (a reversible garment with day and night camouflage patterns); a camouflage pack cover, which also functions as an individual camouflage net and sun screen; a system for carrying the fighting and existence loads of water that held two standard two-quart canteens with carriers and two one-and-a-half gallon water containers; two informal sleeping systems; and desert boots.

The improved fighting load system that was tested is designed to provide a more efficient system for carrying the fighting load. Its specific components were a load-bearing vest (two different types were tested); a cutting device; and an NBC equipment carrying system.

The mission existence load that the Board tested is designed to provide a soldier with existence equipment (tent and stove) so that he can live in the field for extended periods of time, and the Board also tested a means of carrying that equipment (a rucksack). The components of the system were a hybrid rucksack, a fire team tent, and a multifuel stove.

The Board conducted the test program at Yakima Firing Center, Washington, under the prevailing weather conditions. The highest temperature recorded during the test period was 99 degrees, and the lowest humidity was 16 percent.

Both Army and Marine squads wore the clothing and carried the equipment while participating in two 12-day field exercises. Data on performance, human factors, and safety were collected during the test activities through personal observations and the use of data collection forms, questionnaires, and interviews.

The Infantry School and the Army's Development and Employment Agency will use the test results to recommend those items that should be further developed for military use.

APPLICATIONS ARE NOW BEING ACCEPTED for admission to the United States Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS), which is located at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, for the 1984-1985 academic year, which begins in August 1984.

Additional information can be obtained from Army Regulation 351-12 or by writing to the Commandant, USMA Prep School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey 07703.
Advanced NCO Course

NCO ACADEMY STAFF

The best qualified Infantry staff sergeants in the Army are selected to attend the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) at Fort Benning. Here are some of the things these prospective students should know before they leave their units to attend the course.

First, they must have six months left on their enlistments at the end of the course. If they will not, they must either reenlist or extend their enlistments before leaving their parent units.

Any NCO selected to attend the course who has a temporary profile that would keep him from taking part in physical training, physical readiness testing, or field duty should ask to be rescheduled to attend later. If he reports to Fort Benning with a limiting profile, he may be released from ANCOC for medical reasons. (Those NCOs who are over 40 years of age must have medical evaluations and clearances to take part in the physical training activities.)

Noncommissioned officers who have previously completed ANCOC by correspondence and who do not wish to attend the resident course must go through their chains of command and supporting personnel officers to decline attendance; if they report for the course, they will be retained and required to complete it.

Students should plan to arrive so that they can report to Building 17E (Wilkins Hall), Main Post, Fort Benning, not later than 1200 on the Sunday before the course begins the next day, Monday. Activities for that Sunday will include a weigh-in, the issue of supplies and equipment, and a unit orientation.

RECORDS

Each student when he reports must have with him the following records and documents:

- At least five copies of his travel/PCS orders and amendments, as appropriate.
- A copy of his hazardous duty orders, if he is currently on jump status.
- A copy each of his Form 2 and Form 2-1.
- A copy of his DA Form 31, with provision for leave after the course, as applicable.
- His medical and dental records, immunization record, and identification tags.
- A copy of all his limiting medical profiles. These should also be posted in his medical records.
- A copy of his over-40 physical examination, completed and posted in his medical records, as appropriate.

- A copy of his "pinch test/skin fold test" if he has been granted an exception to the height and weight standards shown in AR 600-9. The test must be dated within 14 days of the date of his arrival for the course.

- The personnel, finance, dental, and health records for TDY enroute students. TDY and return personnel need not bring their finance records.

NCOs who are ordered to ANCOC should request advance travel pay or per diem before leaving their parent units, if they think they will need it. The per diem rate is about $3.50 per day. The processing time at Fort Benning for payment of advance travel and per diem is about two or three weeks. (Students must also be prepared to pay $10 for the mandatory dining in.)

Students attending the course, with the exception of those stationed at Fort Benning, will be taken off separate rations and provided a meal card. They will be billeted in two-man BEQ rooms, with maid service provided and washers and dryers available in the building. The charge for the BEQ is $3 per day, two-man occupancy. (This charge is reimbursed when an NCO processes his travel expenses upon returning to his parent unit or
upon reporting to his new duty station.)

The ANCOC uses the same appearance standards as those detailed in AR 670-1. Insignia and badges that are not authorized by the Department of the Army are also not authorized by the ANCOC, with the following exceptions:

- The jungle expert badge may be worn by authorized personnel who are in a TDY and return status to the 82d Airborne Division or to units stationed in Panama.
- The 2d Armored Division patch worn above "US ARMY" is permitted for personnel in a TDY and return status to the 2d Armored Division.
- The USAEUR authorized U.S. flag replica worn on the left sleeve by personnel assigned to the 509th in Italy and who are in a TDY and return status is permitted.

HATS AND BERETS

Drill Sergeant hats and airborne, Ranger, and Special Forces berets will not be worn nor will the green uniform trousers be bloused at any official function during the course. The hat and the berets may be worn and the trousers bloused when the NCO students are off duty and during the graduation ceremony.

Students must bring the following clothing and equipment in at least the numbers shown:
- One Class A uniform, complete with accessories, awards, and decorations.
- One pair of low quarter shoes.
- One garrison cap.
- Two pairs of black combat boots.
- Two pairs of BDUs.
- Two additional pairs of BDUs or conventional fatigues.
- One BDU or conventional baseball cap (as appropriate).
- One pile cap.
- One field jacket.
- One pair of black gloves with inserts.
- One raincoat.
- One sweat band for steel helmet.
- One lensatic compass.
- One set of earplugs with case.
- Four T-shirts (green, brown, or white) without stenciled name.
- Three white T-shirts, crew neck (for PT).
- One pair of running shoes.
- Two pairs of white socks.
- One white shirt.
- One bow tie.
- Ruck sack (optional).
- Kevlar or conventional jump helmet for personnel on jump status (optional).
- Dress blues (optional).

The following requirements have been established for graduation from the course:
- Pass the APRT with at least 60 points in each event. APRTs are administered to standards in accordance with FM 21-20.
- Pass the land navigation field examination.
- Pass all academic examinations.
- Maintain an academic average of at least 70 percent. Students whose averages fall below 70 percent after the fifth academic week are subject to appear before an academic evaluation board.
- Maintain weight in accordance with standards outlined in AR 600-9.

Noncommissioned officers who have any questions about the course should feel free to call the ANCOC chief instructor at AUTOVON 835-7015/1478; Commercial (404) 545-7015/1478. After duty hours, the NCO Academy special duty NCO can be reached at AUTOVON 835-3310; Commercial (404) 545-3310. The mailing address is Chief Instructor, ANCO, NCOA, TSB, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905.

NCOs selected to attend the course are encouraged to write or call at least five weeks before their class starts to check on any possible changes in regulations or policy.

FAOAC: A "7x50" View

CAPTAIN TIMOTHY A. SCULLY

Each morning as the sun creeps into the sky over the prairie dogs at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, a few dauntless captains can be heard to remark "another great day to be in the Infantry!" Armed with charts, darts, camp stools, and calculators, these infantry officers move to the sound of cannon fire as exchange students at the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course (FAOAC). The course of instruction is just a little different from that of the Infantry School, and so the following is a "7x50" view of the experience from one who has been there.

Twenty-four Infantry captains are selected each year by the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center to attend the seven-and-one-half month Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course. (This exchange of officers is part of a program that is designed to broaden the officer corps' knowledge of com-
bined arms operations; each year about 230 captains of Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer, and Air Defense Artillery are selected to attend a branch course other than their own.)

Before starting the course, all exchange officers and allied officers, plus a few other selected officers, attend the Field Artillery Advanced Preparatory Course. This course, which is four weeks long, is designed to teach enough cannon gunnery, firing battery operations, and observed fire techniques to the student officers so that they can start the advanced course on an equal footing with the remainder of the yet-to-be-assembled class. A comprehensive examination on manual and computer gunnery techniques marks the end of the preparatory course and serves to indicate individual strengths and weaknesses that can be addressed during the six months of gunnery instruction that follow.

The week after the preparatory course ends, the advanced course begins in earnest, integrating the "preppies" into the now assembled class of Army and Marine artillerymen.

Fort Sill is the home of the "U.S. Artillery," that is, both Army and Marine Corps, and Marine artillerymen — students and instructors — make up a substantial portion of the Fort Sill population. (As an aside, the Army and Marine Corps instructors present highly polished doctrine without the slightest trace of service bias.)

To meet the requirements of both the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, such subjects as leadership, tactics, communications, and maintenance — common to all advanced courses — are taught to platoon-sized "sections." The balance of the FAOAC revolves around nuclear warfare, counterfire, artillery weapon systems, tactics, and cannon gunnery. The "meat and potatoes" of the course is cannon gunnery: more than one-third of the time is dedicated to it. Included in the instruction are observed fire techniques, registration techniques, special munitions and smoke, illumination, nuclear gunnery, special corrections, and terrain gun position corrections.

Practical applications of the gunnery instruction is achieved through periodic live fire exercises, where students both operate the fire direction center (FDC) of firing batteries and serve as forward observers. The capstone of the gunnery instruction is the "one-day war," where one-half of the class at a time goes to the field to run simultaneously two firing battalions, serving as observers and operating the battery and battalion FDCs. The Gunnery Department has also been in the vanguard in introducing the TACFIRE fire planning and direction system.

MLRS

The Weapons Department introduced the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in preparation for the fielding of the first MLRS battery in the summer of 1982. This department also presents technical instruction on each segment of the artillery weapons community including the M101/M102 105mm howitzers, M114/M198/M109 155mm howitzers, M110 8" gun, and the Lance and Pershing surface-to-surface missile systems. While it does not make each student an expert on these systems, each student does leave with a comfortable command of the operating capabilities of these weapons.

The Counterfire Department is a new-found giant at the Artillery School, as new equipment and organizations emerge to support the AirLand battle. Because of the advent of the "Q36/37" radars and the evolution of the target acquisition battalion, the instruction on survey techniques, target acquisition, target production, and counterfire planning are totally new for all of the Infantrymen and even for a few of the artillerymen. This segment of the instruction is very interesting, because it requires each officer to look deep into the battlefield and well beyond direct-fire ranges.

The nuclear warfare instruction, coupled with the blocks on chemical and biological agents, opens doors that are not normally opened to the non-nuclear community. The perspective of the battlefield is dramatically reshaped by the introduction of nuclear artillery, the Lance, and the Pershing.

While the objective of gunnery is to provide accurate and timely fire, it takes artillery tactics to place the fire support system on the battlefield with the maneuver forces. The support of the "ground gaining arms," therefore, is addressed from the perspective of coordinating close support, deep interdiction, counterfire, naval gunfire, and air support at battalion, brigade, and division levels. Fire planning and scheduling of all available fire support systems to support the combined arms team is stressed. The student officer is trained in the skills that are required of both a firing battery commander and a fire support officer. A comprehensive final examination on tactics ensures that each officer has mastered the skills of the fire support officer — skills as advisor, coordinator, and planner.

All in all, the opportunity to attend the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course is one that an Infantry captain should seriously consider. The course of instruction is indeed first-rate — just ask any artillery officer. The gunnery instruction is definitely tough, but the opportunity to master the fire support skills, while maintaining the maneuver outlook, is rewarding professionally and personally. The experience an Infantry officer gains at Fort Sill will prove to be invaluable and will greatly broaden his professional horizons.

CAPTAIN TIMOTHY A. SCULLY is assigned to the 82d Airborne Division. He was previously assigned to the 1st Battalion, 3d Infantry (The Old Guard). He is a graduate of the University of Florida and holds a master's degree from Central Michigan University.
British Airborne School

CAPTAIN ERIC H. COYNEN

The British Airborne School bears little resemblance to its United States counterpart in either organization or training. For one thing, in Britain the Royal Air Force, not the Army, has always been in charge of British military paratrooping.

England’s Number 1 Parachute Training School (No. 1 PTS) was first formed in July 1940 at RAF Ringway and designated the Central Landing Establishment. It was tasked with training British airborne forces for wartime assaults, which would subsequently include such famous operations as Normandy, Arnhem, and the Rhine Crossing. With the success of the School and the wartime growth of the airborne concept, additional training centers were needed, and schools were then established in India, the Middle East, and Italy.

At today’s No. 1 PTS, now located at RAF Brize Norton, parachute jump instructors (PJs), drawn from the Physical Training Branch of the RAF, conduct all the training. These instructors are also attached to all British airborne forces to perform jumpmaster duties (air dispatching) and conduct refresher training.

The School offers two introductory courses, a two-week course for reservists entering the airborne units of the Territorial Army and a longer basic course for regular soldiers. Administration, discipline, and briefing for all students, regardless of service, is the responsibility of the Parachute Course Administrative Unit (PCAU), which is also located at Brize Norton and commanded by an Army major. The PCAU cadre are on airborne status but are not involved with the training programs.

The students, organized into ten-man sticks, have one instructor who remains with them throughout the course. There is no “harrassment” or physical training at No. 1 PTS, the students having been mentally and physically conditioned in P Company of the Parachute Regiment before attending the School. The result is an atmosphere that is relaxed, yet efficient and conducive to training.

BALLOONS

Except for the mock tower, each training apparatus is located within a single hangar, including an extremely good mockup of a C-130 fuselage. Following three days of ground training, along with several lectures and films, the students make their first jump from a balloon at 800 feet at RAF Hullavington. The balloon, similar to a World War II barrage balloon, has a car suspended underneath that accommodates four jumpers and an instructor. The balloon jump, with the absence of normal sensations such as aircraft flight and engine noise, is a novel experience. It is also a method that permits multiple jumps in a short time. The low drop altitude, coupled with a longer opening than on an aircraft jump, results in a very short descent. Jumpers are graded on each jump by a PJ located on the drop zone and are subsequently debriefed upon returning to No. 1 PTS.

Before its first jump from an aircraft, the class receives an “air experience flight” in a C-130. For this flight the soldiers are rigged with the same parachutes they will use on their first jump. This flight is the final training the students receive before they jump, and it is designed to familiarize them with every event they will experience on the aircraft jump itself short of the actual exit. All the commands are given (except for “GO,” of course), and each soldier moves to the door and places an arm or leg into the slipstream so that he will understand the need for a vigorous exit.

British jump equipment and commands differ from those of their American counterparts, and consequently, result in different procedures. The main parachute, the PX MK IV, can be steered with each lift web and is equipped with an anti-inversion net. The canvas harness, however, is dated and has no capewells that can be opened to quickly collapse the parachute: the jumper must haul in the suspension lines and the canopy to keep from being dragged along the ground. (Although a newer nylon harness has been developed, it is used only for balloon jumping. The harness was designed with capewells, but they have been inactivated for safety reasons.)

The reserve parachute (the same reserve is used on each jump) features a “drive panel” in the rear, which is similar to the cut-out section in an MC1-1B parachute. This modification was made to force the reserve forward and as far away from the main chute as possible to prevent entanglement when the reserve has to be activated. The reserve handle is on the top rather than the side, which means the jumper exits with both arms folded over the top of the reserve.

Aircraft jump commands are as
follows: At "Prepare for Action," the jumpers release and extend their safety belts; at "Stand Up," they stand and hook their static lines onto a metal clip attached to the cable, grip a leather strap attached to it, and do not touch the static line again. The next commands are "Check Equipment," and "Tell Off for Equipment Check." On "Action Stations," each stick moves toward its assigned door with the first jumper turning into the door and placing his leading hand on the door frame, his other arm across the top of the reserve. At the command "Red On," the lead arm is placed over the other, and approximately ten seconds later the green light comes on and the command "GO" is given. The lead jumper takes two steps on exiting. Only the first jumper in a stick touches the aircraft door. Each of the others releases his strap and folds the arm that has been holding the strap over the other arm, which is already on top of the reserve, as he turns into the door. A three-second "compulsory count" takes place before a jumper checks his canopy and conducts all around observation.

Steering the parachute away from other jumpers is emphasized and practiced on every jump. Also emphasized is looking at the ground during descent and turning the feet in the proper landing attitude, depending on the direction of drift. For example, in a right forward landing the toes are turned upward at a 45-degree angle to the left to facilitate the proper initiation of a right-front PLF (parachute landing fall). For a rear landing, the toes are turned in the direction of drift.

The initial aircraft jumps are made with single sticks of six jumpers; the later ones involve larger sticks and simultaneous exits from both jump doors. During simultaneous exits, the jumpers on one side wear white parachutes while those on the other side wear green, which enables the PJs on the drop zone to observe them better. Eight jumps are offered, including night jumps and equipment jumps, with ground training continuing between jumps.

No. 1 PTS teaches all aspects of military parachuting from basic static line through advanced high-altitude free-fall. It has graduated more than one million paratroopers and has served as the model for the airborne schools of numerous nations. The superb training and the international reputation of Britain's Airborne School is a tribute to the professionalism of its cadre and to the soundness of its motto, "Knowledge Dispels Fear."

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A Heavy Mortar for a Light Division

CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. DURANTE

The 82d Airborne Division is one of the finest fighting units in the United States Army. It can move rapidly to almost any place in the world and can be ready to fight when it gets there.

But I believe it would be a more effective fighting force if 120mm Tampella mortars were substituted for the 105mm howitzers in the division's field artillery units and for the 4.2-inch mortars in its heavy mortar platoons.

No major organizational changes would be involved. The crew members in the division artillery's nine Tampella mortar batteries, for example, would continue to hold artillery MOSs and to conduct field artillery indirect fire support missions, and the heavy mortar platoons armed with the Tampella would remain organic parts of the division's nine infantry battalions and its one armor battalion. The Tampella, therefore, would be used in more than the infantry support role the venerable 4.2-inch mortar now performs at the infantry battalion level.

The Tampella, which is produced in Israel, is available in a towed version.
that weighs 763 pounds or a ground-mounted version that weighs 539 pounds. It fires conventional, smoke, and illumination rounds plus a Super Tampella (ST) high explosive round made of a plastic matrix and steel pellets (for better fragmentation coverage of a target area). It is effective, accurate, air transportable, and simple to operate, and it needs only a small crew.

The 120mm mortar would have several advantages over the 105mm howitzer. First, replacing the 105mm howitzer with the mortar would reduce the 82d’s deployment requirements by about 67 tons. At the same time, the division artillery’s firepower would be increased, because the 120mm mortar gives more than eight times as much coverage per round than the 105 does. It would be more lethal, too, since the ST high explosive ensures perfect fragmentation. Still another advantage would lie in the Tampella’s special missions capability, which would give the division a better illumination and smoke capability.

Some of these same advantages apply to the replacement of the 4.2-inch mortar as well: The 120mm is lighter and has greater lethality than the 4.2-inch. In addition, it has a greater range.

There is still another significant advantage in replacing both of these weapons with the Tampella. It would mean that both the division artillery units and the infantry battalions they support would use the same type of ammunition. This would simplify logistics when supplying the division in an airhead.

Additionally, the M106A2 tracked carriers of the armor battalion’s heavy mortar platoon could be modified to tow the 120mm mortar, which would allow the vehicle to carry larger amounts of 120mm ammunition inside. It is true that the cross-country capability of these vehicles would be diminished by the towed mortar, but since an airborne division (after airdrop) moves mainly on foot anyway, this reduction of capability would still be acceptable. Certainly the armor battalion needs a highly mobile indirect fire capability, but an armored unit supporting a completely dismounted infantry division is not expected to operate over the extended distance or at the cross-country speed of the typical tank battalion.

In the infantry battalions, the substitution of the 539-pound Tampella for the 672-pound 4.2-inch mortar would mean either that almost three tons of additional ammunition could be carried, or that the division’s deployment tonnage requirements could be reduced accordingly.

One of the strongest of my reasons for proposing the 120mm mortar is its potential for employment as an antitank weapon through the use of the guided antiarmor mortar projectile (GAMP) round.

The GAMP round, a passive infrared seeking, smart munition, does not require any special fire direction center procedures; it needs no laser designation; and it is not affected by the countermeasures used against Hellfire, Copperhead, or radar-guided Maverick missiles. Its hemispherical warhead can defeat any Threat main battle tank. It has a microprocessor that allows it to identify and ignore armored vehicles that have already been hit and to go on to attack only operational vehicles.

Although the GAMP is a developmental round, it is based on proved technology and is considered a “low-risk” program with a high probability of success. (GAMP rounds for the 4.2-inch mortar and the 105mm howitzer are being considered, but these have smaller warheads and their rifled barrels impose a spin on them, which has to be negated. The 120mm has no spin.)

The Tampella is a combat-proven weapon. Besides Israel, the armies of two NATO countries (Germany and Turkey) and also Ghana, Iran, and Singapore use it.

Tampella platoons would improve the 82d Airborne Division’s combat capability. They would be capable of defeating enemy armor out to 10,500 meters, firing ST high explosive, smoke, and illumination rounds at 15 rounds per minute, and using current vehicles while also decreasing the division’s deployment tonnage requirements. The division could deploy its units quickly to counter an enemy thrust and still retain the ability to defeat enemy armored formations.

The Tampella provides a lightweight logistical package that improves antipersonnel and antiarmor capabilities. In short, it is the best available heavy mortar for a light division.

CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. DURANTE, when he prepared this article, was assigned to the Directorate of Training and Doctrine at the Infantry School. A 1971 ROTC graduate of Colorado State University, he has commended wife and headquarters companies and has served as a battalion S-4.
Battle Fatigue

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BRIAN H. CHERMOL

Despite the many improvements in his weapons, equipment, and tactics since World War I, the individual infantryman has changed little, either in his physical or his psychological makeup. And two truths formulated about men exposed to combat in World War I are still true today—that every soldier, at some time or other, will experience a physical or psychological reaction (or both) to combat and that every soldier has a "breaking point."

The effects of combat stress on infantry units in battle have been documented throughout this century. In World War I, for example, the mere suggestion that the German Army was employing gas munitions in an area was enough to cause "mass gas hysteria," rendering hundreds of soldiers temporarily ineffective, even though they were not actually exposed to gas. Medical records show that for every actual gas casualty in World War I, there were two "psychological" casualties. In World War II, which is probably a conservative model for future warfare, tremendous numbers of infantrymen became psychiatric casualties.

In World War II, as in all wars, infantry units had the highest rates of psychiatric casualties—one psychiatric casualty was medically treated for every three battle casualties (killed in action or missing in action—KIA/MIA). During the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, the number of psychiatric casualties was relatively low, primarily because of the short combat tours, the improved logistical and medical support, the friendly air superiority, and the low lethality of the engagements.

The term "psychiatric casualty" can refer to any number of psychological reactions to the stress of combat. These reactions can take many forms: Some soldiers suffer a recurrence of pre-existing psychotic disorders (severe emotional "breakdown" characterized by abnormal behavior, moods, and perceptions), or they have psychosomatic disorders such as diarrhea or nausea. Others unnecessarily prolong any hospitalization periods or display severe emotional reactions to bodily injuries such as facial disfiguration, for example. Still others abuse drugs or alcohol, or deliberately do not take preventive medications such as antimalaria pills. In some cases, they even inflict wounds or injuries upon themselves.

LARGEST CATEGORY

But the largest category of psychiatric casualties is "battle fatigue." Battle fatigue (BF) is a soldier's psychological and physical reaction to the fear and fatigue that are a part of all combat. Nearly every infantryman in a combat division, in fact, will eventually experience at least mild BF.

The symptoms of BF vary. A soldier may become increasingly emotional—crying easily, becoming irritable, using excessive profanity. Or he may experience sleep disturbances (have difficulty going to sleep or have nightmares), and exaggerated responses to sudden nearby noises and movements. Because these symptoms are common in combat situations, they usually require no medical intervention, but the more severe forms of BF can render the infantryman ineffective, and medical intervention may then become necessary.

Battle fatigue is predictable. The number of cases varies with the intensity of the battle—the greater the number of wounded and killed, the greater the number of BF cases. BF also varies with combat exposure—the longer a unit is in continuous combat, the greater the number of BF cases. Other factors also can increase BF rates: near misses, the inability to take personal action (a unit under artillery or mortar bombardment, for example), the death or injury of friends or leaders, the anticipation of combat action, a lack of confidence in a unit or its leaders, primitive living conditions, lack of sleep and adequate nourishment, and pessimism regarding the outcome of a war or personal survival.

The effect of soldiers' perceptions of the outcome of a war on their determination and perseverance has been demonstrated. There was a decrease in BF rates, for example, during the closing months of the successful European campaign in World War II; and there was a significant increase in BF rates after 1970 in Vietnam as support for the conflict faded.

Other factors, too, affect BF rates. The lack of effective leadership is one of them, as in World War II when similar units within the same tactical
organization had markedly different BF rates. Units with high BF rates either had poor leadership or their leaders had become battle or psychiatric casualties. Within the infantry in World War II, armored infantry units sustained the highest rate of BF casualties followed by regular infantry units, and then by such volunteer units as the airborne infantry and the Rangers. (Interestingly enough, although these volunteer infantry units had the fewest BF casualties, they sustained significantly higher battle casualty rates.)

The high BF rates among armored infantrymen can be attributed to several factors. These infantrymen resented their relative lack of mobile protection (trucks and half-tracks as compared to armored tanks); they were belittled by other infantrymen and the tankers; they had to put up with more primitive living conditions than the tankers they accompanied; and the tactical situation often required them to conduct dismounted (and unprotected) operations during the most hazardous times. (The use of armored IFVs and new tactics, along with improved enemy antitank capabilities, may equalize infantry and tank battle losses in future conflicts, thus reducing the differences in their BF rates.)

Another factor in predicting BF rates is the type of operation. Fast moving, pursuit operations, for instance, typically produce fewer BF cases because morale tends to be high. Slow moving, high casualty-producing offensive operations against a determined enemy — such as the Army and the Marine Corps encountered in the Pacific during World War II — yield numerous BF casualties.

Retrograde operations, such as those at the beginning of the Korean war, elicited few BF cases, because the men knew that succumbing to BF would result in their death or capture. Static defenses under heavy enemy bombardment and assault, however, often produces high BF rates. Defenses that come under heavy mortar or artillery attacks with short lulls are particularly vulnerable, because the lulls permit a soldier’s imagination and anticipation to magnify his fear.

For many reasons, the battlefield of the latter part of the 20th century will be more fear- and fatigue-producing than any in World War II. That battlefield can be expected to include chemical and biological weapons that can incapacitate or kill quickly; tactical nuclear munitions that can destroy, burn, or irradiate; and laser beams that can blind or stun. In addition, the soldiers will have to wear protective clothing for long periods, and enemy antiaircraft systems may deny air superiority to their own forces. They may have to fight throughout the day and night over long distances, relying on communication systems that can be jammed, monitored, or disrupted.

All of these factors will serve to increase the amount of psychological and physiological stress in infantry units. The ratio of BF to WIA/KIA may be as much as 1:3 or 1:2 during the initial 30 days of combat; but as sustained, high intensity combat continues, BF losses may begin to exceed battle losses until entire units are rendered ineffective.

TWO GROUPS

Battle fatigue tends to occur most commonly in two groups — men who are entering combat for the first time and those who have been engaged in sustained combat over many months. Soldiers in their initial exposure to combat will usually show the most dramatic symptoms — severe tremors and shaking, hallucinations, uncontrollable panic, crying, or stupor, and hysterical muteness, blindness or paralysis (without actual physical injury). These soldiers will need medical treatment at the battalion aid station, the brigade clearing station, or the medical support company (in the division rear). Eighty percent or more of them should be able to return to duty within a few days without further problems.

Other soldiers may experience mild BF during the first few months they are in combat to the point that the unit commander may choose to have them temporarily perform administrative or supply duties to prevent more serious battle fatigue. Similarly, battalion medical personnel may be able to resolve many of the milder cases by simply having the soldiers sleep or perform light duty for a few days in the battalion rear or aid station area.

If combat continues for months, however, the “Old Sergeants’ Syndrome” will appear. The soldiers may show apathy; slowness in thinking, responding, or moving; a lack of concern about their survival; dependence on others; confusion; mild tremors; vomiting or diarrhea; failure to eat; hypersensitivity to sounds or movements; sleep disturbances; open fearfulness; excessive smoking or noticeable reclusiveness; and depression or social withdrawal. In addition, those in leadership positions may demonstrate indecisiveness or poor judgment, or they may ask to be completely relieved of their responsibilities.

These soldiers usually respond well if they are removed from combat, but they may suffer a relapse upon returning to combat. Not surprisingly, such soldiers often occupy leadership positions in which they have demonstrated bravery under fire and have performed their combat duties conscientiously. Their problem is “burn out,” and they may need more than just a few days of rest.

The initial treatment for BF of any severity typically will be accomplished in the battalion, brigade, or division rear area near a medical station and under the supervision of a behavioral science specialist NCO (MOS 91G) or a mental health officer (psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or social worker).

Soldiers who do not recover in the division rear area within a few days will be evacuated to corps facilities. The farther to the rear a patient is evacuated, though, the less the chance for his recovery and the greater the chance of his suffering a long term psychiatric disability.
When a soldier does recover, the next problem is to re-integrate him into his parent unit. Most commanders prefer to get the recovered soldier back instead of replacing him with an inexperienced soldier. But this return is often especially difficult for certain categories of infantrymen — commanders and others in leadership positions, members of elite units, and "burnt out" soldiers. In the past the greatest success has been achieved in such cases by sending members from a soldier's parent unit to the rear to accompany him back to the unit. This demonstrates to the soldier that he is needed in the unit and is accepted by his fellow soldiers.

While not all BF can be prevented, a unit can take certain steps during mobilization and training periods and during combat to reduce its BF rates. It can train as it expects to fight, with psychiatric casualties a part of its training scenarios. It can establish a "buddy plan" for detecting BF symptoms in its personnel and do all it can to improve unit cohesion, morale, and physical fitness. It should also provide good leadership; insure that both its soldiers and its leaders get enough rest; conduct pre-battle surveys to ascertain the unit’s morale, will to fight, and confidence; and conduct post-battle group debriefings to permit its surviving soldiers to vent their feelings and develop better ways to conduct operations more effectively.

The infantry leader of tomorrow will have the technological means that will enable his unit to fight continuously both day and night over extended distances, but success on that battlefield will require him to recognize human limitations. The challenge of closing with and destroying the enemy on the battlefield of the future is a formidable one, but one that must be met if this nation is to endure.

In the final analysis, success, as always, will depend on two factors: the ability of the infantry leader to motivate and employ his combat forces effectively, and the will of the individual infantryman to persevere in the face of hardship and danger.

**Recruiting: A Dual Specialty**

**CAPTAIN DAVID P. MINER**

One of the biggest challenges facing today’s Army is the job of finding and recruiting young men and women to join it. To provide the leadership needed to meet this challenge, the Army has established a policy of assigning to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) only branch-qualified officers — those who have graduated from their advanced courses and normally, who have also successfully commanded units. Unfortunately, although these officers are highly qualified in their branch specialties, many are totally unprepared to assume their recruiting duties.

Recruiting duty is unlike any other assignment an officer will be given during his military career. In other nominative assignments, such as ROTC, Reserve liaison, or organizational effectiveness, an officer will still be surrounded by the Army’s familiar support system. And he will continue to do such familiar things as teach, advise, or recommend better ways for his organization to accomplish its assigned missions.

By contrast, when he is assigned to USAREC, the first thing an officer notices is how different the organization is from that of a division. Instead of platoons, companies, battalions, and brigades, he finds stations, areas, districts, and regions.*

At the district level, for example, a newly-assigned lieutenant colonel (the district’s commander) will find a staff that is quite different from what he is

*Since this article was written, USAREC has designated its regions, districts, and areas as brigades, battalions, and companies to more closely parallel the structure of the rest of the Army.

January-February 1984 INFANTRY 16
used to. He may have an adjutant, an operations officer, and a supply officer, but their duties will include such additional tasks as sales and advertising, marketing, and budgeting — subjects not taught in most advanced courses or the Command and General Staff College.

Besides these differences in organization and responsibility, the commander and his staff also have a different mission from that of a unit — one of recruiting and salesmanship. This mission includes "prospecting," making appointments, and interviewing, testing, "physical calling," and contracting applicants. (These include some unfamiliar terms as well as unfamiliar tasks.)

If all this sounds confusing, that's because it is — especially to a commissioned officer who is newly assigned to USAREC. It normally takes about six months for an officer to fully understand the system and to get to know the various schools and recruiting zones assigned to his command. At the same time, it takes a year for him to go through a complete cycle and become familiar with the advantages and disadvantages associated with each month of the recruiting calendar. Since command is a 24-month tour, this means that he will spend 25 to 50 percent of his USAREC tour just learning his job. This is totally unacceptable, both from the officer's and from the Army's point of view.

But the Army already has a program that could be used to solve this problem of constantly assigning inexperienced officers to recruiting commands — the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The purpose of OPMS is to train and develop the right number of officers with the right number of skills to satisfy the requirements of the Army and to assign those officers in accordance with the needs of the Army and, if possible, their own wishes.

As part of OPMS, the concept of career dual specialties further refines the process of balancing officer strengths with skill requirements. The dual specialty program assigns each commissioned officer two job specialties, the first when he is commissioned and the second during his seventh year of commissioned service. An officer is trained in both fields and, through alternating assignments, gains experience and expertise in both. As a result, the Army has many qualified officers available to fill its field grade and general officer command and staff positions.

**BENEFITS**

Accordingly, the designation of recruiting as a career specialty would benefit the Army and the officer corps. An officer could begin his recruiting career with assignments to either the district, the region, or the USAREC staff.

The officer's next recruiting tour could be as an area commander or a primary staff officer. Since this would normally be a second tour, he would not have to spend the first half of it learning the basics of the job. Instead, he could immediately take charge and begin carrying out the recruiting mission. Later, as the cycle continued, when this same officer assumed command of a district as a lieutenant colonel or of a region as a colonel, he would already be an experienced recruiting officer.

In addition to the obvious benefits of experience, there would be other advantages to designating recruiting as a specialty: The cost of training would be reduced, and officers would not have to be assigned out of their career specialties or their normal career progression.

Some might argue that there are too few recruiting assignments for it to be a separate specialty, but other related assignments could also be included: Assignments to the Military Entrance Processing Command and to initial entry processing points, for example, are related closely enough to recruiting.

Recruiting young men and women for today's Army is a difficult and challenging job. The present method of using highly qualified officers, who must use much of their tour trying to understand their jobs, is not good for either the Army or its officers.

By designating recruiting as a career specialty, the Army could be sure it was assigning experienced officers to USAREC. This in turn would ensure that the mission of recruiting qualified applicants for service in the Army was being more effectively accomplished.
Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, once said: "All the business of war, and indeed all the business of life, is to endeavor to find out what you don't know by what you do; that's what I called 'guessing what was at the other side of the hill'"

He probably understood the business of war better than most of his contemporaries, and he was, moreover, a master of defense who, through the judicious use of reverse slope positions, often surprised and attacked in turn his out-guessed opponents. At Waterloo, for example, he concealed the bulk of his forces behind a ridge, from which Picton's division rose to blunt the initial French attack by delivering — at 40 paces — a withering surprise volley upon the French assault columns as they disorientedly topped the crest.

In World War I, the Germans often based the main line of resistance of their innovative defense in depth on a Hinterhang, or reverse slope. By World War II, the reverse slope position assumed such tactical practicality that Captain H.W. MacDonald of the 11th Canadian Armoured Regiment unhesitatingly spoke of the amateurishness exhibited by the Germans in their selection of a defensive position near Arnhem in 1945 with the words, "They'd dug-in on the wrong side, facing us." (The Germans in the Western Desert and in Northwest Europe, though, did make extensive use of reverse slope positions.) He stood off and destroyed his opposition with longer range weapons, just as the British did the Argentinian forward slope positions in the Falklands War, a conflict that again confirmed the vulnerability of such deployments. Properly sited reverse slope positions would thus appear to retain their traditional tactical potential, and they may offer some practical means for stalling the advance of Warsaw Pact armored forces.

The major advantage of a reverse slope position is that the topographical crest affords it concealment. Enemy direct fire, consequently, cannot be brought to bear on it, and the lack of ground observation limits the accuracy and the neutralizing effect of enemy mortars and artillery as well. Given the reported World War II dictum that "a located section post can be a death trap for the men in it," this becomes a particularly important tactical consideration indeed.

It should be noted, however, that a reverse slope position need not necessarily be physically located on a reverse slope; in fact, to force an enemy to attack uphill, it could be sited on a "reverse forward slope." The determining factor is that its fires must fall on the reverse slope to the extent that this area can be converted into an inferno of fire if and when the enemy reaches it. Admittedly, this tactical disposition often may be difficult to attain, but it will, in any case, tend to whittle down the armor range advantage of armored forces to that of the man-packed weapon, thereby giving the edge to an essentially infantry short-range defense (see sketch).

Ideally, a reverse slope position itself should not lack
observation. As a rule of thumb, good observation should extend to the flanks and at least 500 to 600 meters in front of the crest. Such observation is necessary to give the local commander early warning of enemy movements and to enable him, without compromising his main position, to impede the enemy by hitting the latter with observed fire. Though the surrender of such ground in the face of a determined attack may not always prejudice the defense as a whole, ground that affords observation considered vital to the conduct of the defense will doubtless have to be held at all costs.

Commanders will have to be extremely vigilant, of course, in instances where reverse slope positions are visible at a distance or from a flank. They will also have to be conscious of the potential threat from the air and insist upon the highest standard of camouflage and air defense drills. Deception, too, should be considered as a means of gaining surprise.

Obviously, the key to a reverse slope position is the domination of the topographical crest. If that crest cannot be dominated, the position ultimately will be rendered untenable. For this reason, some small arms fire should fall over the forward slope. And any foothold the enemy gains on the crest that limits observation should be thrown off by a counterattack.

By day, forward observation posts, supplemented by snipers and machineguns on the military crest, should be enough to prevent such lodgments; these should be well-concealed and sited so as not to need too much local protection. Consideration should also be given to deploying

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**Variations of Reverse Slope Positions**

**Ideal Position**

- **OP (By Day)**
- **Line of Fire**
- **250-800 Meters**
- **Defensive Position**
- **Mines**
- **Wire and Mines**
- **Enemy Advance**

**Acceptable Position**

- **Hull Down Tanks**
- **250-800 Meters**
- **OP (By Day, Defended by Night)**
- **Miners**
- **Defensive Position**
- **Wire and Mines**
- **Enemy Advance**

**General**

- **Topographical Crest**
- **Military Crest**
- **Wire**
- **Defensive Fire**
- **250-800 Meters**
- **Infantry Defensive Positions Based on Best Fighting Range of Weapons**
- **Night Defensive Positions and Ops By Day Covered from Flanks As Necessary By Tanks and Long Range Antitank Weapons**

**Note:** Flank Positions Must Provide the Defender with Observation of Enemy Movement and Deny the Enemy Observation of the Reverse Slope Position from the Flanks.
long-range antiaircraft weapons to the flanks in the vicinity of the crest, from which locations they could apply enfilade fire before falling back to alternate positions in depth.

All such daylight deployment, of course, would have to be reinforced at night by additional protective parties and standing patrols armed with automatic weapons and grenade launchers, and these should be prepared to hold ground against enemy reconnaissance and infiltration efforts. At rifle company level, the troops that are not deployed forward should be prepared to counterattack the enemy as soon as he gets near these localities. (The same tactics should be used during the day as well.) Vigorous night patrolling will also probably have to be carried out to the flanks and to the front to deny the enemy ground from which he could observe during the day.

FIRE PLAN

The fire plan for the defense of a reverse slope position must aim at converting the crest and the reverse slope itself into a killing zone for armored vehicles and personnel. The defensive position itself should be located at a distance from the crest line so that the troops in the position can bring the most fire to bear on the killing zone without coming under fire themselves from any enemy tanks that might have gained hull-down positions along the crest line. (Given the limited depression of Soviet tank guns, though, the greater threat would perhaps come from the fact that those tanks could call down accurate indirect fire or could correct the fire of other tanks firing from a flank.) A second obstacle that can be covered with effective fire should also be emplaced on the reverse slope. It will be a better obstacle if it is defiladed like the first and if it cannot be reconniéréd by day.

The antiaircraft defense, organized in depth and covering the crest, should be based on a combination of minefield obstacles, hand-held and crew-served antiarmor weapons, and the fire of large caliber artillery pieces. The emphasis at all times should be on bringing fire to bear from concealed positions, for it is only the invisible weapon — the hidden antiaircraft gun, in particular — that can really do the job properly. (Antiaircraft guided missiles, of course, can destroy enemy tanks in hull-down positions that may have attained the crest.) Consideration should be given as well to flank protection, a task that, ideally, can be carried out either by tanks or by infantry fighting vehicles.

The advantages of a reverse slope position can be summarized as follows:

• As the enemy cannot see the defender, he cannot make a detailed plan; he has to attack blind. Because the defender remains defiladed to him, he cannot attack frontally by direct fire. And because he cannot observe the position, he is unlikely to be able to neutralize it with indirect fire from artillery and mortars. Hidden as it is from view, the reverse slope position is protected even from an enemy with surveillance equipment. In fact, such a position is likely to be seen from the ground only when (and if) the enemy has passed through.

• Movement by day is not so restricted, and the soldiers do not have to remain in their fighting positions all the time. As a result, their morale should be better and they should find it easier to maintain an acceptable standard of alertness. Too, work on positions can be continued during the day, which is particularly important after a night attack. In Europe, where fighting positions often become water-logged, such freedom of movement will also have a salutary effect on the health of the troops.

• A well-sited reverse slope position cannot be seen by enemy infantrymen or tank crews until they are within the effective range of the friendly forces' rifles and antiaircraft weapons. Thus, the latter run no risk of disclosing their positions by opening fire too soon. This is a significant consideration because one important combat lesson learned in World War II was to "hold your fire until a kill is a certainty; a miss discloses your position." The defenders also gain the greatest amount of surprise — once an enemy force moves over the crest and down the reverse slope it cannot hide from the defenders, and any movement it may make forward or to the rear will mean its almost certain piecemeal destruction.

• Counterattacks can be rehearsed in relative security, and fire control measures can be more clearly and deliberately defined.

• Resistance that is organized at such points is likely to be discovered by the attacker only when he runs smack into it or beyond it on a flank.

The disadvantages of reverse slopes are generally these:

• Troops that occupy reverse slope positions cannot see what happens forward of the crest to their front.

• The sitting of minefields or other obstacles on the forward slope becomes a major problem, because it may be difficult, even impossible, for the defenders to cover them by direct fire.

• Advance posts must be established forward to give early warning of an attack and to ensure that accurate indirect fires can be brought to bear on the obstacles and the approaches to the position. Such observation posts and standing patrols can be relieved only at night. As they will always be vulnerable to enemy daylight attacks, they must be well-concealed and must remain essentially motionless during the day.

• Some redeployment may be necessary at night, since the enemy cannot be allowed to occupy the crest under cover of darkness. An active patrol program must also be instituted.

• Enemy tanks could conceivably work themselves into hull-down positions on their side of the crest, from which locations they could correct the fires of their artillery pieces and their other tanks.

• The reverse slope position is vulnerable to flank attacks and to the air action of an enemy that has air superiority.

A defender should plan to beat off an enemy attack in-
ially with artillery and mortars, and then, progressively, with antitank weapons and machineguns. Forward observation officers and mortar fire controllers should always be capable of bringing down indirect fire on all major approaches and on the forward slope. Only when an enemy attack is pressed home to the assault stage should the bulk of the infantry be required. This stage may occur in spite of the best defensive plan.

Arrangements should be made beforehand, therefore, to withdraw any troops from the forward crest along pre-reconnoitered and designated routes. Consideration should also be given to mounting local counterattacks if they stand a chance to succeed.

Again, it is important that the reverse slope position itself should have been sited far enough back from the crest so that friendly artillery and mortar fires can be brought down on the crestline. And from the crest back toward the main defensive position, an avalanche of fire must greet and overwhelm any attacking enemy force. The best way to achieve this is to have an invisible defensive position from which the enemy can be subjected to unexpected fire from hidden weapons.

Obviously, an enemy attack during the day would be extremely hazardous to him if an open forward slope and its approaches were covered by fire and observation. Any such attack is thus more likely to be made at night, or under cover of smoke. Therefore, the crest of a reverse slope position should be occupied in sufficient strength by night to stop an enemy force from occupying it by stealth.

Early in World War II it was suggested that “battle positions” should be prepared on the forward slope, keeping troops during the day in “rest” positions on the reverse slope. After trial and experience, however, British Commonwealth armies found this method unsatisfactory, because the troops often found it difficult to move forward to their battle positions under heavy fire. These armies also discovered that soldiers fought better from fighting positions into which they had settled down. The extra time required to distribute ammunition and other administrative supplies properly proved a further problem. Eventually, these discoveries led to the very practical realization that there was really neither enough time nor enough field stores to outfit two positions.

Attacking reverse slope positions and consolidating in relation to them is a more difficult task. It is a truism that with proper support any given position can be taken — the difficulty is always holding it. If possible, an attack should be launched astride a ridge or around another feature rather than directly over the crest. Whatever plan is adopted, fire controllers must be well forward, and troops cannot be permitted to stop on the crest. As a counterattack can usually be expected, too, friendly troops on an exposed slope must get off it and dig in immediately; it is simply impossible to consolidate under close enemy observation. The alternatives are to deny the enemy close direct observation by going forward to the crest of the next feature, establishing fighting patrols there, and consolidating on the reverse slope, or to deny him observation by clearing him off his reverse slope and then going back onto one’s own reverse slope maintaining dominance of the crest.

It is impossible to say which is the most likely course. The exception to these alternatives would be when well-developed enemy reverse slope positions are captured. Though these will now be on the forward slope of a friendly force, it is probably better to occupy them, because they will provide adequate shelter from mortar fire. Even then, positions should be dug on the reverse slope by reserve Platoons or Companies so that the forward troops can eventually be thinned out into them. Only one thing can be considered definitely wrong when attacking a reverse slope position — to remain on an exposed slope where consolidation is hopeless.

A well-developed reverse slope position can achieve the surprise needed to inflict heavy casualties on an enemy force, and it appears well-suited to IFV deployments. Resistance that is organized properly is likely to be discovered by an attacker only when he runs into it. Considering the Soviet predilection for artillery and tanks, the reverse slope position may offer a reasonable, practical means of tactically negating the effects of Soviet direct and indirect fire weapons. The low silhouette of Soviet tanks further mitigates against their taking up effective hull-down positions along ridge lines; in short, a Soviet force may have to use essentially infantry attacks.

All of these other advantages really devolve, in fact, from concealment, both from fire and from view. Concealment is, in fact, the be all and end all of reverse slope positions. Naturally, much can be said for using a reverse slope when the alternative is to occupy a forward slope position that does not offer adequate natural cover. This is particularly true in open country where reverse slope positions may generally prove the most suitable solution. Good reverse slope positions are not that common, however, and flank protection remains their universal weakness.

It is normally possible in close country, of course, to attain concealment without having to locate behind a hill. Accordingly, the hard and fast rule of “always” or “never” cannot be applied to the selection of reverse slope positions — logic will always dictate that, as the object of reverse slope defense is concealment, it is wrong to say a reverse slope position should always be adopted. When developing such a position is indicated, though, it can work quite well, as it has so often in the past.

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Few events in American history have been written about and discussed more than the Civil War. Yet only a handful of the works on this fascinating chapter from our past are geared to the military professional. Studies of small unit actions (brigades and regiments), especially, are few and far between. And a large percentage of the ones that there are are aimed at the civilian layman — many of them, in fact, are not far from being fiction.

This approach is understandable, because authors must sell books, and the civilian and entertainment markets are certainly more lucrative than the military one. But if the study of past failures and successes may one day allow our combat leaders to accomplish their missions better, then it is imperative that we conduct these studies.

If the Civil War is one of the most written about events in American history, then the Battle of Gettysburg is certainly the most written about event of that conflict. As a matter of record, there have been more studies of Gettysburg than of any other combat engagement in world history. (Waterloo is a close second.) So why another essay on the battle? The answer is simple — few studies have used Gettysburg properly to teach a better understanding of small unit tactics.

The cataclysmic engagement of the first three days of July 1863 offers many important lessons for today's military professional. But it would take an entire issue of INFANTRY to do justice to even one day of the battle. The following, therefore, is a study of a portion of one day's battle — the meeting engagement on McPherson's Ridge on 1 July in which a Union force consisting of a cavalry division and a division of infantry met a Confederate force of two infantry brigades. There are definite...
parallels between this battle and a future battle that United States forces may have to fight.

After defeating Major General Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac in early May 1863 at Chancellorsville, Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, decided to invade the North. At the time, his army consisted of some 75,000 men divided into three infantry corps — the First commanded by Lieutenant General James Longstreet, the Second led by Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, and the Third, by Lieutenant General A.P. Hill — and a cavalry division of six brigades led by Major General J.E.B. Stuart.

While historians have advanced numerous reasons for Lee's desire to invade the North, he himself probably offered the most logical explanation: He wanted to draw Hooker's army — 95,000 men divided into seven infantry corps and one cavalry corps — out into the open where he could defeat it in detail. He could then threaten a number of Northern cities and possibly the Northern capital itself.

Lee began moving Longstreet's and Ewell's corps from their positions near Fredericksburg, Virginia, on 3 June 1863; he directed them to move west toward the Shenandoah Mountains and to concentrate at Culpeper Court House. Lee left Hill to cover the Fredericksburg position and to keep Hooker from moving south against Richmond. Hill was to follow later, after Hooker had begun to move in response to Lee's movements (see Map 1).

Hooker was aware that Lee was up to something. Concerned that the Confederate commander might be trying to turn his army's right flank, Hooker ordered his cavalry commander, Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton, to find out what he could about a Confederate force at Brandy Station. On 9 June, Pleasonton found out — he surprised and almost defeated Stuart's cavalry division, which had been concentrating in the area before leaving to cover Lee's northern move. Pleasonton came away from Brandy Station convinced that Lee was preparing to invade the North and passed this on to Hooker.

Hooker was not as certain, but on the 12th he did order three of his corps to move to the west and north to keep Lee from turning the army's flank. He also knew he had to keep his army between Lee and the Washington-Baltimore area. Hill, realizing that Hooker was moving after Lee, left Fredericksburg and started for Culpeper Court House on the 15th. Hooker's last infantry corps left the Union camps near Fredericksburg the same day. On that day, too, Ewell's corps scattered a 9,000-man Union force at Winchester and his lead units crossed the Potomac.

By 17 June Lee had concentrated his army in the Shenandoah Valley. Hooker continued to move his corps to the north and west to block any Confederate move out of the Valley, and he sent strong cavalry formations into the Bull Run Mountains to try to find Lee's main body. Stuart met the Union troopers and turned them back after a series of vicious cavalry actions at Aldie, Upper-ville, and Middleburg between the 17th and 21st of June. But while the cavalry reports gave Hooker a pretty good idea of Lee's location, he still was not certain about Lee's intentions.

Meanwhile, Lee decided to hurry his move to the north, feeling sure that Hooker would not interfere with his move because of Hooker's known conservative style of leadership. He did not know that Hooker had started moving his corps to the north, but this probably would not have made any difference in Lee's plans at the time. He kept two of Stuart's cavalry brigades to guard the Blue Ridge Mountain passes — Ewell had a cavalry brigade with him — and let Stuart take the other three cavalry brigades to screen the army's move north of the Potomac. (Unfortunately, Stuart took wide latitude with his orders and decided to ride completely around the Union army. Apparently, Stuart felt that his presence in Hooker's rear would cause the Union commander to concentrate against him, thus letting Lee move almost unmolested. This did not happen. Stuart soon lost contact with both armies, and he did not rejoin Lee until 2 July.)

For the week between the 17th and the 24th of June, Hooker made no major move, despite the steady flow of intelligence into his headquarters from his advanced cavalry units. By the 24th, in fact, Ewell's entire corps was across the Potomac River, and Lee was hurrying Longstreet and Hill along in Ewell's tracks.

Hooker now decided that he had to do more to counter Lee's moves and, by ordering a series of forced marches, managed to concentrate his army between Middletown and Frederick. He still did not know where all of Lee's army was or what Lee intended to do. For that matter,
Lee had no idea that Hooker's army had moved so far so fast; he missed Stuart's three cavalry brigades, which if they had been present could have given him information about Hooker's moves.

On 28 June, following a series of arguments with General Henry Halleck in Washington, Hooker resigned his command, and Major General George Meade took over, just three days before the army would become embroiled in one of the greatest battles of the 19th century.

On that day the Army of Northern Virginia was spread in a huge 70-mile semi-circle stretching from Chambersburg to Carlisle, east to the vicinity of Harrisburg, then south to York, Pennsylvania. Lee, because of Stuart's absence and the inactivity of his other cavalry units, was moving "in the blind" and did not know in any detail where the Army of the Potomac was.

Late in the evening of the 28th, though, a "spy" rode into the Confederate headquarters and informed Lee that the Union Army was much closer than he had thought possible. The Southern commander had believed that Hooker had not yet crossed the Potomac. But the spy (a man named Harrison) said that the Federals were concentrated 25 miles south of the Pennsylvania border near Frederick, Maryland, and that Major General George Meade had relieved Hooker as commander of the Union Army. Lee knew that if this information was correct — and it was — he must either concentrate his army or subject it to possible piecemeal destruction. Accordingly, Lee ordered his corps to concentrate around Cashtown (15 miles east of Chambersburg) and a town 10 miles to the east — Gettysburg — an intersection of eight major roads.

On the morning of 29 June, Ewell's Second Corps began moving the 25 miles from Carlisle to Gettysburg. Hill's Third Corps moved into Cashtown, while Longstreet's First Corps stayed in Chambersburg.

On the 30th Hill and Longstreet were in the same positions while Ewell had moved into Heidersburg, eight miles northeast of Gettysburg. Hill's lead division commander, Major General Henry Heth, sent one of his brigades into Gettysburg, possibly to reconnoiter the town as a concentration point. (The famous story that Heth went in to get shoes is a myth. Major General Jubal A. Early's division had passed through Gettysburg on 26 June, and any significant provisions, including shoes, would certainly have been taken then.) Brigadier General Johnston Pettigrew, commanding this brigade, had orders not to bring on an engagement.

So late in the day — the 30th — when Pettigrew saw a body of Union cavalry approaching, he withdrew west to Cashtown to report to Heth. When he reported Union cavalry in Gettysburg, both Hill and Heth dismissed the force as nothing more than untrained state militia. Hill gave his division commander permission to move east into Gettysburg at dawn on 1 July and to brush aside the light opposition.

Meanwhile, Meade knew that Lee's army was generally north of Gettysburg and that his own army was on an in- side arc where it could protect Washington or move to meet Lee. He did not know the exact location of the Confederates. On the 28th, he had sent his troops north in two wings. Feeling that Lee's objective was the Susquehanna River and Harrisburg, he sent his right wing units in that direction and ordered the left wing — a cavalry division and three infantry corps — under Major General John Reynolds, to threaten what appeared to be the Confederate right flank around Cashtown.

Reynolds had moved north from Frederick with the First Corps leading the way screened by a cavalry division under Brigadier General John Buford. On 30 June while Reynolds was concentrating at Emmitsburg, Maryland, Buford's troopers had ridden ten miles farther and into Gettysburg. His scouts reported that a Confederate infantry brigade (Pettigrew's) was withdrawing to the west.

Although Buford's orders were simply to screen for Reynolds, he made a decision that would turn Gettysburg into a battlefield. Possibly sensing that the Confederates would be back in strength the next day (Buford had encountered some Confederates west of Gettysburg near Fairfield on the 29th), he resolved to contest that advance and asked Reynolds for infantry support. Buford then sent patrols to the west to follow Pettigrew and to the north to picket the Carlisle and Heidersburg roads.

Early in the morning of 1 July, Meade told Reynolds to concentrate "where the enemy is strongest." (Meade also issued his Pipe Creek circular, which outlined a plan for his army to fall back, if necessary, into northern Maryland.) With Meade's directive and Buford's request, Reynolds ordered the First Corps, then at Marsh Creek six miles south of Gettysburg, to march toward that town at dawn.

As the Confederate Third Corps settled down just east of Cashtown for the night, Heth told two of his brigade commanders, Brigadier Generals Joe Davis and James Archer, that they would be first in the line of march to Gettysburg on 1 July. Unknown to either of these commanders, their soldiers were on a collision course with the Union First Division (Brigadier General James Wadsworth's) of the First Corps (Major General Abner Doubleday's), and Buford's two brigades of Union cavalry. This collision would produce 50,000 casualties and change the course of the Civil War.

THE TERRAIN

As in so many other battles, the terrain around Gettysburg and the use of it would determine the outcome of the battle to follow. At the time, the terrain west of Gettysburg consisted of a series of north-south ridges all the way to South Mountain, ten miles distant. The first of these ridges, Seminary Ridge, named for the Lutheran Seminary that was on it, was a half-mile west of the town. A quarter-mile farther west was the double-spined McPherson's Ridge, named for the farm that was on the
ridge just south of the Chambersburg Pike. Both Seminary and McPherson’s ridges ran north until they met at Oak Hill, the dominating terrain feature in the area (one mile northwest of Gettysburg).

One hundred meters south of the Pike, on McPherson’s Ridge was a 17-acre grove of trees that would become a stronghold on the first day’s fighting. Both Chambersburg Pike and Mummasburg Road cut through both ridges and ran into town. An unfinished railway grading that cut large trenches in each successive ridge ran just north of but parallel to the pike. A half-mile west of McPherson’s Ridge was yet another ridge — Herr’s Ridge; between the two ran a small stream called Willoughby’s Run.

**DELAYING ACTION**

Buford believed that Hill’s Confederate corps of 20,000 men would be coming down Chambersburg Pike at dawn and that more rebels might flank him from the north. With 3,000 troopers in two brigades, he could only plan to conduct a delaying action until Reynolds arrived with infantry support.

His dispositions were perfect (see Map 2). Buford decided to actively defend to the west, so he sent only small patrols to watch the roads north of town. He arranged for four delaying positions. First, he sent a squadron (360 men) four miles to the west as pickets at the point where the Confederates would have to cross Marsh Creek. This squadron was to delay, force Heth to deploy, and report to Buford the enemy’s strengths and dispositions. Buford then placed a line of skirmishers on Herr’s Ridge, which they were to try to hold for a short time. His main line (one brigade on the left, one to the right) was on McPherson’s Ridge, and here he also placed his only battery of artillery — six three-inch rifles of Battery A, 2d U.S. Artillery. (This ridge had two spines which gave Buford’s troopers a secondary line within the main battle position.) Buford’s last ditch stand was to be made on Seminary Ridge, if need be, and he made the tower of the Seminary building his headquarters. From there he had an excellent view of the battlefield.

Despite the difference in numbers, Buford was counting on the firepower of his men (standard issue repeating carbines), on mobility, and on the depth of his positions to hold off the Confederates until help arrived. He could only hope that no Confederate force would flank him from the north.

His plan could not have been executed with more precision. His forward squadron, which leapedfrogged backwards using firepower and mounted mobility, delayed Heth’s forward elements until about 0800 when the Confederates, having driven off the pickets, began to assault the skirmish line on Herr’s Ridge. After a short fight, Buford withdrew his men to McPherson’s Ridge. For an hour and a half, the blue cavalrymen punished their opponents with their seven-shot repeating carbines. With Archer’s brigade on the (Confederate) right and Davis’s brigade on the left, Heth ordered an assault to drive these Union soldiers from the Ridge.

Amazing as it seems, Heth still felt his opponents were state militiamen and failed to support his two forward brigades. He did not make a reconnaissance to the left or right to determine whether he could flank this line. (Between 0800 and 1000, if he had sent one of his two remaining brigades around Buford’s left, the entire Union position would have been untenable.) Apparently, Hill was not supervising this operation closely either, because he gave Heth no specific orders.

Archer and Davis moved forward and began to drive Buford’s men off McPherson’s Ridge. At 0915 Buford must have felt he would be brushed aside because the Confederates were driving his troopers slowly back. Suddenly Reynolds appeared and told him to hang on because his leading division was only about a half-hour’s march away. Buford, therefore, ordered his men to defend the eastern-most spine of McPherson’s Ridge and to hold until relieved, which they did quite gallantly. At 1000, Wadhurst’s division moved up to relieve the cavalry just as Archer’s and Davis’s Confederates forged across McPherson’s Ridge.

Meanwhile, Buford’s patrols to the north reported a large mass of rebels moving toward Gettysburg. Buford informed Reynolds of this, then positioned his troopers to screen and protect the infantry’s left flank.

As Buford’s cavalrymen fell back, Archer’s 1,200 Tennesseans and Alabamians advanced through the McPherson’s grove while Davis’s Mississippian and North Carolinians approached the eastern part of McPherson’s
Ridge. Heth still was not supporting them with his two remaining brigades.

COUNTERATTACK

On the other side of the lines, Reynolds quickly sized up the situation. He sent Brigadier General Lysander Cutler’s brigade of New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians north of McPherson’s woods to halt Davis. The real threat, however, seemed to be Archer’s force, which Reynolds could see massing in the grove to his front. He turned to Wadsworth’s second brigade and cried, “Forward men, forward for God’s sake, and drive those fellows out of those woods!” (See Map 3.)

Meanwhile, Cutler’s brigade was in trouble at the hands of Davis. In combat for the first time, Davis had met three regiments of this Union unit and pinned them on the open ridge with his Mississippi regiments. Davis then sent his 55th North Carolina around Cutler’s open right flank. The Carolinians delivered a destructive enfilading volley that forced the three Union regiments on the right (the 56th Pennsylvania, 147th New York, and 76th New York) back to Seminary Ridge. This uncovered the remaining two regiments south of the Pike and threatened the entire First Corps position.

Davis, however, then botched what would be called today the “consolidation phase.” Instead of advancing up the ridge on line, the Confederates crowded into the unfinished railway cut for protection. Unfortunately, the sides of the cut were too steep to climb in most places. The new Union commander, Doubleday, reacted prudently. Although his defense had been breached, he skillfully counterattacked with Cutler’s two regiments south of the Pike (the 84th and 95th New York) and his corps reserve, the 6th Wisconsin of the Iron Brigade. The New Yorkers frontally assaulted the railway cut while the Wisconsin men fired straight down the cut into the left flank of Davis’s men, who eventually withdrew to the west, leaving 700 casualties behind (300 were captured in the cut). Doubleday had combined his reserve and his front line troops and massed his combat power at the crucial point in the engagement.

As Archer’s and Davis’s Confederates streamed back across Willoughby Run around 1130 and then back to Herr’s Ridge, Doubleday consolidated his positions. He placed the Iron Brigade in McPherson’s woods in a strongpoint salient with Buford protecting his left flank south of the grove. Cutler sent the three regiments that
had been forced to retreat back to McPherson's Ridge north of the Pike. Meanwhile, the two remaining divisions of the First Corps were moving onto the field followed by the Eleventh Corps. Hill and Heth finally realized that this was the Army of the Potomac to their front and that it would take more than a reconnaissance in force to move it.

Hill had already moved a number of artillery battalions onto Herr's Ridge, and these loosed a furious cannonade against the Union position. The Battle of Gettysburg was on, unknown to either Lee or Meade. Even though the Confederate assault would succeed in driving the Federals back to Cemetery Hill by 1600, Buford, Reynolds, and the other Union leaders and troops had bought the Army of the Potomac some much needed time.

SUMMARY

No longer does the American infantryman depend on Springfield and Enfield rifles for his survival; no longer does the American artilleryman call for double canister to stop infantry charges. And fighting vehicles, helicopters, and tanks have taken the place of the cavalryman on the modern battlefield.

But while the weapons of the present have certainly changed, basic tactics and the types of decisions combat leaders have to make remain the same. The meeting engagement at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the morning of 1 July 1863 is much like a future first battle may be — a numerically inferior force trying to stop an aggressive foe until a stronger force can be built up to the rear. The smaller force must make the attacker pay a heavy price for the ground he gains and must get back to its main defensive line first.

The first day's battle at Gettysburg offers as good an example of a classic "meeting engagement" as can be found anywhere in history. Reconnaissance, cavalry screening, hasty attacks, defensive fighting, command and control, withdrawals under fire, and subordinate initiative were all present in abundance.

Buford's performance on 1 July seems to exemplify what is expected of a modern day cavalry leader, which U.S. Army FM 17-95, Cavalry, describes as follows:

Cavalry use exemplifies two essential criteria of battle. The first is the need to find the enemy and develop the situation; and the second is the need to provide reaction time and maneuver space to leave the largest possible residual of combat power in the main body for use at the time and place of decision ... when fighting outnumbered, it is necessary to move to mass sufficient force to accomplish its mission ... tight discipline and imaginative alternatives must be used to insure the cavalry commander has positive control at all times ... .

In future conflicts, our troops and cavalry leaders must repeat the actions of Buford's division on a much larger scale. Our main forces will need enough reaction time. And while our reconnaissance forces may be greatly outnumbered, tight discipline and imaginative alternatives can make up for the disparity in personnel strength.

In meeting a Threat assault, the modern U.S. Infantry leader must demonstrate the same expertise shown by Reynolds and Doubleday, as well as by Wadsworth, Cutler, and Meredith. In addition, our soldiers must show the same aggressiveness in the hasty attack that both Union and Confederate soldiers were noted for. As infantry leaders we must press that aggressiveness in the right direction. The Iron Brigade's assault on Archer could have come right from the pages of FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalion:

- In a hasty attack ... the commander searches out the enemy's weakest sector ... concentration of effort, surprise, speed, flexibility, and audacity characterize a hasty attack perhaps more than any other operation.

The same could be said of Doubleday's timely use of the 6th Wisconsin. Again, according to FM 7-20:

The reserve may be required to counterattack to regain critical positions or terrain. The attack is ideally launched to eliminate small penetrations when the enemy is weak and can be effectively isolated.

Edwin Coddington, in his definitive book, The Gettysburg Campaign, sums up not only the morning action of 1 July 1863 but the stance our present-day army must take.

The Union victory ... may be explained by the greater tactical skill of the Northern generals ... The rather intricate movements involved in achieving success were only possible with highly trained soldiers and quick thinking officers.

As "quick thinking officers" of the present U.S. Infantry, "Let us not," as Abraham Lincoln said at Gettysburg, "forget what they did here."

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LEIPZIG

MAJOR CHARLES MacDONALD

EDITOR’S NOTE: Although this article does not deal with a purely tactical situation, it illustrates graphically the problems company commanders may be called upon to solve in a combat situation. It is reprinted from the Infantry Journal, June 1947. Copyright 1947 by the Association of the United States Army and reproduced by permission.

For a few brief ecstatic moments I dared to hope that I might become famous as the soldier who, single-handedly, captured Leipzig, prewar Germany’s fifth largest city. The travesty that I recount here began on April 18, 1945, when Leipzig was one of the few remaining major prizes left to combat forces in Europe. I was commander of Company G, 23d Infantry, 2d Division.

We had been attacking for two weeks through the flak-infested eastern approaches to Leipzig in an erratic, lengthy and exhaustive campaign against scattered opposition. On the day of what I choose to call le debacle I spent a none-too-pleasant afternoon with my 150 infantry associates astride the city dump overlooking the Weisse-Elster canal. It was our desire to cross the canal, via a wooden railroad bridge, and dig in for the night in an orchard that faced the towering buildings of the Gohls sector of the city some 800 yards away. But a group of cantankerous Germans objected, and fired rifle and machinegun bullets at us. A rifle platoon under Lieutenant John W. Whitman convinced the Germans that we were better men than they by wading the canal and abolishing the opposition in a flanking movement.

The rifle platoons dug in, and soon thereafter Lieutenant Whitman appeared at my CP with Staff Sergeant Joe Weylandt, and a German officer, who, to my amazement, knowing GI souvenir values, continued to carry his pistol in its holster.

Whitman, only twenty-two, was aglow with excitement, like a kid about to visit his first county fair. “Want to capture Leipzig?” he asked in a matter-of-fact tone.

I just looked at him.

“This is an Oberleutnant from Leipzig,” he said, indicating the German officer who bowed and smiled at the reference. “His CO wants to surrender the city without a fight. A mob of civilians streamed down the road from those big buildings while we were eating supper. They jabbered at me until I finally made out that they wanted us to go back into town with them. They said a German major with 600 men wanted to surrender.

“Weylandt and I walked back into town with a bunch of them, and they took us to the police station. We talked to the major. He not only wants to surrender his 600 men, but he said his commanding general would surrender the whole damned city, if I’d go back and get my CO.”

It seemed incredible to me that the usually clever Germans would employ such an obvious ruse. It was too obvious to be a trick. Still I felt that I had to voice a protest. “Now wait a minute. Does he know I’m just a captain? Will he surrender to a captain?”

“Yeah, we told him that. But he said it doesn’t matter. A captain’s good enough.”

I felt like bowing gratefully.

“The Oberleutnant here came along so you’d believe us. He’ll tell you.”

He spoke to the German officer in German mixed with gestures, mostly gestures, and the Oberleutnant looked
at me and smiled widely, shaking his head up and down, grunting, "Ja wohl! Ja wohl! Ist gut! Ist gut!

Such rhetoric convinced me. "I'll go," I said, "but I'll have to get an OK from battalion first."

I went inside to telephone and Whitman followed me. "I'll talk to him if he says 'no,'" he said. "You've just got to go, Cap'n. It's on the level. I swear it is. I can tell by the way the whole set-up looks. You've got to go."

The colonel was not at battalion, but I talked with Major Vern L. Joseph. (I mention his name because I hold him partly responsible. He had only said no, this entire idiotic scheme might have died in infancy.) The major indicated that perhaps I was joking, but I finally convinced him. Whereupon he said, "I'll have to talk to regiment."

The chain of command creaked into gear. We waited while he called regiment, and Whitman told me more details. Finally I called the major again.

"The colonel's out at regiment," Major Joseph said, "but they'll call me back in a few minutes. They've called division."

I gulped and hung up. I had thought of this thing as a purely local action that would not embroil division and higher headquarters until after it appeared in the papers.

I called battalion again.

"Regiment hasn't heard from division," Major Joseph said. "I'll call regiment again and you can talk to the exec. I think they called corps for a decision."

Corps! That was the last headquarters before army, and army was next to last before Supreme Headquarters! I shuddered and wondered what General Eisenhower would say.

TOO LATE

But it was too late to do anything about it. The regimental executive officer was on the phone, and I had to explain the situation hastily. "... we can't wait much longer, sir. It's getting almost too dark now."

The executive officer said, "All right. Keep in touch with your battalion and let us know how you come out."

I took Private First Class Walter G. Harms with me as interpreter, and Private First Class Harold G. Wemiller brought an SCR 300. Lieutenant Whitman and Sergeant Weylandt took seats in the lead jeep with me, and the Oberleutnant sat in full view on the right front fender, looking every bit the martyr of the German nation.

We debated as to whether or not we should carry a white flag, and then decided that would look as if we were surrendering, which we most certainly were not.

The men from the rifle platoon cheered us as we passed their dug-in positions, and I found that I was not so much afraid as I was tremendously excited, I kept telling myself. After all, I was about to accept the surrender of Germany's fifth largest city.

Pardon me, Herr General, but even now the forces of Company G lay siege at the gates of your fortress city. Would you care to surrender, please?

The buildings of the city rose abruptly from the far end of the orchard. The road was lined with curious civilians streaming toward the railroad bridge to view the fabled Americans, forcing our jeep to progress at a snail-like pace. As we entered the city the streets seemed deserted, compared to the mass of people who had lined the road through the orchard, but here and there a group of civilians stopped to stare at us, and I was relieved. We had come to know that there were civilians, to paraphrase an old adage, there was no fire — at least, no enemy fire.

Whitman directed the jeep driver to the police station, an imposing three-story building which, with its surrounding grounds, occupied an entire block at the end of the street and except for the lack of moors reminded me of Wuthering Heights. A tall iron grill fence enclosed the grounds, and we drew up to a gate where two Germans in uniform stood guard.

Civilians appeared from every direction, crowding around us and jabbering excitedly. German soldiers passing by, their weapons slung over their shoulders or about their waists, stopped abruptly at the sight of the crowd around the two jeeps and their mouths dropped open in astonishment at the sight of OD uniforms.

Whitman and Sergeant Weylandt took command of the situation at the gate as if this were old home week. The smartly uniformed guards smilingly opened the gates when Whitman's broken German told them that Der Kommandant had arrived to effect the surrender. We passed through the gate to the rear of the building. As we neared the rear entrance three German officers walked stiffly toward us.

"The tall one, that's the major," Whitman said in a stage whisper. "He's the one who says they'll surrender."

The immaculately groomed officers made me suddenly conscious of my shabby appearance. Their stiffly pressed uniforms contrasted sharply with my own dirty nondescript combination, their jaunty visored officer caps looking like "Brother Rat" in contrast to my own combat helmet with its bedraggled camouflage net. I felt my beard, unshaven for at least a week, and wondered if I shouldn't have prepared more extensively for this operation.

I wondered whether I should salute, unable to remember anything in the Army manuals in those pre-VJ-days that had described the decorum of accepting a formal enemy surrender, particularly in the stronghold of the enemy. In my ignorance I decided that it would be best to salute anything that closely resembled an officer, and I did.

The German major returned the salute and proffered his hand, startling me with the move so that he must have seen my ill composure. I had no desire to shake hands with a German officer, but I recovered quickly and grasped his hand firmly, if not warmly.

He led us upstairs to a room that was luxuriously furnished with upholstered chairs, a deep rug and an attrac-
tive girl, whose appearance made me wary lest Whitman or Weylandt let out a GI wolf call. Another group of stiffly correct officers rose as we entered. The major introduced me, pausing for me to say my name. I smiled profusely as a substitute for saluting, which I decided would not be appropriate indoors.

We sat down, and the room became a confused jumble of mixed languages. The major tried to talk with me in German, seeming offended when I said nicht verstehe and calling the girl to translate for him. No matter what may be said for her anatomy, her English was weak, and I summoned Harms. Whitman was not content to be excluded from the conversation, and he broke in at intervals with scrambled German and English that made the Germans roar with laughter.

I finally made out the German major’s story from the mixed translations of Harms and the girl.

POLICE

He and his men, he said, were not German soldiers, although their uniforms, customs and weapons were practically identical with the Wehrmacht’s. They were policemen of the Leipzig police force, 2,500 strong, with 600 quartered here at the Gohlis station. The city was filled with displaced persons and German civilians, and they wanted to avoid any fighting, if possible. He knew that Germany was kaput and nothing was to be gained by making a battleground of the city.

The commanding general of the police force was of the same opinion and was willing to guarantee that there would be no fighting by the policemen and civilians, if we would assure them there would be no shooting on our part, and the policemen could retain control of the civilians even after our entry.

The situation was absurd. I thought perhaps the man was possessed. When I asked, he told me the commanding general had absolutely no control over the Wehrmacht. But most of the soldiers had left the city that morning. He did not think we would have much to worry about in the way of German soldiers.

Despite the major’s confidence, I saw my dreams of newspaper headlines fading, and I feared that General Eisenhower would be very disappointed in me. Perhaps that fear made me tenacious, and I refused to give up. We argued back and forth for what seemed like hours, and darkness fell outside. Finally, the major offered a suggestion in a tone that insinuated a momentous announcement.

“I will take you to see the general,” Harms translated.

The major called for an orderly and sent for his car, dispatching a second orderly for cognac. Whitman’s eyes lighted up perceptibly as the orderly returned with cocktail glasses on a silver tray and poured drinks around.

I decided that I must be quite mad. I had never envisioned a social hour with a group of German officers, and certainly not with the German officers as my hosts.

The orderly returned with the information that the car awaited us outside. I left Whitman in charge of the group remaining at the police station until I should return, and with Harms I went outside where the chauffeur waited in a luxurious Mercedes-Benz.

I had not the slightest idea where we were going, except that I was to confer with the commanding general near the center of the city. I wondered if we had to pass through any German army defenses to reach our destination, but evidently the police officers commanded the respect of the Wehrmacht, and I felt relatively safe while in their company. I kept telling myself.

I involuntarily sank lower in the deep back seat, however, when a German sentry stopped us in the middle of the dark street. I wondered what would be his reaction should he see two Americans in the automobile, but he asked no questions. He wanted to tell us that it was impossible to go up the street we were following. We could not reach the center of town by this route. The Americans were firing artillery.

The driver turned the big car around, not without ef-
fort, and we retraced our route toward the Gohlis police station.

The major suggested, through Harms, that I might contact American headquarters on my radio and have them stop the artillery. I mulled over the suggestion and realized from what little I had been able to determine about the direction in which we had been traveling that we had been driving toward the southeast, and that would be the 69th Division sector. Getting artillery fire stopped there would necessitate contacting corps headquarters. I would have enough wrath called down upon me if this mission failed without interrupting the operations of another division, so I was a bit thankful when we reached the police station and found that Wesmiller had been unable to make contact with the radio.

The major said that perhaps the telephone lines were not out and he would try to call the general and that we should wait inside the police station. We went into a large room on the first floor and there found Lieutenant Whitman, a bit under the influence of cognac, entertaining a group of German enlisted men, who, for lack of better fascination, were fascinated with the Indian head on the 2d Division shoulder patches.

Whitman had a colored blanket wrapped around his body, and placing his fingers behind his head to indicate feathers, he did a war dance around the room.

The Germans loved it, roaring something in their native tongue which I took to mean, "we love it." Further to indicate their love they produced another bottle of cognac as if by magic, pouring drinks for all of us.

The major finally completed his telephone call, and Harms and I followed him outside again to the car. I had not the slightest idea of how he intended getting past the artillery fire, but he seemed to have thought of something, and I did not think I was exactly in a position to question his actions. The driver turned to the right up a narrow side street, and we found ourselves beneath an arched roof lit by a dim blue blackout light. A uniformed German sentry snapped to attention and raised his right hand in the Nazi salute, barking simply, but with meaning:

"Heil Hitler!"

He opened the door of the car stiffly. The major alighted and returned his salute. He opened the rear door for me. We found ourselves in a well lit marble corridor. Guards, stationed at intervals along the walls, snapped to attention as we passed, giving stiff "Heil Hitler" salutes. The major and the lieutenant returned the salutes, and I wondered what the guards thought of the two disheveled Americans, but their stony faces told me nothing. A stiff guard at the end of the corridor gave the Nazi salute and indicated that we should follow him. He led us up a graceful marble circular staircase, and into a room on the second floor. It was elaborately furnished with an oval mahogany conference table in the center surrounded by ornate mahogany chairs. The carved ceiling was high, and the walls were decoratively paneled. The floor again was marble.

The major motioned us to be seated, the general would be with us shortly.

Suddenly the major barked a command that must have said "attention," and the general appeared at the door. The two officers and the orderly stood stiffly at attention. Harms and I rose, and I found myself unintentionally imitating the Germans' stiff military stance. The general gave some command which must have been "at
case" and entered the room.

I was conscious of my appearance again. The general was even more immaculately dressed than the others, a long row of military decorations across his chest. His face was round and red and cleanly shaven. A monocle in his right eye made him look for all the world like a combination of Eric von Stroheim and Humphrey Bogart.

I wondered if I should salute, but the general's outstretched hand told me differently. I shook his hand and mumbled my name. He indicated three other officers and a brown-suited civilian who entered with him. The civilian, a slim, middle-aged, grey-haired man who might have been out of something by Sinclair Lewis, explained in English that he was the general's interpreter.

"Before the war I studied at the University of Chicago," he said in impeccable English that bore only a trace of an accent. "When the war began, I was professor of English at the University of Bern."

The general motioned us to take seats, and Harms and I sat on the right of the table with the major and lieutenant who had come with us from Gohlis. The general took his seat at the head of the table, the civilian interpreter on his left, and the other three officers, whom I took to be ranking—at least, well braided—members of his staff, to the left of the interpreter.

The general rose, raising his glass and proposing a toast in German. We all stood and drank. I didn't know if I was drinking to long life for Adolf or what, but I drank.

The conference settled down to its purpose, and the general talked long and rapidly, like a spoiled child. The civilian had to break in at intervals to interpret.

His story proved to be relatively the same as that told me by the major earlier in the evening, and my hopes for the capitulation of the city took another nose dive. He was concerned about controlling the thousands of displaced persons in Leipzig and would guarantee there would be no resistance from the policemen, but he had absolutely no control over the Wehrmacht. He tried to assure me that most of the soldiers had abandoned the city, and also he did not know where to contact the commanding officer of the Wehrmacht forces.

The conversation went in circles, always returning to the fact that the general could not guarantee there would be no fight from the German army. I began to see his situation clearly—he was anxious to keep his police in control, but he had attempted negotiations too early. He should have waited until our forces actually entered the city and then contacted our military government officials. The general obviously was an eager beaver.

I looked at my watch and was surprised to see that it was almost midnight. I wondered if my men at the Gohlis police station had given me up. No doubt battalion and regiment—and perhaps General Eisenhower—considered me lost. I had had no communication with them since we first entered the city at dusk.

I wanted to tell the German general that the situation was hopeless, but I declined to admit defeat. What was more important, he might refuse to allow us to return if we said there was nothing we could do about the negotiations. I suggested that he and his staff come with me to my battalion headquarters to contact my CO—the colonel. The word "colonel" seemed magical, and they rose quickly from the table, ready to go.

At battalion headquarters the commander was asleep. Major Joseph did not want to awaken him, so I told him my story, at least admitting that I did not think anything was going to come of the surrender negotiations.

While Major Joseph talked with the German officers, I found that battalion had established radio contact with my men in the Gohlis police station. I radioed them to come back out of the city. They seemed a bit irritated at the order since they were bedded down comfortably for the night.

BACK THROUGH LINES

Major Joseph told me that he was keeping the Germans there for the night and sending them to Corps Military Government in the morning. He wanted me, however, to take the major and lieutenant back through our lines. They would telephone the general's office to let them know what had become of the old man.

I felt like the swimmers when the newsreel is run backward, but we preceded the Mercedes-Benz in a jeep, and I led the officers back to the bombed sector through which we had passed earlier, and then returned to my CP.

It was 0400, and the men had returned from the Gohlis police station. Wesmiller said they had been worried about me and Harms, but from his story of a riotous night, I could not see how they found much time for worry.

Thus did my negotiations fall through. I think it only fair to myself, however, that I continue the story and explain that my night's work had not been completely in vain.

My company was assigned the mission of taking the Gohlis police station that afternoon. We entered in assault formation, but the presence of civilians in the streets indicated that there would be no resistance, and they seemed less interested in us now than they had been the night before. Evidently, they persisted in the belief that the city had already surrendered and our entrance now was anticlimactic.

I solicited a ride in a company jeep to check on the disposition of the rifle platoons. I could find no evidence of the second platoon in the sector south of the police station where they should have been, so we drove on. An underpass beneath a railroad track loomed ahead of us. This was to have been the limiting point for the company's advance, but I saw a group of GIs beyond the tracks.

We rode up beside them, and I recognized Technical Sergeant Wesley I. Phillips, the platoon sergeant. "I thought you knew not to go past the tracks," I said. "Where's Lieutenant Whitman?"
“I know Cap’n,” Sergeant Phillips replied, “but the lieutenant saw all these nice buildings over here and decided to have a look at them.”

I saw Whitman with Sergeant Weylandt approaching down the street, and I tried to think of what Article of War he had violated. But something told me I was in for another crazy scheme of some sort, and I steeled myself against becoming a party to it.

Whitman spoke before I could begin dressing him down for crossing the railroad. “There’re sixty Germans and a lieutenant over there who want to surrender. It’s a German Army garrison ... beaucoup weapons and supplies.”

I sighed. There was no use pretending. I would end up eventually going over to accept the surrender. It would save time if I gave in without argument.

“The lieutenant says they’ve been waiting to surrender ever since we first came in last night,” Whitman continued, “and he’s getting pretty tired of waiting. But he wants to surrender to at least a captain.”

“Come on,” I said. “Tell us where to go.”

The street ended two blocks away at the German garrison area. A sentry stood at a massive iron gate leading into the grounds around a group of three-story stone barracks and warehouses. Whitman said something to the guard in a language that must have made the German wonder if, in heaven’s name, the tongue of the Fatherland had come to this, but he clicked his heels, bowed slightly from the waist, and held out the keys of the gate to me.

SURRENDER

I took the keys and opened the gate. A group of Germans led by a stiff lieutenant, so resplendent in a neatly pressed uniform and shined boots that I expected to hear a bugle fanfare in the background, emerged from the nearest barracks. As we approached, the lieutenant stopped, clicked his heels and saluted smartly. He nodded his head to Whitman to indicate that he remembered him, and I knew Whitman’s heart must have leaped up and scrambled thanks.

I decided to waste no time in this surrender. Either they did or they didn’t. Standing in the open arena surrounded by hostile barracks was not to my liking.

“Tell him to bring all his weapons and pile them here at the gate,” I told Whitman. “Then he can line up his men and we’ll take them in.”

The lieutenant acknowledged the order and repeated it to his noncommissioned officers. They saluted smartly and disappeared into the two nearest barracks. A single file of German soldiers, carrying rifles, machineguns, panzerfausts and pistols emerged from the buildings like disheartened chorus boys. They piled the weapons near the gate, and five men from Whitman’s platoon began to break them against tree trunks.

The task was completed and the Germans lined up in platoon formation with their baggage, looking somehow like travelers out of the Canterbury Tales. The officer stood in front of the formation to address his men, their bodies stiffly at attention, but their heads bowed slightly toward the ground as if the officer were a god and it was verboten to look upon the countenance thereof.

I gathered that the lieutenant was telling them the war was over for them and they were making an honorable surrender and at his command they should give one last Heil Hitler. He barked the command. Their heads snapped up as if someone had suddenly jerked on the reins and the bit hurt their mouths and shouted in unison Heil Hitler!

The officer did an about-face and indicated by a nod of his head that I should remove the pistol from about his waist. I did not like the idea of being told how to conduct the surrender, when I was the one supposedly in charge, but I did not feel inclined to disagree. For all I knew the other barracks might be filled with Germans, their rifles trained upon us, and what was more important, I wanted the pistol.

Battalion had converted the police station into a PW enclosure. When I deposited the lieutenant, I noticed that the police major and his 600 policemen had become prisoners of war. I nodded toward the major, but he was in an ugly mood and gave no indication that he remembered me.

We were eating supper after dark in a restaurant which my kitchen force had liberated when I heard the approach of hundreds of hobnail marching feet on the pavement outside. Hobnail boots could mean only one thing — German soldiers. Outside I found a group of GIs approaching with over 200 German prisoners.

“We’re from K Company,” one of the guards said, when I asked. “We’re on your left. Got those Germans out of a garrison across the railroad tracks.”

My shudder must have been perceptible, even in the darkness. So these 200 Germans had been watching while I had unwittingly accepted the surrender of the German lieutenant and his sixty men!

I told the story inside.

“That’s nothing, Cap’n,” Whitman said. “Right after you left we found sump’n sitting around the corner of one of the barracks that sure made us feel silly ... a brand new Mark IV tank ready for action.”

“Whitman,” I said, slowly and forcefully, “if you ever, ever decide to accept the surrender of any more Germans, you do so entirely on your own, or else you and yours will meet with drastic action too horrible to contemplate. Is that clear? I’ve had quite enough!”

After the uncontested Gohlis entry I might have been convinced that my mission to the police general had accomplished its purpose, through no fault of the general or myself, but I read in the papers that the 69th Division met stiff resistance in the center of the city where I had been on my peace mission. Thus, I know that those men could never be convinced, so I think it best that I remain the man who did not capture Leipzig.
Execution Matrix

MAJOR NICHOLAS G. PSAKI III

Even a casual reader of the most recent FM 100-5 could not fail to grasp the Army's expectations of what the next war will be like: high intensity, high-speed, non-stop combat operations that push men and equipment to their limit. To win, we will have to think and act faster than our foe. If we are to do that, though, we must first refine our command and control procedures and techniques so that orders can be transmitted to key leaders with little loss of time. An execution matrix is one such technique.

The coordinating draft of FM 71-2 (January 1982) presents the execution matrix as a useful technique for recording defensive "positions and orientations." Once prepared, the matrix is written directly on the operations overlay. Although the matrix technique is not mentioned in connection with offensive operations, it can be readily adapted to the offensive as well, with only minor modification.

The first step is to identify the most common missions and tasks used in offensive operations. Almost all of these can be described with such one-word labels as "attack," "lead," "follow," "overwatch," "secure," and "consolidate." (These labels are placed on the left side of the matrix.

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**EXECUTION MATRIX**

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<th>SCREEN</th>
<th>Tm A</th>
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TF Front

Thrust; Ice

Thrust; Ice

Bravo; Delta

1,3,5 9,11
when the commander's concept is put in a matrix format.

Next, graphic control measures that depict in detail the commander's concept are selected. There is nothing new here, just the familiar axes, objectives, checkpoints, phase lines, and the like. For clarity, separate control measures should be used for each sub-unit. Checkpoints, in particular, are flexible, useful control measures, since they have no inherent restrictive meaning, and they can be used to designate overwatch positions, firing points, and on-order axes or boundaries.

On the matrix itself company teams, special platoons, and attachments go across the top. (It isn't necessary to list every special platoon or attachment, although a complete matrix might well do that. But the company teams and the scout platoons, at least, need to be listed.) The tasks that need to be accomplished are then placed along the left side arranged in either chronological order or in any other convenient order. Finally, the control measures appropriate to the unit and the task are entered in the boxes.

An example may help clarify this process. Let's say that we are a task force planning a movement to contact. We are task organized with one tank-heavy and two mechanized infantry-heavy teams. We intend to move on parallel axes with Team A leading on the right, followed by Team Tank with Company B paralleling Team Tank on a different axis. At objective ALFA we'll change lead companies and pass Team Tank through Team A. We'll have the scout platoon screen forward on both axes. The antitank platoon will overwatch from general positions that we have selected on the basis of a map reconnaissance. Finally, the heavy mortar platoon will follow Company B. Graphically, the concept looks like the accompanying sketch, and an execution matrix of this concept would look like the one shown here.

An execution matrix such as this can be constructed quickly and easily. The task organization, the effective time, and the matrix should be written directly on the operation overlay. The result is an overlay that stands alone and presents clearly and concisely the who, what, where, when, and how of the operation.

In a fast-moving situation, each subordinate commander can be given one overlay and know instantly what he is to do. The same overlay will quickly inform higher, adjacent, and supporting units of the plan. Finally, late arriving attachments can be rapidly briefed on the plan and on their part in it.

The execution matrix won't solve all the problems of command and control in a high-speed operation. It cannot replace a commander's clear presentation of his intent or his concept of the operation. With practice, though, this simple technique can reduce substantially the time required to produce an operation order. And time, as we all know, is often a precious resource.

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Winning at the NTC:
Reconnaissance

MAJOR VERNON W. HUMPHREY

The first article in this series discussed an instance in which poor reconnaissance by a battalion in training at the National Training Center (NTC) was largely responsible for its own failure to accomplish its mission despite the presence of only a small OPFOR unit.* (See INFANTRY, November-December 1983, pages 31-33.)

The OPFOR units assigned to the NTC have demonstrated a considerable degree of effectiveness in carrying out their reconnaissance missions. In this article, therefore, we will look at the OPFOR reconnaissance techniques, which combine stealth with speed and which use motorized and dismounted elements in close coordination.

Because the OPFOR's dismounted infantry assets are usually quite limited, much of its deep reconnaissance as described here is done by its mounted elements. Generally speaking, then, the OPFOR uses what dismounted infantry assets it has to occupy vantage points, breach obstacles, and reconnoiter as far forward as the main U.S. positions. But when it has more dismounted infantry assets than usual, it employs dismounted patrols as shown on the accompanying sketch.

This sketch illustrates how both mounted and dismounted patrols are used to give the OPFOR commanders detailed and accurate information about the disposition and movements of their opponents—the U.S. battalions that have been sent to the NTC to maneuver against them.

First, dismounted patrols secure the zone assigned to the OPFOR unit, which is usually considered to be a motorized rifle regiment. These patrols, moving as stealthily as possible and usually at night, scout and secure key vantage points overlooking the regiment's intended avenue of advance—the points labeled A on the sketch.

SECURED

Once these points have been secured, both the dismounted and the mounted patrols reconnoiter the U.S. force's obstacles, locate routes through and around them, and secure the far side. If possible, the dismounted elements also breach the obstacles at various points—shown as B on the sketch—after which stay-behind elements are designated to hold the breaches and the routes around the obstacles while the patrols themselves move on.

The patrols next conduct a reconnaissance of the objective points labeled C. The dispositions and levels of preparation on the objective tell the patrols a lot—if few preparations have been made, for instance, it indicates to them that the U.S. force does not intend to make a stiff fight at the objective. Accordingly, the OPFOR will search for prepared positions to the rear (points labeled D).

Once the U.S. force's positions have been located and reconnoitered, the OPFOR patrols locate and secure routes around or through those positions (points labeled E). Finally, they reconnoiter and secure vantage points in the rear of the U.S. positions (points labeled F).

As a result of these efforts, the OPFOR has fairly complete security all along its intended avenue of advance as well as a detailed picture of the U.S. force's dispositions and a pretty good picture of its plan of action.

The speed phase of the reconnaissance begins at about first light. BRDM reconnaissance vehicles and motorcycles follow the routes that have been marked and secured by the dismounted patrols. Once in the rear of the U.S. forces, the mounted reconnaissance force calls down artillery fire on the U.S. units, guides OPFOR motorized and tank forces, and plunges on to deep objectives, providing continuous reconnaissance for the units of the motorized rifle regiment all the way to their final objectives.

The use of motorcycle scouts by the OPFOR during this phase is particularly noteworthy. Each motorcycle scout is assigned a U.S.

*The opinions expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
maneuver company to watch, and each scout "clings" to his assigned company. When the company moves, the scout moves with it. When the company arrives in new positions, the scout moves to its flanks and coordinates with other scouts who have been covering the flanking units, just as a U.S. company commander coordinates with the commanders of the units on his flanks.

The OPFOR reconnaissance plan, put together by the intelligence officer, is carefully coordinated with the intended scheme of maneuver. Throughout the operation, the information the patrols and scouts produce is collated carefully and then disseminated quickly, efficiently, and continuously to OPFOR commanders at all levels.

The reconnaissance techniques of many of the U.S. battalions stand in stark contrast to the OPFOR's smooth, thorough process. To begin with, U.S. units seem to view their dismounted patrols and mounted reconnaissance efforts as separate and unrelated activities. Too, their intelligence efforts focus more on learning how the OPFOR "usually" operates than on where it is and how it plans to operate today.

In actual practice, scout platoons rarely work for the S2s. The S2s don't train the scout platoons or get involved in training the patrols. In fact, at the NTC most commanders assign "tactical" missions to their scout platoons, using them as extra mechanized rifle platoons. The S2s, on the other hand, stay busy analyzing terrain and drawing up templates. (In justice to our S2s, most of them know the facts about Soviet tactics and equipment. But they seldom think of the OPFOR at the NTC as a flesh-and-blood opponent. Accordingly, while they often know what the OPFOR should be doing — since the OPFOR uses Soviet tactics and techniques — they seldom know how to go about finding out what the OPFOR is actually doing.)

In the U.S. battalions, too, patrolling is usually left to the rifle company commanders. A typical operations order, therefore, will simply direct the companies to send out patrols, or give them permission to do so, without telling them where to send the patrols. There is usually no attempt at putting together a coordinated patrolling plan. As a result, most companies don't even send out patrols because, as one company commander said, they "don't want to spend all night looking for lost patrols."

A related matter is the commander's reconnaissance. Typically, the problem of the commander's reconnaissance is not addressed in planning, or, if it is, commanders are told that they may conduct their reconnaissance within a certain time frame without any further guidance. Company commanders, therefore, often neglect to conduct a personal reconnaissance at all. On occasion, when company commanders have conducted a reconnaissance, clashes between the reconnaissance parties have been reported.
What would be wrong, then, with including something like the following in the briefing of the operations order?

Commanders’ recon will leave from this location at ---- hours. Each company commander and the AT platoon leader is authorized to bring one vehicle and up to four people. The objective: rally point/release point for the commanders’ recon will be coordinates ----. You will have one hour to complete your special recon and return to the ORP. Turn in a sketch of your intended recon to the S2 before we leave. Alpha Company will provide one platoon for security.

And because the U.S. units at the NTC must also find ways to deal with the OPFOR scouts, counterreconnaissance must be a part of every defensive plan.

Thus, the first thing the U.S. forces should do is to establish OPs covering the OPFOR’s likely approach into their sectors. They have to do this anyway to provide early warning, but after the sun goes down the OPs should change their mission and become ambushes, lying in wait for OPFOR patrols.

They should also place additional ambushes on the likely routes through or around their positions and establish moving patrols to cover both the likely OPFOR patrol routes and any gaps in the ambush plan.

Any obstacles that are emplaced should have ambush parties either lying in front of them or actually wired-in as strong points. (In the latter case, the forces in the strong points should send out ambushes.)

Several important lessons about reconnaissance can be learned from the experiences of the battalions that have trained at the NTC:

• S2s must learn to regard their job as a search for a flesh-and-blood opponent and not a classroom exercise. In map and command post exercises, they must constantly remind themselves that they don’t know where the enemy is and consider how they will go about finding him.

• All reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance efforts must be coordinated into a single plan, and this plan should be an annex to the operations order. The U.S. units should adopt some of the highly effective techniques the OPFOR uses.

• The S2 must be actively involved in the training of the scout platoon and in the patrolling effort itself.

• Commanders’ reconnaissances must be planned and coordinated.

• Land navigation training, particularly at night, is critical. A fear of losing patrols can only inhibit aggressive patrolling.

• At both company and task force levels, there must be a plan for dealing with the OPFOR’s motorized reconnaissance elements in case they get through. Using ambushes and tank-killer teams from the unit trains is one way to do this. And company commanders must be alert for those OPFOR motorcycle scouts and must find them and get rid of them.

If the U.S. forces will adopt some of these techniques, their reconnaissance efforts can be as effective as those of the OPFOR in future battles at the NTC and elsewhere.

MAJOR VERNON W. HUMPHREY is assigned to the U.S. Army Training Board at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Commissioned through OCS in 1963, he commanded two companies in Vietnam. He holds two graduate degrees from Georgia State University and has had several articles published in various military journals.

TOW Jeep Modification

LIEUTENANT STEVEN R. PELLEY

The jeep-mounted TOW system is the heart of the 82d Airborne Division’s potent airborne antiarmor defense and has been for almost 10 years. Although the lightweight, modular components and “first round kill” ability of the TOW make it perfectly suited to the highly fluid mission of airborne units, its primary safety problems and proposed some solutions. These solutions, as shown on the accompanying sketch, were modified to streamline production and improve effectiveness and became the basis for upgrading the Division’s entire TOW jeep fleet.

One of the problems with safety was the expected proliferation of wire
on the battlefield from the wire-guided munitions used by virtually every modern army. This wire — strong and nearly invisible — would pose an obvious threat to the safety of men and equipment in open vehicles.

Accordingly, members of the service section, 782d Maintenance Battalion, devised an inexpensive, bolt-on wire cutter made of one-inch angle iron and two-inch channel iron. This wire cutter is unique in that it can be folded down out of the gunner's line of sight while he fires the TOW missile and then raised to protect the crew and equipment while on the move. Either of these adjustments can be made in only a few seconds without any special tools.

HAND-HOLDS

The other safety problem was the lack of secure hand-holds for the crew to grasp while the vehicle was moving. (Several troopers in the 82d had been injured, for example, when they were thrown against equipment or the vehicle itself.) Three bolt-on handles, therefore, were added for the gunner and assistant gunner to grasp. The first of these handles was mounted to the base of the radio antenna's mounting bracket. It provides a firm hand-hold for the gunner's left hand and keeps him from being slammed into the weapon's optical sight and night sight. The other two handles were mounted onto the crew's seat in the rear of the truck. Besides giving the crew something to hang onto, they also double as racks on which to secure ALICE packs, which creates more room in the vehicle for the crew.

Besides these safety problems, there was also a performance problem: the gunner could track 180 degrees over the front of the vehicle only by alternately sitting and standing. All of this movement sometimes caused the gunner to make erratic movements while tracking, which naturally increased his chances of missing his target.

To make matters worse, the AN/TAS4 TOW night sight, which was added to the weapon system, forced the gunner to track his target through an eyepiece about eight inches above the original optical sight. The resulting half-squatting position the gunner had to use was not only uncomfortable but unstable as well, and it influenced the gunner's ability to track smoothly.

The solution to this problem did not come as easily as the others. Several solutions were proposed and rejected because the additions weighed too much, were too expensive, or permanently altered the vehicle. The solution had to be lightweight, inexpensive, and easily removed.

The solution finally adopted was a padded seat, readily available through the Army Supply System, mounted on a one-inch diameter length of bar stock. The bar stock was fitted into a 10-inch piece of one-inch inside diameter pipe mounted to the left rear bumper of the jeep. The seat was offset and a one-inch slip ring placed between the seat and the pipe so that the gunner could adjust the seat to any desired height and lock it without a wrench. This seat gave the gunner a stable platform from which he could easily track a target with either the optical sight or the night sight.

Once these modifications had been engineered, it was simply a matter of procuring the materials needed and fabricating a set of wire cutters, handles, and seats for each of the Division's 162 TOW carriers. The materials selected were common, easily assembled, and relatively inexpensive. (The cost per vehicle was only about $35.) Once the sets were completed, they were installed at a rate of 30 per day. (In less than 10 minutes per vehicle, all of them could be restored to their original configuration by an operator armed only with a few wrenches.)

Here was a case in which the ideas of a concerned commander, translated into action by his direct support maintenance people, contributed to a safer, more effective force.

Anyone who would like more detailed information on these modifications may write to the Commander, 782d Maintenance Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307.

LEUTENANT STEVEN R. PELLEY is assigned to the Maintenance Operations Office, 782d Maintenance Battalion at Fort Bragg. Commissioned from the Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning in 1982, he has completed the Ordnance Officer Basic Course.
Platoon "Y" Defense

PLATOON SERGEANT DAVID J. ROBBINS

With the kind of fluid defense future battlefields will demand, and with our potential enemies concentrating on the indirect approach, a 360-degree defense is a mechanized infantry platoon’s best hope for survival. The "Y" defense for level terrain, shown in Figure 1, offers this 360-degree defense without requiring the troops to displace under fire to alternate or supplemental positions.

This "Y" defense has several other advantages as well:

- The backblasts from the antiarmor weapons are directed into killing zones and do not endanger friendly troops.
- The enemy, when assaulting this position, will have to assault two squads on line, no matter which direction he attacks from.
- The defensive position is difficult to suppress with indirect fire, and only one-third of it can be attacked in any one aircraft pass.
- Any leg of the "Y" that the enemy takes can be fired on by the other two squads.

Laying in this defense is fairly simple. (As I envision it, the platoons should be spaced about 1,000 meters apart and on line.) The only information the platoon leader needs is the location of his defensive position and the direction of the enemy. He gives the first squad leader a heading of 60 degrees, the second squad leader, 180 degrees, the third, 300 degrees, and establishes the platoon’s command post at the hub, or the apex, of the defense. These three equal 120-degree sectors are, in fact, the key to the "Y" defense.

The platoon leader then instructs the squad leaders to lay in their squads with two-man positions 30 meters apart. (The terrain will not always permit this exact distance, of course, but the concept must be retained if the defense is to work.) The third position in each sector should be for the squad’s APC, the fourth for its Dragon, and the fifth for its machinegun. (The first two positions can be placed in unused apertures and taken down when the men need to fire out of those apertures.) These positions must have overhead cover and must be camouflaged.

As an improvement to this defense, a shallow resupply trench can be dug between positions. Any attached weapons can be placed in added positions in any leg of the defense. The fifth position, the machinegun position, should be heavily mined 50 meters out to channel the attacker into the killing zone. Obviously, the more level the ground is for this defense, the better mutual support the platoon will have.

The individual squad member, once trained in this defense, knows exactly how to prepare his own position, and the only time he leaves that position is to attack toward one of the other squads. And knowing he is mutually supported all around, he can sit in MOPP gear all day, because he does not have to move once the position has been prepared.

The "Y" position can also be used by light infantry units in almost any kind of terrain. And by using it, a well-trained and disciplined group of defenders will find it easier to fend off even the most determined attacker.

PLATOON SERGEANT DAVID J. ROBBINS is a graduate of Wichita State University and has completed the Advanced NCO Course. He is now serving with the 1st Battalion, 137th Infantry, 69th Brigade (Mechanized), Kansas Army National Guard.

January-February 1984 INFANTRY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS CMF

The new career management field (CMF) 18, Special Operations, will focus on the unconventional employment of soldiers and units on tactical missions under a wide variety of conditions. Special Operations noncommissioned officers will participate in foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, strike missions, and numerous other activities.

CMF 18 will include the following new military occupational specialties (MOS): 18B, Special Operations Weapons NCO; 18C, Special Operations Engineer NCO; 18D, Special Operations Medical NCO; 18E, Special Operations Communication NCO; 18F, Special Operations Intelligence NCO; and 18Z Special Operations Senior Sergeant.

To be eligible for reclassification into one of these MOSs, a soldier must meet the following criteria:

- Must be male.
- Must be school trained in SQI "S".
- Must have a secret clearance, or be eligible for one.
- Must have passed the most recent APRT within the past six months.
- Must meet the height and weight standards of AR 600-9.
- Must have a physical profile of 111221. (Exceptions to the physical profile require a statement from the soldier's unit commander attesting to the soldier's ability to perform the duties of his current MOS.)
- Must have an appropriate current PMOS or SMOS for reclassification to CMF 18.

Reclassification will be effective no later than September 1984. If a soldier is reclassified, his current PMOS will become his SMOS on the effective date of the reclassification. The record of each service member who currently shows SQI "S" on either his PMOS or SMOS will be reviewed; if these records indicate that the soldier has the experience and training for CMF 18, he will be reclassified.

The records of soldiers in the rank of SFC/PSG (promotable) are being reviewed to determine those best qualified for MOS 18Z. The selected promotable SFC/PSGs will retain their current PMOSs until they are promoted to 18Z. If a soldier is selected and is now serving outside a Special Forces assignment, he will remain in that assignment until he completes a normal tour, but he will be programmed for an 18Z position upon reassignment.

Soldiers who are now serving in 18Z positions who are not selected for reclassification to that MOS, or who do not choose to be reclassified, will remain in their positions until a replacement in 18Z is assigned. They will then be reassigned in their PMOSs by their career branches. Although soldiers in this category will retain their SQI "S" designation, they will not receive any future assignments within the Special Forces community. Their career management individual files (CMIFs) will be returned to their career branches permanently. Any future requests for these soldiers to return to the Special Forces community will be considered on a case by case basis.

Soldiers in the ranks of SFC/PSG and below will undergo a records review some time in Fiscal Year 1984 to determine their eligibility for CMF 18. The final results of all boards and reviews will be implemented not later than September 1984.

The creation of CMF 18 carries with it a promotion forecast of 90 percent, the best in the Army, with the exception of the Chaplains' Corps.

Anyone who would like more information on CMF 18 may call MSG Milligan or SSG Miller at AUTOVON 221-8340/9429.

ATTACHE DUTY

The Army has openings throughout the world for enlisted personnel, in the ranks of SSG and SFC/PSG in the Defense Attache System (DAS). The MOS requirement for all enlisted soldiers is 71L, Administrative Specialist. NCOs in other administrative MOSs or CMFs (career management fields) may apply if they are fully qualified and willing to be reclassified into MOS 71L. (An additional skill identifier of E4 is awarded to these NCOs after they complete attaché training.)

Personnel who are accepted for these assignments will receive administrative orientation, attaché training, and language training (if they need it) in Washington, D.C.

Preparation for an attaché assignment takes from four to eighteen months, and tour lengths are normally two to three years. Positions, duty stations, and application procedures are listed in AR 611-60, Assignment to Army Attache Duty.

LANGUAGE TRAINING

Becoming qualified in a particular foreign language can have a great deal to do with a soldier's future assignments throughout his military career. His PMOS qualifications coupled with his linguistic ability in a foreign language may qualify him for assignments he could not otherwise get.

But many soldiers don't apply for language training at the Defense Lan-
guage Institute's Foreign Language Center because they think it's too hard to do or that they won't be qualified.

DA circulars in the 350 series (Language Training for Enlisted Personnel) contain detailed information on class start and end dates, which MOSs and grades are currently eligible, and where assignments are available. This information is brought up to date each year to show what is available for the next fiscal year.

Personnel Staff NCOs can also help in initiating applications, using Chapter 4 of AR 611-6 to ensure that a certain soldier meets the basic requirements for the program.

After a soldier has gone through these steps and determined that he is eligible, he should submit a DA Form 4187 to MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-L., 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331. His request must include updated DA Forms 2A and 2-1 and verification of his Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score.

BIFV TRAINING COURSE

The following classes of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (BIFV) training course will be conducted at the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, during the remainder of Fiscal Year 1984:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Start/End Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-84</td>
<td>BIFV Gunner Course</td>
<td>13 Apr 84 - 18 May 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-84</td>
<td>BIFV Commander Course</td>
<td>10 May 84 - 3 Jul 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-84</td>
<td>BIFV Gunner Course</td>
<td>8 Jul 84 - 3 Aug 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-84</td>
<td>BIFV Commander Course</td>
<td>19 Aug 84 - 1 Oct 84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SP4s and SGTs attend the Gunner Course and SSGs and SFC/PSGs attend the Commander Course. (There are 32 quotas for each Gunner Course and 37 for each Commander Course.)

Soldiers who successfully complete the training requirements of these courses will be reclassified into PMOS 11M and assigned to a BIFV unit upon graduation. Current 11M assignments are available at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Hood, Texas, and in Germany.

Volunteers must be in PMOSs 11B, 11C, or 11H; cannot be affiliated with regimental or COHORT units; and must not have already received assignment instructions.

Certain other categories are also ineligible and need not apply: Those who have received Article 15s or courts martial; have profiles in excess of 11121; are overweight according to AR 600-9; or are under suspension of favorable personnel action.

Applicants must forward their requests on DA Form 4187, with the recommendations of their chains of command and a copy of their DA Forms 2A and 2-1 to DA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-L., 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22331.

EO TRAINING

The Army is trying to strengthen its equal opportunity program by ensuring that EO advisors have recent experience with the kind of work done by the soldiers they advise. To bring this about, the Army will more than double the enrollment of soldiers in the 16-week course offered at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.

Soldiers trained in equal opportunity will no longer lose their basic MOSs but will be given an additional skill identifier instead. This will enable them to return to their basic skills after their tours as EO specialists.

A new three-week course is being added to the institute's curriculum to train selected officers and senior NCOs for assignment to EO positions at major Army commands and headquarters. While the Army will no longer award MOS 00U, some senior NCOs who now hold it will retain it indefinitely in order to provide continuity during the training period.

WARRANT OFFICER PROGRAM

Soldiers who are interested in the Army Warrant Officer Program should apply now for appointment in technical service fields.

A recent change to AR 135-100 allows for the direct appointment of soldiers in the ranks of SFC/PSG through SGM/CSM directly to CWO-2. The appointment carries a six-year initial service obligation. Otherwise, appointments are to CWO-1 with a four-year active duty commitment.

A complete list of warrant officer MOSs and specific prerequisites for appointment are given in DA Circular 601-83-2 (Warrant Officer Procurement Program — FY 84). Preferred qualifications and application procedures are also listed.

STRIPE FOR BARS

The Army is looking for about 600 noncommissioned officers to fill warrant officer vacancies in the following specialties: 310A, Utilities Operations and Maintenance Technician; 621A, Engineer Equipment Repair Technician; 630A, Automotive Repair Technician; 761A, General Supply Technician; and 762A, Support Supply Technician.

Soldiers in the ranks of SGT/SP5 and above should contact their Military Personnel Centers or Personnel Action Centers to apply for these appointments.

SKILL ALIGNMENT

The Army has developed the Skill Alignment Module (TSAM) to set priorities for Army jobs by skill level. With TSAM, soldiers are offered only the re-enlistment and reclassification options that meet the Army's needs. TSAM will help the Army balance its MOSs and will help its soldiers, too, by guiding them to under-strength MOSs that offer better opportunities for promotions, bonuses, and assignments.

TSAM will be used for all reclassifications for soldiers in the ranks of SGT/SP5 and below and for medical reclassifications for those in the ranks of MSG/1SG and below. The system will give commanders, personnel offices, and reclassification boards a
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

About 300 counterintelligence agents (MOS 97B) are needed to conduct security inspections, investigations, and surveys. Soldiers in the ranks of CPL/SP4 through SFC/PSG may apply. The need for 97Bs with airborne qualification and German and Korean language qualification is especially critical.

Soldiers entering this field are authorized selective reenlistment bonuses under Zones 4A, 2B, and 2C. Those who are within one year of separation and who will have less than 10 years of active federal service upon completion of the 97B course may apply under the bonus extension and retention program.

Soldiers who are serving overseas may apply at any time, but they must complete their tours before attending the 97B course, unless their commands agree to pay for their TDY to the school and return.

Applicants who are accepted will be assigned a class to attend for the 18-week 97B course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, after special background investigations have been initiated.

Applicants must meet many stringent prerequisites. Anyone who is interested in more details should call or visit their local military intelligence units and their personnel offices.

OVERWEIGHT SOLDIERS

Soldiers whose records are flagged because they are overweight can still be reassigned. They will not, however, be assigned to professional schools or command positions, nor will they be allowed to extend or reenlist to meet requirements for overseas tours.

Losing commanders must ensure that soldiers meet the Army’s weight control program standards before they leave for schools or for command assignments. Overweight soldiers who report to such assignments will normally be reassigned to other duties and enrolled in the weight control program.

RESERVE COMPONENT CMF 18

The Active Army will implement a new career management field (CMF 18) in special operations units in October 1984 (see note above). But the Reserve Components will have up to five years to implement this CMF in all applicable units.

All enlisted positions in the ranks of PV1 to CPL/SP4 selected for conversion to CMF 18 will be regraded to SSG slots. Non-selected lower grade positions identified by skill identifier “S” will remain unchanged.

Detailed guidance and criteria for the Army Reserve on the conversion of unit members and individuals in the Individual Ready Reserve or Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and the accession of non-prior service personnel into the Special Operations career field will be provided to the field by 1 October 1984. Organizational structure changes to reflect the new career field will be published and become effective after that date.

USAR PST OPTION

Prior service soldiers who do not have MOSs that match local U.S. Army Reserve unit requirements can now be recruited under the new Prior Service Training (PST) option.

This new option allows (USAR) guidance counselors to process qualified prior service applicants for formal Army schooling as they are enlisted or assigned to USAR units.

Under this option, applicants must either enlist for three years or extend their current contracts to a total of three years. Currently, this option is limited to priority units and to MOS skills in which there is a shortage of qualified soldiers.

The PST option will not replace on-the-job training or USAR schools; it is designed to provide training that the unit cannot provide and to use training spaces that would otherwise remain vacant.

While less than 200 PST options were used in Fiscal Year 1983, funds have been made available to cover the cost of nearly 3,000 such options in Fiscal Year 1984.

FORSCOM officials have estimated that half of the soldiers who return to civilian life do not have MOSs that match local USAR unit requirements. These units, therefore, spend a lot of time and money retraining soldiers.

Despite these drawbacks, however, in most communities, units could not meet their strength requirements without the assignment of experienced prior service personnel by the recruiting force. The option will also help reduce MOS mismatches in USAR units while making it easier for recruiters to fill hard skill vacancies with prior service soldiers.
ADVANCED ASSIGNMENT

The Officer Advanced Course Advanced Assignment Program (OACAA) is designed to reduce the apprehensions an officer may have concerning where he will go next and to eliminate his uncertainty about his future. The program encourages officers to become involved with long-range professional and personal planning.

The process begins three months before an advanced course class starts; each officer slated to attend receives a letter from Infantry Branch. The letter provides information an officer needs in determining what his assignment preferences are — not only for the present but for the future as well. He must consider branch qualification, additional specialty development, and schooling, all of which are critical to his career.

The rules on branch qualification remain unchanged. To be qualified in his primary specialty, an officer needs experience in a TO&EE unit, successful completion of an officer advanced course, and at least 10 months of successful command.

Once he is branch qualified, he will have to look for an assignment away from troops (USAREC, ROTC, USMA, Reserve Component) or an additional specialty assignment. Service school assignments and military schooling that is directed toward additional specialty qualification are also available to branch qualified officers.

Officers who are not branch qualified can expect to be assigned (if it is at all possible) to positions that afford them the opportunity to command. Some of them will be assigned to major commands or to installations in an additional specialty with appropriate schooling en route. Such an assignment allows an officer to use his additional specialty and also gets him back to a troop location.

As an officer develops his preferences for additional specialties, he should consider those that are aligned with Infantry units: SC 18, Special Operations; SC 35, Military Intelligence; SC 41, Personnel Program Management; SC 54, Operations and Force Development; SC 91, Materiel Management; and SC 92, Materiel Service Management. While serving in such an assignment, an officer who is not branch qualified should seek the opportunity to command.

Once preference statements arrive at MILPERCEN from the members of an advanced course class, the assignment officers develop tentative assignments and notify these officers by letter about two months before the class is to begin. These assignments remain tentative until Infantry Branch representatives visit the class later. Visits are scheduled for the first six to eight weeks of the course, at which time the entire class is brought up to date on current personnel policies, and interviews are scheduled for the officers. During these interviews, assignments are made final.

Experience has shown that few of the initial assignments slated three months before the beginning of the advanced course are changed.

Over all, the program works, because officers are becoming more involved in the assignment process and in their own professional development.

REGIMENTAL AFFILIATION

By next fall, according to present plans, every Infantry officer will be affiliated with one of 24 Infantry regiments. Officers who are already assigned to a regiment when it is activated will be affiliated with that regiment if they do not already have reassignment orders. Those who do have such orders have the option of choosing that regiment or another regiment instead. Officers who are assigned to a regimental unit after the activation date will be affiliated with that regiment.

The assignment system will be modified to support the special relationship between the affiliated officer and his regiment. Although the regimental affiliation program increases the likelihood of recurring assignments to the same installation, the program does not increase an officer’s troop duty opportunity. Most officers will serve between one and three tours with their respective regiments in battalion level assignments during their careers.

Assignment outside the regiments — called extra-regimental assignments (ERAs) — will be affected by affiliation. There are two types of ERAs:

- Assignments on TOE installations above the battalion level or outside the combat arms.
- TDA assignments, including ROTC, reserve component, and recruiting duty.

Many of the ERA assignments of the first type will be to regimental homebases. Officers will be given priority for the ERA requirements at their regimental homebases. The proximity of the regimental homebase will be a factor in assignments to ERA positions of the second type.

Technically, affiliation is a SIDPERS transaction. The regiment’s servicing MILPO makes the SIDPERS entry for affiliated officers when the regiment is activated. Affiliation is noted in the remarks section.
OFFICERS CAREER NOTES

of the Officer Record Brief (ORB). The Regimental Adjutant, located at MILPERCEN, maintains a roster of affiliated officers. He will be involved in assignments to and from the regiment and will be a point of contact to members of the regiment in any MILPERCEN related actions.

By the summer of 1984 all officers will receive, through their servicing MILPOS, a DAPC Form 124, Regimental Affiliation Preference Statement, which calls for each to code the form indicating his first five preferences for affiliation. Previously designated officers will have this opportunity to request a change in their affiliation. A suspense date for return of the form will be publicized. When completed and submitted the forms will be fed to a computer for initial scoring on the basis of a scoring plan now being developed. Personal considerations, including membership in the Exceptional Dependent Program, will be figured into the scoring. The list of other valid considerations has not been made final. When the preference statements are issued, a list of consideration codes and criteria will be provided.

OPMS STUDY GROUP

A new study group has been formed at the Pentagon to review the structure and operation of the Army's Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The task of the 25-member group is to take a look at OPMS to see if it is adequately preparing the Army's officer corps — Active, Reserve, and National Guard — to meet the leadership requirements of the next decade.

The present system is not being either dismantled or replaced, but it may need some modifications to meet the needs of force modernization, the AirLand Battle doctrine, and the new manning system.

The study group will focus on a profile of the officer of the 1990s and on an analysis of such OPMS subsystems as strength management, evaluation, and professional development.

The group will visit major Army commands, service schools, and tactical and non-tactical organizations throughout the Army, where they will strive for a broader understanding of the problems.

The results of a survey of 14,000 commissioned officers from year groups 1953 to 1982 will be used throughout the review. In addition, a supporting study, being conducted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), will look at OPMS from the perspective of service school commandants (specialty proponents). Selected Army students at the senior service colleges will also provide input to parts of the study effort.

Individual officers are encouraged to contribute their ideas for improving the current OPMS by writing to OPMS Study Group, HQDA (DAPE-MP-OPMS), Washington, DC 20310.

RESERVE COMPONENT NOTES

RESERVE COMPONENT SC 18

The new career field for special operations officers (SC 18) will apply to the Reserve Components as well as to the Active Army. But while the Active Army will implement the new field in special operations units in October 1984, the Reserve Components will have up to five years to implement it in all applicable units.

In the process some positions currently authorized for lieutenants will be converted to warrant officer slots (MOS 180A). Additional lieutenant positions will be authorized, however, in Reserve Component units only, in order to develop captains and field grade officers in support of CMF 18 requirements.

Detailed guidance and criteria for the Army Reserve on conversion of unit members and individuals in the Individual Ready Reserve or Individual Mobilization Augmentees, standards for the conversion of warrant officers to MOS 180A will be provided to the field by 1 October 1984.

Organizational structure changes to reflect the new career field will be published and become effective after that date:

EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS FOR NG

Officers who are commissioned in the Army National Guard after 30 September 1983 will be required to earn four-year degrees before being considered for promotion to the rank of major.

Graduates of the 1983-84 state officer candidate school classes must have 10 semester hours of college credit to receive their commissions. This requirement goes up to 20 hours for the class of 1984-85, and to 30 hours for the class of 1985-86. By the time the 1989-90 class starts, at least two years of college will be required for commissioning.

After 1990, civilian education requirements will be the same for the total Army, active and reserve component.

UPDATE RECORDS

Officials at the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) advise Active Duty Guard and Reserve (AGR) officers to see that there is a current certified or "true copy" of DA Form 2 (Personnel Qualification Record, Part 1) and of DA Form 2-1 (Part 2), or of DA 4037 (Officer Record Brief) on file at the USAR-AGR Management Office.

These copies should be sent to Commander, ARPERCEN, ATTN: DARPA-PSO, 9700 Page Boulevard, St. Louis, MO 63132.

44 INFANTRY January-February 1984
Good books in large numbers continue to come our way, and we wish to thank all of the publishing houses here and abroad who send us review copies of their publications. Among the books we have received in the past few months that we want our readers to know about are these:

- MODERN SMALL ARMS, by Ian V. Hogg (Presidio Press, 1983. 224 Pages. $20.00). The author probably knows as much about small arms and artillery pieces as anyone now living. A former Master Gunner in the British Army, Hogg writes extensively on military weapons, and this book—although “prettier” than most of the ones he has been associated with—shows his professional approach and his extensive knowledge of weaponry. More than 170 pistols, rifles, machineguns, submachineguns, and shotguns are pictured and detailed. The book has an excellent introduction written by Hogg, and separate sections on “the great American pistol test,” ammunition developments, the assault rifle, and combat shotguns. Hogg believes that within the next 10 years the assault rifle “will have taken over the role held by the ‘standard’ military rifle in practically every armed force of any consequence and will, itself, have become the standard infantry weapon.” This is a fine reference work and Hogg, as usual, throws in a lot of his own ideas on what is, what should have been, and what might be.

- ATLAS OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE, by Donald Matthew (Facts on File, 1983. 240 Pages. $35.00). Donald Matthew, a professor of history at the University of Reading, has written previously on medieval Europe. In this book, he combines his narrative with dozens of four-color maps and hundreds of illustrations to present an excellent survey of European culture and society from the decline of the Roman empire to the discovery of America in the late 15th century. This is another fine reference work, and should appeal to the student of history as well as to the history buff. It is a book that can also be quite useful to the military professional in setting the stage for the many important European wars during those 10 centuries.

- ATLAS OF THE THIRD WORLD, by George Kurian (Facts on File, 1983. 381 Pages. $85.00). The author once served as executive director of the Indo-British Historical Society, and five years ago published a three-volume ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE THIRD WORLD. In this atlas, he compresses from that encyclopedia a large amount of data about 80 Third World countries and presents it in the form of 600 maps and 2,000 charts and graphs. There is only a limited amount of narrative, and that takes the form of a brief introductory comment for each country. This book does provide an instant overview of the political, economic, military, and social conditions throughout the region.

- CHEVRONS: ILLUSTRATED HISTORY AND CATALOG OF U.S. ARMY INSIGNIA, by Lieutenant Colonel William K. Emerson (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. 298 Pages. $49.50). The publisher refers to this as being a “landmark book.” We agree, for we have not seen another quite like it. The author is a serving U.S. Army officer and has had a lifelong interest in the Army’s chevrons and service stripes. His book, which contains pictures of 637 chevrons and service stripes, describes each one, catalogs all of them in a system he developed, and provides an identification guide to the various chevrons and stripes worn by the Army’s officers and enlisted soldiers from the Revolution to the present. We cannot praise this book and the author’s efforts too highly.

- THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1983-1984, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London, 1983. 152 Pages. $14.00, Paperback). This authoritative reference book, with data current as of 1 July 1983, pays particular attention to the economics of defense, to demographic trends, and to the aging NATO and Warsaw Pact fleets. The Institute’s staff does not believe that there is a widespread arms race going on in the world today. Rather, it sees qualitative improvement in military armament rather than larger inventories. The Institute’s staff also questions whether there is enough money in the United States operations and maintenance budgets to keep pace with the rapid rise in the amount of new equipment being acquired. As usual, this annual survey contains a large amount of comparative data on the world’s armed forces and on regional defense pacts. For the first time in some years it does not include a comparison of the theater nuclear forces in Europe.

- ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE AND BRASSEY’S DEFENCE YEARBOOK, 1983 (Pergamon Press, 1983. 399 Pages. $20.00, Softbound). This is the 93rd edition of a well-known and authoritative yearbook. It is, as usual, divided into three parts—a strategic review section, a weapon developments section, and a general section. Ian Hogg, whom we mentioned earlier, prepared two articles on weapon developments for gound forces during 1982. Each of the 22 separate articles in the book was written by an authority on the particular subject. This is another of those books that Infantrymen should be familiar with.
RING OF FIRE: AUSTRALIAN GUERRILLA OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II. By Dick Horton (David and Charles, 1983. 164 Pages. $18.95). Reviewed by Captain F.R. Hayse, United States Army.

The early successes of small raiding operations against German occupied territories by British commando forces led to a suggestion to the Australian government in 1940 that it could benefit from the British experiences.

The Australian government accepted the suggestion and set up a special training center in 1941 at Cairns, and established the Services Reconnaissance Department. Its job was to conduct special operations activities against the Japanese military services, which were still expanding their holdings in the Pacific.

This is the story of the little known activities conducted by the Department and its offshoots between 1943 and the end of the war. It shows how effective well-controlled economy of force operations could be in destroying and disrupting Japanese operations and in cutting Japanese lines of communication. For example, in carrying out 81 operations behind Japanese lines, Department operators raised and equipped more than 6,600 guerrillas, forced the diversion of more than 30,000 Japanese troops to rear area security missions, and inflicted 1,700 known casualties on the Japanese at a cost of approximately 112 people.

The book is written in the matter-of-fact style that characterizes a number of similar books on special operations during World War II, but those interested in current concepts and in the use of special operations forces will find it a good source of information on the types of problems that those who conduct such operations must face.

Although it is written for a selective audience, the book is well organized and provides a good historical study for military professionals and historians who are interested in the use of these kinds of units.


This is an updated and revised edition of an earlier work by journalists Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, both of whom have written extensively on the horrors of terrorism.

Their purpose is "to show how the development of military technology, producing ever-smaller and more deadly weapons, has affected the skills of terror and altered its tactics." Accordingly, they present detailed discussions on the weapons of terror — guns and bombs.

According to the authors, all terrorists share a common heritage: they all have come under the influence of political thinkers who advocate violence. Thus, the authors suggest that modern terrorist tactics were perfected in Latin America by Carlos Marighella.

Dobson and Payne also present an excellent discussion of some of the more notorious terrorist organizations, personalities, and incidents of the 1970s. They feel that because of the increased awareness in the United States of the dangers of terrorism and possible Soviet involvement in certain terrorist organizations, it is easy for some people to believe that there is a master terrorist plan that is controlled by the Kremlin. But Dobson and Payne do not think this is so. They argue that terrorists are exploited rather than controlled by the Soviet Union.

This is a well-written, informative book, and it serves as an instant reference guide for both the specialist and the general reader. It is quite evident that the authors did a good deal of detailed research in preparing to write their book. Footnotes and a more extensive bibliography, though, would have been helpful for those individuals who might want to do more reading on this subject.


This study, originally a doctoral thesis completed at the University of Nebraska, is a comprehensive and scholarly study of the use of Indian Scouts by the United States Army in the trans-Mississippi West during the Civil War and its aftermath.

In subduing the hostile western Indians, the Army adopted a practice first implemented by European armies in the conquest of North America — the British, for example, turned the Iroquois into faithful allies in their wars against the French. The Spaniards along the northern borderlands of Mexico relied upon Pueblo auxiliaries. Thus, Juan Bautista de Anza, when serving as governor of New Mexico from 1778 to 1787, defeated the Comanches with Pueblo allies and then persuaded the Comanches to campaign against the Navajos; eventually, he used a Navajo contingent in combating the Western Apaches.

From 1848 to 1861, the Army's highest authorized strength was 18,000, and it was expected to keep peace with an Indian population that numbered over 400,000. In California the influx of miners during the gold rush virtually annihilated weaker tribes and the Army even tried to protect the Indians from the whites.

The Civil War intensified the Indian-white conflict throughout the Far West as new mining rushes occurred, and five new territories and the state of Nevada came into existence. Indians became an increasingly important part of the Army's combat forces. By the late 1870s, particularly during the Apache campaigns, Indian scouts often were the only troops engaged in battle. In fact, the year 1882 marked the high point of scout service when seven of ten engagements involved Indian scouts.
In the opinion of some Army leaders, the use of scouts shattered the morale of hostile Indians and encouraged them to surrender. Colonel George Crook reasoned that the use of scouts from the same tribe would break tribal cohesion and the authority of hostile leaders. The reconnaissance and trailing functions of the Indian scouts was necessary in any effective military action against hostile Indians.

Although more Indians perished as a result of intertribal warfare than in wars with the whites, scouting seemed to facilitate the assimilation of the Indians into white society, which was an avowed aim of official military policy in the post-Civil War era.

This book has appropriate maps and illustrations as well as detailed notes and a concise bibliographical essay. It offers the reader a different and stimulating approach to the military history of the Far West in the latter part of the 19th century.


Early in the morning of 25 April 1980, a group of elite American military men landed at a desolate spot code-named “Desert One” in the Iranian desert. Four hours later, eight of those men were dead and seven aircraft — one C130 airplane and six HH53 helicopters — lay either destroyed or abandoned at the site.

Just four days later, on 29 April, a relatively unknown Army colonel, Charlie Beckwith, stood in the Pentagon briefing room telling reporters the details of the aborted mission. Still later, he, along with other members of the Department of Defense, testified before Congress in secret meetings concerning the operation. But the general public received nothing beyond the basic facts of the rescue mission known as “Operation Eagle Claw.”

This book provides a good deal more information about the operation and about Delta Force, a special operations group within the U.S. military services that Beckwith had fought for and literally fathered.

Colonel Beckwith’s book is supposed to be an autobiography and a critique of “Operation Eagle Claw.” It is neither, but it is easy to read and does provide some interesting information that is not generally known outside the Special Forces community.

The book is divided roughly into four parts: Beckwith’s one-year tour with the British Special Air Service (SAS), a unit which Beckwith was very much taken with and which gave him the idea of forming a similar unit in the United States; Beckwith’s experiences as a commander of Detachment B-52 (Project Delta) of the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam; the creation of the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment — Delta (SFOD-D), probably the most interesting part of the book; and, finally, the planning, preparation, execution, and aftermath of the Iranian hostage rescue mission.

What needs to be said is that this is one man’s story of events as he experienced them and remembers them. The book itself will probably attract a great deal of interest from the general military community. But in the special operations community, it is bound to receive mixed reviews. Colonel Beckwith is an especially controversial figure, and his recollections of the Delta/Blue Light dispute will be sure to raise some hackles.

Overall — because the book represents one man’s point of view primarily about a unit whose organization, equipment, and techniques are classified — Colonel Beckwith’s remarks should be taken with a grain of salt. His book certainly should not be considered a definitive work.


The primary thesis of this short work is that the United States Army currently has no nuclear battlefield doctrine with which to train soldiers to fight and win in a nuclear environment. A sub-thesis is that the development of the Army’s tactical doctrine, both nuclear and conventional, has been responsive “more to political preferences of our national authorities than to the real nature of the threat and the rigors of the nuclear battlefield.”

With these evident statements as a given, the author recounts the development of the Army’s tactical nuclear doctrine to determine how much it has changed since 1945. Although military doctrine usually is thought of as a set of principles by which the Army guides itself in the application of its forces to support the national objectives, Rose proposes that “the Army requires no preceding set of conditions with which doctrine must conform.” While he may be correct in theory, he goes on to describe in his book just the opposite — how political decisions and considerations have determined nuclear doctrine since 1945.

The author apparently assumes that his readers have little or no working knowledge of nuclear weapons or of the Army itself. Therefore, he makes a number of generalized statements that detract from the overall effect he is trying to create. Further, he argues that so many technological advances have been made in nuclear weapons that it is now possible for a commander to use tactical nuclear weapons almost as easily as he would any of his other weapons. He also states that the use of tactical nuclear weapons will not lead to an escalation of their use.

Rose then outlines his proposed nuclear doctrine. It has three items that differ significantly from the Army’s current doctrine — the immediate use of tactical nuclear weapons once the national command authority has approved their use; the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a counterforce role only; and the
authority to use tactical nuclear weapons delegated to levels as far down the chain of command as the battalion commander. All of this is outlined in rather summary fashion and pleads for more definition.

Perhaps the most interesting part of this short work, though, is its presentation of a historical development of our present tactical nuclear doctrine.

Perlmutter's book is a valuable contribution to the field of contemporary political science. His outstanding academic credentials and his background in military affairs are reflected in this extremely well written and scholarly work.


A vast amount of attention in both books and periodicals currently is being devoted to the Soviet Union. That emphasis is justly deserved, but the result is that the other Warsaw Pact nations are frequently ignored or overlooked. This book remedies that defect to a considerable degree.

It is, in actuality, a collection of papers that were presented in 1981 at the Center for NATO Studies. The contributors include such noted authorities as John Erickson, Edgar O'Ballance, Steven Kime, and Bill Sweetman.

The essays are divided into five sections: the political relationships within the Pact; the Pact countries and NATO; the military forces of each Pact nation; the weapons the Pact nations are currently deploying; and the military doctrine and capabilities of the Soviet bloc countries. Each essay is concise and nicely covers its particular topic. Footnotes to each have been added for this volume. Each is well written.

This book meets a current need and provides an excellent introduction for those who are not familiar with Warsaw Pact affairs. It is also a worthwhile compendium of current information for those who are knowledgeable about the Warsaw Pact.


The seven articles in this volume were presented at the 20th anniversary conference of the prestigious Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society in October 1980. The unifying theme for the volume is a regional approach to civil-military relations around the globe in an attempt to draw larger conclusions from the individual empirical studies.

Morris Janowitz, the editor, founding chairman of the IUS, and the world's most renowned military sociologist, opens with an essay that traces the methodological history of the study of civil-military relations and previews the other essays. C.J. Eugene Kim surveys the Asian military regimes. Ann Gregory and DeWitt C. Ellinwood focus on ethnic problems in South and Southeast Asia. Harlan W. Jenkins addresses China's civil-military relations. Fuad I. Khuri looks at the Middle East, and Ivan Volgyes, the Warsaw Pact countries. Gwynn Harries-Jenkins discusses the implications of Western European welfare state policies on NATO military services, and David Laitin and Drew Harker analyze the secessionist movements in Nigeria and Ethiopia.

As with most collections of conference papers, this is not a smooth, coherent book. The quality of the fare varies greatly. Written for specialists and, particularly, for social scientists, the book has limited appeal to the more general reader.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED


THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE, 1983. Edited by Mark Heller, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1983. 385 Pages. $20.00, Softbound.


FREE DISTRIBUTION

We continue to receive numerous requests from non-Infantry units in the Active Army and the Reserve Components for free copies of our magazine. As much as we would like to, unfortunately, we cannot honor those requests.

The number of appropriated fund (free) copies we can print is strictly controlled. Two years ago, for example, we had to cut back from printing 18,000 appropriated fund copies of each issue to 14,000 copies. We also had to reduce the number of pages in each magazine — from 64 to 56, including the covers.

As a result, we find that we can meet only the needs of our Infantry units — and that we must do. Our only reason for being is to support our Infantrymen by giving them the best publication we can.

We would very much like to send free copies of INFANTRY to combat engineer and military police units and to all of the other units in the Army. We simply cannot. But we do urge those units to consider subscribing to INFANTRY. The full particulars of how to do this can be found on page one.

LETTERS

Last year we received a nice stack of letters from you, our readers. Most of them we eventually published. Many of the letters made interesting points, and we commend the writers for taking the time and trouble to share their thoughts with us.

We would like to hear from more of our readers, though, and we would like very much for you to tell us what you like or dislike about the articles we publish, about our use of graphics, and about our various departments (news, letters, book reviews, and career notes).

We welcome letters to the editor on any subject that has been treated in the magazine as well as on issues of general interest to our readers. We urge you to take advantage of our letters department, which is one of the most popular departments in the magazine.

WRITING FOR PUBLICATION

We also urge all of our readers, and Infantrymen everywhere, to consider writing an article for publication in INFANTRY.

In 1983, we received 207 manuscripts and gave each one of them a thorough going-over. Many, unfortunately, were outside our purview; others were interesting but needed to be recast or completely rewritten.

We would like to see even more manuscripts. If you have an idea you think might be developed into an article, please call us about it, or drop us a note. If you want one of our Writer’s Guides, we will be happy to send you one free of charge. And if we can help you in any way with an article — even one that you plan to submit to another service school journal — please let us know.

Finally, if you should visit Fort Benning for any reason, look us up. We are in Infantry Hall and would be pleased to show you our operation.
ON LEADERSHIP

Lieutenant Colonel Henry G. Gole, in “A Personal Reflection on Leadership” (INFANTRY, September-October 1983, p. 12), states that he has “some strong feelings about [his] Army.” He then proceeds to describe an Army he may think is his army, but it is not the Army I know.

He claims we have a “plastic Army ... mesmerized by appearance, a white rocks and zero defects philosophy that leads to dishonesty and ... inexorably, to false ‘body counts.’” He describes a “system that ensures dilettantism” and “produces generals ... expert in [no single] issue.” He excoriates an officer corps that pursues “a much-criticized but nevertheless ever-present careerism.”

“We talk about the trust and confidence,” he says, “but have forgotten the meanings of the words.” After more of the same, he concludes his introduction to his topic by alleging that “We have lost the human dimension ... but ... we can certainly restore the human dimension to the way we lead men.”

Colonel Gole does not know the Army of which he writes — the Army in the field today. He has drawn on his memory to describe an Army of ten years ago, before he embarked on a series of assignments as an attaché, an instructor, and a research analyst. While he was contributing in those fields, our Army was progressing out of that era.

He describes an Army those of us serving in the field do not recognize — because the Army leadership, from top to bottom, has long since taken action to successfully orient itself toward enlightened leadership and the human dimension. It is ironic that the restoration of the human dimension in leadership that Colonel Gole seeks has been accomplished, for the most part, by the very people he criticizes — and that he missed the process.

I regret his failure to apply to his thesis even the rudimentary test of proof he must have been taught in his long and distinguished academic career, and I resent his arrogance (he suggests the possibility of same, in another context, in his closing paragraph) in castigating the commissioned and noncommissioned officer corps with which he has lost touch.

THAYER CUMINGS
COL, MI
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

INFORMATIVE

First, I would like to commend you for an especially informative and interesting issue (September-October 1983). One of the more interesting articles in that issue is the one by Lieutenant Colonel Gole, “A Personal Reflection on Leadership.”

In view of my own long-nurtured interest in leadership, I found Colonel Gole’s thoughts worthy of examination. I believe I agree with his basic concern, and with his disgust for cant and posturing. I most certainly have great contempt for the likes of a Skinner or a Freud. I also have profited from reading Machiavelli, who has gotten a bad rap from those who have only a superficial understanding of his observations.

Sad but true, we tend to ignore the fundamentals of leadership, which have been known for centuries, suffering the delusion that there must be a better “formula,” something of great technical sophistication that we can simply plug into and get the answer in seconds. In this context current management approaches suffer from the same affliction that befalls our “great” economists whose complex equations seem always to produce the wrong results. Yet, with each crashing failure, these economists are more widely acclaimed and revered than before. They, too, have cast aside the human dimension.

But I’m not sure I completely follow Colonel Gole’s comments about the (unquestioned?) virtues of the humanities. (Perhaps the editor deleted some of his explanatory text, such as in the paragraph about Alexander Pope.) I would like to know more about the “great humanists” who have garnered Colonel Gole’s admiration. It seems to me, for example, that Rousseau was a humanist, and I am really hard pressed to see much that was admirable about his behavior or his ideas. Simply put, Colonel Gole should get more specific.

GEORGE G. EDDY
Austin, Texas

PROVOCATIVE

I have just read “A Personal Reflection on Leadership,” by Lieutenant Colonel Gole. I agree with some of the views expressed in this provocative essay, but I am troubled by several of his assertions.

He is, of course, entitled to his own opinions about the state of our Army (not just his). However, he seems to be describing general tendencies of the Army of a decade ago, with little or no regard for the real progress the Army has made in recent years. For example, as an Infantry battalion commander in Hawaii in the late 1970s, I never once felt pressure from
any of my superiors to choose appearance over substance. To the contrary, I sensed from each a genuine concern for mission accomplishment and for the welfare of the soldiers we were privileged to lead. Moreover, I enjoyed the spirit of camaraderie and healthy competition that existed among the battalion and brigade commanders with whom I served. With rare exception, these men were true professionals in the finest sense of the term. The occasional dilettante and careerist fooled no one, least of all his peers and followers.

Colonel Gole’s criticism of the Army personnel system ignores the genuine reforms that have been initiated in the past decade, such as the centralized command selection system and extended tours for commanders, both of which were designed to improve the Army in the areas he so maligns. As for “trust and confidence” and the assertion that “we have forgotten the meanings of the words,” perhaps he should speak only for himself. Most soldiers I know are eminently worthy of trust and confidence; I feel fortunate to be among them.

In his article, Colonel Gole characterizes the Army School System as “superficial.” Compared to what? As a recent (1982) graduate of the U.S. Army War College and a current member of the Adjunct Faculty of the Air War College, I have found the atmosphere at both institutions clearly conducive to “thinking complex problems through.” Moreover, I find that most of my colleagues welcome the opportunity to pause and reflect on their profession, warts and all. Parenthetically, I would note that Colonel Gole has served the past six years in the military academic environment he finds so intellectually stifling. (I have to wonder why he even accepted a diploma from the Army War College.)

He is also unhappy with the so-called “military-congressional-industrial complex” and, indeed, with our political system, which according to him “virtually guarantees we will be led by amateurs for the first year or two of each new administration.” The latter assertion reflects, in my judgment, an elitist view that is, at best, unseemly for a military professional in a democratic society to espouse.

Colonel Gole is surely right on one point. His comments do, indeed, suggest arrogance. Unfortunately, he is long on criticism and short on suggestions for improving the system he finds so repugnant.

None of what I have said is intended to suggest that our Army is perfect or above criticism. Clearly it is neither. Like most institutions in our society, it is as good or as bad as the people in it. We can only hope that we are better than Colonel Gole’s “humanist” views portray us to be.

THOMAS B. VAUGHN
COL, Infantry
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE

Reading Lieutenant Colonel Gole’s excellent article on leadership, I was struck by his comment on “old soldiers who yearn for something called ‘good old-fashioned leadership’ but who cannot seem to define it.”

I guess he’s right on that. But in my some sixty years of closely observing good teachers (some of them even college and university professors) and good military leaders whom I have had occasion to observe (especially General Charles P. Summerall while I was a cadet at The Citadel between 1934 and 1937, and General George S. Patton, Jr., while I was the Ultra intelligence officer at Third Army Headquarters, 1944-45), I find that both good leadership and good teaching boil down to following exactly and in great detail just two principles: precept and example.

By precept I mean laying down rules, regulations, and sensible orders and seeing to it that they are carried out exactly at all times and at all places without exception. By example I mean setting a good example in all things — “in word, in conduct, in charity, in faith, in chastity,” to quote from St. Paul’s advice to Timothy (1 Timothy 4:12).

Of course, for the military leader there are a few other items in which a good leader must set an example; in the words of General Summerall “good influences can only come from above.” (Unfortunately, we are living in an age and a society in which most influences are coming from below, and therefore, are uniformly bad.) We often see military leaders (and teachers) who are perfect in one or the other, precept or example, but we seldom see leaders who are perfect in both.

M.C. HELFERS
LTC, USA, Retired
Charleston, South Carolina

ON MACHINATO BLUFF

I thoroughly enjoyed reading “Deception on the Shuri Line” (INFANTRY, July-August 1983, page 14), primarily because I read it while sitting on the actual spot the battle was fought over. As I figure it, the Japanese company that was surprised was sitting about where my living room now stands... I thought you might enjoy knowing that the Machinato Bluff is now the site of All Souls’ Episcopal Church, named to commemorate all those who fell in the Battle of Okinawa. The bluff still gives a commanding view, although the view on the land side is now wall-to-wall city. The landmarks in your story, however, are all still visible, and it made very interesting reading as I was able to view the whole area from the Bluff.

Many thanks.

(The Reverend)
JOHN K. DEMPSEY
Okinawa, Japan

LAYING MORTARS

I am writing in response to Major Mark S. Flusche’s article, “Deflec-
Major Flusche's idea is simply a firing chart that can be jury-rigged more cheaply and quickly than the regular issue item. A much simpler solution is available, however — using the firing chart in lieu of this homemade device. Hipshoots are routinely conducted in artillery units in the following manner (modified for mortars):

Determine an assumed grid for the hasty firing point — hopefully near the true grid. Choose any intersection on the chart and put the plotting pin there. Then determine a range and an initial azimuth to the target, again using the trusty 1:50,000 map.

Use any grid line that is convenient as the initial azimuth line and inherently as the initial deflection, which is, of course, the base deflection. With the range fan down this line, mark off the chart deflection indices using the range-deflection protractor (RDP), and you are ready to go.

Use the firing tables to get the starting data. Now mark off the announced range using the selected grid line and the RDP, stick a plotting pin there, and carefully place a target grid in that spot. Orient it as follows: The azimuth should be on the selected grid line. Mark the north arrow, and now you will be able to plot off any observer’s correction as soon as you turn the wheel to align the observer direction with the north-arrow mark.

In less than 10 seconds from the decision to hipshoot, you should have your observed firing chart ready to go, and within 15 seconds of the announcement of the initial azimuth and range, you should be ready to accept corrections to the first round and have it already fired. This allows computations accurate to 2 mils in deflection and 15 meters in range. Try that on an M16 plotting board! (How to transfer this to a surveyed chart is described in laborious detail in FM 6-40 and in the mortar gunnery manual.)

From my own experience in Hawaii and Panama, it seems that the M16 board is exactly what it was designed to be — a primitive but portable aid to computing fires. But in extreme heat or cold, the plastic deteriorates, usually around the pivot; under field conditions, the pivots themselves prove fragile; and the small squares and the need to align several items at once amid a confusing mass of other lines in different directions naturally makes errors more likely.

(In Panama, the 193d Infantry Brigade as a whole converted to the primary use of the firing chart in 1977, with the M16 retained as a backup, mostly in places where a vehicle could not go.)

One remedy is the so-called Graphic Firing Fan, which is merely a work-order (or even a do-it-yourself) modification to the RDP, which is readily available. (The Infantry School will have to provide the stock number to those who are interested, since I don’t have it on record.) All the other materials — plywood, grid paper, and so on — are readily available through unit S-4s.

Almost four years ago, I wrote an article suggesting a number of improvements, doctrinally-tested by the artillery, that might have made mortar fires faster and more accurate (“Mortar Proficiency,” INFANTRY, March-April 1980, page 41). The Mortar Committee responded then that these suggestions were too complicated for an infantry unit to handle, but I reject that attitude. There is no reason why a mortarmen cannot be at least as proficient as an artilleryman.

Major Flusche’s idea was clearly recognizable as a hasty firing chart. A more proper response to it would have been to point out that firing
charts are in fact available to mortar units and that the suggested technique could be adapted in the manner I have described.

Mortarmen everywhere need to join in a collective effort to use these simplified methods of laying mortars — before some defense analyst from IVory tower University eliminates the rest of them from the TO&Es.

DOUGLAS M. BROWN
CPT, Field Artillery
56th FA Brigade
APO New York

DRAGON TRAINING TIPS

The M47 Dragon has been the Army’s medium antiarmor weapon (MAW) for the past 10 years. Throughout that period, considerable controversy has persisted regarding the ability of the Dragon gunner to hit an enemy tank with a live missile.

The reasons for this controversy are legitimate: Many qualified gunners miss the target during their first live-fire engagement, and the gunner’s performances on our current Dragon training devices do not correlate with their live-fire performances as they should. Yet, with the Dragon at least halfway through its life cycle as the MAW, it would not be cost effective to invest in new training devices now. Instead, trainers must use more ingenuity and resourcefulness in their Dragon training programs to make training as realistic and productive as possible, while instilling in the gunners confidence in their weapon system.

Here are some tips trainers can use:  

- Coach the gunner into a tight interface with his weapon during all engagements (but limit him to no more than 20 shots a day). Without this tight interface, during live-fire the launch effects shock the gunner and cause him to move abruptly and lose control of the missile.
- Have the gunners track tactical vehicles at ranges of 400 to 1,000 meters with MILES and TVT equipment for training devices. Smoke, small arms fire, and artillery simulators can be added to train the gunners to ignore distractions.
- Reward good performances (select the best gunners for live-fire training, for example).
- Conduct training on tracking skills every month; these skills deteriorate rapidly.

Certainly, at some time in the future we should have a replacement for the Dragon and one that does not have its drawbacks. Meanwhile, though, the Dragon can do the job if we make the most of our Dragon training with the devices we have.

ROBERT EPPS
CPT, Infantry
Weapons, Gunnery, and Maintenance Department
U.S. Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia

VIETNAM BOOK

I am in the first stages of developing a book on Operation LAM SON 719/DEWEY CANYON II, the U.S.-South Vietnamese operation in 1971. I would greatly appreciate it if any readers who were connected with this operation would contact me as soon as possible so that we can get together for an interview.

Needless to say, the more people I speak with the better, regardless of their positions during the operation. My address is 220 Kingsville Court, Webster Groves, MO 63119; telephone (314) 961-7577.

KEITH WILLIAM NOLAN
AN AMERICAN SOLDIER

Our soldier is a special breed. He is one who will fight for his own survival in the Battle of Life. He is the one who will fight for his country in the Battle of Earth. He is the one who is often alone with his ideas, his vivid war memories. He is the one who sometimes shares those war memories — bits and pieces — with his children, but more often keeps them to himself. He is the one who will give all he’s got — to keep all he has. He is technically minded as to the operation of weapons, strategies of war. Yet, he is attuned to the basic facts of existence — Life and Death.

Our soldier is an introvert who fights like an extrovert. He must. Our soldier takes pride in himself, in his Army, in his Country. Yet, our soldier is humble in his ultimate willingness to die for what he and his fellow Americans have come to depend on, to love and to cherish. Our soldier thinks he can, and does. Our soldier wants, takes and constantly gives. Our soldier may seem selfish with his thoughts — for often what he is thinking and feeling cannot be adequately expressed in words — but our soldier is unselfish in his actions. Our soldier is Strong, Operative, Loyal, Dextrous, Impassioned, Enigmatic, Romantic. Our soldier is a unique combination that, thank God, works.

(By Dana Van Meter. Courtesy Paul Timm, Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, Columbus, Georgia)