# Infantry

A PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE COMBINED ARMS TEAM

May-June 1984

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## FRONT COVER

You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. (Directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944.)
I feel deeply honored at having been selected to be the 17th Commandant of the Infantry School and the third post-World War II Chief of Infantry. I am grateful that the Army is giving me this opportunity to work closely with every member of the Infantry community — from the newest to the most senior — to make today’s Infantryman the finest and toughest combat soldier in the world.

There is, of course, an undeniable sense of personal pride at being considered worthy of the job, especially to one who started as an Infantry private 33 years ago. But far more compelling to me are the challenges that come with being the “Chief” — the many tasks to be accomplished; the obligations to continue the work started by my distinguished predecessors; and the awareness that many of the decisions we make at the Infantry School will make in the weeks and months ahead can influence dramatically not only the Infantry community but every Infantryman as well.

I am most fortunate to have arrived at Fort Benning fresh from commanding the Seventh Army Training Command. That experience served to give me a good grasp of what our Infantrymen in the field need and what we must do to fill some of those needs. It also served to illustrate that the U.S. Army loses much valuable training time through a lack of standardization. Standardization must focus on the tasks that make sense, and it needs to apply worldwide. Standardization and training to standards will pay great dividends to the Army when soldiers and cohorts can step into their new units and know what to do and how well they have to do it. The Infantry School will work on defining those tasks that must be standardized, on including them in our training, and on providing them to unit commanders.

In the recent Infantry Commanders Conference, a number of our senior Infantrymen, as well as Secretary of the Army John Marsh, addressed themselves to some major issues. They believe the key to the Army’s success in battle is professionalism, and they challenge us to develop and train tough professional Infantrymen steeped in our own traditions and ethics. I fully agree with those sentiments and intend to see that the “Home of the Infantry” is professional in every respect.

In the two months I have been at Fort Benning, I have been impressed by the high degree of professionalism that members of the School’s staff and faculty show as they go about their daily business. They not only carry a heavy instructional load, they also deal with dozens of challenges that face the Infantry and therefore the Infantry School and Center. The new Infantry Division (Light) is foremost. We are now designing a new training strategy for that division and the courses needed to execute that strategy. Tactics and doctrine now being developed for this elite force will place the greatest emphasis on individuals, squads, and Platoons — where it has always been for the Infantry.

In other areas we are reexamining our rifle marksmanship program, developing an improved ARTEP for the Infantry, and attempting to include the lessons of the National Training Center in our classroom instruction. Of great importance is our requirement to provide our training products to the field and to meet the training needs of the field. In subsequent issues of INFANTRY, I intend to discuss each of these topics in more detail.

At the same time, we are taking a close look at the Infantry Association, which is dedicated to fostering professionalism in Infantrymen. Reestablished in early 1982, the Association has attracted a great deal of attention from Infantrymen around the world. It is time for us to look more closely at its organization and to decide what activities are appropriate to this association. On this matter, too, I will keep you informed.

We have a lot to do here at the School. But we always have had a lot to do. Defining the Infantry’s role on the ever-changing battlefield of the future will take clear thinking, vigorous analysis, and realistic testing. We remain fully aware that technology advances, that tactics change, and that organizations and warfare become more demanding. Throughout this process we must keep our eyes on the important things and retain them — we must not let them become victims of change just for the sake of change.

We will work hard to make sure the Infantryman can fulfill his role to the fullest as a member of a combined arms team. But to do this, we need your help. Accordingly, I earnestly solicit your ideas and suggestions as to how you think we at the Infantry School can produce the best-trained and best-equipped infantry soldiers, leaders, and units.

Finally, I call your attention to the cover of this issue and to the article on D-Day. In this small way we recall the events of that June day 40 years ago when United States infantrymen broke into fortified Europe and began the momentous battles that led to victory in World War II. Above all else, this example demonstrates what well-trained and determined infantrymen can do to overcome the most adverse conditions and ultimately win.

Infantrymen fight in a combined arms team. The makeup of the combined arms team varies from one tactical setting to another. The one unchanging part of these teams is Infantry. No one ever has found, and no one ever will find, a substitute for the Infantry. That is our challenge — to be ready for any battlefield.
A SERIES OF INTERACTIVE videodiscs has been developed by the Army Research Institute (ARI), along with other government agencies and contractors. This project, called VISTA (Videodisc Interpersonal Skills Training and Assessment), includes eleven scenarios covering such difficult situations as insubordination, emergency leave, and NCO performance counseling.

The Infantry School, one of the first training institutions to apply high-technology methods to leadership skills, has been using these videodiscs in Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) training since June 1983.

VISTA has two instructional modes. One mode shows previews of leader alternatives and uses written feedback to inform the officer of the positive and negative aspects of the actions he has chosen. In this mode the officer is never allowed to go more than one step off the “best path.”

The second mode is more like a simulation of an interpersonal situation. The officer receives no written feedback and can go as many as three steps off the best path before he either loses or salvages the situation.

The “correct” answers within the VISTA scenarios were determined by Army doctrine, counseling and management principles, and input from subject-matter experts.

The overall evaluation results have shown that this training approach is more effective than role-playing and programmed texts when measured by actual tests of the leadership principles the student has learned. Another advantage is that the training is standardized and open to comment or criticism. It is also potentially less costly than the traditional person-to-person training.

Student and instructor evaluations have also been positive; most students have indicated that a combination of VISTA and classroom role-playing was the best method. Experimental use of VISTA with enlisted personnel has shown that being exposed to an officer’s perspective in difficult situations can change their attitudes towards officers.

Several other service schools are now considering implementing VISTA in their own leadership training.

THE FIRST EXPERT BRADLEY Infantry Squad Training Test (EBIST) was recently conducted by the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized)(Separate), which is stationed at Fort Benning. Twelve squads competed during a two-day period.

The first EBIST belonged solely to Company D, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, the Brigade’s “Pioneers.” That the Pioneers came up with the EBIST is fitting — their unit was the first BIFV unit in the Army.

Although the Bradley carries a nine-man squad, for the EBIST the competing squads had only seven men. The EBIST events were determined by the personnel assigned to Company D, and there were 12 all told. Points were awarded on how well the squads placed in each event. The events themselves were geared to squad scoring to encourage teamwork and esprit de corps. In the future, the events can be expanded upon or changed, and it is hoped that BIFV units from throughout the Army will be able to participate.

Additional information on the EBIST and its various events is available from the Commander, Company D, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, Fort Benning, GA 31905.

FORT BENNING’S NEW TRAINING site for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) was recently completed and formally dedicated. Called Deutschberg, the mock German village was built by members of the 43d Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Group, which is stationed at Fort Benning.

The village consists of 30 buildings — offices, stores, apartment buildings, repair shops, a school, a Gasthaus, a bakery, and a butcher shop, plus individual houses. These buildings are all of concrete block construction, and some of them have flat roofs to allow safe landings for soldiers rappelling from helicopters. The village also has a sewer system obstacle.

To keep wear and tear on the buildings to a minimum, certain features have been built into them. For example, the buildings have “mouseholes” to simulate holes that would be blasted into their walls to gain entry, and all multi-story buildings have grappling hook bars built into the windows.

Over the past two and one-half years, in all kinds of weather, three companies of the battalion have alternated one-month periods of construction with their other duties, while a fourth company provided the heavy equipment they needed. Another company belonging to the 36th Engineer Group — the 586th Engineer

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Company — built the sewer system.

Building the MOUT site gave these engineers an opportunity to practice various construction skills that are a part of their SQT training, along with 34 of their 149 ARTEP tasks.

Present plans call for the facility to be used by Infantry Officer Basic Course and Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course students of the Infantry School and by units of the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate). Later, soldiers in training at the Infantry Training Center may also use the site.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS ITEMS have been received from the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning:

The museum has received the uniform that Lieutenant Colonel Wesley B. Taylor, Jr., the commander of the 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, wore during the combat jump his unit made into Grenada in October 1983. His uniform will become an important part of the exhibit that is now being developed to tell the history of the United States Rangers.

A World War II German Kubelwagen has been purchased and will soon be on display. This historic vehicle is a scarce item, and it will add a great deal of interest to the Museum's collection.

Other recent acquisitions include a gift of two World War II German field telephones that had been captured in a bunker near Berlin in 1945; a gift of a scarce Vietnamese Liberation Front Medal in mint condition; and the purchase of the 1851 Colt military revolver and holster of Moses Hannibal Wright, West Point Class of 1859. Colonel Wright commanded the Confederate Arsenal in Atlanta, and later the one in Columbus, Georgia.


The National Infantry Museum Society was formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support; it is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership, or $10.00 for a lifetime membership.

Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

THE FOLLOWING NEWS item was received from the Infantry Board:

- Laser Eye Protection Device. Present battlefield scenarios suggest that the Infantrymen may find themselves confronted by an enemy whose tactics call for using lasers against personnel. This possibility poses a need to protect our Infantry soldiers from eye damage so that they can effectively carry on the fight. It is recognized that laser-protective materials placed in front of the eyes will significantly reduce the threat, but more information is needed about their effect on the performance of the soldiers on the battlefield.

The Infantry Board recently tested eight different materials to see how Infantrymen using the M16A1 rifle performed while wearing the laser-protective materials. Two three-inch squares of each type of protective material were inserted side-by-side in the frames of welder's goggles, thereby providing eight different test items. A ninth pair of goggles with clear glass lenses was used as a control item to obtain baseline data.

The materials have absorption characteristics that lessen the damaging effects of laser beams but have varying levels of spectral and luminous transmission. A neutral density filter with an optical density of 2-4 was used in some test events to simulate low light level conditions.

Nine riflemen fired a modified M16A1 record course nine times each, once while using each pair of test goggles and once while using the control goggles. The test was conducted during bright light and under simulated low light level conditions. Data was collected pertaining to safety, human factors, and the goggles' optical properties.

Letterman Army Institute of Research will use the test results to formulate a decision on the further development of the protective materials.

SOLDIERS WHO NEED special consideration for their handicapped or gifted children or spouses are again being urged to sign up with the Army's Exceptional Family Member Program.

The program, which was started in 1983, attempts to match up a soldier's assignment with the medical or educational facilities the family member needs. Many soldiers who are eligible for the program still have not signed up.

For those who do sign up with the program, a new coding system should increase their chances of getting the right duty assignments.

Soldiers who want to enroll in the program should do so at their nearest medical treatment center.

THE ARMY TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER'S Bulletin Number 84-1, January 1984, contains a brief description of each fielded battle simulation for which the Army's Command and General Staff College is responsible. Also included are future developments in the simulation field and points of contact for obtaining information about simulations. This bulletin supersedes the Center’s Bulletin 82-1.

Questions and comments are encouraged by both the Center and the College. They should be directed to the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, ATTN: ATZL-SWN, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027, AUTOVON 552-4612/2442, or commercial 913/684-4612/2442.
RESERVE COMPONENT: SOLDIERS are now eligible to earn undergraduate college credits without attending classes by taking part in the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES) examination and certification program. DANTES was established by Congress in 1974, with its primary mission being to support the voluntary education program of each of the active military services. This is accomplished by making available to military service members independent study programs and a diverse examination program, and by managing educational contracts for the Department of Defense.

On 1 October 1983, the DANTES examination and certification program was extended to include the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, as well as the Air Force and Marine Corps Reserve components. DANTES sponsors two types of examination programs — those that are funded (for which the examinee does not pay), and those that are not funded (for which the examinee does pay). Most DANTES testing is in funded programs.

The Active Army has agreed to provide testing for its Reserve Component personnel through its installation education centers and to provide cross-service support to Air Force and Marine Corps reserve personnel. This means that eligible Reserve and National Guard personnel may test at any DANTES testing site.

THE RED THRUST STAR Newsletter 22, October-December 1983, contains some excellent comments on how the OPFOR is used at the National Training Center and gives the details of four operations that were conducted by the OPFOR against an armor task force during a recent rotation.

The newsletter also has an excellent reference guide of available OPFOR and unclassified potential adversary information, literature, training aids, and training devices. The guide can be removed from the newsletter and kept in a separate binder.

COMPUTERS, VIDEO EQUIPMENT, and a laser have combined at Aberdeen Proving Ground to reduce range operation costs and increase testing accuracy and efficiency.

The new development is composed of two systems: the live fire evasive target system (LFETS) — which simulates a moving target by projection techniques so that the system being tested can track, engage, and fire at it on live fire ranges — and the automatic video scoring system (AVSS), which provides the hit coordinates for the LFETS. With LFETS, rounds are fired at a projected moving spot of light and are scored as they pass through an imaginary target plane that is defined around the spot of light. The target, a bright laser spot on a retroreflective disposable target screen located 2,500 meters down range, is projected by a four-watt argon laser. The green target spot is visible in broad daylight, and precise computer control allows unlimited target motion and exact replication for good statistical analysis.

An electronic circuited video camera is mounted to the LFETS beam steerer, which controls the spot motion. When a round is fired, its tracker is tracked as it appears in the field of view of the bore-sighted video camera. A skyscreen at the target generates a pulse as the round passes through the target plane, and the video and skyscreen pulses are sent to a processing system. The action video playback freezes the image to allow hard copying, and a processor calculates the hit coordinates.

Although these new developments are presently used only for testing new weapon systems, it is possible that in the future a similar system will be designed specifically for training applications, including a vehicle tracking training system.

TWO TACTICAL WATER distribution systems are now being fabricated for the rapid deployment forces of the Army's Central Command. Each system will consist of seven 10-mile segments of hoseline, 42 pumps, 14 water storage tanks, and 14 distribution points.

In operation they will be used to deliver potable water to remote locations. Water for drinking, food preparation, personal hygiene, and medical use can be pumped through the six-inch hoseline at 600 gallons per minute. At tank farms, the water will be stored in 20,000- and 50,000-gallon fabric tanks. Hoseline, 500-gallon collapsible drums, and tank trailers can then be used to deliver the water to forward areas.

Delivery of the system's components is scheduled to begin this summer and to be completed early next year.

A RECENT CONTRACT will bring the Army 182 more inertial survey systems that are designed to make field artillery operations more efficient. The systems are called Position and Azimuth Determining Systems (PADS); the Army has already purchased 99 of them.

PADS is a self-contained, inertial survey system that can rapidly provide position, elevation, and azimuth readings to the fire support elements of the combined arms team. It consists of three units: A computer/keyboard display, an inertial measurement, and a power source. The device is compact and can be easily installed on an M151 truck or an OH-58A light observation helicopter. The 82d Airborne Division also plans to install the PADS on the new high mobility multipurpose wheel vehicle (HMMWV). PADS is many times faster than the conventional field survey methods and requires less manpower.
Many articles have been written in recent years extolling the virtues of the Division 86 organization. It does provide certain long-needed improvements, and many mechanized infantry commanders see it as a dream come true. The command and control organization of the maneuver forces within the mechanized infantry battalion has been greatly improved, for example. Unfortunately, though, the organization of its logistics elements once again has been given short shrift.

The support structure of the mechanized infantry battalion needs command and control assets just as much as the battalion's maneuver units do, but the Division 86 organization, like so many that have gone before it, fails to provide those assets in anything approaching the number needed. To emphasize this point, the discussion here will focus on MTOE 072431JFC11 for the mechanized infantry battalion (equipped with the Bradley fighting vehicle), under which several FORSCOM units are reorganizing. This document is a derivative of TOE 07-246J, and there are no major differences between the two for purposes of this article. (In fact, the supply aspects of the logistical picture will be examined here, because this is where the crux of the problem lies; to include the other logistical elements such as maintenance and mess would only cloud the central issue.)

Logistical command and control within the Division 86 mechanized infantry battalion has been shortchanged in four major areas: its leader-to-led ratio, its span of control, its complexity of control, and its communications.

The leader-to-led ratio is least favorable in the support platoon. A rifle platoon leader, for example, is responsible for 4 vehicles and 34 men, while the antiair arm platoon leader controls 5 vehicles and 19 men. Yet in the support platoon — the battalion's primary operating agency for all of its resupply functions except class IX — the platoon leader is responsible for 35 vehicles and 45 men. He has twice as many vehicles as an entire line company.

CONTROL

As for span of control, a rifle platoon leader has only three squad leaders to control, while each squad leader has only one vehicle team leader (BFV gunner) and one ground team leader (assistant squad leader). The antiair arm platoon leader has only two section leaders, and each section leader has only his vehicle and one squad leader to control. The support platoon leader, however, has an ammunition chief (sergeant first class), two truck squad leaders (staff sergeants), and one POL squad leader (sergeant) to handle 34 trucks and 43 drivers. Thus, a truck squad leader can be responsible for controlling as many as 14 trucks and 15 drivers with no NCO assistants to help him.

To compound this span of control problem, the complexity of control is also greater for the support platoon leader. A rifle platoon works with all of its elements relatively close to each other and works as a complete unit — no one squad gets very far from the platoon leader. Although the antiair arm platoon's operating radius is somewhat larger, even its dispersion normally does not exceed three kilometers. But the support platoon often has sub-elements of constantly varying composition strung out from the tail of a rifle company all the way back to a brigade support area, and possibly even farther. Thus, a distance of 25 to 30 kilometers between the sub-elements is not uncommon.

In the matter of communications, a rifle platoon has one AN/GRS-60 and one AN/VRC-46 radio in each of its vehicles, plus one AN/PRC-68 portable small unit transceiver in each squad and two more in its headquarters section. The antiair arm platoon has two AN/VRC-46 radios for the platoon leader and one AN/GRC-160 in each ITV. The hapless support platoon, on the other hand, has only two AN/VRC-46 radios in the platoon leader's jeep (or HM-MWV), one backpack AN/PRC-77, and eight AN/PRC-68 small unit
transceivers. The AN/PRC-68, with its range of between 400 and 3,000 meters, is of little use to a platoon that is spread out over a 30-kilometer distance and is constantly on the move. Given the tasks the rifle and antitank platoons must accomplish, their command and control assets are certainly not excessive. Far from it. These improvements have been needed for years. But it is glaringly apparent — even from a superficial examination of the TOE — that the battalion's supply establishment has been given very little with which to accomplish its complex and demanding mission. It would be rare to have a captain (S-4) and a lieutenant (supply platoon leader) who could make such an unwieldy apparatus work in anything that resembled a smooth and efficient manner.

The doctrinal field manuals do not help much. They only superficially discuss the organization and the mission of the equipment in the battalion's support structure. Neither does the new FM 101-5 shed much light on a small unit's logistical problems. And trying to deduce the intended organization and equipment from an MTOE or TOE can be an amazingly involved and inexact process.

Logistics coordination is centered on the battalion S-4 and his staff of enlisted assistants. He has one supply sergeant (sergeant first class) and four general supply specialists (one sergeant, one specialist fourth class, and two privates first class). One of these enlisted supply specialists also serves as the driver of the S-4's one (and only) dedicated vehicle — a jeep (or HMMWV), which has two AN/VRC-46 radios mounted in it. (These radios are the S-4's sole communication assets.)

Although it is not really spelled out in any manual, most battalion S-4s share the use of the M577 command post carrier that is allocated to the S-1 section. This vehicle also has two AN/VRC-46 radios. It is widely believed (and in most cases practiced) that the S-1/S-4 track should be located in the combat trains area. For the time being, let's assume this is so.

Thus, to quickly recap, the S-4 is the primary coordinator and controller of the battalion's supply effort. To help him, he has a jeep with two radios and a driver, and a supply sergeant with three clerks who share an M577 carrier and two radios with the S-1 section. This small group of soldiers must manage a 24-hour-a-day, constantly moving logistical train.

The battalion support platoon supposedly contains all the people and equipment it needs to get the supply job done. Its headquarters consists of a lieutenant, a platoon sergeant (sergeant first class, 11M40), and a driver (private first class) for the platoon leader's jeep, which is equipped with two AN/VRC-46 radios. The MTOE/TOE lumps the rest of the platoon into a transportation section and five mess teams.

**Leaders**

Within the transportation section, if all the noncommissioned officers are ferreted out, the following leaders can be identified: one ammunition chief (sergeant first class, 11M40), two squad leaders (staff sergeants, 64C30), one squad leader (sergeant, 76W20), and one petroleum heavy equipment operator (sergeant, 76W20). This organization, of course, raises several questions:

- Is ammunition management the ammunition chief's only function?
- Since he is the senior NCO in the transportation section, is he also the section leader?
- Does he directly supervise the drivers who haul ammunition, or is their supervision left to the truck squad leaders?
- Since two of the squad leaders have a truck MOS, and one a POL MOS, does this mean that the seven POL trucks are under the POL squad leader's control, with the remaining 27 being divided between the two truck squad leaders?

Looking quickly at the remaining enlisted force in the platoon, we find that there are 2 specialist fifth class truck drivers, 12 specialist fourth class truck drivers, 16 private first class truck drivers, 3 specialist fourth class POL specialists, and 1 private first class decontamination equipment operator (54E) for the skid-mounted, power-driven, decontamination apparatus in the platoon.

To construct an organization chart from these two groupings of soldiers, we must make certain assumptions.

First, because anyone with experience in logistically supporting a mechanized infantry battalion knows that the management of ammunition supply is a full-time job, let's assume this is the ammunition chief's sole function.

Second, let's assume that the skid-mounted decontamination apparatus will get a truck designated to haul it and that this truck, its driver, and the decontamination operator will be placed under the operational control of the battalion chemical officer and NCO in the S-3 section. With these two assumptions, the organization of the support platoon falls into place as shown in Figure 1.

Note the difficult control problem this organization presents to the squad leaders whose trucks may be grouped into widely assorted packages depending on the supply needs of the battalion at any particular time. This problem is increased by the almost total lack of command and control aids (mainly communication equipment) available to them. There is only one AN/PRC-77 and eight AN/PRC-68 small unit transceivers in the entire transportation section. Since the range of the AN/PRC-68 is from 400 to 3,000 meters, and the support platoon operates over distances four or five times as great, an AN/PRC-68 is about as useful to a support platoon as two tin cans and a string.

Doctrinally, the support platoon leader has two more jobs as well. He is designated the assistant S-4 and is also supposed to act as officer-in-charge of the battalion field trains. This presents him with an interesting problem. Because there is no "base station" in the field trains, as there is in the combat trains — the S-1/S-4 track — how does the battalion communicate with its field trains? The so-called "officer-in-charge" — the support platoon leader — is often on the road trying to keep a handle on all of his elements. The maintenance elements that are located in the field trains have very limited communication facilities, and their radio-equipped vehicles are also
often out on the road. Teletype communication to the field trains area is dependent upon the battalion's rig, which usually is not conveniently located for the S-4 and which — given the state of the art (or lack thereof) of our field RATT equipment — is often inoperable anyway. The brigade's rig presents the same problems, so the brigade S-4's clerks must take the messages and call on a land-line to the battalion field trains.

But who should get the messages? The "OIC" is probably on the road. Is the support platoon sergeant the NCOIC? What about the maintenance warrant officer and the master sergeant, who are often positioned there? Also, who interacts with the various supply agencies in the brigade support area from which most of the supplies actually come? The support platoon leader? The battalion supply sergeant or clerk? If it is the supply sergeant, what does he work out of, a support platoon truck? A tent?

In short, our doctrine has left the field trains scrambling to devise a coherent command and control system. Needless to say, every battalion works somewhat differently, thus compounding the problems in an era of rapid and multiple unit cross-attachments.

If it is to succeed, the mechanized infantry battalion's logistical effort must have adequate command and control; it does not have that now.

Effective command and control is achievable, however, and at relatively little expense. The key to the logistical effort with its two focal points — the combat trains area and the field trains area — is to set up an effective logistical control center in each area, and to give the support platoon a more realistic structure.

We should start by organizing the battalion S-4 section into two elements — the Logistics Control Center (LCC) Forward, and the LCC Rear. The LCC Forward would be housed in the S-1/S-4 M577 carrier with the already allocated two AN/VRC-46 radios (battalion and brigade logistical nets) plus one AN/VRC-64 radio to monitor the battalion command net in the secure mode and to serve as a backup for the other two radios. The LCC Forward would be staffed by the battalion S-4, the senior supply clerk (specialist fifth class/sergeant), and one additional clerk (specialist fourth class). The S-4 would have his jeep or HMMWV with two radios and a driver. This element's mission would be to pass the requirements the S-4 has formulated onto the rear, and to coordinate the forward movement of supplies that pass through the combat trains to the forward companies or the designated supply drop points.

The LCC Rear would be housed in an M109 van (or its equivalent) and would have one AN/VRC-46 radio. It would be staffed by an assistant S-4 (lieutenant, quartermaster), the battalion supply sergeant (sergeant first class), two clerks (private first class), and the ammunition chief (staff sergeant), who would be made part of the S-4 section. This element's mission would be to get the S-4's requirements, translate them into appropriate supply actions (coordinating with the various supply elements located in the brigade support area), and prepare the supplies for forward movement.

The support platoon should also be overhauled. Its headquarters would consist of a platoon leader (lieutenant, transportation corps), a platoon
sergeant (sergeant first class, 64C40), and two drivers. It would have two jeeps, each with one AN/VRC-46 radio. Relieved of this assistant S-4 function, the platoon leader, along with the platoon sergeant, would be free to manage the complex tasks of matching movement assets to requirements, coordinating their use, and managing the operator maintenance on 35 vehicles.

The remainder of the platoon would be divided into five squads. The heavy cargo squad would have the five eight-ton trucks, a squad leader (staff sergeant, 64C30), and six drivers (one of whom, a sergeant, would double as an assistant squad leader). There would be three medium cargo squads, each of which would have seven five-ton trucks (four with trailers), a squad leader (staff sergeant, 64C30), and eight drivers (one being a sergeant who would double as an assistant squad leader). The fifth squad would be a POL squad that would have the five five-ton tank and pump-equipped trucks with pod trailers, and the two 2,500-gallon tanker trucks. It would have a squad leader (staff sergeant, 76W30), a driver-assistant squad leader (sergeant, 76W20), a senior driver for the other 2,500-gallon tanker (specialist fifth class, 76W20), and five driver/POL handlers (76W10). Each of the five squads would have two AN/PRC-77 radios with modified LS-454 loudspeakers for its communication needs. These radios could be shifted from truck to truck according to a squad leader's needs.

These squads would provide a "single system" unit of manageable size in peacetime. In the field, or in combat, these squad organizations would also provide the framework for tailoring up to five logistical packages for movement around the battlefield to fulfill the battalion's various logistical requirements (see Figure 2).

The decontamination apparatus and its truck are conspicuously absent from this organization. These would be assigned to the S-3 section and would operate under the direct supervision of the chemical officer and his NCO. If for tactical reasons the S-3 did not want the decontamination truck to be in the forward area, it could be placed under the temporary control of either the assistant S-4 (in the field trains), the S-4 (in the combat trains), or any other suitable person.

Under this proposed solution, the support platoon leader would have more manageable squads and five squad leaders directly under his control. Freed of his assistant S-4 duties, he could concentrate on commanding and controlling these five elements. The squad leaders themselves would

### Table 1: S-4 Section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S-4</th>
<th>LCC Forward</th>
<th>LCC Rear</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CPT, IN</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PFC</td>
<td>SFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Clerk</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>SP4</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1/S-4 M57</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 VRC-46 radios</td>
<td>M109 van</td>
<td>1 VRC-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 OE-254 antennas</td>
<td>1 OE-254 antenna</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 VRC-64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>M151</td>
<td>2 VRC-46s</td>
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### Table 2: Support Platoon Headquarters

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<th>Platoon Leader</th>
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<td>Driver</td>
<td>PFC</td>
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<td>Driver</td>
<td>PFC</td>
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2 M151s, each with 1 VRC-46

### Table 3: Heavy Cargo Squad

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<th>Squad leader</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Driver (8-ton)</td>
<td>SGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (8-ton)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (8-ton)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (8-ton)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>PFC</td>
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2 PRC-77 (mod)

### Table 4: Medium Cargo Squad (3 each)

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<th>Squad leader</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>SGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PFC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton)</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
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2 PRC-77 (mod)

4 trailers

### Table 5: POL Squad

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<thead>
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<th>Squad leader</th>
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</thead>
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<td>SGT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant squad leader</td>
<td>SP5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton TPU)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton TPU)</td>
<td>SP4</td>
</tr>
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<td>SP4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton TPU)</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver (5-ton TPU)</td>
<td>PFC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 PRC-77 (mod)

TPUs have pod trailers

Figure 2
have a more manageable span of control than with the 13 or 14 elements they have now.

With the improved communications and mobility they would have, the support platoon leader and his platoon sergeant would find their tasks, though still formidable, greatly simplified. The LCC Forward and Rear would smooth out and simplify planning and executing the requirements.

Finally, with these improvements the support platoon leader could more easily keep track of his elements, and the S-4 would have several ways of transmitting and coordinating his requirements, each of which could take up the slack if one failed.

Although maintenance and mess requirements have been left out of this discussion, these key elements, with some imagination, could easily be integrated into this framework. The result should be a smoothly functioning logistical system that would be capable of meeting any and all demands that might be placed on it in the fluid environment that characterizes mechanized operations.

CAPTAIN BARTON L. PEARL has served as commander of a combat service company and as S-4 of a mechanized infantry battalion. He has also completed the Supply Management Officer Course at the Quartermaster School and is now assigned to the U.S. Army Computer Systems Command.

The Battalion S-4:
Lessons Learned

CAPTAIN HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR.

The brilliant and audacious “Desert Fox,” Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, showed his understanding of the importance of logistics in military operations when he said that “the bravest men can do nothing without guns,” that guns can do nothing without plenty of ammunition, and “that neither guns nor ammunition are much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient fuel to haul them around.”

Seeing that the “bravest men” receive adequate supplies of weapons and ammunition — and all the other logistical support they need to defeat a determined enemy — is the primary duty of the infantry battalion S-4. Yet the position of S-4 is one of the least desired, least understood, and least appreciated.

Too many battalion commanders, for example, seem to put their best officers in other positions and to have no qualms about rotating their S-4s every three to four months. (Fortunately, most do change their opinions on the value of their S-4s eventually — once they realize that supplying and moving units in a tactical environment is not accomplished at the stroke of a grease pencil.)

It would help matters, though, if they, and everyone else involved, understood the various functions of the battalion S-4 before getting into the position of dealing with him or needing him. And officers who are likely to be assigned the job themselves especially need to understand what they can expect to face.

DUTIES

The battalion S-4 is, of course, responsible for logistics; his primary function is to advise the commander on all logistical matters within the battalion. At that level, he is a logistical planner and coordinator, as well as an operator, and becomes directly involved in requisitioning, receiving, storing, and distributing supplies, or in providing transportation.

The duties of the S-4, in addition to advising the commander on logistical matters, are these:

- Planning, coordinating, and supervising all matters pertaining to logistics within the battalion.
- Coordinating the logistical activities of all attached and supporting elements.
- Assisting subordinate commanders on logistical matters.
- Providing for control of the battalion trains.
- Submitting logistical reports as directed.
- Planning for area damage control.
- Preparing the logistics estimate and paragraph 4 (service support) of the operations order.
- Preparing a garrison and field (tactical) logistics SOP.

The S-4 also normally supervises the activities of the motor officer, the support platoon leader, and all the logistical support elements in the battalion.

When an officer takes an assignment as a battalion S-4, he usually has
had some logistical training. If he has not, he needs to learn quickly what an S-4 is supposed to do and what all his duties and responsibilities entail. The best place for him to start learning is with his battalion commander and battalion executive officer. From them he can find out how they perceive his job and its responsibilities as well as what they expect of him. The brigade S-4 can give him additional guidance, as can his division G-4 and division support command (DISCOM) personnel.

He should also locate and become familiar with logistics references — ARs, CTAs (Common Tables of Allowances), FMIs (especially FM 10-14-2, Guide for the Battalion S-4), SBs, SCs, TOEs, TBs, TMs, and local SOPs. Also invaluable to the new S-4 are correspondence courses from the U.S. Army Quartermaster School, including the Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Supply Management Officer Course, and particularly the Supply Staff Officer (S-4/G-4) Course.

One of the S-4’s challenges is that in effect he works for six bosses: each company commander and the battalion commander. It is imperative, therefore, that he inculcate into the members of his section the strongest sense of duty to the companies and the infantrymen of the battalion — the cutting edge of the unit.

To do his job well, a battalion S-4 has to work regularly with many people at division level — the Division Property Book Officer, the Class II, IV, and VII accountable officer, and the area facilities engineer, for example. He will reap tremendous dividends in later transactions if he will meet with these people soon after assuming his duties and develop a sound working relationship with them.

In supervising the activities of the motor officer and the support platoon leader, one of his responsibilities, together with the battalion commander and the executive officer, is to see that these officers are technically and tactically proficient in their duties. This may mean sending them to special courses, increasing their overlap time with their predecessors, or giving them individual tutoring. Whatever method is employed, this training is essential, and is particularly important for the support platoon leader, who has what may be the most important position for a lieutenant in the battalion—that of Class III (POL) and Class V (ammunition) Property Book Officer.

Because the S-4 rates the motor officer and the support platoon leader, he must counsel them regularly to point out any weaknesses in their job performances and to recommend solutions. Then he must give them enough time to improve before writing their evaluation reports.

The soldiers in his section, too, need special guidance. The S-4 should give
each of them specific duties in a written job description. He should also cross-train them as much as possible so that the section will stay efficient and effective even when key individuals are absent.

The S-4 also needs to evaluate his section's usefulness and to streamline operations as much as possible. In coordination with the company commanders and the unit supply officers, he must take the dominant role in seeing that all unit supply personnel are properly trained. And he should brief those officers who serve as report-of-survey officers on their responsibilities.

As the primary logisticians in the battalion, the S-4 is ultimately responsible for helping all units earn at least "satisfactory" ratings on all their inspections, especially the annual general inspection. To accomplish this, he should serve as the focal point for coordinating inspections, courtesy or assistance visits — such as those by maintenance and assistance inspection teams (MAIT) — and all other assistance efforts rendered by units or staff agencies not organic to the battalion.

**COMPETITION**

To ensure that unit supply rooms maintain AGI standards (while continuing to provide outstanding support to the unit's soldiers), the S-4 can conduct a "Battalion Supply Room-of-the-Month" competition. In such a competition, once a month each unit supply room in the battalion is inspected, with 10 percent of the AGI standards being used as the competition criteria. The completed DA Forms 2404, with discrepancies listed, are forwarded through the battalion commander to the company commanders for correction. The "best" supply room and its personnel are then rewarded accordingly. This way, over a one-year period, each unit supply room can be inspected on 120 percent of the AGI standards and requirements.

Another responsibility of the battalion S-4 is administering the battalion's supply budget. Called TUPMIS (Tactical Unit Financial Management Information System), this budget involves $300,000 to $500,000 worth of general supplies (Classes II, IV, and VII) and of Class IX items each fiscal year. To allocate and control these funds effectively, the S-4 must have guidance and support from his battalion commander.

**TACTICAL**

In a tactical environment, the S-4 is responsible for all logistical support to the battalion. He personally organizes and controls the battalion combat trains (consisting of Class III, Class V, maintenance, and medical assets) and supervises the support platoon leader in controlling and supervising the activities of the battalion field trains. It is essential that resupply procedures in a tactical environment be standardized and that company executive officers be used to resupply units effectively and punctually. This field environment gives the S-4 a chance to be especially innovative, such as developing platoon Class IV barrier material packages to be delivered forward directly to the using unit.

In accomplishing all these tasks, the S-4 should keep a notebook that contains unit missions, section organization, duty descriptions, garrison and tactical SOPs, training guidance, and logistical points of contact. This kind of notebook can be indispensable not only to him but also to his successor, who will thus be given a head start on learning his job.

Throughout his tenure, the battalion S-4 should keep his superiors, as well as others who are affected by his actions, informed as to the progress and the current status of all ongoing projects and activities. He should constantly evaluate and reevaluate his activities, as well as those of his subordinates. Only then can he ensure that all of his soldiers receive the logistical support they need when they need it; that the battalion can deploy to any location at any time, ready to accomplish any mission; that 100 percent property accountability is maintained at all times; and that the S-4 section is always aware of its sole reason for existence — to serve the company commanders and their soldiers by providing all the logistical support they need.

Even though the battalion S-4 position is one of the least desired, understood, and appreciated of the staff positions, it is, nonetheless, one of the most important staff positions. At the battalion level, the S-4 is an operator as well as a logistical planner and coordinator and becomes directly involved in all logistical matters. An effective and efficient S-4, one who is also concerned for others, is worth his weight in gold.

One of the ablest senior commanders in World War II, Field Marshal Earl Wavell, recognized and emphasized the importance of battlefield logistics when he said:

*The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation... It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks.*

Field Marshal Wavell's advice is clearly worth following. Depending on our own individual position, we should all learn either how to be effective battalion S-4s or how to properly employ a battalion S-4. Above all else, we should all learn logistics. Our battlefield success will depend on it.

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**CAPTAIN HAROLD E. RAUGH, JR.** is a brigade staff officer in the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord. He previously served as S-4 of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry in Korea. He is a 1978 ROTC graduate of the University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh.
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article has been abstracted and edited from material taken from two official United States Army historical studies and from one official historical manuscript: CROSS-CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison (OCMH, 1951); OMAHA BEACH-HEAD, 6 JUNE - 13 JUNE 1944 (American Forces in Action Series, 1945); and AIRBORNE OPERATIONS, Chapters I through IX, by Major James A. Huston (OCMH, nd). These sources have been used with the permission of the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

We have concentrated our attention on the airborne and amphibious landings that took place in the U.S. sector on 6 June 1944, and then primarily on the infantry actions. We deeply regret that space limitations prevent us from telling also of the British landings on the same day, and of the magnificent support rendered by the Allied naval and air forces to the infantrymen before and after their landings. We feel that any U.S. Infantryman who landed in Normandy on that day 40 years ago would acknowledge his debt to that support.

OVERLORD, the cross-Channel attack that hit the German-occupied coast of Normandy between Caen and Cherbourg on 6 June 1944, was one of the last and by far the biggest of the series of amphibious operations by which the United States and the British Empire came to grips with the German-Italian-Japanese Axis in the course of World War II. But it was more than just another attack. It was the supreme effort of the Western Allies in Europe — the consummation of the grand design to defeat Germany by striking directly at the heart of Hitler's Reich.

It had taken the U.S. and British planners many months to settle on the 50 miles of coast in Western Normandy, from the Vire Estuary to the Orne, as the assault area for securing a lodgment. The area was near good, relatively undamaged ports in southern and southwestern England, and was within range of fighter planes operating from English bases; the major French ports of Cherbourg and le Havre were within striking distance; and air attacks on railways and river bridges might be able to isolate the region behind the assault area from the main enemy centers of supply and reinforcement to the east.

The Allied forces in the Normandy operation were under the overall command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. The ground forces, which comprised the British Second and the U.S. First Armies, were commanded by General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. The plan called for the Allied ground forces to assault in three main areas with an initial strength of six reinforced infantry and three airborne divisions (see Map 1).

On the left, the British Second Army was to attack with three divisions on three landing beaches. A brigade of the British 6th Airborne Division was to be dropped behind the beach defenses to secure vital bridges over the Orne River between Caen and the sea. The Second Army's objectives for D-Day included Bayeux, Caen, and Cabourg.

The U.S. First Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, was responsible for the other two assault areas. The U.S. VII Corps, on the right, was to land one division — the U.S. 4th Infantry Division — just north of the Vire Estuary on UTAH Beach. In the early morning hours of D-Day, four to five hours before the assault from the sea, the U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were to be dropped inland from UTAH Beach in an area southeast and west of St. Mere Église, where their mission was to capture the crossings of the Merderet River, secure the line of the Douve River as a barrier to the south, and assist the landings of the 4th Division. By the end of D-Day, VII Corps was expected to control the area east of Merderet from just south of Montebourg to the Douve.

Between the other assault areas, the U.S. V Corps was to attack over a 7,000-yard stretch of beach known as OMAHA. Its mission was to secure a beachhead in the area between Port-en-Bessin and the Vire River, from which its forces would push southward toward Caumont and St. Lo, conforming with the advance of the British Second Army. Its initial assault force (Force "O") was made up of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division reinforced to include four infantry regiments with strong attachments of artillery, armor, and engineers, as well as attachments of engineers and service units for movement to the beach. The Division's chief components were its own 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams, the 116th Regimental Combat Team and the 115th Infantry Regiment attached from the U.S. 29th Infantry Division, and the Provisional Ranger Force of two battalions (the 2d and the 5th). Force "O" numbered 34,142 men and 3,306 vehicles.

The follow-up force for OMAHA Beach (Force "B"), scheduled to arrive off the beach after noon on D-Day, numbered 25,117 men and 4,429 vehicles. It included the remainder of the 29th Infantry Division — its own 175th Infantry Regiment — and the 26th Regimental Combat Team, which was attached from the 1st Division.

The loading plans of the two forces were designed to fit an operation that was to develop from an assault by one reinforced division into an attack by two divisions abreast.

The organizational structure of the assault units was modified to give them a careful balance of striking power and mobility so that they could develop a weight behind their initial attack. It was hoped that this weight would not only crumble the enemy defenses but would carry the assaulting troops far enough inland that follow-up troops could be put ashore behind them to consolidate and then to exploit the beachhead.

While the basic divisional structure remained unchanged, the rifle companies were organized in assault teams with special equipment to deal with fortified posi-
tions. Thus, the platoons of the assault companies were split into two assault sections apiece, each with 29 men and 1 officer, the size being determined by the capacity of an LCVP (landing craft, vehicle and personnel).

The two assault platoons in each company included rifle teams, a wire-cutting team, a bazooka team, a flame-throwing team, a BAR (Browning automatic rifle) team, a 60mm mortar team, and a demolition team. The third platoon was similarly organized except that it had an 81mm instead of a 60mm mortar and a heavy machinegun instead of a BAR. After the assault, each platoon was to be reorganized into a normal rifle platoon with two rifle squads and a weapons squad.

The infantry assault troops were to be stripped to the barest combat essentials, but they were to have a loaded fist: a tank battalion attached to each of the assault regiments would lead the attack. A portion of the tanks was to be carried in on LCTs (landing craft, tanks) to touch down approximately with the first infantry wave. Another portion of tanks, modified for amphibious operation, was to be launched about 5,000 to 6,000 yards offshore to swim in ahead of the assault waves. (These were M-4 medium tanks equipped with detachable canvas "bloomers" — accordion-pleated screens which when raised were capable of floating the 32-ton tanks by displacement. They had a duplex drive — twin propellers for swimming and the normal track drive for overland movement. From the duplex drive came their common name, "DDs.")

The tanks were not to be used as an armored force but as close support artillery. (No plans were made to use the tanks in exploitation from the beaches.) Although tanks were not the ideal assault artillery, they seemed the best available. Only armored guns had a chance of surviving on the beaches. Tests indicated that the tanks' main guns — 75mm or 76mm — could be used effectively to neutralize or destroy concrete pillboxes by firing into the embrasures. This would enable the infantry to get close to the pillboxes in their way and destroy them with flame throwers or demolitions.

Following closely the beaching of the first tank companies, the leading infantry waves would touch down, clear the beaches, and cover the landing of engineer demolition teams. The task of the engineers — to cut and mark gaps through the belts of shore obstacles before these were covered by the rising tide — would be one of the most critical in the operation, and its successful accomplishment would demand meticulous adherence to the time schedule. The engineers were to work with special naval demolition units and would have the assistance of tankdozers landed at the same time.

The succeeding assault waves were to consist mostly of infantry and additional engineers. The first artillery units were to come in about an hour and a half after the first landings. The debarkation of heavy vehicles across the beaches was to start about three hours after H-Hour. By that time the assaulting infantry was expected to have the beach exits cleared and to have fought their way well inland. (An assault landing plan is shown in the accompanying diagram.)

AIRBORNE ASSAULT

The first actions of all the U.S. airborne units in Nor-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EASY GREEN</th>
<th>DOG RED</th>
<th>DOG WHITE</th>
<th>DOG GREEN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>H-5</strong></td>
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<td>H-HOUR</td>
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<td>Co A 743 Tk Bn</td>
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<td>Co A 743 Tk Bn</td>
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<td><strong>H+01</strong></td>
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**Note:** Plans as of 11 May

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mandy on D-Day were attempts by small groups of men to carry out, in the fog of the battlefield, their own small portions of the assigned plan. There could be little overall direction from above.

Things began to go wrong almost as soon as the formations arrived over the French coast. Bursts of antiaircraft fire brought a natural response on the part of the pilots — evasive action — although it was contrary to instructions. Formations loosened, and then cloud banks caused further scattering. Soon, all semblance of a formation was lost. Only four or five serials held together long enough to drop their paratroopers onto the proper drop zones in an orderly fashion.

The scattering of aircraft resulted in a scattering of the airborne units on the ground. Units from the 101st Airborne Division began dropping in a wide area southeast of St. Mere Eglise about 0130, 6 June. They were so badly scattered that assembling the paratroopers was almost out of the question.

Glider landings began at 0400 with little more promise of success, what with numerous crash landings and landings in enemy-dominated areas. One of the casualties in the early morning glider landings was the division's assistant commander, who was killed. (Additional elements of the division that could not be included in the initial lift went in by glider between 2000 and 2100 that evening, but again there were numerous crash landings and landings in German-held areas.)

Elements of the 4th Infantry Division, driving inland from UTAH Beach, contacted the 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry (101st Airborne Division) at 1215, but the 101st was still far from being under unified control. As of 2400, for example, 50 percent of the airborne echelon had been accounted for; there had been no word from the 501st Parachute Infantry other than from its 3d Battalion, and it had assembled only 120 officers and men; the 502d Parachute Infantry was holding a series of strong points generally north of St. German de Varreville with about 300 men; the 506th Parachute Infantry had some 350 men at Cucleille, with no word from its 3d Battalion; and some 85 men of the 377th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, with one gun, were with the 502d Infantry. Eleven of the twelve 75mm pack howitzers of the 377th, together with their crews, were lost completely.

The situation with the 82d Airborne Division was even more precarious. It met more determined opposition in the early stages, and it suffered more seriously also from scattered drops that left two of its regiments unable to assemble in sufficient force to carry out their missions.

(In fact, the division's dispersion had been so broad that even two days later, on the morning of 8 June, it was reported that the division had only 2,100 effectives under unified control. Contact had been established with only one battalion of the 508th Parachute Infantry and half a battalion of the 507th that had dropped west of the Merderet River.)

The division's 505th Parachute Infantry, however, probably had the best drop in the whole operation. Its troop carrier planes had also been scattered, but many of their pilots were able to circle back — a dangerous undertaking when several serials were following closely and when formations had been broken — and find the drop zone that pathfinders had clearly marked. Under orders to use only knives, bayonets, and grenades so that any enemy fire could be spotted in the darkness, about a quarter of the men of the 3d Battalion rapidly assembled and moved in to capture St. Mere Eglise before dark. Other members of the regiment reinforced the troops holding the town during the morning. It was the only one of the division's initial missions to be carried out according to plan.

Some gliders had landed in the early morning shortly after the parachute drops, and others were scheduled for the evening. The glider landings, too, were somewhat scattered, but their principal hazards were the small fields enclosed by hedgerows and enemy fire.

Late in the afternoon of D-Day, a task force belonging to the division and consisting of a company of tanks and 90 glider infantrymen arrived by sea to support the 82d. The task force commander was concerned not only with getting the tanks through to the division but also with clearing an area that contained certain designated glider landing zones. These were to be used at dusk by gliders bringing in artillery units.

But the task force could not drive from the area the German defenders, who were in considerable strength and well concealed. On schedule at 2100, about 60 gliders came in low over the area and cut loose for landings. The Germans reacted with intense automatic weapon fire, and many of the gliders crashed while others came down within the German lines. Casualties were heavy. The remnants of the glider force was collected by the task force and formed into a makeshift defense for the night.

Yet in spite of their widespread landings, the airborne troops were able to win their major objectives. German patrols sent to liquidate the invaders became involved in fighting in every direction. There were no U.S. battalion concentrations against which an effective counterattack might be launched. All this confusion did not fit into the German plans for defense; it had no place in German antiairborne doctrine.

Small groups of paratroopers and glidermen fought their way toward their assembly areas. One group, for example, was reported to have dropped 20 miles behind its objective, but the men worked their way back and destroyed two light tanks on the way. The effect of all this action was a very real contribution to the rapid reduction of the defenses on UTAH Beach and to the establishment of a deep beachhead line.

UTAH BEACH

Even as the airborne soldiers were fighting inland from UTAH Beach, the invasion fleet was bringing the main body of the American assault forces to the shores of Normandy. H-Hour for the U.S. beaches was 0630.

The huge convoys, under a constant umbrella of
fighter squadrons, made the voyage unmolested by the Germans either by air or by sea. The naval task force that carried the UTAH Beach assault forces dropped anchor in its transport area at about 0230; the OMAHA Beach assault force reached its transport area about 20 minutes later. The assault troops began unloading into the LCVPs that would take them to the beaches.

German coastal defenses began sporadic firing at 0535, only 15 minutes before the pre-invasion Allied naval bombardment began. Projectiles from the Allied warships thundered over the heads of the troops making the final run in to shore until a few minutes before their landing craft reached the shore. Beach drenching was then taken up by the close support craft.

The 4th Division had planned to land in a column of regiments on a two-battalion front of about 2,000 yards. The 8th Infantry Regiment, with the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry Regiment attached, was to lead; it was to be followed by the remainder of the 22d Infantry, and then by the 12th Infantry Regiment. The 359th Infantry Regiment from the U.S. 90th Infantry Division, the first follow-up division at UTAH Beach, was attached to the 4th Division to begin landing on D-Day. It was to serve initially as the division's reserve.

In May, German activity had been observed on the St. Marcouf Islands flanking UTAH Beach on the north. It was therefore decided to land detachments of the 4th and 24th Cavalry Squadrons two hours before H-Hour to clear out what was suspected to be either a German observation post or a minefield control point.

The 4th Division had little difficulty getting ashore. The cavalry detachments (132 men) found the St. Marcouf Islands unoccupied though heavily mined. From mines and a concentration of German artillery fire that hit the islands in the afternoon, the cavalry units lost two men killed and seventeen wounded.

The small landing crafts (LCVPs) carrying the first waves of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 8th Infantry, were launched in relatively sheltered water and had no serious trouble with the wind and surf. At H-Hour there was no enemy opposition. The 32 DD tanks that were supposed to land in the first wave were delayed by the loss of a control vessel that struck a mine. All but four of these tanks, which were lost when the LCT carrying them hit a mine, were beached about fifteen minutes late. But, as it turned out, the assault troops had no immediate need for them.

Leading elements of the two assault battalions touched down about on time but almost 2,000 yards south of where they were supposed to land. The error was probably made partly because some of the landmarks had been obscured by the smoke and dust the naval bombardment had raised and partly because there was a southeast coastal current. In any case it turned out to be fortunate, since it brought troops in on beaches that were much less heavily defended than those designated in the plan.

Although the mislanding meant that the tasks assigned to each assault section could not be carried out as planned, the lack of serious enemy opposition permitted reconnaissances and speedy reorganizations for improvised maneuver. After company-sized task forces had reduced the very lightly defended field fortifications covering the two middle beach exits, both assault battalions began their advance across the flooded area.

The first infantry wave was followed by engineer and naval demolition parties to clear the underwater obstacles. Because there were fewer obstacles than expected, the original plan to blow fifty-foot gaps was abandoned in favor of clearing the entire beach on the first tide. The job was completed in an hour. Engineers then proceeded to their next task of blowing gaps and clearing minefields. Enemy opposition consisted only of intermittent shelling.

While engineers worked on the beach, the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, supported by tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion, and by the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, were landing and moving out. Well before H plus 3 hours the beach area had been cleared and landings were virtually routine, harassed only by sporadic enemy artillery fire (see Map 2).

OMAHA BEACH

The early success and extraordinarily small number of casualties on UTAH Beach contrasted sharply with the difficulties at OMAHA Beach during those first critical three hours. (In fact, throughout most of D-Day, the German 84th Corps and the German Seventh Army believed that the OMAHA assault had been stopped at the water's edge. It was late in the morning before General Bradley, aboard his command ship, could have contradicted that view and much longer before the Allied command could feel secure about the OMAHA beachhead.)

The 1st Infantry Division assaulted with two regiments abreast, the 116th Infantry on the right, the 16th Infantry on the left. Each regiment was supposed to land two battalion landing teams at H-Hour with their initial missions being to clear the beach defenses and to seize and secure
the portion of the beachhead maintenance line in their respective zones. The beachhead maintenance line roughly followed the ridge of high ground that paralleled the main coastal road and was in most places from two to three miles inland. From this line, the assault regiments, supported by the 18th Infantry landing after H plus 3 hours and the 26th Infantry landing on order of the corps commander, would punch out toward the D-Day phase line. Occupation of that phase line would mean securing a coastal strip five or six miles deep astride the Bayeux highway (see Map 3).

The 116th Infantry was responsible for capturing the Pointe du Hoc coastal battery. On the assumption that the six partially casemated 155mm guns would not be destroyed by pre-D-Day bombardment or by the heavy naval fire that would be directed on them just before H-Hour, the two Ranger battalions had been attached to the 116th Infantry with the special H-Hour mission of taking out the guns.

Perhaps the most important job assigned to the first assault waves was the reduction of the enemy positions defending the roads leading from the beach inland. The gently sloping sand of OMAHA Beach was backed by an embankment of loose stones, or shingle, as much as fifteen yards wide in places. In the Vierville sector the shingle piled up against a part-masonry, part-wood sea wall. On the rest of the beach there was no wall, but the shingle lay against a sand embankment, or dune line. Both the shingle and the dune line were impassable to vehicles.

Behind the beach were scrub-covered bluffs 100 to 170 feet high of varying steepness, and these merged east and west with the cliffs that marked the extremities of the 7,000-yard crescent beach. The bluffs were cut by five draws. Unimproved roads ran through four of these draws, one connecting with the main coastal highway at Vierville-sur-Mer, two at St. Laurent, and one at Colleville. The fifth draw, northeast of Colleville, was steep and contained only a trail, but it was considered capable of development as a vehicle exit.

The plan assumed these exits would be open to traffic at least by H plus 2 hours when the heavy flow of vehicular reinforcements was scheduled to begin. The importance of the beach exits was, of course, as obvious to the Germans as to the Allies, and local coastal defenses were grouped to deny their use to the attackers. On the other hand, the 1st Division had precise information on the location of these defenses, and every effort was made to give the assaulting infantry the heavy fire support needed to knock them out.

At H minus 50 minutes, two companies of DD tanks from the 741st Tank Battalion destined for the 16th Infantry beaches were launched 6,000 yards offshore and almost immediately began to founder. Of the 32 tanks launched, only 5 reached shore, and 3 of those were beached by an LCT that could not lower its ramp at sea. These were the first of the casualties to the weather. There would be others.

The assaulting infantry was transferred from transports to LCVPs ten to eleven miles offshore. At least ten of the ferrying craft were swamped on the way in. More serious was the sinking of much of the artillery.

The attempt to ferry guns ashore in DUKWs through the heavy seas proved disastrous. All but one of the 105mm howitzers of the 111th Field Artillery Battalion were sunk; six of the 105mm howitzers belonging to the 7th Field Artillery Battalion suffered the same fate; five of the six howitzers of the 16th Infantry Cannon Com-
pany were swamped. In addition to these wholesale losses, the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, whose guns were mounted on LCTs and had taken part in the initial beach drenching, lost three of its pieces when the craft carrying them hit mines. In short, the artillery that was planned to support the infantry attack, particularly during the advance inland, never reached the shore.

The weather contributed also to navigational difficulties. Mist mixed with the smoke and dust raised by the naval bombardment obscured landmarks on the coast; in addition, a lateral current of from two to three knots tended to carry the landing craft eastward of their touchdown points. Even so, the actual errors in landing were considerably less than those at UTAH Beach — in most cases they amounted to no more than a few hundred yards. But they proved much more serious for the tactical situation, partly because the errors were not constant, which caused the units to become scattered on their final approach.

Since the men had been briefed only for their particular areas, they were confused by the changed picture. The difficulties were compounded by the heavier enemy opposition, which had the effect of isolating boat sections only a few hundred yards apart. At first, this made the assembly and reorganization of the units for improvised missions almost impossible.

Naval gunfire had temporarily neutralized some of the enemy batteries and fortifications, but most of them were still able to fire at the incoming troops as soon as the bombardment was forced to lift. The 1st Division soldiers in the first LCVPs could hear machinegun bullets splatter against the steel ramps of their craft before they grounded. Debarking in water sometimes up to their necks, the troops on some sectors of the beach were met with a hail of bullets that drove some to seek shelter under the surf, others to scramble over the sides of the craft. Control of boat sections was thus often lost before the men even started in to the beach.

The troops, overladen with heavy clothing and equipment, waded slowly through the surf and through fire that increased as they approached the beach. Some stopped to rest or to seek shelter behind obstacles. Some lay at the water’s edge and were able eventually to crawl in with the tide. But casualties generally were heavier among those who delayed in getting up onto the beach. Many of the wounded were drowned in the rising tide.

The first wave should have landed nine companies evenly spaced along the beach. Because of withering enemy fire and mislandings, however, the right wing all but disintegrated; two companies bunched in front of les Moulins, and the remainder (elements of four companies) clustered in the Colleville sector. One company was carried so far to the east that it landed an hour and a half late.

The two right flank companies — Company C, 2d Ranger Battalion and Company A, 116th Infantry — landed as scheduled in front of the Vierville draw. But one craft foundered and one was hit four times by mortar fire. Men from the remaining craft struggled to shore. Intense small arms fire took its toll of about two-thirds of Company A’s soldiers and more than half of the Rangers before any reached the comparative shelter of the sea wall or the base of the cliff.

Of the 16 tanks scheduled to land in this sector just ahead of the infantry, only 8 survived enemy artillery fire to reach the shore. All were brought in on LCTs because 116th Infantry officers decided the sea was too rough to launch the DDs.

In the eastern part of the 116th Infantry zone, the initial landings had not gone much better. A 1,000-yard gap separated the troops who touched down there from the remnants of the two companies on the right. The two companies of tanks that landed first were brought in on LCTs without losses.

This initial success was not shared by the infantry. Only two of the three companies of the 2d Battalion, 116th Infantry, landed within the regimental zone. One of these companies lost a quarter of its men to enemy fire during the 45 minutes it took them to cross the beach to the protection of the shingle bank. The remainder had better luck in landing in front and just west of les Moulins where the bluff was obscured by smoke fires and where the enemy fire was sporadic and inaccurate. Even these men were somewhat disorganized, and the officers who survived with them were confused by the knowledge that they had landed east of their designated beaches.

The experience of the 16th Infantry on the left flank of the division duplicated that of the 116th, as scattered landings and heavy casualties left the first boat sections incapable of undertaking their primary assault missions.

In the 16th Infantry’s zone, though, one soft spot was discovered. Four boat sections of the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry, landing between the St. Laurent and Colleville exits, crossed the beach with only two casualties from enemy fire. The local defense of this sector of the beach was the Colleville strong point, which had been planned as three mutually supporting resistance nests. Of these, the fortified position atop the bluff midway between the two draws was seemingly unoccupied on D-Day. This apparent negligence on the part of the German defenders, which left the beach northwest of Colleville without an immediate defense, was balanced at first by the landing of so few men there. Except for those four boat sections of the 2d Battalion, the first wave of the 16th Infantry (Companies E and F) touched down immediately in front, or east, of the occupied fortifications of the Colleville strong point, where it was caught in machinegun fire as intense as that which decimated the 116th Infantry.

Many of the soldiers from Company E, hard hit and exhausted in their efforts to wade ashore, flopped on the sand and crawled in ahead of the tide; nearly half of them did not survive. Because most of the supporting DD tanks were swamped on their way in, and because the Germans immediately destroyed five of the company of medium tanks that were beached from LCTs, the 16th Infantry initially had only a third of its planned armor support. The tanks that were available went into action on the beach between the St. Laurent and Colleville exits.
The heavy losses and the disorganization of the first wave affected each succeeding wave through the morning of D-Day. The first serious effect was the inability of the engineers and the naval demolition parties to blow gaps in the beach obstacles as planned. Weather conditions also played a part in keeping the engineers from accomplishing their mission. Half the demolition teams were delayed in landing and only a third of them touched down on their appointed beaches. Since the rest were carried eastward by the coastal current, the 116th Infantry's zone received substantially less than the scheduled engineer support.

German fire also took a heavy toll of both men and equipment. Of 16 bulldozers, only 3 could be put into operation on the beach, and one of these could not maneuver freely because riflemen were using it as a shelter. Casualties to the engineers amounted to about 40 percent for the day and were certainly much higher for the first groups ashore.

In half an hour after H-Hour the tide, rising at the rate of about four feet an hour, had covered the obstacles to the extent that further clearance had become impossible. Remnants of the engineers, therefore, joined the infantry behind the shingle to wait for the next tide.

The second group of assault waves, consisting of five separately timed landings, was to complete the build-up of the two assault regiments by H plus 1 hour and to bring in the 81st Chemical Battalion; two combat engineer battalions whose principal task was to clear minefields for the advance inland; naval shore fire control parties; and advance elements of artillery, medical, and antiaircraft units.

In the zone of the 116th Infantry, the remaining three companies of the 1st Battalion were scheduled to come in behind Company A on the right. On the left the heavy weapons company of the 2d Battalion was to land to complete that unit, and it was to be followed by the 3d Battalion.

The right flank, however, continued to suffer misfortune. Only scattered sections of the reinforcing units managed to land there, and they were hit by the same destructive fire that had virtually knocked Company A out of the battle. The battalion headquarters company, including the beachmaster for the 1st Battalion, landed at the base of the cliff west of the rifle companies and under enemy fire so severe that it was unable to move for most of the day. The heavy weapons company, scattered and hard hit on the approach, took two hours to assemble its survivors. It salvaged only three mortars, three machine-guns, and a few rounds of ammunition.

Only one company of the 1st Battalion survived as an organized group capable of pursuing its assault missions. This was Company C, which had landed 1,000 yards east of its planned beach and within the area of the bluffs covered by smoke from a brush fire. With few casualties and with its equipment virtually intact, the company waded in on a front of not more than 100 yards and reorganized in the shelter of the sea wall.

Next to land in the 116th zone were the Rangers. The 5th Ranger Battalion, together with two companies of the 2d Rangers, had waited offshore for news of the assault on Pointe du Hue, which would determine whether they landed there or came in in the 116th Infantry's zone. The Pointe du Hue assault, though, had been delayed 40 minutes by the eastward drift of the craft carrying the Rangers. Therefore, there was no news at all, and the Ranger reinforcements, concluding that the assault must have failed, proceeded with the alternate plan.

Accordingly, the 5th Ranger Battalion followed Company C, 116th Infantry, and shared its relatively easy landing. But the two companies of the 2d Ranger Battalion came in about where they were supposed to on the fire-swept right flank behind elements of Companies A and B, 116th Infantry. Only between a third and a half of the two 65-man companies survived to take shelter at the head of the beach.

In the zone of the 2d Battalion, 116th Infantry, the second wave brought in the heavy weapons company and the battalion headquarters. Company H suffered such losses and disorganization that it could be of little immediate help in supplying mortar or machinegun support. The 2d Battalion commander, coming ashore near les Moulins, organized a few sections of Company F that had landed in the first wave and attempted an assault on the enemy positions in the draw. The attempt was unsuccessful, but in the meantime the 3d Battalion was landing bunched up astride the regimental boundary just east of les Moulins. Although it was somewhat disorganized by the intermingling of units, the battalion suffered little from German fire in crossing the beach.

At the end of the first hour, the 116th Infantry had at least a nucleus of force that could be organized for an attack against the German defenders. Most hopeful was the situation roughly in the center of the regimental zone just west of les Moulins where enemy fire was light and ineffective, and where shortly after 0730, by great good fortune, the regimental command group came ashore.

The experience of the 116th Infantry's later waves was similar to that of the 116th. Losses were lighter, but the confusion and intermingling of units on the beaches became more serious. The two remaining companies of the 2d Battalion (Companies G and H), followed by the 1st Battalion, landed about where it was supposed to, due north of Colleville. The 3d Battalion completed its landing on the left shortly after 0800. Its headquarters, though, landed to the west and could not join its troops for several hours.

The 16th Infantry suffered another misfortune when the regimental executive officer, coming in with the first section of the headquarters, was killed, along with 35 of his men. The regimental commander did not arrive until 0815 with the second headquarters section.

Command was one of the gravest problems faced by the assault units, not only because officer casualties were high and the mislanding of command groups had left many units leaderless, but also because of the extreme difficulties of communication. For example, three-
fourths of the 116th Infantry’s radios were destroyed or rendered useless. (Carrying heavy communication equipment through the surf under enemy fire was a formidable task that took many lives. Five men of the 16th Infantry were decorated for their heroic work in struggling ashore with vital radios and wire, despite serious wounds. One received a posthumous award of the Medal of Honor for his intrepid efforts in recovering two radios and other equipment while suffering two severe wounds. On his third trip into the fire-swept surf he was killed.)

Furthermore, in the confusion caused by the mixing of units, which were under heavy fire in some places, their men huddled along the shingle embankment or sea wall and were generally shaken by the first few minutes of severe action. It would have been impossible for any commander to exercise control over more than a small group of men on a relatively narrow sector of the front.

In these first few hours on OMAHA Beach, the overall OVERLORD operation faced its gravest crisis. Deprived of the expected air support by the weather conditions and preceded by a generally ineffective beach drenching, the 1st Division had gone in against the one sector of the Normandy coast that had anything like the kind of cordon defense that the German defenders counted on to hold and smash the Allied invaders on the beaches.

Instead of attacking in the sector of one regiment of an overextended static German division as expected, the 1st Division’s soldiers hit on the front of a full attack infantry division. The presence of that division in the coastal zone had been missed by Allied intelligence, even though it had been in place for almost three months.

But even as early and discouraging reports regarding the progress on OMAHA Beach flowed back to General Bradley’s command ship, the crisis was bit by bit dissolving. Among the groups of scared, tired riflemen huddled along the beach were a few bold leaders — officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates — on whose individual backs the big responsibility at the moment lay.

They began by example and exhortation to prod the men to get up, leave such poor shelter as they had found,
and walk or crawl across the beach flat and up the hills where the Germans were dug in. From the larger perspective, the combined weight of the Allied arms began to wear down the defenders.

Movement off the beach, in consequence, at first took place between the exits. It began before 0800 in a number of independent actions by groups of men, never of more than company size and often much smaller. Some of the attacks had tank fire support; others were aided by the action of several destroyers that came within a few hundred yards of the beach and delivered direct fire wherever they could observe German activity.

Certainly the first troops to move inland were the Ranger companies at Pointe du Hoc, though their action was independent of the main landing force at OMAHA Beach and was, in fact, part of the fire support plan rather than of the assault plan itself.

Forty minutes later, the three companies of the 2d Ranger Battalion made landfall under close-in support fires from two destroyers. The destroyers’ fire was particularly effective during the first moments of the assault when it forced the German defenders to take cover while the Rangers scaled the cliff with ropes and ladders. In fact, German fire remained light after the Rangers reached the top of the cliff and began moving inland in groups of three or four across a desert cratered by concentrated aerial and naval bombardment. In disparate and confused actions the Rangers speedily carried out their primary mission. Patrols found the 155mm gun emplacements deserted. The guns themselves were discovered farther inland in a camouflaged field position. Curiously enough, they were unmanned and unguarded, and the handful of Rangers who stumbled on them were able to destroy them easily.

Thus far, the Rangers, despite 30 to 40 casualties in the landings, had not had a hard fight. Their difficulties began later in the day with the first of a series of German counterattacks that would keep them in a state of siege for two days, reducing their combat effectiveness to about 90.

Apart from these Ranger movements, the principal areas of penetration inland were four, two in each regimental zone. Naval fire support played an important part, and engineers finally managed to bulldoze two gaps through the duneline on either side of the St. Laurent exit, fill an antitank ditch, and clear the minefields. The resistance east of this draw had already been neutralized by the 16th Infantry. At about 1130, the Germans in this last organized defense at the St. Laurent draw surrendered to the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, which had begun landing at about 1000. Thus, in a little over an hour, concerted bold action had wrought the most substantial improvement on the beach since H-Hour. Reinforcements were coming ashore, and most important of all a road was at last open to move vehicles inland.

In the meantime, the battles inland were already being joined. The troops who gained the top of the bluffs by mid-morning were scattered groups, a small percentage of the assault battalions, and these were incapable of carrying out the D-Day advances as planned. Their objectives at first were simply to reach the various battalion assembly areas. Because of their small numbers and because of the difficulty of control in the hedgerow country, their actions were fragmented; they completely lacked both armored and artillery support, so their movements could be, and constantly were, checked by small enemy prepared positions seldom held by as much as a company.

Under the circumstances, this scattered resistance by small enemy groups constituted in sum a considerable obstacle to the American advance. But the vast supporting Allied naval and air power was practically unopposed, and by dominating the battlefield, planes and naval guns smashed such German reserves as could be gathered for a counterthrust. This gave the fragmented V Corps infantrymen a chance to recover, rebuild, and again become a ground army superior in numbers and equipment to anything that the Germans could thereafter muster to meet them.

While V Corps units struggled to find secure defenses for the night in their shallow lodgment areas, VII Corps was pouring ashore almost unhindered. As the 8th Infantry battalions moved inland to their objectives they had only minor engagements with an enemy who, on the whole, showed little inclination to fight.

In the northern portion of the 4th Division zone, neither the 12th nor the 22d Infantry Regiment reached their D-Day objectives. The delays were caused not by enemy opposition but by the difficulties of moving up through the marshes. The 22d was halted in the general area from Hamel de Crüttes on the coast of St. Germain-de-Vareville. The 12th came up on the left of the 502d Parachute Infantry, which was holding the 101st Division’s north flank near Beuzeville-au-Plain.
VII Corps had its weaknesses at the end of D-Day, but on the whole it was in a sound position, smaller than planned but better organized and stronger than might have been expected. Though still under intermittent enemy fire, UTAH Beach had been cleared and was prepared for the orderly reception of reinforcements. The 4th Division, virtually intact, was present in the beachhead, organized and equipped for offensive action. Its casualties for the day had been less than 200.

On the left, on OMAHA Beach, the situation was quite different. The main V Corps position at the end of the day was the narrow sector between St. Laurent and Colleville, a toehold on the enemy shore nowhere more than a mile and a half deep. All units lacked the vehicles, supplies, ammunition, artillery, and armored support they needed for further advance inland.

No artillery could be landed on OMAHA Beach during the morning. The elements of five battalions that beached in the afternoon all suffered heavy losses of equipment, including a total of 20 guns. Two antiaircraft gun battalions scheduled to arrive on D-Day could not come in until the following day. Only one artillery mission was fired on 6 June. V Corps losses for the day were about 2,000 killed, wounded, and missing.

The outcome of the assault on OMAHA Beach was not clear at the end of D-Day. A shallow lodgment had been secured, 1,500 to 2,000 yards deep in the area of farthest advance near Colleville. Weak German forces were still holding out in remnants of the beach defenses, and their artillery fire could still harass any section of the landing area.

The unloading of vehicles and supplies had fallen far short of the D-Day schedule. Artillery and tank support for the infantry ashore was reduced by severe losses of equipment. Enemy troops had shown plenty of determination and fighting spirit; if the Germans could muster enough force to counterattack this beginning of a beachhead, they might imperil its existence.

Therefore, the action of the next few days would be decisive. For success, two things would be essential: an advance inland far enough to put the beach area out of artillery range and to secure maneuver room for further progress; and the organization of the beach for maximum landings of supply and reinforcement. The first phase of the effort was to carry forward the original plan and reach the D-Day objectives.

History records, of course, that eventually the D-Day objectives were attained; that the beaches were cleared and a steady stream of men, supplies, and equipment began flowing to the forward units; that the combined Allied armies pushed inexorably ahead despite the twin difficulties of the terrain and stubborn German defenders; and that finally the German defenses in Normandy collapsed and the Allied armies swept across France and reached the borders of Germany.

Once again—much as in 1969, the 25th anniversary of the Normandy landings—thousands of people will assemble on and near the Normandy beaches. Many who were present in 1969—like Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery—will not be there in 1984. Time has taken its toll, not only from the ranks of the high-ranking officers but from the ranks of the privates, sergeants, and captains who survived the landings and all of the subsequent fighting as well. In fact, there are not many in either category around these days.

Thousands of words will be uttered and millions more written about the events of 6 June 1944. Hundreds of tourist buses will bring the curious, the gawkers, the genuinely interested, the pressing, the understanding. Their guides will tell them how at this spot so-and-so did this and that.

But not one speaker, not one guide will ever be able to recapture the magnificent human drama that was played out on those Normandy beaches and in the nearby fields in June 1944 by half-sick, desperate, frightened Allied infantrymen—the cutting edge of the greatest weapon of war ever forged by one nation or by a coalition of nations.

Many of those infantrymen died without ever seeing an enemy soldier. Some died without ever reaching shore, or at the water’s edge itself. More died on the shingle of OMAHA Beach—so many, in fact, that at times the stones were stained by their life’s blood. Scores of paratroopers and glidermen simply disappeared, their fate not known for many weeks.

Alone or in small groups, courageous infantrymen roused themselves and began fighting back. Those on OMAHA Beach stopped looking over their shoulders and braved the bluffs to take on the German defenders who had been shooting their units to pieces. Their airborne compatriots inland from UTAH Beach were already doing the same thing.

More infantrymen died, and many of them lie in the cemeteries that today dot the countryside of Normandy. Their graves will be visited by thousands on the anniversary of the day they died.

But do we really understand what happened in Normandy on that day 40 years ago? Will we ever understand what drove those infantrymen to do what they did? Probably not.

All we can do is to recount the events of that day for today’s infantrymen in the hopes that when their time comes to form part of the United States Army’s “cutting edge” they will not falter or stop, but will continue to fight—and to win. The infantrymen who died in Normandy on 6 June 1944 will expect nothing less. Only then will they know that the example they set that day, the ultimate sacrifice they made in the cause of freedom, was not in vain.

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Since withdrawing from Vietnam, the U.S. Army has made some fundamental changes in the way it trains. In most respects, these changes have been positive ones. The wealth of first-class materials available to support training today, for example, are clearly superior to what we had ten years ago. In place of the dull, buff-covered manuals of those days, we now enjoy publications that are crisp, pertinent, and accessible to the average soldier. Supplementing these new manuals are audiovisual aids, in formats ranging from Training Extension Course (TEC) tapes to video-cassettes, that are eye-catching, informative, and available in large numbers.

Of even greater importance has been the Army's growing family of training devices. In an era of increasingly sophisticated weapons and shrinking ammunition allocations, these devices enable us to train routinely on systems that we would otherwise seldom use. While they cannot replace service firing entirely, some of these devices (the moving target simulator for our Redeye and
Stinger gunners; ATGM trainers such as the Launch Effects Trainer (LET) and the M70; and call-for-fire trainers such as the Marconi device) have inestimable training value. And standing in a class by itself is MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system), a training tool that has revolutionized maneuver training.

Although these improvements in training resources have been impressive, they shrink in importance when compared to what has happened to our conceptual approach to training. Here, the past decade has seen profound changes: the whole notion of “train to fight,” in which a unit's training schedule derives from its wartime missions; the emphasis on specific conditions and standards to define proficiency for any given task; and, above all, performance-oriented training with its recognition that soldiers learn a skill best by doing it, not by being told how to do it.

Ample resources, sound training principles, and a generation of leaders who believe that training must rank first among a host of competing priorities—all of these add up to formidable improvements. Yet despite these advances—despite, moreover, our good fortune in having soldiers who are talented, eager, and highly motivated—the training actually taking place in our units is often no better than it was when BTMS, ARTEP, and T&EOs were exotic-sounding acronyms rather than everyday practices. Indeed, some old hands will contend that the tactical and technical proficiency that is the proof of good training has actually declined. That is a harsh judgment, and one not easily proved.

Deficiencies in our current training system are more readily felt than experienced. One senses it in the frustration of the young commander who never quite “gets it all together.” One reads about it in the “lessons learned” at the National Training Center. One sees it in the performance of units, whether in major exercises or in routine daily training. Somehow we have fallen short in our efforts to translate the improvements in our training resources and the changes in our training concepts into better training and better units.

OBSERVATIONS

Here are a few observations as to why that is the case:

We have misconstrued the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). A basic premise of BTMS is that training occurs in a continuing cycle of planning, resourcing, execution, and evaluation. Each phase of the cycle is essential, and each deserves attention, but execution must still be the most important of the four. It is only in the conduct of training that soldiers improve their proficiency. In practice, though, we tend to focus on evaluation as the crux of the process. We have become infatuated, in fact, with formal evaluations. As a result, our training has suffered.

BTMS tells us that evaluations ought to be part of all good training. Yet if good training can always accom-
panies his platoons or companies through their tests is hardly more than an observer. By restricting himself to this role, he deprives his units of the teaching and coaching that he is so qualified to give.

Reducing the emphasis on evaluations, on the other hand, would allow our commanders a more active role in actually conducting training. Instead of being perennial senior evaluators, our field-grade commanders would become chief trainers. Their units would be the better for it.

Over-emphasizing evaluations also leads us to allocate resources improperly. We all operate under constrained resources. In the continental United States, the problem might be money. In Europe, it might be access to major training areas such as Grafenwoehr or Hohenfels. Whatever the cause, the result is that we have precious few days in the field or on the range. The rarer these days are, the more valuable they become. They allow us to fire our weapons, to maneuver without restrictions, perhaps even to integrate live-fire and maneuver into a single exercise. In short, they allow us to do all the things that we are prohibited from doing in garrison or at local training areas. Such days provide the best learning opportunities a unit has.

The problem is that, all too often, we don’t use them that way. Our tendency to overrate evaluations causes us to set aside the best learning opportunities for testing. Whatever is left over goes to training. Even with the latest in training devices, these leftovers are usually inadequate. In designing our training programs, how much more sense it would make if we first set aside the prime resources we needed to achieve proficiency and only then earmarked whatever was left for evaluating our progress toward achieving that proficiency. As a result, we would have fewer “tests” on the calendar and would be able to devote more time and better resources to the training itself.

If evaluation is one word whose de-emphasis would benefit training, management is another. We have to admit, however, that as our Army has become more “business-like,” management has become a concept that we cannot completely ignore. At certain echelons, in fact, managerial skills are essential to success. But the important thing is that we must not let our enthusiasm for management techniques override our common-sense understanding of what leaders owe their soldiers.

Yet the successful battalion or company commander can no more train his unit from behind his desk than he can fight it from inside a command post. In both cases, relying on someone else’s impressions will mislead him. In both cases, too, he must operate out front if he expects to understand fully and to influence effectively what his unit is doing.

How, then, do we keep the requirements to manage training in proper perspective? We begin by seeing that the signals we send to our subordinates are the right ones. Years ago, General Bruce Clarke taught us that a unit does well only those things that the boss checks. But there is a corollary to that familiar axiom: people give the boss what they think he wants. Commanders who put great stock in all the paraphernalia of training management — the statistics, charts, reports, and briefings — will have subordinates who emphasize those same things. The battalion commander who doesn’t want his commanders to be statisticians must show by his actions what he does expect them to be. What is rewarded, what is tolerated, what is punished — these are the cues that shape their behavior.

Ultimately, defining the proper role of training management in units comes down to a question of efficiency versus effectiveness. The Training Management Control System (TMACS) provides an ideal illustration. TMACS is the fulfillment of a training manager’s fantasy. Imagine! A computer at the fingertips of every battalion S3! Its advocates claim that TMACS enables units to manage their resources down to the last gallon of fuel, the last round of ammunition, and the last minute of a battalion training day. Such efficient use of resources is commendable. Yet the apparent economy of such careful management is really transparent. It may produce reams of data, but it cannot produce a single combat-ready soldier. Only the back-breaking, repetitive, frequently inexact process of teaching can do that.

The only effective use of training resources is the one that pays off in improved soldier proficiency. When we try to convince our leaders that grinding out computer data fulfills their responsibility as trainers, we do them a disservice. Rather, we need to convince them that teaching — organizing it, conducting it, and supervising it — is what training is really all about.

The 1981 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, offers some fascinating reading. Among its more intriguing aspects is the emphasis it places on using mission orders to govern tactical operations. Called by the Germans Auftragstaktik, the concept of mission tactics signifies the ultimate in decentralization. It assumes that so long as a soldier understands his commander’s overall intent, he can direct the efforts of his unit to support that intent. Detailed guidance, complicated overlays, or hefty operations orders are unnecessary. Knowing what the boss wants to accomplish, the soldier can go to work.

Reliance on mission orders has an honorable tradition in our Army. Like many equally honorable traditions, however, it did not survive the Vietnam War.
not efforts by the authors of FM 100-5 will be enough to revive the use of mission tactics remains to be seen. But the continuing emphasis on centralization in training does not bode well for the outcome.

The point needs to be made: We cannot plan to govern combat operations according to one set of principles while conducting day-to-day affairs according to a contradictory set. Centralization continues to be the order of the day in the way we train, but this tendency is inconsistent with the spirit of AirLand Battle doctrine. Moreover, it does not provide an effective solution to long-term training deficiencies.

Most often, the centralization of training reflects a frustrated commander's quick-fix, last-ditch attempt to deal with a specific problem that won't go away. Tired of watching his company commanders wrestle unsuccessfully with the intricacies of Dragon training, for example, the weary battalion commander says, "#*!@#, I'll do it myself." Doing it himself means taking the best-qualified NCOs from throughout the battalion and forming them into a Dragon committee to conduct a rotating training program for each company. Result? Dragon proficiency increases for a while. Yet such centralization also yields other results, though they may be less apparent at first:

- Since the committee's brief visit cannot create a cadre of trainers in each unit, the companies still lack the infrastructure they need to maintain Dragon proficiency. Since the Dragon committee can hardly operate on a permanent footing, any apparent gains rapidly waste away.

- The company commanders now understand that they are no longer held to account for Dragon training; it has become a battalion issue and will remain one. The battalion commander has thus inadvertently undermined his unit commander's overall sense of responsibility for training their crews, sections, and Platoons.

This hypothetical Dragon problem is probably only one of twenty issues of comparable urgency. The battalion commander can't centralize everything and control it directly, training his battalion as if it were an oversized platoon. Nor should he want to, since doing so would destroy the chain of command and reduce the unit's overall effectiveness.

The payoff from good training varies inversely with the echelon at which it is conducted. The lower the echelon, the greater the benefit. Yet conducting productive training at the lower levels — where young leaders deal with soldiers from day to day — ranks among our greatest challenges. Two prerequisites come immediately to mind: We need to resist the allure of centralization — no easy task in an environment where the demands for immediate results are often compelling; and we need to pay more than lip service to training our leaders. For it is only after we have helped our sergeants and lieutenants become good trainers themselves that we can expect unit-level training to be meaningful and effective.

Although the Army's basic approach to training has generally improved over the past ten years, two exceptions to that statement are worth noting. One is sustainment training — a good idea that may well be impractical. The other is individual training. Here, ironically, the wheels of change have brought back, in modified form, a concept that training reformers once rejected.

EXCEPTIONS

As a concept, sustainment training sounds good. It begins by recognizing — correctly — that busy units cannot train with equal fervor on all skills all the time. Whenever possible, commanders should differentiate between areas in which their units have achieved proficiency and those in which weaknesses remain. The wise commander then should concentrate his effort on corrective training in those weak areas. Yet even the best unit can ill afford to ignore entirely the skills in which they are already proficient. Common sense tells us that if soldiers don't practice skills they already know well, their proficiency in those skills will decay. To minimize that decay, therefore, we schedule enough practice to sustain an acceptable level of proficiency.

As an approach to making the most of our limited training resources, sustainment seems to make sense. But applying this notion assumes a condition that seldom holds in our units — personnel stability. To sustain the proficiency of a tank crew between gunnery qualification periods, for example, requires that the same people stay in the same crew positions. Yet our units commonly experience personnel turnover rates of 50 to 60 percent per year. The resulting turbulence within companies and platoons is even greater as crews and squads are reshuffled further because of schools, promotions, disciplinary actions, or seemingly essential internal changes. It thus becomes all but impossible for units to establish the foundation of proficiency that should be the object of sustainment efforts. Therefore, our training focuses instead primarily on incorporating a continuous flow of new arrivals into the unit.

This requirement extends far beyond the obvious task of completing the training of young AIT graduates. "Rookies" in a unit come in all shapes and sizes: a middle-grade NCO who is joining a unit that has equipment he has never encountered before (ITVs or M60A3s or TACFIRE); a pilot who is trading a humdrum aviation battalion for air cavalry; a senior NCO who is returning to troops after years as a recruiter or a reserve advisor. As pros, all of these people have the potential to contribute effectively to their unit, but first, they must get extensive training. In units suffering from severe turbulence, this process of integrating new members into the team dominates the training program, and the very notion of sustainment becomes a fantasy.

Finally, as we survey the Army's overall approach to training, surely individual training is the most disappointing. Our recently implemented Individual Training and Evaluation Program (ITEP) is a notable example.
ITEP is disturbing on several counts. First, in spite of the word "training" in its name, ITEP does not train — it tests. We are fooling ourselves, in fact, if we imagine that supporting this program meets our obligation to train individual soldiers.

Most disturbing is the importance ITEP attaches to written tests. This directly violates our professed commitment to performance-oriented, hands-on training. Worse still is the motivation behind this testing. Virtually no one believes that written examinations improve or even adequately measure a soldier's proficiency. But test scores do give distant personnel managers a convenient tool to use in deciding which soldiers to retain and which to separate from the service.

Besides, using written tests to decide who stays in the Army and who leaves shows a fundamental misunderstanding of what it takes to be a good soldier. Granted, all other things being equal, the smart soldier is preferable to the soldier who is not so smart. But the premise doesn't wash. Other things seldom are equal. And it's the "other things" — enthusiasm, initiative, loyalty, a willingness to learn, a knack for operating the machines of war — that make some soldiers great. Written tests measure none of these qualities.

Last of all, one gets the uneasy feeling that ITEP comes perilously close to betraying the soldier's trust in his leaders. We, the leaders, are pledged to the soldier's welfare. But are we fulfilling that pledge when we subject him to a selection process that we know does not and cannot properly measure his value?

SOLUTIONS

What can we do to compensate for the existing deficiencies in our training programs? To some degree, the solutions lie beyond the troop leader's power to influence. Some of the things we need — such as a meaningful and substantive program of individual training — must await policy changes at the highest levels. Yet, however welcome such initiatives would be, we must do more in the meantime than grouse about how cruel the fates have been to us.

Field commanders retain the ability to determine the training climate within their units. Each of them can do several things to make that climate a healthy one:

- He can give first priority in resources and in his own energies to training instead of to evaluating. (Our aim should be to improve proficiency first, and only then to measure it.)
- He can operate on a small scale with emphasis on the fundamentals of gunnery and maneuver, avoiding grandiose schemes that absorb more in planning, coordination, and execution than they are worth in training benefit. (Bigger is not necessarily better.)
- He can make every leader a trainer, including himself. To do that, he must show his subordinates by his personal example the quality of training that he expects from them.
- He can train his junior leaders. (Only by insuring proficiency among our captains, lieutenants, and sergeants can he guarantee that good training will "trickle down" to his squads and crews. Centralization is no panacea. And leaders who know how to train are the only alternative to centralization.)
- He can reduce the overhead of training management by taking a hard look at what reports or briefings his subordinates really need to give him. Instead of requiring them to report on what they're doing, he should see for himself what they're up to. The result could be vastly more enlightening.
- He can avoid mistaking events themselves for a training plan. Instead, he should identify the needs of his unit and be realistic in plotting the path to that goal. (No leader will get there all at once — he may not get there at all — but the aim is worth the effort.)

As the saying goes, "Training is the Battle-Link." Training as preparation for battle must remain the principal focus of our peace time activities. The complexities of our profession are such that we will never get everything right. But few of us really find that discouraging. Most of us optimistically push on, striving for some achievable perfection. Taking a detached look at where we are today is a prerequisite to moving ahead. Self-criticism is seldom easy, but the willingness of trainers to take that detached look at themselves may well be their primary obligation to the soldiers they will lead in battle tomorrow.

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In one form or another — a drum beat, a bugle, a fife, a marching song — cadences have been used for centuries by the world’s military services to boost a unit’s morale and to promote its martial spirit.

But what we in the United States Army know as the "Jody Call" did not come into general use in the U.S. military services until 1944, and then it was called the "Duckworth Chant" or "Sound Off."

According to Sandee Shaffer Johnson in her 1983 book, CADENCES: THE JODY CALL BOOK, NUMBER 1 (Darling Books, Box 526, Canton, Ohio 44701), "no one seems to know for certain when the 'Duckworth Chant' or 'Sound Off' became known as the 'Jody Call' or 'Jodies.'” But Jody it is today.

Who is Jody? Where did the name come from? No one seems to know for sure. The name itself, Mrs. Johnson feels, "may be synonymous with GI Joe, a variation of John Doe (J.D.) or perhaps Joe D. something."

Regardless, it appears to Mrs. Johnson that the name is not a complimentary one with members of the military services and that Jody is apparently a civilian "who enjoys the comforts of civilization while the serviceman or woman is training in the field or stationed overseas." She says that "soldiers of all ages and experiences agree that Jody is the guy (gal) back home ever ready to take your wife (husband), girlfriend (boyfriend), sister (brother) or even the family car."

There are lots of Jody calls around today. Many of them, however, pertain to airborne and Ranger soldiers and units, while few mention conventional and mechanized infantry and support units. To close this gap, the Infantry Center Public Affairs Office, prodded by Major General James J. Lindsay, who then commanded the Center, conducted a "Jody Contest" from 4 November 1983 through 28 February 1984. The contest had as its primary aim the eventual publication in booklet form of a whole new set of Jody calls that could be used by Infantry and support units (and by other military units, for that matter) during their formations and during physical training periods.

Somewhat apprehensively, because they were not certain they would get many responses for original Jody calls, the contest officials established three different categories and offered a trophy to the winning entry in each category.

By the end of February, the cut-off date, the contest had attracted 164 entries — 45 mechanized infantry, 12 light infantry, and 107 general — far more than the contest directors expected to receive.

For two days, then, a five-member board of judges — two drill sergeants from the Infantry Training Center at Fort Benning, two enlisted soldiers from the 197th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Separate), which is stationed at Fort Benning, and the editor of INFANTRY Magazine — sifted through the entries, judging each one on its rhythm, rhyme, originality, singability, and overall appeal.

The first phase of the judging determined the ten...
finalists in each category. In the second and final phase, each of the entries was “sung” by one member of the board while the others echoed the verses — if they could. The five judges then voted on the final entries, with each judge ranking the cadences from one to ten, with one being the best. The numbers were then added and the cadence with the lowest number was declared the winner. Second, third, and fourth place winners were determined in the same manner. (These three runner-up entries in each category will be appropriately framed.)
Here are the top four winners in each category:

LIGHT INFANTRY

IN FOR A MILLION YEARS

IN - FAN - TRY’s the best there is; I’ll stay IN for a million years. And when the million years is through, I’ll still be proud of my Infantry Blue!!

(Charles Harvey, DOES, USAIS, Fort Benning, GA)

GOOD AS GOLD

I don’t know but I’ve been told, Infantry blue is good as gold. Work all day, play all night, Infantry blue is fit to fight. Dodging bullets and chewing nails, Infantry, Infantry tough as hell. Ruck sacks—but pack walkin’ across the land, Infantry grunts gonna make a stand. Infantry blue is the best in the land.

(SFC Lonnie Joseph, 5th Unit, 3d Battalion, USA Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, KS)

STRAIGHT LEG

The straight legs are the life for me, The chow is good, the rent is free. Guys like us, ya know, we got pride, Walk a hundred miles fore we take a ride. When trucks and tanks bog down and fail, Us doggies’ll still be on the trail. The sergeant’s looking mighty rough, I don’t think I’ll call his bluff. Hey there trooper, What’s the news? Been marchin’ all day so you’re singin’ the blues! Well a few more miles won’t hurt you none, Grab that .50, let’s have some fun.

(PVT Job T. Krakowski, 4th Unit, 2d Battalion, USA Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, KS)

LITTLE JOE

Little Joe has gone away To fight for freedom people say, Left his mom and girlfriend too Traded farm clothes for Army Blues, He enlisted during the Vietnam War Fighting hard in the Infantry corps, One day his squad broke enemy line Joe’s leader died by a Chi-com mine, Joe let out a yell and began to run Straight to the enemy’s largest gun, He threw a grenade before he fell Sent seven enemy right to hell, Joe didn’t die on that fateful day But he lost his mind some soldiers say, He became a leader, for the rest Every battle became a test, Then one night while on a hill The enemy came and blood did spill, Joe was killed and soldiers weeped Some men say Joe’s found his peace, Back home his mom and girl cry For the boy who turned man to die.

(SPS Susan J. Durban, Madigan Army Medical Center, Fort Lewis, WA)

MECHANIZED INFANTRY

PRIDE OF THE INFANTRY

Listen up soldiers and you will hear, The Patriots pride is loud and clear. Up in the morning to the crack of a whip, Get ‘em ready for a mechanized trip. Topped off, loaded up, ready to fight, Can’t beat the speed of mechanized might. We SP the motor pool right on time, Mechanized road march mighty fine.

(PVT Job T. Krakowski, 4th Unit, 2d Battalion, USA Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, KS)
Rifle, machine gun, mortar and TOW,
Mech infantry fights where others won't go.
Fifties on the left, fifties on the right,
Mechanized fire power out of sight.
Track soldiers fight when others are thru
Mechanized super trooper me and you.
We move like a butterfly, sting like a bee,
We're the heart and soul of the Infantry
Airborne, Ranger, can't you see,
Mechanized is the way to be.
With bullets, missiles and lots of flack,
We blow up the OPFOR so they can't come back.
We're the Queen of Battle and happy to be,
Not the flat footed grunt, but Mech Infantry.
We move, we shoot, we communicate,
We're the Pride of the Infantry — the 58th.

(LTC Bruce Blake, 1st Bn, 58th Inf,
197th Inf Bde (Mech) (Sep),
Fort Benning, GA)

MECHANIZED DEATH

M113 cruising down the track,
Mechanized soldier with a ruck on his back.
Open up the hatch and close the door,
Push that pedal to the floor.
Fifty cal. mounted on the top,
Goin' to "Lebanon" non stop.
Chasing those commies night and day,
Mechanized ... is here to stay.
Drop that ramp and out he go,
Hear that sixty gunner roar,
"Bound to the right! Bound to the left!"
Mechanized is rolling death.
On the high land or on the low land,
What do you see?
Mechanized death, that's you and me,
Pivot to the right and pivot to the left,
That's the dance of "The Mechanized Death."

(SSG Oliver A. Norris,
Company C, 9th Battalion,
2d Inf Tng Bde, Fort Benning, GA)

MECHANIZED INFANTRY BRAVE AND BOLD

I woke in the morning it was drizzling rain.
Pulled my APC into a plane.
The plane took off with a hell of a roar.
I knew at that second I was off to war.
So I'll tell you a story not often told.
About Mechanized Infantry brave and bold.
They roll off the planes in the middle of the night.
They hit the ground and they're ready to fight.

(SSG Edward M. Becker, 1st Battalion,
USA Correctional Activity,
Fort Riley, KS)

MECHANIZED FIRE AT YOUR WILL

Mechanized vehicles in a row
Revving those engines, they're ready to go.
T62 coming over the hill,
Fire your Dragon at your will.
The sound of the TOW is right behind,
Scaring those commies out of their minds.
The mortars are drumming out a beat,
Dropping the rounds right at their feet.
M60 Tank, now where you at,
Come help me make those commies scat.
Big trucks, small trucks carrying a load,
Mechanized vehicles on the road.
Delivering the bullets, delivering the beans,
Mechanized is a lean machine.
Mech-a-nized, "All the Way,"
Mech-a-nized, "Follow Me."

(SSG Oliver A. Norris,
Company C, 9th Battalion,
2d Inf Tng Bde, Fort Benning, GA)
GENERAL CATEGORY

UP WOKE THE TANKER

Up woke the tanker never clean;
He was a commie fighting machine;
He was born on a 60-series tank;
His crew awoke when the engines cranked.
M60 tank rolling down the road;
57 tons is a hell of a load;
Driver stop, gunner heat;
An M60 tank just can't be beat.
T62 rolling down the road;
M60 tank, gonna lock and load;
Sabot up, on the way;
Some commie sureely gonna die today.
Coax, 50, 105;
Bringing death and destruction to keep us alive;
So you look down range with your hand on your head;
Scoping over the terrain, only enemy dead.
You pray to God, it will end some day;
So you can go home, state side to stay.

(SSG(P) Glenn W. Holsinger,
Co D, 5th Battalion, 68th Armor,
APO NY 09028)

KNOCK, KNOCK

Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me one,
We run PT just for fun.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me two,
We run easy all day thru.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me three,
PT all day, you and me.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me four,
Come on fellas, let's run some more.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me five,
This is great and that's no jive.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me six,
We run this way just for kicks.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me seven,
PT all day feels like heaven.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me eight,
Pick it up we're running late.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me nine,
Running smooth and feeling fine.
Knock, Knock, Knock, Knock,
Give me ten,
Tomorrow morning we'll do it again.

(SPT Peter D. McBride,
Co A, 3rd U.S. Infantry,
"Commander in Chief's Guard,"
Fort Myer, VA)

PT PILL

Old John Wayne was a friend of mine,
We did PT all the time,
Push Up, Sit Up, 2-mile run,
We didn't stop 'til all was done.
John Wayne loved his Vitamin P,
He taught me how it was good for me.
On day one, I was puny and weak,
John Wayne started with the bend and reach.
On day two, it was doing me good,
I kept my faith, like he knew I would.
On day three, I was tall and proud,
I felt so good, I led the crowd.
PT's good for you and me,
We'll never OD on Vitamin P.
We do PT the John Wayne way,
We do PT every day.
I like PT, that's no lie,
I'll do PT 'til I die.
PT keeps me fit and strong,
With Vitamin P, I'll never go wrong.
Vitamin P, PT. Vitamin P, PT.

(SFC Noel W. Fox, Battery B,
1st Battalion,
230th Field Artillery,
Reidsville, GA)

RAN ONE MILE

Ran one mile just the other day
Felt so good, do it every day.
Ran two miles, thought I'd stretch it out
Felt so good had to scream and shout.
Ran three miles, did it just for fun
Felt so good, being in the sun.
Ran four miles, was a-pouring sweat
Felt so good, and I ain't done yet.
Ran five miles, finally have to stop
Pulled over speeding by a traffic cop.
So if you want to run, but don't wanna stop
Better watch out for those traffic cops.

(CPT Craig D. Barra,
Readiness Group, Meade,
Fort Meade, MD)

The Fort Benning PAO is now getting its booklet ready. It will include most of the entries that were submitted for the contest and will be distributed in small numbers to other public affairs offices throughout the Army.

Additional information about the contest and the booklet is available from the Commander, U.S. Army Infantry Center, ATTN: ATZB-PAO, Fort Benning, GA 31905.
The ultimate key to victory is to destroy the enemy before he can destroy you. A unit does this through the application of its firepower.*

Firepower, though, is more than just the ability to hit targets — although that ability is certainly crucial and the lack of it a serious shortcoming in many of our units. Throughout this series of articles, a number of the units I have talked about have been defeated at the National Training Center in both offensive and defensive operations because they were unable to kill the opposing force (OPFOR) soldiers fast enough. They had weapon systems that never got into battle; they failed to cover all avenues of approach; they failed to assign engagement priorities; they failed to integrate and coordinate all their means of fire and fire support; they ignored the need for establishing a base of fire; and often they simply tried to overcome the OPFOR units with sheer numbers. Our units, therefore, must do a better job of planning the use of their available firepower and then use it.

In planning a defensive battle, for instance, or in planning to conduct a delaying action, the first thing a unit must do in planning its fires is to designate engagement areas (EAs) — areas in which a commander plans to destroy the bulk of the OPFOR. Its staff planners should arrive at the disposition of the subordinate elements and the unit’s available weapon systems by planning backward to get the best possible coverage of the designated EAs. Each subordinate commander, then, must designate EAs for his particular unit by dividing his own assigned EA into smaller overlapping EAs.

This planning for EAs must be done along with the planning for obstacles, target reference points, and range markers.

The primary EA (the one in which most of the killing will take place) should be on the far side of the obstacles. The obstacles themselves must be planned and constructed to complement the effect of the unit’s weapon systems by slowing or stopping the OPFOR in his most exposed position. The obstacles must also have enough standoff — about 2,000 meters from the forward battle positions is best.

Target reference points (TRPs) must be planned throughout the EAs, in the obstacles, and on and behind the defensive battle positions. These are used to control both a unit’s fire and its maneuver. To be effective, the designated TRPs must:

• Be known to every gunner.
• Barked, so that they can be not only seen but recognized from different positions. (It doesn’t help when someone mistakes TRP Y11 for TRP Z10.)
• Be plotted as indirect as well as direct fire targets.

Ranges for the various weapons must be marked. (Poor range estimation is one of the primary reasons for the poor gunnery our units have exhibited with their TOWs and Dragons.) It is important for gunners to know the location of the range markers as well as the TRPs, and good units use colored stakes or patterns of chemical lights for both their TRPs and range markers to make it easier for their gunners to locate them.

As part of their direct fire planning, leaders must make up range cards for all their weapon systems (tanks,
TOWs, Dragons, machineguns), and they must incorporate them into the fire plans at platoon and company level. Each unit's plan must also be checked to ensure that it fully covers the EA assigned to that unit.

To detect dead spaces, leaders must walk (or drive) the principal directions of fire from each position. For the TOW, the tracking distance is also important, because it's extremely frustrating to see a target go into the weapon's dead space just before the missile hits!

Any weapon's dead space, of course, should be thoroughly covered with fire, especially those areas in which the OPFOR's units could mass or reorganize for a final assault.

Engagement priorities for targets must be made clear to everyone. If a gunner has a choice between shooting at a tank and shooting at a BMP that's shooting at him, which should he engage? The answer to that question should be worked out and understood beforehand.

**TERRAIN**

Hills or other terrain features that offer the OPFOR a place to reorganize must be considered as a part of the fire plan. OPFOR units can be expected to gravitate to any area that is not covered by direct fire and to use that area as a springboard for their final assault.

Indirect fire support must be planned and coordinated along with the rest of the defensive plan. The OPFOR units move so fast that artillery and mortars can't keep them covered. Accordingly, fires should be planned in "ladders" — two or more concentrations planned parallel to the OPFOR's direction of attack to be fired simultaneously — so that if the OPFOR runs out of one concentration, it runs into the next.

These planned fires must be marked on the ground, with one marker at the "trigger point." (When the OPFOR reaches that trigger point, the FO will call for fire.) Other markers should be placed where the fire will actually land, usually 250 to 500 meters short of the trigger point for the first concentration in the ladder, depending on the speed with which the rounds can be delivered.

The fire support plan for the defense must also have the unit's company mortars integrated into it. Calls for fire to the mortars must be monitored by the FSO so that he can keep track of the indirect fire battle. At the same time, the FSO must examine company fire plans, both artillery and mortars, to see that they mesh with the overall plan.

Attack helicopters, if they are available, are also powerful support weapons. A battalion may have either a company or a platoon of helicopters in support and using these assets properly requires planning for their employment in keeping with their rearm-refuel cycle. Because it can take from 30 minutes to one hour to refuel a platoon of helicopters, engagement areas for attack helicopters should be planned on that basis.

The first EA for attack helicopters should be deep — beyond the artillery's maximum range — and the scout platoon should be the unit to call for the helicopters and hand off targets to them.

The second EA should be the forward edge of the obstacle trace so that a single platoon will have time to rearm and refuel after covering the first EA. If the obstacle trace is used as a "trigger line" to start a withdrawal (as it should be in a delaying operation), then the attack helicopters should provide most of the direct fires in this EA to allow the task force to withdraw to its subsequent positions before becoming decisively engaged.

The third EA for the helicopters should be located between the obstacle trace and the first battle positions; it is designed to give the task force even more time to withdraw, if necessary. If an attack helicopter company is available, its third platoon (and hopefully its by-now re-armed first platoon) will handle this EA. If only one platoon is available, its time of commitment to the second EA must be regulated so that it can provide coverage of this critical third EA as well.

Any direct fire weapons that might be located forward of the battle positions should allow the OPFOR to bypass them before opening fire. They should be mutually supporting, and their initial fires should be orchestrated. For example, a tank could fire from the OPFOR's left rear. If the OPFOR reacted by attacking that tank, a TOW or another tank could fire on the attacking OPFOR from its right rear. If that TOW or tank was attacked, a third TOW or tank could begin firing, and so on. In this way, the OPFOR's attacking formations could be pulled apart and slowed down.

Wherever possible, ground-mounted TOWs should be placed in inaccessible terrain — near the top of high, rocky hills, for instance — so that attacking them would be difficult.

The forward weapon systems, once the OPFOR has passed, would then maneuver to fire on the OPFOR's rear. If the OPFOR began to move out of range, the weapon systems would follow, firing on its own as well as calling down indirect fires.

Leaders should be aware, of course, that in actual practice, weapon systems are less effective than their design characteristics indicate. Typically, TOWs will fire two or three rounds from the same position, with 20 to 40 percent hits, while Dragons will have a very low effectiveness. Tanks will fire four or five rounds with a slightly lower hit percentage (and at a shorter range) than the TOWs. An attack helicopter platoon can probably get ten kills per engagement area.

Fire support plans that assume unrealistic weapon effectiveness are, therefore, doomed to failure. Direct fire weapons must be placed in depth and maneuvered to obtain the best possible engagement positions. Multiple engagement areas must be planned, and bypassed units must continue to fight.

If it can, the OPFOR will "focus" its attack so that only one of the defending units will bear the brunt of its
attack. The other defending units will be only lightly engaged or not engaged at all.

The unengaged units, therefore, should be used as reserve units, and the defensive plan should provide for moving units and weapon systems to other positions from which they can be used effectively to ward off an OPFOR attack. The reserve units can:

- Execute counterattacks.
- Form fire pock[ets by repositioning themselves to fire into the OPFOR's flanks or rear.
- Withdraw to positions farther to the rear either to block the OPFOR's advance or to cover the withdrawal of friendly units.

Engaged forces normally cannot do much maneuvering. A unit or a weapon system that is faced with the choice between being destroyed if it pulls out of position or of being overrun should stay put and fight it out. If the OPFOR bypasses it, then that unit should reposition itself when it is safe to do so to fire on the OPFOR's rear. Ultimately, it should follow the OPFOR's attacking units.

In the attack, supporting units must establish bases of fire — both near and far — to allow the offensive unit to reach the OPFOR's positions without heavy casualties. Normally, the far base of fire will be manned by tanks and TOWs and will be set up about 2,000 meters from the OPFOR's position.

As a unit gets closer to the OPFOR's position, it should establish an additional base of fire, usually at between 1,000 and 500 meters from the OPFOR. The weapons in the near base of fire should engage the OPFOR from a different angle from those in the far base of fire, so that the OPFOR has to fight in two directions.

Since the two bases of fire together will support the friendly assault unit, the scheme of maneuver should be such that the fires from the bases do not endanger the assault unit or interfere with its maneuver. Once the initial squad or platoon objectives have been taken and the OPFOR position begins to unravel, the forces from the bases of fire can then also be committed to the assault.

Throughout the attack, commanders must maintain close control over their direct fire systems, because these are usually employed close to friendly troop units. For example, engineers breaching a minefield must work close to the OPFOR forces covering that minefield, and those OPFOR forces have to be suppressed by direct fire. To complicate matters, the engineers also need to be screened by smoke, and the same smoke may also screen the OPFOR's positions.

Check points within the objective must be used to control close-in fires. The assault force identifies a target with reference to a check point — "machinegun bunker 100 meters northwest of Check Point 49," for instance — and then adjusts the fire in meters up or down and left or right along the gun-to-target line. (Since MILES fires cannot be sensed, an observer must establish a search pattern to cover the entire target area.)

Direct fires in the assault should be controlled by the assault force commander. He is, after all, the man who will be killed if there's an error and the man who can best assess the effectiveness of the fires.

But no matter how good a commander's other plans may be, it is fire that kills. Without careful and thorough fire planning and coordination, he cannot execute those other plans, because he cannot kill the OPFOR fast enough to keep from being overrun. With careful and thorough fire coordination, though, he can make his other plans work and help him win at the NTC — or, more important, on the battlefield.

The Cook's Worksheet:
A Commander's Tool

NAOMI PAYNE

In spite of all the sophisticated weapons and equipment the Army now has, the infantry soldier will continue to be the decisive factor on the battlefield for some time to come. An infantry commander, therefore, is naturally interested in the welfare of that man, and one thing that keenly affects a soldier's welfare is his diet — proper food. Still, this concern sometimes gets shuffled to the bottom of a commander's stack of priorities, because he knows his soldiers will be fed. But how well they will be fed is something else.
Most commanders keep a close watch on the accountability of such items as weapons and ammunition, but they probably don’t give that same attention to subsistence accountability. In fact, according to recent reports from the Troop Support Agency’s food management assistance teams (FMATS) and the Army Audit Agency on the Army’s food service program, subsistence accountability is a major problem.

This lack of proper accountability presents a two-fold problem for a commander: It allows for waste, fraud, and abuse in the handling of such supplies, and affects the kind of food the soldiers get. If a food service officer, sergeant, or cook is not doing what he should be doing, the soldiers are not going to eat as well as they should.

There is one tool in every dining facility that a commander can use to see how well his unit’s food service program is doing. This tool is DA Form 3034, the cook’s worksheet (see accompanying sample). Although it is partly a production work schedule that tells the kitchen work force what to do, it is capable of being used for more than that — provided it is properly maintained. The worksheet can be used to help with food accountability, to improve food quality and preparation, and to decrease food waste. It can also be used to show which foods the soldiers prefer, to schedule skill qualification training, to develop on-the-job training programs, and to document enlisted evaluation reports (EERs).

Unfortunately, though, as a 12-month review of FMAT visits revealed, most dining facility personnel do not fill in the worksheet accurately or completely. (AR 30-1 tells how it should be done.)

The cook’s worksheet, along with issue slips and monthly inventories, is a key link in the food accountability chain. When an auditor compares the food on hand and the amount prepared (including leftovers) with the amount of food received, he should be able to account for the food used. But in a recent survey of 12 dining facilities in a major command, for example, 6,000 pounds of high-cost meats, worth about $6,600, were unaccounted for in one month. This does not necessarily mean the meat went out the back door; more likely, it means a supervisor failed to add to the worksheet the additional food prepared over the initial amount planned as shown on the worksheet.

Leftovers also need more attention on the cook’s worksheet. The amount of leftovers can indicate several things. Too much of one item can mean that the food was prepared improperly, that too much was prepared in relation to the headcount, or that the soldiers did not like that particular food. The "comments" column of the worksheet provides a way to evaluate leftover items and show whether they were satisfactory. If this column is not being used, the shift leader should be reminded to complete it.

A commander should also review the worksheet to see what type of menu is being prepared. From it he can readily see whether the food service sergeant is serving only low-cost meal items (to stay within three percent of the basic daily food allowance) or is serving foods the troops seem to prefer. While he is in the dining facility, he should compare the worksheet with the serving line to see that all the items on the line are also on the worksheet. At the same time, he should see that the worksheet does not list items that are not on the line.

A commander can also use the cook’s worksheet to verify an enlisted evaluation report on one of the cooks. For example, let’s assume that a food service sergeant prepares an EER for a food service specialist, and says that the soldier is a poor cook and cannot do his job. One way a commander can verify this statement is to review the cook’s worksheet to see what remarks have been made about items the soldier in question has prepared.

So among all a commander’s daily worries about such things as supply, maintenance, and training, he must not forget to devote a little time to seeing that his soldiers get good food. Equipment deadline rates and all other aspects of the unit may be perfect, but if his troops get sick from food poisoning or from a lack of adequate food, or if they have low morale because of a poorly operated dining facility, his unit is unlikely to be able to perform its mission.

If a commander takes steps to see that the cook’s worksheet is used properly, therefore, he should see an improvement in food accountability. Just as important, maybe more so, his soldiers will have better food, their training will be improved, and the commander will gain satisfaction from knowing they are well cared for.

NAOMI PAYNE, now Editor of Troop Support Digest, previously wrote Army training literature for several years, specializing in combat service support units. She is a graduate of Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond.
ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

PROMOTION POINTS FOR DLI TRAINING

Many soldiers may not be aware that they can earn promotion points and college credit by attending the Defense Language Institute (DLI). With the exception of language-dependent MOS holders (96C and 98C), soldiers earn two promotion points per week of DLI training; for example, a soldier can earn 48 points for attending a 24-week course, 94 points for a 47-week course.

To earn college credits for this training, a soldier must file an official transcript showing his DLI schooling through a recognized, accredited institution. Local Army Education Centers (AECs) can help. For a 47-week course in Basic Russian, for example, a soldier can get about 21 semester hours of college credit. For Intermediate Russian, he can get up to 18 semester hours of credit.

REENLISTMENT CRITERIA

Effective 1 April 1984, mid-term soldiers who want to reenlist will face tougher general and skill-qualification testing. The trainability requirements for these soldiers will be as follows:

• Soldiers tested on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) before 1 January 1976, or on or after 1 October 1980, must have a GT score of 100 or higher and two other aptitude area scores of 85 or higher.

• Those tested on the ASVAB on or after 1 January 1976 but before 1 October 1980, must have a GT score of 107 or higher and two other aptitude area scores of 90 or higher.

• Soldiers who verify their SQTs with a score of 80 or higher, as shown on the individual soldier’s report, are exempt from all ASVAB scores, except for the GT score.

• Soldiers who have no SQT score or who fail to verify the SQT must meet all score requirements.

Soldiers who are not on overseas assignment and who fail to meet the above requirements may be extended until 1 April 1985 for the purpose of being retrained and/or retested to meet the new criteria.

Soldiers who are on overseas assignment instructions may be extended for the minimum time necessary to complete the appropriate overseas tour, or until 1 April 1985, whichever is longer. This change in policy does not apply to the Army National Guard or to the U.S. Army Reserve.

AIRBORNE IMPROVEMENT

The Airborne Improvement Plan was initiated by the Director, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD) in 1982 to increase the number of soldiers who are Airborne-qualified. Logistics Branch, Combat Service Support Career Division, was designated as the MILPERCEN Airborne Management Office.

MILPERCEN directorates; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, HQDA; FORSCOM; TRADOC; USAREC; XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; and other CONUS and overseas commands were involved in carrying out the plan.

Periodic in-process reviews are provided to the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps, the Director of EPMD, and other general officers associated with the recruiting, training, and readiness of our essential airborne forces.

The Airborne Improvement Plan has and will continue to have a major effect on Airborne soldiers worldwide. It has resulted in better, more intensive management of these soldiers. In addition, the plan has directly affected the strength posture and readiness of Airborne units worldwide.

For more information concerning the Airborne Improvement Plan, contact MSG Waite, DAPC-EPM-L, AUTOVON 221-8006.

PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PROGRAM

The Army’s physician assistant (PA) program, established in 1971, has become one of the finest fully accredited PA training programs in the country.

Each year, 30 enlisted Army medical personnel are selected to begin the two-year course, which is offered in two phases. Phase I is conducted at the Academy of Health Sciences at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. During this first year the students are given basic science and clinical instruction.

The second phase is conducted “on the job” at many Army community hospitals, where students, under the guidance of physicians, apply what they have learned from Phase I. Under the supervision of physicians, the students rotate through various professional services of the hospital to gain the medical experience they need to care for patients.

After they graduate from Phase II, the physician assistants receive baccalaureate degrees from the University of Oklahoma and are ready for their first assignments in the Army’s health care system as warrant officers.

PAs may be assigned to Army com-
E5/6 Assignments
(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-8059/9399

SFC Billie Paulk
E5/6 11B
Career Advisor

Lenore F. Christenson
Chief, E5/6
Assignment Team

Gwendell Heath
E5/6 CONUS
Assignment Manager

Beverly Eastman
E5/6 CONUS
Assignment Manager

Colleen McQueen
E6 Overseas
Assignment Manager

E1-E5 Assignments
(202) 325 or AUTOVON 221-9517/9543

SFC Robert J. Hayes
E1-5 11B/C/H/M,
E6/7 11C/H Career Advisor

Jackie Cohen
Chief, E1-4
Assignment Team

Rosie E. Garner
E1-4 11B CONUS
Assignment Manager

Robert T. Davis
E1-5 11C/H CONUS
Assignment Manager

Carver E. Polindexter
E1-4 11B/C/H/M Overseas
Assignment Manager

Phyllis Morgan
E5 11B/C/H Overseas
Assignment Manager

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bat units, community hospitals, or medical centers. There, under the supervision of physicians, they provide primary level medical care to soldiers and their families. Their duties include seeing sick call patients, being available for emergency treatment, and performing numerous other medical procedures as directed by their supervising physicians.

They diagnose and treat patients with various diseases, acute illnesses, and injuries, but promptly refer more complicated cases to physicians for evaluation and care. PAs may request X-rays, laboratory tests, and other diagnostic procedures needed to help them perform their medical duties. They may also write prescriptions for medications that have been approved by the local hospital commander.

Information about applying for this program is in DA Circular 351-82-3, Military Physician Assistant Training Program for Fiscal Years 1984-85.

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**EER PREPARATION**

Packets containing instructions on preparing EERs were recently sent to sergeants major and military personnel offices around the world. This packet is intended to help rating officials prepare more complete and accurate EERs on their soldiers.

Additional copies of the packet are available from Commander, MIL-PERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-MSE, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332.
OFFICERS CAREER NOTES

BRANCH CHIEF NOTES

Over the past several months numerous promotion and selection boards have convened. Each of these boards, after it adjourns, sends comments to MILPERCEN concerning the official files of the officers involved and the problems it encountered during its deliberations — many of which significantly affected the board's ability to analyze officer records accurately.

The Officer Record Brief (ORB) continues to be a sore point. Many ORBs the boards review are inaccurate. Assignment history, length of time in each assignment, and duty title are the items mentioned as most critical. Local military personnel officers are responsible for updating ORBs, and officers should work closely with their MILPOs. Tenacity and perseverance are required if ORBs are to be accurate.

Hard copy photographs are still missing from many records. An officer's photograph is important in developing board member perceptions about him and his potential for selection or promotion. Photographs should be sent straight to Infantry Branch; we will see that it is filed properly.

Promotion boards have few decision tools. The letter of instruction they receive, ORBs, performance microfiche, and photographs provide the guidance and information they use to make decisions. No officer should take a chance with inaccurate data on his ORB or fiche.

SPECIALTY 54

In December 1981 a proposal to revise SC 54 and eliminate SC 28 (Training Development) was approved. The two would be merged into a new SC 54 called Operations, Plans, Training, and Force Development.

Along with the merger of SC 54 and SC 28, an additional skill identifier (ASI 7Y) was established for combat development positions, thus eliminating SSI 54B. The unique skills associated with training development were identified by ASI 7Q. This action was intended to promote the establishment of a corps of officers who were proficient in the skills associated with planning and conducting unit operations and training. In addition, the new SC 54 expanded the role of force developer to include manpower management.

Why should an Infantry officer want to have this as one of his specialties? The desire to remain close to fighting units and at the center of tactical operations is an overriding reason, and 31.2 percent of all SC 54 officers are now Infantrymen.

Challenge, promotion, and schooling also make the specialty attractive. Specialty 54 develops our corps and division principal staff officers and high level planners. The operational doctrine of today's Army demands staff officers and commanders who can integrate the actions associated with combat, combat support, and combat service support elements of the AirLand Battle. This complex focusing of activities is called Combined Arms Integration. It has become imperative that the Army develop competent officers who can not only keep pace with this trend but also shape and direct it. Because of its generalist nature and its emphasis on plans, operations, training, and force development, specialty 54 seems uniquely suited to meet today's needs.

Current trends indicate that the opportunity for promotion and selection are excellent for officers serving in SC 54. These officers have shown an above average rate of promotion to colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, and an above average schooling selection rate for the Command and General Staff College and the senior service colleges.

Some new proposals are now being considered that are designed to help prepare SC 54 officers for the future. The SC 54 portion of AR 611-101 (Commissioned Officer Specialty Classification System) is being revised. If the revised regulation is approved, it will orient future SC 54 officers more toward the tactical environment than is the case now.

This may be accomplished by requiring that all SC 54s be branch qualified. As defined by Infantry Branch, this means they must have successfully completed an officer advanced course and a company command. Although it is not a requirement for entry into SC 54, developmental experience in assignments that support combined arms operations in a tactical environment may ultimately be required for retention. Such assignments might include, for example, battalion/brigade S3 or XO, assistant S3, S3 Air, G3 operations/plans, tactics instructor, air/ground liaison officer.

There are no specific qualification bench marks by grade. Generally, an efficiency report, other than an adverse one, for a period of at least 12 months from one of the previously mentioned jobs, would qualify an officer at that grade. Additionally, as a minimum training standard for SC 54, each officer must complete the MEL 4 (command and staff level schooling), in either its resident or non-resident form, by the time he enters the zone for promotion to lieutenant colonel.

In February 1984 a quality review of all SC 54 officer records outside the
command and staff college selection window (promotable majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels) was conducted. The officers this board found to be unqualified are being asked to consider another specialty or to update their qualification criteria.

The force development portion of AR 611-101 will also fundamentally change. To qualify in the future for SSI 54C (Force Development), an officer must first be a qualified 54. The officer should apply for the new four-week Force Development Course taught at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Anyone who is headed for a force development or manpower management assignment should contact his assignment officer at MILPERCEN to see about attending this course.

The proposed revision of AR 611-101 will change duty position coding guidance to get SC 54s down to brigade level positions. This would occur in lieu of the current use of most SC 54s, which is basically at corps level and above.

Additional questions or comments should be directed to the SC 54 controllers at Infantry Branch: Major Chris E. Brown (LTC controller) and Captain Spurgeon A. Moore (MAJ/CPT controller) at AUTOVON 221-0317/18 or commercial (202) 325-0317/18.

SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

Officers who attend advanced level schools that start after 30 September 1984 will have to remain in the Army for at least a year. This move is intended to make mid-level training more cost effective.

Specific obligations include, for example, the following:

- A one-year obligation for attending an officer advanced course starting 1 October 1984 or later, with the obligation effective upon graduation or upon release from the course.
- A two-year obligation for officers attending the Judge Advocate General's graduate course.
- A three-year obligation for officers entering the astronaut candidate program after July 1984.

These revised service obligations will be included in a change to AR 350-100. Further information is available from local military personnel officers.

OAC RESTRUCTURED

The mission of Officer Advanced Courses (OACs) is to produce technically and tactically competent captains who are professionally qualified for their next assignment and prepared for future development.

Another benefit of a branch OAC is that it gives young officers an opportunity to soak up not only the latest ideas and developments of their branch, but also to share experiences and aspirations with their fellow officers. The branch schools also benefit from their OACs because of the new ideas, insights, and challenges students fresh from duty in the field bring with them to each school. The schools and their faculties thus can be better proponents for doctrine and development.

Over the past year, TRADOC, recognizing the increased schooling demands on the officer corps and the growing needs for specialized education, has explored options for improving the OACs. After several alternatives were presented and discussed, a decision was made to retain the present permanent-change-of-station (PCS) OAC, but in a modified form.

A PCS OAC of 20 weeks will be established. It will contain a core of common and branch-specific tasks that all students will take and a series of modules that will be determined on an individual basis in coordination with each student. The selection of the individual modules will be based on SSI experience or professional development requirements. Additional modules of up to six weeks at the end of an OAC will give an officer intensive training for his next assignment.

The OAC core will provide the basic knowledge and skills all captains in a particular branch need, and will be made up of common and branch-specific components. The common component, of about six weeks, will be prescribed by TRADOC and included in every OAC. It will cover leadership, training, combined arms, logistics, force development, and other common military subjects. The length and content of the branch-specific component will be determined by each commandant and will vary by branch.

The modules within the 20-week core OAC will provide more detailed technical and tactical instruction. They may be organized around SSI or configured functionally, depending on the structure and the requirements of the particular branch. They will be designed to provide individualized training to officers.

Add-on pre-command and other functional modules will give an officer intensive training for his next assignment and will be selected for each student after that assignment has been determined. The type and length of a module will be determined by the branch proponent and will vary by branch, but in no case will it exceed six weeks.

The concept of add-on modules will allow an officer several methods of attending and completing advanced course training. For example, those officers with a clearly defined branch assignment will take the appropriate modules at their own service schools, such as the pre-command course or the operations module for S3s. Officers going to SI assignments will go to the course at Fort Benjamin Harrison, while those selected to be battalion maintenance officers will go to a course at Fort Knox or Fort Benning. Officers who are going to an assignment that requires no specific training (graduate school, for example) or to a command that provides its own assignment-specific training (Recruiting Command, ROTC) will leave their service schools at the end of the 20-week OAC.

The implementation date for this revised OAC is January 1985.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Army's Center of Military History in Washington, D.C. has brought out THE ARMY HISTORIAN, a periodical that is dedicated to the proposition that an appreciation of military history is a valuable addition to an officer's intellectual background. It has been designed, therefore, to further the study and application of military history in the Army. Its managing editor is Bruce D. Hardcastle; his telephone numbers are AUTOVON 285-1278, or commercial 202/272-1278. His mailing address is U.S. Army Center of Military History, Pulaski Building, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20314.

Mr. Hardcastle is seeking articles of from 300 to 1,500 words for publication in his future issues. He would particularly like to see articles on Army historical activities, current research, the uses of military history and its position in the Army, past commanders’ use of history, military historiography, programs promoting historical awareness, and professional reading.

Thus far, Hardcastle has turned out two fine issues. It is a quarterly publication and subscriptions to it are free for the asking by either military or civilian personnel. All one has to do is to request a subscription from Mr. Hardcastle.

In addition to THE ARMY HISTORIAN, the Center of Military History has prepared more than 200 titles of historical works and has listed them in a brochure entitled "Publications of the U.S. Army Center of Military History," which is also available free of charge from the Center. Most of the Center's publications can be procured through Army publication channels, and these are listed in the current DA Pamphlet 310-1, which is updated periodically in microfiche.

Too, nearly all of the Center's publications are sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. To help an individual order the right publication, that office has prepared a select bibliography entitled "Military History," which is free upon request.

All orders to the Superintendent of Documents should be accompanied by payment in the form of a check or money order payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Payment may also be made by a Superintendent of Documents deposit account number, or a VISA or MasterCard account number, furnishing the expiration date. All international orders ($4.00 minimum per order) must include payment in U.S. dollars drawn on a U.S. or Canadian bank located in the United States or Canada, and payment must include an additional 25 percent of the total order for international handling. UNESCO Coupons and international postal money orders are also acceptable remittances from foreign countries.

With the exception of free promotional literature — catalogs, lists of publications, and the like — no free books are distributed by the Government Printing Office. The free services that are available should be requested in writing from the Publication Order Branch, Stop SSOP, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

We urge our readers to take advantage of the tremendous offerings from both the Center of Military History and the Government Printing Office.

Here are a number of books we think you will find both interesting and useful:

• PRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR: WAR IN CHINA, 1937-1941. By Roy M. Stanley II (Scribner's, 1982. 213 Pages. $24.95). Although we briefly mentioned this book in an earlier issue, we would again like to call it to your attention.

The author is a long-serving intelligence officer in the United States Air Force. A trained photo interpreter, he brings his knowledge of and experience in that field to his book, which tells the story — in words and more than 250 photographs — of the little known China War, that vast and bitter struggle that provided Japan with a training ground for World War II.

Stanley feels strongly that if the Western powers had had professional intelligence establishments in the 1930s "the battles of early 1942 would probably have had a different outcome." He feels, too, that "the magnitude of the licking taken by the West early in World War II can be traced to a decade of lost intelligence opportunities on the Asian mainland." He says, "All the answers were there, but nobody was really paying attention. The West had to learn everything about the Japanese war machine for itself — the hard way."

This is a fine piece of work about a war that most United States military men know little about; it deserves far more of their attention today, given the importance of the Far East to all of us.


NOTE TO READERS: All of the books mentioned in this review section may be purchased directly from the publisher or from your nearest book dealer. We will furnish a publisher's address on request.

44 INFANTRY May-June 1984
964 Pages). This is an excellent follow-on volume to the Stanley book mentioned above, for it begins where that book leaves off and carries the story of World War II in the Pacific — although from a high level, and then only on one side — to the end of the war with Japan in 1945.

The author wrote the manuscript for this book between 1946 and 1953 while he was serving with the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was classified at the time it was finished and was not cleared for publication until 1971. In a preface to this 1982 publication, Hayes describes the nature of her rather massive undertaking and tells what the book is and what it is not. The only significant difference between this and the original version is the addition of a detailed bibliographic note prepared by Dean C. Allard from the U.S. Naval Historical Center.

Hayes points out that her manuscript "is a history of the involvement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the war against Japan," but that "it is not a history of that war." Because it is what it is, her book has to be regarded as a most valuable reference tool, not only for the student of the U.S. high command during World War II but also for the student of the Far East aspects of that war. It is, overall, an excellent historical presentation.

• WITH SHIELD AND SWORD: AMERICAN MILITARY AFFAIRS, COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT. By Warren W. Hassler, Jr. (Iowa State University Press, 1982. 462 Pages. $29.50). Statistics and personalities dominate this book, which apparently was written to be a text book for military history courses. The difficulty with the author's approach is that the statistics mean little by themselves and the "pictures" drawn of the leading participants are far too sketchy to give the reader a real understanding of the leading actors.

Still, the author does pull together under one set of covers information about all of our wars, so his book could be used as a general reference work. But it is no more than that.

• ADVICE AND SUPPORT: THE EARLY YEARS, 1941-1960. By Ronald H. Spector (U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1983. 391 Pages. $11.00, Softbound). The closest project to its World War II Green Book series that the Center of Military History has going at present is its planned 18-volume series on the Vietnam War.

Ronald Spector's book — published simultaneously in both hardcover and paperback — is the first book in the new series. Spector has been with the Center since 1971 and served as a field historian with the U.S. Marine Corps in Vietnam during 1968 and 1969.

He has divided his book into three major parts: the events in Vietnam during and immediately after World War II; the U.S. support of the French in their long war against the Viet Minh; and, finally, the early U.S. advisory efforts in South Vietnam and the origins of the Second Indochina War. In his last chapter, Spector offers an assessment of those early U.S. advisory efforts.

The author has done a difficult task very well indeed and has gotten the new series off to a fine start.

• THE IMAGE OF WAR, 1861-1865: VOLUME V, THE SOUTH BESIEGED. Edited by William C. Davis (Doubleday, 1983. 461 Pages. $39.95). The war was going badly for the South; how badly is told in this fifth of a planned six-volume photographic history of the Civil War. With the end in sight, the South was besieged on all sides.

In this volume, seven essayists cover the fighting for Tennessee; the Northern naval blockade that was becoming more and more efficient and, therefore, more effective; the Wilderness campaign; the fall of Atlanta; the war in the West; and Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign.

Magnificent photographs once again dominate, particularly those of Atlanta, the siege of Charleston, the bloody Wilderness, and the forgotten war in the West.

• TANK BATTALIONS OF THE U.S. ARMY. By James A. Sawicki (Wyvern Publications, 1983. 427 Pages. $25.00). Three years ago, the author of this book published a similar volume of the Army's Infantry regiments. Then he brought out a two-volume set on the field artillery battalions of the United States Army. Now, in this book, he completes his combat arms trilogy, and it is, as he says, "the most comprehensive publication of its kind to appear in print."

In his book, Sawicki documents the history, heraldry, and honors of the 417 tank battalions that have existed since World War I. Much of the information he offers has never before appeared in print. His 38-page history of the tank battalion is also particularly interesting and informative. And adding to the book's reference value are three appendixes — one on coats of arms and distinctive insignia, one on campaign streamers, and the third a glossary of lineage terms — plus tables showing the tank battalions of World War I and the divisional assignments of the World War II tank battalions, and a good index. Sawicki has done another fine job.


This has been a significant year — 1983 — for reflection and retrospect on the Vietnam War. A number of conferences early in the year concentrated on the war. Most important was "Vietnam Reconsidered," a huge and emotional gathering in Los Angeles. Fox Butterfield's "The New Vietnam Scholarship" in the New York Times Magazine demonstrated the resurgence of the academic study of the war on the college campus.

But the most significant indication of the revived interest in the war was the 13-part Public Broadcasting System saga, "Vietnam: A Television History." Anyone who watched one of the segments is aware that the volume reviewed here is the companion text to that series.

The volume is the best text now available. Karnow is a journalist
author of several books on China with extensive experience in Asia and long service in Vietnam. The book is well written in a style that will appeal to both the novice and the specialist. Karnow's research is solid, and his interpretations, for the most part, are balanced and sound. The auxiliary features, such as 150 captioned photographs, a glossary of important individuals, and an extensive chronology, are excellent. The coverage is far broader than any of the present popular texts such as George C. Herrig's America's Longest War (1979) or Michael Maclear's The Ten Thousand Day War (1981).

I have not been happy with every aspect of the PBS television series; neither do I support every interpretation in Karnow's text. But both the series and the book are major pieces of work that serve a valuable role in reviving interest in the history of this important American experience. I expect to use both in my classroom for some time.


Because of the length of the Vietnam War and the numbers of and variations in the armies involved, the task of writing a book that deals only with the basic uniforms and items of personal equipment is a most difficult one. In writing this book, Lee Russell, a former Marine and a Vietnam veteran, reduced this task to more manageable proportions by covering only the armies of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the United States and by using selected photographs and color illustrations to complement his text.

Russell's text is clearly written in the sparse style found in all of these men-at-arms books, but he does give both a thorough and a progressive account of the development of uniforms and equipment during the Vietnam era.

There are some technical errors in the book, particularly in the captions that accompany some of the illustrations concerning special operations units. But these are not overly important and do not detract from the book's total worth.

I recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in the Vietnam conflict. I also recommend it to those military professionals who believe that history repeats itself and who look on such books as this one as valuable reference tools. It contains many lessons learned that should not be forgotten.


This index is a welcome supplement to the register of California volunteers that was compiled in 1890 by Brigadier General Richard H. Orton and published by the California State Printing Office. The original register is now available in a reprinted edition from Gale at a cost of $45.00.

Although the military role of the California Volunteers in the Civil War was primarily confined to service in their home state and in other Western states and territories, more than 16,000 men were in infantry and cavalry units that occupied Army posts from Puget Sound to San Elizario, Texas. These troops guarded the overland trails, drove out Confederate invaders from Arizona and New Mexico, forestalled the threat of Confederate privateers on the Pacific Coast, and took part in hundreds of engagements with Indians throughout the Far West. Moreover, 500 cavalrymen serving in the California "Hundred" and the California "Battalion" under the flag of Massachusetts fought in several major battles.

The Orion book is an essential source for anyone researching the Civil War in the West. Parker's index adds to its importance, for it enables researchers and genealogists to locate information on any of the volunteers who are listed in Orton's compilation, which lacked an index.


The author is well qualified to write about small unit leadership, one of the Army's most important subjects. In his nearly 30 years of distinguished service as a soldier, Colonel Malone spent most of his time either studying, writing about, and teaching leadership, or serving in various positions as a leader of soldiers. His grassroots knowledge and experience are quite apparent in this book.

In fact, it can be said that Malone has succeeded in writing a no-nonsense "how to" leadership book that all company-level leaders, regardless of branch affiliation, should find immensely informative and instructive. There is no lengthy discussion about the leadership theories of Maslow or MacGregor, or about leadership versus management. And there are no reproductions of various leadership models. Malone focuses instead on the sergeant, lieutenant, and captain, with the singleminded purpose of building better small unit leaders.

The reader of this book should not be fooled by the author's commonsense approach to leadership. He will find that it takes time, study, and much inner reflection to absorb the full meaning of Malone's major theses.

If the book can be faulted in any one area, it would be with its many checklists — 63 all told. These are fine for establishing order in one's thinking-and-doing process, but checklists make tedious reading.

Leadership has been called one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth. From a careful reading of Malone's book, the


With much of the world's attention focused on France's Normandy beaches for the 40th Anniversary of the Western Allies' landings there on 6 June 1944, these three reprinted volumes could not have appeared at a more opportune time. They have long been out of print, which is most unfortunate. They detail as no other publication does the preparations for and the execution of what was possibly the largest amphibious operation in the world's history, as well as the subsequent fighting by U.S. forces in the difficult Norman hedgerow country.

The maps in these reprinted versions are not fold-outs, and they are printed in black-and-white only. But they are still most useful and a necessary adjunct to the volumes. All of the photographs appear to have been left intact — and all three volumes are filled with photographs.

Because we have published our own anniversary article earlier in this issue, and because we have depended on the original versions of these books so much in getting our anniversary piece together, we heartily recommend them to all of our readers.


In his earlier book, The Killing Zone, Fred Downs described his four-month combat career as a platoon leader with the 4th Infantry Division in South Vietnam and his literally being blown apart by an antipersonnel mine in January 1968.

In his new book, Downs takes the reader through the pain-wracked ordeal of his recovery and return to "the world," where he currently serves as the director of the Prosthetic and Sensory Aids Service for the Veterans Administration in Washington, D.C.

While Downs cannot be labeled a typical Vietnam veteran — whatever that is — he is certainly an extraordinary example of the will power that human beings can muster to overcome seemingly overwhelming difficulties. Both of his books are vivid testimonials that war, and its aftermath, is indeed hell. At the same time, though, he confirms the irony that war also brings out the very best in man as shown by man's willingness to serve others through sacrifice and sharing.

In Aftermath Downs describes the Army's medical evacuation system, from his initial dust-off flight through his eventual rehabilitation at Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Denver. Along the way he leaves few emotions untouched — anger, pride, hatred, love, revenge, humor, fear, and forgiveness are all there. A rightfully proud and undaunted infantryman, Downs wonders if his country will ever "welcome all of us back in body and in spirit."

His excellent book should take us a long way toward that goal. It is an apothecary's labor of love for the Army and the country, but more so for the men of the platoon he led in combat.

All of today's junior leaders can learn much from Downs' experiences. For that matter, they can also serve as a refresher course for the not-so-junior leader.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED


THE CHALLENGE OF SOVIET SHIPPING. Edited by Curtis Cate. National Strategy Information Center, 1983. 46 Pages. $3.95. Softbound.


MONARCHS, RULERS, DYNASTIES, AND KINGDOMS OF THE WORLD: AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA GUIDE TO MORE THAN 13,000 RULERS AND 1,000 DYNASTIES FROM 3,000 B.C. TO THE 20th CENTURY. Compiled by R.F. Tapsell. Facts on File, 1983. 511 Pages. $35.00.

AVIATION INSIGNIA

The Army Aviation Branch insignia shown on page 5 of your January-February 1984 issue may have been worn in the past, but it is not the new insignia approved for wear by Army officers and enlisted personnel.

Enclosed are designs of the new branch insignia. Note that the wings have been modified and that they differ from the designs shown in your news item and also from the wing designs now used on Army and Air Force aviator qualification badges.

The new insignia draws upon the original insignia for historical and symbolic purposes, but was deliberately modified to signify a new chapter in Army aviation history.

GERALD T. LUCHINO
COL, General Staff
Institute of Heraldry, USA
Cameron Station, Virginia

EASY WAY OUT

I was appalled by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph A. Hallenbeck's article, "Reorganize Platoon," in the November-December 1983 issue of INFANTRY. It seems to me that what he is saying, in effect, is that his squad and platoon leaders were not doing their jobs, so instead of finding out why and then ensuring that they were able to do them, he took the easy way out and reorganized everything.

The problems the author sees with the current organization, such as a lack of maintenance supervision or deciding who will man the caliber .50 machinegun when the squad dismounts, are far from insurmountable. What ever happened to a designated carrier team leader who acts as track commander (TC) in the squad leader's absence? If Colonel Hallenbeck feels that it is a "tall order" for his squad leaders to maintain an M113 and train their squads to drive and to employ the caliber .50 and the Dragon, then perhaps he needs to find some new squad leaders.

I wonder if the author has considered what will happen when a member of the heavy squad becomes a casualty. Obviously he will have to be replaced by a member of one of the light squads since they are the only ones with any personnel to spare. But if that replacement's only experience with an APC is as a passenger, he isn't likely to make a very good driver or TC. The obvious solution here is for the light squad leaders to cross-train their squads in the duties of the heavy squad. But that's what Colonel Hallenbeck seems to feel was so difficult in the first place. The job won't be made any easier by not having their own APC to train on.

The author goes on to propose that only the best performers should be allowed to be members of the heavy squad and that they should be "excused from petty details." That isn't likely to do much for the cohesion and team spirit of the platoon as a whole! Stacking the heavy squad may well result in "speedy and fluid maneuver" that looks good on exercises, but where does it leave the light squads, which are forced to make do with the less capable leaders and the least-experienced troops?

Let's not lose sight of the fact that those dismounted infantrymen are the platoon's real reason for existence. If a mounted maneuver force were the primary requirement, a platoon of tanks would be a lot more effective.

TED R. STUART
SGT, A Troop
1st Squadron, 124th Cavalry
Texas Army National Guard
Fort Hood, Texas

MACHINEGUNNER MOS

I read with great interest Major Harlie Treat's article "Machinegunners" (November-December 1983, page 38). The author stresses the need for a separate training program for designated gunners, leading to a separate MOS for these gunners.

As first sergeant of a mechanized infantry company, I am very familiar with trying to "battle roster" personnel as assigned gunners and assistant gunners in addition to their duties with their respective squads and platoons. It is not simply a matter of assigning a weapon to a crew, or more often to an individual. By dividing a soldier's duties, you are not necessarily doubling his skills; in most cases you are cutting his skills in half, and he will hardly be proficient in either of his assigned duties.
Machinegunnery is a science that can be learned only by continual practice. In the not-too-distant past we had heavy weapon squads attached to each rifle platoon. These men were designated gunners whose primary duty was to operate the squad’s machineguns. They were proficient simply because they handled their assigned weapons every day. Making machinegunnery an additional duty makes as much sense as making mortar gunnery an additional duty. You are doing a great injustice to both skills.

So I say, “Bravo, Major Treat!” Finally someone is addressing a problem that has been an infantryman’s nightmare for a long time. The Army would be wise to give serious consideration to his suggestions.

DANIEL R. PAUL
Pennsylvania Army National Guard
East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania

AGREES, BUT IRRITATED

I completely agree with Major Treat’s analysis in his article “Machinegunnery,” in which he proposes assigning a separate MOS to machinegunners and putting them in the weapons platoon. But one thing irritates me: Why didn’t he simply say that the Marine Corps has been doing this for years, that it works, and that it’s time the Army did it, too?

This omission implies the solution is his own idea, which is simply not the case.

J. D. HOWELL
1st Lt, USMC
Twentynine Palms, California

BAYONET REPLACEMENT

I’ve just lately managed to get a couple of copies of INFANTRY, and I see the Army has gone back to the bayonet. I have a timely idea for a new piece of equipment to take the place of this item.

The new device is a 10-round magazine of .56mm cartridges. It is sealed in a special quick-opening pouch about the size of a pack of cigarettes, clipped to the load-bearing equipment where the bayonet is now carried. When someone threatens the soldier with bayonet combat, the soldier — instead of fixing a bayonet — produces the 10-round magazine, inserts it in his rifle, and shoots the offender.

This device has several advantages: It weighs no more than the bayonet and is more convenient to carry; it requires no special training apart from the usual rifle courses; and it can be used equally well by soldiers of either sex or any size. In addition, unlike the bayonet, it neither detracts from the accuracy of the rifle nor significantly increases its dimensions; it does not impose destructive strain on the rifle when employed; it can be used without disadvantage in weapons fitted with grenade launchers or optical sights; and it is lethal at a considerable distance.

I shall be happy to demonstrate the utility of this invention against any three bayonet instructors on any standard close-combat course.

WILLIAM BEFORT
Durham, New Hampshire

FIRE CONTROL

I woke in a sweat the other night. After 26 years as an infantryman, and primarily as a leader, now retired, my past seemed to be catching up with me. In a dream, as I recall, I had found myself watching an enemy force closing on our positions. They were beyond the range of my .45 pistol, and for some reason the men around me were not taking the enemy under fire. Furthermore, I couldn’t seem to get them to fire. I ran to one soldier and grabbed his M16 only to discover there was no magazine in it.

For all infantrymen, but particularly leaders, a critical problem that will not seem to go away is the initiation, control, and termination of fire. All those who have been in combat have experienced the problem. In the 1950s the late S.L.A. Marshall wrote an excellent book, Men Against Fire. I suspect that today too few of our infantry leaders have read the book or understand the problem. It is a phenomenon that is not understood until it is too late—partly because it never seems to take focus until you are in the same situation. I do not believe we are sufficiently focusing on the problem in our training today, except as another of the many problems attendant to close combat.

In the fall of 1967, our battalion minus was in a dug-in perimeter defense. A small enemy force surprised us very near our perimeter by command-detonating two Chinese Communist claymores against our position, followed by two or three minutes of automatic weapons fire. Needless to say, our security had left something to be desired. The most surprising problem, however, was that no one returned fire. By the time indirect fire (organic mortar and direct support artillery) was brought in, the enemy force was gone.

I have participated in many live fire exercises under tactical conditions. Whether on offense or defense, the problem was virtually the same. First, men were reluctant to fire. Second, they rarely knew where to fire. Third, once they started, they normally fired until they ran out of ammunition. This is very frustrating, but it is really a chain of command and a training problem—one that our new infantry leaders must know about and devise ways of solving.

It would appear that our infantry will be in for a number of situations similar to Beirut and Grenada in the future. At the small unit leader level we must focus on fire control. Particularly in fluid, non-distinct circumstances, small unit leaders and their men must somehow always be ready to initiate and/or return fire. An SOP is really not good enough because circumstances change too rapidly. Infantry leaders and their men must be as well drilled as those men who took part in the Ontay Raid—at least as described in The Raid.
I hope this letter will somehow help to generate more thought and attention to this particular area of the profession of infantry.

FORMER INFANTRYMAN

INFANTRY DIVISION (LIGHT)

As a soldier who proudly wears the patch of the 199th Infantry Brigade (Separate) (Light) on my right shoulder, I have a special corner in my heart for light infantry. I look upon the new Infantry Division (Light) as a much needed organization in our force structure. [See Commandant's Note, INFANTRY, January-February 1984, page 2, and "Infantry Division (Light)," March-April 1984, page 14.]

Our Army now does not have enough infantry to hold the ground that our firepower is going to make available to us on the battlefield. The Division 86 armored division, especially with its two armor and one mechanized infantry mix simply does not have enough riflemen to provide the necessary close combat strength to defeat enemy infantry. With the advent of the powerful Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, the infantry squad has been reduced to nine men and the actual "rice paddy strength" (to use a phrase from long ago) will be further reduced to keep a crew on the vehicle. We need more rifles, and the Infantry Division (Light) will give them to us.

I see two problems with the division, however—employment and support. The employment problem (outlined above) is that when a unit is short of infantry by TOE and has an infantry mission (MOUT, rough terrain, for example), it has to get the infantry from somewhere. If we are not careful we are going to find the light infantry brigades of this new division falling under the operational control of other units and rarely fighting under their own division headquarters.

If this happens, it will bring on the other problem—support. Having fought in a light infantry brigade with too few trucks to provide ground transport, too few helicopters for air transport, and too little artillery to provide adequate fire support, I can see it happening again.

I just hope the force developers will think long and hard about just how the division will be supported in the various employment options open to its commanders.

QUENTIN W. SCHILLARE
CPT, Armor
Killeen, Texas

MILITARY HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

The U.S. Air Force Academy's Department of History will sponsor the Eleventh Military History Symposium 10-12 October 1984. The topic of the symposium will be "Military Planning in the Twentieth Century."

The program includes examination of successes and failures in strategic military planning from an international perspective but focuses on U.S. planning efforts. Topics will range from the education and training of the military planner to the reconciliation of twentieth century technological, managerial, and social changes with traditional military planning. The discussions will also include the experiences of planners during the Cold War and in limited warfare.

For information about symposium registration, anyone who is interested may write to me at the Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO 80840, or call me at (303) 472-3230.

BERNARD E. HARVEY
Captain, USAF
Executive Director

CONVERT TO METRIC

I would like to congratulate Captain Michael McEwen on his article "A Fitness Badge." But I would like to suggest one change to the endurance run and hope that change could be extended to all military fitness tests:

All distances should be in meters or kilometers, for some very practical reasons: They would be more universal, for one thing, and they would help give soldiers a better grasp of the international system of measures as well as the ranges of their weapons. I taught the metric system for several years and found that having my students walk a 100-meter course and a 1,000-meter course gave them a better sense of judgement regarding such measurements.

In the military, we should not, for example, write that we have a NATO 5.56mm weapon that weighs 8.2 pounds. This is mixing two entirely different and totally unrelated systems of measurement.

It would not be a bad idea for the military to convert completely to the metric system. All it would take would be about six months of instruction, followed by a total "overnight" conversion replacing all equipment and forms.

GEORGE WILLIAMS
ILT, USAR
Greenville, North Carolina

DISLIKES NEW HELMET

Although I knew a German-style helmet was being tested for the Army, I was quite surprised to read that some of the troops who were used on Grenada wore this new helmet. From what I've read, the Kevlar works ballistically, but I see two serious deficiencies in the helmet's design: First, it impairs the soldier's hearing; and second, it is a one-piece helmet. From my experiences in World War II, both of these can cause serious problems.

As for the hearing part, some of the most lethal things on a battlefield occur very quietly. With good, unobstructed bilateral hearing, a rifleman may survive these lethal things, but without it his chances become slim indeed.

With a howitzer shell, for example, a sort of rustling noise precedes it, allowing a rifleman with keen hearing to pick out a depression that may be as
far away as 5 or 10 meters and dive into it before the shell explodes.

A mortar shell sort of whispers in, so even keener hearing is required to detect that noise, determine its direction, and act to evade the shell. (In that connection it’s too bad the Army is getting away from the 60mm mortar, because it is about the most difficult mortar to hear and evade. This, in turn, makes it more effective than its relative burst pattern would indicate.)

Shells from direct fire tank guns and similar weapons are a real problem for the rifleman. With us in World War II it was the German 88. (Our 90mm tank gun is essentially identical to the 88, and the 105mm and perhaps the 120mm tank guns are only slightly different.)

Because the 88s were fired at us from relatively short distances (perhaps 1,000 meters), the shell had a time of flight of maybe a third of a second. Even so, an alert infantryman could hear it and dive for cover in that split second. (After seven weeks of being shot at, this one-time PFC rifleman did pick up a piece of shrapnel from an 88. But I ducked enough to cover up all the vital places and was back on duty within a week. A soldier can’t duck, though, when he’s under direct fire and can’t hear.)

Other “quiet” sounds can signal something just as lethal. A machine-gun being loaded, for example, will make a sort of click, which, if an infantryman hears it, can help him survive. (A fellow first scout in the platoon next to mine once heard enough of a noise to cause him to dive for a shallow depression. The German machinegunner laid into him with an entire belt—250 rounds. His squad members were horrified to see his web equipment—a light pack and a canteen—shot right off his back. His buddies did knock out that machinegun and recover their first scout. He and I walked back to the aid station together. He had 42 burn marks on his shoulder blades and buttocks, but the skin in those areas was not broken.)

With other individual weapons, a safety being pushed off will make enough of a click to enable the keen-hearing, alert rifleman to take evasive action. In a defensive position, the breaking of a twig or the crunch of a light footstep made by enemy infiltrators or an enemy patrol may enable a rifleman to survive.

Combat is for keeps, and that is something that some people don’t seem to realize.

A recent newspaper article on the new helmet says that the “protective design” of the helmet made hearing more difficult “compared to the steel pot,” but that “scientists at Army laboratories in Natick, Massachusetts, were said to believe soldiers would adapt with experience.”

My division lost its rifle strength about five times over during the three months the division was on line. To put it in other terms, every week the division had to replace half its strength of riflemen. About half of these losses were due to the problem Americans have in fully perceiving that someone else is really out to do them in—that once committed to the line everything they did was for keeps, that there was no second chance. The statement by Natick scientists that soldiers would “adapt” reflects this difficulty in perceiving reality.

As for the “protective design,” wounds to the ear are rare, as studies published by the Surgeon General
have shown. In one study of 4,600 men wounded in action in Korea, there were 1,189 wounds to the head, of which only 38 were near the ear. That is hardly enough to warrant incorporating into the new helmet a "protective design" that will impair the rifleman's ability to survive in battle.

As for the one-piece design of the new helmet, I believe a two-piece helmet is essential to the rifleman's survival. My division in Europe in winter needed the steel pot to bail water out of our foxholes, and it is inconceivable to me that anyone would want to try to cope with winter warfare without a two-piece helmet. (Even with it, my division lost about 4,000 riflemen to trenchfoot, and getting their feet wet was the major cause.)

The Germans did not like the one-piece helmet either. My squad captured more than 200 Germans out of field fortifications and were astonished at the number who had thrown away their steel pots. It seemed that in most cases they were wearing their soft hats. Even in the face of the enormous volume of artillery fire the U.S. Army was then capable of, it seemed that, often as not, the German front line soldiers did not wear their steel pots.

The point of all this is that two somewhat minor improvements do not compensate for the adoption of what is, in my opinion, an unserviceable helmet. The improvement to the suspension system could have been made to any helmet, even to the liner of our current M1 helmet. And it has been long recognized that the Hadfield (manganese) steel used for the M1 steel pot could one day be improved upon. If Kevlar is that improved material, fine, but even Kevlar could be used in a design as good as that of the M1 steel shell.

Quite aside from these real design problems, there is also the idea that a helmet of "Fascist" design only lends itself to our enemy's identification of the U.S. as "Fascist" and "imperialist" — the same malgnancies that identified the Kaiser and Hitler and proved eventually to be the cause of the defeat. That such allegations against the U.S. are false is irrelevant. What is relevant is the perception, as was proved to us again in Vietnam.

Just as the obstruction of hearing caused by the new German-style helmet will be disastrous for the riflemen who have to wear them in combat, its symbolism could prove disastrous to the best interests of the Nation.

From here, it seems that the production of the new helmet should be cancelled and the stocks withdrawn from the field.

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DINFOS ALUMNI

The Defense Information School (DINFOS) is compiling an alumni list in conjunction with its 20th Anniversary in July 1984.

Anyone who is a graduate of DINFOS at Fort Benjamin Harrison, or any of its predecessor schools — the Armed Forces Information School at Fort Slocum, N.Y.; the Army Information School at either Carlisle Barracks, Pa., or Fort Slocum; the Air Force Information School at Craig AFB, Ala.; or the Navy Journalist School at Great Lakes, Ill. — are asked to send their names, armed services, school attended, graduation date, present occupations, and addresses.

The address is Public Affairs Office, Defense Information School, Building 400, Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN 46216.

GARY L. WERNER
COL, Armor
MISTAKEN IDENTITY

On a number of occasions in recent years, people have confused INFANTRY with a former well-known magazine called the INFANTRY JOURNAL. There is no relationship between the two. The INFANTRY JOURNAL was published by the old Infantry Association, a private organization that joined with the old Field Artillery Association in 1950 to form the present Association of the United States Army (AUSA). Today, AUSA, in addition to its many other activities, publishes ARMY magazine.

Our magazine began in 1921 as the Infantry School MAILING LIST. For $1.50 a year, subscribers to the MAILING LIST received individual pamphlets and other instructional material published by the School. Beginning with the 1930-1931 academic year, the School material was collected and published semi-annually in bound volumes. At the same time, original articles began to appear with increasing frequency in the publication.

The INFANTRY SCHOOL QUARTERLY replaced the MAILING LIST in July 1947, and in April 1957 the title of the magazine was shortened to INFANTRY, although publication remained on a quarterly basis. In October 1959, we began the bimonthly schedule on which we still operate.

Thus, we are the oldest, continuously published service school journal in the United States (although no volumes were printed in 1945 because of a paper shortage). We are quite proud of our long history of service to the United States Infantryman. With your continued support, we intend to keep our record of service intact for years to come.

UNIT DESIGNATIONS

In several cases during the past year, units on our appropriated fund (free distribution) mailing list either have disappeared from the Army’s rolls or have been redesignated. Sometimes it takes us quite a while to discover what happened to them, particularly when their magazines are returned with “Address Unknown” stamped on the envelopes.

We have a pretty good idea which units in the Active Army will go off the rolls or be redesignated under the new regimental system. But we do not always know when Army Reserve or National Guard units will be reorganized or redesignated. In fact, many Reserve Component units make rather drastic organizational changes that we are not aware of until someone happens to mention it to us.

Therefore, if your unit is scheduled for a reorganization in the near future, or if it is planning to move to another installation or armory or be rebranched, please let us know. In that way, your unit will not miss any copies of INFANTRY, and we will not waste a lot of the Government’s postage money in our attempts to find you.