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COVER

Infantry leaders need to think about how they will fight and, accordingly, about how they will train to fight.
USAIS

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COL William H. Gavan

INFANTRY PROPENSITY
COL Richard D. Merlaux

THE SCHOOL BRIGADE
COL Frederick Peters

NCO Academy
CSM David J. Kloss
For my first note as Commandant of the Infantry School, I think it will be useful to review what each of the School’s departments and directorates has been doing and continues to do. First, though, let me discuss some initiatives that cut across all of them.

The most satisfying trend in the past two years has been the influx of high-quality officers and NCOs to School assignments, and this trend continues. This summer alone, the School will receive five Army War College graduates, a brigade commander, and 14 battalion commanders, as well as a host of Command and General Staff College graduates. A similar picture can be painted on the NCO side, where we are raising the instructor qualifications for our Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC), Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNOCO), and Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) classes. In the near future, for example, all of the NCO tactics instructors for our ANCOC classes will be sergeants first class who have served with distinction as platoon sergeants, who have been thoroughly prepared in the NCOES process, and who are themselves graduates of the course. We are also raising the experience level of the NCOs who present our BNOCOC and PLDC instruction. These NCOs are all graduates of the courses they teach, and most of the instructors from the combat arms have served as squad leaders or assistant platoon sergeants.

At the same time, our officer and NCO board selection rates have been quite good. This shows us that our “schoolhouse” is again considered an attractive place to serve.

Our instructional focus has been on hands-on performance-oriented field training conducted with small groups. More and more instruction—even leadership training, and other so-called soft skills—has been moved out of the classroom and into the field. The mentoring concept is now being used in our Infantry Officer Advanced Course (IOAC) classes and will eventually spread to our other courses as well. Certification is another key initiative with its hallmark being found principally in the Maintenance Management Division of the 29th Infantry Regiment/Weapons Department (automotive, weapons, communications, and NBC).

In the area of doctrine, our intent is to formulate fewer but higher quality products. Our focus is on putting the essence of a subject into a manual and reducing boilerplate and volume. We are looking at standardized task training products and at flexible, high initiative tactical products. Translating all of our doctrinal products into AirLand Battle formats is keeping us busy, but we are meeting the time lines.

In the past 18 months, we have produced more than 20 field manuals and circulars. (Make sure your units are getting them.) Among these are FM 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC) (March 1985); FM 7-90, Tactical Employment of Mortars (June 1985); FC 71-6, Battalion and Brigade Command and Control (March 1985); FC 7-7, The Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley) (April 1985); FC 7-12, The Infantry Company Fighting in Mountains (June 1985); and FC 7-90-1, Tactical Employment of the 60mm Mortar Section (December 1985).

In combat developments, our eyes are on the critical requirements. We have mobilized all our resources to concentrate on one item at a time, and this is paying off, because after ten years, several weapon programs finally survived funding cuts this past year—a Dragon replacement, an interim Dragon improvement, two TOW product improvements, a follow-on TOW, mortars, and a new bayonet.

Now let’s take a look at our departments and directorates individually.

**COMBINED ARMS AND TACTICS**

A mentor program for all IOAC classes has been instituted. Each class is divided into 20-man groups for the 13 weeks of tactics instruction, and a full-time mentor is assigned to each group to present that instruction. This departure from the committee method of instruction, together with an increase in the number of hours devoted to field training and a return to subjective grading, will produce graduates who are much better prepared as maneuver warriors well versed in AirLand Battle doctrine. We have also integrated all aspects of combined arms operations—fire support coordination, tactical communications, mobility and counter-mobility, and the like—into these classes.

Additionally, we have restructured all ANCOC instruction so that its emphasis is now on the application of doctrine and not on the mere teaching of it.

The School has started a program of instruction to support the new Army writing style and is conducting classes in that style in all of its
officer and noncommissioned officer career courses. We are emphasizing effective military writing, not grammar.

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

During the past year, major study efforts have been undertaken on basic and advanced rifle marksmanship training, including evaluating known distance firing and establishing tougher qualification standards. Programs to improve marksmanship training in the institution and the field will be on the streets soon.

The School has developed a training strategy for the cadre of CONHORT units that includes a resident training course at the School as well as exportable training support packages. An analysis is now being run to see if the Army can afford the strategy.

Bradley and Mortar Gunner South studies were conducted to test the training effectiveness and the resource requirements of alternate 'V' and mortar training programs, including training devices.

Major revisions of all the courses taught at the School have been completed, and programs of instruction for training Air Force Security Police have been developed. Other new programs of instruction developed in the past year or so include a LRSU POI, an infantry reserve officer professional update program, a sniper instruction POI, and a master marksman POI.

The Expert Infantryman Badge test has been revised and incorporated into DA Circular 350-85-3. In addition, 1986 military qualification standard (MQS) manuals for pre-commissioning programs and for infantry lieutenants have been either developed or revised, and field validations of the infantry captains manual have been conducted.

A training strategy for MOUT training has resulted in a MOUT training circular that will be distributed during Fiscal Year 1986. We are making an intensive effort in this area, and you will hear more on it in the future.

29TH INFANTRY REGIMENT/WEAPONS

The 1st Battalion has consolidated its battalion-level maintenance support and refined its methods of instruction to conduct mentorship training where it can.

The 2nd Battalion implemented a new basic rifle marksmanship program, introduced infiltration training, began SAW instruction, and prepared a master marksman course.

The maintenance management division has trained ten IOBC classes, five IOAC classes, five ANCCO classes, and four infantry PCC classes. With time, we should be able to make a big dent in our maintenance vulnerabilities, about which many of our commanders talk and write.

COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS

The Infantry School continues comprehensive programs to develop clothing and equipment, antiarmor systems, mortars, small arms, directed energy weapons, night vision devices, and all proponent infantry vehicles. Major emphasis has again been directed toward developing a medium antiarmor system. Since the program has been headed at DA, we are more optimistic about finally being able to replace the Dragon with a highly lethal, very trainable system.

Operational and organizational plans have been developed for such items as a close combat laser countermeasure system, a light mobile robotics system, a light anti-optics weapon system, a new sniper rifle, a multipurpose bayonet, and a battalion-operated surveillance system.

Infantry requirements have been identified for a family of armored vehicles, the future infantry fighting vehicle family, and a shoulder-launched multipurpose assault weapon, while a front-end analysis of light infantry capabilities and limitations has been performed in conjunction with the 7th Infantry Division.

TOE documents have been completed for airborne infantry and Ranger battalion units using Army of Excellence initiatives under the documentation modernization program directed by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. In addition, living TOEs for mechanized and heavy separate infantry brigades will be published in October 1986.

Initial design actions have also been completed for the development of a unique TOE document for the 6th Infantry Division, the Alaskan Defense Division. If all goes according to plan, this document will be published in October 1986. We have constant dialogue with the field and are working hard making fixes on current TOEs that are troubling our field units.

RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

This directorate is developing a prototype mechanized infantry task force ARTEP mission training plan (AMTP). It will focus on analyzing missions to determine the underlying tasks and on developing training plans to carry out the tasks rather than the missions. This AMTP (71-21) should be in the field by the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1986. It will give us a more precise training document but one that is far less voluminous and far more simple to execute.

INFANTRY PROPONENTS

Action has been taken to upgrade the experience level of MOS 11C soldiers in our heavy mortar Platoons. The platoon sergeant's position now calls for a master sergeant, the section leader's for a sergeant first class, and the chief computer's for a staff sergeant.

Action has also been taken to recode the infantry immaterial positions in TDAs to balance the understaffed MOSs 11C and 11H by shifting to them such TDA positions as land navigation, leadership, rifle marksmanship instructors, and operations sergeants from 11B. These initiatives will improve the experience level in our mortar sections and allow much more favorable career development, including promotion rates.

An updated DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization, will be published in April 1986. It will emphasize the influence light infantry and Ranger units have had on the accomplishment of the Infantry's mission and the need for company grade officers to serve in both mechanized and light infantry units to improve their cross-training experience.

Action has begun for coding as Ranger positions certain selected positions in both light and heavy infantry units (primarily at the platoon leader level) to provide Ranger-trained and experienced leaders in those units at the small unit level. Certain other selected positions will be coded as Pathfinder because of the increased emphasis the Army is now placing on air assault and aerial resupply operations. Pathfinder duty will be an additional duty for the coded positions.

ST 71-1, Infantry Professional Development, is currently under revision with a projected print date of May 1986. This text provides the enlisted soldier with information that is relevant to his professional development and tells him of assignment considerations.

EVALUATION AND STANDARDIZATION

Two separate efforts—an ITV training evaluation and an ITV maintenance evaluation—were conducted to keep the Infantry School abreast of the training and maintenance of this critical war-fighting system. The results portray in general a well-trained ITV force but one that is lacking in maintenance expertise. Efforts are under way to correct this.

Infantry Liaison Teams (ILTs) continue to visit units throughout the world. ILTs help units solve training problems in matters for which the School is the proponent, and also help the units apply the School's
training products to the units’ training programs along with the BTMS. The ILTs also function as the School’s external feedback system. If you need a team’s help in your unit before one is scheduled to visit, please let us know.

LIGHT INFANTRY TASK FORCE

During the past year, the Infantry School has continued to support the implementation and sustainment of a training strategy for the light infantry divisions. Field Circular 7-14, Light Infantry Company Operations and ARTEP Mission Training Plan, was published in February 1985, and the final draft of Field Circular 7-13, Light Infantry Battalion and Brigade Operations and Battalion ARTEP Mission Training Plan, was completed in November 1985.

During Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, these light infantry field circulars will be converted into field manuals and AMTPs.

Special courses have been developed by the Infantry School for soldiers and leaders in the light infantry divisions and distributed to other service schools to help them develop their own programs.

The certification of the light infantry concept, currently in Phase II, is expected to be completed by the end of the present fiscal year.

THE SCHOOL BRIGADE

The Tactical Leadership Course (TLC) is a recent addition to the IOBC and ANCOC POLS. The drill-based TLC, which is intended to train platoon-level leaders in critical combat skills, is conducted in the field under stressful, simulated combat conditions. The course is now being packaged to export to units outside of Fort Benning.

In response to certain perceptions from the field that many infantrymen are weak in land navigation, a program is under way at the School to upgrade its land navigation training. The School is now using competitive orienteering as a training vehicle to improve its students’ terrain association skills.

Mentorship has begun in all aspects of the IOBC program. Each IOBC company is commanded by a major; he is assisted by senior platoon trainers who are captains who have commanded companies. These officers serve as role models for the young lieutenants in the course. In addition, each platoon has two Ranger-qualified noncommissioned officer trainers who are either staff sergeants or sergeants first class. Seven of the course’s 16 weeks are spent in the field. More than 75 percent of the instruction is conducted by the cadre of the 2d Training Battalion. As you can see, committee instruction is becoming a thing of the past at the Infantry School.

RANGER

The Ranger Department graduated 1,893 Rangers in Fiscal Year 1985, the largest number—by 461—to earn the Ranger tab in any one year in the 35-year history of the Ranger course. The training load for Fiscal Year 1987 will increase from 2,100 to 3,080 to meet the needs of the light divisions entering the force structure, of the additional Ranger battalion, and the Ranger regimental headquarters. I will guarantee you, though, that this is being accomplished without reducing standards.

Leaders from 17 battalions or battalion equivalents have been trained in the Light Leader Course. These personnel came from the 7th Infantry Division, the 25th Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, and the 29th Infantry Division (National Guard). Leaders from 14 other battalions will be trained during Fiscal Year 1986, with the Department using a double-run concept.

Leaders from corps LRSU companies and division LRSU detachments will be trained by the Ranger Department in a five-week course that will begin in October 1986 (if the instructors arrive in time). Nine such training courses are programmed for Fiscal Year 1987.

SECRETARY

Within the School library, a number of changes have taken place. An antiterrorism orientation room has been opened, a military history room is being developed and should be completed by early spring, and a student and faculty area has been set up on the mezzanine level where users can leave their research materials for a number of weeks.

The Allied Student Training Detachment handled more students during Fiscal Year 1985 than it has ever handled—more than 700 students from 84 different countries. The School and ASTD combined efforts to host a very successful TRADOC Allied Training Officer conference during a three-day period in September 1985.

The Infantry School is a busy place these days and all of us here are dedicated to turning out the world’s finest infantrymen. More than that, as you can see from the above, we have initiated a number of innovative programs, the results of which will have a tremendous effect on all of our infantrymen and infantry units throughout the world.

The School has not worked in a vacuum, but has counted on your ideas, suggestions, and feedback to help it reach its immediate goals. In the months ahead, I look forward to continuing that dialogue, for I know that with all of us pulling together, we can do much to maintain the United States Infantry as the best in the world.
The article "Dismounted Night Attack," by Lieutenant Colonel William A. DePalo, Jr. (September-October 1985), raises some important issues that should be examined closely. What he has done is a classic case of deductive reasoning, going from the specific to the general, using only one example to support his conclusion.

In this case he has taken the results of a dismounted night attack during REFORGER 85 and deduced from it that "the unsupported, nonilluminated, dismounted night attack remains a highly effective and desirable part of our offensive doctrine," and further that "there is no reason, therefore, to believe that special operations forces can conduct dismounted night attacks." He says, "The mechanized infantryman, if he is well prepared to do so, can also conduct successful night attacks."

It has long been accepted that one of the most important ways to prepare for future encounters is to use the results of past encounters. But maybe the most important point for the would-be user of past examples to remember is that only insofar as one can count on the essential conditions of a given situation remaining the same can one count on essentially the same outcome. As Sir Julian Corbett, a noted British military and naval historian wrote, "The value of history in the art of war is not only to elucidate the resemblance of past and present, but also their essential differences."

With that in mind, we would like to look at the essential circumstances that contributed to the success of Colonel DePalo's attack.

He says, "Through stealth, [the dismounted infantryman] can move over virtually any kind of terrain, maneuver around choke points, and, in many instances, walk onto an objective undiscovered and therefore unopposed."

The attack itself was successful in that "all elements had crossed the river undetected and regrouped to begin infiltrating the objective." Further on, he states that "night is the ally of the infantryman and negates many of the advantages enjoyed by a defender who occupies good defensive terrain and has sophisticated optics and weapon systems."

The implication of all this is that his battalion slipped past the defenders totally undetected, except for "a single brief interruption when an enemy machinegun opened fire on the right flank company."

That is his side of the story.

We were the squadron commander and the S-3 of the unit that faced him, and we have a slightly different view of the battle (not surprising, since opposing forces often have completely different views of the battle). Let's look at an interpretation of these events from our side and see if some unique circumstances may have contributed to his success—essential circumstances that may or may not be transferable to future battles.

For starters, however, his units were not "undetected." They were seen even before midnight by line crossing patrols from the blue side (even though these were against the rules, as was his scout screen). They were further picked up in the thermal sights of both the M1 tanks and the M901 ITV's, both of which were deployed well forward. The patrols were tracked even before they approached the line of departure. So stealth did not contribute to their success, but, as Colonel DePalo states, they did manage to seize their objective. How?

The first essential circumstance that allowed this success, even though detected, was REFORGER artillery play. We have been on more than a dozen REFORGERS over the past ten years and can tell you that artillery is virtually worthless to the tactical commander in these exercises. This is because the cumbersome system used to allocate credit for artillery is unworkable. Many commanders stop using artillery because they know they will never get credit for it, and there are other things they can do with their time.

Did we call for artillery on these dismounted patrols? Yes, almost 100 calls for fire directed against them were sent to the DS 155mm battalion that was supporting our squadron. Our maneuver umpires (who normally do not give credit for artillery, as only artillery umpires are supposed to do this, according to the REFORGER umpire book) declared that the patrols would have been devastated by all of this artillery. They tried to give credit, but the results were insignificant.

The second essential circumstance made the little credit that was given worthless to us.

During REFORGER, casualties on the attacking side came back to life after two hours while casualties for the defenders came back after four hours. Not only did they come back to life, they were allowed to continue on with their patrol, even while "dead." Thus, the patrol leader could afford to completely disregard artillery. Since he wasn't attacking anything, merely infiltrating, he didn't need any combat power to continue, and the loss of men was insignificant.

Why didn't we maneuver to counter the dismounted patrols? Simple! For safety reasons, no mounted night tactical maneuver was allowed. Thus the tracked vehicles of the covering force were also ineffective. Also, the covering force vehicles were not issued any blank ammunition, so even this was not played. (Whoever "fired" on the right flank company must have been from the attacking battalion's own scout forces; it wasn't any of the covering force units.)

Could one, then, count this night dismounted infantry attack a success? Absolutely! It was a classic example of gamesmanship. It was a brilliant use of the quirks of REFORGER to gain a tac-
tical advantage. There is nothing wrong with this. We have been challenged over and over to break out of the conventional mode of thinking and to look for innovative solutions to problems. The night dismounted attack took advantage of several inherent limitations in REFORGER tactical play and made the most of them.

This is normal during REFORGER. REFORGER attacks by armor and mechanized infantry units are characterized by pressing the attack at all costs and concentrating lots of units in one small area—with attacking units coming back to life in two hours and the defenders in four hours, it doesn’t take long for an attacking force to build up an overwhelming advantage. There is no free maneuver during REFORGER because of maneuver damage limitation. Tracked vehicles are essentially road and trail bound.

What does all this have to do with the dismounted infantry attack? Just this. REFORGER is not the place to either argue or develop tactics. It is a great test of logistics and command and control at the battalion level. It may also be a good test of operational level skills. But the one thing it is not is a good test of tactics. And that is because the essential circumstances of combat are not there.

If Colonel DePalo expects to fight a mechanized unit with no night sights, ineffective artillery, and no ammunition and one that cannot or will not maneuver at night, and if he expects that his casualties will move while dead and come back to life in two hours, then maybe he can use this particular example as one on which to base his future plans. We hope, for the sake of his soldiers, that he does not.

None of this invalidates a night dismounted infantry attack—not even a night dismounted attack against a mechanized force. But neither can this particular exercise be used to validate any tactical doctrine. It is therefore ludicrous to use this example to bolster the argument for night dismounted attack.

Using historical examples is a time-honored means of preparing for the next war. But there are as many cases of nations and individuals using the wrong lessons as there are of using the right ones. The key is to make sure that one uses situations that approximate, in their critical circumstances, the situation one is trying to prepare for. And we don’t really think Colonel DePalo has done this.

No one is faulting his soldiers for their admittedly magnificent physical feat. But at the same time, that feat bore little relation to the kind of battle we expect to fight in Europe, and to say that it does is to do a disservice to the Army, but most especially to the dismounted infantryman.

GEORGE K. CROCKER
LTC, Armor

CLINTON J. ANCKER, III
MAJ, Armor
3d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

MORE ON NIGHT ATTACK

I concur with the theory behind Lieutenant Colonel William A. DePalo, Jr.’s article “Dismounted Night Attack.” Since I was an umpire during this operation of the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, I would like to make some comments about it.

During a REFORGER exercise, a mechanized infantry battalion is held to the constraints of the exercise, one of which limits tracked movement during hours of darkness. Umpires, controllers, and commanders must coordinate and plan so as not to allow the control restrictions to become tactical distractions. To control the battle and calculate the odds, each umpire must know the details of the maneuver commander’s intent, and during this particular exercise better communications would have helped.

To reinforce Colonel DePalo’s intentions, I recommend a closer look at the capabilities of the mechanized infantry. Its combat power can be increased if forces are concentrated toward the main effort of an attack. Such a course of action would have improved this battalion’s ability to sustain the effort of the division and may have allowed the attack to continue into the main battle area. But a main attack was not included in the battalion’s plans.

The battalion compromised its mobility when the drivers and track commanders were removed from their vehicles and ordered to contribute to the dismounted attack. Carrier teams, tanks, and TOWs could have been tasked with reinforcing the main attack or with providing continuous support by overwatching the dismounted element. Then the M113 armored personnel carriers could have carried the 60-pound rucksacks for the dismounted elements, leaving the soldiers with only the weapon systems required to complete the mission. A planned link-up operation using control measures would have made it easier to consolidate later and rejoin the dismounted elements with their tracks.

In this particular battle, trucks were used incorrectly and inefficiently. Wheeled vehicles carrying light infantry to a secured dismount point previously seized by a scout section or by the lead element of a maneuver unit would have served the effort more effectively. This technique would have allowed a more efficient use of both men and equipment, and the force would have had stronger soldiers ready to fight, instead of soldiers who had just walked 14 miles in a foot of snow. Selected tracks could have been used to carry mission-essential equipment and to help distribute the logistical needs of the battalion.

One simple control measure would have been to have TOWs move into overwatch and 107mm mortars support the forward elements’ movement to the river. When the dismounted units reached the river, the TOWs would have moved forward to overwatch, the tracks would have moved forward with rubber boats, and the trucks would have been prepared to resupply the effort.

The battalion’s mission was to penetrate the enemy’s covering force. Analyzing the operation, I consider it to have been a successful infiltration but not a successful attack. Bypassing the enemy’s covering force supported the principles of infiltration, while a penetration is designed to destroy the enemy force and with it the coherence of the defense.

The infantry should always train for
dismounted night attack, which is the most effective operation for disrupting the enemy's defensive plan. By combining the audacity of the dismounted soldier with the mobility of the mechanized infantry, we can destroy the coherence of an enemy's defense.

PAUL J. CANCELLIERE
CPT, Infantry
Fort Benning, Georgia

FOG BOUND

Your excellent magazine is read with great interest by all members of the British Army Staff in Washington and elsewhere in the United States and the United Kingdom.

I was interested to see in the INFANTRY News section an item about the Abrams M1A1 (November-December, p. 9). It is undeniably a superb tank, and I very much look forward to seeing it "in the flesh."

I would, however, like to comment on the final paragraph of that item, which claims that "The tank's thermal imaging and laser sighting systems enable the gunner to fire accurately through dense fog, smoke, or dust while the tank is traveling at combat speeds."

Excellent though the thermal imager and laser range finder may be, they will not operate through dense fog, thermal screening smoke, heavy fuel smoke, or thick dust clouds.

Water droplets and water vapor severely degrade the performance of thermal imagers and lasers. In light mist, fog, or rain, they will continue to operate but at reduced ranges and with less definition. In heavy rain thermal contrasts are drastically reduced and it becomes very difficult to distinguish targets from their backgrounds, except at very short ranges. In dense fog, thermal imagers and lasers "penetrate" little better than the human eye or a vehicle headlamp. Thermal imagers will, as claimed, operate through conventional smoke as though it did not exist, but some lasers will be defeated by the same smoke. These are mainly neodymium yag lasers, which comprise the majority of the lasers in military service throughout the world.

The M1A1 will, of course, have a CO₂ laser that can penetrate conventional smoke and can therefore be operated with thermal imagers. However, thermal-screening smokes are being developed, and some heavy fuel smokes currently used by Warsaw Pact forces may often "blind" thermal imagers and lasers. Dust can also have a "blinding" effect, but much depends on the size of the dust particles and the thickness of the dust cloud or screen.

These comments are in no way intended as a criticism of the excellent M1A1 tank, but I am sure you will agree that it is very important that soldiers be well aware of both the capabilities and the limitations of the equipment they use. They should certainly not overestimate those capabilities.

JOHN BOLTON-CLARK
Lt.Col., Royal Artillery
British Embassy
Washington, D.C.

JUST ONE

In reference to the article by Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, "Three Kinds of Infantry," in your July-August 1985 issue (and the response by Major R. McMichael in the November-December 1985 issue), I would like to offer the following views.

I personally believe that there are not three different kinds of infantry and that there is no need for three. There is only one type of infantryman, and he is employed differently in different scenarios and units.

Arming the "armored infantry" with submachineguns accomplishes one thing: It renders the dismounted infantryman unable to influence his immediate area beyond a range of 50 meters.

Having served in light infantry, airborne infantry, and mechanized infantry, I see no real differences beyond extra equipment and employment. Despite all the arguments to the contrary, I have found it quite easy to move from one "kind" of infantry to another. The basic training required is the same, and the tactical employment of the different "kinds" is not all that difficult.

The idea of institutionalizing three different types of infantry with, one assumes, three different MOSs and training programs would put a strain on the training base and fix a problem that doesn't really exist.

JACK E. MUNDSTOCK
CPT, Infantry
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

AUTHOR RESPONDS

Reference the letters by Captain Cormier and Sergeant Holmes in the November-December 1985 issue of INFANTRY (p. 5) in response to my article on extended PTXs for RC units (May-June 1985, p. 42), I would like to make some comments.

First, I would like to commend Sergeant Holmes on some of the excellent points that he made. I know that most Reserve Components now train throughout their annual training period in the field. Some even train at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and there is no better training available.

But during the 1970s, and when I was working on this article in 1981, many units did not train during the middle weekend, nor did they train for an extended period in a field environment. I am sure there were some that did, even then, as in the case of Captain Cormier's unit. If they did they should be commended, for they are truly superior to most RC units in all aspects of training.

It appears that my article may have been somewhat obsolete, but I remain firm in my opinion of this kind of training, and if there is still a unit somewhere that does not fully benefit from this kind of training, then the criticism will have been worth it.

On another subject, I enjoyed immensely the article "Longstreet and Jackson," by Captain Michael A. Pipps (November-December 1985, p. 29).

I agree with Captain Pipps that Longstreet was not given the credit he so richly deserved. Probably the most apparent reason for his unpopularity was his perceived performance at Gettysburg. He made several efforts to persuade Lee to
change his tactical plan at Gettysburg, but, for some reason, Lee actually thought he could win the battle and end the war.

After the battle, many of Longstreet's subordinate commanders blamed him for the defeat, maybe not knowing what discussions had actually taken place. When he made his feelings known after the war, this naturally made him very unpopular. And his becoming a Republican after the war and joining with old friend Grant in rebuilding the South made him a marked man. As Captain Phipps points out, he became a scapegoat.

TONY N. WINGO
CPT, Infantry
Birmingham, Alabama

PROVOKED

Although I usually do not indulge in writing rebuttals to letters in your "INFANTRY Letters" section, Lieutenant Mark A. Dorney's letter in your September-October issue (p. 4) has provoked me to do so.

Having served for 25 months as an infantry company commander, and having personally organized and run 36 squad-level live fires (all with movement) and 14 platoon-level live fires (again, all offensive in nature), I take issue with Lieutenant Dorney's entire thesis.

Captain Thomas P. Kratzman's article ("Concerning 'Safety,'" May-June 1985, p. 10) and its companion piece ("Training Realism and Safety," by Paul A. Dierberger, May-June 1985, p. 12) represent a lucid, rational argument for reviewing AR 385-63 and, more importantly, for reviewing all division safety regulations that serve as guidelines for live-fire exercises.

My point is that though MILES is a good system it is no substitute for live fire; it reinforces some poor tactical techniques (hiding in tall grass, for example), and the soldiers know they are shooting blanks. Scoring grenades or anything else does not improve realism. There is a tremendous psychological difference between throwing a grenade on a range and on a live-fire exercise.

The control measures that need to be emphasized are lines of departure, observation positions, and boundaries.

Live-fire exercise scenarios must conform to doctrine. There must be no "administrative" periods—there will be none in combat. We must suppress the attitude that "in real life we'd do it this way, but because of safety we do it that way." An operation is either tactically sound or it is not. Safety is also a real world planning consideration. If doctrine calls for us to do things we're forbidden to do, either doctrine or the regulation must be changed. Include a realism briefing as well as a safety briefing to tell the soldiers the standards expected of them in terms of realism.

Accidents are the cost of doing business. Just as we know accidents are going to happen with aircraft and vehicles, we should accept that accidents will happen on live fires. We must not be cavalier about it, and we must take all available precautions, but when controls inhibit the imagination of the maneuvering unit, an exercise ceases to fulfill its primary mission—preparing the soldier for battle.

WILLIAM B. CREWS
CPT, Infantry
Fort Ord, California

CALL FOR PAPERS

Abstracts of papers and workshop proposals are invited for the U.S. Army Combined Seminar on Human Technology/Stress Management to be held in Indianapolis on 4-8 August 1986. The deadline is 30 April 1986.

Topics for the seminar include soldier selection and placement, soldier and unit performance in the areas of physical, mental, and stress management skills or morale, and unit cohesion and esprit.

Abstracts should address these five criteria: What does the technology propose to change? What evidence supports the technology's claims? At what target populations is the technology directed? What are the essential characteristics of the technology? What are the cost and benefit factors?

For information, write Commander, U.S. Army Soldier Support Center,

ATTN: ATSG-DSS (Bridges), Fort Harrison, IN 46216-5060, or call (317) 542-3878.

ROBERT C. MITCHELL
COL, Infantry
Directorate for Soldier Advocacy
Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana

WRITING BOOK

I am preparing for publication a full-length book that I have tentatively entitled Line of Departure. I would like very much to hear from soldiers who served with me between 1950 and 1975, and I ask them to contact Ms. Julie Sherman for further details.

Ms. Sherman can be reached at P.O. Box 187, St. Lucia, Queensland 4067, AUSTRALIA.

I appreciate any help that can be given to me.

DAVID H. HACKWORTH
COL, U.S. Army, Retired

BOOK ON KHE SANH

I am writing a narrative account of the Siege of Khe Sanh (January-April 1967) and need some detailed personal accounts from participants.

I would appreciate hearing from anyone who served at or in support of the Khe Sanh Combat Base (including air and artillery) during the siege.

My address is 1149 Grand Teton, Pacifica, CA 94044; telephone (415) 355-6678.

ERIC M. HAMMEL
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS for the squad automatic weapon (SAW) have changed with the addition of point targets at 600 meters and area targets at 800 meters.

FM 23-14, Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) M249, which was distributed throughout the Army in December 1985, incorporates the extended range tables and standards.

The qualification scores and ratings are as follows:

- **Expert**: 27-24
- **First Class Gunner**: 23-20
- **Second Class Gunner**: 19-15
- **Unqualified**: 14 and below

Units that have not received their copies of FM 23-14 should check to make sure they are scheduled to receive them through pinpoint distribution.

IDEAS ON TACTICS and training are being solicited from the field by the U.S. Army Infantry School in an effort to find better ways of fighting.

The School’s Research and Analysis Directorate will conduct an initial evaluation of the ideas to determine the feasibility of adopting and implementing them into its doctrinal literature. Promising ideas will then be presented to the responsible agencies for deeper analysis.

Anyone who has ideas that may improve the Army’s ability to fight may write to Commander, USAIS, ATTN: ATSH-RA, Ft. Benning, GA 31905-5000 or call AUTOVON 835-4673/3731.

MORE NONCOMMISSIONED officers should be attending the Infantry Mortar Platoon Course (IMPC) at Fort Benning. Historically, three times as many commissioned as noncommissioned officers have attended the course. A review of mortar unit TOEs shows, however, that a reverse ratio is now needed to fill the units’ needs.

The six-week IMPC, conducted by the U.S. Army Infantry School, is designed to prepare officers and NCOs to supervise and direct the fire of a mortar platoon in support of infantry combat operations.

The course is broken down as follows: Mechanical training (32 hours), fire direction center procedures (96 hours), fire planning and forward observer procedures (9 hours), field firing exercise (24 hours), tactical employment of mortars (18 hours), and student examinations (30 hours).

During Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, the School will conduct 12 IMPC classes per year with 79 students programmed for each. To meet the new officer to NCO ratio of 1:3, each of these classes should contain about 19 officers and 60 NCOs.

Field unit commanders are asked to help the School meet this goal.

Commissioned officers must be first or second lieutenants, either assigned to or on orders for assignment to infantry mortar units (Active Army or Reserve Component). Those assigned to units in CONUS must have served for one year as infantry or armor/cavalry platoon leaders and must attend IMPC in a TDY and return status. Lieutenants assigned to units overseas may attend in a TDY enroute or a TDY return status.

Noncommissioned officers must be in the ranks of sergeant through sergeant first class/platoon sergeant. Active duty NCOs must have nine months or more of active service time remaining after completion of the course. NCOs may attend in TDY and return or TDY enroute status.

Both officers and NCOs must have minimum physical profiles of 111221. No security clearances are required.

Further information and assistance are available from Captain Kim, AUTOVON 784-2513/4308 or commercial 404-544-2513/4308.

A USER’S HOTLINE has been established at the U.S. Army’s Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center. The Natick Center is The Army’s proponent for food, clothing, shelters, and air-drop systems.

After Natick’s duty hours, a recording device will be available to take the caller’s message, and his call will be returned the next business day.

Army issue and supply personnel are encouraged to use the hotline to report, discuss, or resolve problems with centrally procured and issued food, clothing, individual equipment, aerial delivery equipment, tentage, and rigid wall shelters.

The hotline number is AUTOVON 256-5341.

THE DIRECTORATE of Combat Developments has provided the following news items:

- **The Battlefield Management System (BMS)**. The BMS, which is intended to improve the command and control capabilities of maneuver unit commanders, is being studied by the Infantry School.

As part of this effort, DCD project officers will be visiting these commanders in the field over the next few months to determine how the system can best serve the units’ needs.

BMS will use automated and digital data information processing with existing
communications systems for the close combat maneuver force at levels from individual combat leader through battalion. The system will be able to process plans and orders (both graphically and digitally), provide navigational and terrain data, and transmit real-time intelligence data and routine administrative and logistics reports and requests. Many of these functions will be automated.

The BMS will be integrated into the automated Maneuver Control System (MCS), now being fielded at brigade level and higher. (See INFANTRY, November-December 1985, p. 8.) During their field visits, DCD personnel will actively seek the assistance of infantry commanders from platoon leader to battalion commander and will observe field exercises to determine the specific BMS needs for the infantry battalion. Some of the key issues to be discussed will be the critical tasks recommended for automation, levels of automation, and hardware/software requirements.

* **Small Unit Radio (SUR), AN/PRC-126**. The SUR, a handheld, more practical version of the present AN/PRC-68 small unit transceiver (SUT), will soon be in the hands of infantry leaders. (See INFANTRY, September-October 1985, p. 7.)

The SUR will allow communications between the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, and the squad leaders during dismounted operations. It will have a frequency selection between 30.00 and 87.95 megahertz and a range of three kilometers.

The new radio will be compatible with the AN/VRC-12, and AN/PRC-77, and the SINCgars family of infantry radios. It will weigh less than three pounds and will be attached to a soldier's load-bearing equipment by means of a carrying case.

This issue of radios will be restricted to infantry and Special Forces units.

* **NBC Protective Mask, XM-40**. The new NBC protective mask, scheduled for fielding during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1986, is a hybrid of the current M17 and M9 protective masks. (See INFANTRY, September-October 1985, p. 11.)

The mask is equipped with an external NATO standard filter canister, which can be mounted on either the left or the right side of the mask to accommodate firing weapons from either side; dual voicemitters for better communications; and a drinking tube for water similar to that on the M17 mask.

Some other significant features include larger eye lenses for greater visibility, a larger carrying case with velcro closures, and a filter that can be changed in 10 seconds.

* **Light-Fighter Chemical Protective Ensemble (Lite-Protector)**. A need has been identified for an extremely lightweight “risk-taking” NBC overgarment that will offer a 30 percent reduction in heat stress and a 40 to 50 percent reduction in weight over the present garment. A key feature of this development is the shroud that will be its low initial pack volume (100 cubic inches), which will allow the Lite-Protector to fit inside a BDU pocket.

This new garment would be used primarily by light infantry divisions and special operations forces during low NBC threat operations. Development should begin in Fiscal Year 1987, with a projected initial operational capability of Fiscal Year 1988-89.

THE PRESIDENT of the U.S. Army Infantry Board has submitted the following news items:

* **Mortar Ballistic Computer (MBC)**. The MBC is a small, hand-portable computer (7 x 10.5 x 2.3 inches) weighing 6.6 pounds. It is designed to be able to calculate all the fire control information needed to lay and fire 60mm, 81mm, and 107mm mortars with all the types of rounds designed for those systems.

It is a solid-state electronic computing device with a waterproof membrane switch keyboard and panel switches, circuit boards, display elements, and power supply. The MBC is powered either by self-contained throw-away or rechargeable batteries or by external power sources (AC or DC). It has two batteries—an operational battery, which provides the voltage for the control panel, display, microprocessor, and modem, and a “keep-alive” battery, which is incorporated into the circuitry to power the memory. The MBC is designed to accept fire requests from forward observers through the digital message device (DMD), AN/PSG-2, or tactical radio or wire communications.

The MBC, formerly called the Mortar Fire Control Calculator (MPCC), was tested by the Infantry Board in late 1980. (See INFANTRY, May-June 1981, p. 7.) From these and other tests, the Army concluded in July 1981 that the MBC would be acceptable after specified improvements had been incorporated into it.

In March 1985 the 197th Infantry Brigade was designated to be the first unit equipped with the MBC. From October through December 1985, the Infantry Board conducted tests using the TOE 107mm mortar platoons from the brigade.

The functional performance of the MBC was tested during both nonfiring and live-fire exercises. During the non-firing exercises, the MBC operators performed some representative tasks required of FDC personnel during mortar platoon tactical exercises. These tasks included computing firing data for 60mm, 81mm, and 107mm mortars, with the MBC operators computing data for their respective platoons.

During both types of exercise, the mortar platoons were supported by FIST personnel (forward observers) who transmitted requests for fire and other information to the FDC over normal communications lines using both voice and the DMD.

To determine whether deficiencies and shortcomings detected during previous testing had been corrected, specific test events required the MBC operators to compute the firing data not obtained during the normal nonfiring or live-fire exercises.

During all testing, data was collected on reliability, availability, and maintainability; logistics supportability; human factors; and safety.

These test results will be used by the Infantry School to ensure that the system is ready to be fielded.

* **Mini Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation Set (MELIOS)**. Two prototype mini laser rangefinders were tested at Fort Benning in 1979. (See INFANTRY, May-June 1980, p. 8.) In 1982, a decision was made to develop an eyesafe
system, now called the MELIOS, AN/PVS-6.

A small, lightweight, handheld device, the MELIOS was designed to meet ranging needs out to the maximum range of infantry weapon systems with a required accuracy of plus or minus five meters. It has a monocular optical sighting telescope with 5X to 7X magnification and a seven-degree field of view. The range is displayed digitally when the read-out switch is activated. Prototypes from two contractors were recently provided to the Infantry Board for testing.

Fifty-four combat arms soldiers (MOS series 11 and 19) from the 197th Infantry Brigade and the 29th Infantry Regiment participated in the first operational test of the MELIOS, conducted by the Board last fall. These test soldiers included small unit leaders, vehicle commanders, direct fire and indirect fire weapon gunners, and reconnaissance personnel. All of them were proficient in map reading and in the current range estimation techniques (visual range estimation aided by binoculars, compass, and map).

Side-by-side comparative tests of the two prototypes and the current range estimation techniques were conducted. Ranging exercises against single and multiple target arrays at ranges out to 4,000 meters were conducted from a mounted position in the commander’s hatch of the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, from a building, and from a dismounted position on the ground using the prone, kneeling, and foxhole body positions.

Reliability, availability, and maintainability; logistical supportability; human factors; and safety data was collected throughout the tests. Night signature and ranging under illumination were also tested.

These test results will be used by the Infantry School in developing the validation In-Process Review position for MELIOS.

THE NATIONAL INFANTRY MUSEUM has provided the following news items:

A large prisoner-of-war exhibit was opened at the Museum following the rededication of a prisoner-of-war monument that was transferred to Fort Benning from the City of Columbus, Georgia, in November 1985. (See INFANTRY, January-February 1986, pp. 8-9.) The monument had been erected following World War II in remembrance of all the soldiers who died while imprisoned. The father-in-law of such a soldier had originated the idea and led the drive for the monument. Members of the family of that prisoner were present for the rededication ceremony and, as previously reported, Dr. Brooks Kleber, himself a prisoner of war during World War II, was the speaker for the occasion.

The POW exhibit includes a large number of artifacts that belonged to Colonel Ray O'Day, donated by his son, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Nat O'Day.

Colonel O'Day survived the Bataan death march in 1942 and spent the remainder of the war a prisoner of the Japanese. In the camp he earned the nickname “Colonel Fix-It” and a camp saying arose, “Don’t throw it away, give it to O’Day.” He learned early to keep as busy as possible so that time would pass more quickly. With a crude selection of homemade tools and scraps of anything he could get, he made a wide variety of items that the prisoners badly needed. He was also able to repair shoes and to mend and patch clothing, which was in short supply.

This exhibit shows items made or used by prisoners of war from the Civil War through the Vietnam War. Among these items are hand and leg irons used in Civil War prisons, articles of clothing worn by American prisoners and those of other nationalities held prisoner by the United States, and personal articles such as letters, identification papers, and a Bible.

Also displayed are articles made by prisoners, such as playing cards, hammocks, underwear, clothespins, and various carved objects. One object, a large American flag made by prisoners at a German POW camp, was assembled from scraps of cloth and crudely hand sewn with the stars glued on. This flag was raised above the camp on 6 April 1945, just after its liberation by the 95th Infantry Division.

The prisoner-of-war exhibit, a moving tribute to U.S. prisoners of war, serves as a reminder of the sacrifices they made. The accompanying photographs show some of the items in the exhibit.

The Museum continues to receive donations of articles that improve its collection. A number of unit histories have been donated recently, as well as regimental crests and historical photographs. The Lizzie Rutherford Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy donated a copy of the book City of Progress, A History of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1978, an important reference source on the area and its people.

Other items donated include World War II brown leather boots worn by the donor’s father throughout the war; an 1808 booklet entitled Military Companion and an 1825 epaulet, both of which were used by an ancestor of the donor; and a U.S. Army Medical Department flight service chest.

The National Infantry Museum Society, formed at Fort Benning a number of years ago to assist the Museum with financial and volunteer support, is open to anyone who is interested in joining. The cost is $2.00 for a one-year membership or $10.00 for a lifetime membership. Additional information about the Museum and the Society is available from the Director, National Infantry Museum, Fort Benning, Georgia, 31905-5273, AUTOVON 835-2958, or commercial 404/545-2958.

March-April 1986 INFANTRY 11
Our best professional soldiers have long recognized that the diligent study of military history is essential to their success. According to Antoine Jomini, Swiss general, historian, and author of The Art of War, "Military history, accompanied by sound criticism, is indeed the true school of war."

Why study military history and spend precious time poring over yellow-paged tomes crammed with the exploits of long-dead warriors? Quite simply, because we can learn from history. In the words of Captain Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, history "provides us with the opportunity to profit by the stumbles and tumbles of our forerunners."

Even though the tactics, techniques, and weapons of warfare have changed and become increasingly lethal with the progression of civilization, the human element of leadership and military history remain constant. Brigadier (later Field-Marshal the Earl) Archibald P. Wavell of the British Army, a highly successful commander and proconsul and a keen observer and chronicler of military history, emphasized studying the individual soldier. He wrote:

_I do advise you to study the human side of military history, which is not a matter of cold-blooded formulas or diagrams, or nursery-book principles such as be good and you will be happy; be mobile and you will be victorious; interior lines at night are a general's delight; exterior lines in the morning are the general's warning, and so on. To learn that Napoleon in 1796 with 20,000 men beat combined forces of 30,000 by something called "economy of force" or "operating on interior lines" is a mere waste of time. If you can understand how a young, unknown man inspired a half-starved, ragged, rather Bolshe crowd; how he filled their bellies; how he out-marched, outwitted, out-bluffed and defeated men who had studied war all their lives and waged it according to the textbooks of the time, you will have learnt something worth knowing._

**GUIDANCE**

More recently, the Chief of Staff of the Army has charged "all soldiers, from private to general, who are serious about the profession of arms and making our Army one of excellence," with reading and studying military history. It is therefore the duty and responsibility of all leaders, especially at the Infantry brigade, battalion, and company levels, to translate this guidance into meaningful, effective, and productive military history study programs.

Toward that end, Company B, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, a COHORT battalion of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), has developed a professional military history reading and writing program that has the potential to be extremely effective in improving the knowledge and the leadership abilities of all its officers.

The personnel stability in a COHORT unit is especially conducive to the long-term study of military history, with virtually no repetition in the program. For example, in Company B, all four lieutenants (the executive officer and the three rifle platoon leaders) are all second lieutenants with dates of rank within one month of each other; all arrived in the unit within a three-month period; and they all have about the same level of knowledge and experience. Other types of units, however, can easily adapt the program to suit their own needs.

The company's professional military history reading and writing program was conceived and developed during the three-month chain-of-command training period before its soldiers arrived and the unit was formally activated.
Informal sessions were conducted in which anniversaries of famous unit battles, stories of regimental Medal of Honor winners, and other vignettes of unit heritage were used to explain the value of military history to the unit’s officers. To further stimulate and enrich their intellectual interest, the program called for all of Company B’s officers to read and discuss two chapters from *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*, published by the Army’s Center of Military History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). The two chapters were Chapter 2, “A Perspective on Military History,” by Colonel Thomas E. Griess, and Chapter 3, “An Approach to the Study of Military History,” by Lieutenant Colonel John F. Votaw. (This illuminating book, which is issued to all lieutenants in the Infantry Officer Basic Course at Fort Benning, served as the foundation for the unit’s military history study program and its jumping-off point.)

**HUMAN FACTORS**

The first year of the company’s military history reading program, in which the company’s officers are now engaged, concentrates on studying the human factor in the Army, small unit tactics, and battlefield leadership, and provides a historical and philosophical “perspective on infantry.” (See accompanying chart.)

After reading and studying the first year’s books, each officer prepares a short, handwritten synopsis of a specific chapter or incident in each book, then discusses that item in an informal symposium. This gives each officer a chance to express himself both orally and in writing, and the company commander an opportunity to assess each lieutenant’s ability to communicate effectively. Then the commander can recommend remedial programs where they seem to be needed.

In addition to reading professionally enriching books during the first year, each of the unit’s officers is expected to hone his reading and writing skills by compiling a research paper on a historical topic of individual interest in one of the following areas:

- Infantry Battalion (Light) concept of operations in a low-intensity conflict.
- Battlefield logistics and resupply operations for the Infantry Battalion (Light).
- A historical example of a battle won by light infantry forces.
- A historical example of effective small-unit leadership in combat in a light infantry unit.

These papers must include the following information, which Colonel Votaw recommended in his article:
- An evaluation of the strategic situation (period of history; war; international adversarities; principal events leading up to the battle, campaign, or conflict analyzed).
- A review of the tactical setting (location; any terrain advantages held by either side; approximate force ratios; types of forces, if relevant; feasible courses of action available to antagonist).
- A list of other factors that affected the event (effects of terrain or weather; special advantages or disadvantages the antagonists had).
- A synopsis of the conduct of the event (opening moves; salient features; outcome).
- A statement of the historical lessons provided by the event.
- An assessment of the significance of the event.

As these projects are completed, they are evaluated by the company commander. Then, in an officer professional development (OPD) session, each officer presents his topic and shares his ideas with his fellow officers of the battalion.

The purposes of this historical research project, in addition to giving the company’s officers a greater appreciation for military history and teaching them lessons about its application, are to improve their analytical and research abilities and their oral and written communication skills.

**ASSIGNED READINGS**

**FIRST YEAR**

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**SECOND AND THIRD YEARS**

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During the second and third years of the company's military history reading program, the books to be read and studied include those on military philosophy, small unit actions, training, and logistics, and also an autobiography (see chart).

Again, each lieutenant will study these books, prepare a synopsis of an assigned chapter or incident, and relate it to contemporary aspects of military leadership and tactics.

The members of Company B realize, of course, that they may not always be able to keep strictly to the program’s schedule of reading and writing projects. Nevertheless, the initial successes indicate that the communications skills of the company’s lieutenants have already significantly improved and that these officers now have a much greater appreciation for the lessons of military history and for their unit’s heritage.

The importance of the diligent and thorough study of military history in making our Army one of excellence cannot be overemphasized. We can, and must, learn from the experiences of our forbears in the profession of arms.

Captain Harold E. Rough, Jr., is commander of Company B, 5th Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment at Fort Ord. He previously served in various platoon leader and staff officer assignments in the Berlin Brigade and the 2d Infantry Division.

Buzzword Cowards

FRED BOST

Too many otherwise brave infantrymen become cowards when faced with a certain recurring duty requirement. It doesn’t help to realize that this same kind of cowardice prevails throughout much of the rest of the Army. This cowardice is displayed almost every time a leader sits down to write the narrative section of an officer or an enlisted evaluation report (OER, EER)—and hides behind buzzwords.

In theory, OERs and EERs are a key factor in the promotion and assignment of soldiers, because they allow a comparison of strengths and weaknesses. But this strange quirk of cowardice has kept the theory from becoming fact. Because ratings on the numerical scales of OERs and EERs have always been inflated, the narrative section of the report is the only place a user of the report has any hope of “seeing the individual” (and thus of making accurate comparisons). But too many evaluators refuse to narrate the simple truths the users need.

Why? Their reasons are hard to pin down, but judging by their submissions, these people seem to be highly uncomfortable with “writing” and afraid that commonly used, everyday words—“you and me language”—will be regarded as inadequate and below standard.

In short, too many soldiers (even some with college degrees) fear that their writing will somehow reveal them as uneducated or unsophisticated. Because of this fear, they try to give their writing more “pizzazz” by borrowing strange words and unfamiliar phrases, the kind of wording supposedly considered impressive. This “borrowing” not only cheats the government of the intent of the report—an accurate, detailed assessment of the soldier being evaluated—but sometimes it backfires on the writer and makes him look like a dunce.

EXAMPLES

One writer, for example, was obviously unfamiliar with the meaning of the word “potential” when he wrote, “SFC Walkonwater has far surpassed his highest potential.”

The writer of this next sentence, from another report, apparently borrowed more than a single word:

SFC Carefree’s basically questioning nature regulates his adaptability to somewhere on the borderline of excellence; however, his outstanding attitude and initiative traits, combined with his graded sense of responsibility and performance, cause him to be a reliable asset to this section or an attribute to the Army.

Confess! You recognize these borrowed words, don’t you? You’ve probably latched onto some of them yourself: adaptability, outstanding attitude, sense of responsibility, reliable asset, attribute to the Army.

It’s not that these words are bad in themselves. When used to introduce something specific, any of them will work fine. But when such words are tied together as a group, introducing nothing, as in this example, they lead nowhere.

What is making these empty word structures more destructive than ever is that they are becoming more prevalent. Today, in fact, they are being actively pushed by the ignorant as the correct approach to writing narratives. As a result, the use of copycat phrases has become a fad. At various posts, multi-page lists of phrases and buzzwords are openly exchanged by soldiers. Apparently just two criteria are used for composing such a list: The wording must sound pretentious, and it must be so nonspecific that it can be applied to just about any soldier doing just about any job.

Here are some examples of suggested phrases culled from a list entitled
If you hide behind buzzwords and would like to change, try being yourself and using your own words. Before you reject the thought of using normal language, remember that for many years your language has been serving you well as a professional soldier. Probably, you have been praised for classes you taught, and you have had no problem critiquing soldiers and describing their performance or praising a soldier face-to-face for a job well done. Why then do you need someone else’s words to handle such tasks on paper? The secret is to write about a soldier’s good points and bad points the same way you would talk with your commander about those good points and bad points. It’s that simple.

Of course, structuring your thoughts to put them on paper does cause some minor differences. For one thing, because you are limited by the space on the form, you have to choose your points carefully. For another, when speaking to your commander, you would probably let jargon slip into the conversation (terms that might not be understood outside your type of unit). But there’s no real problem with that. After writing your narrative the first time, you can go back over it, pull out the jargon, and replace it with words that say the same thing in a way that is more understandable to outsiders.

While going over your narrative, check out a few other things. Unless you have a good reason to do otherwise, use the active voice—make each of your sentences first mention the soldier before saying something about what he does or how well he does it. (The sentences in the general’s narrative are fine examples.)

**SUGGESTIONS**

And here are a few other suggestions that can help you do the job right:

- Make the opening sentence say something important about the soldier’s overall performance during the rating period. Have this topic sentence signal your proposed direction to the reader. Make it general enough to act as a “fence” to tie together the specific facts that follow. (You saw how the general laid out the facts in the report he wrote; lay yours out in the same way.)
- Try to use short, easy-to-understand words that will help the reader picture the situation.
- Get details into your narrative. Show the soldier’s value in concrete terms, or else describe his actions. A good technique is to present shortcomings by offsetting them with accomplishments. For example, “As a new sergeant, he has often failed to pass on instructions to his team members. He does, however, make an extra effort to see that his mission is always accomplished.”
- Another good technique is to follow a general statement with a closely related specific item: “During this rating period, he has greatly improved his professional knowledge. For example, he recently learned, on his own, how to field strip the Soviet PPS-43 Sudarev submachine-gun.”
- If a soldier’s performance has changed since the last report, say so: “His performance is improving.” or “He has shown no improvement since the last rated period.”
- The best sentence to close with is one that leaves no doubt as to your judgment of the soldier’s performance during the rated period: “Despite the weak area noted, Sergeant Mann’s desire to do well stands out above everything else.” or “In short, during this rating period, Sergeant Mann performed all assigned tasks in a professional manner.” or “Sergeant Mann has made every effort to become the best soldier in his division.”

Above all else, the important thing to remember is to be sincere. State the facts accurately as you know them; don’t resort to copycat phrasing; don’t hide behind buzzwords.

Traditionally, the infantry has led the way across treacherous battlefields. Now a peacetime battle is shaping up, the battle to rescue the floundering evaluation system.

You can help win that battle by making sure you yourself handle the job right.

Fred Bost is a retired sergeant major, having served in the U.S. Navy during World War II, then with the Army National Guard, and more than 19 years with the Regular Army (all of it with infantry or special forces units). He was a newspaper reporter for eight years and now teaches effective writing at Fort Bragg.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel is often quoted as saying that "the battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins." The "quartermasters" of the fighting forces are the combat service support logistics (S-4), the administrators (S-1), the maintenance officers (BMO), and the medical platoon leaders. Even if all the equipment, fuel, ammunition, personnel, and transportation assets are available, though, the fighting units must receive their proper allocations at the proper times and places on the battlefield, and sometimes that is not a simple matter.

Paragraph IV of operations orders, along with logistics annexes and service support overlays, are routinely tucked away near the end of the orders. Tacticians, interested primarily in Paragraph III, often only glance superficially at Paragraph IV. The existing logistical manuals are heavy on doctrine but short on technique for tactical units.

We have a tactical execution matrix to use as an easy-to-read, quick reference for the execution of instructions. (See INFANTRY, September-October 1985, pp. 34-36.) Why not a combat service support matrix that works the same way? The CSS matrix shown here is a technique for incorporating the combat service support concepts into a more practical and useful format. It is a one-page matrix that is designed to help company commanders and logisticians understand how their support is to be accomplished.

With it, a commander, executive officer, or CSS representative knows exactly when, where, and how much of each class of supply his unit will receive and also the source of the unit's medical and maintenance support. Thus, the service support and tactical matrices stand alone, saving the user the time it would take him to search through pages of operations orders to extract the information he needs.

To develop the service support matrix, the S-4, on the basis of his commander's guidance, first determines how he will support the planned operation. He considers all of the available assets, all information dealing with supply, recovery, and evacuation, and then develops Paragraph IV of the operations order, which includes the matrix itself.

SAMPLE

In preparing the matrix, he lists the task force elements across the top and the classes of supply, evacuation, recovery, and other support along the left margin. Inside the blocks, he notes all the pertinent details, including amounts of each class of supply, LOGPAC windows, and priorities.

The sample matrix shown here has been developed in this manner:

Class I. The S-4 has entered for each unit where the LOGPAC will be, when it will be there, and whom the unit will support or receive support from. Company A of the infantry battalion (A IN), for example, will support the scouts, while the Vulcan section will receive its Class I supplies with Company B of the infantry battalion (B IN).

Class III. He has noted which vehicle will come to each unit (TPU, HQ 54 to A IN); he has shown that the engineers will have a vehicle attached and at what point they must notify the S-4 to resupply them.

Class IV. In these blocks, the S-4 has written what type of barrier packages each unit will receive. These packages are designated as company-sized and then broken down into platoon-sized packages ("2 IN" and "1 AR" stand for two infantry platoons and one armor platoon).

Class V. The S-4 has shown in these blocks what type of package each unit will receive and how much and what type
of ammunition will be cached. For example, the 4.2-inch mortar platoon will receive 50 rounds of WP, 25 of illumination, and 100 of HE. (The S-4 decides on the size and make-up of Class IV and V packages in accordance with his available assets.)

**Medical evacuation.** He designates units to assist independent elements such as the mortar platoon, scouts, or antiaircraft company. He also designates whether a unit will receive additional support assets. The scouts, for example, will evacuate to A IN, while A IN assists the engineers and receives an additional ambulance; E IN will receive its evacuation vehicles from CP 4.

**Maintenance.** In this block, he shows how the battalion maintenance officer (BMO) will support the task force. For example, the 4.2-inch mortars will recover their vehicles to CP 4; an M88 recovery vehicle is reserved for area coverage. This block details maintenance priorities, which in this example are bulldozers, tanks, TOWs, and Vulcans, in descending order.

Separate units are an additional effort for the support planner. Air defense artillery, mortars, antiaircraft elements, scouts, tactical operations centers, trains, and others do not have organic support; they are supported by the nearest element that does have organic support.

The combat service support matrix can be used for either offensive or defensive missions. In defensive missions, the matrix includes Classes I, III, IV, and V. Offensive missions will emphasize Classes I, III, V and recovery and evacuation of personnel, recovery of vehicles, and maintenance priorities.

Once a task force staff has been trained to the point of being able to formulate a solid, comprehensive logistical plan on the basis of METT-T, the next problem is seeing that the plan is executed properly.

Although the subordinate element could get the necessary logistical information they need from Paragraph IV of the operations order and from the service support overlay, that effort would cost them valuable time and could lead to some confusion.

The service support matrix, which is a quick, simple compilation of logistical information, can save a user that time just as it will eliminate any possible cause of confusion.

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**The Vital Link**

**MAJOR THOMAS R. ROzman**

Division 86 is now being implemented throughout the Army. This is the most significant reorganization of the Army's ground combat power since 1982. Combat support elements once again have been moved into the headquarters company. A fourth line company has been given to the armor and mechanized infantry battalions, and an antiaircraft company (Company E) has been added to the mechanized infantry battalions.

One of the most important things about this reorganization is the radical change it makes in the way battalions conduct their maintenance. Trends toward removing administrative burdens from the maneuver company commands were apparent in the mid-1970s — such as the consolidation of personnel administration at battalion level — but the idea of centralizing maintenance has always met with resistance. The old line mechanized infantrymen and tankers were always concerned about responsive logistics for mounted operations — Would they be able to keep their vehicles operational?

**FEARS**

The idea of eliminating organic maintenance at company level, at least in garrison, raised fears of a potential for failure in several areas; the need for operators to identify parts failures through their preventive maintenance; the responsive requisitioning of those parts; and a consolidated maintenance support activity's ability to be responsive in repairing vehicles in the large numbers found in the mechanized infantry and armor battalions.

The Israeli experience of recent years, however, argued strongly for a consolidated maintenance effort. The fluid battlefield and the numerous vehicle casualties spawned by modern mechanized warfare showed clearly the wisdom or timely and rapid recovery and repair well forward in the operational area using efficiently pooled resources.

In our own Army, garrison maintenance crews, when considered in the context of personnel realities in the 63-series MOSIs, had always seemed to operate short of the number of skilled personnel required to keep a unit's vehicles operational. How better to provide high-quality maintenance in this situation than to consolidate the available resources? Reality,
in more ways than one, strengthened a consolidation concept, and Division 86 embraced it.

But the old troopers’ concerns still have not gone away, and we cannot wish them away. So how do we make it work? We know it takes experience, knowledge, and constant checking and rechecking to perform effective maintenance.

One critical rule in getting things done has always been to put someone in charge and to make sure he knows he is responsible. But what specific responsibilities does a maintenance supervisor have? If we are consolidating maintenance but have concerns about our ability to perform good preventive maintenance, supervise operators, and work within a consolidated maintenance operation, then we should be able to tell the people who supervise these operators about their responsibilities. Yet none of our doctrinal literature gives them to us.

In response to this need, the 2d Brigade, 1st Armored Division tackled the job of developing some suitable guidelines and responsibilities. The brigade focused on the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants in the various companies as being the vital links in the preventive maintenance supervisory chain. A study group in the brigade’s mechanized infantry battalion analyzed the problem. The experience of the unit and other battalions in the brigade, along with a study of recently published Division 86 doctrine (Tt 71-2J and FM 29-2J, for example), provided material for a draft list for each of these leaders. These draft lists of duties and responsibilities were circulated to all the brigade’s battalions for comment. The lists were then refined and forwarded to the brigade commander, approved, and distributed. Their contents are shown here.

These lists of duties for platoon leaders and platoon sergeants have been a major step toward solving some of this brigade’s concerns about Division 86 maintenance. Lists such as these are not the answer to all our maintenance challenges, of course. Nevertheless, by incorporating these duties or some combination of them into a platoon leader’s OER support form, we are going a long way toward assuring effective maintenance under the Division 86 organization. At least our platoon leaders know what we expect of them.

Major Thomas R. Rozman is assistant G-3 for Training Resources, 1st Armored Division, where he previously served as a battalion executive officer. He is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy and has completed the Command and General Staff College.

PLATOON LEADER’S DUTIES

Responsible for the combat readiness of his platoon’s vehicles, communication systems, small arms ammunition, and equipment.

Assigns an operator and maintenance supervisor for all platoon vehicles.

Enforces standards for operator/crew maintenance, use of 10 operator’s manual, proper PMCS, and active maintenance supervisor involvement in platoon maintenance operations.

Leads by example in maintenance standards and operations.

Sets maintenance tasks, conditions, and standards for maintenance training and effectively uses troop training procedures in planning maintenance operations, in accordance with company commander’s guidance.

Directs and supervises subordinate leaders in training operators and crew personnel to standard in maintenance procedures.

Anticipates future maintenance needs, coordinates for maintenance support, and allocates maintenance resources.

Supervises maintenance operations, verifies standards, critiques maintenance supervisors, and enforces good maintenance habits.

Demands timely follow-up of maintenance discrepancies and accepts only high quality repairs.

Evaluates maintenance support, verifies repair part requisitions for platoon, and provides feedback to company commander and battalion maintenance officer.

Knows and keeps commander informed of current platoon maintenance status.

PLATOON SERGEANT’S DUTIES

Executes platoon leader’s maintenance duties in his absence.

Insures combat readiness, serviceability, and cleanliness of platoon vehicles, ammunition, communication systems, and equipment.

Provides maintenance training proficiency to assist platoon leader, and for platoon validation of job book maintenance skills.

Conducts maintenance training and is available to advise the platoon leader in maintenance operations.

Supervises squad leaders in use of operator and crew maintenance forms and records.

Trains subordinate leaders on the use of 10 operator’s manual, PMCS, DA 2404, dispatch procedures, maintenance procedures, safety, and responsibilities of maintenance supervisors.

Makes on-the-spot corrections of maintenance deficiencies, retains maintenance supervisors, and helps enforce maintenance standards.

Insures platoon accountability, accomplishes implied tasks, and prepares platoon to receive maintenance support.

Manages allocated maintenance resources and executes platoon scheduled services.

Responsible for key control, security, accountability of platoon vehicles, small arms ammunition, and equipment.

Supervises platoon recovery operations, application of combat field expedient repairs, and immediate maintenance follow-up.

Verifies installation of repair parts, reconciliation of deferred maintenance DA 2404, compliance with vehicle load plans, and unit maintenance SOP.

Supports and reinforces the platoon leader’s maintenance policy as platoon’s quality control manager.

Enforces clean and safe maintenance environment.

Accomplishes maintenance mission to standards.

Knows and keeps platoon leader informed of current maintenance status.
USAR: Leadership vs. Management

CAPTAIN JAMES H. DUDLEY

If you’re a U.S. Army Reserve commander, did you ever wonder why troops don’t show up for drill; why they show up in the wrong uniform, needing haircuts; why they don’t know their common or technical skills; or why they don’t reenlist? If so, ask yourself whether you’re really providing leadership or just managing.

Many Reserve leaders and commanders ask this question, but few dig deep enough to find the cause of the problem. Most just try to treat the symptoms for three years and then leave the disease for someone else to cure.

Such leaders offer a variety of excuses:
- I don’t have enough qualified people to teach the others;
- I don’t have enough time on the weekends;
- I don’t have enough resources (money, equipment, or training areas);
- I don’t have enough knowledge myself; As long as my statistics look good, I’m O.K.; If my Reservists don’t get it done, the full-time force will; My soldiers are civilians 28 days a month and don’t want to put up with a lot of harassment on a drill weekend.

There are several responses to such statements:

- First, for the past four or five years, the Chief of Staff of the Army has told us time and again that we have one mission, which consists of two priorities (not to be confused with responsibilities)—training our troops and maintaining our equipment. This is our mission—train and maintain. How much simpler could it be?
- If we and our chain of command left it at that, it would be easy to handle, but, as we know, the Army expects us to be able to do more than two things at once. That’s why the chain of command is constantly hounding us about our strength, MOS qualification figures, Unit Status Reports, Material Condition Status Reports, attendance, appearance, Army Physical Readiness Test results, weight control, and reenlistment rates.

Because these are areas that can be evaluated from month to month and year to year, they have become statistics by which we are evaluated. As a result, we sometimes fudge on one or more of them to make our unit, and subsequently ourselves, look better. What’s more, we evaluate our subordinates on these same statistics.

EXPECTATIONS

The second response to the excuses for poor participation is to ask why we think the average enlisted person is in the Army Reserve. If we think it’s for the money, we’re mostly wrong. If we ask them, they’ll tell us what they expected when they enlisted (and maybe how that goal no longer matters to them because of the way we do business). Their reasons will range from wanting camaraderie, to wanting to do “something different,” to wanting to serve their country as their parents and grandparents did, to, finally, wanting and sometimes needing the extra money. Each wants to belong to an organization he can take pride in and one in which he can also be proud of himself.

Why then, if this is the predominant reason, are there so many problems with enlisted personnel in the U.S. Army Reserve? Maybe we should consider the possibility that the problems are not with the enlisted personnel but with us, the leadership, the officers and noncommissioned officers of the Reserve.

If our troops don’t feel like they really belong, we might ask ourselves a few pointed questions:

- When was the last time we conducted an in-ranks inspection; recognized someone in front of his peers; made an on-the-spot correction; counseled a soldier properly (one on one); spent motor stables in the motor pool with our troops; checked individual or squad training and coached or corrected the trainer to help him improve?

How many times have we arrived at a drill after our troops were already there; been afraid to check training because we weren’t sure how it should be done ourselves; hesitated to go to the motor pool because it was too cold; cut ahead of our troops in a chow line; failed to make on-the-spot corrections because we were too timid or felt it really wasn’t important? If we feel embarrassed by these questions, we are probably not alone. But why does this situation exist, and what can we do about it at our level?

Our troops want, expect, and are entitled to the very best leadership the Army can provide. The Army has seen fit to bestow the honor of leadership upon us, and only we can prove deserving of that honor.

Yet many times we spend a weekend drill in our office reading documents that have come in since the last drill, just trying to keep up with what’s going on. With the limited amount of time available, we should be spending it with the troops to make sure they are proper-
ly trained and do our reading and paperwork somewhere else.

On too many occasions, a unit's leaders will show up on a Saturday morning and everything appears to be out of control—people running in all directions, no apparent organization or leadership. The only possible explanation for this type of situation is that those leaders did not properly plan the drill in advance. Planning for next month's drill should start at this drill and then must be refined throughout the month, including the ATA, until the actual drill. (Some activities will require two or three months of refinement.)

At other times, we have probably caught ourselves wandering around during a drill asking ourselves what we should be doing? If we're doing that, imagine what our troops must be doing and wondering.

Of course, we cannot change things we do not have the authority and responsibility for, but we can try to make our unit—squad or battalion—the best unit in the USAF. How? For starters, we might simply imagine ourselves going into combat. What kind of leadership would we want then from our superiors? What kind of personal problems would we have? We should isolate each of these and many other questions and evaluate our answers to them. Then we should make sure that when our subordinates ask the same questions, they don't have to wonder about the answers, or about us.

Some Reserve commanders feel that if they're "good ole boys," all the troops will like them and do what they ask, so what's the problem? The problem is that being a "good ole boy" and being a leader are diametrically opposed to each other. The troops, with few exceptions, want a leader—someone who is firm, yet fair; someone who will share their hard times as well as their good ones; and, probably most of all, someone who will ensure that they get the training they will need to survive on the battlefield.

Instead, what do we give them? We give them management—we spend hours looking at the statistics, treating the symptoms of low percentages, trying to show our boss that when we raise the percentage in one or more of the areas, we really have control over our unit, and promise him even further increases.

Naturally, we cannot completely ignore the areas in which we use statistics. On the contrary, as long as we are evaluated by them, we must be ever aware of them and work toward improving them. But if we fulfill our two basic responsibilities (not to be confused with priorities)—to accomplish the mission and look out for the welfare of our troops—the statistics, for the most part, will take care of themselves.

Some of us view our responsibilities for accomplishing the mission and also looking out for the welfare of our troops as something of a paradox. Some of us are reluctant to insist that a certain task be done because we consider it unnecessary, an inconvenience to our soldiers, or we're afraid they will develop a dislike for us if we ask them to get dirty, wet, or sweaty, to perform repetitious training, or to do anything else they may not want to do.

But the mission must always come first. When we reschedule an FTX because of wet or cold weather, we place the comfort of our troops, and ourselves, ahead of accomplishing the mission. It is possible, of course, and necessary, to do both: We can conduct the FTX in the rain and cold and fulfill our responsibility to our troops by seeing that they have the proper clothing or equipment to keep them as dry and warm as possible—just as we would in actual combat. Are we so naive as to think that the next war will stop when it gets cold or rains? Or that our troops will be able to survive in combat in these conditions if they have never trained in them? Aside from mere survival, our troops will be able to do effectively in combat only those things we have trained them to do in peacetime.

When we "fix" weapons qualification and PT test results because we do not want to see one of our soldiers transferred out of the unit or separated, we do him no favors. Is it better to allow him to mobilize with the unit and become a casualty because he cannot hit the enemy or keep up with the physical demands of combat, or worse yet, to cause other casualties for the same reasons?

**BETTER LEADERS**

How can we make ourselves better leaders, and subsequently our units better units? The following are some suggestions:

First and foremost, we've got to decide for ourselves whether we want to be the type of leaders our troops will follow into combat—knowing that we could very well determine whether or not they will survive. If we stand up and say "Follow me," will they follow, or will they panic and run? They certainly will not follow us if we haven't trained them, cared for them, disciplined them, and gained their trust, confidence, and respect. We may respond to that statement with something like, "I'm not a combat unit. I'm support," or "We'll have plenty of time to do those things if and when we are mobilized." But, modern warfare being what it is, any unit can expect to perform a combat mission of some type, at one time or another. It may be only to defend a position 100 miles from the main battle area, but if we don't expect it and aren't training for it, we certainly are not providing the kind of leadership our troops will have to have to survive.

We must be current on the various types of mobilization, concepts, and missions. Certainly it will not take a declaration of war to mobilize our unit, nor will we have six months to a year to prepare for our mission upon mobilization.

Secondly, we certainly won't become that type of leader just by saying we want to; it takes hard, dedicated, sincere work,
and a true desire on our part. We can’t do it by being “good ole boys,” or by belonging to or condoning cliques within our organization. Nor can we do it if we are so complacent as to think we will never have to lead our unit in combat. After all, why do we have a Reserve force? Sure, we all hope we will never have to go to war, but there’s a tremendous gap between hoping we won’t and believing we won’t, and in that gap are all those things we as leaders must do to help enable our units to survive on the battlefield once we have been mobilized.

Having said all of this, how can we get the trust, confidence, and respect of our troops? There are several ways:

Lead by example. Many authors have written about leading by example, but few have cited specific ways to do it. Here are some that can have a significant effect on how our troops view us, their leaders. Although we’ve heard most of them before, let’s refresh our memory on how important they are:

If we want our troops to look sharp and be on time, then we should look sharp and be on time. If we want our troops in the motor pool at 0800, we should be there at 0755. If we want our troops to know first aid, we should know first aid and be willing to help them learn it. If we want our troops to qualify with their weapons, we should be in the first firing order, then visit each man on the firing line, observing his firing and reminding him how important qualifying is.

If our troops must train on a cold, rainy day, we should be as visible and interested in their training then as we are on a warm, sunny day. If our troops are eating MCLs, we should be eating MCLs. No matter what they’re eating, when all of our troops have eaten, then we eat. When all of our troops have field jacket liners, then we draw ours. If they are guarding a perimeter, we should visit their positions and let them know that we know where they are and that they are performing a vital service. Nothing replaces that feeling our troops have when they see us not only concerned about them and their training but also sharing it with them.

Know ourselves and seek improvement. Self-evaluation is one of the most difficult aspects of leadership, yet one of the most critical. Many of us advance in our civilian jobs and attend management seminars and graduate schools in various disciplines, but, by and large, we find the same principles do not apply to our military jobs. To offset this imbalance, we must constantly seek schools, seminars, and other training activities in the military environment that will keep us current.

Reading new field manuals on leadership, counseling, tactics, doctrine, operations, security, maintenance, and training, as well as exchanging information with our peers, is an alternative to these schools.

We must also evaluate what we look for in a leader, under combat conditions when our lives are in his hands, and then assess how we think we rate with regard to those same expectations. If we expect competent leadership from our superiors, we must ask ourselves whether our subordinates are getting it from us.

Set high but attainable standards. Can each of our soldiers perform his common and technical skills? If not, we must develop a plan, specific and attainable with a realistic timetable, that will bring each man up to proficiency in those skills and then follow it up with on-site supervision, coaching, and correcting.

To do this, we must first know how it should be done ourselves. We must burn the midnight oil, if necessary, then move the same process to small unit training. We must establish standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the way we want things done—from in-processing to squad, platoon, or company level training—then insist that it be done that way, every time, over and over, until it has become second nature.

Do our troops know what our standards are on such things as appearance, conduct, and integrity? And do we “lead by example” in this regard or just pay it lip service?

Be firm, yet fair. When a corporal or sergeant violates the rules, does he get the same consideration (and punishment, if appropriate) that one of our fellow leaders would get? Do we have favorites and allow them to bend the rules while we look the other way, thinking no one will notice? (Let’s not kid ourselves! Our soldiers are neither blind nor ignorant.) Do we enforce all the rules or just some of them? (Almost any soldier will tell you that he doesn’t mind the rules of the military environment so long as he knows what they are and so long as they apply to everyone and not just to some.)

Insist that our subordinates provide the same type of leadership. Do our subordinates know what kind of leadership we want them to provide? Do we lead by examples that correspond to our words?

We need to talk with our subordinates to help improve communication and understanding. We need to walk the perimeter, or our portion of it, in a bivouac site to see if our soldiers have their tents up, have dry socks, have their sleeping bags, or are on guard duty as required. If our subordinate leaders don’t know what we want, we have no one to blame but ourselves.

All of these things require effort, but they produce the most tangible results we could ever want. They save lives on the battlefield. And isn’t that what it’s all about?

Captain James H. Dudley, an Active Guard Reserve officer, is assigned to the 448th Combat Engineer Battalion at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. Directly commissioned in 1960, he previously served in an enlisted status with U.S. Army Reserve units and on active duty in Europe, Korea, and Vietnam.

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Battlefield casualties are a stark reality of war, but the stringent demands of combat preclude sustained fighting in such vastly understrength units as two-man squads or eight-man platoons. In combat, U.S. Army infantry units instinctively and routinely tailor themselves into viable, capable formations as changes occur in their field strength.

These same reorganization techniques must be learned and practiced in peacetime training as well. There are two reasons why they must. First, the techniques for reorganizing are essential to the combat readiness of small infantry units—seriously understrength units cannot fight properly, and units must train as they are going to fight. Second, full-strength units in a peacetime training environment are as rare as they will
be in combat. Even overstrength units like the Rangers and the 82d Airborne Division seldom, if ever, field full-strength squads and platoons for training.

Leaders are misleading themselves if they think they are conducting squad training with three-man squads or platoon training with ten-man platoons. Some type of training is being done, to be sure, but it is not small unit collective training on "nuts and bolts" subjects like battle drills and tactics in situational training exercises. Before training begins, therefore, grossly understrength platoons and squads must be reorganized so that the unit can train properly and realistically. And this reorganization must continue during the training day as a unit's field strength continues to change. The entire leadership of a battalion, from the battalion commander through the fire team leaders, must know how their platoons and squads are to be organized when they have people missing.

I offer no cook-book recipes to be memorized or placed in notebooks (although the tables in this article might be put in a handy place as useful guidelines). Rather, I offer an approach to thinking through the challenges of reorganizing a unit whose strength is constantly changing to create organizations that will be able to accomplish their missions in combat.

The U.S. Army has two basically different categories of infantry—light and heavy. Each is organized differently and, to add a little challenge for infantry leaders, even the basic light and heavy categories have variations.

(The Army is currently experimenting with a third type—motorized infantry—but has not yet determined exactly how it will be structured. Motorized infantry has some of the characteristics of both light and heavy infantry. Although the reorganization of the motorized infantry platoons and squads are not addressed here, the principles presented can be readily applied to motorized infantry formations.)

The new Army of Excellence light infantry platoons and squads have three different organizations—pure light infantry, airborne/airmobile, and Ranger. Common to all of these is the nine-man rifle squad made up of a squad leader and two identical fire teams with a fire team leader, an automatic rifleman (AR), a grenadier, and a rifleman in each. In the pure light infantry and the Rangers, the rifleman can usually perform as a designated Dragon gunner if required.

The Ranger and airborne/airmobile units have weapon squads. The Rangers' weapon squad is built around the M60 machinegun, which is the platoon's long-range killing punch. The airborne/airmobile infantry units have two dedicated Dragon gunners and two assistant Dragon gunners in their weapon squads in addition to the M60 machinegun teams.

The number of M60 machineguns and their manning also differ among the types of light infantry. Only the Rangers retain three machineguns per platoon with the traditional three-man machinegun teams—gunner, assistant gunner, and ammunition bearer. The airborne and airmobile infantry have two M60 machineguns and a two-man crew for each. The pure light infantry has the same two-gun/two-man machinegun team structure, but their guns are located in the platoon headquarters.

All light infantry platoon headquarters basically contain the platoon leader, the platoon sergeant, and a radio-telephone operator (RTO). The Rangers have a medic assigned and are authorized an additional RTO (31C1V), who is usually present only for long-range communications when an independent platoon mission.

Heavy infantry comes in two types—Bradley and M113. Each has a platoon headquarters and three nine-man rifle squads. Each squad is subdivided into a vehicle crew and a rifle team.

The vehicle crew of the Bradley has three men—the track commander (who is usually the assistant squad leader or the squad leader), the gunner, and the driver. The less sophisticated M113 needs only a track commander (usually a team leader) and a driver.

The rifle team of a Bradley squad has six men—a squad leader, two automatic riflemen, one grenadier, and two riflemen, one of whom is a designated Dragon gunner. The M113 rifle team has seven men available to dismount—a squad leader, a team leader who can double as a grenadier, a machinegunner, an assistant gunner, an automatic rifleman, and two riflemen, one of whom can be armed with a Dragon.

The leaders of all these small infantry units must continually assess their situation to determine how and when to reorganize. The method of doing this is fairly simple, and it fits properly into the estimate of the situation that leaders
always make as they train or fight.

Reorganization, therefore, revolves around the application of five considerations:

Step 1. Apply METT-T. An analysis of the mission, the enemy, the terrain, the troops available, and the time available is the time-proven method of assessing a situation.

What is the unit’s mission? Attack? Defend? Ambush? Establish an OP? A platoon leader must have a clear concept of the intent of both his company and battalion commanders. Squad leaders must have a similar grasp of the platoon and company situations. Only in this way can they counter the confusion and isolation inherent in intense combat and take advantage of any unforeseen opportunities for accomplishing the missions that may present themselves on the battlefield.

What type of enemy forces will the unit encounter? Light? Heavy? Guerrillas? Third World? How are they armed? What tactics do they employ? How will they react to contact with us? What is their expected mission? The answers to these questions will have a major effect on how a unit organizes and arms itself.

Where is the unit fighting? Forest? Desert? Urban area? What cover and concealment is available? What are the fields of fire for our weapons and for his? Avenues of approach? What is the weather now, and what is the prediction for 12 and 24 hours from now? What is the light data?

Troops available is the crucial question. Although present-duty strength determines how a unit reorganizes, it is not quite that simple. The leader needs to know not only how many soldiers he has available but also who they are—how well trained, how much experience they have had, who is reliable and who is not.

How much time is available before the unit moves out or before the enemy is expected to arrive? Is there enough time to train the unit or even brief the troops on a reorganization? It doesn’t take long to orient well-trained and well-disciplined soldiers on a new situation and on their responsibilities and duties. Likewise, a good unit can accomplish a lot of high-payoff training in just a few hours. The point is that valuable training must not be wasted. Time will determine a leader’s options as he reorganizes.

Once the small unit infantry leader has made his estimate of the situation using METT-T, he is ready to begin the actual reorganization.

Step 2. Fill the key leadership positions. Units even as small as fire teams will not function properly unless someone is in charge. Key positions must therefore be filled with soldiers who can do the job. On some occasions, leaders have to consolidate units because adequate leadership is just not available.

Because of the Army’s two basic types of infantry, the key positions to be filled are not exactly the same. But all infantry platoons—light and heavy—must have at least a qualified platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, and squad leaders for all the squads that can be manned.

Light infantry units must have fire team leaders—the fighting leaders who maneuver their fire teams by their own personal, up-front example.

Heavy infantry units—M2 Bradley or M113—must have track commanders. When the infantry dismounts, a qualified soldier must be left in charge of the vehicle—to move it and to direct its weapon systems—and another qualified leader must be in charge of the dismount element or rifle team.

Step 3. Man the most potent, most applicable weapons. The enemy and terrain will have a major effect on the weapons a leader chooses to man. Light infantry units fighting enemy armored or motorized forces will probably want all the antitank weapons they can get—Dragons, LAWs, M202 Flashes, and AT mines if in the defense. The same light infantry units fighting in the jungle against lightly equipped forces will most likely take no Dragons or AT mines, but AR men and riflemen will probably be at a premium.

Since the M60 machinegun is a principal weapon to light infantry units, seldom will those units fail to man all of their available M60s. To heavy infantry units, however, the M60 machinegun and the dismounted Dragon may be less important, especially if the units are employed near their carriers.

A leader’s choice of soldiers to man the essential weapons is especially important. A machinegunner, a Dragon gunner, or an AR man must be capable of employing his weapon effectively.

Step 4. Determine the minimum acceptable manning level for small units. This is the crunch point. Units must

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RIFLE SQUAD/TEAM FILL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Team Leader, A Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Rifleman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Team Leader, B Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic Rifleman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifleman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heavy Infantry (Bradley)

| Squad Leader/Ast Squad Leader | X X |
| Automatic Rifleman | X X |
| Grenadier | X X |
| Rifleman | X X |

(NOTE: Assumes the three-man vehicle crew is fully manned.)

Heavy Infantry (M113)

| Squad Leader | X X X |
| Team Leader/Grenadier | X X X |
| Machinegunner | X X X |
| Assistant Machinegunner | X X X |
| Automatic Rifleman | X X X |
| Rifleman | X X |
| Rifleman/Ammo Bearer | X |

(NOTE: Assumes the two-man vehicle crew is fully manned.)

Table 1

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have well-thought-out guidelines for reorganizing before they go into combat or when they train. The following are some guidelines for both light and heavy infantry units, and the leader on the spot should be given the latitude to reorganize his unit on the basis of his estimate of the situation.

In light infantry units, a fire team must have at least four men—the fire team leader plus three team members. If the first fire team is filled, then it takes at least a two-man buddy team to make up the additional fire team, and one of these members must be capable of filling the role of the fighting leader, the fire team leader.

A rifle squad must have a squad leader and at least one full fire team—a total of five men, the squad leader and the minimum acceptable four-man fire team. If there are fewer than five qualified men, then it is not possible to have a squad.

As Table 1 shows, with five qualified men a light infantry squad is at minimum acceptable strength. Six men produce a squad with a five-man fire team—in this case with an additional AR man. When the initial four-man fire team is present, it takes at least two more to man an additional fire team. Seven or more men create a squad with two fire teams.

The weapon squad found in the airborne, airmobile, and Ranger infantry platoons must have a squad leader and minimally manned crew-served weapon teams. The weapon squads are very important in the light infantry, and many times soldiers will be shifted from the rifle squads to man the critical crew-served weapons.

It takes at least two men to operate an M60 machinegun properly—a gunner and an assistant gunner. An M60 must not be manned by only one soldier. And this goes for the mechanized infantry as well. A machinegun just doesn’t work very well if only one man is dedicated to it. With two men, the gun performs adequately; add an ammunition bearer, and it works better still. (And that machinegunner should be made a corporal. He’s an important soldier in a light infantry platoon with a great responsibility as a team leader; that responsibility should be recognized.)

In airborne and airmobile units, the weapon squad has two Dragon teams composed of a gunner and an assistant gunner. The minimum acceptable level of manning for this squad depends upon the situation. If there is a strong enemy armor threat, it should be fully manned—maybe even augmented with another ammunition bearer.

An airborne- airmobile weapon squad is authorized nine men and in a high threat enemy armor environment, all nine are needed to man the machineguns and the Dragons. In a low armor-threat situation, seven may be able to do the job—a squad leader, two machinegun teams of two men each, and two Dragon gunners without their ammunition bearers.

A Ranger weapon squad is authorized ten men. The minimum acceptable fill is seven—the squad leader and three, two-man machinegun teams.

Looking at manning a light infantry platoon (Table 2), a platoon (to be one) must have a platoon leader, a platoon sergeant (for sustained operations), and a radio-telephone operator. A platoon must have at least two squads, and in an airborne, airmobile, or Ranger unit one of them could be the weapon squad.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light Infantry Platoon Fill</th>
<th>Field Strength</th>
<th>Platoon Hqs</th>
<th>Weapon Squad</th>
<th>Rifle Squads</th>
<th>Platoon Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry (authorized 34)</td>
<td>34 or more</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3x9</td>
<td>34+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3x5</td>
<td>22+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2x5</td>
<td>17+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1x5+</td>
<td>12+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 12</td>
<td>No platoon can be formed—Cross-level with another platoon.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes full manning of the two-man Dragon teams in the weapon squads.

| Airborne/Airmobile Infantry (Authorized 39*) | 39 or more | 3 | 9+ | 3x9+ | 39+ |
| 34 or more | 3 | 9+ | 3x5+ | 27+ |
| 17 or more | 3 | 9+ | 1x5+ | 17+ |
| Less than 17 | No platoon can be formed—Cross-level with another platoon. |

*Does not include additional RATELO (S1C1V) in platoon HQ.

**Accepts two-man MG teams instead of authorized three-man teams.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heavy Infantry Platoon Fill</th>
<th>Field Strength</th>
<th>Platoon Hqs</th>
<th>Vehicle Crew</th>
<th>Rifle Team</th>
<th>Platoon Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradley-equipped (Authorized 32)</td>
<td>32 or more</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3x3*</td>
<td>3x6+</td>
<td>32+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 or more</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3x3*</td>
<td>3x5+</td>
<td>29+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 or more</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3x3*</td>
<td>2x6+</td>
<td>24+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 or more</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3x3*</td>
<td>1x6+</td>
<td>19+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 19</td>
<td>No platoon can be formed—Cross-level with another platoon if infantry is to be dismounted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M113-equipped (Authorized 31)</td>
<td>31 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3x2</td>
<td>3x7+</td>
<td>31+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3x2</td>
<td>3x5+</td>
<td>25+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3x2</td>
<td>2x9+</td>
<td>20+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3x2</td>
<td>1x5+</td>
<td>15+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 15</td>
<td>No platoon can be formed—Cross-level with another platoon if infantry is to be dismounted.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(If less than two squads are available, then it is not possible to have a maneuver element and a base of fire element and, therefore, not possible to have a platoon.)

Manning heavy infantry units is, of course, somewhat different (Tables 1 and 3):

The weapon systems on mechanized infantry vehicles, especially on the Bradley, and the need for instant mobility, usually demand that a full vehicle crew remain with each vehicle. The vehicle crew for the Bradley consists of three men—a qualified track commander (TC), a gunner, and a driver. The Bradley TC can be the squad leader or the assistant squad leader, depending upon the situation. Current thinking, though, is that the squad leader will dismount with the rifle team in most tactical situations.

There may be times, however, when the commander's METT-T analysis leads him to increase his dismounted infantry strength and temporarily leave the Bradley with a two-man crew, with the TC doubling as the gunner and the driver. The Bradley's weapon systems, its mobility, and its ability to conduct sustained operations definitely suffer with a two-man crew. Less than full vehicle crews also greatly limit the flexibility and responsiveness of a Bradley platoon in reacting to unexpected developments.

The M113 can get by with a two-man vehicle crew—the track commander, who is normally one of the squad's team leaders, and a driver. It is rare to cut the M113 crew down to a single man.

The rifle team that fights from the Bradley and that dismounts from either vehicle is composed of the squad leader (or assistant squad leader in some cases with the Bradley) plus at least a four-man team. As Table 1 indicates, if a unit cannot dismount at least five men, then a rifle team does not exist.

As a general rule, heavy platoons man all of their vehicles even though they may not be able to man all of their squads. The Bradley, and even the M113 with its M2 .50 caliber machinegun and M175 Dragon mount, provides an excellent base of fire. But in order to be a platoon, the platoon must be able to generate at least one dismounted rifle team. If the platoon cannot do this then it is no longer a heavy rifle platoon, although in the case of the Bradley it may become something else in terms of providing a base of fire for the company.

Step 5. Cross-level as required, on the basis of the preceding guidelines. The application of the rules produces different results with the different categories and types of infantry.

The pure light infantry, airborne/airmobile, and Ranger infantry are cross-leveled as depicted in Table 2, assuming that qualified soldiers are available to fill the leadership positions and man the appropriate weapons.

For example, a pure light infantry platoon can obviously field a full-strength platoon if it has 34 or more qualified soldiers. But what happens if it has only 18? Applying the rules established in steps 1 through 4, an 18-man light infantry unit can field a full platoon headquarters of seven men, to include manning the two two-man machinegun teams, plus two squads of five and six men respectively. But if a light infantry platoon has less than 12 men, then it is not possible to form a platoon with a maneuver element and a base-of-fire element. When this occurs, the company commander must cross-level with another platoon to form a unit capable of both fire and movement.

An airborne or airmobile platoon can field a platoon headquarters, a full weapon squad, and three rifle squads with at least five men each if it has 23 or more qualified soldiers. If an airborne or airmobile squad has less than 17 soldiers, it cannot perform what is expected of a rifle platoon and should be cross-leveled within the company to form one.

These two examples both assume that the leader's METT-T analysis has led him to fully man his crew-served weapons and that he has qualified soldiers to cross-level. If the small unit leader's analysis of the situation has led him to believe he can afford to man less than his full complement of crew-served weapons and still accomplish the mission, then he will have additional manpower to fill his rifle squads and keep his platoon intact.

Heavy infantry units cross-level in a similar manner (see Table 3). A Bradley platoon of 29 or more qualified soldiers can fill all four of its vehicles with a full vehicle crew to man the potent weapon systems and maneuver the track and also fill at least three rifle teams with at least five men each. If this same platoon has 19 soldiers, it can fully man all four vehicle crews but can provide only one five-man rifle team on one of the vehicles. METT-T considerations will naturally produce slightly different organizations as trade-offs are made. The M113 platoon observes similar rules.

The five steps I have suggested here are merely guidelines that indicate a common-sense approach to finding a proper organization for combat and for training. At the very least, infantry leaders need to think about reorganizing, about how they will fight, and, accordingly, about how they will train to fight.

Brigadier General Wayne A. Downing is Deputy Commander of the 1st Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. Formerly, he served for several years in Army Ranger units, including command of the 2d Battalion, 75th Infantry and of the 75th Infantry Regiment.
RECONNAISSANCE PLANNING:
A NEGLECTED ART

MAJOR DAVID J. OZOLEK

In countless cases, the dramatic success or dismal failure of a unit on the National Training Center's battlefield has been traced directly to the unit's patrol effort before the execution phase of its operation began. The reconnaissance effort for any attack mission must be an integral part of the operation and must be planned and supported with the same degree of detail as the scheme of maneuver or the fire support plan for that mission. The importance of the patrolling effort has been emphasized in after-action reviews, lessons-learned packets, and many articles written about the NTC, but many task forces still fail to send out a single reconnaissance patrol during their entire NTC training period.

Conversely, the infantry of the NTC opposing force (OPFOR) regiment conducts aggressive pre-attack reconnaissance patrolling. As a result, the thorough intelligence picture available to the OPFOR command group is often the key to the regiment's ability to bring its mass, speed, and firepower to bear in a well-orchestrated, violent attack. The OPFOR's standard reconnaissance procedures can easily be adapted and employed by any U.S. task force.

This reconnaissance effort consists of the following five phases, which are depicted in the accompanying sketches:

**Phase I:** Seize and maintain a line for the security force.

**Phase II:** Determine the enemy's front line trace.

**Phase III:** Conduct a shallow reconnaissance (2-10 kilometers).

**Phase IV:** Conduct a deep reconnaissance (10-40 kilometers).

**Phase V:** Conduct continuous reconnaissance during the execution of the mission.

The patrol effort begins as the regiment moves into its forward assembly area to begin preparing for its mission. The reconnaissance company pushes as far forward as the enemy will allow, or to the limits of its supporting fires, to gain and maintain control of the terrain necessary for protecting the main force and supporting subsequent reconnaissance operations. If it encounters enemy reconnaissance or security elements, the company destroys these elements immediately to take away the enemy's ability to observe the regiment's preparations and also his early warning capability before he can use it to advantage. If necessary, the reconnaissance company is reinforced with tanks or infantry combat troops to repel any enemy counterattacks aimed at regaining this critical terrain.

Once this terrain has been secured and all enemy elements between the screen and the main force have been located and destroyed, Phase II of the reconnaissance operation begins. The reconnaissance company occupies hide positions as soon as it can so that it will be able to observe the enemy's main force elements. It also begins continuous surveillance of the enemy, with emphasis on determining where the enemy units are concentrating. Dust trails from vehicular movement or bar-
rior construction, for example, are tell-tale indicators of significant activity. During late afternoon, particularly if there are indications that feeding or refueling operations are taking place, motorcycle scouts are sent forward to determine what is taking place in the vicinity of these dust trails.

(By contrast, many of the task forces in training at the NTC seem to concentrate on only one task at a time and appear willing to tolerate enemy infiltrators during periods in which security is not the specified priority. Unit training and SOPs must stress the need to conduct counter-reconnaissance activities at all times, for the OPFOR's — or the Soviets' — relentless approach to reconnaissance will discover and exploit any lapse in security, no matter how temporary.)

**TASKS**

Three important Phase II reconnaissance tasks are done by the OPFOR just before dusk. First, high-speed patrols are sent forward to try to draw enemy fire at its maximum range. As soon as they see direct fire signatures, these patrols break contact and usually return with one very important bit of information—the limit of the enemy's forward ability to detect and engage armored vehicles. To do this, the patrols report their location at least every 500 meters until they make contact, so that if they are destroyed the reconnaissance company commander will know how far they got.

The second pre-dusk OPFOR event is the link-up of a ground surveillance radar (GSR) team with the company commander. The GSR co-locates with the reconnaissance command post and works directly with the company commander. There are several advantages to this arrangement. First, it provides security for this valuable asset so that the team members can concentrate on surveillance without being distracted by local security requirements. Second, although surveillance priorities are assigned by the regimental S-2, the face-to-face contact between the radar team and the company commander allows the commander to do several things: direct the efforts of the GSR to confirm other possible sightings; monitor the progress of friendly patrols; and ensure that all avenues of approach are scanned to identify any enemy reconnaissance patrols moving toward the regiment. Most important, however, the reconnaissance company commander, as an experienced combat arms officer, can make sense of the hundreds of sightings a GSR team will make during the pre-attack phase. This allows him to adjust his reconnaissance effort as the enemy situation begins to become clearer and, if necessary, to modify (with the concurrence of the S-2) the surveillance plan to fit the situation and terrain.

The third important Phase II event that takes place at dusk is the establishing of wire communications between the regimental forward command post and the reconnaissance company CP. This allows direct, secure communications between the regimental intelligence officer and his reconnaissance and security elements. All spot reports from the reconnaissance company of the GSR are sent immediately to the regimental S-2, who analyzes the information as it comes in and uses it to help plan for the next phase of the intelligence effort.

If a second GSR team is available, the S-2 co-locates it with the regimental forward CP, once again for the security and
pany commander at his CP, where they receive a final update on the situation forward of the lines and coordinate for support and re-entry.

Once forward of the reconnaissance company, the patrols send their important spot reports or pre-arranged location reports to the commander on the reconnaissance company net, which the S-2 monitors. This reporting procedure has several advantages: First, the reconnaissance company continually monitors the activity of all the patrols so the commander does not have to be briefed on the results of the individual patrols before his company moves out on its Phase IV deep reconnaissance mission.

Next, since all elements on the scene know what is going on with the friendly elements forward, it is much easier for them to sort out friendly from enemy patrol activity. Finally, the patrols can normally use their radios on low power, decreasing the possibility they will be monitored or detected. In addition, specified sections of the reconnaissance company may be assigned to answer the traffic of an individual patrol. This disperses the electronic signature of the company and helps keep the important CP location from being identified and targeted.

The patrols initially move forward mounted to the point where the Phase II high-speed patrols drew long-range fire earlier. Here the infantry dismounts and moves forward to conduct a close reconnaissance of the enemy’s positions and barriers. Their armored support element overwatches from its position and surveys the enemy’s positions with the vehicle-mounted telescopic and night vision systems. The vehicle can also act as a relay for the dismounted element and, when ap-

control advantages of co-location. The forward command post is in itself also a command observation post, usually situated so that the command group and staff can directly observe the battle area. This second GSR set is the S-2’s personal eyes, which he can direct to areas of interest that he receives more information. Additionally, the GSR can be directed into some of the deadspace of the forward unit caused by terrain masking. More important, it serves as a back-up to monitor any enemy movement behind the security screen. If the GSR with the reconnaissance company fails, this second set can quickly replace it.

By the time Phase III of the reconnaissance effort begins, the OPFOR regimental commander and his S-3 have devised the tentative concept of operation for the mission. This concept is based on a preliminary analysis of the mission, early enemy information, the terrain, and the assets available. Each of the regiment’s battalions is assigned an axis of advance and objectives. Each battalion provides at least one patrol to the regimental S-2, who assigns that patrol a route reconnaissance mission that covers the same ground its parent battalion would cover during the maneuver phase of the operation.

These patrols typically consist of a squad of infantry and an armored carrier. Depending upon the particular situation, the squad may be accompanied by a tank or a BMP that has a tank-killing capability. After a personal briefing by the regimental S-2, the patrols report to the reconnaissance com-
appropriate, can provide fire support, long-range reconnaissance by fire, or a diversion. If the dismounted element is killed or captured, the carrier team can render at least a partial patrol report, and some information is always better than none at all.

The dismounted element is sometimes called upon to perform other clandestine tasks in addition to information gathering. It can breach and mark lanes in the enemy's obstacle system, for instance, or it canemplace range markers so that the maneuver commanders know when to expect enemy fire and when they themselves can begin to engage the enemy effectively. Stay-behind elements are often left at key locations to continue to observe enemy activities or to secure key terrain or obstacle breaches. They can also disable enemy systems by stealth, preferably in a way that will not be discovered until each system is needed. (In the real world, an explosive charge or solid obstruction in the barrel can be used to destroy a gun tube when the weapon is fired. In the MILES world, a roll of toilet paper or an empty sand bag can block the breach-mounted laser and effectively take the system out of action.)

But the most important mission for the patrols is still information gathering. The patrols are trained, and reminded, to look for specific key indicators that can help the S-2 determine the enemy's concept. These indicators include such basic items as gun-tube orientation, extent of position preparation, range to obstacles, and location of range or sector markers such as panels or chemical lights.

When a patrol returns, its members are debriefed three times. The first debriefing takes place at the reconnaissance company CP. The commander is not as interested in where the enemy is as in where he is not, because the next mission for the reconnaissance company will be the Phase IV infiltration and deep reconnaissance, in which the company will use the gaps the dismounted patrols have found in the enemy's forward battle positions to move undetected and gather intelligence in the depth of the enemy's defenses.

The second debriefing, which takes place at the regimental forward CP, is conducted personally by both the S-2 and the S-3. The S-2 concentrates on putting together an accurate enemy picture. Since by this point he knows the general locations of the enemy company-team units and specifically what each location contains, he can begin to account for all the elements the order of battle dictates that the enemy have. By using a template of the enemy's postulated tactical doctrine, he can determine where missing enemy units logically should be. These suspected locations are telephoned forward to the reconnaissance company to become checkpoints for its deep reconnaissance mission. The S-3 is interested in hearing the account first-hand from an operator's perspective. He uses this information to confirm or adjust his tentative plan in preparation for a final briefing of the line company commanders shortly before attack time.

The final debriefing takes place at the CP of the patrol's parent battalion commander. Here again, exact detail is important to the final formulation of the battalion commander's scheme of maneuver. As a final check, the patrol leader rides in the leader's hatch of the commander's vehicle to point out physically the locations of things he found the night before. The other members of the patrol may be placed in the leader's hatches of company or platoon commanders' vehicles to provide face-to-face information for the sub-elements.

Phase IV, the company's infiltration and deep reconnaissance, begins either two hours before the attack or two hours before dawn, whichever comes first. (Since this is primarily a mounted operation, it must be conducted during pre-dawn darkness. Two hours of planning time has proved to be the best, both for ensuring that the company's information will be virtually current at attack time and for allowing sufficient time for the penetration before the attack begins.

The first tasks for the company in Phase IV are to confirm the location of gaps between enemy battle positions, to widen the breaches the dismounted patrols have opened in the enemy's barriers, and to make additional breaches if they can. Next, the company covers the assigned battalion's attack routes behind the enemy's forward positions and reports, clears, and marks lanes in any deep barriers. The company also reconnoiters the positions the S-2 has projected for likely enemy positions and searches all key terrain features for enemy preparations.

After completing these first critical information-gathering tasks, elements of the company may perform other combat missions. Key terrain features in the depth of the enemy's defenses can be occupied and denied to him once the maneuver phase of his defense begins. Often the enemy's defensive concept is totally disrupted when he finds he has to fight for a piece of terrain he expected to be his, while simultaneously being pursued at high speed by the regiment's main force elements.

The elimination of key enemy assets such as command posts or fire support elements is another common mission for the reconnaissance company. Usually these elements are not destroyed by the hidden company sections until the attack actually begins, thus increasing the effectiveness of the attack by disrupting the defender's command, control, and fire support at one of the battle's most critical moments and allowing him no time for recovery.

As with the shallow reconnaissance effort of Phase III, however, the primary mission for the company in Phase IV is still deep information gathering. By going deep behind the enemy, often as far as 25 to 40 kilometers (many times to positions beyond pre-battle radio range), reconnaissance elements can give important information on the enemy's displacements once he begins maneuvering. As the regiment comes within radio range of the deep elements, these spot reports allow the S-2 to keep track of enemy locations and strength, and allow the regiment to isolate, pursue, and destroy the enemy in detail.

The final phase of the reconnaissance effort takes place during the execution phase of the operation. (Reconnaissance does not cease until the last enemy element has been hunted down and destroyed.) During the attack, a well-organized spot report system is required. All enemy contact and all enemy major system losses are reported immediately. The S-2 keeps a running tally and constantly compares the enemy's losses to what the order of battle and the reconnaissance effort have shown that he should have. Because the S-2 continuously updates the command group on the expected enemy combat power at a given time, he can advise either picking up the pace or in-
creasing caution, depending on the risk the commander is willing to accept and the current combat power ratio.

The S-2 personally rides into the attack in the S-3’s combat vehicle, while the BICC (battlefield information control center) officer (or assistant S-2) and the assistant S-3 control the TOC operation. Typically, the regimental commander and the fire support officer ride on the main attack axis, while the S-2, the ALO (air liaison officer), and the S-3 follow the supporting attack. This dispersal offers the command group greater observation of the battle and control of the regiment, allows the commander to concentrate on fighting at the decisive point, and enables the combat staff to make knowledgeable recommendations to the commander.

This simple, but aggressive OPFOR patrol effort can easily be transformed to fit the U.S. task force structure: The OPFOR reconnaissance company becomes the scout platoon, and the subordinate OPFOR battalions become the company teams. With a little practice, any unit can apply this “combat-proven” system and achieve the benefits accurate intelligence offers the maneuver commander.

But more important than the mechanics of this particular system are the principles that must govern pre-attack patrolling. First, an effective reconnaissance plan must be aggressive. Units must actively seek out detailed information on the enemy in their sectors instead of simply waiting for reports from their higher headquarters. Next, patrolling must be continuous. The unit must have early information to facilitate planning and current information to allow for a constant revision of its plans as the time for the attack approaches. Finally, the reconnaissance effort must be redundant. All available systems must be used and must overlap to make sure every possible bit of information on the enemy is discovered and used to advantage.

Our doctrine is most effectively implemented when a high-resolution picture of the enemy is made available to the lowest possible level of command. The commander who hesitates to patrol aggressively because he is afraid of losing a few key men—and who therefore enters combat with less than a complete idea of the enemy’s situation—is going to end up losing far more men and perhaps the battle as well.

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**SWAP SHOP**

Chemical lights can greatly improve a defensive position at night: They can be used to clandestinely mark target reference points (TRPs), deadspace, and known avenues of approach. These lights can also be used to make a combined height reference and aiming point. Since the tendency of many soldiers is to aim high at night, such a point at a known height off the ground will enable soldiers who do not have night observation devices to keep their fires low enough.

Chemical lights in different colors can also be used to delineate sector responsibility and to augment other control devices for night firing.

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*Contributed by Captain Timothy L. Casey, Company B, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, Fort Ord.*
A FOOT A DAY IN COMPANY A

BRIGADIER GENERAL FRANK H. LINNELL
UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)


The time period is roughly from April 1967 to November 1968. The place, Binh Son District, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Vietnam.

The title does not refer to the slowness of Company A's movement but to the daily risk to the company's men from Viet Cong mines.

It is a story of bravery, tenacity, patience, ingenuity, generosity, compassion, and danger, but most of all, soldiering.

From few records, this story is a recollection by the brigade commander at the time.

In the spring of 1967, the North Vietnamese Army had infiltrated the northern provinces of South Vietnam (RVN) in such numbers that the U.S. Marines, the U.S. ground forces in the provinces, were hard put to defend their air and ground bases. The Marine commander, Lieutenant General Lew Walt, proposed to the overall American commander, General William Westmoreland, U.S. Army, that he (Walt) move his 1st Marine Division from the two southern provinces, Quang Ngai and Quang Tin, north to the area of Danang. Thus, the division would replace portions of the 3d Marine Division so that those units could thicken the U.S. ground forces at the border between North and South Vietnam.

Westmoreland agreed and formed a provisional "division" with the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division; and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. Augmented by separate units of artillery, engineer, signal, and support troops, this division was named Task Force Oregon (the commander, Major General William Rosson, being from Oregon).

In April, the 196th Brigade was flown from Tay Ninh, not far from Saigon, to the Chu Lai combat base in Quang Tin Province. There, augmented by additional infantry (1st Battalion, 14th Infantry) and armored cavalry (2d Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry), it relieved in place the 1st and 7th Regiments of Marines. The 3d Battalion, 4th Infantry, down from the Pleiku highlands, replaced the 5th Marines. The brigade from the 101st Airborne Division acted as a mobile strike force.

The three brigades, having dissimilar missions, acted as task forces and, though cooperating with each other and with U.S. and Korean Marines and the Army of Vietnam, each went about its own business.

The business of the 196th was to protect the Chu Lai air base and prevent the destruction of the 100 or so airplanes and another 100 helicopters positioned there; to locate and destroy hostile forces within the tactical area of operation; and to protect the Vietnamese people living in the area from the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.

Before the 196th arrived, the Marines, who had been in the area for about a year and a half, had performed these same tasks. In doing so, they had built some battalion camps and company strongpoints. In some haste, the 196th relieved the Marines throughout their tactical area of responsibility; but, because there were far fewer soldiers than Marines, the defenses of the 196th were thinner and the strongpoints more scattered. As an example, the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry (Polar Bears) with four rifle companies replaced two Marine battalions with six rifle companies. Also, the Marine rifle companies had been far larger than those of the light infantry.

The situation of the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry in the latter
The situation on April 1967 was as shown on the map. One company (D) south of the air base protected against infiltration into the base and patrolled incessantly for VC raiding parties. The remainder of the battalion, operating from fairly comfortable company-sized strongpoints (flimsy shacks and floored tents, latrines with roofs, and mess halls with screens) also patrolled vigorously throughout their assigned areas. From April until June, Company A patrolled to its east and south, by foot, by APC (borrowed from the cavalry), and occasionally, by small helicopter lift from point to point (called "Eagle" flights).

The terrain in the Polar Bears' area was rolling country, interspersed with many ponds and streams, heavily wooded in spots with open areas of pasture, rice paddies, and cactus. There was fairly good visibility throughout from observation points on high ground. The roads were dirt and, in the dry season (which this was), were trafficable to anything on wheels or tracks.

Unfortunately, the VC had no difficulty in planting mines at night and so, at daylight, every foot of road south of battalion headquarters had to be swept before vehicles could go over it. Many mines were missed, though, and trucks were blown up. (The Polar Bears named the road to Company B 'Thunder Road'.)

Except for the mountain to the east, the entire area was full of hamlets, which in Vietnam could be one or two thousand people. The great majority of these people wished only to be left alone. But the VC's attitude toward the villagers was: "If you're not with us, you're agin' us," so the people had little choice but to support the VC.

The Polar Bears thus lived and soldiered among thousands of people, all dressed alike, most looking alike, and none of whom could be identified as friendly or enemy. Most of these people farmed and some had small businesses. (A patrol in the middle of nowhere in a chow break might be approached by little kids or old ladies selling ice cold Cokes.)

The closest friendly forces, the Korean Marines, were not actively patrolling and, at night, buttoned themselves into their heavily bunkered perimeters and fired flares.

By June, the Viet Cong night raiders had made the corridor between the Koreans and Company B a regular route to the river. Being on the glidepath into the Chu Lai air base, they could shoot at U.S. aircraft at will and go up and down the river banks.

The commander of 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Smith, pressed the brigade commander to take this country back from the Viet Cong, asked for Company D from the north side of Tra Bong River. He got it. The Gimlets of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry took over from Company D, which moved south of the river, and Company A prepared to move to "Alpha Hill."

Some time in June, Company A was lifted onto Alpha Hill by Hueys and "Hooks" (CH-47As). Captain Edward F. Hill had planned the organization of the strongpoint in detail. By nightfall, he had some strong bunkers under construction, his mortars and recoilless rifles were sited in, and the soldiers were enjoying a hot supper.

The Polar Bears, though, had sat right down on the Viet Cong's main line into downtown Binh Son. The VC, realizing that they would have no base of operations if the U.S. companies kept on leaping-frogging to the south, decided to fight for Alpha Hill.

An American rifle company, reinforced by all the fires available from battalion and brigade artillery and from gunships (Huey Bs and Cs) could hold out against any amount of lightly armed infantry. But at night, especially on moonless nights, the Viet Cong could approach close enough with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and light mortars to harass the defense and cause casualties. If they wanted to shoot back at the VC, all of the defenders obviously could not go to ground in bunkers. So there would be casualties.

As with all other company commanders on their own in this type of situation, Captain Hill could not sit back and be shot at every night. He decided to patrol vigorously in the daytime to catch infiltrators "laying up" and to set out ambushes at night for the VC working around his perimeter. The local enemy were numerous and bold, and they were expert demolition men.

The tactical area of responsibility of Company A was so large that the VC could move fairly freely and did so, planting mines of all types in every place an American patrol might conceivably venture.

Every day, in every direction, squad and platoon patrols searched out the ground yard by yard. They caught, captured, or shot some Viet Cong almost every day but unfortunately had continuing casualties from antipersonnel mines. Most were

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trip-wire-operated U.S. grenades that had been either lost, abandoned, or stolen. So the temper of this little war flared. The VC got Company A by day, and Company A got the VC by night, but not enough of them.

The brigade sent two searchlights to the company. Aligned with a machinegun, the searchlights could cover concealed routes to Alpha Hill. The defense of the hill was made more difficult by homeless, burned-out Vietnamese who built shelters as close to Company A's wire as they could (for protection against their own countrymen).

Battalion headquarters helped Company A move these waifs and strays out of the line of fire, but they were never wholly out of it and suffered their casualties from "overs" and "shorts." The company medics did the best they could for these innocent bystanders and evacuated the seriously wounded out with the wounded soldiers.

Experience throughout the rest of the brigade had shown that the sooner these company "forts" were connected by roads, the more secure each company would be. Armored vehicles could patrol and ambush, even at night; vehicles using lights could surprise infiltrators (even mine planters); and trucks could take over supply and evacuation tasks from helicopters.

So Colonel Smith, with some brigade engineers, built a road from Bravo to Alpha and used it day and night. A "deuce and a half," well sand-bagged, could stand a large explosion and still make it on in. So the fight changed from a fight for Alpha Hill to a day and night skirmish for Alpha Road.

Since Alpha Hill was a secure base and Alpha Road was used around the clock, the Viet Cong could no longer operate in that area.

In the middle of August, the brigade commander spent a morning with the men of Company A and wrote a few words about it in a letter to his wife:

_This morning I spent with A/4/31 on what's known as "a detailed sweep." We found all kinds of things, including three grown-up men who, carrying grenades, ran away and were shot. Two killed, one wounded—he was a VC hamlet chief._

A few days later—noting that the enemy was "almost completely stocking his arsenal of mines and booby traps from U.S. sources"—he put out a letter to the brigade listing ways to prevent this:

- **Strict control of the issue and turn-in of ammunition to individual soldiers, vehicles, and bunkers.**
- **Disciplined destruction, salvage, or turn-in of used materials that can be used in any way to fabricate explosives.**
- **The crushing of every tin can that can be used to fabricate explosives—beer, pop, food—every can.**
- **The reporting of time and location of every high explosive dud—air-dropped or otherwise.**
- **Strict and thorough police of every battlefield, camp, and bivouac area.**

By the end of August, although Company A's private war was not over, it had died down to the level where the soldiers no longer counted on losing "a foot a day."

During this entire operation, many men of Company A were wounded or killed by mines and booby traps—60, more or less. Some others felt the sting of small arms or rocket-propelled grenades, but their main hazard was the antipersonnel mine.

Yet, day and night, for more than 60 days, these good soldiers still humped it through the woods and fields, knowing that the next step might be their last. Brave men!

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Brigadier General Frank H. Linnell, USA Retired, is a 1941 graduate of the United States Military Academy. During his career, he served in New Guinea, Luzon, Japan, Panama, Korea, Santo Domingo, Vietnam, and Germany in a variety of jobs from platoon leader on up. He was commanding general of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade in Vietnam.
Sniper-Observer Teams

CAPTAIN JAMES W. BOWEN

One of the most potentially valuable but most overlooked tools available to today's commander is the sniper-observer team. U.S. Army doctrine concerning the employment of snipers dates back to 1969, and while Training Circular 23-24, *Sniper Training and Employment*, contains pertinent information, much of it has been rendered obsolete by advances in equipment and technology and changes in doctrine and the attendant tactics.

Recently, the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry developed and tested an advanced program that was designed to create highly-trained and effectively-equipped sniper-observer teams. The 82d Division has since adopted the program for use throughout the division.

In developing the program, the leaders of the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry felt that any sniper organization should be concerned as much with observing and reporting enemy activity as with shooting. Accordingly, their answer to the organizational problem was to form, train, and equip an 11-man sniper-observer squad (from the battalion's own resources) to augment the scout platoon of the battalion's combat support company. Now, each of the infantry battalions in the division has one of these squads, which consists of a squad leader and five two-man sniper teams.

The overall concept behind the training and selection of the members of these squads is driven by a desire to find and field self-reliant, well-trained, and mentally and physically tough soldiers to increase the combat capability of the battalions.

For too long, sniper training had been "shooter" training only. This overemphasis on marksmanship had resulted in soldiers who could shoot well on a rifle range but who could not adequately perform the doctrinal missions required of snipers. The division's solution is a training program in which specially chosen soldiers—each of whom is a volunteer—attend an Army Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU) sniper course to hone their shooting skills and become versatile combat snipers. But first, they must go through a tough selection process, which consists of four phases:

**Records Screening.** A thorough check of the soldiers' records and psychological screenings are conducted to ensure that the soldiers allowed into the program have no history of substance abuse, disciplinary action, or mental instability.

**Recommendation by Company Commander.** To be accepted for the program, a soldier must be recommended by his company commander.

**Selection Course.** This is a five-week course, part of which is conducted away from Fort Bragg in North Carolina's Uwharrie National Forest. The part of the training program in that location includes instruction in land navigation, stalking, mission planning, intelligence, communications, ballistics, rappelling, and air assault operations. The sniper-observer candidates are then brought back to Fort Bragg where they learn how to call for fires from a supporting 81mm mortar unit and how to direct close air support strikes by A-10 aircraft. The final part of the course is a demanding four-day land navigation exercise conducted both in the national forest and on Fort Bragg.

**Commander's Board.** Finally, the would-be sniper-observers take a written test on all of the subjects covered in the course and submit peer evaluations on the other candidates. Then they appear before an assessment board chaired by the commander of the battalion conducting the training. The board's purpose is to test each soldier's ability to think and act under pressure.

The 11 members of a battalion's sniper-observer squad are then selected on the basis of the results of the land navigation exercise, the peer evaluation, the written test, and the board's evaluation.

Follow-on training for the members of each squad includes the AMTU sniper course and weekly sustainment firing periods. (The 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry feels that at least 50 rounds per man per week are needed to maintain its standard of a first-round kill at 350 meters and a second-round kill at 600 meters.) Some of the sniper-observers may also attend the counter-sniper course at Fort Meade, Maryland.

Sniper-observer teams are used as of-
ten as doctrinally feasible. When not employed, the squad leaders plan training that will sustain and add to the skills each man developed during the course.

The three missions considered most productive in combat situations for the sniper-observer teams are related to defensive operations—in a covering force, in the defense of the main battle area, and in a stay-behind role following a delay or withdrawal by the parent battalion.

With a covering force, the teams can delay or disrupt an attacking enemy by directing their fires at such key enemy personnel as tank commanders and unit leaders. They can also observe and report enemy troop concentrations, or they can direct their own artillery and other supporting fire against enemy formations. (The latter method of employment is particularly useful at choke points, which are abundant in Europe as well as on other potential battlefields throughout the world.)

Within a main battle area or in a stay-behind situation, the sniper-observer teams perform similar missions. Urban terrain, in particular, lends itself to the employment of snipers. The teams can also be used to effectively cover obstacles and, in certain situations, to force enemy mechanized units to dismount.

OTHER MISSIONS

These three missions certainly are not the only ones that sniper-observer teams can perform. The teams can be used in raids, for example, and in other similar offensive operations. In fact, a wide range of possible uses is available to a commander.

In developing this sniper program, the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry did find that while the team members should be equipped to the fullest extent possible with their normal individual equipment, some special equipment is essential for each team—a sniper rifle, a set of binoculars, and a radio. In addition, some other equipment will make the teams even more effective—a spotter scope, a laser rangefinder, secure communication equipment, and special camouflage uniforms.

Unfortunately, although the Army's current M21 sniper weapon system, which consists of an accurized M14 rifle with an ART-11 scope and an M49 spotter scope, may be an acceptable general-purpose system, as a sniper system it has a number of deficiencies. For example, a user cannot perform any maintenance on the system that requires disassembly of the rifle. Also, the scope cannot be taken off the rifle without the loss of zero, and this makes it impractical for use by an airborne sniper-observer team.

(The 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry tested an alternate weapon, the McMillan M82, which is currently used by selected units within the Department of Defense. The battalion found this an excellent weapon that increased the combat capabilities of its sniper-observer teams.)

The AN/PRC-77 radio, while not ideal, is widely available, and it is adequate under most circumstances. When used with VINSON equipment (which gives it a secure communication capability), a long whip or field expedient antenna, and a headset, it enables an observer to report intelligence data, receive missions, or adjust fire on targets. The headset frees the observer’s hands for using his spotter scope, laser rangefinder, or binoculars.

As part of the program, each team member constructs his own “Ghillie suit,” a special camouflage uniform made from a fatigue uniform reinforced in the front to allow sustained low crawling without damage and with a net attached to the top and additional camouflage on the back. The team members put on these suits when they arrive at their objective rally point (ORP) and wear them on their approach to and while in their firing and observing positions.

Future implementation of the program
includes leader training in sniper employment, procurement of another sniper rifle, and additional selection courses to maintain fully manned and trained sniper-observer squads. The division has submitted an MTOE change for a nine-man sniper-observer squad and has strongly recommended that an 11-man squad be included in Army of Excellence organizations. (More detailed information on the selection, training, and use of sniper-observer squads can be obtained from the Commander, 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307.)

The dividends to be gained from developing sniper-observer squads far outweigh the resource requirements they demand in terms of manpower spaces, equipment, and dollars. By providing a commander with an additional combat capability, these squads increase the readiness of any infantry battalion to fight and win on a modern battlefield.

Captain James W. Bowen, a 1969 graduate of the United States Military Academy, was Assistant S-3 of the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry when the sniper-observer program was developed and is still involved in the program.

Tactical Logistician

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALTER J. CRIMMINS, JR.

Our brigade and battalion S-4 officers, along with the others in the logistical chain, are responsible for fueling and fixing our vehicles and weapon systems and for feeding and arming their operators. On the battlefields depicted in Field Manual 100-5, these logistical will have to accomplish their tasks in a variety of combat operations by determining how to get what is needed to the point where it is needed at the time when it is needed. They must be able to select the correct course of action and carry it out under adverse conditions as well.

Unfortunately, our normal peacetime training leaves tactical logisticians less than fully prepared for such combat situations. Both peacetime constraints and training emphases hinder their on-the-job development and training. In particular, three aspects of training limit the kinds of problems an S-4 must solve and may even prevent him from considering other problems.

First, logistics for any field training exercise (FTX) is normally limited to what is necessary for the play of the exercise. This aspect of the problem acknowledges that logistical assets are too precious to be prepared, expended, or used when they are not needed. It also acknowledges that manning levels are not high enough to allow fictitious operations to be planned and monitored when there are actual ones that must take place. Thus, the emphasis is usually placed on supporting a particular FTX, with little question of how that support would be done in combat. Whatever support is not needed is never addressed or planned for. Although this conserves precious assets, it also limits opportunities for planning and executing the handling of these assets.

LIMITED

The second aspect of the problem concerns the physical limitations of today's training areas. This simply acknowledges that maneuver units cannot conduct offensive and retrograde movements over the distances the writers of the FMs envision for the future battlefields. In addition, maneuver units in an FTX rarely employ all forms of combat support and combat service support. Live fire events are usually limited in scope and duration, and this means that S-4s and the CSS system are less than fully exercised.

During most field problems, S-4s are rarely required to operate at extended distances from their supply base and their support units, or with a challenging array of requirements. Even the size and the complexity of the trains may be reduced to a deceptively simple level. In short, in the logistical environment found in many field training exercises, management and span of control problems are greatly reduced.

The third aspect involves the importance of brigade and battalion level FTXs to the commanders concerned. Maneuver units pour a great deal of effort into planning and preparing for such an event, because many of their critical training tasks can be done only during an FTX. It is therefore quite natural that commanders should demand that every possible step be taken to support the exercise. This emphasis is well placed, but its results must also be considered.

In actual practice, CSS is rarely ever interrupted or limited—the support of the FTX is the end purpose; the training of the tactical logistician is secondary. Good units do stress training in communications, security, camouflage, and fieldcraft of all types, but this, unfortunately, is not the type of training in question. The S-4, for example, rarely gets to move and set up field trains in new locations during darkness. His span of control is not tested, and he is not required to support and move at the same time. He may practice noise and light discipline on resupply runs but may never get a chance to attempt a throughput operation.
bypassing intermediate supply activities). While the maneuver units may practice night withdrawals, the S-4 probably stays in a static location until those units begin withdrawing from the field.

If all this is so, where does it leave us? It leaves us, the tactical logisticians, with deficiencies in our training and a need to overcome them through an increased emphasis on logistical training at the tactical level.

Accordingly, the tactical logistician must seek out the tactical operations officer early in the formulation of training plans and present his own training objectives. Then, together, they can plan and identify requirements. Teamwork is necessary to both.

The teamwork between the S-3 and the S-4 must begin before the troops go to the field. Command post exercises (CPXs) with FIRST BATTLE or other simulation games can be used. Reporting systems that parallel the field system can be set up in which a unit that does not request resupply or replenishment is rendered ineffective until its requests are submitted and acted upon. Maneuvers that are impractical to do on many posts can be exercised during CPXs.

Extended offensive or retrograde operations that require the displacement of trains can be conducted as part of the movement to or from the field location. Field Manual 52-4, The Division Support Command and the Separate Brigade Support Battalion, states:

In retrograde operations, whenever possible, brigade trains displace to the rear before the combat elements begin their rearward movement. Some elements from the brigade trains may be required to remain in the forward area to provide immediate support to combat elements.

Brigade and battalion S-4s and their commanders should explore this general guidance, asking themselves these questions: What elements remain to provide immediate support? How much of each element remains forward? Who is in charge of setting up the new area? Who is running the existing area with the support requirements? What supplies are enroute to this location? What supplies and equipment should be, or can be, left behind? These questions multiply when a tactical trains displacement is being considered.

Careful planning and timing could even allow for a complete move of a trains area during an FTX. Such a move could be the very first or the very last event of the exercise. It could even be worked into the tactical play.

Such ideas may be only food for thought, but we are all trainers, and each of us must look at the training needs of the other. Not every FTX has to have a complete movement of the field trains, of course, but somehow each S-4 must be fully trained through practice and experience. It is only through this on-the-job problem solving that an S-4 can develop his ability to support tactical operations. He must demand opportunities to do so during peacetime and must show how the aspects of training that limit his development can be overcome. If his opportunities and challenges in peacetime are limited, his responses and solutions in wartime may also be limited—too limited.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter J. Croomins, Jr., is assigned to Readiness Group Fort Benjamin Harrison. He has served as a battalion executive officer and S-3 and as a battalion and brigade S-4. He holds a masters degree from the University of Southern California.

Shortcomings in New TOE

LIEUTENANT TERRY L. DURAN

The old story about the lack of a horseshoe nail causing the eventual loss of a battle is one that makers of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOEs) would do well to heed. In the Army's rush to a Division 86-style Army of Excellence, care must be taken not to let too many horses want for nails, lest the battle overrun both the soldiers in the field and the TOE makers.

A prime example is the average J-series, M113-equipped mechanized infantry battalion in Europe. Although this battalion can expect to receive the M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle within the next year or two, it must, because of its location on the "front lines of freedom," be ready to go to war at any time, regardless of what it is equipped with. Unfortunately, some shortcomings in the transitional J-series MTOE (M113) are definitely nails that could cause many a shoe to be lost. Admittedly, many of these shortcomings apply to the expanded headquarters company only, but some of them apply as well to the entire battalion.

These problems can be loosely grouped into three categories: Too Much, Too Little, and Incompatibility.

"TOO MUCH"

First, the Division 86 mechanized infantry headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) has more than 300 men, regardless of which particular "modified" TOE (MTOE) is referred to—more than a third of the battalion's entire manpower. Because of the company's size and diversity, it is not surprising to find...
many of the TOE shortcomings in it. The eight HHC sections—scout, heavy mortar, maintenance, communication, mess, personnel, medical, and battalion staff—encompass 26 different military occupational specialties in 16 different career management fields. The day-to-day training and support requirements often spread a company literally to the four winds. This often results in one of two command philosophies at company level: very loose control or very tight control.

The “very loose” concept allows the greatest freedom—within general guidelines—for the platoon and section leaders to “do their own thing,” as far as possible, in terms of training and generally running their units. This concept may result in fewer gray hairs for the company commander, and can definitely give valuable experience to the platoon and section leaders who get a chance to run things. But these leaders, to make it work, must be mission-oriented self-starters. If they are not, there will be an erosion of meaningful training and personnel accountability.

On the other hand, “very tight” control requires an energetic, experienced company commander who can somehow keep from being buried under three times the paperwork a rifle company commander has. The “very tight” commander may raise the standards of accountability and sometimes provide more useful guidance to subordinate leaders than the “very loose” commander, but he runs the risk of imposing unrealistic requirements on one or more of the eight sections in the company because rarely is a commander an expert in all of the fields concerned.

What is required is an HHC commander who can walk the tightrope down the middle, spot checking training and providing guidance as necessary, but avoiding oversupervision, micromanagement, and unrealistic requirements or evaluations. Most, if not all, commands have a policy that an HHC commander must have successfully commanded a rifle company before he takes over an HHC. This is an excellent policy; it is also a good idea for an HHC executive officer to have had experience as a line company XO. The same goes for first sergeants.

Most HHC commanders, however, despite their best efforts, seem to wind up walking on one side or the other of the tightrope most of the time because the company is just too large and too diversified.

"TOO LITTLE"

The “too little” problems involve both personnel and equipment. In the modern-day peacetime Army, every unit—platoon, company, battalion—will almost always be short a few men (unless it is artificially beefed up for a special occasion). But even infantry battalions in Europe, where manning levels are highest, are fortunate if half of their 36 rifle squads have eight men actually working day-to-day in each of those squads.

The reasons for this, often bewildered by leaders, are numerous: details, special duty, TDY, and the like. Most often, the problem is just too few assigned people. Many of the details that plague combat units in peacetime may vanish in wartime, but other deficiencies will not become apparent until war does break out. For example, a rifle company is authorized three two-and-a-half ton trucks—but no drivers or truck commanders (TCs). The first sergeant, supply sergeant, or XO often rides in the right hand seat of one or more of these, depending on mission requirements, but the drivers are inevitably 11Bs pulled from the rifle squads. This is not to say that they don’t do good jobs—but they are infantrymen, not truck drivers, and they can’t pull a trigger with a steering wheel in their hands.

In the field, a first sergeant or supply sergeant runs Chow and other necessities to his company from the battalion trains or logistics release points, often in one of his company’s two-and-a-half ton trucks. Since no radio is authorized for that truck, however, these people are left in the dark when the company has to make a sudden, unexpected move while they are enroute.

Additionally, more thought should be given to the number and the kind of radios given to a rifle platoon leader. He has either two AN/PRC-160s (a PRC-77 in a vehicle mount) or one 160 and one AN/VRC-46, which is impractical for dismounted use. When a platoon leader is mounted in his M113, he must maintain communication with the company commander on the company net and with his three squads on the platoon net. When he dismounts, he still has the same requirements, but he has only one radio (a PRC-77) to work with. His M113 must retain at least one radio for communication with the rest of the platoon and with the platoon sergeant, if the latter does not switch over to the command track when the platoon leader dismounts.

Unless the platoon leader always keeps one PRC-77 in a backpack mode (thereby decreasing its range and reliability and using more batteries), he is slowed down when he has to dismount rapidly. If he keeps his radio on the company net and stays near one of his squads, he can maintain communication but is hampered in his movement. If he "steals" one squad’s radio-telephone operator (RTO) (or even just its radio) to keep with him, that squad is left without communication.

A rifle platoon leader should be authorized at least one more AN/PRC-77, for a total of three on the platoon command track. The platoon leader, when dismounted, should carry one radio on his own back—either on the company or the platoon net, depending on the situation—while the RTO should carry the radio that is on the less urgent net.

In the headquarters company itself, most “too little” problems are the result of not thinking big enough — of being stuck with the idea that “this is just another company.” But it is not just another company. It is larger and more complex. Some of its “too little” problems are these:

- The support platoon has 18 five-ton trucks but no assigned truck commanders. To expect a driver — a private, PFC, or specialist four — to drive and navigate at the same time is not only unrealistic, it is dangerous.
- Likewise, seven fuel trucks are authorized, along with their drivers, but no TCs.
- The dining facility’s solitary two-and-a-half ton truck is expected to pull a mobile kitchen trailer (MKT) and a water trailer, which is clearly impossible.
- Each rifle company has one MKT
with four cooks assigned, responsible for feeding about 100 men. The HHC, with over 300 men, has one MKT with six men—one of whom is also the dining facility supervisor who must oversee more than just one MKT.

- No jeep drivers are authorized for the HHC commander, the XO, or the heavy mortar platoon sergeant.

- There is no NBC NCO for the largest company in the battalion. A 54E (NBC) staff sergeant is authorized for the HHC, but his job is in the battalion S-3 shop, where he acts as the battalion NBC NCO. The only other 54E slot is for a decontamination equipment specialist (specialist four or below). If the rifle companies rate a 54E sergeant for about 100 soldiers, then surely the HHC deserves one.

- No training NCO of any type is authorized for the HHC, despite 290 enlisted men in 26 different MOSs.

- MTOE calls for one 76Y (Supply) staff sergeant and two clerks in HHC, one of whom is the armorer (still 76Y). Experience has shown that this supply sergeant should be a sergeant first class with two clerks also authorized, along with an additional sergeant 76Y armorer.

- One problem common to all the companies in the Division 86 mechanized infantry battalion is handling the prescribed load list (PLL). Each company has its own PLL, which is the means whereby vehicle parts (and many other essential items) are ordered. The six companies—HHC, A, B, C, D, and E—are authorized only four PLL clerks, and one of them must also handle TAMMS (The Army Maintenance Management System). With one clerk handling TAMMS, one clerk each for HHC and Company E—which have the largest and most varied PLLs—and one clerk per two line companies, at least one more PLL clerk (MOS 76C) is needed.

INCOMPATIBILITY

The HHC organization breaks down into two main groups: combat arms (scouts and mortars) and combat support (communication, medics, maintenance, cooks, and PAC), but both groups must be battle ready. There is a basic incompatibility, though, in their missions—dropping mortar rounds or scouting out an enemy’s strongpoints are tasks essentially different from turning a wrench or repairing a radio or flipping a pancake. All of these jobs are necessary, of course, but a soldier’s primary mission is either to engage his enemy with direct or indirect fire or to support the guys who do.

This basic split just makes things harder for the headquarters company and its commander. One potential solution would be a return of sorts to the old combat support company concept, but under a different name.

Since in tactical operations the scout and heavy mortar platoons work for the battalion commander and the S-3 anyway, they could be removed entirely from the HHC and put in Company E. The present MTOE Company E is smaller than a rifle company: 60 men compared to 100. Taking the scout and mortar platoons out of HHC would lighten the load on the shoulders of the HHC commander, the XO, and the First Sergeant by 65 people, and would increase the present Company E to only a little more than a rifle company (125). Maintenance operations would also be consolidated in the case of the scouts, who are also equipped with ITVs.

Another solution, although not as elegant, would be to create a maintenance company. It would consist of the maintenance platoon—by far the largest now in HHC, with over 100 men—the communications platoon, and a small direct support contact team for items such as crew-served weapons, Dragons, TOWs, and night vision devices.

The entire battalion’s problems dealing with equipment such as radios could be solved simply enough—given, of course, the money and the will to buy more equipment. The personnel problems, however, would be more difficult, since they result largely from an effort by high level planners to do more with less. This means that the makers of TOEs are not likely to look favorably upon requests for more people.

SOLUTIONS

Stopgap, make-do solutions can always be found, of course, one way or another—life goes on and the mission must be accomplished, regardless. And infantry units worldwide are finding their own best solutions: Soldiers in 11 and 19 series MOSs sometimes find themselves doing jobs that are entirely different from those they learned in Basic and AIT. This is not necessarily bad, in and of itself, for diversity is usually an asset, so long as a soldier can still do his primary job.

Three things are necessary, though, if the Division 86 Army of Excellence is to live up to its name:

First, infantry units—and combat arms units in general—must have the number of people necessary to accomplish the mission. (I once evaluated a heavy mortar platoon on a maneuver ARTEP that could not man all its gun tracks and its FDCs at the same time, even with only two men per gun instead of the authorized four, because it was at half strength.) Soldiers and NCOs who are guiding two-and-a-half ton or five-ton trucks through the woods can’t be with their squads or platoons. Drivers without TCs get lost. Doing more with less only goes so far.

Second, the chain of command, from team leader to top commander, must not only keep looking for better ways to accomplish the mission, or for ways to remove obstacles that hinder mission accomplishment, they must also be willing to push their suggestions up the chain of command. Whether it is for adding some radios so that a platoon leader can follow doctrine or for assigning enough PLL clerks to take care of all the companies...
Centralize the Plan,
Decentralize the Execution

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL A. GALASSI

Working in operations and training for the past five years, watching units struggle to document what they had done and justify what they planned to do, I've sensed that something was wrong. It was a gut feeling that I couldn't quite articulate, but for the sake of trainers below the battalion level, maybe it's time I tried.

The Battalion Training Management System (BTMS), which consists of binders full of training management techniques and documentation, does not yield comparable dividends in combat readiness. I'll admit that the theory behind BTMS seems foolproof, but the problems we have in training today go much deeper. They come, I think, from much higher levels than the battalion.

BTMS is a good solution for the wrong problem. Our problem shouldn't be one of trying to make managers and planners out of leaders at the battalion and lower levels. Hopefully, they have all they can handle being trainers. Rather, our training plans need to come from the top; they need to be centralized. The only decentralization in training should be in its execution. (Why should we approach training differently from the way we approach war? War plans are centralized, but battles become very decentralized when platoon leaders have to execute those plans.)

Those of us in the Reserve Components have become very well acquainted with mission task lists, mission essential task lists, and post-mobilization training plans. There's nothing wrong with that, except we're acquainted with them because we at the battalion and company levels are primarily responsible for their development. There is something wrong with that, however, and it's wrong because that battalion is part of a division when it's mobilized. It is not an individual entity responsible only to itself. Our post-mobilization training problems are therefore compounded when the battalions that do report to a mobilization station may be operating on different priorities and, in many cases, at different levels.

This situation will be inevitable unless there is a drastic change in the way we develop our training plans. The changes I'm suggesting have only one basic goal—to provide a consistent level of combat readiness throughout a division. For this to be accomplished, commanders and staffs at division and higher levels should decide where they want their battalions to be in terms of combat readiness, with the decision being based on our wartime missions and our available resources. A plan should then be developed and a time frame established for bringing all like battalions within a division to the same level of readiness. To do this, the plan would have to be standardized with, as an example, all infantry battalions in that division training on the same missions and tasks during a particular training year. Then annual evaluations would be based on how well that unit could perform the missions it was assigned that year.

For the division commander to get an objective look at where his battalions are and where they need to concentrate their future efforts, the evaluation team would have to come from his headquarters. Every battalion (of the same branch) within that division would then receive the same evaluation on the same missions. It is obvious that any battalion
commander who knows exactly which missions or tasks his battalion must train on would spend most of his time developing interesting and innovative training techniques instead of developing training plans. He wouldn't be concerned with which missions to program into his yearly training plan; that would already be done for him, and just as in a war, his mission would be to lead the execution of the assigned mission.

With a "train as you fight" approach, documents such as training schedules and job books become unnecessary. In their place we should consider, simply, operations orders and immediate retraining on bocched-up individual tasks—in other words, do it until we get it right and then move on. Individual tasks should be trained and retrained during rehearsals for collective training and performed during the conduct of that collective task or ARTEP mission. The priority for individual training should go to those tasks that support the major ARTEP missions being trained that year. The ITEP becomes unnecessary when squad leaders train their soldiers as a unit, while at the same time conducting on-the-spot corrections and retraining. The Army's emphasis should be on evaluating units, not individuals.

As Army trainers, we don't need courses and manuals telling us how to manage training. We need an Army-wide training system that follows three basic principles: The Army develops the plan; staffs plan the execution; and leaders execute the plan.

A common-sense approach to training management is long overdue. It's time we ended our present fascination with documentation. Any unit can publish tons of documents to support what it's doing or is supposed to be doing, but do those documents make that unit any more combat ready? Evaluations need to be directed toward how a unit executes its assigned missions. The process that a commander uses to organize and implement the execution of his training program should be irrelevant to the outside evaluator. Whether a commander has an effective training program or not will show up when he employs his unit under different tactical scenarios in the field.

Strong leadership and motivated trainers, not systems and theories, will improve unit training, ensure that higher headquarters missions are carried out, and result in an overall increase in a unit's ability to go to war. The top people in any field get there by working hard, using common sense, and following their own instincts. (Ask any head of a major corporation if his success is attributed to some magical theory or system he pulled out of a textbook in college.)

If a unit commander wants to use some of the management techniques from BTMS, that's fine, but only if it helps him better organize and use his training time. If he's using these procedures only to fulfill a requirement, though, then he's wasting his time and his soldiers' time as well.

The battalion I work for has always done its best to establish training programs under BTMS guidelines, and continues to do so (as directed by higher headquarters), but there was never much consistency between units in the battalion, and our annual training evaluations were never better than average, until under one commander, the battalion received C-2 ratings (Excellent) for three consecutive annual training periods. Why the sudden change? In one word, "standardization." Rifle company training programs were standardized while our headquarters and combat support companies trained to support the major ARTEP missions we would perform at annual training. The units in the battalion had a common goal. They trained toward that goal during inactive duty training (IDT) and executed better than ever before during our annual training periods. The commanders were concerned only with conducting training, not with figuring out what they were going to do, or where their priorities should be.

Once training programs become standardized within the Army's divisions, and once specific missions are assigned, we can base our evaluations of a unit on whether or not the training being conducted is mission-oriented, challenging, varied, physical, well led, and innovative (and therefore more interesting to the soldiers). These are answers you'll find in the field, not in training rooms.

If we ever hope to attain a higher level of combat readiness throughout the Total Army, our first step must be to boot decentralized planning out of our training offices and replace it with a training program that emphasizes the decentralized execution of a centralized plan. I can't speak for the entire Army, but those of us in the Reserve Components don't have the time to do it any other way and still maintain the level of readiness expected of us.

Lieutenant Michael A. Galassi served for six years on active duty in Korea and at Fort Campbell and since 1979 has been a member of the Illinois Army National Guard. He is presently a full-time training officer for the 2nd Battalion, 130th Infantry, 47th Infantry Division.
Land on the Objective

CAPTAIN RONALD M. BUFFKIN

The loss rate for helicopters during the United States' intervention in Grenada in 1983 demonstrated the necessity for carefully planning airmobile operations. Given suitable conditions on the landing zone (LZ), an infantry commander has two choices—land on the objective or land away from it and maneuver to it. The factors of surprise and time favor landing on the objective.

A plan to land an airmobile force on the objective can succeed if the airmobile task force (AMTF) commander will apply the concept of "Three Slows and a Quick," a concept born and used successfully during LAMSON 719, the invasion of Laos between 8 February and 9 April 1971.

The three Slows are the principles of warfare that are "slow" by virtue of having to be planned for—combat power, enemy, and surprise—not slow in terms of speed. The Quick is the factor of time—the time available to accomplish the mission. Time is "quick" because it is the single most important principle in executing an airmobile operation. An infantry unit that lands on the objective must be quick—the success of the operation depends upon it.

The Slows must be planned for as completely as time will allow. The Quick, on the other hand, is a function of training and discipline and can be improved only slightly through rehearsal.

Combat power, the first Slow, refers to how much combat power can be introduced early in the operation. In an airmobile operation, this power usually takes the form of artillery fire, close air support, occasional naval gunfire, and fire from attack helicopters. Field Manual 90-4, Airmobile Operations, contains adequate guidance on the inte-
placed under the operational control of the AMTF as a subordinate maneuver unit.)

It is important that the mobility of assault helicopters not be confused with their maneuver. The Black Hawks (UA-60s) that carry the task force to the LZ are a form of mobility for the infantry. Just because a battalion task force lands untouched on an LZ that is also its objective doesn’t mean that is has “maneuvered” itself there. (Maneuver, to quote FM 100-5, is “the dynamic element of combat,” while mobility is a function of how a unit gets where it is going, whether by jungle boot, Bradley, or Black Hawk.)

In planning for combat power, therefore, infantry commanders and their staffs should integrate attack helicopters into the airmobile scheme of maneuver. (Since the attack helicopter unit is a subordinate maneuver unit, its instructions go in the sub-unit paragraph, not under “fire support.”)

The second Slow to be planned for is the enemy—specifically, his strength, weapons, and air defense systems in and around the objective. Since the task force will be landing on the objective, all known and suspected air defense artillery positions must be neutralized or suppressed before it lands. It is a tall order for an S-2 to identify these ADA sites, but a weapons template and good map reconnaissances or aerial photographs can help.

Today, aircraft such as the Black Hawk can absorb a considerable amount of fire and continue to fly, but no helicopter can fly over enemy weapon systems with impunity. The on-board weapons on an assault helicopter are used, at best, for suppression only. The doorgunners should not be expected to provide additional firepower; rather, their job is to return the fire directed at their aircraft, and they continue firing just long enough to get in and out of an LZ. Ideally, every major weapon system on the LZ or objective should be hit just before the task force lands.

A word of caution is needed in planning fires on the LZ. Smoke and fire tend to confuse inbound helicopters. If a landing on an objective is to succeed, the LZ cannot be in flames when the helicopters get there.

The third planning goal, surprise, is essential. The careful use of terrain, cover and concealment, darkness, and reduced visibility all contribute to surprise. Smoke and the sound of preparatory fire can also be used effectively to mask incoming helicopters. Landing on the objective sometimes creates the best element of surprise, especially if tactical deception has been used in all phases of the planning.

Landing on the objective also favors missions that are limited in time—the one Quick factor. But during the time spent on the objective, the action should be violent, swift, and lethal. Landing on the objective allows no time for a movement to contact, an approach march, or an assembly on a strobe marker. The troops need to be taught that landing on the objective is like stepping into an ambush kill zone seconds before it is blown.

The Three Slows and a Quick cannot replace a knowledge of FM 90-4 or practical experience working with aviation units. By simplifying the task and reducing the hazard, however, this concept can give an infantry unit commander and his staff a mental tool to help them succeed when landing on the objective.

Captain Ronald M. Buffkin, an Aviation officer, was commissioned in 1973 from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning. He completed the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, and the Airborne, Ranger, and Pathfinder courses before attending flight school. He served in Europe with an aviation battalion of the 1st Armored Division. When he wrote this article, he was attending Auburn University.

Dismounted Drill

CAPTAIN CLARENCE K. K. CHINN

Leadership in combat is an infantry company commander’s sole reason for being. In peacetime, this translates into producing a unit that is ready to fight and win on tomorrow’s battlefield. One method of training that can help a commander in this effort is drills. Drills allow small units to link individual and leader tasks into coordinated, efficient, and effective group action. Drills also provide a means by which a unit can make sure its training in these tasks is done right and properly reinforced.

Although battle drills have received some attention in recent years, dismounted drill is generally neglected, even though the proper use of dismounted drill can help prepare a unit for conducting battle drill more effectively.

Throughout recorded history, military leaders have recognized that fighting men have to be disciplined, organized, and exercised collectively in battle. From this early realization sprang the necessity for dismounted drill, which embraced both weapon training and field exercises.

Dismounted drill was designed not merely to instill discipline but also to teach the soldier the kind of close-packed formations and movements actually used on the battlefield. Drill movements and formations were tactical maneuvers involving both fire and movement, and
troops were taught in parade formations how to withstand, unflinchingly, the impact of fire and the assault of a column of infantry or horse. Dismounted drills enabled a commander to move forces swiftly from one point to another and to mass forces and maneuver them on the battlefield as the situation developed.

Before the end of the eighteenth century, dismounted drill was directly connected with the battlefield. The place and duty of a soldier in battle was taught through the constant repetition of dismounted drill. A well-drilled soldier would precisely and instinctively execute the orders of his commander. In short, dismounted drill was training for war; depending on the situation, the proper execution of orders would lead to victory on the battlefield.

Today, although dismounted drill procedures are no longer used on the battlefield, some of the same objectives that have always been accomplished by that drill—discipline, precision, teamwork, confidence—are just as important today. In fact, dismounted drill is the first step in linking individual and leader tasks together to provide a coordinated group action. This action, in the form of soldiers instantly moving in unison to barked commands, teaches a soldier the basics of his trade. And a confident, disciplined soldier who understands teamwork provides a good foundation upon which to build an effective fighting unit.

One of the key objectives of dismounted drill, of course, is to develop discipline in the soldier. Discipline is the habit of instantly and automatically obeying the will of the leader. Without discipline, a unit cannot function, for discipline is the human basis of response on which effective command rests. Dismounted drill leads to good discipline by reinforcing good discipline.

When a leader gives a command, he must demand precision—alertness, attention to detail—and instant obedience. Otherwise, he is not reinforcing good discipline, and a soldier's failure to react instantly to a command given by a leader in combat may mean the difference between life and death for that soldier or others in the unit.

Another key objective of dismounted drill is to build the concept of teamwork into each individual soldier. Teamwork is putting individual skills together to create one unified effort. Dismounted drill gives the leader a tool with which to build this unified effort. With it, he takes individual skills and combines them to create a coordinated group action. On the drill field, when soldiers react precisely, instantaneously, and in unison to the commands of the leader, everyone involved feels the effect of teamwork.

LEARNs

But when one soldier fails to follow the commands of the leader instantly and precisely, teamwork diminishes. His failure has a negative effect on the entire unit. From this, the soldier learns what he must know on the battlefield—that when one man gets "out of step," other men may die.

The last key objective of dismounted drill is to build confidence in the soldier. Each time he reacts precisely and instantly to the commands of the leader, his self-confidence grows. When he begins to realize that his individual actions are correct, this also develops in him a sense of pride and accomplishment.

When dismounted drill is conducted as a team (fire team, squad, platoon, company) and all the soldiers react in unison, each member of the team becomes more confident. Teamwork builds, and the men gain a sense of esprit de corps. The soldiers begin to understand that by working together they can achieve positive results. Human nature, after all, desires gratification, and the leader's praise of the unified effort increases the soldiers' pride.

As a soldier's confidence in himself and his team builds, so does his confidence in his leader. During the drills, he sees the leader organize the unit, issue commands, and enforce the standard to which those commands are carried out. He therefore knows that the leader himself knows the standard, and this increases his confidence in the leadership ability of his leader. In combat, this confidence becomes especially important, for if a soldier has to stop for one second to think about whether his leader's command is the proper action to take, he may die.

The benefits to be gained from dismounted drill depends on how well the drill is carried out. Dismounted drill should be conducted every duty day for ten to fifteen minutes, perhaps after physical training or after morning parade. The standard should be to have soldiers moving precisely, instantaneously, and in unison to the orders of the leader. The leader must insist on absolute perfection every time dismounted drill is conducted. For those soldiers who understand the purpose and the correct use of dismounted drill, those ten or fifteen minutes will be well spent.

Dismounted drill is a return to the basics of soldiering. It provides a building block for the development of a well-trained soldier—a soldier who is confident and disciplined and who understands teamwork. Dismounted drill, conducted to the proper standard, ensures a good foundation upon which leaders can build a combat-ready unit.

Captain Clarence K. K. Chinn is now assigned to the 2d Infantry Division in Korea. Formerly, he served with the 8th Infantry Division and the 2d Battalion, 76th Infantry (Ranger) at Fort Lewis. He recently completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course.
UNUSCIA CORRESPONDING STUDIES COURSE

A selection board will convene at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, on 28 April 1986 to consider applicants to enroll in Class 14 of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Corresponding Studies Program, which begins in April 1987.

About 200 soldiers will be selected to enroll in the program, and no alternate or standby board list will be established.

To be eligible, applicants must be in the rank of SFC/PSG (promotable), MSG/1SG, or SGM/CSM (not waivable), and must hold basic active service dates (BASDs) of 1 May 1964 or later. (General courts martial convening authority is authorized to grant waivers for personnel who want to apply with BASDs from 1 May 1960 through 30 April 1964.) Applicants who are not selected may reapply in subsequent years.

Soldiers who complete the USASMA corresponding studies program do not incur a service obligation.

Soldiers who have completed or are enrolled in the corresponding studies program are not eligible to attend the resident course. But those who apply for the CSP are also in the zone of consideration for the resident course will be considered for the resident course first, unless they specifically decline that consideration. Applicants who are selected for the resident course will not be considered for the nonresident course. This procedure allows eligible soldiers to compete twice for USASMA before the same board.

The zones of consideration for the resident course and procedures for declining that consideration will be announced later.

Successful completion of either the resident or the corresponding studies course carries the same weight with career managers and selection boards. Both are fully accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and the American Council on Education.

Applications must be forwarded through appropriate MILPO and command channels to Commander, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPT-FN, 2461 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22331-0400 to arrive not later than 5 April 1986.

Further information is available in MILPO Message Number 8651, or from MSG McInnis, AUTOVON 225-3405, commercial 202-695-3405.

WARRANT OFFICER ENTRY COURSE

The Warrant Officer Entry Course has been developed to train highly motivated junior noncommissioned officers to support the advanced technology of the future.

The Warrant Officer Entry Course at the service schools is taken in two phases, either as a resident course or by correspondence. The six-week, four-day resident course is designed to teach the candidates leadership, ethics, motivation, counseling, military justice, personnel management, and the communication arts.

The Warrant Office Entry Course, Reserve Component (WOEC-RC), incorporates all the subject matter of the active component course. The correspondence phase (135 hours) is made up of those subject areas that are adaptable to export; it must be completed within the 12 months preceding attendance at the resident phase.

The resident phase involves two weeks of training at the Army Reserve Readiness Training Center (ARRTC), Fort McCoy, Wisconsin.

Following completion of WOEC or WOEC-RC, the candidates are ready to attend technical certification training at their respective MOS proponent schools to complete Phase II of the program. In Phase II, the emphasis is shifted from officer training to technical training.

CHANGES TO EER

The Army enlisted evaluation report (EER) is being revised on the basis of recommendations from the NCO Professional Study Group. The group recommended establishing eight essential categories of competency to aid in the selection and development of NCOs.

The eight categories are as follows:

- An NCO must be thoroughly proficient and knowledgeable regarding the full range of duties of his present assignment.
- An NCO must maintain a level of understanding of his particular military occupational specialty (MOS), even when certain responsibilities do not fall under his present assignment.
- An NCO must have the basic educational skills required to communicate effectively, to train, to counsel, and to write reports pertinent to his position.
- An NCO must be physically fit and must maintain proper military bearing at all times to be ready to fight and lead and to be a strong positive example to the soldiers under him.
- An NCO, as a leader, must be attentive to the needs and concerns of his soldiers, continually looking after their interests and making sure his troops can fight and survive in battle.
- An NCO must be, primarily, a trainer.
- An NCO must hold the professional values and standards of his service, which lead to greater discipline and dedication to duty.
- An NCO is responsible for managing and accounting for the soldiers, property, and equipment placed in his charge.
NATIONAL INFANTRY BALL

The 1985 National Infantry Ball was held at the Hilton Hotel in Springfield, Virginia, on 9 November 1985. Major General John W. Foss, then Commandant of the Infantry School and Chief of Infantry, acted as the Master of Ceremonies for the event, at which General Matthew B. Ridgway was honored as the 1985 recipient of the Doughboy Award.

Plans are now being made for the 1986 National Infantry Ball, to be held 15 November 1986 at the same location, and nominations are being solicited for suitable candidates for the 1986 Doughboy Award.

Candidates should be members of the private or retired sectors who have significantly contributed to the Infantry or to the overall improvement of the quality of life for soldiers.

Nominations should be submitted to DA, MILPERCENT, ATTN: DACP- OPE-I (Infantry Ball Committee), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0400.

Anyone who would like to attend the 1986 Ball may write to the same address asking that his name be added to the invitation mailing list.

OER SUPPORT FORM

All Army officers must now use the revised Officer Evaluation Report Support Form. All rated officers must maintain a working copy of the support form throughout the rating period. This working copy should show the date of the initial face-to-face interview between the officer and the rated officer and must be delivered by the initial contact.

The Military Personnel Office is no longer responsible for initiating the form and providing it to the rated officer.

Complete guidance on the preparation and use of the new OER Support Form is in AR 623-405 (Officer Ranks Personnel Update).

PROBLEMS WITH OFFICER PREFERENCE STATEMENTS

Although much has been published on the need for officer preference statements, some officers apparently still believe that submitting them is useless because they are not used anyway.

This is just not true.

Having a statement on file does not guarantee an officer his desired assignment, or course. But it does give him an opportunity to participate in the assignment process, and it is used. Every time an assignment manager reviews an officer’s record, he sees that officer’s preference statement information — if it is available — displayed on his computer terminal.

Too many officers, however, still have not updated their master files using the new DA Form 483, even though it was implemented in early 1985. And among those who have, too many have failed to complete their forms properly.

The Officer Preference Statement is now a mark-sense form, and an assignment officer’s computer terminal provides the only readable translation of the information coded on it. If a form has not been completed accurately, it can cause delays in processing. As a result, an officer’s latest preferences may not show up on his record at a crucial time.

DA Form 483 is simple to complete, but it is sensitive. The instructions in its upper right-hand corner must be followed carefully, with special attention to certain items:

- A #2 pencil must be used to fill out the form — not a pen, crayon, or felt-tipped marker
- The entire mark-sense circle must be completely darkened.

- The officer’s Social Security number must be entered in the area indicated.
- The form must be mailed unfolded in a 9x12 envelope. The reader cannot process folded forms.

An officer can submit a preference statement at any time, but MILPERCENT recommends that he do so at the following times especially:

- About 12 months before completing a long tour overseas.
- Upon arrival at a short-tour area.
- About 12 months after reporting to a CONUS assignment.
- At least 60 days before beginning a military service school, or training with industry that requires a permanent change of station within CONUS.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE CORRESPONDING STUDIES

Some curriculum changes in the U.S. Army War College Corresponding Studies Program, to be effective with the class of 1987, will affect core subjects and course structure. The changes will ensure that the corresponding studies curriculum closely parallels that of the resident course.

Additional emphasis will be placed on military doctrine, wargaming at the operational level, and the changing international environment that will affect U.S. national strategy formulation in the future.

Graduates of both courses will continue to be awarded Military Education Level I and will be given equal consideration for assignments that require officers who have been awarded senior service college diplomas.

The Chief, Army Reserve Professional Development Education Board considers Reserve officers for both the Army War College Resident Course and the Corresponding Studies Program.
Once again we have a number of important books we would like to call to your attention. First is Brigadier Richard Simpkin’s RACE TO THE SWIFT: THOUGHTS ON TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY WARFARE (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1985. 345 Pages. $32.50). The author retired from the British Army in 1971 after 30 years of active service as an officer of the Royal Tank Regiment. Since his retirement, he has written a half-dozen important books on armor warfare.

In this, his latest book, Simpkin offers dozens of meaty ideas that all serving U.S. infantrymen should ponder carefully and digest slowly.

For example, he offers a proposed organization for NATO’s armies that differs considerably from the present ones; the tactics the new formations should employ; and the development of the leaders to command those units during wartime. He also discusses the writings of Carl von Clausewitz and why he feels Clausewitz’s writings have been misinterpreted; the importance of terrain to the ground soldier; maneuver warfare; and the importance of mass in determining success in battle.

All of this — and there is more — makes the book essential reading.

Another important book is the third and final volume of D. Clayton James’s biography of Douglas MacArthur — THE YEARS OF MACARTHUR: TRIUMPH AND DISASTER, 1945-1964 (Houghton Mifflin, 1985. 848 Pages. $29.95). In this book, James, a professor of history at Mississippi State University, traces General MacArthur’s life and times from his arrival in Japan on 8 September 1945 to his death in the Walter Reed Army Medical Center on 5 April 1964.

This is biographical history at its best — objective, well written, thoroughly researched. James has divided his book into three major parts: the occupation years from 1945 to 1950; the war in Korea from its beginning in June 1950 to MacArthur’s relief on 10 April 1951; and MacArthur’s final 13 years of life, most of them spent as chairman of the board of the Sperry Rand Corporation.

When he feels it is necessary, James criticizes, but he also praises his subject for actions well taken. He makes few personal judgments and admits that after more than 18 years of work on MacArthur, he still knows precious little “about MacArthur’s inner self.”

This is one of those books — as James’s first two volumes in this same series are — that Infantrymen should find professionally rewarding.

As part of the MacArthur story, portions of a recent biography of Admiral William F. “Bull” Halsey by E. B. Potter, a professor emeritus of history at the U.S. Naval Academy, are of considerable interest because of Halsey’s relationship with MacArthur in the Pacific Ocean areas during World War II. This book is titled BULL HALSEY (Naval Institute Press, 1985. 421 Pages. $19.95). Unfortunately, Potter can find no war on his man and a reader has to wonder why not. Still, his is a good account of the Navy’s coming of age in the first half of the 20th Century and of the life and times of one of that service’s most colorful and sometimes controversial combat leaders.

Another colorful combat leader — the U.S. Army’s Matthew B. Ridgway is profiled in another recently published book, one that may (or may not) be welcomed by all airborne enthusiasts. It is Clay Blair’s RIDGWAY’S PARA-TROOPERS: THE AMERICAN AIRBORNE IN WORLD WAR II (Double-day, 1985. 588 Pages. $19.95).

It is really two books in one, as the title indicates, and while the author says it is not an “authorized biography,” he did have access to General Ridgway’s private and official papers and did have Ridgway’s full cooperation during the research phase of this project. (This book may also be considered an “inside story” of the U.S. airborne effort during World War II, what with the accounts of personal rivalries and petty jealousies in the various airborne units at regimental level and higher.)

Although the airborne soldiers, in general, fought well once they were on the ground, they usually had to start fighting from almost impossible situations because the air transport phases of the various operations failed. Accordingly, no major Allied airborne operation during World War II in North Africa, in the Mediterranean theater, or in northwest Europe was an unqualified success. In fact, serious thought was given at the highest levels at various times during the war years to disbanding the airborne divisions.

Ridgway himself proved to be an exceptional combat commander, at both division and corps levels. He was not liked by all of his subordinate commanders, and his actions at St. Vith during the Battle of the Bulge have been openly criticized by other commanders who were on the scene.

Ambitious almost to a fault, driving, personally brave, fiercely competitive, Ridgway ended the war as one of the Army’s brightest stars and a force to be reckoned with in the post-war years.

Blair writes well and if his claims for the airborne effort seem slightly exaggerated, his story of that effort should be welcome reading by all airborne enthusiasts. At the same time, his narrative of the operational events should alert those same enthusiasts to the tremendous problems airborne commanders can expect to encounter in mounting and executing any future major airborne operation.

Here are several other interesting publications that have recently come our way:

• THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1985-1986, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (ISS,
1985. 199 Pages. $21.00). This authoritative annual publication appears in its usual format and lists organization, manpower, budgetary information, and equipment of the armed forces of 148 countries. It also contains a section in which the Institute provides brief summaries of the existing international security arrangements and treaties, compares defense expenditure patterns, and identifies major new arms sales agreements. A final section discusses "the East-West conventional balance in Europe." (The material is current as of 1 July 1985.)

It is important to note, too, that this publication provides more extensive and detailed information than ever before on the organization and equipment of the Soviet armed forces. In fact, the Soviet entry has been changed to reflect the division of Soviet forces into five arms — Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Troops, Air Defense, Air Force, and Navy — and the order of precedence that the Soviet authorities attach to them.

Overall, the Institute feels that "military budgets — with the important exception of the super-powers — are generally showing slow or no growth and in a number of cases budgets are actually declining. Modernization naturally continues as weapons become technically obsolete, but overall numbers of deployed weapon systems or of men in uniform have shown little change over 1984."

- **THE POLISH CAMPAIGN 1939,** by Steven Zaloga and Vincent Madej (Hippocrene Books, 1985. 195 Pages. $19.95). The authors draw on little-known but extensive Polish documentary sources to tell the story — from a Polish viewpoint — of the first major World War II campaign. They include a complete Polish order of battle as it was in September 1939 and a discussion of Poland's strategic planning and tactical doctrine. Although Poland's small forces fought heroically, the authors concede that "the outcome of the campaign was a foregone conclusion before it even began."

- **THE FIGHT FOR THE CHANNEL PORTS: CALAIS TO BREST 1940,** a study in confusion, by Michael Glover (David and Charles, 1985. 269 Pages. $25.00). By the end of the first week of June 1940, more than 300,000 British and French troops had been taken off the European continent through and around the Belgian port of Dunkirk. To most of the world, this was the end of the British Army's participation in the defense of western Europe.

Not so, says the author, an often-published British historian. In his latest book, Glover tells the story of the 160,000 British soldiers, including those in Britain's only armored division, who were trapped outside the Dunkirk perimeter and who fought their way down the Channel coast seeking a way to safety. (Thousands of other British troops were still in the south and west of France as well.) Eventually, 144,000 of these British soldiers were evacuated to England.

Parts of this story have been told before; here Glover has told the whole story, ending with "the final undignified scurry from Brest." In addition to being good military history, this book provides the professional infantryman a number of important lessons in the conduct of rear area operations, a subject much under discussion these days.

- **NATURE BOUND POCKET FIELD GUIDE,** by Ron Dawson (OMNIGraphics Ltd., 1985. $12.00, Softbound). This is one of the better books we have seen on wilderness survival in North America. Its various sections include discussions on survival in general, such as the use of a compass and map, fire starting, weather awareness, and the like; edible and poisonous plants found in North America (complete with color photographs of each species); and wilderness first aid.

Here are a number of our longer reviews:

- **ON TERRORISM AND COMBATING TERRORISM.** Edited by Ariel Merari (University Publications of America, 1985. 188 Pages. $24.00). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, United States Army Retired.

This book's 17 chapters contain the lecture and discussions that took place in Tel Aviv during the 1979 International Seminar on Political Terrorism. The editor is a member of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University; he tells us that while this book "has been delayed for several reasons . . . it is astonishing to realize that the material in this book remains so highly relevant several years after it was written." For many responsible and informed citizens, the continued relevance of the problems addressed six years ago regarding terrorism is, indeed, a matter of worrisome concern. Despite some impressive U.S. declarations and political rhetoric, the reality is that the free world has yet to find a way to cope with terrorism. As Merari so vividly points out — democracies are just beginning to learn what it takes to combat terrorism, or to live with it.

The broad range of issues presented in this book indicate the many dimensions of the terrorist challenge, from military options to the psychology of terrorism, from the "Stockholm syndrome" to international relations, from the Red Brigades to the Irish Republican Army. The strength of the book, therefore, is in the fact that it raises basic questions confronting democratic societies, and the seminar participants articulate in a straightforward fashion some of the difficult problems in dealing with terrorism and possible solutions to those problems.

Although the book offers little for the specialist, it should prove informative to the general reader. Chapter endnotes and a bibliography, however, would have considerably strengthened it.

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This is a good capsule account of the North African campaign during World War II from the launching of Operation TORCH in November 1942 through the battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943.

Those who participated in that campaign are here reminded by the author of the cold, mud, and other hardships they endured that winter in the difficult and rocky desert terrain of Tunisia. Today's commanders, on the other hand, are exposed to the lessons learned the hard way by both Allied and Axis forces. A failure
to achieve unity of command by both sides resulted in an excessive number of battlefield casualties and precluded a full victory.

Whiting's book is obviously based on many well known texts, especially the writings of Martin Blumenson. Thus, World War II history buffs should consider this book only the tip of an iceberg, a beginning of research into the dozens of volumes listed under the author's notes and sources.

On balance, this book is recommended reading for today's infantrymen. From it, they can analyze the mistakes made by their predecessors. Campaign veterans, of course, are guaranteed a range of emotional responses as they read what really happened in Tunisia some 40 years ago.


On 4 November 1979, the United States embassy in Teheran, Iran, was taken over by a mob of Iranian men and women, and 53 Americans became hostages in a rabid anti-American political maneuver that ended after 444 days of captivity and after a failed American rescue mission in which eight U.S. servicemen lost their lives.

Until now, little factual information has surfaced concerning the ill-fated rescue attempt and its ignominious failure at an interim staging area named DESERT ONE, which was located in a remote desert area of Iran.

Several newsmagazine accounts and a book by Colonel Charles Beeknight, with the mission's ground commander, provide some of the better unclassified sources of information available to the general public. Another is the unclassified and sanitized version of the Department of Defense's 1980 "Rescue Mission Report," the so-called Holloway Report.

In this book, Paul Ryan, a retired U.S. naval captain and a research fellow at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace at Stanford University, discusses the background, planning, and execution of the rescue attempt; world opinion and criticism; the Holloway Report; and an expanded U.S. special operations effort.

By a judicious use of numerous general reference works, articles, television transcripts, and government documents, Ryan has produced a logically organized and readable book that gives a reader an insight into the high-risk nature of all special operations.

This book is a must for those concerned with our current special operations forces and their capabilities. It will also appeal to those who like exciting adventure stories. But the ending is less than satisfying, because the actual ending to the Iranian special operation was not satisfactory.

In two of his final chapters, Ryan leaves his reader with many valid ideas that should be pondered, as well as with a series of questions concerning the future use of U.S. special operation forces. For as one former commander of the U.S. Air Force special warfare school liked to say: "How many special operations can you afford to lose?"


The resurgence of interest in the Vietnam War has inspired a demand for document collections to be used in the proliferation of new college courses on the war. With the Pentagon Papers out of print, and other collections such as that by Gareth Porter not well accepted, the market was ripe for a mass circulation paperback edition such as this. Four of the biggest names in diplomatic history add authority to this volume.

The 84 documents, which include Presidential and State Department papers, congressional debates, military reports, newspaper accounts, and treaties ranging over the period from the 1840s to 1975, are divided into four chronological sections. Each section is headed by a lengthy introductory essay to place the contents into historical context. Short commentaries illuminate the individual documents. This book is designed to serve as a college text, and I predict it will be a commercial success.

The theme and orientation of the book is clear, as anyone with any knowledge of the four editors, all doyens of the so-called new left, would expect. (In addition to William Appleman Williams, they are Thomas McCormick, Lloyd Gardner, and Walter Febeer.) But the volume addresses such important questions as the misperceptions and deceptions of political leaders, the role of the media and public opinion on the war, and the internal consequences of the conflict. To my mind, the best section is on the 1945-1952 period when the specter of monolithic communism limited our policy options.

Despite my personal difference with the editors' perspectives, the volume is definitely worth reading. But anything that propes to capture the immense dimension, complexity, and controversy of the Vietnam War must by definition distort grievously; that is the most important problem with this volume.


A good volume of sound, useful military history is frequently hard to find. Such a work, by my own personal standards, should be interesting and not just "drums and bugles" coverage, and it should contain enough human interest to relay the pathos and burdens of war. It should certainly reveal the human strengths and weaknesses of commanders and leaders as well as of their men under fire and stress. This book combines all of the necessary elements for good military history; it is also about a particular battle that has begged for modern coverage (the last book written strictly about the battle was published in 1914).

After setting the stage, McDonough spends two chapters tracing the events of the months leading up to December 1862 and the stark human costs that the war had already extracted. The following chapters detail the strategy, tactics, and actual moves made by the opposing generals — Braxton Bragg and William Rosecrans — and their armies. The author is a master at describing both the
human and the tactical aspects of the battle without dragging the reader into unnecessary details.

One irritating weakness of this volume, though minor, is the placement of the battalions on maps. They spread across two pages but the heaviest action always seems to fall in the folded portion.

But if you are hungry for a good military history of the Civil War period, this book will meet your needs.


"I went to Vietnam as a basic naive young man of eighteen. Before I reached my nineteenth birthday, I was an animal." So says Specialist 4 Arthur E. Woodley, Jr., a combat paratrooper and one of the 20 Black veterans of the Vietnam War interviewed for this book by Wallace Terry.

Each of the 20 has a different but intriguing story to tell, but each story has one basic theme — being Black and fighting with the ever-present danger of death in an unpopular war for an apathetic U.S. society. What made it worse for most Black soldiers was the fact that they were in Vietnam doing their patriotic duty for a society that was still wrestling with itself for their equality.

But the book also has some diversity, and the author should be commended for bringing into clear focus the diverse views of those he interviewed. And because each narrative is a story in itself, a reader may skip around and finish the book without having to read it from cover to cover.

Here are personal glimpses of Black Americans fighting a war with White Americans. The book is highly recommended to all military people, as well as to those interested in the Vietnam War. The "lessons" that can be drawn from these pages could some day prove invaluable.


In this book, the former editor of France's L'Express magazine has written convincingly of the problems (many of which are self-imposed) that modern democracies face in dealing with Soviet expansionism.

At the outset, a reader must bear in mind that Revel is writing from a European perspective. As he points out, many leaders in western Europe have imposed a double standard in judging United States and Soviet behavior in the international arena. Revel notes that "to a totalitarian regime, strategic necessity is justification enough for Soviet presence in another country . . . a democracy, on the other hand, is not granted the right to defend the vital barricades of its own security unless the democratic imperative is obeyed."

Revel's thinking and insights, and the numerous historical examples he cites, can be of substantial value to the military strategist and the student of international affairs. For example, whether Spain was under Franco's authoritarian rule until 1975, or whether Spain is under a parliamentary government in 1985 is only one factor to be considered. The overall strategic importance of Spain, its newly acquired membership in NATO, and its recent entry into the European Economic Community, plus its internal form of government, is what really counts.

This otherwise well-written and well-translated book is marred by only a few errors. For instance, military historians will dispute Revel's assertion that General Eisenhower, in his role as supreme Allied commander in Europe during World War II, "made it possible
for the Soviet Union to take over Central Europe in 1944-45."

On balance, Revel's book merits serious consideration by anyone concerned about the role that the U.S. and its NATO allies will play in the years to come.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED


THE IOM KIPPUR WAR. By Peter Allen. Scribner's, 1982. $17.95.


AND WE SHALL SHOCK THEM: THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. By David Fraser and Charles, 1984. $27.00.


From The Editor

INFANTRY CONFERENCE

As we mentioned in our last issue, the 1986 Infantry Conference will be held at Fort Benning during the period 8-10 April 1986. The general theme of the conference is organizing, equipping, and training the Infantry force. Infantry Association members who plan to attend the conference and who have not yet done so are asked to contact the editor of INFANTRY as soon as possible. They will be sent needed information as well as other general material of interest.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

We would like to express our deepest thanks to those of you who have renewed your subscriptions this year. It is only through your continuing support that we are able to bring you a truly professional military journal dedicated to the United States Infantryman.

Our rate of subscription renewals has been one of the best we have ever enjoyed, and we look forward to a very successful circulation year. We can have this, of course, only if you and your fellow infantrymen join forces to support this, your journal.