17 OPEN LETTERS TO THREE NCOs
First Sergeant Jeffrey J. Melliger

22 RIFLE FIGHTING: High Payoff Training
Colonel William O. Vowell

26 THE ALAMO SCOUTS: Lessons for LRSUs
Major Billy E. Wells, Jr.

DEPARTMENTS

1 COMMANDANT'S NOTE

3 LETTERS

5 INFANTRY NEWS

8 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

8 STAFF LEADERSHIP
Captain Stephen W. Jarrard

9 THE SOVIET AK-74

10 RANGE OPERATIONS CHECKLIST

13 THE PLATOON LEADER: Keys to Success
Lieutenant Daniel F. Sullivan

15 120mm MORTAR IN LIGHT FORCES
Richard E. LaRossa

33 TRAINING NOTES

33 U.S. ARMY SNIPER SCHOOL
Captain Mark L. Rozycz

35 TEAM SPIRIT '88: Light Division, Heavy Challenges
Lieutenant Colonel Cole C. Kingsseed

37 TRAINING DURING AN ALERT
Captain Stephen J. Townsend

39 NIGHT FIRING
Master Sergeant Edward C. Shelley
Sergeant First Class Frank A. Recktenwald

40 DOUBLE YOUR DRAGON
Captain Martin N. Stanton

42 TOWS IN THE OFFENSE: Techniques of a Motorized Force
Captain Craig J. Currey

45 ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

46 OFFICERS CAREER NOTES

49 BOOK REVIEWS

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TRAINING NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO TRAIN

Individual training is the principal duty and responsibility of our noncommissioned officers. It is a role that is firmly established in our training literature, and one that was recently reaffirmed by the Chief of Staff. Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, clearly places on our senior NCOs the responsibility for developing individual task lists to support each unit’s mission essential task list (METL); we must then integrate these into each collective mission essential task during METL-based training. During this Year of the Noncommissioned Officer, it is appropriate to examine just how well we at the Home of the Infantry are preparing our NCOs to meet their training responsibilities.

Over the past several years the institution has done well in training NCOs to lead, fight, and sustain, but it has been determined that we must place more emphasis on training our NCO trainers to train. Here at Benning, this initiative has become known as T3, or Training the Trainer to Train. The major aim of T3 is to develop our NCO competencies in training soldiers on infantry weapons, to improve our training literature, and to certify our NCOs as trainers. We feel that current and projected reductions in OPTEMPO funds, ammunition allocations, and range availability make the T3 concept not only necessary but critical.

In developing this concept, we have implemented a number of changes in the two infantry-focused NCOES courses, BNCOC and ANCOC, and we think the changes will have a positive carry-over to our infantry units. The new Infantry BNCOC contains a weapons module that focuses not only on the training aspects of all the weapons found in the squad, but more particularly on the training devices that must be used to train soldiers properly on the weapons. We also teach squad and section leaders how to develop and execute a situational training exercise (STX) to ARTEP standards, and they take part in a live fire exercise that incorporates the standards their unit commanders will expect them to set.

In the Infantry ANCOC, we have set aside additional time for teaching students how to train rifle marksmanship. The NCO students learn the Army’s marksmanship training strategy, how to coach marksmanship, how to use marksmanship training devices, and how to run effective and safe ranges. In addition, the ANCOC students now spend several days during their training management block of instruction learning how to develop STXs. They then set up and conduct an STX in the field and execute it to standard. We also allocate T3 time in such other critical areas as NBC and maintenance.

Besides designing noncommissioned officer education courses that focus on preparing our NCOs as trainers, we are also revising our training literature to provide the necessary doctrine for training our trainers. For example, our Soldiers Manuals now contain only critical combat tasks—tasks that by definition are performed only in combat. There are, however, many tasks that are critical to effective training, but which have no direct combat application. The use of weapon training devices illustrates this point. While some trainer tasks do appear in our literature on specific devices such as the Dragon launch effects simulator/launch effects trainer (LES/LET), we have no single publication in which all of the trainer tasks are codified.

The Infantry School, therefore, has taken steps to incorporate trainer tasks, conditions, and standards into some of our publications; we feel that our weapon
manuals are especially appropriate for this. There is also a clear need to develop a body of training literature that addresses the specific how-to-train requirements for using infantry weapon training devices and simulators. We plan to add these to all of our new weapon manuals, an initiative that should greatly assist our NCO trainers.

The growing costs associated with training the infantry force, coupled with probable reductions in future military budgets, will drive us more and more toward applying new technologies to improve the effectiveness of our training while reducing costs. The Precision Gunnery Training System (PGTS) for our Dragon and TOW antiarmor weapons and the Precision Gunnery System (PGS) for the Bradley fighting vehicle are just two examples of new training devices that use improved technologies to make our training more effective, efficient, and economical. These devices are expected to be fielded in Fiscal Year 1991. We need to train and certify our Infantry NCOs to use them and get the most out of them.

The certification of trainer proficiency is an essential adjunct to our development of a professional noncommissioned officer corps of skilled trainers. Used in this context, certification means the NCO trainer has met standards that qualify him as a subject matter expert to train others on specific subjects or weapons systems.

This certification is a three-part process. The first part is a written component to test the noncommissioned officer’s knowledge in a particular subject area, which may be a common soldier skill or a skill associated with a specific infantry MOS. The second part of the process is performance oriented—an NCO must be proficient in performing the tasks that he will have to teach other infantry soldiers. Finally, the trainer must prove his proficiency in the trainer tasks that he must perform to properly execute his trainer responsibilities. For example, an NCO trainer who will train soldiers to engage armor targets with the Dragon system will have to demonstrate his proficiency in the use of the LET and LES. Once an NCO trainer has demonstrated his proficiency in all three areas, he will then be fully certified to train in that particular area.

In most cases, the first two parts of the certification process are already being done. The last part, however, has been neglected in the past, and it is a critical component that we must add to our NCO training program.

The role of the noncommissioned officer is to train his subordinates in their individual tasks and crew duties. Quality training in the Army must be a way of life—a professional and moral imperative. To meet that responsibility, we must first teach our NCOs how to train others and then certify that they are competent to do so.

At the same time, our literature must include specific NCO trainer tasks, conditions, and standards.

Today, more than ever before, the Infantry School is taking steps to ensure that our noncommissioned officers are fully capable of executing their training responsibilities, and that today’s Infantryman is the best trained, most combat-ready soldier on the battlefield.
DON'T CHANGE EIB

Reference the letters in INFANTRY's November-December 1988 and January-February 1989 issues concerning the Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB), the idea of making the EIB only a temporary award with periodic requalification is a foolish one. Aside from the administrative problems it would cause, what would it do to morale?

Why not make Ranger School graduates go back and "re-qualify"? After all, they can also forget a lot! Then we have the Combat Infantryman Badge. That would be a really challenging re-test.

The EIB is an award for successfully meeting and passing certain tasks. The training and testing are demanding, and they do improve MOS skills.

I served on this past year's EIB committee for the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. We started with 60 soldiers in the competition, but only 38 soldiers met the standards.

Let's stop all of this hoop-la about changing the EIB (to make it harder) and support our soldiers with pre-training and encouragement.

BRIAN R. ANDERSON
SGT, U.S. Army
Co A, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry
 Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Reference the article "Extra Magazine Pouches," by Master Sergeant David A. Pils (January-February 1989, page 18), what ever happened to our Army's combat experience?

In Vietnam, we always carried a battle dressing at the bottom of every one of our ammunition pouches. It raised the magazines a little so they were easier to retrieve and gave every man more dressings in a readily accessible place. One battle dressing does not do the job with most combat wounds.

Cravats were worn around our necks and laced through the belt loops of our pants so that they were out of the way and readily available when we needed them.

A bottle of water purification tablets was taped to the top of every canteen, and things like foot powder, Band-Aids, and iodine solution were always carried inside the rucksack—where all non-combat gear belongs.

Canteen covers were used to carry grenades and magazines, because they held more than the regular ammunition pouches and were easier to get into.

Smoke grenades are not essential to fighting and were carried attached to the outside of our rucksacks. If we needed them we always had the time to get to them.

And finally, contact is never broken with smoke grenades—except at places like the NTC—as Sergeant Pils implies. This is done with CS, WP, and fragmentation grenades. To think otherwise is folly, and to make such statements is dangerous because soldiers, as General Summerall once said, "think as their leaders think." And I worry that some of our leaders may not be thinking as they should!

F. RICHARD HAYSE
CPT, Special Forces
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EFFICIENCY REPORTS

Reference "Writing Efficiency Reports," by Major Harry D. Stumpf (January-February 1989, pages 14-16), it's reading articles like this that causes us NCOs not to trust the NCO-ER with its bullet format.

The example of the first sergeant with the profile is not a good one for first-time raters to see: "In spite of setting a high standard in physical fitness and routinely leading the company in physical training, First Sergeant __________ is exempt from the APFT because . . . ."

I can understand explaining why there is no APFT score, but wouldn't it have been better to state, for example, that "Even with, or in spite of, a physical profile, First Sergeant __________ sets the standard for physical fitness and routinely leads the company during training."

In the first example, "in spite" is like saying "you may be good but you've got a profile, so you're not that good." Maybe this is simplistic, but a lot of us feel that way.

The old system may not have been the best, but the "buzz" words were there and everyone knew what they were. Now it's going to be up to the raters' writing ability as to who gets the better NCO-ER.

This letter will not change the new system, but maybe it will cause raters (me included) to carefully read and re-read what they write before sending an NCO-ER forward.

ERNEST D. HOLIFIELD
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ARMORED FORCES MONUMENT

An impressive monument is being planned that will honor the "citizen-soldiers" and the "citizen-Marines" who served in the armored forces since World War I.

The Armored Forces Monument will consist of a three-foot wall around a 30-by-40-foot black granite engraving depicting the evolution of the armored forces from the U.S. cavalryman through World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It is scheduled to be

May-June 1989 INFANTRY 3
dedicated on Veterans Day, 11 November 1990.

It will be adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery's new visitors center on Memorial Drive where some four million visitors will see it each year.

The memorial is being financed through donations, not public funds, as a gift from veterans to the American people in the spirit of "Their Valor is Your Heritage."

Veterans and friends of the U.S. Army's armored forces who are interested in contributing to the memorial may write to the Armored Forces Monument Committee, P.O. Box 1146, Fort Myer, VA 22211, or telephone me at (703) 532-0776.

DUQUESNE A. WOLF
COL. U.S. Army, Retired
Executive Director

M24 SNIPER WEAPON VERSUS THE M21

I would like to comment concerning the news item in the March-April 1989 issue of INFANTRY (page 5) on the M24 sniper weapon system.

The item states that the scope on the M21 system cannot be removed by the operator. This is definitely not the case. The Leatherwood ART-II issued with the M21 system can be detached quickly by means of the two large attaching screws on the side of the mount. In Vietnam, the scope was normally removed at dusk and replaced by an AN/PVS-2 or AN/PVS-4 night vision device for shooting under nighttime conditions. The snipers of the 9th Infantry Division racked up a number of night kills using this system in the Mekong Delta region. In addition, with the scope removed, the iron sights of the M21 can be used. (The news item states that there is no backup sight system on the M21.)

It is true that the M21 was not "user maintainable" since the receiver group is glass-bedded to the stock, but that type of maintenance is not needed on an operator level. I've had an opportunity to handle the M24 system, too, and I cannot think of a reason why the shooter would want to remove the action from the stock to perform normal maintenance and cleaning.

The news item failed to note that the backup sights used with the M24 system cannot be fitted when the scope is in place, and I can't imagine trying to detach the scope and attach the sights under any kind of pressure (to say nothing of the fact that the sights would not be zeroed).

The M24 doesn't have a detachable box magazine like the one that the M21 system has. And since the scope is mounted over bore, the weapon cannot be loaded from stripper clips but must be single loaded. This will force a sniper to carry loose rounds in his pocket, which is not going to be conducive to the rapid reloading of the five-round internal magazine. A box magazine could not be fitted because of the requirement that the system be capable of chambering the .300 Winchester Magnum round at some time in the future.

A great number of fine 7.62mm NATO sniper systems are available in the free world today that are capable of fine accuracy at ranges up to 1,000 meters, but the supposed need for a more powerful cartridge knocked them out of the running.

Finally, it would seem that the Army is paying a lot of money ($5,145) for a system that doesn't seem to do everything a sniper of today needs for it to do. Inadequate backup sights, no capability for fitting night vision devices, slow reloading, and a highly questionable civilian-made bipod seem to point to muddled thinking and unfair procurement practices that may cost a sniper his life on tomorrow's battlefield.

JOSH ALLFREE
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SPIRIT OF AMERICA PAGEANT

Spirited by America, the U.S. Army Military District of Washington's annual patriotic pageant, will return to the Capital Centre in Landover, Maryland, for its 28th year.

This year's pageant can be seen at 8:00 p.m., Wednesday through Friday, 14-16 June and at 2:00 p.m., on Saturday and Sunday, 17 and 18 June.

The show, which features a cast from the 3d U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard) and The U.S. Army Band (Pershing's Own), traces more than 200 years of U.S. history.

It also showcases three of The Old Guard's specialty units: The U.S. Army Drill Team, The Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps, and The Commander-in-Chief's Guard.

Admission to the pageant is free, but tickets are required because of the great demand. Anyone who wants tickets should write to Spirit of America, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC 20319-5050.

JEFFREY MYERS
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Public Affairs Officer
Fort Myer, Virginia

4 INFANTRY May-June 1989
MISSION TRAINING Plans (MTPs) represent a departure from past Infantry School Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) products. The common elements of all types of infantry have been identified and consolidated into a single source document for each echelon. Units throughout the Army will therefore have a common standard to apply to all mounted and dismounted operations. This standardization effort will reduce confusion, redundancy, and waste in our training literature programs.

The standards in the MTPs are observable, measurable, and quantifiable, and they apply to each task. These standards, in many cases very rigorous, are vital to productive training that is focused on success in combat.

Detailed standards for an opposing force (OPFOR) have been added to each operation to provide for more effective force-on-force training. Complementary standards create an environment that allows greater freeplay and a situation in which either force can win.

The status of the various MTPs is as follows:

Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, ARTEP 7-8-MTP. Addresses mechanized (M2 and M113), motorized, regular, light, airborne, air assault, and Ranger platoons and squads. Has been distributed.

Infantry Rifle Company, ARTEP 7-10-MTP. Addresses regular, light, airborne, air assault, and Ranger companies. Has been distributed.

Infantry Battalion, ARTEP 7-20-MTP. Addresses regular, light, airborne, air assault, and Ranger battalions. Has been distributed.

Infantry Brigade, ARTEP 7-30-MTP. Addresses regular, light, airborne, and air assault brigade, and Ranger Regiment command groups and staffs. Has been distributed.

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team, ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Addresses M2, M113, and tank companies and tank/mechanized infantry teams. (U.S. Army Armor School lead, U.S. Army Infantry School co-proponent.) Has been distributed.

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, ARTEP 71-2-MTP. Addresses M2, M113, and tank battalions and tank/mechanized infantry task force. (Infantry School lead, Armor School co-proponent.) Has been distributed.

Mortar Platoon, ARTEP 7-90-MTP. Addresses 60mm, 80mm, 181, and 107mm mortar platoons and squads. Final draft approved for DA printing.

Antiarmor Company and Platoon, ARTEP 7-91-MTP. Addresses improved TOW vehicle (ITV) and High Mobility Multiple Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted TOW platoons, the battalion antiarmor company, and the TOW light antitank (TLAT) battalion TOW companies (and references for other TLAT battalion elements). Final draft.

Scout Platoon/Sniper Team, ARTEP 7-92-MTP. Addresses regular, light, airborne, and air assault battalion scout platoons and sniper teams in all infantry units. Has been distributed.

Long Range Surveillance Unit (LRSU), ARTEP 7-93-MTP. Addresses LRSU and Long Range Surveillance Detachment for the corps and division (light and heavy). Has been distributed.

Infantry Headquarters and Headquarters (HHC) and Combat Service Support Platoons, ARTEP 7-94-MTP. Addresses the HHC and maintenance, communications, medical, and support Platoons of the nonmechanized infantry battalion. Coordinating draft 31 January 1989.

THE INFANTRY AND Military Intelligence Schools have continued to develop long range surveillance units (LRSUs) for corps and division employment.

In one change, the corps LRS company intelligence officer, now a lieutenant (35D) on the table of organization and equipment (TOE), will be a senior warrant officer (35OB) order of battle technician on the next TOE update.

This action represents the most effective means of satisfying the intelligence officer requirement for this position. It is based on the Military Intelligence branch’s inability to support the position at the rank of captain, and it acknowledges that the experience level of a lieutenant is inadequate to the demands of the position.

In other developments, the LRS teams are scheduled to exchange their M16 rifles for M4 carbines beginning in Fiscal Year 1993 or earlier, depending upon funding. This will give the team members a shorter (10-inch) and lighter (1.5-pound) weapon. Each team will also be issued two 9mm pistols as additional weapons.

PLANS FOR A LIGHT forces vehicle (LFV), a lightweight, wheeled vehicle, have been developed by the Infantry School. The vehicle will replace selected HMMWs in airborne, air assault, motorized, and light infantry divisions.

With a gross vehicle weight of 4,200 pounds, the LFV will be used to carry a variety of weapon systems ranging from machineguns to TOWs and laser designators.

THE M60 MACHINEGUN manual, FM 23-67, does not adequately deal with “slack” adjustment for the weapon’s traversing and elevating mechanism while firing.

To reduce slack in the traversing and
SINCGARS Manpack. The Infantry Board has tested load carrying equipment that is designed to correct problems with carrying the new SINCGARS (single channel ground and airborne radio system) and the KY-57 speech security device.

The present carrying system consists of a plastic shelf mounted on the outside of the ALICE pack frame on which the SINCGARS and KY-57 are mounted. The problem with carrying the radio this way is that the exposed cables catch on vegetation, and the control knobs accidentally move when a soldier is moving through thick vegetation. It also leaves no space to attach the ALICE pack and makes it impossible for a soldier to carry a subsistence load.

The 10th MOUNTAIN Division is now complete with two Active Army brigades at Fort Drum, New York, plus a roundout brigade, the New York Army National Guard’s 27th Infantry Brigade. For several years the division had its 1st Brigade at Fort Drum and its 2d Brigade at Fort Benning while construction was being completed at Fort Drum.

The maneuver elements of the division’s two Active Army brigades are the 1st and 2d Battalions, 22d Infantry; the 1st and 2d Battalions, 87th Infantry; and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 14th Infantry. The 27th Infantry Brigade consists of the 1st Battalion, 105th Infantry and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 108th Infantry.

Units of the division have participated in deployments to Honduras, to Germany for REFORGER, and to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee.

THE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY Board has submitted the following items:

The Board tested two versions of the ALICE pack that had been modified by Natick Laboratories to solve these problems. Both versions had a new strapping system sewn inside and a slot in the storm flap to accommodate the protruding antenna. One version used the existing pocket and the other had an enlarged pocket sewn inside. The SINCGARS and the KY-57 were carried in two different component configurations—side-by-side and piggyback (with the KY-57 mounted on the back of the SINCGARS).

Twelve heavy antiarmor weapon infantrymen (MOS 11H) in the rank of private to corporal and 10 qualified parachutists served as test soldiers. They conducted five-mile road marches and negotiated the clothing and equipment test facility (CETF) obstacles while carrying combat loads, including the SINCGARS/KY-57, in modified ALICE packs.

The test soldiers were timed as they packed and unpacked the modified manpacks. The test also considered the accessibility of the radio controls and the soldiers’ ability to manipulate them barehanded, wearing NBC gloves, or wearing cold weather gloves. During the airborne operations testing, parachutists performed 20 jumps from U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft while wearing typical combat equipment, including the test item.

Several problems with the test item became apparent. After the road marches and the negotiation of the CETF, holes were discovered in both versions of the pack. The holes were caused by the normal stress and movement of the sharp corners of the radio and the KY-57 against the pack’s fabric.

In addition, neither pack had a clip ring on which the handset/microphone could be hung when it was not being used. The test soldiers also commented that the free-moving antenna of the SINCGARS was a nuisance and posed a potential safety hazard.

Before the test, the project manager for SINCGARS modified six radios by adding carrying handles to them. Observers watched to find out whether the soldiers would use the handles, and they did. They would lift the modified radios by the handles and the unmodified radios by the antennas or the handsets.

Eleven of the test soldiers preferred the ALICE pack with the enlarged pocket because it provided better weight distribution and was easier to pack. Additionally, most of the test soldiers preferred the side-by-side component configuration.

The characteristics tested were mission performance, human factors, safety, reliability, and suitability for airborne operations.

The Infantry School and the Program Manager for SINCGARS will use the test results to evaluate the modifications and to determine the best configuration for the SINCGARS manpack. Natick Laboratories will then provide field units with the specifications so they can modify their existing ALICE packs to accommodate the SINCGARS radio more effectively.
Plastic Ammunition Container (PAC). The Board conducted a concept evaluation program (CEP) test to assess the operational utility of plastic ammunition containers (PAC) for 7.62mm ammunition for M60 series machineguns.

There were two test containers, PAC A and PAC B, and one control item, the standard M4 bandoleer with cardboard box liner. PAC A is a hard-plastic container that incorporates a wider shoulder strap than the M4 bandoleer, has a sliding lid, water drain holes, and a 100-round capacity. During use, the sliding lid is retracted until it hits a stop that prevents its accidental removal during rapid opening. The lid can be removed and replaced to permit the ammunition from several containers to be linked together. PAC B is a corrugated soft-plastic liner designed to replace the cardboard box liner now in use with the M4 bandoleer.

The test soldiers were 24 qualified M60 machinegunners. While carrying three each of a test or control item, they participated in a 7.5-kilometer road march, negotiated the obstacles of the clothing and equipment test facility, fired a fire and movement exercise, and fired day and night field firing exercises.

Before starting the test events, 24 of each of the test and control items to be carried during the test were soaked in water for five minutes and allowed to dry for 48 hours. This stressing procedure was repeated three times to replicate field conditions during combat operations.

The test issues included comparative human factors, audible and visual signature effects, reliability, and safety.

REGIMENTAL DISTINCTIVE unit insignia (DUI) are not being worn properly by some soldiers on their black full-pull sweaters. According to Army policy, a soldier who is affiliated with a regiment (but not assigned to it) may wear his regimental DUI only in cases where the unit to which he is assigned does not have its own DUI.

If a soldier is assigned to a unit that has a DUI, he may not wear his regimental DUI with it or instead of it.

A COMPUTER NETWORK for Reserve Component trainers has been in operation since May 1987. Sponsored by the U.S. Army Training Board, the network consists of the Reserve Component Training Net (RCTRARNET) and the Reserve Component Training Institution Net (INSTNET). Its purpose is to provide a forum for the exchange of training ideas, concepts, and questions through computer teleconferencing. Both networks are subnets of the U.S. Army FORUM program.

RCTRARNET is open to all RC individuals and organizations for the discussion of any topics related to training force. The INSTNET is intended as a forum for trainers and organizations that are directly involved in providing institutional training (such as U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools and Army National Guard Academies).

These networks are available to anyone who has access to a computer, a modem, and communications software.

The users pay only the cost of local telephone calls. The Training Board picks up all other costs.

Trainers at most major Reserve Component institutions already received RCTRARNET/INSTNET information packets, which include local telephone access numbers and user identification numbers issued by the Training Board.

Further information for users and potential users is available from the U.S. Army Training Board, ATTN: ATAB-B, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5320; telephone AUTOVON 680-4375/4105 or commercial (804) 727-4375/4105.

U.S. ARMY RESERVE soldiers may now apply for affiliation with combat arms regiments that are part of the U.S. Army Regional System.

A combat arms soldier in a troop program unit (TPU) who wants to affiliate with a regiment must submit DA Form 4187 through his chain of command to his Army Reserve Command (ARCOM). Once the request is approved by the ARCOM, copies are furnished to the soldier, his unit, the regiment concerned, and the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) for inclusion in his records.

A combat arms soldier in the Active Guard Reserve (AGR), the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), or the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program must submit DA Form 4187 to ARPERCEN along with documentation to establish his eligibility—orders showing previous assignment to the regiment, branch or advanced course completion certificate, verification of advanced individual training completion, or orders awarding the necessary PMOS, SMOS, AMOS, or SQI.

If a soldier's application is approved at ARPERCEN, his career advisor or personnel management officer will annotate his career management information file and forward copies to the soldier, the regiment concerned, and his official military personnel file.

Distinctive unit insignia and regimental color insignia may be purchased or ordered through military clothing sales stores or directly from the regiment.
Staff Leadership

CAPTAIN STEPHEN W. JARRARD

The myth persists that staff members are somehow excused from the hard responsibilities of leadership. As the myth goes, adjutants, supply officers, and operations NCOs are only supposed to attend to reports, files, range schedules, and other “adminstrivia.” Company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, and squad leaders are the ones who lead and make the tough decisions that affect the soldiers.

Although the latter statement is certainly true, the former is incomplete. Staff officers and NCOs, while managing their areas of expertise, must also exercise that most important element of combat power—leadership.

Staff members do not have close contact with those whom they support, and their influence is more often felt than seen by the soldiers. The leadership a staff member exercises is therefore different from that of a company commander. The two roles themselves are different, and the Army has different expectations of them. But there is a common ground that all leaders share regardless of their branch or duty positions, and this common ground is effective leadership.

Field Manual 22-100 outlines 11 principles of leadership that act as guidelines for all leaders, including those who serve on a staff. Among these are: having technical and tactical proficiency, making sound and timely decisions, and attending to the training and welfare of their subordinates. If staff members will practice these principles, they will develop a more effective staff organization that can provide better support for the commander, the soldiers, and their families.

Staff members must exhibit the good leadership character traits that the field manual stresses—courage, competence, candor, and commitment. Additionally, they must have unquestioned integrity, self-discipline, and initiative. By striving to develop these traits to an even higher level, a leader can improve his personal credibility, professional competence, and leadership ability. The practice of good character traits in their daily duties is also an important way for staff members to display good leadership qualities.

Leaders in staff positions must have skills in management and administration, because much of their time is spent with planning, personnel management, and resource considerations. But throughout the mission planning process, a staff member will also find many opportunities to practice the principles of leadership.

Unfortunately, planning for post support missions, field training, and even routine activities too often lacks the influence of the leadership principles. A mission that seems well planned at brigade or battalion level may appear chaotic at squad level. The reason may be that those who developed the plan simply forgot about those who would have to execute it. The convenience of the planner must yield to the reality of the situation. If staff members adhere to the leadership principles, this will not happen and the result will be increased unit readiness, more training time for the commander, and a greater degree of coordination in all of the unit’s efforts.

A staff member must concentrate more on leadership for two reasons: First, the style of staff leadership is different from that of command leadership, and it concerns itself more with decision making and sound planning. Second, the chain of command may not expect leadership from the staff, just management skills. The practice of leadership by the staff needs to be recognized as being crucial to the successful accomplishment of a unit’s mission.

For staff members to assert their lead-
The Soviet AK74

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article is another in a recurring series prepared from unclassified sources by the Threat Division, Directorate of Intelligence and Security, U.S. Army Infantry Center, at Fort Benning.

The Soviet AK74 is hailed by some Soviet and international sources as the best assault rifle in the world today. It was first introduced in 1974 to selected Soviet forces and first seen in public in the May Day parade in Moscow in 1977.

This weapon is the latest in the Kalashnikov assault rifle series. The original was developed by Mikhail Kalashnikov to capitalize on the strong points of the World War II German MP43 and MP44 rifles. AK assault rifles, in one variant or another, have been used in every world conflict of the past 25 years. The chain of evolution has included the AK47, the AKM, and now the AK74. The AK74 family includes a light machinegun (RPK74), a folding stock version (AKS74), and a submachinegun (AKSU74).

The AK74 continues the well-known reliability of the AK47. It is extremely effective when fired on automatic because of its muzzle brake compensator (MBC), which is the best in the world today. This MBC limits the characteristic rise of round impact and causes no more recoil than a standard .22 caliber long rifle bullet. The AK74 will deliver a high volume of accurate fire.

The magazine is plastic and twice as heavy as an M16 magazine, but it is rugged and is grooved to accept 15-round stripper clips to facilitate loading.

The effective range of the AK74 is 450 to 500 meters, which is greater than that of either the AK47 or the AKM. This does not mean, though, that the AK74 is a sniper weapon, because the improvements in the system—such as the MBC and the accurate 5.45x39mm round—do not in themselves make better marksmen.

The AK74 does have some weak points:

- Its extremely loud report has hospitalized some Soviet soldiers during range firing.
- Its muzzle flash is three times that of the AK47.
- It can easily be defeated by body armor.
- The safety has not been changed in 40 years; it is still loud to operate and
hard to manipulate.
- Despite its qualitative improvements, the AK74 is a volume-of-fire weapon.
- No windage adjustment is possible below the unit armorer level.
- Firing studies have proved that the battlesight zero of the AK74 can change 1.65 inches between firings without any rough handling.

The AK74 can be identified by its muzzle flash, the characteristic light green color of its tracer round, and its loud report. It can be distinguished from the AKM and the AK47 by its muzzle brake compensator, its relatively straight magazine, and the magazine’s burnt orange color.

The accompanying table shows how the AK74 compares with the U.S. M16A2 rifle. Both weapons have strong and weak points, of course. Neither is capable, for example, of penetrating standard construction materials (one layer of concrete blocks), and this means heavier weapons must be used in urban environments. But overall, they are basically comparable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AK74</strong></td>
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Range Operations Checklist

As an aid to planning, coordinating, and conducting range operations, the National Guard Marksmanship Training Unit (NGMTU), Nashville, Tennessee, developed a range operation checklist. The checklist was adapted from an article by Captain Eric E. Holdeman that appeared in the September-October 1979 issue of INFANTRY (‘‘Everything You Wanted to Know About Ranges,’’ pages 27-30).

The checklist is reproduced here, reduced in size from standard page-size sheets. The actual pages are plastic covered so that a grease pencil can be used and then rubbed off, and are punched for use in a three-ring binder.

The instructions on the first page (illegible in the reduced version shown here) read as follows:
This checklist consists of eight sections, each covering a different topic relating to range operations.

Before using the checklist on the job, always call higher headquarters safety office to find out if there are any recent changes to the regulations or SOP.
Then report to the person who must answer the questions in each section. Ask that person each question in order.
Record each ‘‘Yes’’ answer by placing a check in the GO column. Record a ‘‘No’’ or ‘‘Don’t Know’’ by checking the NO GO column. Refer now to the checklist to find the GO and NO GO columns.

When you have asked all the questions in a section, advise the person who answered with NO GOs that the problems exist and ask him to correct them. When you have completed the entire checklist, look back over the NO GOs. Contact the people who reported them and ask if they have corrected each problem. If so, change the answer to GO.

If any NO GO remains for any reason, analyze the safety hazard it presents. Then design and implement a countermeasure for the hazard. Afterwards, check that your countermeasures work.
Before range operations start, be sure that you have a workable countermeasure implemented for each hazard presented...
How to Use This Checklist

Section 1 - Mission Analysis

1. Who will be firing on the range?
   No. of Personnel
   Unit

2. What weapons and courses will be used?
   Weapon
   Course

3. Where will the training be conducted?
   Range

4. When is the range scheduled for operations?
   Date
   Opens
   Closes

Section 2 - Double Check

1. Has sufficient ammunition been requested for the number of personnel?

2. Are the range facilities adequate for the type of training to be conducted?

3. Has enough time been scheduled to complete the training?

4. Have conflicts that surfaced been resolved?

Section 3 - Become an Expert

1. Review TM's and FM's on the weapons to be fired.

2. Talk with the armormen and other personnel experienced with the weapons to be fired.


4. Visit range control and read installation range instructions.

5. Reconnoiter the range (preferably while it is in use).

6. Check ARTEP's and SQT manuals to see if training tasks can be integrated into the range training plan.

Section 4 - Determine Requirements

PERSONNEL:
1. OIC
2. Safety Officer
3. Assistant Safety Officer
4. NCOIC

EQUIPMENT:
1. Training aids for concurrent training stations
2. Sandbags
3. Tents (briefing tent, warm-up tent)
4. Space heaters, if needed
5. Colored helmets for control personnel
6. Safety paddles and vehicle flag sets or lights
7. Ambulance or designated vehicle
8. Ear plugs
9. Water for drinking and cleaning
10. Score cards
11. Master score sheet
12. Armormen's tools and cleaning equipment for weapons
13. Brooms, shovels, and other cleaning supplies and equipment
14. Tables and chairs, if needed
15. Target accessories
16. Fire extinguishers
17. Tarp, stakes, and rope, to cover the ammunition
18. Toilet paper
19. Spare weapons and repair parts as needed
20. Tow bar and slave cables for vehicles
21. Fuel and oil for vehicles and target mechanisms

May-June 1989 INFANTRY 11
Section 5 - Determine Available Resources

1. Fill personnel spaces
2. Keep unit integrity
3. Utilize NCOs
4. Effect coordination with supporting organizations:
   - Ammunition
   - Transportation
   - Training Aids
   - Medics
   - Mess
   - Weapons
   - Other equipment

Section 6 - Foolproofing

1. Write an overall lesson plan for the range
2. Organize a plan for firing:
   - Determine range organization
   - Outline courses of fire to be used
   - Have fire commands typed for use on range
   - Set rotation of stations
3. Rehearse concurrent training instructors and assistants
4. Brief RTO on unique range control radio procedures
5. Brief and rehearse reporting NCO on range operation and all his duties
6. Collect and concentrate equipment for use on the range in one location

Section 6 - Foolproofing (Cont.)

7. Obtain training aids
8. Pick up targets from range warehouse, if required
9. Report to range control for safety briefing (if required) and sign for any special items
10. Publish LOI:
   - Uniform of range and firing personnel (helmets and earplugs)
   - Mode of transportation, departure times and places
   - Methods of messing to be used
   - Any special requirements being placed on units

Section 7 - Occupying the Range & Conducting Training

OCCUPY THE RANGE:

1. Request permission to occupy the range
2. Establish good communications
3. Have designated areas prepared:
   - Parking
   - Ammunition point
   - Medical station
   - Water point
   - Concurrent training
   - Mess
   - Heelpad
   - Armor

4. Inspect range for operational condition

Section 7 - Occupying the Range & Conducting Training (Cont.)

CONDUCT OF FIRING:

11. Troops responding properly to commands
12. On the spot corrections being made when troops use poor techniques or fail to hit the target
13. Conservation of ammunition enforced
14. Weapons cleared before they are taken from the firing line
15. Personnel checked for brass or ammunition before they leave the range
16. Anyone standing around not involved in training or support

Section 8 - Closing of Range

1. Close down range control according to the local SOP
2. Remove all equipment and ammunition from range
3. Police range
4. Restake and resurface targets as required by range instructions
5. Perform other maintenance tasks as required by local SOP
6. Request a range inspector from range control when ready to be cleared
7. Submit after action report to headquarters
8. Report any noted safety hazards to proper authorities
The Platoon Leader
Keys to Success

LIEUTENANT DANIEL F. SULLIVAN

When he receives his first assignment as a platoon leader, a new lieutenant also receives a great opportunity. Preparing to lead 30 or more soldiers into the heat of battle is exciting, demanding, and challenging.

The qualities necessary to become a good leader develop from an officer’s education, personality, and willingness to learn. To accept the responsibility for his mission and his soldiers, a platoon leader has to force himself to mature quickly. It takes a high level of self-discipline for a platoon leader to work with noncommissioned officers who have five to ten years of service and to gain the confidence of his soldiers.

In my years as a lieutenant, I have discovered several proven leadership traits that are important to the process of becoming a good platoon leader. This is not a school-book solution; it is only a tool to help a new lieutenant get started. In addition, it is a tool that a company commander might use in training his lieutenants.

Taking the Initiative. Our current doctrine emphasizes the commander’s intent so that junior officers and leaders are expected to continue the mission in the absence of orders. To a platoon leader, this means taking the initiative.

Developing the ability to take the initiative is a continuing process in which a leader learns how to improve both the platoon and himself. To do this, he must concentrate on one main effort—making his platoon the best in the Army. This means refusing to allow training distractions to control his training. This is not easy, because there are some things a platoon leader cannot control. But he can take his platoon out to a local training area to work on battle drills, SOPs, and general weaknesses, for example, instead of sitting in his office waiting for his company commander to tell him to train. He should ask the commander for guidance first, tell the commander which tasks he will be working on, and then get out and do it.

Leading By Example. There is no more important leadership trait than being an example for his soldiers and NCOs to follow.

One way he can do this is by scoring 300 points on the physical fitness test. This shows his soldiers that fitness is important, encourages them to achieve the standard he has set, and builds their confidence in his abilities.

Another way for a platoon leader to develop his soldiers’ confidence is to be the first to volunteer to do tasks that require physical courage, such as rappelling off a 200-foot cliff or going down the slide-for-life. And he can show moral courage by being willing to admit it when he has made a mistake.

What all of this leads to eventually is having all his men willing to follow him into battle because they believe in him. This is not always easy. Often, a leader may have a weakness in a certain area. What he should do then is to acknowledge the weakness and show his soldiers that he is making an extra effort to overcome it. He shouldn’t try to hide the weakness or make excuses. Soldiers are too smart for that.

Delegating Authority. A platoon leader should use the experience of his noncommissioned officers, especially his platoon sergeant.

The platoon sergeant is the platoon leader’s right arm and the most experienced soldier in the platoon. When planning training, a lieutenant would have to be a fool not to use that soldier’s tactical experience and advice. At the same time, the platoon leader should be aware of the need to clarify their separate roles and avoid bungling heads.

In the field, the platoon sergeant should be the enforcer, making sure the standards are followed and the platoon is functioning properly. His role is to advise the platoon leader on problems and give suggestions to help plan the next mission.

A platoon leader should handle his junior NCOs with care and avoid micro-
managing. But he should also make sure they understand who is in charge, and should make sure they follow the standards.

He should counsel them privately on both their good and bad performances. If he has a problem with an NCO that he and his platoon sergeant cannot solve, he should ask the first sergeant for advice.

Finally, a platoon leader should remember that he can delegate authority but he cannot delegate responsibility.

Taking Care of Soldiers. Some platoon leaders seem to think that taking care of soldiers means making them happy and comfortable. But taking care of soldiers means training them to become seasoned soldiers who could survive on a battlefield because they are technically, physically, and mentally proficient. Showing sympathy to a soldier who is hot or tired, for instance, will only weaken him for facing the real challenges in combat. At the same time, though, the leader must be able to recognize cases in which a soldier may be overheated or suffering from heat exhaustion.

Taking care of soldiers means enforcing standards such as security, personal hygiene, noise and light discipline, wearing helmets, cleaning weapons, and the like. In garrison, it means making sure the soldiers obey the rules of conduct, and taking care of their families.

Upholding Morals and Values. This is a broad topic that can be interpreted in many ways. As a professional and a leader, the platoon leader is held responsible for his own actions. For example, he may see other officers coming in late, leaving early to play golf, or taking advantage of a situation for their own personal gain. But as an officer, the platoon leader must realize that his own behavior and actions will be a direct reflection on the way he is perceived and how well his platoon performs.

He cannot be in it for himself. He must be a team player and think of everything in the “we” sense instead of the “I” sense. He should never let his personal habits interfere with his job performance.

Exhibiting Loyalty and Integrity. As an officer and a professional, a platoon leader must be loyal to his unit, his soldiers, and his leaders. Many times, he will find himself in disagreement with other officers. His only option is to voice his opinion in a professional manner. By doing this, he shows that he can stick to his guns, and he may be able to provide constructive comments that will influence the decision.

On the other hand, he often has to accept a decision he does not agree with and follow through unconditionally with the orders he is given. This “unconditional obedience” is, for the most part, necessary to make the chain of command function.

Loyalty is a two-way street. If the platoon leader expects his NCOs and soldiers to be loyal to him, he has to be loyal to them, just as his commander has a responsibility to be loyal to him. Most important, the platoon leader must be loyal to his commander, or there will be a serious breakdown in leadership within the organization.

A leader does not speak critically of another leader in front of troops. When there is a loss of integrity among his leaders, the soldiers observe the breakdown and lose their faith in the unit’s leadership. Also, a lieutenant should give orders in his own name, instead of saying, “Men, the commander says we have to....” Once an order is given to him, it becomes his order.

In short, a platoon leader’s success depends on his ability and desire to be the best. The ability can be learned, but the desire must come from within.

As leaders, we owe it to our country and our soldiers to train them to be the best fighting force in the world. This should be our ultimate goal. The qualities mentioned here, combined with a platoon leader’s personal attributes and his style of leadership, will make him a successful leader.

Lieutenant Daniel F. Sullivan served in the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry at Fort Benning as a platoon leader and a company executive officer. He recently completed the Military Intelligence Advanced Course at Fort Huachuca and has been selected for the Special Forces Qualification Course.
There is no doubt that the Threat military services can deploy armor and motorized rifle divisions to most areas of the world. When this fact is combined with our present strategic lift limitations, it is clear that wherever we have to go fast, we also have to go light. A picture quickly unfolds, therefore, of our light infantry units being called on to fight tanks in intense conventional combat. Accordingly, our light infantry divisions need as many tank-killing systems as they can get. Any other conclusion would only encourage a reenactment of the 1950 Task Force Smith defeat by North Korean tanks.

Our light infantry forces are primarily organized, equipped, and trained to deploy rapidly to fight and defeat enemy light forces anywhere in the world. Many of the areas to which they may deploy are the same areas in which they can expect to encounter heavy opposing forces. Because of the unique missions of our light forces, they must have a lethal and transportable indirect fire capability to deal with both heavy and light opposing forces.

The tenets of our AirLand Battle doctrine challenge us to increase the effectiveness of our combat support. Light infantry forces equipped with 120mm mortars could provide increased firepower through better munitions and rapid deployability. They could produce the destructive supporting firepower needed to engage a numerically superior armored threat successfully.

I propose, therefore, that we replace the 105mm howitzers presently found in the field artillery battalions of our airborne, air assault, and light infantry divisions with 120mm mortars as the direct support weapon system. This would not only significantly improve their firepower, including lethality, it would also increase their smoke and illumination capabilities. Of primary importance is the 120mm mortar’s potential as a deadly antitank weapon when it uses precision-guided munitions (PGMs), the family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), and other...
# COMBAT POWER

## CURRENT STRUCTURE

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<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>WEAPON</th>
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## PROPOSED STRUCTURE

### Alternative A

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### Alternative B

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Table 2

Replacing the howitzers with 120mm mortars would also give a maneuver commander tremendous flexibility and would increase his fire support on the battlefield. In addition, this action would give him an all-important antitank, indirect-fire capability that would extend from the near battle area to the close-in portion of the deep battle area (see Table 1).

A battalion of 120mm mortars would be much lighter in weight and smaller in numbers than a battalion of 105mm howitzers. Air transportability and rapid deployment during tactical displacement would both be improved. The reduction in crew size (four people instead of seven) would be most significant, because the Army could then add two batteries of 155mm (M198) howitzers to the current single battery in a light division without adding any personnel. This increased fire support would give the division more long-range combat power and even more effective supporting fires (see Table 2).

I do not propose any changes to a light division artillery’s basic structure. The only changes that would be needed would involve the substitution of weapon systems, the shifting of some personnel, and the addition of two field artillery batteries.

The capabilities of a vastly superior 120mm mortar would increase our employment options significantly. We know that fire support is essential and that it must be flexible enough to supply supporting fires without interruption as the tactical situation changes. Future warfare fighting preparedness demands that we consider this innovative opportunity for exploiting the potential of the highly mobile 120mm mortar.

Because indirect-fire engagements would depend on observer information, and because they would be within the range of 120mm mortars, the range differences between calibers would become insignificant. The challenges imposed by Threat forces demand this incremental and evolutionary approach to strengthening the indirect fire support to our light infantry forces. The 120mm mortar provides a practical solution and clearly points the way to a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of supporting fires.

Richard E. LaRossa is assigned to the Concepts Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments, at the Infantry School. A retired infantry sergeant major, he has had combat experience with light, medium, and heavy mortars. He served in the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
"The Year of the NCO" is the Army's theme for 1989. So let's make some noise and tell all who will listen how good the noncommissioned officer corps is, what great things NCOs do, and how the Army would collapse without its backbone.

Laurels—aren't they great? But are you, the guy on the line, really a strong part of the backbone? Or are you just a strained ligament, a slipped disk?

Unquestionably, NCOs as a whole are deserving of praise. I am equally convinced, though, that many are not clear on how they can be better NCOs, because no detailed instruction manual is available on how to do it. Sure, there are field manuals and regulations, but what do they all mean?

I have therefore written open letters to the team leader, to the squad leader, and to the platoon leader in an attempt to distill some advice for each of them. (I got the idea from a squad leader of mine, who got it from a squad leader, and so on.) I hope those of you in each category will read the appropriate letter, pause to think, and see how you measure up against the rest of the Backbone.

To the Team Leader

As a team leader, you occupy an important position in an infantry company. You are responsible for the lives, the training, the health, and the welfare of your team members—a responsibility that does not end with the duty day.

It was no accident that you became a team leader. Someone saw in you the potential for excellence, the will to win, or some other quality, and chose you from your peer group.

Let's talk about what that really means:

As a team leader, you must be thoroughly proficient, both technically and tactically. You are the one who tells the soldiers how to wear their equipment, how to rig their rucksacks, where an assembly area is, how to move through woods, what they must do during halts, during contact, and during actions at the objective. You show soldiers, by example, how to search and secure prisoners and how to dig in. You show them how to care for and clean their weapons, how to prepare for inspections, and you enforce standards of cleanliness and conduct. You explain the unit's SOPs to newly assigned soldiers and ensure that they are followed. You answer questions about formations, haircuts and appearance, and standards of conduct. You must take your position seriously, for you will find that your team is a direct reflection upon you and your demonstrated, applied, and enforced standards.
You must know your men personally and professionally, and truly look out for their welfare. Talk extensively with each new man to find out about him—where he is from, what he has done, what his goals are, and why he joined the Army. Make him feel that he is truly a member of the team.

Caring for the welfare of the men is much easier said than done. Some of your responsibilities in this area are obvious—seeing that your men are treated fairly, that they get deserved time off, that their pay and personal problems are resolved quickly and confidentially. You demonstrate your genuine concern by counseling your men on their performance and professional development, and by making reward and punishment recommendations as quickly as possible.

If you're truly concerned about your team and its performance, you will take your responsibility one step further and continually inspect and make corrections—training to standards, not to time. You will be “hardcore”—not because of your stripes or position but because you want your team to be well trained, prepared for combat, and healthy and happy.

Keep your men informed. In the field, they must know everything you know about locations, missions, friendly units on the left and right, medical evacuation, fire support, what's on the objective, and the like. Give them all this information using combat orders, and keep them posted at every halt.

In garrison, it's your job to get your men prepared for the next day's training and to get them to training on time, in the proper uniform, with the proper equipment, ready to train. They should know the unit's long-range and short-range training plans, and married soldiers should be required to take this information home to their families, as operations security allows. (To be most effective, a soldier must have the support of his family.) When you send soldiers on a detail, tell them where they're going, why, for how long, in what uniform, and who will be in charge of them.

The motto of the NCO corps is “Lead By Example,” and you must exemplify that motto. After all, you are the only fighting leader in the Army—Do as I do and “Follow Me!” If you are late, sloppy, disrespectful, need a haircut, or grumble when given a task or mission, then your team will soon be doing the same. But if you are able and willing, punctual, attentive to detail, and if you enforce discipline and standards, then your team will eagerly do likewise. Your soldiers will reason, "He is my leader; he's been here a while; therefore, what he's doing must be acceptable for me, too."

You must be there at first call, during barracks maintenance, drawing equipment, moving to training, during training, and during maintenance after training. You must continue to supervise your men until the job is done to the standards expected. If it is not, you should be the first to notice and take corrective action.

How can you evaluate your own effectiveness? Your unit’s discipline, proficiency, esprit de corps, and morale are the indicators to evaluate. Do your soldiers get into trouble on or off duty? Do they display proper regard and respect for orders or authority? How well do they salute? Do they command parade rest when you enter their room? Do they stand proudly at the mention of the unit? Do they really know its history and heritage? How did they stack up with others during the last SQT? Have they earned their EIBs? What conditions are their lockers, rooms, and military equipment in? Are they on time to formations and training? How do they perform in the field? Are they the first to notice the enemy? Are they aggressive in every task or mission? How do they fight? What are their actions during halts? Do they practice noise, light, and litter discipline? Are their personal and financial affairs in order? Do your answers to these questions meet the expected standards?

Finally, you must remember that you and you alone are responsible for your team, and that their lives, training, health, and welfare are in your hands. It's an awesome responsibility. Take it seriously.

To the Squad Leader

I personally believe that the job of squad leader is the most important and rewarding one the Army has to offer. No first sergeant, colonel, or general has the kind of control over the destiny of soldiers that you have, or the ability to mold them. These other leaders may talk about how good “our” soldiers are, but the soldiers are really yours, and yours alone. Everyone above you is in a support role to help you do what you must do in combat—close with and capture or destroy the enemy and his equipment. Rarely does anyone else accomplish this task, so you must be good at it.

I think I can help you be a good squad leader if you will follow my advice and meet the demands placed on you by your squad and the Army.

You are the second most important person in the Army (the soldier is the first). You are directly responsible for training your squad as a team, maintaining discipline, instilling pride in unit and performance, and improving morale. Your squad’s appearance, discipline, and proficiency are a mirror image of you and your abilities. What results are you expected to achieve? What do your own leaders and the soldiers you lead expect and demand from you?

Inspect your squad before any formation, training, or mission for proper hygiene, appearance, equipment, and physical condition. Make sure that lost or damaged equipment is replaced or repaired quickly and that all equipment and clothing fits, is adjusted properly, and is 100 percent serviceable. The only way to do this is through proper training, inspection, and reinspection.

According to Field Manual 7-70, you are a tactical leader, leading by example. You are the one who must take the plan and make it work through proper control, selection of fighting and weapon positions, and your ability to maneuver your squad against an equally determined enemy. If you do not take the business of training seriously now, you will never effectively accomplish your mission later.

Serve as an example in your personal and professional life. Both on and off duty, conduct yourself as a true professional. If you do, no question will ever be raised about your integrity, loyalty, values, or morals. Quell rumors and gossip instead of spreading them. Your loyalty to your superiors, peers, and subordinates will carry you the same loyalty from them. Never
discuss other NCOs or officers in front of your men.

Be professional. Your valuable experience can be beneficial to all, so share your information, techniques, and failures. Deal with the men in other squads or units only through their squad leaders—except when making on-the-spot corrections, and even then keep your NCO leaders informed of your actions.

Treat your team leaders with respect; give them an opportunity to make decisions, to fail, to learn. Seek out their opinions and advice. Train them to train their soldiers, and also train them to take your place when the time comes. At the same time, watch the platoon sergeant and seek advice from him, for you may be next in that job.

Assign responsibilities to your team leaders in garrison and in the field, and give them a chance to lead and learn. Issue orders that are clear, simple, and well planned. Make sure they are carried out properly. Deal fairly and impartially with all of your men—give them all an even chance, regardless of race, creed, education, or ability. Encourage your soldiers to see you and other members of the chain of command or NCO support channel about problems, but try to resolve them at the lowest possible level.

Keep your soldiers out of trouble. “How can I do that?” you ask. “I can’t control their every move.” True. But disciplined soldiers rarely get into trouble. Soldiers whose leaders have weak morals will soon develop the same tendencies. Be the example, and get your soldiers out of harm’s way; don’t sit idly by and watch them get drunk, brawl, and embarrass the uniform.

Try to reward positive behavior more often than you hand out punishment, because rewards produce the fastest, longest lasting kinds of changes in behavior. Think carefully before punishing soldiers, because punishment should be used only after counseling and corrective training have failed. Soldiers should perform out of pride and respect rather than out of fear or intimidation.

Lead the way in difficult tasks or maneuvers. Share hardships and discomforts with your men—don’t use your rank or position to evade or shirk them.

Be friendly, but always professional. Remember that familiarity breeds contempt. In all but official morale and off-duty activities, socialize only with other NCOs. Require that all squad members address each other properly and that they observe all the customs and courtesies of the Army.

Read and understand regulations, SOPs, and training manuals so that you can explain, demonstrate, and train your squad to those standards or higher. Engage in occasional “bull sessions” with your men to gauge your effectiveness as a leader. Remember the indicators of leadership? Discipline. Proficiency. Esprit de corps. Morale. Evaluate these indicators continually. Talk on a man-to-man basis when discussing performance, complaints, or problems. Learn and apply the rules for counseling, and remember confidentiality as it applies.

Participate in physical training, organized athletics, and social activities with your squad members, and show them an example of the standards expected—you. Expect your men to work hard because you do. Work during the duty day, and take all training as seriously as though your life depended on it, because it does. Be there as long as one man needs help, for yours is not a nine-to-five job. Never waste your soldiers’ time, conduct poor training, or let their problems go unresolved or unnoticed. And don’t rest or eat before they do.

Avoid doing or saying things that discourage your soldiers. Instill discipline through earned respect and loyalty for you and your authority, improved by challenging, rewarding, and superior training. Never go in “half-stepping.” If you’re not motivated to excel, how can you expect your soldiers to be?
Keep your superiors informed on the status of your job and your soldiers. Always be honest. Stand by your soldiers through good and bad, thick and thin; it is this kind of loyalty that binds the squad, platoon, and company together. This is not to say that you should try to lie or cover up failures or mistakes. Mistakes will be made, but hiding the truth or lying will never be forgiven or forgotten. Your credibility and reputation is on the line, and so is that of the rest of the NCO corps.

Be punctual, dedicated, honest, caring, honorable. Have the best haircut and uniform, the shiniest brass and boots in the squad. While some may argue that “pretty soldiers” may not know how to fight, “pretty soldiers” demonstrate pride, attention to detail, and discipline—all trademarks of the best fighters in history. Make on-the-spot corrections, punish wrongs, and make extra efforts to reward excellence.

Finally, never forget your two most important duties: accomplish the mission, and look out for the welfare of your troops.

To the Platoon Sergeant

Since I’ve told the team and squad leaders all that is required of them, it may seem like there’s nothing left for you to do. In fact, many soldiers may think that all you do for a living is provide "beans and bullets." But you are the Army’s Master Trainer; you have to train them all—grenadiers, machinegunners, radio operators, privates, sergeants, and lieutenants.

Yes, lieutenants.

Training your platoon leader is not only your job but your responsibility. If he fails, the platoon fails, and so do you. As the senior and most experienced NCO in the platoon, you must pass on the benefit of that wisdom and experience to your platoon leader as well as to the soldiers.

A new lieutenant is a precious thing, a rare commodity, enthusiastic and eager to learn. Don’t take advantage of him, but train him, correct him when he needs it (remembering that diplomacy is part of your job description), and be ready to tell the world proudly that he’s yours. If you are ashamed of him, maybe it’s because you’ve neglected him or failed to train him properly. Do something about it. Show a genuine concern that he’s learning the right way instead of the easy way. But be careful not to undermine his authority or destroy his credibility. Remember that order and counter-order create disorder.

Ask any colonel or general, and I’m sure you’ll find that he got as far as he did partly because of his first platoon sergeant, and the one thing that sticks in his mind is that his particular NCO was never afraid to train his lieutenant. Train yours, and you’ll soon find that the two of you will be a real team.

Don’t neglect your own training, though. As you train your platoon leader, remember that you are also training yourself to do his job in case he should be killed in combat. Set your sights on a 100 percent score on your Skill Qualification Test. “Can’t be done,” you say? I’ve done it more than once, and I know many other NCOs who have. Do you have to be a proficient test taker to do that? No, just an example-setter. How can you be an example for your soldiers if they achieve higher scores on a test than you do?

I’m not just talking about SQTs, but also about PT tests. It’s well known that you can’t lead from the rear. (How many times have you been professionally embarrassed to find out that the straggler to the rear of the formation was a platoon sergeant or higher?) You must be the premier example of physical and mental fitness, proficiency, and professionalism. It can be no other way. If you fail in this, your soldiers will lose respect for you not only as a person but as their leader. (Where’s your Physical Fitness Excellence Badge?)

Train and support your squad leaders. You already know from experience that their job is the toughest. They cannot do this job effectively if you don’t give them all the support, assets, and quality training time that they need to do it. Neither can they do it if you allow their soldiers to schedule appointments during training time. Schedule them for an off day.

Anticipate training aid requirements, schedule classrooms,
and supervise and spot-check classes. Order rations, talk with the XO and the first sergeant about transportation and maintenance requirements. Act instead of reacting to the squad leaders’ needs.

Make corrections to their tactics and the employment of their squads. Supervise administration, logistics, and maintenance. “My gun’s jammed, the radio won’t work, and this MILES gear is no good” are all signs of poorly trained and unprepared soldiers.

Train the squad leaders to train their soldiers. If you do it all yourself, you’ll deny your junior leaders the opportunities for trial and error that will make them great. And if your squad leaders are not prepared to do your job as well as you do it, if not better, you still have one more task to work on before you close the CP.

What do you do in the field? You should be the one to put in the security, crew-served weapons, and squads. Then show the platoon leader what you’ve done so he can make any necessary changes. Are you active in the security plan, or do you stay in the CP and wait for the squad leaders to check in? Are you listening intently to individual squad orders, or do you sleep through them? Where are you at 0300 when the security patrol reports in to the platoon leader?

Do you occasionally walk the perimeter, or are you content with the idea that there is no enemy activity? (I am constantly reminded of the 90 or so soldiers in an African country several years ago who all had their throats slit by an enemy force. They had posted no security.)

Have you put your medic to work checking your soldiers? Has he done a foot check today? Disease and infection historically have cost us more casualties than anything else. Have you really planned your medical evacuation procedures, or have you simply paid them lip service? When was the last time you made your squads carry a victim on an expedient litter for any real distance? Just saying, “Smith and Jones are the litter team” simply won’t fly. Are you there for all training, or do you find an excuse to be absent?

Counseling is also an important part of your job, and it includes all the members of your platoon. (Counseling your platoon leader takes the form of guidance and suggestions, but it is counseling all the same.) Counseling your subordinates is critical to success. If your juniors don’t know what they’re doing wrong and what you want them to do to fix it, they’ll never improve. Evaluate each success and failure on its own merits and, unless safety is involved, counsel your junior leaders in private. Look them in the eye and tell them just what you think they’re doing wrong, but finish every counseling session with something positive about them. If you leave them with an “atta-boy,” you won’t lessen their mistakes, but they’ll accept the counseling more readily than they will if they hear only a steady barrage of criticism. During after-action reviews, don’t pick apart the soldiers’ every action but concentrate on the major points, good and bad.

How do your soldiers perform on Soldier-of-the-Month boards? Are they ready for promotion, going in with every possible edge? Can you tell them what is required for promotion to specialist rank? What about promotion to sergeant? How much time in grade and service? Do you check their official photographs and help them write for copies of their microfiche records? Are you able and willing to tell a soldier that he’s what the Army needs and that he ought to reenlist? And are you equally prepared to look a soldier in the eye and tell him that he’s not cutting it, that he’s overweight, and that you intend to have the commander bar him from reenlistment because of his poor performance or disciplinary record?

Although leaders need to be given the freedom to experiment and succeed or fail in order to learn, safety can never be sacrificed. Safety begins with the plan, and every operation or movement should include a safety plan.

You are the safety expert. You have to know whether the sectors of fire are safe, whether soldiers should be riding in vehicles without restraint devices, and whether there are weak swimmers in the platoon.

And you also have to be prepared to conduct safety briefings. Brief safety not only for training but also for off duty time. Make sure your soldiers know the proper misfire procedures for weapons and demolitions, or what will happen to them if they open the automatic chemical alarm without disconnecting the power source. You should teach and enforce safety measures right along with tactics, maintenance, and the school of the soldier.

Yes, it’s the Year of the NCO, and we justly deserve the recognition. We have worked many long and hard hours for the distinction. Let’s not waste it or let its significance be diminished because we don’t have the energy or the desire to go one step further and really set the example.

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RIFLE FIGHTING
HIGH PAYOFF TRAINING
When someone makes broad generalizations about the state of the Army in small arms marksmanship, howls of indignation invariably echo across the hills and descend to the plains. Having said that, we at the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit offer a broad generalization, grab our helmets, LCE and weapons, and prepare for incoming: Folks, our soldiers can’t hit a bull in the ear with the proverbial fiddle. We have work to do.

The first outcry will most assuredly be, “Not in my unit!” Perhaps not—but perhaps, just perhaps, it does apply to your unit. Look harder and deeper. Just because a unit satisfies the annual regulatory qualification requirements does not, by any means, insure its success in defeating a determined battlefield enemy bent on the destruction of U.S. soldiers.

A confident, determined soldier who believes in himself, his unit, and especially his rifle and knows how to use it is a dreaded instrument that all our potential enemies must learn again to fear. What it takes in training priorities and plain leader dedication to create such a soldier goes light years beyond mere minimum standard qualification on some manicured training range.

As Thomas Paine wrote in 1776, “These are the times that try men’s souls.” In 1989, the horizon reveals cutbacks in manpower and money, as well as all sorts of constraints that are probably far more real than simply apparent.

Where, then, does individual rifle marksmanship training fit into a commander’s overall priority list? Surely, it must rank right up there with physical training. We cannot find a single documented case in which we ran enemy soldiers to death or killed them with sit-ups. And that scourage of our enemies—the dreaded push-up. We can hear the enemy commander now, “Spread out men. One American push-up dropped in here could get us all.”

I do not indulge in cheap sardonicities here. I am merely saying that if physical training is important enough to do three or more times a week, individual marksmanship training ought to be a lot higher on any priority list than it is now. If the Army’s physical training program is a combat multiplier, accurate, devastatingly effective rifle fighting also ought to be entered into these high mathematics, somewhere. After all, first rate rifle ability is pretty basic to being a soldier—regardless of a soldier’s MOS.

I do not suggest, because of range, ammunition, and time/space constraints, that we have our soldiers shoot live rounds three times a week, but three times a quarter may not be all that unrealistic. The first primal scream to be heard on this radical proposal, that we actually require soldiers to shoot their rifles more frequently, will probably be about range and ammunition constraints. All right, then, how about live fire rifle training three times a year? What an improvement even that would make.

There are numerous high payoff tactics that would result in a quantum leap toward better rifle fighting efficiency. They are very simple, very basic, readily available, and not at all uneconomical. Let’s look at what we can do better with what we already have.

The basics are the absolute first points upon which we must concentrate our soldiers’ attention. I am talking about a training program run by knowledgeable, confident trainer/leaders who can teach. Start by looking at our soldiers’ real grasp of the four fundamentals—steady position, aiming, breath control, and trigger squeeze. These are the building blocks upon which later advanced rifle fighting techniques must be based. There will be a point—amid the fear, noise, and confusion of a pitched battle—when a soldier will have to shoot fast over the front sitepost at a fleeting glimpse of an enemy soldier; and then he will have to shoot quickly and efficiently. Our soldiers must master this sort of technique for their own survival. But before they get to such a celestial level of personal rifle abilities, an individual soldier must master the four fundamentals—not just be able to recite them. We are nowhere near the mastery of fundamentals in the United States Army. If you listen carefully you will hear trainers all down the line still telling soldiers to remember their “eight steady hold factors,” which went out about the same time as the “eleven general orders.”

TRAINING EFFORT

The next point is to establish a determined training effort in every unit, an effort deliberately designed to ensure our soldiers’ total familiarization with their rifles. Again, I am not suggesting that every soldier must become a ballistics expert. Every soldier, though, ought to know his rifle inside first, outside second; he absolutely must know what it can and cannot do. Total familiarization with the rifle instills confidence.

Do many of our soldiers have the foggiest notion of what actually happens once they launch the projectile from the end of the barrel? I don’t think they do. But they should, because it will help them hit the target at which they are aiming. It will also cause the individual soldier to use his rifle without hesitating when the opportunity is there.

Do our trainers have even the most basic notions about the flight path trajectories of standard 5.56mm rounds? Across the board, they do not. Should we, the trainers, understand such lofty matters and be able to tell our soldiers why, for example, the standard for zeroing is based on a four-centimeter shot group at 25 meters? (For a good explanation, see FC 23-11, page 10-3, Unit Rifle Marksmanship Training Guide, August 1984.) Am I saying that across the board our trainers do not understand marksmanship fundamentals enough to teach them? Yes, I am. We are living in a dream world, fellow leaders, if we think we have a handle on rifle fighting throughout the Army.

Let’s admit it, then, and do something constructive about it. Now. In peacetime.

If you’re short on ammunition, get your soldiers out behind the barracks with their M16A1s or A2s. It takes practice to use a rifle that has five to eight pounds of trigger pull. Lay a dime on top of a barrel, snug front of the front sight assembly, and have your soldiers dry fire until the dime doesn’t fall when the hammer does. Do this in the prone unsupported position. Now try it standing—offhand. Vary the exercise any way you want. Move the dime progressively farther out toward the muzzle as your soldiers get better at it. If your unit is armed
with the M16A2, which has a somewhat heavier barrel, use a quarter. This makes it more sporting. It is amazing what this single, cost-effective technique will do for a soldier’s trigger control skills—and you can still spend the dime or quarter. The time-tested target box exercise has been lost somewhere in the shuffle. The first time I used the target box exercise to sharpen sight alignment and sight picture skills, there was an M-1 Garand lying in the target box notches. In other words, the technique has been around for awhile. (The target box exercise is still used in the initial entry training environment, but try and find one in an MTOE unit.) Local training support or self-help centers can build target boxes inexpensively from wood scraps. Check it out.

Our zeroing procedure is the most maligned, misunderstood function of rifle marksmanship—bar none. Its original purpose and procedure are buried in myth and folklore. As Will Rogers once said, “It ain’t the things you don’t know what gets you in trouble; it’s the things you know that just ain’t so.”

Dig out the manuals and do a massive trainer re-education exercise on zeroing. Conduct your own unit train-the-trainer program on zeroing. At the risk of becoming ridiculously elementary, understand that the zeroing procedure for the M16A2 is decidedly different from that for the M16A1.

Read the manuals, practice it, rehearse it, understand it. Then when you are satisfied that your trainers understand exactly what they are doing, have them teach you—after you are sure you have done your own homework thoroughly. There are racks and racks of un-zeroed weapons out there, right now, assigned to soldiers; these are their own weapons with which they must deploy into a combat zone, and they don’t have the foggiest notion of where they’re going to hit.

Let’s get really basic here and ask an even more foreboding question, the answer to which usually brings on professional palpitations: “How many of our soldiers do not even have an assigned weapon?” This gets really close to the epicenter of small arms neglect in the U.S. Army, doesn’t it?

Diligently, seriously, work on target detection techniques. The last time most U.S. Army soldiers did any serious target detection training was during initial entry training. Even if a soldier is a superbly trained rifle fighter, it does no good if he can’t detect and effectively engage targets.

Preliminary rifle instruction (PRI) is also a lost art. But we can easily improve it with a change in mindset. It’s called translating the peacetime training routine into a warfighting way of doing business. Let’s stop talking about training as we are going to fight and actually start doing it.

Thus, qualification day should be just like organizing for combat. This is the commander’s or the leader’s time for evaluating and assessing his unit’s small arms efficiency. Soldiers should go to qualification day zipped up, taped down, checked out—thoroughly prepared and ready to max the course. They should not have to ride or march to the range and then wait while someone in charge figures out what the next event is going to be. All the preliminary rifle instruction should have been done before qualification day—especially zeroing. How many times have we all seen this sort of training debacle executed by unprepared trainers, disorganized planners, and detached commanders?
If we just clean up PRI and use qualification firing for our evaluation, the results will be much more realistic and a much better evaluation tool for developing future training programs.

It is not enough for leaders and trainers to read the source documents. They must make certain they are reading the right publications. The U.S. Army Infantry School is the proponent for small arms marksmanship. If our trainers have any doubt what they should be following, they should check with the proponent.

Although we are small in numbers, the United States Army Marksmanship Unit has a specified mission to help the Army train its trainers. We have three outlying marksmanship training units, one for each of the FORSCOM corps, and we’re working to coordinate the same additional assistance overseas.

We, too, are dedicated to the training of our soldiers. The Army’s train-the-trainers program is a very large part of the reason for our existence. Just remember—the Army Marksmanship Unit works for you. Don’t forget us.

While we are on the subject of sources, bibliography, and training aids, you might want to check your zero targets. The Canadian bullseye zeroing target was replaced in 1983. If you have any, please get rid of them. You should use only the zeroing targets for the M16A1 and the M16A2, keeping in mind these are two different targets.

Soldiers want and need feedback on how well they are shooting. If you can’t build a new range where you train, try balloons. Even with inflation (no humor intended), they cost about three cents each. When an M16 projectile hits a balloon, there is instant feedback. Try it. You and your soldiers will like it, and it’s cost effective.

A spinoff of this technique is to take old uniforms and stuff them with any soft material, such as straw; make a balloon head and implant a balloon in the kill area of the chest (inside the shirt). The beauty of this simple technique is that you can set up such a series of targets anywhere in your training area where live rounds are allowed, with no requirement for takes or lawn mowers. Sound realistic? It is, and the balloon technique works especially well when conducting collective live fire small arms training. Instead of just launching a wall of wasted lead down range, the soldiers receive feedback on the effectiveness of their fire.

Try these simple high-payoff tactics in training your unit. The result, instead of being simply an increase in the number of misses per minute, will be an increase in the number of one-shot kills our soldiers get during each engagement.

I have outlined only a few of the techniques that will help any unit achieve better results. Many more are being used in units all over the Army. Use your imagination, within real world safety considerations.

It is important to understand, or at least to recognize, that small arms marksmanship, as a sport, is getting worse—not better. It is also important to recognize that true commander or leader involvement can achieve stunning results in reversing this trend.

We must instill fear in our potential enemies. When an enemy soldier knows that within rifle range there is a confident U.S. soldier with a deadly accurate rifle, it becomes a deeply personal thing. Concerns will mount in that enemy soldier’s mind about both his immediate future and his long range future. And that is the enemy soldier we want to confront on the battlefield.

Our goal must be to build confident U.S. soldiers who know they are masters of themselves, their rifles, and any enemy who dares lift his eyes above ground level.

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In 1986 the U.S. Army activated its first corps long range surveillance unit (LRSU), which was designed to provide a reliable human intelligence collection resource to division and corps commanders. Today's commanders, as they shepherd along that fledgling organization, might take a look at some of the valuable lessons in reconnaissance and surveillance that a group of men known as the Alamo Scouts discovered many years ago. Although the rules of lineage prevent the LRSUs from sharing the proud heritage of the Alamo Scouts—an organization officially designated as the Sixth U.S. Army Special Reconnaissance Unit—these units do share many of the same characteristics and much of the same spirit.

The story of the Alamo Scouts begins in the Pacific Theater of World War II. The Japanese offensive had run its course,
and had been stopped finally in the jungles of New Guinea. General Douglas MacArthur was about to begin one of the most brilliant campaigns in U.S. military history—he would outflank entire Japanese armies and leave them to "wither on the vine" in a near perfect example of what we now call maneuver warfare.

To help him execute his daring strategy, he asked that an old confidant and subordinate, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, be assigned to his command. General Krueger, 62 at the time, arrived in Australia on 7 February 1943 and assumed command of the U.S. Sixth Army on 16 February near Brisbane. Many problems faced him and his staff. His troops were scattered over a 2,000-mile area from Melbourne to New Guinea. Malaria was a significant problem, and many of his units were untrained in jungle warfare and amphibious operations—training that was absolutely necessary to the success of future tactical operations in this theater.

One other problem concerned General Krueger: intelligence. If he was to plan, prepare, and execute the numerous amphibious landings required for a successful campaign, he had to know where the enemy was and where he was not. Dense jungle frequently reduced the usefulness of aerial reconnaissance, especially in locating enemy troop dispositions and fortifications. Cartographic coverage was almost nonexistent, while the few available maps were generally inaccurate. Naval charts simply did not exist in the coverage and detail that would be necessary to plan and execute amphibious assaults.

Some intelligence was available from Japanese prisoners of war and from a limited number of civilians who had escaped from enemy territory. These sources were generally considered unreliable, however, and a better method of satisfying the Sixth Army's intelligence requirements was needed. These conditions led General Krueger to form a new provisional organization to conduct reconnaissance in advance of Sixth Army operations. On 28 November 1943, his headquarters published an order directing that a scout training center be established before 1 January 1944 to train selected volunteers in raid and reconnaissance work.

ALAMO

General Krueger, a Texan from San Antonio, selected a name for the new organization from his own heritage, a name he had already used to designate his own headquarters the Alamo Force—the Alamo Scouts.

General Krueger selected Colonel Frederick W. Bradshaw of Jackson, Mississippi, to establish the training center; he was to be assisted by a young infantry captain named Gibson Niles. Soldiers were not selected to attend the training course on the basis of their military occupational specialties but on the basis of their individual qualifications of courage, stamina, intelligence, and adaptability. All of the Sixth Army combat units were ordered to send students, and subsequently the rolls of the Alamo Scouts would read like an order of battle roster for the entire Sixth Army. Infantrymen, cavalrymen, engineers, and communicators all could be found in the organization. They were expected to be proficient in the basic subjects before going off to the training center.

Training began for the first group of volunteers—6 officers and 40 enlisted men—on 27 December 1943 on Fergusson Island off the southeast coast of New Guinea. The six-week course was divided into two phases. The first phase consisted of three and one-half weeks of refresher training on scouting, patrolling, map reading, and weapons, including the use of Japanese small arms.

The prospective scouts had to master message writing, radio communication skills, various intelligence skills, and working as members of a team in conducting field reconnaissance. Each scout was thoroughly cross-trained in all team member duties. In addition to basic refresher training in map reading, scouts were given additional work in interpreting aerial photographs, a skill considered critical to navigation in the largely unmapped jungles of the Southwest Pacific.

The scouts also spent many hours mastering the art of operating small rubber boats. To develop the stamina they would need for this and to prepare themselves for the hardships of an extended stay behind enemy lines, physical training became something akin to a religion. It normally occupied about one and one-half hours each day for the first four weeks, with the emphasis on swimming.

The last two weeks of training was given over to practical exercises in the infiltration of teams into hostile areas, reconnaissance operations, and recovery. Each exercise was normally conducted over a period of three nights and two days.

SELECTION PROCESS

The training conducted at the Alamo Scout Training Center also served as a selection process, and not every student who attended was selected to become a Scout. The process itself was based upon peer ratings. For example, each enlisted man was asked to rank the top three officers he would prefer as his team leader on an actual mission. He was also instructed to select five other men to whom he would trust his life on such a mission.

Conversely, each officer was asked to identify the men he would select to accompany him on missions behind enemy lines. Thus, the bonds of mutual respect and trust based upon demonstrated proficiency formed the basis of cohesion within the teams.

This selection process subsequently proved its worth on the numerous lengthy and dangerous independent missions conducted by the Scouts during which mutual respect and self discipline served to keep teams working together well.

For field operations, a team generally consisted of one officer and five enlisted men, at least two of whom were normally noncommissioned officers. In some cases, interpreters and native guides were also attached, depending on the purpose of the mission.

From their inception in 1943 to the successful conclusion of the Philippine campaign in 1945, the Alamo Scouts performed a wide variety of missions for Sixth Army that ranged from static surveillance to limited direct action missions. They
worked directly for the Sixth Army G-2, who had overall staff responsibility for all aspects of their training and employment.

Reconnaissance missions were among the first assigned to the Scouts. The initial one was conducted on 26 February 1944 in the Admiralty Islands. Subsequently, almost every amphibious operation conducted by units of the Sixth Army was preceded by Alamo Scout infiltration and reconnaissance operations. These teams provided valuable information on the beach areas being considered for landings; furnished critical information on the terrain behind the beaches; identified the size, composition, and location of enemy units; located critical enemy installations such as ammunition dumps; and identified any obstacles that might impede friendly maneuver and amphibious assault operations. They also frequently provided engineer reconnaissance of potential or existing airfields.

With the invasion of the Philippine Islands in 1944, Alamo Scout missions became more varied. The Sixth Army was keenly interested in enemy troop movements on both Leyte and Luzon. Given a friendly population and an active guerrilla movement, Alamo Scout teams went ashore and made contact with the guerrillas. With their assistance, the Scouts set up numerous road, rail, and coast watch networks. These networks, supervised and frequently operated by the Scouts themselves, allowed U.S. forces to monitor the movement of Japanese reserve units, to identify major enemy routes, and to estimate more accurately the size, composition, and location of the Japanese forces opposing them.

Through experience, the Alamo Scouts learned the value of appropriate mission planning and preparation. They learned that attention to detail was absolutely essential. Once the Scouts were inserted behind enemy lines, faulty equipment, communication failures, and incompletely considered contingencies could all be deadly.

Upon receipt of a mission, each team was briefed by the special intelligence subsection of the Sixth Army’s G-2 section. This briefing included a description of the area of operations, an analysis of the tactical situation in the area, and a statement of the commander’s intelligence requirements. To help the teams evaluate the information they gathered, they were provided with the enemy situation and order of battle in as much detail as possible. The G-2 topographical section was responsible for providing up-to-date terrain information and analysis. This included aerial photographs, maps, and terrain studies of the area in which the Scouts would be operating.

Each team was given signal operation instructions (SOI), for its particular mission. Primary and alternate radio stations and schedules of contact were determined, and all radio equipment was issued and thoroughly inspected by the G-2’s radio repair and maintenance subsection. Spare radio parts were on every team’s packing list, and all the operators were capable of making minor equipment repairs in the field. No detail of the communications plan was left unchecked.

During the initial operations, which were of short duration (three to five days), the teams used only lightweight voice radio sets to communicate with the extraction party. Later, when they were employed on longer missions in areas where the native population was friendly, they had to have sets capable of operating at ranges from 50 to 3,000 miles. Scouts usually used the SCR-300 (FM) radio for internal communications and linkups and the SCR-694 (AM) radio for the transmission of information. Transmissions were secured by a double transposition cypher, the equivalent of today’s one-time pads.

AD HOC GROUP

The Scout missions in the Philippines were not limited to static surveillance, for General Krueger had a number of priority intelligence requirements that could be satisfied only by a human intelligence collection element. For further campaign planning, his staff needed data on roads and bridges, mountain trail networks, and Japanese installations well beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and the reach of normal ground patrols. The Scouts successfully performed many such missions for their commander, clearly demonstrating the value of a well-trained reconnaissance team to a senior staff.

The various missions performed by the Alamo Scouts throughout their existence cannot be discussed without mentioning the few but generally successful direct-action operations they carried out. Among these were two friendly hostage and prisoner rescue operations. The first was conducted in New Guinea by the Scouts acting alone. The second was executed in the Philippines where the Scouts served as the advanced reconnaissance element for the 6th Ranger Battalion on a mission that resulted in the dramatic liberation of more than 500 survivors of the Bataan Death March.

The Scouts were also used for a variety of missions for which no other organization was available. Such missions included recommending and directing deep air strikes, determining the location of key Japanese personalities, and locating and retrieving downed Allied air crews. Still, their main focus was intelligence collection.

PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS

When the standard signal and repair procedures were found insufficiently responsive to scout requirements, an ad hoc radio maintenance and supply group was formed before the Luzon Campaign. This organization consisted of an officer and several technicians who had been radio engineers in civilian life. The Philippine Army’s 92d Division, a guerrilla organization on newly liberated Leyte, provided the personnel. This small group ensured that communications equipment was prepared for field operations and completely checked and reconditioned all the radio equipment when the mission was completed. Many Scout team radio operators for the Luzon Campaign came from this division.

Radio repair parts were also provided by the radio maintenance and supply group, but other supplies, including medical items, were handled by the special intelligence subsection. Because supplies for the Scouts were maintained by the G-2, resupply items were generally either airdropped or airlanded within 24 hours of a request. Small supply dumps and caches
were used in areas under guerrilla control. Large amounts of needed supplies were coordinated by the special intelligence subsection through the Army G-4.

The usual armament for the teams consisted of Thompson submachineguns, carbines, hand grenades, and hunting knives. They needed lightweight yet rapid-fire weapons to help them break any contact they might encounter. Team leaders conducted showdown inspections of all the individual and team equipment required for the operation. Shortages were made up with supplies maintained by the G-2 for that purpose.

Simultaneously with these preparations, coordination was conducted to infiltrate the teams into the objective area. Although various techniques were used, amphibious infiltration was the norm. PT boats, landing craft, Catalina flying boats, and submarines were all used to get the teams within range of their targets, and inflatable rubber boats were commonly used. Later in the campaign, C-47 and L-5 aircraft were employed, but generally their use was restricted to resupply missions.

The means of infiltration depended largely on a mission’s requirements and availability of resources. When guerrilla reception committees were to be used, as in the Philippines, the necessary arrangements were made for recognition signals, security, and linkup at the infiltration site.

For the most part, all of these arrangements were made by the Army’s special intelligence subsection. This freed the teams to focus their attention on preparing for a mission, and enabled them to be ready to go within 48 hours after a mission was given to them.

The Scout teams did not always operate only in support of Army headquarters. When an upcoming operation was to be the responsibility of a lower echelon, for instance, Alamo Scout teams were frequently attached to the headquarters that needed the information. This procedure was first used with I Corps during the Hollandia Campaign. An Alamo Scout
Group of three (later four) under the command of an Alamo Scout officer was attached to the corps G-2. The Scout officer served as the contact (liaison) officer for Scout employment and advised the G-2 on the capabilities, limitations, and administrative needs of the Scouts. When the Scouts were used, he monitored the status and operations of the Scouts, thereby ensuring that an interested party was available at higher headquarters to anticipate the needs of the Scouts and provide assistance to the teams in the field.

The Alamo Scout team leaders learned many lessons from their operations, a number of which seem applicable to today’s LRSU units.

THEATER SPECIFIC

First, a training program should be established that is specific to the potential theater of deployment. A school based in the continental United States can provide the basics, but cannot meet all of the training requirements. Theater orientation will have a significant effect on everything from infiltration techniques to intelligence training such as determining enemy order of battle.

Special training is needed in communications, medical, and fire support skills (especially close air support). Cross-training is especially important. All team members must be thoroughly trained in intelligence skills and must be able, at least to a limited extent, to analyze, interpret, and determine the importance of the information they gather. It also allows them to cut down the number of radio transmissions they must make and lessens their communications time and signature.

Absolute top physical fitness was required by the Scouts and should be required for all LRSU team members. Soldiers who have shouldered a rucksack with a SATCOM or HF radio and a week’s worth of batteries will attest to the truth of this statement. Physical fitness training, however, should be keyed to employment considerations. For example, a LRSU team in the Pacific might orient its physical training toward swimming skills while a team in southern Germany might focus on marching through rugged terrain with mission loads, or on climbing skills.

At the same time, all mission and individual equipment should be carefully considered by weight and function. Weapons and other armorment should be lightweight and should offer maximum initial firepower and versatility. The Alamo Scouts carried carbines and Thompson submachineguns, both of which were lightweight rapid-fire weapons. Silenced firearms were requested for the point men. Occasionally, the teams also carried a 60mm mortar without its bipod and sight; they used a plumb bob and a makeshift quadrant for aiming. (Today’s equivalent would probably be the M203 grenade launcher.) Both fragmentation and smoke grenades were common to the packing list. Even today the hand grenade, by virtue of its versatility, small size, and relatively light weight, is an attractive alternative to the bulkier claymore mine.

Food was not given much consideration. Initially, the teams carried too much food and found that the extreme tension of operating behind enemy lines significantly decreased their appetites. Later, during missions of longer duration, the teams subsisted on guerrilla rations or foraged for their food. Foraging, of course, is a theater-specific skill that requires training. It also requires time that takes away from the mission.

In cases where cultivated crops are available, foraging must be carefully considered, because a neutral or hostile population will notice it and may report it. Even where the population is friendly, a random pilfering of crops is likely to create resentment and impair future cooperation.

The single most important item of equipment (and the ones that contribute the most weight) are team radios. Communications are indeed the lifeblood of today’s LRSU team. Without communications the team is not only useless but is also in extreme danger, because it can neither communicate information nor request support. Both short range (intra-team) and long range (reporting) systems are generally required. Communications must be structured to the mission, though, and depending on the length and purpose of the mission, short range sets may be the only requirement.

The minimum allowable number should be carried but there should be some redundancy. Spare components should be carried for parts that are frequently broken (RF cables, headsets, fuses). Spare radios may be taken in and then cached. The secure system must also have a manual backup (such as a one-time pad) in case the secure device malfunctions. Plans for automatic resupply of spare communications equipment may be prearranged and employed under certain criteria (for example, if the team misses two consecutive communication checks).

Care must also be taken to limit damage in the event the team is captured or compromised. This can be accomplished through proper planning. Special CEIs must be used that do not compromise those of larger units. Prearranged code words or other procedures designed to signify that a station is operating under duress must be employed. Finally, if all else fails, there must be a jointly coordinated survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) plan.

SUPPORT LIAISON

One final note of caution. A LRSU supporting another unit or attached to a subordinate headquarters should not automatically expect support. The LRSU should assume nothing and check everything. A knowledgeable LRSU liaison officer or NCO located at the controlling headquarters is essential to the effectiveness and safety of the team. His duties should include coordinating support and monitoring field operations. It is also a good idea for him to accompany teams to the drop-off point during infiltration and to be in charge of the contact party during linkup and extraction.

A number of factors that directly influence the effectiveness of LRSUs, however, are beyond the control of a detachment or company commander, because they are generally within the authority of a senior commander or staff officer.

One of these involves the selection of personnel. If a high standard of performance is expected, then a strict personality selection process must be used. Completing the Ranger course
or the LRSU course does not guarantee that a soldier is a good reconnaissance man.

As with the Alamo Scouts, the initial selection should be based on the characteristics of the individual, not on his MOS or former unit. A careful balance of youth, maturity, and experience is required. The composition of the Alamo Scout team was a perfect example of this principle. A junior officer— together with five or six enlisted men, two of whom were middle grade NCOs—provided a good balance. An MOS did not enter into the process.

Recent evidence indicates that good reconnaissance personnel fit a certain psychological profile. This stands to reason since, except in rare circumstances, teams must be trained to totally avoid contact. A corollary to this is that people who like to “kick in doors and break things” rarely make the best reconnaissance and surveillance men.

Great individual soldiers do not automatically make good team members. Cohesiveness must be attained as a prerequisite to teamwork—each soldier must have complete confidence in his teammates. For this reason, COHORT LRSU teams may be an attractive option for the future. Using the same selection process as the Alamo Scout Training Center did, teams could undergo training and selection simultaneously. Those who were not selected for LRSU duty might be considered top candidates for scout duty with infantry battalions.

A final note on team composition. If the situation allows, consideration should be given to providing indigenous personnel to the teams as guides and interpreters. This normally requires prior planning and training, though, because a team is normally a close knit organization.

A senior commander and his G-2 must give the teams focus by helping them develop their mission essential task list (METL) for a specific theater. Certainly the training for VII Corps LRSU teams would be different from that for I Corps teams, because the potential conditions of METT-T are significantly different. A LRSU team that is trained to support a heavy corps fighting against a Warsaw Pact opponent is not likely to be skilled in reconnoitering beaches and landing zones. Nor is it likely to be familiar with insurgent characteristics and tactics. Conversely, teams from light divisions and contingency corps may not fully understand the requirements of heavy units.

To make these unit requirements easier to understand, General Krueger employed a training technique seldom seen in today’s Army. He was frequently accompanied by Alamo Scouts when visiting his subordinate units, or when observing combat operations. This procedure offered three significant benefits. First, the Scouts got to know the subordinate staffs in preparation for a possible future attachment. In this way they avoided being just unknown faces; they developed an understanding of subordinate unit personalities, contacts, and requirements; and they laid the groundwork for future cooperation. Second, these opportunities allowed the Scouts to comprehend the “big picture” and fully understand the concerns and intent of their commander. Finally, through contact with their commander, they developed a personal loyalty that further increased their reliability and determination in difficult circumstances.

Infiltration techniques must be simple, reliable, and flexible. Complicated infiltration plans and exotic methods are usually unnecessary, require more training time than is justi-
fied, and beg for failure. Emphasis should be placed on the infiltration means that are reasonably available within the theater.

The length of any particular mission should be given careful consideration. As a general rule, the length of Alamo Scout missions was a function of the sympathy of the people in the area. If the population was hostile, neutral, or unknown, the missions were of short duration, and contact was absolutely avoided. But once the Scouts deployed in the Philippines where there was active resistance to the Japanese, contact with civilians ceased to be a great danger and longer missions, occasionally for a month or more, were the rule.

When planning the length of a mission, other significant factors should also be taken into consideration. The schedule must allow enough time for moving to the objective site or observation post. Because its combat power is limited, a team does not move at the pace of a rifle company. Its only protection is stealth, and stealth requires time. In the objective area, a careful balance must be achieved between the probability of compromise and the time required for the team to execute its collection tasks. If compromise would significantly affect combat operations, then only a short time should be spent in the objective area. On the other hand, if detailed information is required, enough time must be allowed for collecting it.

Alamo Scout support to the 6th Ranger Battalion's prisoner of war rescue mission at Pangatian, Luzon, is a good example of the way these factors interact. Infiltrated only slightly ahead of the Rangers and after joining forces with Philippine guerrillas, the Scouts, in the brief time allowed, could not come up with the detailed information required for planning a successful raid—determining guard and prisoner schedules, billeting locations, and troop strength. Consequently, when the 6th Ranger Battalion arrived, the information was incomplete, and this forced a 24-hour delay while the Scouts completed their reconnaissance. Fortunately, the delay was not significant, since the unit was operating in conjunction with native guerrillas and a supportive population that significantly reduced the possibility of compromise. One day later, with all of the required information in hand, the 6th Ranger Battalion launched its famous liberation raid.

Who should control LRSU teams? Today's doctrine says the G-2 should be in charge; the combat experience of the Alamo Scouts verifies this concept. The G-2 section should handle the most important aspects of team planning and receive the collected information, and it should be structured to support all of a LRSU's requirements from radio support to supplies.

The G-2 section assisted by the G-3 must coordinate staff support to make sure the teams are adequately prepared. A detachment or company commander cannot do this; he is too junior and lacks the authority to task others to help him. Particular attention must be focused on staff support and briefings in the areas of intelligence, communications, supply, infiltration, and exfiltration. Thorough preparation is critical to mission success.

A final note that may stir some controversy. LRSUs can be used for many missions other than identifying the "second echelon." This is especially true for the units in light divisions and contingency corps. Small teams can and should be employed in reconnaissance work as opposed to strictly surveillance work. The intelligence a light force commander needs can seldom be gathered from a static position. LRSUs can conduct deep reconnaissance of landing zones, beachheads, drop zones, and raid targets, and provide terminal guidance for air strikes and interdiction fires.

Each of these missions was executed by small bands of well-trained Alamo Scouts operating at the high end of the spectrum of conflict against a tenacious and determined foe. And they were executed with such success that in more than 80 such missions, not a single Alamo Scout was killed or captured. These missions were performed to such a high standard that General Krueger was prompted to remark at the end of the war that "this little outfit has never failed the Sixth Army."

Can today's LRSU teams achieve such a high degree of success in such a wide variety of missions? Certainly the human element is the same today as it was in 1943. If anything, today's soldier is better educated and more attuned to the technology used in modern reconnaissance and surveillance operations. With proper selection, training, and equipment, we should expect at least as good a return on our investment.

For an example of what can be expected, we need only look to the record of the Alamo Scouts, a group of young men who achieved incredible results against an enemy who was noted for his stealth and cunning.

Major Billy E. Wells, Jr., is assigned to the Infantry School's Combined Arms and Tactics Department at Fort Benning. He previously served with the 75th Ranger Regiment as the first commander of its Regimental Reconnaissance Detachment; with the 1st Armored Division as a rifle company commander; and with the 82d Airborne Division as a scout platoon leader. A 1975 ROTC graduate of Mississippi State University, he holds a master's degree from Louisiana State University.
The use of sharpshooters or snipers can be traced in U.S. military history back to the Revolutionary War. Most recently, during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, the Rangers successfully employed sniper teams to engage a Cuban mortar crew. Cuban prisoners who were questioned after the action revealed that the accurate sniper fire of the Rangers was directly responsible for reducing their will to fight.

Snipers are once again recognized as being an effective supporting arm, force multiplier, and economy of force element for an infantry commander. As a result, the Infantry School and the 29th Infantry Regiment have revitalized the School’s sniper program and are committed to providing the best possible training and equipment.

These efforts have included the establishment of the U.S. Army Sniper School at Fort Benning, Georgia. The three-week course of instruction offered by the school trains snipers to engage targets successfully with precision rifle fire out to 1,000 meters and to be experts in fieldcraft techniques.

The advanced marksmanship instruction (54 hours) with the M24 sniper weapon emphasizes the weapon system, long range shooting skills, and environmental effects on ballistics. Practice live fire exercises and qualification exercises make up a significant portion of the marksmanship training.

The fieldcraft instruction (120 hours) includes training in concealment, sniper camouflage, movement, range estimation, observation, and target detection. Soldiers who graduate from the school are awarded the additional skill identifier (ASI) of B4, and the award is made retroactive to the school’s start in July 1987. This is the only school in the Army today that is authorized to award this ASI.

Eleven classes are planned for each year. The optimum class size is 18 students; the maximum is 24. With 18 students, a class has an instructor for every two students. The instructors are highly qualified noncommissioned officers from the 29th Infantry Regiment, and all of them are graduates of both the U.S. Army Sniper School and the U.S. Marine Corps Scout/Sniper School.

The course is both physically and mentally demanding, because the sniper students train an average of 14 hours a day, six days a week. Each training day begins with PT from 0530 to 0645, and students road march to and from the training sites in special camouflage (Ghillie) suits with rucksacks and weapons (9-12 miles daily).

To make sure the students are prepared for this level of activity, cadre members administer a diagnostic Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) during in-processing, and the students must achieve at least 70 points in each event.

Training during the first week is oriented on fieldcraft techniques, sniper patrol orders, and sniper movement techniques. The students also zero their weapons and receive training on marksmanship fundamentals. They spend an average of four hours a night construct-
ing their Ghillie suits, writing their first patrol order, and studying. Cadre members are available to help them.

Throughout the second week, the soldiers participate in a number of evaluated exercises that include their first record fire, concealed movement, and target detection. To facilitate training, the sniper class is divided into two training groups but with the members of each sniper team kept together.

On the eighth day, the training moves out of the classroom to the range and the fieldcraft training sites. The focus of training is now placed on advanced sniper marksmanship as well as sniper fieldcraft.

This training continues through the third and final week, which concludes with an arduous 24-hour sniper team tactical exercise and a final shot exercise. During the tactical exercise, a sniper team is evaluated in a number of areas including sniper patrol order, construction of positions, target reduction, and final shot.

EVALUATION

Sniper students are evaluated in 10 separate areas, beginning the day they report (see table). The evaluation system is based upon a total score of 1,000 points. A student must receive a total of 710 points to graduate and be awarded the ASI.

A student who fails in any one marksmanship area, including the final shot, is dismissed from the course; a student who fails in two fieldcraft areas is also removed for academic deficiency. Students who demonstrate a weakness in either fieldcraft or marksmanship receive remedial training and, if necessary, remedial testing.

Soldiers are selected by their units to attend the sniper course, and they attend on a temporary duty and return basis. It is imperative that unit commanders become personally involved in the selection process, and that they select only top quality soldiers with a year’s retainability in the unit.

A soldier selected must meet the following minimum prerequisites:

- Rank of private first class through sergeant.
- Volunteer with commander’s recommendation.
- Good physical condition with corrected vision of 20/20.
- Proficient in MOS 11B, Skill Level 2.
- No history of drug or alcohol abuse.
- No record of disciplinary action.

Students report to Building 4511 in the Harmony Church area of Fort Benning between 1200 and 1300 hours the day before the training starts. During in-processing, students are issued TA-50 equipment for the duration of the course, and are issued meal cards.

Billets and meals are provided for all students, who must live in the barracks while they are attending the sniper course. Units are asked to make sure that any of their soldiers who are receiving separate rations are taken off that status during the time they are attending the course.

Each soldier must report with at least the following items:
- One copy of DA Forms 2 and 2-1.
- Five copies of orders.
- Medical records.
- Identification card.
- Two ID tags with chains.
- One U.S. Army PT uniform.
- Four sets of BDUs.
- Two pairs of boots (combat or jungle type).
- One pair of black gloves with inserts.
- One field jacket.
- Two pairs of ear plugs with cases.
- Two padlocks.
- Pocket calculator.
- Sewing kit with canvas-type needle.
- Clip board.
- Two black grease pencils.
- Two black ink pens.
- Two #2 pencils.
- Loose-leaf notebook with paper (8½ by 11).
- Toiletries, underwear, and the like, as needed.

In addition, students may want to bring the following items:
- Map case.
- Ruler.
- Camouflage netting for face/weapon veil.
- Bush hat.
- 550 cord.
- Highlighter.
- OD green tape.
- Knife.
- Ranger Handbook.
- Pruning shears.

When properly trained, equipped, and employed, a sniper can be a potentially decisive factor on the modern battlefield. He more than pays his way in combat, because he lives by the sniper motto—"One shot, one kill."

Captain Mark L. Rozicky, commander of Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry at Fort Benning, is responsible for the operation and administration of the Sniper School. He previously served with the 82d Airborne Division and the Berlin Brigade.

EVALUATION POINT SYSTEM

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<th>GRADED AREA</th>
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<th>MINIMUM STANDARD</th>
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Team Spirit 88
Light Division, Heavy Challenges

LIEUTENANT COLONEL COLE C. KINGSEED

A light division's combat mission is to deploy rapidly to defeat enemy forces in a low intensity conflict and, when properly augmented, to fight and win in a mid-to high-intensity conflict as well. Nowhere has its ability to accomplish this mission been demonstrated more clearly than in Team Spirit 88 in Korea, the largest joint military exercise in the free world.

As a participant in that year's exercise, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) deployed from Hawaii to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in late February and early March 1988. The division quickly assembled and conducted interoperability training with a number of ROK and U.S. units. The division also participated in a ten-day joint/combined training exercise over rugged and unfamiliar terrain. It then conducted after-action reviews at all levels of command. These reviews not only provided valuable lessons for small units fighting in a mid-intensity environment, they also identified several issues that merit additional study.

First, to conduct sustained operations, a light division must be augmented by mission-specific combat, combat support, and combat service support units. During Team Spirit 88, the 25th Division deployed with an infantry brigade, a 105mm howitzer battalion, a 155mm howitzer battery, and the division base, which consisted of the division headquarters and elements from the division's signal, air defense, military intelligence (CEWI), and combat engineer battalions, as well as appropriate representation from the division's organic service support commands.

The division's combat forces were rounded out with a ROK regimental combat team, a light attack brigade from the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized), a ROK armor battalion, two ROK 105mm howitzer battalions, a ROK 155mm howitzer battalion, a ROK engineer battalion, a U.S. floating bridge company, a Reserve Component TOW light antitank (TLAT) company, and other combat support and combat service support units.

LIAISON

Because of its structure, a light division does not easily accommodate augmenting units, particularly during a joint/combined exercise. For example, it does not have the manpower to provide enough liaison teams to coordinate with the augmented units. But liaison teams are essential to successful operations, and the necessary personnel, vehicles, and equipment have to be found somewhere in the division.

In addition, the selected liaison personnel must be carefully screened to make sure the teams are proficient in the necessary language requirements and operational terminology. The attachment of numerous specialized units, such as engineer and combat service support battalions, also requires a careful orchestration of the already scant number of command and control vehicles and equipment.

The entire concept of getting the combat service support from augmenting commands requires continued examination. Combat service support units are designed to support a division, not separate brigades. When they support separate brigades, there is no longer a habitual relationship between a support battalion and a maneuver brigade, and the light division support command base cannot be divided three ways. The receipt of attached brigades without a support package makes this situation worse.

Particular challenges arise when a non-U.S. battalion is attached to a U.S. light infantry force or when heavy forces are attached to a light force. According to the prevailing doctrine, support for an attached force comes from the unit to which it is attached. In joint/combined operations, though, differences usually complicate this effort, and a light division, in most instances, is simply not up to providing the necessary support.

Fortunately, early coordination to determine the exact requirements and an attempt to use common forms during the exercise, coupled with meticulous logistical planning, resulted in relatively smooth support being extended to the maneuver elements attached to the 25th Division.

Just as the major subordinate commands had problems with augmentation, small units and even battalions had similar problems. Ideally, a light division needs additional radios to make the command and control of augmenting units easier, but the division lacks communica-
tion flexibility. During Team Spirit 88, the 25th Division was reasonably successful in this regard because of prior training with task force elements and tactical exercises without troops. In fact, training as a task force before the exercise greatly eased the smooth absorption of non-organic units, but this may not always be easy to accomplish in other situations. This warrants a hard look at the command and control of augmenting forces to a light division.

STRENGTHS

In addition to identifying areas that need additional study, the exercise also confirmed several of the light infantry division's strengths. To succeed, light leaders must exploit the advantage that terrain can offer to their units. Throughout the exercise, small unit leaders made excellent use of secondary and tertiary trails in moving rapidly around and through enemy strongpoints. Constant reconnaissance of routes of entry and egress saved valuable time and gained a mobility differential over enemy armored units. Movement on the main road networks was kept to a minimum, and this reduced casualties considerably.

The most striking lesson learned during the exercise was the tremendous advantage the conduct of night operations offered to light units. Platoons and companies were extremely successful when they fought during hours of limited visibility. The movement of units from squad to battalion size was not detected when conducted in the evening. The reconnaissance of routes and the rehearsal of actions en route and at the objective were also absolutely necessary.

Another factor that contributed to successful operations during the exercise was the careful scrutiny given to the load the soldiers carried. Obviously, the considerations of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time) were the primary planning factors in determining the combat load. During periods when soldiers were required to move rapidly, for instance, they carried a "light fighter's load" consisting of load carrying equipment with poncho, poncho liner, entrenching tool, and a single MRE (meal, ready to eat). Non-essential equipment was cached, and the men remained confident in their unit's ability to provide additional ammunition and rations when they were needed. Light leaders must be willing to accept a certain degree of risk and avoid burdening their soldiers with unnecessary weight.

Dismounted fighting over a wide area also demonstrated the need to conduct extensive leader training. When communications failed, units that had used tactical exercises without troops, command post exercises, situation training exercises, and officer professional development courses to train their leaders were generally successful. Similarly, units that had regularly conducted extensive radio/telephone operator training had fewer problems than their counterparts who had not. This was particularly true when these units received attachments and other augmenting forces. Careful preparation and first class training before Team Spirit 88 significantly improved the leaders' ability to command and control their units.

Finally, a clear understanding of the commander's intent proved to be the single indispensable factor in a unit's success on the battlefield. At times, units moved both day and night without being able to communicate with their commanders. Those units in which the commanders had required their subordinate leaders to brief them on their proposed schemes of maneuver and fire support plans to make certain they were in accordance with his intent were uniformly successful.

In summary, Team Spirit 88 clearly demonstrated the ability of a light division to perform its combat mission in a mid-intensity scenario. The exercise identified certain areas that merit additional study and confirmed that light forces can and will be successful if they are employed properly. Light leaders must become familiar not only with the doctrinal constraints, but also with the inherent advantages of a light force. A light force can and will survive on the modern battlefield if leaders train the force properly. Team Spirit 88 provides an excellent case study for just such an analysis.

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Training During an Alert

CAPTAIN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND

Today’s Army has to be prepared to fight and win in a “come as you are” war, and almost all of its divisions are subject to no-notice alerts and readiness exercises. This means that a great deal of the time immediately preceding an actual deployment is spent “locked in” barracks, marshalling areas, or alert holding areas. Even in rapid deployment units that routinely maintain battalions on short-notice alert, there are often times when political or command decisions can cause units to move to a high state of readiness—and then to sit and wait.

On these occasions, much valuable training time is usually wasted. Units that routinely undergo emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDREs) can and should use this time for training that will fine-tune an already well-trained unit and better prepare it for action.

Obviously, once an alert has been called, it is too late to begin collective training. But in every well-trained unit there are still individual and crew tasks that are highly perishable, that somehow have been neglected or overlooked, or that may apply only to the particular situation for which the unit has been alerted.

One task that falls into this category is something I’ll call “weapons handling.” Some of our allies call it “skill at arms,” which, in addition to marksmanship ability, requires detailed technical knowledge, expertise in assembling and disassembling weapons, rapid reloading, immediate actions, and more than just a passing familiarity with all of the unit’s organic weapons.

Other tasks are crew-served weapon drills, handling of enemy prisoners of war (EPW), first aid, aircraft and armored vehicle recognition, fire direction center procedures, and requesting and adjusting indirect fire and close air support.

With a little imagination and a minimum of training support, time, training areas, or training aids, a unit can conduct many of these tasks during an alert.

An additional benefit of this type of training is that it profitably occupies the soldiers’ time and helps to alleviate boredom and harmful speculation. It can be conducted in such a way as to maintain a calm, low-key atmosphere in the holding area. This is particularly important during a real-world contingency alert when units may be “locked down” for days on end.

GET READY...AND WAIT

During such an alert last year at Fort Ord, my unit was ordered to move, within three to five hours, from a post support role to an advanced state of readiness. This included loading and palletizing all the equipment, drawing troop weapons, making final checks of personnel records, and getting the troops aboard transportation for the departure airfield.

But as so often happens in this line of work, once we were ready, we were told to “wait for further instructions.” All of our coordinated training had been cancelled, and it wouldn’t have been much use to us anyway because we were not permitted to stray far from the unit area. Facing the prospect of an extended wait and then possible deployment into combat, my subordinate leaders and I saw a training opportunity and began to devise ways to take advantage of it.

First, we found some lessons from the British experience in the Falklands War. During their mobilization and deployment, they had conducted rigorous physical conditioning and daily training on weapons and first aid. Procedures for adjusting indirect fire, preventing cold weather injury, and handling prisoners also received high priorities.

Then I recalled some lessons from my own experience in Grenada as a second lieutenant platoon leader in the areas of EPW handling and military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). Our doctrine on these areas does little to train a soldier for the situations he is most likely to encounter:

• Searching and handling large numbers of civilians and refugees in the battle area who are probably not hostile but among whom may be some weapon-bearing enemy soldiers or deserters.

• Clearing large tracts of buildings and houses that are unoccupied or that are occupied by innocent non-combatants but still must be cleared without unnecessary property damage or loss of life, and with minimum effort and ammunition expenditure.

• Requesting and controlling close air support provided by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.

From these examples, we devised our training. First, our physical training program continued. We changed from battle dress to PT clothing and conducted our workouts in the unit area. After determining how much time we could afford to wait for a platoon to return from PT in the event of orders to move, we also
conducted runs of limited duration and distance from the unit area.

The second task of our program was a simple talk-through review of our company tactical SOP. Items that we highlighted included basic unit standards; actions during movement and halts and upon contact; law of land warfare; operations security; reporting; and hand and arm signals.

The training continued with first aid taught by the platoon medics (who were on alert with us). This included a hands-on review of the common tasks such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, the lifesaving steps, treating penetrating wounds and sucking chest wounds, and more advanced techniques such as administering intravenous (IV) solutions. This last task is one that every combat arms soldier should know but one that we had not trained our soldiers to do because of budget constraints and a general reluctance to “waste” IV fluids. But this particular alert situation removed many of these roadblocks—every soldier received instruction in administering IVs, and several in each platoon got a chance to actually administer them.

Our weapons handling training was mainly a refresher, because we conduct this type of training regularly. It includes load, fire, clear, and reduce stoppage drills; rapid reloads from different positions; machinegun and mortar crew drills; and “down gunner” drills with the squad members taking turns manning the machineguns. For dummy ammunition, we used expended blank rounds and links.

POW and search team training emphasized handling civilians and refugees in addition to enemy combatants. We practiced some techniques of one-man and two-man “live” searches as well as our SOP for searching wounded and dead enemy soldiers.

Our final training task during that day was on methods of requesting and controlling close air support. One of the NCOs from the fire support team taught the class to all the leaders from the fire team level up. Using a sandtable, some toy soldiers, a few cotton balls, models of an Apache helicopter and an F/A-18 Hornet, he was effective in communicating the techniques of employing attacking aircraft and also some of the safety considerations. This training ended with a practical exercise in which leaders were picked from the group, given a target, and tested on their ability to “talk” to the “pilot,” help him get his eyes on the target, and avoid fratricide.

In seminar fashion, we discussed the problem of clearing buildings in a third-world urban area with the additional complication of civilian occupants. Some of the ideas that we came up with for this were the following:

- Maintain a low profile; inner and outer walls can easily be fired through.
- Use a signal mirror to see around doorways and into rooms without exposing more than a few fingers to a possible enemy.
- Burst into rooms ready to engage an identifiably hostile target but without throwing a preparatory grenade or spraying the room with automatic fire. (Once it has been determined that the room contains hostile personnel, the rest of that building can be cleared in textbook fashion.)

The training planned for the next day of the alert included PT, more weapon handling (with the emphasis on refreshing the cross-training the troops had received on weapons other than the ones they were assigned); more hands-on practice administering IVs; classes in aircraft and armored fighting vehicle recognition (concentrating solely on the aircraft and vehicles we could expect to work with or encounter if we were actually deployed); and a sandtable exercise designed to improve leaders’ proficiency in calling for and adjusting indirect fire. This would be done in much the same way as the close air support call-up with a sandtable and a simple sketch map complete with grid lines and coordinates depicting the “terrain” on the sandtable. Finally, to provide a break and a morale boost, a period of organized athletics would be conducted, consisting of volleyball and touch football.

That evening, however, we received the order to stand down, and while the NCOs tended to the breakdown of the pallets and the turn-in of equipment, a couple of the platoon leaders and I reviewed what we had learned. With regard to the training, the alert had shown us that there were some vital tasks that needed greater emphasis in the future—more advanced first aid techniques, and techniques of clearing simple wooden buildings that are “most likely” not occupied by enemy soldiers.

During later discussions, and while collecting comments for an after-action review, the NCOs and officers of the company came to the following conclusion: Our training program for the previous year had done its job and, with the few exceptions mentioned, had prepared us for battle.

As ready and confident as a unit’s leaders may feel, though, there is still plenty of room for improvement to guide its future training. Even after the next alert is called, a unit’s leaders must use every minute before deployment to polish the skills that will fine-tune it for action.

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Night Firing

MASTER SERGEANT EDWARD C. SHELLEY
SERGEANT FIRST CLASS FRANK A. RECKTENWALD

A night vision device (NVD) is a tool that can give a rifleman an advantage if he is trained properly in its use. The problem is that too many units expect their soldiers to be able to engage targets effectively before they have learned the characteristics of their particular NVDS and the proper zeroing techniques for them.

Soldiers must understand how to operate their NVDS before they go to a range. And before they mount NVDS on their weapons, they must be thoroughly familiar with Technical Manual (TM) 11-5855-213-10 (AN/PVS-4).

Preliminary marksmanship instruction must also be conducted before going to the range. Until the soldiers are familiar with the equipment and zeroing techniques, this training should be conducted during daylight hours, followed by reverse cycle training to include detecting and identifying targets at night.

Next to zeroing, operating the NVD is the most important part of the instruction. For example, soldiers must be able to install batteries, identify and use the controls, and have a thorough understanding of the reticle they are using. This phase of training can be conducted in a classroom environment, and the TMs have good illustrations that can be enlarged into training aids for teaching soldiers the various types of reticles and the meaning of each line and dot inside a reticle.

Before zeroing, an NVD must be mounted securely to the weapon. The best technique a soldier can use to mount the AN/PVS-4 on an M16 rifle is to push the AN/PVS-4 mount on the rifle's carrying handle all the way forward and then use a cartridge case to increase leverage as he tightens the M16 mounting knob. After firing a few rounds, he should recheck the mount. Using the same method each time should ensure him that his first round will be a hit. Any soldier who has zeroed his NVD correctly should be able to remove the device, remount it, and engage targets effectively.

SUGGESTIONS

The following are some suggestions for more accurate and consistent zeroing:

First, soldiers should be required to fire from supported positions. The standard 25-meter zero target should be used (not the Canadian bull target). The aiming point is the center of mass of the target, and the bullet strike should be 7 centimeters from the center for the M16A1 or A2 and 11.9 centimeters for the M60 machinegun. It is best to zero at night because the daylight cover sometimes poses problems by causing a double and triple image inside the sight.

Once zeros have been obtained at 25 meters according to the operating procedures in the AN/PVS-4 technical manual, soldiers should confirm their zeros on a metal target at 250 meters. Although the following method is not found in the standard manuals, it has been used at Fort Benning during sniper training and has improved accuracy and hit ratios. It is simple and inexpensive to use.

A one-half-inch homogeneous steel target (20 inches by 40 inches), painted white, is placed at a range of about 250 meters. When a bullet hits the metal target, the white paint chips away and leaves a noticeable mark or impression. After firing, a soldier uses an AN/TVS-4/4A night observation scope to focus in on the target and see where his rounds hit.

Each firer should aim for the center and make sure his bullets are hitting at that point. If the rounds are hard to observe, tracers can be used. Adjustments can be made using the minute-of-angle theory—one click on the reticle elevation or azimuth adjustment actuator equals one inch at 100 meters, two inches at 200 meters, and three inches at 300 meters.

Reticule adjustments on the AN/PVS-4 are marked to indicate the direction of movement of the strike of the rounds. If a shot group is high and to the left of the desired impact point, for example, the elevation adjustment is moved in the down (DN) position and the azimuth adjustment in the right (RT) direction. (The reticle inside the sight will move in the opposite direction, but the soldiers should disregard this movement.)

This method is extremely accurate, and it allows the soldiers to confirm their zeros with immediate feedback. The audible bullet impact on the metal target also reinforces the soldiers' confidence that their particular sights are zeroed accurately.

The AN/PVS-4 should be handled carefully when it is not in use. A place should be designated for storing it in each type of vehicle while it is being transported, and it should be secured at all times.
If it malfunctions, the procedures in the TM should be followed. The TM outlines certain tests and inspections that a firer can use to determine the probable cause of a malfunction and the corrective action he should take.

The use of the AN/PVS-4 on the M60 machinegun is not recommended. The machinegun’s large muzzle flash can cause the scope to “white out” or shut down after the first one-or-two-round burst, and this may require the gunner to cease fire before the targets again become visible. The heavier recoil and vibration of the M60 also frequently causes the device to become damaged more quickly than when it is mounted on an M16.

Using NVDs on machineguns sometimes encourages gunners to fire at night and disclose the locations of their weapons, which, according to our night doctrine, should be used primarily to fire on massed targets and to lay down final protective fires. A trained rifleman using a properly zeroed AN/PVS-4 is usually more effective and less susceptible to detection.

Tracer ammunition is not recommended for use except as a last resort. It is the most erratic (least accurate) ammunition available and, because of slightly different ballistics, does not usually have exactly the same point of strike (zero) as ball ammunition. Tracers also make it easier for the enemy to locate the firers’ positions.

Leaders should issue night vision devices only to soldiers who have good vision. Although the devices have an adjustable focus, they cannot always compensate for serious vision problems.

More important, commanders need to understand that rifle marksmanship, with or without night vision devices, is a skill that requires continuous repetition, reinforced by competent coaching and instructing. They must realize that for their units to achieve full marksmanship readiness, they must allocate more ammunition and time for night training. Night firing is a dying art that must be rejuvenated. Adequate resources, expert trainers, and, above all, command emphasis are the keys to this recovery.

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Double Your Dragon

CAPTAIN MARTIN N. STANTON

The M47 Dragon is the Army’s standard medium antitank missile. It is the only major antitank system in light infantry and non-modernized mechanized infantry units. The basic Dragon system consists of three major end items—the SU-36 day sight tracker, the AN/TAS-5 night sight tracker (with batteries and bottles), and the round itself (guided missile surface attack M222). The range of the system is 1,000 meters with a 12-second tracking time at maximum range.

Most people in the infantry know all this.

But not too many people I talk to realize that the Dragon has a unique capability: The SU-36 day sight and the AN/TAS-5 night sight are independent of each other, and this enables a single Dragon system to launch two missiles simultaneously.

This capability exists both in daylight and at night because of the thermal imagery of the AN/TAS-5. (The sight tracks heat sources and is not dependent on ambient light magnification.) The SU-36 day sight tracker can be fired under coordinated illumination from artillery pieces or mortars, which is the way Dragons were employed before the advent of night sights.

The “two for one” firing capability of the Dragon is especially important, given the firing characteristics of the weapon in terms of range and tracking time.

The range of 1,000 meters or less makes the Dragon, by definition, a weapon of decisive engagement. Usually, when Dragons start firing, the battle has reached its crisis, and the ability to shoot and scoot becomes secondary to the ability to mass fires into an engagement area.

By using both the day sight and the night sight trackers, a unit commander could double the mass of his Dragon fires and reduce the time spent reloading missiles. That is to say, this would increase the chances of expending all the available ammunition at the appropriate time. Also, by spreading his rounds out among both day sights and night sights, a commander could reduce the effects of losing individual firing positions to enemy counterfire.

The employment technique of using both day sights and night sights is not
without its problems, though. A few of the more considerable ones are the following:

**Fire Control.** With two groups of people looking through two different sights (normal day sight picture and thermal image sight picture), target acquisition and fire control is more complex. Both groups must be more careful than usual to avoid target duplication.

Passive control measures such as trigger lines, target reference points (TRPs), and engagement areas must be clearly visible through both the day sights and the thermal sights. Thus, if the kill zone commander wants to have some of the Dragons engage command-type vehicles as a priority, he would do better to assign these tasks to the day sight Dragons, because it is easier to discern the radio antenna configurations of command vehicles through the day sight. In addition, he should be wary of giving fire commands to a Dragon gunner who is using a thermal sight by describing characteristics that the gunner can't see: "Shoot that one with the number 106 on its turret" is not a good fire command for him.

In addition to passive control measures, active control measures become more difficult, because infantry squads are not equipped to provide a radio to each Dragon system; there is one GRC-160 for each mechanized infantry squad, and one PRC-68 for each light infantry squad. It stands to reason, then, that each squad leader will probably have to control the fires of two Dragons using voice commands or signals. This is going to make it more difficult for a platoon to fire all of its Dragons at the exact same moment. Rehearsals and passive fire control measures are the key. A commander should spell out the criteria of engagement for each gunner. The following is an example:

*When the enemy crosses Trigger Line Bruno, that road there. See it? Then you are to fire into engagement area 24 north of TRP 2. See TRP2? Those two engineer pickets with the white sign attached to them. It also has as a thermal source an ammo can with lighted heat tablets in it for the night sights. Your primary engagement area is north of that white sign from that bush to that building. If no one comes north of the road, you are to wait until the enemy elements pass you and cross Grey, that second major road there, and then engage them south of TRP 2 with shots into their flanks and rear. Your priorities are command and control vehicles (tanks with more than two antennas), ADA vehicles, engineer vehicles, infantry carriers, and all other armored vehicles. Now repeat what I just told you.*

Detailed fire control instructions and control measures are the best insurance against having the gunners fire too early or too late, and these measures also increase a unit's ability to mass its fires.

**Obscuration.** An easy solution to fire control, of course, would be to put all the thermal night sight trackers on one engagement area and all the day sight trackers on another. But this does not take into account the enemy's use of obscurants. Thermal trackers must be positioned so they can fire throughout the unit's engagement area. Then, even if the enemy succeeds in partially or completely obscuring the engagement area, all the thermal systems will still be able to engage targets. In this situation, a unit must practice moving its missiles from the day sight tracker positions to the night sight tracker positions to ensure a steady volume of fire.

**Night Firing.** Any night firing with the day sight tracker, of course, will require some sort of coordinated illumination. This will almost invariably be furnished by the unit's mortars, but it may be from supporting artillery battalions. Flares in the kill zone are not a good idea, however, because they will present a confusing thermal source to the AN/TAS-5 gunners.

A light infantry company has an advantage here over a mechanized company because it has two 60mm mortars. These mortars may not be big people killers, but they provide plenty of illumination just when the commander needs it. The maximum range of 60mm illumination is 950 meters, and it has a burn time of 25 seconds. This means that if the commander of a light infantry company plans to use his day sight trackers at night, he had better think of bringing along more illumination rounds for his 60mm mortars. Using battalion mortars for illumination is the next step, but this requires extensive coordination and rehearsal.

Registering illumination is an excellent idea, but it has to be balanced against the possibility of giving away the unit's intent to enemy reconnaissance elements. The most important thing is timing. The enemy is not going to be in your kill zone for long. Even if there is an obstacle to slow or stop him, he won't sit still; he'll get out as quickly as he can. The commander and his fire support officer must make sure the illumination pops at exactly the right moment so that the Dragon gunners can inflict the greatest possible damage.

**Positioning.** The best positions for massing Dragon fires into an engagement area are not necessarily the best
ones for massing fires to repel an infantry assault. The decision must be based upon the commander’s METT-T analysis and his acceptance of risk.

The key to being able to employ all the Dragon sights effectively is training. Far more men are going to have to be qualified as Dragon gunners with both day and night sights. In addition, company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders must be aware of some problems with using MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) for Dragon training. MILES is a good engagement simulator, but it reinforces some bad habits with regard to the actual employment of the Dragon missile system:

- It gives troops the false impression that it is all right to lug a missile around with the tracker permanently attached. Both trackers should be left in their carriers until the last possible moment.
- It does not force junior leaders to plan on where in the scheme of maneuver they are going to mate the tracker to the round. In the assault position? At phase line so and so? There is no one right answer, but the question needs to be part of the thought process.
- It gives no practice in the vital task of mating a round to the tracker. This should be a practice drill with soldiers showing quickness and an absolute economy of motion.
- It is reloadable, but a Dragon missile is not. If a squad’s basic load is three rounds, then it needs to train to carry three rounds, not one Dragon MILES and three ATWESS (antitank weapon effects simulation system) cartridges.

In addition to all of these considerations, manning the extra Dragons can be a problem. The fact that most infantry Platoons average 25 men does not help matters. If a platoon has three Dragon systems and uses all six sights, that will occupy a quarter of the platoon. For a mechanized infantry platoon, the percentage is even worse. The best solution is to evaluate both the mounted and dismounted threats, to build sets of positions to deal with both, and to rehearse moving from one to the other based upon the commander’s analysis of the threat.

Finally, there is the problem of the soldier’s load, especially in light units.

Who will carry the four rounds per Dragon system (two for the day sight and two for the night sight)? A commander will sometimes be faced with the decision of what other equipment to leave behind. The decision to go Dragon-heavy will always be based on METT-T, with the emphasis on mission, enemy threat, and the terrain to be traversed.

As a rule of thumb, the suggestion to use both sights and carry extra rounds is more practical in the defense than in the offense. In the defense, it is possible to pre-stock ammunition so the soldiers don’t need to be overloaded.

In summary, the Dragon system is probably going to be with us for some time to come, and we as leaders must always be looking for new ways to use what we have. We owe it to our soldiers and the Army.

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**TOWs in the Offense**

**Techniques of a Motorized Force**

**CAPTAIN CRAIG J. CURREY**

In traditional heavy task forces in an offensive situation, their TOW 2 weapons normally take on an overwatch role to support the attacking armor or infantry forces. But in a motorized “middle-weight” force such as the 9th Infantry Division, TOWs are used aggressively in offensive operations. Recent exercises, including Devil Strike, the first motorized rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), have demonstrated that an expanded role for the TOW in the offense is possible if certain techniques are carefully applied.

The 9th Division’s combined arms battalions consist of a mix of TOW companies (each with 20 TOW 2 systems mounted on M966 HMMWVs) and light motorized infantry companies, each with many MK19 grenade launchers and Dragons, as well as with the entire range of infantry support arms. Each battalion also includes a combat support company with scouts, heavy mortars, and an additional antitank platoon of TOWs. This force structure enables a battalion to take several agile and lethal approaches to its conduct of offensive operations.

In a movement to contact against a moving enemy, for instance, it may employ a single axis formation, which allows the scouts and other attached forces to act as security elements, with
a light motorized infantry element supported by a platoon of TOWs following as an advanced guard. In a two-axis movement, the security force is beefed up to operate on both axes, and an advanced guard element is provided for each axis.

In either case, the HMMWV TOW companies follow and use their speed and mobility to by-pass or flank an enemy contact on any axis and use their standoff range ability to set up hasty engagement areas (EAs) to destroy follow-on enemy forces.

Thus, the flexible, aggressive use of TOWs in the offense allows the security elements to locate enemy formations using the full capacity of the weapon well forward to provide long-range killing power to an infantry-heavy advanced guard. For example, in a meeting engagement, the TOW companies can actually destroy the bulk of an enemy force without becoming decisively engaged.

In this kind of action, the TOW companies move to positions that best allow them to engage the enemy. They will quickly occupy a “gun line” (platoons on line in hasty positions that take advantage of whatever cover and concealment is offered by the terrain). While pre-planned engagement areas allow for easier command and control, the TOW units must remain flexible enough to allow the commander on the ground to adjust to the terrain and the enemy’s movements to maintain the necessary standoff ranges and allow for flank and, if possible, rear shots.

In occupying a hasty engagement area, the TOW commander relies heavily on his subordinate leaders to position their TOWs to get the best fields of fire. Command and control are therefore critical, and fire control becomes difficult.

Dispersion and all-around security are also critical factors that must be considered. A TOW platoon will disperse according to an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time). As a security measure, a platoon leader should position his platoon in a lazy W formation, because a linear one is more susceptible to enemy air attack. By occasionally repositioning his sections, a platoon leader can make his gun line more difficult for the enemy to identify and therefore to engage.

As a company commander orchestrates his gun line with the help of his platoon leaders, individual gunnery and crew skills (the cornerstones of a motorized force’s effectiveness) come into play. Defensive EAs can be prepared in detail since an area can be secured, occupied, thoroughly briefed on the ground, and rehearsed, but offensive EAs must flow from SOPs and good planning. In either case, a gunner should have a pre-planned trigger line. If he does not, his squad leader must identify one for him on the basis of the TOW’s effective range or what the terrain will allow. A squad leader also assigns sectors of fire.

The company commander develops pre-planned target reference points (TRPs) or designates potential TRPs upon arrival at a hasty EA. Platoon leaders add any necessary platoon TRPs and make sure each squad leader knows all the TRPs and understands the firedistribution plan for those TRPs. If, for example, an old hulk or building is in the EA, one platoon might be assigned to shoot to the left of it while another would shoot to the right of it. A TRP will also include when to fire, priority of targets, method of engagement (including individual or volley fire), and the sectors or sequencing of enemy vehicles to ensure their greatest possible destruction.

In ideal situations and terrain, the M966s cannot afford to become decisively engaged at ranges of less than 2,000 meters in the offense, because they have little ballistic protection. At lesser ranges, without a dug-in position and with its slow rate of fire and long tracking time, the M966 will usually lose. Disengagement criteria therefore become critical. If the FM radio links break, the subor-
M966, the system is fast and can maneuver to destroy the enemy. It is even capable of moving behind an attacking infantry force in a deliberate attack and slipping by or fighting through a weakly defended enemy position.

Since the TOW is the main killing system in a motorized force, it must be ready to conduct such offensive operations if the force is to accomplish its mission. With a well-trained force, the necessary techniques of fire control, dispersion, and gunnery can help a TOW company survive and win.

Captain Craig J. Currey, when he prepared this article, was commander of Company A, the TOW company in the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry, 9th Infantry Division. He previously served with the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment at Fort Lewis and with the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry in Korea.

If you are a company commander, one of your most important tasks is templating fires accurately, both the enemy’s and your own. A quick template of enemy positions showing the arc of the weapons’ ranges will show the enemy fire sacks and will help you make sure you can cover your engagement area with your weapon systems. You can make a weapons template that will help you do this.

Draw the template (Figure 1) with an alcohol pen on acetate and then sandwich the acetate between two pieces of combat acetate. Draw the friendly line and weapons in blue, the enemy in red. Mark miles and kilometers in black. Put a small hole through the base mark and each of the weapon system marks.

Put a pin in the base hole and put it over the weapon position on the map. Put a marker in the appropriate weapon system hole and mark the arc. When this process is completed, you should be able to identify and avoid fire sacks.

An example of how the template can be used is shown in Figure 2. This example considers a Soviet BMP platoon in a defensive position.

Submitted by Major John N. Helin, S-3, 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas.
ENLISTED CAREER NOTES

INFANTRY BNCOC POI REVISED

As a result of a worldwide conference on the Career Management Field 11 Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) held in November 1988, the Infantry School is refining the program of instruction for Infantry BNCOC.

The improvements to the present POI, scheduled for implementation this year, include hands-on as well as written diagnostic testing, M16 qualification before graduation, a train-the-trainer module for infantry squad weapons, a live-fire situational training exercise (STX), shared training, certification STXs for 11B, 11C, 11H, and 11M military occupational specialties based on the new mission training plans (MTPs).

M16 RIFLE QUALIFICATION FOR ANCOC

Qualifying with the M16 rifle is now a prerequisite for graduation from the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC).

Beginning the third quarter of Fiscal Year 1989, the same prerequisite will apply to Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) graduation.

RESERVE COMPONENT NOTES

ATTENDING ACTIVE ARMY SERVICE SCHOOLS

When an AGR soldier's requested training is approved by the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN), he is obligated to attend that training. If he fails to attend without a valid reason and a proper excuse from the Enlisted Management Division, he will not be granted a subsequent quota.

An AGR soldier should notify his commander when he finds that he cannot attend the training. His commander will then immediately notify the soldier's personnel manager (Toll Free 1-800-325-4119), and follow up in writing through the chain of command stating why he could not attend the approved training.

ARMY CORRESPONDENCE COURSE PROGRAM

Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers are encouraged to use the U.S. Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) to improve their SQT scores and their chances for successfully completing a resident Active Army service school.

In some cases, AGR soldiers attending resident Active Army service schools tend to have a difficult time meeting course standards.

Soldiers who attend skill level 3 training are either extended in the present course, recycled to a skill level 1 course for retraining in skill qualification, or returned to their units as academic failures.

Soldiers should review their SQT results with their commanders or unit trainers to determine areas that need improvement and then enroll in the ACCP in accordance with DA Pamphlet 351-20.

AGR SERVICE OBLIGATION

The purpose of the U.S. Army Reserve's Active Guard Reserve Enlisted Promotion System is to fill AGR noncommissioned officer requirements with soldiers who have demonstrated their ability to function in the next higher grade.

The promotion system is not intended as a reward for faithful service on release from active duty, discharge, or retirement.

By accepting a promotion, a soldier agrees that he will take action, if necessary, to adjust his expiration term of service (ETS) or release from active duty (REFRAD) date to provide for the fulfillment of the obligation he incurs. Promotion to staff sergeant or sergeant first class incurs a one-year AGR obligation, and promotion to master sergeant or sergeant major incurs a two-year AGR obligation.

During the term of the incurred obligation, a soldier cannot apply for nondisability retirement, but he can be released from active duty for reasons provided in AR 635-200. Ordinarily, a soldier will not be released from active duty for ETS or termination of an AGR tour order during the term of the incurred obligation, because he will have taken action to adjust his ETS/REFRAD date.

May-June 1989 INFANTRY
OFFICER ASSIGNMENTS: The NTC
Infantry Branch, PersCom

EDITOR’S NOTE: This article is the first in a series that will concentrate on assignment opportunities for branch qualified Infantry captains. The intent of the series is to inform officers on the type of duty positions available and to describe each assignment briefly. This information will help officers select assignments and discuss them intelligently with their assignment officers.

The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, has become the premier training facility for mechanized infantry units based in the continental United States. And with the recent concept of mixed light and heavy forces, the NTC has also become the focal point for the development of light/heavy operations.

Infantry Branch at the Total Army Personnel Command (PersCom) views an assignment to the NTC as critical to future Army readiness. Each Infantry officer selected for duty at the NTC is therefore personally screened by the Infantry Branch Chief, and the officer’s experience and performance determine his suitability for this duty.

Every captain being considered for assignment to the NTC must be branch qualified (see Figure 1). Since most of the units that train at Fort Irwin are mechanized, prior company command in a mechanized unit is desired. With the addition of light infantry units on rotation at the NTC, however, there is also a growing requirement for officers with light infantry company command experience.

Previous duty performance is the primary consideration. Because these officers will probably serve as company trainers (observer-controllers) during their tours at the NTC, it is imperative that only the best infantry officers be selected. For this reason, only officers who have consistently high officer evaluation reports are competitive for selection.

Because of the current stabilization policy of 48 months for CONUS assignments, officers normally serve four years at the NTC. An exception to this policy is an assignment known as Project Warrior, which is designed to export the knowledge and experience gained at the NTC to the TRADOC service schools. Under this option, an officer is assigned to the NTC for two years, then reassigned to a service school (the Infantry or Armor School, for example) where he serves as a small group instructor or develops and writes doctrine.

An assignment to the NTC has two distinct advantages over other “away from troops” assignments. First, an officer can remain tactically and technically proficient and can actually influence future doctrine. Second, the knowledge he gains from observing units in training puts him in an excellent position for an assignment as a battalion S-3 or executive officer when he returns to troops. In fact, commanders in Europe are now specifically requesting officers with NTC experience to fill these key positions.

Duty at the NTC is extremely demanding. An officer who is assigned as a trainer spends an average of 200 days in the field each year. Field time is not unusual for most infantrymen, of course, but when they are serving in “away from troops” assignments, it is often the exception rather than the rule.

During an assignment to the NTC, an Infantry captain serves in several different duty positions. Typically, his initial position is as an operations analyst at battalion or company level. In this capacity, he is responsible for providing a detailed technical analysis of company and battalion operations. The information he gains during the force-on-force engagements is given to the company trainers to use in preparing after-action reviews.

In addition, analysts are responsible for the following tasks:

- Assist units in conducting MILES equipment checks.
- Analyze the task force operations order.
- Analyze the company operations order.
- Prepare training aids for the after-action review—audio-visual equipment, sandtable, and charts.
- Monitor company maneuver during force-on-force engagements.

Once an officer has served as an analyst, he is ready to perform the duties of a company trainer. A company trainer's main responsibility is to observe and control the rotational companies during their tactical missions, 24 hours a day.

A typical task force rotation is shown in Figure 2. The specific duties of a com-

![Figure 1](image-url)
SPECIAL FORCES SELECTION BOARD

In June, Special Forces Branch will consider all applications for transfer to Special Forces from Year Group 86 Infantry officers. The deadline for applications is 2 June 1989.

Interested officers should forward their application packages to Commander, PersCom, ATTN: TAPC-OPE-SF, 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0411.

RECORDS UPDATE

Officers frequently complain that their orders for decorations and skill badges do not appear on their Official Military Personnel Files (OMPFs) as quickly as they would like. The reason these orders are sometimes delayed is that the office that handles them also handles OERs, and the OERs are given priority.

Officers should allow up to six months for the processing of documents other than OERs.

FA DESIGNATION, YEAR GROUP 84

Functional area (FA) designation for officers in Year Group 84 will take place in the Fall of 1989. Year Group 84 consists of officers whose date of rank is between 1 October 1987 and 1 February 1988.

Infantry Branch will write directly to each of these officers to solicit their functional area preferences and undergraduate

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INVASION BRANCH POINTS OF CONTACT
(Effective 15 June 1989)

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<th>ASSIGNMENT AREAS</th>
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<td>Branch Representative USAIS, Ft. Benning</td>
<td>CPT Bunting</td>
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*For commercial calls, use area code 202 and the prefix 325 (instead of 221) for PersCom; area code 404 and the prefix 545 for Fort Benning.
transcripts. Officers should begin now requesting their undergraduate records, Graduate Record Examination scores, and language test scores for forwarding to Infantry Branch.

In addition, these officers are encouraged to read DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization.

Officers who correspond with Infantry Branch about functional area designation should use the following address: Commander, PersCom, ATTN: TAPC-OPE-1 (FADSP-84), 200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0414.

IOBC STUDENTS MAY BRING FAMILIES

Married Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) students are encouraged to bring their wives and families to Fort Benning during their IOBC attendance. The course has an active wives program that includes orientation on Fort Benning, a briefing to acquaint them with the role they will fulfill, coffees, luncheons, and the Commandant's Reception. Wives will also have an opportunity to observe training and thereby gain an appreciation for their husbands' responsibilities.

An officer's decision to bring his wife and family to Fort Benning is a personal one, though, and may depend to a great extent on his financial condition. Normally, a student will not receive additional temporary duty funds for non-availability of quarters. This may make the decision even harder.

Prospective IOBC students who want more specific information (including an IOBC Welcome Packet if they have not already received one), should call the Personnel and Administration Center, 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry at (404) 545-3014/2824/4023 or AUTOVON 835-3014/2824/4023.

RESERVE COMPONENT NOTES

ROTC ASSIGNMENTS

About 60 ROTC Assistant Professor of Military Science positions (for majors) will be available during 1989.

Basic criteria include a 2.5 undergraduate grade point average, completion of an advanced course, and meeting height and weight requirements. Lower GPAs may be accepted if the applicant has a graduate degree or other qualifications that are useful in the position; for example, a local connection or recruiting experience.

Interested captains and junior majors may call their personnel management officers or the ROTC coordinator at (314) 263-9501 or toll-free 1-800-325-4118. An applicant must be prepared to provide copies of all his college transcripts and a good official photograph.

The nomination process takes from 45 to 60 days, and a permanent change of station usually occurs between May and August.

CAS 3

All Army Reserve Active Guard Reserve (AGR) majors and captains with less than 13 years of active commissioned service must complete the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS 3)

course conducted at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This mandatory training may be waived only for those officers who enrolled in or completed the Command and General Staff Course (any version) as of 1 October 1986. Officers who have credit for CGSC or its equivalent and who want to improve their overall professional development and potential on a voluntary basis may participate in the Reserve Component CAS 3 course taught by the U.S. Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools.

More information is available from personnel management officers.

KEEP RECORDS UP TO DATE

One of the most important things an Active Guard Reserve officer can do for himself is to keep his official military personnel file (OMPF) up to date.

Since AGR officers are scattered around the world, many of them may not be able to visit the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPENCEN) to review their military records. How do they make sure their records are current?

First, an officer should order a copy of his OMPF from ARPENCEN. The OMPF contains all of the authorized documents pertaining to his military career that are on file at ARPENCEN. The OMPF may be in either microfiche or hard-copy form. If it is in microfiche, a local library usually will have a microfiche viewer an officer can use. Viewers may also be found at military facilities and Reserve centers. If an officer's file is in hard copy, copies will be made and mailed to him.

He may request his OMPF by writing to the Commander, ARPENCEN, ATTN: DARPA-PSA-EVO, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132-5200. All requests for the OMPF must include full name, social security number, and signature.

After reviewing the file, if an officer determines that some items are missing, he should mail copies of these documents to the Commander, ARPENCEN, ATTN: DARPA-RRP-PMP, 9700 Page Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63132-5200. (AR 640-10, Table 4-1, "All Ranks Personnel": UPDATE lists the documents that are authorized to be in an OMPF.)

All documents received at ARPENCEN must have the officer's name, social security number, and primary area of concentration indicated prominently on them.
We are always pleased to tell you about some of the publications we have received for review from various publishing houses in the United States and in foreign countries. We thought you should know about these:

- VIETNAM PRIMER: LESSONS LEARNED. By S.L.A. Marshall and Lieutenant Colonel David H. Hackworth. A 1983 Reprint of an official U.S. Army publication originally printed in 1967 (Lancer Militaria, P.O. Box 886, Milledgeville, Georgia 31061). This pamphlet was sent to Vietnam in December 1966 by General Harold K. Johnson, then the Army’s Chief of Staff, on a 90-day mission to train combat historians in the technique of conducting combat interviews. Hackworth had only recently returned from Vietnam where he had spent a year in combat as a brigade executive officer and then battalion commander in the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Marshall was well known in Army circles for his experiences in two wars analyzing combat operations.

As a result, the two men were able to reconstruct most of the combat actions of the preceding six months. But they felt more was needed—something in writing that highlighted the lessons that had been learned and that could be used by young infantry leaders preparing to go to Vietnam. As Hackworth puts it in his recently published book, ABOUT FACE (a review of which appears later in this section), what was needed was “a handy-dandy little guide of do’s and don’ts on how to fight the bad guys.” This “primer” is the result, and it was published by the Army and given wide distribution.

General Johnson had this to say in his Foreword: “Their study is presented not as the official solution to all the ills that beset combat troops in Vietnam but as the authors’ own considered corrective and guide for the effective conduct of small unit operations....it can be read with profit by all soldiers.”

- RUSI AND BRASSEY’S DEFENCE YEARBOOK 1989. Edited by The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London. 99th Year of Publication (Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989. 361 Pages. $63.00). This particular edition of a long-standing series of yearbooks is divided into three major parts—an introductory feature on change and reality in the immediate future, an issues part that contains 20 individual essays on a variety of subjects by noted contributors from around the world, and a final part that has chronologies and other types of reference data. Several of the essays should be of interest to infantrymen—chemical weapons proliferation, the Egyptian army today, the Soviets in Afghanistan, glasnost and the Soviet military services, and military developments in space.

- AK47: THE COMPLETE KALASHNIKOV FAMILY OF ASSAULT RIFLES. By Duncan Long (Paladin Press, 1988. 185 Pages. $14.00, Softbound). In addition to providing a history of the Kalashnikov family of rifles, the author provides such information as the specifications for each model, streamlined field stripping and cleaning procedures, and ammunition loads and accessories. He also offers some thoughts about the best AK47-style sniper rifles, semiautomatic weapons, and light machineguns.

- POWER PACK: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965-1966. By Lawrence A. Yates. Leavenworth Papers Number 15 (Combat Studies Institute, CGSC, 1988. USGPO S/N 008-020-01149-5. 236 Pages. $9.00, Softbound). The author is a historian with the Combat Studies Institute and has long been interested in cold war history and military operations at the low intensity level. He feels that this particular operation “offers insight into a basic dilemma the United States faces in Latin America today” and should therefore be studied in that light. He emphasizes the military role in the operation without neglecting the political side and is able to point out a number of problems that plagued the military commanders as they went about their business of carrying out their mission. Despite the problems, the author concludes that Power Pack “fulfilled the requirements of a successful stability operation.”

- DRAGON OPERATIONS: HOSTAGE RESCUES IN THE CONGO, 1964-1965. By Major Thomas P. Odom. Leavenworth Papers Number 14 (Combat Studies Institute, CGSC, 1988. USGPO S/N 008-020-01147-9. 240 Pages. $9.50, Softbound). The author was formerly assigned to the Combat Studies Institute and in this study analyzes the series of events that led to and flowed from the commitment of Belgian paracommandos to free hundreds of European hostages being held in the cities of Stanleyville and Pointe-Noire.

He uses both primary and secondary sources to explain the U.S. role in the two operations as well as the international aspects of the overall mission. He offers many cogent lessons for our future thought and consideration and points out the difficulties inherent in any attempt to free hostages.

- A CHRONOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION, 1945-1985. By John E. Jessup (Greenwood Press, 1989. 952 Pages. $85.00). This is an ideal reference work, for it contains more than 10,000 entries arranged chronologically by year, month, and day. Each entry is a concise, factual description of an event with relevant background information and identification of the locale and the major participants. As the author puts it, “this is a chronology of conflict rather than of war.” His intent is “that it should be used as a research tool.” Fortunately, it does contain a detailed index as well.
as a glossary of abbreviations.

* THE WAY WE WERE. By Ken Bell (University of Toronto Press, 1988. 256 Pages. $39.95). Today, the author is one of Canada’s leading photographers. Yesterday, he served during World War II with the Canadian Army’s Film and Photo Unit. In this nicely put together book, he compares the then and now—Sicily, Italy, and northwest Europe of 1943-1945 and those same areas today. In some cases, he has found the same people and photographed them in the same places. This is a fascinating study of war and peace—war at its grimmest, peace at its loveliest. Anyone who served in the places mentioned, Canadian or not, should not overlook this one.

* THE FACTS ON FILE WORLD POLITICAL ALMANAC. Compiled by Chris Cook (Facts on File, 1989. 453 Pages). This book contains a mass of useful information on the political world since 1945—international organizations, diplomacy and treaties, warfare and armed forces, and elections and political parties. The author also includes brief biographical details of major statesmen and a glossary of international political terms.

Here are some of our longer reviews:


In the matter of war, there are some individuals who can start wars, some who can fight wars, and some who can stop wars. Retired U.S. Army Colonel David H. Hackworth definitely belongs in the second category. No one in the United States Army between 1950 and 1971 knew more about infantry combat at the platoon, company, and battalion levels than did this man— orphaned at an early age, a school drop-out, a street fighter with street smarts, a sergeant at 19, a commissioned officer at 20, a colonel at 40.

Hackworth began learning about infantry combat in Korea in late 1950; he ended his combat career in the Vietnam Delta in 1971. Along the way he earned two Distinguished Service Crosses, ten Silver Stars, seven Bronze Stars, and eight Purple Hearts, and was known throughout the infantry community as a “warrior.” He had made friends in high places (and a host of enemies), attended courses of instruction at Forts Benning and Leavenworth, written for publication (the Vietnam Primer mentioned above is one of his early efforts), and had earned two college degrees.

But beneath the veneer of civilized man, there remained the street fighter, willing to take on anyone who disagreed with him. With few exceptions he held the officer corps in contempt; he despised most of the senior commanders under whom he served, particularly those in Vietnam.

Eventually, his emotions won out and he went public with his disagreements with the way the war was being fought in Vietnam. The Army was not having any of his and retired him, but only after subjecting him to considerable humiliation. Since his retirement, he has lived most of his years in Australia.

The book is too long; some of the more personal events could easily have been omitted without harming the main story. But Hackworth does have a lot of good things to say about training soldiers and about leading those soldiers in combat.

At least two of the chapters are outstanding—16, “Box Seat,” and 17, “Corporate Headquarters.” (S.L.A. Marshall will never be the same.) And it is a story of U.S. infantrymen at war—a dirty, grimy, costly, bloody business at best. Ernie Pyle and Bill Mauldin told it in their way; Dave Hackworth tells of it his way.


Bud Hennings, former U.S. Marine, does not believe that patriotism is a dirty word or that it is dead in our country. He feels it needs a push or two every now and then and in this book—produced at his own expense and on his own time—he gives it that push. To him, there have been no greater patriots than those who have served in the ranks of the country’s armed forces and who have willingly offered their lives to protect and defend the Stars and Stripes and all our flag stands for.

This volume is the first of a planned three; it covers the period in our history from 1770 through 1918. It amounts to a comprehensive history of the U.S. armed forces written in a narrative style and arranged in chronological order by day. To that, Hennings adds much useful reference data and a detailed index.

Although the completed book is a true labor of love, it is also a valued reference tool, one that should be on the shelves of every library in this country.

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Some four years ago we had the good fortune to review IDEC 1985. We thought the publishers did a fine job in presenting a huge volume of information concerning defense equipment and defense industries. They have done equally well with this latest edition, and it is also a fine reference publication.

The three volumes describe new developments as well as existing defense systems, subsystems, components, and services. Some 600 firms from 26 countries, in fact, present more than 2,500 products. The entries are arranged according to the U.S. Federal Supply Classification (FSC) system, and 3,000 color illustrations complement the written product descriptions.

Volume I contains the users guide, explains the defense equipment procurement organizations in 29 countries, and explains the FSC system. Volume II has the product presentations from FSC Groups 10 to 23, and Volume III the product presentations from FSC Groups 24 to 101.

This book is must reading for the U.S. infantryman. Within its pages are the compiled thoughts on warfare of three of the most venerable scholars known to man: Ardant du Picq, Carl von Clausewitz, and Antoine Jomini. Most of the book is made up of condensed versions of du Picq's "Battle Studies" and Jomini's "Summary of the Art of War."

The portion dealing with Clausewitz is a short treatise titled "The Most Important Principles for the Conduct of War."

Most of the ideas discussed are as applicable to warfighting today as they were in the authors' times. Reading and studying this book can only improve one's understanding of warfare and its effects on man. These three works provide much of the foundation for our present-day doctrine and represent major contributions to the development of modern military thought.

Each text is preceded by excellent introductory summaries. I found these most valuable because they highlight the authors' lives and the essence of their philosophies.

The book is well worth its price and should be in every military professional's library.


When the Union Army of the Potomac crossed Virginia's Rapidan River in early May 1864, it had a new commander, Ulysses S. Grant. The days ahead under that new commander would bring a vastly different style of war to the eastern theater of operations.

As the Federal units crossed the Virginia river, their route of march led them into the Wilderness, remembered bitterly by many of the veterans because of the fighting that had taken place there in 1863. The still unburied remains of some of their fallen comrades had an even more sobering effect.

But unlike his predecessors, Grant's goal was to push through the Wilderness and engage Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia as soon as possible. Lee's goal, on the other hand, was to force Grant and his soldiers back across the Rapidan. The result—the battle of the Wilderness, fought on 6 and 7 May 1864.


The long range intercontinental bomber that was eventually born as the B-29 was conceived in the mind of aviation visionary Billy Mitchell in the 1920s. Initially, it was an engineering paper, first designated the B-15, but only one was ever built. The project stopped in its tracks when the United States prepared to go to war in 1940 and 1941 and emphasis shifted to producing the already tested B-17 and B-24 bombers.

Eventually, the effort was renewed. First flown in 1942, the B-29 endured one hazardous test flight after another. But the aircraft was ordered into production, and testing and development continued even while aircrews were being assembled and trained for the massive air war planned against Japan.

Even command and control was argued between the Navy, Army, and Army Air Force, with the B-29s finally being
assumed directly to General Hap Arnold, the head of the Air Staff in Washington, acting as the agent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With the help of hard-driving Curtis LeMay and a nucleus of experienced air crews from the air war over Europe, the B-29s proved their worth and Japan was pulverized by an ever increasing tempo of B-29 raids, culminating in the nuclear attacks against Nagasaki and Hiroshima. While the argument will probably never be settled as to whether the nuclear bomb's use was absolutely necessary, LeMay clearly states his belief that its use helped the Japanese "hasten the surrender process already underway," thereby saving at least one million American and three million Japanese casualties.

The appendix has a number of interesting tables that show all the major B-29 actions of the 20th Air Force and the development chronology of the various B-29 models. A number of photographs and illustrations are included, but the omission of a map of the area of operations is a glaring mistake in any military history. Nevertheless, this is an excellent reference for those interested in the air war against Japan during World War II.

**TO CHANGE AN ARMY.** By Harold R. Winton (University Press of Kansas, 1988. 284 Pages. $29.95). Reviewed by Captain Harold E. Raugh, Jr., United States Army.

Military historians have long attributed the development of mechanization and armored warfare in the British Army to the writings and influence of B.H. Liddell-Hart and J.F.C. Fuller. There were, however, a number of other soldiers who remained in the British Army during the Interwar years who played a significant, albeit less recognized, role in the modernization of that army.

One of them was General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, and this book concentrates on his role in the evolution of British Army tactics and doctrine between 1927 and 1938. Even though he held several important commands during that period of time and was instrumental in directing and assessing the trials of the Experimental Mechanized Force, in conceiving and supervising Britain's first large-scale mechanized operations in the desert, and in formulating the doctrine for the emerging Mobile Division, his role has remained relatively obscure. In this book, Burnett-Stuart's contribution has been ably placed within the larger context of British military doctrinal reform in general.

The author is a serving U.S. Army officer, and the book is based on his doctoral dissertation. His scholarship is impeccable and he has made use of a large number of unpublished sources and private papers. It is well-written and sheds much light on the British Army's subsequent performance in World War II.

**KOMMANDO: GERMAN SPECIAL FORCES OF WORLD WAR II.** By James Lucas (St. Martin's Press, 1985. 245 Pages. $16.95). Reviewed by Captain F.R. Hayse, United States Army.

When one thinks of special forces, he is more than likely referring to the current U.S. Army Special Forces, the so-called Green Berets. Unknown to many who claim to be expert in guerrilla warfare or in low intensity warfare and special operations, however, is the extensive use Nazi Germany made of special forces during World War II.

This book serves as a corrective as it encompasses all of Germany's wartime special operations forces—the Brandenburgers and the concept of vertical envelopment, the SS 500 Parachute Battalion, the Navy's special boat and frogman squads, the Luftwaffe's KG 200 squadrons, and the partisan-like Werwolfen.

Unfortunately, this book does have a number of faults. The author gives only limited information about many of the units he writes about and does not nearly satisfy those readers who want a more detailed account of how these units were organized, trained, and used. There is also an almost complete lack of operational diagrams and maps.

Despite these problems, overall this is a good book and is worth reading. It does provide a historical look at the use of special forces as force multipliers in conventional military operations.

**RECENT AND RECOMMENDED**


HELP!

We continue to be surprised at the relatively large number of student officers and noncommissioned officers attending various courses of instruction at Fort Benning who have never seen or even heard of INFANTRY, their professional bulletin.

This bothers us a great deal, because we send copies of the bulletin to every infantry company and battalion in the Active Army and the Reserve Components and to every senior Army ROTC detachment. (We also send additional copies to the Military Academy and to selected military schools.)

We can only assume, therefore, that those copies are not being made available to our soldiers and cadets, and that they are being treated as personal copies by the first people who get their hands on them.

We plead with the commanders of our ROTC detachments and infantry companies and battalions to see that the unit copies of INFANTRY are made available to their cadets and soldiers. We also ask the commanders to mention the fact that personal subscriptions are available. Just recently, for example, several newly commissioned infantry officers told us they knew of the bulletin but did not realize they could purchase subscriptions to it.

Our junior officers and noncommissioned officers in particular need the kind of information we publish. Please help us get that information to them.

INDEXES

Copies of our indexes for 1986, 1987, and 1988 are still available free of charge to anyone who writes to request them. These indexes, arranged by subject as well as by title and author, can be very useful in finding material on a certain topic.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

INFANTRY is available to subscribers at $12.00 for one year and $23.00 for two years. Foreign (non-APO) subscribers must add $4.00 per subscription per year to cover mailing (surface mail) and handling charges. Foreign air mail rates will be furnished on request. Single copies are $2.50 each if sent to a U.S. address.

Payment must be made in U.S. currency, by international money order, or by a check or draft drawn on a U.S. bank. For best service, payment should accompany each order, because we cannot start a subscription until we have received full payment for it. Checks, money orders, or drafts should be made payable to INFANTRY and mailed to P.O. Box 2005, Fort Benning, GA 31905-0605.

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