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COVER: Regardless of the advantages afforded by today’s technology, success in combat ultimately boils down to the infantryman relentlessly seeking out his enemy. This cover is based on a 1968 photograph of a radiotelephone operator and other soldiers in the Mekong Delta negotiating a log footbridge during operations of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division.

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Distribution: Special
The Commandant’s Note in the November-December 1994 issue of INFANTRY was my first as Chief of Infantry, and during the 18 months since its publication we have seen considerable progress—in the development and fielding of materiel, doctrinal, and training improvements—and identified new challenges in terms of the actions that will still be necessary as we continue to transition to Force XXI. We have come a long way toward improving the lethality, survivability, and sustainability of the Infantry, and in this note, I want to describe some of those improvements, and then outline what remains to be done to sustain the pace of modernization.

The basic mission of the Infantry—to close with and destroy the enemy—will remain, even in the face of the changing conditions that will confront the soldier of tomorrow; this aspect of combat has always been the most demanding, and will remain a decisive factor even during this time of sweeping technological advances.

The dedication of the Dismounted Battlespace Battle Laboratory’s Night Fighting Training Facility at Fort Benning has further consolidated our position as a leader in own-the-night technologies. Under an ongoing program to meet current and future night operational requirements by providing newer, lighter, and better technologies for the combined arms force, we have under development—or are already fielding—night vision goggles, infrared munitions, markers, and lights; and thermal weapons sights that have made it possible—for the first time in history—to see farther than we can shoot at night.

Additionally, such cutting edge developments as the Dismounted Soldier Combat Identification System, the Shortstop Electronics Protection System that can jam and detonate incoming proximity-fuzed shells, enhancements in target acquisition capability, and dramatic improvements in lethal and rapidly deployable tank-killing systems will reduce the effectiveness of the enemy’s weapons and tactics, while increasing the survivability and lethality of our own forces.

These improvements to the way we will fight apply to the entire Infantry force, light and heavy alike. The Land Warrior strategy—for example—employs an evolutionary approach to the soldier modernization effort, and is a program that will link the soldier to the digitized battalion, and will empower him to do his job as never before. The U.S. soldier of the next century will stride onto the battlefield with advantages in weapons and survivability that would astonish his predecessors.

The materiel upgrades to the Bradley force are receiving high priority, with the fielding of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) upgrades planned for this year. Improvements in land navigation capability such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and associated items of equipment will both reduce the likelihood of fratricide and enable commanders to accurately target an enemy and maneuver against him.

But the Bradley upgrade doesn’t stop there. The scheduled Bradley A3 modernization will represent a quantum improvement over even the ODS upgrades. The A3 will afford its commander and crew enhanced situational awareness through displays for the vehicle commander, gunner, squad leader, and driver; greater lethality by means of significantly improved target acquisition and digital fire control; and greater survivability through enhanced combat identification and overhead protection. To meet the requirement for the Future Infantry Vehicle (FIV) an eventual successor to the Bradley, an Integrated Concept Team (ICT) has been established at Fort Benning. The ICT has already begun meeting to examine the mission need and alternatives for the FIV, and will develop a viable milestone schedule for the FIV program.

Firepower has received its share of attention as well: the accuracy and increased lethality of the M121 tracked and M120 towed 120mm mortars will be complemented by enhanced precision guided munitions, the mortar fire control system, and an improved mortar ballistic computer. Battalion and company commanders will now be able to call upon organic and supporting indirect fire support that is more responsive, more accurate, and more deadly than ever before.

The individual soldier will also see improvements in his own
combat effectiveness, including the weapons he carries. Small arms are the essence of individual firepower, and the U.S. Army Infantry Center small arms strategy envisions a family of weapons that will nearly double the effective range of the soldier’s individual weapons, with commensurate increases in lethality. This will be accomplished through a combination of fire control innovations and bursting munitions, providing the decisive, violent target engagement that is often needed to disrupt the enemy and seize the initiative.

The infantryman’s ability to deal effectively with an armored threat will be substantially enhanced as a result of the Antiarmor Master Plan. A follow-on replacement for the TOW missile system will have greater range and lethality, and crews will be able to fire it from current TOW platforms, using an applique kit. This missile will be able to defeat advanced tank threats and countermeasures. The Antiarmor Master Plan will incorporate developing technologies, and includes the Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided Munition (EFOG-M) and the Line of Sight Antitank (LOSAT) systems.

The Infantry has long relied upon the machinegun to provide suppressive fire and sustained coverage of critical terrain to disrupt the enemy’s formations and break his will to fight. These missions will not change, but we will be performing them with even better machineguns than we had in the past. In the near term, the M240B, a ground version of the Bradley’s 7.62mm coaxial machinegun, will be the Infantry’s medium machinegun until the advanced medium machinegun is fielded. The venerable.50 caliber machinegun and the MK 19 grenade machinegun will be kept in service until they are replaced by the objective crew-served weapon.

These materiel initiatives are not the only improvements you can expect, however; the draft Task Force XXI manuals for scouts, antiarmor sections, the light and heavy platoon, and the light company and battalion have been sent to the field for comment before the final draft is published. Additionally, the drafts of Field Manual (FM) 7-30, The Infantry Brigade, and FM 90-10-1, The Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas, have been distributed. Other manuals on the battlefield task force, air assault operations, and stability and support operations are currently being drafted or revised and will likewise be fielded for comment this summer.

These are only some of the improvements that have been achieved thus far. We have also made considerable progress in that we have defined a number of challenges we must meet as we prepare the infantry force for the next century. Close to the top of the list is the requirement to accurately locate, identify, and destroy enemy forces in built-up areas. New MOUT (military operations on urban terrain) training facilities, such as the one at Fort Benning, must be designed to allow the greatest possible realism commensurate with safety requirements. In training to meet these and other mission requirements of the year 2010 with new technologies, we must strive to bridge the gap between our training media and the go-to-war equipment the soldier actually carries. Any artificiality in training can reinforce bad habits, a weakness that can be deadly in combat.

Sustainment of the Force XXI divisions is another issue that deserves our attention. We will continue to downsize while maintaining a combat-ready force that can execute a diverse array of missions, and sustainment of the force is an imperative that cannot be ignored. As we strive to increase both the number of dismounted Bradley infantrymen and the size of non-mechanized machinegun teams to assure the decisive edge in firepower, we may have to accept—and figure out ways to offset—a corresponding reduction in the number of combat service support troops. Force structure offers challenges that will require our best effort if we are to field and sustain a force that will dominate the battlefield. The Iraqi army learned many bitter lessons in the Gulf War; one of those was the folly of conducting mobile combined arms warfare against an opponent whose logistical doctrine and materiel were both carefully planned and well maintained.

Today, threats to our Nation’s interests can take many forms, and we must train to meet all of them. As a result of domestic economic realities and the collapse of the threat we faced a decade ago, we now have fewer forward deployed forces to respond to those threats, and because of that, one of our preeminent missions is force projection. If we are to accomplish this successfully, we must achieve—and maintain—an over-matching capability in lethality, survivability, and the sustainability of our deploying forces and their command and control assets. And to do this, we must train even at a time when we are challenged to do more with less.

This, therefore, is the state of the U.S. Infantry as we approach the end of the 20th Century. The United States Army and the fighting spirit of the American infantryman have sustained our great Nation for more than 220 years, as her defender in time of war and an instrument of her foreign policy in time of peace, even in those times when no external threat was readily apparent. As I mentioned earlier, force projection will remain one of our major missions; today the U.S. infantryman stands as the centerpiece of our force projection Army. We owe it to him to ensure that he is the best trained, best equipped, and best supported fighter on the battlefield. We have done this in the past, and we must continue to do it in the future, even in times as austere as these. We have seen lean years before, and we shall see them again, but we must sustain the pace of modernization and readiness if we are to perform the missions entrusted to us. The stakes are far too high for us to do otherwise.
"I'LL TAKE THE '60"

I found the two articles in INFANTRY’s November–December 1995 issue on the machinegun’s role both informative and thought provoking (see “Machineguns in the Infantry,” by Maj. James B. Baldwin, pages 7–8; and “Thoughts on the Medium Machinegun for the Light Infantry Company,” by Capt. Matthew M. Canfield, pages 9–12). As a rifle platoon sergeant in the 41st Infantry Brigade, I have some points to make that are worth considering in the evolution of this extremely important part of the infantry’s firepower.

There is a great deal of argument about the relative merits of the M249 and the venerable M60. Proponents of the M249 argue that the high-powered NATO 5.56mm round has roughly the same ballistic properties as the 7.62mm ammunition used in the M60. They also tell us that an M249-equipped team can carry a larger basic load of ammunition than a team using the M60. Taken at face value, these would seem to be good reasons to replace the M60 with a newer and more reliable weapon. When considered in total, however, it seems clear that, although the M249 is an important part of the squad’s firepower, it does not meet the platoon leader’s need for a medium machinegun.

The medium machinegun evolved on the basis of the need to place accurate, long-range, automatic fires on a target. The M60 was the weapon the Army selected for this role, and it has served us well since its adoption, years before many of today’s soldiers were born. Now, the M240 appears slated to replace it (at least in the Active Army). This is an intelligent and logical decision. The idea of supplanting the M60 with the M249 is not.

The use of one weapon to perform dissimilar roles has never met with a great deal of success. For example, how many of us can honestly say that an M16-equipped automatic rifleman truly accomplished a mission different from that of a rifleman carrying the same weapon? Doctrinally, there may be important differences in roles and missions at the lowest (and most important) level, but these differences often blur under the pressure of operational necessity. While the M249 might perform some of the requirements for a medium machinegun, it will inevitably be forced to perform in a support role that is better handled by a heavier weapon.

The argument for a larger basic load flies in the face of current doctrine. The ability to carry over 800 rounds is important, but the really important factor is to put steel on target, not to carry an unrealistically large number of bullets. The soldier’s load is already too heavy. If we have to carry something, let’s make it powerful enough that the payoff outweighs the negative aspects of getting that weapon onto the objective. When the supporting position opens up with M60s to initiate an assault, there will be no doubt that rounds are moving downrange. I do not think the effect from the M249
will ever match that, ballistic tables notwithstanding.

We now have an extremely effective supporting weapon in the rifle company—the 60mm mortar section. The medium machinegun is certainly capable of firing in the indirect role, as Captain Canfield explained, but it is not nearly as well-suited to this role as the mortar and other weapons presently in the Army’s arsenal. In my unit, every soldier already load. I doubt that the addition of the ammunition needed for indirect machinegun fire will “add value” to our load. The creation of another specialized MOS does not seem like a good idea either.

Large machinegun-equipped units were established by the World War I combatants to address the seemingly insurmountable obstacles presented by barbed wire, trench fortifications, and heavy artillery. In terms of manpower and control of the battlefield, medium and heavy machinegun battalions represented a logical solution to defense-oriented warfare. But under the fast moving conditions of our current style of war, this kind of unit would be left in the dust.

The answer clearly is not the creation of a new doctrine or MOS. Every answer to the question of the machinegun’s role lies within the foundation of our tactical doctrine—from Field Manual 7-8, the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, through Lieutenant Colonel William C. David’s series of articles in INFANTRY. (See “Preparing a Battalion for Combat: Physical Fitness and Mental Toughness,” May–June 1995; “Marksmanship,” July–August 1995; “Route Clearance Operations,” “Preparing a Battalion for Combat: Maneuver Live Fire Training,” and “PIRs: What They Are…And Are Not” (September–October 1995). These issues in particular will stay in our unit library. Keep up the good work.

EDWARD STEELE
MSG
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

EDITOR’S NOTE: By now, these units should have received two more issues of INFANTRY, with additional articles that we believe will be equally relevant—on countermachinegun missions in operations other than war (OOTW), riot control, and cold weather operations in the January–February 1996 issue, and on law of war training and infiltration techniques in this March–April issue. Coming up are also articles on training the rules of engagement and military operations on urban terrain.

INFANTRY would welcome articles on tactics and lessons learned from soldiers currently serving in Bosnia.

LOOKING FOR COMMENTS ON DMA MAP PRODUCTS

My newly formed team of cartographers with the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) recently completed team training. As a result, we are now looking for input from the users of DMA products to help us improve the products we create. Already, one soldier has told me that, on 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 scale TLM maps, he uses a magic marker to mark the grid values to make them easier to see.

There must be other ideas out there that enable one person or a small group to outperform others. These new ways, if adopted by all, could help make everyone more successful. They might save us money, or you, lives.

If you would like to learn more about DMA products, use E-mail: cogliani@dma.gov. Or send me your ideas through E-mail: carlsonw@dma.gov; or write me at the Defense Mapping Agency, 3200 South Second Street, St. Louis, MO 63118-3399.

BILL CARLSON
THE DOCTRINE DIVISION of the Infantry School’s Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, is writing Change 1 to Field Manual (FM) 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company. The Chief of Doctrine is requesting your thoughts and ideas regarding the manual’s contents.

As infantry units worldwide receive new weapons and equipment, or participate in realistic combat training center (CTC) rotations and actual deployments to hot spots, they invariably learn important lessons and develop useful techniques. These lessons and techniques can be used by infantrymen in other units and should be included in company-level doctrinal literature.

The primary purpose of the change to FM 7-10 is to provide updated doctrinal guidance on the principles of employing the Javelin antitank missile, soon to be fielded, and various items of own-the-night equipment, such as laser pointers and infrared illuminators.

Additionally, the Infantry School wants to provide users in the field with relevant tactics, techniques, and procedures for light infantry combat as well as stability and support operations. The School is seeking comments from current and former commanders at company level, especially those with CTC or operational experience within the past five years, specifically dealing with the following questions:

- What parts of the existing FM 7-10 do you feel are no longer relevant or contain outdated information and should be changed?
- What issues, if any, are not addressed in the current manual that you think should be included?
- What specific lessons have you learned from recent combat or training that you believe should be passed on to other units in a doctrinal manual?
- What was the most striking thing you learned from your last combat or stabil-}

The Infantry School will review your comments on these topics for potential inclusion in the change to the manual. Input should be received by 30 June but will be accepted at any time. Although there is no standard length or format for submissions, you should state the point you want to make as clearly and concisely as possible. Please include an address or telephone number where you can be reached in case additional information is needed.

Send your comments to Commandant, U.S. Army Infantry School, ATTN: ATSH-ATD, Fort Benning, GA 31905-5000; or call Mr. Durante at DSN 835-7114 or commercial (706) 545-7114. E-mail may be sent to: durantea@benning.army.mil or FAX to DSN 835-7500 or (706) 545-7500.

THE SOLDIER ENHANCEMENT Program (SEP) continues to examine commonsense ways to improve the lethality, mobility, and survivability of soldiers on the modern battlefield. Since its inception in 1990, the purpose of SEP has been to accelerate the acquisition of lighter, more lethal weapons and improved soldier items of equipment, and to get that new equipment to soldiers in the field in three years or less.

Since the request for proposals went out last August, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager-Soldier has received 155 separate submissions from industry, Army staff agencies, major commands, and soldiers in the field. Each proposal was initially screened to ensure that it met the SEP minimum criteria: an item worn, carried, or consumed for individual use in a tactical environment. It was then forwarded to the Soldier Systems Command (SSCOM) Project Manager-Soldier for technical risk assessment by the research and development community. Following the technical risk assessment, the TRADOC proponent schools evaluated each proposal to determine whether there was an operational need or requirement for the item. Proposals that met the criteria, were low-to-moderate technical risks, and solved a battlefield deficiency or need were then briefed at the Annual SEP Review at Fort Benning in early March 1996.

Of the 155 projects submitted, 43 new proposals were briefed as potential “new starts” for Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 funding. The SEP Executive Council then met and voted to fund the following 15 new projects beginning in FY 1997:

- Heavy sniper weapon system.
- M249 feed-tray cover.
- M249 flexmount for the M249 light machinegun.
- Improved buttstock for the M4 carbine.
- Weapon flashlight.
- Close quarters battle sling for M4 carbine.
- Shoulder holster for 9mm pistol, left/right handed.
- Pistol belt extender.
- Improved underlying insulating layers for the extended cold weather clothing system (ECWCS).
- Alternate-wear hot weather boot.
- Extreme cold weather boot.
- Ballistic/nonballistic face and body shield.
- Beverage/cooler cup cooler.
- Improved fuel bar for heating and cooking.
- Physical fitness uniform.

The procurement of commercially available samples and the testing of new starts will begin in October 1996.

In addition to reviewing new start proposals at the Annual SEP Review, current programs (both Army and Marine Corps) were reviewed and the following Army programs carried over:

- Stabilized binoculars.
- Improved chemical biological protective glove.
Enhanced incendiary grenade.
Lightweight chemical overgarment.
Stun hand grenade.
Individual soldier radio.
Optic sight, M249, M60, M240G.
Midsized non-lethal riot control agent dispenser.
40mm less-than-lethal grenade.
Shin and knee guards for riot control.
Anti-reflection device to reduce glare from optics.
Compression sack.
5.56mm cartridge, less-than-lethal.

The SEP program strives to make soldiers more effective or efficient on the battlefield by reducing their loads and improving lethality, survivability, command and control, sustainment, mobility, and quality of life in the field.

THE INFANTRY School is now on the INTERNET with the Fort Benning Homepage. This homepage and the many others that can be reached through it have been developed to give the whole Army a better understanding of Fort Benning and the Infantry Center and School.

To get to the Fort Benning Homepage, go to the following World Wide Web (WWW) address: http://www.benning.army.mil. From there, information is available on the following topics and much more:

General welcome-to-Fort Benning information.
Basic Fort Benning maps.
The Fort Benning command group.
Fort Benning’s community activities.
The Ranger Training Brigade.
The Infantry training community and training literature.
Infantry Force XXI.
Martin Army Community Hospital.
Infantry doctrine development.
Infantry Center highlights.
The Donovan Technical Library.
The installation phone book.

Additionally, the Fort Benning Homepage provides you with links to many other web sites of interest to the typical infantryman:
The TRADOC Homepage.
The Federal Web Locator.
SOLDIERS Magazine.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned.
The Army Research Institute.
The Infantry Branch Bulletin (INFANTRY).
Electronic forms on-line.

Plans for the future call for the Infantry School to provide on-line access to all of its doctrinal and training literature such as field manuals, training circulars,

and mission training plans. Even now, the doctrine development homepage contains information on the status of doctrine writing projects, and all of the pages contain the names, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses of points of contact at Fort Benning who can help with more detailed information.

THE GUIDED PARAFoil Airborne Delivery System-Light (GPADS-L) is being produced under a recent contract let by the U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Center. It can deliver payloads weighing 500 to 1,500 pounds onto preprogrammed targets.

The guidance system is a complete, off-the-shelf, commercial product that has been independently developed over the past five years. Its mission planner and simulator allow the user to input primary and secondary targets, waypoints, and estimated wind conditions, and then to test for all probable mission scenarios. In flight, it continually compensates for changing wind conditions and automatically adapts to different payload characteristics. The system is designed to be failsafe: It will not accept “impossible” missions and will warn the user of marginal mission profiles.

THE LAND WARRIOR and Generation II Soldier programs were combined recently to meet the changing needs of the Army. A new development strategy agreement was signed at Fort Benning in February 1996.

Working together, the Army’s Soldier Systems Command and the Infantry School will develop and field Land Warrior—the first integrated soldier system—by the end of FY 2000.

Land Warrior is designed to enhance the warfighting capabilities of the individual soldier. It relies on five subsystems: computer radio, protective clothing/individual equipment, software, integrated helmet assembly, and weapon system. These subsystems and their components are shown in the accompanying box.

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<th>Computer/Radio Subsystem</th>
<th>Integrated Helmet Assembly Subsystem</th>
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<td>Computer</td>
<td>Lightweight Helmet with Suspension</td>
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<td>Squad Radio</td>
<td>Image Intensifier with Flat Panel Display</td>
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<td>Global Positioning System</td>
<td>Laser Detectors</td>
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<td>Video Capture</td>
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<td>Chemical/Biological Mask</td>
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<td>Protective Clothing/Individual</td>
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<td>Equipment Subsystem</td>
<td>Laser Rangefinder</td>
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<td>Advanced Load Carrying Capability</td>
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<td>Modular Body Armor</td>
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<td>Chemical/Biological Garment/</td>
<td>Wiring Harness</td>
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<td>Glove/Boot</td>
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<td>Modular Weapons System</td>
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<td>Software Subsystem</td>
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<td>Software</td>
<td>Laser Aiming Light</td>
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<td>Government Furnished Software</td>
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In October 1994 the 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 24th Infantry Division (now the 3d Infantry Division) deployed to Southwest Asia as part of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. Its mission was to configure and deploy the Army’s prepositioned-afloat contingency stock to deter possible Iraqi aggression. The mission was successful, and it served to validate and improve prepositioned-afloat doctrine.

The Army War Reserve-3 (AWR-3), the Army’s prepositioned equipment afloat, was exercised for the first time during this operation. It represents the Army’s latest move toward flexible response and the rapid deployment of heavy forces.

AWR-3 is based on a heavy brigade (plus), or an armored cavalry regiment, and the associated combat support and combat service support elements normally included in brigade level operations. Additional CSS elements are included because of the unique requirements of ship off-load, port, and onward-movement operations.

The post-VIGILANT WARRIOR force consists of four balanced task forces (TFs) of two infantry companies and two armor companies, a field artillery battalion reinforced by a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battery, a heavy division engineer battalion, an enhanced support battalion, an air defense artillery battery, a military police company, a signal company, a military intelligence company, a chemical company, and a brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). The force is prepositioned on five “roll-on roll-off” (RO-RO) ships, three of them Cape H-class and two Cape D-class.

Additionally, the brigade is supported by a composite transportation group, a heavy corps support group, and a terminal services company for port operations currently prepositioned on three RO-RO ships, two of which are Cape W class. The equipment is accompanied by a 15-day supply of most required classes. These ships are currently sited at two separate locations, ready to sail in contingency operations.

**Doctrine**

Prepositioned-afloat doctrine is described in Field Manual 100-17-1, *Army Prepositioned Afloat* (Draft). The purpose of the prepositioned heavy force is to allow for the introduction of a heavy combat brigade in several roles. These roles range from rapid peacetime response in support of operations other than war, to reinforcing an ally with credible force, to reinforcing an initial lodgment in a forced-entry situation.

Doctrinally, the first task force is prepared to conduct combat operations 15 days after notification. Ideally, port-opening forces arrive first, along with the support ships to establish port operations and the port support activity, followed by the brigade’s combat forces.

The combat forces receive the equipment, finalize its configuration, conduct precombat checks and services, and prepare for onward movement. In an unconstrained environment, the doctrine calls for the brigade (plus) to be prepared for combat operations 22 days after notification.


The Army Materiel Command “owns” the equipment and is tasked with preparing, issuing, and accounting for it to the gaining unit. Army Forces Command provides the operational forces to fight using the prepositioned equipment.

The Air Mobility Command provides strategic airlift support to move the operational forces with the “to accompany troops” (TAT) equipment to the sea port of debarkation. The Military Traffic Management Command manages the port support.
and coordinates the onward movement of the configured heavy brigade. The successful execution of the doctrine requires the coordinated effort of all the major commands involved.

Several Army elements participate in prepositioned-afloat operations to produce the required combat power. The Army Service Component (during VIGILANT WARRIOR, the U.S. Third Army, Army Central Command) assumes operational control of the equipment and determines the type of forces required as well as the size of the force that is to be landed and configured.

The primary Army elements that fall under the Service Component during the operations are the combat brigade, the corps support group, and the composite transportation group. The combat brigade provides forces to operate the equipment and to conduct operations with the configured equipment. It deploys in accordance with the Time-Phased Force Deployment Document (TPFDD), providing drivers and mechanics early in the effort as an additional port support activity package to help with off-load operations.

The corps support group, which provides port support activities and logistical support, begins to establish the required troop life-support facilities. The composite transportation group, which operates the port, provides motor transport for onward movement. The detailed coordination of these elements is the task of the Army service component headquarters.

The prepositioned-afloat program is further described in the battlebooks produced for each ship. Each battlebook provides a wealth of critical information. Each gives a generic overview of the entire AWR-3 fleet, followed by detailed information for the specific ship.

The battlebook lists the units whose equipment is stored on the ship, the equipment authorized for those units, and what equipment—if any—is not on board at the time of publication. The modified tables of organization and equipment for the units also provide information that is critical for determining TAT requirements. Additional, each battlebook contains a detailed, foldout stowage plan for the ship (deck-by-deck) that describes where all of the equipment and containers are stowed. The container list identifies the container by serial number and describes what is in each. The task force (TF) ships carry 1.5 basic loads of ammunition, which the battlebook describes by Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC), quantity, and container number.

Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR demonstrated the need to get all battlebooks to the using units as early as possible and to keep them up-to-date so that they accurately reflect the property on the ships. The battlebooks are now being updated in accordance with the modifications to AWR-3 made during the operation.

Effects of the Operation

As a result of Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR, the warfighting capability of the AWR-3 improved dramatically. The prepositioned stocks were loaded in pure battalion and company units as space was available before the operation began.

Several ships had to be downloaded so the “slice” elements could be arrayed to take full advantage of the heavy task force’s capabilities. By order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AWR-3 set was reconfigured and restowed during VIGILANT WARRIOR, and it now represents a more effective fighting force. The intent was to create ships that would more closely represent a heavy task force when downloaded. The task forces converted from pure battalions (two tank and two mechanized infantry) to balanced task forces of two tank companies and two mechanized companies each. The combat support and combat service support elements were then dispersed among the four balanced task forces, which represented a more accurate picture of the “habitual slice” found in a task force.

The engineer battalion was broken down into three companies and an HHC. The three companies were stowed on TF ships 1, 2, and 4, with the headquarters company on TF ship 4, creating an engineer-heavy task force.

The artillery battalion (M109A2 and M109A3) was also divided among the TF ships. Batteries were placed on TF ships 1, 2, and 3. The reinforcing MLRS (multiple-launch rocket system) was also stowed on TF 3, along with most of headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) to create an artillery-heavy ship.

The air defense battery was also prepositioned on the TF ships. Bradley fighting vehicle Stinger platoons were stowed on TF ships 1 and 2, with the HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) Stinger section and the
headquarters section being stowed on TF ship 3. TF 4 did not receive an air defense slice because of scarce resources and the requirement to maintain unit integrity for command and control purposes.

A military police platoon was stowed on TF ship 1, and the rest of the company was stowed with the support battalion on TF ship 5. The brigade command and control module, consisting of HHC and an MSE (mobile subscriber equipment) signal company, was stowed on TF ship 2. The military intelligence company and the chemical company were stowed on TF ship 4.

The “fightable” ship concept was strengthened by several lessons learned during VIGILANT WARRIOR download operations:

A ship discharge package (SDP), consisting of forklifts and rough terrain container haulers (RTHCs), was placed on each TF ship. (The SDPs were previously consolidated on several non-task-force ships, which slowed discharge of individual ships before the arrival of the one carrying the SDP.)

The SDPs were restowed near the ramp of the RO-RO ships to facilitate rapid access. Also stowed near the ramp were recovery assets organic to the task force—M88 tracked recovery vehicle and 5-ton and HEMTT (heavy expanded mobility tactical truck) wrecker—which were needed to move any vehicles that could not be started.

Maintenance support teams (MSTs) were stowed on the four task force ships to improve logistical abilities. The MSTs, constructed from support battalion assets, consisted of an M936A1 wrecker, two M109 shop vans, a contact truck, a 5-ton truck to carry tools, and a HMMWV and an M113 for command and control. The MST on TF ship 4 is not complete because of shortages in several pieces of equipment, but all TF ships also have the organic maintenance capabilities of the HHC.

The task force stows were also improved through better use of the available ships. The brigade ships are H-class and D-class RO-RO vessels. The H-class is 20 percent larger than the D-class, providing more stowage capacity.

The support battalion equipment, previously stowed on one of the larger H-class ships, was restowed on a D-class ship, allowing the first three task forces to be stowed on the H-class ships. This modification enabled a larger slice of support elements to be placed with TFs 1, 2, and 3.

After-action review comments indicated the need for several additional modifications, and these suggestions will help make the AWR-3 even more effective.

An engineer company should be added to AWR-3 so that all four task forces have an engineer company in direct support. A fourth artillery battery should also be added to ensure that all task forces have indirect fire support available until the force can be massed; then the artillery elements can revert to the control of the artillery battalion. The remaining SDPs and maintenance support teams should all be fully resourced.

Major improvements were also made among the individual vehicles that make up the AWR-3 fleet. These vehicles were brought up to fully-mission-capable status and were combat configured. Previously, vehicle basic issue items, components of end items, camouflage nets, and radios were stored in containers on board the ships. The configuration of the vehicles required that the containers be downloaded and the equipment issued to the individual vehicles for combat storage. The vehicles were reconfigured with all of the above equipment before being restowed during VIGILANT WARRIOR; this will save precious time for the next user of the vehicles and equipment.

The communications status of the AWR-3 was also improved during this operation. The radios in TF 1 were upgraded from 12-series nonsecure to SINGCARS (single-channel ground and airborne radio system) secure radios following onward movement to Kuwait. The upgrade will enable deploying units to fall in on equipment like that at home station. The other task forces are equipped with 12-series radios, which will be upgraded to SINGCARS during subsequent maintenance periods. The mobile subscriber element signal company will support the AWR-3 once the required shelters for the M1037 HMMWVs arrive with the deploying unit.

The addition of several equipment types will continue to improve the AWR-3 and reduce a major portion of the TAT requirement, making the force more “fightable.”

A Bradley fighting vehicle should be provided for the brigade commander (if it is an infantry brigade), as well as several Bradleys to serve as operational readiness floats during combat operations.

Vehicles and the radios required for a tactical air control party (TACP) are not a part of AWR-3 at this time. The TACP is a critical combat multiplier for a heavy brigade and a bulky TAT requirement as well. The AN/TPQ-36 counterbattery radar should also be added to the fleet.

Although the required 5-ton trucks and HMMWVs are stowed, the radar and support equipment is not. To make the most of the chemical company capabilities, decontamination trucks and NBC reconnaissance vehicles should be added to the force. The MSE signal shelters should also be prepositioned on board the TF ships to increase the AWR-3 and decrease the TAT requirements. Stowing the above-listed equipment would reduce the amount of critical equipment that would have to be restowed on other than the first five ships.

AWR-3 is a heavy force projection tool that is available worldwide for major regional contingencies. It provides the flexibility today’s Army needs to meet diverse requirements. Because of its basic design, any heavy Forces Command brigade unit can use it.

Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR validated the principles of AWR-3 and also provided the opportunity to continue improving the force and the doctrine involved in prepositioned-afloat operations.

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British Company or Squadron Group
In the Hasty Attack

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP J. BRANDLI

The diversified missions the U.S. Army is performing around the world today reflect the role it is likely to continue to play as we enter the next century. Operations other than war, joint peacekeeping efforts, and coalition operations such as DESERT STORM demand that commanders and leaders at all levels have a better understanding of our prospective allies’ training and tactics. The purpose of this article is to discuss the equipment and doctrinal aspects of a hasty attack, as it would be conducted by a British company or squadron group.

A British Army battlegroup is a combined arms force grouped, or organized, around the headquarters of an armored infantry or armored battalion. An armored infantry battlegroup conducts an advance (or movement) to contact with either an armored infantry company or an armored squadron (company equivalent) leading, depending upon the tactical situation.

When contact is made with the enemy and that contact warrants a hasty attack, British Army Field Manual, Battle Group Tactics, calls for the attack to be conducted by the company or squadron group rather than by the battle group. Exercises conducted at the British Army Training Unit in Canada provide valuable lessons that are incorporated into the tactics, techniques, and procedures of armored and armored infantry battle groups.

The battle group organizes for combat with two company or squadron groups composed of an armor squadron and an armored infantry company. The battle group commander commands these groups, but each group is controlled by the commander whose force is leading it. For example, during an advance to contact with tanks leading, the squadron commander controls the group until the infantry moves into the assault, at which time control passes to the infantry company commander. While most U.S. leaders would be apprehensive about this system, the British find that it works for them.

Organization

The British armored squadron or company consists of a squadron headquarters of three tanks—one each for the commander, the second in command (2IC), and a troop sergeant (master gunner)—and three troops (platoons) of three tanks each. During an advance to contact, the squadron normally operates as a squadron (minus) with one troop grouped (task organized) with the leading infantry company. This platoon serves as the intimate support (IS) tank platoon. Once operations begin, the grouping is not likely to change. Although it is accepted that infantry and tank platoons may operate outside their normal company command for specific tasks, British doctrine considers this the exception rather than the rule.

The armored infantry company is organized with a company headquarters and three rifle platoons. The company commander (a major, hereafter referred to as the OC) and his 2IC ride in Warriors—British infantry fighting vehicles—configured as command vehicles. Each company is authorized a second captain, or Warrior captain, who rides in the OC’s vehicle as the gunner. With this arrangement, the Warrior captain stays oriented to the ground and the tactical situation. This enables him to maintain control over the company’s Warriors in the event the OC dismounts.

Each rifle platoon has four Warriors, one for the platoon commander and his headquarters element and one for each of his three sections (squads). In addition to the normal platoon sergeant, each platoon is authorized a second sergeant, or Warrior sergeant. The Warrior sergeant, the dedicated commander of a section vehicle, assumes control of the platoon’s Warriors when the platoon commander dismounts. The platoon sergeant, unlike his American counterpart, rides in the rear of the platoon commander’s vehicle and dismounts when the platoon dismounts.

Each infantry section consists of 10 men: a three-man crew that remains with the vehicle and a seven-man dismount element. When the infantry dismounts, a deputy vehicle commander assumes control of the vehicle and takes commands from the Warrior sergeant. The vehicle’s gunner, who is trained in that position, remains in the gunner’s seat throughout the operation.

A Milan antitank guided missile section from the battalion’s ATGW (our ATGM) platoon may be grouped with the infantry company. The section, consisting of two Milan systems, moves in FV432s (vehicles similar to the M113 armored personnel carrier), which cannot keep pace with the Warrior. This lack of mobility, coupled with the Milan’s 2,000-meter range and long time of flight, makes it a difficult system to employ. When a replacement for Milan is fielded, it will be pintle-mounted on the antitank platoon’s Warriors.

Warrior Characteristics

The Warrior is designed to carry a 10-man section with full equipment. Although space in the troop compartment
is limited, the Warrior has more storage space than the Bradley; less ammunition storage is required because the Warrior does not have port firing weapons or a TOW missile equivalent.

The vehicle is fast and agile, reaching speeds of 48 miles per hour with an operating radius of 500 kilometers. The Warrior has a high-performance suspension system and low ground pressure, which—combined with its speed—enable it to keep pace with the Challenger, the British main battle tank.

The Warrior’s main armament is the 30mm Rarden cannon, which fires armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) and high explosive (HE) rounds. It has a maximum range of 2,000 meters and can defeat lightly armored vehicles. The Warrior also mounts a 7.62mm coaxial chain gun similar to the general purpose machinegun (GPMG), the British equivalent to the U.S. M60. Both weapons can also engage helicopters. The vehicle commander and the gunner have image intensification, combined day and night sights.

The vehicle’s hull provides protection from air and ground burst 155mm shells at 10 meters and against armor-piercing rounds up to 14.5mm. The internal sides and rear have anti-spall linings, and the vehicle is fitted with an over-pressure system.

**Conduct of the Hasty Attack**

A successful hasty attack seeks to combine the Warrior’s shock effect and maneuverability with rehearsed drills and procedures to assault the enemy and fight through the objective. To avoid further confusion, the OC and the squadron commander must have a simple plan, and they must have sufficient and accurate information about the enemy and the objective.

The conduct of the hasty attack is best explained through the five parts described in **Battlegroup Tactics**:

**Deployment.** When the battlegroup close reconnaissance element (scout platoon) directs the company squadron group to conduct the hasty attack, the armored infantry company and the armored squadron move to a rendezvous and then to the “forming up” point (FUP), which is similar in purpose to a U.S. assault position. In the FUP, the company or squadron group finalizes plans for the attack and makes any required organizational adjustments. The company or squadron group spends as little time as possible in the FUP passing through it to move into assault formations, if drills and procedures have been sufficiently rehearsed.

One platoon of tanks establishes the fire support group (FSG), usually off to a flank, under the command of the squadron 2IC. Any Milan sections not moving with the assaulting infantry company also move to the FSG. The FSG must win the fire fight, assisted by any indirect fire support, and increase the level of fire to cover the assault forces as they move toward the objective. A forward observation officer or a mortar fire controller coordinates the indirect fires.

**Assault and Break-in.** The infantry normally deploys with two platoons on line, behind the assault tanks and the IS tanks. With two platoons on line, the OC maximizes his firepower forward to provide suppression on the objective during the dismount. The third platoon normally remains one tactical bound behind the company as the reserve. The tanks provide the initial shock action as the assault force moves from the FUP. The assault tanks then seal off the objective from any counterattacking force, moving to the flank opposite the FSG.

From the FUP departure up to this point, the hasty attack has been controlled by the squadron commander, who moves with the assault tanks. As the tanks move off from the front of the objective, the infantry company continues to follow the IS tanks, and the OC takes control of the battle. He controls the IS tanks, which are guided to the objective by the FSG. The assault tanks and the FSG continue to provide the support for the break-in and the fight-through under the control of the OC.

Depending upon the enemy’s strength and disposition on the objective, the IS tanks lead the assaulting infantry onto and through the objective. If the enemy’s strength or obstacles prohibit the tanks from moving onto the objective, the tanks provide suppressive fire while the infantry dismounts.

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**ARMORED INFANTRY COMPANY**

(6 Officers/120 Enlisted)

- **Company HQ**
  - **3 (15)**
  - **Major** Officer Commanding
  - **Captain** Company Second Captain
  - **Cpl/Lt** Company 2IC
  - **WOG** Company Sergeant Major (1SG)
  - **Color SGT** Company GM Sgt (Supply Sgts)
  - **SGT** Tech Sg (Motor Sgts)
  - **CPL (x3)** Signal Cpl, Supply Cpl, Maint Cpl
  - **L/CPL (x4)** Supply Cln, Cln, Dvr, Veh Gunner
  - **Private (x5)** Radioman, Dvr, (x3), Veh Gunner

**ARMORED INFANTRY PLATOON**

(1/35)

- **Platoon HQ**
  - **1 (5)**
  - **Subaltern** Platoon Commander
  - **SGT (x2)** 2IC (Pvt Sgts, 2nd (Warrior) Sgts
  - **Private (x3)** Dvr, Vehicle Gunner, Radioman

**SECTION**

(5/10)

- **CPL** Section Commander
  - **L/CPL (x2)** 2IC, Dep Vehicle Commander
  - **Private (x2)** Light Support Weapon (SAW)
  - **Private (x3)** Riflemen
  - **Private** Vehicle Gunner
  - **Private** Driver

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The infantrymen dismount at a point and time usually selected by the OC. They do not dismount until enemy action requires them to do so, but the dismount point is preferably in dead ground. As they dismount, the Warrior crews and the IS tanks continue to provide fire support. If these tanks move with the dismounted infantry through the objective, the infantry follows, communicating over the external telephone.

**Fight-Through.** After the infantry has dismounted, the Warriors have five options. In each, the Warrior sergeant controls his platoon’s “Bravo” Warriors, the designation given to the Warriors when the infantry has dismounted. The actual support from the Bravo Warriors, operating in platoon groups, is coordinated at company level by the OC or, if the OC has dismounted, by the 2IC. The following are the five options:

- **Envelopment**—The Bravo Warriors of the assaulting platoons move to either flank of the objective to support their respective platoons. This is likely to mask
the fires of the FSG and possibly of the assault tanks. It also carries a significant risk of the vehicles firing on each other.

Flank support scenario—The Bravo Warriors move to a single flank, one platoon at a time. If the third platoon has remained one bound behind as a reserve, this may be a likely time for it to be committed with the FSG tanks. The Warriors must take care that they do not move forward and outpace their infantrymen and possibly fire on them.

Stand-off positions—if it is not feasible to take up positions on either flank, the Bravo Warriors may take up hull-down positions and concentrate their fire on enemy fighting vehicles. Any other type of suppressive fire may be too difficult to coordinate with the dismounted infantry.

Intimate support—if the situation on the objective allows it, Bravo Warriors can move onto the objective under the control of the Warrior sergeants. This allows them to provide close support to their sections. The Warriors can also provide the same support to both Platoons under the command of the Warrior captain.

Combination—Any or all of the options can be used in combination, but this requires well-rehearsed drills and considerable practice.

Reorganization. This part of the hasty attack is normally carried out in accordance with drills and procedures. The infantrymen clear the objective (bunkers and trenches) in detail. They must also have a plan to bring the infantry back together with their vehicles and to cross-level ammunition, weapons, leaders, and individual soldiers.

Exploitation. The tactical situation and the brigade commander’s plan dictate whether exploitation or consolidation will take place. If the battlegroup is to exploit a successful attack, the infantry company follows the assault tanks and the FSG tanks in the exploitation.

Armored infantry battlegroups conduct hasty attacks to seize ground or destroy enemy forces in hastily prepared positions, trading preparation time for maintaining momentum. The company or squadron group makes maximum use of shock effect through the firepower and maneuverability of the Warrior and the tanks supported by indirect fire. Success in the hasty attack depends upon accurate information and a simple plan aggressively executed through drills and procedures. The more familiar the commanders are with each other, the more effective the command and control procedures will be.

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There is a lot to say in bringing you up to date since you left. Here beside me I have several false starts on letters to you, but they were inadequate and out of perspective. So I will not say I’m sorry I did not mail a letter sooner, for I am glad I held off until this day, when I am sure and unhurried and can write one letter for 15 days with no place to mail it, and can now speak from more authority and experience. I changed jobs at a lucky time. In the S-3 shop, I was in on the post-battle discussions and writings of the Regiment, and talked with the generals and the staffs, and wrote and read. So now I can say

__Action on the Jamestown Line__

**Close Combat in the Korean War**

**COLONEL DAVID R. HUGHES, U.S. Army, Retired**

When I began writing the letter, I was on a boat just out of Otaru, Japan, and on my way home, after 16 months in the regiment. I had served as a rifle platoon leader and (still a lieutenant) as commander of Company K. I was then assigned to the regimental S-3 shop, where I was able to refresh my memory on the details of the extreme combat the company had engaged in during September and October 1951. As a result, I was confident that the letter was as accurate as I could make it.

As a young officer, I profited from reading reports of small-unit combat actions, and I trust that young officers today will profit from reading these actions in Korea, more than 46 years ago.
what there is to be said.

I learned and saw enough since you left to write ten books, all of them different. Personalities rose and fell, battles swelled and diminished, boys became men, and men became memories.

The Regiment fought like a demon for some pieces of ground and suffered incredible casualties defending it. And then, partly because of the casualties, the division was pulled out and replaced. It was time. The 1st Cav Division was left with only a smattering of real strength.

In the big picture, of course, the whole Army moved forward in the October offensive. Before that time, the fighting had diminished in the west where we were, to great series of barbed-wire obstacles and extensive patrolling. When I left the division, we were still in the same area, the same front as when you were there. After you were hit, the division went back to the Kansas line and dug and wired in for a few weeks, while the 25th Division had our sector. The 24th Infantry had the old 7th Cav sector and fared pretty badly. When we came back up there, they had lost the patrol base on the 487-477 hill mass, which the 3d Battalion had for so long. We were not to get that hill mass back until four months later after five well-planned attacks—two of them regiment size—had failed.

Actually, in the final analysis we prepared the Wyoming line more thoroughly than we did the Kansas line. As a matter of record, the 7th laid more wire on that line than the 8th and the 5th together. We had up to ten double aprons all across the MLR (main line of resistance), 20 in places and six on the OPLR, not counting protective and tactical wire. It was never tested. The Chinese started digging in on a line from Hill 487 in front of Hill 347 and on down to the Imjin. So we kept patrolling out farther and farther until that line was established; then we sent out the patrol bases again. That set the stage for the offensive.

But back in K Company, I was getting the outfit shaken down and ready to fight. A few of the tactical ideas I told you about, such as numbering the draws, later paid off. My real problem, of course, was getting those squad leaders, platoon leaders, and riflemen who were left after rotation into the proper jobs. At one time, I was the only officer left in the company, but I got a few shortly before the big fight.

We were involved in one of the battles for 487. The line generally paralleled the road from Yonchon to Chorwon, and at this time the 3d Division had the sector down to opposite 477. The 3d Battalion of the 7th was given the job of a dawn attack in a flanking move around the north and east of 487. It was up the two tough sides of the mountain, but was probably the least defended too.

We moved and jumped off on schedule; at least K Company did. Companies L and I were late, and we had seized our first objective before they reached the line of departure. But we pulled up and soon were on the two fingers. The peak and its approaches had been plastered day and night for a long time by weapons of all calibers up to 8-inch. The peak was bare but the Chinese were too well dug in. Three thousand rounds of 4.2-inch mortars were used in preparation.

Up we went and learned the defenses
were simply impregnable. On K Company’s approach, the last 300 yards was a 45-degree slope and with no cover. The Chinese laced into us with five machineguns, and we were so placed that we were attacking the rim of a teacup from the inside bottom. At the high point of the attack, 200 yards from the top, the whole assaulting platoon was in the open under direct observation on a concave slope. I had everything in the book going in at the bunkers—precision registered 155mm, direct fire from five tanks, and all the rest—but not one single machinegun was silenced.

We were ordered off in late afternoon with 23 casualties, 20 of them gunshot. Company L had about the same. Two weeks later, the entire 65th Regiment tried to take the peak and failed.

One of my platoon leaders was badly shot up in the arm, which left Lieutenant Radcliffe (1st Platoon leader) and me again. But the new Company K had been bloodied; the men were more ready to fight and knew what to expect.

For another couple of weeks, we ran patrols from near Yonchon, and I got in five good officers. Then we watched the two patrol bases out in front of us get it in the neck. One was on Hill 343 and the other on 339. Hill 339 was key and about halfway between lines. It was lost and regained by patrols every few days. One day, Company C was sent out to hold a perimeter on it, which they did for two days and on the night of the third was completely overrun in a mass attack. We got the hill back again with the 2d Battalion and then they were ordered off. This Yo-Yo game continued until 21 September when they ordered the 3d Battalion out to hold a patrol base from 339 to 343 and back over to 321, a 4,000-yard perimeter. Company K got the delightful mission of holding 339 and 1,000 more yards of perimeter.

We moved out and after plastering the hill from an OP on 321, 1,500 yards away, we went up, but the Chinese set off a red flare and pulled off. I topped the peak and about five minutes afterward learned what the score was going to be for the next two weeks: They suddenly began shelling us and mortaring until I thought the roof was coming off the hill. They kept working the front slope over with a battery of 75mm and self-propelled artillery, and they shook us to pieces with more 120mm mortars than I thought we had in 4.2-inch. The rain of 82mm and 60mm was just incidental. That kept up for many more days. The fewest incoming rounds we ever reported for 24 hours was 350, and we estimated 1,200 on the second day.

It took me until the next day to see why they had targeted us while hardly touching the rest of the perimeter. Once on the peak OP, I could see more of their positions and gun positions and access routes than they could afford to have me see. So it went. We dug in amid dead enemy and friendly troops from earlier battles, and tried to organize the hill. They watched us like hawks, though, and could see our rear slope from the flanks. We could not top the ridge or put a single man in position on the forward slope during daylight; they would just open up with the SP and dig him right out of his hole. From bombardment alone, with very little movement on the hill, we took 33 casualties in a week from direct hits on the holes with mortars and the midnight dose of 120s.

The first night, we had a scrap. They came across a little saddle from which they had hit Company C, and they came down the road on the extreme right flank. On the road they ran into a tank, and it scattered them while the mortar fire kept them dispersed. But on the peak they plastered us for 20 minutes with everything they could and came right in under their own mortar fire to hit the right shoulder of the hill and smash into Sergeant Malloy’s machinegun. He waited until they were ten yards away and then cut loose. They did not definitely locate him in the confusion and noise, and he stopped them cold. They crawled around and poured machinegun fire on us for a few more hours and then pulled off their dead and withdrew. In the morning they were five dead enemy within those ten yards of Malloy, and one had his hand draped over the gun parapet. We took no casualties from the small arms. This cat and mouse game went on for seven days while we took the brunt of all the fire in the battalion.

I made out a little card on the company positions and numbered the draws and worked the 60mm gun crews until they could get a round off on any concentration in 30 seconds. We were all up on the peak. It was only about 1,000 yards across the high ground, and nobody was more than ten yards from the crest, including the mortars. That paid off later too.

We sent out daily patrols that only got 600 yards before getting hit. On the 25th, I had to send out a platoon toward positions I knew were there; I didn’t like it at all because the enemy had been getting cager and cager and had been holding their fire. But out went Lieutenant Radcliffe and his 1st Platoon. The Chinese let them get 200 yards from the peak before opening up with cross-firing weapons. Radcliffe was killed instantly. The platoon sergeant, a corporal, didn’t hesitate. He ordered marching fire, and the platoon took half of the peak so the rest could get out. There were three dead. Sergeant Brown was cut down by a grenade near Radcliffe. He rolled over and took Radcliffe’s .45 pistol and the maps and took them all back as he himself was carried out. A machinegunner who couldn’t find a vantage point to set up his machinegun went up with it cradled in his arm and with one belt of ammunition. He had to be evacuated for the burns on his arm.

Every night, enemy patrols would crawl up and feel us out. They plotted our weapons and counted our men. Every night I would have to get up and calm down a squad that thought the whole Chinese Army was out there. But this had one good effect: The men dug in tight. They kept their weapons spotless. They slept in the daytime and watched at night. The 60mm
mortar crew got faster and faster under platoon leader Lieutenant Walker. I collected heavy machineguns and on the 28th had five heavies and seven lights across the front. But because of the fire and the dwindling number of men, we had been able to put out only a few rolls of concertina wire on the two easy approaches. (The engineers all but refused to work laying mines in front of us.)

The night of the 28th came. The day had been quiet and it seemed as good a time as any for the big show. At 2330 a bombardment came in. It was deadly accurate and concentrated on the positions controlling the two approaches. It continued until 2400 and then, for a few minutes, stepped up to the frenzied firing of all kinds of shells. Then I heard the rip of a burp gun on the left. At the same time, just as I popped out of my bunker, a purple flare went off on both flanks of the peak. I yelled off a series of concentrations to the FOs (forward observers), and the first sergeant roused the 60s on the phone. But before I had even given a command to the 60s, two plop plops came out, and in a second a flare was burning over each flank. They had fired in about 20 seconds from the enemy flares.

All hell broke loose. A company hit each flank and, even with the 4.2s dropping right in the draw they came up, they overran the tie-in with Company L and rolled up the flank of the understrength 1st Platoon. On the right they were stopped for a while by the automatic weapons and the 81mm and 60mm mortars, but there again they punched through on a squad front and overran that squad, turning toward the peak past the 2d Platoon. Not a man bugged out of his hole in either platoon, and all the dead soldiers in the morning were found in their holes.

By this time, all the defensive fires were going full blast, but I was waiting for the Sunday punch. It came in about 20 more minutes at 0110. They only had a strip of our territory about 150 yards long on the right and 200 yards on the left, but they sure filled it up. They moved a mortar onto the ridge of each flank and began peppering the CP (command post). They got a couple of machineguns up there and fired overhead fire for their next attack. And they never stopped pounding the top of the hill with those 120s. Then they jumped off again. The Chinese companies that had penetrated sent people around behind us, and they raked the back slope with small arms and cut off our communications with battalion.

I did not know this at the time, but two things had happened. One was that they had attacked nearly, the first time, just to the left of two machineguns on the right flank and thus never touched any part of the 3d Platoon. Only two rifle platoons were involved all night long! The second thing was that at the beginning of the attack, the battalion S-2 section had been monitoring the 300 stations, and their Chinese interpreter picked up the command channel of the battalion that was attacking me. So all night long battalion had a running account of the battle and knew how we stood from the four company radios the Chinese used and the command radio.

When the big attack came at 0110, the two companies on the ridgeline on both flanks started the attack toward the peak, and just when they were exerting maximum pressure on the heavy machineguns at the shoulder of the peak on each flank, two more companies came at us on those two saddle approaches we had wired in. I was waiting for that, and on the left, as they started across the wire, we opened up with the 57mm at 20 yards on the wire, and I called in the 155s at a range of 150 yards from us and the two fires caught the company on the move.

On the right they attacked across that little saddle, and we were waiting there too. At the first sign of the attack, I called in the 4.2 mortar fire to 125 yards, and it played havoc with the supporting troops. I started the 60mm mortars firing at top speed (by this time we were getting artillery flares) and then, as the first grenade-throwing wave hit the positions, we turned on the two flame throwers. The first wave just expired where it was. In a short time, we were out of flame thrower juice, but it had scared them and the next waves walked across instead of running. I kept dropping the 60mm fire closer and closer until we went to 83 degrees—firing nearly vertically—when firing at a gun-to-target range of 65 yards and were dropping shells only 15 yards in front of the machinegunner. It finally broke them after they got the 2d Platoon CP and had the platoon backed up to the mortar.

On the left they got much closer. They killed the crew of the heavy section, broke through the refused flank, and came steaming up the hill at the CP about 35 yards up. I had every man I could spare on the perimeter, including the 5th Platoon, so I asked my radio operator to commit the reserve. That consisted of one heavy machinegun that was sitting on top of the CP bunker. He set it up and stopped the attack 15 yards from the CP, which was full of wounded. Then I sent the first sergeant to the 57mm recoilless rifle section, which was now in an untenable position, and as the section soldiers came up the hill a Chinese soldier came up with them and after a tussle was killed in the CP.

That was the high point of the attack. They had captured three enemy on the left. One of them was taken off the hill immediately; the second and third were pushed up to be in front during the attack, but one—seeing that heavy reserve machinegun kill all of their mortar crew and cut down the attack wave—kicked his captor, jumped over the side of the steep ridge, and escaped. The third went on up and was killed by our fire.

At about 0330 the artillery was out of flares, we were just about out of ammunition, even with the stockpile, when a flare ship arrived and helped us counterattack the high points of the attack. The reserve heavy gun had done good work but its water cans were full of holes, indicating the volume of fire directed at it.

The enemy radios had announced that
three company commanders had been
killed and they could not get the GIs off
the hill. They asked permission to with-
draw but were told they had to have the
hill “tonight.” Then the reserve company,
the fifth one, claimed they had so many
wounded from the artillery that they could
not carry them back and therefore could
not attack. Of course, we didn’t know
any of this.

Then a passing flight of B-26s were
hailed, and under flare light and by ra-
dar, dive bombed the ridge 600 yards in
front of us.

We drew up in a tighter perimeter at
0430 and waited out the day. In the morn-
ing we cleared the flanks and bombarded
many enemy trying to get over the hills
with their wounded and dead.

We could not move around very well,
because the enemy fire was still coming
in, but by 0800 we counted 77 dead within
our positions. We had sustained ten
killed, 15 wounded, and one captured.

We were pretty beat up by this time,
having taken—with attachments—54
casualties in the seven days on Hill 339.
On the 29th, we were rotated around the
perimeter and Company I took over.

Four days and no replacements later,
we jumped off in the attack launched by
the Eighth Army. Company K had a se-
ries of objectives that culminated in Hill
347. We jumped off on 3 October with
the 4th Battalion, Greek Expeditionary
Force, on the right and Company L on
the left. At the end of the first day’s fight-
ing, the rest of the 1st Platoon was de-
stroyed and two officers were critically
wounded. Meanwhile, Company G had
taken 130 casualties, including four offi-
cers—on Hill 418, and the Greek com-
panies on my right had taken 135 casualties.
No units had gained their objectives.
The 2d Battalion won and lost Hill 418
times.

On the 4th we did the same thing with
all the support we could muster, but again
we were in the trenches and the Greeks
were in theirs, but the tremendous mor-
tar fire and unlimited number of enemy
threw us out with still more casualties. I
got 30 replacements that night.

On the 5th, the Greeks made it and we
tried again. We couldn’t make it until all
the companies of the battalion attacked
just after dark, and we captured the two
little hills with 17 more casualties includ-
ing the artillery and 4.2-inch mortar FOs.

On the 6th we reorganized while they
threw 3,000 rounds into the regimental
zone. I had two rifle platoons and a mor-
tar section.

On the 7th we advanced on Hill 347,
all the elements of the battalion abreast.
Company K reached the trenches and
were blown off the hill, losing an officer
and 20 men. Companies L and I were on
the other side of the peak, and while Com-
pany L was fighting up the hill, Company
I was stopping a counterattack behind
them, and the men in the battalion OP
were fighting off a grenade attack on their
flank.

The second time up we fell short of the
trenches again and were grenaded and
mortared off the hill, losing another
officer and more men.

The third time, same thing, and my last
officer was wounded by a grenade and the
attack was broken: I had six riflemen
left up on the hill, so I took all the rest of
headquarters and the mortar crew and the
FOs and, loaded down with grenades, up
we went.

There were 30 of us in all, and we hit
the hill at the same time as the remainder
of Companies L and I. I could see the
mistake that was being made. The men
were not going up over the trench at all
costs and then working down. The Chinese
were standing in four-foot trenches where the direct fire didn’t
bother them, and they just threw a deadly
pattern of unlimited grenades out on the
slope.

So when I took the platoon up I made
everybody run through the grenade fire
and cross the trench and try to keep the
automatic weapons fire down by our
missed carbine fire. It worked. Two FOs
were killed by the rain of antitank gre-
nades, and we lost about 10 more men,
but we got across the trench and met
Company L’s lead men coming across the
trench on the other side. We threw all
our grenades in the battle on top and
forced the Chinese back into their caves.
Then, one by one, we got them out as pris-
oners or dead men. By dark we had 192
prisoners from the area above the perim-
eter trench, which was only ten yards
down and 200 yards around.

With all attachments and FOs, I had
37 men, including a 14-man Company M
machinegun section. We discovered why
they had held out so long. We had cap-
tured the Chinese division CP and regi-
mental artillery CP, but the commanders
had dug out a few hours before we got
the hill. We counted 250 dead and late-
er took the clerk of the enemy battal-
ion defending the peak. I still have his
exhaustive report confirming the estimate
that we attacked a reinforced battalion
and captured or killed all but 80 men.

We were soon relieved on the hill and
went back to another part of the regimen-
tal front where the 1st Battalion had just
been overrun; it was left with a captain
as commander and had only 200 men.

Then we stayed rather stationary on
the hills while the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regi-
ments took ten more days to catch up and
get their objectives.

The last of the men who had been with
us at the peak of the fighting rotated then,
and the last of the old Company K was
gone. I was the only officer in the com-
pany for a while longer until they brought
in a few; then I was made assistant regi-
mental S-3.

The 1st Battalion was not finished with
its bad luck though. In the first part of
November, it perimeted on a patrol base
in that newsy spot called “West of
Yonchon.” There, one night they were
attacked for four hours and were over-
run. Very few dribbled back from that
fracas; they took more than 500 casual-
ties and still have 280 missing.

And that’s how we were when the di-
vision went into reserve and got ready to
ship out to Japan. The Regiment had
taken all its ground at a cost of 1,400
casualties within the organic troops. The
1st Cavalry Division, with all organic
troops, not counting the foreign troops,
had taken a real pounding; it never suf-
f ered more casualties in an equal period
of time during its tour in Korea. Com-
pany K, which ran about fifth in casual-
ties, lost 167 men and six officers.

Although I held down the captain
vacancy for 6½ months straight, the Army
would not promote me, so I’m still a
lieutenant. But I’m on my way home and
hope to see you soon.
Experiences during combat training center rotations have underscored the need for unit training on mortuary affairs (MA) recovery operations and planning. Unfortunately, few combat arms units train on MA operations enough to support their own wartime requirements.

U.S. Army doctrine charges maneuver unit commanders with the responsibility for conducting initial MA operations during combat. Unit responsibilities outlined in Field Manual 10-63, Handling of Deceased Personnel in Theaters of Operations, and elsewhere include initial search and tentative identification and the evacuation of remains to the nearest established mortuary affairs collection point (MACP).

Some combat leaders may assume that an MA team sent out from the brigade support area (BSA) will recover remains and evacuate them to the rear. But the BSA has only one MACP—manned by seven mortuary affairs specialists (MOS 57F)—with which to support three or more battalions. A division is usually augmented by some mortuary affairs personnel from corps, but these units help operate MACPs for the division and each BSA, and do not normally operate in a maneuver battalion’s area.

In the initial stages of conflict, there is no mortuary affairs augmentation. Units deploying rapidly and fighting in austere environments must be prepared to operate their own collection points initially, and their recovery teams must be well trained.

A battalion’s first step is to prepare a comprehensive mortuary affairs section for its tactical standing operating procedures (SOPs). Commanders can then build training programs to achieve the desired level of proficiency.

The following key points should be addressed in this SOP addition:
- Battalion officer in charge (OIC) for MA training and operations.
- Battalion or company NCOIC for MA training and operations.
- Battalion/company assistant NCOIC for MA training and operations.
- Recovery team personnel by battle roster positions.
- Standard collection point locations.
- Tentative remains identification and information required.

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<tr>
<th>Units deploying rapidly and fighting in austere environments must be prepared to operate their own collection points initially.</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Equipment evacuation with remains.</td>
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<td>- Methods of evacuation.</td>
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<td>- Supply items—personal effects bags, remains pouches and liners, rubber and latex gloves, surgical masks, and “shoe tags.”</td>
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<td>- Minimum stockage levels for supply items.</td>
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<td>- Forms needed: DD 565, Statement of Recognition of Deceased; and DD 567, Record of Search and Recovery.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Procedures for handling remains contaminated with NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) agents.</td>
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<td>- Required references.</td>
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Unit OICs of any branch may attend a two-week course at the Quartermaster School to learn MA planning and operations. Successful completion of the course earns these soldiers additional skill identifier 4V. MA recovery team personnel may be of any branch or MOS.

**Recovery Team Training.** Maneuver units can build battalion and company level MA recovery teams with the following training, which takes an estimated 17 hours:
- Battalion MA SOP—two hours.
- Organizing and conducting searches—two hours.
- Recovery operations—two hours.
- Preliminary identifications—two hours.
- MA forms used by the recovery team—two hours.
- Transporting remains—one hour.
- Procedures for NBC-contaminated remains—two hours.
- Practical exercise that combines search, recovery, preliminary identification, and evacuation of remains—four hours.

Land navigation is an essential skill for recovery teams conducting search operations. Soldiers must be confident in their navigation ability before assuming roles on the collecting team. Experience with global positioning systems is helpful in conducting searches.

When building a recovery team training plan, a unit should ask the mortuary affairs NCO in the forward support battalion (FSB) to provide his input and training expertise. One of his responsibilities is to help with the initial and sustained training of unit recovery teams.

**Sustainment.** Once the members of a recovery team have trained and rehearsed,
it takes little training to keep them combat-ready. Unit first sergeants should review recovery team rosters quarterly and schedule training for new members.

Sustainment training, including practical exercises, should be conducted at least quarterly. Again, a key soldier for planning and conducting sustainment training is the FSB mortuary affairs NCO.

Additional training assistance is available from the Quartermaster Center and School at Fort Lee, Virginia (DSN 687-3831, commercial 804 734-3831). Particularly helpful is a training support package on performing MA operations for non-MA personnel.

**Deployment.** Recovery team supplies, references, and blank forms need to be combat-loaded in labeled and easily identifiable containers. Any container that a single soldier cannot carry should be broken down into two or more boxes. Ship-

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**Land navigation is an essential skill for recovery teams conducting search operations.**

ping containers for repair parts are ideal for this.

The collection team kit must be load-planned on a vehicle that is readily accessible to recovery team personnel, and all team members must know the vehicle bumper number.

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Unit recovery operations must be conducted with the highest respect for soldiers killed in action and must convey this respect to soldiers, families, host-nation civilians, and the news media. The duties recovery teams perform have a direct effect on unit morale, and training a proficient, confident team ensures that this effect is positive.

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**Heavy Mortar Fires Improving Their Responsiveness**

**LIEUTENANT PATRICK S. MCGYNN**

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Mortars are generally accepted as the Army’s most responsive indirect fire weapons, because they are organic at company and battalion level and therefore available when other indirect fire weapons are not. Because of their high angle of fire, they are uniquely suited to urban operations and mountainous terrain. Today’s field commanders rely on the organic indirect fires that a battalion’s heavy mortars add to the combined arms scheme of maneuver. To be effective, however, indirect fire systems must be capable of hitting the target rapidly and accurately.

The field artillery has the M109A6 Paladin, which can send highly accurate 155mm projectiles downrange within 30 seconds of receiving a fire request. And after completing a fire mission, and before the enemy can put counterbattery fire onto its position, the Paladin can then move to another position.

When field artillery support is not available, and maneuver units need indirect fire support, fire requests are passed down to the battalion’s heavy mortar platoon. Unlike the Paladin, however, heavy mortars must be laid-in through time-consuming survey techniques. The standard time for the mortar section to occupy a firing position is eight minutes, and it takes another two minutes to process the request and place accurate indirect fire on a target. If a mechanized infantry unit on the move needs an adjust-fire mission, it may be ten minutes before the first adjustment round can be fired.

The standard for a mortar section to obtain an accurate fire-for-effect (FFE) is 11 minutes after receiving a fire request. The process takes even longer in a nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) environment, at night, or in conditions of limited visibility.

The “hip-shoot” emplacement technique, which is one solution to this delay, can be used to reduce the delay to four minutes or less for an immediate suppression mission. But this technique sacrifices accuracy for a faster FFE.

Neither survey nor hip-shoot emplacement is sufficient for the rapid pace of modern combat; the momentum of battle will not allow for repeated ten-minute halts to provide accurate indirect fire support. Combined arms commanders need a heavy mortar that can “shoot and scoot.”

I believe that we can improve our mortars and make them more responsive by
taking the following steps:

**Give each mortar section a global positioning system (GPS).** The GPS is common to many Army units but is not part of a mortar platoon’s table of organization and equipment (TOE). The GPS could take seconds, if not minutes, off the time required for a mortar section to get the first round downrange, not to mention the improved accuracy that would come from the ability to pinpoint its own position at all times.

**Put one mortar ballistic computer (MBC) on each track.** Presently, only the fire direction centers (FDCs) have MBCs. Each gun track does have an M-16 plotting board, but the board lacks the range to plot heavy mortar rounds using the maximum charge for the 4.2-inch mortar, and it is even less adequate when used with the 120mm mortar. Changing the mortar platoon TOE to put an MBC on each track would increase survivability by reducing the interruption in fire support that the loss of an FDC would cause and enabling each track to control the fires of the remaining gun tracks, if necessary.

**Upgrade the present mortar fire direction system.** A slightly more expensive alternative would be to upgrade the present mortar FDC by integrating the GPS, the MBC, the digital message device, and the SINCGARS (single-channel ground and airborne radio subsystem). This integration would enable a forward observer to send a fire mission electronically, giving the mortar section immediate firing data. Since all of these items already exist, combining them probably would not require any new research and development, but it would require some reconfiguration of the FDC vehicle.

**Mount heavy mortars on Bradley chassis.** Mounted on Bradleys, the mortars would be better able to keep up with the units they support. The supply system’s burden would be lightened by not having to stock as many different parts and lubricants. The Bradley-mounted mortars would use many of the same repair parts as the supported unit, with the added advantage of enhanced mobility.

**Make the heavy mortar breech-fed and turret-mounted.** A breech-fed mortar permits a high rate of fire and allows the mortar to be mounted inside a turret. A turret gives the mortar a greater field of fire, a possible direct-fire capability, and better protection from small arms and artillery fire. It also offers the ability to integrate the gun tube into a computer-operated FDC and an opportunity to be less vulnerable to NBC attack.

The British have a turret-mounted, breech-fed 120mm mortar, that might possibly be used in an existing Bradley chassis with little modification. The British mortars also have an integrated computer fire direction system that allows them to stop and fire instantly.

The tools are available to make our heavy mortars more compatible with the tanks and infantry fighting vehicles that they support. In order to do this, we must take advantage of the technology currently available.

In today’s cost-conscious environment, developing a new mortar system from scratch is at best difficult if not impossible. Using or modifying existing equipment and weapon systems makes more sense, and the infantry force can train more quickly on the weapons that it will need on tomorrow’s battlefield.

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FIFTY YEARS AGO IN HISTORY

The early spring of 1946 saw increasing tension among former allies, renewed hostility between old adversaries, and the early stages of a realignment that was to shape the political and military future of the world for the next five decades. The Soviet Union would repeatedly test the will of the United States, the Nationalist and Communist Chinese factions would remain implacable enemies, and the cornerstone would be laid for the establishment of a Korean army. The tensions and political and military maneuverings of those years echo even today, as China flexes her muscles and North Korea shows signs of becoming increasingly restive.

These and other highlights of the events of those days have been provided by Mr. Bud Hannings, in preparation for his upcoming chronology of the Korean War.

2 March Under the terms agreed upon at the London Conference of foreign ministers in September 1945, today is the last day for occupation forces to remain in Iran. Russian troops remain, however, in contravention of the pact they have signed, and inform the Iranians that they intend to remain for some time.

4 March Concerned that the Russians pose threats to both the security of Turkey and the Iranian oil fields, President Truman meets with Secretary of State James Byrnes and directs that a strong but polite message be sent to the Russians concerning the situation in Iran. The Russians do not respond, and a stronger message is sent to Stalin; on March 24, the Soviets finally announce that their troops will be withdrawn.

15 March Believing that the cease-fire between Nationalist and Communist Chinese forces in Manchuria is stable, Special Representative George C. Marshall returns from China to confer with President Truman; hostilities resume as Nationalist forces harshly restrain members of the cease-fire teams.

21 March The U.S. Strategic Air Command is established, under the command of General George C. Kenney.

25 March While in the United States, George C. Marshall arranges for vast quantities of war surplus materiel to be transferred to the government of a unified China, while President Truman has arranged a $500 million loan for China from the Treasury department. After the Chinese ambassador demands changes to the terms of the loan and Chiang Kai-shek makes a fiery, militant speech, both deals fall through and Marshall returns to China.

1 April Soviet troops enter the American zone of Berlin and set about removing railroad track, claiming that the rails are part of the war reparations due them. They dispatch armed troops to the scene when challenged by the Americans. Confronted by U.S. tanks, the Soviets eventually leave, after considerable tension on both sides.

18 April George C. Marshall returns to China and finds the situation deteriorating rapidly, with Nationalist and Communist forces in open conflict. The Communists claim to have been attacked by a U.S. plane; it turns out to have been a U.S. plane, but one belonging to the Nationalist Air Force. Communists consolidate their gains, capturing the Nationalist capital at Changchun and the Manchurian city of Harbin.

30 April Japanese War Trials begin in Tokyo, with the former premier Hideki Tojo and 27 others among the first to be tried. Meanwhile, in Korea the establishment of a constabulary force is under way, with more than 2,000 troops recruited thus far. Constabulary regiments are established in Seoul and seven other towns and cities, for the purpose of augmenting the National Police Force.
All too frequently at the training centers, units do not effectively wargame courses of action. As a result, rehearsals—which are intended as opportunities for the chain of command to assess a unit’s readiness for the mission—become wargaming sessions in which only tentative planning finally takes place.

One common failing is that while subordinate leaders can clearly state their assigned tasks, they are not required to articulate how those tasks will be accomplished. The rehearsal fails in its main purpose, which is to reinforce understanding of the concept of the operation. Participants may leave the rehearsal without a clear, common understanding of when and how the decisive action is to take place; or—even worse—they may think they understand it, only to realize later during the after-action review that they did not.

The concept of the operation, including the commander’s intent, clearly focuses on the decisive action, but it may not be a complete description of the critical actions that must occur at a given time and place. The precise communication of more information is therefore essential, and this article is intended to offer a framework the commander can use to develop his expression of the decisive action on the objective or in the engagement area. A commander who uses this or any similar technique should be able to derive maximum benefit from wargaming and rehearsals.
A unit must be able to carry out its mission in a correct and timely manner, even in the absence of orders and specific guidance, and the commander has a number of tools that can help him and his unit attain this level of proficiency. The commander’s estimate, sound troop-leading procedures, and an understanding of the decision-making process can all help him arrive at the course of action (COA) that will best insure success. Well-written, detailed orders, a clear expression of the commander’s intent, and carefully planned and executed rehearsals will facilitate the planning and preparation for combat operations, while also identifying any weaknesses that need to be addressed.

The commander’s intent will reflect the extent to which the leader has used his decision-making tools in planning the operation. His intent will include the purpose of the operation, his vision of how it will be executed, and the results it should achieve. A clear expression of the purpose of the operation will enable subordinate commanders to exercise their own initiative and still carry out the mission in the absence of further guidance, should the commander be incapacitated or otherwise unable to communicate with them. The commander’s vision—the how of the operation—will outline the way the force will be deployed and maneuvered against the enemy. Finally, a discussion of the desired end state will describe what situation should exist relative to the enemy and terrain at the conclusion of the operation.

The commander begins his description—his vision—of the decisive action to be accomplished by developing COAs. This development includes elements of wargaming and addresses friendly and enemy COAs in terms of action, reaction, and counteraction. Although formal COA analysis or wargaming may follow later as part of the decision-making process, it is usually helpful to apply the technique early to give direction and focus to COA development. This will reduce the chance of wasting time on infeasible or unacceptable COAs. Further time can be saved by integrating a consideration of relative combat power and developing significant factors and identifying critical action during the development of the COAs. The advantage of a systematic approach is that better COAs can be
developed and assessed than if the COA elements had been assigned arbitrarily.

Field Manual (FM) 7-10, The Light Infantry Company, offers a useful technique for COA development, a seven-step process that applies equally well to units of all sizes and compositions:

**Determine the decisive point.** The decisive point is that event, geographical location, effect, or combination of these that, once achieved, represents the point at which we are winning and the enemy is losing. At this point, unless we blunder, the enemy cannot prevent the success of our mission. The purpose of determining a decisive point is to focus combat power. It identifies the opportunity for success but does not define success. Many potential decisive points may exist; there is usually no single point. Identifying a decisive point as part of the planning process is simply a start point for COA development.

**Determine the desired effects of combat power at the decisive point.** This answers the question, “What do I want to accomplish in relation to the enemy and terrain at this point?” and includes considerations of the dynamics of combat power, with firepower, maneuver, protection, and leadership all being weighed in terms of their effectiveness. By focusing friendly strengths against known or projected enemy weaknesses at the decisive point, the commander can begin to identify and develop the actions that will be necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Determine the purposes of the main and supporting efforts.** The expression of the purpose reflects both the intended outcome and the method chosen to attain it. Once the subordinate units have accomplished their purpose, the end result will be the accomplishment of the purpose of their higher unit, providing the higher unit commander’s intent has been effectively communicated to subordinate leaders. The purpose of the main effort is focused at the decisive point, while the purpose of supporting efforts should complement that of the main effort.

**Determine the tasks that best match unit purposes.** Typical tasks in the offense include seize, secure, fix, suppress, and neutralize. Tasks for units in a defensive role include block, destroy, fix, interdict, and contain. Other tasks are possible, and all have distinct military definitions whose understanding is essential to our common language; these can be found in FM 101-5-1, Military Graphics, Terms, and Symbols. Units may, of course, be assigned additional tasks that are not their mission essential tasks.

**Determine the type and size units to accomplish the tasks and purposes.** First, task organize the main effort so that it has the right mix of forces to accomplish its task and purpose. Next allocate forces to the supporting effort or efforts. If additional combat power is necessary, request further resources or determine whether the supporting effort can still be accomplished with the forces available. In any case, do not weaken the main effort.

**Determine the command and control requirements for each unit.** Who will be in charge of the planning, preparation, and execution of each unit’s mission? This is a critical step in the process. Unless responsibilities are carefully analyzed and
assigned, a unit may exceed its leader’s logical span of control, or may find itself trying to live with an unworkable command relationship. Such problems may indicate a need to revise an earlier step in the COA development process, because a decisive point identified was not fully analyzed, or because it may be necessary to add or modify mission essential tasks. This process of revision and assessment is to be expected and is essential to the development of well-thought-out COAs.

**Develop a visual representation of the COAs.** A sketch of the COA should include the significant terrain features with the initial operational graphics, as well as a visualization of the sequence of actions that may or may not appear on the final overlay. A sand table—often useful in supplementing the sketch and highlighting key features of the operation—is as critical to the development of a unit’s expression of its decisive action as is the decision support template used during wargaming. Both are invaluable tools that enhance understanding and provide focus during the formulation and rehearsal of the OPORD.

The sequence of developing a COA must be closely followed, because it represents a thought process, and the omission of one of its elements could lead to erroneous decisions whose impact may not become apparent until the wargaming, rehearsal, or even execution of the operation.

While the commander and staff will be active throughout the development of the COA, they must retain a clear vision of what the decisive point or event is to be; they must not confuse the actions leading up to the decisive point with the point or event itself. Likewise, the actions initially represented on the sketch or terrain model used to depict the COA may not remain as originally drawn, but will probably evolve in response to changes to enemy and friendly capabilities and likely COAs.

A common error at this point is to draw graphics first and then develop tasks and purposes to fit the map; this is an easily recognized sign of impatience on the part of an inexperienced commander and his staff.

Figure 1 is a graphic representation of an expression of decisive action by a mechanized team commander whose assigned task is to seize an objective (OBJ EAST) held by a motorized rifle platoon (MRP). His purpose is to establish a foothold so that the main attack can seize a deeper objective (OBJ WEST), the task force (TF) decisive point. The commander has already analyzed the mission, terrain, and enemy in accordance with the estimate process. The next step—COA development—will yield a sketch and his expression of actions on the objective.

The commander knows that he will have to secure and clear the objective; he chooses the destruction of the BMP vehicles and a T-72 attached to the MRP as his decisive point. Understanding that one element cannot both secure and clear the objective, he determines that his main effort can nevertheless achieve the decisive point that will facilitate the attainment of that purpose. Accordingly, he establishes a main effort task with the purpose of destroying vehicles on the objective so that the rest of the company may more easily clear it once the enemy infantry have been separated from their supporting armor.

The team commander further understands that in order to support the main effort, a supporting attack must conduct an assault breach of the enemy position, through which the main effort can continue the attack onto the objective. Another supporting effort must also suppress the enemy on the objective to isolate first the breach point and then each MRP squad position in turn as the main effort assaults the objective.

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The commander chooses his attached tank platoon to conduct the main attack, since he knows that—even with an attached engineer platoon—the best and most survivable asset he has to conduct an assault breach is his tank platoon with its firepower and mine plow. But he recognizes that the tank platoon would be overtasked and unprotected against dug-in infantry if called upon to both breach and secure the entire objective. So he revises his COA—and refines his decisive point—by dividing the objective so that the tank platoon is to conduct an assault breach and secure only the first half (OBJ EAST) of the team’s objective, while the first Bradley platoon places suppressive fire on both objectives. This definition of a subordinate unit’s culminating point is an essential element of the wargaming process.

Once the breach has been achieved and OBJ EAST secured, the second mechanized infantry platoon and its attached engineers follow, and the infantrymen dismount to clear the objective and assist in isolating the breach as necessary. This platoon of infantry then continues the attack to seize the second objective (OBJ WEST), while the tank platoon places suppressive fire on the second objective. At this point, the commander has defined his subordinates’ mission essential tasks and purposes, and has provided a visual representation of how they are to be accomplished.

The commander must now address other actions that are significant to fire and maneuver, and that may only become apparent during wargaming or in the course of a rehearsal. The description of actions on the objective must include all actions taken from the time the unit deploys for the attack until the consolidation of the newly seized objective. Again referring to Figure 1, an expression of actions on the objective might read:

The 1st Platoon (Mech) deploys to a support-by-fire position, dismounting to clear a possible enemy combat outpost there. As the Team (-) occupies the assault position, 1st Platoon suppresses the breach point and OBJ EAST with direct and indirect fires while adjusting indirect fires onto OBJ WEST. As 3d Platoon (Tank) conducts assault breach to secure OBJ EAST, 1st Platoon dismounts clear OBJ EAST. The 2d Platoon (Mech) then assumes the main effort, attacks around the 3rd Platoon (Tank), and secures OBJ WEST. Meanwhile, 1st Platoon (Mech) moves to block possible enemy counterattacks (CATKs) while its dismounts assist in consolidating the objective or clearing beyond the culminating point of the 2d Platoon and its dismounts. The 2d Platoon immediately suppresses the adjacent MRP position, adding its direct fires to those of the TF. The 3d Platoon (Tank) consolidates north on the objective and suppresses as necessary to facilitate the assault of the TF main effort onto the adjacent MRP position.

A statement of actions on the objective may be familiar to many, although it may be applied only infrequently or too late to be useful. A less familiar technique is an expression of actions in the engagement area (EA) in the defense. The expression of actions in the EA is a reflection of how the commander built the EA and is developed concurrently with it. The methods and techniques for structuring an EA include the following:

**Target reference points (TRPs).** TRPs serve to focus and adjust fires, are either terrain-oriented or enemy-oriented, and can be tied to trigger lines or maximum engagement lines. They can also assist in shifting fires to alternate TRPs or to a TRP nearest an identified target.

**Engagement areas (EAs).** EAs are employed to focus fires over a larger area, and can assist in fire distribution. Assigned EAs can be further divided and assigned to subordinate units.

**Fire commands.** Usually given verbally, fire commands are used to mass, time, shift, and constrain fires, and may apply from crew through company or battery level.

**Fire patterns.** The function of fire patterns is to distribute either planned or command directed fires against a particular enemy formation. The patterns include frontal, depth, cross, and near, far, left, and right.

**Fire techniques.** Used to distribute fires, these techniques can be planned or fire command directed; they include simultaneous (all elements firing), alternating (one element followed by another), or observed (one element fires while another observes or adjusts).

**Engagement priorities.** Another means of distributing and massing fires, engagement priorities require that specified units or weapons systems be the first to engage targets that have been specified by type, location, or function.

**Sectors of fire.** Normally defined by boundaries within which a unit operates, sectors can also serve in the massing and distribution of fires, and on-order sectors can assist in shifting fires.

**Target array.** Another fire control measure, the target array is defined by the disposition of the enemy force and not solely by terrain, as is the case with a sector.

**Quadrants.** Positioned on enemy formations using terrain as a reference, quadrants may be centered on TRPs and used in conjunction with a target array. In its application, this technique is much like dividing the EA.

These measures are indispensable for the building of an engagement area, and planning for their use requires a thorough understanding of their purpose. It is not enough to place them on a map arbitrarily. As with actions on the objective, the
poorly considered application of these measures may go unnoticed until the wargaming or even the rehearsal phase of the operation. When the fire plan for actions in the EA is drafted, it can include a number of these tools and techniques, but it must include the fundamentals of fire planning. In short, it must provide for the distribution, focusing, and shifting of fires as the situation develops; it must facilitate the massing of fires; and—most important—the plan must be understandable. Developing a proper expression of actions in the EA is fundamental to ensuring that the fire plan is indeed understood by all who will later depend upon its smooth execution.

To examine the development of actions in an EA, consider the situation of a mechanized team commander in a blocking position (Figure 2), with the mission of blocking the enemy in one portion of a task force EA. His assigned purpose is to prevent the envelopment of the TF main effort on his southern (left) flank.

From his analysis of the mission and situation, the commander determines that to accomplish his mission he will have to either destroy a first echelon motorized rifle battalion (MRB), followed by a possible second echelon MRB in his portion of the EA, or, he must consider his actions if all three MRBs attack to the south of his sector instead. He prudently plans for the first outcome, knowing that adjacent units to his south will deal with the attack in their sector.

In building his EA, the TF commander seeks to focus his own strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses, and he tries to do this at the decisive point that will lead to the success of his mission. Having been assigned a TF blocking obstacle, he elects to position it at a place where the enemy will most likely begin deploying into his attack formation, and where he will mass the fires of his team. He also tentatively plans his TRPs and other control measures to facilitate the development of this decisive point.

Due to its capability as a tank killer and its survivability—both essential to mission success—a tank platoon is designated as the main effort. It is assigned a blocking position with a task of blocking the enemy and the same purpose as the team, that of preventing envelopment of the TF main effort. The commander, concerned about a dismounted avenue of approach leading into his northern flank, decides to use a dismounted effort to prevent this. He assigns his two mechanized platoons battle positions to the flanks of the tank platoon, with the tasks of destroying enemy in sector. They will assist in the destruction of enemy in the EA to prevent the envelopment of the tank platoon from the north and to isolate enemy at the decisive point.

While determining his command and control measures, the commander decides that the blocking of a possible dismounted attack on the northern flank could be better expressed as a task assigned to the mech platoon in the north than as a mission essential task for a separate dismounted element, and adjusts his COA accordingly. Having done this, the team commander next refines his graphics and expression for actions in the EA by continuing with a mental or terrain board analysis that pits possible enemy COAs against friendly reactions and subsequent counteractions.

The following is a sample expression of actions in the EA:

The 2d Platoon (Mech) and 3d Platoon (Tank) engage once a motorized rifle company (MRC) or greater is in EA BLUE. Lead tanks will be destroyed by tank and TOW fires in EA BLUE by all three platoons. Other vehicles will be destroyed by 2d Platoon 25mm fire. The focus of indirect fires will be to neutralize vehicles and destroy dismounts at the blocking obstacle,
allowing most of the team’s fires to destroy enemy held up at the decisive point. TRP A. 3d Platoon—along with 25mm fires from 1st Platoon (Mech)—will destroy elements which enter EA RED. Enemy in EA GREEN will be engaged by 25mm fire from 2d Platoon while 3d Platoon engages tanks in the EA. 1st and 3d Platoons continue to engage remaining lead elements in EA RED, while 2d Platoon engages second echelon MRCs in EA BLUE. The destruction of the first echelon MRB will be completed by 1st and 3d Platoons, using the nearest TRP at their command. The second echelon MRB will be engaged initially in EA BLUE by 2d Platoon. Once an MRC from the second echelon MRB crosses into EA RED, 3d Platoon will engage and destroy it. 1st Platoon will assist in its destruction once it cannot identify and engage any remaining elements of the first echelon MRB.

A clear expression of the purpose of the operation will enable subordinate commanders to exercise their own initiative and still carry out the mission in the absence of further guidance, should the commander be incapacitated or otherwise unable to communicate with them.

Although the focus of this example and our discussion for the defense have referred to EAs, it is relatively simple to apply the principles even when no EAs can be clearly identified. Likewise, the process and method of expression apply to task forces as well as to company teams for both the offense and the defense, and they may differ only in the choice of tools and techniques.

A refined discussion of actions on the objective or in the EA can best be addressed in the OPORD as a part of—or immediately following—the commander’s statement of intent and his concept. In a written order, it should be a separate paragraph best found in coordinating instructions. It is critical that the other parts of the order be formulated only after the intent, concept, and decisive actions are developed, to insure synchronization and avoid unnecessary repetition. A synchronization matrix cannot clearly represent as much detail as an expressed decisive actions paragraph. Experience at the training centers further indicates that synchronization matrices complement—but cannot replace—a written maneuver paragraph. Likewise, a fire plan is of limited utility without a complementary oral or written expression of its meaning.

An expression of actions on the objective or in the engagement area must not be so inclusive that it discourages subordinate’s initiative, but it must be complete enough to facilitate the synchronization of the fires and maneuver the commander deems necessary. Additional specific and coordinating instructions can complement the commander’s description of the decisive action. Other tools such as priorities of engagement, actions on contact, and displacement criteria may be stated as separate coordinating instructions. The command and signal paragraph can provide detail on the visual and radio communications that will initiate particular phases of the operation.

Even the best expressions of decisive action do not obviate the need for subordinates who are well versed in basic battle skills. This is true even during actions in an EA. Following initial contact with the enemy, company and higher fire commands are rare, but a commander must rely upon detailed, thorough planning to direct the planning and execution at and below platoon level. This is true of both offensive and defensive actions.

Attention to the expression of decisive action will help a commander avoid the tendency to assume the enemy away. It accomplishes this because it forces him to specify how success will be achieved, instead of merely restating the mission essential tasks that should lead to success. The expression of the decisive action is a refinement of the parameters—that is, reasonable limits on initiative—that the commander’s intent and concept represent.

The advice offered here has been to complement the already well-established tools available to the commander as he seeks to do the right thing, at the right time, and to the right degree. We have an ever-expanding menu of tactics, techniques, and procedures—so many in fact that commanders may find selection difficult. Expression of the decisive action should be viewed not as just another addition to the list, but as a valuable and logical means of rapidly and accurately communicating essential information to the maneuver units of the infantry force.

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The light infantry has wrestled with the conduct of infiltration attacks ever since the 10,000-man light division was established in the mid-1980s. In a doctrinal environment that included such things as the "expanding torrent attack" and the "inverted web defense," the concept of infiltration attacks seemed to fit quite well.

We have tried an array of techniques—infiltration lanes, rally points, assembly points, hide positions, squad-platoon-company, and so on. The whole concept took on an aspect of "attack by escape-and-evasion." The results were often frustrating and sometimes downright disappointing. Leaders would survey the wreckage of their best-laid plans and wonder what had gone wrong; some were professionally shaken by their inability to conduct infiltration attacks.

The concept of an infiltration attack involves formations of troops bypassing enemy formations by stealth, either to attack those formations from an unexpected direction or to attack other enemy formations and installations behind them. The attack usually—but not always—includes breaking a unit down into smaller subordinate groups (squads or platoons) to avoid de-
tection by the enemy. This, in turn, requires reassembly at a
designated place, orientation on the objective, and a coordi-
nated attack at the designated time.

What we are doing, then, is breaking down units into nu-
merous elements, making command and control more difficult
from the outset. It is unrealistic to put those elements into a
clandestine movement to sneak past the enemy and expect ev-
everyone to be at the appointed place, in the middle of the night,
in time to reorganize and orient for the attack.

These facts sum up the problem with infiltration attacks.
Although they depend upon stealth, it’s hard to sneak a large
unit through an enemy’s security zone or positions. If a unit
disperses and infiltrates in smaller groups, it faces the twin
problems of reassembly and orientation onto the objective (can
it be done in time?) and having enough combat power to react
to chance contacts (a battalion broken down into squads can
be destroyed piecemeal if its infiltration lanes are compre-
mised).

Therefore, the key consideration is how far to break down
the battalion. Some of the considerations are shown in Table 1.
Each level of organization has its advantages and its risks.

Although this is not addressed in current doctrine, I believe
infiltration attacks can further be broken down into the two
sub-categories of close and deep infiltration attacks.

Close infiltration attacks are those whose purpose is to by-
pass the enemy security zone and conduct surprise attacks
on the enemy’s first or second echelon defensive belts. The
attacks are conducted within range of supporting friendly
artillery and, once initiated, are supported with fires in the
manner of normal deliberate attacks. They usually take only
one night’s movement and do not require a unit to carry large
amounts of Class I supplies (subsistence items) or any resup-
ply before linkup with converging forces.

Deep infiltration attacks, on the other hand, are those whose
objectives are beyond artillery range and whose infiltration
phase may take several days, or even weeks. These attacks are

A good example of a deep infiltration attack is
the attack of the 5307th Composite Regiment
(otherwise known as “Galahad” or “Merrill’s
Marauders”) on Myitkyina in Burma during
World War II.

normally intended to achieve a larger tactical or operational
objective and are part of a scheme of maneuver at division
level (or higher). A good example of a deep infiltration attack
is the attack of the 5307th Composite Regiment (otherwise
known as “Galahad” or “Merrill’s Marauders”) on Myitkyina
in Burma during World War II.

Deep infiltration attacks are hampered by logistical re-
quirements. Units normally have to carry large amounts of Class I
or rely on aerial resupply with the corresponding risk of com-
promise. Casualty evacuation is also more complex. The unit
conducting deep infiltrations needs to be issued special com-
communications and mobility equipment because of the distances
involved and the limitations of the unit’s own equipment.

To better understand the full complexity of an infiltration
attack, let’s look at some of the specific considerations that
face unit commanders and planners in preparing for one. These
considerations, discussed by battlefield operating system
(BOS), reflect my own personal observation and study.
Although they are by no means a final solution, they may serve
as a departure point for further study.

### Intelligence

Like any other operation, an infiltration attack is apt to be
more successful if it is based on accurate intelligence. Unfor-
nately, this information is not always available, especially
for deep infiltration missions. Accurate templating of the
enemy situation is key, because this may be all an infiltrating
unit has to go on.

The template should include enemy dispositions and likely
courses of action; for example, a forward slope defense or a
reverse slope defense. The unit S-2 will use this template to
build his reconnaissance and security plan on the objective.
Key indicators as to the enemy course of action should be first
on the S-2’s reconnaissance and security plan tasks, because
they will drive modifications to the basic scheme of maneuver
that is briefed before line of departure (LD) time.

Scouts and designated reconnaissance personnel should
begin infiltration at least one day ahead of the main body. Time
can be well spent in a detailed surveillance of the objective if
the scouts and other designated reconnaissance personnel can
get there early. These soldiers can “proof” the infiltration lane
and then call in updates to the infiltrating unit while it is
moving to its attack or assault position.

The S-2 must travel with the command group on the deep
infiltration. Unlike the deliberate attack or the close infiltra-
tion where the S-2 stays in the battalion main command post
(CP), the S-2 and an assistant from the S-2 section must travel
with the command group to provide his analysis during the
orders process. Continuous intelligence updates from the scouts
and higher sources will probably generate the requirement to
do an update fragmentary order (FRAGO) upon reaching the
objective area.

The scouts cannot get so close to the objective that they risk
compromise. This is not the kind of situation that requires people
snaking in to read bumper numbers. Scouts must make maxi-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ease of enemy acqisition</th>
<th>MASS</th>
<th>DISPERSION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerability to chance contact</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>Less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of reassembly</td>
<td>Less</td>
<td>More</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Deciding how far to break down the battalion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications (PRC-77 or SINCGARS)</th>
<th>SQQ</th>
<th>PLT</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>RN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| FOIFIST Team                          | No | Maybe | Yes | Yes |

| Multiple maneuver elements            | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| Medic                                 | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antiarmor capability</th>
<th>AT-4</th>
<th>Dragon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| AT-4                                  | Dragon |

| Dragon TOW                            |       |

| Organic Indirect fire capability      | No   | No   | Yes | Yes |

Table 2. Analyzing capabilities of the infiltrating unit by size.
Mun use of their telescopes and other stand-off acquisition devices. If adequate surveillance can be maintained from two kilometers away, so much the better.

**Maneuver**

In considering how far to divide a unit for infiltration, a key consideration is the capability of the individual units. For example, squads have the advantage of being small, but they have only limited ability to communicate and react to chance contact. Some of the key capabilities that could be required of infiltration units are listed in Table 2.

Squad infiltration offers stealth and survivability from indirect fires, but it has almost no other advantages in terms of reassembly and individual unit capabilities. Battalions are the most capable, of course, but also the easiest for the enemy to detect, acquire, and engage. The two organizations that are the most useful in infiltration attacks are therefore platoons and companies. Both have the advantage of a TOE (tables of organization and equipment) that allows for communications over extended distances. Both have the ability to call for and direct indirect fires, and both have multiple maneuver elements. The difference is in the amount of risk a planner is willing to accept in deciding whether to infiltrate by platoons or companies.

Regardless of the level of threat, the smallest organization that should be used for infiltration is a platoon. Platoons offer key advantages over squads in terms of command and control and ease of reassembly combined with survivability. Platoons are more capable of defending themselves in a chance contact and are only marginally easier to detect and engage than squads.

In organizing for movement, infiltrating units have to balance the amount of equipment to be carried against security. The sheer load to be carried drives the infiltrating units to designate point, flank, and rear security elements that are lightly loaded, and main body elements that are heavily loaded and moving in modified traveling (column) formation. This is more true of deep infiltrations than close ones, but even in close infiltration the problems of moving with heavily loaded troops should not be down-played. An attempt to keep perfect formations only slows the movement and causes confusion. The main body of each infiltrating unit must be almost in a linear column formation to facilitate movement and command and control. It is up to the security elements to keep the columns of heavily loaded men from being surprised and ambushed.

The infiltration of ground-mounted TOW antiarmor systems with a limited number of missiles can give an attacker a priceless advantage. This is especially true if the attacker can set up a support-by-fire position that has a vantage point over the objective area and into vehicle fighting positions. TOWs firing from steep hillsides that vehicles cannot climb can achieve a devastating surprise effect.

Unfortunately, most infantry units consider carrying TOWs too hard, especially now that the TOW crew in a HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) has three members instead of four. But TOWs are still man-portable; it’s just that the necessary resources must be provided.

A good rule-of-thumb is that it takes a full-strength infantry platoon to carry a TOW system and four missiles. The TOW system itself can be carried on two stretchers; four missiles can be carried on four more stretchers. The infantry can still carry enough munitions for the assault in terms of small-arms grenades and AT-4 antiarmor weapons. For a battalion to carry four TOW systems would take four platoons.

The positions for the TOWs should be reconnoitered by the scouts before the TOWs arrive at the support-by-fire position. The systems and their crews and missiles would be dropped off by the infantrymen, who would then go on to their other tasks. This technique for TOW systems could also be used for .50-caliber machineguns or MK-19 40mm grenade machineguns in an environment in which there is little or no armor threat.

The global positioning system (GPS), in the form of small lightweight GPS receivers (SLGRs), represents a revolution in a unit’s ability to infiltrate in that it significantly reduces the chance of gross land navigation error. The SLGRs can also assist in linkup and therefore reduce linkup time. Units designated to conduct an infiltration should have their GPS TOE temporarily augmented to provide at least one system per platoon, one per scout squad, and one for the battalion command group and S-3. If more GPS units are available, they should go to the battalion medical and support platoons. The cross-leveling of GPS should be done early enough to enable the using units to test GPS and become familiar with it. Commanders must also ensure that the cross-attached GPSs are returned promptly to their parent units once the infiltration is finished.

**Fire Support**

In a close infiltration, the key to a successful movement to the objective area and the assault position could be counterbattery radar coverage. That is to say, the infiltrating unit may risk early discovery as long as it is covered by counterbattery radar and artillery units to respond against enemy indirect fire.

Although stealth is preserved as long as possible, the unit can infiltrate in larger groups to facilitate reassembly and orientation on the objective so it can respond to any chance contact. The infiltrating unit depends upon the radar-artillery team to destroy
the enemy indirect fire systems that are threatening them. Therefore, a key consideration is the dedication of radar assets to the infiltration effort and the positioning of radars to provide consistent coverage to the entire movement of the infiltrating unit.

Battalions and companies face hard choices when it comes to infiltrating their mortar platoons and sections. Neither the 81mm mortar platoon at battalion nor the 60mm mortar section at company has enough personnel to carry all of its TOE equipment for an extended distance. Commanders at both levels must therefore decide what to do: Leave half of the tubes behind (two 81mm mortars and one 60mm) so the platoon or section can carry some complete weapons, or detail additional infantry from the rifle platoons to carry the equipment that the mortar platoon and section personnel cannot.

If the answer is the second choice, then the commander has another choice to make: What other capability am I sacrificing (number of Dragon rounds carried) in order to carry all my mortars?

There is also the consideration of mortar ammunition. Which troops carry 81mm ammunition and which carry 60mm? How many rounds per man? One mortar round per man is no solution. Troops are heavily loaded with all sorts of equipment as it is. Automatically handing an 81mm round to a man already carrying 50 pounds of batteries and ammunition is not the answer. Load considerations are especially critical on deep infiltrations where troops must carry large amounts of Class I supplies and assorted personal survival gear.

Another issue that must be resolved is the effect desired on the objective. Will the mortars be used mainly for obscuration or illumination because artillery is in range, or are they going to be the only ground indirect fire system available? The answers to these questions will affect the mortar shell/fuse requirements and thus the ammunition load.

Deep infiltrations will take the units beyond the range of field artillery behind the FLOT (forward line of own troops). Fire support of infiltrating units, in this case, consists initially of organically carried assets and attack helicopters or close air support (CAS). The problem with this is that the CAS must be kept either in an on-station orbit behind the FLOT with a short time of flight to support the infiltrating unit or on strip alert with a correspondingly longer response time. The question is: How many air assets does a commander want to dedicate to this? Is it a trade-off? Keeping a continuous CAS orbit on-station is costly in terms of dedicated aircraft that could be flying other missions. Keeping a strip alert package dedicated to the infiltrating unit frees aircraft to perform other missions but may lose critical minutes in supporting an infiltrating unit in a chance contact.

For attack helicopters, the consideration is more of a strip-alert one. How many will be dedicated to supporting the mission? Mass is a key consideration in attack helicopter operations. Because of the nature of these aircraft, at least an aviation company would be required to provide short-notice support to an infiltrating unit in contact; a battalion would be better.

In the case of both CAS and attack helicopters, other planning factors—such as coordinating suppression of enemy air defense and electronic warfare suppression to facilitate penetration of the FLOT by the aircraft—further complicate the overall scheme of maneuver and plan of operations and must be coordinated at senior tactical and even operational levels.

Finally, in missions in which the scheme of maneuver calls for linkup with ground maneuver forces, the infiltrating force can be supported by the artillery of the converging linkup force. This will require well-coordinated control measures as well as a clear delineation of the hand-off of priority of fires and the control of fires when both the infiltrating force and the converging force are in contact with the same enemy.

In actions on the objective, the infiltration attack is similar to any deliberate attack in its use of control measures. The control measures used during linkup between the infiltrating unit and the main attack are the same as those used between any two converging units. The big difference in fire control measures between deliberate attacks and infiltration attacks is in the infiltration phase.

The infiltration phase is when chance contact with the enemy is most likely. It is also the time when a unit is least likely to have full control of its subordinate infiltrating elements or accurate, up-to-the-minute positions on subordinate elements. In addition, chance contact in the infiltration phase is most likely at night. In short, we have a high potential for artillery fratricide and a fires clearance nightmare.

A solution to this would be to make the infiltration lane a restricted fire area (RFA) from LD to the assault position. This would require that all fires within the infiltration lane be cleared by the infiltrating unit’s fire support element. It would not

Fire support of infiltrating units, in this case, consists initially of organically carried assets and attack helicopters or close air support.

impede engagement outside the infiltration lane but would add another check before an indirect fire engagement. The entire infiltration lane would not have to be an RFA all at once; it could be activated by phase line, with the RFA one phase line ahead of the lead element of the infiltration. A good rule-of-thumb is the more subordinate units in an infiltration lane, the harder it is to clear fires for a chance contact.

In an infiltration, air defense is limited to man-carried Stinger missiles and small arms air defense (SAAD). The number of Stingers carried normally depends on the length of the mission. On a close infiltration, two per team is usually enough.
This would give a battalion with an attached Stinger section 10 missiles with which to defend their force. If a linkup is to be effected shortly after the infiltration objective is seized, ten missiles would probably be enough.

The more complex question of carrying Stinger missiles occurs in deep infiltration missions. This is especially true in scenarios in which the enemy can employ fixed-wing and rotary aircraft to search for infiltrating units. In these situations, loads of three or four Stingers per team may be desirable. Again, it boils down to a decision based on METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). The decision must be based on the weight of the Stinger missiles, the threat, the other requirements to carry munitions, and classes of supply. Carrying large numbers of Stingers can seriously overburden an infantry unit already trying to infiltrate with a heavy load. At the same time, enemy attack helicopters are a grave threat to an infiltrating unit; they can pin an infiltrating unit in place until forces can be massed to eliminate it. This is especially true in terrain that does not offer the infiltrating force continuous cover.

The air defense status for an infiltrating unit is basically one of “weapons hold.” Units would not be cleared to engage air threats until they were under attack. A critical decision would be whether to engage aircraft that were attacking the infiltrating units with air defense assets that were in range but had not yet been discovered. In the assault phase and the consolidation on the objective phase when the clandestine nature of infiltration was no longer a factor, weapons control could be made more flexible to support the operation.

Of course, the best air defense during infiltration is still a passive one. Units conducting deep infiltrations in an air threat environment should take a page from a former enemy’s book and have all soldiers carry camouflage matting on their backs so they can lie down and blend in almost instantly. Marine Corps General Louis B. “Chesty” Puller said of the Chinese communists in the Korean war: They had a square of dirty white cloth and a straw mat they carried with them...They cover themselves with the cloth when there’s snow, and a plane comes over. They can hide a whole division from us, right along this road. They use the straw on open ground.

Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability

Light engineers on infiltration attacks are faced with the same weight issues as their infantry and air defense counterparts. This limitation is felt in all three aspects of engineer operations.

Some of the best engineer breaching equipment (bangalore torpedoes, mine detectors) is too heavy to carry for extended distances without the dedication of extra soldiers from the infantry. In these cases, breaching must be done by hand with limited equipment. Antitank ditches have to be breached manually by digging down the sides with shovels. Unimpeded, an engineer squad can render an antitank ditch trafficable to armored vehicles in 10 to 15 minutes. Mines have to be cleared by probing and by individual demolition emplacement. Wire has to be breached by wire cutters and rope. All of these methods are high risk and manpower intensive. In addition, both engineers and infantrymen can use their carry stretchers as assault ladders to breach wire and cross trenches.

For mobility during infiltration, a unit relies largely on ropes for bridges and portage up steep hills. Depending on the number and the width of water obstacles to be encountered, the engineer unit may be tasked to carry a few small rubber boats (three-man) to expedite river crossings. These boats can be used to send out far-side security parties at water obstacles and then, once several one-rope bridges have been established, to ferry heavy equipment. Engineers might also be required to fill in holes along trails or to corduroy roads with trees as other mobility tasks. A deep infiltration may require the engineers to carry more mobility equipment (ropes, block and tackle, shovels, rubber boats, and saws) than actual breaching equipment (demolitions).

Units involved in an infiltration most need countermobility support in the consolidation on the objective phase. Few countermobility materials can be carried on an infiltration attack. Mines weigh a lot and, unless there is a very important avenue of approach that can be closed with less than a dozen, an infiltrating unit cannot carry enough to make a difference. The only realistic option for a hasty minefield to support an infiltrating unit’s countermobility requirements is either artillery or air-delivered minefields. These, of course, come with danger-close and circular error probable restrictions that preclude their use as hasty protective minefields.

The infiltrating unit engineers can be used to reposition some of the previous defender’s wire barriers. In addition, any enemy mines still stockpiled and not laid can be hastily integrated into the defense. Even surface-laid without fuses, they would have some deterrent effect. Units conducting consolidation on the objective should also look at making barriers out of captured vehicles and equipment.

These stop-gap measures are about the best an infiltrating unit can do until resupplied on the objective by either ground or air. From a countermobility standpoint, the most important thing to remember is that an infiltrating unit is largely dependent upon what is captured from the enemy or what can be delivered by indirect means to improve its defenses.

Survivability tasks are limited mainly to those that manpower can accomplish. Engineers and other units can break down enemy positions and use their building materials. In addition,
engineers can strip derelict vehicles and structures of materials to improve hasty defensive positions and use their saws to cut trees. Once again, the infiltrating unit is largely limited to what it can scavenge to improve its survivability status.

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
A light infantry unit has only a limited ability to survive in an NBC environment. An infiltrating unit probably cannot afford to carry all of its NBC defense equipment because of weight. It is therefore best for the unit to avoid fighting in an NBC environment, if at all possible, even to the point of radically altering the infiltration scheme of maneuver to avoid contaminated areas.

Persistent chemical contamination is the greatest NBC threat to an infiltrating unit, because it has both an area hazard and a downwind hazard. An infiltrating unit can avoid actual contact with a persistent agent and still take casualties from its vapors. A persistent agent placed along likely routes of infiltration could significantly disrupt an infiltration attack.

To combat this, in an NBC threat environment the lead elements on each infiltration lane should carry M-8 alarms and wear NBC suits if at all possible. Except for the M-8 and NBC test kits, this element should be as lightly loaded as possible. The lead element should be far enough in front of the other infiltrating units that adequate warning can be provided if a contaminated area is encountered. The actual distance would, of course, depend on terrain and weather.

Upon encountering a persistent agent contaminated area, the lead element should immediately begin to reconnoiter the area to determine its extent. Bypasses must be out of enemy observation and out of the downwind hazard as well. What might otherwise seem like the best bypass route may not be practical if it exposes the infiltrating unit to downwind contamination.

The decision on whether or not to carry or wear NBC suits is critical in an NBC environment. It is not too far-fetched to say that a deep infiltration attack may not be possible in terrain riddled with multiple persistent contaminated areas. The weight of the additional NBC equipment, combined with the difficulty of decontaminating while in the infiltration lane and handling contaminated casualties, just makes the entire effort too difficult and risky. In an environment of heavy NBC use, close infiltrations are still possible. This is especially true in a moderate-to-cool temperature that allows troops to wear their NBC suits for the short-duration movement.

Decontamination during the movement must be limited to the individual decontamination of personnel and equipment. Personnel have to be careful not to use areas for decontamination that other infiltrating units will be passing through, or use water sources that other units will pass through or use. NBC contaminated casualties must be consolidated and their location passed on to either the converging units or to higher headquarters to arrange for helicopter extraction if possible.

Combat Service Support
Combat service support (CSS) assets in infiltration attacks are divided into two groups—what the infiltrating unit brings with it and what is provided to it enroute and on the objective—because the infiltrating unit can only carry so much. At the same time, CSS assets (such as the battalion aid station) that cannot be infiltrated may be badly needed and not immediately available. The decision on what the unit should bring along is very much dependent upon METT-T. The thought processes for a close infiltration attack are very different from those for a deep one.

A close infiltration’s limited duration normally means that Class I is not a problem, but water can continue to be a critical
factor, particularly in hot weather. The emphasis in load can be on weapons and ammunition and special equipment to support the assault. Resupply and casualty evacuation can be done by the converging forces or by the infiltrating unit’s combat trains following the leading elements of the converging forces.

Some of the major considerations are medical and classes of supply and maintenance.

In close infiltration, casualties incurred in movement are consolidated at casualty collection points (CCPs) along the infiltration route. These casualties are normally evacuated by elements of the battalion medical platoon or, for litter-urgent cases, by air evacuation. The problem is that, to preserve the clandestine nature of the movement, this evacuation cannot normally take place before the attack is initiated. Elements of the battalion medical platoon should follow the lead battalion in the converging forces so as to reach the CCPs along the infiltration route as soon as possible.

In actions on the objective, casualties should be consolidated as close as possible to the objective but far enough away from any breaches or lanes in obstacles on the objective to avoid any enemy indirect fires that might be called onto these locations. This positioning is intended to facilitate treatment by both the infiltrating aid station and the converging unit combat trains that will displace forward to the vicinity of the breach. Every effort should be made to coordinate the treatment of the infiltrating unit’s wounded with the converging forces’ aid facilities. Infiltrating unit commanders and subordinates must fully understand the converging unit’s casualty evacuation plan they can take full advantage of it.

The replenishment of classes of supply and maintenance of equipment generally occurs after the mission is complete and the combat trains of the infiltrating unit move forward (or the unit is transported from the objective to link up with the combat trains in an assembly area). Emergency resupply of items such as ammunition and water can be coordinated with the converging units if the possibility exists that both the infiltrating and the converging units will end up fighting side by side on the same objective.

In deep infiltrations, CSS is more complex because of the larger sustainment load that must be carried—not only Class I but also expendable supply items that add significant weight (radio and night-vision-device batteries). Units conducting deep infiltrations must balance the sustainment load against the fighting load. A unit carrying insufficient Class I will have to be resupplied by helicopter or parachute drop, with all the possible complications in security that such actions entail. On the other hand, it will do little good to infiltrate for 10 days without enough weapons and ammunition to fight. Ideally, the infiltrating unit reduces its sustainment load, going short on food (one or two MREs per day for up to two weeks) in order to carry enough munitions. Leaders have to watch their troops to see that they do not eat all their rations days before resupply. Once the attack is initiated, resupply can be effected by parachute or helicopter or by the converging unit.

The most critical single item is water. If no potable water source is found along the route and an infiltrating unit must depend upon the water it carries, resupply will be essential after only a few days. The weight of the water required will probably exceed anything else the unit might carry. Long-range infiltrations such as the assault on Myitkyina were possible because water was available along the route. Without it, an unresupplied deep infiltration is impractical.

Casualties incurred on a deep infiltration should be carried to the objective with the unit if at all possible. If not, they should be consolidated at CCPs designated along the route. (This is assuming, of course, that the infiltration effort continues. If it is aborted due to contact or other difficulties, casualties should either be carried out with the unit or by medical evacuation personnel.) These casualties should be evacuated by either air or ground elements of the converging attack. If air evacuation is used, the infiltrating unit should be as far from the landing site as possible. Ideally, the CCP should wait at least a day after the infiltrating unit has passed before evacuating the casualties.

CCPs used along the route of march must have adequate communications left with them to coordinate evacuations. Because it is hard for the medical and security teams to catch up to the infiltrating unit, which has up to a day’s head start, they should be extracted with the casualties. Those evacuated with the casualties should be reinserted on the objective in the first aerial resupply during the consolidation phase.

Currently, the main approach to the man-portage of equipment is to break the equipment down and carry it in individual loads. This is difficult, especially for items that weigh a lot and are awkward to carry, such as missiles, weapons, and supplies. Each of these loads broken down to an individual soldier’s pack along with his equipment. This requires a great deal of attention to who has what, along with continual reshuffling of loads from one rucksack to the next if the infiltrating unit takes casualties enroute.

One way to simplify the portage of supplies and equipment is to carry them on stretchers. A TOW missile strapped to a stretcher is 26 pounds for two men or 13 pounds for four. This method has the added advantage of allowing troops to drop their burden and react faster to tactical emergencies. It also makes it easier for leaders to redistribute loads in the event of casualties. The trade-offs are, of course, poor security in move-

In actions on the objective, the infiltration attack is similar to any deliberate attack in its use of control measures.
ment and the need for increased emphasis on point, flank, and rear security to keep the column from being caught in close formation.

Individual stretcher loads should be limited to 120 pounds per stretcher, and every effort should be made to make each stretcher a four-man carry. A yoke system could be devised to allow the weight of the stretcher to be carried on the shoulders of the soldiers instead of their arms. The soldiers could also trade off sides of the stretcher to give their arms a rest. The equipment or supplies would be attached to the stretchers with general-purpose straps. Depending on the duration of the mission and the equipment required, a battalion conducting an infiltration could carry equipment on 40 to 60 stretchers. A company could carry 10 to 15 and a platoon from three to six. In addition to their use as portage, the stretchers could be used as assault ladders to breach wire in the assault phase and to assist in consolidation and care of casualties in the consolidation phase of actions on the objective.

Command and Control

Command and control (C2) operations for infiltration attacks are similar to those for any other tactical operation. But organization for command and control is different because of the separation of vehicle and man-portable radio assets and the distances involved. This organization is different for close and deep operations.

Close infiltration operations are normally controlled by FM radio, both within the infiltrating unit and externally with higher headquarters and converging units. No special augmentation to the infiltrating unit’s TOE is normally necessary. An infiltrating unit can reduce its radio-electronic signature by using directional antennas (vertical half rhombic, erected with camouflage screen poles and green tape) and extend its range by using relay or retransmission.

The command group is normally split, with the commander and fire support representatives moving with one unit and the S-3 traveling in a vehicle at least one terrain feature back. The rationale for this is that man-portable radios may not always be able to reach everyone necessary. It is important to put at least one soldier who is fully read into the plan in a position to talk to everyone and coordinate. The battalion main CP remains behind in the LD to coordinate activities between the infiltrating unit and the other elements of friendly maneuver and fire support. The main CP normally displaces to link up with the battalion in the consolidation phase on the objective.

In deep infiltrations, the battalion command group is to be augmented with personnel from the main CP to facilitate C2 operations over extended time periods. The battalion XO travels with the infiltrating unit, leaving the HHC commander with the main CP and the combat trains behind the LD. The command group consists of the S-3 and S-2, along with the FSO, their NCOs, and enlisted assistants. The command group carries enough supplies and equipment to conduct planning and C2 operations. The XO travels separately from the command group with a smaller C-2 cell and acts as a redundant C2 node.

The infiltrating unit would use FM to communicate internally but would employ long-range communications such as tactical satellites (TACSATs) to communicate with higher headquarters. An infiltrating unit should have at least one TACSAT link per company and two per command group. The loss of long-range communications must be avoided at all costs. Lost contact drills and procedures must be established and practiced between the infiltrating unit and its higher headquarters well before LD time. Designated areas must be set up for panel signals to cover activities and intentions in the event communications are lost. Also, designated times should be set up for FM communications with aircraft sent over to reestablish contact.

Infiltration attacks are difficult, highly complex operations that require extensive planning and coordination. Their high-risk nature makes them relatively rare forms of maneuver, especially deep infiltration attacks. Units that are serious about conducting them should consider devoting large amounts of training time to develop and sustain proficiency. In actual combat, a unit designated to conduct an infiltration attack should be identified as early as possible and pulled off the line to practice.

In attempting to make the infiltration attack just one of many mission essential tasks over the years, we have overlooked its complexity. An infiltration attack is not something that can be attempted on the spur of the moment. Only through careful planning and meticulous preparation can it hope to succeed.
For most Americans, the killing of more than 175 Vietnamese civilians in the hamlet of My Lai was a part of a war they would like to forget. But military leaders should never forget it. As painful as it may be to acknowledge, this isolated incident showed that—in the absence of leadership, discipline, and proper training—horrible violations of the law of war can occur.

The law of war is often overlooked as a training topic. Although most units conduct periodic law of war training, it often consists of a lecture, a briefing, or a video shown in the unit day room. I would like to suggest some techniques for taking this training from the day room to the field.

One of the initial challenges of teaching infantrymen the law of war is dispelling their preconceived notions about it. First and foremost, they must be taught that—contrary to popular belief—adhering to the law of war will not hinder their ability to fight the enemy or accomplish their mission.

The first step is to define the subject matter in commonsense terms. To the Judge Advocate General Corps (the Army’s law of war experts), the term law of war refers to a number of domestic, international, and customary laws applicable to the regulation of armed conflict.

For the infantryman at small-unit level, the term is best defined as the rules that govern a soldier’s conduct in combat.

Most infantry soldiers readily accept that certain rules should govern their conduct, but they sometimes have a hard time understanding why they should learn and follow these rules when the enemy often ignores them. In addition, other soldiers may see the law of war as a set of rules that “tie their hands” on the battlefield. The following advice may help leaders address these concerns:

First, leaders should explain that training in and adherence to the law of war is required by regulations and that violations, no matter how small, are punishable as criminal offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Whether or not an enemy complies with the law of war does not alter a U.S. soldier’s obligation to do so.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.77 requires that each branch of the Armed Forces observe and enforce the law of war; implement programs to prevent law of war violations; and ensure prompt reporting and thorough investigation of violations and, where appropriate, take corrective action. This directive is implemented through a series of Army Regulations (ARs), including AR 350-1, Common Military Training; AR 350-216, Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Training; and AR 350-41, Training in Units. Other source materials include Field Manual (FM) 27-2, Our Conduct in Combat Under the Law of War; FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare; and Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-1, Treaties Governing Land Warfare.

Leaders must emphasize, too, that adherence to the law of war actually increases the Army’s combat effectiveness and helps bring a swift end to the conflict. Indiscriminate killing and wanton destruction only serve to increase the enemy’s will to resist and alienate indigenous populations. Compliance encourages positive news media coverage and bolsters popular support for the war effort.

Contrast, for example, the effects of the My Lai incident with the professionalism...
of U.S. soldiers during Operation DESERT STORM. While the former damaged the public image of the military—and provided fuel for anti-war activists—for years, the latter engendered overwhelmingly positive media coverage and ensured popular support for the war effort.

The infantryman’s mission is unlike any other. He is expected to close with and destroy the enemy—often at extremely close range. Because he will have contact with the enemy and the indigenous civilian populace, the infantryman must be prepared to make critical on-the-spot decisions regarding a variety of law of war issues.

Additionally, under many scenarios, infantrymen frequently find themselves operating in very small groups, far forward, and isolated (sometimes for days at a time) from their company, or even their platoon. Junior leaders must therefore be advised that they—and not some JAG officer from higher headquarters—will be responsible for ensuring that their soldiers adhere to the law of war.

Recognizing that most soldiers do not need an in-depth knowledge of the finer points of the law of war, the Army has developed an excellent synopsis of essential law of war principles—"The Soldiers’ Rules"—which is in AR 350-41, paragraph 14-3b (see accompanying box).

Performance Oriented Training

Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, notes that soldiers learn best by doing—using a hands-on approach—and law of war training for infantrymen should be no exception. While initial training should be done in the classroom, leaders can incorporate any number of the Soldiers’ Rules into training similar to situational training exercises (STXs).

Leaders should work with their supporting Judge Advocates to develop a program consisting of a lecture and discussion, followed by a field training phase. Leaders should secure the use of a local training area and set up STX lanes, each designed to present a different scenario that requires soldiers to make decisions involving the law of war.

After the formal classroom instruction, the unit should proceed to the training area where the soldiers receive an intelligence briefing detailing the scenario in which the training is to take place. After a fragmentary order (FRAGO), the soldiers negotiate each lane by squad or fire team. Once all lanes have been negotiated, an after-action session should be conducted.

Soldiers should carry their rucksacks with seasonal load, load carrying equipment, and individual weapon with blank ammunition. One member of each team should carry a radio. Leaders can set up a small operations center and, along with their supporting Judge Advocate, monitor radio transmissions. Leaders should refrain from solving problems for their soldiers by radio, and each lane should be assigned a different frequency to keep the teams from getting information about the upcoming lanes.

The following are some suggested scenarios:

**Training Lane 1:** Soldiers receive a FRAGO directing them to move by squad or fire team from a start point along a designated route. During the movement, they are to perform a zone reconnaissance. Contact with the enemy is brief as unlikely, but the soldiers are advised that there are reports of enemy stragglers in the area.

During the movement, the soldiers encounter a small group of people; some are in uniform and some are not. Some are carrying weapons, others merely wearing load carrying equipment; some even appear to be civilians. The soldiers apparently want to surrender to the patrol, but they do not have a white flag. The patrol should react and apply the Soldiers’ Rules. ( Soldiers’ Rules Tested: 1, 2, 3, 7.)

**Training Lane 2:** Soldiers receive a FRAGO directing them to proceed to a set of grid coordinates and conduct an area reconnaissance. The objective to be reconnoitered is briefed as a suspected enemy command post. The patrol is instructed that upon locating and observing the objective they are to call for artillery fire on the area.

At the objective, the patrol finds what appears to be a command post next to a medical tent, possibly with medical vehicles parked nearby. When the soldiers report this situation by radio, they are ordered to call for fire nonetheless. The patrol should react to this situation and apply the Soldiers’ Rules. ( Soldiers’ Rules Tested: 5, 9.)

**Training Lane 3:** Soldiers receive a FRAGO directing them to proceed to a set of grid coordinates and conduct a bomb damage assessment. Enroute to the objective, the soldiers encounter an enemy soldier who is wounded and begs the patrol to either kill him or simply let him die where he is. The patrol should react to this situation and apply the Soldiers’ Rules. ( Soldiers’ Rules Tested: 3, 4.)

The task of the American infantryman is an ever-changing one. With each new conflict and each new mission, he is thrust into a different situation, with each requiring different decisions. Today’s infantrymen must exercise discipline and restraint as never before. As part of this process, they must be prepared to adhere to and enforce the law of war. In these sensitive times, no infantry task is more mission essential.

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Logistics Lessons Learned
At the National Training Center

MAJOR DANIEL J. KLECKER
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Air assault forces of the U.S. Army conduct decisive, deep operations under a variety of complex conditions, and sustaining them poses distinct challenges and considerations.

In 1994 our unit of the 101st Airborne Division conducted a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) that combined air assault and heavy units for the first time. During that training, many logistical principles were validated and many lessons learned. We offer here some logistics lessons that apply at brigade level, including the integration of the heavy force and some considerations unique to operating in a desert environment.

The initial logistical focus must be on the complete integration of the heavy force as it is attached to the air assault brigade task force headquarters. Opportunities must be created that will familiarize each unit with the other's assets, capabilities, doctrine, and language. These opportunities might include multiple liaison visits and a command post exercise, the exchange of standing operating procedures (SOPs), a discussion of Class IV and V combat configured loads (CCLs), and the introduction of the logistical status (LOGSTAT) report. Key personnel should be introduced and begin forging relationships.

It is important early in this process to identify the troop list and accurately quantify all available and required assets. Because of the diversity of the modified tables of organization and equipment, the two units have little equipment in common. The forward support battalion (FSB) must be carefully task organized to ensure adequate and appropriate support for all supplies and services. Its foundation should be the air assault task force FSB, significantly augmented by resources from the heavy task force FSB.

Key logisticians must be at the tactical operations center (TOC) in the early stages of the planning process. The brigade S-4 and the FSB support operations officer should be there during the mission analysis. Frequent communication with the FSB at this stage will ensure greater responsiveness and earlier involvement by the entire logistics community.

The logistical preparation of the battle field should begin immediately so that early planning can support the tactical scheme of maneuver. This planning must include detailed terrain analysis to identify potential sites for key logistics routes, facilities, supplies, and services.

Because of the austere nature of air assault operations, it is important to identify the facilities and assets to be found on or near the battlefield that will help sustain combat operations. Such assets include water (potable and non-potable), Class III and IV sources, electrical power, transportaton assets, railroads, airfields, potential landing and pickup zones, hospitals, population centers, hard-stand maintenance facilities, and the like. Using these existing assets or facilities will reduce the number that must be brought forward or prepared.

Once the task organization has been determined, its logistical implications should be considered. A mission-specific task force may not have the required organic combat service support (CSS) assets. For example, this may be the case for a special task force created to conduct the counterreconnaissance battle. And the creation of a new or ad hoc element may generate new reporting requirements. The effective time of the task organization is important, as is the period of time it will remain in effect.

The brigade S-4's planning products, developed at the brigade TOC, are crucial to the support of the task force. Time for producing a CSS annex may not always be available. The high operational tempo often causes a compressed planning process that results in fragmentary orders instead of more complete ones. Furthermore, since the exacting detail in the CSS annex does not change much from mission to mission, changes to the original annex may be all that is needed.

The brigade S-4 should produce four CSS operation order (OPORD) products for the first mission: paragraph 4 (Concept of Support), execution matrix, CSS annex, and CSS overlay.

Paragraph 4 keys the entire logistics community to the CSS plan. It details, by phase, the supply and service priorities to support the scheme of maneuver. Every logistical asset in the brigade task force should take its cue from the concept of support. The early
involvement of the brigade S-4 and the FSB support operations officer in the planning process makes this crucial document better, to the benefit of the entire task force.

An event-triggered execution matrix should immediately follow paragraph 4 in the basic order. This matrix is useful to CSS planners because it indicates the locations of key logistical assets by phase.

The overlay should be a comprehensive, stand-alone product that graphically depicts all CSS information for task force units. The CSS plan is much more flexible if the area of operations is planned throughout the entire depth and width of the brigade sector.

The CSS annex shows details of the general support plan for missions in the theater of operations. It describes the basis for all supplies and services rendered and prescribes how, when, where, and which units in the area will be supported. Since the general support plan usually does not change drastically, an annex may be required only for the initial brigade OPORD. Subsequent changes and details can be conveyed in overlays, matrices, and paragraph 4.

These documents should be distributed with the OPORD at the briefing. Otherwise, they are unlikely to be disseminated to all units in time to be used. Units will continue to plan without a brigade logistics plan, and the result is likely to be disjointed and inefficient. Distributing CSS products quickly is more important than trying to make them perfect. It is better to distribute an 80 percent solution in a timely manner, and use rehearsals and staff visits to coordinate or disseminate additional information.

The S-4 and FSB support operations officer will have key information about specific unit requirements early in the planning process, and this information can be relayed to the appropriate units by a logistics warning order. This order gives subordinate units and logistic elements more time to prepare for the mission; they do not have to wait for the presentation and dissemination of the OPORD.

Resupply
The predominant method of resupply for air assault units during air assault missions is by air, particularly during the early phases of an operation. The most reliable way of planning for aerial resupply is to include logistics in the air movement table (AMT) and make it an integral part of the tactical mission. When planned in this manner, supplies are pushed to the objective area with the flow of combat soldiers and key equipment. Aircraft sorties are dedicated to resupply as part of the tactical operation. Otherwise, logistics must follow as a separate mission, and other priorities may cause it to be delayed or less responsive.

Aerial resupply should be planned in four distinct categories during an air assault operation:
1. Mission essential supplies.
2. Immediate, on-call resupply.
3. Routine, scheduled resupply.
4. Emergency resupply.

Mission essential supplies should be factored into the AMT as part of the air assault mission. These supplies should be routinely requested, configured, and rigged for sling load by the using unit, at the air assault pickup zone (PZ) logistics point. They are pushed into the air flow and arrive on schedule at the designated LZ (selected by the using unit to support the mission—as coordinated at the air mission meeting. All supplies required for the mission are moved by rotary aircraft (sling or internal loads) in accordance with the AMT. Command and control will be conducted over the command net, and the aircraft are allocated by the air assault task force S-3.

Immediate, on-call resupply consists of additional supplies anticipated for use during the mission but not included in the AMT. These supplies are requested in a routine manner, configured, and rigged on the air assault PZ logistics point by the air assault task force and made readily available for immediate resupply. The aircraft to move these supplies are either mission aircraft that become available once the air assault is completed, or a diversion of the dedicated mass casualty aircraft prepositioned at the PZ. As is the case with mission essential supplies, command and control will be conducted over the command net.

Routine, scheduled resupply is configured at the brigade support area (BSA) logistics delivery point by the requesting unit’s field trains. These are the supplies previously forecast on the unit LOGSTAT, issued to the unit during routine resupply operations, and staged in the field trains. Requests for aircraft to support this mission are submitted through the brigade S-4 to the FSB. The mission is supported by dedicated, daily logistical aircraft, routinely allocated by the brigade S-3 to the FSB.

Emergency resupply requests reflect supplies not forecast but needed immediately by the requesting unit, most likely in the vicinity of the objective area. These supplies are configured for sling load at the logistics pickup point in the BSA or the division support area (DSA). The aircraft are diverted from routine resupply missions by the brigade S-4 or FSB or requested from the brigade S-3 if the mission cannot otherwise be supported. Command and control is conducted on the administration and logistical net.

Since the heavy forces do not normally use aerial resupply as much as air assault task forces, our joint rotation was an opportunity to expedite important supplies, such as high-priority Class IX parts, ice, and emergency supplies. Air medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is also an important asset. The helicopter lift capability available to the air assault task force, if carefully planned and coordinated, can provide great opportunity for the heavy force.

The deep insertion of assets to support the tactical plan—scouts, combat observation lasing teams, and communication nodes—poses unique support considerations. Since these assets are usually inserted for limited periods, up to 48 hours, the best way to support them is to use kick bundles, carefully configured packages that are air assaulted with the deep units into their LZ. These bundles contain all the supplies anticipated for the duration of their limited mission. Since follow-on resupply missions risk
com-promising these units and the mission as well, it is important to include all supplies during the initial insertion.

Rehearsals

Logistics rehearsals are vital to synchronize resupply with the scheme of maneuver. To be most effective, rehearsals should be conducted at every level and should include as many soldiers and systems as possible. As a minimum, the brigade logistics plan should be rehearsed twice—first as part of the brigade rehearsal, normally conducted at the brigade TOC, and second in the BSA with all key unit logisticians.

The first rehearsal ensures that the logistical plan includes all key leaders and is synchronized with the scheme of maneuver. This forum permits the discussion of the plan and enables the key logistical planners to be available to address any concerns. Any changes to the scheme made at the rehearsal will immediately be identified and the CSS plan promptly adjusted.

As a result, subordinate unit logisticians come to the second rehearsal with a thorough understanding of their commanders' plans and then brief the way those plans will be supported logistically. They can be prepared to address any issues or problems they have or anticipate and should give the brigade S-4 a copy of their CSS graphics at this rehearsal.

The brigade S-4 should collect CSS graphics from all subordinate units and consolidate them, producing one overlay that depicts all CSS units and plans. Time permitting, this overlay should be reproduced and disseminated to subordinate units. It will be useful in resolving any conflicts, help situational awareness and battle tracking, and facilitate area support requirements, by phase.

Any resupply activities required during the mission should be conducted as discussed previously. Dedicated logistic aircraft should be designated routinely to ease daily resupply activities. Consistent with mission requirements, one of these aircraft should be allocated to the DSA to push supplies forward to the BSA, under the control of the main support battalion (MSB) commander. Another should be allocated to the BSA to push routine resupply forward to the requesting units, under the control of the FSB commander. Additional aircraft should be allocated as missions demand.

The Daily LOGSTAT

The key document that allows for prompt, yet routine resupply activities is the daily LOGSTAT. This document details the unit's current logistical posture and forecasts all requirements. The unit LOGSTATs are compiled by the brigade S-4 and submitted to the division G-4 and the FSB. Since this process triggers all routine resupply activities, it is important that the LOGSTAT accurately reflect the unit's current status and forecasts. The following techniques are effective in achieving this goal:

- Allow the unit adequate time to prepare the LOGSTAT by requiring its submission late in the day. Ensure that there is time enough to capture requirements as noted by the unit's returning logistical support elements. The units should validate expressed requirements and annotate quantities currently on-hand in the combat and field trains. The LOGSTAT system must be disciplined to ensure it is submitted in an accurate and timely fashion.

- Liberally exercise the use of the LOG warning order to ensure that subordinate units have the best available information with which to forecast supplies. They must codify all requirements as early as possible on the LOGSTAT so that the FSB and MSB can satisfy all logistical requirements.

- Use the daily meeting with unit logisticians in the BSA to keep them abreast of the tactical situation and all known future operations. The brigade S-4, who visits frequently and stays in constant communication with the brigade TOC, often knows more than subordinate unit logisticians about their future operations. Keep them informed, and they will produce better LOGSTATs and do their jobs more effectively. This daily meeting is a good time to require submission of the daily LOGSTAT and to allow discussion.

- Ensure that all LOGSTATs are examined by an appropriate member of the brigade S-4 section. This final check will ensure that the document is in line with support for current and future operations. There may be times when the S-4 adds supplies to a subordinate unit's forecast on the basis of information he has from the brigade TOC. Request routine requirements routinely. The LOGSTAT is the key document in facilitating this procedure.

Battle Tracking

To function as an alternate TOC, the brigade rear command post must accurately track the battle. This promotes situational awareness, which allows for more responsive logistical support. Accurate battle tracking also helps logisticians anticipate triggered events.

At the tactical conclusion of the mission, units perform many routine actions that permit rapid and effective resupply. The ammunition, casualty, equipment (ACE) status report is conducted during consolidation and reorganization and may be conducted more than once during any given mission. The information that comes from the units during this process facilitates the cross-leveling of supplies and may be the basis of an emergency resupply request. The status at the tactical conclusion of the battle becomes the basis for the unit LOGSTAT report. It is important to obtain an accurate status as quickly as possible to trigger prompt casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and vehicle recovery, as well as routine logistical activities.

The tactical conclusion of a battle often triggers other events as well, such as the displacement of logistical assets and the continuation of the planning process for the next mission. It is important that units police the battlefield promptly to take care of soldiers and equipment and then shift the focus to upcoming events.
CASEVAC requires thorough and detailed planning. One technique that helps streamline CASEVAC operations and save lives is to dedicate MEDEVAC helicopters to the mission. These aircraft, rigged for mass casualty situations, can be staged forward in the PZ LOGPAD, where they will be responsive to situational requirements. Used in this manner, the aircraft can be diverted, if necessary, to support immediate resupply requests to units on or near the objective. Such a mission is not a distractor; it is an efficient use of assets. When required for MEDEVAC, these helicopters are closer to the objective area and can bring patients back on their return trip.

An efficient method of Class V resupply is to use Class V CCLs. These loads consist of predetermined packages of ammunition that are based on the unit’s number of weapon systems. The CCLs should include ammunition for all key weapons in all essential types and appropriate mixes. For example, an artillery CCL should include a standard package of artillery ammunition, with a mix of munitions and fuses so that it is complete and self-contained.

CCLs are an efficient way for the unit field trains to prepackage Class V to be sent forward, upon request, from the logistics pickup point in the BSA. CCLs should be standardized and included in unit SOPs.

Doctrinally, the FSB operates an ammunition transfer point (ATP) in the BSA, because it has no Class V storage capability. This means the supported units must forecast requirements and assemble these supplies in the field trains. Class V is then pushed forward to the combat trains or unit positions. Any ammunition not forecast and delivered to the unit field trains through the BSA ATP must be called forward from the corps supply point. This time-consuming process taxes transportation assets and is not responsive enough for emergency resupply.

The key is to forecast requirements accurately and push supplies forward before the mission. This process is best accomplished by requiring units to maintain an accurate status of ammunition on-hand, accurately forecast requirements on the LOGSTAT, and push these require-
ments as far forward as the tactical situation allows. This process is necessary for all classes of supply, but it is crucial for Class V.

There is also great merit in putting together Class IV CCLs, which helps in planning and streamlines resupply activities. Class IV CCLs should be planned for platoon survivability packages and tactical obstacle packages. Like Class V CCLs, these too should be validated, codified, and included in unit SOPs.

A platoon survivability package includes all the barrier material needed to emplace a platoon in defensive positions. The packages are staged, ready to be called forward when needed; then they are sling loaded forward to a location determined by the unit (close enough to decrease transportation requirements at the site of the defensive positions). Sling loading preconfigured platoon survivability packages is the most expedient and efficient way of pushing these critical supplies forward.

Tactical obstacle CCLs should be planned in a similar manner. These include all Class IV barrier material and Class V mines required for the tactical obstacle effort. The CCLs are configured in the DSA and pushed forward to the unit Class IV and V points as soon as those locations are confirmed and the tactical situation permits.

Preconfiguring tactical obstacle CCLs early and pushing them forward leaves more time for defensive preparations. Although aerial resupply is possible for these packages, it is usually impractical because of the amounts required for deliberate defensive preparation. Using ground assets may be the most efficient method.

Decontamination assets make up another category of supply. The chemical platoon habitually attached to an air assault task force is very capable, but the attachment of a heavy force emphasizes the need for detailed planning to make enough decontamination assets available, consistent with METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). During our rotation, because of the lack of water sources in the desert, a 5,000-gallon tanker was pushed forward to the chemical platoon when the METT-T analysis indicated the need for it.

Resupply windows in the BSA should be established, in coordination with the FSB support operations officer, and published by the brigade S-4 as part of the CSS plan. Such windows inform tenant units when to report to the appropriate BSA supply point to draw their scheduled supplies. Each tenant should be assigned a different time to draw supplies from the various points so that units do not have to wait in line or risk massing. Staggered schedules permit units to use their organic transportation assets more efficiently, reducing external transportation requirements. Resupply windows also give the FSB a predictable schedule for unit arrivals, which makes their operations more efficient. All resupply windows should be completed in time for the units to organize and prepare supply requests for the daily logistical support missions.

Whenever the mission suggests the need for extended lines of communication between the BSA and the combat units, as deep air assault missions do, a forward logistics element (FLE) should be planned. The FLE should include key personnel, supplies, materiel handling equipment, and command and control and communications assets. It must be prepared to air assault forward to ensure responsive and continuous support to combat units until the tactical situation permits the BSA to displace forward.

It takes continuous coordination between the brigade S-4 and the FSB support operations officer to maintain the critical link between the brigade and all external CSS support. For this reason, it is recommended that the FSB support operations officer accompany the brigade S-4 to the TOC early in the planning process to make
Developing a Training Plan
For a Line Company Supply Section

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS JOHN DUEZABOU

There are some serious flaws in the training strategy for the supply section of a mechanized infantry or armor company. As a former Readiness NCO for a National Guard armor company, I helped develop a plan to correct these problems.

My company found the gaps while comparing different levels of our mission essential task list (METF) in accordance with Field Manual (FM) 25-101, Battle Focused Training. We had little trouble with our line platoons. Their mission training plan spells out collective tasks and ties in individual tasks to support them. But when we came to the supply section of our company headquarters, we ran into major problems in both collective and individual training.

Some may argue that a line company shouldn’t worry about the supply section’s collective training, because the section trains as part of the support platoon while in the field. My unit didn’t agree. The supply section belongs to the company, not to the support platoon. Thus, it’s the company’s job to train the section. This is especially true in a Reserve Component unit, where the section may work with the support platoon only two weeks a year during the unit’s annual training period.

Even if the support platoon conducts the collective training, the company still needs to know the collective tasks. That’s the only way to ensure that the section’s soldiers—a supply sergeant (staff sergeant) and an armorer (sergeant)—train on the correct individual supporting tasks while in garrison.

Whichever unit conducts the collective training, it will face two problems. The first is that the section performs vastly different tasks in garrison than they do in a tactical environment, yet neither can be ignored.

In garrison, the section’s main job is ordering and accounting for all supplies except those for the company’s vehicles. In wartime, logistic requests go from the platoons through the first sergeant directly to the battalion S-4 section. The supply section’s duties then become more a delivery function than an ordering and accountability function. While we must “battle focus” the section’s training, we cannot neglect the job it does routinely, day to day.

The second problem is that neither ARTEP 71-1-MTP, Tank/Mechanized Infantry Company Team Mission Training
Plan, nor ARTEP 17-236-11-MTP, The Support Platoon Mission Training Plan, covers the section’s tasks in enough detail to train and evaluate them.

Developing Collective Tasks
My company solved both problems by developing collective tasks for the section’s critical duties on post and in the field and then fitting them into our METL. Since our METL includes a mobilization task, the section’s purely garrison tasks (Account for unit equipment and Conduct supply actions) fit into it nicely. Units without a mobilization task in their METL can probably fit the section’s garrison duties under deploying to their area of operations. After all, if your supply people haven’t done their garrison job, you aren’t going to reach your operating area in any condition to fight.

Following FM 25-101’s guidance, we first wrote down all the collective tasks our supply section performs. Then we pared the list down to what was essential for each of the company’s METL tasks. We came up with a matrix of section collective tasks, including support platoon tasks from ARTEP 17-236-11 MTP (see matrix).

Then we began looking for proper conditions and standards to train and evaluate the tasks. In the five cases where the support platoon ARTEP tasks had enough detail, we simply used them as they were.

Otherwise, the support platoon ARTEP had the right tasks, but we had to write detailed standards for the supply section. We wrote them so that the section had to perform to standard for the support platoon to meet its standards. Sometimes, as in the section task React to ambush, we combined two support platoon tasks into one section task.

For the task Prepare for tactical operations and parts of other tasks, we merely changed similar armored vehicle crew tasks. We did this by adapting the standards to fit the section’s 2 1/2-ton truck with ring-mounted M2 machinegun.

We wrote the conditions and standards for the remaining tasks from scratch using manuals, regulations, standing operating procedures, and inspection checklists as sources for the standards.

Once we had written the section’s collective tasks, we picked the individual tasks needed to perform each of them. That’s when we ran into our third problem: the section’s MOS-specific soldier’s manuals didn’t contain any tasks on the section’s vehicle, weapons, or performance in combat; they dealt strictly with garrison supply procedures.

Since we developed this plan, the supply career management field (CMF) 76 has changed to CMF 92. Perhaps the new MOS 92Y soldier training publications will correct this problem. In the meantime, we found all the tasks we needed in another set of STPs already in the company headquarters—the NBC NCO’s MOS 54B manuals. A mechanized infantry unit could also find some of the required tasks in its CMF 11 STPs.

In the 54B STPs, we found tasks on driving and maintaining trucks, firing and maintaining the M2 machinegun, and operating in convoy. We needed to go outside the company for two tasks—Transport cargo and Operate vehicle with pintle mounted trailer—which we found in our support platoon’s MOS 88M truck driver STPs.

We were still looking for two small arms repair tasks for the armorer when I left the unit. The arms maintenance task in the 76Y STP deals only with conducting scheduled maintenance, not with making minor repairs. We felt the armorer needed this skill, as well as the ability to make out work orders on repairs that were beyond his training. The company hopes to find such tasks in the MOS 45B (Small Arms Re-
pairer) STP and then analyze them to see if they’re needed.

We ended up with 33 MOS tasks (76Y, 54B, or 88M) for the supply sergeant and 31 for the armorer, including the two tentative small arms repair tasks. These were in addition to the common tasks the section’s soldiers needed to perform their collective tasks (22 for the supply sergeant and 16 for the armorer). We prepared matrices showing the individual tasks for both soldiers in the section and the collective tasks they support. (On request, the editor of INFANTRY will send a complete set of these matrices, along with the conditions and standards that we wrote. The address is P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.) The company recently put this plan into practice, and the results are good so far.

Perhaps it will help your company as well.

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Tips on
The Light Infantry Combat Trains
CAPTAIN JIMMY M. BRADFORD

One of the more difficult tasks for a new S-4 is handling the logistics and administration of the combat trains. Most leaders don’t realize the difficulties they can encounter in trying to prepare the trains for combat until they are faced with coordinating support for their units.

Although the S-4 is not a “green tabber,” he is the commander, or officer-in-charge (OIC), of the combat trains. In this task, he has the assistance of other qualified battalion personnel, especially the S-1 and the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) first sergeant. The S-1 serves as the assistant OIC and handles the battalion’s personnel issues during combat, while the HHC first sergeant, as the NCOIC, is responsible for the internal administration of the trains.

Another of the S-4’s tasks is to conduct leader training before each training event. He must gather all leaders who play a role in the combat trains and assess his mission essential task list (METL). From this assessment, he then develops a training plan that will accommodate his training objectives and still support the battalion. He should sit down with the HHC commander if his training plan involves outside platoons or sections—such as the antitank platoon for convoy security—to make sure he can tie them into the plan and they can prepare for the training. The battalion executive officer must be briefed to make sure the S-4’s training plan will support the battalion commander’s intent.

The combat trains, like any unit in the Army, has individual and collective tasks that are derived from field manuals, mission training plans, and training and evaluation outlines.

When the unit deploys to the field, the S-4 should allocate enough resources for the battalion’s initial supply; then he should be able to start his training on the basis of the METL assessment. All levels of combat service support must be trained—including company supply sergeants and personnel administration center personnel in the training plan and objectives. After each training event, he must conduct the appropriate after-action reviews and assessments to see where he needs to go with the next training event.

The combat trains, like any unit in the Army, has individual and collective tasks that are derived from field manuals, mission training plans, and training and evaluation outlines. By training these task to standards, the S-4 sets himself up for success at all levels using the appropriate resources and developing future training scenarios.

Field Manual 10-14-2, Guide for the Battalion S-4, outlines the basic tasks that need to be accomplished while operating in a field environment under field or combat conditions. But the manual is only a guide. It will take time for a new S-4 to become familiar with all that he needs to accomplish while operating under field conditions.

But by using the resources around him and applying and if necessary modifying what he has been taught, he can accomplish these things and successfully prepare the combat trains for combat.

Captain Jimmy M. Bradford served as support platoon leader, HHC executive officer, and S-4 in the 4th Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and recently completed the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He was commissioned through the ROTC program at New Mexico Military Institute and holds a degree from the University of Texas.
Light infantry squads and Platoons, once they take casualties, often have trouble maintaining momentum during search and attack operations.

The focus of units conducting a search and attack should be to find, fix, and finish the enemy. But the moment a unit sustains casualties, that focus shifts to treating and evacuating casualties. The unit loses momentum by not pressing the fight and pursuing the enemy, and then masses on ground that is already targeted by enemy direct and indirect fire systems. In addition, security is lacking because leaders are too involved in overseeing the treatment and evacuation of casualties to assign sectors of fire, position crew-served weapons, and establish observation posts.

According to Field Manual 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, consolidation and reorganization is the last step in the squad and platoon attack drills. This takes place after the assault is complete.

Consolidation is most critical because it ensures that the unit is prepared for a counterattack. It includes assigning sectors of fire, positioning key weapons, developing an initial fire support plan against an enemy counterattack, employing an observation post, and taking up hasty defensive positions.

Reorganization—in addition to treating casualties and evacuating wounded—includes reestablishing the chain of command, redistributing ammunition, manning crew-served weapons, processing prisoners, and sending and receiving reports.

Many of these tasks can be done at the same time, and all of them in a matter of minutes; this is critical if the unit is to resume offensive operations fast enough to maintain the initiative.

A typical scenario might run like this:

A platoon departs friendly lines and begins to search its assigned zones for enemy. After searching for almost three hours, shots ring out; first squad is in contact. The squad immediately takes up good covered and concealed fighting positions and begins to return fire. The squad leader quickly assesses the situation and determines that he can effectively deploy his squad to finish the enemy.

After notifying the platoon leader of the contact, the squad leader begins to maneuver his squad against four enemy soldiers. As the squad begins to close with the enemy, the squad leader loses contact with one of his team leaders and hears calls for a medic echo down the line. The Alpha team leader has been wounded from enemy direct fire. The squad continues to engage the enemy. The SAW gunner goes down. But the squad has taken out two enemy soldiers as well; the two remaining enemy begin to withdraw from the area. Fire ceases. The squad leader notifies the platoon leader that the enemy has broken contact and that he has two friendly casualties, one of whom is litter urgent. He says he also has two enemy soldiers, one of them only slightly wounded.

The squad leader immediately calls for the aid and litter team to attend to and evacuate the casualties to the casualty collection point. At this point, the focus of the entire squad changes from finishing the enemy to evacuating the casualties. As a result, the squad not only loses the initiative but also loses security when it is most needed.

The enemy, now monitoring the squad’s activity, hears the squad leader’s commands and begins moving back toward the squad. Soon enemy soldiers are engaging the squad; two well-aimed shots and the squad leader and the medic are both casualties. The platoon leader commits second squad. This forces the enemy to withdraw but not before they inflict another friendly casualty.

The platoon leader assesses the situation—six friendly casualties and two enemy. After notifying the company commander, the platoon leader orders his squad leaders to begin evacuating casualties. Now practically the entire platoon is focused on treating and moving casualties. Momentum has ceased. Suddenly, a volley of mortar fire pounds the platoon as it is massed around the casualties, causing four more casualties.

Units pride themselves on the notion that they will never abandon a fallen soldier to die or be taken prisoner. But infantrymen must keep in mind that their first priority is to close with and destroy the enemy. Performing duties as medics and combat lifesavers, though critical, is secondary. Field Manual 7-8 states that infantrymen provide initial treatment until medical personnel can treat casualties, but only after their primary task is complete. This does not mean they cannot perform triage.
or treat casualties after medical personnel arrive if the tactical situation allows it, but if the mission is not accomplished, all of the soldiers themselves may become either casualties or captives.

Certainly, it is our moral obligation to do all that is possible to see that wounded soldiers are treated in a timely manner, not only to prevent loss of life but to reduce suffering and prevent further injury. But if the treatment and evacuation of casualties becomes the focus of squads and platoons before the mission is accomplished, nothing is achieved except a greater number of casualties and the failure to finish the enemy.

The IOBC Mentorship Program

CAPTAIN DAVID M. TOCZEK

Today, most officers are familiar with the word mentor, which is defined as “a wise or trusted teacher,” and a newly commissioned second lieutenant gets his first taste of mentoring in the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC).

IOBC is a rigorous 16-week course designed to challenge lieutenants and prepare them to serve as rifle platoon leaders. The program of instruction (POI) involves a significant amount of instruction at the small group or platoon level. Today, it is more difficult than the old basic course that many of us remember.

The structure of the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, supports this new POI and increased mentoring opportunities. Each company, depending upon class size, has two to five platoons, each trained by a captain as senior platoon trainer. Working for the captain are two noncommissioned officers (NCOs)—a sergeant first class and a staff sergeant.

All trainers are hand-picked by the battalion commander. The company commander, a major, is typically a former small-group instructor (SGI) from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. With a former SGI as company commander, the senior platoon trainers instruct material they themselves learned in the Advanced Course, but focused at platoon level.

The importance of the platoon trainers in the development of the lieutenants cannot be overstated. Each of these captains is under the scrutiny of some 30 lieutenants on a daily basis. The platoon trainers lead by example in all physical training and field training and teach a large portion of the classroom instruction as well.

The development of the lieutenants takes place daily, both formally and informally. Classroom instruction, social functions, dining-ins, formal receptions, and field time all figure into this development. This focused development, conducted by first-rate captains and senior NCOs, is the key to success in IOBC.

Still, the lieutenants also need a broader perspective from more senior officers. The Senior Leader Seminar was established for just this purpose. It allows lieutenants the freedom to question and learn from a colonel of infantry. Since a lieutenant assigned to a brigade usually does not have free access to his brigade commander, this program gives him a perspective he might not otherwise have.

Before each IOBC class, infantry colonels from Fort Benning volunteer to act as Senior Mentors. One colonel is assigned to each IOBC platoon. He meets initially with the platoon on the first Friday of the course, and the program calls for four one-hour periods of formal instruction throughout the remainder of the course. Most Senior Mentors also visit the platoons in a field environment, conduct physical training with them, and host informal social functions. The program’s strength is in its flexibility to mesh the POI with the Senior Mentor’s wishes for interaction.

Topics of discussion range from fiscal responsibility to the Officer Efficiency Report (OER) to those qualities Senior Mentors expect an infantry platoon leader to display. At times, the Senior Mentors tutor their platoons on how to succeed in difficult situations; at other times, the conversations delve into less tangible themes such as the relationship between the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant. In each session, the conversations are free-flowing; colonels listen intently as lieutenants voice their questions and concerns. More often than not, the Senior Mentor does not offer a solution to a problem but uses his personal experiences to illustrate how he dealt with a similar problem.

The Senior Leader Seminar sets the stage for newly commissioned infantry lieutenants to experience mentoring firsthand. The program allows them to see just how helpful or illuminating a senior officer’s experiences or knowledge can be. It also leads them to expect mentoring from their superiors when they reach their first unit of assignment.

Although IOBC provides the formal
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structure for officer development, the seminar supplements it through the personal expertise of senior officers. Senior officers develop lieutenants through open discussions. Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training, states: “The commander must continually listen to, understand, challenge, and mentor junior leaders.” This relationship—and the knowledge imparted—may well pay off on a future battlefield.

A mentor can make an important difference in the development of an officer. While this effect is most pronounced among junior officers, senior officers can also benefit. The Senior Leader Seminar is a way to establish in the lieutenants’ minds how mentorship works. Although mentoring may place heavy demands on senior commanders’ time in infantry battalions and brigades, its result in the development of our officers could make it well worthwhile. As one Senior Mentor observed, “We must spare no expense to make lieutenants successful, because the cost of failure is too great.”

Captain David M. Toczek recently completed an assignment as a senior platoon trainer in the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry. He previously served as a rifle platoon leader, a company executive officer, and battalion adjutant in the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, in Italy. He now commands Company A, 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division. He is a 1988 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Leadership
A Commonsense Approach

LIEUTENANT COLONEL VICTOR M. ROSELLO

Looking back on my first months of commissioned service, I still vividly remember the sense of awe and wonder that seemed to be eroding my self-confidence as that first assignment as an infantry platoon leader drew nearer. In a way, it was frustrating, because I had worked so hard to prepare myself during the officer basic course.

Of the many concerns I had during those early months, the single most important one dealt with leadership style. Some typical questions I would ask myself were:

* What kind of leader should I be?
* What type of character or personality should I demonstrate to my soldiers?
* Should I assume a role of some sort that will convey the image of a tough or benevolent leader?
* Of the people I know, which role model should I emulate? Were my ROTC (or Academy) instructors good enough role models? How about a historical figure? Would a Patton or an Eisenhower do?

For answers, I looked to the leadership instruction I had received in the basic course, and it helped me develop a framework and some guidelines for sound and effective leadership. But how much of what you learn do you apply? Can you remember all those long lists of leadership principles, definitions, examples, attributes, qualities, things you must know, things you must do? If we could somehow distill all this knowledge or reduce it to a few easy-to-remember lines, wouldn’t it be well worth the effort?

I offer here a short block of instruction that promises to help you find a leadership style that will be yours and yours alone, because it will be founded on your own talents and your own institutional concept of the ideal leader.

My approach to this instruction emphasizes brevity. Instead of reexamining the leadership principles you’ve already studied, I offer here a leadership concept that you can emulate in principle.

In presenting this concept, I call upon three historical figures whose writings have captured the essence of leadership. A short quote from each of them will point the way to a natural leadership style that will fit your own personality. I have selected their quotes because they share a common factor that transcends cultural and his-torical boundaries. They also reinforce my philosophy and concept of leadership style. If you remember the essence of the eternal words of wisdom of these men, you will not fail:

First, a quote from British Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery of World War II fame, will establish the overall objective of leadership:

*The first thing a young officer must do when he joins the Army is to fight a battle, and that battle is for the hearts of his men. If he wins that battle and subsequent similar ones, his men will follow him anywhere; if he loses it, he will never do any real good.*

Right up front, Montgomery tells us that the new officer must somehow win his soldiers over so that, together, they can become an effective team able to accomplish any mission.

The obvious thing we must determine next is how to win their hearts. Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu will give us some insight:

*Regard your soldiers as your children,*
and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

As new second lieutenants, you’re probably wondering how useful it is to regard soldiers as children or to look on them as sons. But Sun Tzu is saying that we must provide soldiers the same degree of care and attention that parents ideally provide their children. But is this the role model we want to emulate? Are most parents the ideal leaders?

U.S. Marine Corps General John A. Lejeune clarifies this point:

The relation between officers and men should, in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son, to the extent that officers are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well as the discipline and military training of the young men under their command.

These words are worth remembering, because they capture the vital essence of our business and should help you formulate your own leadership style. This is a formula for success. The whole business of leadership boils down to a basic understanding of human nature. Accept the fact that soldiers, like anyone else, generally want to do well in life. They want to excel in their profession and to be rewarded through promotions, awards, or recognition. Recognition is an important ingredient in leadership. Soldiers want to be respected as human beings; they want to feel like part of a bigger whole—an organization that cares and satisfies their basic needs.

Following General Lejeune’s idealistic parent-to-son approach requires common sense. Be firm only when you must. Punish judiciously and fairly to enforce discipline. Take time to enjoy your job by showing your human side. Show some humor when it’s appropriate. Don’t put on a show or take on a role that is not the real you—no one likes a phoney. Allow your soldiers to make mistakes, and don’t be ashamed to admit that you make mistakes too. Provide positive feedback and counseling. Teach them self respect. Be considerate of the wants and needs of your soldiers. Expect nothing but the best from them. Above all, be approachable. If you demonstrate honest care and affection for them, you will win their hearts, and they will follow you with pride, fully knowing that they are part of a family and a unit that honestly cares. If you use this simple formula, your soldiers will never let you down. You will be well on your way to developing the cohesion an organization needs to survive the rigors of peacetime training and the challenges of combat.

One word of caution: The development of unit cohesion, unit pride, teamwork, and mutual trust begins the first day of your assignment. Hopefully, you can develop these qualities in your unit during peacetime before you must lead your soldiers into combat. As we all know, under the stress and strain of combat, fear will rear its ugly head and become one of your primary enemies. That’s why you must build that important cohesion and team attitude as early as possible; then cohesion will carry you and your unit through the most difficult times, like a strong ocean wave or a gust of wind. Cohesion is a powerful invisible force when it is tapped properly. The great captains of history have conquered empires with it. But if it is not tapped properly, the proverbial crack of the whip may lead to the accomplishment of some missions, so long as the whip is cracking. But what happens when the man with the whip falls? The soldier’s allegiance to the organization will dissolve, and he will care only about himself. The result will be the deterioration of unit cohesion and effectiveness as a fighting unit.

Heed these simple words of advice and common sense, and you will be followed willingly “into the deepest valleys”—and you will succeed. Your soldiers will ensure this because it is they who will carry you on their shoulders to success, and “they will stand by you even unto death.”

Lieutenant Colonel Victor M. Rosello, now G-2 of the 82d Airborne Division, commanded the 313th Military Intelligence Battalion during the Gulf War. He is a 1974 ROTC graduate of the University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras and holds a master’s degree from the University of Chicago.

Training With the National Guard

LIEUTENANT TODD COOPER
LIEUTENANT DAVID MCCLOSKEY

A few years ago, our Active Army combat engineer battalion at Fort Lewis, Washington, became affiliated with two National Guard combat engineer battalions in nearby states, in addition to its own U.S. Army Reserve roundout company. We worked with all three of these elements to help improve their training and combat readiness. After a year of this affiliation, we had an opportunity to work with both battalions during their annual training periods. These exercises turned
out to be productive training events for all concerned.

The Reserve Component members learned from us, and we learned from them. In the end, a friendly, productive relationship was established among the three sister battalions that will help improve their training in peacetime and their performance in wartime.

We want to share some of the lessons we learned from this experience in the hope that other Active Army units affiliated with Reserve Component units can also establish productive, working relationships with their counterparts.

**Enter the training event first with the attitude of a mentor and second with that of an evaluator.** People don't like an evaluator constantly looking over their shoulders; it only puts them on the defensive and can make them leery. On the other hand, people are more open to a potential mentor.

If the active duty members go in with the attitude, "We are here to work with you and help you where you need it," the relationship established will be more productive and less stressful than the typical evaluation relationship.

**Understand that the Reserve Components are not the same as the Active Army.** Do not enter a training event initially expecting to see the same level of task execution you might expect in an active-duty unit. It is imperative that you understand several key differences:

- Reservists and National Guardsmen train one weekend a month and two weeks a year. Tailor your expectations of their initial performance on the basis of this limited amount of training time.
- In some cases, the officer-NCO relationship may not be clearly established. Some of them may work side by side in their civilian jobs, or the officer may even work for the NCO. This puts both in an awkward position in which they must find some sort of balance.
- Do not be surprised to find the enthusiasm and motivation of the Reserve Component soldiers to be higher than those of their active-duty counterparts; they are understandably excited about their long-awaited exercise.

**Enforce output-oriented training.** While understanding that Reserve Component soldiers do not have the same training opportunities as active-duty soldiers, it is important to hold them to the same standards in training that you would apply to your own soldiers. If they fail to meet the standards, teach and help retrain the soldiers until they can accomplish the mission to standard. Under no circumstances should you dismiss a substandard execution of a mission by merely having an after-action review and moving on. The mission should be done and redone until it is done to standard.

For example, some of the squads we worked with had trouble with dismounted breaching drills. Instead of proceeding to the next task, the mentors sat down with the squad leaders and team leaders and explained the drill using a sand table. Then they helped the squad conduct rehearsals and showed them expedient demolition knots such as the Scanman knot. Finally, when the squads had perfected the techniques, they executed the mission to standard. Regardless of the task, by enforcing output-oriented training, the squads were able to improve their performance in all cases.

**Leave the leaders with the permanent tools for continued success.** In the course of a year, the National Guardsmen and Reservists may forget some of the verbal advice given to them by their active-duty mentors. To help prevent this loss of knowledge and experience, leave copies of your battalion field operating procedures, drill books, platoon leader and squad leader field books, and whatever else you think your Reserve Component counterparts may find helpful. Thus, they can continue to improve their training without the active-duty mentors present. Additionally, it will be beneficial to videotape the execution of one of the critical tasks. Reviewing the tapes later could improve squad and platoon performance.

Armed with the right attitude, expectations, dedication to output-oriented training, and tools to leave behind, you and the Reserve unit will find the training event productive and meaningful. Hopefully, it will also help establish a positive working relationship between the two units that will serve them both well in the years to come. By using active units to help train Reserve Component units, Army leaders have recognized that it can improve overall combat readiness to fight more effectively, and ultimately win, our future wars.

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**Lieutenant David McCliskey** was executive officer of Company B, 14th Combat Engineer Battalion. He is a 1990 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

For almost two decades, Iran and Iraq have been the most significant source of friction and instability in the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf area in particular. Indeed, this threat does not appear to be diminishing.

It is therefore the responsibility of military planners, strategists, and soldiers to "know the enemy." While this book enumerates and assesses many factors that constrain Iranian and Iraqi aggression in the near term, neither country acts as a "rational bargainer." Religious and cultural strife, internal economic problems, and many other factors cause both countries to be unpredictable and potentially volatile and aggressive.


This is a well-written and absorbing book that analyzes all facets of recent actions, military trends, and dynamic warfighting capabilities of Iran and Iraq. It examines in detail developments in conventional weapons and technology, as well as the risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the region, and how these may affect the military balance there. Numerous tables compare and contrast all facets of the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces. The 55 pages of excellent and detailed notes and the selected bibliography reflect the currency and depth of research.

The author concludes, "It is clear that the West and the southern Gulf must take every possible action to limit Iran and Iraq's present war fighting options." Four measures need to be taken in concert: arms control, technology and equipment transfer limits, strengthening the deterrent and defensive capabilities of southern Gulf forces, and enhancing Western power projection capabilities. Without these measures, the potential for conflict in the region increases dramatically.

A reader of this excellent and informative book will certainly learn about and "know the [potential] enemy." Unfortunately, because of the book's high price, it is not likely to get the readership it richly deserves.


The Gulf War of 1990-1991—our DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD/DESERT SABER operation (though the latter term is seldom used to delineate the air war from the ground wars)—is now more than four years in the past. But its effects are still being felt throughout the Gulf region, and we still have sizable military, naval, and air forces in the region to ensure a degree of stability.

Unfortunately, as time passes and we become more involved in other military operations such as Somalia and Bosnia, we tend to forget why and how we fought the Gulf War and the lessons we learned from it. Maybe it's because we are just not interested in "past" history, and only the future counts in our doctrinal and tactical forecasts. Or perhaps it's because we are sending our soldiers to places we have never gone before—Macedonia and Bosnia, for example, with the Golan Heights looming large in future calculations—and this tends to distract us from our history. But we really should not forget the Gulf War and all of its ramifications.

This smallish book, by a retired U.S. Army officer, gives a broad outline of the events leading up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Then he tells of the invasion itself; the creation of a coalition of nations to oppose Iraq and its aggressive actions; coalition problems; the melding of the armed forces from 34 nations into a coherent whole; and the eventual eviction of Iraq's armed forces from Kuwait.

His chronology begins on 28 February 1990, and he ends the book with a wrap-up chapter in which he discusses the war's results. The chronology ends with 28 February 1991, but, as he points out, some actions occurred after that date. He stays pretty much with the facts as he understood them at the time he prepared his manuscript, and those facts have not changed over time.

The book does contain several annoying errors: It's Erwin, not Edwin, Rommel (page 28); a mistake in one of the photo captions on page 73; Iraqi forces were to withdraw from Kuwait, not Iraq (page 31); and a failure to properly identify the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps (this organization is called the XVIII Corps in a number of places). Nevertheless, this is a worthwhile reference book for a reader to have in his personal library.


American Battlefields is one of the finest books of its kind anywhere. Hubbard Cobb has put together a handy and "user friendly" reference work of the existing battlefields of all wars fought on U.S. soil: the French and Indian Wars (1689-1763), the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), the War of 1812 (1812-1815), the Texas War of Independence and the War with Mexico (1836-1848), the Civil War (1861-1865), the Indian Wars (1622-1891), and the attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941).

This book is ideal for those who are developing staff rides. Each entry begins with a good description of the conflict, including events leading up to it and an introduction of notable commanders on both sides. Once the stage is set, the author discusses the tactics employed by both antagonists, their troop strengths and dispositions, the terrain, and other matters. Maps of each battle (with the exception of Fallen Timbers) supplement the text.

Cobb also includes a number of special features in each chapter. For example, on the French and Indian Wars, he talks about fortification (the types of forts used, their construction, and methods of siege warfare). On the Civil War, he analyzes technological advances in weaponry and their effects on tactics and
strategy. The book also has three appendices, a glossary, and a suggested readings section. These provide directions to each battlefield; the addresses and telephone numbers of national, state, and local agencies; military terminology; and notable publications on each conflict.

American Battlefield contains a wealth of information in one source. It is designed primarily for the novice, but it should serve as the starting point for anyone seeking to understand any particular conflict fought on American soil. Professional soldiers may be disappointed by the simplicity of the maps; nevertheless, Hubbard Cobb has done a magnificent job of researching and writing this book.

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In recent years Jefferson Davis has attracted an increasing number of critics for his role as commander-in-chief of the Confederate States of America. In this book, author Steven Woodworth concludes the analysis of Davis that he began with Jefferson Davis and His Generals. In the first book, he concentrated on the mismatch of strategy and policy in the western theater. Now he focuses on the critical eastern sector of operations, principally the Virginia theater, dominated by Robert E. Lee.

The central theme of this book is Davis's inability to find and direct generals in such a way that they would carry out his ideas in the operation of Southern armies. The Davis who emerges from these pages is a chief executive who fails to comprehend that his countrymen were not fighting for the idea of constitutional liberty but for a place and a social system. Consequently, Davis consistently underestimated the willingness of Southerners to continue the struggle; this perception, in turn, affected his relationship with his generals.

Davis's choice of Lee to command the Army of Northern Virginia was his best of the war. Lee presented him with an alternative strategy for winning. In contrast to Davis's own preference for waging a defensive war, Lee opted for an offensive strategy designed to win a quick, decisive victory before the North's military and economic strength could make Confederate victory impossible. Of course, the availability of the South's own resources would determine how long the struggle could be continued.

Confronted with two viable strategies, Davis vacillated, never giving Lee all the resources at his disposal for fear of precluding the Confederacy's ability to go on, should the gamble fail. According to Woodworth, Gettysburg was the bitter fruit of mixed strategies. Lee, sensing the fading opportunity for decisive victory, moved with desperation into the worst-run battle of his career. That the Confederacy was able to endure for nearly two years after Gettysburg was a tribute to Lee's tactical acumen and Davis's steadfastness.

In the final analysis, the author remains ambivalent concerning Davis's effectiveness as commander-in-chief. On the one hand, he admires Davis for the product he demonstrated in the wake of numerous defeats. (Whether Davis was a "near military genius" as Woodworth opines is debatable.) On the other hand, he chastises Davis for indecisiveness, pride, and reluctance to change an opinion or admit an error. The product of these personal foibles was a failure to delineate and direct a consistent strategy. Therein lies the true tragedy of Jefferson Davis as a wartime leader.

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James Parker graduated from Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, and served a tour in Vietnam. After he left the Army, he attended college in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. While there, he was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to be a paramilitary case officer in the Special Operations Group, assigned to work with Hmong volunteers and Thai mercenaries in Laos. Codename Mule is the story of Parker's two years of work with the Laotian hill people to keep the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao out of Military Region II generally and the Plain of Jars area specifically.

Parker begins his story by describing his training at several CIA schools and ends by telling of a final dramatic gesture of defiance. In between, he talks about the details of the fights, describes the people with whom he worked (both American and Laotian), remembers the funny and not-so-funny stories of war, and even tells us about his personal life—his wife accompanied him to Laos and, while there, they adopted two children.

His affection for these children and for "his" Hmong soldiers comes through in his narrative. In his epilogue he briefly describes what has happened to the people since the end of the war in Laos. Those readers who have served with allied military units will appreciate and understand his (and others') frustration when they were ordered to stand down because a political, and not a military, settlement had been reached in their (secret) war. Since several of the Hmong now live near him in Pinehurst, North Carolina, it seems logical to conclude that this proximity is no coincidence.

This book is one of six that introduce the Naval Institute's new Special Warfare Series. All are written by special operators who participated in the action, and five of them are original works. Parker's book is short but excellent, a straightforward telling of his story without unnecessary embellishments or side trips. The Foreword, written by William M. Leary of the University of Georgia, is an outstanding short essay on how the CIA became embroiled in the war in Laos and sets the stage perfectly for Parker's story.

I recommend this book to military history students and enthusiasts and also to soldiers who want or expect to serve with allied military forces.

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John Prados's eight books, including significant works on American activity at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and his study of Khe Sanh, establish him as one of the best popular scholars of intelligence activity and national security issues. This volume is an interesting addition to the Vietnam bibliography. The title at first seems to be a misnomer since much of the book is drawn from published sources, but it is really a play on words, since the topics deal with questions of intelligence activities and operations that were hidden aspects of the war at the time, and some remain clouded or neglected today.

Prados presents 24 vignettes or microcosms from which he debunks self-serving myths and draws "lessons" of the conflict. Examples of his topics include American POWs from the French-Indochina War, Op Plan 34-A activities, six mysteries of the Tonkin gulf, the Westmoreland-Sam Adams numbers controversy, intelligence prior to Tet, the Phoenix Program, the secret wars in Laos and Cambodia, and much more.

Although most of the vignettes do draw heavily from published works, some are original research by the author that make important new contributions. Some examples are his analysis of the officer corps of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, particularly the background of the South Vietnamese gener-
als, and his treatment of communications intelligence gathered by both the U.S. and the North Vietnamese. He has a unique ability to bring together the existing published sources augmented by his own archive research and interviews to shed new light on topics that have been treated by others. Moreover, Prados does a masterful job of weaving these isolated topics into a coherent whole.

Despite my kudos for the book, the lack of footnotes providing specific verification is disturbing. The book offers only general references indicating the source of the material for each chapter. I often wanted the specific source of a particular piece of information or assertion. Also, the final chapter on alleged government misdeeds against the Vietnam Veterans Against the War lacks the objectivity of previous chapters. Finally, I fail to be convinced by the argument in the conclusion that the conditions of the war made it impossible that any strategy could succeed.

This is not a book for the novice. It presumes a fairly sophisticated knowledge about the war, but for those with a basic grounding, it is insightful and provocative. Although I do not agree with all his conclusions, this is one of the most interesting contributions on the war that I have seen recently.

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This analysis is divided into two parts. The first deals informatively with the structure, strength, composition, deployment and stationing, weaponry and respective doctrines of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Reserves, and the state National Guard. The second part focuses on the various conflicts and contingencies from the Gulf War to operations other than war (OTW), including unconventional conflicts, such as insurgency and counterinsurgency.

At the end of each section, the editors provide commentary and conclusions, attempting to project how well, or how poorly, the services may be expected to perform in the future. With the many indeterminate roles, missions, budgets, and attitudes of the present administration coupled with uncertain support of the American public in such engagements as Bosnia in the nebulous state of “new world order” international affairs, the military will be hard-pressed to develop enthusiastic cohesive, consistent, and effective responses. The editors assert that in Bosnia, for example, the military is somehow expected to serve as ambiguous peacekeepers when there is no real peace and the American public is substantially opposed to the operation. Many regard it as a “lose-lose” affair that involves no genuine threat to U.S. interests, while some cynics—on the other hand—have attributed U.S. participation to political motives.

Overall, the dilemmas and stresses facing the military have become intense, and there will be compounding controversy as to “proper” roles and missions in the 21st century, compounding as editor Connor notes because the Army has no prevailing theory of war. He concludes that theory “is indispensible to well-ordered military thought.” Too little attention is paid to thought, and too much to technology. Connor stresses that chief among the intellectual projects that must be completed by the service heads is the establishment of a theory of war that in itself would unify the service staffs and bind them to a common view of war. Therefore, he contends, the first and most serious challenge facing the services, individually and collectively, is intellectual.

At the conclusion of Part II, the editors contend that in the long run conventional wars such as the Gulf War may be the least likely contingencies for the United States. “This does not mean that regional conflicts will necessarily diminish,” they assert, “but it does suggest that U.S. involvement may be the least optimum strategy, and when the U.S. does become involved, it may have only a minimum amount of time to respond effectively, in contrast to the 1991 Gulf War.”

The editors write that there is a dangerous misconception in the notion that involvement in a variety of “peace” missions establishes and maintains military relevancy in the eyes of the American public as well as the national leadership. Additionally, to presume that the military must replicate society by responding to a variety of domestic demographic and social issues is another dangerous notion, as the authors state. Moreover, the military may become engaged in a variety of operations that may have little to do with national interests. To some observers, this is already happening with consequences that may not be known for decades. Finally, despite what unknowns await the military both in the world at large and at home, the editors conclude “the highest levels of the military chain of command must retain a global perspective and strategic view not limited by microintellectual rigidity.

This is no mean task.” Back to theory again? Buy this book, and put on your thinking cap!

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Cutler, a retired Navy officer, points out in the preface to his book that the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the “biggest and most multifaceted naval battle in all of history” because the area in which it was fought spanned more than 100,000 square miles, involved more ships than ever before, involved more men than ever before (nearly 200,000), introduced the largest guns ever used in a naval battle, and a new Japanese tactic that would eventually kill more American sailors, and sink more American ships, than any other used in the war.

Although the Japanese Navy had suffered greatly at the Battle of Midway (3-4 June 1942) and two years later at the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944), it still had a formidable fleet, and it was expected, as Cutler points out, that the two navies would meet one more time, as the inevitable thrust of U.S. sea and land power into the inner sanctum of the Japanese Empire left no alternative. The Battle of Leyte Gulf would be the final naval struggle.

Cutler relates in vivid detail how three Japanese fleets converged on the U.S. vessels covering General Douglas MacArthur’s amphibious landing on the Philippine island of Leyte, and how they nearly prevented the general from fulfilling his “I shall return” vow; not because the Americans did not have overwhelming resources to sustain the landing, but because of questionable decisions by one of America’s greatest naval commanders.

U.S. aircraft and submarines stopped one Japanese fleet under Admiral Takeo Kurita on 24 October with sizable Japanese losses, but Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, with the greater part of the U.S. fleet, was lured away from the main area of the struggle by a decoy under Japanese Admiral Jisshiro Ozawa, leaving unprotected the troops covering MacArthur’s beachhead, and the smaller U.S. fleet there to cover and sustain their landing. However, as Cutler points out, the Japanese were unable to capitalize on this opportunity, in part because of the extraordinary valor on the part of the U.S. Navy force supporting the landing. And because Admiral Kurita, beaten on the 24th, turned his fleet westward on 25 October, when he might have thwarted the American success, because he believed he faced a larger force than was there.

Cutler questions Halsey’s tactical decisions during the battle, and his later attempts, after the war was over, to deny he made any mistakes.
BOOK REVIEWS

Cutler has provided the reader with the best account of that naval battle, which ensured U.S. victory in the Pacific. Mistakes were made on both sides, but as Cutler states, “I sincerely believe that only those who have never been shot at would disparage the actions of men under fire.”


Vo Nguyen Giap is one of the great generals and strategists of history. A good Giap biography is overdue, and one is being written. But this is not it.

Retired British general Peter Macdonald, a novelist and popular historian, offers a readable account of the long Vietnamese struggle with the French and later the Americans, with emphasis on the communist side. Throughout, he interjects Giap’s public life, but the book is far short of a biography. Based on a few interviews and the incorporation of secondary works with no identification of sources, the book is a fast and enjoyable read; but it has been a great disappointment to serious students.

The best parts deal with the French-Indochina War with interesting portraits of the French forces, especially at Dien Bien Phu. The author spices the account with tidbits of quantitative information; for example, that 82,926 parachutes dropped in the Valley of Dien Bien Phu, that the French had 49,000 bottles of French wine and two mobile brothels of Vietnamese and Algerian prostitutes at the fortress, or that the record for porterage on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was held by Nguyen Viet Sinh, who in 1,089 workdays carried 55 tons over 41,000 kilometers. This makes for lively reading, but substance is minimal.

The treatment of the American phase of the war is trite, chicle-ridden, and at times blatantly inaccurate. Although Macdonald tells us what Giap did, he fails to give us much insight into the man, as an individual, a strategist, or a political figure. The portrait is cardboard with little life or depth. The final chapter, entitled “Giap—An Assessment,” is hardly that at all.

Although the engaging nature of the book is attractive for the layman, the superficiality of substance and interpretation does not make it one that the novice should count on for understanding of this long, complex struggle.

**RECENT AND RECOMMENDED**


**Crossed Currents: Navy Women From WWI to Tailhook**. By Jean Ebbert and Marie-Beth Hall. (Hardcover edition published in 1993.) Brassey’s, 1995. 368 Pages. $15.95, Softbound.


**War Slang: America’s Fighting Words and Phrases from the Civil War to the Gulf War**. By Paul Dickson. Pocket Books, 1995. 336 Pages. $18.00, Softbound.


**Flashpoint! At the Front Line of Today’s Wars**. By Anthony Rogers, Ken Guest, and Jim Hooper. Sterling, 1995. 160 Pages. $24.95, Hardcover. *Hell on Wheels: The 2nd Armored Division*.


**Sun Fin: Military Methods**. Translated, with introduction and commentary, by Ralph D. Sawyer. Westview Press, 1995. 392 Pages. $18.95, Softbound.


KEEPING OUR GUARD UP

Operations security—the good old OPSEC of our youth—has gotten short shrift since the dawn of the information age, and now is the time to take a good look at the way we do business.

The information superhighway is a toll road, and we need to examine the potential costs before we sign up for a trip we may not be able to afford. Today, we can transmit so much information, so fast, that we may not stop to think whether we should be doing so. There is a lot of E-mail traffic shuttling back and forth, and most of it is highly vulnerable to interception.

Electronic mail has a number of legitimate uses, and in our profession the exchange of ideas is at the top of the list. Today it is possible to get fast input from a variety of sources and levels of organization without the delays of routing staff actions through a conventional distribution system. This is fine, so long as key issues and players don’t get bypassed for the sake of expediency. But while we’re busy sharing our thoughts with our colleagues, we cannot afford to forget that there may be other parties who are equally interested in our discussions.

The Internet has become the Sears Roebuck catalog of the information age, and our thoughts are now accessible to a far wider audience than any of us would have dreamed a decade ago. Today, when you come up on the web, the world is listening. Legitimate interest in our military affairs can range all the way from the curious hobbyist to the men and women in uniform who read our journals for information that will support their professional development and help them do their jobs better. But there’s another audience that listens attentively, dissidents at home and potential enemies abroad, and we still need to be careful what we reveal to them.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—long regarded as the greatest threat to our security—did not sweep away the host of bad guys out there; indeed, it gave rise to a host of new ones, all intent on monitoring our capabilities and intentions. Nowadays, in open sources, we can read of unit deployments, unit and national strength figures, courses of action, weapons capabilities and employment options, and a host of other succulent bits of information. When a threat rears its head, experts appear on television to describe our options and likely courses of action. Time was, we sought to keep the enemy guessing; today his biggest challenge is to decide which channel can give him the most information.

You and I may have little—if any—control over these leaks, but we can decide what traffic we will pass over unsecure systems. Information doesn’t have to be classified to be of value to an enemy; if you think a piece of data is sensitive, treat it as such and be careful how you transmit it. At the beginning of this note, I mentioned the possible cost of riding the information highway. If we’re prudent, the cost will be measured only in dollars, and it will be the normal price of doing business. If we do not keep our guard up, however, the cost will be measured in lives.

Make changes where you can, train your soldiers to do likewise, and watch your lane. When troops go ashore to be met by alerted news media, it’s bad; when they land to face an alerted enemy it’s inexcusable.

RAE

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