Lane Training in Haiti...Page 22
Platoon Under Fire, Mogadishu, October 1993...Page 27
22 LANE TRAINING IN HAITI
Lieutenant Colonel Leo A. Brooks, Jr.
Captain Michael O. Lacey

27 PLATOON UNDER FIRE: Mogadishu, October 1993
Captain Mark A.B. Hollis

DEPARTMENTS

1 COMMANDANT'S NOTE
3 LETTERS
5 INFANTRY NEWS
8 PROFESSIONAL FORUM
  8 THE WEIGHT OF COMMAND: Colonel Harold K. Johnson in the Korean War
     Lewis Sorley
  10 THE JAVELIN AND BFV INFANTRY: What Is Really Important?
     Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton
  12 MISSION ANALYSIS IN STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS
     Major Kevin J. Dougherty
  15 SHOOT, MOVE, COMMUNICATE
     Colonel Richard L. Strube, Jr., U.S. Army, Retired
  18 EXTEND THE RANGE OF A RADIO
     Captain Daniel T. Williams

35 TRAINING NOTES
  35 TRAIN AS WE FIGHT
     Lieutenant General William F. Kernan
     Colonel Daniel P. Boigger
  37 MOUNTAINEERING AND LEADERSHIP: The 5th Ranger Training Battalion
     Major Stepen A. Hiller
     Major Mark R. Morrow
  39 SUPPORT-FIRE POSITIONS
     Captain Chris Toner
     Captain Josh M. Williams
  43 PROTECTING THE OBSTACLE
     Major Fred Johnson
  45 EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING OF A LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION
     ANTITANK PLATOON
     Captain Michael Dane Acord
  47 THE BATTALION S-4 IN THE FIELD
     Captain William M. Connor, V

49 BOOK REVIEWS

COVER: A platoon of the 3d Reconnaissance Company, 3d Infantry Division, fires at a group of Chinese Communists near Songbong-dong, Korea, 20 May 1951.

• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: Editorial, (706) 545-2350 or 545-6551, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6551; Subscriptions, (706) 545-3626. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia. • POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • USPS Publication No. 370830.
THE INFANTRY—FOCUSED ON THE FUTURE

The Infantry. Queen of Battle. Our mission: to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver, to defeat or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack. We've been doing it—and doing it well—for 223 years. Our Army's values, the American Infantryman, and the Infantry culture that toughens him mentally and physically for the rigors of close, personal combat have remained constant ever since the Infantry was organized. This is true for all five types of Infantry: mechanized, Ranger, airborne, air assault, and light. In this Commandant's Note, I want to talk about where the Infantry stands today and where we're headed.

We must continue to provide the Army with clear, current, concise warfighting doctrine to address a wide range of contingencies. We must keep our doctrine current, if we are to remain competitive in the face of ever-changing threats to our national interests. We do this by developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to support new equipment before it is fielded; we assess long-range requirements in order to train our Infantry to meet them; and we draft, staff, and publish the doctrinal manuals—and an array of specialized manuals—for all five types of Infantry. Twenty-five of our manuals are written by the Combined Arms and Tactics Directorate, 22 by the 29th Infantry Regiment, and four by the Ranger Training Brigade, including Ranger and long-range surveillance training and operations literature. The 11th Infantry is the proponent for Airborne doctrine, and the Army Physical Fitness School is responsible for an additional two manuals that institutionalize its own subject matter expertise.

The 29th Infantry Regiment is presently working an initiative to define new, higher marksmanship standards that will capitalize on the new small arms sights and scopes already being fielded. Watch for an article on this important adjunct to our combat power in the next issue of Infantry.

Feedback is an essential part of the doctrinal process, and we need your continued help in this area. Through our telephone and e-mail networks, we're linked with every battalion in the Army, and Infantry Magazine offers further opportunity for an exchange of information. Additionally, the Assistant Commandant leads the Infantry Traveling Team during its itinerary to visit every major command having a high density of Infantry units once a year. Our Command Sergeants Major and selected colonels who represent Infantry School directorates accompany the team, and their job is to link up with field commanders and Soldiers to get face-to-face feedback on how we're doing and what we need to do better. Sooner or later, all of your feedback will be reviewed and eventually reflected in the products we distribute to the U.S. Infantry community.

One of these is the new draft Field Manual (FM) 100-5 that we plan to field for review in the immediate future. The strategic and operational material in FM 100-5 has led to the drafting of a new manual, FM 100-40, which is the equivalent of the tactical portion of FM 100-5. The new core leadership manual, FM 22-100, is in final draft, and commanders will need to take a close look at it when we field it for review, because whatever appears in the final product will be taught in the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and the Infantry Captains Career Course, formerly the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. The Bradley gunnery manual, FM 23-1, has undergone revision, as has FM 90-10-1, the MOUT manual. What we do not yet have, however, is a brigade-level or combined arms MOUT manual, and we're going to get to work on that.

We will also coordinate with Leavenworth to develop a MOUT manual for division-level operations. The Infantry Stability and Support Operations document, TC 7-98-1, is in the field, as is antiarmor doctrine that includes the Javelin fielding. Doctrinal changes are coming quickly; the ongoing MOUT Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, and the gunnery changes that will accompany fielding of the A3 version of the Bradley will be added to existing doctrine.

At Fort Benning, tough, realistic training is the order of the day, seven days a week, 50 weeks a year. We've added Officer Candidate School (OCS) Phase III, the National Guard OCS; this used to be called the State OCS, but now its final phase is being consolidated at Fort Benning to support regional training needs. Machinegun training for Soldiers in one station unit training (OSUT) has been increased to eight hours, and will include both the M-60 and the M-240B. The OSUT FTX is now eight days instead of the previous five,
and includes a 12-mile road march at the outset and a 15-mile forced march on the last night. We plan to add one week to the 13-week OSUT program of instruction to cover training specifically focused on the Army values of loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and physical courage. The entire course of instruction is intentionally more demanding, to close the gap between the types of Infantry, so that every grunt who leaves Fort Benning is—first and foremost—an Infantryman.

Ranger School has always been tough, but it’s going to get tougher. More PT. More combatives: boxing, bayonet training, pugil stick training. Two airborne operations in the Camp Darby phase. A 16-mile forced road march, squad evaluations, and a buddy run. Rangers will get 18 hours of advanced land navigation, including orienteering, and will learn to use both the traditional map/compass and global positioning system technology. The mountain phase will begin with a deep air assault into Dahlonega and includes two patrol-based FTXs, with mountainin in between. They leave the mountains in an airborne operation into the Florida Ranger training area. Coastal operations are once again part of the Florida phase, with more water operations than ever before. At the end of that phase, Rangers return to Fort Benning in another airborne operation and complete a 30-mile shuttle march before they graduate.

Building leaders is another important mission of the Infantry School. Power projection missions demand leaders who understand rules of engagement, the implications and demands of rapid deployments, and attaining and sustaining the OPE TEMPO of units called upon for such missions. The professional military education of our captains is the cornerstone of success for deploying units, and we are focusing the Infantry Captains Career Course to better prepare our young warfighters for the challenges they will face. The course still teaches operations from company through brigade—with most of the emphasis on company and battalion operations—in a combined arms context, and students train using both tactical exercises without troops and simulations, and will soon have access to a new close combat tactical training facility.

Most Infantry officers can still expect to alternate between light and mechanized assignments, and we have the Bradley Leaders’ Course for those going to Bradley units. The Ranger Training Brigade is drafting a new POI for a light leaders’ course lasting approximately two weeks. Both of these courses will considerably reduce the learning curve for Infantry officers who will need to join a unit ready to deploy and do the job expected of them.

Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses are being restructured to close the gap between what NCOs in the 11B and 11M career fields are learning. This includes some add-on Bradley instruction for career field 11M NCOs. Mortarmen, career management field 1IC, will also be getting improved technical certification, similar to what officers earn in the Infantry Mortar Leader Course. We’re also making it easier for Infantrymen of any MOS to attend Ranger School, including making it possible for a Soldier to enter the Ranger course as soon as he completes the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course, which is now consolidated at Fort Benning.

The organizational structure of our Infantry will drive the way we do business, and the Infantry can only retain its resiliency through robust organizations that are manned, trained, and equipped to do the job right the first time. We have recognized that the small size of squads and platoons means that any casualties would degrade combat power to an unacceptably high degree, and your comments from the field have confirmed our concerns. We’re taking a hard look at the future design of the Mechanized Infantry and the Force XXI Division, and the impact of constant personnel turbulence on readiness. The bottom line is that you cannot train a platoon to standard if you have squads that are zeroed-out or otherwise understrength. Our message to the decision-makers at Department of the Army is that we need full-size platoons and squads. We will continue to solicit your input on these and other issues of equal relevance to the force, and hope that you will continue to use Infantry Magazine as the channel for communicating your thoughts.

Airborne Soldiers will be interested in the Advanced Tactical Parachute System (ATPS), the proposed next-replacement for the T-10. The canopy is smaller than that of the T-10 and is about the same size as the current reserve parachute canopy. The T-10 currently in use lands a trooper—with equipment—at 22 feet per second. The new parachute employs the counterforce principle to slow the rate of descent to 15 feet per second immediately before landing. This will reduce jump injuries and ensure that the unit has its maximum combat power available once it is on the ground. The ATPS has been a four and one-half year research and development task, and the end product will be a parachute with a reliability factor as good as or better than the already superb track record of the T-10C model.

Modernization upgrades of the Bradley are on track, and over 6,700 of the fighting vehicles in various configurations are protecting U.S. interests around the world. In addition to the TOW-2 antiarmor system, restowage of ammunition and gear, final drive, and other improvements to the A2 models, later model upgrades include the laser range finder, driver’s thermal viewer, a combat identification system, digital compass, and applique armor. The Bradley A3s we are now testing will have imbedded digitization, onboard diagnostic systems, second-generation forward looking infrared for the driver, and displays to the squad leader in the rear of the vehicle, the gunner, and the Bradley commander. When you add the autotracking capability that enhances the vehicle’s target acquisition and first-round hit probability, it is easy to see why the Bradley will truly be a technology partner with the Abrams main battle tank.

We live in exciting times, and the Infantry will continue to be the point of the spear as the Army prepares to execute and win the close, personal, brutal fight on our own terms. Our five types of Infantry are better trained, equipped, and supported than at any time in our nation’s history, and Fort Benning is where it all begins. I welcome your comments on the quality of the Infantrymen we’re sending you.

Hooah!
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER

INFANTRY's March-June 1997 issue (page 6) lists a Soldier Enhancement Program proposal for a “machinegun assault bag,” which would hold 300 rounds of linked ammunition. Such an assault bag was devised in 1970—and used in combat—by an innovative, young machinegunner in the 2d Battalion, 47th Mechanized Infantry, 9th Infantry Division.

By attaching a shoulder strap to an issue butt pack, he was able to carry a 300-round belt of ammo that was not subject to the damage that typically occurs with belts carried “Rambo style” (that is, exposed, wrapped around the torso).

Reference the M240B machinegun article (pages 8-9), by Captain John Hodge—which says, “The M240B is an excellent example of the Army’s commitment to provide the best...”—the Army deserves, perhaps, both cheers and jeers for fielding the best 7.62mm machinegun in the world. . .40 years after it became available!

STANLEY C. CRIST
San Diego, California

SECURING A BASE CAMP

I recently saw your November-December 1996 issue and the article “The Defense of Camp Able Sentry,” by Captain Craig A. Collier, and felt compelled to write. I saw combat with the 25th MP Company, 25th Infantry Division, in Vietnam and know what I’m talking about.

The defense of this camp in Macedo- nia is reminiscent of the mentality that led us into Pearl Harbor, the fall of Seoul, Firebase Maryann, Beirut, and Somalia.

Taking 25 minutes to arm 150 men and then with only one magazine apiece is negligence. On a small base like this, from the sound of the siren to having 100 percent manned and ready should take no longer than one minute—30 seconds if you’re already on orange alert.

Each man’s combat gear should be stored by his bunk, each squad’s weapons and triple basic load of ammunition should be kept in the squad area. Members of each squad must be preassigned to their positions and held responsible for their upkeep. Not only must there be fighting positions for all of your men, but each position must have at least one and preferably two fallback positions.

Ideally, the camp should have a berm and trench with bunkers, concertina, claymores, landmines, and punji stakes. Each M113 should be dug in hull-down, or have dirt piled around three sides. An RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) screen should be fixed around three sides and left movable on the back to allow displacement. There should be at least two positions for each M113 on line and an additional position to fall
back to. Each M113 should have a permanent crew assigned to it from the force reaction platoon. The crewmen should live near their vehicle and man guard duty from it at night. Fifty caliber machine guns should be kept with belts in the tray and ready to go. Each M113 should be manned by at least one crew member 24 hours a day.

The men should abandon observation towers and move to prepared fighting positions below them at the outset of hostilities. All personnel on guard duty should be in full combat gear with a tripod basic load of ammunition.

Although a berm with land mines and stakes may not be allowed, there is no excuse for not having triple row concertina and claymores.

Assume an equal opportunity defensive position; have positions facing all four sides of the camp. Prepare positions with an eye to the possibility of rear attack.

Better barricades are needed at the front gate. An M113 will not stop a dump truck full of explosives moving at high speed.

Better overhead protection is needed for all shelters; 18 inches of protection will stop small arms but is marginal for aircraft cannon and insufficient for larger shells. Three feet should be the minimum with six feet for C3, ammunition, and aid stations. A long-term presence in this camp should have resulted in most of the facilities moving underground.

Failure to follow even these basic defensive steps could result in the worst kind of public relations, should the Serbs decide to take action. Looking weak and defenseless is not the way to encourage adherence to peacekeeping policies.

MICHAEL F. MEACHAM
Phoenix, Arizona

COMPASS TECHNIQUES

Thank you for sending us the copies of INFANTRY articles on compasses and land navigation.

We, of course, rely heavily on the GPS (Global Positioning System), currently using Silva XL 1000 units, but in a number of situations we use traditional compass techniques for navigation and mapping, in particular in areas with heavy forest canopy.

Although very popular in Europe (including the British Army) and Africa, we find the protractor compasses (Silva) unsuitable for the long sightings necessary for mapping or navigation in desert or similar open terrain and frequently need to use resection techniques, in particular when making our own maps. In many parts of Africa, the only available topographic maps are the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency 500,000-scale, and we have to use these as a base for producing our own local large-scale geological maps.

For navigation and map making, we use the old (World War II) British Army liquid-filled prismatic compass, which is rugged (mine is made of brass!) and reliable. In addition, we use the French Châix Universelle compass, which is excellent for long sightings as well as geological work, and the U.S.-made Brunton induction damped PRO 5008 for geological work (measuring dips and acting as a hand level) and short sights in particular for mapping in jungle (should I say rain forest?) regions. We have not tried the lenstic compass.

DR. RICHARD RUMBOLD
Geologues-Conseils Internationaux
Kingsbridge, Devon
England

RANGERS NEED SIDEARMS IN URBAN FIGHTING

When a Ranger is clearing a building, his shoulder weapon is the first thing sticking out into an enemy-held room. The new 21st Century Land Warrior program even brags that its optics will allow the M4 carbine to peer around the corners of buildings to relay a picture to the soldier’s helmet display.

Has anyone considered what will happen to the combat effectiveness of that soldier if his weapon is destroyed?

It is common practice for members of U.S. Army Special Forces detachments, elite counterterrorist units, and Navy SEALs to carry at least the issue M9 9mm Beretta pistol in holsters by their sides to serve as a backup in case their main shoulder weapons are rendered inoperable.

The commonsense answer is to issue one of the thousands of M9 pistols the Army owns to each of the soldiers most likely to be sent into a city fight—the Rangers.

The pistol in a city fight would also enable a Ranger to engage and stop an enemy who charges him as he changes his shoulder weapon’s magazines. If he needs a hand free to throw a grenade, or if his shoulder weapon is slung as he climbs a rope, he can unholster the pistol more rapidly with one hand and use it against an enemy. Certainly we wouldn’t expect him to let go of the rope and fall trying to reach for his carbine.

These M9 pistols could initially be fielded in their issue holsters, but for use in close quarter battle (CQB), small organizations like the 75th Ranger Regiment should buy a commercial off-the-shelf low-riding leg holster for faster access in a fight as well as better interface with the Ranger body armor.

Once fielded, these pistols need to be integrated into tactical CQB training. An evaluator moving with the team during room clearing could call out to the Ranger that his shoulder weapon is inoperable, requiring him to finish the exercise using the pistol. Blank rounds do exist for pistols, though dry-firing could suffice. Soldiers must be ready to switch to the pistol whenever the situation calls for its use, and only constant training can produce this readiness.

This training should include the smooth, safe, and technically efficient presentation of the pistol from the holster in various situations, as is standard training for elite police counterterrorist units that “fight” in cities daily.

The point of contact in the urban fight is often the individual Ranger. We need to issue the side arm and incorporate it into our Ranger CQB training and tactics.

NAME WITHHELD
A rapidly deployable direct fire assault/antitank weapon capability is needed to help ensure the survivability of early-entry forces in contingency operations. Currently, there is a substantial gap between the rapid direct fire capabilities of the early entry light forces and those of the follow-on heavy forces.

Early entry forces rely heavily on limited strategic transportation assets (C-5, C-17) to deploy the heavy forces into theater. During the critical assault phase of a rapid force projection operation, light forces are most susceptible to artillery fires and armored forces. It is during this phase that early entry forces require an organic, rapidly deployable direct fire weapon system to counter armored threats. The line-of-sight antitank (LOSAT) system can provide this capability.

A LOSAT advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) will be conducted to evaluate the improved operational capabilities of the early-entry or forced-entry force that is armed with the LOSAT. The 82d Airborne Division will be the demonstration unit.

The LOSAT system consists of a kinetic energy missile and its IBAS-based fire control system, mounted on an expanded capacity HMMWV (high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle).

The system will provide improvements in the firepower capabilities of light forces as an assault support and antitank weapon. This capability makes LOSAT more lethal against high-value targets, including heavy armor and bunkers.

The Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab at Fort Benning will conduct three Battle Lab Warfighting Experiments to assess the military utility of the LOSAT system, beginning in Fiscal Year 2002:

- The tactical deployability experiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It includes a roll-on, roll-off test of the LOSAT system on a C-130 aircraft, a low-velocity airdrop of two systems from a C-130, an external air transport of a LOSAT system using a CH-47 helicopter, and an external air transport of a LOSAT fire unit using a UH-60L.
- The lethality live-fire experiment, White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. A platoon of LOSATs will deploy to the range, one section of two systems will roll off a C-130 or C-17, and the other section will be airdropped. The platoon will conduct a tactical road march to a live-fire range, where it will engage appropriate threat armored vehicles and bunker fortifications, during both day and night.
- The force-on-force operational assessment, National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The entire LOSAT company will deploy as part of a heavy-light brigade combat team and participate in force-on-force operations against a world-class opposing force.

At the conclusion of a successful ACTD, the XVIII Airborne Corps will receive a “go-to-war” residual capability of 12 LOSAT systems, with all associated personnel and equipment. One hundred forty-four missiles will be delivered during the extended two-year

---

**LOSAT ATTRIBUTES**

- Line-of-sight precision engagements.
- Kinetic energy lethality (5,000 feet/second).
- Countermeasure resistant.
- Multiple target engagements.
- Four ready-to-fire missiles, plus eight stowed rounds.
- Three-man crew.
- C-130 through C-5 transportable; CH-47/UH-60L sling loadable.
- Second-generation FLIR (forward-looking infrared)/day TV.
- Situational awareness through applique.
user evaluation period. (Prepared by Captain Paul J. Hurley, Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab.)

ADVANCES IN LOAD-CARRYING equipment (LCE) will soon make things easier for Infantrymen in the field.

The All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment (ALICE) pack has served the Army well over the years in many conflicts. But the time has come to retire it and produce a rucksack that exceeds the capabilities of the earlier existing technology. Changes in load-carrying equipment, along with new information from soldier performance research, will increase the soldier’s ability to fight and win on the modern battlefield.

The proponent for the new rucksack is the Infantry School’s Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD). Design and testing is being done by the Army’s Soldier Systems Command (SSCOM) and the Natick Research, Development, and Engineering Center (NRDEC), along with the U.S. Army Research Institute for Environmental Medicine.

The test agencies conducted a study in which 2,000 soldiers and marines were surveyed to determine specific deficiencies in the ALICE system and requirements for a new load-carrying system. SSCO then hosted a “muddy boot” meeting at Fort Benning with representatives from senior NCOs from various units to discuss requirements for a new load-carrying system.

It was determined that the new system, to be called the Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment (MOLLE), would be designed to increase soldier performance on the battlefield. The initial fielding of the system is scheduled for Fiscal Year 1999.

The MOLLE will increase comfort, reduce fatigue, and increase soldier efficiency. For example, the MOLLE adds a waist belt that allows a soldier to shift the weight from his shoulders to his hips and back again.

The system’s removable components and pockets will enable a soldier to tailor his load specifically to the mission at hand, reducing weight and improving his ability to perform. Many of the component pouches (such as easily accessible pockets fitted for specific gear) were based on recommendations from soldiers in the field.

The use of the waist belt has been shown to improve performance in many mission specific tasks, including negotiating obstacles (climbing over walls, low crawling, operating in urban conditions), moving from a prone position for weapon firing and conducting individual movement techniques. The ability to take the pressure off his shoulders when they begin to ache will give the soldier more energy and improve his ability to fire a weapon, accurately throw a grenade, or perform other mission-related tasks.

The MOLLE currently uses a single-padded waist belt, which is compatible with both the load-bearing vest (LBV) and the ruck. When a soldier doffs the ruck, the frame quickly detaches from the LBV, which remains on the soldier as his fighting load.

A soldier’s ability to tailor his load to his mission has been a concern for some time. Units have different missions, which require different equipment. Even soldiers in the same unit need different equipment, depending on their positions and primary weapons. The improved LBV, in addition to being lighter and more comfortable (made of nylon mesh), will be sized for maximum mission effectiveness. The frame will be sized to accommodate as much of the soldier’s body as possible, but still remain lightweight. It will have a basic load of ammunition and pockets for his specific needs.

Follow-on improvements to the MOLLE will include the development of pockets and components specific to a military occupational specialty. These pockets can be removed and interchanged, based on the soldier’s comfort, unit standing operating procedures, or special mission requirements.

The tailorability of the MOLLE will help decrease the bulk that has been associated with the ALICE/LCE. The MOLLE will allow the soldier to remove or add components (outside pockets, SINCgars pocket, detachable patrol pack, or sleep system) based on mission need. This will reduce the soldier’s silhouette and load, making the pack less likely to catch on tree branches, obstacles, and other snags.

The hydration system will now be included in the system. The hydration pocket doubles as a pocket for a rearbody armor plate, increasing a soldier’s comfort and maintaining protection while he is wearing body armor with his rucksack. An outside pocket of the MOLLE system was developed specifically to hold an M16 magazine so that a soldier does not have to waste time rummaging through the internal compartment. Behind the magazine is a removable bandolier capable of holding six 30-round magazines that can be slung for extra ammunition or used to resupply an entire squad. A soldier returning to the objective rally point for resupply will always know where the extra ammunition is in the ruck. And because the ruck can be slung, it will carry enough for many other soldiers.

The main ruck has a smaller, easily accessible internal pocket designed to carry the radio. This pocket can be removed and slung and will keep the radio from sinking to the bottom of the ruck. Another benefit of the MOLLE is the ability to move the main ruck on the frame so soldiers carrying heavy equipment can adjust the ruck to increase comfort and ease of carriage.

In addition, the new Interceptor body armor is being designed in parallel with MOLLE and will be compatible with all its configurations. All of the MOLLE pockets can be attached to the Interceptor as well. In fact, the MOLLE may not be necessary for some missions, such as room clearing and short duration missions, because the magazine, grenade, and SAW ammunition pouches and all other pockets can be directly attached to Interceptor and used with the MOLLE patrol pack.

The MOLLE system is currently being tested in different environments to determine how it meets the needs of the soldier. Many of the improvements and modifications that have been made from the original design have come from the soldiers in the field who have tested this equipment.

Like other new equipment, the MOLLE will require training, because it is a high-tech system designed to improve the lethality and survivability of the 21st century soldier. The system
will continue to improve throughout its life cycle through technical improvements, the changing needs of the soldier, and, most important, the suggestions and recommendations from soldiers in the field who use it daily.

Comments, questions, concerns, and recommendations may be sent to: cpalmer@Natick-emh2.army.mil or to Natick R, D, and E Center, ATTN: SSCNC-IC (Chris Palmer), Natick, MA 01760-5019.

The Soldier Intercom will soon reduce the confusion that reigns during dismounted close-combat operations for Infantrymen in limited visibility environments. This commercial off-the-shelf item (similar to a walkie-talkie in size and shape) will begin fielding in August 1998.

The Soldier Intercom is meant as an aid to communications within the squad, allowing all members of the dismounted Infantry squad to talk to one another and to their squad leader in any situation. This solves the age-old tactical problem of how to communicate when hand and arm signals are not practical.

The value of "internal" communications on vehicles and within sections or platoons is not disputed. Until now, however, the dismounted Infantry soldier has not been able to capture the tactical advantage that an "intercom" capability provides. Finally, the dismounted Infantryman will benefit from the same capability that mounted forces have had for years—the ability to talk within the squad.

The Soldier Intercom has a short range (approximately 700 meters) and is designed to be used in a "horizontal communications" mode. It will not be fielded to headquarters elements, nor is it designed for use by those elements. In addition to its short range, it does not have a secure communications capability.

The commander on the ground has long had the ability to communicate effectively with his subordinates through various devices. But during periods of limited visibility, or when voice or hand-and-arm signals are not practical, the lowest level leader has not been able to communicate with his soldiers without physically moving from position to position. Additionally, the individual Infantry soldier has been unable to report critical information without using hand-and-arm signals or voice communications. This intercom solves these critical dismounted Infantry operational problems.

The Soldier Intercom will be fielded with a headset that provides hands-free listening and a push-to-talk button that can be placed anywhere on the soldier's uniform or equipment. The headset is designed so that a soldier does not have to remove it to put on or take off his helmet. Additionally, the intercom will be fielded with two rechargeable batteries, each with an operational life ranging from 24 hours to 42 hours, an adapter that allows for the use of either disposable or rechargeable AA batteries, and a carrying case that attaches to the load carrying equipment, along with one six-port battery charger per platoon.

The short range of this piece of equipment minimizes the "bleed-over" effect that units may experience when working close to each other.

During operational testing by elements of the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, this piece of equipment performed extremely well and was well received by dismounted soldiers and commander's alike. Commanders found that being able to talk to the dismounted Infantryman, no matter how many organizational levels down, greatly enhanced their ability to control the operation and keep informed of situational changes. This improved situational awareness enabled him to make rapid and informed decisions that directly influenced the outcome of the mission.

This new piece of equipment will prove highly beneficial to all dismounted Infantry soldiers. Infantrymen will become more lethal and agile as their ability to communicate within the squad improves.

Any questions concerning this program or any other program involving the dismounted Infantry soldier may be directed to Major Bill Mason in the TRADOC System Manager—Soldier Office at Fort Benning, Georgia, at (706) 545-4517, DSN 835-4517, or E-mail: MasonW@benning.army.mil.

The National Infantryman's Association (NIA) now has a web site at: www.columbusga.com/infantryassn. It offers information on the history and objectives of the association, chapters, contact and membership information, awards, and current projects.

One of the current projects is the commissioning of a series of limited edition lithographs entitled "Follow the Flag—Follow Me." The first piece, now available, depicts Union troops at Antietam and bears the distinctive NIA seal. A portion of the proceeds will benefit NIA.

Check the web site, or E-mail infantry@mail.com for further details.
The Weight of Command
Colonel Harold K. Johnson in the Korean War

LEWIS SORLEY

Copyright © by the University Press of Kansas, 1998

Harold K. Johnson had served brilliantly as operations officer of the 57th Infantry (Philippine Scouts) during desperate fighting early in World War II, then survived the Bataan death march, the hell ships, and 41 months of captivity by the Japanese. Rebuilding his shattered career, he found himself in command of a provisional battalion hastily thrown together and rushed to the Pusan perimeter early in the Korean War, another very difficult situation.

Johnson’s regimental commander was fully aware of what he was asking of Johnson in selecting him to command the provisional battalion. “Since in my opinion Johnny was far and away my strongest battalion commander,” explained Colonel John Guthrie, “I felt constrained to send him and his battalion to Korea, despite the horrendous experience he had just undergone as a POW in World War II.”

The initial onslaught of North Korean forces had rapidly pushed South Korean and U.S. forces southward, driving them into a defensive enclave around the port of Pusan, where they would have to hang on or get pushed into the sea, and hanging on was about what it amounted to at that point. The troop ship carrying Johnson and his troops docked in Pusan on 25 August 1950. There, Johnson’s unit was redesignated the 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, and assigned to the 1st Cavalry Division. Four days later, they were in a shooting war in a sector of the Pusan Perimeter. (Despite the “cavalry” designation, these units were now infantry formations.)

“We sort of played yo-yo for about five days at a place called Tabudong,” said Johnson. Actually, it was a lot more than that. After fierce enemy attacks had driven elements of his battalion from a critical piece of high ground nearby, Johnson personally led a counterattack to regain the lost position. Placing himself with the forwardmost elements, he rallied his men and led them forward. Apparently unconcerned, Johnson moved about exposed to enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire, and by his example kept the attack moving. When devastating enemy fire threatened to bring it to a halt, he moved in close proximity to the enemy, where he set up and personally operated a forward observation post. From that exposed position he directed mortar counterfire against the enemy positions.

Ultimately, however, the weight of the opposing forces prevailed. When Johnson’s mortars were disabled and his unit’s casualties continued to mount, it became necessary to withdraw. He remained in his exposed position until the last unit had cleared, ensuring that weapons and equipment were salvaged as the troops moved out, then reorganized the survivors. Two days later, coming at the position from another direction, they seized their objective. By the time nightfall came on 4 September, Johnson’s battalion had been in combat for just one week, and he had earned the Distinguished Service Cross for “extraordinary heroism.”

One of his platoon leaders later recalled the situation for Time magazine (December 10, 1965, page 33): “The world was coming apart. Our company commander had been killed. There was heavy firing 100 yards away. Colonel Johnson said we could handle it. He parcelled out firepower and called in air strikes. He hadn’t slept for three days, but he never used a profane word.”

Korea was a war of infantry, by and large, and a tough, hard-slogging and bitter war besides. Johnson subsequently commanded two regiments, the 5th Cavalry and then the 8th Cavalry, in that fighting. “I remember vividly the faces of many of your stalwarts along the Naktong and the bloodletting at such places as Hill 314,” wrote an officer who had been with Johnson on the ship going to Korea. “I remember seeing Colonel Johnson below Hill 314
when we were getting ready to attack,” he said later. “He looked very weary. He had just been in a tough battle.” Another officer later told Johnson he remembered a talk they had in an apple orchard north of Taegu at a place called the “Bowling Alley.” “Things were very grim,” he recalled. “Your concern then was for your men and in taking objectives with minimum loss of life.” Even with that concern, three weeks after entering combat Johnson had taken 400 casualties in his battalion of 703 men. It is not surprising that he remembered these as “dark, bitter days.” The cost had been high, but they had done what was asked of them. “It was,” he thought, “a superb effort on the part of a green unit. My pride in that unit has never diminished.”

A long time later he wrote to his mother about the experience: “During my first week in combat I didn’t see any generals unless I went to the rear a couple of miles. Our generals weren’t any cowards, either, but it was really hot. I feel in my own heart that the third day we were in [action] my outfit held the Pusan perimeter and the main road leading to Taegu. There just wasn’t anything behind us. We paid dearly but we held pretty well.”

Before leaving his battalion, Johnson had one last duty to perform. In mid-October, on the outskirts of Pyongyang, he personally conducted a memorial service for the 400 killed and wounded that the battalion had lost since arriving in Korea in late August. There with him, he recalled, “a pitifully small remainder” from the original contingent paid tribute to their fallen comrades. Then he bade them all farewell.

Johnson was a compassionate leader of men, one who took very seriously the heavy burden of asking men to risk their lives in combat. “I spent a great many nights on my knees” in prayer, Johnson said of his days in command in Korea. “I didn’t expect any voice to answer me, but we operate so much of the time in the gray area, where it is hard to tell the difference between right and wrong. It is important to have some kind of star that can take you through troubled times.”

In the autumn of 1950, Chinese communist forces entered the war, and the 1st Cavalry Division was the first American division to engage them. Not long before this, Johnson had typed a letter to his mother and brother, at home in North Dakota. “The worst job is the letter to the family of my officers [killed in action], and I’ve lost so many, many of them close friends,” he wrote. “This is a terribly grim game. It is bad enough behind a rifle platoon, but the toll in the rifle platoon is high.”

Entry of the Chinese forces into the war was the nastiest kind of a shock. General MacArthur had assured President Truman that it could not happen, and now seemingly unlimited masses of Chinese soldiers were swarming everywhere. In fact, by mid-November there were some 300,000 Chinese troops in the field, 180,000 of them confronting Eighth Army. “About all there is to do is hang on and pray each day,” Johnson wrote to his mother. “I’ve done a lot of it and it has brought a certain peace of mind and spiritual comfort.”

Johnson would later speak candidly of his doubts in the midst of those dark days. “On a lonely road just southeast of Pyongyang,” he often recalled when asked to speak at a prayer breakfast or some such event, “a lonely commander was deeply troubled by the threat to the men he was charged with safeguarding. Could he do the job that was his to do and still give his men a fighting chance to survive? And out of the still of the night, as if from a great distance, came God’s voice saying, ‘Be strong, have no fear, I am with you.’”

In early February, with his regiment on the attack and performing well, Johnson moved to a new assignment as a corps G-3. When he had settled into the routine of the staff job, Johnson wrote to his mother with some reflections on the command assignments he had just completed. “This job is radically different from what I’ve been doing over here,” he told her. “Command is a terrible strain. There is never a moment when you aren’t conscious of the responsibility for the lives of the men in your command. My regiment had over 3,000 most of the time, and that is a lot of responsibility. You had to be in touch with moods of the moment, and there was always the fear that the constant running would continue when we were supposed to be going the other way. There was a lot of satisfaction to doing a job, too, and I left my outfit when it was at its peak.”

As his career evolved in succeeding years, Johnson surprisingly never commanded again. He would serve as an assistant division commander, head up a major Army school, run the most important Army staff element, and ultimately head the entire Army as its chief of staff, but never again would he command an Army unit. Regimental command was it as far as his assignments were concerned. Nevertheless, it is certain that in those last assignments he sought to apply the lessons he derived from his battle commands in the Korean War.

As he described them later, Johnson distilled three major insights from his experience as a commander. One was that if you could command successfully at battalion level you could also expect to be successful in command of substantially larger elements. What that boiled down to, he maintained, was “being a man of integrity as the commander of a unit. That is, your relationships with subordinate and superior alike are open and frank, and you stand up and take the consequences of your actions.”

Next, he held that “a foremost consideration of any commander has to be the welfare of the men under him, and that he does not abuse his subordinates for personal gain.... That is,” he insisted, “just something that cannot be condoned under any circumstances.”

And third, he stressed the commander’s obligation to do everything possible to improve his technical and tactical competence, by which he meant those aspects of the job that are outside the area of human relations. “Command to me,” he explained, “is a series of continuing problems in human relations, and a good commander is a fellow who solves them and a bad commander is the fellow who pushes them aside or ignores them. I believe that any reasonable person can solve most problems in human relations.”

These were not, the record makes
clear, simply theoretical constructs that Johnson developed. Rather, they embody his own style and values as demonstrated in command. The way he was regarded by his fellow soldiers reflects that, as expressed for example by Major James Huey, an assistant regimental S-3 in the 8th Cavalry when Johnson had command: "Duty, honor, country," yes; but courage, morality and fortitude must follow those words to truly and honestly describe this outstanding soldier," he wrote of his former commander. "At times, I felt General Johnson was a very lonely man, but later I was to discover this was not true. He was merely so deep in thought about the outcome of the next day's fighting, and the welfare of his troops and their families, that he just had to be alone to work out those difficult problems that face a commander in combat. I say, "Thank you, God," for providing this nation such an outstanding leader."

The Javelin and BFV Infantry
What is Really Important?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARTIN N. STANTON

Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV) infantry (the dismounts) have always been overtasked and under-resourced. Few BFV units have anywhere near their authorized dismount strength; most company commanders feel fortunate to be able to dismount more than 40 infantrymen. This problem is compounded by the BFV’s many weapons. A platoon leader dismounting his infantry has four Dragons, two M60 machineguns, M249 light machineguns, and M203 grenade launchers, as well as rifles. Often each platoon has only a dozen or so dismounts to begin with.

The current concept of 9x2+5 (two squads of 9 men each plus a 5-man machinegun section) in a BFV dismounted infantry platoon is, in practice, unachievable. Most BFV platoon leaders would be thankful for two nine-man squads, a radiotelephone operator (RTO), and a medic to dismount from their platoon’s vehicles, much less two machinegun teams.

We have been working with the BFV for 15 years now, and the guys in the back are still overloaded and overtasked. If we are to be successful, we have to make some hard choices: Just what is it that we want Bradley dismounts to do?

We have to come to terms with the fact that BFV dismounts are not like other infantry. Their area of focus needs to be much narrower and should be tied to their vehicles, except in unusual circumstances. Thus, viewing the BFV dismounts as a separate maneuver element is often a mistake. The two are inseparable and complementary.

The following is a suggested breakdown of tasks for the BFV infantry:

**In the Offense:**
- Breach obstacle.
- Assault.
- Clear a trenchline.
- Clear a building in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT).
- Provide local security for the BFV.

**In the Defense:**
- Defend obstacle.
- Provide local security for the BFV.
- Man observation post (OP), security patrols.
- Defend along dismounted (non-vehicle trafficable) avenues of approach.
- Defend in MOUT.

The weapons required for these tasks are always individual close-range weapons—AT4s, SAWs, M203s, M16s, and hand grenades. As a result, we must make a conscious effort to divest the BFV infantry of the bulky crew-served weapons that now burden it. Dragons (and their Javelin replacements) should be eliminated from the BFV platoon. The two M60s should be retained within the platoon—on the chance that a defense on a dismounted avenue of approach will require M60s on tripods with traversing and elevating mechanism—but they should not habitually be used in the assault.

In the attack, the BFV infantry—freed of the heavier weapons—would be able to place more men in the actual assault while being supported by the direct fire of the BFVs and M1 tanks (as was originally intended). We have a much better chance of seeing two coherent squads—with a total of 14 to 18 men—and a platoon leader with his RTO on the ground, instead of a platoon (minus) mob of guys carrying heavy weapons that are ill-designed for close assault. If we have positioned the tanks and BFVs correctly, we shouldn’t need M60s and Javelins in the assault. And quite frankly, the absence of these weapons will make ill-advised separate dismounted night attacks before the line of departure (so popular at the National Training Center a few years ago) significantly less palatable.

In the defense, the infantry secures obstacles, provides local security for the
fighting vehicles, and can also provide defense on a dismounted avenue of approach. This last mission is one of the few in which BFV infantry should be employed away from their vehicles. Because of the limited number of dismounts available, their position along the dismounted avenue of approach must be chosen with some care. The requirement to reload the TOW system further limits the number of infantry in the defense (or in overwatch). This normally means a dismounted infantrymen stays aboard the vehicle to facilitate TOW reloading and pass 25mm ammunition forward as required.

Any way you look at it, the Javelin is a neat piece of gear. It is more accurate than the Dragon, and it has twice the range. Unfortunately, the current philosophy of one-for-one replacement for the Dragon leads us right back to the overloaded BFV infantrymen.

The problem with equipping the BFV company with the Javelin is that it gives the infantry dismounts something else to carry. The BFV dismounts (even in the 9x2+5 configuration) clearly don't have the manpower to be lugging Javelin systems around (just as they really couldn't lug Dragons around). By equipping the BFV platoons with Javelins, the Army is virtually guaranteeing that everyone dismounting from a Bradley will be carrying either a Javelin, an M60 or M249 machinegun, an M203, or a radio. We're essentially back to square one in terms of having BFV infantry that is loaded lightly enough to perform its mission.

The first step we must take is to admit that we don't need as many Javelins in the BFV battalion as we had Dragons. Considering the massive amount of antiarmor firepower inherent in a BFV battalion task force, we can get by with significantly fewer of these systems. Eight Javelin systems would be enough to complement the capabilities of the M1s and B芙s.

We could reorganize the BFV infantry in several ways. Assuming 9x2+5 is still the goal of the Infantry School, we could have two platoons per company with a five-man machinegun section and one platoon with a five-man Javelin section. Although this would cut down on the number of Javelin systems, it would still present the normally understrength BFV infantry with six crew-served weapons and too few people to man them. It would also limit at least one platoon's ability to conduct close assault. (Let's face it—the Javelin is a great system, but it's nothing you'd want to carry while doing individual movement techniques against an objective.)

Javelins do bring a unique man-portable, fire-and-forget punch to the battlefield. I would never propose that they be left out of the BFV battalion. What I do propose, however, is that they be taken out of the actual BFV companies and placed in a separate organization of their own.

Specifically, I propose the creation of a single antitank platoon—a Javelin platoon—in the heavy battalion's headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). This would keep the BFV infantry focused on its important tasks and also give the heavy task force commander a Javelin capability. The BFV battalion—with its other armor-killing systems—does not need as many Javelins as a light, airborne, or air assault battalion. The BFV battalion's Javelin platoon should consist of two sections of four systems each. It should have six M113-type vehicles—one for the platoon leader, one for the platoon sergeant, and four for the two sections—with a total of two Javelin systems carried on each. The Javelins would be fired from the dismounted position only; the M113s would be purely battlefield transportation.

In the defense, the Javelin platoon would be emplaced on terrain that is not suited for vehicle-mounted antitank systems such as BFVs and tanks—hillsides, ridges, the sides of ravines, or upper stories of buildings in a MOUT environment. With its M113 safely hidden, a Javelin squad would be free to prepare positions, allowing for maximum system survivability. Ideally, each system should have several alternate firing positions with prestocked ammunition. (These positions would have to be within running distance of each other.)

The Javelin is less than the ideal weapon for rapid displacement from one battle position to another, because a Javelin team must disassemble its systems to move to and remount its M113, and then dismount and move to its next firing position. The Javelin platoon would probably be best employed in the main engagement area of the battalion task force where less major repositioning is necessary.

A key consideration for the employment of the Javelin platoon is its rate of fire. Although the Javelin has twice the range of the Dragon—with a much higher hit/kill probability—it has a similar rate of fire. At three missiles in two minutes, the Javelin platoon in itself could not generate enough volume of fire to break a large armored formation in the same manner as could a tank or a Bradley platoon.

In offensive operations, the Javelin's role is to provide support-by-fire and overwatch. Its comparatively short range increases its vulnerability (especially in a daylight, open-terrain environment such as the National Training Center). But the ability of the Javelin teams to dismount and climb to vantage points that would not be available to typical vehicle-mounted systems would give the Bradley battalion task force a capability it otherwise does not have.

The distance from the vehicle to the firing position and the difficulty of the terrain involved—plus the number of missiles that have to be carried to provide overwatch or support-by-fire—may dictate that each Javelin squad carry only one of its two systems and the other squad members carry ammunition, radios, and the like.

The Javelin squads' infiltration on foot to a hidden support-by-fire position before line-of-departure time is one of the few instances in which a mechanized task force commander may want to conduct a separately timed movement.
with his BFV dismounted infantry element. Even in this case, it would be a good idea to use the infantry from a follow-on team to allow the dismounted infantry to assist or protect the dismounted Javelin element in movement, and then move to a location where they can remount their BFVs and continue the attack. Key planning considerations in this are, once again, the number of Javelin systems and the number of rounds to be carried. At least four rounds per system would be needed for an effective overwatch or support-by-fire position.

In the attack, the Javelin platoon, at least initially, would be on the battalion task force net. In support of company teams in action on the objective, however, the overwatching Javelin element would have to be on the assaulting company team's net as well.

The Javelin platoon leader should be able to monitor two nets simultaneously, which would cause him to drop off the battalion net to provide responsive overwatch and receive fire directions from the assaulting unit. Arrangements within the Javelin platoon would have to be made for monitoring the battalion task force net, probably within the platoon sergeant's vehicle.

During stability and support operations in an environment with no armored threat, the Javelin platoon could be useful in several secondary roles. The availability of a platoon with six M113s and 30 soldiers would give the task force commander additional flexibility. The Javelin systems should either be left at home station or cached at a secure site in country, while the platoon deploys with small arms only. Ideally, each vehicle could be configured much like the old Vietnam era M113 ACAV with one .50-caliber and two M60 machineguns on pintle mounts. This would give the platoon formidable machinegun firepower, and enough M16s and M203s should be made available for all crew members.

The following are some of the missions the Javelin antitank platoon can perform in a stability and support operation:

- TOC/trains security.
- Main supply route security.
- Convoy escort.
- Armored support platoon missions (resupply of elements under fire).

The BFV platoon started off overloaded, and we have been adding gadgets to it ever since. We keep trying to get this small platoon dismounted element to do way too much. It is time to fall back and regroup. By concentrating on core tasks and divesting the platoon of unneeded (and unused) capabilities, we can improve the performance of the BFV infantry in those core tasks that are necessary to the success of the BFV battalion in combat.

Most of all, we must be realistic about the fielding of the Javelin system in the BFV battalion. Merely replacing the Dragon one-for-one will not work. Cutting down on the number of Javelins and reorganizing them within the BFV companies will alleviate—but won't entirely eliminate—the over-equipping problem of BFV infantry. Only by creating a separate Javelin platoon can we also make the most of this new system's capabilities. We must bite the bullet and form a dedicated Javelin unit within the battalion. The capabilities of the Javelin warrant this; it will nicely complement the BFV and the M1. By doing so, we can improve both the employment of the Javelin and the performance of the already overloaded BFV dismounts.

---

Lieutenant Colonel Martin N. Stanton is assigned to U.S. Army Forces Central Command in Qatar. He previously served in the 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, in Somalia. He is a 1978 ROTC graduate of Florida Technological University.
Mission Analysis
In Stability and Support Operations

MAJOR KEVIN J. DOUGHERTY

In many of today’s operations, units find it hard to define the mission. For the 10th Mountain Division in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, mission analysis was made difficult by a lack of focus, definition, and end state from the higher headquarters.

It is easy to understand the division’s situation, but some of the mystery of mission analysis in such operations is dispelled when we remember that the process we use is the same one we use in war. Nonetheless, for some reason, leaders do not use clearly defined tasks, do not link the main effort to the unit’s purpose, and do not link the supporting efforts to the main effort.

The first point that needs attention is the difference between an operation and a task. Although this is certainly not new ground for any recent graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, it is an important point that seems to be lost in the fog of operations. Field Manual (FM) 7-20, The Infantry Battalion, defines an operation as “a group of similar missions.” Familiar examples include offensive, defensive, and retrograde. In today’s environment, an example of an operation would be peace
enforcement, and it is on such an operation that this article will focus.

It is the task, however, not the operation, that must go into the mission statement, and a task is something very different from an operation. FM 7-20 defines a task as follows: "a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and units. It is a specific activity that contributes to the accomplishment of the mission.” Examples of tasks are clear, destroy, secure, and breach. A more complete list is in FM 7-20 (page 2-11), but no list is exhaustive. Additional tasks, generated by mission analysis, are perfectly valid so long as they meet the definition cited. But don’t be too quick to discount the familiar tasks, even in stability and support operations.

Most of the definitions of these tasks are general enough that they still make sense, given restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs). Clear, for example, means “to destroy or force the withdrawal of all enemy forces and reduce obstacles that may interfere with subsequent operations.” Isn’t that exactly what you are trying to do in a peace enforcement operation when you establish a buffer zone, even if your primary way to “force the withdrawal” is through negotiation? Likewise, interdict means “to prevent or hinder by any means enemy use of any area or route.” This may be an appropriate task for a checkpoint operation. Again, the “by any means” would be clearly spelled out in the ROEs.

Instead, however, even squad leaders are using “conduct peace enforcement operations” or “enforce the UN mandate” in their mission statements where the task should be. Interestingly, the rotational units at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) have been through a similar learning experience with the search and attack, which is an operation, not a task. Depending on whether they are part of the find, fix, or finish force, squads, platoons, and companies may perform such tasks as recon, block, or destroy. But to have “conduct search and attack” as a task is as general—and hence as meaningless—as “conduct peace enforcement operations.”

The second familiar concept is that of the main effort. FM 7-20 says it is the battalion commander who links the purpose of the main effort directly to the purpose of the battalion. Often, the main effort’s purpose will be the same as that of the unit. If you understand the concept of a main effort, it is not too difficult to understand the idea of a supporting effort. FM 7-20 very logically requires that the supporting effort’s purpose be clearly linked to the main effort’s assigned purpose.

General William DePuy describes this relationship as cascading and nested concepts. He writes:

*Cascading concepts carry the top commander’s intentions to the lowest levels, and the nesting of those concepts traces the critical path of concentration and priorities . . . The concepts are nested like mixing bowls in a kitchen. Each must fit within the confines of the larger and accommodate the smaller and so on down.”* ("Concepts of Operation: The Heart of Command, The Tool of Doctrine," Army, August 1988, pages 26-40.)

These relationships are too often ignored in a stability and support situation. The purpose of all three battalions in a brigade task force should not be the same. One should be the main effort and the others supporting efforts, and the purposes should reflect this. Likewise, a company that has three separate unrelated checkpoints to operate is not following the process of nested concepts either. This is especially true when, under the guise of “decentralization,” these checkpoints are so widely dispersed that they are completely beyond mutual support.

Decentralization is a critical element of all Army operations, but it is also a slippery slope. I think our concept of decentralization, particularly in stability and support operations, has gone well beyond the bounds of both practicality and doctrine. Our manuals address decentralization in terms of decision making. FM 100-5, Operations, says, “In battle, initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level.” FM 7-20 says “decentralization provides latitude to subordinates to make decisions rapidly within the framework of the commander’s concept and intent.” Thus, what decentralization is a way of streamlining decision making at lower levels. What it is not is squads running around the battlefield without a coordinated purpose, without the ability to mass and concentrate, without adequate sustainability, and without mutual support. FM 100-5 cautions us that this kind of decentralization may result in the loss of synchronization, and I believe that we have reached that point in many recent situations.

Nonetheless, few discussions of stability and support operations exclude the topic of decentralization. Interestingly, however, FM 100-5 does not address the subject in its discussion of the principles of “operations other than war.” What it does emphasize, how-

---

**1st Marines Civil Disturbance Missions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSN #</th>
<th>MISSION DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>MISSION LOCATION</th>
<th>PERS. REQ.</th>
<th>AO STATS.</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>Town Center</td>
<td>Alameda &amp; Compton Blvd.</td>
<td>Co.</td>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>Zero presence visibility. Company assembly area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Fashion Center</td>
<td>Long Beach Blvd. &amp; Orchard</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>Position covered by hourly mobile patrol x 24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>Carson Mall</td>
<td>Avelon &amp; Del Amo Blvd.</td>
<td>1 PLT</td>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>Zero presence visibility. Company assembly co-located area at LASD-Carson HQ nearby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8</td>
<td>Pac. Bell sites x 2</td>
<td>Social Gas Sites x 1</td>
<td>MP PLT(1)</td>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>3 positions covered by hourly mobile patrol x 24 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Hourly, one mobile patrol manned by MP PLT(1) covers MSN 1-2 and 1-5. These patrols are escorted by Compton Police Dept. cruisers.

---

January-April 1998 INFANTRY 13
ever, is objective, and cautions us that "each separate operation must be inte-
grated with every other to contribute to the ultimate strategic aim." We have
accomplished this traditionally by link-
ing the main effort's purpose to the
unit's purpose and the supporting ef-
forts' purposes to the main effort. We
should not change this practice for sta-

tility and support operations, even if
that requires additional troops, a smaller
area, and fewer tasks.

Consider, for example, a peace en-
forcement scenario in which the U.N.
mandate requires a task force to sepa-
rate belligerents, protect civilians, assist
prisoners of war and interned non-
combatants, conduct mine awareness
training, and assist nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). That is a pretty
tall order, and surely not all of it be-
longs in the mission statement. In fact,
the initial draft of FM 100-15, Larger

Unit Operations, states:
The corps commander must guard
against a tendency to expand the stated
mission in an effort to accomplish more
than is appropriate for the military. The
commander and staff should not expand
their mission, unless the accom-
plishment of additional tasks is critical
to accomplishing the primary mission.

If this is important at corps level
with all the available resources, it is
much more important at the lower tacti-
cal levels. What belongs in the mission
statement is the mission essential task
and the purpose.

Of all a unit's responsibilities, some
are more important than others. FM
7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, says
that "a failure to accomplish a mission
essential task results in the company's
failure to accomplish its primary pur-
pose for the operation." Because the
final phase of a peace enforcement op-
eration is relief by a peacekeeping
force, let's assume the purpose of this
mission is "to establish conditions that
allow for the introduction of UN
peacekeeping forces." It is the mission
essential task that will achieve this pur-
pose, and that task is to separate bellig-
erents. Although other tasks are im-
portant, too, they don't belong in the
mission statement. FM 7-20 says that
those tasks not deemed mission essen-
tial can appear elsewhere in the opera-
tions order. The whole idea is to main-
tain focus.

Now the drill is to translate "separate
belligerents" into the common military
vocabulary. Some commands may be
comfortable with the term as it is, and if
it's clearly defined in their units, their
subordinates should have no problem. I
would suggest, however, that it can be
improved. Separating belligerents prob-
ably entails establishing a buffer zone, a
task that is both force oriented and ter-
rain oriented. Therefore, clear would
be better. Thus, the mission statement
would be "1st Battalion clears Buffer
Zone Alpha NLT 25 Feb XX in order to
establish conditions that allow
for the introduction of UN peace-
keeping forces."

Now, within the battalion, one com-
pany will be the main effort. Because
the main effort's purpose should be
linked to the unit's overall purpose, the
purpose in the main effort's mission
statement will probably be almost iden-
tical to that of the battalion. The main
effort's task, then, must be something
that facilitates this purpose. For ex-
ample, the main effort might be required
to clear the buffer zone itself if this area
is small or, more likely, to clear that part
of the buffer zone that contains the de-
cisive point. The decisive point could
be a belligerent force templated or
known to be in a certain location, a
population or resource center that must
be controlled, or anything else that
gives the friendly force a key advan-
tage.

For the sake of argument, let's im-
agine that within Buffer Zone Alpha
there is a village called K-town that is
the belligerents' stronghold and their
source of manpower, supply, and com-
mand and control. If the belligerents do
not control K-town, they cannot con-
duct organized and sustained operations
in the buffer zone. If all this is true, K-
town is a potential decisive point and a
good objective for the main effort.

Thus, the main effort's mission state-
ment might be "Company A clears K-
town NLT 23 Feb XX in order to elimi-
nate the belligerents' ability to conduct
organized and sustained operations in
Buffer Zone Alpha." The company
may accomplish this task by means of a
cordon and search, which is an opera-
tion. If the commander wants to in-
clude this in his mission statement for
clarity, he can, but he still must have the
task. This style of mission statement
would be, "Company A conducts a cor-
don and search to clear K-town NLT 23
Feb XX in order to eliminate the bellig-
erents' ability to conduct organized and
sustained operations in Buffer Zone Alpha."

The purpose of the supporting efforts
must be linked to the main effort. Say
that area of operations (AO) A1 is close
enough to K-town that belligerent
forces there could interfere with the
main effort's operation. The purpose of
the supporting effort in AO A1 would
then be to prevent this interference.
The task that facilitates this might be
clear, block, interdict, or something
else. Let's stick with clear. The sup-
porting effort's mission statement then
might be "Company B clears AO A1
NLT 22 Feb XX in order to prevent
interference with the main effort in
K-town."

Within AO A1 there is some decisive
point; let's say it is Checkpoint Romeo,
which is on the main road leading to
K-town. This road has been the pri-
mary means of belligerent traffic to and
from the town. Thus, the commander
of Company B assigns the main effort at
Checkpoint Romeo to a platoon (plus).
Its mission statement might be "1st
platoon (+) establishes Checkpoint Ro-
meo NLT 211500 Feb XX to block bel-
ligent traffic in order to prevent interfer-
ence with the battalion main effort in
K-town."

The company commander wants to sup-
port his main effort at Checkpoint Romeo by securing its
flanks. To do so, he divides AO A1
into halves and assigns responsibilities
for each. Thus, the mission statements
for the supporting efforts might be "2d
Platoon (-) clears AO East NLT 210900
Feb XX in order to prevent interference
with the company main effort at Check-
point Romeo" and "3d Platoon clears
AO West NLT 210900 Feb XX in order
to prevent interference with the com-
pany main effort at Checkpoint Ro-
meo."

Unfortunately, these clean mission
statements do not make all the other tasks go away, but they don’t do this in combat situations either. Even more unfortunately, more tasks will probably follow. The 10th Mountain Division noted in Somalia that mission creep is an inevitable part of any operation. The Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force discovered the same phenomenon during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The technique the task force used to capture mission creep was the mission matrix shown here.

This matrix enhances battle command by providing in a single picture the tasks and resources that currently affect the unit. It is preferable to a stack of fragmentary orders in an accordion file, because it shows the total impact and helps alert the commander that he is reaching his culminating point. If the commander’s mission analysis indicates a platoon is needed to operate a particular checkpoint, he should not reduce this force to a squad simply for the sake of accepting another task. If he does so, he is, by definition, saying he does not have the force required to operate the checkpoint.

The mission matrix tells the commander where his resources (both personnel and equipment) are and helps keep him from spreading himself too thin. All tasks, even such requirements as liaison, should be included on the matrix.

The mission matrix can be used as a graphic aid to depict a unit’s status to higher headquarters. The 10th Mountain AAR on Restore Hope says that “commanders must drive mission
statements, task organizations, and end states from the bottom up....This driving from the bottom will either get ideas approved or force higher headquarters to give more detailed guidance on what they expect to be accomplished.”

To go back to our example, I believe this bottom up analysis will convince higher headquarters that the unit cannot specifically separate belligerents, protect civilians, assist POWs and interned non-combatants, conduct mine awareness training, and assist NGOs, all at the same time. Obviously, there is the concomitant relationship by which clearing an AO of belligerents to some degree assists NGOs by making it safer for them to operate in that AO. But having Company A separate belligerents, Company B assist NGOs, Company C conduct refugee operations, the engineer platoon conduct mine awareness training, the antitank platoon man a checkpoint, and so on, is not in keeping with the traditional process of nested concepts that has served us so well.

The answer, I think, is to prioritize tasks, do the most important task first (focusing on the decisive point), and shift to secondary tasks (which may also mean shifting the main effort) upon completion of higher priority tasks. Simultaneity, versatility, and decentralization are all good ideas, but so are concentration, synchronization, focus, and mass. I think we may have gone a little overboard with the former set of values at the expense of the latter.

Surely there will be cases when unrelated tasks must be done simultaneously. Many times, a battalion size noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) can’t wait until the brigade size buffer zone is established. Economy of force is still a very valid principle. But we should not allow ourselves to deviate from everything we’ve done to this point concerning task and purpose, the main effort, supporting efforts, objective, the decisive point, nested concepts, and the like just to try to accommodate stability and support operations. The Army has certain capabilities and limitations. We have a big role in such operations, but we must fulfill this role within these capabilities and limitations. We cannot do everything at once.

Perhaps my view is short-sighted, and the current situation requires that the best way to serve our country is, in fact, to do everything at once. If this is the case, our current mission analysis process, as described in our 7-series manuals, is inappropriate and must be reviewed in light of the way we do stability and support. To make this change, I believe, would be a tremendous mistake. But teaching one thing and doing another is not the right answer either. Our doctrine must change along with the complexity and the diversity of the missions we are expected to execute.

Major Kevin J. Dougherty has served at the Joint Readiness Training Center, in the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, and in the 101st Airborne Division. He is now assigned to the U.S. European Command. He is a 1983 graduate of the United States Military Academy.
The success of an infantry leader is judged by how well he does three things—shoot, move, and communicate. If he does those well, his unit’s success is assured. What could be easier?

*Shoot. Move. Communicate.*

The first time I heard those words I was a radiotelephone operator for the platoon leader, and the company commander was patiently explaining their importance. When I heard them a couple of years later in Officer Candidate
School, it began to occur to me just how difficult it is to do those things right. In fact, it may be that nothing is more difficult than successfully directing the actions of a group of people as they attempt to shoot, move, and communicate. Many who attempt the task never succeed. Others get only part of it right. Only a rare few get it all right consistently enough to be considered successful.

Before going too far into this, however, it is important that we define what we mean by success. If we measure success by the number of promotions received, being able to shoot, move, and communicate may not be enough. If we measure success by mission accomplishment, especially in combat, with minimum casualties, then it is essential that we know how to direct the efforts of groups ranging from five or six soldiers to formations as large as brigades as they shoot, move, and communicate. We must also understand that the ability to do these three things is not limited to being able to do them in combat. In many respects, they are done in every unit, in one form or another, every day.

The mission of the infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy. Although there may be different ways of saying this, the point is that the infantry will take or hold ground, by the use of direct or indirect fire, by maneuvering when necessary, by either killing or capturing the enemy, or by forcing him to withdraw from contested ground. The ground in question may be a limited piece of terrain that can be occupied by a squad or a platoon, or it may be a forest, a mountain, a city, or a beach. The size is not important. Each infantry echelon has its own piece, and each unit must successfully shoot, move, and communicate if the whole is to succeed. Of course, the infantry does not do this alone. There’s an entire combat arms team involved, but the infantry soldier is the heart of it all, and the rest of the team was created to support him. The essential part of this is that the infantryman do his part. He must be in the right place with the right support at the right time and must have clear instructions on what he is to do.

Thus, the central question is whether the leader has prepared his soldiers to shoot accurately, taught them how to move to the right place, and provided them with clear instructions. If he has done all that, the chances of success are very high. But success in combat is never guaranteed. There are too many unknowns—weather, terrain, enemy capabilities, equipment failures, and many others.

An examination of the three words—shoot, move, communicate—will show the difficulty of accomplishing them. No dictionary will adequately define their importance.

Shooting implies using a weapon, either directly or indirectly aimed at an enemy, to either kill, wound, or drive him off. An infantryman has a variety of weapons at his disposal, and an infantry leader has an even greater choice. The first task may be as basic as selecting which weapon to use—rifle, grenade launcher, machinegun, TOW, mortar. The next step may not be so easy: Where does each weapon go in the formation? Which is on the right, and which on the left? Are the targets clearly defined? What type of position does the soldier prepare and occupy? How long will it take to finish that work? What about range cards and aiming stakes, mutual support, ammunition supply, principal direction of fire, final protective fire, target recognition, distribution of fire, fire discipline, alternate and supplemental positions, grazing fire, plunging fire, enfilade fire, dead space, ammunition redistribution plan?

What else do you have to do as a squad leader? What is your priority of work as a platoon leader? Maybe there is a forward observer with you, or a tank crew, an air defense artillery section, an electronic warfare element, or engineers. Oh, yes, preparation of the battlefield, obstacles, mines, wire. All these things are being incorporated into a single cohesive piece of terrain, and nobody has yet said, “Shoot.” You are only getting ready to shoot!

Don’t forget to consider the effects of weather and visibility on your preparations. Remember how difficult it was to accomplish all this work at the National Training Center, in Germany, or on a range at Fort Riley? Consider how much more difficult it will be when the enemy is practicing his own tasks of shoot, move, and communicate.

Basic rifle marksmanship, all 60 rounds of it, is not the answer. How is your maintenance program? Are all of your weapon systems operating? How about the logistics system? Do you have the right types of ammunition? Do you have enough of it? Do you have a means of transporting it? What will you do when the resupply truck breaks down? Are you defending? Preparing to attack? Going to the range? Is it so cold you can’t hold the rifle steady for shivering? Are you too tired to focus on the problems at hand because you haven’t been able to implement an effective sleep plan? Is the platoon sergeant (with 14 years of service) on leave and you have only your senior...
Shooting is hard!
Moving is harder! Moving, of course, implies going from one place to another, in some fashion. All movements should begin with a plan. And the plan should start at the beginning—where you are. Who is going? Where are you going? Is everyone going all the way to the final destination? Where is the final destination, and what is there? Or, what is supposed to be there?

How will you get there? That's one of the great things about the infantry—there are so many different ways to travel. In addition to riding trucks or buses, infantrymen walk, swim, or just drop in. It doesn't matter how they get to the battlefield; what is important is what happens after they get there.

The unit must be task organized to support the mission, and it must be properly equipped. Is the equipment in the right place? Just where is the engineer tool set? How far can that 135-pound infantryman carry that 105-pound load today—uphill? What formation will you use? Are you certain this is the right route? Why did the very best compassman in the platoon have to go to the Advanced NCO Course this month?

It is important while discussing this movement thing not to forget the purpose of a move. Are you simply going from point A to point B to occupy some piece of terrain, or are you moving to contact? Do you feel secure enough to speed along? Are you maneuvering to gain position and advantage so you can bring firepower to bear on the enemy? Are you moving only dismounted soldiers, or is there a combined arms team to control? Where is the unit that's supposed to be protecting your left flank? Why didn't anyone tell you the road was cratered and your resupply vehicles will be delayed several hours? Don't they know you're out of water, your soldiers are nearly out of bullets, and you have wounded soldiers to evacuate?

How much worse can it get? Where is that platoon? They went where? Why didn't you prepare those strip maps? The scout platoon is under heavy fire, and there won't be any guides to bring the teams forward. No, I didn't mark my map—I was going to have a guide! Oh, watch out; are we outflanked? How did that enemy force get away over there so fast? The helicopter carrying the task force commander and his operations officer was shot down? What do we do now? Where do we go? Who's in charge? We need 15 trucks to move this outfit and they sent me only 9; what do I do now? We're pinned down and we can't move. How can I maneuver when I'm being attacked?

Moving is hard. You have to plan, plan, plan. Start point. Destination clearly defined. And keep in mind the possibility that you will often have to shoot and move at the same time.

Communicating is the hardest. Even when you clearly and distinctly hear what the other person is saying, the two of you may not be communicating. Even while you have plenty of time to read the operations order, you may not understand what is required or intended.

Communicating is hardest.

Under the best of conditions, communicating is always difficult. Under the normal operating conditions for an infantry leader, it is far more difficult. It is important to understand that there may be times when you will have to perform the most complex tasks imaginable, under the most horrendous conditions, and all mechanical channels of communication are inoperable. What will you do? Do the men in your squad really know hand and arm signals? Are they truly proficient in executing battle drills? Mounted and dismounted? Do they know the SOP, and can they be relied upon to follow it? Did you actually lay that wire to the command post? To the adjacent unit? Does the man operating your radio know what he's doing? Do you have the right operating instructions? Can you use them? "Authenticate XI"! What do you mean the rain washed the graphics off your map and you don't know where you're going? No one in that Korean Army platoon on my flank speaks English. How can I coordinate with them? Your transmission is broken and garbled.

Break squelch two times. Did I forget to change frequencies? Get off my net! Just how long did the commander tell me to hold this hill? Can I withdraw now? This operations order is pretty clear, but I don't understand the commander's intent. He can't really mean that. It clearly says we're to maintain radio listening silence, so I can't call him to ask about that paragraph. I'll just do what I'm certain he meant to say.

Does any of this seem made up to you? This brief article has only touched on the nature of the situation. No one has a tougher job than the small-unit infantry leader. No one has greater challenges or more difficult obstacles to overcome. From fire team leader to company commander. Only the best will succeed.

Fortunately, you don't have to try and do it alone. Of all the leadership traits that are indicated for comment on an efficiency report, perhaps the most important one of all is "Tactical and technical proficiency." To succeed you must study your profession and all that it demands. That study will be difficult, time-consuming, and never-ending. At times it will be drudgery. And you must practice what you study. No doubt you are familiar with the story about how a kingdom was lost for want of a nail. Well, the nails that hold your unit together are found in the toil and sweat of uncounted hours and endless days on ranges and in training, and in studying manuals and bulletins and talking to—communicating with—your subordinates, your peers, and your commanders. All of the information you need is available. Your boss and his boss will do all they can to help, because if you fail they may also fail. When you signed up for the infantry, they told you it would be fun. They never told you it would be easy.

Shoot, Move, Communicate.

Colonel Richard L. Strube, Jr., was commissioned through Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning in 1970. He is a graduate of Kansas State University and holds a master's degree from Central Michigan University.
Extend the Range of a Radio

CAPTAIN DANIEL T. WILLIAMS

In the fast and fluid environment of a combat training center, task force retransmission operations need to function as quickly and smoothly as possible.

Retransmission is listed as a specific communications platoon task in the mission training plans (MTPs) for maneuver, combat support, and combat service support units. Specifically, in ARTEP 7-94-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Combat Support/Combat Service Support Platoons, this task is titled “Establish Retransmission Site.” In the MTP for the engineer (combat heavy) headquarters and support company as an MTP task, it is called “Retransmission of a Radio Message.”

Technically, a retransmission (or retrans) operation is “the arrangement of two radios connected together to provide automatic retransmission of signals between two other radios that are too far apart to communicate directly with each other”—Field Manual (FM) 24-18, Tactical Single-Channel Radio Communications Techniques, 30 September 1987.

A normal scenario that would require the initiation of retrans operations is one in which the net control station has lost, or is about to lose, contact with one of the net stations. One cause can be distance. The range of our best radio system is 40 kilometers with the use of a7 power amplifier. (SINCGARS—single-channel ground and airborne radio subsystem—performance data are shown in the accompanying table. Ranges shown are for planning purposes only; they are based on line of sight and are averaged for normal conditions.) Since the radio systems the Army operates with SINCGARS are line-of-sight, another cause may be an obstruction—natural or man-made—between the sending and receiving units. Whatever the cause, losing contact is frustrating and can keep the mission from succeeding.

Within the framework of a battalion task force tactical setting, units focus on conducting three basic high-intensity conflict operations: attack, defend, and movement to contact. Another mission that is very much a part of the training scenario is conducting stability and support operations (peacekeeping and peace enforcement). When communications are lost at this level, the rippling effects may extend to division or corps, depending on the mission and the task force’s role in it.

At some point, lost communications require a decision on how to regain contact with the distant station. The usual response is to “send out the retrans team.” The problem with this decision is in executing the order as outlined in our doctrine concerning retrans operations.

The following are some special considerations when conducting retransmission operations:

- The two stations must be at least-10 MHz apart.
- The retransmission site radios are identified as retrans radios C and D, while the distant radios are identified as terminal radios A and B. Radios A and C operate on one frequency, radios B and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VEHICULAR RADIO PERFORMANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TYPE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice (SR or LR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice (SR or LR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice (SR or LR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice (LR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data (SR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data (SR Radio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1. Retrans layout.
and D on another. Figure 1 shows another way of illustrating this.

- The connection for retransmission between radios C and D is the RXMT Cable, CX-13298/VRC, shown in Figure 2. As of March 1995 this cable is no longer a component of the end item but an additional authorized list (AAL) item. This may be a problem for units that received their SINCGARS after March 1995 and were not issued this cable. In the June 1995 Technical Manual 11-5820-890-10 HR, the special-purpose cable assembly, NSN 5995-01-224-0016, appears as an AAL item.

- According to TM 11-5820-890-10-8, "maximum results are attained by using two OE-254 antennas, separated as far as the cabling will permit." Using the installed antennas on the same vehicle will attain the least favorable results. A multiplexer is used along with the antennas. The SINCGARS system is designed to work effectively with the TD-1456/VRC frequency hopping multiplexer (FHMUX), but some units have attempted to use the 12-series radio multiplexer instead, which results in symptoms similar to jamming. In effect, the radios cancel each other out, and retransmission is not possible. The FHMUX is expensive and still in the experimental stages of development.

These are the technical aspects of retrans operations, and several technical manuals specify them.

With a few exceptions, units are not capable of effectively conducting the retrans operations they want at the times they want them, but the following tactics and techniques may help.

In conducting tactical operations, the planning process, of course, should conclude with an operations order (OPORD).

The S-2 always plays an important role in retrans operations. A thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefront should always consider the terrain for the purposes of OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach). This process, applied to the ranges obtained with the radio system, will help determine two things—the maximum ranges in the terrain of an area of operations and possible retransmission site locations. The battalion signal officer can do this with the S-2 and have the questions answered for his specific needs. Another possible avenue is a terrain-based software program for the area of operations, but this is rarely suitable. The TF engineer can also help the signal officer with his terrain analysis.
Another key player is the battalion S-3, who must determine whether retransmission operations are necessary for the specified mission. Which mission, if any, will require retransmission is too often an afterthought. The typical mission for retrans operations is the attack.

Whichever mission is selected for the employment of retransmission teams, the following should be considered:

Security. Security is a twofold concern—the movement of the teams to their transmission sites and the security of the teams once they are on site. Figures 3 to 5 illustrate a way to array the forces to ensure their security during movement in a high-intensity environment. Also considered in these illustrations is the principle of site security. Although stability operations are multifaceted, the same principles apply.

In Figure 4, the retrans teams move under the protection of the advance guard. This provides security and a high probability that they will be headed in the right direction and area of operation. They will also need a trigger for deploying to high ground without getting so far forward that they are in the middle of the meeting engagement. In the attack (Figure 5), the retrans teams may be safer moving forward with the support force. This serves to keep the retrans element out of the line of fire and near high ground. It may be best to position the team at least one hill mass from the objective, and on a reverse slope.

The typical scenario is that the teams are deployed without security. As a result, they seldom reach their intended destinations safely, and those that do may not have adequate security at their sites. These failings in security are seldom due to poor discipline on the part of the retrans team. The problem is inadequate manning. If there are only two soldiers on the team, one will sleep, security will not be the first priority, and retransmission may or may not be achieved. The number of personnel necessary to ensure an effective retransmission operation can be determined by asking the commonsense question, "How many people will it take to secure the site, institute a sleep plan, and conduct retrans operations?"

Another specific problem that may not be readily apparent is that the retransmission of a radio message is a platoon task. Based on the observations at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, however, it is not issued or executed as a platoon task.

Set-up. When discussing set-up, the concern is not where but how, and this is a matter of training. FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, discusses in detail several levels of training exercises that can be used as well.

One in particular is the command post exercise (CPX), a medium-cost, medium-overhead exercise that may be conducted either at garrison locations or in the field. The purpose of a CPX, among other things, is to train subordinate leaders and staffs at all echelons to establish and use communications. The preferred location for a CPX is in the field.

Before conducting the exercise, the commander should determine whether the personnel chosen to participate are proficient in the required individual and collective skills. As in all training, the goal is to improve. For the purposes of small-unit or section-level training, however, the real value comes from the
lessons learned. A unit can capture these lessons in writing and, from them, develop the drills and standing operating procedures (SOPs) that will make the task a success.

The steps for establishing a retransmission site do not necessarily need to be trained in a remote location. This training should be a drill, which can be incorporated into a battalion SOP. Typically, the most detailed battalion SOPs mention retrans operations only in showing who is responsible for them—the battalion signal officer or the communications platoon leader. Set-up consists of the two radios connected with the RXMT cable on the appropriate frequencies, and the erection of the two OE-254 antennas.

Equipment. To successfully complete a set-up, the team must have the resources available, and the communications platoon leader or signal officer must know the status of his equipment. In spite of the urgency of the mission, precombat inspections are rarely conducted; these inspections are necessary, however, to ensure that the resources are available and in good condition. Since the OE-254 antenna (Figure 6) has many parts and pieces, it is the most likely to cause problems for the retransmission team.

Site. The site location is very important to the success of retrans operations, and the S-2 and the task force engineer can help determine where the team should set up. As a rule of thumb, it should be between the forward and rear stations. The site should be on the rear slope of a hill or on high ground; that is, away from the enemy. If possible, the terrain should afford overhead concealment without masking the signal from either station.

Signal. Although the location is important, the ability to communicate is far more important. Although the site chosen may seem to be adequate, it is worthless if you can't communicate from it, both forward and rearward. The strength of the signal is also important. Upon arrival at the site, the team should establish contact with the net control station, then attempt to contact a forward station.

Support. The final concern, and one that is often overlooked, is support. How long will the operation last? How will the team resupply Classes I, III, and V? What about maintenance support if the vehicle or equipment should break down? These are legitimate concerns that need to be addressed in the OPORD or by the drill established in the battalion's SOP.

This brings up the issue of the OPORD and where retransmission operations should be addressed in that order. In producing an OPORD, time and space are of the utmost concern—time, because the final product should meet the one-third/two-thirds rule to give subordinate leaders adequate time to conduct their troop leading procedures; and space, in an effort to streamline the amount of information (and paper) in an OPORD.

A way to attain brevity and timeliness is to include the retrans operation in the battalion SOP. The bulk of the detailed information—pre-combat inspection, set-up drill, responsible OIC/NCOIC—can be addressed here. The retransmission operation can be discussed in at least three different places: Paragraph 3, "Tasks to subordinate units," Paragraph 5, "Signal," or a separate annex.

The most important player is the task force commander. His focus is on the platoon level operations in his battalion, and his concern should not be on the reaction mode of execution. He must be confident that the communications platoon can execute its combat critical tasks to standard. This level of confidence is not possible unless the training at home station has been done, and done to standard. The task force commander is the only one who can decide whether his battalion will be able to talk over extended distances. And he alone is responsible for its success or failure.

The concept of retransmission is not new. There are other ways of extending the range of a radio, but these ways—which include tactical satellite (TACSAT) communication—are not available to most infantry or armor battalions. On the dynamic battlefield of the future, the options are limited by units' modified tables of organization and equipment, their leaders' imaginations, and the doctrine on which the training is based. To succeed, a unit's retransmission operations must be planned, prepared, and trained. The equipment, the personnel, the time, and the manuals are available. The rest is up to the individual unit.

Captain Daniel T. Williams is assigned to the operations group at the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany, where he also served as a fire support observer controller for the task force battle command. He previously served as the division artillery operations officer in the 2d Armored Division at Fort Hood. He was commissioned through the Officer Candidate School in 1986.
On 24 July 1996, approximately 190 paratroopers from the 82d Airborne Division deployed on a U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) emergency deployment readiness exercise to Haiti. These soldiers—most of them assigned to the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry—formed Task Force 1-504 (TF 1-504).

The task force’s deployment was designed to improve joint operations, validate selected portions of the contingency plans for Haiti, and increase force protection for deployed U.S. forces in Haiti. Those forces at the time consisted of 250 soldiers who made up U.S. Support Group Haiti. The support group consisted mainly of engineers doing public works projects, a security platoon, and other logistical personnel. Upon arrival in Haiti, the task force would fall under the control of the group commander.

The rules of engagement (ROEs), as disseminated by USACOM, were a combination of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) memorandum number 3121.01 and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) “red card” (Figure 1), then in use by U.S. security forces there. Most noteworthy were the rules that did not allow U.S. forces to intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Also, the rules limited the use of deadly force to circumstances of “hostile intent” (as defined in JCS Memorandum 3121.01) toward U.S. military, United Nations (UN), and civilian police (CIVPOL) personnel as well as U.S. citizens. The CIVPOL were police from other countries employed by the UN to train the Haitian National Police. Strangely, the operations order the task force received from higher headquarters did not contain the usual ROE annex or appendix.

The TF commander was given total autonomy in structuring his force from within his battalion, the only restriction...
**UNITED STATES SUPPORT GROUP**  
**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)**

1. Treat all persons with respect and dignity.  
2. Use of force must be proportionate to the level of perceived threat.  
3. If possible, warnings should be issued prior to the use of force.  
4. Minimize collateral damage to civilians and their property.  
5. Riot control agents (RCA) including pepper spray and CS are authorized to defend US personnel and facilities and UNMIH personnel, and for riot control purposes.  
6. You may temporarily detain persons infiltrating Support Group facilities. Detainees will be turned over to the appropriate Haitian or UN authorities as soon as possible.  
7. Nonlethal force for crowd control is authorized.  
8. Warning shots are authorized to accomplish your mission.  
9. Do not intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence, except to defend US military personnel and civilians, and in emergencies to defend non-US UNMIH and CIVPOL personnel.  
10. DEADLY FORCE is authorized to prevent death or serious bodily injury to ALL military personnel and civilians.  
11. DEADLY FORCE is authorized to protect weapons and ammunition and other mission essential property as designated by CMUSSPTGPHAITI.  
12. DEADLY FORCE is authorized to defend non-US UNMIH and CIVPOL personnel from hostile acts or demonstrable hostile intent in emergencies, when there is no time to communicate with higher headquarters, and immediate action is required to prevent death or serious bodily injury.

---

**PROCEDURES AFTER AN INCIDENT**

1. Render FIRST AID as soon as possible to all persons injured or wounded.

2. RECORD DETAILS OF INCIDENT TO INCLUDE:
   - date, time and place of incident.
   - unit and names of personnel involved.
   - the events leading up to the Incident.
   - why SPTGP personnel used force.
   - who or what force was used against.
   - the weapons used.
   - the apparent results of the incident.

3. REPORT the above information and current situation through your chain of command to the CMUSSPTGPHAITI immediately.

4. Report ANY use of force, using the above format.

---

**Front**

**Back**

---

Figure 1. ROE Card used by U.S. security forces in Haiti during deployment.

being the number cap of 190. The task force was composed of two platoons of light infantry from Company B and two motorized platoons from Company D. (The modified tables of organization and equipment for the 82d Airborne include a Company D in each of its nine infantry battalions.)

Company D had five platoons of four M996 HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles)—which could be configured to carry the TOW missile system, the .50-caliber machinegun, or the Mk 19 grenade launcher—and an M998 cargo vehicle for resupply operations. Mobility would be at a premium, given the mission and the distances to be covered in and around the city, and the M998s would give the light infantry the mobility to respond as a quick-reaction force. The mounted .50-caliber machineguns would provide additional firepower and also serve as a highly visible symbol of U.S. commitment to the Haitian democratic process.

This mission differed significantly from the typical combat mission for which the task force soldiers had been trained. The soldiers’ usual aggressiveness and individual initiative, so crucial to success in combat, could spell disaster for the mission in the friendly streets of Port-au-Prince.

In preparation, the brigade commander ordered the task force to conduct realistic training on the rules of engagement immediately upon arrival in Haiti. He wanted every soldier to understand the inherent right of self-defense, along with the responsibility to use deadly force only when it was authorized under the ROEs.

Having served as the operations officer (U-3) for the UN Command in Haiti, the brigade commander had experienced success with the use of ROE “lane training.” During his tour as the U-3, he had used lane training to familiarize many of the foreign forces that made up the multi-national force with the complexity of peacekeeping and nation building ROEs. The task force S-3, along with the brigade trial counsel, would develop the situational training exercises (STXs), implement their execution, and evaluate the unit in country.

The RAMP principles would be used to assist in the training. RAMP (Figure 2) is a simple memory device that encompasses much of the “soldier relevant” information set forth in JCS 3121.01. It provides a simple, user-friendly way for the average soldier to remember key concepts that help him accomplish the mission.

The Haitian mission presented unique challenges for fire discipline and the soldiers’ understanding of when to use deadly force. In order to train the task force soldiers on the principles of RAMP, the brigade commander ordered lane training with scenarios specifically designed to approximate encounters that were possible in Haiti. The lane training would be conducted on the ground in Port-au-Prince.

As soon as the task force arrived in country, arrangements were made to implement the training. A suitable training site required open terrain with an unused road network for vehicles, and the site had to be away from the observation and possible interference of Haitian locals. A quick map reconnaissance revealed an abandoned airfield, once used by the Haitian military, which offered open training space and was surrounded by a 12-foot wall.

The job of creating the training scenarios fell primarily upon the battalion S-3 and the brigade judge advocate. Re-
lying heavily upon the brigade commander’s input, they created seven separate scenarios. These scenarios used the traditional “task, conditions, standards” training approach of a line company and battalion mission essential task lists (METLs).

Some of the training scenarios involved crowd control or interaction with the local Haitians. All of the vignettes required capable actors for training. Without them, the soldiers would not receive realistic training.

Having a good opposing force (OPFOR) is always an important element of training, but it is particularly important in stabilization and support operations such as this one. Typically, an OPFOR only tests a soldier's ability to fire and maneuver. The TF commander wanted the actors to challenge his soldiers’ ability to think and react in a non-hostile environment. The brigade trial counsel, who was already familiar with the training scenarios and the training objectives, was appointed as the officer in charge of the opposing force.

Training Vignettes

The overall training objective was for the soldiers to employ an appropriate mix of initiative and restraint during operations other than war.

SITUATION #1:

Task: Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, demonstrate an ability to measure the amount of force necessary to accomplish the mission.

Conditions:

- Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier): U.S. forces are deployed to a poor third-world country where only U.S. support troops have been operating. Although the country's military and police forces have some control, armed bands of thugs, radicals, and rebel militia units present a real threat to both the civil authorities and U.S. citizens. The President of the country has invited additional U.S. forces into the country. The National Command Authority (NCA) has determined that the re-introduction of U.S. combat troops into the country will have a stabilizing influence. The armed forces of the country have not been declared hostile. The UNMIH ROE card is in effect. Your commander has issued the additional guidance that deadly force is authorized for use against any attempt to steal any U.S. weapon or against any hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent against any U.S. national or UNMIH forces.

  - Training Requirements:
    - 3 rolls of concertina wire (to simulate U.S. secure area).
    - 1 foreign national in civilian clothing.
    - 1 M16A2.
    - UNMIH ROE card.
    - 1 evaluator/briefer.

  - Training Setup: The soldier is read the scenario backdrop; he is given the ROE card and allowed 10 minutes to study it and ask questions. He is told that he has been placed on guard duty inside a U.S. cantonment area and that the limits of his post are from point A to point B. The HMMWV is placed approximately 50 meters from the leftmost limit with the M16A2 leaning against the side that is visible to the soldier. There should be a small gap in the concertina wire near the vehicle. The soldier is given an M16A2 rifle with a magazine of blanks in his ammunition pouch and his selector lever set to safe.

  - Training Execution: The foreign national, who is hiding, either in the HMMWV or in a nearby woodland, grabs the M16A2 and goes through the wire.

  - Standards: Upon observing the theft, the soldier should shout warnings, give chase, and as a last resort fire his weapon. Alternatively, if the soldier determines that firing shots could put others at risk, he refrains from firing and only gives chase.

  - After-Action Review (AAR) Discussion: The evaluator should go through each bullet of the RAMP mnemonic, emphasizing the P (for protect property designated by the commander).


SITUATION #2

Task: Same as for #1.

Conditions: Same as for #1, except that instead of an M16A2, an M42 protective mask is placed near the HMMWV where the soldier can easily see it.

Standards: When the foreign national grabs the mask, the soldier should shout STOP in Creole, and give chase, but should not use deadly force.

AAR Discussion: The activity the soldier witnessed does not rise to the level of authorizing the use of deadly force. The evaluator should go through the ROE card and the RAMP mnemonic. The "R" clearly does not apply because the soldier received no fire. The "A" does not apply because the soldier could hardly anticipate any kind of attack from the foreign national seizing the mask and running. The "M" requirement is met when the soldier shouts and gives chase. The "P" does not apply because the protective mask has not been declared property that is to be defended with deadly force.

SITUATION #3

Task: Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, he will measure the amount of force necessary to respond to foreign national-on-foreign national violence.

Conditions:

- Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier): Same as #1, except that the soldier has now been posted at the entrance gate to the U.S. secured area. The soldier is told that the only individuals allowed to pass through are UNMIH personnel or those bearing a U.S. military ID card. No foreign national is allowed inside the secured area without a U.S. escort. The soldier is told that if any foreign nationals try to gain entry through the gate or if a riot appears imminent, he is to use the factors of graduated response, with the mnemonic VEWPRIK.

  - Training Requirements:
- 2 rolls of concertina wire.
- 2 actors playing foreign nationals armed with clubs.
- 1 evaluator.
- 1 female victim.
- Red ROE card.
- TA-I wire.

- Training Setup: The soldier is given the red ROE card and 10 minutes to study it. The concertina wire is placed so that there is a 20-foot gap between the strands, representing a roadway entrance into a U.S. secured area. If he is confronted with any situations not covered in his general orders or his instructions, he is to use the TA-I to contact higher headquarters for guidance.
- Training Execution: The "female victim," visibly upset and frightened, approaches the U.S. soldier on guard duty and attempts to draw him into conversation. Several seconds later, two foreign nationals approach the woman and start to drag her away. She pleads for help from the U.S. soldier.

Standards: The U.S. soldier does not interfere in the incident. He reports it to higher and requests reinforcements, and/or reports it to the proper authorities (CIVPOL/Haitian Police) to deal with a possible riot.

AAR Discussion: The red ROE card is clear on this—the U.S. cannot interfere with Haitian-on-Haitian violence. A leader goes through the RAMP factors with the soldier again. The use of deadly force is not authorized in this situation.

SITUATION #4

Task: The soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, demonstrating an ability to measure the amount of force necessary when confronted by a variety of threats.

Conditions: Same as above, except the soldier is equipped with pepper spray.

- Training Execution: Includes five variations:
  a. A foreign national in an unknown location begins firing at the soldier manning the checkpoint.
  b. A Red Cross relief worker approaches the checkpoint, says he thinks he is in danger, and requests safe haven.
  c. Two or three foreign nationals come within 50 meters of the checkpoint and throw rocks at the soldier.
  d. A civilian vehicle stops near the gate, shots are fired from the vehicle, and it speeds off.
  e. A civilian truck initially stops at the checkpoint, but speeds away when the soldier approaches to check IDs.

Standards: The soldier seeks cover and returns fire, in accordance with the "R" of the RAMP, if he can identify the position from which the sniper is firing; if not, he remains under cover and reports the incident.

b. The Red Cross worker should be taken into the U.S. secured area, and higher headquarters should be contacted for an escort back to the CP.

c. The soldier should seek cover from the rock throwing and report the incident to higher. None of the RAMP factors are met that would allow the soldier to use deadly force. The "M" factor would argue for the use of non-deadly force, but the soldier would have to leave his guard position to implement it (the range of pepper spray is five meters).

d. The soldier should respond to the vehicle with deadly force. Both "R" and the "M" argue for returned fire.

e. The soldier should respond to the civilian truck with deadly force. The "A" for "anticipate attack" strongly argues for deadly force—the truck may be headed toward the CP with explosives.

SITUATION #5

Task: The soldier will respond properly when asked questions by national news media.

Conditions: Scenario backdrop (briefed to soldier) is the same as in Situation #1. The soldier is placed on gate guard at the front entrance to the U.S.-secured area. He is informed that the press is in the area and that he may talk to them if it does not interfere with his guard duties. He is given the "Dealing with the Media" reference guide, and 15 minutes to study it.

- Training Execution: An actor in civilian clothes (representing a reporter) approaches the soldier and asks one or more of the following questions:
  a. What are you doing here?
  b. What town are you from, are you married, any kids?
  c. About how many U.S. soldiers came down with you?
  d. I've heard that you can't interfere in any Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Is that true? Why?
  e. What unit are you with? Do you enjoy it? What is the Army like?
  f. When are you leaving?
  g. Is that weapon loaded?
  h. I've heard that this unit was sent down here to make way for your Charlie Company, which will be staying for four months?
  i. Off the record......
  j. Now you soldiers are airborne right? What does that mean?
  k. Some people back home are saying that the fact we've sent additional troops to Haiti means that the President's strategy has failed. What do you think?
  l. What if some Haitian starts shooting at you?
  m. Are you high-speed, elite soldiers really cut out for this type of peacekeeping mission?
  n. What do you think about Haitians? Do you think they appreciate you being here? After we leave, what do you think will happen?
  o. Isn't it true that you guys are down here because lots of stuff is being stolen by Haitians?
  p. I see you have pepper spray. When can you guys use it?
  q. If you could tell the folks at home one thing, what would it be?

Standards: The soldier should first ask the reporter for press credentials and picture ID. Soldiers will not answer any question dealing with operational security or national policy. Soldiers may answer questions about personal matters, such as those in b, e, j, and q. (Only talk about your area of expertise: Stay in your lane. If you own it, drive it, carry it, you can talk about it.)

SITUATION #6

Task: Soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, he will respond with graduated response to a civil disturbance or riot.

Conditions: Same as above, with the additional instructions that the soldier's team is escorting a humanitarian relief convoy.

- Training Requirements:
  - 2 HMMWVs loaded with empty boxes.
  - 20-30 Haitian actors.
  - 1 evaluator/controller.

- Training Execution: A fire team leader is instructed to escort the convoy from point to point. As the convoy rounds a corner it is approached by 20 to 30 Haitians who surround the convoy and begin asking for food. They become more aggressive and start trying to enter the HMMWV to take food. Once the U.S. soldiers fire warning shots, the crowd disperses.

Standards: Soldier uses the graduated force measures (VEW-PRIK) to force the crowd back and resume the movement.

SITUATION #7

Task: The soldier will adhere to an ROE; specifically, the ability to measure the amount of force used in a situation where hostile intent is unclear.

Conditions: Soldier is placed on guard duty as in Situation #3 at the entrance to a U.S. secured area. He is given the same instructions as in situation #3.

- Training Requirements: Same as #3, with the addition of five or six foreign nationals in host-nation uniforms carrying rifles at sling arms.

- Training Execution: The foreign national police/military ap-
proach the U.S. soldier with their weapons at sling arms. After they are stopped by the sentry, the senior Haitian becomes irate and motions that he and his group should be allowed to continue down the road. After about 30 seconds of arguing between the senior Haitian and the U.S. sentry, one of the other Haitian soldiers/policeman attempts to move his rifle from shoulder arms to a firing position pointed at the U.S. sentry. If the U.S. soldier does not respond with deadly force, the senior Haitian orders his soldier to lower his weapon and they depart. If the U.S. soldier does respond with deadly force, the other Haitians run away.

**Standards:** This soldier can’t lose. He is correct if he opens fire when the Haitian soldier moves his weapon from shoulder arms to the firing position. He is also correct if he holds fire when the foreign national moves his weapon.

**AAR Discussion:** Either response of the soldier is correct as long as it is done for the proper reason. If the soldier elects to open fire, his action is correct under the "A" (anticipate attack) requirement of RAMP. The "A" allows the use of force first against any element that displays hostile intent. The change in status of the Haitian soldier from shoulder arms to at-the-ready clearly demonstrates hostile intent. The "A" of RAMP could also argue for the soldier to hold his fire. The police/soldiers are clearly of the host nation, which is still nominally neutral towards the U.S. force. The "A" element allows the soldier to assess the risk before using force. If the U.S. soldier believes the risk of the Haitian opening fire is remote, he is correct in not opening fire when the Haitian moves his rifle. The scenario calls for a subjective analysis by the sentry of what constitutes "hostile intent," with the benefit of the doubt going to the U.S. soldier.

**Evaluation**

Since training without proper evaluation is unwise and often unproductive, the command decided to evaluate each soldier's performance using a modified grade sheet from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 96-6, dated May 1996. The modified version is reproduced in Figure 3.

Soldiers were evaluated on each of the tasks. Those who failed the performance measure were retrained and given another opportunity to excel. The evaluators used the after-action review discussion as a focus for their AAR with each soldier. Particular emphasis was placed on the explanation of the RAMP factors the soldier should have used in making his decision.

Perhaps the most surprising realization to come from the training was that U.S. soldiers were reluctant to use force even when hostile intent was clearly evident. It was a difficult transition from peacekeeper one minute to combat soldier the next. However, the paratroopers were quick to grasp and use the VEWPRIK graduated force measures. Another revelation from the training was the command's observation that many soldiers did not understand the proper way to use the pepper-spray.

The soldiers gave positive marks to the RAMP concept and compared it to the use of the SALUTE report for reconnaissance. They also agreed that the most useful training (perhaps because of its novelty) was that involving convoy escort instead of local crowd control. The crowd control or riot vignettes also helped team and squad leaders understand how difficult it would be to control their soldiers under such circumstances.

After the lane exercises, the soldiers of 1st Battalion,

---

**USE FORCE APPROPRIATELY**

**PERFORMANCE MEASURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>RESULTS</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GO</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Returns fire from a hostile force with aimed fire. Vignette #4a, 4d**

2. **Identifies clear demonstrations of hostile intent using the RAMP factors. Anticipates attack by firing first. Vignette #4e**

3. **Identifies situation where hostile intent is unclear using the RAMP factors. Holds fire while maintaining or seeking a secure position. Vignette #7**

4. **Responds with measured force when confronted with a potentially hostile force. Uses the scale of VEWPRIK measures. Vignette #4c, 6**

5. **Omits lower level VEWPRIK measures if threat quickly grows deadly. Vignette 4e, 7**

6. **Declines to use deadly force when piece of property is snatched. Vignette #2**

7. **Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect comrades and persons under U.S. control. Vignette 4b**

8. **Uses deadly force, if indicated, to protect key property. Vignette #1**

9. **Responds correctly to members of the news media.**

10. **Soldier correctly responds to foreign national on national violence. Vignette #3**

---

504th Infantry, felt better prepared to react to the many possible situations in the streets of Port-au-Prince. Thankfully, the task force was confronted with none of the situations for which they had trained during the brief deployment.

Although everyone agrees that ROE training is important, unfortunately, it is too seldom done. Hopefully, these scenarios and the experience of the task force in Haiti can provide a starting point for comprehensive ROE training, not only in our combat divisions but in the training base as well.

**Lieutenant Colonel Leo A. Brooks, Jr.,** commanded 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, during the exercise in Haiti, served in the G-3 section of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and is now attending the U.S. Army War College. He previously served in the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and the 3d Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. He is a 1979 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a master's degree from the University of Oklahoma.

**Captain Michael O. Lacey,** a Judge Advocate General officer, recently completed an assignment as Chief, Administrative Law, 82d Airborne Division, in which he also served as trial counsel and operational law attorney. He previously served in the 4th Battalion, 87th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. He is a 1987 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a doctorate from the University of Illinois School of Law.
During the battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, on 3-4 October 1993, a rifle platoon was separated from the main body of the company, ambushed, and pinned down. I had become leader of this platoon—2d Platoon, Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division—on 25 July 1993, just five days before it deployed to Mogadishu as part of the UN Quick Reaction Force (QRF). This is the story of the “lost platoon” as it worked to break out of an encirclement and link up with friendly units.

The 10th Mountain Division elements and support units relieved the United States Marines, who had been sent into Mogadishu in the fall of 1992 to establish order and allow the distribution of food to starving Somalis. These U.S. forces operated under UN command on a mission of mercy, but they still had to deal with pockets of unrest. One of these was Mogadishu, which gained the attention of U.S. forces. General Farah Aideed and his Somali National Alliance (SNA) wanted control of the country and would stop at nothing to attain that goal.

The SNA was blamed for such incidents as the ambush of a Pakistani unit and the command detonation of a mine that killed four American military policemen, which spurred the United States to action. The authorities issued warrants for the arrest of Aideed and his lieutenants. A special operations
group known as Task Force Ranger (TF Ranger)—composed of one Ranger company, a contingent of assault and attack helicopters, and other elements—was sent to the region to search for and capture Aideed. (For a detailed account of Company A's overall role in this operation, see Captain Charles P. Ferry's two-part series: "Mogadishu, October 1993: Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO," INFANTRY, September-October 1994, and "Mogadishu: October 1993: A Company XO's Notes on Lessons Learned," INFANTRY, November-December 1994.)

The 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, unlike others sent previously, was staged in Mogadishu and did not escort convoys outside the city. The battalion's mission was to act as a QRF for U.S. and UN forces in case of trouble. The battalion task force organized the three rifle companies to accomplish certain missions—support, main supply route (MSR) security and training, and QRF. Each of the platoons would execute one of the assigned missions for three days and then rotate duties, a procedure that maintained combat readiness, assured cross-training, and prevented mission burnout.

Elements from Headquarters Company (HHC) and transportation assets augmented the QRF company. The transportation company provided five-ton trucks, which were sandbagged for protection. HHC provided security assets such as armored HMMWVs (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles) and medical assets, including a front line ambulance. Engineers and field artillery observers also joined the QRF as needed.

The QRF elements ate, slept, and attended all meetings with the current QRF company. Reaction time was meant to be less than 15 minutes. We soon had it down to less than five.

Early in the afternoon of 3 October, elements of TF Ranger were stranded during a daylight raid to capture Aideed. The task force had executed nighttime raids in the previous weeks without success, and planners believed this daylight raid would be worth the risk.

The mission changed when Somali gunmen shot down one of the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters used for the Ranger insertion. The TF Ranger operation now became a rescue and recovery operation. The Rangers pulled off their initial objective, the Olympic Hotel, and secured the helicopter crash site. There, they were engaged by a numerically superior force, took numerous casualties, and were trapped. Another Black Hawk was shot down. The second crash site, about one kilometer south of the first, became known as Crash Site 2 (Figure 1).

The battalion's Company C, the QRF company, was sent to relieve the embattled Rangers. But the five-ton trucks carrying the soldiers were easy targets for Somali gunmen with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and the column, having sustained heavy casualties, retreated to the airfield to

![Figure 1. Map of Mogadishu showing the route of Company A with the 2d Platoon route added.](image)
regroup. The battalion commander organized a second rescue attempt, and soon Company A linked up with Company C at the airfield to resume this mission.

Company A, which was on the support mission cycle, was sent to reinforce Company C at the airfield, while Company B conducted training north of the city. Because vehicles were not readily available to move both companies at the same time, Company A, located at the university compound, was moved first while vehicle assets were freed to move Company B later.

Because of the support requirement, Company A’s 2d Platoon had been tasked to provide one squad to augment the airfield’s internal QRFs, and the platoon’s 2d Squad was sent to perform the mission. This meant that 2d Platoon was missing one rifle squad. The company commander assessed the situation and placed the engineer squad under 2d Platoon’s control.

We arrived at the airfield around 2030 hours. Companies A and C linked up with the rest of TF Ranger. I attempted—unsuccessfully—to make contact with my 2d Squad on the platoon and company nets, then switched to battalion and tried again. Told to clear that net because of incoming orders, I switched back to the company net and awaited instructions.

Minutes later, the company commander informed us that elements of TF Ranger had been trapped and were in danger of being overrun. He said the company was moving over to New Port where we would load onto armored personnel carriers (APCs) for the trip to the Rangers’ position.

The column began moving with Company C and elements of TF Ranger in the lead, followed by Company A. Upon arrival at New Port, final pre-command inspections were completed, more ammunition was issued, and the commander moved forward for more instructions.

The plan he returned with was simple: Pakistani tanks would lead Malaysian APCs carrying 2d Battalion soldiers. Company A would attack to break through to TF Ranger, followed by the battalion tactical command post, and then with Company C in the remaining APCs. Company B, once moved down to the airfield, would become the task force reserve staged at the airfield.

The element was to move mounted as far forward as possible, dismounting only on its assigned objectives. Company A was to secure the northern crash site and extract the Rangers. Company C was to secure the southern crash site and secure any survivors or remains. Both companies were then to return to the New Port for mission completion.

My task as leader of 2d Platoon was to attack, secure TF Ranger’s location, and extract the Rangers. The platoon was task organized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st SQUAD</th>
<th>3d SQUAD</th>
<th>PLATOON CONTROL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squad Ldr</td>
<td>Squad Ldr</td>
<td>Plt Ldr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 x APC</td>
<td>Plt Sgt</td>
<td>M60 Tm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M60 Tm</td>
<td>Engr Tm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medic</td>
<td>Interpreter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engr Tm</td>
<td>1 x APC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 x APC</td>
<td>1 x APC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along with the 1st and 2d Platoon leaders, I linked up at the commander’s HMMWV; when he returned, he briefed us on our task and purpose. Although there was some confusion about the route, we now had enough information to begin loading the vehicles.

The vehicles we were using were German Condors, which have features similar to our Fox chemical reconnaissance vehicle, with a turret on the top. The agreement was that the Malaysians would be the drivers, turret controllers, and gunners. The U.S. soldiers would be passengers.

Loading began with some difficulty in communication. Since none of us had ever seen these vehicles, even opening the door became a problem. Once that problem was solved, loading began.

The 1st Squad loaded in the first vehicle, and my radio-telephone operator (RTO), interpreter, an M60 team, an engineer team, and I loaded in the second vehicle. The commander’s HMMWV was the third vehicle. The fourth held my platoon sergeant, an M60 team, a medic, 3d Squad, and the second engineer team. The rest of the company followed with 1st Platoon, then 3d Platoon, in the remaining vehicles.

After loading, I found the commander and tried to get confirmation on the exact route. He told me not to worry about the route, that the Malaysian driver knew the directions. I returned to my vehicle. I was positioned directly behind the driver, and my RTO was seated next to the side door, which had a small view port. From this position, I could see some of what was to the front and the side.

The column began movement around 2145 hours, with the Pakistani T55 tanks in the lead. Immediately, the tanks took small arms fire and returned fire with their coaxial machine-guns. Slowly, the column began moving east, then north toward National Street.

The Pakistani-driven tanks were supposed to lead the column to the Rangers, but arguments ensued, and the Pakistanis only agreed to lead as far as National Street, where the Malaysian-driven Condors were to take the lead. I did not receive this change in plans.

The trip to National Street was uneventful, for the most part. Sporadic small-arms fire hit the sides of the vehicles. The soldiers in my vehicle seemed relaxed and quiet. The only noise was the engine and the Malaysians talking. I tried to count blocks as they went by and approximate our location as we moved through the city, but this was very hard to do.

As the column approached the turn onto National Street, all hell broke loose. I heard small-arms fire and RPG explosions and felt shrapnel hit the vehicle. The Malaysian driver began to jolt the vehicle forward in an unpredictable manner, causing everyone in the back to be tossed about. Land navigation at this time was impossible; every time I tried to look out, I was thrown in a different direction.

The vehicle began to pick up speed. We started going over curbs and obstacles in the road, which again threw us around. Unknown to me, at the same time the first vehicle, which held the 1st Squad leader, and my vehicle, the second, began pulling away from the rest of the column. The commander’s placement of his HMMWV, the third vehicle in
the march order, was the only thing that kept the rest of the Malaysians from following the runaway lead vehicles. This effectively separated me and my two lead squads from the rest of the company. We did not see the rest of the company again until the next morning.

At this time, I was totally disoriented and had not realized we were on our own. Being bounced around in an armored vehicle made it difficult to tell which way I was going, while the explosions outside made communication with the company commander virtually impossible.

The two APCs continued west on National Street, then turned south toward Crash Site 2 and continued past it. I believe they were trying to return to the New Port facility.

The vehicles were about one kilometer beyond Crash Site 2 when they entered a Somali ambush. RPG fire struck the lead vehicle head-on, mortally wounding the Malaysian driver. My vehicle was struck a moment later in the engine compartment (the front right-hand side of the vehicle). The blast felt like someone had lifted the vehicle up and was trying to balance it on a pedestal. The vehicle teetered back and forth a bit, I heard a high-pitched ring, and the smell of an explosion filled the compartment.

The 1st Squad leader called from the lead vehicle, saying his vehicle was hit and requesting guidance. I instructed him to get out of the vehicle and establish security. I was going to do the same. When I opened the door and got out, I realized we were on our own. Looking back the direction we had traveled, I saw a long upward sloping hill with no one behind us. Green tracers and RPG rounds were hitting all around us.

At this point, I turned back to my RTO, and we moved to a building east of the vehicle and occupied some low ground on the south side. I still did not want to believe we were alone. I made contact with the squad leader and told him to stay in his security position. I told him that my group was going to move north, back up the hill, and try to reestablish contact with the rest of the company. Low ground and the buildings were blocking all radio transmissions (Figure 2).

I led my platoon headquarters group with the engineer team north past two buildings, attempting to gain sight of the company. Small arms fire began to intensify from the direction of travel farther up the hill. The M60 gunner engaged targets from the corner of what appeared to be some sort of garage. All he was actually doing, however, was drawing fire; every time he engaged someone, the RPG fires into our location intensified. I instructed the gunner to engage only identified targets to limit the RPG fires and not to suppress the area. He said that he was only engaging identifiable targets and that there were a lot of people up the road.

With the enemy fires getting even worse as we pulled away from the squad leader in the security position, and with the fear of the enemy coming in between my divided forces, I decided to return to the original location. Before moving out, I heard the clearing of a weapon on the other side of the wall. I pulled out a grenade, pulled the pin, flipped the thumb clip, and threw the grenade. There was no explosion. I pulled out another grenade, repeated the arming process, released pressure from the spoon, and the spoon did not fly off. The tape we used to silence the grenade rings had left small strands that kept the grenade from arming. I then pulled the spoon off and threw the grenade, and a huge explosion followed. The weapon noise stopped.

Throughout the entire movement, the RTO kept trying unsuccessfully to initiate radio contact. About 15 minutes from the time of the ambush, I led the element back to the original security position and reestablished a secure perimeter (Figure 3). An M60 assistant gunner, in his haste to leave the vehicle, had left behind his gear and additional ammunition, and I sent him back recover it.

When he returned, the Malaysians in the vehicle apparently decided they were going to exit the vehicles as well and join our perimeter. When they came running from the vehicles, the M60 gunner, catching their movement out of the corner of his eye, spun with the M60 and engaged. Luckily for the Malaysians, this spinning movement caused the M60 to double feed, and they were not shot.

One previously injured Malaysian dived right on top of me. I pushed him off me and over to my RTO, telling the RTO to bandage him up. At this point, my unit was still under heavy fire, and I decided we had to get inside a building to survive. I asked the engineer squad leader if he could make a hole in a wall (pointing to the wall), and he assured
me he could. I then contacted the squad leader, telling him my plan was to blow a hole in the compound he was backed up against and establish security positions inside. He was to make sure he had no personnel beyond the corner of the wall.

Once I received confirmation that all his personnel were out of the direct blast radius, the charge was set. It had a 42-second time fuse, which seemed to burn forever, and I in my haste looked up just as the blast went off, receiving a chunk of concrete in my face. The PVS-7As I was wearing took the brunt of the blast. The device’s optics tube bent sideways, and I had only a small cut above my right eyebrow.

Everything on the battlefield seemed to go quiet after the blast, as if it had surprised the Somali gunmen. The blast was so large that it not only made a hole in the wall but knocked down the wall and a small building on the other side. The squad leader reported that part of the wall on his side had come down on his soldiers as well. (Next time, I will specify how large a hole I want.)

In the quiet after the blast, I figured someone would have to make the initial entry, and all my soldiers were pulling security. So I jumped up, sprinted across the street, and entered the compound, firing at the house I was entering. No fire was returned. I then called the squad into the compound to establish a more defensible perimeter.

We formed two mutually supporting battle positions. The squad was oriented south, west, and east. The engineers and an M60 team were oriented north, west, and east.

The RTO and the Malaysians also entered the compound. The RTO continued to work to establish voice communications. He put up the long whip antenna and tried different nets. The Malaysians were placed in the hallway toward the rear of the building. The squad’s combat lifesaver began working on the injured Malaysians while I checked security.

Two adults and several children who were in the house positioned themselves in the back room, and we left them alone. I figured we had done enough, blowing up their home and occupying it as a defensive position.

Then screams of pain were reported, coming from the lead APC, apparently from a wounded Malaysian who had been left behind. I told a team leader to go out there and get the man. Without concern for his own life, he ran back into the kill zone and retrieved the mortally wounded soldier and attended to his wounds. (This act earned him a Bronze Star with Valor device.)

Returning to the RTO, I found that he still had not been able to contact anyone on any net. In my frustration, I pulled the PRC-77 radio out of the ruck sack, took off all secure devices, and transmitted in the red. The battalion commander’s voice was the first I heard, and this was the most calming influence I had that night. He said, “Keep doing what you’re doing. You’re alive, and I will work on getting you out.”

The battalion commander then told me to drop down to the Company C net and make contact with the commander. I did so, and the captain and I conducted recognition procedures. I shot a red star cluster so he could see how far away I was, and he shot a green one. We agreed that we were about one kilometer apart. He then informed me that he would work on getting his company down toward our location once he had completed the search of the crash site, and that we should stay put.

While I was speaking to him, an AH-1 Cobra helicopter flew over us. The battalion commander must have talked to
someone and sent some fire support to our location. The Cobra flew east and started engaging targets a block or two away. This prompted me to place my M203 gunners on the roof of the building, and they engaged targets toward the east throughout the night.

During that time, Somalis continued to conduct sporadic attacks. Their favorite action was to stand off and lob RPGs at the compound. I counted no less than ten impacts in a one-minute period, and this kept up throughout the night.

I received a call from my M60 team saying its current location was getting too hot. I then pulled the M60 crew into the compound. The vehicles were still the favorite targets for the Somali gunners. My vehicle sounded like a mad popcorn machine and, with one huge final pop, the top of it was gone. All that remained were four burning tires.

Around 0300, the commander of Company C asked to speak to me. He said that he was having trouble moving south, that enemy resistance was too great for his company. He wanted us to try and move north and link up with his lead platoon.

I called in my element leaders to formulate a plan to get out of the area. The plan was for the engineers to lead, followed by my gun team and me and the Malaysians, then 1st Squad. My theory was that if I ran into trouble, the engineer squad leader could become a base of fire, and I could maneuver my 1st Squad leader, since I had maneuvered him in the past.

The element leaders disappeared to brief their soldiers, and I retrieved a poleless litter from the combat lifesaver. Returning to the Malaysians, I found that the mortally wounded soldier’s bandages were soaked with blood. I knelt next to him and laid out the litter. I tried to explain to the Malaysians what was about to take place, but they did not understand. I picked up the wounded man, placed him on the litter, and tied him in. Then I grabbed the Malaysians’ hands and placed them on the carrying loops and pointed up the road. Then they understood.

As I informed my company commander that we were beginning movement, the RTO told me he had heard over the net that one of my soldiers in 3d Squad was dead.

The engineers began moving, and I followed with the RTO and the gun team. The Malaysians were supposed to stay behind me, but I had trouble keeping them in formation. They tended to move past me, then stop and allow me to catch up. The leader of 1st Squad took up the trail (Figure 4).

The engineers moved up past the garage where we had been earlier that night. I positioned myself on the corner of the garage looking north. The Malaysians came streaming by, moving up toward the engineers. Then a Somali gunner stepped out in front of the engineers and sprayed their advance.

Three men were injured; one of them took a round in the chest and died later in Germany when surgeons tried to remove the bullet. I moved forward to a door stoop and began suppressing the gunman’s position. An engineer helped pull the wounded men back behind the door stoop.

From that stoop, all I could do was suppress the gunman’s location. I needed a better shot if I was going to kill him. I yelled back to the 1st Squad leader to take a team across the street, move up the wall, and keep the gunman. He came back with, “This street? The one with bullets flying down it?” I said, “Roger.” Reluctantly, he and the combat lifesaver moved across the street and worked their way forward.

The medic came up to my location to help with the wounded and to see if I needed any help suppressing the gunman. I told him to take care of the wounded because no more than one person at a time could fire from the small stoop.

Just as I ran out of ammunition and was changing magazines, the gunman moved around the corner and began shooting at my location. His actions gave the squad leader enough time to draw a bead on him and kill him. I was so eager to ensure he was dead that I grabbed grenades from the medic and hurled them into the building. We had no more shots from that gunman. Then another one began engaging us from across an open lot to our north.

The new gunman’s shots were accurate enough to keep the squad leader and the combat lifesaver pinned against a building. At this point, I had two casualties who were litter priority, two who were litter urgent, and eight who were walking wounded. We needed help. Yelling back to the RTO, I said to contact Company C, tell the commander our status, and request transport out. He informed me that the Malaysians were on route, and that we had “Little Bird” on station. (Little Bird was a special operations AH-6 helicopter equipped with 2.75-inch rockets and twin 7.62mm mini guns, an outstanding close-support platform.)

Yelling over to the squad leader, I asked him if he could mark the building with an M203 flare, and he said he could. Then I yelled back to the RTO to tell the pilots. The flare was shot, but it hit the wrong building, which Little Bird came in and destroyed.

I then told the RTO to tell Little Bird I was marking the building with tracers. Standing up from behind the stoop, I emptied an entire magazine of tracers into the building. Little Bird came in perpendicular to our location, fired his 7.62mm gun, then his rockets, and the building disappeared.

Turning to the task of extraction, I asked the squad leader if he had any chemical lights on him to mark the road. He did, and the glow of a green chem light now filled the road. I had one white smoke, and he had one. The plan was that once the vehicles moved down here and turned around, we were going to pop the smoke and allow the cloud to build, then all of us would enter the vehicles.

In between the time that the vehicles were en route and our pick-up, I started looking for a new building from which to defend. I started firing rounds into the door on top of the stoop, trying to blow off the lock. I then realized the roof had collapsed behind the door and even if I blew off the lock, we were not getting in.

Company C was having some difficulty getting the vehicles to move down to our location. Waiting was the worst part. Finally, two Condors appeared. The language became a problem once more because I wanted the drivers to turn around before we entered the vehicles. What I did not want
was for the vehicles to move back into the ambush thinking that was the fastest way back to the New Port. Finally, one of the Malaysians who had been with us all night understood what I wanted and started yelling in his language, and the drivers turned the vehicles around.

We popped the HC smoke, allowed a cloud to form, and then everyone sprinted to the vehicles—only to find the doors were locked. I went to the front of the vehicle and began pounding on the windshield of the driver’s compartment to get him to open the doors before the smoke dissipated. Finally, everyone boarded.

All the wounded engineers were loaded onto the vehicles for transport. Our ordeal was almost at an end. We moved back to Company C’s location and on to the Pakistani stadium. This represented a change for me. In previous operations, we had always returned to the point of departure. This time, we had left from the New Port.

Arriving at the stadium, we unloaded the casualties and moved inside to take accountability and wait for the rest of the company. My RTO was finally able to make radio contact with the company RTO. I felt it was better not to bother the company while it was extracting.

Soldiers guided the Company A vehicles inside the stadium. We began unloading the Ranger and 2d Battalion casualties. I sorted through the commotion, locating my soldiers and directing them to the 1st Squad leader, who was taking accountability. All the soldiers were accounted for, including the one who had been killed by a Somali sniper near the Olympic Hotel.

All of us were exhausted and extremely hungry. The Pakistanis brought us goat meat and tea with milk and sugar, which tasted great after not eating for 20 hours. Then we lay down on the benches to nap until helicopters arrived to transport us back to the University compound.

I looked around at my soldiers while they ate and rested. Everyone seemed different, including me. We all had that 1,000-yard stare and looked old. I know I gained a new outlook on life that day. The 14th Infantry crest has a picture of a golden dragon earned from prior campaigns. On that day, we had seen the dragon and survived.

Lessons Learned

The lessons my platoon and I learned are relevant for new platoon leaders. Having taken command of my platoon five days before deployment, I really had to learn “on the go.” I am thankful for the good noncommissioned officers and well-trained soldiers I could rely on in a tough situation. My first platoon sergeant was an excellent trainer who shaped 2d Platoon into a superb fighting unit. Unfortunately, he fell ill and had to be sent back to the States before this battle. But the senior squad leader performed superbly in his absence. One of the true tests of a leader is to be able to leave and have someone else step into his position and perform well.

Doctrine states that we should train as we fight and fight as we train. I remember going through the Infantry Officer Basic Course and learning about the Bradley fighting vehicle, thinking to myself, “Why is this important? I’m going to be a ‘light’ fighter.” But the concepts taught about maneuver with mechanized forces were important, and I should have paid closer attention to them.

The location from which I chose to command and control our vehicles’ movement was unsatisfactory. I learned that I should avoid any location where my field of view is limited. If I had taken the assistant driver’s position instead, I would have known immediately when my element broke contact with the rest of the company.

Under the “train as you fight” doctrine, a platoon leader sent into a theater of operation needs to know and understand the equipment he may be using. I had never seen or heard of a German Condor APC until the day of execution. Finding out how to open the door to a vehicle 15 minutes before rolling out the gate is not the way to start a mission. A platoon leader needs to coordinate through his company commander to arrange a time when the allied forces can come over and teach his soldiers about their equipment. This is particularly significant at a time when operations with other United Nations forces are becoming more frequent.

Communications were a problem all over the battlefield that night. The old adage about the “fog of battle” is true. Fortunately, there are some filters to limit the effects of the noise. A platoon leader should always know the route. The company commander may be too busy, but the platoon leader must find a way to obtain the information. If he cannot brief his commander, he should find another platoon leader or the executive officer to get the information.

The leader should check and recheck FM communication before rollout. There was a major problem communicating with the man-packed radios inside the vehicles. The solution was to communicate with the mounted radio or stick the antenna outside the vehicle to improve communication. The platoon leader must render reports frequently to the other platoon leaders and the company commander. This way, the commander can understand the situation and make intelligent decisions. The leader must transmit all radio traffic in a calm voice. Leaders trying to gain information will not understand jumbled or shouted transmissions. My battalion commander spoke clearly and effectively on the radio. His transmissions inspired confidence and had a great calming influence.

One problem has yet to be resolved: How do we communicate with those who do not speak English in the midst of battle, with no interpreters available?

During fire fights, adrenaline kicks in, and it helps at the beginning. But it is only a tool and should not be used as a crutch. Firefights are physically and mentally demanding; every sense is on maximum overload. The adrenal high lasts for only 15 to 20 minutes; after that it is the physical and mental conditioning attained before the battle that decides the outcome. Aggressive physical training (along with extensive road marches) enabled 2d Platoon to fight on past the adrenaline high and complete the mission.

I did not conduct the train-up with 2d Platoon; I only refined and continued the training once we deployed. For me, Ranger school was the best, most realistic training for combat. I graduated from the Ranger course, went on leave for two weeks, and then arrived at the battalion. Ranger training
gave me the ability to look beyond my physical and mental exhaustion and make the tough decisions. I believe that junior NCOs and senior specialists should attend Ranger school as well.

Throughout the entire time in country, the 2d Battalion conducted live-fire training. This training was another combat multiplier that gave each man in my platoon confidence in his fellow soldiers. These soldiers were used to other soldiers firing over them and beside them, while engaging targets of their own. As a deployed platoon leader, I never fired one round of blank ammunition and never incurred any training accidents due to live-fire training. Leaders down to team level were responsible for the safety and certification of their soldiers before any live-fire training event. It built confidence between the leaders and the soldiers. They were able to locate and control fires. All soldiers received extensive cross-training and familiarization with weapons. Any time a soldier became a casualty, another was able to fire his weapon.

Casualties will occur no matter what happens. This is the nature of our high-risk profession, but a platoon leader can do several things to reduce the burden. He must know his soldiers. He must sit down with them, throughout his time as a platoon leader, review their counseling packets, tell them what he expects from them, and tell them what they can expect from him. He should find out about their home life and what their expectations are. He must develop an understanding with his soldiers. In the end, he will find out he has some outstanding soldiers working with him and discover some life-long friends. Writing a letter home to a parent who has lost a son in combat is not an easy task. But this task becomes more manageable as the leader takes an interest in the soldiers’ well being, both professionally and personally.

The final learning point is not one over which a platoon leader has much control—allowing for a “cooling off” time at the end of a deployment.

Our company allowed soldiers to talk among themselves and to begin dealing with any problems they were facing together. For several weeks after this battle, soldiers had an opportunity to talk among themselves and deal with their problems. The chaplain and mental health care personnel were readily available to assist soldiers with this important task.

Platoon leaders need to talk to their soldiers and evaluate how well they are dealing with stress. I found that a good time for gauging how my soldiers were doing was the middle of the night while they pulled guard duty. I would take time to talk to them then. I believe I got a true feeling for how my platoon was dealing with the stresses of combat. I was able to direct soldiers who were having a hard time with something in their lives to appropriate resource persons so they could get the help they needed. The key here is to deal with the situation before it becomes a problem.

The 2d Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found itself in a critical situation that could have resulted in its annihilation, but the unit fought as a team in the face of heavy enemy resistance to establish contact and link up with friendly forces. The soldiers who took part in this action performed very well because that is what they were trained and prepared to do, and in so doing saved their own lives and those of our Malaysian allies.

---

**Captain Mark A.B. Hollis** led 2d Platoon, Company A, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, in Somalia. He is now assigned to a unit in Korea.
Train as We Fight

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WILLIAM F. KERNAN
COLONEL DANIEL P. BOLGER

When our country calls us to battle these days, we rarely have a lot of time to get ready. Instead—as they did in Grenada, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, Liberia, and Rwanda—our senior leaders simply say “go.” And we go. Our Army prides itself on our ability to execute operations based on as little as a mission and a commander’s intent.

How are we able to do this?

The answer is simple to say and hard to do: We fight as we train. Driven by Field Manuals (FM) 25-100, Training the Force, and 25-101, Battle-Focused Training, and much supporting training doctrine, our combat forces have learned how to get the job done in all climes and against all foes. There is an interesting parallel between our training doctrine and our fighting doctrine. You won’t find it stated in exactly the same way in today’s 25-series manuals, but the idea is implicit throughout our doctrinal literature. In war, we determine the desired end state, issue orders to the leaders, focus the main effort, and capitalize on our strengths. Quality training relies on exactly the same underlying principles. Success in training promises success under fire.

Define the End State. There’s an old maxim that says, “If you don’t know where you’re going, any road will take you there.” Well, soldiers do know where they’re going, and that means we pay attention when we choose the route to that destination. The end shapes our choice of means, in training and in conflict.

Confronting our adversaries, we speak of end state as the key component in our commander’s intent. It tells our subordinates, all the folks on our team, what success looks like. We express end state in terms of our side, the enemy, and the terrain. That formula can be found in every order issued, from the rifle squad up to corps and joint task force. If everything else goes bad, our soldiers return to that simple definition of victory and make it happen.

So it also goes in training. Here, our branch schools have done the preliminary spade-work for us. Mission training plans (MTPs) offer time-tested tasks, conditions, and standards. And if you read carefully, you can’t help noticing that the MTP standards regularly speak in terms of friendly force, effects on the opposing forces (OPFOR), and terrain. In short, our training end state is already embedded in our detailed MTPs.

That’s the science part, the part where you can rely on the system. The art part, which draws on experience and imagination, is just as important. You have to figure out where you want to go, then pick the scheme that gets you there. In combat, you design an operation to reach your end state. Trainers must pick the MTP tasks (one or two) that bring their units to the desired end state. If you want rifle platoons that can fight and win, you might choose to focus on the ability to execute a night maneuver live-fire exercise involving the attack of a fortified position. In that one end state you can identify a multitude of critical subtasks that could easily generate an entire cyclical training plan.

Once you select that kind of core competency task, everything else falls out pretty clearly. You know where you’re going, so the road becomes obvious. Our fine MTPs show you the supporting individual, collective, and leader tasks. With this brand of roadmap in hand, you have the plan. But as General George S. Patton, Jr., warned, planning is only five percent of the challenge. Execution is where we really earn our pay, whether we’re fighting or training.

Train Leaders First. With the intent described, a commander must then get the word out and ensure that his task force understands the operation. Our tactical processes rely heavily on a proven series of orders, backbriefs, rehearsals, “synch-exes,” and reconnaissance to make sure everybody knows his job. When we do so, and then make contact, we greatly increase the chances that we’ll fight on our own terms. Not surprisingly, our training methods should follow this same path.
It's sometimes frustrating to see units head out to a range or a field site and spend an inordinate amount of time getting organized. Often, our leaders act as if they first put their minds to their business when they cross into the training grounds. As a result, the units can spend a lot of time training their own leaders, instead of the other way around. To resort to a tactical analogy, it's as if we tried to figure out our scheme of maneuver on the fly, between the line of departure and the objective. This is no way to fight. It's no way to train, either.

To get it right under fire, you must tell the leaders the mission, talk it out, let them brief their troops, and then rehearse, rehearse, and rehearse. Training runs the same way. We must discipline ourselves to allow time to teach our leaders first, to get them in the picture early. Then, our officers and NCOs become true experts. When they, in turn, teach their units, there is little wasted time. As a side benefit, trust and confidence grow in the chain of command.

When you let these troop-leading procedures play out, including full-up rehearsals, you quickly find that 90 percent of the learning occurs long before you execute the terminal training task. In this effort, it's important to allow time for a good after-action review (AAR). Equally important, we have to carve out resources (including time) for retraining and numerous iterations. We do AARs and retraining in combat, too. Once again, this reinforces training the way we fight.

**Do Less Better.** Under fire, you cannot hope to do everything everywhere all the time. You have to pick your victims and concentrate combat power, for trying to be strong everywhere and ending up spread too thin. That's a recipe for failure.

Spreading yourself too thin can happen very easily in training. Those same wonderful MTPs mentioned earlier feature dozens of tasks that beg for attention. A recent infantry battalion MTP, for example, lists some 60 battalion-level tasks. Many of these cry out for weeks and months of extensive training. And yet our calendars constrict us, and our ammunition and ranges limit our appetite. You can't eat everything on the menu any more than you can take every objective or destroy every enemy unit at once.

The trick in war or training involves deciding on that one key effort and then making it overwhelmingly strong. You have to do less than everything, but perform better on the one you choose to emphasize. The same kind of combat multipliers must be applied to triumph in battle or on the range. We have to bring in the entire combined arms team—including our medical evacuation, supply, and maintenance elements. Resources must include MILES or live-fire targetry, training ammunition, and the right kind of land and ranges. In force-on-force training, we gain a lot by introducing an uncooperative OPFOR, civilian and press role players, and varied terrain, including built-up areas. Don't neglect the special challenges brought on by darkness. The emphasis is on quality and intensity, not just throughput and numbers.

Now some of us won't be comfortable with this kind of approach. Soldiers are "type-A" personalities by nature, who want to do more and more, not less. We like long mission-essential task lists and lots of subunit tasks, as if quantity alone proves how good we are. It does not, especially if you don't have time to train on all these potential tasks. In war, or in training, you win by doing a few key things right.

**Focus on Foundations.** When you fight well, you mass your strength against hostile weaknesses. Historical evidence consistently tells us that armies are only as good as their small units. In modern warfare, we fight spread out, combined arms, joint services, and often with allies. We must have very-high-quality small units to operate in that environment. Our foundations, our strengths, lie at company or battery or troop level and below.

The exact fighting focus varies by branch and type unit. In light infantry, the rifle platoon is the first element that has a decent radio, leadership, and arms enough to carry out contemporary operations. In attack aviation, we fly into action by companies. Military intelligence often goes in teams of two to five men, as with ground surveillance radars. Once you know your foundation, you know where to put most of your training effort.

That said, what about units above the company echelon? Simulations offer one good way to work on troop-leading procedures, tactics, staff work, and command post routines. This is a valid form of leader training and should be exploited as a form of rehearsal.

It would be a mistake, however, to place too much stock in pushing electrons. Basing tactical expertise on computer simulations alone is like thinking you can play professional basketball after a few rounds of Nintendo 64. As soldiers, we know that nothing short of going out to the field can teach you how to accommodate fatigue, uncertainty, fear, and Murphy's Law. So while we put our priority on training highly skilled small units, we must also create key events and exercises to replicate larger unit operations. When done correctly, these exercises allow for (indeed, insist upon) high-quality small-unit training as crucial measures of overall performance.

**Train as We Fight and Fight as We Train.** We can be pretty certain that the next rewrites of our 25-series training doctrine will better reflect the intentional similarities between the way we plan and execute training and the way we plan and execute combat operations. Training management has never been some arcane subject conducted in a vacuum. It's nothing more (or less) than drilling our battle tactics over and over until we know them cold.

Define the end state.
Train leaders first.
Do less better.
Focus on foundations.

None of these are unique concepts, but taken together, they offer a pretty good way of ensuring that we really do train our soldiers using techniques similar to those they will use in war. The more training resembles combat,
the more we do to get our forces ready for that ultimate test. Our goal remains that of the old Roman legionnaires, of whom the historian and soldier Josephus wrote: “Their drills were like bloodless battles; their battles were like bloody drills.” The better the training, the less the blood.

That’s all there is to it.

Lieutenant General William F. Kernan is commanding general of XVIII Airborne Corps. He previously served as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, an assistant commander of 7th Infantry Division, and commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment. He holds a master’s degree from Central Michigan University.

Colonel Daniel P. Bolger commands the 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, in Korea. He previously commanded the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, was G-3 of the division, and served in the 2d Battalion, 34th Infantry, at Fort Stewart, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry, in Korea. He is a graduate of The Citadel.
Mountaineering and Leadership
The 5th Ranger Training Battalion

MAJOR STEPHEN A. HILLER
MAJOR MARK R. MORROW

The mission of the 5th Ranger Training Battalion, Ranger Training Brigade (RTB) is to train small-unit leaders on mountaineering skills and to further develop their combat leadership and functional skills. The brigade accomplishes this mission by requiring Ranger students to perform individual and collective tasks in a tactically realistic mountainous environment, under mental and physical conditions approaching those found in combat.

Although the mission has not changed in more than 40 years, the methods and techniques the battalion uses have evolved along with doctrine and technology. Individual success is still defined as earning the Ranger tab. The course’s success is defined as an infusion of those intangible leadership skills and strength of character a warrior develops in order to get other warriors to do what they do not want to do.

The mountain phase implemented a new program of instruction (POI) in August 1997 that still develops mountaineering and leadership skills.

The most recent changes involve content and course structure and equipment. The significant changes in content include a tactical scenario for insertion into Camp Frank D. Merrill (in the north Georgia mountains), a reintro-
duction of squad and section patrolling and improved mountaineering instruction, and a five-day platoon level field training exercise (FTX). This phase is still 21 days long.

Along with the changing structure of the Mountain Phase, the RTB has upgraded the equipment issued to the students. Ranger students use AN/PVS-7D night vision devices during section and platoon training to assist their night movements. Both the Ranger students and opposing force (OPFOR) personnel wear MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) equipment, which gives the Ranger Instructor (RI) information that is critical in after-action reviews (AARs). Ranger patrols use the global positioning system (GPS) as an enhancement to pinpointing a location (the GPS is not authorized for use in movement as a navigational aid). Students now carry the M4 rifle; both the M240G machinegun and the SINCGARS (single-channel ground and airborne radio system) are slated for issue to the brigade in the near future.

Transitions from one phase to another are based on a tactical scenario introduced on the first day of the course. The continuity of the tactical scenario sustains the students’ focus and provides a battle rhythm for the Rangers throughout the 61-day course. Under the old POI, Rangers traveled to Camp Merrill by commercial bus. Transition from the Benning Phase to the Mountain Phase now begins with an air assault and an infiltration of more than eight kilometers. In this cadre-led mission, the Ranger students watch a battalion operations order given by the battalion commander and his staff and observe as their company commander conducts a compressed planning process. Then they participate in rehearsals.

Within 24 hours the battalion accomplishes two major training objectives: First, the instructors demonstrate the standard for planning, rehearsing, and executing a Ranger mission. Second, they introduce the students to mountaineous terrain, which gives them an opportunity to teach necessary navigation skills and route selection techniques. Finally, the mission identifies any Ranger students who may have difficulty with the physical demands of the phase.

Upon conclusion of the infiltration, the students get a period of about 12 hours to refit and in-process. Then they move directly into section operations—two days of combat techniques training followed by a four-day FTX.

The Ranger students learn the fun-
damentals of patrolling with a focus on planning, task organization (with particular emphasis on the "mission" and "troops available" factors of METT-T), supervision, navigation, and squad and section unit-size tactics and techniques.

The company commander starts the planning process for the FTX by issuing an order. The section FTX begins with squad reconnaissance missions of enemy air defense artillery (ADA) and cache sites, followed by a link-up of two squads to form a section element. For three days, the Rangers execute raids and ambushes to eliminate enemy ADA capabilities and open flight corridors to support to Camp Merrill.

The final mission of the FTX is a squad exfiltration back to Camp Merrill through friendly forward unit (FFU) lines. The section training and the FTX missions complete the transition from the squad operations conducted at Fort Benning to platoon operations conducted in the second FTX in North Georgia and in Florida.

Students move directly into the mountaineering portion after successfully completing the section FTX. Under the old POI, students arrived at Camp Merrill, in-processed, and started mountaineering training. Fundamentally, instruction has not changed in the mountaineering phase, but two subtle changes were made in the training—a new knot test and improved equipment. The improvements to the training have reduced the number of mountaineering failures as well as the number of injuries.

The knot instruction now centers on the figure-8 family of knots. This keeps the Ranger Course's mountaineering training consistent with that provided at other military courses. Rangers must successfully pass the knot and belay tests to remain in the course and move on to advanced mountaineering training. Ranger students receive more than 15 hours of knot training and have three opportunities to pass their tests. A student who fails is dropped from the course but has the option of returning at a later date.

The second subtle change is that Ranger students now use more modern equipment. They use kernmantle ropes, which are more pliable than standard issue green-laid rope. Kernmantle ropes also greatly improve the Rangers' ability to tie knots.

One of the most popular pieces of new equipment is the climbing harness. Rangers still learn to tie the "Swiss seat," but now they wear a climbing harness when conducting rappelling and climbing training. This harness moves the center of balance from the waist and to the chest, which allows for more freedom of movement. The introduction of this equipment has reduced injuries and is giving the Army better-trained Rangers.

The first three days of mountaineering still consist of knot instruction and testing, climbing and falling training, basic rappelling, belaying instruction and testing. The students receive classes on the construction of A-frames, rope bridges, and the suspension traverse. This training gives the students the basic skills they need to proceed to more technical training.

Advanced mountaineering, conducted at Mount Yonah, is one of the events with the highest risk. Ranger students foot march to the top, set up a bivouac site, and start training. During the two days of training each student must successfully negotiate a 200-foot night rappel, a direct-aid climb, a woman party climb, and a balance climb. While the training certainly does not make the students experts, they do gain a tremendous amount of personal confidence (many have never done anything like it before). At the end of the second day, the students foot march back down Mt. Yonah and move to Camp Merrill to begin their platoon technique training.

Following the successful completion of the mountaineering training, the students receive an intelligence update from the battalion S-2. Two days of combat technique instruction at platoon level reinforce the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for the raids, ambushes, and patrol bases taught thus far in the course and focuses the Rangers on platoon operations. The students receive an operations order and begin planning. On day 15 of the phase, the students air assault into the Chattahoochee National Forest for a five-day FTX, which concludes the evaluated portion of the Mountain Phase of the Ranger Course.

Rangers who successfully pass half of their patrols, receive a passing mark on peer reports, and have not accumulated a total of five major minus spot reports begin preparing for operations in the Florida Phase. Rangers who do not meet the academic standards go before an academic review board chaired by the battalion commander. Each Ranger is examined individually, and his records are closely examined to determine whether he will be recycled, dropped, or sent on to Florida. The only Ranger students who are recycled are those who have not met academic standards but clearly have the potential to succeed in the next class. All others are released from the course but are eligible to return later. The final appeal authority is the brigade commander.

Rangers who are going on to the Florida phase receive an operations order and begin planning for an airborne insertion into a drop zone at Eglin Air Force Base. Following a short refit period, Rangers receive sustained airborne training, load aircraft, and execute the airborne insertion into the drop zone. Their mission, to secure a drop zone for follow-on forces, completes the Mountain Phase of the Ranger Course and provides a seamless transition of control from the 5th Ranger Training Battalion to the 6th Ranger Training Battalion, while maintaining the tactical flow of the course.

The tactical scenario is integral to maintaining the focus and realism for the Ranger students. What used to be a scripted event controlled by Ranger instructors is now a free-play scenario based on mission-type orders and OPFOR counterattacks. OPFOR squads are not given exact platoon locations or student missions. Instead, they must conduct their own reconnaissance missions to make contact with the Rangers. The free-play scenario forces the Ranger patrol leader to think through the intelligence preparation of the battlefront (IPB) process and be prepared for enemy contact at any time. The OPFOR is relentless and often success-
ful. Feedback from the students is overwhelmingly supportive of the free-play scenario.

The Mountain Phase taxes the students both mentally and physically. Results indicate that Rangers who have participated in a pre-Ranger program have a higher success rate than those who have not. Unit programs should focus on teaching task organization for the patrolling mission instead of relying on the three-squad method of mission preparation. Prospective Ranger students should review TTPs and the IPB process and its application at small unit level.

During the Mountain Phase, a Ranger student conducts air assaults, adjacent unit coordinations, departure and reentry of an FFU, and link-up operations, control of aerial resupply missions, and location of caches.

The only route to success is teamwork and individual heart, will, and desire. More than 80 percent of all students who arrive at the beginning of a phase will go on to the next phase. The formula for failure is a soldier who is trained but lacks the self-discipline to follow the standard, plus a leader who fails to enforce that standard.

The 5th Ranger Training Battalion has worked hard to improve the course, introduce new equipment available to units in the field, and provide the most tactically realistic training under conditions approaching those found in combat.

The battalion cordially invites any personnel in a Ranger student’s chain of command to observe training and walk a patrol.

Major Stephen A. Hiller served as S-3 of the 5th Ranger Training Battalion and is now battalion executive officer. He previously commanded a company in the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and served as an observer-controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center. He is a 1984 ROTC graduate of Virginia Military Institute.

Major Mark R. Morrow recently completed a tour as executive officer of the 5th Ranger Training Batalion. He formerly commanded companies in the 6th Ranger Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry. He is a 1983 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a master’s degree from Troy State University.
Support-by-Fire Positions

CAPTAIN CHRIS TONER
CAPTAIN JOSH M. WILLIAMS

The support by fire task focuses on the specified form of maneuver or the designated main effort with direct or indirect fires. The result is an objective on which the conditions set will enable the maneuver force to accomplish its assigned task.

We offer here some techniques for setting up a light infantry support-by-fire (SBF) position. Although indirect fires are also important, these techniques focus on the direct-fire engagement only. This is by no means the only solution, but it has proved helpful in setting the conditions on the intended objective. These techniques focus on the direct-fire engagement only (with no intent of diminishing the importance of indirect fires). They can be applied to team through battalion level positions (squad level react to contact, platoon ambush, platoon or company SBF, and defense).

The result is an effective SBF element that balances the rate of fire with the desired effects. All of this leads to a no-lull SBF that fully accommodates any amount of time needed for the desired form of maneuver.

Assumptions. Planning a deliberate SBF begins with a detailed reconnaissance of the objective area and the selection of a tentative position. Imagery, photographs, and human intelligence will provide many of the answers that help develop a plan for the execution of the SBF. Further reconnaissance will then refine the plan and confirm the SBF location, sectors of fire, primary targets, and engagement priorities. But even a hasty SBF will succeed if the principles discussed here are incorporated into a unit standing operating procedure (SOP). The unit will simply be able to accomplish more in less time.

Concept. The SBF element is built at the lowest level—a team consisting of M60 machinegun, M249 light machinegun (or (SAW), M203/M16, and M16 marksman. This team concept facilitates the control and distribution of fire that will be discussed later. It also allows teams to be placed together to form larger SBF elements.

The team is formed with the M60 on the left or right limit, with the M249 next to it, then the M203 and the M16. This team allows for the matching of the two key weapon systems, the M60 and the M249, to cover both the primary and the secondary sectors of the M60. This enables the leaders to control the distribution of fires as well as the rapid execution of battle drills and fire commands.

Distribution of Fires. The effective distribution of fires covers the objective in both width and depth. It includes the assignment of primary, secondary, shift, and lift sectors of fire and priority targets in each sector. This insures complete coverage of the objective in terms of specified targets and the denial of positions or terrain to the enemy.

First, leaders must look at the target
area and decide which targets or areas are critical to the mission (bunker, trench). They compare this information to the intended effect of munitions, weapon priority targets (M60 on group of 3-5 personnel, M203 on bunker, and so on), and the effective range of the weapon systems. The distance of the SBF position from the objective will depend upon an analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time) and the maximum effective ranges of the weapons. This can also create two or more SBF positions to accomplish the assigned task.

**Target Area.** Obviously, the siting of support-by-fire positions is a METT-T decision on where to place effective fire in order to achieve the desired result. The target area must be divided into an area covered by fire in both width and depth. This ensures an area that is covered by fire and observation, regardless of the rate of fire. The target area dictates the assignment of primary and secondary sectors, priority targets, shift sectors, and lift sectors. Sectors of fire should be assigned on the basis of the criticality of that area and the weapon best suited to deliver fires on the target. For instance, the commander assigns first a primary sector, then a secondary sector. Within a sector of fire, he assigns primary and secondary targets and establishes weapon priorities.

**Primary and Secondary Sectors of Fire.** Each weapon system is assigned a primary and secondary sector of fire that complements the maneuver plan. In the case of the M60 and the M249, these sectors are assigned to complement each other as well as to support the maneuver plan—the M60’s secondary sector of fire becomes the M249’s primary sector, creating a mutually supporting team. This is done for two reasons: First, it allows the M249 to shift rapidly to the M60’s primary sector in the event the M60 malfunctions, is destroyed, or must conduct a barrel change. Second, it provides complete coverage of both the primary and secondary sectors of the M60—a need based on the criticality of the M60’s sectors of fire. In this concept, the M60 and M249 form a team and complement each other during the course of fire and cover the most critical sector or sectors. It may be necessary to assign the M249 three sectors of fire—a primary sector (the M60’s secondary), a secondary sector, and the contingency sector (the M60’s primary). The number of M249s in the rifle platoon makes it possible to support two sectors of fire while assigning other sectors to M249s that are not paired with M60s.

**Weapon Priorities.** Weapons must be given priorities for engagements within their sectors of fire. The M60 has priority for thin-skinned vehicles, three to five personnel, bunker suppression, trench suppression. The M249 has priority to three to five personnel, individual targets, bunker suppression, and trench suppression. The M203 has priority to thin-skinned vehicles, area personnel targets, and bunker suppression. M16 marksmen are given individual target criteria or placed in a security role. This all becomes SOP within the unit and changes only when dictated by METT-T. This makes it easier to define each weapon’s sector of fire and to control the weapons during the execution phase. It also reduces the number of fire commands that must be issued during the SBF and allows personnel to more rapidly engage the targets that appear in their sectors. (Example order to an M60 gunner: Your priorities will be to Bunker #1 followed by Bunker #2; once the maneuver element destroys the bunkers with AT4s, you will engage 3-5 personnel targets in your secondary sector; we do not expect any vehicles on the objective; however, if a thin-skinned vehicle enters your current sectors, it becomes your priority target, and you are to engage it immediately.)

**Shift or Lift?** Either a shift-fire or a lift-fire sector is assigned, depending on the mission. A shift-fire sector complements the form of maneuver by allowing a gradual shift of preparatory fire in front of the maneuvering element. Priority targets are assigned to facilitate the “creep” of the fires and deny the enemy the ability to regain key positions or place effective fire on the maneuver force. A lift-fire command is just that—a command. It is not a cease-fire with respect to marksmanship ranges. It means that SBF personnel are scanning an assigned sector, weapons are on safe, and targets are engaged only when a leader issues a specific fire command. One technique, if it suits the form of maneuver, is to keep the lift sector the same as the shift sector.

**Control of Fires.** The control of fires allows for the effective placement of fires on the objective and also helps prevent fratricide. There are many different techniques, but nothing can substitute for the placement of the key leaders in the SBF position. Properly positioned leaders can control the rate and distribution of fires and enforce the planned control measures. Leaders identify targets and sectors of fire either by using laser designators, or by actually pointing them out to the individual soldiers.

When not using laser designators, a good technique is for the leader to lie directly on top of the SAW, M203, and M16 firers to show them their sector while sighting down the top of the individual weapons. This will immediately confirm that the soldier understands his targets and sectors of fire. The M60 is
easier to confirm with the use of the tripod and the metal-to-metal technique. The best way of controlling the limits of fires with respect to the maneuvering element is the M60 tripod-mounted machinegun. With the volume of fire on the objective, the light due to fires, and noise resulting from the impact of munitions, the M60’s burst of six to nine rounds is the clearest, most visible signature. All of the personnel in the SBF position can control their fires by keeping them inside the limit established by the M60. The assaulting soldiers can also see this line. This will allow the leaders in the SBF position to walk the supporting fire based on the maneuver element’s rate of advance. Other weapons subordinate to the M60 are lost in the volume of fire on the objective. Soldiers with night-vision goggles can see the fire better, but other soldiers can still see it. Leaders must ensure that the #1—or “control”—M60, is using a 4x1 mix of ammunition (DODIC A131), not straight ball (A143).

Rate of Fire. The rate of fire is an absolutely critical part of the SBF position. It is easy for a leader to dictate a rate of fire in a fire command, but this is useless if a soldier does not understand how to achieve that rate of fire. For instance, a command to an M60 gunner to fire a rapid rate of fire should mean to him that he will fire a 6-to-9-round burst, followed by a one-second pause, then another 6-to-9-round burst, and continue this for a specific period of time. This rate will be approximately the 200 rounds per minute dictated by a rapid rate of fire; it also tells the gunner that he must change his barrel every two minutes. Determining the desired rate of fire includes considering the desired effect on the enemy, the amount of ammunition on hand, and the amount of time needed to support the form of maneuver. (It is important to remember that the trigger of the M60 machinegun is squeezed and released each time during the cyclic rate of fire. The only time a machinegun trigger is depressed continuously is during aircraft engagements.)

Barrel Changes. Preventive maintenance requires that barrel changes be made at specific times during the three specific rates of fire. This is a battle drill that the M60 team and M249 gunners execute at a specific time or event. To facilitate this, leaders can program the amount of ammunition to coincide with the rate of fire and barrel change. For instance, if the M60 is firing at a rapid rate, 400 rounds should be programmed in the first ammunition can to ensure the correct stopping point. This also facilitates the control of barrel changes by keying secondary weapons to begin covering the primary sector.

Ammunition Formula. After the mission analysis is completed, leaders can use several factors that will help them estimate the amount of ammunition needed to complete the mission. These factors—duration of fire, rate of fire, ammunition needed, and preventive maintenance drills—combine to produce an SBF position that is well controlled, timed to the event, and executed with little or no unplanned lulls in the rate of fire. Given an estimate of the amount of time needed to support the maneuver element, leaders can compare this to the ammunition on hand in the rate of fire needed to accomplish the mission. Ammunition constraints may drive them to a specific rate of fire to provide sustained fire during movement of the maneuver element. Leaders can further designate the initial (and subsequent) rate of fire for each weapon system to accomplish the task. (This is not a foolproof system that will lead to a perfect execution of the task. Enemy reaction, mishaps, and weapon malfunctions will force the SBF element to adjust the plan, but having a plan will allow for a much faster adjustment without loss of supporting fires.) This is accomplished by taking an individual weapon, its issued ammunition, the expected duration of fire, the desired effect of fire, and the programmed barrel changes, and then planning a fairly accurate sequence of fire. For instance: M60—1,000 rounds of ammunition; duration of event—five minutes, desired effect = suppression (cyclic for 30 seconds, rapid for 1:30, sustained for 3:00), barrel changes based on rate of fire = 1 (at the 2-minute point).

In this case, ammunition can #1 is loaded with 525 rounds and a second can with 475 rounds. The gunner is told to fire can #1 at the specified rate of fire—30 seconds at cyclic and 1:30 at rapid. Upon completion of the first can, he changes barrels. Can #2 is then loaded for the 3 minutes of sustained fire. Obviously, this will tie in with the target area and his assigned sector of fire, but at least there is a plan for the servicing of the target area, the consumption of ammunition, and the barrel changes.

SBF Equipment. Success depends upon having the required equipment in the SBF position:
- Ammunition cans are an excellent way of carrying ammunition into the SBF position. They can be used as ready boxes for the M60, the SAW, and even the M203 (an enormous number of M203 illumination rounds are required for an illuminated attack). The soldiers can carry larger quantities of ammuni-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RATE OF FIRE</th>
<th>M60 MG</th>
<th>Burst Rate</th>
<th>M249 MG</th>
<th>Burst Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CYCLIC</td>
<td>550 RPM</td>
<td>6-9 rounds as fast as trigger can be squeezed.</td>
<td>850 RPM</td>
<td>3-5 rounds as fast as trigger can be pulled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPID</td>
<td>200 RPM</td>
<td>6-9 rounds with a 1-second pause between bursts.</td>
<td>200 RPM</td>
<td>3-5 rounds with a 1-second pause between bursts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSTAINED</td>
<td>100 RPM</td>
<td>6-9 rounds with a 2-second pause between bursts.</td>
<td>85 RPM</td>
<td>3-5 rounds with a 3-second pause between bursts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BARREL CHANGE REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rate of Fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYCLIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSTAINED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
tion, the ammunition is protected from the elements, and leaders can program the exact amount of ammunition into each can for the planned task. With proper execution, the ammunition will be clean, effectively fed into the weapon and—in the case of the M60—the assistant gunner can have both hands free to facilitate crew drill and the acquisition of targets. The cans should be noise-proofed with towels, dunnage, or tape. The cans can even be carried in ammunition rucksacks or by individuals during a movement to contact.

- The tripod, traversing and elevation mechanism, and pintle mount are absolutely necessary for the SBF position. This equipment allows for the accurate placement of fire by the leader assigning the sector. When used on the left or right limit, it allows the leader of the support element to walk the fire to the front of the maneuver element with greater accuracy. When the M60 is used as a limit, all other SBF weapons fire to the inside of it.

- Binoculars are necessary for leaders and assistant gunners so they can rapidly and accurately identify targets and friendly forces.

- Night vision devices give the edge to our forces during limited visibility engagements. Their use allows for the placement of precision fires on the objective and helps enforce antitransurope measures.

- The cleaning rod, Leatherman’s tool, SAW tool, and M60 wrench are used to clear weapons during misfire procedures. The Leatherman’s tool is excellent for clearing brass and links from the chambers of the machineguns.

- Asbestos gloves are a must for barrel changes. An M60 gunner who does not have them cannot change the barrel at the required time. Two gloves should be carried with each M60.

- Spare barrels must be available. The most flagrant violation that often occurs during an SBF is the lack of extra barrels for the SAWs. Leaders must ensure that the crew changes barrels as needed, and that this is planned into the SBF task. The barrels must be carried into the position and the bags unzipped, with the barrels on top ready to go.

- The laser designator is a fairly new device that enables leaders to assign sectors of fire to their soldiers at night. Each soldier can see his sector of fire when the leader turns on the designator and illuminates the target. The obvious problem with this is that the enemy can also see the beam. But this device is extremely useful when under preparatory indirect fire or when in contact.

**Training.** Training is essential if the readiness and proficiency of the SBF element are to be maintained. From leader training to Skill Level 1 training, all are equally important. At the individual level, soldiers must train continually on maintaining assigned weapons; practicing misfire procedures, barrel changes, drum and ammunition changes; sustaining marksmanship; and manipulating the M60 tripod. The crew-level training includes barrel and ammunition drill, assistant gunner target acquisition and adjustment, malfunction drills, tripod drills, target identification, fire commands, and gun evacuation drills. The unit can train on all of these individual and crew drills in garrison, and they should be a part of concurrent training on every qualification range.

In leader training, the OMEGA(?) technique is very effective in teaching the principles of SBF. At the rifle company level, the platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, weapon squad leaders, first sergeant, executive officer, and company commander form the SBF element.

The training starts with the mastery of the individual and crew level tasks and then moves to the collective level, which can include qualification on each of the weapon systems. Once the leaders have mastered the individual and crew tasks, they are given classroom instruction on the principles of the SBF. This includes everything discussed earlier and culminates in a sand-table exercise. During this exercise, the leaders establish a mock SBF position and use sand table aids to demonstrate the coverage of the objective area with each weapon. Each leader then briefs his area of responsibility and his weapons’ engagement plan. The successful completion of the sand-table exercise is followed first by a hands-on blank fire exercise and then by a live-fire exercise.

The company commander receives an operations order that includes the SBF mission, the specific amount of ammunition, and the expected duration of the event. The company commander then plans the SBF, issues an operations order that covers the specifics on servicing the objective area, and supervises the rehearsals.

The SBF element is first issued blank ammunition and tactically moves to the position, occupies it, and executes the task. The first blank fire exercise is followed immediately by an after-action review. The element is given time to conduct retraining and another blank-fire run, if needed. The training culminates in a live-fire assault on the objective area.

This training does not require a complex maneuver range. In its simplest form, a machinegun qualification range that allows for the addition of fixed targets can be used. The objective can be of simple design and does not necessarily have to be at the maximum range of the weapons. This allows the leaders to confirm, through action and evaluation, the required principles of the collective task—day or night.

Once the final after-action review is completed, the leaders can return to their company, where they should immediately have the resources to take the company through the same training. The desired result is the execution of the event on a complex maneuver range, at night. This training will produce a unit that not only can conduct an SBF task but that can also execute the react to contact, break contact, defense, and ambush subtasks to standard.
Protecting the Obstacle

MAJOR FRED JOHNSON

During the defense phase of a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the success of a mission often hinges on a unit's ability to destroy the enemy's mechanized force in designated engagement areas (EAs). Central to effective EAs is the use of obstacles that either turn, disrupt, block, or fix the enemy to help concentrate combat power against the attacking force.

Though defending units have made great strides seeing that obstacles are emplaced in the right locations, the opposing force (OPFOR) continues to be successful in the attack. The reason for this success starts hours before OPFOR mechanized forces cross the line of departure, when dismounted elements breach the obstacles.

Units that protect obstacles from OPFOR breaching efforts succeed because they effectively execute several basic tasks:

- Having leaders participate in the reconnaissance of the obstacle location and the emplacement of key weapons.
- Ensuring that the obstacle is covered by observation and direct or indirect fire.
- Securing the key weapons.
- Executing a counterreconnaissance and combat patrol plan.

Before the first U-staked picket is placed in the ground, the leader responsible for securing the obstacle (usually the company commander) must conduct a reconnaissance with the engineer. Otherwise, the engineer may emplace the obstacle on the basis of his own general orientation without regard to the capabilities of the unit's weapons. Unfortunately, the result may be that machineguns firing along the friendly side of the barrier have no effect on the enemy as they conduct the breach, or there may be extensive dead space that limits the weapon's capabilities.

A small amount of time and some visual aids can prevent this problem. The engineer must explain to the leader the purpose of the obstacle and what is required (tying it into certain terrain features, for example) for it to achieve the desired effect. Engineer tape should then be strung where the obstacle is to be positioned (several pickets can be used if the obstacle will extend over a long distance). The gunner of each primary weapon and the leaders who will direct its fires should first site the weapon. If the gunner cannot place effective fires from this site, it may be possible to reposition the wire or the mines so the weapon can attain the desired effects, with the obstacle still achieving its purpose. If not, the leader must consider alternatives, such as indirect fire, to cover the barrier.

Clearly, before an obstacle can be covered by either direct or indirect fire, it must be observed. Although units usually have good intentions of maintaining observation of the obstacles, this task is not always accomplished. The primary reason is poor situational awareness on the part of the soldiers. Ineffective rest plans significantly decrease the soldiers' ability to maintain surveillance of an obstacle. (Unfortunately, the OPFOR units usually conduct their reconnaissance and breaching operations when our soldiers are asleep.) To counter this deficiency, leaders must develop and enforce rest plans. They must also be active in ensuring that soldiers on watch are awake and alert, which means periodically "walking the line."

Traditionally, units that use night observation devices (NODs) during hours of limited visibility succeed in protecting obstacles. With the current modified tables of organization and equipment for most units, every soldier in a company should have an assigned NOD. When AN/PVS-7s are properly worn, with the night sight mounted on the head harness, soldiers are better able to acquire and identify the OPFOR. Although the older AN/PVS-4s have limitations, the newer generation tubing greatly improves their resolution and their acquisition capabilities. For this reason, the PVS-4 should be mounted on selected weapons. In addition, the unit should use thermal devices, including the AN/PAS-7, AN/TAS-4 or 5, and the thermal weapons sight currently fielded.

Even assigning a NOD to every soldier in a unit and seeing that he uses it properly still does not guarantee success, however. Observation plans must ensure that the entire area is covered by NODs and that observation systems are redundant and overlapping. This includes giving soldiers sectors to observe. PVS-7s and 4s should orient on relatively open areas and the thermal devices on more wooded terrain. Thermal devices are better suited for wooded areas because they can acquire heat signatures through vegetation that might conceal personnel from observation with PVS-7s or 4s. Booby traps and early warning devices should be used in NOD dead spaces. In addition, an illumination plan should be developed. Mortar and handheld illumination, if properly employed, can greatly improve observation and target acquisition.

Once the leader determines that the obstacle can be covered by direct fire,
and once the weapon that will prevent the breach of the obstacle has been emplaced, forces must be arrayed to secure that weapon. Depending on conditions of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time), several weapons may be committed to securing the obstacle, but usually crew-served weapons such as M60 and .50-caliber machineguns or Mk 19s are the ones used for the defensive effort. The leader must regard these weapons and crews as the unit's main effort, because they are essentially accomplishing the mission of preventing the breach of the obstacle. Too often, leaders try to position all the unit's weapons to cover the obstacle, disregarding the need for 360-degree security. The OPFOR can then envelop the unit by conducting an attack from the rear or rolling up the unit's flank.

Several methods can be used to protect key weapons and ensure that obstacles are not breached. Supporting efforts that will assist the main effort can have a variety of objectives. Using the platoon as an example, squads can be tasked to destroy the OPFOR, provide early warning, call for and adjust indirect fires, and conduct counterreconnaissance or combat patrols. But the key point is that they are not protecting that primary weapon, preventing the OPFOR from neutralizing it or disrupting its mission. The following is an example of a platoon's scheme of maneuver:

Weapons squad, the platoon main effort, destroys OPFOR to prevent the breach of the obstacle. First squad destroys OPFOR to prevent the envelopment of the main effort. Second squad provides early warning and calls for and adjusts fire to prevent the OPFOR from surprising the main effort and disrupts the OPFOR's breaching effort. Third squad destroys the OPFOR to prevent the attack of the main effort from the rear of the platoon position.

Another way to facilitate the success of the main effort is to determine when and where the enemy is preparing to attack, and then focus combat power to disrupt that attack. The OPFOR's tactics are much like the U.S. Army's requiring the establishment of objective rally points (ORPs), the conduct of reconnaissance, and the attack. In addition, they usually move in large elements (platoon and company size) to achieve mass at their objectives. Objectives include key terrain such as crossing points and choke points, locations where obstacles are normally emplaced. It is therefore important to develop a plan to counter these activities and get into the OPFOR's decision cycle. Two ways to do this are through counterreconnaissance and synchronized combat patrols intended to disorganize the OPFOR as they initiate their attack.

The intent of counterreconnaissance is to deny the OPFOR information about the friendly unit's disposition. To do this, leaders must be aware of all the OPFOR's potential information collectors. These include civilians, special operation forces, terrorists, insurgent groups, and division and regimental reconnaissance assets. Consequently, the first step of a sound counterreconnaissance plan is good operational security (OPSEC) and good situational awareness on the part of the soldiers.

A more active form of counterreconnaissance is the employment of forces to locate and destroy the OPFOR's recon elements before they can determine the unit's disposition and relay the information to their higher headquarters. Although this battle is usually conducted at battalion level, companies and platoons can assist the effort by adhering to the OPSEC standards outlined in ARTEPs 7-8, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Company, and 7-10, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad.

The purpose of combat patrols in the scheme of maneuver is to disrupt the enemy's attack and prevent him from concentrating combat power against the main effort. Again, the unit may conduct ambushes along likely enemy avenues of approach. In addition, attacks on the enemy's occupied ORPs adversely affect the enemy's synchronization. Both of these provide early warning to the defending unit and prevent surprise.

Depending on METT-T conditions, the unit tasked to conduct the combat patrol may not be required to dig fighting positions, thus freeing its soldiers to execute tasks of counterreconnaissance or manning observation posts (OPs) during the preparation phase.

Another technique that can be used to provide early warning and disrupt the enemy's attack is squad OPs. Positioned on a likely enemy avenue of approach, a squad OP makes it possible for the unit to conduct continuous surveillance operations and call indirect fires against the enemy as they move. Though very effective, the OP must have the appropriate organization for combat and must be in a location that promises success.

The unit should consider using a forward observer (FO) and giving the squad additional radios. The platoon leader—along with the company commander, fire support officer, OP leader, and FO—must develop a detailed fire support plan, ensuring that it is tied in with the company's purpose of fires. This plan should include the use of trigger lines and visual target reference points to ensure effective and responsive fires. In addition, a casualty evacuation and withdrawal plan must be generated to support the operation.

A unit's armor killing assets are generally considered the heroes of the defensive fight. At the JRTC, there is no sight more glorious than dozens of blinking enemy vehicles. But if those OPFOR vehicles cannot be turned into an EA or blocked to allow effective antitank fires, the unit cannot achieve this desired end state. On a real battlefield, the results of this shortcoming could be measured in soldiers' lives. But with the application of basic doctrine, coupled with experience and initiative, obstacles can be protected and victory can be realized on the JRTC battlefield, and in combat as well.

Major Fred W. Johnson is assigned to the Center for Army Lessons Learned. He previously served as a battalion task force analyst at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and served in the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division. He is a 1985 ROTC graduate of Wofford College.
Employment and Training
Of a Light Infantry Battalion Antitank Platoon

CAPTAIN MICHAEL DANE ACORD

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Army has undergone many changes, in both structure and doctrine. Light infantry battalions have restructured training to meet the emerging threats in the Third World and in areas formerly part of the Soviet Union. These units are often called upon to conduct stability and support operations, in which there is less need for tank-killing assets.

Although the threat remains (most countries still have some armor capabilities), light infantry forces are less likely to face a mechanized threat. As a result, light infantry antitank platoons often find themselves underutilized. I propose some methods of improving the employment and training of antitank platoons, addressing missions, equipment, personnel, and training.

Light infantry antitank platoons can be employed in many different ways. Their missions can be broken down into the two broad categories of combat and combat support. Combat missions include reserve and quick reaction force, screen, defend, and infiltration. Combat support missions include convoy security, checkpoint or roadblock, casualty evacuation, and resupply.

The preferred method of employing antitank platoons is in the combat role. The ability to shoot, move, and communicate rapidly is a great asset in a battalion task force. As the reserve, the AT platoon can provide heavy weapons support anywhere on the battlefield and do it faster than any other organic battalion asset. The psychological effect alone is enough to displace most insurgents. During a screening mission, the platoon can observe high-speed avenues of approach and open areas along the battalion’s flanks or front. Our night vision sights can spot heat signatures (vehicles and personnel) out to 3,000 meters. In the defense, the antitank platoons can be instrumental in destroying enemy reconnaissance elements as “killers” during “find and kill” counterreconnaissance missions. During inclement weather, AT platoons can capitalize on the mobility of their vehicles to insert scouts forward of the battalion.

Antitank platoons also have a vital function in the combat support role and should be used in this role during low-intensity conflicts. The primary combat support mission is convoy security. During this mission, the AT platoon can secure battalion convoys and provide competent navigation within the battalion’s area of operation. It can also establish checkpoints and roadblocks to control traffic along key roads and conduct search and seizure operations. During missions involving a large number of casualties, AT platoons can provide security for front-line ambulances and transport the less serious casualties in the C&C HMMWV (cargo). When units need immediate resupply, and when LOGPACs are too vulnerable or not scheduled, the AT platoon can tactically and skillfully push supplies to those units.

The antitank platoon’s equipment diversifies its deployment options. Currently, light infantry AT platoon vehicles include four M966 TOW HMMWVs and two M988 cargo HMMWVs. Each vehicle contains a communications platform that includes an AN/VRC-88 SINCGARS (single-channel ground and air radio subsystem) in each gun vehicle and an AN/VRC-91 SINCGARS in each C&C vehicle. The platoon’s weapons that can be mounted include four TOW systems, two Mk 19 grenade machineguns, and two M249 light machineguns (January 1996 Tables of Organization and Equipment).

On the basis of my experiences, I recommend the following concerning the antitank platoon’s weapons:

- Keep the TOW authorization at four. (Most countries still have vehicles that threaten light infantry forces.)
- Keep the Mk 19 authorization at two. Its destructive fires can rapidly gain fire superiority against any threat.
- Increase the M2 .50 caliber authorization to two. It is a proven weapon system and is very effective against light-skinned vehicles and aircraft.
- Increase the M60 authorization to two. The M60 complements the large weapon systems, promoting force protection while employing longer range weapon systems (the TOW and Mk 19 are dangerous to fire at close-in targets).
- Keep the M249 authorization at

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Platoon Leader</th>
<th>11A</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Platoon Sergeant</td>
<td>11H40</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section Sergeant</td>
<td>11H30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squad Leader</td>
<td>11H20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunner</td>
<td>11H10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver/RTO</td>
<td>11H10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
two. This weapon is light, allowing mobility of firepower during dismounted operations.

Knowledge of the mission and enemy will help commanders determine the ideal mix of weapons. Correct mounts and turret modifications will facilitate that mixture and improve force protection. The Mk 64 mounting system is primarily for the Mk 19 grenade machinegun, but with an M2 .50-caliber adapter or an M60 platform and tray, gunners can rapidly employ multiple weapons to meet any enemy situation. I highly recommend a turret modification to add a secondary weapon mount. The Mk 19 and the TOW are ineffective and dangerous against targets within 100 meters. Most metal shops will build mounts to employ M60 or M249 machineguns. The combination of thermal optics and an M60 machinegun proves very effective against small dismounted elements.

The two most important aspects of the personnel equation are strength and quality. MTOE strength for an AT platoon is shown in Table 1. When the AT platoon operates at less than 100 percent, a leader is forced to serve as gunner. Strength, maneuverability, security, and firepower are rapidly exhausted. I recommend two possible courses of action:

The preferred course would be to add a loader position to each vehicle, for a total strength of 20. The ability to continue the mission in spite of combat losses would then increase greatly.

A second course of action would be to fill the platoon with soldiers in MOS 11B. Just as a light infantry platoon leader mans key weapons within his platoon, a battalion commander reorganizes across the battalion to man the battalion’s key weapons. Looking at quality, it is essential that the section sergeants and squad leaders be able to operate independently. Often antitank missions are complex and the necessary planning time is not available. Strong AT leaders can greatly influence a unit’s success.

Training should focus on driving, react to contact battle drills, and gunnery.

Aggressive defensive driving is the most essential element of survival on the battlefield, and the most experienced soldiers should be placed in the driver positions. The HMMWV is highly capable, even on the most challenging terrain. The vehicles and drivers should be pushed to their limits but should not drive recklessly. Every exercise should include terrain driving and stealth driving (through woods and away from roads). Proficiency with night vision goggles is paramount to unit success. Mounted land navigation skills require frequent sustainment training.

The react to contact battle drill is essential in employing the platoon to its maximum capabilities. ARTEP 7-91 Drill, Drills for the Antiarmor (TOW) Platoon, Section, and Squad, outlines a TOW-specific drill that is inadequate in today’s employment. I recommend instead the battle drill shown here, which was developed from FM 7-8, The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, and associated manuals. SOPs should be developed for disabled vehicles and recovery, disabled driver, casualty evacuation, and displaced crew escape and evasion. Using the crawl, walk, and run method of training, leaders could run short situational training exercises against a thinking, fighting opposing force to exercise initiative and free thinking. Finally, training should be done in the restrictive terrain where light infantry tends to operate.

The greatest training challenge for the AT platoon is weapon proficiency. Engaging targets from the turret is hard and requires a significant amount of sustainment. The guidelines in Table 2 will help maintain the unit’s minimum proficiency on crew-served weapons. The purpose of gunnery is to teach soldiers to engage targets. Leaders should not get wrapped up in complex maneuvers live fires until each gunner can effectively engage targets. On frequency, each system and task has frequency outlined in various field manuals and Standards in Training Commission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOW</th>
<th>Conduct the Gunner’s Skills Test Tables 1-6 as outlined in FM 23-34. Additionally, set up advanced gunnery (indoor and outdoor), Concentrating on targets between 1,000 and 1,500 meters.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mk 19 Grenade MG</td>
<td>Conduct Mk 19 Gunner’s Test. Conduct Tables 1-6 IAW FM 23-27. Conduct a field fire engaging multiple targets with a free gun (no T&amp;E).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2 .50-Cal MG</td>
<td>Conduct Gunner’s Skills Test and Qualification IAW FM 23-66. Conduct a field fire, engaging multiple targets with a free gun (no T&amp;E).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M60 MG</td>
<td>Conduct Gunner’s Skills Test and Qualification IAW FM 23-67. Conduct a field fire engaging multiple targets with a free gun (no T&amp;E).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M249 Light MG</td>
<td>Conduct Gunner’s Skills Test and Qualification IAW FM 23-67. Conduct a field fire engaging multiple targets with a free gun (no T&amp;E).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2
(STRAC) manuals. The Gunner Skills Tests should be conducted quarterly to sharpen gunners’ basic skills. These tests require few resources and are relatively easy to execute. Qualifications are conducted annually, but a unit should never miss an opportunity to put rounds down range.

Finally, the AT platoon should be used in its combat roles. Although effective and necessary in the combat support role, their employment should not be limited to the latter mission. Proficiency in such diverse missions takes time to train to standard. The AT platoon should not be used as the battalion OPFOR detachment. It should receive appropriate attention and command focus. Crew proficiency is an important part of the battalion task force and, when properly employed, the antitank platoon can be a deciding combat multiplier.

Captain Michael Dane Acord led an antitank platoon and a rifle platoon and served as a company executive officer in the 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division. He is a 1993 ROTC graduate of North Georgia College.
The Battalion S-4 in the Field

CAPTAIN WILLIAM M. CONNOR, V

The battalion S-4 has a big job when he is deployed to the field. To start with, he is the commander of the combat trains, responsible for everything that goes on there. This includes the trains’ emplacement and security, the soldiers’ discipline and daily activities, and the information flow from the battalion headquarters to the combat trains.

In addition, he plans and supervises all logistics activities in the battalion. He writes paragraph IV of the operations order and plans the day-to-day resupply activities. He tracks all classes of supply and updates the battalion commander. He establishes the administrative/logistical (admin/log) radio net and keeps the flow of logistics information running from top to bottom and bottom to top. In a light infantry unit, he also serves as the battalion maintenance officer, continually tracking maintenance functions and ensuring that repairs are timely and complete. Unfortunately, few doctrinal references are available dealing with the S-4’s duties in the field.

I served as S-4 of a light infantry battalion, including training for and deploying to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). When I first started this job, I studied the training and evaluation outline performance measures for everything related to the S-4. The problem was that the performance measures were extremely broad and general. Tasks such as setting up the combat trains and task organizing to provide a defensive plan were left to me to figure out. During my many deployments to the field, I discovered (usually the hard way) some good techniques that made the job easier.

One of the first decisions the battalion S-4 has to make is how to set up his command post. If he sets up an operations cell using M577 tent extensions, he has more room and a nicer environment in which to track the battle; the problem is that, given the mobile nature of light infantry combat trains, the time it takes to set up and take down the extensions is usually not worth the benefits gained. Another option is to work out of the back of one covered HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle). This vehicle is very mobile but also very small. Most important, the medical platoon command post is then in a separate vehicle (because of space problems and the separate vehicle radio mounts the platoon needs).

The solution we found was to park the S-4 HMMWV and the medical platoon leader’s HMMWV back-to-back in the center of the combat trains. We then put a board between the two so we could walk back and forth, and a tarp over the opening between the two vehicles so that no light would escape at night. We had as much room as if we had used tent extensions, and were just as mobile as we would have been using the back of one HMMWV.

Another decision the S-4 has to make is how to establish the combat trains and how to task organize to control it. The first thing he must do is to ensure that he and the S-1 are cross-trained. Each needs to know the other’s job, and both need to work as a team. In my unit, to establish the chain of command below us, we first established which NCO would be in charge of the combat trains and then appointed section points of contact.

Since the medical platoon was always the largest section, our medical platoon sergeant filled the role of trains noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC). He was responsible for the guard schedule, individual camouflage, fighting positions, and internal food support. Essentially, he was the first sergeant of the combat trains. Each of the sections had an NCOIC and turned to him for all NCO-related issues. The sections that were habitually with us were elements of the support platoon, the command post, the air defense artillery slice, and the antitank platoon.
The support platoon element had the support platoon sergeant as NCOIC. The command post element had the battalion signal NCO (who was also in charge of keeping the battalion admin/log net up). Each of the other sections was generally led by its highest ranking NCO.

Before the start of each field problems, the medical platoon sergeant and I got the NCOs together and gave out all of our standing operating procedures (SOPs). We had an SOP on our quarterming party, one on setting up initial security, and one on where each element would set up in our assembly area. (The assembly area was based on clock direction, with 12 o'clock being our direction of movement, and everyone had a portion of the clock to occupy.) At the JRTC we had to establish security quickly and jumped frequently. Since we all knew where we were supposed to go in the assembly area, there was no confusion when we occupied it. The most valuable time for a unit is during occupation, and we were never compromised. (Another advantage to having an SOP for section set-up locations is that each section knows where the others are.)

We had an SOP for establishing concertina wire around the perimeter: All vehicles carried concertina, and the first things drivers did when they occupied was to tie in their concertina with that of sections to their right and left. That established a 360-degree concertina fence. We also set up many daily business types of SOPs, such as stand-to and guard shift. (It takes some detailed work to set up the guard shift in the combat trains. One of the first things we discovered was that medics pull most of the guard duty and must be fully proficient in infantry skills. Before deploying to the field, the S-4 must get involved in medical platoon training to make sure those soldiers can help defend the trains.) We also handed off a copy of the SOPs to attachments, which quickly assimilated them into our team.

Outside of setting up the combat trains, about the biggest problem the S-4 must deal with is delivering resupply from the logistical release point (LRP) to the individual companies. The first option is to deliver supplies straight to the companies from the LRP using the company resupply vehicle. This is a quick way to run LOGPAC, but it leaves those vehicles extremely vulnerable to ambush. The next option is to bring all the resupply vehicles into the combat trains and send them out one by one with a complete security package. Although this keeps the resupply vehicles relatively safe, it takes far too much time. The solution we came up with was to send three vehicles from the support platoon element to the LRP. Each of these vehicles guarded one company vehicle on the way to the company. One man on top of a support platoon HMMWV with an automatic weapon is adequate protection. This allows the antitank security element to concentrate on securing the convoy coming to the LRP, and then secure the LRP itself. Because the support platoon vehicles go to the companies, supplies from the combat trains can be sent out during LOGPAC. The companies can use the support platoon vehicles to backhaul casualties or anything else to be moved. If security has to be improved because of an increased threat, then the antitank vehicles can also be sent out to each company. Three vehicles, two with automatic weapons, make a very secure convoy going to each company.

One of the major problems an S-4 encounters is keeping up with supply status in the field. This is generally because the companies do not monitor the admin/log net and do not send LOGSTAT (daily status of current supply levels) or SPOTLOSS (lost equipment update) reports. The reason they do not is the shortage of radios to monitor the admin/log net in light infantry companies. Company executive officers (XOs) and first sergeants are usually ordered to stay on the command net because they cannot monitor both the command and the admin/log nets. At the JRTC we discovered that the combat trains had no authority to make the companies stay on the admin/log net, especially when we were seven or eight kilometers away. The technique we used was to train our radio operators to listen closely for losses on the command net. When there was a lull in radio traffic, they asked the XOs to switch to admin/log for a quick logistics update. That way, the company XOs were not off the command net long, and we received the information we needed. Our radio operators were trained to follow the battle, and when anything happened that dealt with supply (such as a company capturing enemy supplies), they knew to break in on the command net the first chance they had and have the XO switch to admin/log.

I recommend that the Army incorporate into current doctrine more information on S-4 field functions. The field manuals and training and evaluation outlines do not adequately tell the S-4 what he needs to do in the field to accomplish his mission. He must learn mostly from long, hard experience. After being an observer-controller for another S-4, I discovered that new S-4s learn quickly only when the old S-4s share the techniques they have learned. New references need to be written on the battalion combat trains and on the battalion S-4 in the field. A unit that cannot be sustained in combat is doomed, and it is up to us to figure out how to best support the combat force.

Captain William M. Connor, V, served as S-4 of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and is now a company commander in the battalion. He is a 1980 ROTC graduate of The Citadel.

This is an excellent biography of a courageous, tough-minded, and talented Regular Army officer who always put "the personal into personnel matters" for which he was, responsible. He respected soldiers, and they trusted him, in peace and war.

Author Lewis Sorley chronicles Harold K. Johnson's military career from the Depression of the 1930s, through World War II and the Korean War, to his four-year tour of duty as Army Chief of Staff.

Johnson was a recognized leader from his first assignment until his retirement from active duty. His military challenges were awesome; his contributions to his country's security were immense. He will be remembered as a great and good man.

The author's text is very well documented from start to finish. In addition to some 149 boxes of personal papers, Johnson's primary oral history is the most extensive at the Military History Institute, running to more than 600 pages. Sorley has supplemented these sources with another 200 interviews of his own—targeting contemporaries who knew or worked with Johnson at various stages of his career.

The first half of Honorable Warrior traces Johnson's professional career from 1933 until 1968. For example, Chapters 4 through 8 describe Johnson's achievements in the Depression Army and his horrific experiences during World War II. Captured in April 1942 when Japanese forces overran American defenses, he survived the Bataan Death March, Japanese prison camps in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea; and sea voyages on three "hell ships." Finally, on 7 September 1945, he and other survivors were able to rejoin American forces in Inochon, Korea. It had been 41 months since his capture in the Philippines; now he was on his way home.

Chapters 9 and 12 cover important milestones at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1946 to 1949—and 1960 to 1963. Johnson later wrote, "Our happiest days were at Fort Leavenworth."

For combat veterans, the chapter on the Korean War has to be the most interesting. During the period August 1950 through October 1951, Johnson "commanded one battalion and two regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division, served as a corps operations officer, earned promotion to colonel, and was decorated four times, including award of the DSC for extraordinary heroism in action."

In the second half of this comprehensive work, Sorley focuses on the Vietnam era—those hectic years 1964-1968 when the Army prepared for and began to fight its "unpopular" war. As Chief of Staff, Johnson had to deal with an unhinged President Lyndon Johnson, a relentless Secretary of defense McNamara, and an Air Force Chief of Staff's position "that everything that flies should be Air Force."

There was also a major problem in the conduct of the ground war in Vietnam. Generals Johnson and Westmoreland did not agree on strategy or tactics; but for obvious reasons, they had to be publicly supportive of Army combat operations.

Lewis Sorley is to be congratulated on this outstanding biography. Honorable Warrior is must reading for those who knew Johnson—and for scholars and history buffs who specialize in military leadership during the 1933-1964 period.


Nearly a quarter century after the fall of Saigon, images of the Vietnam war still captivate us. Amid the avalanche of monographs that memorialize the conflict, two recent photographic books bring the struggle in Southeast Asia to life.

The Vietnam War is the fifth in the Brassey series of photographic books entitled America Goes to War. Dedicated to the Americans who served in the Vietnam War, especially to those who died, a superb team headed by Donald M. Goldstein, himself the author of numerous books on World War II, presents the war in the context of its political and diplomatic background. Divided into 11 chapters that range from the background to American involvement to photographs of Ho Chi Minh City today, the book concentrates primarily on the American fighting man.

Written primarily for the novice reader, the book illustrates the traumatic history of the war as the authors seek to remember those Americans who served well and faithfully during the conflict. Goldstein and his fellow authors are best in reaching younger readers who have only a rudimentary knowledge of the war. The simplicity of their narrative effectively communicates the major events of the war but lacks the detailed analysis normally associated with photographic essays.

For sheer photographic brilliance, Requiem is far superior in conveying a sense of the indescribable horror and the stark brutality of the wars in Southeast Asia. What makes this book so compelling is the fact that the photographs were all taken by 135 photojournalists who died or are currently listed as missing in Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The list includes 72 photographers who died on the Vietnamese communist side, as well as Robert Capa and Larry Burrows, who were working in Indochina only days before their deaths.

Also present are photographs of Bernard Fall, whose Hell in a Very Small Place and Street Without Joy inspired a generation of journalists. Many of the photographs are in color and appeared in the leading periodicals and newspapers of the day. In a sense, Requiem is a lasting tribute by Horst Faas and Tim Page to the photographers from ten different nations whose courage and devotion brought the war into American living rooms and onto the world stage.

BOOK REVIEWS

Pages. $19.00, Softbound. Reviewed by Christopher B. Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

This is a very disturbing book. It is exceptionally well written, meticulously researched, and easy to read. The author pulls no punches and makes no apologies for the brutalities inflicted by the Wehrmacht on its enemies, especially the civilians. But he reminds us that atrocities were committed on both sides and that the German Landser, or infantryman, was victimized at times by his own officers. In addition to facing the Russian winter, overwhelming Allied air power after 1943, and a crushing imbalance in tanks and artillery, German soldiers had to be mindful of the Gestapo and military police units that monitored their activities on the front, although from a safe remove; they were suspicious any time an Army unit had to retreat and were not above arresting troops as well as officers for “political crimes” or more simply, “cowardice.” The Russian winter may have claimed tens of thousands of Landser, but the Gestapo and military courts executed over 20,000 German soldiers from December 1941 to the end of the war: almost two divisions’ worth of men.

What makes this book disturbing is the simple examination of why so many young men so willingly threw their lives away for a butcher who, coward that he was, committed suicide in the end. Author Fritz answers this question by drawing on diaries, letters, and memoirs. The German soldier fought so well, so effectively right up to the end out of a sense of comradeship, of not wanting to let down his platoon mates when the going got rough. In that respect, he was like soldiers everywhere who may hate their commanding officers as much as the enemy but soldier on, even to the point of committing atrocities, because their sense of honor, however debased it may be, demands it. This comradeship could help a soldier make light of his suffering, give him a sense of optimism about the future, give him hope.

In the course of reading the accounts of these young soldiers, it is virtually impossible not to begin to feel a deep and profound sympathy for their individual situations. One can call Hitler vicious, homicidal, megalomaniacal, and still experience sympathetic emotions for the Landser. These young men had purchased a horribly flawed ideology with the price of their youth and, in many cases, their lives. Not all of Hitler’s victims were enemies of the Third Reich.


The author of this book, R. B. Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired, provides a well-written narrative that sheds light on the experiences of the Iron Brigade. The author’s account is based on extensive research and personal interviews with survivors of the Iron Brigade. The book provides a detailed account of the Iron Brigade’s role in the Civil War and the experiences of its members.

Civil War historical writing in the past five years has included an increasing number of regimental and larger unit histories. A large number of such unit narratives were produced in the 35 years after the Civil War by self-appointed “unit historians” who had served in the unit during some period of its war service. The Civil War Centennial, beginning in 1961, saw another large number of specific unit histories, such as James Robertson’s Stonewall Brigade. One of the most noteworthy unit histories published in 1961 was Alan Nolan’s Iron Brigade. As with many other histories newly written about Civil War personalities, battles, and related themes that have received historical treatment in earlier decades, the Union Army’s Iron Brigade has been the recipient of new attention from two very capable authors within the past year.

The Iron Brigade, mainly composed of Westerners, was predominantly made up of Wisconsin regiments as well as troops from Michigan and Indiana. Organized in the rush to arms during the early days of the war, the Iron Brigade saw military action in the eastern theater with the Army of the Potomac throughout the war. The brigade saw combat action in most of the major eastern battles, such as Antietam, Second Manassas, and Fredericksburg, up through the action during the first day at Gettysburg. The unit had received its eternal title of “Iron Brigade” from its conduct and performance in the early campaigns of the war, and the army’s commanders knew the brigade could be trusted with a heavy load when the need arose. After the heavy combat seen at the unfinished railroad cut on July 1 at Gettysburg, many thought the Iron Brigade had been “used up.” One of its regiments had, in fact, suffered the heaviest casualties of any other that saw action in that battle.

Lance Herdegen, Director of the Institute of Civil War Studies at Carroll College, has brought to bear his extensive research into the Civil War careers of the Iron Brigade’s members in providing a well-written narrative that fleshes out the bare bones facts of the battles and campaigns in which the brigade participated. Like many other excellent unit histories published within the past few years, Herdegen describes the realities of the Civil War, not only for those who served in the ranks but also for those left behind on the home front. One poignant incident tells of a young lady who received a letter from her soldier beau saying that she would not be reading it unless he had been killed in battle. Four long days later, she learned that the person who was to mail the letter for him had either lost it or inadvertently mailed it. Her soldier beau and future husband had just come safely through action at Chancellorsville. Herdegen provides an excellent feel for both the combat front and the home front for those involved with the Iron Brigade’s service in the war.

Alan Gaff’s On Many A Bloody Field takes a more detailed look at some of the men serving in the Iron Brigade with an excellent study of Company B, 19th Indiana Volunteers. Gaff is very well qualified to write about the brigade, having published previous histories on the brigade at Brawner’s Farm, a regimental history of the 2d Wisconsin, and editing Adventures on the Western Frontier by one of the brigade’s commanders, Major General John Gibbon.

Both of these narrative histories of the Iron Brigade are highly recommended. Alan Nolan’s Iron Brigade is also well worth reading and is now recognized as one of the classic regimental histories. These more recent histories benefit from the additional materials and research information that have become available in the intervening 35 years to enhance our appreciation for and understanding of these men from the Midwest who, far from their homes and families, marched, slept, and fought on the hills and valleys of Pennsylvania and Virginia during the Civil War. These two books are well worth reading.


British historian Lyn MacDonald is the author of four previously published books on World War I, most notable for her extensive and effective use of the letters, memoirs, journals, and interviews of participants in the various battles. This latest book, 1915: The Death of Innocence, also records the combat experiences of soldiers and makes a most welcome addition to the literature of the First World War.

By Christmas 1914 it had become obvious that the war was not going to be just a short, "glorious adventure" but a long, drawn-out conflict requiring hitherto unimaginable casualties before any type of
resolution could be achieved. As the first full year of the war, 1915 also served as a watershed in another respect: Pre-war Europe was much simpler and less complicated than the continent that emerged from the conflagration. The theme of “the death of innocence,” which flows through the book, thus refers not only to the individual soldiers, many of whom faced combat and possible death for the first time, but also to European society as a whole.

This volume covers the 1915 battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, the second battle of Ypres, and Gallipoli, the campaign staged in an attempt to break the stalemate of the Western Front. The author ably provides the diplomatic background to the military events of 1915, and activities at the operational and strategic levels. Official accounts, in addition to divisional and regimental histories, were used as source material for the operations of the various units. But one of the highlights of the book, and its most significant strength, is the number of individual narratives of participating soldiers that are interspersed throughout the text.

The first-hand perspectives bring the book to life. Soldiers, from riflemen and squad leaders to platoon leaders and battalion commanders, describe their hopes and fears, boredom and anticipation, and daily routines in and out of the trenches. It was seldom a pretty sight. Soldiers with their legs blown off, bleeding to death. Or victims of the first German gas attack, drowning because of their own fluid-filled lungs. Or bloated corpses, unburied for months in “no-man’s land.” It was war, and it was real.

Great Britain lost much more than just its innocence during 1915, the pivotal year of the war. Casualties were enormous and unprecedented. Of the 19,500 square miles of German-occupied France and Belgium, that year the Allies recovered only eight—an average of more than 200,000 casualties for each square mile of recovered territory. This interesting and highly readable book tells in great detail, often in the words of the actual participants, what it was like to serve and fight in those 1915 battles of “the war to end all wars.”


To attempt any understanding of the long and complex evolution of American military involvement in Vietnam requires a comprehensive, balanced, and sprightly account in so few pages. However, in its valuable function as a resource essay, which will well serve for many courses where such a brief volume is needed, I am reminded of Martin P. Herz, The Vietnam War in Retrospect (1984), the only other source I know that packed such a comprehensive, balanced, and sprightly account in so few pages.


Army Korean War expert Lieutenant Colonel Roy Appleman has called the 1st Marine Division of the Chosin Reservoir campaign “one of the most magnificent fighting organizations that ever served in the United States Armed Forces.” The remarkable and inspiring story of the division at the Chosin Reservoir has been the subject of numerous books and several films. During their fighting withdrawal, the Marines inflicted severe losses on several divisions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army while at the same time fighting an exceptionally harsh winter.

Joseph Owen’s book on the subject tells the story from the cutting-edge perspective of a rifle company. The author served as a mortar section leader and rifle platoon commander in Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, from its activation in August 1950 through the Inchon-Seoul and Chosin fighting, where he was severely wounded.

Many reasons are given for the outstanding performance of the Marines in Northeast Korea during the winter of 1950. It is clear from this book that a large measure of the credit goes to the Marines and their leaders at the small-unit and rifle company level. Owen’s narrative covers the hasty activation and training of the company, its brief participation in the fighting north of Seoul after the amphibious assault at Inchon and the details of its intense fighting at Chosin. He candidly discusses the mistakes made by the leaders and Marines of Company B, including his own. More important, he covers what they learned from these mistakes and how they used that knowledge to defeat the Chinese in a series of intense actions.

Owen’s description of the activities of the company before its commitment and the organization and tactical employment of the 60mm mortars should be of great interest to today’s infantrymen. The 7th Marines were

This book is a novel, and not a new one at that, but it is well worth noting. Originally published in 1942, it was only recently reprinted, thanks to the Marine Corps, and made available outside of used book stores. Forester is the author of the better known classic indictment of higher echelon ineptitude in World War I, The General. But he writes this story of loyalty and duty in the face of extreme odds from a totally different perspective—the individual infantryman.

Private Matthew Dodd is a British regular fighting against Napoleon in the Peninsular Wars. He is one of Wellington's "scum of the earth." Yet, despite his lack of formal education and "proper" upbringing, he exhibits a remarkable sense of duty, initiative, and tactical knowledge. These are traits born of many years of campaigning with his regiment.

Cut off from his beloved regiment during a small skirmish, and presumed dead, Dodd links up with Portuguese partisans and wages a vicious guerrilla campaign against the French. He inflicts casualties and, more important, disrupts French operations out of all proportion to the size of his band of men. He understands that anything he can do to hurt the French will help his comrades. He conducts his little war effectively, but always in his mind is his overarching desire to return to his regiment and the comrades he has soldiered with for so long. His story is a testimonial to the initiative of the individual soldier under difficult conditions and to the esprit de corps of highly cohesive units.

This is one of those rare books that are equally enjoyable to the newest private with a high school diploma and the oldest colonel with a doctorate. Our brother warriors in the Marine Corps chose it for two consecutive years as the Commandant's Selection for all grades. For the junior officer and soldier, it shows the value of regiment and how the individual and small unit can affect the battlefield at orders of magnitude above their small numbers. For the senior officer, it reinforces the idea that small units win wars and shows that the commander's intent was useful even before the term was doctrinal.

Recent and Recommended


Resumes and Cover Letters That Have Worked for Military Professionals. Edited by Anne McKinney. Seven Hills Book Distributors (49 Central Avenue, Cincinnati, OH 45202), 1996. 256 Pages. $25.00, Softbound.


Walking Point: The Experiences of a Founding Member of the Elite Navy SEALS. By Chief James Watson with Kevin Dockery. William Morrow, 1997. 289 Pages. $23.00.00
From the Editor

GETTING YOUR SHARE?

Fort Benning trains five types of infantry. Soldiers—officer and enlisted—who graduate from one or more of the 29 courses we teach will join American Ranger, airborne, mechanized, light, and airborne infantry units around the world. Infantry Magazine is a microcosm of the Infantry School and, as such, strives to offer articles of interest to all five specialties within our branch. I want to tell you up front that in order to provide coverage—credit due, if you will—I need articles on what you and your units are up to. If you're in a Bradley unit in Bosnia and feel that Rangers, the National Training Center, and the light fighters are getting a disproportionate share of the attention, it's probably because we've gotten more articles from those sources.

We do not allocate space solely based upon the volume of stuff we receive, however; in each issue, we shoot for a balance between branch specialties. We do this for a number of reasons: to keep the interest of the greatest possible number of readers; to ease the transition for leaders going from mechanized to light assignments, and vice versa; and to give non-infantry readers in the combat, combat support, and combat service support arms a better appreciation of the capabilities and needs of the infantry in today's combined arms environment. The lessons we offer—and in turn receive—are not limited to the Army. Our relationship with the United States Marine Corps—to name just one example—began during the Revolutionary War, and has continued to this day. We exchange and read branch magazines and doctrinal literature, train together, and fight together when called upon to do so. In our business there is no longer room for the sophomoric parochialism that has for so long been a divisive factor within the Army and between services. The survival of our nation depends not only upon presenting a unified front to our enemies, but also upon maintaining an internal cooperative effort to assure that our citizens are defended as they deserve to be.

You are part and parcel of that defense, and by sharing your expertise you can pass on what you have learned. I may not get you into print as fast as you—and I—would like, but be patient and your word will get out and you'll see your message on the pages of Infantry. If you have an idea for an article, write, call, or e-mail me, and I'll be happy to discuss it with you. One thing, if you have a manuscript, mail it to me. E-mail demands a lot of my time, and the time I spend serving as my own secretary and answering e-mail only slows me down. I realize this is a heretical attitude in the Bill Gates era, but an occasional whiff of reality can be salutary for all of us.

Keep up the great work you're doing, and let me help you share it with the rest of the force.

RAE

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

INFANTRY is available to subscribers at $12.00 for one year and $23.00 for two years. Foreign (non-APO) subscribers must add $4.00 per subscription per year to cover the cost of surface mailing and handling. Foreign air mail rates will be furnished upon request. Single copies are $2.50 each if sent to a U.S. address.

Payment must be made in U.S. currency, by international money order, or by a check or draft drawn on a U.S. bank. For best service, payment should accompany each order, because we cannot start a subscription until we have received full payment for it. Checks, money orders, or drafts should be made payable to INFANTRY.

One-year subscriptions are not refundable; two-year subscriptions are refundable, but service and handling charges will be deducted.
COMING ARTICLES:

The Forward Support Company
Deception and the MRB Defense
The RPG-7: Rugged, Simple, Lethal
Airborne Heavy Weapons Company
Sniper Employment Officers Course
164th Infantry Regiment on Guadalcanal