PB 7-99-1

Infantry

January-April 1999



Night Stalkers and Mean Streets

Urban Guerrillas in Afghanistan

(Page 20)

PB 7-99-1

This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
9926301

Distribution: Special

Infantry

January-April 1999 **Volume 89, Number 1**

DEPARTMENTS

• **INFANTRY** (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: Editorial, (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; Subscriptions, (706) 545-3626. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia. • **POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.** • USPS Publication No. 370630.

Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL CARL F. ERNST Chief of Infantry

THE INFANTRY—SECURING THE FUTURE

The Queen of Battle has served the United States of America in war and peace for 224 years, and the social, technological, and doctrinal changes that have marked our transition from a revolutionary state to a world power during that time have been astonishing. Today we have come to accept improvements in technology almost as a matter of course, as the gap between yesterday's science fiction and today's feasibility has narrowed. Our force projection capability has enabled us to respond to worldwide contingencies while reducing the size of forward stationed forces around the globe. We have seen similar improvements in force modernization, target identification and acquisition systems, anti-fratricide technology, and communications systems. Some of our most striking successes have been in the field of night operations, and I would like to use that as a good example of how far the U.S. Army has come since those tentative years, when our forefathers committed everything they owned—or hoped to own—to found this great nation.

From the earliest days of the Republic, American militia and Regulars had to grapple with the problems of night operations, and for a long time the advantage lay with our Native American adversaries who were well-versed in moving and operating under cover of darkness. But we soon learned how to use the night as well, and the confusion and fear that attended night operations gave way to confidence. The American Army conducted one of its first large-scale night attacks at Yorktown, when her Infantry captured Redoubt #9 from the embattled British, in a daring night bayonet assault. This was possible because careful, detailed training had transformed the rough militia units of the previous fall into a well-trained, efficiently led, cohesive force. The Continental Army developed the basics of many of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used today, such as short-range recognition signals, unit release points, guides, a probable line of deployment, and clandestine breaching, examples of the innovation that characterizes today's Infantry as well.

That confidence has continued unabated until this day, when we can say without fear of contradiction that we now own the night. Even in the early days of the Vietnam War, darkness offered our foe a cloak of invisibility that we were hard-pressed to penetrate. But we did, and by the time we left Vietnam our enemy could no longer boast of impunity at night; it was now his turn to be afraid of the dark. Our first primitive infrared and starlight night observation devices have been replaced with equipment whose range, resolution, and reliability continue to be refined and improved even today. Night operations are now the preferred mode for Infantry, because of the concealment and the element of surprise they allow. Such operations can often be accomplished with fewer friendly casualties, and with greater psychological and physical damage to the enemy, his positions, and his materiel. We have seen commensurate improvements in the accuracy, mobility, and responsiveness of our artillery fire support systems. At the same time, the flexibility, mobility, and survivability of logistical support have also been upgraded to better sustain the maneuver force.

Today's combined arms operations draw upon the capabilities of the Abrams main battle tank, the Bradley

fighting vehicle, the Paladin and other artillery systems, Army Aviation, and the myriad combat support and combat service support assets whose refinements and product improvements have kept pace with those of our own branch. This is how it should—and must—be. Given the potential threats that we face today, as well as those that may rear their heads in the next century, intra- or interservice parochialism cannot be allowed to hamper our efforts to achieve unity of effort against those who would test our national resolve. We have made considerable progress in this direction: Army and Marine Corps initiatives in the field of military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) are being tied to the efforts of other branches and services to enable us to deal with future adversaries, regardless of the terrain they may choose. The Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment scheduled for September of next year will highlight the cooperative effort and mindset that have enabled us to focus our efforts in this crucial aspect of our national defense. The time, effort, and resources that we and our sister services are committing to this experiment will yield tremendous benefits in the years to come.

Having personally observed—and been a part of—the changes of the past three decades, I would like to share some observations. During and after the Vietnam War, we experienced the polarization of our society's attitudes toward the Army, its missions, and indeed even a challenge to its necessity. We completed the transition from a draft Army that had drawn its manpower from a cross-section of our society, to a volunteer force that relied instead upon a variety of motivational appeals to attract the personnel needed to maintain an adequate defense and a credible deterrence to the threat—primarily the Warsaw Pact—that we perceived at that time. With the inception of the volunteer force, we once again focussed on the basic building blocks of the Army: skilled, motivated, disciplined Soldiers led by competent leaders of high character, and our progress and innovation in the field of leader development has been phenomenal. Changes to officer training have been broadened to meet the diversified challenges of both combat missions and stability and support operations. We have implemented a noncommissioned officer education system that is every bit as comprehensive and challenging as the professional education system of our officer corps and is the best in the world.

During the same time, the combat training centers at Fort Irwin, California; Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Hohenfels, Germany, came on line to hone the tactical maneuver skills of the combined arms force. During the past 30 years, the Army has undergone a remarkable period of recovery that continues even today. The time, money, and effort spent on modernization, quality of life, and training issues paid off when we were called upon to deploy forces to Operations *Urgent Fury*, *Just Cause*, *Desert Shield*, and *Desert Storm*, to Somalia, and—most recently—to the Balkans. Credit for our success in these and other missions belongs to the superb Soldiers of our United States Army. We must continue to attract and retain Soldiers of their quality if we are to defend our nation and her people against all adversaries. Quality of life is a key element of readiness, and we must continue to commit resources to barracks, housing, and the infrastructure that can support Soldiers and family members. We need to make Soldiers' pay commensurate with the demands and sacrifices that we place upon them and, at the same time, closely examine what we are doing for retired members of the Army family, many of whom are centers of influence in their own communities.

At a time when we are trying to bolster enlistments in all of the services, these retired men and women can significantly influence the decision of a young man or woman to join our Army, and it is their own perception of how they are now being treated that will determine the extent of their support for our efforts. In the Civil War, both World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam, we relied on the draft to provide the manpower to field our army, and—unless we can attract enough volunteers—we may once again be forced to rely upon the draft. Our Soldiers are our best recruiters, and when friends and families visit them at their duty stations, they tell the Army story. We must spare no effort to ensure that the truth they pass on to others will encourage the listeners to become part of the proud, wonderful experience that is the United States Army.

As I approach the end of my tenure as Chief of Infantry, I see great cause for optimism. We have the best trained, best equipped, and best supported Infantry in the world, with virtually limitless technological advances and potential for success on the horizon. Our country has historically revealed its commitment to its values by putting its Soldiers in harm's way, by drawing that line in the sand that defines the limit of aggression, and it has always been the Infantry that has drawn and held that line and paid the heaviest price. Since June 14, 1775, the Infantry has always answered the call to arms, and will continue to do so as long as we recruit, train, and retain the Infantrymen who will carry on that proud tradition. Hooah!

INFANTRY LETTERS



ONE TEAM, ONE FIGHT, ONE FUTURE

I have been an avid reader of *Infantry* Magazine for the past four years and have learned much from this fine publication. I have noticed, however, what appears to be a lack of respect for Army National Guard officers who have been trained through their respective state military academies. (I myself am a proud state military academy graduate, serving as an Active Guard Reservist training officer for a light infantry battalion.)

In your September-December 1998 issue, I noted in a contributing author's biography that he was a graduate of a state military academy, but was not recognized by his rank ("Brazzaville—The Congo: Dying Cities in an Unknown War," by Adam Geibel). While an Army National Guard officer is commissioned to serve his state, he is also expected to serve the President of the United States. How are we different from officers commissioned through the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)? Both state OCS graduates and ROTC graduates are commissioned as reserve officers and therefore federally recognized by the U.S. Army.

The state military academies of the Army National Guard are doing an outstanding job in developing and preparing young men and women to lead reserve component soldiers in the 21st century. Each state OCS must meet stringent criteria enforced by the Training and Doctrine Command and the Army OCS at Fort Benning, in order to commission and federally recognize officers. How, then, can you deny a National Guard officer his rank? This battalion currently has several state military academy graduates deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation *Southern Watch*. Their service, sacrifice, and stature should not be regarded any less because they were commissioned through a state OCS.

On 18 June 1998 the Army released the concept of "One Team, One Fight, One Future." This concept is becoming a reality with the reactivation of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), coupling Army National Guard enhanced brigades under a unified active component command. This partnership is a testament to the skill, professionalism, and dedication of hundreds of Army National Guard officers schooled by their state military academies.

With the current downsizing of the military, future wars will be fought by all the Army National Guard, the U.S. Army Reserve, and the active Army. National Guard infantry may again fight alongside its active component brothers as it did so valiantly in World War II and Korea.

One Team, One Fight, One Future.

JONATHAN M. STUBBS
1LT, Arkansas Army National Guard
Searcy, Arkansas

EDITOR'S NOTE: While I can understand one's sensitivity to slights—real or imagined—such is not the case with the author of this article.

When no rank is included in an Infantry *byline, it is usually the author's preference. Many of our authors are retired—as is the case with the Editor, a retired Regular Army officer—or served for a time before returning to civilian status, and no longer use the ranks they have earned.*

Many others of various ranks and sources of commissioning are full-fledged authors or journalists, aside from their military careers, and prefer using the same bylines they use elsewhere. The latter is the case with Adam Geibel.

We fully appreciate all of the officers of the U.S. Army, no matter where they may have earned their commissions, as well as all the noncommissioned officers and civilians who contribute to these pages.

BE VERY CAUTIOUS

I agree with Captain Drew Meyerowich that Battle Drill 6 needs to be replaced (*Infantry*, May-August 1998, page 11). I think, however, that we should be very cautious about adapting techniques used by SWAT (special weapons and tactics) or HRT (hostage rescue team) units for use in a high-threat MOUT setting.

The Stack bunches up a group of soldiers and then "pours" them through the "fatal funnel" of a window or doorway. While paused alongside the wall outside the entry point, the clearing team is vulnerable to ricochets traveling along the wall and, if the wall construction is typical of many parts of the world, also to fire coming through the wall from the room they are about to clear. Booby traps in the doorways and windows or hand grenades thrown through those points by the enemy would also cause heavy casualties in the entry team because its members are so close together.

Even the adoption of a procedure such as dropping to one knee in the event of a weapon malfunction can lead to some interesting situations. What happens when the #1 man on the entry team has a malfunction while he is in the doorway and takes a knee? It has happened to at least one SWAT team out there, and it was lucky that no one was injured in the resulting doorway jam.

Anyone interested in MOUT small-unit tactics should check out what the Marines have been doing over the past couple of years. The *Marine Corps Gazette* is an excellent source of information. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, in his article "Preparing for Today's Battlefield" (July 1997), presents a detailed explanation of the dangers of "The Stack," the alert or Groucho walk, and the four-man entry when they are applied to a MOUT situation. Also, the April 1999 issue of the *Gazette* is devoted to urban warfare and should be considered must reading for any infantryman. For those with Internet access, the MOUT Homepage is a great starting point for further research: http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/.

CURTIS CARNEY
CPT, USAR
Superior, Colorado

INFANTRY NEWS



A HOTLINE is maintained at the Infantry School specifically to receive questions and comments from soldiers in the field about publications, course requirements, career progression information, doctrine, and specific programs in progress at the School.

The Hotline number is DSN 835-7693; commercial (706) 545-7693; or 1-888-899-6985.

An answering machine will record the questions, and callers will receive replies to their questions and comments.

Callers should leave full name, unit, mailing address, and DSN or commercial phone number.

THE U.S. ARMY Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) will conduct two Armywide surveys, beginning in September 1999. The surveys, distributed on diskettes, will be sent to unit command sergeants major in the active and reserve components.

One of the surveys will focus exclusively on first sergeants. The intent is to accurately determine which tasks first sergeants actually perform.

The second survey will be completed by soldiers serving in battle staff NCO positions. Battle staff NCOs are staff sergeants, sergeants first class, master sergeants, and sergeants major who are assigned to staff positions in S-1/G-1, S-2/G-2, S-3/G-3, or S-4/G-4 sections. Again, the intent is to determine which tasks battle staff NCOs actually perform.

USASMA training managers will use the survey results to make necessary design changes to the courses by adding, eliminating, or modifying the tasks to be taught. Survey information gathered from those who actually perform the jobs is a critical piece of the analysis process, ensuring that the academy's course content remains current. Accurate, timely feedback from the field enables training managers to design courses that best serve the needs of soldiers and their commanders.

Soldiers can complete the computer-generated surveys using computers in their units, libraries, learning centers, or homes. For more information, contact Stephen Chase at DSN 979-6716, commercial (915) 569-6716, or e-mail chases@emh10.bliss.army.mil, or visit the USASMA Directorate of Training and Doctrine–Futures web page at http://usasma.bliss.army.mil/website/dot/futures/futures_home.htm.

RANGER SCHOOL requires that students be physically, mentally, and medically prepared. Leaders and schools NCOICs in the field should make sure the soldiers they send to the course meet the following medical standards:

All students must arrive with complete health records, which must include the following:

- Current Ranger training physical examination (SF 88, 1993) and supporting documents; purpose of examination listed as "Ranger training"; dated within 12 months of the class starting date; signed by a physician stating that the student is medically qualified to attend Ranger training.
- Letter signed by commander verifying that a dental PANOREX exists at home station and is available upon request from sending unit, or a complete dental record if the soldier is in transient status. Standards of Medical Fitness will be in accordance with Army Regulation 40-501 (chapters 2, 5-3, 5-4, 5-6) and performed in accordance with Chapter 8.

Reminder: Students with a history of cold weather injuries will not be enrolled during winter classes (October through March). Students with a history of hot weather injuries will not be enrolled during summer classes (April through September).

Preventive measures against respiratory disease include the administration of pneumococcal vaccine April through September and additional bicillin (shot) October through March, following enrollment in the course.

Historically, 95 percent of the students who are not enrolled upon arrival fail to meet the medical requirements. Common problems include missing or incomplete health records, missing dental records or PANOREX statement, and incomplete physical examinations.

Sending soldiers back to their units because of these omissions wastes the soldiers' time, school slots, and temporary duty funds.

For further information, call the Ranger Training Brigade Senior Tactical Officer at DSN: 784-6413 or commercial (706) 544-6413.

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY Academy (USMA), at West Point, New York, offers admission to approximately 200 Regular Army soldiers each year. Although some of these soldiers are offered direct admission, the majority are first admitted to the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

USMAPS prepares soldiers for success at West Point through an intensive curriculum, focused on English and mathematics. An applicant must meet the following qualifications: Be a U.S. citizen, a high-school graduate, unmarried with no legal obligation to support dependents, under 23 years of age prior to 1 July of the year entering USMA (under 22 years of age prior to 1 July of the years entering the preparatory school), of high moral character, and have a sincere interest in attending West

Point and becoming an Army officer.

Especially encouraged to apply are soldiers who meet the basic eligibility requirements, have achieved good grades in a college-preparatory high school curriculum, and SAT scores greater than 1000 or ACT composite scores of 20 or higher.

All application requirements must be met by 1 April 2000 for a soldier to be considered for an appointment in July 2000 to either USMA or USMAPS.

Interested soldiers should contact Major Rob Young at (DSN) 688-5780 or (914)938-5780; or by email at tr9618@westpoint-emh2.army.mil.

THE SOLDIER INTERCOM SYSTEM enables soldiers to talk to each other at distances of up to 700 meters without giving away their positions. It also allows soldiers to operate in all kinds of terrain and environments.

A squad leader talks to the entire squad simultaneously on a separate channel that only the squad members can hear. On another separate radio, he communicates with his immediate chain of command. This instant communication increases situational awareness and safety for soldiers in the field.

The soldier intercom has been in the hands of soldiers of the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 82d Airborne Division since November 1998. Other dismounted units will be getting the system through fiscal year 2001. Ultimately it will be used by Ranger, airborne, air assault, light infantry, and mechanized infantry units in tactical situations.

SWAP SHOP

The size and logistics involved with heavy weapons—the M2 .50 HB machinegun and the Mk 19 automatic grenade launcher—often pose a problem for planners incorporating them into an air assault. And putting them into action quickly can bring decisive firepower that allows the assault element to get its foot in the door and put its organic weapons in the fight.

We developed one technique that packages the ammunition with the weapon and allows for rapid employment. We modified the SKEDCO litter, adding "fastek" clips like those used on assault packs in place of the buckles that secure casualties, and two CGU-1Bs to the sides. With the modification, we now place the complete weapon on the SKEDCO upside down with tripod attached and ammunition configured as shown.

Although a four-man antitank section can employ the weapon, a six-man section should be tasked to do it. This provides the manpower, leadership, security, and replacements needed in case of casualties.

On a UH-60, the section exits from one side. The first two men grab the pull rope on their way out while the rest feed the package out the door. On the ground, the section moves to its designated support-by-fire position, between 25 and 100 meters, and engages the targets the fire plan has designated.

SKEDCO CONFIGURATION for Mk 19



EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND WEIGHTS

A 2 x 80-round belts = 156 lbs
B Mk 19 & Mk 64 cradle
C Tripod and T & E — 141 lbs
Section leader carries: PLGR, Mk II/MELIOS, SINCGARS, GCP, M-4.
Crew members carry individual weapon, LSA, ANTVS-5, CLS bag/poleless litter.

SKEDCO CONFIGURATION for M2 MG



EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND WEIGHTS

A 4 x 100-round ammo cans = 152 lbs.
B Upper receiver and barrel
C Tripod and T & E — 154 lbs
D Spare barrel = 28 lbs.
Section leader carries: PLGR, Mk II/MELIOS, SINCGARS, GCP, M-4.
Crew members carry individual weapon, LSA, ANTVS-5, CLS bag/poleless litter.

PULL CONFIGURATION



(Submitted by First Lieutenant Robert Thompson, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, Fort Campbell, Kentucky.)

PROFESSIONAL FORUM



Breaking Contact Under Fire

CAPTAIN ERIC A. PATTERSON

On 13 September 1993, in Mogadishu, Somalia, elements of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, successfully broke contact under heavy fire in an urban environment. This force succeeded primarily because its soldiers abided by the key principles of retrograde operations, including the use of multiple routes, obstacles, air and ground reserves, and fire support from defending forces.

The battle itself began a little after 0700, following the successful completion of a cordon and search mission against an arms cache of Mohammed Farah Aideed's forces, the Somali National Alliance (SNA). The arms cache was in the northern section of the city, approximately 1,000 meters to the north of the United Nations (UN) and U.S. compound at the former Embassy and the University of Mogadishu. The battalion commander's intent was to reduce the threat to UN and U.S. forces by depriving the SNA of weapons, staging areas, and key leaders.

Before U.S. forces could withdraw from the objective, an unknown number of SNA militia moved into the area to confront Companies B and C of the battalion, each of which had a psychological operations (PSYOPs) team and an engineer squad attached. Elements under immediate battalion task force control that were also directly engaged in this battle included 3d Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, the battalion's antitank (AT) platoon, the scout platoon, a civil affairs team, and the combat trains. The approving authority for the mission was United Nation Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), phase two of which was known as Operation *Continue Hope*.

When the U.S. operation in Somalia began on 9 December 1992—with the Marines conducting a beach landing at Mogadishu—the primary threat they faced was large numbers of relatively untrained but highly experienced urban guerrillas.

The total number of SNA militia was unknown, but was generally accepted to be 2,000 to 5,000. Their weaponry consisted of mostly nonfunctioning crew-served weapons mounted on Japanese pickup trucks, a few operational 82mm mortars, and a seemingly limitless supply of rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms ammunition. Also, some of the civilian noncombatants would occasionally act as the auxiliary by providing hiding places for guerrillas and weapons and by alerting the militia to U.S. presence in the area.

Soon after the arrival of U.S. troops in the country, forces fanned out across the country to secure relief agency sites in other towns. Most of these locations were manned by one infantry battalion each, sometimes supplemented by combat troops from UN members such as Belgium and Pakistan. The other UN countries present either limited their involvement to support personnel or kept their combat troops in the capital city. By the end of the first month of U.S. operations, both Marines and 10th Mountain Division soldiers had been involved in shooting incidents in Mogadishu and surrounding towns.

Throughout the first five or six months of the operation, combat forces consisted of one U.S. Army infantry brigade with divisional headquarters and support units, one Marine Corps expeditionary unit, offshore for the most part, and approximately one battalion each from Italy, Pakistan, Belgium, Malaysia, Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey. Combat support and combat service support units included forces from Australia, France, Germany, and Sweden. UNOSOM's immediate objectives were to secure relief agency efforts to prevent further starvation, and to prevent the inter-clan fighting that was severely affecting the local populace. This initial mission was successful because of the overwhelming array of forces sent into theater and the Somalis' initial hesitance to engage the UN in full force before it could determine what the reaction might be.

By the time UNOSOM II, or Operation *Continue Hope,* began around May 1993, U.S. combat forces consisted of one infantry battalion in Mogadishu.

The U.S. mission consisted of a quick-reaction force (QRF) for the UN, for the purpose of securing and protecting UN operations. UN forces had assumed all of the missions in the outlying towns. Concurrently, clan militias had grown more comfortable with the UN presence and had once again resumed their inter-clan battles. While the SNA limited itself to demonstrations and riots during this period, its people were also closely observing UN and U.S. reactions to the resumed clan fighting.

On 5 June 1993 Aideed began his fight for the rule of Mogadishu when the SNA ambushed a Pakistani convoy, killing 23 peacekeepers. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution calling for "the arrest, prosecution, and trial of those believed responsible for the attack." U.S. forces in country, now at an all-time manpower low, were conducting more aggressive operations and were being engaged by direct and indirect fire almost daily. In addition to their official mission as the QRF, they were now conducting the manhunt for Aideed and his lieutenants. (The soldiers came to call this manhunt the "Elvis" mission, since every two or three days some local intelligence source would report an Aideed sighting, but no attempt at a snatch mission would ever be successful at locating him.) Additionally, instead of waiting for UN-directed missions to come down to the battalion, the command group began to initiate concepts, develop their own plans, and send them higher for approval. This led to a more aggressive operational tempo and more conflicts with the SNA. The battalion commander's intent was to keep the guerrillas off-balance by depriving them of the initiative.

On 8 September 1993 the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry's quick-reaction company (QRC) conducted an impromptu cordon and search in response to intelligence that indicated the possible cache site of a mortar tube that had been shelling the University compound almost nightly (Figure 1). Although no mortar tube was discovered, the QRC recovered documents that indicated weapons were being stored in buildings referred to as the Blood Bank and the Old Ministry of Defense. Both of these buildings were on the edge of a known SNA enclave, and both were within direct supporting range and line of sight of the Benadir Hospital, a known SNA strongpoint. The battalion intelligence officer believed that each building housed up to 50 militia members, with limited security patrols occurring after dark.

The orders group, of which I was a member, began planning a cordon and search against this target. (Because of the proximity to so much SNA activity, the running joke was that this was a new form of operation, a "cordon and search to contact.") The planning sequence took about two days, with the battalion operations officer taking us through a process that encompassed facts, assumptions, specified and implied tasks, and course-of-action development. Because of the likelihood of enemy contact, both the intelligence annex and the order itself fully prepared the units involved for the contingency of stiff enemy resistance. At the end of the second day of planning, the staff presented the various courses of action to the commander.

The overall objective was named ODIN (Figure 2); the separate company objectives were LOKI and THOR (Figure 3). My role in this operation would be to provide combat support. I placed my platoon sergeant in charge of the actual combat trains vehicles. I would lead the four support platoon soldiers who were tasked out to the S-1 for the purpose of establishing the detainee collection point and providing detainee security. The collection point was to be at a small circular intersection between and on the south side of LOKI and THOR. My small team was in radio contact with the combat trains, which would roll forward on my order to pick up detainees and confiscated equipment. All the units participating in the mission attended an operation order briefing, conducted by the executive officer, and afterward were given written copies of the order and about 24 hours to conduct their own planning. Following final briefbacks to the battalion commander, the unit was ready to execute.

Beginning at 0300 hours, an OH-58D helicopter kept ODIN and the surrounding area under constant surveillance. The helicopter maintained enough standoff to avoid alerting the inhabitants of the objective area but reported nothing significant. Before the main body moved out of the compound, scout platoon snipers occupied guard towers on the eastern perimeter of the Embassy compound. Their purpose was twofold: Provide overwatching



Figure 1

fires during infiltration and exfiltration, and coordinate with the Turkish guards normally positioned there (that is, to avoid friendly fire). The lead element, Company B, moved out from a gate between the University and Embassy compounds, on the northern side of the two camps. Movement began sometime between 0445 and 0450, with the goal of having all units in place by 0507.

The orders group picked this specific time for initiation because of the local religion. At 0500 each morning, the holy men would climb into the minarets of the mosques and, using loudspeakers, announce the call to prayer. Most of the locals would appear outside the buildings and begin moving to the mosques 10 or 15 minutes later. Thus, being in place by 0507 would mean that most of the locals would be awake and dressed, but not yet outside. This played directly into our course of action: The Somalis would not be outside to observe our infiltration, but would still be able to move outdoors quickly in response to our PSYOPs messages.

Company B moved along Route ASGARD until they reached Checkpoint 3 (CP 3), then proceeded along Route BALDER so as to approach THOR from the east. The following element, Company C, moved along ASGARD to approach LOKI from the south. No vehicles moved with these lead companies. My support soldiers and I moved dismounted in the center of the Company B column, which advanced in two parallel files along either side of the street. All went well until Company B halted momentarily at CP 6. The leaders from that company went forward to reconnoiter the objective and confirm unit positions and entry points. During that time, a Company B squad leader fired a warning shot over the head of a Somali male who approached the company column from a side street and refused to stop when challenged. This intruder fled, but the obvious concern now was that the shot had alerted the Somali militia.

Once the two companies were in position, the attached platoon from the 87th Infantry battalion followed on Route ASGARD using eight armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) equipped with Mk 19 automatic grenade launchers and M60 machineguns. They moved to and occupied blocking positions one through five (BPs 1-5), with the mission of interdicting enemy reinforcements and dispersing crowds. The cordon was in place. The command group in the tactical command post (TAC) and the PSYOPs HMMWVs moved with this motorized platoon, but separated from the cordon force and moved to the detainee collection point between the two objectives.

At 0510, the assault began, using a graduated response. Our first action, under the rules of engagement, was to initiate with loudspeakers that announced our presence and intent. The PSYOPs HMMWV was in position at the intersection with the TAC. The basis of the message was that U.S. forces had the two compounds surrounded, and that those who came out unarmed would have their safety guaranteed. After five minutes of repeating the announcement, during which time no one emerged, both companies simultaneously blew holes through the compound walls and began clearing the buildings inside. The clearing operation went smoothly, with no gunfire required, and netted 50 detainees. Company B found two AK-47s and two 82mm mortar rounds on THOR. They placed the rifles on the TAC vehicle, and blew the mortar rounds in place during the withdrawal from the objective. All 50 of the detainees taken were males, which indicated that they were most likely SNA militia.

While the companies were searching the two objectives, a crowd of Somalis formed about 400 meters north of the objective area. They had emplaced a burning obstacle there, but so far had not interfered with the mission. Finally, both companies completed their searches and were consolidating to prepare for withdrawal. Without any warning, an RPG exploded on the western wall of THOR, beside a gate that only seconds earlier had been vacated by a sergeant from Company B. Coming from the vicinity of the burning roadblock, which was very close to Benadir Hospital, this RPG had traveled almost 500 meters down the road between the two objectives and exploded less than 50 meters away from the TAC and the detainee collection point. The angle of impact indicated that the point of origin had been an elevated position on the roof of the Benadir Hospital. Soldiers of Companies B and C in position on the northern sides



Figure 2

of their respective objectives returned fire into the roadblock area.

After recovering from the prone position, my soldiers and I moved the detainees into better cover behind the corner of THOR. Simultaneously, the battalion commander ordered the armored HMMWV at BP 3 to displace to cover the road between the two objectives, and gave the order for withdrawal to begin. The companies' return fire stopped very quickly while they continued to scan for targets.

As the companies began their withdrawal from LOKI and THOR—which in itself was an involved maneuver because of the number of occupied buildings and the open spaces within the compounds—they began to receive more RPG and small arms fire from Benadir Hospital. Another RPG impacted inside THOR, wounding a Company B soldier with fragments. Soldiers were conducting squad and platoon-level break-contact drills at this point, returning fire and bounding backwards from building to building to reach the initial entry points. While the opposing forces exchanged fire at the range of about 500 meters, I completed the evacuation of the detainees with a second turnaround of the combat trains vehicles. Curiously enough, we did not draw any fire while moving the detainees back along Route ASGARD. It was clear that either the Somalis would not shoot at us while we were carrying their compatriots, or the bulk of their force had massed at ODIN and had not yet moved from the objective area to positions along our withdrawal route. This situation was to change very quickly.

The battalion commander ordered the attached platoon to abandon its blocking positions, and the platoon quickly returned to the safety of the University. Immediately following this withdrawal, firing on LOKI and THOR picked up substantially, then fell off just as quickly once the Somalis realized that most of the U.S. soldiers were moving off the objectives. Company C completed withdrawal from LOKI and began moving back along Route ASGARD, reaching the University compound with minimal contact.

Company B, meanwhile, was having problems. The 1st Platoon left the objective and, as ordered, started down Route ASGARD following Company C. But the initial entry point for the 2d and 3d Platoons proved to be the target for accurate fires from Benadir Hospital, which had the height to observe down into THOR and across the open ground inside. Consequently, the commander of Company B ordered another hole blown through the wall closer to Checkpoint 6. He also ordered 1st Platoon to return to lead the company back along Route BALDER. After moving his company off THOR, he had to go back along the east side of this objective to reestablish contact with the TAC. The command group had failed to follow 1st Platoon out and was pinned down as it attempted to cross the road between the two objectives. While attempting to reach the TAC, the company commander came under fire from points within LOKI and THOR, areas U.S. troops had vacated only minutes before. Apparently, during the lull in fires following the withdrawal of the attached platoon, the SNA militia had rapidly advanced from the Benadir area to ODIN. After linking up with the battalion commander and his command group, Company B began withdrawing along Route BALDER with the TAC following. They continued to receive sporadic fire all along this route, but were able to continue movement.

As the lead soldiers of Company B approached Checkpoint 3, they once again came under heavy RPG and small arms fire. This fire divided 1st Platoon, leaving a squad and a half on either side of the intersection at CP 3. The platoon leader briefly considered conducting a limited assault to clear the enemy positions to the east but dismissed the idea after observing the complete lack of cover to his front. Instead, he had his men return fire from behind a one-foot-high rock wall on the eastern side of Route BALDER, while he called 2d Platoon forward to supplement his suppressive fires. As 3d Platoon and the TAC approached CP 4, they received fire from Somalis who were attempting to flank 2d Platoon's position by moving through a refugee shanty village. Here, 3d Platoon stopped and engaged, effectively catching this SNA flanking maneuver in a crossfire.

Throughout all of this action near CPs 3 and 4, the scout snipers on the wall to Company B's rear had been selectively eliminating targets with their sniper rifles (M24 7.62mm and Barrett .50 caliber). Also, several Turkish armored personnel carriers, acting independently, came forward from a permanent checkpoint they manned near CP 2 to assist briefly with suppression.

This massing of fires from various points by multiple units allowed for the suppression of identifiable enemy positions. The enemy, however, was moving from point to point to engage, using the occupied civilian houses as shields. The U.S. soldiers, under the rules of engagement, could not, and for the most part did not, indiscriminately suppress large areas for fear of either hitting noncombatants or running out of ammunition. Many civilians were moving to the front of Company B in an attempt to get out of the way. This forced



Figure 3

the U.S. soldiers to scan a large area to identify the exact source of incoming fire. As a result, the Company B commander determined that the enemy fire was still too heavy for his unit to try to move the last 800 meters along the Embassy wall. Instead, he ordered his attached engineers to blow a hole through that wall immediately to the company's rear, but this attempt failed. The field-expedient picket charges the engineers carried did not have the necessary blast to blow through two feet of reinforced concrete. The leader of 2d Platoon took fragments in the knee from this blast. At almost the same time, a 7.62mm round hit a soldier of 1st Platoon, penetrating the buttstock of his weapon and then his flak jacket before striking him in the abdomen. His wound was severe, and it was obvious that both men would need medical evacuation.

The Company B commander contacted the battalion commander, who was only 200 meters to his rear, and requested the use of the scout weapons team, which was under the control of the task force for this mission. The team consisted of one OH-58D and two AH-1 Cobra helicopters. It greatly enhanced their response time that their brigade commander (who was also the brigade task force commander) was on the ground with our TAC. The Cobras commenced gun runs using their 20mm cannons, going from south to north about 150 meters to the east of and parallel to Company B's front. Because of the large presence of noncombatants, however, the Cobras could not fire directly on the enemy's positions. Instead, the area of impact was about 50 meters to the enemy's front in the large open area that separated Company B and the SNA. Despite this limitation, the Cobras' support had a dramatic effect on the enemy's suppressive fires.

Taking advantage of this shift in the superiority of fires, the battalion commander called forward the antitank (AT) platoon (the battalion reserve) and a field litter ambulance. The AT platoon consisted of four HMMWVs, armed with two Mk 19s and two M60s. Following the last Cobra gun run, these AT vehicles established a support position at CP 2 and began to engage the enemy, while the ambulance dashed forward along the Embassy wall to pick up Company B's wounded. Although this vehicle had its antenna shot off, and sustained several bullet holes through its cargo compartment, it successfully evacuated the wounded.

Now freed of its casualties, Company B began a rapid leap-frogging along the Embassy wall, conducting internal fire and movement at the platoon level. As they reached CP 2 and the AT vehicles, they rounded the corner and basically began to double-time to the compound gate. Just as the trail platoon came through the entrance, a final RPG detonated on a bunker beside the gate. No injuries resulted, even though a soldier of the scout platoon was inside the bunker at the time. Finally, the AT vehicles abandoned their position at CP 2 and, at about 0930, were the last to enter through the gate.

This battle is important to the contemporary military officer because it aptly demonstrates that every mission planning sequence must include the contingency of withdrawal under fire.

The fight itself had lasted approximately two hours. The soldiers successfully accomplished the mission and achieved the battalion commander's end state of having all forces closed in the University. Company B suffered three wounded. Aideed reported to the world press a few days later that the SNA sustained losses of between 25 and 60 killed.

This was the first engagement of company size or larger and the first extended fight for the battalion in Mogadishu. Previously, firefights had amounted to brief sniping or harassing fire actions, limited in intensity and maneuver. The key event of this battle occurred when Company B massed all of the fire support at its disposal and conducted casualty evacuation, thus being able to continue its retrograde action unimpeded. If the company had continued to lie unsupported in its generally exposed position, or if the soldiers had tried to withdraw while carrying their wounded, it would undoubtedly have suffered more casualties.

Neither side could claim a significant tactical victory. The battalion had successfully cleared and searched its objective and had broken contact, with only minimal casualties. U.S. forces had not deprived the SNA of any key leaders or large amounts of armaments and had, in a sense, been forced off the battlefield. Conversely, it can be safely assumed that the SNA would surely have preferred to inflict more than three casualties. What categorizes this mission as a success is that the task force was able to extricate itself with so few casualties simply because it abided by certain key principles of retrograde operations.

This battle is important to contemporary military officers because it aptly demonstrates that every mission planning sequence must include the contingency of withdrawal under fire. Additionally, a withdrawal contingency must incorporate those principles of retrograde operations that place friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. The operation should at least contain such control measures as graphics, sequencing, and reserves—even if they are not described literally in an order—that will allow troops to withdraw while under fire. A failure to properly execute the withdrawal on 13 September 1993 could easily have resulted in a debacle, with significantly higher losses in men and materiel.

It was generally true that U.S. forces had better organization, tactics, leadership, and fire support in every engagement during *Continue Hope*. And it was universally true that the Somalis were poor marksmen and were capable of only the most rudimentary maneuvering. But it was the unique way these factors were applied to this engagement that determined the outcome. Halting Company B's initial movement down Route ASGARD and moving instead along Route BALDER allowed the commander and his men to move away from the objective area while maintaining distance from the bulk of the

closing Somalis. This use of multiple routes capitalized on the SNA's poor weapons employment and maneuvering skills and gave the U.S. force time to move into range of its own supporting weapons. Once the lead elements of Company B stopped at CP 3—by which time the Somalis had maneuvered forward and were attempting to close with the U.S. soldiers—the large open area essentially became an obstacle. This obstacle prevented the SNA from using its preferred technique of attacking from close-in with automatic fires. Thus, the obstacle kept Company B from becoming decisively engaged. The company could have continued to withdraw at this point, but doing so would have been at the expense of additional casualties.

While it was pinned down against the Embassy wall, Company B was getting fire support from defending forces, mainly from the scout snipers. While the impact of these snipers may seem limited compared to the firepower of an infantry company, the snipers had several advantages over the pinned down soldiers of Company B. They were much more familiar with the area to their front; they were able to shoot from fortified positions that were not drawing heavy fire; and they did not have to move because they were already in a secure area. Thus, they were able to deliver accurate, pinpoint fires despite civilian presence and, in the case of the Barrett .50 caliber, even shoot through trees and walls that the enemy was using for cover. While they did not decimate the enemy's ranks, they did force the SNA to be more selective and cautious while shooting and maneuvering, and created a more equal exchange of fires between the two opposing forces.

Finally, the use of air and ground reserves in the form of the Cobras, the AT platoon, and the ambulance allowed Company B to move the last 800 meters quickly and with no further casualties. The Cobras were especially useful in suppressing the fires of the SNA, who were clearly intimidated by the heavy weapons on these aerial platforms. This intimidation translated directly into fire superiority for the company, which allowed the ground reserve to come forward to assist. The ambulance and its AT escort allowed the company to reorganize and poise itself for the last dash to CP 2. Again, Company B probably could have made it back to the safety of the compound without these assets, but their presence and use allowed the withdrawal to occur without further casualties.

In addition to these lessons, several other points of interest came to light during the course of this battle, as well as the entire tour of duty in Mogadishu: In operations other than war—even more so than in conventional operations—the principles of security, discipline, and flexibility are paramount to success and safety. The rapid escalation of the situation, from that of a *cordon and search* to a full-fledged task force engagement, occurred with no time to move from a relaxed to a combat-ready mode. If leaders at all levels do not enforce this readiness, the time required to make the transition will be paid for with casualties. Also, identifying the source of fire in urban operations is a skill that is lacking in most non-veteran soldiers. Small-unit leaders must be prepared to direct the fires of individual soldiers to specific targets, and to mark the targets if necessary.

Urban operations of this kind bring a new twist to the issue of firepower and the soldier's basic load. Operating for short durations—with no front lines or lines of communication, and no known enemy positions—essentially means that each mission must be treated as a raid into enemy territory. During this two-hour battle, Company B alone expended 4,800 rounds of 5.56mm ball, 1,500 rounds of 5.56mm tracer, 2,500 rounds of 5.56mm linked, and 2,200 rounds of 7.62mm linked—roughly half of the unit's basic load. Leaders should place extra emphasis upon carrying increased amounts of ammunition and water, most logically at the expense of food and additional clothing items. Also, the combat trains vehicles, wherever they are positioned, must carry an onboard stock of emergency ammunition resupply.

The outcome of this battle, which was essentially the "bloodying" of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, was significant because it set a new operational tone and altered the unit's perception of the SNA. The surprisingly rapid massing and aggressive response of the enemy were now considered during any and all operational planning. Additionally, the battalion's soldiers gained great confidence in their unit, its training, and its leaders. The observed reaction from the SNA was an immediate decrease in the harassment from mortars and snipers. Following this battle, the enemy, instead of moving into the area of compounds or convoy routes to initiate an engagement, generally engaged U.S. forces only when they deliberately intruded on SNA territory.

This battle changed the nature of the battalion's operations in Somalia. It boosted confidence and esprit de corps, but it also added a new gravity to the way each soldier viewed his job in Mogadishu. The lessons of this battle should also have immediately affected U.S. policy—specifically, that regarding the level of U.S. combat power, mission "creep," and strategic objectives. Before this could take place, however, the soldiers of the battalion had occasion to put these lessons to use, during the night of 3-4 October 1993, when they were called upon to reinforce Task Force Ranger in recovering crews and equipment from two downed helicopters. In that battle, two companies (plus) from the battalion, along with one company-sized element from TF Ranger, more than held their own against incredible odds, and inflicted staggering losses upon a determined enemy.

These soldiers trained for and passed the uncompromising test of combat, and we must ensure that all U.S. soldiers committed to similar missions are as well prepared and well supported as were the soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry.

Captain Eric A. Patterson led rifle, support, and scout platoons in the 10th Mountain Division and currently commands a Special Forces Operational Detachment A in the 3d Special Forces Group. He is a 1991 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Interservice Relations

The Army and the Marines at the Battle of Okinawa

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

As joint operations become more and more common, a review of previous such operations can provide some useful experience. The Battle of Okinawa in World War II seems particularly relevant.

The Tenth Army, which invaded the island, was an amalgamation of Army and Marine combat units. Naval officers served in support and staff positions. The commander, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., U.S. Army, worked hard to establish good rapport with his Marine subordinates, but he failed to take into account the differences in combat doctrine between the Army and the Marine Corps, which allowed an interservice dispute to develop.

Interservice rivalries were almost unavoidable in the invasion of Okinawa. The Tenth Army that Buckner commanded was the product of two different services, with distinctly different approaches to fighting. The main combat units in this field army were the III Marine Amphibious Corps and the Army's XXIV Corps. According to Army doctrine, the proper way to destroy an enemy was through the use of overwhelming firepower in a head-on confrontation. The mission of the infantry was to find and hold the enemy force; the artillery would then destroy it. To succeed, these tactics required the materiel superiority that only a long logistical tail could provide, and they did little to win admiration from either friend or foe. In Europe, German generals held U.S. infantry in contempt, respecting only the American artillery. British and French officers in North Africa called the Americans "our Italians."

Marine doctrine was different in both focus and method. During the interwar period, the Marines had made amphibious assault their specialty. Marine methods also called for a combined arms assault: Naval gunfire would soften up enemy coastal fortifications, and aerial support would cover advancing ground troops. Marine tactics stressed maneuver on a short supply line. Marine training emphasized esprit de corps and discipline to a far greater extent than did Army training.

Problems began during the planning of this joint operation. The Tenth Army staff planned the invasion but ignored the differences between the two services, writing a plan that emphasized Army tactics and assigned similar missions to both Army and Marine divisions. At the same time, the staff of Admiral Chester Nimitz expected that preliminary air and naval operations would give the U.S. command of the air and sea, but also expected strong Japanese counterattacks from Formosa and Southern Japan. As a result, these Naval planners emphasized mobility and combined arms operations for rapid conquest of the island that would reduce the exposure of Navy ships. To accomplish this task, the staff of the Tenth Army decided to have the army land on the west coast, just below the neck of the island. The Marine III Amphibious Corps would take the northern section of the island, while the XXIV Corps marched south.

Concerns about interservice relations had even played a large role in the assignment of Buckner as commander of the Tenth Army. On 7 October 1944 Buckner recorded in his diary, "Admiral Nimitz, after sounding out my attitude on the Smith vs. Smith* controversy and finding that I deplored the whole matter and harbored no interservice ill feelings, announced that I would command the new joint project." For his part, Buckner designated a Marine, Major General Roy S. Geiger, commanding officer of the III Amphibious Corps, to serve as his successor in case he became a casualty. The two generals got along fine with each other.

Although Buckner did exceptional work in preventing interservice disputes and developed a good working relationship with his main Marine subordinate, he did little to alleviate the differences between the Marine and Army units. Buckner was a firm believer in U.S. Army doctrine. During the battle, he explained his strategy for winning to a group of reporters: "We're relying on our tremendous fire power and trying to crush them by weight of weapons" (*New York Herald Tribune*, May 2, 1945). Buckner treated his Marine divisions like Army infantry divisions. This failure to appreciate the differences between the types of units under his command actually exacerbated the disputes between the two services.

At first these differences seemed irrelevant. The American invaders enjoyed some early success on Okinawa. The landing on the beaches went uncontested, and the 1st Marine Division raced across the island, enjoying

*During the battle on Saipan, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, a Marine and commander of the V Amphibious Corps, had relieved Major General Ralph Smith as commanding officer of the 27th Infantry Division, a substandard National Guard unit. The 27th Division occupied the middle of the American line and made the least amount of progress, creating a U-shaped salient that jeopardized the Marine units on either side.

the temperate, dry weather and reaching the eastern coast on April 4. The Marines reached the northern tip of Okinawa on April 13 and secured the Motobu peninsula on April 20 in an advance that was almost painless.

This success was deceptive, however, because the Japanese had intentionally conceded the northern end of the island to the Americans. The Tenth Army's success came to a sudden end when the XXIV Corps began its march south.

On April 4, the same day the Marines reached the eastern coast of Okinawa, several infantry divisions made contact with the defensive lines of the Japanese 32d Army. The Japanese goal was to disrupt "the enemy's plans by inflicting maximum losses on him, and, even when the situation is hopeless, holding out in strong positions for as long as possible." After a careful analysis of Okinawan geography, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, senior officer in charge of operations, accurately predicted the location and size of the American invasion force. In a memo to Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, the commanding officer of the 32d Army, and the chief-of-staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Cho, Yahara argued that they lacked the strength to defend the beaches and suggested that the army defend only the militarily valuable southern half of the island, conceding the landing and the unpopulated north to the Americans. The mountainous geography of this region made it impossible to build airfields in the area and limited its military importance. Ushijima and Cho agreed with Yahara and adopted his proposed strategy. They ordered the construction of three defensive lines, using an interconnected system of tunnels, blockhouses, pillboxes, trenches, caves, and Okinawan tombs, many of which had overlapping fields of fire that channeled American attackers into prepared lanes of fire. These fortifications, which were on both the reverse and forward slopes of hills, neutralized the effectiveness of American artillery and the invasion plan itself. The 32d Army also had more artillery than any Japanese force the U.S. had encountered in the war, including a six-month supply of ammunition. This defensive posture effectively sealed the fate of the island and determined the outcome of the battle. The contest would be a bloody siege of attrition, which the Americans would win only if they could afford to pay the cost in casualties.



Second-Landing Controversy

A controversy soon broke out over a strategic proposal to minimize contact with the Japanese fortifications and over Buckner's use of Marine units. Major General Andrew Bruce, U.S. Army, commanding the 77th Division, suggested that the Tenth Army stage a second landing on the southern tip of the island, using his unit and the III Amphibious Corps. Bruce was a fighting general, and Buckner approved of this willingness to fight. He said, "Bruce, as usual, is rarin' to go and is looking well ahead of action. I much prefer a bird dog that you have to whistle in to one that you have to urge out. He is of the former variety." But the issue hardly registered in Buckner's diary. He looked at his supply lines—which reflected his grounding in Army doctrine—and said no to the second invasion. Many of the Marines on the Tenth Army staff, and, more important, General Geiger, agreed. When he later explained his decision to the authors of the Army's official history of the battle, he said a second landing would have been "another Anzio, but worse."

There were many, however, who liked the idea. Some Marines enthusiastically endorsed the proposed second landing. On June 4 the Sixth Marine Division, with only 36 hours notice, had made an amphibious landing across the open sea in front of Naha harbor. The Marines had landed on Oroku Peninsula, which was to the south side of the harbor. The Marine division's commanders thought another amphibious assault would also work. (After the war, both Major General Pedro A. Del Valle, Commanding Officer of the 1st Marine Division, and Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding officer of the 6th Marine Division and later Commandant of the Marine Corps, claimed that a Marine division had enough internal supplies to operate for a month free of a supply line.) Support for this idea was not limited to the Marine corps. The commander of Army ground forces, General Joseph Stilwell, who was visiting Okinawa on an inspection trip at the time, was impressed with the proposal: "Bruce is the only man I've met who remembers his tactics," he recorded in his diary. Stillwell, however, had less

positive things to say about Buckner: "Tactics all frontal. 6th Marine landing S. of Naha only attempt to go by. No thought of repeating it. Buckner laughs at Bruce for having crazy ideas. It might be a good thing to listen to him." Stillwell also found the general staff of the Tenth Army wanting: "There is NO tactical thinking on push. No plan was ever discussed at the meetings to hasten the fight or help the divisions."

As the battle continued, the decision became controversial. Homer Bigart, war correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune*, filed a story that was critical of Buckner's rejection of a second landing. He called Buckner's Army tactics "ultra-conservative." In his view, "A landing on southern Okinawa would have hastened the encirclement of Shuri. Instead of an end run, we persisted in frontal attacks," he wrote. "It was hey-diddle-diddle straight down the middle."

Thus, an honest dispute about tactics was soon twisted into an interservice dispute. Syndicated columnist David Lawerence, using the Bigart article as his main source, claimed an amphibious assault would have saved American lives. In one of his two columns about Okinawa he started with a loaded sentence: "Why is the truth about the military fiasco at Okinawa hushed up?" He blamed Buckner and the Army for conservative tactics. In a deliberate distortion of the facts, Lawerence wrote that the Marines' rapid conquest of the north was ample proof of the soundness of their tactics. He demanded an immediate investigation into Buckner's decision.

The second-landing decision became an interservice dispute, partly as an indirect result of unequal press coverage and an effort on the part of the Department of the Navy to manipulate media coverage in its favor. Working in the headquarters of Admiral Nimitz, at the personal insistence of Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, Captain Harold "Min" Miller arranged support for reporters, giving them access to communications facilities so they could send their stories back to their news agencies, providing them with copies of newsreel footage, and letting them visit the front lines and travel with Marine units. Press coverage on Okinawa favorable to the Marines naturally followed this institutional support. Soldiers fighting for their country value recognition, whether in the form of combat decorations or news stories. Major General John Hodge, commanding officer of the XXIV Corps, even complained about media coverage in a four-page memo. "I have been able to find but little mention of Army troops fighting their hearts out in the last twelve days of the 82-day battle," he complained. "These [stories] get back to soldiers from their families and makes for bitterest feeling toward the Marine Corps where there should be and normally is a feeling of great friendliness and mutual respect between individuals of the two services." He also suspected the reason: "The press was naval controlled and Navy-minded to a great degree."

Buckner dismissed the allegations from the press. In a letter to his wife, he wrote, "We have splendid relations here between the Army, Navy and Marine components of my command in spite of unpatriotic attempts on the part of certain publicity agents at home who are trying to sir up a controversy between the Army and Marines." He also responded forcefully at a press conference on June 15, but the only publication that gave extended coverage to this conference was the *New York Herald Tribune.* The purpose for taking the island, Buckner said, was to use its airfields to bomb Japan, and build it up as a base for the invasion of the main Japanese islands. The second landing was only one of the issues Buckner discussed. He explained that the geography of southern Okinawa ruled against a second landing. Reefs would have made an amphibious assault difficult, and the hilly terrain would have made it easy for the Japanese to contain American forces on the beach. "If we'd scattered our forces we might have got licked, or it might have unduly prolonged the campaign; or we might have been forced to call on additional troops, which we did not want to do." He explained that economy of troops was necessary, because the congestion of more units would have slowed down construction of the airfields. "We didn't need to rush forward, because we had secured enough airfields to execute our development mission."

Buckner also had defenders in both the Navy and the press. When Nimitz read the Lawerence columns, he responded with a statement that attacked the journalist and defended Buckner. A reporter for the Associated Press wrote that the admiral's statement was "rare" in its bluntness. Bigart and the *Herald Tribune* backed away from their earlier criticisms of Buckner, which denied Lawerence any cover. "This correspondent still believes that a landing on the south coast of Okinawa would have been a better employment of the Marines," Bigart responded. "But to call the campaign a fiasco is absurd. The writer covered the Italian campaign during the Anzio and Cassino actions and he knows what a fiasco is." The editorial board of the *Herald Tribune* later noted that Bigart's report "did not on its face, warrant the conclusions Mr. Lawerence drew," and "would seem to leave Mr. Lawerence open to merited rebuke."

Stilwell and General of the Army Douglas MacArthur were also critical of Buckner—and were far more important than Lawerence. When Stilwell returned to Manila, he met with MacArthur and told him what he had seen. MacArthur had clashed several times with Buckner over manpower and supply issues, and had had enough. He declared his intention to replace Buckner and asked Stilwell if he would accept the assignment. At the time, the command of an army was an assignment for a lieutenant general, and MacArthur wanted to know if Stilwell would accept, even though he was a general. Stilwell said he would gladly accept any command assignment.

Stilwell became the commander of the Tenth Army a few days later, when Buckner was killed in a Japanese artillery barrage. For him, Okinawa offered lessons for the pending invasion of Japan. He told General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, that he expected a larger scale version of the battle for Okinawa: "The

terrain in Japan is rugged and lends itself to defense; unless we are prepared for the conditions, we are likely to meet not only a determined defense in well dug-in positions in depth, but the fanatical opposition of the entire population, who will resort to any extremity to oppose us." It was important that the U.S. Army avoid employing frontal assaults exclusively: "In future operations, some feint or diversionary attack should be added to the main attack in order at least to make the Japanese face in two directions."

Any assessment of the American combat leadership on Okinawa should keep the problems that Buckner faced in perspective. He worked hard to establish good personal relations with the command element of the other services in the Tenth Army. But an interservice dispute developed despite his best efforts.

Several things went wrong, some of which were beyond his control:

- The enemy fought tenaciously and neutralized American advantages in a battle of attrition, even though this effort conceded to our ultimate victory.
- Staff planning had failed to consider the differences in doctrine between the components of the American ground force.
- Press coverage was unequal, possibly the direct result of service manipulation.
- Planners refused to reconsider options, other than those found in doctrine, that could have more quickly overcome enemy resistance.

General Buckner's mistake in this joint operation was that he did not fully understand that the differences between the services were more significant than just uniforms and traditions, or that interservice cooperation should have involved more than good personal relations.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is an assistant professor of history at Texas A&M University-at Commerce. He holds degrees from the University of Texas, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Southern California. He is the editor of *Seven Stars: The Okinawa Battle Diaries of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr., and General Joseph Stilwell.* He is also the author of the forthcoming study *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1945-1972.*

Cultural Awareness
In Stability and Support Operations

CAPTAIN JOEL B. KRAUSS

In today's volatile world of ethnic conflict, humanitarian relief operations, and disaster assistance, the United States Army finds itself deployed on missions to provide a stabilizing presence in various locations. When it comes to preparing soldiers for these types of missions, however, there is a missing piece, and that is cultural awareness.

At the upper levels of command and control, specialists are assigned to ensure that the commanders are politically astute, historically aware, and culturally sensitized. Unfortunately, this information has no real conduit down to company and platoon levels, and, perhaps most important, to the individual soldier. In most organizations of the conventional infantry force, there is no Foreign Area Officer or Civil Affairs Officer—personnel who specialize in these matters—to fill this gap. Although it is vital for senior leaders to be well informed in these facets of operations, it is often the company commander, platoon leader, or squad leader who finds himself on an isolated checkpoint or observation post dealing with the civilian populace day by day.

How can we prepare our junior leaders and soldiers for these scenarios? What assets do we have available to inform and sensitize them to these very foreign environments? The answer to these questions may be easier than you think.

The question most often asked by soldiers and junior leaders is, "Why are we here?" They have to wonder why they are deployed to a certain country to help sort out what is, all too often, an internal problem of the host nation. The United States has survived the Cold War as the sole remaining global superpower. But the yardstick for measuring *superpower* is no longer simply the ability to mass more forces than the other guy. It has evolved into the ability to export one's own values. In the case of the United States, those include peace, stability, and democracy. That is the guiding factor in most of our deployments today. The United States has the credibility and, more important, the ability to support the entire spectrum of peace operations. So we find ourselves deployed to such places as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Do our soldiers and junior leaders *really* understand this crucial aspect of national security policy?

With the decentralized nature of peace operations and the growing international intolerance for violent solutions to internal conflict, it is in our best interests to inform our soldiers of the subtleties of the environment in which they will find themselves.

With all the new things going on, soldiers will want to know what their focus should be. There are many models upon which to draw when studying internal conflicts in a foreign state. But we must be careful to pare this down to its core elements and confine the discussion to pertinent information. With all of the things to do before a deployment, the N-Hour sequence is probably not the time to force this information down the chain of command. Rather, preparations must begin early and must be sustained on a constant basis.

The areas that I propose focusing on are basic, and the information is relatively easy to obtain.

Geographical Aspects. Where is this place on the map, and how does its internal strife affect the countries around it?

Historical Aspects. No need to go back centuries here. The focus should be on contemporary history, say the past few decades.

Political Aspects. Who are the major political players, and what do they want?

Cultural Aspects. Who are the people? What is their religious and ethnic makeup? What are their customs, and what effect will our presence have on them?

This model seems relatively basic, but it is by no means the last word on what information to gather. The target audience is the key. Enlisted soldiers, noncommissioned and commissioned officers with varying levels of education and backgrounds, competing priorities, different duty positions and MOSs all make for a broad-based audience. The information should be concise, clear, and pertinent to the upcoming mission. If you are keeping track of your unit's geographic area of responsibility, you can focus even further and, more important, earlier.

In this age of technological advance and the telecommunications boom, there are few excuses for not staying informed. There is a multitude of free information on the Internet. When using the Internet, however, stick to reputable news sites, such as *CNN Interactive*, *The New York Times*, and *The BBC Online*. Not only are these sites constantly updated, but you can also customize them to focus on a specific region of the world.

Other sources of current information are foreign affairs-based journals and magazines and news publications. Of particular note is *The Economist*, which is not simply a business magazine, but a world-renowned source of international news. In addition, numerous domestic papers provide excellent international coverage of events unfolding worldwide.

Last, but not least, television can add a critical "third dimension" to your mission preparations. With the "CNN effect" influencing world opinion daily, we professional officers can use timely video footage to capture and tie together the other information and put a "face" on it. Some of the video coverage on television will contain a great deal more intelligence than you might think.

At company and platoon level, the commanders and platoon leaders can develop sustainable programs using as little as 15 minutes as week. With a map of the unit's area of responsibility posted in the dayroom or command posts, along with some 3x5 index cards containing pertinent data posted weekly, a system for tracking events can be established. Reviewing taped news footage can add to the understanding of volatile situations as they evolve on the world stage. A payday activities brief after physical training can further tie it all together.

A Case Study:

In December of 1994, with the Dayton Conference quickly wrapping up, the 3-325th Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT), based in Italy, was notified to begin preparations for deployment as the first NATO ground combat force to move into Tuzla, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having just returned from an assignment to the Joint Military Contact Program, an offshoot of the Partnership for Peace Program, I was assigned to the battalion staff as the S-5. It helped that I had a knowledge of Serbo-Croatian, was married to a Croatian national, and had traveled extensively in the region, but what about the rest of my battalion? I broached the subject with my battalion commander and voiced my desire to begin a program of cultural and historical awareness briefings to coincide with our tactical and logistical preparations. We decided it would be best to present these briefings down at the platoon and section level and to keep them brief and to the point. With this guidance I set off to spread the information throughout the battalion combat team.

First, I made up a few simple handouts, which contained a series of maps starting at the regional level and working down to Tuzla itself. Second, I typed up a brief historical summary of events that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. I then posted on an easily portable board some pictures I had taken while on leave in Croatia and Slovenia. Finally, I coordinated with the harried company leaders and key staff sections for briefing times and places.

The briefings went well, with the soldiers, from commanders down to the lowest ranking enlisted soldier, listening intently and asking good questions. I brought my wife along on several briefings to add the "native" element to the sessions. We briefed in dayrooms, offices, motor pools, and maintenance sheds. The briefings obviously had their intended effect. The soldiers appeared calmer, more confident, and better able to understand the situation they were about to enter. We used video footage for certain elements of the battalion, particularly the scout platoon. The video footage from *CNN International* was these soldiers' first real look at the various factions and their equipment. As their former platoon leader, I knew how much this information would affect their train-up for the operation.

As we moved to the departure airfield at Aviano, Italy, I continued talking to the soldiers and answering questions. They were hungry for information to help alleviate the anxiety of the wait. All in all, I believe the program we developed had something to do with the extremely professional conduct of the battalion and its soldiers. More important, it gave them the feeling that we, the leaders, cared about them and

wanted them to understand why they were deploying and how that related to the commander's intent.

To summarize, I think it is fair to say that there are numerous requirements competing for our attention as commanders and leaders. But as we accelerate into the 21st Century, the armed forces, particularly the Army, will be placed in harm's way in missions mandated by NATO and the United Nations. Weapon proficiency, equipment maintenance, individual readiness, and collective training are the cornerstones of success. But now that we find ourselves deployed into stability and support operations, maybe we should add cultural awareness to our kit bag of combat multipliers. It is the right thing to do for our soldiers as we lead them into strange lands to carry out their missions.

Captain Joel B. Krauss served as operations officer for the Military Liaison Team in Slovenia and as translator for the 3-325th ABCT during its operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He now commands Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry at Fort Benning. He is a 1992 graduate of Officer Candidate School. He is a graduate of Troy State University and is completing a master's degree in International Relations.

Let's Level the Training Field
For Mechanized Infantrymen

FIRST SERGEANT JEFFERY A. HOF

Despite the technological advantages our infantry forces have been striving to achieve the past few years, mechanized infantrymen still find it difficult to gain access to schools—Ranger, Air Assault, and Sniper—that are offered to the other four types of infantry.

Each of these physically and mentally challenging schools develops and helps define the next generation of infantry enlisted leaders. The mechanized infantry of Force XXI would be tremendously improved by increased opportunities to attend similar challenging infantry schools. Mechanized infantry force commanders at all levels desperately need to understand the importance of this training.

Future success demands well-rounded and versatile noncommissioned officers, especially in light of the reorganization of the next generation Bradley fighting force. In addition to fielding the most modern vehicles, that force will have three rifle squads per platoon, consisting of nine infantrymen with one sniper team per company. (The current task organization consists of two rifle squads per platoon with one sniper team.)

Although Bradley proponents are planning, and in some instances operating, the new technological systems, the computer chip will meet only a small part of our future needs. The Army's real potential lies with the infantrymen in our charge. The next generation infantry warrior needs leadership development, motivation, and highly honed tactical crafts.

The Ranger Course offers invaluable leadership training. Unfortunately, our modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOEs) now authorize only five Ranger-qualified NCOs—two staff sergeants and three sergeants—even though the new organization will authorize 16 staff sergeants and 25 sergeants. A sergeant first class cannot attend Ranger School because the MTOE does not authorize the Ranger additional skill identifier (ASI G) for that position, despite a current professional career management blueprint that strongly encourages those in the rank of sergeant through sergeant first class to become Ranger qualified. Nor is there an ASI G authorization for the company first sergeant—the master trainer, the leader above all other enlisted soldiers who sets and maintains the standard. The only acceptable standard for him is 11M50, regardless of his additional skill identifiers.

Many exceptionally skilled and motivated indirect fire infantrymen (MOS 11C) in other types of infantry units have long since graduated from Ranger school. Nonetheless, if they are assigned to mechanized infantry battalions, the opportunity to utilize their skill is not authorized. Meanwhile, there is a tooth-and-nail fight for each available Ranger School slot. Even with the execution of a battalion-level pre-Ranger program, any first sergeant in the light infantry would find himself frustrated by this shortage of school slots at a time when Ranger-trained NCOs are desperately needed.

The Army seems to think of the Bradley as a scaled-down version of the M1 Abrams tank. But the Bradley is an infantry vehicle that provides a superior fire platform, which requires enough capable NCOs both to lead dismounted rifle squads and to conduct 25mm direct fire engagements. Armored task force commanders with cross-attached mechanized infantry companies need these infantrymen to close with and destroy the enemy in order to complement the speed, agility, and firepower of the M1 Abrams. In the future, we will need highly skilled Ranger-qualified infantry NCOs even more than we need computer-literate infantrymen.

With the challenges that lie ahead in our reorganization, Ranger-qualified

NCOs will be essential in molding and leading the next generation of mechanized infantrymen. I graduated from Ranger School more than 12 years ago, and the lessons I learned helped me develop the sound teaching, coaching, and mentoring skills that have benefited those in my charge ever since.

The Ranger School's training places extraordinary demands on a soldier's mental and physical abilities, with minimum guidance, in stressful and sometimes chaotic situations. The next-generation mechanized infantry warrior deserves that same opportunity to hone his leadership skills—especially with the arduous challenge of maneuvering three rifle squads, employing a sniper team, and massing the firepower of the Bradley fighting vehicle.

The Air Assault Course also provides skills that are critical to the future success of the mechanized infantry. These skills would help mechanized infantrymen train for the rapid movement of the dismounted rifle squads with the new task organization. Since there are only four Bradleys per platoon, the airmobility dimension of combat will be used to the fullest extent possible. With proper schooling, enough of our infantrymen will have the knowledge they need to teach, coach, and mentor their peers and subordinates when the tactical situation requires rifle squads to be airmobile. It is the traditional concept of passing on to someone else a learned skill that has made our NCO corps second to none.

As for the Sniper School, each of our companies is assigned an M24 sniper rifle, but has limited knowledge of techniques for effectively using its capabilities. Again, there is the problem of sending select soldiers to the school. Anyone can research the field manual that provides the basics of the rifle and the tactics required to employ it on the modern battlefield. But a school-trained NCO can bring back to his commander a wealth of knowledge that he has gained firsthand, and under stressful conditions, from the best snipers in the Army.

I am confident that these much-needed infantry schools can provide the vital skills that mechanized infantry will need in the future.

First Sergeant Jeffery A. Hof is a Bradley company first sergeant in the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division. He has also served at the Joint Readiness Training Center, in the 502d Infantry in Germany, and in the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Crisis in the Horn of Africa

Ethiopian-Eritrean Border Battles, 1998

ADAM GEIBEL

Since both Ethiopia and Eritrea maintain large armies, by regional standards, their border hostilities of the summer of 1998 are worth examining. Both countries were important to the U.S. policy of containing the Sudan, and both had populations with extensive combat experience. The Ethiopian Army, in particular, had a staff trained in Soviet Cold War conventional tactics.

In 1998 Eritrea's standing army numbered about 40,000 and Ethiopia's, 120,000. If fully mobilized, both countries could field a combined force of around half a million combat-veteran fighters of both sexes. The Ethiopians have 350 to 400 T-55 tanks and the Eritreans 200 to 300, though not all of them battle-worthy.

The Eritreans gained formal independence from Ethiopia in 1993, after helping the rebels end 17 years of harsh military rule. But relations between the one-time allies soured when Eritrea triggered a trade war by introducing its own currency in November 1997. Ethiopia's occupation by force (with more than 1,000 troops) of eastern Eritrea's Adi Murug area in July 1997—followed by the Ethiopian publication in October of a new map of Tigray that incorporated large areas of Eritrea—did not ease tensions.

Eritrea claimed that the crisis in the summer of 1998 had been triggered on 6 May by an unprovoked Ethiopian attack on Eritrean troops in southwestern Eritrea. Both sides began massing troops and equipment along the border immediately after its government in Addis Ababa alleged that Eritrean forces had invaded and occupied the land around the town of Erde Matios (Tigray, its northwestern territory) on 12 May. Known as the Badme area, this rocky 400-square-kilometer triangle is claimed by both sides.

On 13 May 1998 Ethiopia's Parliament declared war on Eritrea. The Eritrean government officials in Asmara claimed that the Ethiopian army had launched four attacks inside their border on 22, 23, and 25 May in the Setit area; and, on 31 May, in the Alga-Aliteina areas. On 31 May and 1 June Addis Ababa countered that Eritrean forces had made incursions into Ethiopian territory around Alitena (near Mt. Assimba in the central area of the border). Regardless of who initiated it, heavy fighting was reported with artillery, mortars, and small arms across the broad valley.

Another Eritrean probe was launched at Zalambessa (or Zala Anbessa, a strip of buildings on either side of the road),

on the main highway between Addis Ababa and Asmara, but was repulsed. By 2 June the border was quiet again. The Eritrean offensive was hampered by the beginning of the winter rainy season, and a normally dry riverbed in the Badme region that now flooded and presented an obstacle to Eritrean supply efforts.

At that point, even Libya's Colonel Muammar Qaddafi suggested sending troops from the six-nation Sahelian-Saharan Group (Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso. and Sudan) to the disputed border area.

Around this same time, Djibouti, as a precautionary measure, began mobilizing troops along its northern border with Ethiopia and Eritrea in response to the proximity of the fighting. (The overthrow of the former Ethiopian ruler, Colonel Mengistu, in 1991, had led to a civil war in Djibouti.)



Ethiopia claimed that the Eritrean Brigade that occupied Zalambessa was driven out on 6-7 June by the Ethiopian units. The local Eritrean commander, claimed, however, that 200 Ethiopians were killed in the initial assault on the Eritrean border post, and morale was nonexistent among those who were taken prisoners. Three tanks captured from Ethiopian troops were immediately reissued to Eritrean units.

In the air, Eritrean MB-339 light support aircraft attacked Tigray's capital Mekele, while two pairs of Ethiopian MiG23s bombed Asmara's military/civilian airport. Aside from civilian casualties on both sides, the military value of the attacks was negligible. One MiG23 was confirmed downed at Asmara with a second claimed, while Addis counter-claimed an Eritrean MB-339.

On 9 June, residents 27 kilometers to the south of Adigrat could hear intense tank, mortar, and artillery fire. The Eritreans claimed that the Ethiopians had begun their counterattack at 0515 hrs (the fourth in two weeks), while the Ethiopians countered that the Eritreans attacked at dawn, only to be repulsed four times with heavy casualties.

Seesaw fighting raged through the empty border town of Zalambessa, and outside of town the Eritreans lost four T-62s. Ethiopia had moved at least a pair of multiple rocket launchers and one six-gun 130mm M46 battery up to the battle. The fourth attempt took place at around 1400, allegedly while the Eritreans at the Organization of African Unity summit were calling for an end to hostilities.

The fighting had turned thousands of civilians into refugees. At 0600 on the 10th, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of launching a fresh attack, with large numbers of troops supported by tanks, on an Ethiopian post on the Badme-Sheraro front at Erde Mattios near the Tekeze River, which forms the border between the two countries.

A third fighting front around Assab—a drier region 500 kilometers south where warfare could be carried out more effectively—was reported at the same time. By the 12th Ethiopian officials reported heavy fighting in Bure (about 45 miles inland from Assab) and farther east than earlier clashes.

On the 11th, Eritrean jets and a helicopter dropped eight bombs on an army base and a part of refugee-crowded Adigrat. Four persons were reported killed and 30 injured. Although a U.S.-brokered ban on air strikes was put in place over the weekend of 13-14 June, both Eritrea and Ethiopia continued to reinforce their front lines, and a stalemate on all three fronts continued for about two weeks.

As of 1700 on 14 June, the official Ethiopian figures for Eritrean casualties on the Badme Front were 1,808 killed and 3,606 wounded. On the Zalambessa Front, there were 1,392 Eritreans dead and 2,784 wounded, while on the Bure-Assab Front, Addis claimed 900 Eritreans killed and 500 wounded.

On the morning of the 24th, there was a brief artillery exchange at Zalambessa (which Asmara denied), though there was no apparent follow-up action. On 28 August Eritrea released the first batch of 71 Ethiopian soldiers captured along the border.

The troops were kept on the front line throughout the winter and past the Ethiopian New Year (11 September) with little diplomatic headway being made. Since then, arms purchases have been made, which will guarantee that the next bout of fighting will be even bloodier. When Bulgaria announced in December that they were selling 210 T-55s to Uganda and Ethiopia, the potential for future fighting increased dramatically.

These border skirmishes were little more than meeting engagements, but they would set the stage for the large-scale, set-piece battles of February and March 1999. *(EDITOR'S NOTE: This period will be covered in the author's next article.)*

These and similar conflicts across the globe show how fragile peace is in those regions, and demand that the United States remain vigilant. If and when military and political unrest appears likely to affect U.S. interests in a region, we must be prepared—psychologically and militarily—to respond.

Adam Geibel is the tactical intelligence officer in the 5th Battalion, 117th Cavalry, New Jersey Army National Guard. He previously led a tank platoon in the 3d Battalion, 102d Armor. He is also Associate Editor of *Museum Ordnance* magazine and a free-lance journalist on military topics. He is a graduate of Drexel University and was commissioned through the New Jersey Military Academy Officer Candidate School in 1990.

Night Stalkers and Mean Streets

Urban Guerrillas in Afghanistan

Ali Ahmad Jalali
Lester W. Grau

Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) forces were never able to completely control the major cities of Kandahar and Herat. Finally, the Soviets bombed 75 percent of Herat and virtually the entire Kandahar suburb into rubble but still failed to stop the urban guerrillas. The DRA and the Soviets had more success in controlling the capital city of Kabul, but still could not stop the rocket attacks and guerrilla actions.

Surviving urban guerrillas are harder to find to interview than guerrillas who fight in the countryside. Urban guerrillas are surrounded by potential informants and government spies. They must frequently move around unarmed, and the government can usually react to their actions much faster than would be possible in the countryside. To survive, the urban guerrilla must be anonymous and ruthless. For this reason, urban guerrilla groups in Afghanistan were usually small and fought back with actions of short duration. Many urban guerrillas lived in the countryside or the suburbs and entered the cities only for combat. The Soviets and the DRA devoted a great deal of effort to finding and eliminating them, and many innocent civilians became victims of this hunt. We are grateful to the urban guerrillas who provided us with these candid interviews:

This article is taken from the authors' book The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics In the Soviet Afghan War *(United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division, 1999), which is based upon interviews with members of the Mujahideen resistance and presented in vignettes in the words of the guerrillas.*

These vignettes, from the chapter on urban combat, provide insights into the ingenuity, determination, and flexibility of the Afghan guerrillas, traits that are likely to characterize other groups, including our potential adversaries.

Kidnapping a Soviet Adviser

By Commander Shahabuddin

We were in contact with an Afghan driver from Paktia Province who drove for a civilian Soviet adviser. The adviser worked with the DRA mining industry. We wanted to kidnap the adviser. The driver had trained for a short time in the USSR and so the adviser trusted him. The driver agreed to help us, but we did not trust him and asked him to prove his loyalty. He stated, "I will bring my family to stay in a Mujahideen-controlled area as proof of my trustworthiness." The driver came to our camp with his wife and family. I sent his family to my village of Shewaki to stay while we captured the adviser.

One day the driver informed us that the adviser's wife was coming from the Soviet Union to join him. The driver would take the adviser to the airport to meet his wife. We gave the driver a small hand-held radio and told him to contact us if there were any changes. We would contact him within 20 minutes of his call. The driver called us one morning. He reported that the adviser's wife was arriving that day and that no one would accompany the adviser but the driver. We

dressed one of our Mujahideen in a DRA military officer's uniform and put him in a car and sent him to wait at the bridge over the Kabul River in East Kabul. He got out of the car and waited for the Soviet adviser's car, which soon arrived. The driver pointed at our Mujahideen and told the advisor, "That's my brother. He's going to the airport. Can we give him a ride?" The adviser agreed and they stopped to pick up "the officer," who got into the back seat behind the adviser and pulled out a pistol. He held the pistol to the adviser's back and ordered the driver to drive to Shewaki. Another car, carrying eight of our Mujahideen armed with pistols with silencers, followed the adviser's car. We had no trouble with the checkpoints since the guards saw the DRA officer's uniform, saluted, and waved the car and its "security tail" right through.

We took the adviser to Shewaki and burned his car. The government launched a major search effort, so we moved the adviser again, to the Abdara Valley. Government helicopters strafed Shewaki after we left and landed search detachments, trying to find the adviser. We kept the adviser in the Abdara Valley for two days, then moved him to Tezin, near Jalalabad, for a few more days. Finally, we took him across the border to Peshawar, Pakistan, where we turned him over to one of the factions. I do not know what happened to him.

Four Urban Bomb Attacks

By Haji Mohammad Yakub

Bombing is a necessary part of being an urban guerrilla. The object is to create fear and take out selected individuals. We got our explosives from Pakistan. Commander Azizuddin and Commander Meskimyar were our contacts in Paghman District who forwarded the explosives and detonators to us. They used elderly people as our go-betweens to carry messages and explosives to us. The following are typical of the missions carried out against the Soviets and their allies.

• In April 1980, we carried out an attack on the Radio Afghanistan building, which housed the central offices for Afghanistan radio and television broadcasting. Soviet advisers worked at the building where they oversaw radio and television broadcasting and edited and cleared the news before broadcast. The Soviets were our targets. We received a bomb from our contacts and gave it to a woman who worked in the radio station. She smuggled it in to the station and armed it. The bomb went off at 1000 hours on a workday. The explosion killed two Afghan Party activists and two Soviets. It also wounded a DRA soldier. For some time after the blast, Afghanistan Radio and TV stopped broadcasting. After this, the security procedures for the building were greatly increased and everyone was carefully searched. Our lady contact later managed to get herself transferred to the payroll office of Kabul University.

• The communist regime converted Kabul University into a center for communist indoctrination. We decided to target the primary Party Organization at Kabul University in January 1981. Bombing seemed to be our best option. By this time, our lady contact from Radio Afghanistan was working in the payroll office at the University. We gave her two bombs. She planted one in the University Administration building and set the timer for 1000. She put the second in the primary Party Organization building and set that timer for 1145. The theory was that, after the first bomb went off, people would mill around the site and then the key party activists would gather in the primary Party Organization building to discuss the bombing. The second bomb would attack this concentration. Our plan worked as we thought it would. Following the blast in the administration building, the party secretaries of all the various communist organizations gathered in the primary Party Organization building. The blast killed a Soviet adviser and several party secretaries. The bombs killed a total of ten and wounded an unknown number.

• On 6 May 1983 we bombed the Ministry of Interior building in Kabul. We had planted 27 kilograms of explosive in a room on the second floor close to the office of the minister. The bombs were hidden in four large flower pots that had been there for some time. We had a contact who was a gardener for the Ministry of the Interior. He agreed to smuggle in the explosives, plant the bombs, and set them for detonation. We trained him how to do the job. He mixed the explosives with limestone and smuggled them in plastic bags over a period of time. We planned to detonate the bombs during the daytime for maximum casualties, but our faction headquarters in Peshawar overruled us and told us to set the bombs off at night. Our faction wanted to keep Minister of the Interior Gulab Zoy alive since he was a leading member of the Khalq faction and his survival would insure that the friction between the Khalq and Parchim communist party factions continued.

When he went home at 1600, the gardener set all the time pencils for 2300. There was no sense setting different times since the building would virtually be deserted. The bombs went off on time and killed four duty officers and damaged the minister's office. If we had set off the bombs during the day, we would have killed Gulab Zoy, Ghzi (his body guard), Sheruddin (his aide-de-camp), and perhaps a hundred oth-



Map 1. Afghanistan

ers. The DRA closed the roads leading to the site for 24 hours and conducted an investigation. However, they thought that the blast was connected to some internal quarrel within the communist leadership and never suspected our gardener.

• The Soviets lived in the eastern Micro rayon region of Kabul. We decided to attack them right where they were living. There was a bus stop in the area where the Soviets would wait for buses to take them to work. We checked the timing of the buses. There was a daily 0745 bus that drew the most Soviets. We needed to establish a pattern so that we could leave a bomb without drawing attention. We got a pushcart and loaded it with the best fruits and vegetables we could get. The produce came from Parwan Province. We charged reasonable prices. The Soviets and local people got used to seeing us there and buying from us. We kept this up for several days. At night, we would work on the pushcart. We built a false bottom in the cart for our bombs, where they would be undetected even if the cart was inspected. We attacked on 2 October 1983. We loaded five bombs into the false bottom, inserted time pencil fuses in the bombs, and set them for 0743. Then we put in the false bottom and loaded the cart with produce. Six Mujahideen carried out the attack. None of us carried weapons. We brought the cart to the bus stop as usual. Thirteen Soviets crowded round it to see what was on sale. We slipped away from the cart and mixed with the local people. The bombs went off at 0743 just before the bus arrived. The blast killed 13, wounded 12, and damaged a nearby store. The DRA searched the crowd but made no arrests from our group.

Many people find such bombing attacks morally reprehensible, yet have no qualms about much larger bombs dropped from aircraft. Neither type of bombing attack is surgical, and both types kill innocent bystanders. The only real difference is in the size of the bomb and the means of delivery. The Mujahideen lacked an air force but retained a limited bombing option. The Soviets had an air force and conducted large-scale bombing attacks throughout the war.

Incident at Qala-e Jabar

By Mohammad Humayun Shahin[3]

During Ramadan (June) of 1981, five Mujahideen met with a Soviet soldier in Qala-e Jabar to buy some Kalashnikov magazines from him. Qala-e Jabar is some three kilometers south of the Darulaman Soviet military base. Our group leader was Alozai, who was known as Sher Khan. Hukum Khan, two others, and I made up the group. We went to Qala-e Jabar and met with the Soviet soldier. He said his name was Hasan and showed us his merchandise. We agreed to buy the magazines and pulled out a wad of 50-Afghani notes. The Soviet soldier was not familiar with the 50-Afghani note and demanded that we pay in 100s. Since we could not speak Russian, Sher Khan tried to show him that two 50-Afghani notes equaled one 100-Afghani note. He even wrote it on a scrap of paper. The Soviet, however, apparently did not understand and kept demanding 100-Afghani notes, which we did not have.

As we tried to communicate, the Soviet got louder and louder. We were fairly close to the Soviet camp and were beginning to worry that this might be a trap and that he was signaling others. Hukum Khan grabbed the Soviet in a headlock and wrestled him to the ground while Commander Sher Khan took out his knife and stabbed the Soviet to death. Then we grabbed the rifle magazines, plus the Soviet's AK-74 assault rifle and left the area.



Map 2. Afshar Ambush

There was a regular commerce between the Soviet soldiers and the Afghan populace. Soviet conscripts would sell fuel, ammunition, weapons, batteries, and military equipment for hashish, food, and Afghan money. They would use the money in the bazaars of Kabul to buy western stereos, music tapes, cigarettes, and clothing. Some goods were available in the Soviet PX (*voyentorg*), but the conscript soldiers had little access or cash, so they tried to shop locally for items they wanted.

Afshar Ambush

By Commander Asil Khan

On 28 May 1982 I led a group of four Mujahideen in an ambush at the very gates of the Soviet garrison in Kabul. At that time, elements of the Soviet 103d Airborne Division and some other units were based in Darulaman about 10 kilometers southwest of downtown Kabul. The headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army was there in the Tajbeg Palace.

I selected the ambush site after we spent several days in reconnaissance and surveillance of the Soviet traffic around Darulaman. During the reconnaissance, we detected a pattern in Soviet vehicular movement along the road from Kabul to the Soviet headquarters in the Tajbeg Palace. Just north of the Soviet Darulaman base is the small village of Afshar. It has a typical suburban bazaar with several grocery and fresh fruit stores and stalls. Soviet soldiers frequented this bazaar and would stop their vehicles there to

buy cigarettes, food, and imported vodka. Afshar looked like a good ambush site. Soviet soldiers felt secure there, there was enough room to set up an ambush, and site entrance and exit were fairly easy. The path to and from the ambush was mostly concealed, and we could easily reach Mujahideen bases and safe houses in the Chardehi District using this path.

We spent the day of the ambush in Qala-3 Bakhtiar—a village six kilometers to the west of the ambush site. We had four AK-47s and a non-Soviet manufactured light antitank grenade launcher. In the early evening, we moved out toward Afshar. It was the Muslim month of Ramadan when Muslims fast during the entire day. Few people were out at sunset since this is the time to break the daily fast. Since our ambush site was in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet base, I decided to conduct a very quick attack on a single Soviet vehicle and to take prisoners if possible.

We moved through a narrow street of Afshar that opened onto the main road north of the Darulaman Palace. Around 1930 hours, as my leading riflemen reached the street intersection, a Soviet GAZ-66 truck approached from the east on its way to the military camp. The truck had five passengers—a driver, a soldier in the right front seat, and three soldiers in the back. One of the soldiers had a back-packed radio. I told my antitank gunner to fire when the vehicle was in the kill zone. He fired but narrowly missed the truck. The truck came to a sudden halt, and its occupants jumped out of the vehicle, took up positions, and started firing at random.

During the brief fire fight, we killed one Soviet soldier. Two soldiers ran away to the southwest toward their camp. One soldier crawled under the truck near the rear tires. The radio-man rushed into an open grocery store and hid there. One of my Mujahideen was close to the shop behind a concrete electric pylon. I told him to follow the Soviet radioman into the front of the shop while I went in the shop's back door and introduced myself as a "friend." The Soviet soldier was flustered at first, but when he saw the foreign light antitank weapon in the hands of my Mujahideen, he uttered "dushman" [enemy]. *He kept quiet as we bound his hands and led him out back. I recalled my team and we quickly left the area. The whole action lasted only a few minutes.*

Fearing enemy retaliation, we moved out swiftly in the dark, heading to Qala-e Bakhtiar. From there, we went on to Qalal-e Bahadur Khan, Kala-e Jabar Khan, and Kala-e Qazi until we reached our Front's base at Morghgiran around 2200 hours. We kept our prisoner there for three days and then transferred him to our faction headquarters in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Detailed reconnaissance and knowledge of the enemy's movement and security arrangements contributed to a workable ambush right in the heart of the Soviet garrison area. The Soviets had not posted a vulnerable point adjacent to their garrison—either through overconfidence, or due to negligence on the part of lower-level commanders.

The selection of a small group of fighters, with an effective mix of weapons and good selection of the ambush site, played a significant role in the action. But using a non-standard antitank weapon probably caused the gunner to miss a large target at close range. One wonders if the gunner had any training or practice with the weapon before he used it. An RPG-7 and an experienced gunner were needed.

One also wonders why the Soviets stopped their truck in the middle of a kill zone once the Mujahideen rocket missed them. There was no need for the truck to stop, and the soldiers could have escaped through the small-arms fire before the antitank gunner had a chance to reload. The Soviets failed to react effectively. Stopping in a kill zone under small-arms fire was a risky and unwise move that cost the Soviets the life of one soldier and the capture of another.

Attack on the Ministry of Defense

By Mohammad Humayun Shahin

In November 1982 some 60 Mujahideen from Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Mohseni's Harakat-e Islami launched a night attack on the DRA Ministry of Defense located in the Darulaman Palace. The security in the area was very tight and the area between Darulaman Palace and the Tajbeg Palace (Headquarters of the Soviet 40th Army) was heavily patrolled. We decided to limit the attack to a short-range RPG attack. The Hezb group were armed with AK-47 Kalashnikovs, while the Mohseni group had British Sten guns [a 9mm World War II submachinegun with a 32-round magazine that fires some 540 rounds per minute] *and other weapons. The Mohseni used the RPG-7 in the attack. Both sides provided RPG ammunition.*

We assembled in the staging area at Char Qala in late afternoon. Char Qala is about three kilometers north of the target. From there, we moved south in groups to the intermediate villages of Qala-e Pakhchak and Qala-e Bahadur Khan and Qala-e Bakhtiar. Our attack position was a water mill outside the Juvenile Penitentiary close to the Darulaman Palace. As we moved, we dropped off security elements. Most of the men in the group were assigned to provide security during movement to and from the target area. Security elements were positioned at key locations, which facilitated our infiltration and withdrawal. Once our forward security elements secured the firing area, the RPG-7 gunner Saadat (from the Mohenseni faction) took his position about 250 meters from the target. He fired two rockets at the building. The enemy response was immediate. Guards from around the palace filled the night with heavy small-arms fire. We did not return their fire. Instead, we immediately began retracing our steps and pulled out along the route held by our security detail. We then scattered into hiding places and safe houses in the villages of Chardehi. Some years later, a prison inmate who was on the RPG side during the night attack told a Mujahideen contact that about 20 people were killed or injured in our attack.

The Mujahideen urban warfare tactics were low-level and fairly unsophisticated. Their actions were usually limited to a single strike followed by an immediate withdrawal to avoid decisive engagement with a better-armed and supported regular force. Survival dictated the tactics, but their impact



Map 3. Attack on the Ministry of Defense

was political and psychological rather than military. The work and risk that the urban guerrillas accepted was great, and the results were often minimal or not immediately evident.

Mujahideen success in the urban areas was due primarily to the support of the population and the lack of DRA/Soviet control outside the areas they physically controlled. The cities were under nighttime curfew, but the patrols enforcing the curfew could hardly move safely off the main city roads. The Mujahideen had great freedom of action outside the main thoroughfares and in the suburbs. But they could not fully exploit this advantage due to insufficient training, poor organizational structure, a lack of modern weapons and equipment, an ineffective command and control system, and a lack of tactical cohesiveness among the various Mujahideen combatant groups. The lack of communications equipment, particularly in the early days of the war, severely hampered the Mujahideen.

Raid on Balahessar Fortress

By Commander Shahabuddin

A Soviet regiment was garrisoned in the Balahessar Fortress in Kabul. In September or October 1983, we decided to raid a security outpost south of Balahessar. This outpost formed part of the security belt around the fortress. I had 62 Mujahideen in my group. My armaments included eight RPG-7s and two 82mm recoilless rifles. My base was some ten kilometers south of Kabul at Yakhdara. We planned the raid in our base at Yakhdara, moved in the late afternoon to the village of Shewak, and waited until dark to move out. On the way, there were several regime outposts. I detailed a five-man security element against each one as we passed it. The main outpost was at Aakhozi and others were at Bagh-e Afzal and Qalacha. The security element's mission was to secure our return trip so we wouldn't be ambushed by the enemy.

We reached Balahessar fortress, which is surrounded by several security posts. I retained a 15-man attack group and posted the rest of my command as security elements guarding the other outposts. I divided my attack group into a five-man support group and a ten-man assault group. We crept up to the outpost, climbed the wall, got up on the roof of the outpost, and then attacked it. I led the assault group. We hit the sentry with an RPG and he vaporized. We blew open the doors with RPG rockets and opened fire on the soldiers in the courtyard. We killed 12 of the DRA and captured three of their wounded. The rest escaped through a secret covered passage into Balahessar fortress. I had two KIA. One was Zabat Halim. [a legendary urban guerrilla who had been an NCO in the Royal Afghan Army, and whose death was a blow to the Mujahideen]. *We took our dead with us. We could not carry the wounded prisoners so we left them there. We captured 16 weapons—Kalashnikovs and machineguns, a mortar, and an RPG. As we left, there was a commotion in Balahessar, and tanks moved out of the fortress in our direction. One tank came close to us, and we destroyed it with an RPG. The other tanks then stopped coming—they had lost their taste for the fight. We just wanted to get out of there, so we left for our assembly area. We had a designated assembly area and, as we approached it we were challenged and responded with the password. Once I assembled my entire group, we left. My security elements guaranteed a safe return. This raid was on the tenth day of the first month of the Islamic Lunar calendar—the Day of Ashura. This day commemorates the anniversary of the massacre of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson Hussein and his 72 followers at Karbala in Iraq. It is a day of mourning, reflection, and solemn thinking for Shia and others. On this day, we thought of our dead who died defending truth and righteousness.*

Many of the urban guerrilla commanders maintained their main operating bases in the suburbs or outlying villages, where it was easier to assemble and train groups of men without government observation. The guerrilla commanders maintained a net of informers and supporters who aided their entry into and passage through the urban area. Still, guerrilla groups operating within an urban area had to secure their route of entry and withdrawal, which took the bulk of their force.

Raid on the Kabul Metropolitan Bus Transportation Authority

By Commander Shabuddin

In October 1983 I assembled 120 Mujahideen at our base

at Yakhdara for a series of raids. We had 16 RPG-7s, three mortars, three 82mm recoilless rifles, and numerous small arms. I divided the force into three 20-man teams to attack the Bagrami textile company, the police station, and—our main objective—the Kabul Metropolitan Bus Transportation Authority, located on the east side of the city, which served as the central bus terminal for 130 buses. Sixty men constituted the security element, which would secure our route of advance and withdrawal. A primary consideration of the urban guerrilla is always covering his route of retreat.

We moved our force from our base and spread out into the surrounding villages. To preserve mission security, only my subcommanders and I knew the plan. Once we were in position, the commanders would brief their men and tell them what to do. The first group went to the textile mill. The second group—reinforced with an 82mm recoilless rifle, a mortar, and some RPG-7s—set out to attack the police station at Kart-e Naw. I commanded the main attack against the bus authority. As we moved, we posted security elements outside all the security outposts in the area. I sent one group of Mujahideen to the Eqbal cinema to attack the security outpost located there so that these soldiers would not interfere with our raid. As our Mujahideen were getting ready to attack the outpost, a roving jeep patrol came by. They destroyed the jeep with a rocket. The soldiers in the security outpost saw the burning jeep and ran away. The Mujahideen captured three Kalashnikovs at this site.

I led my group to the large enclosure of the bus transportation authority. When we got there, I posted a few guards to prevent anyone from surprising us. Then we attacked the security detachment at the bus park. We killed eight, captured two, and torched 127 buses in the enclosure. Only three buses escaped destruction. We also captured 13 or 14 Kalashnikovs and 155 bayonets. We withdrew over our escape route to our base camp. I learned that the group attacking against the textile mill fired their mortar and heavy weapons and inflicted damage on the building. Kabul was without bus transportation for a good while.

The urban guerrilla attacks the credibility of the government by chipping away at morale, attacking notable government targets, and disrupting the daily life of the populace. The bus terminal was an optimum target since it clearly demonstrated the reach of the Mujahideen and considerably slowed the life of the capital city.

Night Raid on a City Outpost

By Ghulam Farouq

I was a high school student in Kandahar and used my student identification to move freely around the city to support the Mujahideen. I would try to make contacts with DRA soldiers in the government outposts during the day, and then the Mujahideen would use the soldiers' information to attack them at night. One day in January 1984, I made contact with a soldier who showed a willingness to cooperate with the Mujahideen in capturing his outpost. This was the Saray-e Saat-ha security outpost in Kandahar. The post was located on the second floor of a building in the Bazaar-e Shah section of the city, across from the road junction of Alizai Street and Bazaar-e Shah. The outpost was located there because the Mujahideen used Alizai Street to enter the city and the outpost controlled this path.

I took the soldier with me on my bicycle to Chardewal—some six kilometers south of the city. There, we met with my commander, Ali Yawar. We all discussed our plan; then I brought the soldier back to the city on my bicycle. That night, our group of 30 Mujahideen assembled. We entered the city on the south side near the Shekarpur gate (Rangrezha street). From there, we moved along Sherali Khan street near Bazaar-e Herat and from there to Wali Mohammad street. As we moved along this path, we posted security so we could withdraw safely. We had agreed with my contact that we would arrive at 2200 hours. We arrived on time and signaled with a flashlight as we approached the outpost. Our contact answered our signal. We crossed the paved road and posted our men at the gate. There were 22 Mujahideen now securing the route and gate. The remaining eight of us entered the gate and climbed to the second floor. Everyone appeared to be asleep. There was one soldier who had just completed his turn as sentry and we assumed he was asleep. He wasn't. He grabbed his Kalashnikov and fired at us, killing one. The dead Mujahideen's brother returned fire, killing the soldier and two of his sleeping comrades. We captured four other DRA soldiers plus nine Kalashnikovs and a pistol. My contact deserted to us.

The firing alerted DRA forces, and it would be hard to leave the city carrying a body, so we started to take the body to a safe house where we could leave it for the night. As we were moving down the street, one of our four captives escaped. A Mujahideen tried to fire at him but discovered he was out of ammunition. We knew that the escaped DRA soldier would report our whereabouts to the authorities and, since he escaped near the safe house, we could not now risk leaving the body there. So we left the body hidden near a bakery. We covered the blood trail with dirt and then withdrew along the same route we entered. We left the city at 0200 hours.

Since the government knew that we had left our dead behind, they blocked all entrances into the city. We tried to return for our dead the next night but could not get in. On the third night. We tried a different route from the north of town through the Chawnay suburbs. We traveled from Kalscha-e Mirza to Chawnay. We got into the city and went to the bakery. The government had not found the body, so we retrieved it and took it outside of town for a decent burial. The person who was killed was Hafizulla—a graduate of Kabul University.

Movement through a city is high risk unless the route is secured. In this case, more than two thirds of the available force secured the route. This got the force out safely. On the other hand, prisoner security was not very good. Prisoners should be bound, gagged, and roped together in small groups for firm control. If possible, they should be blindfolded so that they remain disoriented and unable to give much imme-

diate information should they escape. Finally, a raiding force should be kept small, but the correlation of Mujahideen to DRA was almost one to one. Surprise gave the Mujahideen an advantage, but the one soldier who was not sleeping offset that advantage.

Raid on 15 Division Garrison

By Commander Akhtarjhan

The DRA 15th Infantry Division was garrisoned in Kandahar, and we had contacts within the division. In the fall of 1987, our contacts invited us to come and seize the weapons from the division's military police company. We gathered about 100 Mujahideen for the operation. I commanded a group of 15 within the larger group. We crossed the Argandab River from our base camp at Chaharqulba to Baba Walisaheb and, from there, we went through the suburb of Chawnay. Local guerrillas secured our passage. We finally reached the division's main garrison. We waited until the moon set around midnight. The military police company building was at the end of the main compound. We crept to the building and saw that our contacts had placed a ladder against the wall for us. Some of our group took up positions outside the compound while our raiding group of 50 climbed the ladder up onto the roof of the building. Then we climbed down from the roof inside the compound walls.

Some of our contacts were on sentry duty, so we had no troubles. Our contacts met us and led us into the barracks building. We assembled in a large empty room. Our contacts then took us to different rooms where the soldiers were sleeping—five or six per room—and took their weapons. Then we raided the larger arms room next to the barracks and took hundreds of weapons. We then started carrying all the weapons onto the roof and passing them down to our fellows outside the compound. While we were doing this, the company political officer got out of bed and saw us. He started to make a noise, so we killed him with some of the bayonets. We finished getting the weapons out and left for our base camp. Our contacts deserted the DRA and came with us. [Commander Akhtarjhan was an elementary school student when he joined the Jihad, or holy war, at the age of 12. Because he had two brothers killed in the Jihad, he took their place as family tradition dictated. At the end of the war, he was 25 and a commander.]

The Mujahideen penetration of the DRA was essential for successful raids like this. Entering a sleeping compound is always a high-risk proposition, because someone besides the sentries is always awake, or suddenly awakens. A secure approach and withdrawal route is essential to urban guerrillas. Having local guerrillas secure the route allowed the force to bring enough people to carry off the captured weapons without worrying about being ambushed on the way out.

The urban guerrillas' biggest concerns were security and logistics. Security demanded small groups and a supporting net of agents and informants throughout the community. Logistic support often came from their enemy through the purchase or capture of needed supplies. The urban guerrillas in Afghanistan were never strong enough to capture a city, but their constant raids and ambushes created a siege mentality among the inhabitants and diverted large numbers of soldiers from the main battle for control of the countryside.

EDITOR'S NOTE: We have learned a lot from the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, but above all it underlines the challenges of dealing with a tough, determined enemy on his own turf. As this series of actions illustrates, the Mujahideen were able to move freely among the population and strike at the place and time of their choosing. Neither the massive retaliatory strikes of Soviet ground and air forces nor their efforts to separate the guerrilla from his support base were successful.

The concept of selectively targeting public facilities for bombing as described—with its acceptance of collateral casualties and damage—may strike us as reprehensible. But these and other tactics recounted here are the methods of choice for many nationalist and terrorist organizations active in the world today, and we can learn a great deal by studying the way they habitually operate. Just as in Afghanistan, hostile groups are not likely to risk direct confrontation with large conventional police and military forces, preferring instead a more subtle mode of operation.

As we prepare to deal with the contingencies of the next century, we would do well to closely examine our goals and our potential allies and adversaries before committing ourselves to any course of action.

Ali Ahmad Jalali is a former Afghan Army Colonel. A distinguished graduate of the Military University of Kabul, he has also attended the U.S. Army's Infantry Officers Advanced Course and the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He joined the Mujahideen in 1980 and served as the top military planner on the directing staff of the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen during before he joined the Voice of America. As a journalist, he has covered Central Asia and Afghanistan over the past 15 years.

Lester W. Grau retired from the Army as an Infantry colonel and foreign area officer specializing in the former Soviet Union. He is now assigned to the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His earlier book, *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan*, a companion piece to *The Other Side of the Mountain*, deals with Soviet tactics in Afghanistan.



SECURITY OPERATIONS SOP

A Rifle Company in Bosnia

MAJOR MALCOLM B. FROST

While the conflict raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s, U.S. forces in Europe prepared for possible deployment to that region. The missions they trained for ranged from humanitarian relief to peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and high intensity conflict. In 1994 elements of the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, Airborne Battalion Combat Team (now 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry) and its parent headquarters, the Southern European Task Force's Lion Brigade, deployed to Rwanda during Operation *Support Hope* to conduct humanitarian relief operations. In 1995 they deployed from Italy to Germany and participated in two Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotations that included peacekeeping and security operations, and two full-up Mission Rehearsal Exercises for the possible extraction of United Nations forces from enclaves in Bosnia. At the end of this training in November, policy for U.S. involvement in the area changed, and the 3d Battalion was alerted to deploy as part of a NATO peacekeeping force that would enforce the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.

The purpose of this article is to show how one American rifle company conducted security operations in the demanding operational environment that faced the first U.S. combat unit to enter that troubled land. The article will concentrate on the initial main gate of Tuzla Airbase, which was a chokepoint and—until the Sava River was bridged—the only lifeline connecting NATO and the U.S. to Bosnia.

The U.S. troops and the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) faced threats that varied in scope and capability. The factions were still entrenched along the Line of Confrontation within the Zone of Separation and had access to a variety of armored vehicles, artillery, and heavy weapons. Several Mujahadeen with terrorist backgrounds remained in sector who wanted the "holy" war in Bosnia to continue and were therefore against the deployment of NATO and the United States.

The land mine threat was also very real. Thousands of marked and unmarked antiarmor and antipersonnel minefields littered the countryside, and specifically Tuzla Airbase. Local "police" factions and gangs roamed Tuzla and wielded unchecked power. Illegal checkpoints, celebratory firing of small arms and mortars, and thievery were the norm. Break-ins at Tuzla Airbase to steal food, parts, and other supplies remained a daily occurrence.

After waiting nearly a week for the weather to clear, elements of the battalion deployed from Aviano, Italy, on C-130s headed to Bosnia. These forces landed at Tuzla Airbase on the evening of December 18, 1995 as part of Task Force Eagle, IFOR, and NATO during Operation *Joint Endeavor*. As the first U.S. combat force to enter Bosnia, the 3d Battalion's mission was twofold. The stated mission was to relieve UN forces and secure the perimeter of Tuzla Airbase to allow follow-on mechanized, armor, and logistics forces to move to the Zone of Separation between factions in Bosnia. An important implied mission was to send a strong signal to all factions that IFOR was a capable, combat-ready force. The battalion would send an immediate and clear

message to Bosnians, Serbs, Croatians, and the world that U.S. and NATO troops were on the ground and in charge.

The first demonstration of this transfer of authority from the UN to NATO occurred at the main gate of Tuzla Airbase. Company C of the battalion conducted a relief in place and secured three combat outposts (COPs) on the northern portion of the airbase. Instead of existing United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) checkpoints, the battalion established platoon-sized combat outposts on all main avenues of approach into the airbase that were well dug-in and obstacled, stocked with ammunition, and capable of continuous operations for weeks or even months. The main effort was focused on COP Foxtrot, the main gate to Tuzla Airbase and the only entrance and exit used for the first 60 days.

COP Foxtrot was a high traffic area and was deluged with reporters, press stands, and cameras from numerous U.S. and international news organizations. Company C's first platoon relieved the sparse UN element at the gate, which consisted of less than a squad of soldiers from a Swedish infantry company within UNPROFOR. The relief of the Swedish soldiers constituted the unofficial transfer of authority from the UN to NATO. Thus began the overnight transformation of the main gate from a simple entrance and exit point to a fully resourced and fortified combat outpost, capable of both defending the airbase and controlling access in and out of it.

On D-Day the clear intent that IFOR communicated to the battalion was that the local populace, the press, and the world would clearly witness the demonstration of force and have no doubt that the IFOR and NATO had taken charge.



During that first night, the company and battalion focused the priority of logistical effort and support to the main gate. With no organic vehicles available to haul precious barrier material, the battalion borrowed various assets from the UN and local contractors. During the ten hours of darkness, vehicles and countless barrier materials (dump trucks, wood, sandbags, wire, digging tools) were obtained through the sheer will and ingenuity of officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted soldiers. By morning, the main gate had bunkers, fighting positions, obstacles, and a platoon's worth of soldiers executing the IFOR mission. During the next 70 days, continuous improvement took place while the company developed an extensive tactical standing operating procedure (SOP) for combat outpost operations.

Company Operations

The three Company C COPs along the airbase perimeter were 600 to 1,000 meters apart. Each was tasked to secure its COP to prevent unauthorized access along a high-speed avenue of approach. Critical to mission success was extensive

patrolling along the fence line to deny penetration. Patrol routes were designated for the COPs. With one squad occupying the COP at all times, the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) squad was responsible for executing the patrol schedule using team or squad-sized elements. The longer patrol routes between COPs required that platoons alternate patrols with the platoons to their left and right. Company commanders coordinated these schedules because patrol routes crossed platoon and company boundaries. By alternating platoon responsibility as well as patrol start times and routes, commanders ensured that the perimeter patrols could not be predicted. This proved essential, because of the large distances between COPs.

Once the battalion established a battle rhythm, platoons conducted dismounted off-base patrols through Tuzla and the surrounding countryside to further demonstrate a show of force. The patrols varied as to location, distance, and time. Some patrolled near local military and faction headquarters, while others patrolled near the locations of recent firing incidents. Each patrol reported specifics about weapons, personnel, battle damage, and civilian reactions to the patrol, as well as any specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) designated for the patrol.

The two remaining platoons in the company increased their security posture to 100 percent and took over the patrolling platoon's COP responsibilities. Off-base platoon patrols stretched company resources, and permitted each company to conduct only four or five patrols a week. An entire platoon conducted the daily operations of the main gate, leaving Company C with only two platoons to conduct off-base patrols. Given these missions and the personnel constraints, each remaining platoon could manage just one off-base patrol a week.

SAMPLE ROTATION SCHEDULE

DATE	TIME	ELEMENT GATE	QRF	DOWN
2 Jan	Midnight–Noon	3d	2d	1st
	Noon–Midnight	1st	3d	2d
3 Jan	Midnight–Noon	2d	1st	3d
	Noon–Midnight	3d	2d	1st
4 Jan	Midnight–Noon	1st	3d	2d
	Noon–Midnight	2d	1st	3d
5 Jan	Midnight–Noon	3d	2d	1st
	Noon–Midnight	1st	3d	2d

EQUIPMENT

Checkpoint Commander–9mm, AN/PRC-126, green star cluster.
Security SL–M16, PRC-126, green star cluster.
Tower Security–M16/M203, TA-1 (wire), SINCGARS, PRC-126, binoculars, PVS-7, PAQ-4B, laser pointer, video camera.
Guard Shack–SINCGARS, landline switchboard, additional star clusters and parachute flares, base passes.
Exit Lane Guard–M16/M203.
Fence Line Guards–9mm/M16, mirrors on rods, 6-8 foot wooden probing rods.
Bunker Security–M249 SAW, M203/M16.
MP Shack–9mm, metal detectors, access rosters.
Machine Gun Bunker–M60 MG, PRC-126.

Main Gate Operations

The 1st Platoon consisted of three elements (squads plus), which rotated through their duties at COP Foxtrot. The first was the Gate element, composed of one complete squad, an M60 machinegun crew, two military policemen, and an M3 Bradley with crew. During peak hours at the gate, additional attachments might include an MP or Air Force SP bomb dog with handler, Bosnian police, and a local national interpreter.

The second element was the Quick Reaction Force (QRF), composed of one squad that was kept on standby to reinforce the gate as needed. This element kept its combat equipment within arms reach at all times and was also responsible for conducting all required local patrols along the fence line near COP Foxtrot. Additionally, this element continuously improved the platoon's positions and maintained the obstacles at COP Foxtrot. The third element was the Down element, which consisted of one squad, an M60 crew, and a checkpoint commander. This element conducted personal hygiene, executed its rest plan, and conducted any necessary personal business.

When rotating to the Gate element, soldiers from the incoming squad physically assumed duties before the outgoing Gate element was relieved. Once outgoing soldiers had briefed their replacements on the previous shift's significant activities, all outgoing soldiers removed their magazines from their weapons, cleared their weapons under the supervision of their squad leader, and dry-fired into a weapons clearing barrel.

Elements rotated every 12 hours. Though 8-hour shifts were used successfully, 12-hour shifts gave an air of predictability over extended periods of time and allowed the soldiers to both execute their rest plan and take care of personal business during their down cycle. Since soldier fatigue and complacency could easily arise with 12-hour shifts, the Gate element rotated from the down cycle to ensure soldiers were sharp at the gate. The Gate element rotated to QRF, and QRF to Down element. Risk was assumed in the QRF element with up to half of the element executing a rest plan, fully clothed and next to their weapons and equipment, in a bomb shelter less than 50 meters from the gate.

Either the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant served as the COP commander, who was responsible for the entire platoon sector including the gate, CP, attachments, patrol routes, and resource requirements. Within the COP commander's control was the checkpoint commander (a staff sergeant squad leader) and a security squad leader (senior sergeant team leader). The checkpoint commander was responsible for routine operations and overall security at the gate. He coordinated as necessary with local national interpreters, Bosnian police, and attachments (Bradley crews and MPs) working the gate. The security squad leader was primarily responsible for the organic assets manning the gate: M60 machinegun team, search personnel, guards, bunkers, and the sniper.

The gate positions were continuously manned by nine to ten personnel organic to 1st Platoon (see sketch). Bunkers 1 and 2 were each occupied by one squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner who was oriented on one of the two entrance and exit lanes. Two fence-line guards conducted random

searches of UN vehicles, detailed searches of all civilian vehicles, and ensured that all IFOR vehicles exiting the airbase met the convoy security requirements of the 1st Armored Division (1AD). Depending on the time of day, one or two exit guards maintained traffic flow, ensured that civilians kept a safe distance from the gate, and acted as early warning in case vehicles attempted to break through.

Two soldiers manned an M60 position that overwatched the fence-line chokepoint and acted as the second line of defense in case of a mounted or dismounted breach of the gate. One soldier occupied a 50-foot observation tower in front of the main gate to act as early warning for the eastern and western avenues of approach. Lastly, one soldier occupied the guard shack and was responsible for maintaining landline communication with 1AD's provost marshal office (PMO) and issuing passes to contract civilian workers who routinely entered and exited the airbase.

Attachments included one or two armored vehicles that provided depth to the COP and acted as a last line of defense in the event of a breakthrough. Initially, the Swedish infantry company provided infantry personnel carriers for this task until 1AD moved its first company of Bradleys into the compound. One or two U.S. military police soldiers assisted with identification checks and personnel searches, and an MP/SP with dog assisted with vehicular searches. Soon after occupation, a rotation of interpreters and legitimate Bosnian police from the local area translated and helped quell any disturbances or disagreements at the main gate.

Daily Operations

Identification Procedures. One of the most difficult tasks for soldiers working the gate was identifying personnel entering and exiting the airbase each day. They had to examine many types of identification cards—each of which mandated different procedures. U.S. military personnel carried standard green U.S. Armed Forces ID cards or IFOR ID cards. Those entering on foot were checked for photo likeness and match between the name on the ID card and the name on the battle dress uniform (BDU), and were allowed to carry weapons with magazines out, yet were not subject to search. Checking the photo against the BDU was necessary because U.S. BDUs were sometimes lost or stolen from local laundry contractors and used by Bosnians. The ranking individual of each U.S. military vehicle entering the gate was checked by the same standards and had to vouch for all passengers. Convoy commanders had to identify the number and type of vehicles in the convoy and ensure that mounted weapons were locked and cleared.

Holders of UN-issued blue ID cards were treated much like U.S. soldiers. In the Tuzla area, the blue UN ID cards were carried primarily by British, Swedish, and Norwegian troops and were eventually phased out and replaced by IFOR ID cards. Entrance search requirements for IFOR cardholders were the same as for U.S. soldiers. UN ID cards issued to civilians were yellow, orange, and white. Since these were not controlled military ID cards, UN ID holders underwent an MP-controlled hand-held metal detector search as well as the photo-face ID match. Once searched, they were allowed on base unescorted. These ID cards were accepted through January 1996, when all of the controlled, blue UN ID cards were issued.

Non-UN, local civilians were allowed on base for legitimate contract work, such as trash removal, mess and janitorial duties, and interpreting. The MPs examined personal IDs and searched these civilians using metal detectors. Once the soldier operating the guard shack had searched a civilian, he exchanged the local national's personal ID for a temporary base pass. The workers were temporarily held at the gate and the appropriate military agency on base was contacted to physically escort them to their place of work. At the end of the day, all workers left before last light and exchanged their passes for their personal ID cards as they left. The same method was used for personnel of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. This provided a way to track civilians and make sure the base was clear by nightfall.

The arrival of NATO, and controlled access to the base, was a shock for UN personnel who had been able to come and go at will. They found it irritating to wait for entrance and have their vehicles, packages, and persons searched. Almost daily there would be instances where UN workers refused to be searched. In such cases, soldiers politely explained that entrance requirements had changed for security reasons. Those who refused to be searched were not allowed on base and were asked to leave the main gate area. Those who provoked confrontation tested the patience of those on the gate and it took self-control and restraint by soldiers under stress to control the situation. If tirades got out of hand, the PMO was notified and MPs were detailed to detain those causing the disturbance. The soldiers knew that if they lost self-control or if a confrontation turned violent, their mission would fail.

The press people were often the most challenging group to work with. Continuous coverage of the main gate and numerous press stanchions complicated daily operations. Press personnel were admitted to the base only with Joint Information Bureau (JIB) escort. Individual press personnel attempting to enter the base without escort were searched with metal detectors and held while the JIB was contacted. The JIB then verified that the individual was from the press and provided a public affairs officer (PAO) escort. Often the JIB would fill a bus with press personnel to enter the base. The PAO who escorted the bus verified the identification of all press personnel aboard and vouched for them upon entering the base.

The activities of press personnel just outside the gate were acceptable so long as they did not adversely affect the security posture. To accommodate the press, reporters and cameras were allowed to operate around the main gate. Often several organizations used this hub as a backdrop for their nightly reports.

Occasionally though, the press would push beyond the limits of the invitation and get in the way. A few times, they jeopardized their own safety by trying to get the perfect shot. Press personnel who had cameras with blinding lights, who blocked the view of soldiers manning the gate, and whose

interviews hindered gate operations were politely asked to cease work. Refusal to obey the requests of the checkpoint commander constituted a security risk. Unruly press personnel were detained, had their press passes confiscated, and were turned over to the JIB where an incident report was filed. The effect of press operations on security at the main gate was left to the judgment of the checkpoint commander.

It was in our best interest to embrace the press, because they portrayed the message of the mission to the world. We wanted this to be a message of U.S. troops keeping the peace between the warring factions, providing humanitarian relief, and saving lives through the execution of their mission. Therefore, during hours of limited traffic flow, interviews of soldiers at the main gate were permitted, and press personnel were granted access to areas that provided interview backdrop. This helped our relations with the press and also allowed the Army to showcase its best salesman, the soldier.

Individual Searches. MPs conducted personnel searches using a hand-held metal detector while another soldier kept overwatch from a bunker. Only the COP commander could authorize pat-down searches, and a female MP conducted pat-down searches of females. During the search, personnel stood with their hands outstretched to their sides and were scanned from head to toe with the metal detector. Metal items and all bags were also inspected and any contraband was confiscated. Anyone who refused to be searched was not allowed on base and, although some tried to claim it, nobody had "diplomatic immunity" that would give them freedom from being searched.

Vehicle Search Checklist

1. **All personnel exit vehicle.**
2. **Driver opens doors, hood, and trunk and empties vehicle of all packages. One soldier with pistol searches while other provides overwatch with M16.**
3. **Begin search at the engine compartment. Look for new wires to indicate possible explosives. Look for wires or tampering in area of glove box. Look under/behind seats and feel seat backs for packages/protrusions. Feel headliner and door panels for protrusions. Inspect under dashboard and carpets for wires. Inspect trunk and spare tire area.**
4. **Have driver/passengers open all packages (if possible have bomb dog inspect). Inspect gas tank with wooden probing rod/dipstick if possible, feeling for soft, solid material. Inspect bumpers, wheels, and complete chassis. Inspect all truck beds with wooden probing rod (pushing through sand and gravel). Have bomb dog search entire vehicle when possible.**
5. **Bring anything suspicious to the attention of the checkpoint commander.**

As a general rule, no local area civilian vehicles were allowed on base. The only exceptions to this rule were trucks essential to base support operations, such as those hauling garbage, sand, or gravel. Due to the large number of UN vehicles entering the base, vehicular searches were random. Each day the checkpoint commander would draw a number between five and ten to determine the routine search pattern. Each designated vehicle would then be directed to the search area and inspected.

Vehicle Searches. Vehicles searched varied according to the driver and passengers in the vehicle. UN military and IFOR vehicles were allowed free passage once the ranking person had his IFOR or U.S. military identification card examined for photo likeness. In accordance with 1AD policy, all U.S. IFOR vehicles were required to have at least four vehicles in the convoy, two personnel in each vehicle, and at least one M16 per vehicle. Every UN civilian vehicle was subject to a visual search of the exterior and interior, and a detailed search if it fell within the random search number or appeared suspicious. Non-UN civilian vehicles and host-nation vehicles had to be cleared on base by the PMO. Once cleared, each one underwent a detailed physical search.

Passes. Passes were issued to all personnel who did not have UN, U.S. military, or press ID. Individuals were escorted to the guard shack for passes after being searched by the MPs at the security point. Personnel were then required to state the purpose of their visit, identify their points of contact (POCs) on base, and present their local, personal picture IDs to the soldier at the guard shack. Once contacted, the agency POC within the base sent an escort to pick up the individuals at the gate and assume responsibility for them. While waiting for passes to be issued and the escort to arrive, the fence-line guards executed a detailed search of the vehicle. Again, IDs were examined for photo likeness. Finally, before a pass was issued, the pass number, individual's name, stated business, agency POC, and time of arrival were logged for tracking purposes.

Upon leaving the base, individuals were required to get out of their vehicle at the fence line to return their passes in exchange for their personal IDs. In instances where individuals made several trips in and out of the base each day, such as sand, gravel, and garbage runs, passes could be retained until the close of business. This did not preclude the individuals and their vehicles from being searched every time they entered the base. In cases where a pass was out for over 24 hours, the personal ID was turned in and a report filed with the PMO. The numbered pass then became invalid. Individuals who tried to enter with an invalid pass were detained and handed over to the PMO for investigation.

Traffic Procedures. As seen in the sketch, the main gate could be accessed from two separate lanes that ran from the main road outside the base. These lanes converged at the gate and naturally developed into separate entrance and exit lanes. To prevent high-speed breakthroughs at the gate, chicanes (alternating wall obstacles that required several turns to navigate) and fabricated speed bumps were employed on both lanes. The chicanes were developed using a British-made product called Hesco Bastion walls. The chicane on the western lane was more restrictive because it provided no natural turns before reaching the gate. The eastern lane, which had a natural sharp turn just before the entrance, had a less restrictive chicane. The eastern lane was also used for both entrance and exit by unusually long or wide vehicles that would not fit through the western lane.

The portable frame walls were made of chain-link wire

and lined with canvas. They were made in sections and folded out to form a topless 4'x4' box, 5 feet high, that could be filled with sand or gravel. Each section connected to the next, making it possible to choose walls of various lengths. They could also be stacked to provide additional cover. These were essential in the construction of obstacles and above-the-ground bunkers (Tuzla had a very high water table) and helped provide cover for the guards conducting daily operations at the main gate. Through the use of dozers and small emplacement excavators (SEEs), these portable frame walls reduced bunker and obstacle construction time by a factor of ten.

The entrance and exit lanes for all vehicle traffic were switched at random to keep from establishing a pattern. The number of times the lanes were switched each day was also random. From 1800 to 2300 daily, after most of the daytime traffic had subsided, one of the lanes was further restricted and not used. From 2300-0600 the entire main gate closed and opened only for an occasional convoy that left the base or returned.

During the weekdays, traffic flow peaked between 0800 and 1000 hours. During this time, 200-300 vehicles would enter and 100-200 would depart. Typically, 50-100 personnel entered on foot. Monday morning traffic was particularly heavy, and it was not unusual to have a 100-meter line of vehicles waiting to enter. This caused many tempers to flare and pressured the soldiers conducting searches to hurry their work. This was the most confusing and dangerous time of the day and was treated as the daily main effort. A beefed up leadership presence was necessary to deal with those who were belligerent, and to ensure that all searches were thorough. The pace for the remainder of the day steadied to a manageable 15-20 vehicles per hour. The peak flow of local workers began around 1600 and generally finished by 1700. The rest of the day and night traffic flow diminished to less than 10 vehicles per hour.

Sustained Operations

Once the primary fighting positions were completed, the emplacement of alternate positions and obstacles began. Both alternate and supplemental positions supported the COPs on the flanks and in depth. A series of unannounced alerts and announced drills tested each COP on the Contingency Plans and the QRFs ability to react, assess, and support the personnel manning the COP.

The high volume of traffic at the main gate demanded continuous maintenance. The obstacle walls damaged by vehicles navigating the chicanes had to be replaced routinely. Cement and sand bag speed bumps lasted only a few days. Bunkers needed to be fixed and concertina wire replaced.

The two other platoons in the company couldn't help because each had its own portion of the airfield perimeter to secure, in addition to ramped-up patrol schedules. Each of them conducted platoon-size patrols outside the airfield once or twice a week, which required one platoon to fall in on the other's sector.

Since they were stretched thin, the company headquarters section brought supplies to the gate and a combination of QRF and Down element personnel were in charge of gate maintenance. Over time, maintenance of the gate area became so difficult that 1st Platoon's alternating fence-line patrol duties were tasked to the platoons on its left and right.

Quality of life improvements also became important. During conditions of extreme cold, warmth was an issue on the static positions of the COPs. Kerosene heaters were placed in each bunker and guard position. Roving guards were allowed five-minute breaks in a heated bunker or building. Living quarters included buildings, GP Medium tents, and evacuated aircraft hangars. Wooden floors and pot belly stoves were put in the tents. Cots and beds from the airbase were used wherever possible. Access to contractor-built shower, gym, and PX facilities soon became important to the morale of the soldiers. Dissemination of "any soldier" mail also helped to keep spirits up.

VIP visits to all the COPs soon became routine, and visitors ranged from field grade officers within the battalion to the President of the United States. These visitors, including the press, became a part of the mission itself and could not be discounted. During high-level visits, security for the principal visitor was the main concern. Heightened alert status, increased patrol activity, and cross-leveled manpower between COPs became necessary. For unplanned visits, leaders from team through platoon levels had to be prepared to brief their situation, mission, execution of operations at the COP, and recent activities.

Avoiding complacency became a factor on all COPs. Patrolling outside the airbase broke up the monotony. For 1st Platoon, however, patrolling was not possible. Although it was busier than any other COP, its duties began to get routine and mundane. After 50 days operating the main gate, there wasn't much the soldiers hadn't seen. Alerts were useful in combating this, but over time they worried about failing to anticipate the unexpected. As a result, 1st Platoon and 3d Platoon rotated COPs. This provided each with a new mission they attacked with vigor; it minimized complacency, and the change reduced chances of an unfortunate incident.

All of the training conducted before the deployment proved invaluable. Generally, the company's focus was on its wartime mission essential task list and small-unit basics—tasks and drills from ARTEP 7-8 MTP and FM 7-8 DRILL. The peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks were trained only when the battalion was alerted for missions outside the high intensity spectrum. During the year before deployment, the company had performed nine maneuver live fires at the platoon or squad level. Some of these included tasks in an urban environment. This realistic training developed small-unit leaders and teams that kept their discipline and confidence when they headed into the urban sprawl of Tuzla.

Once alerted for imminent deployment, the unit switched its focus to individual and team peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks such as *react to civil disturbance, mine avoidance/mine clearance, demonstrate show of force, control crowd, disarm belligerents,* and *react to media.* These tasks were trained on tough, realistic lanes that included an opposing force, role players, and observer-controllers. In addition to the tasks, each lane emphasized rules of engage-

CONTINGENCY PLANS

Suspicious Vehicles or Individuals. Individuals on foot or in vehicles are noticed paying unusual attention to activities at the gate. This includes several drive-bys by a particular vehicle, vehicles parked near the gate for long periods, and individuals who linger outside the gate and watch gate operations.

- The first guard to notice the unusual activity informs the Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.
- A detailed description of the individual(s)/vehicle, license plate number, time vicinity the gate, and activity is noted on a suspicious incident report in the guard shack.
- The video camera is used to record the suspicious activity and to act as a deterrent.
- If subject continues to linger, Bosnian Military Police officer or U.S. security detail w/interpreter questions subject as to intent and business.
- Spot report is sent to higher detailing activity.

Mob In Street. An armed or unarmed mob that assembles or riots outside the gate. Bosnian Military Police are unable to defuse the situation. The assembly's anger is directed toward the gate, airbase, or IFOR personnel.

- All personnel seek cover.
- QRF is alerted and deployed, remainder of platoon is alerted.
- Report submitted to higher, request assistance as needed.
- All traffic is diverted to another gate.
- Bosnian Military Policeman is asked to inform his higher HQ and request assistance.
- If mob becomes violent, attempt to use non-lethal deterrents. Laser pointers, bomb dog scare tactics, videotape crowd, identify and detain ringleaders.
- Platoon prepares to protect airfield from gate penetration by forming protective line.
- COP Commander may authorize warning shots.
- Use necessary deadly force IAW ROEs.

Shooting Near Gate. Individuals outside the perimeter fire shots within sight of the gate.

- All personnel seek cover.
- If firing is directed away from the airbase no action is authorized, but subject firing will be monitored (hundreds of small arms firing incidents can be heard each day and are normal).
- Shots directed toward the airbase may be answered with warning shots authorized by the Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.
- Deadly force is not authorized unless aimed fire and hostile intent is displayed.
- Videotape and report the situation.

Drive-By Shooting. A semiautomatic, automatic, or shoulder-fired weapon is fired toward the gate or airfield from a moving vehicle.

- All roving personnel immediately seek cover.
- Security personnel in bunker positions open fire on vehicle only if they have clear, unobstructed line of fire. Traffic, pedestrians, and houses must be taken into consideration.
- QRF is alerted and deployed.
- Report is submitted to higher.
- Bosnian Military Police are notified.
- Gate is shut down to all but military convoy traffic until area is confirmed safe.

Sniper. Aimed, individual shots are detected that likely emanate from a static position.

- All roving personnel immediately seek cover.
- Security personnel in bunker positions attempt to locate muzzle flash or smoke signature.
- If source is positively identified, the Checkpoint Commander may authorize personnel with M16s and clear line of fire to return fire on the sniper position.
- QRF is alerted and deployed.
- Report is submitted to higher, QRF prepares to patrol for sniper position.
- Bosnian Military Police are notified.
- Gate is shut down to all traffic until sniper fire ceases and sniper position is cleared.

Gate Roll-Through. A vehicle rolls through the front gate and hostile intent is not clear. Normally a simple misunderstanding where the vehicle must be stopped but deadly force is not necessary.

- All personnel call out "ROAD BLOCK" three times and give vehicle description by shouting and using PRC-126 radio.
- Closest personnel attempt to physically intercept vehicle and wave it to a stop.
- Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader may authorize use of warning shots.
- Remaining personnel move to covered positions until vehicle's intent is determined.
- M3 Bradley receives road block message FM and physically blocks road. Electrical safe will not be disengaged until a hostile act is witnessed.

Gate Ram. A vehicle intentionally runs through the obstacles and front gate and attempts to penetrate the airfield perimeter. Hostile intentions are not in doubt.

- All personnel call out "BUST" three times and give vehicle description by shouting and using PRC-126 radio.
- Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader fires green star cluster.
- Guard shack guard switches SINCGARS to channel 1 (CO CMD) and repeats bust message. Land line is used as alternate.
- Exposed personnel on gate go to nearest dive positions
- SAW in bunker #2 opens fire if possible.
- M60 position receives message FM, locks and loads, opens fire on vehicle as it passes through gate.
- M3 Bradley receives bust message FM, physically blocks road while simultaneously firing with coax machinegun.
- QRF is alerted and deployed.
- Report is submitted to higher.
- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

Car Bomb. A search team (dog or human) detects the possible presence of an explosive device in a vehicle.

- Search team alerts Checkpoint Commander or Security Squad Leader.
- Driver and passengers are taken into custody and moved to platoon CP.
- Gate is shut down and barricaded from traffic in both directions.
- M3 Bradley blocks road to prevent traffic from approaching gate from inside the base.
- All personnel on the checkpoint seek covered positions and the tower is vacated.
- All FM traffic vicinity the gate is restricted and landline is utilized.
- Report is submitted to higher, EOD is notified.
- Bosnian Military Police are notified.

Subject Attempts to Escape Airbase. The platoon is alerted and the platoon sector is 100% occupied.

- All vehicles and personnel attempting to exit the main gate are required to present ID.
- Special attention is paid to personnel or vehicles matching description of subject.
- Personnel on the fence line are stopped, questioned, and told to move away from the airbase.
- If the subject is positively identified, the SL may order a security detail to chamber a round prior to moving to apprehend the subject.
- If apprehended, detain, place under guard, report, and await evacuation to higher or the PMO.

Dismounted Assault. An organized, military style assault is conducted against the airbase.

- The platoon is alerted and 100% of the sector is occupied.
- All personnel chamber a round on order of the COP Commander. Open-bolt weapons go to the open bolt position.
- As per ROE, a tactical movement of troops constitutes hostile intent, therefore advances against the airbase may be engaged before the enemy opens fire.
- Report and adjust the perimeter (to include M3 Bradley) as the situation dictates.

Indirect Fire. An artillery or mortar round impacts in the vicinity of the airbase. Alternately, a REDLEG alert is received from the Q37 radar indicating rounds are inbound.

- All personnel seek cover.
- The gate is shut down to all traffic.
- All rounds that impact within sight of the checkpoint are reported and counted.

ment and force protection at all times. Only when units and individuals were certified across a broad spectrum of peacekeeping and peace enforcement tasks were they given the go-ahead to deploy.

Another lesson learned from Bosnia was the importance of capturing lessons learned and developing SOPs on the ground. The combat outpost SOP developed during the first few months at Tuzla Airbase was captured on paper and updated continuously. It was tested and adjusted as necessary through bottom up input. Eventually, the SOP developed at Tuzla Airbase was disseminated through the 1st Armored Division and used as a baseline for COP development by follow-on units throughout the American sector.

Mission experience during peace-keeping or peace enforcement operations is very beneficial to post-deployment high-intensity retraining and future deployments in any operational environment. The cognitive skills the soldiers gain can complement many missions and tasks. Improvements can be seen in the staff application of the military decision making process, leader decision making skills, and individual soldier tasks and discipline. The ability to apply rules of engagement pertains to the entire spectrum of warfare. Security operations, contingency planning, fighting position and obstacle construction, and rehearsals are all invaluable in any operational environment.

Soon after redeployment to Italy, the 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, including Company C, was alerted for immediate deployment to Monrovia, Liberia. Along with 10th Special Operations Forces, these soldiers conducted a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. Embassy personnel. The experience gained and the cohesion developed during the deployment to Bosnia proved invaluable during the performance of this highly successful NEO.

Looking back, the immediate change in standards and the visible sign that NATO and IFOR brought to the COPs and the main gate were essential. They sent an unmistakable signal to all in the area and to the world that IFOR was in charge and that its soldiers were professionals. This tone helped set the stage for successful peace enforcement in the war-torn region and marked the beginning of a change in a region long torn by ethnic war. This resulted in countless lives saved and a lasting peace that has brought stability to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Major Malcolm B. Frost commanded Company C, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry (ABCT) in Bosnia and recently completed an assignment as Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army. He previously served in the 4th Infantry Division and commanded a company in the 3d U.S. Infantry. He is a 1988 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.



TRAINING NOTES



Civil Affairs Forces

Civilians on the Battlefield at the JRTC

MEMBERS OF THE COMBAT TRAINING BRANCH (CTC)
U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYOPS COMMAND, AND CA PLANNERS AT THE JRTC

Civil Affairs (CA) forces can greatly enhance mission accomplishment for a maneuver brigade commander undergoing evaluation during a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. Various tactical scenarios have demonstrated the value of CA forces when they are properly integrated into maneuver force operations.

The JRTC offers battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs the most realistic training short of actual conflict. It is at brigade level that CA forces integrate with the maneuver force in a stressful, near-combat environment. The employment of CA forces during Civil-Military Operations (CMOs) will enhance the military effort in all operational environments. The versatility and flexibility of CA forces help the maneuver commander minimize civilian interference and also facilitate and lend legitimacy to U.S. military operations and objectives.

In peacetime and at various levels of conflict, military operations have proved more effective when commanders successfully integrated CA forces into their operational and tactical plans. Although conditions differ throughout the operational continuum, CA forces help commanders establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace within an area of operations (AO).

The term CA refers to the type of force as well as the operations the force conducts. The term CMO refers to a type of operation; for example, one that involves both civilians and the military. Although CMOs may or may not include CA forces, CA operations always include CA forces. For example, infantry units conduct infantry operations in support of combat operations; CA units conduct CA operations in support of CMOs, which may or may not support combat operations.

CA operations are those executed as an integral part of a military mission. The CA forces provide the local authorities and populace in an area with an understanding of the military operations and the consolidation activities being undertaken by the U.S. to achieve its objectives.

CA forces are employed to support two distinct missions: CMOs, as described above, and support to a host nation's civil administration. The emphasis at the JRTC is on CMOs.

The civilian dimension has grown larger and more complex in recent years. Civil-military operations help commanders influence, control, and develop civilian activities and organizations. Maneuver commanders with civilians in their sectors have inherent responsibilities for CMOs, including the following sub-mission related activities:

- Foreign nation support.
- Populace and resource control.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Military civic action.
- Civil defense.

Integrating CA Forces

Members of U.S. Army CA units are either tactical generalists or functional specialists. Tactical civil affairs forces normally operate within a command relationship, and are normally attached to maneuver commanders. Civil affairs specialists (functional specialty teams) also operate within a command relationship but may not always work for a maneuver commander. It is not uncommon for functional specialists to work under the tactical control of an Ambassador, a U.S. representative or other agency director, and yet receive administrative and logistical support from a military force operating in the area.

During pre-combat operations, CA forces work with the unit S-5 or G-5 on the CMO Estimate of the Situation, CMO Annex, and other CMO or CA-related appendices to the operations plan or order. The CMO Annex outlines the CMO mission, the elements

involved in its execution, and the priorities. CA forces also assist during the planning phase in analyzing operational courses of action against key CA-related factors. The CA soldier's goal is to help the commander minimize civilian interference with military operations.

Post-combat operations may be supported by providing a means of reconstructing public administration organizations and facilities, and giving the commander a means of conducting the transition from military to civil agencies. CA forces can interface with host nation civil and military authorities, as well as provide language and cultural expertise to U.S. military commanders. While CA forces, through daily contact, are in a position to obtain information from civilians, the role of CA in collection must remain passive. (Executive Order 12333 dated 4 Dec 1981, and USSOCOM Directive 11-1 prohibits SOF personnel from actively collecting intelligence and information.)

Civil Affairs Support Teams

A CA Brigade Support Team (BST) is staffed by USAR Civil Affairs units. A CA Tactical Support Team (TST) may be staffed by either Active Army or USAR Civil Affairs units. (See accompanying box.)

Various Civil Affairs support teams provide CA support to maneuver brigades and battalions. These teams usually consist of four to six soldiers, depending on the level of command to be supported. Vehicle and communications assets are organic to these teams, but supported commanders should be aware that the Army is currently fielding Civil Affairs forces with multiple subscriber equipment (MSE), with fielding to be completed during Fiscal Year 2000. Because 97 percent of the Civil Affairs force is in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), the maneuver commander may have either an Active Army or a USAR team organized as follows:

These teams function as the brigade CMO staff and provide civil affairs support as required. The teams conduct general and limited technical assessments as well as provide advice and assistance concerning regional and cultural matters.

CA BRIGADE SUPPORT TEAM (BST)
- Commander, Major (38A).
- Operations Officer, Captain (38A).
- Team Sergeant, Sergeant First Class (38A40).
- CA Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (38A30).
- CA Sergeant, Sergeant (38A20).
- CA Specialist, Specialist (38A10).

CA TACTICAL SUPPORT TEAM (TST)

USAR TST:
- Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain (38A).
- Team Sergeant, Staff Sergeant (38A30)*.
- CA Sergeant, Sergeant (38A20)*.
- CA Specialist, Specialist (38A10)*.

ACTIVE DUTY TST:
- Civil Military Operations Officer, Captain (39C).
- Operations/Intelligence NCO, Sergeant First Class (18F40)*.
- Engineer NCO, Sergeant First Class (18C40)*.
- Medical NCO, Sergeant First Class (18D40)*.

**The CA Branch, CMF 38A, exists only in the USAR. Selected CMF 18 NCOs and FA 39C Officers are in the Active Army.* (See attachment for duty descriptions of team members.)

Commanders requesting CA forces should recognize that for contingencies and quick-reaction crises the Active Army CA soldiers provide immediate deployment response. These soldiers are specialists in CMO and are qualified to provide cultural expertise, limited language capability, and expertise in dislocated civilian (DC) operations. Most CA operations, however, require the application of specific civilian-related skills that are available only within USAR CA units. As a result, Active Army CA forces are typically deployed on a quick-reaction basis until USAR soldiers can replace them.

CA forces can also orchestrate a coordinated effort between the maneuver unit and any nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), international organizations, and local governments operating within the area of responsibility. In summary, without proper CMO planning and the effective use of attached CA soldiers and teams, commanders must use their own soldiers and resources to resolve difficult situations involving civilian matters.

During a JRTC rotation, a brigade or battalion commander may encounter various situations, each of which includes tasks typically coordinated or monitored by attached CA elements. A brigade commander who allows the brigade or battalion CA team to focus on and coordinate such situations will be better able to achieve his military objectives without distraction or reorientation of his maneuver force.

Civilians on the Battlefield

Each town or village within the JRTC maneuver box is populated with role players acting as civilians with a certain political profile. These people present an ideal opportunity for the maneuver commander to determine how to win the support of the local populace. This situation is best accomplished by sending a CA team into the village to open a dialogue with the local officials. As might be expected, failure to do so may result in increased disruption of military operations by the OPFOR and hamper control of the village.

"Civilians on the Battlefield" is a term commonly used by the JRTC staff and observer-controllers. These civilians may include the following categories, among others:

- Displaced Person—a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundary of his resident country in time of war. (Also a generic doctrinal term that may include the following groups as well.)
- Refugee—A civilian who, because of real or imagined danger, has left his residence to seek safety.
- Evacuee—A civilian removed from his residence by military order.
- Stateless person—A civilian who meets any of the following criteria—who has been de-nationalized, whose country of origin cannot be determined, or who cannot establish his right to the nationality he claims.
- War victim—A classification created during the Vietnam era to describe a civilian suffering injuries, loss of a family member, or damage to or destruction of his home as a result of war.

Towns and villages at the JRTC are populated with civilians because of their

potential to affect the unit's mission. A primary doctrinal task for the CA team is to help the unit S-5 develop plans to minimize civilian interference with the unit's mission. These civilians are the responsibility of the maneuver commander, as outlined in Field Manual (FM) 27-10, *Law of Land Warfare.*

Information gained from interaction with the local population can be invaluable in determining the most effective methods and techniques to use in dealing with complex military-civilian situations. The CA team should review this information, share it with the unit S-5, S-3, and commander and recommend a course of action that supports the unit's mission.

In the absence of this interaction between the CA team and the civilians on the battlefield, the maneuver commander may need to use other organic units that, through no fault of their own, lack the expertise to resolve such issues. Maneuver commanders, by virtue of their position on the battlefield, run the risk of further complicating any problems these civilians may present, as well as unnecessarily spending time and resources on efforts to solve those problems.

In today's world, civilians are likely to be dislocated by virtually any type of conflict, and maneuver brigade commanders must recognize the ways in which they can affect operations. The CA team is the maneuver commander's primary resource for reducing the impact of these people on operations. As an integral part of the JRTC training experience, the team's proper role in coordinating civilian movement and handling through establishment of control measures reduces the effects of civilians on the brigade's operations.

As previously mentioned, it is important that the maneuver commander learn the political climate prevalent in the villages in the AO, and this insight may be obtained from information gathered by the CA team. The attitude of the populace may range from neutral to pro-government or from neutral to anti-government.

When the attitude leans toward pro-government, commanders must open a dialogue with the local village officials. Failure to do so may alienate the populace and open the door to OPFOR influence instead.

The CA team's actions can reinforce the positive perception of U.S. forces and its efforts to help the people of the village, and these steps can lead to greater cooperation from the populace.

When the attitude tends toward anti-government, a commander's failure to effect contact with a local village can lead to increased resistance to U.S. forces and aid the cause of the OPFOR. Since the populace has seen and possibly assisted the OPFOR, efforts to win their support greatly increase the chances of a successful mission. CA teams are an excellent medium for such contact.

Towns or villages that have a neutral-to-negative attitude give the commander an excellent opportunity to gain valuable information about the OPFOR. Sending a CA team to talk with local officials and leaders in the area demonstrates U.S. concern for the safety and well-being of the populace. Visits to local officials may also help lead the populace to support friendly forces.

Coordination

Coordination with civil or military authorities is essential to the success of CMOs. Military commanders at all levels can influence both the populace and the civil authorities in many ways to help the brigade accomplish its mission. They use the CA teams coordinate with the NGOs and PVOs portrayed during the rotation.

An example of civil-military cooperation occurs during the DC flow portion of a rotation. Also, coordination with the NGOs and PVOs will result in a more controlled flow of DCs with minimum effect on brigade operations. The coordination the CA team performs can allows for the use of host nation assets to control and move civilians away from main supply routes, thus reducing the amount of brigade assets required.

Improperly conducted coordination will result in an uncontrolled flow of DCs throughout the brigade's AO. Failure to properly coordinate for host nation support will also force the brigade to use its own assets to transport DCs to and from the collection points. Additionally, coordination with local medical authorities reduces the need for the brigade to provide medical assistance to the DCs.

Shelter for the Homeless. In the event homeless civilians request shelter, the CA team may be used to ascertain how many there are and the location of suitable shelter. Finding shelter for these civilians may free supply routes, improve battlefield circulation control, and encourage a stay-put policy.

Food and Medical Assistance.

CIVIL AFFAIRS DUTY DESCRIPTIONS

38A Civil Affairs Specialist (USAR)—CA specialists conduct coordination, research, analysis, and execute civil affairs related functional specialty missions. They plan, train, advise, assist, and execute CMO and other programs to accomplish national objectives.

18 Series Special Forces (Active)—These soldiers act primarily as Civil Affairs generalists in addition to performing 18-series skills (Operations/Intelligence, Engineer, and Medical). They are capable of supporting the maneuver commander's immediate needs by supervising or conducting CMOs that support the tactical mission. They are CA-qualified but normally do not have the civilian-based functional skills of a Civil Affairs specialist.

38A Civil Affairs Officer (USAR)—The 38A CA officer is technically qualified within a civilian-based functional skill. The CA officer plans, trains, advises, assists, and executes CMOs and other programs to accomplish national objectives. In addition, he commands or serves in CA units, S-5/G-5 positions requiring CA experience or training, and in command or staff positions requiring the following:

- Political knowledge and diplomacy skills to advise and interact with senior officials (ministerial level) of foreign nations and ability to conduct coordination or liaison between U.S. military, foreign governments and civilians, civilian relief agencies, and other U.S. Government agencies, and use interpersonal and cross-cultural communicative skills to facilitate interaction.
- Knowledge and ability to provide advice and assistance to civil, paramilitary, and military leaders of U.S. and foreign nations involving matters concerning CMO.

39C Civil Affairs Officer (AC)—The 39C Civil Affairs Officer (AC) performs the same duties and requires the same knowledge as the 38A Civil Affairs Officer (USAR). In addition, the 39C Civil Affairs Officer has other requirements such as a language skill and Airborne qualification.

While it is still the local government's responsibility to feed and provide for its population, civilians may look to the military commander in the AO for food and medicine. After every effort has been made to have the local government take responsibility for resolving the problem using civilian resources, support and assistance may be provided when necessary. Captured enemy supplies may be used to feed and provide medicine to the local populace. U.S. supplies should be used only in emergency cases.

Protection from Combat Operations. The panic caused by combat operations themselves may lead to unnecessary civilian casualties. Coordination with local officials can help enforce a stay-put policy or a controlled evacuation, thus enabling the maneuver commander to manage his battlespace with minimal civilian interference.

Protection from Enemy Forces or Guerrillas. In the event local national forces cannot provide adequate security for their citizens, U.S. forces may have to provide some sort of protection against enemy or guerrilla forces. A logical strategy is to coordinate with local officials to identify civilians who may be loyal to enemy forces and have them detained by civilian authorities.

If a commander finds it necessary to use U.S. combat units to locate and destroy enemy forces, the plan should focus on ensuring civilian cooperation and support (stay-put, screening, combat information from civilians). A sense of security among the populace will increase support to U.S. forces in the area. Failure to provide a secure environment may lead to continued fear, suspicion, panic, and increased civilian and military casualties.

Support in Restoring Facilities. In restoring damaged facilities, again, U.S. military resources are used only as a last resort. If U.S. forces have not caused the damage, leaders should coordinate with civilian officials for necessary repairs using local resources. The brigade simply does not have the equipment or resources to make major repairs. In cases where U.S. forces have caused the damage, local officials should be informed that repairs and or reparations can be requested after the cessation of combat operations. Repairs to facilities will keep refugees to a minimum, ensure U.S. use of key facilities, if necessary, and encourage favorable views towards U.S. forces.

Reports of Civilian Deaths. Reports of civilian deaths must be handled carefully. Failure to show concern for civilian deaths places U.S. forces in a bad light with the local population. This lack of concern may alienate the local populace, and give the OPFOR an incident to exploit.

The recommended action for a commander is to determine whether deaths have actually occurred, whether U.S. forces have been operating in the suspected location of the remains, and whether the deaths were due to U.S. forces or enemy forces.

If it appears that U.S. forces have caused the deaths, an initial investigation should be conducted to determine the proximate cause of death. The proper recovery and disposition of civilian remains should then be coordinated with local officials.

Reports of Livestock Deaths. Livestock losses during combat operations can greatly affect the economy of an area and rapidly turn public sentiment against U.S. forces. Livestock must be considered a source of livelihood for the populace, and this must therefore be given the attention it demands.

If U.S. forces kill livestock, the private owner of that livestock has grounds for a claim against the United States. Identifying what type and how many will help resolve problems.

Unrecoverable Minefields. Unrecoverable minefields left behind when U.S. forces move to new locations can have devastating consequences for the local populace. Beyond the obvious personal suffering, unrecovered mines also deny farmers the use of their fields, hinder the resumption of agricultural production, deny access to markets, reduce public confidence in fledgling governments, and cause resentment of U.S. forces.

Before units move, it is the commander's responsibility to see that his engineers verify the locations, dimensions, and number of minefields that will not be recovered and report this information to local civilian officials. Coordination must be made with civil officials, PSYOP units, and public affairs officers to disseminate the information.

Requests for Refugee Status. Displaced civilians often request refugee status, which only the Department of State can grant. But the local commander—normally at division but no lower than brigade—does have the authority to grant temporary refuge. When refugee status is granted, corps headquarters provides follow-on instructions or guidance.

Transportation Support. If providing transportation for civilians adversely affects operations, the CA team can explain to civilian authorities that the civilians will have to use local assets or walk, using specified routes.

When transportation is for movement of cargo, priority of transport is required. If the cargo is emergency food or medical supplies to support DC operations, supporting the request may adversely affect tactical operations.

Civilians on the battlefield have been, and will continue to be, a fact of life in combat. The CA team's primary mission at the tactical level is to minimize civilian interference with the maneuver unit's ability to accomplish its objective. The proper use of CA resources in CMOs can contribute significantly to mission success, whether it is at the JRTC or in an actual contingency. A commander's increased awareness of the versatility and employability of his attached civil affairs forces will enhance mission accomplishment in all kinds of training and combat.

The authors of this article are the following:

Major Michael A. Eyre, Deputy Chief, Humanitarian Demining Office, CENTCOM J-5.
Major Alvin T. Banker, Jr., CA planner, JRTC.
Captain David J. Albanese, Deputy Chief, Collective Training Branch, U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.
Sergeant First Class John Stockton, Special Forces Branch (PSYOPs), U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.
Sergeant First Class Colleen M. Burrows, Office of G-3, U.S. Army CA & PSYOPs Command.

Close Quarters Marksmanship
Training for Conventional Infantry Units

CAPTAIN BRET VAN POPPEL
CAPTAIN JOHN PAGANINI
CAPTAIN JEFFREY A. RYNBRANDT

In an effort to standardize training on military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), U.S. infantry battalions in Korea are testing a prototype training program based upon leader training, close-quarter marksmanship (CQM), and close-quarter battle (CQB). With a high personnel turnover and with less training ammunition and fewer facilities than Special Operations units, the overall training package is simple and focuses on basic individual and squad-level skills. The draft training proposal is predicated on principles from Field Manual (FM) 90-10-1, *An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat*, with Change-1, and Ranger Regiment Training Circular 350-2. Modified for a conventional unit with heavy personnel turbulence, the proposal is divided into four phases:

Phase I—Leader Training and Certification (team leader through platoon leader).

Phase II—Close-Quarter Marksmanship.

Phase III—Preliminary Close-Quarter Battle.

Phase IV—Dry Fire through Live Fire for Individual through Multiple Team-Multiple Room.

This article will address Phase II—CQM training, qualification, and evaluation. As with all collective training, CQM begins with leader training and certification.

Leader Training

The MOUT training proposal initiates every phase with leader certification. Units may elect to conduct leader training in one block immediately before each phase. For CQM training, we recommend that all battalion-level leader training be conducted within one month of unit CQM training. Leader training should start with an officer professional development (OPD) to familiarize all officers, especially junior leaders, with basic quick-fire or reflexive firing techniques, dry-fire drills and training tips, marksmanship tables, and basic range setup. A one-day battalion-level OPD might include a two-hour classroom block of instruction, followed by two hours of dry-fire and blank-fire drills in the battalion area. In the afternoon, all officers shoot several CQM familiarization tables on a certified or modified quick-fire range.

Company-level leader training should also begin in the classroom with professionally prepared blocks of instruction for all the company's leaders (from

TABLE I— Familiarization

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	4	4m	Single shot	None
Straight ahead	4	7m	Single shot	None
Straight ahead	4	10m	Single shot	None
Straight ahead	4	4m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead	4	7m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead	4	10m	Controlled pair	None

TABLE II—Familiarization

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Left turn	6 (2 ea. X3)	10m	Controlled pair	None
Right turn	6 (2 ea. X3	4m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead walking	6 (2 ea. X3)	7m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead walking	6 (2 ea. X3)	10m	Controlled pair	None
Walk-stop-turn	6 (2 ea. X3)	4m	Controlled pair	None
Run-stop-shoot	6 (2 ea. X3)	7m	Controlled pair	None

TABLE III—Timed Practice

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	6 (2 ea. X3)	10m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Left turn	6 (2 ea. X3	4m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Right turn	6 (2 ea. X3)	7m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead walking	6 (2 ea. X3	10m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Walk-stop-turn	6 (2 ea. X3)	4m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead walking	6 (2 ea. X3	7m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Run-stop-shoot	6 (2 ea. X3)	10m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead	4	25m	Single shot	None (fam)

team level up). These leader professional development sessions should be conducted the week of, or the week before, MOUT and CQM training, and the instruction should be prepared and delivered by NCOs. Preliminary instruction must include detailed explanations of the fundamentals of reflexive firing, including the following:

- Stance.
- Carry technique (low-carry, high-carry).
- Aiming techniques (slow-aim, rapid-aim, aimed quick-fire, instinctive).
- Movement with weapons.
- Weapon control (moving from low-carry to high-carry).
- Safety considerations.

Classroom instruction concludes with reflexive-fire range setup and control, CQM familiarization firing tables, and qualification requirements.

Company leader training progresses from the classroom to hands-on training. All company NCOs and officers execute dry-fire and blank-fire drills before graduating to live-fire familiarization on a quick-fire range. Leader training must focus on training and control rather than on perfection in individual skills. Range procedures, safety principles, and training troubleshooting techniques are paramount for company leaders.

TABLE IV—Transition Familiarization

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	4	4m	Controlled pair	7 seconds
Straight ahead	4	7m	Controlled pair	7 seconds
Straight ahead	4	10m	Controlled pair	8 seconds
Straight ahead walking	4	7m	Controlled pair	8 seconds
Straight ahead walking	4	10m	Controlled pair	8 seconds

FIRING TABLE V—Stationary, Single Target, Shape Discrimination Familiarization

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	6 (2 ea. X3)	4m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead	6	7m	Controlled pair	None
Straight ahead	6	10m	Controlled pair	None

FIRING TABLE VI—Single Target, Moving and Turning Discrimination

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Left turn	6 (2 ea. X3	4m	Controlled pair	None
Right turn	6	7m	Controlled pair	None
Walk-stop-shoot	6	10m	Controlled pair	None

FIRING TABLE VII—Multiple Target, Moving and Turning Discrimination

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	4	4m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Straight ahead	4	7m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Left turn	4	10m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Right turn	4	7m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Walk-stop-shoot	4	10m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Walk-stop-turn	4	7m	Controlled pair	5 seconds
Walk-stop-turn	4	10m	Controlled pair	5 seconds

NOTE: For pretest, use a bank of three realistic or shape targets. Two targets are engaged on command *UP, (shapes)*. Scoring Standard: 24-28 hits = T; 18-23 hits = P; 1-17 hits = U.

FIRING TABLE VIII (CQM Evaluation). NOTE—This table fired twice.

POSITION	ROUNDS	DISTANCE	METHOD	TIME STD
Straight ahead	2	4m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Left turn	2	7m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Right turn	2	10m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead, walking	2	4m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead, walking	2	7m	Controlled pair	3 sec .from *UP*
Walk-stop-turn	2	7m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Run-stop-shoot	2	10m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*
Straight ahead	2	25m	Controlled pair	3 sec. from *UP*

NOTE: 3 E-type silhouettes in a target bracket. Firer engages using proper aiming technique on command *UP,(shape)*. Only one target engaged for each engagement. Scoring Standard: 26-32 hits = T; 22=25 hits = P; 0-20 hits = U

Preliminary CQM Training

Training on basic individual skills should begin, again, in the classroom. Squad leaders and team leaders teach squad members the fundamentals of stance and weapon carry technique of all soldiers. Classes *must* be professionally prepared and validated by platoon sergeants and platoon leaders and must be performance oriented. Squad leaders may use butcher paper diagrams, computer-generated illustrations, action video footage, and live demonstrations to inculcate skills and fundamentals. Take-home packages or handouts also help soldiers understand. For planning purposes, classroom preliminary training usually requires three to four hours.

For hands-on training, all soldiers should have M16 rifles or M4 carbines. Using the *crawl-walk-run* methodology, team and squad leaders evaluate the stance and weapon carry technique of all soldiers. Soldiers slowly move straight ahead and turn left and right. In actual or simulated confined spaces, all soldiers should master general movement:

- Straight ahead.
- Left turn.
- Right turn.
- Walk-stop-walk.
- Run-stop.
- Walk-turn-walk.

Once the soldiers have a solid base of movement with weapons, the training should move on to aiming techniques. Although dependent upon the situation, the most desirable aiming technique is rapid-aim fire (a quick sight picture; used from 0-25 meters) or the aimed quick-fire kill (top of front sight flush on the rear peep sight; used from 0-11 meters). E-type targets should be set up or targets designated for soldiers to engage. Starting from the stationary position, all soldiers are drilled in obtaining a quick, modified picture—first from the high-carry position, then from the low-carry position.



While facing targets within 25 meters, the soldiers rapidly obtain modified sight pictures on the command *UP*. When this basic skill has been instilled, turns and movement can be added.

The graduation phase of preliminary CQM should include all types of movement and the components of stance, weapon carry, and aim. Exercises can take many forms. Dry-fire tables corresponding to live-fire CQM tables are recommended (addressed in detail below). These exercises can be conducted in unit areas using E-type silhouettes and engineer tape to mark four to six lanes. MILES harnesses can also be fitted on targets to provide downrange feedback for dry-fire or blank-fire preliminary tables.

CQM Qualification

A reflexive fire range is ideal for CQM qualification. If no such range is available, many squad or platoon maneuver ranges or known-distance ranges can be modified to support CQM firing. CQM qualification ranges should include at least four lanes, adequately spaced for safety and effective training. The range should extend out to 25 meters and be marked at four, seven, and ten meters. Markings should be unobtrusive, as they serve only as administrative control measures for instructors and controllers. Target stands should hold at least three E-type silhouettes for firing that requires the shooter to discriminate between targets (see diagram).

During the execution of CQM, soldiers draw pre-loaded magazines and begin from designated firing lines (four-meter, seven-meter) in accordance with the marksmanship firing tables. Taking commands from range instructors, all soldiers begin from the low-carry position and engage targets in their respective lanes.

In Table I, firers administratively move to each firing position on the command of the instructor. From the low-carry position, firers aim and fire on the command *UP*.

SAMPLE TRAINING CALENDAR—Platoon

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
OFF				Leader Tng—CQM	Leader Tng—CQB; Prep	OFF
OFF	Range Setup PLT CQM	Platoon CQM Makeup/Flow Drills	Tirehouse LFX, MOD 1-3	Tirehouse LFX, MOD 4-5	Refit	OFF

SAMPLE TRAINING CALENDAR—Company

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
OFF				Leader Tng—CQM	Leader Tng—CQB; Prep	OFF
OFF	Range Setup 1st PLT CQM	2d PLT CQM 1st PLT Flow Drills	3d PLT CQM 2d PLT Flow 1st PLT LFX MOD 1-3	3d Plt Flow 2d Plt LFX MOD 1-3 1st Plt Refit	3d Plt LFX MOD 1-3 2d Plt Refit	Refit/OFF
OFF	3d PLT Spt 2d PLT Prep 1st PLT LFX MOD 4-5	1st PLT Spt 3d PLT Prep 2d PLT LFX MOD 4-5	2d PLT Spt 3d PLT LFX MOD 4-5 1st PLT Refit	RETRAIN MAKEUP	REFIT	OFF

In Table II, for right turn and left turn, soldiers face 90 degrees from target, pivot turn on the command *UP*, and fire.

In Table IV, two E-type silhouettes are placed in the target bracket. Soldiers must engage both targets with two rounds each on the command *UP*.

In Firing Table V, use three E-type silhouettes in a target bracket. Each E-type will have a 6"x6" shape (circle, triangle, square), black on a white heavy-duty paper or poster background. The firer engages the correct target using the proper aiming technique after command *UP* and shape (*UP*, *Circle*, for example).

CQM-CQB Linkage

CQM is only the second phase of an overall MOUT training package. Subsequent phases incorporate CQB individual skills through the collective task of clearing multiple rooms with multiple teams. During the live-fire CQB phase (Phase IV), this training proposal has squads train the following modules in a tirehouse or shoothouse:

- Module 1: Individual dry fire, blank fire, live fire.
- Module 2: Buddy team dry fire, blank fire, live fire.
- Module 3: Single team, single room dry fire, blank fire, live fire.
- Module 4: Single team, multiple room dry fire, blank fire, live fire.
- Module 5: Multiple team, multiple room dry fire, blank fire, live fire.

With limited assets and time, the training calendars such as the example shown here allow squads to train to the P+ or T– level.

Close-quarter marksmanship is an integral part of fighting in any built-up area. Even without large quantities of training ammunition and the weeks of dedicated training time in a shoothouse, units can still train and sustain individual proficiency in CQM and squad-level proficiency in CQB collective tasks with multiple teams.

Captain Bret P. Van Poppel served as a platoon leader in the 6th Infantry Division; the support platoon leader in the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment; and assistant G-3 in the 2d Infantry Division. He currently commands Company B, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, in Korea. He is a 1992 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Captain John Paganini served as platoon leader and brigade S-3 Air in the 82d Airborne Division; as S-1 and S-3 Air, and company commander in the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, and is currently S-4, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. He is a 1992 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

Captain Jeffrey A. Rynbrandt was a platoon leader, company XO, and brigade S-3 Air in the 82d Airborne Division, and S-3 Air in the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, and now commands a company in the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry in Korea. He is a 1993 graduate of the United States Military Academy.

The Sphinx Target

Marksmanship Training in Three Dimensions

MASTER SERGEANT MARC PALMER

No matter what you think about the state of Army marksmanship training, certain items are absolutely essential to conducting worthwhile training. The most basic of these items are weapons, ammunition, ranges, and targets.

Regardless of the location or the element conducting the training, targets are almost always two-dimensional. While two-dimensional targets are effective for training soldiers in Basic Rifle Marksmanship, they stifle a soldier's further development and the trainer's ability to simulate battlefield targets.

During my tenure as the NCO in charge of the Special Operation Target Interdiction Course at Fort Bragg, one of the instructors, Sergeant First Class John Simpson, came to me with a training problem. He wanted a target that presented a three-dimensional profile of an enemy soldier and that also afforded a scoring method.

In other sniper courses, rag-filled dummies were used on field fire ranges where they were laid out to represent enemy soldiers lying prone on the ground. Some dummies are made to simulate the head and shoulders of a soldier observing from a fighting position. Scoring hits on these dummies is very difficult and Sergeant Simpson wanted to make it easier to evaluate the number of hits.

After a few minutes of discussion we went to the target shed and grabbed two E-type silhouettes and came up with a target that we call the Sphinx:

Cut the first silhouette (head target) across the chest 19 inches below the top of the head. Then cut one entire shoulder away and cut a slit from the bottom of the target halfway up toward the head. Score a line on the second (base) target across the chest 19 inches below the head and then fold along this line. Cut a three- or four-inch slit upward from the center of the target bottom for the tab on the "body" strip. Also slit the base target from the top of the head downward to accommodate the head target. Then cut the body strip from the remainder of the first target nine inches wide and have a small tab at one end to



Sphinx Target

engage the slit in the bottom of the base target. To lock everything together, cut a two-by-four-inch strip as a locking piece for the head and body sections.

The target can be assembled very rapidly. Lay the body of the base target flat on the ground with the head raised to vertical, and slide the head target down into the head of the base target. Insert the tab on the body into the slit in the bottom of the base target and fold it over. Then cut a notch for the locking piece in the rear shoulder of the head target and the body strip to lock everything together. Once the target is assembled, it can be thrown around without coming apart. See the accompanying sketches for construction and assembly.

The options for using the Sphinx are almost limitless. Sphinx targets can be used on any terrain, because they do not require stakes to emplace, are easily scored, can be patched with normal pasters, and afford lifelike positioning. The Sphinx target can be held in position during high winds by sandbags, a little dirt kicked onto the target, or a small piece of wood placed onto the Sphinx.



Target Construction

Sphinx targets can be used in structures during MOUT training without creating specialized target stands. Additionally, three-dimensional standing targets can be made from two full size E-type silhouettes for MOUT training:

Slit one target from the top of the head halfway down through the body, and slit the other from the bottom halfway up toward the head. Then slide them together, forming the three-dimensional profile. These targets can be placed inside structures standing on the floor, tables, or boxes to create target heights that simulate personnel in standing or kneeling positions. Furniture can be used to partially mask or completely hide the targets, and clothing can be draped over the shoulders of the Sphinx.

The Sphinx targets' greatest value is on an unknown distance range where they can be placed with varying levels of camouflage to challenge soldiers to find and engage them within a specified period of time. The three-dimensional nature of a Sphinx gives it different appearances from different vantage

points. The changing appearance causes soldiers to observe the ground in front of them instead of simply looking for silhouettes. Of course, painting these targets in other colors or patterns contributes to the difficulty in finding and then engaging them, which adds still more to the training value.

The targets are easy to disassemble and store for reuse later. The disassembled targets do not require a large amount of storage space because they can lie flat and occupy the same space as E-type silhouettes. Eliminating the requirement for wooden target stakes solves the problem of stake procurement, stake emplacement (hole digging), disposal of broken stakes, and storage of serviceable stakes. Picks and shovels are not required, and range clean-up is much faster.

The Sphinx is a training enhancement that any unit can use at virtually no cost. Give it a shot!

Master Sergeant Marc V. Palmer has served in Special Forces assignments since 1977, including assignments as an instructor, a gunsmith, and NCO in charge at the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course. He is now assigned to Training Branch, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), at Fort Bragg.

The Power
Of the Quarterly Training Brief

MAJOR JOHN M. SPISZER

Field Manual (FM) 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, requires company commanders to brief their brigade commanders on their quarterly training plan. Commanders often ignore this aspect of the Army's training doctrine, since FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, states only a requirement from battalion to division. This is a misconception that must be corrected because it is detrimental to the Army's purpose in maintaining a trained and ready force.

Army training doctrine should reemphasize the importance of brigade-level quarterly training briefings (QTBs), because they provide the critical azimuth check to ensure that training is conducted in accordance with that doctrine and also because they are an invaluable leader development tool.

In fact, the brigade-level QTB is a much more valuable tool than the division equivalent. The planning and execution of most training occur at company level, and these plans, due to their importance to the force, deserve more attention than they usually get. In addition, the leader development aspect of briefing the senior rater (and rater), with lieutenants and senior sergeants present, is vastly greater than that between division and battalion commanders. At this level, true mentoring relationships are formed that are vitally important for both the senior and the subordinate.

In order to present and manage QTBs effectively, commanders must understand them. Some units conduct them religiously. My experience as a company commander included doing a QTB every quarter, six to eight weeks out, for two years. But no other brigade commander in the division required a QTB from his company commanders. An informal survey of my contemporaries in the Command and General Staff Officer's Course revealed that only about half of them had ever briefed a QTB as a company commander. Many senior commanders recognize the value of brigade-level QTBs but fail to ensure that their subordinate commanders conduct them. This occurs because they either do not understand the requirement or assume that it is common knowledge and accomplished accordingly, but this is not the case.

The question then is whether brigade-level QTBs are important enough for the effort they require. Perhaps the collective wisdom is that they are just one more administrative requirement that takes commanders away from training to go to war. If you examine this issue from the time perspective alone, there is some argument: It is another training event that will probably take at least two hours per battalion for the actual briefing, or at least six hours of a brigade commander's time every quarter. Both battalion staffs and company commanders have to prepare, which takes even more time. But preparation time can be limited to only a few hours, especially for a commander who is actively involved with his training strategy and needs on a daily basis; for example, establishing a standard briefing packet and piggybacking on the higher level QTB (conducting the brigade QTB after the division's to ensure the higher plan is approved first). A company can adequately brief its plan in 20 to 30 minutes (including time to respond to the brigade commander's questions), and a battalion's companies can finish their QTBs within two hours.

Another issue concerns when to conduct the brigade-level QTB. Doctrine states it is to be conducted before the lock-in window (at least six weeks out) for training and after the publication of the quarterly training guidance. Since the QTB results in a training contract between the senior and subordinate, this

makes sense, and it needs to be far enough out not to change near-term training but close enough that the plan has some coherence. But when should this briefing take place, before or after the battalion commander's briefing to the division commander? It must go *after*, for the practical reason that the higher contract (division to battalion) should be signed first to avoid multiple changes to the company commander's training plan. The practice of briefing the company plan before the battalion's briefing is largely an effort to fine-tune and rehearse the battalion effort. In fact, the company commander does not have the clarity of guidance and resources necessary to prepare his training plan until after the battalion's plan has been developed and approved. Thus, his briefing must follow that of his battalion commander (approximately two weeks, to allow preparation and modification time), and he still needs to brief before the near term training lock-in, ideally before the period to be briefed becomes a topic during his company training meetings (closer to eight weeks out). This sets the time window for both division and brigade-level QTBs—ten to twelve weeks out for the former and seven to nine weeks for the latter.

The next question is whether the time is worth the result, the QTB. The answer is a definite yes. First, it is vitally important that the brigade commander review and approve the training plans of his companies. Using the QTB process, he can ensure that his brigade is planning to conduct the appropriate battle-focused and multiechelon training needed to ensure success in its wartime mission. The briefing also verifies to the commander that his guidance is being followed and that his company commanders have a firm grasp on how to plan for, assess, and manage their training. In addition, the brigade commander can make any necessary adjustments to the company (and battalion) training plans during the QTB. These adjustments occur far enough out that a unit and its personnel can easily make them, ensure that training detractors are kept to a minimum, and keep the entire unit working toward a common goal.

Perhaps most important, most of the training is done at company level. Every day is a training day for all combat arms companies and for most combat support and combat service support companies as well. Staffs and higher level organizations plan training, support daily operations, and occasionally execute training. But units at battalion level and higher execute training far less frequently. The company commanders are the Army's primary trainers who do it every day. For training events to achieve standards, their planning and preparation must meet standards as well. The brigade-level QTB is the brigade commander's azimuth check to ensure that the company commanders' plans are feasible, acceptable, and suitable.

The integrated training tasks matrix will help ensure that the company commanders are planning to accomplish what is necessary. This matrix is added to the standard type QTB format and is shown simultaneously with the company's monthly training calendar, and follows the unit's mission essential task list (METL). *(See Major Spiszer's article, "A Tool for Commanders: The Integrated Training Task Matrix," in* Infantry, *November-December 1996, pp. 5-9).*

The matrix is a tool to assist in the identification, preparation, and integration of the tasks the unit will conduct during training. It integrates collective, leader, individual, and drill tasks, both before and during training. It highlights retraining requirements as well as Sergeant's Time tasks. On one or two matrix slides per calendar month, a company commander, along with his first sergeant, can articulate in terms of time and effort how he plans to prepare for and conduct training and how the training is integrated from individual to collective level. By reviewing the matrices and calendars immediately after the METL assessment slide (or by posting the unit's METL assessment on an easel where it is visible during the entire meeting), the brigade commander can check to make sure the company has the appropriate battle focus. When the matrix is shown with the calendar, the brigade commander can verify that the training is appropriate in relation to other events. Showing as Sergeant's Time those tasks to be done prior to collective training, and those that require retraining, allows the brigade commander to ensure that thought has gone into preparation, NCO responsibilities, and evaluation of past training. In short, the use of the integrated training task matrix, along with the METL assessment and unit training calendar, is an invaluable tool for the brigade commander. He can tell at a glance whether planned training is in accordance with the METL and his guidance. Furthermore, since the brigade-level QTB occurs after the division level, it also allows the battalion commander to ensure that the planned training is in accordance with his just-concluded training "contract" and guidance.

INTEGRATED TRAINING TASKS

____WEEKS OUT WEEK ____

COLLECTIVE TASKS	LEADER TASKS	INDIVIDUAL TASKS	DRILLS	
DURING GREEN/AMBER CYCLE	DURING COLLECTIVE TNG	DURING COLLECTIVE TNG	DURING COLLECTIVE TNG	
FUTURE TASKS WK	PRIOR TO COLLECTIVE TNG	PRIOR TO COLLECTIVE TNG	PRIOR TO COLLECTIVE TNG	SERGEANT'S TIME
	RETRAINING	RETRAINING	RETRAINING	

The use of these matrices also shortens and focuses the QTB. The focus gained is on those truly critical aspects of training: *Why* are we training, *how* are we going to train, and *when* are we going to train. Shortening and focusing QTBs will make them less time-consuming and easier to conduct, give the brigade commander more time to give his verbal guidance, and result in a more valuable session for everyone attending.

Preparing the matrices (and the thought processes necessary to the preparation) requires the company commander and his subordinates to truly plan and integrate their training. They must understand and articulate why they are training, how they are training, and the reasons they have prioritized specific tasks above others. In addition, preparing these matrices for the brigade-level QTB adds substance to the company's training plan for the next quarter. In essence, the matrices and calendars are a company commander's quarterly training guidance. Further refinement provides an excellent tool for the final planning, preparation, evaluation, execution, and review of training during weekly training meetings. The integrated training task matrix is a multi-use tool that deserves as much emphasis as the QTB. It is indispensable to a focused and productive QTB at the brigade level.

Finally, the brigade-level quarterly training brief is one of the premier events a brigade commander has for leader development. During this session, he will have an entire battalion's leaders present, probably down to platoon sergeant. This is the single best opportunity a senior leader has for imparting his training philosophy to his subordinate leaders. The section on "Senior Leaders and Training" in FM 25-100 provides ten important reasons for senior leader involvement in training, from communicating their vision to eliminating training distractions. The QTB is the one scheduled training event in which the brigade commander can accomplish all of this with all of the primary trainers in a battalion present.

This is also an excellent opportunity for the commander to give his overall intent for the conduct of military operations; that is, how he intends to employ his brigade. The discussion of training tasks and their integration (and their importance to the unit's METL) can and does lead naturally to this subject. Subordinate leaders can gain valuable insights into the way their brigade commander will employ their units during combat. The brigade-level QTB provides the forum for leader, staff, and unit development in this fashion. In fact, it is much more meaningful than QTBs at higher levels since the leaders participating have far less rank and less experience. The brigade commander can greatly affect the development of his leaders through the QTB session.

Brigade level QTBs can definitely provide benefits far greater than the time and effort they demand. They can ensure that the unit is planning its training in line with doctrine, the METL, and the commander's guidance. They provide a forum for professional discussion, learning, and leader development. Reemphasizing the importance of this element of training management is necessary. Senior leaders, the Department of the Army Inspector General's office, and our institutional training base should all play a part in ensuring that brigade-level QTBs are part of every unit's planning for training.

If and when our training doctrine is revised, it should also reemphasize the importance of the quarterly training brief. Doctrine must ensure that there is no disconnect between the two principal training manuals and that they both clearly articulate the requirements and benefits of conducting brigade-level QTBs.

Major John M. Spiszer commanded a rifle company in the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, where he also served as assistant battalion S-3 and assistant brigade S-3. He is now assigned to G-3 Plans, 1st Infantry Division, in Germany. He is a 1984 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a master's degree from Central Michigan University.

Tactical SOPs

CAPTAIN RICHARD G. GREENE, JR.

A well-constructed Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) can dramatically improve the effectiveness of a light infantry rifle company. Conceptually complex light infantry operations can be reduced to a series of less complex supporting tasks. If most of these supporting tasks are addressed in a company's TACSOP, planning is simplified; leaving more time for rehearsal and preparation. These tasks are easier to execute because effective procedures and techniques are familiar and disseminated throughout the company.

A working TACSOP can also benefit a company in other important but less obvious ways. It can help integrate new personnel (especially new leaders) into the company and provide a reference that explains "how we do it here." This reference can prove critical when the

inevitable influx of fillers and attachments arrives shortly before any deployment. A published TACSOP can facilitate the rapid assimilation of new personnel when time for reception and integration is limited.

A TACSOP can also increase unity, cohesion, and esprit in a rifle company. Distinctive and innovative tactical techniques, personnel markings, and wear of equipment can set a unit apart from others. Soldiers and leaders embrace and rally around characteristics that make them feel special. A company that always wears elaborate natural camouflage, carries tent stakes strapped on top of their rucksacks for expedient aiming stakes, or routinely employs a new and effective method of casualty evacuation (such as SKED litters or Israeli stretchers) will be identified through these actions. If these procedures lead to success, the company will enjoy a notable reputation as a result.

TACSOP entries can be derived from several sources, one of which is doctrine. As an example, Field Manual (FM) 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, requires that commanders and leaders configure their soldiers' loads into combat, approach march, and sustainment loads. The exact components of each of these loads can be prescribed in a portion of a company TACSOP.

Another source for TACSOP development is a higher headquarters TACSOP. A battalion TACSOP may prescribe that each company package and transport its logistical package on a habitually-relate high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and trailer from the battalion support platoon. The actual load planning of that vehicle, and inventories of the supply boxes on board, can be included in the company TACSOP.

Finally, a commander may simply formulate an SOP designed to improve the effectiveness of his unit. A rifle company commander may elect to enhance his planning process by including a standardized "fill in the blank" operations order (OPORD) format in his company TACSOP.

A commander may try to base his company TACSOP entirely on his own acquired experience; but he will normally need to consult with additional references. Peers, subordinates, and superiors, as well as professional and doctrinal publications can provide enough time-proven, combat-tested tactics, techniques, and procedures to build a broad TACSOP. Regardless of the source, potential TACSOP entries should be doctrinally correct. Doctrinal correctness is, of course, a matter of opinion or interpretation in many cases. A commander should apply his best judgment and perhaps seek additional viewpoints as well. The commander should not select SOPs that simply duplicate what is detailed in field manuals. Chapter 3 of FM 7-10 describes company movement formations in graphic detail. To reproduce this in a company TACSOP would probably be a waste of effort. Additionally, a commander should avoid publishing SOPs that run counter to a published higher SOP. If the battalion TACSOP specifies that breach lanes are marked with blue chemlites and the shift-fire signal for the battalion is a green star cluster, rifle company commanders should not establish an SOP that differs from this. Finally, a commander should be cautious of standardizing tasks and techniques that are normally performed at lower echelons. Platoons and squads should be encouraged to develop their own TACSOP for tasks that routinely belong to them. A platoon leader should not be directed to use a particular technique for a patrol-base occupation, as long as his technique is doctrinally sound. Conversely, a commander is correct in distributing to his platoon leaders a pre-combat inspection (PCI) checklist developed by the company first sergeant. PCIs are among the many tasks performed by platoons and squads that are most effective when standardized throughout a company. Additionally, current doctrine lacks needed detail on how to perform PCIs correctly.

To determine what specific facets of company operations should be included in his company TACSOP, a commander can examine his mission essential task list (METL) or battle task list. While the planning and execution of the task *Perform infiltration* (7-2-1137) is probably too dependent upon terrain, enemy, or situation to attempt to standardize, supporting tasks within this task can be standardized. The task *Perform Infiltration* normally requires the company to occupy an assembly area, conduct troop-leading procedures, conduct a passage of lines, move tactically, and conduct a linkup. Command and control and sustainment functions are required throughout the execution of this infiltration. Once these supporting tasks are identified, it is easy to see that they are components of many other key METL or battle tasks. Because the company is required to perform these supporting tasks repeatedly, the commander could consider standardizing recurring tasks such as *Occupy assembly area* (7-2-1136; or *Perform passage of lines* (7-2-1125).

Once the contents of the TACSOP are finalized, work can begin on developing and writing specific procedures. A commander can reserve this work for himself or delegate portions of the TACSOP to key members of the company with appropriate guidance. The commander should develop the portions of the TACSOP that apply to the company as a whole (that is, a command and control SOP). The commander can task his platoon leaders to develop any SOPs that standardize platoon or squad-level; a fighting position SOP is an example of such a task. Platoon leaders should then develop a proposed SOP with input from their platoon sergeants and squad leaders. Once a draft proposal is complete, a platoon leader can submit it to the commander for initial approval. Once he has reviewed the draft, the commander can staff it through all of the company's senior leaders. This will facilitate rapid acceptance of the new technique and will serve to get all leaders on board with the new procedures. Additionally, "bottom up" refinement can only improve an already good SOP. The commander, of course, should reserve the final approval for himself and his first sergeant. Once successfully staffed and modified as needed, the final version of a particular SOP can be added to the company TACSOP.

A commander may choose to wait

until all portions of the TACSOP are complete before distributing the finished product. Or he may elect to distribute each portion of the TACSOP as it is completed, making the TACSOP a living document. The latter strategy enables leaders to begin training their troops immediately on the published portions of the TACSOP, saving the company from the inevitable shock brought on by the sudden arrival of a thick new TACSOP.

The effectiveness of a TACSOP can be enhanced in several ways. First, a graphics-based approach is arguably the best for a company level TACSOP. Clear, bold text military graphics and symbology arranged to explain a particular technique are more descriptive than several pages of text. Leaders and soldiers are constantly bombarded with text messages, such as policy letters, regulations, and forms. A TACSOP that consists of reams of text could end up at the bottom of a platoon leader's in-box as another morass of information he and his leaders must wade through. In the case of TACSOP s, the pictures are indeed worth a thousand words.

Checklists also serve to improve a TACSOP. In many cases, warfighting doctrine is relatively simple when described in field manuals but exceedingly complex in execution. The execution of a task can be simplified if it is recorded as a series of actions, and each of these actions is assigned to an individual or sub-element. Once a task is formatted in this manner, a leader can consult a checklist in the TACSOP during an operation and figure out his next step. Tactical checklists are remarkably useful to leaders who are fatigued or functioning under adverse conditions.

A company TACSOP must be a "go to war" document. This mindset encompasses many different considerations. A TACSOP should be portable and weatherproofed. The most comprehensive, well-designed TACSOP becomes worthless as a reference if it falls apart in a downpour or if it is left at home station because it is too bulky to fit in a rucksack flap pocket. Some installation print plants will accept reproduction work orders from commanders, some will not. A commander may find it necessary to raise funds internally, or appeal to his higher headquarters for a small slice of a battalion's operating budget.

A TACSOP should include various subjects that units normally do not consider in training because of peacetime safety constraints and limited training resources. Examples are numerous but not always obvious. Minimum safe-distances for indirect fire in a combat situation are different from those observed during live fire training; leaders need to include "real world" procedures like this one in any TACSOP. Additionally, the standardization of soldiers' loads and the conduct of PCIs need to account for the host of items that are routinely issued during combat deployments but issued in small amounts or not at all during peacetime. Examples include full unit basic loads of service ammunition, mines, pyrotechnics, hand grenades (smoke; fragmentation, thermite, concussion), demolitions, and nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contingency items. Additionally, standardized individual and unit packing lists should reflect the worst-case scenario in terms of sustenance, expendables, and comfort items. Many deploying soldiers come to realize the need for such considerations when they try to cram nine MREs (meals, ready to eat) into a rucksack already bulging with ammunition, water, and antipersonnel mines, and 60mm mortar rounds. Forethought by a commander and his key leaders can result in SOPs that make a company more effective once it gets on the ground in a combat zone.

A sample TACSOP, containing the various aids mentioned here, is available on request from *Infantry* Magazine. Write to Editor, *Infantry*, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.

A commander may reserve a portion of the TACSOP for specifications, standards, and requirements that do not fit easily into any doctrinal niche. A list of "Standing Orders" placed at the fore of TACSOP will supply leaders and soldiers with tactical *do*'s and *don'ts*" prescribed by the command group. Matters of field discipline, uniformity, and fieldcraft may be established as standing orders for any tactical operation, mission, or task. Some of these standing orders can easily become unique and identifiable characteristics that set the company apart from other like organizations.

If a TACSOP is to remain an effective tool, it must be trained on frequently and revised as needed. TACSOP training must be integrated into all tactical training events. This is easy if the TACSOP supports the company's METL task list, and the platoon, squad, and individual tasks nested within it. If the company deploys to conduct live fire ambushes, the commander can direct that the company occupy a company assembly area by SOP. The company can execute training on that particular SOP before sending platoons down-range to begin their walk-through and blank-fire iterations. Packing lists for any training event should be based on standard loads in the TACSOP, with modifications by exception. Any deliberate deviation from the published SOP should be identified as such, to avoid inadvertently adopting a new standard. After any training event, portions of the TACSOP that were exercised should be reviewed. The company leaders should, at least informally, determine whether the TACSOP describes the best way to perform the task that was trained. If it does not, a new procedure should be developed, disseminated, and included in the TACSOP.

An effective rifle company TACSOP can serve a commander and his organization well. Collecting and applying time-tested, combat-proven techniques and procedure—and melding them into a codifying document—can make what is routine excellent, and what is excellent routine.

Captain Richard G. Greene, Jr., commanded a company in the 2d Infantry Training Support Battalion, 191st Infantry Brigade at Fort Lewis. He previously served as a platoon leader, company executive officer, and S-1 in the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and as S-4, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division. He is a 1989 ROTC graduate of Loyola College, Baltimore.

BOOK REVIEWS



***Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades.* By John B. Wilson. The Army Lineage Series. Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998. 469 Pages. $36.00 (GPO S/N 008-029-00340-6).** Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Albert N. Garland, U.S. Army, Retired.

The author of this volume was a member of the Organizational History Branch of the Center of Military History from 1968 until he retired in 1997. He worked on one other book in the lineage series and authored several articles on various aspects of organizational history and evolution.

Although Wilson finished most of his manuscript in 1990, he returned to the Center to add a short chapter detailing the changes in the Army's organizational structure between 1990 and 1996. This became necessary because of the time it took for the Center to get the volume ready for publication; some official histories have taken longer.

Overall, Wilson has done an excellent job of mixing history with minute organizational details and in accomplishing what he set out to do: to tell the story of "the evolution of divisions and separate brigades in the U.S. Army as it searched for the most effective way to fuse combat arms, combat support, and service units into combined arms teams."

Having lived through roughly 60 years of the Army's recent history—either in or closely connected with, or an ardent observer of, Army matters—I found that Wilson's narrative and even the usual boring descriptions of unit structures, brought back many memories—some fond, some not so fond. I can recall the arguments between advocates of the square and triangular divisions; the disappearance of brigades from organizational tables, which I thought was a good idea then and was sorry to see them brought back; the ridiculous Pentomic division that eliminated the regiment from our structure, all to please one senior officer and an action that plagues the Army to this day: the rise of Army aviation and the tremendous battles with the Air Force ("anything with wings belongs to the USAF"); Division-86; and the Army of Excellence (AOE); plus the many other efforts undertaken by goodness knows whom and for goodness knows what purpose: ROCID, ROAD, CARS, ARS, and on and on.

Wilson tells all these stories after he uses his first four chapters to get his reader to the World War I era and the eventual authorization, for the first time in our history, of permanent brigades and divisions, which was accomplished by the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. The 1st Division, now the 1st Infantry Division, was our first permanent division, and it came into being on 6 July 1917 in France.

Many things in this book stood out for me. Until almost the outbreak of World War II, our organizations were formulated on the basic assumption that they would fight within the United States, not overseas. Until then, our commitment to foreign wars was considered an aberration.

Another item was the number of civilians authorized within each division, again until the late 1930s. These could be found in the service units, but I could not help wondering about their status. Wilson does not go into this and I don't suppose it is that important, but it brings into focus once again the Army's dependence on civilians (today called technical representatives) at various times in its history. Can the Army go to war today without these people? Not from what I understand.

Finally, Wilson demonstrates the effects rapid demobilization has had on the Army and its various organizations. The country tends to go through a frenzy of "Bring the boys home" after every war or battle campaign, regardless of how the military services may feel about the world situation or what problems it might face in trying to carry out the political decisions that will be thrust upon it. Then when war breaks out, we rush to mobilize large numbers of soldiers, fill up unit ranks with hastily trained people, and send them off to war woefully unprepared for what they will face.

This raises a most important point that Wilson only touches on: When combat units arrive in overseas theaters during a full-out war, the overseas commander invariably modifies the structures to meet his views on how his war will be fought. To paraphrase an old saying, "No organizational structure survives the first bullet." In each of our most recent major wars, our units were reorganized time and again to meet the challenge posed by well-trained and determined enemy forces. (We have been most fortunate since the end of the Vietnam War in not having to meet such a foe.)

One last point I would make that Wilson does not: What is the answer to the frequent question, "Does doctrine precede organization, or does organization precede doctrine?" I have seen it go both ways. Personal views, however, rather than serious doctrinal study, usually precede the creation of the organizations to execute that doctrine. In these cases, any studies that were made generally agreed with the expressed views of the individual who created the study group. There was a period in the 1980s when the Army never completed one set of organizations to carry out a particular set of doctrinal tenets before it had to create a whole new set of organizations to carry out another set of tenets.

Today, the Army seems to be on the verge of undergoing all sorts of reorganizations to meet someone's ideas of how the future will pan out. Go to smaller, more flexible and maneuverable organizations, or stay with the heavier, which has more firepower but will be less flexible? Shades of the Pentomic division and TRICAP! But one word of warning to today's planners: Don't you dare touch the airborne division, and never, never change the unit designation of our one air assault division!

I strongly recommend that all Infantrymen who are truly concerned about the Army's future ground themselves in this book. They will be far better and more knowledgeable soldiers for having done so.

***Thunder on the Dnepr.* By Bryan Fugate and Lev Dvoretsky. Presidio, 1997. 415 Pages. $27.95.** Reviewed by Colonel Christopher B. Timmers, U.S. Army, Retired.

OK, class. In today's History of World War II, let's see a show of hands as to how many of you believe the following: (1) Hit-

ler's 22 June 1941 invasion of Russia completely took Stalin by surprise because, (2) Soviet intelligence was generally inept and failed to anticipate German intentions so that, (3) Vast amounts of artillery, tanks, and combat engineer equipment—not to mention tens of thousands of prisoners, fell into the *Wehrmacht*'s hands.

Very good. You all pass. Sort of. No, not on your military history test. But you do pass muster for having accepted those statements as gospel—those *highly dubious* statements which you should have challenged. What's that? How were you to challenge them? What scholarship was available back in those days at West Point or Annapolis or wherever? Well, OK. There was no scholarship to challenge the conventional "wisdom" then.

But there is now.

Permit me to introduce Dr. Brian Fugate of the University of Texas and his colleague Colonel (retired) Lev Dvoretsky of Amscort International. These gentlemen eloquently argue—and buttress their contentions with excerpts from official Soviet correspondence, maps, and operations orders—that Stalin, acting upon the advice of Marshals Zhukov and Timoschenko, conceded to the invading Germans huge tracts of land and deliberately allowed their own forces to be encircled. But they point out that much of the Russian Army's artillery and vital engineer equipment had been evacuated to rearward positions weeks before the June 22 invasion. Indeed, Soviet intelligence was not caught napping, at least not entirely. The spymasters to the Kremlin had anticipated an invasion in August, not June, but had anticipated it nonetheless.

And what about all those soldiers in Bialystok salient and other pockets? The ones cut off from their own lines? The authors tell us that many of these Russian soldiers were not captured but constituted "floating pockets" of resistance which drifted westward back toward Soviet lines and could not easily be reduced. The Germans had counted on a swift armored advance, as had been the case in their Blitzkrieg through the low countries and France. They had not counted on the Soviet defense in depth and the vast distances over which military operations took place in Russia. And they undermined their own efforts by mistreating many of the non-Russian minorities whose villages they occupied (particularly the Ukrainians). Many of these ethnic groups had no use for Joseph Stalin and the Russian majority which ruled the USSR and, had their disaffection been cultivated, could have been made into valuable allies for, instead of partisans against, the German war effort. Finally, outside the little town of Yelnia on the Dnepr river, the exhausted German army finally had its lightning advance checked and the war in Russia had its turning point.

You, class, all of you, need to buy and read this book. At $27.95 it is easily worth the price. As you read, pay particular attention to the maps and especially to the chapter on the January-February 1941 Soviet war games, which were so instrumental in helping Zhukov formulate his plans for the defense of the Russian Motherland. I advise you to give this book the close study it deserves over the weekend. There will be a test on Monday.

Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong. **By Mark Moyar. U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1997. 416 Pages.** Reviewed by Dr. Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

Few aspects of the Vietnam War are less understood and subject to more myth and misinformation than the Phoenix program. Only a few solid works, such as Richard Hunt's *Pacification* (1995) and Dale Andrade's *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam Warm* (1990), exist on the topic. Now Mark Moyar's thoroughly researched, balanced perspective, and fascinating new study, which draws heavily upon interviews with more than 100 American and Vietnamese participants, becomes the premier work on this topic. Moyar began this study as an undergraduate thesis at Harvard, and even though he is now only in his mid-twenties, this book makes him a serious scholar of the Vietnam War.

Moyar offers a fresh and realistic perspective on the Viet Cong's efforts to establish alternative political control in the villages, what he calls "the shadow government." He then proceeds to address and to assess the myriad programs in the many areas of South Vietnam over the span of the long war all with the common objective of targeting the shadow government. He focuses, however, on the 1967-1972 period, the height of the effort against the VC infrastructure.

He clarifies that Phoenix was a coordinating effort of many components against the VC infrastructure, an outgrowth of the original Intelligence Coordination Exploitation (ICEX) born in 1967. It ran parallel to the South Vietnamese corollary, the Phung Hoang program. Phoenix became the catch phrase for a host of activities, some relatively successful and some hapless, and the program differed tremendously in nature and effectiveness in different provinces and districts. Leadership was the key element. Where there was strong American and Vietnamese leadership, the programs were successful. Where this was not the case, especially on the Vietnamese side, they were usually not effective.

Among Moyar's many other conclusions, several of which counter existing scholarship, he judges that in the latter years of the war most villagers favored the South Vietnamese government. They were not driven into the Viet Cong ranks by the effort against the shadow government. While mistakes and even atrocities undoubtedly occurred, they were the exception and not the rule or practice within the genre of activities labeled as Phoenix. Moyar also addresses the important questions and intellectual debate over a primary emphasis on pacification as opposed to the big-unit conduct of the war. His arguments have forced me to reconsider some of my own assumptions on these questions.

This is a fine, readable, and captivating book that I recommend most highly.

The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat. **By Earl J. Hess. University Press of Kansas, 1997. 244 Pages. $29.95.** Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, U.S. Air Force, Retired.

This book is an excellent attempt at answering the question, "What was combat like for the Union soldier who served during the Civil War?" Given the nature of the linear battle tactics used predominantly throughout the first part of the war and the trench/siege warfare encountered later at such places as Vicksburg and Petersburg, Virginia, historians have wondered what a Northern soldier's existence was like from his initial recruitment to discharge, or until wounds or death cut short his career of military service in the war.

Historian Earl J. Hess of Tennessee's Lincoln Memorial University has done an outstanding job of analyzing the Union soldier through a variety of official war records, published memoirs, and unpublished personal accounts and correspondence. While his observations certainly do not have total relevance to the experience of the American fighting man in other wars of this nation, they certainly help us better understand the challenges and experiences of combat that faced these soldiers on the mid-19th century battlefield.

Hess provides a thorough analysis of the Northern soldier's gradual progression from new recruit through the first taste of battle to

seasoned combat veteran. He provides a thorough description of the way Civil War soldiers viewed courage and the way in which they were able to fight despite the presence of death and the loss of comrades around them during many battles. His descriptions of Civil War battles from the participants' own perspectives give a much better appreciation of the combat in which they engaged and the manner in which most Northern soldiers were able to adapt and perform their duties honorably.

The Union Soldier in Battle is a major contribution to a better understanding of the American soldier's experience during the Civil War. It certainly helps us grasp the typical Union soldiers' experiences and the challenges they faced during that conflict.

***Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei.* By William R. Phillips. Naval Institute Press, 1997. 306 Pages. $29.95.** Reviewed by Michael F. Dilley.

In late 1967 General William C. Westmoreland, suspecting that the North Vietnamese were planning a major combat effort around the Lunar New Year—Tet, was determined to force them into a major set-piece action in order to decimate as many of their units as he could. He baited his trap with the Marine Combat Base at Khe Sanh, in the far northwest part of Quang Tri Province, just south of the DMZ. His strategy was to offer a target similar to Dien Bien Phu to suck them in and then pound any units that showed up with all he had at his disposal—artillery, air support, naval gunfire, arc lights (B-52 raids), and so forth. Westmoreland was also determined that this battle would end differently from the Viet Minh victory in 1954.

William R. Phillips' latest book, *Night of the Silver Stars*, deals with the events just before the siege of Khe Sanh, specifically the battle of the Lang Vei Special Forces camp, nine miles west of Khe Sanh. It was during this battle (6-7 February 1968) that the North Vietnamese Army first used armored vehicles against U.S. forces.

Lang Vei was the northernmost of the Special Forces camps in Vietnam. It was only about a mile from Laos to the west. It replaced another camp, also called Lang Vei, that had been attacked and badly damaged in early May 1967. The new camp was occupied by Special Forces team A-101, several Vietnamese Special Forces soldiers, and four Civilian Irregular Defense Group companies. Lang Vei had the outward appearance of a tethered goat, waiting for the North Vietnamese to attack, thus triggering a larger battle. And in some respects, that is what happened. Soon after Lang Vei fell, the Khe Sanh siege started.

Phillips' account of the struggle by the Lang Vei inhabitants to hold on, then later to survive and help others do the same, and the various rescue attempts, all against overwhelming odds, is solidly paced and well told. His descriptions of the various components of the battle are concise and factual without resorting to bombast or snide criticism. The fact that one of the Special Forces soldiers missing after the battle was his first cousin may have fueled his desire to tell the story of the battle; nevertheless, his telling is of the dispassionate observer, moving everywhere on the battlefield, trying to leave nothing untold.

Only one other book, *Tanks in the Wire*, by David B. Stockwell (Daring Books, 1989) deals exclusively with the battle at the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. This book, however, more than holds its own by comparison and stands alone as an excellent account.

***The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877.* Edited by R. Eli Paul. University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 245 Pages. $15.00, Softbound.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Richard D. Starnes, U.S. Army Reserve, Cullowhee, North Carolina.

The United States Army campaigns against the Plains Indians were some of the most arduous and tactically challenging in American history. In *The Nebraska Indian Wars Reader, 1865-1877*, R. Eli Paul, a historian at the Nebraska Historical Society, republishes ten important essays that illuminate the missions, strategies, and tactics of the campaigns on the Nebraska frontier. Individually, these essays offer detailed treatment of individual campaigns and commanders. Collectively, they give tremendous insight into the character of the frontier army, the relationship between military authorities and the civilian population, and the strategy, goals, and missions of Native American leaders.

Until the late 1860s, campaigns against the Plains Indian tribes were not a national military priority. The area of operations was remote, the affected civilian population was small, and the pressures of the Civil War and Reconstruction dominated operations and resources. Even after the war, these campaigns were almost always undertaken with ill-equipped, poorly supplied troops who often lacked the guidance to accomplish their poorly defined missions. Yet, according to James T. King in his essay on the Republican River Expedition of 1869, the leadership of officers seasoned in frontier warfare helped to compensate for inadequate logistics, eventually bringing about victory. In this way, these campaigns are excellent case studies for leadership and mission accomplishment under the worst of logistic conditions.

While much of the popular and scholarly treatment of the Indian wars depicts United States Army troops campaigning against the indigenous population, there is another aspect of this conflict that often goes unexplored. In his essay on the 1873 battle of Massacre Canyon, Paul D. Riley argues that conflict with federal authorities did not serve to unite Native American tribes against a common enemy. Instead, intertribal warfare continued and, in some ways, contributed to the eventual defeat of the Great Plains Indians.

In fact, Donald F. Danker argues that Army commanders astutely exploited longstanding hatred to a tactical advantage by enlisting Pawnee braves to fight Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne. These Indian soldiers rendered yeoman service fighting alongside U.S. Army regulars on campaign and protecting white settlers from attacks. By exploring these understudied aspects of the Great Plains campaigns, Paul's book offers new insight into the complexity of the Indian Wars themselves and the relationship between military forces and native populations.

While Paul does not offer an original interpretation, he does offer an excellent introduction to the important Nebraska campaigns against the Sioux and Cheyenne in the years following the Civil War. Students of military history, Native American studies, and anyone interested in this period of the American experience would benefit from these essays.

***The Wars of Frederick the Great.* By Dennis E. Showalter (Longman Group Limited, 1996. 371 Pages. $23.50.**

***The Prussian Army, 1640-1871.* By Jonathan R. White (University Press of America, 1996. 378 Pages. $56.00).** Reviewed by Doctor Charles E. White, former Infantry School Historian.

Perhaps no other subject has so captivated contemporary American military personnel as the military prowess and professionalism of the Prussian-German Army. The very word "Prussian" evokes strong feelings of the warrior ethic and military excellence. The Prussian-German Army has become the standard by which many contemporary American military personnel measure their

own military prowess and professionalism. Indeed, at times it seems that we Americans are obsessed with Nazis and their *Wehrmacht*.

Two recent books that address the issue of Prussian-German military excellence are Dennis Showalter's *The Wars of Frederick the Great* and Jonathan White's *The Prussian Army, 1640-1871*.

In his superb study of the campaigns of Frederick the Great, Showalter places the reader squarely into the social, political, and military context of 18th-century Europe. This is history at its best. The author makes clear in his introduction that "*The Wars of Frederick the Great* emphasizes war*making*: the *behaviour* of the diplomats, the soldiers, and the institutions to which they belonged." Showalter's approach is an excellent attempt to return the study of history to its original form. His book treats the 18th century on its own terms, not in the "politically correct" perspective that has plagued the writing of history for the past two decades or more.

Showalter argues that Frederick the Great brought the art of 18th-century warfare to perfection. Frederick ruled Prussia for nearly half a century, from 1740 to 1786, and military affairs consumed his attention during his reign. Prussia, it seemed, was constantly at war. Yet, upon his death, Frederick left a Prussia that was double the size it had been 50 years earlier. And Prussia was overtaking Austria for leadership of the German-speaking lands. Indeed, Frederick was one of the few men in history to be called "the Great" in his own lifetime.

More than anyone else, it was Frederick who introduced Europe to the concept of "total war for limited objectives." Frederick's campaigns were specifically designed to convince his adversaries that it was wiser for them to make peace (and keep it) than to fight him. For Frederick, battlefield success was the means to the more enduring goal of a successful negotiation and peace. This was the rationale of the Age of Reason.

Showalter offers a penetrating analysis of the political and military dynamics of 18th-century Europe. He demonstrates that Prussian "militarism" exists only in the minds of the politically correct. Two hundred years ago, Frederick's own age perceived conflict as a rational means of arbitrating differences between states. His judicial and prudent use of force earned him the respect of the world. For those seeking a book that combines narrative history with the brilliant insights of a master historian, *The Wars of Frederick the Great* is clearly the one to read.

Jonathan White's *The Prussian Army, 1640-1871* is a thought-provoking work that synthesizes the major works of the most prominent historians of Prussian history (Gordon Craig and Peter Paret are but two that he cites) for college-level students. As the author states in his introduction: "The purpose is to give non-historians the ability to understand Craig and the other masters."

White seeks to analyze and explain the nature of Prussian (and later German) militarism. How could a tiny state like Prussia, surrounded by large, aggressive neighbors (Sweden to the north, Austria to the south, Russia to the east, and France to the west), manage to build and maintain a powerful military force in the middle of central Europe within one century? And how could this same tradition, within two centuries, unite the German-speaking states in central Europe (less Austria) under its banner? For decades, historians, political scientists, social scientists, and others have sought the answer to these questions.

Like so many others before him, White has difficulty understanding this so-called "German Problem," simply because he assumes "Germany" is the aggressor in Europe. But look at the time period this book covers—1640-1871. This span of time included Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII of Sweden, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great of Russia, Louis XIV and Napoleon of France, and the Hapsburgs of Austria. All of these dynasties sought to dominate Europe. Add to this group the English, who consistently fought to keep the continental powers divided and even at war with each other.

In the middle of this strife lay nearly a thousand tiny principalities, papal states, and kingdoms, collectively called "Germany" or the "Holy Roman Empire" (which Voltaire said was neither holy, nor roman, nor an empire). Where did France, Sweden, Austria, and Russia fight their battles? On German soil. During the Thirty Years' War (1619-48), Sweden, Austria, and France raped, pillaged, and plundered Germany. Eighty percent, or eight million, of the German people, were killed or died of causes related to the war. Following that devastating conflict, one dynasty decided it would never again put its subjects through such an ordeal. It would raise an army to defend its people and territory. That dynasty was the Hohenzollern, and its domain was the tiny state of Prussia.

The Prussian Army is beautifully written and does an excellent job of combining the secondary sources of other authors. But it needs to place Prussia in proper perspective. Throughout much of the time frame this book covers, France was the aggressor in Europe and the greatest impediment to world peace. Indeed, England was Prussia's great ally during most of this period. And contemporaries such as Voltaire praised Prussia and her enlightened rulers; Prussia consistently drew the greatest minds of Europe to her land. Unfortunately, White does not convey this in his otherwise fine work, and impressionable young minds may come away from reading *The Prussian Army* with the "politically correct" view that Prussian militarists caused all the evil that took place in the world. This is certainly not correct.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

Combat Team: The Captains' War: An Interactive Exercise in Company Level Command in Battle. **By John F. Antal. Presidio, 1998. 384 Pages. $17.95, Softbound.**

The Test of Battle. **By Paul F. Braim. Originally published by University of Delaware Press, 1987. White Mane Publishing (P.O. Box 152, Shippensburg, PA 17257), 1998. 247 Pages. $35.00.**

Soldier's Guide to a College Degree. **By Larry J. Anderson. Stackpole, 1998. 176 Pages. $12.95.**

Doughboy's Diary. **By Chester E. Baker. White Mane Publishing (P.O. Box 152, Shippensburg, PA 17257), 1998. 138 Pages. $19.95, hardcover.**

Choppers: The Heroic Birth of Helicopter Warfare. **By J.D. Coleman. St. Martin's, 1998. 352 Pages. $6.99.**

From the Fulda Gap to Kuwait: U.S. Army, Europe, and the Gulf War. **By Stephen P. Gehring. Center of Military History, 1998. 377 Pages. $17.00, Softbound.**

The One That Got Away: My SAS Mission Behind Iraqi Lines. **By Chris Ryan. Brassey's, 1998. 260 Pages. $17.95, Softbound.**

Blood Rites: Origins and Passions of the History of War. **By Barbara Ehrenreich. Owl Books, 1998. 292 Pages. $14.95, Softbound.**

Sgt. York: His Life, Legend, & Legacy. **By John Perry. Broadman & Holman, 1997. 320 Pages. $16.99, Hardcover.**

The Liberation of Guam, 21 July-10 August 1944. **By Harry Gailey. Presidio, 1997. 231 Pages. $15.95, Softbound.**

A Prisoner's Duty: Great Escapes in U.S. Military History. **By Robert C. Doyle. Naval Institute Press, 1997. 400 Pages. $34.95.**

Battle Fire! Combat Stories from World War II. **By Col. Arthur L. Kelly. University Press of Kentucky, 1997. 323 Pages. $22.00.**

MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign. **By Stephen R. Taaffe. University Press of Kansas, 1998. 314 Pages. $35.00.**

The Company They Keep: Life Inside the U.S. Army Special Forces. **By A.J. Simons. Avon, 1998. 237 Pages. $5.99.**

U.S. Army Patches: An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Cloth Unit Insignia. **By Barry Jason Stein. University of South Carolina Press, 1997. 233 Pages. $39.95**

Napoleon's Invasion of Russia. **By George F. Nafziger. Originally published in 1996. Presidio, 19980. 704 Pages. $24.95, Softbound.**

From the Editor

GETTING YOUR MAGAZINES?

With each mailing of *Infantry* magazine, the U.S. Postal Service continues to return copies that have gone to the wrong addresses. Some are from units that have been dropped from the rolls, and this is a sad reality that we may have to face for some time to come. In the difficult process of inactivating a unit that has served the nation faithfully in peace and wartime, notifying us that you're going out of business may not be a priority, and we can certainly understand that. But the fact that we are losing these fine organizations makes it even more important that the remaining units continue to get their copies of *Infantry*. If your unit has been—or is about to be—reflagged, or is moving for some reason, please take time to give us a heads up so we can make the necessary address changes.

But this is only part of the problem. Individual subscriber copies are also being returned with increasing frequency. Each returned copy costs at least 50 cents in postage, and—unless we get a forwarding address—we cannot mail the remaining copies to the subscriber who paid for them. Of course, once the subscriber realizes that he hasn't seen a magazine in months and calls us, we will send the back issues at no charge, but this can take time. If you see a permanent change of station coming up or change your address for any reason, please write, call, or e-mail the new address to us and we'll take care of it.

One last point: The usual rate of distribution for appropriated fund copies of *Infantry* is three per company, but if you need more let us know and we may be able to increase the number we send. And while you're at it, don't forget the research service we offer to *Infantry* subscribers; we can provide you with either back issues or—if the issue is out of print—a copy of the article you need.

That's it. Notify us of your new address, let us know if you need help with back issues, and stay in touch with the fast-paced changes that are taking place in the Infantry. Watch your lane!

Telephone: DSN 835-2350 or commercial (706) 545-2350
E-mail: edgertonm@benning.army.mil
Standard Mail: P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005.

RAE

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

INFANTRY is available to subscribers at $15.00 for one year and $28.00 for two years. Foreign (non-APO) subscribers must add $5.00 per subscription per year to cover the cost of surface mailing and handling. Foreign air mail rates will be furnished upon request. Single copies are $2.50 each if sent to a U.S. address.

Payment must be made in U.S. currency, by international money order, or by a check or draft drawn on a U.S. bank. For best service, payment should accompany each order, because we cannot start a subscription until we have received full payment for it. Checks, money orders, or drafts should be made payable to INFANTRY.

One-year subscriptions are not refundable; two-year subscriptions are refundable, but service and handling charges will be deducted.

COMING ARTICLES:

Ideas for New Platoon Leaders

Lieutenants as First Line Tacticians

Infantry Platoon Operational Planning

Task Force Faith at the Chosin Reservoir

Fire Support Doctrine and Methodology

6mm—The Optimum Rifle and Machinegun Caliber?

PIN: 077571–000

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
INFANTRY (USPS 370630)
U.S. Army Infantry School
ATTN: ATSH-OTI
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905-5593

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PRESORTED STANDARD
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
TEMPLE HILLS, MD
PERMIT NO. 4820