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DEVELOPING THE “INITIAL” BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM

You’ve heard about or read of the initiative by General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, to give our nation a more deployable, lethal force. General Shinseki has challenged us to roll up our sleeves and help with this transformation process. Force projection has been a cornerstone of our response to contingencies for over two decades, and we must continue to refine our ability to quickly deploy and to fight and win across the full spectrum of conflict. We will do that by standing up a lighter, more deployable “Initial” Brigade Combat Team within the next two years. This initiative will be the subject of this year’s Infantry Conference and in this issue’s Commandant’s Note, I would like to tell you where we are headed.

The Army is transforming itself as a result of changing conditions in the world. The Infantry has been on the cutting edge of change ever since our branch was established in 1775; this current transformation is no exception.

The message is clear: If we are to continue to field an effective, survivable, sustainable force in defense of our nation’s interests, we must adapt our doctrine, tactics and materiel to meet a changing range of contingencies. The increasing urbanization of potential hotspots likewise demands the training and fielding of forces that we can deploy before an adversary has time to react. And these forces must be early responders in theater who can execute their assigned missions with flexibility, agility, and lethality equal to or as close as possible to today’s armored and mechanized forces.

Events in our own hemisphere, in Southwest Asia and in the Balkans have demonstrated the likelihood that smaller scale contingencies will demand the lion’s share of our attention early in the 21st Century. While heavy forces must always remain a deployment option, such issues as trafficability, infrastructure, and the capabilities of an adversary will demand that we explore more agile, less predictable and more survivable alternatives. This does not mean that tanks are going away, or that our Bradleys are going to be mothballed. Far from it; there are scenarios in which they are indispensable and under which we will deploy them. While heavy forces must always remain capable of deploying in response to a commensurate threat, General Shinseki has noted: “Those heavy divisions, good as they are, are also constrained by our ability to maneuver them in many places in the world where the bridging and highway structure and infrastructure cannot support that kind of weight.” Light divisions will remain a vital part of the Army. The capability of rapidly deploying an airborne, air assault or light infantry task force is of great strategic value. A balance between strategic and tactical mobility, lethality, survivability and sustainability is the goal of this transformation.

The lethality issue is of particular significance, for it is the actual—and perceived—lethality of deployed forces that affords them the credibility they must have to meet the demands of stability and support operations and to transition into combat operations with little or no warning. The Infantry will continue to serve in its traditional role as the “first
responders” from our Contingency Corps, followed by flexible, more easily deployable units that themselves possess high degrees of lethality comparable to enemy forces.

We will continue to perform our missions as part of a joint and combined arms team, and the demands for rapidly transportable, survivable, self-sustaining units underline the need for interservice and in-service cooperation. Here at Fort Benning, we have organized an “Initial Brigade Combat Team” task force within the Directorate of Combat Developments. This task force will draw upon the subject matter expertise of all directorates of the Infantry School, and will complement our efforts with visits and exchanges of information with Fort Lewis, where the brigade combat team will first see the light of day. We are working together with Forts Lewis, Knox, and Sill, other Army branch schools and the United States Marine Corps to meet our objective.

The future force will be designed from the bayonet and foxhole back; from the close combat, dismounted assault to supporting systems; a force centered on soldiers. In addition to the usual close combat tasks of the Infantry, it must be able to destroy hardened targets and possess a stand-off precision strike capability to defeat armored vehicles and targets. It must be trained to do this in open, close, and urban terrain while under the effects of indirect and direct fires, as well as in an environment of chemical, biological, and nuclear contamination. Tough missions!

The “Initial” Brigade Combat Team must also be able to exercise tactical, mental, and organizational agility. We must be able to quickly move forces operationally and tactically throughout an extended battlespace. We must likewise be able to transition from peacekeeping operations, to stability and support, to mid-intensity combat missions without missing a beat. Our advances in the realm of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance will support this organizational and mental agility by permitting the rapid transfer of information and orders. This means that the commander will no longer be tethered to a command post, but can now influence the actions of his unit from wherever he is in the area of operations. Read this as leading from the front, at the critical place and time!

The versatility that future contingencies will demand requires the coordinated effort of the active and reserve components. Now, more than ever, “The” Army concept must become reality. The distinction between active and reserve forces will continue to fade away as deployed forces execute their missions. In order for the entire force to be capable of full-spectrum operations, we must design a force structure that will let us leverage the total capabilities of these units. Only in this way can we achieve the levels of lethality and protection that until now have been the province of the heavy forces, while laying claim to the agility and relative ease of deployability that characterize our light units.

The transition to a lighter, more deployable Army will not be a quick fix. We’re going to take the time to do it right, and it will demand considerable time and effort. To those of us accustomed to the doctrine and organizations of the past, the initial brigade combat team will be both familiar and revolutionary. We will recognize many of the tactics, techniques, and weapons with which we are already familiar. Be prepared, however, to see some changes in how we deploy, in the increased emphasis on high-mobility vehicles we will be employing as carriers and weapons system movers, and in how we sustain our deployed units. The infantry mission—of closing with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver, to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack—will remain the same, but the way we train, deploy, and sustain the force may certainly change. The Infantry is no stranger to change. Our ability to adapt and improve the way we do our job has been one of our most enduring strengths. In the coming months you will read a great deal in Infantry magazine and other sources about the lighter, more deployable Army that is our vision for the future. We are committed to this important effort, and its success will demand the support and shared expertise of the entire Infantry community. Remember, this is the time to pay close attention, provide input where appropriate, and prepare to execute the new and challenging missions that will carry us into this new century.
THREE INFANTRY SCHOOL publications have been approved for distribution, depending upon funds available and priority level. All publications will be available online in the Army Doctrine and Training Digital Library at http://www.actdl.army.mil.html.

STP 7-11BCHM1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, MOS 11BCHM Infantry, Skill Level 1. This manual contains standardized training objectives in the form of task summaries to train on critical tasks that support unit missions during wartime. It applies to soldiers in the Active Army and the Reserve Components.


STP 7-11M14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and Trainer’s Guide, MOS 11M Fighting Vehicle Infantryman, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4. These manuals are for skill levels 1 through 4 soldiers holding MOSs 11H and 11M. They are also for trainers and first-line supervisors. They contain standardized training objectives in the form of task summaries, which support unit missions during wartime.

All three soldier’s manuals should be made available in the soldier’s work area, the unit learning center, and unit libraries.

A DEPLOYABLE CITY training and test facility, Force Provider, was recently activated at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Force Provider serves as the Army’s premier base camp for deployed troops. Each containerized, highly mobile city can be transported by land, sea, or air. It offers high quality living conditions in the areas of food, billeting, and hygiene services, as well as morale, welfare, and recreation facilities. Its features include climate-controlled tents, modern kitchens, showers and latrines, and advanced laundry service.

A Force Provider module is typically established on 10 acres of land. It takes an average of three to four days to prepare a site, then five to six days to set up the base camp and make it fully operational. One module is designed to support 550 soldiers and 50 base-camp operators.

The modules are prepositioned at key locations for rapid response to contingencies around the world. Force Provider first served as a base camp for troops participating in Operation Sea Signal at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in July 1994. Then, in November 1995, six modules were deployed to Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. The Product Manager-Force Provider has been tasked to build and assemble a total of 36 modules by fiscal year 2005.

A BULLETPROOF “FLAK JACKET” that weighs 35 percent less than the current system was recently introduced. The Army and Marine Corps plan to issue Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) as a replacement for the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT). After more than 15 years of service, the anti-fragmentation vest is now considered outdated.

The 16.4-pound Interceptor system consists of a tactical vest and a pair of small-arms protective inserts. The Kevlar vest includes detachable neck and groin guards, while the ceramic plates slide into pockets on the front and rear.

The vest alone protects a soldier from shrapnel and 9mm pistol rounds. When the protective inserts are added, the system acts as a ballistic barrier to 7.62mm rifle ammunition as well. By comparison, the PASGT weighs about one-half pound more but offers defense only against fragmentation.

The PASGT, if it is teamed with the Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest, can be upgraded to stop 7.62mm rounds, but the combined weight of the two systems is 25.1 pounds. To reduce this burden, researchers merged the two designs into a lightweight body armor system that provides greater comfort and protection.

FLAME RESISTANT UNIFORMS for our nation’s military personnel is a goal of the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center (Natick).

Army tankers and aviators from all services are authorized to wear flame-resistant clothing systems made from Nomex fiber. These materials, which char instead of melting, provide durable flame protection for the life of the garment because the fiber is inherently flame resistant. While these systems receive high user ratings, they are too expensive to provide to all military users.

Natick is actively addressing these cost-based user needs and has established a team to conduct flame and thermal research and development in this area.

The team’s objectives are to establish flame and thermal performance requirements for military clothing systems; demonstrate a flammability test methodology that simulates military hazards; and develop a flame protective clothing system that is 30 to 50 percent less expensive than the existing Nomex-based systems.

The team has already succeeded in reaching the first two objectives and plans to reach its final objective of developing less expensive flame protection for service members by 2001.
Operational Planning
At Platoon Level

CAPTAIN ALLEN J. PEPPER

"Assemble the orders group!" While this command is far from unusual in the brigade or battalion tactical operations center, it is rarely heard as far down as platoon level. But why not?

Field Manual (FM) 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, goes into great detail about the roles of the various brigade and battalion staff members and the importance of their interaction in the operational planning process. Each member of the staff contributes his knowledge and experience to the development of the operations order (OPORD) or a fragmentary order, and in doing so improves the plan while reducing the work load on the commander and the operations officer.

An experienced, well-integrated staff can rapidly put together a solid plan that takes into account each of the battlefield operating systems (BOSs) and uses the capabilities of the command's subordinate units. This system of staff work and integration has been developed over time and is accepted throughout the Army—although refinements continue as the Army evolves and technology affects operations. The idea of a brigade or battalion commander developing a plan without consulting his staff and using their knowledge and experience is considered foolhardy at best and dangerous at worst.

Why are the maneuver platoons so different from a brigade or a battalion in their planning process? To be sure, there are differences in organization, and the level of coordination and synchronization required at platoon level pales in comparison to that required at battalion level. But the impact NCO experience can have on planning at platoon level is not entirely different from the benefit derived from the knowledge and experience of the various staff officers on the planning process at battalion level.

Both FM 7-71, Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (Bradley), and FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, address the familiar eight troop leading procedures (TLPs) in their Chapter 2 and give good examples of a platoon warning order and a platoon operations order. This chapter also addresses the value of rehearsals, the various types of rehearsals that may be conducted, and the relative merit of each type.

Both manuals (which many infantry leaders collectively call "the platoon leader's bible") note that the platoon leader will not often have enough time to go through each step of the TLPs in detail. Time, the only nonrenewable resource on the battlefield, always works against us.

The Ranger Course strongly reinforces the idea that time has a major effect on operations. Lack of time is one of the many factors that put so much stress on a Ranger student.

Missing a "hit time" or even a resupply link-up time, can lead to the dreaded NO-GO or another day of short rations. And, while time management is recognized as an important factor in the success or failure of a patrol leader, the course offers little formal instruction in time management or time-saving techniques. Most Ranger students pick up on some timesaving techniques during the course, but the squads and platoons rarely have the continuity to develop hard and fast procedures to codify and promulgate these techniques.

While the Ranger school platoon has little opportunity to establish planning SOPs because of the lack of continuity in personnel and duty positions, a TOE (tables of organization and equipment) infantry platoon can and should develop a planning SOP in order to produce plans and orders that draw on the knowledge of the NCOs of the platoon while reducing the time required to develop the OPORD. A platoon may develop a simple, well-rehearsed planning sequence and drill it until it becomes second nature. The first step is to develop the sequence and assign responsibility for the various tasks.

The first TLP, Receive the mission, may come in written form, face-to-face with the company or battalion commander, or by radio, and the platoon leader must immediately put together and Issue a warning order to his subor-
ordinates. If the tactical situation permits, this should include the whole platoon, but in most cases, only the platoon sergeant and the squad leaders will be available. The warning order puts the platoon in motion, oriented on the upcoming mission and the preparation leading to it. While the squad leaders issue warning orders to their squads, the platoon sergeant begins logistical planning or coordination as required by the situation and mission. This time allows the platoon leader to delve into the order more deeply and pull out the specified and implied tasks, assets available, and constraints. Additionally, he must select the portion of the map that must be recreated on the sand table.

Once the squad leaders have had enough time to issue their warning orders, the third TLP, Make a tentative plan, begins. This is the step where the knowledge of the NCOs and the orchestration of the leaders and soldiers can lead to a solid, well-integrated plan in a minimum of time.

First, the platoon leader must instruct the NCO in charge of the sand table team on what he wants. The sand table team should be led by a senior team leader and should consist of the point men for the squads (and a gunner from each Bradley section, in a mechanized platoon). The platoon leader’s instructions should include the area he wants portrayed, any control measures to be depicted, key terrain to emphasize, whether to build a separate terrain model for the objective area, and a deadline for having the terrain model completed. The platoon leader must remember that time is the driving factor for the amount of detail to be shown.

After giving his instructions to the terrain model team, the platoon leader assembles the platoon sergeant, squad leaders, and forward observer around the map to begin wargaming. He first recaps the highlights of the warning order and, using the map, graphically focuses everyone on the concept of the company operation and the platoon’s mission. He then reads the specified and implied tasks to the assembled leaders so they will know the full scope of the platoon’s responsibilities. At this point, the squad leaders and platoon sergeant offer their ideas on how to accomplish the mission. This may be an open exchange, with each having the opportunity to build on the ideas of the others. Or the platoon leader may task each leader to develop a course of action (COA) and have them reconvene a few minutes later to discuss the various COAs and compare them. Although a team that has worked together for a time may fare well with the open exchange option, the danger is “group think,” or considering only one COA. The platoon leader must prevent this by steering the wargaming to other COAs as well.

Once the wargaming team has developed at least two courses of action, the platoon leader must decide on one.

While the squad leaders issue warning orders to their squads, the platoon sergeant begins logistical planning or coordination as required by the situation and mission.

Based on the input of his squad leaders and platoon sergeant. At this point, the team refines the plan, using the BOSSs as a guideline. Although these systems are usually considered at battalion level or higher, the platoon leader may use them as a framework to ensure that the plan is integrated. For example, at platoon level, fire support may consist of planning fires along the route of march; and mobility, countermobility, and survivability may consist of determining an internal breaching plan for the final assault on the objective.

At the completion of the wargaming, the platoon leader should provide guidance to each subordinate responsible for preparing a portion of the order (including a deadline for having the paragraph ready for the platoon leader’s review). Each platoon may develop its own ideas about who prepares which portion of the OORD, but one suggested breakdown is the following:

Platoon leader: Paragraphs 2 and 3 (should be the same in every platoon).
Senior squad leader: Paragraph 1.
Second senior squad leader:

Movement annex (when trucks, planes, helicopters, boats are involved).


Forward observer: Fires paragraph and annex.

Radiophone operator: Paragraph 5.

Each leader should have an acetate copy of the platoon SOP ORORD format and prepare his portion of the order in accordance with this format. This ensures that all aspects of the order are covered. It also helps accelerate the process of issuing the order, because those receiving the order are simply filling in the blanks.

At the time specified in his guidance, the platoon leader should inspect the terrain model to see that it meets the requirements for the issuance of the order. After making any corrections to the terrain model, the platoon leader reviews the paragraphs of the order prepared by his subordinates and makes any necessary corrections. Once these steps have been completed, it is time for the order.

As many field manuals say, the platoon leader should strive for maximum attendance at his operations order. When the tactical situation permits, this should include his entire platoon. When this is not possible—and it usually will not be—those attending should at least include the platoon sergeant, squad leaders, senior team leaders, forward observer, radiophone operator, and medic. Because the platoon leader has already inspected the terrain model and reviewed each of the paragraphs prepared by his subordinates, he may allow the subordinate who prepared each portion of the order to brief his portion. The NCOIC of the terrain model team may orient everyone to the terrain model and explain the legend. Then the senior squad leader may brief the situation paragraph, followed by the platoon leader briefing the mission and execution paragraphs, and so on. The end result is a well-prepared, well-briefed order issued after a minimum of preparation time.

Many may argue that a platoon leader who uses this technique for planning operations is simply delegating his job...
to his subordinates. But the platoon leader is responsible for everything the platoon does or fails to do, which includes operational planning. Using this technique is not a shirking of his responsibility but a better sharing of the knowledge available, which better prepares the subordinates to exercise initiative during the execution of the operation. Because the operation is ultimately the platoon leader's responsibility, he must make the final decision on key matters. For example, he must choose the COA to use and decide how much risk he is willing to assume during different phases of the operation.

The next argument against using this planning technique is that the platoon does not have enough time to do a full-blown operational planning session. Many times this will be true, but the technique may be a very rapid one, once all members of the orders preparation group are well trained. As with any Army task, training is the key to proficiency.

While cross-training is certainly beneficial for junior leaders, platoon members must first become highly proficient in their assigned tasks. For this, repetition works best. Whether in a garrison or field environment, the platoon leader should use every opportunity to train his orders preparation team, with each member playing his assigned role.

The first few times, the platoon leader should allow plenty of time for the preparation of the order to ensure that each subordinate can complete his task to standard. As each subordinate becomes proficient, the platoon leader should decrease the time allotted to complete each task. This will give his subordinates the opportunity to determine what portion of their tasks must be completed to successfully brief the order (much like a company commander planning training and prioritizing critical tasks, as there is never enough time to do everything). The end result will be an orders group that is well-rehearsed and able to complete orders to varying degrees of detail, depending upon the time available.

As with a brigade or battalion staff with subject matter experts, a platoon leader should use the collective knowledge of his NCOs to plan operations.

While the technique presented here is only one of many that could accomplish this goal, it is one that my platoon field tested in various battalion and brigade field training exercises and during a JRTC rotation. Each time, we worked to improve our proficiency, and the results were impressive. With regular training, any infantry platoon can enjoy the same success.

Captain Allen J. Pepper is assigned to the 7th Army Training Center in Germany. He previously led rifle and scout platoons in the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (since reflagged the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry) and served as a company executive officer. He is a 1993 graduate of the United States Military Academy.
Let's Talk Tactics
Lieutenants as First-Line Tacticians

CAPTAIN KEVIN S. PETIT

The Army has a great need for junior officers with a good understanding of tactics. We need lieutenants who can provide their superiors and subordinates with solid military options, recommendations, and analysis. These lieutenants should be skilled technicians and tested leaders, adaptable, knowledgeable of military history, and versed in the language of the art. In short, commanders must develop lieutenants to be the battlefield's first-line tacticians.

To teach tactics, we need to implement programs in our units that bring the lieutenants together periodically to talk tactics.

The purpose of these sessions should be to provide the familiarity and competence that lead to confidence. This officer professional development (OPD) process must go beyond classes in writing an operation order. It should also go beyond simply teaching how infantry, artillery, and armor work together to attain a designated objective or end state. It will take time, study, and practice.

The best teacher of tactics is experience. There is no substitute for being in the field, under arms, freezing and sweating. But gaining tactical experience exclusively in the field can be slow, painful, and expensive. Likewise, the standard training cycle of a typical unit offers woefully few opportunities for lieutenants to make battlefield decisions. In a low-budget environment, lieutenants cannot wait for experience to catch up with their need to know tactics. Commanders must create opportunities for discussion and the exchange of ideas to develop tactical sense in young officers.

The following discussion is a sample training path that will help you, as a unit commander, improve the tactical abilities of your junior officers:

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). A study of tactics must begin with developing the enemy situation. The IPB is the analytical
method of reducing uncertainties about the enemy situation. It integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. From these enemy characteristics, planners determine what enemy courses of action (COAs) are feasible and probable. Once settled upon the way the enemy will fight, we can begin to develop friendly COAs to defeat him. It is imperative that the red graphics (enemy) go on the map before the blue graphics (friendly).

A solid, detailed IPB allows the planner to focus his effort. When templating an enemy platoon position, include likely observation posts, probable security patrol routes, obstacles, escape or counterattack routes, command and logistics nodes, machinegun and other automatic weapon positions, and antitank or antiaircraft gun positions, to name a few. Do not be satisfied with an enemy platoon graphic placed on a hilltop. Reject enemy templates that say, “Seven to ten enemy soldiers in the building.” Well, is it seven, or is it ten? The difference is significant: Seven men may mean an ordinary infantry squad is defending a building. Doctrine indicates allocating one friendly platoon against this threat. Ten men, however, may be an infantry squad protecting a heavy machinegun team—a lethal threat that may require the allocation of two friendly platoons.

The IPB, therefore, must be detailed and specific. Leaders should create an environment in which lieutenants are not afraid of being “wrong.” The IPB is a continuous process that requires constant refinement. Speculation is necessary to progress in the planning, provided it proceeds methodically and is based upon probabilities, not possibilities.

Terrain Analysis. After World War II, terrain analysis became a central theme for cadets and officers. Topographical drawings, terrain walks, and map-reading instruction continue today in the Army’s schools. The ability to read a map, to see the terrain through its symbols and elevation lines, is increasing with technology, but there is no substitute for constant study.

During periods in the field, marksmanship ranges, and the company area, junior officers should create terrain models. Commanders should begin by asking, “What is the best way of moving a military force through this terrain?” Soon, they will ask, “What is the best way to organize this terrain for a combined arms defense?” Logisticians, communicators, and administrators ought to share in the exercise.

The classic account of how to organize a piece of military terrain is found in The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, by British Major General Sir Ernest D. Swinton when he was a captain, shortly after the Boer War at the beginning of this century. A succession of bad decisions and resultant calamitous defeats occurs in the dreams of a lieutenant fighting in that war. This treatise on hills and valleys for gun positions, fields of fire, obstacles and enemy avenues of approach should be required reading for lieutenants.

Instruction in terrain analysis should begin with the military aspects of terrain, or OCOKA (observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles and movement, key terrain, and avenues of approach). Once familiar with this information, junior officers can go on to match terrain with the capabilities of weapons and formations.

History Strengthens. Many who have achieved success in the military profession have testified to the utility of studying military history. General Douglas MacArthur constantly used historical examples to underscore his point of view. General Walter Krueger, as a young officer, translated books and articles from German literature. Early in his career, General Dwight Eisenhower spent countless hours listening to Brigadier General Fox Conner on the lessons that could be learned from military history. General George Marshall, while a student at Fort Leavenworth, reconstructed Civil War campaigns from after-action reports. General George Patton took the time in 1943 to read about the Norman conquest of Sicily nine centuries earlier and ponder the “many points in common with our operations.” Likewise, General Robert Eichelberger summoned from memory a passage on Cold Harbor from Grant’s Memoirs and thereby stiffened his own resolve to press the attack at Buna.

To teach tactics, we need to implement programs in our units that bring the lieutenants together periodically to talk tactics.

Historical examples add interest and realism to the study of tactics. To complement a lesson on the dangers of tactical shortcomings, recount the failings of Austrian General Mack von Leibnitz, who was defeated by his own indecision at the hands of Napoleon at Ulm. A lesson on timidity is best illustrated by Confederate General Gideon Pillow’s flight from Fort Donelson shortly before its surrender to General Ulysses Grant in 1862. When teaching maneuver, describe Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen’s theory of envelopment or Captain B. H. Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirect approach. Teach history to generate interest and curiosity in tactics and its application. Emphasize not the details of a particular battle, but rather the overall views of the Great Captains of battle. Examine the conditions under which the leaders made decisions, and learn to think in the same manner.

When used properly, history is a powerful tool in teaching tactics. It is an understanding and an appreciation of tactical experience that we seek, and history develops a great reservoir of that experience.

Introduce the Maneuver Warfare Argument. The maneuver versus firepower and attrition debate is an excellent vehicle for promoting tactical discussion. Regardless of personal inclinations, the academic argument has instructional tactical value. Lieutenants should be introduced to the tenets and terms of this controversial theory.

Auftragstaktik, Schwerpunkt and Auflösen are also terms and concepts that all junior officers should know. Discuss with them the concept of the “Center of Gravity.” Illustrate how “soft spot tactics” and the idea of “surfaces and gaps”
allow planners to attack the enemy's weaknesses and avoid his strengths. Examine Liddell Hart's analogy of maneuver when expressed as an expanding torrent. Question the practicability of accepting confusion and disorder and, while trying to operate within it, imposing it upon the enemy. Deliberate the importance of speed to the maneuver theory and whether speed really is, in fact, security.

Our lieutenants do not need to be able to defend the theory. They only need to recognize important characteristics about the model, identify the false analogies and oversimplifications, and question the selected historical examples that typically "prove" the case. Similarly, the lieutenants ought to ascertain the strengths of the theory. A few important points lieutenants should learn from the study are that men, not machines, win wars, that battlefield decentralization is important, and that leadership and initiative must be emphasized.

As a teacher, closely monitor the discussion, but do not try to settle the argument. Your goal is merely to generate intelligent tactical discussion. Logical thinking and tactical reasoning will spring naturally from even the most elementary instruction on maneuver warfare.

**Tactical Decision Games (TDGs).**

TDGs are a simple, interesting, and effective way to improve decisionmaking and tactical insight. Let lieutenants assume the role of commander. Provide a map or blown-up portion of a map and read a short tactical situation. The situation should be deliberately terse, because dealing with uncertainty is one of the fundamental challenges of decisionmaking.

Within an established time limit, force the lieutenants to decide what action must be taken and to communicate that action in the form of orders to subordinates. On the map or terrain sketch, require an overlay for the concept of the operation. Allow lieutenants to explain what options existed, what factors warranted consideration, and what was foremost in the commander's mind, and then to defend why they chose a certain course of action. They need not be "right," but they should be able to defend their solutions intelligently from their understanding of tactical principles.

What TDGs are intended to develop is what Frederick the Great called *coup d'oeil*, which literally means "strike of the eye," or a rapid and comprehensive glance. Frederick described it as *the talent which great men have of conceiving in a moment all the advantages of the terrain and the use they can make of it with their army...the cleverer general perceives the advantages of the [situation] instantly,...Whoever has the best coup d'oeil will perceive at first glance the weak spot of the enemy and attack him there.*

The tactician gifted with *coup d'oeil* sees patterns and opportunities on the battlefield where others may see only chaos and confusion. This "strike of the eye" brings into focus all the tactician's knowledge and experience, and it sets in motion a series of quick decisions concerning how and where to deploy forces.

The Germans also have a word for this phenomenon, *Fingerspitzengefühl*, which literally means "finger-tip feeling" and refers to the instinctive sense of matching terrain with doctrine and weaponry. Regardless of the term, tactical insight and creativity occur after the mind has been well honed and stocked with facts and ideas. TDGs are an excellent vehicle for achieving this tactical sense.

**Course of Action Development at the Company Level.**

Troop leading procedures at the company level are, to some extent, an art. Field Manual (FM) 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, discusses the deliberate planning process but does not tailor it well to company level planning. The manual suggests that the company commander develop "two or three courses of action." It suggests that the company executive officer may be used to develop courses of action (COAs) only if the commander's planning time is limited. Likewise, the manual states that the executive officer "may assist" with the wargaming effort.

Company commanders who receive a battalion operations order and close their doors, asking not to be disturbed, are planning inefficiently and missing a developmental opportunity. COA development for company schemes of maneuver can and should be done at the company level. Given guidance, lieutenants can develop COA sketches and statements for impending company operations. Lieutenants who are skilled in TDGs will make an easy transition to formulating and briefing COAs. This is an efficient and effective way to teach tactics and streamline planning at the company level.

Ultimately, lieutenants will implement what a company commander wants done in the field. The company commander formulates his plan on the basis of, among many things, the battalion commander's intent. The battalion commander sets forth in his intent his vision of the outcome of the action. But the battalion commander cannot proceed on the unreasonable assumption that all officers have had similar developmental experiences.

To increase the professional competence of junior officers, we must broaden our own experiences and hence our competence. Instruction begins with service schooling, but it must go beyond the memorization of the principles of war and the five paragraphs of an operations order. Commanders need to combine service school instruction with a self-study program and OPDs to advance the competence of their junior officers. They must treat tactics first as an academic subject, then train it in the field. Leaders can set the conditions and encourage self improvement through guidance, education, and developmental opportunities.

In short, by talking tactics, we can develop our lieutenants into first-line tacticians. These are the officers we need in our army, and we cannot afford to believe we are producing them when, in fact, we are not.

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CPT Kevin S. Petit commands Company A, 3d Battalion, 75 Ranger Regiment. He previously commanded a company in the 82d Airborne Division and led a platoon in 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Team. He is a 1988 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a master's degree in military studies.
Thoughts For Rifle Platoon Leaders

LIEUTENANT CHARLES J. DUGLE

When I started out as a new platoon leader, I would have appreciated some type of guide book or tips-and-tricks pamphlet to tell me the ins and outs of the job. This article is an attempt to help platoon leaders solve some commonly faced problems and perhaps learn better techniques for training and teaching their platoons.

For those operating in the field environment, I will share some experiences from force-on-force exercises, specifically dealing with actions on the objective and battle drills. For the garrison environment, I will discuss ranges, physical training (PT), and counseling.

One of the best kinds of training to develop tactical knowledge, experience, and the ability to counter "Murphy's Law" is to conduct platoon force-on-force exercises. A platoon force-on-force exercise consists of two rifle platoons—with zeroed multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) equipment and good observer-controllers (OCs)—going head-to-head against each other in a free-play environment. Each platoon leader is given a mission to plan and execute as he sees fit. We did this many times when I was in the National Guard and on active duty. I learned more about tactics and what really works from these exercises than from any other type of military training I ever received.

One advantage of force-on-force training is that the platoon is facing another equally motivated and skilled platoon from the same company. For both units, pride and bragging rights are at stake. What comes out of this training is a full-fledged, no-holds-barred battle in which brains, hard work, and superior tactics win the day.

Force-on-force training, like combat, provides a tough, motivated enemy who is just as eager to succeed as you are. This exercise results in two highly motivated and well-trained platoons that are giving their all to succeed. Leaders gain a greater and more immediate understanding of the consequences of their actions and decisions. They are able to see where they need work, whether it is in synchronizing the assault or conducting better pre-combat inspections.

Two examples of force-on-force exercises that we conducted illustrate the benefit of this training.

In one scenario, 1st Platoon moved to conduct a defense of a hill. The 2d and 3d Platos, with one of the platoon leaders also acting as the company commander, moved to attack 1st Platoon. The company commander and the executive officer acted as OCs, which enabled them to use their expertise to mentor the acting commander. In this scenario, a platoon leader got a chance to run the company and see first-hand the challenges of that job. Acting as company commander also helps the platoon leader understand the way his platoon mission fits in with the larger company and battalion missions.

My platoon learned some valuable lessons from this scenario. As acting company commander, I learned the need for receiving timely and accurate reports from the platoon leaders so that I could coordinate company assets such as mortars and the company reserve. Because I learned how important it was to the company commander and the overall mission, I now take extra time with squad leaders and team leaders in practicing and developing the reporting process.

Actions on the objective—specifically, consolidation and reorganization—proved to be the most confusing and problematic parts of the mission. To counter this and improve our actions on the objective, we constructed a mock-up objective in the local training area, where we could practice various combinations of assaults, focusing on conducting a thorough consolidation and reorganization. The extra training enabled us to perfect our individual movement techniques and bounding styles.

We were also able to determine which task organizations worked best for us. For example, we learned the best place to put our platoon casualty collection point, as well as the most advantageous locations for the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, medic, and forward observer during an attack.

In another scenario, 2d Platoon had the mission to conduct a hasty defense of a hill. Fifteen minutes after the platoon arrived at the site and started its priorities of work, 3d Platoon conducted a hasty attack on it. At the conclusion of this battle, 1st Platoon conducted a hasty attack on the hill against the victor of the battle between the 2d and 3d Platoons.

In this exercise, we learned the value of time management when receiving orders to conduct hasty missions, as well as the importance of executing swift, thorough priorities of work in preparing the defense. Once again, consolidation and reorganization during actions on the objective presented problems that reinforced the fact that we needed to spend extra time on this task.

As platoon leaders, we had to deter-
mine the key considerations in conducting a mission. Was it using surprise to gain the advantage by attacking as soon as possible? Was it taking the time to formulate an intricate maneuver plan? Or was it conducting thorough rehearsals and concentrating on briefbacks and inspections?

We found solutions to many of the problems we had experienced, and developed training ideas that have improved our performance in force-on-force exercises:

In the second scenario, we learned a great deal about the importance of battle drills. Almost without exception, the platoon that executed battle and crew drills quickly and correctly won the engagement. These drills need to be instinctive. When the bullets fly and the soldiers are scared, cold, wet, tired, and hungry, they must rely upon habits formed in training. If it has been drilled into them, it will carry them through the mission.

We ran battle and crew drill training so that our platoon became much like a football or basketball team that practices the same plays over and over; each member of the team then has his part memorized and the plays are seamless during the game. We found that these drills could even be done during PT, in PT uniform with helmet, load-bearing equipment, and weapon. This also proved to be a good form of realistic combat PT.

In the second scenario, I learned that the fight tended to break down into groups of separate fire teams fighting each other, instead of being a fight between two cohesive platoons. As a result, the platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders were killed first. This left the team leaders with only the guidance they remembered from the order. At that point, what should have stood out in their minds was the leader’s intent, the mission, the end state, and the location of the limit of advance. We felt that as long as they understood these four things, the mission would succeed.

A good technique for seeing that this happens is to involve the team leaders in the orders process and ensure that backbriefs are thorough. During squad level training and exercises, we also found that placing the team leader in charge of the squad for the duration of the mission improved his experience and confidence so that it would not be a new experience if he ever had to do it.

The things we learned and improved on from these force-on-force exercises would not have amounted to much if we had failed to consider one key point: No matter what else we do, or how good it looks, it is all for nothing if we can’t hit what we’re shooting at. Firmly believing in this principle, we went to great efforts to run small ranges of the highest quality. We found that the key to improving our soldiers’ shooting skills in all types of firing positions and situations was intensive premarksman-

Almost without exception, the platoon that executed battle and crew drills quickly and correctly won the engagement.

ship instruction (PMI) and incorporating alternate and advanced firing techniques—such as quick-fire drills and firing from a knee and standing—into our ranges.

From our experiences we devised the following range training schedule:

First, we fired only one type of weapon at a time and focused all the company’s resources and personnel on that task. On one day we conducted PMI, advanced and alternate firing position classes, and practical exercises, along with the boresighting of our night vision devices. On a separate day, we fired a standard zero and qualification range to include night fire and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) fire. The following day, we had a make-up firing session and conducted qualification using alternate firing positions, such as qualifying while on one knee or standing. We then conducted advanced firing techniques such as quick-fire drills. On the final day, we conducted maintenance and recovery from the range.

We found that a good PT program was almost as important as marksmanship. Infantrymen must be able to get to the objective and still have the physical stamina and strength they need to subdue the enemy. No matter how hard it was, I always made sure time was allotted for PT whenever possible. We did our utmost to make it interesting and challenging. We varied our types of PT to include upper and lower body workouts, combat PT, squad PT, and weight training. For upper body strength, we might do push-up improvement exercises, the rope climb, and wind sprints. For lower body strength, we would do a four-mile run and an abdominal workout. Combat PT would include such things as litter and buddy carries or battle drill training. Squad PT involved turning the training over to the squad leaders and letting them choose what they wanted. And finally, we would throw in some weight and aerobic training. We did all of this with the intent of making PT more challenging and interesting for the soldiers. With this varied program we raised our platoon’s PT average more than 30 points.

Finally, I would like to state the importance of counseling and tracking soldiers’ records. Keeping up with counseling and knowing what is going on with a soldier’s career shows that you care about him and his development as a soldier. To make sure we were proficient in these areas, the platoon leadership held classes on how to fill out paperwork—awards, counseling forms, or noncommissioned officer evaluation reports. In these classes, we would also do practical exercises, filling out these forms on fictional soldiers.

We also found that it was useful in keeping track of soldiers to have the squad leaders carry “leader books.” These books contained such things as the soldiers’ family information, PT and weapon scores, schools, awards, and promotion point status. During a soldier’s initial counseling, we also filled out a goal sheet that outlined his immediate and long-term personal and professional goals, including a plan on how to attain these goals. The platoon sergeant also kept track of the platoon master record book.

Counseling should be a continuous process in which leaders counsel their
men on their positive and negative performance as outlined in their initial counseling and military goals sheets. This keeps soldiers on track and gives counselors a standard to work with. Counseling can be hard to keep up with, but it is a necessary task that shows soldiers what we expect of them.

The advice offered here in no way covers all the problems or challenges that face a new platoon leader, but it does offer some answers and alternative techniques to help in the training and development of platoons. If we continue to exercise innovative, imaginative training techniques, we will better prepare our soldiers and units to fight and win on the battlefields of tomorrow.

Lieutenant Charles J. Dugle led rifle platoons in the 1st Battalion, 293d Infantry, Indiana Army National Guard, and in the 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, where he is now an S-3 Air. He is a 1993 ROTC graduate of Kemper Military School and College and Ball State University.
Simple Ideas
For the New Platoon Leader
CAPTAIN VICTOR H. KOCH, JR.

New platoon leaders have access to many references that deal with leadership, tactics, and training, and as a new platoon leader, you should look at as many of these sources as possible. The more you know, the more options you will have available.

This article, however, is meant to provide a few lessons and ideas that may be overlooked. Some of these are on leadership, but the rest are simple ideas that will make your job easier.

First, keep a file of all your orders. Most officers do this, and the best way is in a hardcover notebook so that your documents are organized and accessible. This book should include assignment orders, award orders and certificates, officer evaluation reports (OERs), and any other document that might go in your military file. Keeping this file in a chronological order makes it easy for you to find a specific record at a specific point in your career.

Along the same lines, keep a file of all documents that you produce. Every award, evaluation report, Report of Survey, Line of Duty Investigation, OER Support Form, and any other document that you write should be kept in a file. You will find yourself continually using these documents.

This file is important for two reasons. First, you have a copy in case the document you produced is lost at higher levels. Second, and more important, you have a reference from which you can take ideas. Writing an evaluation report or award is much easier if you have examples to follow. This file should be paper copies of the original documents in something as simple as a manila folder. Saving documents on computer is fine but not as convenient as actual paper copies. A paper copy can be referenced instantly by anyone who needs to use it as an example.

One of the first things you should do when you arrive at your unit is to check out your entire battalion area. Most units have sponsors to show new personnel around. You need to take a look at all the battalion’s facilities, inside and out. Look around the battalion headquarters, S-4 shop, motor pool, dining facility, Aid Station, and every other place that may directly or indirectly affect your platoon.

While doing this, meet the soldiers who work there. The Physician’s Assistant, S-4, Motor Sergeant, PAC NCO, and the chiefs of many other areas, will all somehow affect your platoon, and you should be able to put a face to each place. This way, when someone says “the PAC NCO says...” or “the S&T Platoon Leader needs...”, you have a true idea of where and who he is talking about. They, in turn, will be able to connect your face and name more easily. For the same reason, on a larger scale, you need to learn as much about your post as possible as soon as you can.

Your additional duties will also be an important part of your job. NBC officer, Arms Room Officer, Weight Control Officer, Safety Officer, and the dozen other possible additional duties may seem relatively unimportant to the success of a rifle platoon. But these duties are very important to the success of the company and surprisingly important for a platoon leader to learn. You have the opportunity to develop your professional knowledge by learning in the company and by attending related schools or courses, such as the NBC course. As a platoon leader you may get by at first with limited knowledge of the commodity areas and additional duties. But the more you learn about company operations as a platoon leader, the less you will have to learn as an executive officer or commander. Executive officers, and especially commanders, have to know about the additional duty areas to keep the company running smoothly. If you take the
time to learn your additional duty areas, your company will be better off. And in the long run, so will you and your platoon.

Whenever you must take a problem to your commander, also try to offer him a solution as well. The commander has enough to think about without having to solve every single problem. Have solutions to problems ready, and be prepared to make recommendations about training, personnel, military justice punishments, and other matters that come up. The commander is likely to accept your recommendations or solutions, or with some slight modification, most of the time. This gives you greater freedom to lead your platoon and make your own destiny. If your commander does not accept your recommendations, support his decision and continue to offer solutions to other problems and issues. As long as your recommendations are doctrinally sound and tactfully presented, you are doing your job.

Upon completion of the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) and the Ranger Course, you will have the base of knowledge about tactics and leadership that you need to become a rifle platoon leader. Believe in what you know, and trust your instincts. If something doesn’t look right to you, it probably isn’t.

Don’t allow your soldiers to continue doing things the wrong way, especially if they say, “This is the way we’ve always done it here.” As a recent graduate of IOBC and possibly the Ranger Course, you should know the newest doctrine. You will probably meet resistance to changing techniques that have always been done a certain way, especially from those who have been in the unit for a long time. Explain that tactics and techniques have changed and why a specific technique has changed, and back the changes with the appropriate manuals.

You should not, however, go into a platoon and try to change everything right away. If changes are necessary, focus on the major issues first. Once you have gained the trust of your soldiers, it will be easier to make changes. The important thing to remember is, do not be afraid to make corrections.

Again, so long as you make valid corrections tactfully and on the basis of current doctrine, there should not be any ill feelings.

Remember that there are many things you still need to learn, especially about your platoon’s equipment. Asking questions is as important as making corrections. The SINCgars radio, the precision lightweight GPS receiver, and numerous pieces of NBC equipment all may have been discussed briefly in IOBC, but you certainly will not know everything you need to know about them. If you go to a mechanized unit, the Bradley course certainly won’t teach you all you need to know about the vehicle. And, if you become a specialty platoon leader, such as mortar or TOW, there is a whole new realm of equipment to learn. Ask your soldiers questions about the equipment and show them that you want to learn. This way, you not only learn the equipment, but also open the communications flow within the platoon.

As a leader, it is your job to ensure that you and your soldiers are performing assigned tasks to standard. It is important that your subordinate leaders know exactly what needs to be done. One of the easiest and most effective ways to ensure that tasks are being accomplished is to create, and use, checklists.

Checklists are important for your leaders to have as a reference. In the heat of a busy day, it is easy to overlook a task or two, even for an experienced squad leader. To ensure that all the steps of a task are being done, a quick reference such as this is more convenient to use than a manual.

Checklists can easily be part of a platoon standing operating procedures (SOP). Checklists for priorities of work, pre-combat inspections, and maintenance checks can easily be reduced to pocket size. And such checklists are a simple way for subordinate leaders to ensure they are meeting your standard.

One leadership lesson I want to discuss is the need to develop trust. A platoon leader must trust his NCOs and soldiers—and in turn earn their trust—so he can develop a strong team. But how do you develop trust? You have to listen to the recommendations of your NCOs and soldiers. This does not mean that you have to accept every suggestion. The final decision is ultimately yours. But you open the communications flow by listening to and implementing some of the techniques and ideas of your soldiers. Your NCOs and soldiers should feel comfortable making suggestions and offering ideas. They should feel comfortable asking questions that clarify your intent. This is a great asset, whether planning training or planning a mission. Trust builds loyalty. Loyalty and trust together build a team.

Along with listening to the recommendations of your soldiers, learn about them. Learn who they are and tell them about yourself. Let them know that you are interested in them and care about what they have to say. Your soldiers should follow you into battle, not because they know that you are the platoon leader, but because they know you are competent and you care about them.

The final lesson is the importance of professionalism. You must always try to maintain your military bearing. Your professionalism is always being measured. Always try to control your emotions. Think before you speak. Be consciously aware of who is around you. Control your body language (a facial expression can say as much as the spoken word). Use good judgment when making decisions. And never compromise your integrity. You can recover from tactical errors in training. That is why we train. But it is very difficult to recover from errors in judgment that reflect on your professionalism.

All of the ideas presented in this article are fundamental to our profession. These are certainly not all of the things that you need to succeed as a platoon leader. But the information will make your job somewhat easier and will better prepare you and your platoon for combat.

Captain Victor H. Koch, Jr. led a rifle platoon and an infantry antiarmor platoon in the 2d Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division. He is a 1992 ROTC graduate of Texas Technological University.
The Defense
Of a Mortar Platoon Position

LIEUTENANT MICHAEL P. SHANNON

The defense is a coordinated effort to cause the enemy attack to fail and set conditions favorable to assuming the offensive. Defensive operations retain ground, gain time, deny the enemy access to an area, and damage or defeat his attacking forces. An essential element of the battalion commander's combat power in the defense is the battalion mortar platoon.

The 81mm mortar platoon in an airborne infantry battalion can provide immediate, accurate, and responsive indirect fire support for the battalion task force. Mortars enable the commander to strike out against the enemy, to regain the initiative and synchronization, and to counterattack by fire. Thus, the mortar platoon is an integral piece of any defensive operation and can be used specifically for the following:

- Deceive or divert enemy attention.
- Screen friendly maneuver.
- Obscure enemy observation and fires.
- Neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces.
- Fix the enemy in position for counterattack.
- Deny the enemy the use of defilade or decisive terrain.
- Illuminate the battlefield for more effective friendly direct and indirect fires.
- Harass the enemy and interdict his massing of assault forces.

A key ingredient in the mortar platoon's ability to support the task force defense is its own defense. The establishment of the mortar platoon defense should be methodical to save time and effort. The many factors the mortar platoon leader uses in building a mortar defense are the enemy situation, the commander's intent, and the ability to range the battalion sector. He must also consider a number of enemy threats, the greatest of which are enemy counterfire, ground attacks, and air attacks.

This article discusses my platoon's standing operating procedures for the defense. The key events in the execution of the defense are shown in Figure 1.

A good mortar defense begins with a thorough mission analysis. The platoon leader must analyze the battalion scheme of maneuver and, along with the battalion fire support officer (FSO), select a location that best supports the battalion's maneuver elements. They may first select a general area of operation, and later narrow it down to a specific location on the basis of a thorough leader's reconnaissance.

The platoon leader must determine whether he can accomplish the mission from the position he has chosen. He selects the platoon firing position on the basis of the following fundamentals: mission accomplishment, tactical situation, range, target area coverage, mask and overhead clearance, surface conditions, communications, and routes. He must also consider where to place the aiming circle, the fire direction center (FDC) and headquarters element, and the platoon's vehicles. The defense is then tailored to the resources available and the enemy threat. Once the leader's reconnaissance is complete, the platoon can safely occupy the position in accordance with the standards in ARTEP 7-90MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Mortar Platoon, Section, and Squad.

A key element in the occupation of the firing position is the platoon's ability to move from the occupation to the priorities of work. Each squad leader must be diligent in implementing the priorities of work. The most important priority is the establishment of local security. Once the platoon leader is sure the area of operations is secure and defensible, the platoon can begin to execute the priorities of work. The following is a list of priorities that other platoons can adapt to their own needs:

- Establish local security (emplace observation points and early warning devices).
- Establish communications with the FDC (both wire and FM).
- Clear mask and overhead clearance.
- Camouflage positions.
- Emplace alternate aiming posts and safety stakes.
- Emplace M-8 chemical agent alarms.
- Select alternate and supplementary positions.
- Prepare sector sketches and range cards.
- Dig/construct mortar positions.

Figure 1. Execution of the defense of a mortar platoon position

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• Emplace obstacles and mines (in accordance with battalion SOP).
• Perform weapons maintenance.
• Perform personal hygiene and camouflage self and equipment.
• Eat and implement rest plan.

The most effective way to accomplish all of these tasks is to delegate the priorities of work to the squad leader, who can then report the status of his squad to the platoon leader as each task is done.

The survivability of the platoon depends upon both security and a good obstacle plan that includes the use of existing and reinforcing obstacles. Depending on the engineer assets available, the platoon leader should use his resources as effectively as possible in executing his obstacle plan. Using concertina wire and mines is one of the best ways to provide protection for the platoon. Protective and tactical wire should be the main priority for wire obstacles.

The mortar defense concept my platoon has developed is shown in Figure 2. Note that the flanks of the position are covered by a .50 caliber machinegun position and a Mk 19 grenade launcher position. The rear of the position is covered by a two-man observation post that is used to provide early warning of approaching enemy. Wire obstacles, supplemented with mines, cover the most likely enemy avenues of approach. One mortar gun squad acts as the platoon quick-reaction force (QRF) in the event of an enemy probe of the position.

Once the platoon leader is confident that the priorities of work are being accomplished and the obstacle plan is in effect, he should begin to look for alternate firing positions. This begins with a thorough map reconnaissance of proposed locations. Once a primary location has been chosen, the platoon leader takes his recon party and selects the alternate firing position. He should determine the location for each tube, the aiming circle, and the platoon’s vehicles, and then determine the deflections to each gun and all other critical information. A key to this process is determining a route to the alternate location and timing the movement. If at all possible, a movement rehearsal should be conducted to determine how long the platoon will be out of action during the move. This information should be passed to the battalion tactical operations center so the FSO or S-3 can plan for the interruption of fires in the event of a displacement.

At this point, the defense is almost fully developed, and the platoon leader must supervise to ensure that the platoon is meeting his intent. He must constantly see that security is maintained. In the event of an engagement, he must control and direct fire, using the QRF. If necessary, he must also move soldiers, ammunition, and equipment within the position to ensure continuous support. He must reposition to ensure that the FDC is tracking the battle so the platoon can continue to be effective. Finally, he must reorganize and reestablish the defense during lulls in the battle.

The platoon defense plan is good only if it is known and well rehearsed. Platoon rehearsals are the only way each individual soldier will understand his part of the plan. Every soldier must know his task and purpose and how it relates to the big picture. The rehearsal should always be conducted under conditions similar to those in which you will fight. It should focus on battle drills, SOPs, and individual tasks.

Rehearsals can begin immediately after the first warning order is issued. Mission specific rehearsals usually follow the operations order. The platoon leader must establish the priority for rehearsals on the basis of time and resources. The first priority should focus on the platoon’s actions at the decisive point in the battle. The most important rehearsal for the platoon defense is that for actions in the event of enemy contact, and the use of the QRF to respond to those actions. The platoon leader should brief his soldiers on the location and routes to the alternate firing position and the conditions that warrant an evacuation of the primary firing position. He should also conduct rehearsals with the QRF squad, including blank and live fires, if possible.

The prime consideration in the defense of a mortar position is survivability. The platoon must be able to accomplish its task and purpose and also defend itself. History has shown that a well planned, well rehearsed, and well executed mortar platoon defense leads to success in combat.

Lieutenant Michael P. Shannon led a mortar platoon and an antitank platoon and served as a company executive officer in the 1st Battalion, 504th Infantry. He is a 1995 ROTC graduate of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Ethiopia-Eritrea 1999
Border Battles Continue

ADAM GEIBEL

EDITOR’S NOTE: The protracted conflict described in this article typifies in many respects the challenges facing us in the 21st Century. Here we see two Third World countries, ostensibly engaged in war based upon deep-seated enmity and conflicting interests. This conflict would remain an obscure border war but for the infusion of advanced technology by major powers needing to shore up their already stressed economies through military sales. Conflicts such as this can easily spill over into other nations in which U.S. interests lie, and will demand the commitment of U.S. forces. We must, therefore, examine and learn from these actions, and include the indigenous equipment and tactics in our contingency planning.

After their protracted fighting in 1998 failed to achieve any clear advantage, the Ethiopians and the Eritreans fell into a kind of trench warfare reminiscent of World War I—albeit with 1950s vintage weapons. For reference, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) will be referred to as the Eritrean Army and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as the Ethiopian Army. By implication, both were once guerrilla forces, which might explain the horrendous casualties that were to be suffered by both sides.

Tensions on the border increased in late January and continued into February. An Eritrean administrator told a Reuters reporter that at least 55,000 Ethiopian troops had been massed across the border from the Eritrean town of Tsonora. On the heels of a 31 January statement by Eritrean President Issais Afwerki that “Eritrea will never fire the first bullet,” the Ethiopians claimed, at 1600 on 2 February, that Eritrean guns shelled their units for 45 minutes on the Zalambessa front along the trunk highway between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

On 3 February, Ethiopia accused Eritrea of massing a division in Tsonora across the border from Axum and the industrial town of Adwa. At dawn on the 4th, Eritrea began continuous shelling along the Badme front and the next day, at 1045, of bombing Adigrat again. The fuel depot and surrounding areas were targeted.

On the 6th at 0600, the Ethiopians claimed to have captured a major Eritrean stronghold in a tank, artillery, and missile attack, with their enemies suffering heavy losses. The Eritreans denied being driven from their trenches, claiming that two Ethiopian brigades were completely routed and two more were severely battered in the attempt.

The fighting included helicopter gunship attacks, and the forces ended the fight with their lines roughly one mile apart.

On the 7th, the Ethiopians said that Eritrean units shelled targets in Adigrat, killing three civilians. They also claimed the destruction of an Eritrean radar station at 1745, five kilometers southeast of Adi Quala. The Eritreans countered that the report of Ethiopia’s targeting of a radar station was a pure fabrication; the town proper was shelled, killing eight civilians, wounding 23, and demolishing ten houses. They also added that more than 250 Ethiopian troops were killed in action and 18 taken prisoner along the Mereb-Setit front.

On the 8th Ethiopia claimed that its fighter-bombers had backed up its artillery counteroffensive and were instrumental in the capture of towns on the Tsonora flank of the Alitena-Mereb front late in the day. Asmara in turn claimed that the Ethiopian 20th and 24th Divisions were badly battered in the same area, suffering 1,500 killed and 3,000 wounded.

Asmara repeated its assertions that the Ethiopians had enlisted foreign helicopter gunship and fighter aircraft pilot mercenaries, who were flying missions on the Mereb-Setit front. On the 9th Ethiopian planes bombed Deda (a small town that is home to 500 Eritreans deported from Ethiopia in Gash-Barka), killing five and wounding another five. At 0550 an Antonov high-altitude “bomber” (apparently a cargo plane field-modified to deliver ordnance) dropped at least four bombs and some incendiary flares, while Eritrean antiaircraft guns opened up in retaliation.

WEAPONS PURCHASES
Prelude to Round 2

Despite a postponement due to Eritrean protests, in early September 1998, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu approved the sale of ten upgraded MIG-21B fighters to Ethiopia. The first plane was scheduled to be delivered in 1999. (Israel is upgrading 100 MIG-21s for Romania and the ten sold to Ethiopia will be replaced by ten Ethiopian MiGs in need of upgrading.)

In early December, it was reported that Russia would supply Ethiopia with $150 million worth of used fighter planes, helicopters, and other military equipment that would be delivered later in the month. By mid-month, the Eritreans were reported to have acquired an unknown number of MIG-29 fighters at $25 million each. The Russians had also reportedly sent 20 pilots to Asmara to train the Eritreans. As of 16 December, MIG-29s were reportedly flying over Asmara.
This attack was followed by an Ethiopian MiG bombing run about two kilometers away.

The Eritreans showed journalists 100 Ethiopian prisoners at Tsonora (100 kilometers southwest of Asmara, 35 kilometers northwest of Zalambessa) and claimed 250 Ethiopians killed in action on the Badme front. They added that the Ethiopians had suffered heavy casualties, losing almost four brigades in the last three days of fighting on the Mereb-Setit front. Independent sources estimated that at least 4,000 troops from both sides had died in 48 hours of fighting. A United Nations special correspondent in New York estimated that more than 200,000 soldiers were involved in the conflict.

On the 10th, there were unconfirmed rumors in Asmara of a truce. Eritrean troops remained dug in on the Badme front. The next day, Addis Ababa called on Asmara to evacuate its civilians from the fronts and disregarded the UN appeal for an immediate cease-fire. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister declared that a truce would be possible only after the Eritrean troops withdrew from Ethiopian territory.

On the 12th, there were heavy artillery exchanges on the Zalambessa front. That same day, the Ethiopians announced that they had successfully completed the first phase of their plan with the control of the key military positions essential for up-coming missions and with the seizure of three “key strongholds, one along the Badme front and two on the Tsonora front.”

On the 13th, the Eritreans said that they had 22 Ethiopian deserters and 147 prisoners of war (some of whom they claimed were mere children). Meanwhile, Addis Ababa released 15 pilots of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime who had been held in jail for “war crimes”—two generals (the former air force chief of staff and the former military commander of Asmara), as well as nine colonels, one major, two captains, and a lieutenant—all pilots of F5s, MiGs, Antonovs, or Mi-24 helicopters.

Early on the 14th, an Ethiopian Antonov bombed civilian targets on the Bure front line, 71 kilometers east of the port city of Assab. A large water tanker was hit, a significant loss for such a dry area. At 0900 Asmara’s antiaircraft guns managed to down an Ethiopian Hind on the same front, killing pilot and crew. Although Eritrean fighters took off from Asmara, there was no apparent air-to-air combat.

That evening, the Ethiopians claimed that an Eritrean company was completely destroyed as its battalion tried to recapture a fort. Earlier, they claimed the Eritrean command had been ejected from that fort by Ethiopian forces, cut off and surrounded at Gemahlo. Rescue efforts failed to materialize and, with supplies running out, the veteran Eritrean Army commander had to consider surrendering with his troops.

On 16 February, Ethiopian Air Force MiG-23s bombed an Eritrean logistical support center. Heavy weapons, armored vehicles, military rations, and a huge water reservoir were destroyed. Eritrean military personnel suffered heavy losses.

After six days of fighting, Addis Ababa estimated that 7,000 Eritrean troops had been “put out of action” (4,000 troops, two tanks, three multiple launch rocket systems on the Badme front and the Tsonora front, 3,000 troops and four tanks as well as various artillery pieces and ammunition depots).

At dawn on the 21st, two Ethiopian Antonov bombers conducted a series of bombing raids on Assab’s airport and city reservoir. The planes, forced to fly at high altitude because of Eritrean air defense artillery (ADA), dropped 12 bombs, but none hit their targets. That evening, the Antonovs returned to bomb a village outside Tsonora.

The Mereb-Setit front had been relatively quiet on the ground for the two weeks since the Ethiopian large-scale attacks on 6 and 7 February. Eritrean troops (with heavy artillery and tanks) dug in on the high ground along the 100-kilometer front. The fortifications of lumber, concrete, and steel had an average thickness of 45 centimeters.

On the 22nd, Ethiopian MiGs conducted an intensive, though ineffective, day-long air bombardment on the Mereb-Setit front and Tsonora flanks. The next day, the Ethiopians opened a barrage at 0430 and, an hour later, two Antonovs dropped bombs near Eritrean Mereb-Setit front trenches. Nine of their T-55s were destroyed and two captured during an 0700 assault, according to Asmara. Ethiopia subsequently summoned more air support, but the MiG-23 fighters turned back after Eritrean resistance. The Ethiopian offensive would later be described as a World War I-style assault (Addis Ababa also opened a “feeble” attack on the Tsonora front around 1000).

Intense fighting continued into the afternoon of the 24th, with Eritrea claiming 22 Ethiopian T-55s destroyed and one captured, while their ADA units brought down one of Ethiopia’s Mi-24s behind Asmara’s lines.

Ethiopia apparently bled off units from other fronts to mass an attack on the Badme front. The Eritreans claimed that their enemy had deployed six divisions, two of which were completely routed in the attacks.

On the 25th, Ethiopia claimed that one of its SU-27s had shot down an Eritrean MiG-29 (rumored to be piloted by the Eritrean Air Force commander) in a dogfight over the Badme front. (The other five or six MiG-29s were piloted by Ukrainian or Eastern European mercenaries.) This was followed the next day with the claim of a second Eritrean MiG-29 shot down.

After four days of fighting, an Eritrean presidential adviser told the press that Ethiopian “human wave attacks” had broken through a defensive position south of Badme on the 60-kilometer front. The Ethiopians then infiltrated units through the penetration and rolled up Eritrean lines from behind.

Dug-in Eritrean tanks facing south (where an Ethiopian counteroffensive was anticipated) were flanked, and Eritrean commanders reportedly tried to reinforce the front-line by mobilizing troops from other fronts. Ethiopian jets and gunships struck at units and supply points behind the front, paralyzing any moves by their enemy.

Addis Ababa claimed that 50,000 Eritrean troops were “put out of action,” while Eritrean official sources claimed the Ethiopians had lost more than 9,000 dead and 12,000 wounded.
Eritrea described this decision to withdraw as a move to preserve their military manpower and hardware, adding, "Ethiopia has made this advance at great human and military cost. We have left our position with our forces intact and have taken up new positions."

On the 27th, Ethiopian planes dropped four napalm bombs on an all but empty town 30 kilometers from Badme, destroying 150 homes. That night, Eritrean officials agreed before the UN Security Council to accept the only peace plan on the table, which Ethiopia had already approved.

On the last day of the month, Ethiopia declared a "total victory" over Eritrea. A government statement said that Ethiopian troops had overrun 100 kilometers of heavily fortified trenches, dealing the Eritrean army a "monumental and humiliating defeat."

Eritrea countered that it had killed 14,000 Ethiopians since fighting began 22 days earlier, more than 9,000 since February 23. Asmara described Ethiopia's victory statement as "boasting and lies" and said that its own forces had foiled an Ethiopian offensive on the Mereb-Setit front.

Ethiopia lashed out at the United Nations on 1 March, stating that it would not accept the UN Security Council Resolution that "demanded an immediate halt to the hostilities, in particular the use of air strikes," or the one that "strongly urges all states to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea."

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) mission, expected to begin in Asmara on 3 March, was postponed.

**The March Offensives**

Asmara claimed that the Ethiopian Army suffered a devastating defeat in the Altiena-Merab sector of the Tsonora front in the battles that ran from 14 March until 0900 on the 16th: More than 10,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed, 57 tanks and scores of other military vehicles destroyed, six tanks captured, and one MiG-23 shot down.

Repeated Ethiopian attacks took place throughout the 15th and into the night, and "thousands of its troops fell like leaves." Asmara claimed another 25 tanks destroyed (bringing that campaign's total to 44 destroyed and two captured).

Reminiscent of tales from the Italo-Ethiopian War, 63 years earlier, the Ethiopians supposedly forced 5,000 of their own villagers to carry ammunition up to the front on pack animals and their own backs, some of whom became casualties.

The Eritreans also accused the Ethiopian regime of denying that any fighting was taking place at all and later qualifying it as "routine shelling and skirmishes." Ethiopian sources denied the Eritrean victory, defining their own withdrawal as a tactical maneuver.

An Ethiopian Mi-35 gunship attempting to strafe Eritrean positions along the Mereb-Setit front sustained slight damage from Eritrean antiaircraft fire on the 18th, which forced it down behind Eritrean defense lines.

The Eritreans also said that four Ethiopian tanks were destroyed and two captured during 17-18 March. Three Ural trucks carrying ZU-23 antiaircraft guns were also destroyed.

During the same period, Asmara noted that Ethiopian Antonov bombers, MiGs, and helicopter gunships bombed two civilian districts, allegedly in retaliation for the heavy defeat on the Tsonora front.

An Eritrean military spokesman estimated that "some 10,000 Ethiopian soldiers were killed and 57 tanks destroyed in three days of fighting at the Tsonora front." He said, "The figure represents what we think is probably a low-end calculation."

Early on the 19th and continuing into the 20th, Ethiopian and Eritrean forces continued to clash in the Mereb River vicinity west of the Zalambessa-Igala front, where fierce fighting had been raging for several days.

An official Ethiopian statement issued on the night of the 19th accused Eritrea of paying only lip service to its acceptance of the OAU peace plan for resolving the border dispute "after it was forcibly evicted from Badme."

According to the terms of the OAU framework agreement, "Eritrean troops are required to withdraw from all occupied territories. This is what they were required to do 10 months ago, and it is what they still need to do."

The Eritreans said that their forces shot down an Ethiopian MiG-23 over the Badme front on 21 March (as well as destroying two tanks), which the Ethiopian government denied.

Ethiopia claimed on the 28th that its troops had inflicted "heavy losses" on Eritrean forces during the latest two fierce battles on two fronts this month. They claimed that nearly 23,000 Eritrean forces had been put out of action and a total of 51 tanks destroyed during the engagements of 13-16 March and 17-26 March, respectively.

On the Zalambessa-Igala front, more than 9,000 Eritrean troops were put out of action, 36 tanks were destroyed along with three batteries (each containing four or five long-range heavy artillery pieces), from 13 to 16 March.

During the Mereb River fighting, 13,700 Eritrean forces were killed, wounded, or captured, according to Addis Ababa, as well as 15 tanks, a large ammunition depot, and two batteries of long-range heavy artillery. Four tanks were also captured.
On the 28th, the Ethiopians claimed that their air force shot down two Eritrean MiG-29s and that they captured hundreds of mortars, antiaircraft and antitank weapons and medium-range heavy artillery, and thousands of light and medium armaments, as well as several food and ammunition supply depots. The greatest claim was ten batteries of long-range heavy artillery.

Also in late March, the Ethiopians alleged that Asmara planted about 110,000 antipersonnel mines and more than 10,000 antitank mines near its trenches in Badme and some parts of Sheraro. The Ethiopians also claimed that the mines were as much to prevent Eritrean desertsions as to stop Ethiopian troops but that an Ethiopian engineering unit had managed to clear breaches.

On 15 April the ceasefire collapsed when Ethiopian fighter planes attacked three military bases 50 to 60 kilometers from the border, including an army base and a fuel depot. Successive raids between 1230 and 1300 were described as “high altitude bombings and indiscriminate.” The Eritrean government condemned the attack for deliberately targeting civilians.

Two weeks later, Ethiopia launched an air raid against Eritrea using two Antonov planes escorted by fighter jets. On 28 April, the Ethiopian planes violated Eritrean airspace to “bomb nomadic grazing areas along the Bimbina-Kukul road in western Eritrea,” according to the Eritreans. They claimed that the air raid was deliberately timed to coincide with the visit of a UN special envoy to the region.

Another series of raids were launched by Addis Ababa two weeks later. On the morning of 14 May, Ethiopian MiGs targeted an Eritrean logistic center and a mechanized unit on the Zalambessa front, causing “heavy damage” and returning to their base without suffering any losses to ADA fire.

The next morning, five Ethiopian MiG-3s targeted Massawa’s port and naval base, and a mobile oil depot. Asmara claimed that only a warehouse containing tires was hit. While Addis Ababa claimed that the raid heavily damaged targets in the city, western journalists said that the port was untouched. Speaking from Cairo, Eritrean President Afwerki dismissed the Ethiopian air raid as a show of force in response to the mediation efforts.

At 2130 local time on the 16th, the Ethiopian Air Force Antonovs launched an attack on a weapons depot near Shambuko, about 25 kilometers from the border. The Ethiopians claimed heavy damage to Eritrean heavy artillery stored in the warehouse, as well as several trucks used as prime movers. This would be excellent damage assessment for a night raid. The raid was presumably scheduled to lessen the effectiveness of Eritrean antiaircraft fire, and the Antonovs returned safely.

The next outbreak of fighting was in late May, with predictable conflicting statements from both sides. An Ethiopian division-sized attack launched on the central flank of the Mereb-Setit front on 21 May was foiled after four days, according to Asmara, with 380 killed, 975 wounded, and 11 captured. The Ethiopian statement said that fighting began on 22 May, when four Eritrean brigades attacked Ethiopian positions, resulting in 400 Eritrean soldiers dead and 1,500 wounded near the River Mereb. An Ethiopian Hind helicopter was downed on the 24th.

Three weeks later, the Ethiopian army launched what appeared to be a diversionary attack on the Bure front of the 1,000-kilometer border, then committed two full divisions to an assault on the central flank of the Mereb-Setit front line on the 11th. Eritrean forces claim to have killed or wounded 12,210 Ethiopian soldiers in three days of fighting. The Ethiopians claimed to have killed or wounded 7,800 Eritreans during the same period.

Eritrea claimed four Ethiopian MiG fighters in two fierce border battles, including two MiG-23s downed on the Mereb-Setit front with surface-to-air missiles. Ethiopia denied the losses.

Both sides had tried to gain the initiative before the rainy season, when further advances would be impossible. The pattern of two weeks between air attacks indicated Ethiopian probes of and softening attempts on Eritrean defenses. The same pattern during the ground assaults was probably due to logistical limitations. Clearly, both sides needed to reload.

By the end of June, Eritrean units had moved forward (up to six kilometers) all along the hilly, 50-kilometer, U-shaped Mereb-Setit front.

An Uncertain Future

Up to this point, the efforts of African neighbors, the UN, and the United States had failed to settle the dispute. But with the rainy season fast approaching in July, both sides became more willing to return to negotiations.

During the last week of June, a Libyan deputy minister in charge of African Affairs shuttled between the two capitals until a settlement plan was negotiated. On 3 July, the Libyan press reported that Ethiopia and Eritrea had stopped all military operations as a prelude to signing a cease-fire agreement.

Nevertheless, border tension, punctuated by occasional skirmishing and shelling, continued into the fall, with diplomacy making no headway and with the war threatening to spread. Ethiopian forces pushed into southern Somalia to get at Eritrean rebels allied with Somali warlord Hussein Aidid. Eritrea had sent Oromo Liberation Front rebels, along with shipments of arms and munitions, to Aidid, but skirmishing in this area quickly cooled.

By October the entire border had stagnated and more Ethiopians along the front were dying from disease than from bullets. While the Ethiopians held the town of Badme and were in defensive positions, near Zalambessa the front lines were only 200 meters apart, and the Ethiopians were prepared to take the town.

To date, there is no solution to this conflict, and the skirmishing continues.

Adam Goibel is S-2 of the 5th Squadron, 117th Cavalry, New Jersey Army National Guard. A graduate of the New Jersey Military Academy Officer Candidate Course, he has led both tank and scout platoons. He is also a correspondent for the Journal of Military Ordnance and a free-lance writer on military subjects and affairs.
From the Commander’s Mind
To
Steel on Target

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MATTHEW T. HALE
MAJOR JOHN MARK MATTOX

The historical experience of the Army’s combat training centers has identified several problems that consistently reduce the effects of indirect fires. Some of these problems stem from a general misunderstanding of the role fires play in combined arms operations. Others stem from the inability of key leaders to articulate that role. While the problems differ in their specifics, they all indicate that indirect fires must be more effectively integrated into maneuver operations if units are to achieve the best effects of fire delivery systems.

This lack of effective fire support integration is a function of two things: First, maneuver commanders often tend to provide direction that is too general. Second, fire support personnel at all echelons sometimes fail to ask maneuver commanders the searching questions that might lead to the production of effective fire support plans. Both of these symptoms point to the need for a methodology that will make sure the commander’s intent for fires translates directly into steel on target.

A New Vision of Fire Support

For many generations, the Army’s doctrinal manuals have instructed maneuver commanders to spell out a concept of fires along with a concept of operations. In the concept of fires, the commander must “describe how fires will be used to support the maneuver commander’s concept of operations” and to “address the priority of fire support” (Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations). The following example has been cited as an adequate statement of a brigade commander’s intent for fires:

Priority of fires during Phase I to 1st Bn, 16th Inf. Priority of fires for Phase II to 1st Bn, 22d Inf. An additional COLT [combat observation and lasing team] has been allocated from div arty to support the brigade for Copperhead missions and laser designation of CAS [close air support] precision munitions. The division commander retains FASCAM employment authority. (FM 6-20-50, Fire Support for Brigade Operations (Light)).

This example highlights one cause of the ineffective integration of indirect fires in combined arms operations. In the example, the commander assigns a priority of fires to subordinate units, but he never actually says what he wants the indirect fires to accomplish. He merely reports some general facts concerning the fire support assets that he has been allocated.

Likewise, consider the following example of a “concept of fires” paragraph at the battalion task force level:

Priority of field artillery (FA) fires from the LD/LC to PL GRAY is to the scout platoon. Tm A has priority of mortar fires. Scout Platoon has two priority Copperhead targets and one FA priority target. Tm A has two mortar priority targets. Battalion COLT moves with the scout platoon and occupies a position vicinity FA075733 and prepares to lase priority targets for the scout platoon vicinity objectives LEE and JEB. Scout platoon is responsible for initiating smoke missions to support attacks by Tm A and Co C. A Battery, 1-42 FA, will be available to provide smoke. Priority of FA fires shifts to Tm A after it crosses PL GOLD. Tm A has two FA priority targets. After Ohjs LEE and BOWIE are seized and Co C crosses PL GRAY, priority of FA fires is to Tm A,
Co C, and Co B, in that order. If the TF receives air assets, priority of fires is to SEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses].

In this example, the commander provides a few more details. In addition to specifying the priority of fires, he also assigns priority targets, and he attaches a COLT to the scout platoon and assigns the scout platoon to emplace artillery-delivered smoke. He does not, however, state what he wants his assignment of priority of fires, priority targets, the COLT, or the smoke to accomplish. In short, the one critical thing that is missing from the commander’s concept for fires—the statement of his intent—is his intent!

Consider the following concept of maneuver: “I want the brigade to attack swiftly and violently, massing all combat power at the decisive point in time and space.” No maneuver commander would ever regard such a statement as an adequate expression of a concept of maneuver. Yet, that is precisely the kind of statement that some commanders are content to provide as a concept of fires.

**Why Provide a Commander’s Intent for Fires?**

The sole purpose of fire support is to enable the maneuver commander to accomplish a tactical mission. Moreover, all mainstream tactical missions that seek a decision require the use of fires. But if fires are to enable maneuver commanders at any level—platoon through corps—to accomplish their missions, fire support personnel at the corresponding echelons must know two things: the commander’s intent for maneuver, as revealed in his stated concept of maneuver, and the commander’s intent for fires, as revealed in his stated concept of fires.

Like all members of the battle staff, the fire support personnel learn directly from the commander himself what he expects maneuver and fires to accomplish. Properly understood, the commander’s intent for maneuver and his intent for fires should be so completely intertwined that they might be considered two sides of the same coin. Except in the most unusual circumstances, neither maneuver without fires nor fires without maneuver will be decisive on the battlefield.

Although they understand that coordinating fires and maneuver is critical, maneuver commanders sometimes find that the scheme of fires conceived by fire supporters in response to their stated concepts does not adequately reinforce maneuver and, hence, does not serve as a true combat multiplier. This may happen for various reasons. In some cases, maneuver commanders may assume that as long as they state what they consider a clear concept of maneuver, there is no particular need to explain Allied concepts (such as fire support or combat service support). In other cases, maneuver commanders may feel inclined to defer automatically to the judgment of the fire support advisor on all matters related to fire support. Still others may not see themselves as deferring uncritically to that judgment, but simply assume that, given a concept of maneuver, fire supporters should be able to produce a complementary scheme of fires without additional guidance.

While all of these assumptions are a compliment to fire supporters, they deny the reality that fire supporters cannot know what the commander expects fires to accomplish unless he tells them. Again, however, guidance to the effect that fires should be “violent” and “massed” is no guidance at all. The commander who seeks to achieve maximum benefit from supporting fires must ask himself the following central questions:

“What effects on the enemy do I require in each phase of my maneuver plan?”

“How do I envision fire supporting my ground tactical plan?”

The answers to these questions constitute the first step toward translating the commander’s intent for fires into steel on target on the battlefield.

**Translating Intent into Reality**

Like any other battlefield operating system, fires function best when they are assigned a clear task and purpose, but clarity alone is not enough. The tasks assigned to fires also must be carefully considered and prioritized so that ordnance delivery systems can perform well a few key tasks. For example, “I want you to provide a wall of steel that will stop motorized rifle regiment X at phase line Y” certainly is clear, but it is also unrealistic because it is not sufficiently constrained. On the other hand, “I want you to disrupt formation X when it is delayed on obstacle Y at triggering event T” is both focused and constrained. The commander must issue detailed concept statements of this kind to maximize the effect of fires in his maneuver space.

Naturally, not every task is appropriate as a fire support task. What does count as an appropriate fire support task will change from mission to mission on the basis of standard METT-T considerations (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time). Additionally, the technical characteristics of the available fire support systems (ranges, trajectories, ammunition, etc.) further restrict the range of possibilities for the application of fire support.

At this juncture, the question naturally arises, “Just how much detail must the commander include in his concept for fire support?” The answer is, enough to enable fire support planners to understand exactly what he expects fires to accomplish. The natural corollary question is, “But isn’t the job of fire supporters to work out the details of how to accomplish the commander’s intent?” The answer is “yes.” But the commander and the fire supporter also must have a tacit agreement, one that approaches a contract, on what supporting fires can reasonably be expected to do.
Some maneuver commanders might object to the suggestion that they should “contract” with their supporting units. It should be noted, however, that this is precisely what the maneuver commander does when he issues his concept of maneuver to his subordinate maneuver commanders. Of course, he can elect to change the terms of the contract, for whatever reason, and subordinate commanders will react as required to achieve success in light of the new instructions. Nevertheless, the commander must realize that any deviation from either the maneuver contract or the fire support contract comes at a cost, either in time, flexibility, or the efficient use of resources. Therefore, as it pertains to the deliberate planning process, the question is not whether the commander’s operational concept is a contract in the relevant sense of the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>Defend in sector</th>
<th>TASK #1</th>
<th>Limit ADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TASK #1</td>
<td></td>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Facilitate free movement of friendly aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Close fight—destroy ADA immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>Deep fight—coordinate with DIVARTY for deep SEAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No friendly aircraft lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK #2</td>
<td>Disrupt 5th MRD formations</td>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Facilitate destruction of 5th MRD west of PL MAINE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>3 methods</td>
<td></td>
<td>a) Target all obstacles with 105mm; battalion FSOs assign observers for obstacles in their sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) DIVARTY fires FASCAM in LEACH Pass; COLT 1 &amp; 2 observe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>c) CAS attacks AGMB in CAS Box 1 (EA HACK); FAC-A observes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>No formation larger than MRP crosses PL MAINE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASK #3</td>
<td>Disrupt RAG (counterfire)</td>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Prevent RAG from initiating Phase III fires against 1BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>Q-36-Az of search 4500; counterfire with 105mm</td>
<td></td>
<td>Request Q-37 coverage beyond common sensor boundary, H + 1 thru H + 3; counterfire with MLRS (coordinate with DIVARTY).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish CFFZ at vic. NV 3326-NV3526-NV37224-NV3524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>RAG unable to mass between PL ALABAMA &amp; PL TENNESSEE H + 1 thru H + 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1

Figure 2
word; the question is more a matter of which mechanism to use to execute the contract most effectively.

The contract forms most effectively when the maneuver commander clearly specifies his essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), namely, those tasks that fires must accomplish in order for the maneuver commander’s plan to succeed. The fire supporter, for his part, identifies for the commander any aspect of his expectations that exceeds the capabilities of available assets. Similarly, the fire supporter recommends the use of fire support capabilities that the maneuver commander’s vision may have omitted (non-lethal fires, for example) or that appear not to be integrated to their full potential. In either case, the resulting EFSTs constitute a contractual understanding between maneuver commander and fire supporter as to the role fire support assets will play in the operation.

The Emerging Doctrine of Fire Support

Both the philosophical basis for EFSTs and the fundamental techniques associated with their application are detailed in the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center’s 1998 White Paper entitled “Fire Support Planning for the Brigade and Below.” The White Paper is available on-line at http://www.irwin.army.mil/wolves/white_paper.htm, and the substance of the paper will be incorporated into the forthcoming edition of Field Manual 6-20-40, TTP for Fire Support for Brigade Operations, scheduled for release in 2000. It is safe to suggest that the doctrine espoused by the White Paper represents the most significant advance in the theory of fire support in the latter half of the century. Moreover, when properly applied, this doctrine assures maneuver commanders that they will find it easier than ever before to use fires to achieve their battlefield aims.

According to the White Paper, each EFST consists of four components: task, purpose, method, and effect. Proper attention to each of these components is crucial for accomplishing the commander’s intent for fires.

TASK—The task specifies exactly what the commander wants the use of fires to accomplish. Not all tasks are appropriate for fire support. Rather, the tasks must focus upon the commander’s high-payoff targets (HPTTs). This kind of focus ensures that fire support assets are not used piecemeal on targets of only fleeting importance. Of course, this means that many targets that are not HPTTs may not be targeted at all. (Then again, precisely the reason something is not designated an HPT is that, when considered in the context of the whole operation, its destruction or disablement may have little or nothing to do with overall outcomes.) Most tasks appropriate for fire support may be expressed in terms of the following action verbs:

- Disrupt (break apart, disturb, or interrupt an enemy function, such as the ability to counterattack).
- Delay (slow the movement of a unit).
- Limit (restrict the enemy’s ability to pursue a particular course of action).

An example of an appropriate task is: Disrupt the regimental artillery group (RAG).

Purpose—The purpose specifies the role the task will play in the overall operational scheme. An example of a purpose for the above task is: Prevent the RAG from initiating Phase III artillery fires against 1st Brigade.

Method—Although fire support advisors are responsible for working out the technical aspects of the method, the maneuver commander’s involvement here is as important as it is for task and purpose. Otherwise, the commander will not have a clear picture of the way his fire delivery systems are allocated and, hence, how well those systems are positioned to accomplish his overall intent.

The specification of the method must be highly detailed, as in the following example, which correlates with the task and purpose above:

The direct support (DS) artillery battalion Q-36 radar orients on azimuth of search 4500. The S-3 requests division artillery (DIVARTY) to provide Q-37 radar coverage and to fire counterfire targets over the corresponding area beyond the common sensor boundary. The Q-36 orients on templated RAG positions and establishes a call-for-fire-zone (CFFZ) bounded by NV339260, NV355260, NV339245, and NV355245. The Q-37 provides supplemental coverage in support of the brigade deep battle and when the Q-36 is in transit. The trigger is a radar acquisition requiring counterfire beyond the 1 Brigade CFL. Observers are the Q-36/37. The munition is 105mm HE for DS artillery, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) for general support (GS) artillery.

Note that this method might also include the use of non-lethal fires, if available, such as the division’s QUICKFIX to jam the RAG’s fire nets. In any event, the commander and his fire support advisor should always be attuned to the incorporation of both lethal and non-lethal fires, as appropriate.

Effect—Here the maneuver commander specifies exactly what result he expects the completion of the related EFST to accomplish. (Some fire support planners use the term end state synonymously with effect.)

For example: The RAG is unable to mass fires on 1st Brigade between phase line (PL) ALABAMA and PL TENNESSEE from H + 1 to H + 3. This specification accomplishes two purposes: It provides a measure by which to assess whether a task the commander regards as mission essential has been accomplished, and it serves to ensure that neither the commander nor his fire supporter expects fire support assets to yield a result beyond their design limits. Hence, the above example may be a realistically achievable effect in a way that Destroy the entire RAG almost certainly would not be.

It is important to note that EFSTs are limited, as the name implies, to those fire support tasks that the maneuver commander considers truly essential. That does not mean a target cannot be attacked unless it is on the initial high-payoff target list (HPTL). The appearance of unanticipated tactical opportunities may, in fact, warrant a change in that list and a corresponding modification of the EFSTs. The point is that changes to the HPTL simply signal that the maneuver commander may want to modify his EFSTs—not that he wants to abandon them to attack targets that are not essential to the
ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) TO FRAGO 6 TO 1 BCT OPORD NO 99-056

1. SITUATION

Indirect fire system found in the regimental artillery group (RAG) of 5th MDR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Number of Units</th>
<th>Number of Tubs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25mm</td>
<td>1 x btr</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15 km rg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28mm</td>
<td>1 x btr</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30-40 km tsh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm mortar</td>
<td>1 x btr</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.2 km rg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. MISSION

1 BCT defends in sector NLT 110300E to 98 to destroy the first echelon of the 5th MDR in order to deny penetration of PL MAINE.

3. EXECUTION

ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASK #1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>Limit effect of enemy ADA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Facilitate conventional movement of friendly aircraft in support of 1 BCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>DS artillery fires on ADA weapons systems immediately upon identification. diversity provides long-range SEAD for ADA acquisitions beyond DS artillery range.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>5th MDR defended without loss of friendly aircraft.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASK #2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>Disrupt maneuver operations of 5th MDR by maneuver forces west of PL MAINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Prevent the RAG from initiating Phase III artillery fire against First Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>(a) 155mm artillery and fine HRN on all obstacles emplaced by 1 BCT in order to disrupt the first element of the main body (MBI) and prevent MBI from penetrating PL MAINE (on the penetration line). Trigger: MBI stopped in an obstacle. Observers: those supporting units in whose area the obstacle is located. Targets: A&amp;H (NV10250), ASH (NV49234), AGS10 (NV49235).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>50% of 5th MDR destroyed such that no formation larger than HRP is able to cross PL MAINE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ESSENTIAL FIRE SUPPORT TASK #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>Disrupt the regimental artillery group (RAG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>Prevent the RAG from initiating Phase III artillery fire against First Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHOD</td>
<td>(a) Direct support (DS) artillery establishes Q-36 radarrence on azimuths of Q-36. The S-3 requests division artillery (DIVARTY) to provide Q-37 radar coverage and to fire counterfire targets over the corresponding area beyond the common sensor boundary. The Q-Xs are then scheduled to provide limited RAG positions and establishes a cell-for-cell area (CFA) bounded by NV335260, NV335260, NV335260, and NV335265. The Q-31 provides additional coverage in support of the divisional strike and the Q-36 is in town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECT</td>
<td>The RAG is unable to mass fire on First Brigade between phases I and II.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fighting Unit</th>
<th>Delivery System</th>
<th>Tactical Mission</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-220 FA (3)</td>
<td>155 mm Howitzer</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

High-Payoff Target List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subordinate Maneuver Unit</th>
<th>Number of conventional targets to plan</th>
<th>Number of FASCAM minesfields to plan</th>
<th>Number of CAS sorties allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-327 IN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SDE will control all CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-327 IN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SDE will control all CAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-77 CAV</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SDE will control all CAS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FSO Location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishing Headquarters</th>
<th>Effective Date/Time Group</th>
<th>Radar Trigger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFL</td>
<td>5th Division</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL NEVADA</td>
<td>5th Division</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>XUS Corps</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL KENTUCKY</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See APPENDIX 4 (NAF/RFA List) in ANNEX D (FIRE SUPPORT) to 52 ID (N) OPLAN 99-03-01 for a comprehensive list of 52 ID standing NFAs and RFAQs.

Figure 3

Additional Instructions:

The CAS window currently is scheduled to be 110400-111000DEC. The attack aviation window currently is scheduled to be 110300-111100DEC.

Submit CAS requests to 1 BCT FSE.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

SDE CMD: XXXX
3-220 FA BN CMD: XXXX
OFF: XXXX
MEDEVA: XXXX

by the maneuver commander. During the military decision-making process, the 1 BCT commander identified his EFSTs. The commander restricted these tasks to a very small number—generally three, but never more than five. The commander specified a purpose for each task, thus providing a clear picture of his intent for fire support. Where appropriate, he gave guidance (sometimes directive, sometimes suggestive) regarding the method to be used. Naturally, he left the technical details to the fire support coordinator (FSCoord) and the fire support officer (FSO). Nevertheless, his EFSTs were not only guiding principles for planning all fires for the operation but also constraining principles. Thus, when the wargaming process suggested uses for fire support that were tangential to the commander’s EFSTs, the brigade staff immediately knew that it had two choices: Either the FSCoord/FSO had to recommend to the commander a change to the EFSTs, or the staff had to solve the tangential problem by some means other than the use of fire support (perhaps by a change in the scheme of maneuver).

Throughout course of action development, the FSCoord and FSO developed the methods for each of the EFSTs, using two tools—an EFST worksheet (Figure 1) and a concept of fires sketch (Figure 2). These two documents, used together, plainly revealed any gaps in the fire support plan and, hence, facilitated the necessary corrections to the plan. They also served as the basis for a clear and simple fire support annex (Figure 3). The FSCoord and FSO used these documents to backbrief the 1 BCT commander on the fully
developed plan. This gave the commander a clear picture of the way fire support assets would be used to achieve his EFSTs. This clear picture enabled the commander to make an informed decision with regard to approving the plan or directing its modification.

Because the EFSTs brought into clear focus the commander's intent for fire support, the S-3 of the direct support field artillery (DS FA) battalion was able to develop an equally clear set of essential field artillery tasks (EFATs), the operational tasks required of the DS FA battalion in order to accomplish the maneuver commander’s EFSTs, and hence, to achieve his intent for fire support. Thus, the test for how well the DS FA battalion was poised to execute the commander’s intent became a measure of how closely the EFSTs and EFATs were linked. This test simplified the matter of detecting discontinuities between the intent for fires as it existed in the commander’s mind and as it existed in the orders for implementing his intent on the ground.

The final check for continuity between the EFSTs and the EFATs occurred in the 1 BCT’s fire support rehearsals.

The first key to the success of these rehearsals was that all the people in the fire support chain attended them, including the 1 BCT commander. The commander’s attendance clearly demonstrated his recognition that fire support is ultimately a command responsibility and that its successful integration requires command involvement. The rehearsal centered on the commander’s EFSTs and their corresponding EFATs. Because the EFSTs clearly conveyed the commander’s intent for fire support, he could easily tell whether or not the EFATs briefed in the rehearsal could produce the desired results.

The second key to the success of the fire support rehearsals was that they were held before the maneuver rehearsals. This arrangement enabled the commander to fix in his mind the scheme of fire support so that he knew exactly what he could expect fire support to do when he rehearsed the maneuver plan.

The maneuver commander gains one of the greatest combat multipliers when he and his fire supporters share a vision of what he expects fires to accomplish. As the experiences of the 1 BCT of the 101st Airborne Division attest, EFSTs make that shared vision possible for two reasons: They provide a vehicle whereby the commander can convey his intent clearly; and, when fleshed out in technical detail by fire supporters, the EFSTs and the EFATs that logically flow from them tell the maneuver commander exactly what he can and cannot expect of his fire support resources.

Given the operational uncertainties of the future, the use of EFSTs might prove to be not only a viable way, but indeed the only viable way to optimize fire support planning. Non-linear battlefields characterized by decentralized operations covering large areas are sure to pose enormous challenges. In light of those challenges, the use of EFSTs and their attendant EFATs can do much to ensure that the commander’s intent for fire support is completely understood and executed—in spite of battlefield fog and friction.

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew T. Hale is fire support coordinator for 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, and commander of 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery. He previously served as division artillery operations officer for both the 25th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division and served on the faculty of the United States Military Academy. He is a graduate of the Academy and holds a master's degree from Stanford University.

Major John Mark Mattox is 1st Brigade fire support officer, 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division. He previously served in the 1st Infantry Division in Germany, on the faculty of the United States Military Academy, on the faculty of the United States Military Academy, and as assistant S-3 of 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artillery during Operations Desert Shield-Desert Storm. He is a graduate of Brigham Young University and holds master's and doctoral degrees from Indiana University.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The events described in this article represent the actions of many Americans who found themselves isolated in the wake of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941, and are still relevant to Americans serving around the world today. The principles described here—taking care of your sick and wounded, conducting hit-and-run operations against a numerically superior enemy, enlisting the logistical intelligence support of the indigenous population, and maintaining communication with higher and adjacent units—are not limited to those attempting to evade capture. These principles apply as well to any units whose mission is to harass, interdict, and confuse the enemy, and to force him to commit forces far out of proportion to the friendly force opposing him. The heroism of Private Beck and his American and Filipino allies inflicted significant losses in men and materiel upon the Japanese, and contributed to ultimate victory.

As the truckloads of Japanese infantry drove by, the soldiers in the back jeered at their American prisoners, and some swung bamboo poles or golf clubs at the heads of those who were walking closest to the vehicles, connecting now and then, with deadly results. Such was the treatment of Americans captured in the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941, and as a result many Americans chose to attempt escape and evasion as an alternative to captivity.

Shortly after the initial air attacks on December 8, 1941, which wiped out most of the American air forces in the Philippines, Japanese ground forces began landing in Lingayen Gulf, 80 miles north of Manila (Map 1). The overwhelming Japanese offensive relentlessly pushed the Allies southward down Luzon Island, forcing them to retreat onto the Bataan Peninsula, where they set up a defensive line. By the beginning of January, the Japanese began their final offensive. The Americans and their Filipino comrades fought side by side for every foot of ground, but were slowly pushed back down the peninsula. One of these Americans was Private Leon Beck, an Oklahoman, a member of the 31st Infantry. The 31st, known in the Philippines as "Manila's Own," was the only all-American Infantry unit in the Philippines, and—because it had served in China and Siberia—it was looked upon as America's Foreign Legion. Leon Beck had volunteered to go to the Philippines and become a part of the 31st because he figured that was where the action would be. He arrived there in April 1941 and by the middle of December turned 20 years of age, just as the retreat to Bataan began.

The U.S. Army in the Pacific was grossly unprepared for a war with the Japanese Imperial Army. Leadership and training were poor among many of the officers and non-commissioned officers. The troops were likewise poorly trained and lacked the necessary supplies to fight an all-out war. As Leon Beck pointed out, "We had scads of the new 60mm mortars, but we didn't have any ammunition for them." And besides a lack of equipment, the Americans had underestimated the fighting ability of the Japanese soldier. It soon became apparent he was a tough, determined, and often ruthless adversary.

Once the battle for Bataan started, the Allies were soon in serious difficulty. The troops were put on half rations, which soon had to be cut in half and then cut again. After three months of continuous combat, the Americans and their Fili-
The U.S. Army was going to be back in six months to retake the Philippine Islands, and they would soon be free and on their way back to the States.

Some of the captured Americans were put to work driving for the Japanese. Leon talked with one of them who informed him that he had to escape before they reached the town of San Fernando (Map 2). If he didn’t, he would lose his chance, because all of the prisoners were put on trains that went directly to the O’Donnell prison camp north of Clark airfield. When the column reached the town of Lubao, Leon remembered, “We were put in a warehouse for the night, and as I tried to crawl out through everybody’s legs to find a safe place to rest I got caught by the guards. They really worked me over and I guess they knocked me unconscious.” One of his friends, Corporal Louis Read, saw him lying on the ground as they were being herded back out onto the march the next morning. Read said, “I left him lying on the ground for dead there in Lubao…Beck never showed up in the prison camp afterwards and I just assumed he was dead.” When he came to, Leon recalled, “I saw what was going on and when the guards were busy and not looking in my direction I crawled away and hid in a nearby burnt-out building.”

Leon spent the night in his hideout and had just enough strength the next morning to rejoin the march with the next group that came along. Fortunately, it included some men from the 31st Infantry. He said, “When we marched out of Lubao my buddies around me said that they’d watch the guards for me, but they didn’t want to escape themselves. They were willing to help me and when they said it was okay I just rolled off the road and got under the first row of bushes. Once I got behind the first row of bushes they couldn’t see me.” By escaping from the column of prisoners, Leon Beck became a fugitive, an ordeal that was to last nearly three years, and his survival would be due largely to the support of pro-American Filipinos.

Ironically, the Filipinos’ willingness to aid Americans was due to a great extent to actions of the Japanese themselves. One of the greatest errors on the part of the invading Japanese Imperial Army was their mistreatment of the Filipino people. Although the Japanese had publicly proclaimed a propaganda policy of “Asia for the Asiatics,” their subsequent actions belied their words. This behavior helped create a great deal of sympathy for the Americans.

Among those civilians living in the Philippines were the Fassoth brothers, who played an important role in helping escaped American soldiers. Bill and Martin Fassoth had come to the Philippines 20 years earlier from Hawaii, and had a sugar plantation just north of Bataan in Pampanga Province. With the Japanese invasion, they had moved westward with their families toward the Zambales mountains along with a large number of Filipino friends and workers. With the Japanese pillaging through the flatlands, the brothers decided to go deeper up into the jungle-covered mountains. They created a camp, built the necessary buildings, and brought their people to it. Their contacts with the Filipinos enabled the Fassoths to set up a system of communication and supply.
On April 17, 1942, eight days after the surrender, two American soldiers stumbled into their camp. The soldiers were fed steamed rice with cooked snake meat and were given a place to rest. From then on a stream of soldiers came staggering in. In time the brothers gave Filipinos written notes to be given to any escaping soldiers they came upon. They built a barracks that could accommodate a hundred men, and the soldiers—mostly American—drifted into the camp half starved and sick with malaria and a variety of other ever-present tropical diseases. Looking back, Bill Fassoth recalled, "There must have been two or three hundred American Army boys who stayed with us in the camp over the next twelve months. In time the Americans recovered enough to go on a hunt or hike through the mountains, looking for other Americans who were forming guerrilla units."

It was this camp—and others like it—that Beck was to visit many times in the coming months, as he carried messages back and forth, at first coordinating efforts to evade Japanese patrols, then gathering intelligence on the enemy, and finally taking part in ambushes and other direct actions against the Japanese. But he would not reach the Fassoths' camp for some time after escaping from the Death March.

On the day of his escape, Leon Beck came out of his jungle hiding place once the column of prisoners passed and as quickly as he could moved off down the empty road. After a short distance, he left the road and swam across the Pasic River. In time, he came upon what he thought was an empty shack. Inside was an American officer, delirious and suffering from what Leon figured was sunstroke and dehydration. The next morning a Filipino boy came by and, finding the two Americans, told Leon that he knew where there were some American officers. Beck scribbled a note that said "I'm Private Leon Beck, Antitank Company, 31st Infantry and I have with me a very sick American captain named George E. Crane." The young boy took the note and returned later in the day with an answer, which read, "Come join us. I have a rifle for you," signed Lieutenant Colonel Peter D. Calyer, Executive Officer of the 31st Infantry.

Beck recalls, "In the dark they put Captain Crane and me into a dugout canoe and paddled us up the river to another shack. There were a number of people there including Lieutenant Colonel Calyer and an ordnance captain. Over the next few days some of the officers in the shack died. There was no way to bury them so Calyer took their personal effects and without much talk had the bodies placed in the river, where they floated away."

Leon came down with a severe case of malaria and was lying in the shack when he overheard a conversation between Colonel Cal yer and the ordnance officer. A Filipino civilian had found a house for them in the barrio Natividad a few miles away and were ready to move them there. The ordnance officer was arguing that Beck was too sick to travel; he was going to die anyway and they should just leave him. Leon listened as Colonel Calyer replied, "Hell, he's an American soldier. When we move, he moves with us. And if he's too sick to move, we'll all just stay here until he gets a little better. We're not going to go off and leave him." From that day forward Leon had a soft spot in his heart for Colonel Cal yer and less than friendly feelings for the ordnance officer.

When it finally came time to move Leon, the Filipinos placed him under a bundle of rice straw in a two-wheeled buffalo-drawn cart. Because the Japanese were everywhere, the group of officers and Beck moved from house to house every night. For some reason the Japanese never looked into the attics in the buildings they searched. "Whenever the Japanese would come into the building," Leon recalled, "we'd climb up into the attic of the house we were in and lie there under the tin roof. It's like about 210 degrees up there and you were always afraid the sweat coming off you would run down and drip on the [Japanese]."

While they were hiding out, Colonel Calyer formed the Luzon Guerrilla Force to establish security for the barrio people and tasked the mostly women and children who were there to alert everyone when Japanese patrols were in the area. Included along with this defensive early warning system was an intelligence network checking on where the Japanese were stockpiling their supplies, fuel, and ammunition.

On August 1, Colonel Gyles Merrill joined the group. He was a 60-year-old cavalry officer who had fought in the First World War and had been in the Philippines at the start of the Second World War. Because he outranked Lieutenant Colonel Calyer, he took command of the organization. To consolidate his command of the troops who were on-the-run behind enemy lines, he selected Private Beck as the man to carry his orders to the other camps that had American officers in them.

"I wouldn't say that it was a dangerous mission," Leon recalled. "First, it was easier to send a private than one of the captains. On top of that, I was picked because of my height [five feet, five inches]. I was small like the average Filipino and when I was walking around with a group of them I blended in. And lastly I was willing to go because I needed something to do. The strangest thing is that the whereabouts of Fassoth's camp in the Zambales Mountains was pretty well known to almost everyone except the Japanese." Along with Filipino guides, Leon went across Pampanga Province and made his way up into the hills to get all the officer volunteers and bring them back to barrio Natividad, where they were assigned a specific area on Luzon Island in which to organize guerrilla units.

The officers throughout Luzon were brought in under Colonel Merrill's command, and each was assigned an area of operation where he was expected to organize a guerrilla unit. There was no intention at this time of actually attacking or fighting the Japanese, who were heavily armed in comparison to the Americans and Filipinos. Along with a group of Filipinos, Leon had gone back onto the Bataan Peninsula scavenging for arms and ammunition. Aside from the lack of heavy armament, the Americans in general were not in any physical condition to mount active military operations. The idea was to organize and gain intelligence for the time when the U.S. Army returned, something everyone felt would be only a matter of months.

During this time, there was a serious question regarding
whether an American enlisted man had to become a guerrilla fighter. Colonel Merrill’s policy was that the American officers had to, but it was up to the individual enlisted man whether he wanted to or not. He would have to volunteer. Based on the Japanese policy that any American caught carrying a weapon would be executed as a guerilla, Merrill felt that it was dangerous enough just trying to survive behind the Japanese lines. As far as he was concerned, there was no good reason to make the life of the enlisted man more precarious than it already was. If a man honestly felt he did not want to carry a weapon and fight, he was relieved of any military duty.

Leon later admitted, “It was unbelievable how many enlisted men wouldn’t get involved or carry a weapon. They just wanted to survive the war and figured that maybe their chances were better in a Japanese prison camp than [they were] on the loose. A lot of escaped soldiers made arrangements with the local Filipinos to contact the Japanese so they could go in and surrender themselves.” At the same time, the Japanese passed the word to the escapees through the Filipino civilians that if they surrendered they would not be harmed, a promise that was not always honored.

Leon Beck was not one of those enlisted men who refused to bear arms. Besides an M-1 Garand rifle, in time he acquired two Astro Patent Spanish-made .38-caliber revolvers, which were similar to the American Colt revolver. He wore one on each hip, in hand-made goatskin holsters.

“It was around September 1942,” Leon recalled, “when the [Japanese] began to make things hot for us in Natividad, so Colonel Merrill decided to move his headquarters from Pampanga Province west across the mountains into Zambales Province. The barrio of Natividad had a large garrison of Japanese soldiers and there was another garrison only two and a half miles away in the town of Santa Rita. We weren’t looking for trouble at that time. We were trying to organize the Filipino people for intelligence purposes to prepare them for the time when the American Army did come back.”

During this entire time, the Japanese had been well aware that large numbers of escaped Americans were wandering about the Philippine countryside, and by September 1942 had decided to round them up. Considering the number of American soldiers in the camp at any one time, it was a wonder that the enemy hadn’t figured out much earlier where it was located. They had posted a reward for the capture of any member of the Fassoth family, placing flyers in all the barrios in Pampanga Province. No one in the Filipino community would give them up, but one of the local tribesmen, who had done some work for the camp, was captured when he went down onto the plains to buy some farm materials.

The captured native was taken to the main Japanese garrison at San Fernando and tortured until he agreed to lead them to the Fassoths’ camp. In the meantime Bill Fassoth had been informed that the man had been taken and immediately dispatched a runner to warn everyone to be on the alert. The food supplies were hidden in the jungle and everyone moved out of the camp in different directions. But the Japanese did not attack immediately, and some of the Americans came back to the camp and were there when 200 Japanese soldiers attacked at 2:00 o’clock on the morning of September 25, 1942.

One of the Filipino kitchen workers heard them coming and gave the alarm. Of the 16 Americans who were there, ten escaped into the jungle while the others, too sick to run, were taken captive. The Japanese burned the buildings and broke up everything they found. One of the Americans who jumped out of the barracks window and hid in the jungle was 21-one year old Private Earl Oatman. Tall and skinny, he had been seriously ill with malaria and a number of other jungle illnesses for the first few months he was in the Fassoth brothers’ camp. By September he had improved and by the time of the raid was in good enough physical condition to move out on his own. In time, he found his way into the camp that Colonel Merrill had established on the other side of the mountains in Zambales Province.

By the end of 1942, contact had been made with General Douglas MacArthur, who issued orders to Colonel Merrill to avoid actual combat unless absolutely necessary, and continue to organize the Filipino people into units that would concentrate on gathering intelligence for the Americans’ return to the Philippines. Merrill’s new camp was on a hill near the barrio of Bujaeno, about 12 miles from the town of San Marcelino, where the Japanese had a large garrison. The Japanese in the town no doubt knew of the existence of Merrill’s camp but for some reason made no attempt to attack it. Usually their patrols got to within four miles of the Americans, and then turned back. Because the Japanese had effectively alienated the majority of the natives, they were never able to move out of their military compounds without word being spread immediately to communities in their path.

What fighting was being done in that part of Luzon involved the Filipino guerrilla groups known as the Huckbalahap (the Anti-Japanese People’s Liberation Army), whom the American military considered to be Communists. The Hukas had been hostile to the American forces before the war, but with the Japanese invasion they had shifted their attention and their hostility to the Japanese. With a common enemy, the Hukas avoided conflict with the Americans, spending their time ambushing the Japanese, killing an estimated 5,000 over the course of the war. They also claimed to have killed 15,000 pro-Japanese Filipino collaborators during this same period.

The Japanese intensified their military activities in the spring of 1943, which had a marked effect on the group of enlisted men living near the headquarters compound. Privates Earl Oatman, Millard Hileman, Coleman Banks, Bill Ostrander, and Hank Winslow got together to talk about the precarious situation they were in and about possibly having to give themselves up to the Japanese. Coleman Banks was against the idea of surrendering, having already escaped once from a Japanese prison camp on Subic Bay. Finally, after much discussion, they decided among themselves that they didn’t want to be guerrillas. The idea of individual survival seemed to have taken hold.

While the Americans were assessing their options and courses of action, in April 1943 the Japanese mounted an all-out drive to clear the mountains of American escapees and
Huk guerrillas. In Zambales Province they mounted a three-pronged attack in the direction of Colonel Merrill’s headquarters. All of the trails came to a junction right outside the barrio Bujaoen. A half mile from the trail junction, Leon Beck and Major Roy Tuggle were asleep in one nipa palm shack, with Colonel Merrill and Lieutenant Colonel Calyer in a second, and Captains Crane and the ordnance captain in a third.

Sleeping in a shack at the road junction were two brothers, Arturo and Vincente Bernia, who had been helping the Fassoth brothers when they were in Pampanga Province. They were with a large group of guerrillas when the Japanese attacked. In the battle Vincente Bernia was killed, along with a large number of the Filipinos guerrillas. As Beck described it, "The [Japanese] just kicked the [daylights] out of everybody at the junction. In all, about 80 Filipinos were killed and the rest were surrounded and forced to surrender." In the confusion Colonel Merrill and the others were able to escape. They moved quickly up into the mountains where they established a new headquarters among the native tribes. The Japanese attacked another Fassoth camp in the late spring and came close to capturing everyone in it. Bill Fassoth estimated that there were about 60 Japanese soldiers and 20 Filipino collaborators. Bill and the others were just able to slip into the jungle, from which they watched as the camp was burned and the invaders made off with their food supply.

During this same time, those Americans who were not in the Fassoth camps were on the move as well. Because of an incident involving a theft by one of the natives, Oatman decided to leave the Filipino family with whom he had been living. He and Coleman Banks took off with only a small amount of rice and the clothes on their backs. They crossed over the mountains into Pampanga Province and hid out in the foothills for a time. One day, leaving Banks—who was sick and unable to travel—in one of the nipa palm shacks, Oatman went down into the lowlands to find some milk and sugar for him. When he returned to the shack he found that Coleman had been captured by the Japanese. Earl wandered about on his own, ending up with a small guerrilla group run by Private Fred Stamper, who had been in the Fassoth Camp with him back in 1942. Stamper stated flatly that he was going to fight and wasn’t the least bit interested in going into any Jap prison camp. After a couple of weeks Earl left Stamper and his guerrilla group and struck out on his own.

In a short time he was picked up by some Filipinos who turned him over to the Japanese authorities.

By the end of 1943 the Japanese had tightened the noose around those areas harboring Americans. The renewed Japanese military campaign of 1944 found Leon Beck in the small barrio of Lambac in Pampanga Province. The Japanese moved in quickly and came close to capturing both Leon and another American escapee, Private Blair Robinett, who just happened to be in the barrio with him when the Japanese arrived.

In the time the villagers became alarmed at this game of cat-and-mouse and decided to move the two Americans out of the barrio and into a cave dug into the bank of the river that ran nearby. The cave was situated a couple of feet above the river and back under an overhang. The two Americans expected to spend few nights in their cave, but before it was over had spent 27 days there. One day they heard heavy rifle fire nearby and could tell from experience that it was from Japanese weapons. Immediately Leon decided that he had had enough of living in a cave, and the two Americans linked up with a group of Huk guerrillas who were commanded by Lieutenant Bill Gardner, a part Apache American Indian from the 31st Infantry, who had received a battlefield commission during the battle on Bataan. Captured on Bataan, Gardner had broken out of the prison camp. When
Leon met him, Gardner had with him two Filipino guerrilla fighters as guides. When they reached Merrill's camp and were reporting in, one of the men with Gardner got into an argument with one of the local guerrillas and a gunfight erupted. When the smoke cleared, both of the guerrilla guides with Gardner were dead, as well as the son of Captain Rodriguez, the local guerrilla commander.

Rodriguez made it known that Lieutenant Gardner had to be shot for killing his son. In a discussion with the Americans, who were not going to let them execute an American officer, Colonel Merrill told Lieutenant Gardner that he had to leave. Gardner escaped the next morning and fled over the mountains into Pampanga Province. Rodriguez sent two native trackers after him. They caught up with him and were able to hit him in the back with an arrow before he killed both of them. Later he would joke about an American Indian going all the way to the Philippines to get stuck with an arrow.

After leaving Gardner and Robinett, Beck wandered around Pampanga Province on his own. He wasn't interested in going back over the mountains to Merrill's headquarters. Thinking about it, Leon recalled, "I knew that I got a little bit stupid but I was bored. I got good and fed up with running with the same outfit. I could go off on my own and after awhile I'd run into someone or we'd look each other up. And the Philippine people were always ready to help because as long as there was an American in the vicinity they had hope that the American Army would come back and get rid of the [Japanese]."

He finally joined up with a Huckbalahap guerrilla squadron commanded by Luis Taruc, the co-founder of the Philippine Socialist Party, who said: "Leon was not only modest but what we call a regular guy. He easily won the trust and good will of his fellow guerrillas and was a fine example of what we think of as the Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln character."

"We had to move every night to a new location," Luis recalled. "There were around 70 to 80 men in each squadron but the number usually depended on the number of weapons we had. Those who joined the Huckbalahap were mostly young Filipino men who wanted to kill [Japanese]. When we weren't planning or attacking a Japanese patrol or outpost, we would go into one of the peaceful villages, stationing guards as lookouts while the rest of the guerrillas fighters would help the villagers in their daily routine of plowing, planting or harvesting." Commander Taruc related, "If, like in Leon's case, a guerrilla squadron had an American with them, they would make him stay in one of the houses so as not to attract too much attention. There were a large number of Filipino collaborators who were helping the Japanese capture the free roaming Americans."

"It was," Leon remembered, "a nomadic life. And I never used a disguise. I wore shorts that were cut off just below the knees and a tee shirt. I did wear a woolen hat and shoulder cover made from palm leaves during the rainy season. I never worried about the [Japanese]. It was something that was always there but I didn't brood or worry about it." Leon added, "The heaviest weapon we had was the BAR [Brown- ing Automatic Rifle] which was a beautiful weapon. We would go back to Bataan scavenging for guns and ammunition. You could go in there and the chance of running into [an enemy] patrol was practically nil."

When asked why they didn't go over to the prison camps and break out some of the Americans, Leon explained, "Every friend I had went into the camps. Even if I was able to get them out, we couldn't take care of them. We were barely able to take care of ourselves. It wouldn't have done any good." Leon spent the next seven months wandering about the countryside with the Huk guerrillas. He and Robinett were together in one particularly successful attack on the Japanese which took place in the town of San Fernando. This was the same town where the Death March prisoners were put on trains for their trip to the O'Donnell prison camp. "There was a large sugar warehouse on the right side of the road," as Leon recalled, "and we ambushed two trucks full of [troops]." Robinett explained, "The normal system of hitting a convoy was to set a squad of riflemen on one side of the road and a Browning Automatic Rifle on the other. As the trucks came into range the BAR would sweep the windshields of the lead truck. The normal reaction of the driver was to swing off to the other side of the road where the riflemen were waiting. We pulled that trick a number of times and it always worked like a charm."

Leon recalled, "We had men in the ditches on both sides of the road and shot up the trucks as they came down the road. None of the Japanese survived. We took their rifles and ammunition. Up to this time the U.S. Government had not dropped any supplies in our sectors."

Leon remembered, "We [broke contact] once the shooting stopped. The [Japanese] kept a large garrison in the city of San Fernando, which was the provincial capitol, and it was only a short distance away. To my knowledge, [they] did not take any action against the civilians for this fight, but they did increase their patrols for several weeks and put armored cars at the head of the truck columns."

"Actually," Leon pointed out, "the most important aspect of the guerrilla warfare was not necessarily the fighting... but organizing the local units and having a cohesive unit with which to fight when the right time came. Sometimes the [Japanese] fired on us first and sometimes we fired first."

In 1944 Leon quit the Huk Squadron that he had been running with. "I was kind of operating on my own," he recalled. "I didn't have a formal job with them. I wasn't even in touch with Colonel Merrill. I was just 'free lancing'...I knew the topography and the lay of the land. I never did go back and operate with the Hucks other than to take messages back and forth over the mountains." During the time that he was behind the Japanese lines he figured he must have made the trip over the mountains 20 times or more.

In August 1944 Leon decided to leave Pampanga Province. "I wandered back over the mountains into Zambales Province and joined back up with Colonel Merrill. Shortly after that the first American air raids on Luzon occurred. For the first time in two and a half years I began to believe that the end was in sight. That night several of us dug up some jugs of home brew that we had buried and had a nice drunk."
By December 1944 there were airdrops of munitions including carbines, BARs and Thompson submachine guns. Also in the airdrops were quinine tablets, underwear, waterproof matches, and dynamite. And the word came down from General MacArthur informing Colonel Merrill to activate the guerrilla units for the coming invasion of Luzon Island.

As Leon recalled, “In January of 1945, the [Japanese] started to pull back. We had started getting regular airdrops and for some reason or other, they dropped us more dynamite than anyone could have ever used. We had enough dynamite to blow Bataan off the map. They wanted us to blow all the bridges and communications lines and clear the airfields. The [Japanese] pulled back, abandoning the airfield near us. We found the strip had been booby-trapped with cluster bombs in holes all over the runway. We didn’t have any experience in handling that stuff so we would dig around the bombs, tie a rope around them, hoist them up and swing them onto a cart filled with straw, and take them to the end of the runway and roll ‘em off down the river bank. By the 29th of January of 1945, there were American planes landing and shortly after that I was given my orders to get my stuff together and head for home.”

Of the 12,000 Americans soldiers who were on Bataan and Corregidor at the beginning of the war, it is estimated that 80 percent of them, or approximately 9,500, died before the war was over. Private Earl Oatman survived the Japanese prison camp and went home. Leon Beck was given orders to ship out but he refused. He was not going to leave the Philippines without his wife, Veneranda, whom he had married on August 15, 1944. He announced to his commanding officer that he would go AWOL rather then go home without her. Beck told both Colonel Merrill and Lieutenant Colonel Calyer, “I lived here almost three years and the Japs couldn’t catch me and I know damn well the American troops can’t catch me.” He was at that moment on the wrong side of the mountains from where Veneranda was hiding out and the thought of crossing them again on foot was a bit too much. The Colonel agreed and cut him orders so he could get military transportation to go back and find his pregnant wife.

After Leon and his wife got back to the States, Leon put in for his back pay and benefits. He was informed that there was no proof that he was actually in the army during the two and a half years he was behind the lines fighting the Japanese. The Americans in the prison camps were paid because there was a record, made by the Japanese, stating who they were and in what prison camp they spent their time. The officers, who were behind the lines with Leon, were paid because they were officers, but Leon wasn’t. It wasn’t all that much money considering that he was only a private, but that didn’t matter as far as the army paymasters were concerned.

This disagreement, in one form or another, went on for the next 50 years, and in 1996—54 years after Private Leon Beck rolled off the road into the jungle to escape from the Bataan Death March—the U.S. Government sent him two checks, which included the principle and interest for his back pay and benefits. The total was $55,065. On September 12, 1997, with his wife looking on, retired U.S. Army Master Sergeant Leon Beck was awarded the Bronze Star with V device and Oak Leaf Cluster for his meritorious service in the Philippines during the Second World War. The justification for the award described how he had successfully infiltrated Japanese lines, assisted Philippine civilians to safety under Japanese air attacks, trained Philippine guerrillas despite severe and debilitating illness, performed courier service through areas heavily patrolled by enemy forces, conducted intelligence and surveillance missions in heavily patrolled areas, and performed other actions that facilitated the coordination of guerrilla action with U.S. landings in Lingayen Gulf.

Private Leon Beck, the Oklahoma Kid, finally received the honors that he so justly deserved.

Gordon Browne is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh and a veteran of the 2nd Reconnaissance Squadron of the famed 7th Cavalry. He is a free-lance writer who has just published a series of articles on the subject on the Unsung American Hero. In addition to Leon Beck, as represented here, the series includes a frontiersman who made peace with the Apache, a Midwest businessman who successfully toppled a criminal political organization, a police officer who exposed massive drug corruption in the New York Police Department, a captain of cavalry who was the real hero of the battle of the Little Big Horn, and a civil rights worker who took on the state of Mississippi and won a war against racism.
Search and Attack Considerations
Using Reconnaissance to Retain the Initiative

MAJOR PATRICK D. McGOWAN

Infantrymen continue to struggle with the search and attack technique. When unit leaders are unable to plan and control this aspect of the infantry fight, the results are often frustration and high casualties. Too often, units fail to gain the initiative, even when they have more men and resources than the enemy. Many units in our Army can attest to this fact on the basis of lessons they have learned during rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).

The leaders who succeed at the JRTC are generally those who effectively communicate their plans and control their units. They apply a systematic planning process that puts their units in a positional advantage over the enemy.

The search and attack reveals the biggest training deficiency for infantrymen—the ability to apply tactics in the tactical decision making process. Battalion commanders, operations officers, and company commanders face a situation in which they must make decisions on the basis of many assumptions and few facts. To succeed, they have to develop the situation aggressively and then react quickly. When units are unable to do this, they become combat ineffective after one or two contacts.

The significant problem at the JRTC is that commanders and staffs develop plans in which their combat power is not positioned to influence decisive action in the search and attack. As a result, units conduct these missions on terms better suited to the enemy. They fail to mass sufficient combat power, and frequently disperse in zone at squad level to find and fight enemy forces of team and squad size; this enables the enemy to fight on his own terms, using terrain and marksmanship to his advantage. Battalions frequently become bogged down in reacting to small-unit contacts and lose the initiative.

Most units conduct a deliberate planning process in the intermediate staging base, and the initial plan often develops an operation that is complex and difficult to control. The result is that units are not positioned to accomplish the mission. Successful positioning in the search and attack means that most of the combat power is positioned in mutually supporting locations. Typically, a unit tries to find and destroy enemy squad-size elements. The best way to do this is with rifle platoons—one platoon in position to block the enemy’s escape and another to close with and destroy him. But maneuvering platoons into these mutually supporting positions requires information on terrain and enemy activities, and collecting this information requires reconnaissance.

Commanders often tend to develop search and attack plans that are complex and difficult to control, beginning with the initial analysis of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time (METT-T). But too few commanders use the products that should result from mission analysis, which only makes their planning process more difficult. They communicate ambiguous mission terms, undeveloped enemy situations, and a lack of understanding for the limitations of soldiers in the search and attack. What they need to make the search and attack less complex is a detailed understanding of the task and purpose, the use of mission analysis products, intelligence-driven operations, and an understanding of unit limitations.

The products of mission analysis do several things:
- Facilitate planning for the search and attack.
- Simplify task analysis and allow the use of concise terms to reduce misunderstanding.
- Outline the use of purpose to fa-
cilliate the relationship between the main and supporting efforts.

- Show that the detailed development of the enemy situation will cause commanders to emphasize reconnaissance in the search and attack.
- Review movement to contact considerations and limitations so that commanders can reduce the risks to their soldiers.

**Mission Analysis**

Most leaders understand that mission analysis results in the development of a restated mission, along with several other products that support planning for the search and attack. Company commanders rarely use the staff products of proper mission analysis to facilitate their own planning. Staff mission analysis as part of the estimate process results in the identification of the enemy’s most probable course of action (COA), a modified combined obstacle overlay, and a time line, among other things.

The identification of the enemy’s most probable COA and the use of the overlay are excellent in planning for the company search and attack. Company commanders can refine these products and conduct detailed planning. But they must also be able to visualize the meaning of the tasks in the mission statements. Understanding the subtle differences between tasks results in specific missions that are easier to achieve.

**Understanding Tasks**

Many units use the term “search and attack” as the task in their mission statements. But this use of the term typically does not mean “gather information so the company can develop an attack plan.” Instead, it often results in units making numerous contacts and suffering high casualties while the enemy dispositions and intentions are unknown and he is still very effective.

Tasks are specific actions used to achieve measurable results, but commanders rarely use them in giving units their missions, and rarely use them for mission analysis or COA development. Executing each task requires resources, and some tasks may need to be augmented with engineers and combat service support assets.

The resources infantry units use are time, manpower, weapons, and supplies—variables that leaders must consider before employing units in any operation. In the search and attack, these resources are measured against the ability to cover ground and fight the enemy. If time is short and the task is difficult, the unit should request additional personnel. When this is not possible, the commander must review the unit’s mission in order to stay within its ability to accomplish that mission reasonably. Leaders must understand the resource requirements for each task, based on the situation, so that they can recommend and request what is needed to execute the mission.

An examination of the term “search” is useful in understanding its application. The best use of the term is in conjunction with search and attack operations, which can be visualized as soldiers physically entering buildings to look for contraband and personnel. In search and attack missions, it is best described as soldiers entering a suspected enemy area and looking for signs of personnel, equipment, and supplies. The latter implies that reconnaissance must gather information to focus the search efforts. Understanding the tasks and terms in the search and attack will make it easier for the unit to analyze the requirements of the operation.

Although soldiers in infantry rifle companies can perform certain tasks well in search and attack missions, their abilities diminish when fatigued and operating at night. For example, a soldier can effectively observe a sector at night for only about 30 minutes before his attention and alertness decrease. A team in an observation post (OP) can be effective for several hours if it rotates observers but cannot do this indefinitely. At some point it will need to rest. The requirement to observe or conduct reconnaissance translates into short and long duration operations. A good analogy is the comparison of sprinters to marathon runners. Sprinters in a 100-meter race know that they can expend all of their effort to reach the finish line and have time to recover before the next heat. But if marathon runners expend too much effort in the beginning, they won’t be able to finish. Rifle platoons have the same problems as marathon runners when they start a mission at the sprinter’s pace. Halfway into it, they are forced to fall out. Or they lose situational awareness and walk into an enemy ambush.

Long duration operations are usually more than 24 hours, requiring platoons to conduct sustainment actions. For shorter operations, a unit may be able to forego resupply until the mission is complete. Short operations are for those which a unit is required to execute for a specific, limited time (typically four to eight hours). An example is a platoon in a search and attack focusing on named areas of interest (NAIs). The focus on one NAI for a platoon allows it to provide a mutually supporting reconnaissance effort or OPs. This allows for a third squad to rotate from the objective release point (ORP) so that squads can conduct priorities of work and provide security. A platoon can typically observe one NAI for one long-duration operation or three NAIs for short periods. This applies to both OP and reconnaissance operations.

A dedicated security element is required for reconnaissance or observation operations; this is usually necessary for platoons, but it limits the number of squads looking for the enemy. Security usually consists of a squad that secures the flank of the reconnaissance and OP elements. Given the requirement to sustain, control, and provide security, a leader should understand that the use of ORPs is an important consideration in continuous operations. A leader reconnaissance and the ORP facilitate control, flexibility, and the dissemination of information. If these functions are properly performed, they will affect the amount of time and resources available.
for reconnaissance and observation operations within the search and attack mission.

Given the terrain at the JRTC, these resource limitations force companies and platoons to operate in relatively small areas. An example is a task in which a platoon observes guerrilla infiltrations into the village. The platoon leader determines that he will use an OP operation. Considering the terrain and the most probable avenues of approach, the platoon will be able to set up only two OPs about 200 meters apart to observe one NAI. The platoon leader conducts a leader’s reconnaissance to confirm or modify his plan. In the ORP he disseminates information from the leader’s reconnaissance and then deploys his platoon.

The company commander can task the platoon to focus on the NAI where he expects the infiltration to occur. If the platoon leader is given more than one NAI, he needs to ask which has priority and to state any concerns he may have. More NAIs require him to cover an area with fewer observers. This may mean only 100 to 200 meters for each NAI, and this smaller sector increases the risk that the enemy will be able to infiltrate without being detected. A platoon should be assigned within its capabilities, to focus adequately on an approach. At company level, three platoons make it easier to cover more NAIs, but the commander is still limited to a small area in which to conduct reconnaissance operations. To avoid allowing the enemy the initiative to harass and disrupt his movement and static positions, the commander must commit a platoon to protecting the ORP or patrol base for operations of long duration. Otherwise, he will lose combat power relative to that of the enemy.

Analysis of the Enemy

The difference between techniques and operations in search and attack missions depends upon the quality and timeliness of intelligence. Intelligence is the reason leaders struggle with the search and attack technique in movement to contact operations. Many commanders have problems with situation development in the planning process. More specifically, they seem to lack understanding of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) as part of the decision making process. This understanding is more than knowing what the battalion S-2 should produce. Detailed terrain analysis products—weather data summaries, detailed studies of the enemy’s equipment and doctrine, and a logical set of enemy COA models depicting two or three possible enemy COAs—are useful in laying the foundation for the operation. These products identify the facts and assumptions about the battlefield and the enemy that lead to effective planning.

The IPB focuses on identifying the information needed to make decisions. In the search and attack, the S-2’s situation template usually does not give the commander enough information to commit his company to a movement to contact operation, much less a search and attack. The S-2 may even provide the priority information requirements (PIRs) and key indicators for leaders to use in developing orders. Without hard facts about the enemy, units cannot clearly focus their combat power. The commander must take actions that will provide some concrete information relative to the situation.

The S-2’s situation template is like a puzzle with none of the pieces in place. Search and attack missions are akin to putting the puzzle together with only the picture on the box to show what it will look like. Only when some pieces are joined and the picture starts to take shape can a commander gauge how long it will take to complete. Observations and information provide the pieces needed for the commander to decide on a course of action; for example, observations of enemy soldiers carrying heavy rucksacks in an isolated area, followed by reports of soldiers coming back with empty rucks or none, indicate patrol base or cache activities. This type of information, with other reports of helicopter or vehicle traffic, lends credence to specific enemy activities that indicate supply operations. Along with a knowledge of the surrounding terrain, this information helps a commander make an informed decision to conduct a movement to contact. With even more specific information, the commander could be in a situation where an approach march technique would better accomplish the mission.

A company commander needs to identify a decisive point to focus his platoon leaders’ efforts. Initially, the decisive point may be the identification of the enemy’s movement routes or patrol bases until a pattern can be developed. Companies need to collect evidence of indicators that will either confirm or deny enemy activity.

In the search and attack, many units conduct an operation on the basis of a decision that is not grounded in facts, or even in good assumptions. A unit may execute a search and attack mission because a higher level headquarters has directed it, or because it just seems like the right thing to do. The typical result is an operation that beats the bushes until contact occurs.

The commander always has to locate the enemy before he can determine how best to engage him. The recurring problem with units going into a search and attack is that they cannot effectively
develop an intelligence picture to focus combat power. Vague intelligence situations require operations that are designed to gather and develop information. The enemy situation, if not fully developed, should lead units to focus on reconnaissance to collect that information. One key to developing the enemy situation is to identify enemy weaknesses.

A review of the enemy’s limitations may show that he has extended supply routes and relatively slow command and control systems, both of which are vital to his support. In contrast, his strengths may include familiarity with the terrain, small-unit capabilities, and an understanding of the culture. Typically, a U.S. force focuses on destroying small team-size elements that fight on our terms; however, units that attempt to fix and destroy squad-size forces by conducting a search and attack tend to fight the enemy on his own terms. They make contact with small elements on his ground where he has the initiative. This fight will result in high casualties for U.S. forces, and will probably fail to reduce the enemy’s strength.

Units should focus on the enemy’s weakness. For the brigade, this may mean cutting off his ability to support himself or denying him access to support from the local population. The brigade’s decisive point may be a focus on the battalion or company supply point that will force the enemy to react. An enemy cut off from his support is forced to take risks to obtain supplies, and this forces him to fight on our terms. Forcing the enemy to expose himself enables us to predict his actions and plan accordingly. The point of main effort may be appropriate for battalion and brigade level operations, but at the rifle company level the enemy forces themselves are invariably the point of main effort.

The decisive point at the company level usually focuses on three things that the company commander identifies—terrain that puts the enemy at a disadvantage, an enemy weakness that can be exploited, or a time when the enemy’s combat potential is degraded. At the JRTC, given the capabilities and experience of the opposing force, it is difficult to identify only terrain or time as a decisive point. Under such circumstances, the best objective point is the enemy soldiers themselves.

The commander usually selects the point of main effort on the basis of the enemy weakness where he can best focus combat power to accomplish his mission. To do this, the commander must understand how the enemy is likely to fight under given circumstances. The enemy usually operates in team-size elements, avoiding contact with rifle companies and does not initiate a fight unless it is on his own terms. The key is to attack these team-size elements as they move into or out of zone where a unit can mass superior combat power to prevent the enemy’s escape while engaging him. This requires the company to observe enemy movement and to establish a pattern of movement without being detected.

Focusing reconnaissance efforts to collect information on the enemy will enable the commander to set the conditions for success. Use of the IPB with collection efforts for indicators will translate into effective reconnaissance operations within the search and attack. This, in turn, will lead to focused combat operations to destroy what is vital to the enemy. The result will be a reactive enemy who will be forced to fight—and lose—on our terms.

**Movement to Contact**

In the search and attack, many company commanders do not demonstrate a fundamental understanding of movement to contact operations when developing courses of action, and they overlook the considerations of such operations. The search and attack, when applied appropriately, is a technique of movement to contact that is very effective against an elusive enemy.

Doctrine describes both the search and attack technique and the approach march technique as movement to contact operations that end when contact is made; then a hasty attack, deliberate attack, or other appropriate offensive action is launched to destroy the enemy. Commanders at the JRTC frequently overlook the use of reconnaissance in finding the enemy and delivering a decisive blow in the search and attack.

The movement to contact is one offensive operation used to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Frequently, company commanders fail to maintain the initiative in the offense, and poorly developed plans in the search and attack usually cause units to lose the initiative. Maintaining the initiative consists of first locating the enemy without being detected, and this rarely occurs at the JRTC. Most contacts are meeting engagements in which the enemy usually wins. Initiative also results from fixing the enemy in position and suppressing his fires to allow movement of the friendly force. This enhances the unit’s ability to identify, or create, a weakness to exploit. The final aspect of maintaining the initiative is delivering the violent and decisive blow. Without initiative, the unit’s actions are just reactions to the enemy’s own actions. Initiative in movement to contact operations is much more than individual effort. It is the result of developed plans that have positioned the company to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Field Manual 7-10, *The Infantry Rifle Company*, shows that the search and attack technique of movement to contact operations, is normally used when the enemy’s situation is vague and there is not enough time for extensive reconnaissance to find him. Because the enemy situation is unclear, the company moves in a way that provides security and still supports a rapid build-up of combat power against an enemy unit once it is located. One of the most important things that company commanders overlook is the ability of the company to retain freedom of maneuver.

The key to the search and attack is making contact without first being detected. This gives the commander three options: Destroy the enemy with the immediately available combat potential, maneuver the rest of the company to destroy the enemy, or follow the enemy force back to its base camp and destroy it there. To do this, however, the commander should already have addressed these contingencies in his plan and his decision making process.

A critical look at the way units use
the search and attack technique will show that search and attack is a misunderstood term. After all, units do not use the term approach march and attack. Most often, an approach march positions the unit for the hasty attack. This creates two sequential operations in which the unit does not execute the hasty attack until the approach march has been planned and executed. In the same light, the search and attack is fundamentally different several different operations that units frequently try to accomplish at the same time and find they cannot do any of them effectively. A more appropriate term for what units attempt at the JRTC would be reconnaissance operations that position the unit for offensive operations in the search and attack.

Commanders need to emphasize that the search and attack does not equal three separate and distinct platoon-level tasks, but is a sequence of coordinated events. This technique of movement to contact operations does not involve the entire company until reconnaissance has set the conditions. Platoons should develop and execute reconnaissance, blocking, and assault operations to position combat power for the company operations. The company commander plans to position platoons in a sequence where reconnaissance is done first. When information is collected to confirm his decision, then a search and attack, in the classic sense, is conducted involving all platoons. This is how the find, fix, and finish concept of search and attack is accomplished.

A closer look at the reconnaissance techniques shows that proper use of the fundamentals will meet the requirements of what units try to accomplish in movement to contact operations. In the absence of adequate intelligence picture for the search and attack or movement to contact, a reconnaissance operation is appropriate to develop the necessary information for search and attack missions and to position units for successful operations.

One of the problems company commanders have with the search and attack is understanding the role of reconnaissance. Frequently, commanders at all levels think reconnaissance simply means to find the enemy and then initiate a hasty attack to destroy him; if they can’t destroy him, then break contact or try to fix him for another element to destroy. This often results in squads and platoons finding the enemy but suffering high casualties because the engagement is on the enemy’s terms. This misunderstanding is a fundamental problem at the JRTC. Units do not task organize, plan, and prepare to insert into the zone, and then execute a patient and deliberate information-gathering plan without being detected. It is much less costly to see the enemy, pinpoint his weaknesses, and then deliver a violent strike than it is to blunder into contacts with small units.

Typically, movement to contact operations are enemy oriented and require a moving force to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. For light infantry companies, this implies that they gain contact with rifle platoons and squads. These units operate in formations that provide security to the flank and front with very little emphasis on reconnaissance.

A review of the purposes of search and attack show that there are four: destruction of the enemy, area denial, force protection, and information collection. Of these four, information collection must be done first in order to execute the others effectively. Without a good information collection plan, units cannot focus combat power to accomplish the other purposes.

Company commanders and platoon leaders need guidance to focus planning efforts for movement to contact and reconnaissance operations. This guidance must be in the form of a clear task and purpose that does not dictate the operation the units will execute. Early in the search and attack, elements must focus on reconnaissance to gain information with the purpose of developing attack plans in the absence of a firm intelligence picture. Mission statements must clearly show the company’s task and purpose. The execution paragraph should outline the concept of operations and tasks to platoons.

The following is an example of a mission statement and an execution paragraph:

**MISSION:** Company A destroys enemy squads NET 230600 August in AO Foxtrot One to allow Team Clearance to clear MSR Blue to Jetertown.

**Commander’s Intent:** Avoid detection until the company is positioned to attack.

**EXECUTION:**

**Concept of the operation.** The main effort will be enemy squads infiltrating into the area of operation to mine and conduct ambushes along the MSR (main supply route). This is a three-phased operation that will position the company for a hasty attack in the vicinity of the enemy’s patrol bases. In Phase I, I intend to use one platoon to identify routes and observe the movement of the enemy. Phases I ends when we have confirmed enemy sightings and a tentative area for their patrol base. In Phase II, I intend to maintain observation and move a platoon into blocking positions. Once this platoon is in position, we will begin with Phase III, in which we will use a search and attack technique of movement to contact and find the enemy. The main effort platoon will begin movement on order to make contact and transition to a hasty attack.

**Tasks to platoons:**

1st Platoon. Locate enemy forces in AO Foxtrot One to allow main effort to position for attack. On order, observe enemy movement to provide updated changes in situation to the main effort. Be prepared to assume 2d Platoon’s mission to secure the ORP if no contact on day one.

2d Platoon. Secure the company ORP to allow the main effort to rehearse and conduct pre-combat inspections for the attack. On order, block enemy forces from escaping the main effort attack. Be prepared to assume 1st Platoon’s mission if no contact on day one.

3d Platoon. Main effort. On order, destroy enemy forces in AO Foxtrot One to allow Team Clearance to clear MSR Blue to Jetertown.

This sample from a company order shows clear tasks and purposes for the company and its platoons. The main effort platoon clearly has the mission of accomplishing the company’s task and purpose. The other two platoons have
supporting efforts. It is important to understand that in this example the commander articulates what has to be done and not how. He allows the platoon leaders to refine their analyses of the situation and develop appropriate courses of action. He has also considered his limitations and outlined an end state in case no contact is made by the end of the day. These are mission tactics with clear use of language to facilitate understanding and allow initiative.

Movement to contact search and attack operations are appropriate when the commander has enough information to pinpoint the enemy in a relatively small area but not enough to commit to an approach-march technique. This situation may include reports from observation posts or reconnaissance operations observing enemy foot and vehicle movement into an isolated area. Additional reports may provide information that enemy helicopters have been landing in the same vicinity. The S-2 may validate this information with his terrain analysis that water sources and vegetation in the area could support a patrol base.

Given the nature of the enemy’s ability to move a supply or patrol base in a short time, the commander might be risking too much if he conducted further reconnaissance trying to pinpoint the suspected enemy fixed site. This provides the right situation in which to conduct a movement to contact operation using the search and attack technique.

In the initial phases of the search and attack when the situation is vague, it may be feasible for only one company to conduct it. Within the company, one platoon may be tasked to locate or observe enemy activity in a reconnaissance operation, while the other platoons are protecting the ORP or preparing for assault operations. The company’s focus is on reconnaissance to collect information for the targeting process. Once the commander has enough information to confirm a decision, the company conducts the search and attack technique of the movement to contact operation.

This is where the find, fix, and finish concept is especially applicable. The company has an objective narrowed down to a manageable area. At the JRTC, this may be an area no larger than several hundred meters across. Each of the rifle platoons is task organized to support the company operation. The main effort platoon is tasked to destroy the enemy, which may translate into an assault element. Supporting efforts include one platoon tasked to block the enemy’s escape or isolate the area, which may translate into several squad-size ambush operations. Another platoon, as a supporting effort, may be the search element in the company’s search and attack. As the lead element in the movement to contact, this is the unit that will deliberately “search” the ground with squad size units until contact is made.

This search is not a reconnaissance to avoid detection. It is a deliberate movement to make contact with the enemy. Once contact is made, the company moves into position to destroy the enemy. It also positions itself to retain the initiative by fixing the enemy, establishing suppressive fires, creating or locating a weakness, and delivering a decisive blow with the main effort assault platoon. In his decision making process, the commander assigns control measures to synchronize his platoons. As a minimum, these measures include an objective, a limit of advance, and link-up points. This will facilitate actions in the event the situation changes and the commander must redirect his company.

The problems company commanders and platoon leaders have with the search and attack can be reduced if commanders start with the understanding that the movement to contact positions the company where freedom of maneuver will allow it to retain the initiative. The company commander needs to establish a point of main effort with the emphasis on seeing the enemy without being detected prematurely. The unit does not fight the enemy until the commander has established the conditions under which he wants to fight, and he establishes these terms by developing the situation through reconnaissance. To do this at his own level, each leader should know the fundamentals of reconnaissance and be able to assess and decide. He must know the estimate process, understand the meaning of stated and implied tasks, and know which IPB products the S-2 can provide.

The understanding of the resources to apply against mission requirements provides the information to develop the appropriate course of action through good mission analysis and situation development. This also arms a leader with the information he needs to ask questions and outline risks. He should use enemy situation templates to identify areas on the battlefield where and when he expects significant events to occur or targets to appear. He continues to use the situation template during the mission to piece together the picture on his map, and then to focus the effort. Leaders can also use this updated template to debrief at the end of the operation. This is especially valuable for the search and attack because any enemy movement later reported will add further information to be considered. Leaders should emphasize that squads do not at first have to engage the enemy to accomplish the mission. Contact without the enemy’s knowledge will allow the commander to make a decision for future decisive action. Orders should include tasks such as observe to further develop the situation and position the company for success. If leaders update their situation templates, they can better determine where the enemy will focus and then concentrate their efforts in that area.

The use of specific tasks and initial reconnaissance operations will save many hours of analysis by pinpointing specific areas on which to focus the effort. This will ensure that platoons are not sent on missions before they are positioned for success.

Major Patrick D. McGowan served for three years at the JRTC, serving as an observer-controller in rifle platoon, scout, company, and battalion operations. He previously commanded a company in the 10th Mountain Division and served as a platoon leader and company executive officer in the 2d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.
Heavy-Light Reconnaissance and Counterreconnaissance TTPs

MAJOR CRAIG A. TRISCARI

The reconnaissance versus counterreconnaissance battle is essential to the success of combat operations. It is also one of the toughest missions to control and support.

I participated in a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) in which a light battalion and a heavy brigade created a reconnaissance battle to fight the security zone. Within the security zone, the reconnaissance battalion fought two separate missions—reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance.

The three line companies were assigned three separate missions—one as a reconnaissance company team, another as a counterreconnaissance company team, and the third to be a reserve company team.

The reconnaissance battalion also had the mechanized scouts under its operational control. The establishment of the reconnaissance battalion placed the unit under a battle rhythm different from that of the brigade, as well as under a task organization different from the one it was used to fighting. The commander tasked with the recon/counterrecon fight must assume an accelerated battle rhythm, different from that of the main battle maneuver force, and plan and train accordingly.

There were two basic schools of thought regarding the role of the light infantry in a mechanized environment. One contended that the role should be a supporting mission. This meant that a battalion of light infantry would support a mechanized infantry attack by seizing key terrain, providing local security for the mechanized forces, or closing a flank in the defense.

The second school of thought contended that even though these missions were important, they were not as important as executing the first mission in a battle—the recon/counterrecon force. Looking at numerous studies at the NTC and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), we found that the unit that wins the reconnaissance fight usually wins the battle. This is not hard to understand, considering that having the correct information about the enemy helps commanders make informed decisions.

The second school of thought led to the idea that a light infantry recon battalion should be established to fight the security zone in a mechanized environment. Using its current doctrine, the light infantry battalion began to train on conducting movements to contact using the search and attack technique, which provides all the requirements for fighting and winning in a security area. The companies did not issue mission statements using the term search and attack but instead focused their platoons on specific missions.

For example, the recon company team task organized to conduct a zone or area reconnaissance of special named areas of interests (NAIs). This allowed the battalion to have finders in front of the counterrecon element. The counterrecon company then established such missions as antiarmor ambushes, reconnaissance, or block, deny, and attack missions. With finders, fixers, and finishers, the battalion could call the operation in the security area a movement to contact using the search and attack technique.

Some tacticians may not be convinced that what I have described is, by definition, a movement to contact using the search and attack technique. I would describe it as a textbook definition, but according to FM 7-20, a search and attack “is a decentralized movement to contact, requiring multiple, coordinated patrols to locate the enemy.” The purpose of the search and attack is to focus the units’ effort on the destruction of the enemy, area denial, force protection, and information collection.

Task Organization

The following requirements were identified as necessary to the accomplishment of a continuous recon/counterrecon mission and were the basis for the establishment of the task organization of the recon battalion:

- The entire brigade’s heavy/light scouts would be controlled by one battalion commander. This unity of command would permit the commander to task organize the reconnaissance elements with heavy scouts and give the reconnaissance company team sole command of these elements. This would enable the reconnaissance battalion to communicate with one recon headquarters instead of several.
- The designation of a company team
reserve would allow continuous operations throughout the campaign.

- A reserve would be maintained to reestablish a security zone as soon as a battle ends. The task organization of this reserve must be constant to allow an easy transition into follow-on missions.

- A play book must be published to standardize procedures and help alleviate some of the pressure caused by the accelerated battle rhythm. The light battalion must likewise be self-sustaining during movement into sector and must be able to protect itself as it enters the sector.

- The units must be efficient in battle drills and must understand their engagement criteria.

Reconnaissance Company Team

The primary mission of the reconnaissance company is to find, report, and conduct a battle handoff of all enemy units to the counterrecon zone units. By definition, the reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation to obtain information and locate and test enemy operations and report all activity to higher.

The following are some considerations for planning the reconnaissance fight:

- Establish a reconnaissance and security (R&S) plan early enough to disseminate it to all soldiers.
- Do not overload the recon element with NAIs. Choose areas that are likely to be used chiefly by the enemy. Develop a separate casualty evacuation plan for the recon elements.
- Develop a separate combat service support plan, aside from the main battle plan.
- Replace lost observers.
- Provide air cover and a fire support plan.
- Use force protection when inserting recon forces.
- Take calculated risks when moving units into position.
- Allow recon elements to be aggressive, so long as they do not compromise the overall mission.
- Establish a recon standing operating procedure for reporting.
- Ensure reliable communications with reconnaissance elements.
- In the desert environment, plan on covering six to 11 kilometers in depth forward of the counterreconnaissance.
- Designate no fire areas for all recon positions.
- Establish near and far recognition signs to prevent fratricide.
- Ensure that both reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance elements have a plan to conduct a battle handoff of enemy locations.
- Establish a different battle rhythm in the battalion to fight the light.
- Know Battle Drills 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12 thoroughly (React to Contact, Break Contact, React to Ambush—both dismounted and mounted).
- Develop a battle drill for reacting to armor while dismounted.

Counterreconnaissance Team

The first thing that comes to mind when you hear the word counterreconnaissance is deny, or destroy, enemy forces. The next thing that comes to mind is, “We are in the defense.” But I would venture to say that the counterrecon in a heavy/light environment can use light forces as a counterreconnaissance force in the offense as well as the defense. It is clear from the study of history that the first step before battle is the collection of information about the enemy, followed by the destruction of enemy intelligence gathering devices, and then the destruction of the enemy himself. If you accept that as truth, then why not maintain a counterrecon force in both the offense and the defense?

The following are some considerations for fighting the counterrecon missions in a heavy/light environment:

- Maintain unity of command within a company.
- Ensure that you maintain mobility in the counterrecon zone (horse blanket technique).
- When the unit is in the offense, be able to bolster recon forces rapidly where needed. Replace lost observers.
- Give your platoons specific missions—ambush, deny, for example.
- Make sure you can relay information from the recon zone if necessary.
- Have a plan for vehicle and dismounted identification.

Communication

At the NTC, my unit realized that flooding the recon zone with observers resulted in an increase in reporting, as well as for overlapping reporting. This also had its disadvantages because of the CSS operations needed to support such a large number of recon forces. A unit could have as many as 30 teams in position. The recon battalion commander must rely on the companies to properly screen his company teams’ reports in order to be effective.

For example, the recon team in a light battalion must report to the squad leader, then the platoon leader, and then
the company. The recon platoons from the heavy and light unit reports to the company commander in charge of the recon zone. In order for the information flow to work, the issues of communication support and retransmission have to be organized before planning this operation. A unit can only field the number of teams with which it can communicate.

On the basis of the lessons learned at the NTC, I am sure a light infantry battalion can do more than anyone previously thought possible. The key to this technique is for the light unit to fight at least one major training exercise with a heavy unit, and for both units to understand their limitations as well as their advantages. This will allow both types of units to be more productive in executing the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance mission.

Major Craig A. Triscari served with the 2d Infantry Division, the 177th Armored Brigade, the NTC operations group, and the 25th Infantry Division, and is now G-3 assistant training officer at Fort Hood. He is a 1989 ROTC graduate of Purdue University.
The Mk 19
As an Indirect Fire Weapon

LIEUTENANT ROBERT THORNTON

The company order called for one platoon to place two dismounted .50 caliber heavy machineguns in the battalion support-by-fire (SBF) position. The two platoons tasked to augment the battalion reserve were to move onto Objective DOG after it was secure, to prepare for a possible enemy counterattack. The two remaining platoons were tasked to seal off the objective from enemy reinforcements. They were to take up positions within 2,000 meters of the objective to provide indirect fires with their Mk 19s to suppress and disrupt enemy defenses, while the 81mm mortars and 105mm artillery rounds obscured the main effort’s breach site.

The Company B executive officer running the SBF position saw it first. The enemy was repositioning one of its DShK machineguns to cover the breach site. It was moving behind a piece of micro terrain that masked it from his SBF element. He radioed D46 and D56 and called for an immediate suppression mission. Within 60 seconds both elements had rounds landing within 200 meters of the target. The XO made the corrections for D46 while the 2d Platoon sergeant adjusted rounds for D56. The next rounds landed 25 seconds after the corrections were sent; this time they landed within 50 meters of the DShK crew. The next call was a Fire for Effect.

As the enemy was repositioning, 96 rounds of 40mm HEDP (high-explosive, dual purpose) from four Mk 19s (two 12-round bursts from each weapon) landed on top of them. The beaten zones from the four converging cones of fire, each 70 meters long and 30 meters wide, tore into the gun crew and the surrounding enemy soldiers. By this time the assault element was moving to the objective. The XO moved the Mk 19 fires up the hill, keeping the edge of the beaten zone 50 to 75 meters in front of the lead fire team.

The effects achieved with the Mk 19 in this hypothetical scenario are well within the capabilities of today’s antiarmor platoons, given adequate training and resources.

My company—Company D, 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry—wanted to move into a more direct role with the battalion and was therefore looking for more ways the heavy weapons could support rifle company operations. The following are the task, conditions, and standards that we used in employing the Mk 19 in the indirect fire mode:

Task. The maneuver commander was provided with a system that accurately put a large number of high explosive rounds onto an objective within 120 seconds of the call for fire.

Conditions.
- The gunners could not see the targets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MK 19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maximum Range</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rates of Fire</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustained</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid</td>
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<td>Cyclic</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Operating Load</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Muzzle Velocity</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Angle of Fire</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
• We used 11H infantrymen as forward observers.
• All targets were between 1500 and 2000 meters.
• The observer and the Mk 19 crew knew each others’ PLGR (precise lightweight GPS receiver) grids.
• The observer had a six-digit or eight-digit grid for the target.

Standards.
• Initial rounds were fired within one minute of receiving the call for fire.
• The squad leader with the Mk 19 gave the observer a gun to target (GT) line before the first 3- to 5-round burst was fired.
• The observer used the GT line to make his spotings. The observer then sent the correction based on the impact in reference to the GT line; Example RIGHT 50, DROP 50 (for a target over 1,500 meters). The last standard allowed the gunner to index corrections on his traversing and elevating (T&E) mechanism without the use of a fire direction center (FDC). (The observer makes use of the GT line by drawing it on his map through the target, then bisects the GT line through the target. He then plots his corrections on the map so he can sent the squad leader ready corrections he can input to the T&E.

In actual test fires on Fort Campbell ranges, we achieved impressive results. The initial 3-5-round bursts were fired within one minute. Adjustments were made and rounds fired in bursts within 15 seconds of the FO’s corrections. The FO called for a fire for effect of two 10-12-round bursts after two to four adjustments. The beaten zone averaged 60 to 80 meters long and 20 to 40 meters wide, between distances of 1,200 and 2,000 meters, respectively. The gunner can add further depth and width to the fire for effect by manipulating his T&E in increments of 2-5 mils after his first burst.

While developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), we found that Appendix E to Field Manual (FM) 23-27, Mk 19 40mm Grenade Machine Gun MOD 3, provided the necessary raw data to make a ballistics chart for the M430 HEDP round out to 2,000 meters for the M430 HEDP round. With the maximum range of the system listed as 2,202 meters, we used the increase in ratio of the last four ranges to provide rough data for 2,100 and 2,200 meters.

The problem we ran into was that some of the data was ambiguous in terms of the way it was used, and the data was not in the units of measurement that we needed. First, the muzzle elevation was listed in mils, and we needed it in degrees. This was an easy fix: The 17.8 mils in a degree translates to 33 degrees at 2,000 meters. Second, the maximum ordinate was in feet, and we needed it in meters. This translates to 1,486 feet times 12 inches, divided by 39.37, which equals 453 meters.

With a ballistics chart we were able to construct a sight we could index the elevation onto, since the rear sight only goes up to 1,500 meters. We bought a Stanley Quick Square (which is basically a T-Square that gives degrees between zero and 90) and sawed off one of the inside edges so it would mount flush to the right-hand side of the Mk 64 cradle. We attached a turret level at the base of the T-Square so that the level reads zero degrees at zero degrees on the T-square. We used a bolt and wing nut to mount our sight to the upper right-hand corner of the Mk 64 so the base of the sight was in line with the center of the barrel. The gunner could now zero his T&E using the sight by aligning the level at zero then bringing the muzzle down to zero degrees elevation on the sight, regardless of the angle of the vehicle. This gave the gunner his course elevation adjustment.

The next problem with elevation is that the Mk 19 must be fired from a reverse slope to achieve a maximum range of 2,212 meters. Since the T&E will not allow the gunner to achieve a 54-degree angle, it must be supplemented by a firing point on micro terrain that elevates the front wheels, and the sight must be zeroed as explained above.

### Ballistic Chart for the M430 HEDP Round

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (Meters)</th>
<th>Impact Angle (Degrees)</th>
<th>Muzzle Elev (Degrees)</th>
<th>Max Ordinates</th>
<th>Time of Flight</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>90</td>
<td>54</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Data for 2200 and 2100 meters is based on an increase in ratio. Max range we achieved was 2050 (estimated by the observer).

### Ballistic Data for the M918 TPT Round

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range (Meters)</th>
<th>Impact Angle (Degrees)</th>
<th>Muzzle Elev (Degrees)</th>
<th>Max Ordinates</th>
<th>Time of Flight</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>
SAMPLE CALL FOR FIRE TO A DELTA SECTION FOR INDIRECT Mk 19 FIRE

OBSERVER: D26 THIS IS R6, ADJUST FIRE, OVER
SECTION LEADER: R6 THIS IS D26, ADJUST FIRE, OUT

OBSERVER: GRID DR 35955350, MACHINEGUN POSITION, OVER
SECTION LEADER: GRID DR 35955350, MACHINEGUN POSITION, OUT

SECTION LEADER: GT LINE 05 DEGREES, RANGE 1700
SECTION LEADER: GT LINE 05 DEGREES, RANGE 1700

SECTION LEADER: GT LINE 05 DEGREES, OVER
SECTION LEADER: GT LINE 05 DEGREES, OUT

SECTION LEADER: BURST, OVER
SECTION LEADER: BURST, OUT

OBSERVER: LEFT 100 METERS, DROP 200 METERS, OVER
SECTION LEADER: LEFT 100 METERS, DROP 200 METERS, OUT

SECTION LEADER: LEFT 50 MILS, DROP 100 MILS
SECTION LEADER: LEFT 50 MILS, DROP 100 MILS

SECTION LEADER: BURST, OVER
SECTION LEADER: BURST, OUT

OBSERVER: RIGHT 25 METERS, ADD 50 METERS, OVER
SECTION LEADER: RIGHT 25 METERS, ADD 50 METERS, OUT

SECTION LEADER: RIGHT 12 MILS, ADD 25 MILS
SECTION LEADER: RIGHT 12 MILS, ADD 25 MILS

SECTION LEADER: BURST, OVER
SECTION LEADER: BURST, OUT

OBSERVER: TARGET, FIRE FOR EFFECT, OVER
SECTION LEADER: TARGET, FIRE FOR EFFECT, OUT

SECTION LEADER: BURST, ROUNDS COMPLETE, OVER
SECTION LEADER: BURST, ROUNDS COMPLETE, OUT

OBSERVER: TARGET DESTROYED, OVER
SECTION LEADER: TARGET DESTROYED, OUT

SUGGESTED EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GUNNER</th>
<th>FO</th>
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<tr>
<td>DAY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>Radio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Binoculars</td>
<td>NVDs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Mini-eyesafe laser infrared observation set
**A night laser range and compass binocular, fielded to Company D in July 1998.

To index the GT line onto the gun, the squad leader stood behind the gunner and shot the azimuth to the target and then brought the gunner on line with commands of Left, Right, Steady, and Stop. We experimented with using aiming stakes like the mortars use, but this system is faster and takes advantage of the turret ring's ability to go quickly to a new azimuth and engage a new target.

All adjustments after the first burst were made with the T&E and the turret ring. When the observer sends in a spotting to the section leader, the section leader does the math, using the formula of 1 mil equals 1 meter at 1,000 meters, or 2 meters at a range of 2,000 meters. The section leader sends the squad leader “Drop 100,” and the gunner moves the muzzle down 100 clicks on the elevation wheel. For the deviation, any corrections above 30 are made using the turret rings. There are 128 holes in the turret ring, which works out to 50 mils per hole. If the correction is RIGHT 220, the gunner moves 4 holes right and 20 clicks on the traversing wheel. If the gunner’s traversing wheel is all the way to the right before the correction, he can move 5 holes and back off 30 mils on the traversing wheel. With the observer sending spotings to the section leader and the section leader sending the ready corrections to squad leader, the squad leader can concentrate on helping the gunner and monitoring the net instead of acting as FDC.

Some of the strong points for using the Mk 19 in the indirect fire mode can turn limitations, such as range, into steady attributes. The standard muzzle velocity insures no shot rounds due to a change in charge. The 15-meter burst range allows maneuver forces to work closer to the beaten zone. The available data allows for solid planning in terms of maximum ordinate and angle of impact. It also increases the system’s survivability by providing maximum standoff.

There are ten Mk 19s in a light infantry battalion’s Delta Company and many possibilities for their use as indirect fire weapons in the attack. If the battalion’s indirect fire assets are tied up obscuring the breach or supporting the main effort, the Mk 19s can be used to suppress and reduce the enemy forces on the objective.

The use of the Mk 19 in the indirect fire mode fits the definition of a screen, according to FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols. It would also work well in a mission to suppress enemy air defense (SEAD). We ran immediate suppression and within one adjustment had suppressed the target. This mission is especially applicable since the Mk 19 does not need to be dismounted to fire.
In the defense it can be used to provide on-call indirect fire to units fighting the counterreconnaissance battle or the dismounted battle while the Delta Company sits farther back in the battalion sector or screens the flanks. Additionally, it can be fired out of the back of the platoon sergeant’s or the platoon leader’s vehicle to cover dead space in front of the screen line, if the gun-trucks are TOW pure. This could be accomplished by caching supplies and sandbagging the bed of the cargo compartment. The legs of the tripod must be tied to the cargo tie-down rings for added security. Firing points must be prepared behind the screen lines by registering the intended targets, then driving pickets to mark the vehicle’s orientation. The azimuth should be rechecked before firing, but the adjustments should be minor.

These are just a few of the missions that fall within the Mk 19’s capabilities as an indirect fire system.

Lieutenant Robert Thornton led rifle and antitank platoons in the 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division. He is a 1989 ROTC graduate of Austin Peay State University, and previously served in the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army National Guard.
Marksmanship Training
Quick-Fire Techniques

CAPTAIN BRYAN P. HERNANDEZ

Marksmanship training is one of the most fundamental skills for infantrymen. Soldiers fight as they train, and with the complexities of the modern battlefield—conducting peacekeeping operations, movements to contact, and military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) exercises—the little things can easily be overlooked in the training process.

As a rifle company commander, I once assigned my platoon leaders the mission to prepare a training plan at the individual and team level for MOUT training. I gave them the individual, leader, and collective tasks that I wanted trained and evaluated and focused their attention at a level they could handle. The company had not conducted MOUT training in several months, and my lieutenants were new, so I knew much of the input would come from the platoons' noncommissioned officers. After several backbriefings and further training guidance, we left for the MOUT site. What I saw truly brought to light the differences in interpretation and experience levels among leaders, and—most—important the imperative that training must reinforce and build upon the basics.

As I walked around the classes that morning at the MOUT site, the platoons were divided into three separate areas. One platoon was gathered around the platoon sergeant, who was giving a class, using butcher block paper, on room-clearing techniques and team member assignments. Another platoon was moving through engineer-taped areas on the ground that simulated building structures. The other platoon, however, was in a platoon formation being given instruction on marksmanship techniques. I asked the platoon leader at what point he planned to begin training in the MOUT site on room-clearing techniques. The platoon sergeant immediately jumped in and said they would enter the buildings after they finished the basics, primarily marksmanship. He said there was no reason even to take the soldiers into the rooms until they knew how to walk, look, and shoot in the urban environment.

That platoon sergeant could not have said it better. As the training progressed, this platoon performed much better than the other two platoons in all the evaluated tasks the company trained. The training this platoon conducted focused on weapon control, movement, quick-fire techniques, and confidence in acquiring and engaging targets. I later used this training tech-
nique at all levels for every operation we conducted.

The great advantage of quick-fire training is its compatibility with basic and abundant M-16 and squad live fire ranges. After developing the training plan and safety data zones, conducting quick-fire training was just a matter of setting the range up to meet the specific requirements.

We conducted this training at least quarterly and incorporated it into squad and platoon live-fire exercises. The training can be conducted with both blank and live ammunition, in any environment. The range setup and the necessary equipment can be found in any unit and can easily be provided by the installation range control office.

The training normally requires one day of dry-fire exercises, Phases I to III, and two days at a suitable range for Phases IV and V.

**Phase I. Instruction on the fundamentals of marksmanship techniques.** This class is taught in the platoon configuration with a primary instructor and safeties.

The following are the areas of instruction:

A. Weapon control.
B. Proper firing positions (with a focus on holding the weapon in the low and high carry).
C. Target acquisition (proper use of the front sight aperture for quick firing).
D. Safety (focus on thumb safety release method and weapon awareness).

**Phase II. Instruction of the fundamental movement techniques.** Concentration is on “sweeping the weapon,” proper firing positions, and walking (proper foot placement), using the same method as in Phase I.

A. Foot placement and rotation with turns.
B. Sweeping the weapon into a proper firing position.
C. React to an empty magazine (drop to a knee) and magazine exchange.
D. Movement using the low crouch and “duck walk.”

**Phase III. Basic four firing positions and target acquisition while walking.** This instruction is given in a platoon formation with added space between ranks. Safety personnel are
placed so they can provide immediate corrections. All positions are taught first in the stationary position and then while moving in the low carry with a slow walking pace.

A. Left Side (Stationary/Moving).
B. Right Side (Stationary/Moving).
C. Front (Stationary/Moving).
D. Rear (Stationary/Moving).

Phase IV. Range Qualification.
This phase is conducted at the range on Day 1. Instruction is given on range safety and orientation, NCOIC firing commands, target composition, and target acquisition.

A. Range firing is conducted in three iterations for each firer. The iterations cover the four basic firing positions, single and double tap method, and multiple target engagement.

1st Iteration: Firer reports with eight magazines, with 20 rounds each. This first iteration consists of the four basic firing positions:
- Left Side (two magazines).
- Right Side (two magazines).
- Front (two magazines).
- Rear (two magazines).

2d Iteration: Firer reports with eight magazines, with 20 rounds each. This iteration is conducted the same as the first but using the double tap method.
- Left Side (two magazines).
- Right Side (two magazines).
- Front (two magazines).

3d Iteration: Firer reports with eight magazines, with 30 rounds each. Targets are engaged using multiple targets (E-type silhouettes with circle, diamond, and square painted on each). The NCOIC directs the specific target and order in which to fire the engagement; for example “circle, diamond, square.” The NCOIC uses a whistle to order “Commence firing.” This iteration can be conducted with the single or double tap method, depending on the firer’s proficiency.
- Left Side (two magazines).
- Right Side (two magazines).
- Front (two magazines).
- Rear (two magazines).

Phase V. Range Qualification.
This range is conducted on Day 2 of firing, after firers have exhibited proficiency in Phases I-IV. This phase focuses on engaging targets while moving parallel to the target line and forward (see diagram). The two parallel movements concentrate on the individual’s ability to fire from both the left and right sides. This firing is conducted with one firer at a time. The subsequent movement is firing from the low carry while moving forward. This range can be conducted with five firers at one time, alternating firing positions. The first iteration concentrates on the ability to engage targets on the NCOIC’s command while moving.

1st Iteration:
- Left Side (one 30-round magazine).
- Right Side (one 30-round magazine).
- Once firer has reached the no-fire line, he moves back to the start position and resumes.

2d Iteration:
- Forward movement.

This movement consists of using the low crouch and “duck walk,” starting 25 meters from the target and moving slowly to the no-fire line (five meters from the target). Once the firers have reached the end point, they return to the start point. This engagement may begin with the single shot method and progress to both double tap and multiple target engagements.

The training can be executed from squad to company level within the times specified, and it requires minimal logistical support. As fundamental as the training is, it offers dividends that make it well worth the effort.

Captain Bryan P. Hernandez commanded a rifle company and headquarters company in the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division. He previously led rifle and mortar platoons in the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, and served as a company executive officer. He is now a foreign area officer assignment in Brazil. He is a 1989 graduate of Marion Military Institute and holds a master’s degree from the University of Alabama.
Developing the warrior spirit in soldiers is vital to the Army as we move into the 21st century. This is one of the objectives during the Benning phase of the Ranger Course.

What do I mean by the term “warrior spirit”? Above all, it is a state of mind. A soldier with the warrior spirit thinks aggressively, always seeking ways to close with and defeat the enemy. He is confident that he is tough enough to meet the enemy on any level. He is less concerned for his personal safety and more concerned with inflicting as much pain as possible on the enemy. In training, this soldier focuses completely on ways to improve his unit’s ability to fight. He draws his satisfaction from continually developing his fighting prowess. He takes it personally when he loses in training because he knows it
is unacceptable to lose in combat. In sum, the warrior spirit drives a soldier to fight and win, or die trying.

Although this is a personal definition, it is close to the doctrinal definition of the “warrior ethos” found in the newest update of Field Manual 22-100, Leadership:

The will to win with honor. Despite a thinking enemy, despite adverse conditions, you accomplish your mission. You express your character—the BE of BE, KNOW, DO—when you and your people confront a difficult mission and persevere. The warrior ethos is the will to meet mission demands, no matter what, the drive to get the job done whatever the cost.

In recent years, the focus within the Army has been on technological advances and skills (particularly in relation to its plans for Force XXI and Army After Next). But these advances have brought about a decline in the development of the warrior spirit. The many peacekeeping deployments—with the necessary emphasis on following strict rules of engagement and preventing the outbreak of hostilities—have further contributed to the weakening of the warrior spirit.

This decline in the warrior spirit is hard to measure objectively outside of combat. Part of my analysis comes from personal observations during nine years in infantry units. It is also based on the consensus of the combat arms officers and noncommissioned officers I have talked to on the subject. One objective measure is that most Ranger students, when asked, say they have not done combatives at the unit level.

The question that must be answered, therefore, is: Have we moved to the point that the warrior spirit is not as important as it once was, and will our overwhelming technological superiority negate the advantages of the warrior spirit in future combat? The short answer is that the warrior spirit is more important now than ever and will continue to be important.

The future of warfare for the U.S. Army, particularly for the light infantry divisions, lies, among other things, in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) and heavily restrictive environments. The world population continues to increase and become more urbanized, particularly in third world countries.

Most of our potential adversaries know two things about the United States that they will try to use against us: We are very sensitive to casualties, and our strength is in open terrain, where our technological superiority is at a premium.

They know that one way to gain their political objective is to draw us into a situation or location in which they can inflict excessive casualties. Although military forces will continue to carry out their missions, the American people (through their political representatives) will not tolerate high casualty rates, unless they perceive the enemy as a direct threat to our nation. Somalia is a good example.

Operation Desert Storm showed what we can do in wide-open terrain. But, as the North Vietnamese and their allies quickly discovered, if you can get close enough to your opponent, you negate many of his technological advantages. Urban or heavily restrictive terrain puts us at a distinct disadvantage in both of these areas.

We can therefore expect that if a potential adversary wants to gain a political objective he will figure out some way to draw us into such environments. Because of the close, personal nature of these operations and their likelihood in the future, soldiers will have to have the warrior spirit to fight the enemy at close quarters, as in MOUT, and defeat him.

The Benning phase of Ranger school receives an average of 300 small-unit leaders each month. They come from various types of units and with various degrees of warrior spirit. The method I will describe outlines why most students leave Ranger school with the warrior spirit and take it back to their teams, squads, platoons, or companies, where they will have a great effect on the rest of the Army.

Part of the warrior spirit is confidence and physical toughness. For these two attributes, Ranger school does what it has always done—push the students beyond what they thought were their limits. When students are deprived of food and sleep and physically stressed all the time, they develop physical and mental toughness. Each student learns that he can function and lead under combat conditions. He gains confidence in his own ability to face the enemy in combat operations. He gains confidence in his tactical ability when he is forced to plan and lead patrols to the high Ranger standards.

The major improvement Ranger School has made over the past few years in regard to developing the warrior spirit has been in the use of physical contact events. Up until two years ago Ranger students were taught combatives but without free-play force-on-force. Although they learned the different fighting techniques, they didn’t get a chance to actually fight each other. Combatives and knife fighting techniques are still taught. The change is the addition of boxing and pugil stick fighting, which is held in the first nine days of the school.

The pugil stick event serves two purposes: It allows the student to practice the bayonet fighting techniques he previously learned, and it helps him face his fears and gain confidence that he can function under the uncertainty of combat. (Colonel Lewis Millet, Medal of Honor recipient and honorary regimental commander of the 27th Infantry, used to tell his soldiers that they should periodically face their fears in peacetime by doing things that involve an element of risk—such as skydiving, scuba diving, or boxing—to build confidence in their ability to face their fears in combat.) The Ranger instructor referees ensure that the students make an aggressive effort to attack their opponent. If they do not, they are stopped and required to fight again. Each student fights a one-on-one bout three times against the same opponent. The winner is the one who takes the best two out of three. Those who excel are rewarded. The students must be extremely aggressive to win the close fight.

The boxing event serves many of the same purposes as the pugil stick event. Although soldiers are not likely to engage in fistfights during combat, boxing does build their confidence in the ability
to fight without a weapon if it is necessary. This is a real possibility in a MOUT environment, where opposing soldiers can be within feet of each other before they know it. The most important thing boxing does, however, is to force the student to confront his fears. More than half of all Ranger students say they have never been in a fistfight, and I would bet that the percentage would be much higher in regular units. Combat is not the place for a soldier to face his fear of confrontation for the first time. During the matches, Ranger instructors stress the same aggressiveness as in the pugil fighting.

Almost all the feedback from the students about boxing and pugil sticks is positive. They say they gained something from it and wish their units did more combative events of this type. Another by-product of the pugil and boxing events is that they build teamwork, and most student feedback confirms this.

Ranger school takes a few safety measures to ensure that the pugil and boxing events are safe and realistic. First, fighters are medically screened for potentially hazardous conditions. A good example of this is students who have had previous head injuries. Next, students who have less than 20/20 vision are identified so that they fight only each other. In the boxing event, any students who have had a lot of past boxing experience are separated and fight each other. Finally, students are matched in size. All the standard safety equipment (headgear, mouthpieces) is used. Medics are always on site, and the Ranger instructors look for medical problems with Ranger students. With these measures in place, instructors can encourage the students to fight to their utmost potential. With the same precautions, any unit in the Army could conduct force-on-force combatives. The benefits gained through developing the warrior spirit would be worth the small number of injuries.

Even if Ranger students don’t make it through the entire course, they still take back to their units what they have learned. In this way, what is taught in the Ranger Training Brigade affects the entire Army. Developing the warrior spirit is one of the many things Ranger School does, which makes it relevant to the likely future of warfare. In dirty, face-to-face MOUT fighting, the victor will be not only the side with the technological advantage but also the side with aggressive, fearless warrior leaders—leaders who have developed the warrior spirit in their soldiers, based on what they have learned in Ranger School.

Captain William M. Connor, Jr., commanded companies in the 4th Ranger Training Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, and is now Aide to the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Infantry Center. He is a 1990 graduate of the Citadel and has previously written articles for Infantry Magazine.
Deployment Plan
For the Combat Maneuver Training Center

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL E. CARR

In February 1997, the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry (Air Assault), Michigan Army National Guard, began planning for a mid-August company-size deployment to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany. During the rotation, the battalion’s Company B would become Company F of the 1st Battalion, 508th Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT) in Italy. I would like to describe some areas in which early planning helped this company during its five-week deployment.

Two coordination conferences were conducted, one at the unit in Michigan and the other in Italy. The initial conference discussed in detail overseas deployment for training dates, transportation, locations, tailoring the unit, the multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES), ammunition, the mission essential task list (METL), and specific training tasks. The second meeting validated Army Physical Fitness Tests, five-mile run, previous CMTC lessons learned, and the development of a post-deployment training schedule. This training would be executed before company level operations in the “box.”

Predeployment Training
Adherence to the Army’s tactical training doctrine had Company B’s METL and training program on line with what would be required of it at the CMTC. Critical operations were attack, defend, and movement to contact. The platoon level supporting tasks had been trained to standard using ARTEP 7-10-MTP, Mission Training Plan for the
Infantry Rifle Company, and the company was clearly proficient in them. The brigade commander added other tasks that included clear a trench line, conduct air assault operations using the UH-60, and complete a five-mile run.

The company conducted both individual and collective training before the deployment:

We had been warned of the level of physical conditioning we would need to be successful. Conducting physical training only on drill weekends would not be enough. The unit developed a five-day-a-week physical conditioning program, with validation scheduled for July. Since physical fitness and mental toughness are interdependent and inseparable, we approached mental conditioning by using the battalion’s heritage and reinforcing pride, patriotism, and service since 1855. (The examples of the unit’s service in three major wars and its seven Medal of Honor recipients provided the example, spirit, and will to fight.)

Leader training was conducted at the same time as scheduled squad and platoon tasks. Readiness Group Selfridge in Michigan provided sustainment training in troop-leading procedures and air assault operations. The soldiers were assigned homework to do between drills on the factors of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time), call for fire, casualty evacuation, standard rehearsal methods, and familiarization with the 508th ABCT’s standing operating procedures (SOPs).

Collective training had to be sustained and validated from squad to platoon level, and the importance of enforcing standards was emphasized during every field exercise. The unit obtained and reviewed copies of mission checklists for priorities of work provided by the 508th ABCT, in the attack and defense. We practiced standard battle drills and followed up with retraining on those that needed work.

UH-60 air assault training and a mobilization for the deployment readiness exercise, which was scheduled and conducted in June, required support from the National Guard Bureau and Michigan National Guard Headquarters.

**Post-Deployment Training Tasks**

Once on the ground at the CMTC, the company scheduled training on the following events:

**INDIVIDUAL:**
- MILES zero, M16, M60.
- Land navigation.
- Physical training, road march.
- Rules of engagement.

**COLLECTIVE:**
- Company attack.
- Air assault.
- Company defense.
- Night operations.

In addition, we recommend that other units deploying to the CMTC consider the following points in the areas of training and equipment:

- Company mortars must be included in the deployment so the commander can have his own indirect fire assets.
- Global positioning systems must be used in navigation during periods of limited visibility.
- Night vision goggles are required for movement and defense.
- Each soldier must fire MILES Dragon and AT-4 weapons.
- Soldiers should re-zero their weapons daily.
- MILES antitank systems must put volley fire at the same time on the same target to register a kill.

- Enough antitank weapon effects signature simulators must be provided to support platoons in the defense.
- Water must be managed at squad level, and resupply must support the operational tempo.
- SOPs should address the basic load to be carried when rucksacks are staged.
- Platoon level training is required to defend against armor as part of a defense.
- Platoon level training must include the emplacement of mines and antitank obstacles when establishing a defense.

- The METT-T analysis must include leader terrain appreciation using OCOKA (observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach).
- All NCOs and officers should carry and use the Combat Leaders Guide, from the Army Research Institute, Infantry Forces Research Unit (1994).

Company B was challenged at the CMTC, and its successes were due to its well-trained soldiers and competent junior leaders at squad and platoon level. To integrate and fight with an Active Army force, a reserve component force must begin training early, and must focus its preparations and training at the lower levels.

**Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Carr** commanded 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry (Air Assault), during the CMTC deployment and is now the General Studies Battalion Commander, Regional Training Institute, at Fort Custer, Michigan. He previously served with the 1st Marine Division during the Vietnam War. He is a graduate of Lake Superior State University and holds a master’s degree from the University of Louisiana.

Lost Battalions is the story of two World War II battalions—one German, one American—each cut off behind enemy lines in the same forest at the same time, and the heroic efforts to save them.

As Allied forces were breaking out and racing across France to the Rhine, few took notice of the U.S. Seventh and French First Armies' sweep up the Rhone Valley in the fall of 1944. This advance, which some called a "cakewalk," certainly looked that way in the beginning, with the rapid advances made following the Riveria landings. But the German Nineteenth Army quickly fortified the Vosges Mountains and made a stand that resulted in one of the hardest fought battles of the war. It was during the course of this largely unknown struggle that the Wehrmacht's 202d Mountain Battalion and the U.S. 141st "Alamo Regiment" of the 36th Texas Division were both encircled by enemy.

During abysmal weather, the 201st Mountain Battalion tried to come to the relief of its beleaguered German comrades. At the same time, only five miles to the north, the heroic 442d Regimental Combat Team, which was composed of Americans of Japanese descent and became the most decorated unit of the U.S. Army, strove valiantly to save the Texans in the bloodiest battle since Anzio. This book describes the bitter and intense fighting over the rugged terrain of the Vosges and focuses on the bravery of American Nisei who had volunteered for service in the U.S. Army, despite the fact that many of their family and friends had been sent to internment camps back home.

Lost Battalions is based on official reports, personal letters, and many interviews with the participants on both sides. It is an extraordinary story of uncommon courage and valor on both sides during what the American soldiers in the battle came to call the "crossroads of hell." It includes very useful photos, maps, and appendices. This book is an important addition to the scarce literature of the Vosges Campaign and the Seventh Army's attack through southern France.


After decades of liberal lies, America bashing, and political correctness from other writers, renowned British historian Paul Johnson has written the definitive story of our nation. Breathtaking in its scope and depth, A History of the American People is a penetrating reinterpretation of our history.

Professor Johnson covers every aspect of American life and tells our story in terms of the ordinary men and women who collectively created our unique character. Not surprisingly, religion plays a decisive role in the development of the American character, as does our English heritage and culture.

Johnson divides his majestic study into eight parts: Colonial America (1580-1750), Revolutionary America (1750-1815), Democratic America (1815-1850), Civil War America (1850-1870), Industrial America (1870-1912), Melting-Pot America (1912-1929), Superpower America (1929-1960), and Problem-Solving, Problem-Creating America (1960-1997). Throughout these sections, Johnson provides an indispensable reevaluation of American history that is firmly grounded on the facts. Every page brings forth his undisguised love and respect for the United States.

What makes this book so valuable is the way Johnson tells America's story. He uses primary source material wherever possible, so that the reader gains a sense of presence, and can judge from the source what really happened. Only then does Johnson provide his interpretation of events. The reader soon discovers that Johnson has tried at all stages to present the facts fully, honestly, and objectively.

This book corrects decades of liberal distortion and is the perfect antidote for the often slanted perspective of textbooks used in our school systems today. Anyone who loves America and seeks a better understanding of our past should read this book.


Colonel James Humphries served two tours with the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, in Vietnam. Although he began his first tour as a pay officer for Vietnamese laborers, he seized the first opportunity to command a rifle company. During the very last days of his tour in the field in the Hiep Duc Valley, in June 1968, he sustained a very serious injury and lost his right eye. Nevertheless, he returned to the brigade in 1970-71 to serve as battalion operations officer.

This is his account of his first tour. It is a good combat history that tells the story of a division, the 23d Infantry (Americal) Division, which has not enjoyed one of the most prestigious reputations among Vietnam combat units. Unfortunately, the unduly maligned Americal Division is often remembered for its saddest moments, such as My Lai or the tragedy at Fire Base Mary Ann in 1971. This positive depiction of dutiful and heroic performance in little-reported battles in the northern provinces helps to balance the picture.

Humphries augments his first-person narrative with research conducted at the National Archives and the Center of Military History—after-action reports, lessons learned, intelligence summaries, operational summaries, daily journals, senior officer debriefing reports, oral histories—and correspondence and oral interviews to put the combat in which he participated into larger perspective. Several good military maps included throughout the text help the reader understand the action.

A large number of books fit into this combat narrative genre. This may be one of the better ones in detail and accuracy, and, like all good first-person accounts, it contributes to our understanding of the Vietnam War experience. I do not find it one of the May-August 1999 INFANTRY 49
more interesting narratives, however. Humphries' impassionate, almost matter-of-fact style, is a bit mechanical and dry. Still, the book is solid and informative and provides good insight into men in battle.


Imagine a country which, as a result of the First World War, effectively lost 22 per cent of its national territory; incurred debts equivalent to 136 per cent of gross national product, a fifth of it owed to foreign powers; saw inflation and then unemployment rise to levels not seen for more than a century; and experienced an equally unprecedented wave of labor unrest—a country whose newly democratic political system produced a system of coalition government in which party deals behind closed doors...determined who governed the country...a country in which the poverty of returning soldiers and their families contrasted grotesquely with the conspicuous consumption of a hedonistic and decadent elite.... The country? Not Germany, but Britain (the territory lost consisted of the 26 counties of Southern Ireland which eventually became the Republic of Ireland we know today).

In this exhaustively researched work, Niall Ferguson gives us World War I from a largely economic viewpoint. He offers statistics in terms of lives lost and property destroyed, but ultimately this is a book that details the human cost of what was to be called the “War to end all wars.” The Pity of War is the pity of the First World War.

Ferguson sets out to answer 10 questions of his own making from “Was the war inevitable?” (he posits that it was not) to “Who won the peace? or Who ended up paying for the war?” (everyone ended up paying for it and his answer to who won the peace I’ll let the reader discover for himself).

He tells us in his introduction that this book is not a narrative of World War I. There are some black-and-white photos of the aftermath of battles, but no maps, no discussion of individual or unit heroics. These items will be found in other texts. What he does show, however, are charts, graphs, and data tables from “Estimate for total public spending as a per cent of Gross National Product for the 5 Great Powers, 1890-1913,” to “Enlistment in the British regular army and Territorial Force, August 1914-December 1915.” His most interesting data comes largely from economic tables and deals with industrial strengths, national debts, European bond prices, and, finally, the most compelling of all, “The cost of killing: War expenditure and death.” By this measure alone, Germany and the Central Powers were the victors. In the expenditure of $61.5 billion (current outlays) they brought about 5,421,000 Allied deaths. The Allies, on the other hand, spent $147 billion and killed 4,029,000 enemy. Such stark statistical contrasts, although viewed in context, are present throughout this work.

His argument that World War I could have been prevented, while not necessarily new or flawed, is unremarkable. All wars, we can argue, are preventable. The pity of this war was that a sober analysis of its costs was never undertaken by people whose opinions mattered. Had Ferguson been born two generations earlier and produced this book, one wonders if the cost in human misery of the second World War could have been avoided.


Author David Eicher has produced an excellent reference work at a very reasonable price for any reader interested in serious study of the published Civil War history over the past 130 years.

In this book, Eicher has included what he considers the 1,100 most significant books published on the subject (with the assistance of an editorial advisory board composed of John H. Eicher, Gary Gallagher, James M. McPherson, Mark Neely, Jr., Ralph Newman, and James I. Robertson, Jr.) This is the first and best effort of its kind since the publication of the centennial-era Civil War Books edited by historians Allan Nevins, James I. Robertson, and Bell Wiley in the 1960s.

Eicher breaks down the books covered into categories of biographies, memoirs, and letters for both the Union and the Confederacy; battles and campaigns; general works; and unit histories. The description of each book contains a succinct description of the subject matter covered and an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, or biases in the book's writing. The volume concludes with both author and title indexes to help in the search for a particular history.

This book is highly recommended to everyone interested in the Civil War. Its limitations, of course, are that it includes only 1,100 books, but the material provided on each title is far superior to any previous bibliographic works of this kind. The Civil War in Books is a worthy investment for any student of the war.


On 20 November 1943, Operation Galvanic, the code name for the first major American amphibious operation of the war in the Pacific, took place on two very small islands of two different coral atolls in the Gilbert Islands.

Units of the 2d Marine Division were to land on Betio Island, the largest in the Tarawa Atoll. It was the most fortified of all the Gilbert Islands and had an air base on it. Two regiments of the Army's 27th Infantry Division were to land on Butaritari Island, the largest island of the Makin Atoll, which was north of the Tarawa Atoll.

The mission of both divisions was to capture these atolls so that land-based aircraft from fields on them could wear down enemy positions in the Marshall Islands prior to Operation Flintlock—the invasion of the Marshalls that was to follow Galvanic—and to cooperate with carrier attacks during the initial assault in eliminating Japanese air strength throughout the entire island group. The Army division had very few problems getting ashore on Butaritari Island, but the same was not true of the Marines.

On D + 1 a force of Marines from the huge fleet submarine Nautilus landed on Kenna Island, which was leeward of their intended touchdown point on the Abemama Coral Atoll south of Tarawa. They were members of the V Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company whose mission was to scout the atoll and determine whether the Japanese had shipped in any sizable force at the last moment.

One of the problems that worried the Americans was the tides. They had thought the water would be deep enough for their assault craft, drawing three to four feet of water, to maneuver through the reefs to the shore. But a native boy picked up and questioned by Naval Intelligence officers very shortly before the invasion said they could not navigate their way through.

Minutes after the last air and sea bombardment ended on Betio, the Japanese de-
fenders blasted away at the Marines going ashore in their amphibious tractors from positions that the Marines thought had surely been destroyed. Many of the assault boats became stranded on the reefs, and the Marines were forced to walk ashore. Within seconds, tragedy struck the 2d Marine Division.

Graham's book describes some of the most violent combat that took place during World War II, and especially on the island of Betio, where a promised "cake walk" turned into indescribable horror, suffering, and death. Using personal accounts of many of the men he knew, along with official records, the author takes the reader step-by-step through the five days of hell and heroism that it took the Marines to get ashore and eventually to capture the island.

Using stories that capture the valor and sacrifice on the part of the Marines, this book reminds us of what devotion to duty, as well as to one's fellow soldiers and Marines, is all about. It is also good to remember that however sophisticated the weaponry may be, what happens on the ground is often the ultimate guarantee of victory in a combat situation. This was certainly true on Tarawa, and to a lesser degree on Butaritari. Marines will find this book well worth reading, whether they served in World War II or not. And so will anyone interested in the whole picture of that war.

Death or Glory—primarily through the first-hand accounts of participating soldiers, journalists and others—provides a window through which the reader can see the reality of war in the Crimea a century and a half ago. The Crimean War was unusually harsh and horrible, and it is good to be reminded that war is hell and wears a human face.


The battle between Brigadier General Daniel Morgan's combined Continental-militia American force and Colonel Banastre Tarleton's largely regular British one on 17 January 1781 at the Cowpens, a crossroads in South Carolina, was neither the largest nor the longest battle fought during the Revolution.

Morgan deployed about 1,600 men (suffering between 127 and 148 casualties) while Tarleton sent about 1,250 infantrymen, cavalrymen, and artillerymen against his foe. Tarleton, the loser, left behind some 800 soldiers, dead (100), wounded (200), and prisoners (500). All of this carnage occurred in approximately 40 minutes of actual battle, during what the author, Lawrence E. Babits, claims "was the finest American tactical demonstration of the war."

Babits is an associate professor of maritime history and nautical archaeology at East Carolina University. But don't let his academic title bother you, as it did me when I first read it. Babits served on active duty between November 1963 and March 1966 with Company B, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, thereby getting a good feel for the life of a fighting soldier, both in garrison and in the field.

He then served from 1967 to 1984 as a member of the First Maryland Regiment, a group portraying the Revolutionary War Continental soldier. This experience gave him invaluable background when he undertook to write about a Revolutionary War battle that has not been well presented by previous authors. The Cowpens may have been a smallish battle but one that Babits believes had a tremendous effect on the British Army operating in the Southern colonies and "helped lead to the Yorktown surrender." In my opinion, Babits has produced one of the better battle books I have ever had the pleasure of reading.

Babits believed a new study of the battle, and of the events leading to it, particularly the British approach march and its physical and mental effects on Tarleton's men, was "necessary because...no author used all published sources or attempted to resolve differences of chronology and tactics" while "most recent writers tend to present the southern campaign within a broader context" and Cowpens, therefore, "becomes only a small segment of a campaign."

After a well-written and informative introductory chapter that sets the stage for the battle itself, Babits follows with chapters on battlefield tactics at the small-unit level, including individual weapon employment, organizational pictures of the unit involved (in narrative form, of course), and excellent word pictures of the unit commanders on both sides. Photographs of the top commanders are also included in this chapter.

He follows these with chapters on the events that led to the clash, Morgan's defensive positions and his intentions as to how he would fight the battle, the battle itself as it moved from one American line to another, the cavalry actions, and the aftermath and results. Babits believes the "details of Morgan's tactical plan have not been appreciated because most writers omit discussion of his sophisticated, unconventional, main-
line deployment, as well as the reverse slope defense.”

Babits does all of this in just 161 narrative pages, which includes 19 maps, 6 photographs, and 9 tables and figures. The remaining 70 pages are given over to chapter notes, a detailed bibliography, and a proper index. I should also mention that Babits has made a detailed terrain walk of the battlefield.

Revolutionary War buffs and military historians interested in the actions of men in battle should get a copy of this book. It is not cheap; few university press books, on an initial printing, are ever in that category unless they appear in softcover format. But this book is worth the money.


The seventh volume to appear in the Center of Military History’s comprehensive history of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam War, this is the first volume of the combat histories. By October 1955, the American troop buildup in Vietnam, which had begun 18 months earlier, had reached a point where General William C. Westmoreland believed that the U.S. could move from simply defending South Vietnam to undertaking the offensive initiative. Westmoreland knew that task would not be short or simple. The long war of attrition would test the Army’s capabilities and America’s commitment “to stay the course.” The North Vietnamese also understood the situation and stepped up their infiltration to raise the stakes in the conflict. During this decisive year, combat operations against North Vietnamese main force units increasingly became a central element of the war.

The book begins by describing the challenges that Westmoreland faced in late 1966 as he launched the U.S. offensive, and it discusses the enemy’s strategy to counteract American actions. MacCarriage then traces in extensive detail the military actions in all parts of the country, area by area, unit by unit. His basic sources are the unit records, including command reports, the Operational Reports-Lessons Learned quarterly summaries, unit daily journals and logs, and after-action reports. The author admits that these sources varied greatly in quality. Many are so vague as to be useless. and most were subject to the all-too-common problem in Vietnam of exaggerating achievements and obscuring failures. He also employs numerous oral interviews, both those in the collection of the Center of Military History and the more than 50 that he conducted personally. The solid, readable narrative is supported by 45 color maps, which are invaluable, and by numerous pictures in both black-and-white and color.

The final chapter is a balanced assessment of the accomplishments and failures of the year. Westmoreland was optimistic in November 1967. The achievements, statistically and empirically, were impressive. But success was not uniform throughout the country. Indeed the situation in 1 Corps, which would soon become the focus of the American nation’s attention, was bleak. And the costs of success had been high with 8,237 Americans killed between October 1966 and September 1967, greatly exceeding the 4,737 killed between 1961 and October 1966.

For this reason and others, on the home-front American patience with the war was very thin. Equally important, the great casualties suffered by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese during the year had not damped their resolve or optimism as they prepared to up the ante in confronting the U.S. military in a toe-to-toe struggle. Westmoreland was confident that his strategy would be successful over the long term. But by the end of 1967, the clock was ticking on long-term strategies. In the author’s concluding words, “The U.S. Army in Vietnam was running out of time.”

Although one could wish for a little more critical assessment of the failures of both strategy and tactical operations, this is a very fine book that adds considerably to our detailed knowledge of the fighting of the war. I look forward to the forthcoming combat operations histories.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED


Thunder Along the Mississippi: The River Battles That Split the Confederacy. By Jack D. Coombe. Originally published in 1996. Ban-
We've heard a lot lately about upcoming changes to the force structure. Here at Fort Benning and at Fort Knox we call it the initial combat brigade team, Army Times discussed it in the context of a prototype medium brigade, and as time passes you may hear it referred to in still other terms, depending upon who is talking. Try not to get locked in on a name, but instead pay attention to what the new unit will look like and what we will expect it to do. The bottom line is that—at least to some extent—we will be looking at better ways to do business.

The techniques and skills we used to deploy and fight in the past will have to be re-examined—and if necessary modified—to deal with the adversaries of this decade and beyond. There are several reasons for this. First, the enemy himself is changing. Gone are the static formations and predictable doctrine that we planned—and trained—to engage for the last half of the 20th Century. Instead of the monolithic threat of the Soviet Union and its surrogates, we now see an array of smaller potential adversaries that can collectively stretch our resources. We must be ready to fight one or more of them on short notice, and very likely in built-up areas.

Secondly, we may not have forces stationed close enough to a hotspot when the pot boils over. We will have to get there fast and be prepared to go in fighting if necessary. Once we hit the ground, we may be facing an adversary on a playing field with which he is already familiar. In all probability, he will have already trained and fought over that piece of ground, and will have adapted his tactics, techniques, and equipment to achieve maximum effect on it. We will have to hit him hard, fast, and decisively, and we can do that only if we equip, train, and practice moving our combat power into theater faster than we ever have before.

Finally, we must re-examine the way we move and fight because most of our potential enemies already know how we operate. The advent of the Internet has given everyone—from hobbyists to militia groups to credible adversaries—access to the experience and lessons learned in combat and in training. We need to have a few tricks up our sleeve that no one's seen before, and that's where good, old operational security—remember OPSEC?—comes in. This is the time for initiative and innovative thinking, but share your professional knowledge only on a need to know basis, and let the bad guys learn their lessons the hard way. It's hard to achieve surprise today, but it's something we must learn to do.

So how do we prepare to operate as part of a lighter, more deployable Army? For now, continue to train as we have trained before, but keep your eyes and ears open. We can continue to hone that fighting edge by maintaining proficiency in the basic infantry skills. Our infantry doctrine is sound. We will always be part of the combined arms team. We will still have tanks and Bradleys because there are circumstances under which there will be no substitute for them, but we will also train to shoot, move, and communicate under other conditions as well. Whether we dismount from a Bradley, a light armored vehicle, a Fox, or a dump truck, infantry will still employ the tactics of fire and maneuver that spell success. Trust our leadership to arrive at sound, reasoned decisions; present your input as those decisions are being staffed, and spare no effort in training our soldiers to move swiftly, grapple with and whip the enemy, and return home safely. Sure, change is coming, but change has spelled success for our Army ever since 1775. Remain flexible, stay on top of the latest information, and train to win the next fight. Watch your lane!

RAE

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