Marksmanship and a Rifleman's Lethality

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INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S. Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for the infantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry and infantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerning editorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; e-mail rowanm@benning.army.mil. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. • POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. • USPS Publication No. 370630.

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Commandant’s Note

THE INFANTRY: Training Now, Winning Tomorrow

Returning to Fort Benning is great for all infantrymen, and I am pleased to once again serve at the home of the Infantry. It is here that our weapons, equipment, and concepts are developed and tested; it is both the origin and the repository of our doctrine; and it is where today’s Soldiers and young leaders become imbued with the Warrior Ethos. We are an Army and a nation at war, and Fort Benning’s contribution to the global war on terror is reflected in the aggressive, lethal Soldiers and units and the adaptive, confident leaders who take the fight to the enemy every day.

Our enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan have learned they cannot survive — let alone win — in a direct confrontation against American Army and Marine infantry. They have had to continually modify their tactics. But, we have adapted our own tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) as well, and are beating the enemy on his own turf. Fighting alongside America and her allies are the confident, competent units of the Iraqi Army, well trained and led, who are showing they are prepared to assume an ever-increasing role in the defense of their own nation.

One of my first duties as Chief of Infantry was to host the September 2005 Warfighting Seminar and conduct face-to-face discussions with leaders throughout the force. These warriors have fought the close, personal infantry fight at all levels, and the seminar was a unique chance to get their impressions on Fort Benning’s role in training and equipping the force. We are committed to do our job better, and your input is needed. Direct, candid feedback from the field is our stock in trade, and we will continue to encourage it. Digital communications have made possible real-time information transfer between units and the Infantry School. Results of this exchange can be seen in the flow of information from the field to our doctrine writers and tactics instructors.

The hard-earned experience of infantrymen is passed along to other units in articles published in Infantry Magazine and is reflected in changes to our doctrinal literature and instruction. Their experience with ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), enemy initiatives in information warfare, and the challenges of fighting an enemy attempting to hide in a no longer entirely supportive civilian population are real-world and relevant, and we can share these invaluable lessons with other branches and our sister services. Every Soldier is an infantryman, and we will make sure all Soldiers are prepared to fight as infantry when the need arises.

This month’s issue of Infantry Magazine is focused on marksmanship. We have made considerable progress in the past few years on improving the Army’s marksmanship standards, training enablers, and execution. The Infantry School, as the proponent for individual marksmanship, has been intimately involved in soliciting good ideas from the field Army in incorporating lessons learned from the GWOT. I am extremely proud of the work we have done, especially in Initial Entry Training, in improving our training techniques and in resourcing marksmanship as a key task for all Soldiers in all courses of instruction at Fort Benning. Hopefully, this month’s magazine will inspire our readers to give us their good ideas concerning this important subject.

We look forward to a continuing dialog with you, our customers, in the future.

Fort Benning faces many challenges in the coming years, but one thing is certain, the Infantry Center and School will continue to serve this great nation as she has since October 19, 1918, by training and deploying the world’s best-trained, best-equipped, and best-supported infantrymen. The Infantry has fought in all of America’s wars, has suffered the greatest losses in her defense, and has never let America down. It is up to us to sustain the momentum, support the force, and defeat terrorism.

Follow me!

September-October 2005 INFANTRY 1
Improving Rifle Effectiveness Should Be Priority

I am a retired infantryman and have always believed that shooting proficiency should be a priority. I wrote an article for your magazine that you published back in prehistoric times (1978). I am glad to read in the Commandant’s Notes and elsewhere that marksmanship and small arms proficiency are now a priority for the entire Army. In my experience, small arms proficiency was given lip service until about 1984. Some units trained for it, many did not. After 1984, weapons proficiency started to get more command emphasis; I retired in 1993 so I have no idea what happened since then.

From personal experience, I know that the M16A2 rifle is a far superior rifle to the M16A1 of my day. There must be a good reason that most infantrymen are now armed with the M4. I have read that blended metal 55 grain 5.56 bullets cause severe wounds which knock down or quickly kill the enemy. What I don’t know is this bullet’s ability to penetrate body armor, thin masonry, plywood, car bodies, etc. I have read comments from Army equipment developers and fielding agencies that bullet placement is the critical part of bullet lethality. This is absolutely true. The problem is that fear and fatigue always degrade marksmanship in a firefight. To me, we have two choices to counteract this. The first is to train so much that the rifleman automatically aims for the brain, but this will take weekly shooting exercises which would not be possible given the multitude of unit training tasks. The second is to increase the caliber of the bullet or at least make the current bullet heavier or change its composition. The ideal would be a new round between 6mm-7mm with a 100 grain or so bullet. This keeps all the advantages of the intermediate caliber round. Bear in mind that modern weapons optics make our small arms much more effective at longer ranges. We now can kill or wound people out to 600 meters. We desperately need a round that matches the new potential of our small arms.

Again, improving rifle effectiveness ought to be a very high priority. It is up to the Army and the Marine Corps to solve this.

— Major Paul Conway
U.S. Army, Retired
USAMU CONTINUES SDM CLASSES

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) continues to offer Squad Designated Marksman (SDM) train-the-trainer classes to help Soldiers improve their warfighting marksmanship skills.

During the class, Soldiers are instructed in areas of marksmanship, range estimation, and target detection.

The course is leader training to develop long-range shooting skills, according to Lieutenant Colonel David J. Liwanag, USAMU commander.

“The Squad Designated Marksman Instructor Course offers commanders an excellent tool to train Soldiers in combat and advanced marksmanship techniques,” Liwanag said.

“When they complete the course, trainers will have the ability to identify and train Soldiers in their units to hit targets 500 meters out. Targets at 200 and 300 meters won’t be much of a challenge,” Liwanag continued. “Leaders get hands-on training, range practical application and training materials provided by the Army Marksmanship Unit.”

The award-winning shooters of USAMU’s service-rifle team teach the Squad Designated Marksman Instructor Course. These shooters specialize in firing small arms that are organic to units within the military, including the M-14, bolt-action rifles, and all variations of the M-16 and M-4 at distances up to 1,000 yards.

The course is available to NCOs in team-leader through platoon-sergeant positions, with priority going to Soldiers in deploying units. (E-4s in leadership positions may also be considered.)

Upcoming dates for SDM classes on Fort Benning are:
* January 23-27 * February 6-10

To get a seat in one of the upcoming classes, the unit S3 must send a request via e-mail with the Soldier’s full name, rank, social security number, MOS, unit, and unit point of contact with phone number. The Soldier’s unit must fund the TDY. USAMU will provide the DM rifles and ammunition, but Soldiers must bring the Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight (ACOG) that they will use when deployed.

Units can also request that a mobile training team (MTT) visit their home station to conduct training.

For more information on the Squad Designated Marksman Instructor Course, contact Michael J. Behnke, USAMU chief of competitions, by e-mail at michael.behnke@usarec.army.mil or phone (706) 545-7841.

OPSEC:
Enemy Can Exploit Information From Open Source Media

KRIS GONZALEZ

Operations security (OPSEC) isn’t just a Soldier’s responsibility anymore.

With more Americans using the Internet to communicate, whether by blogging, instant messaging or sending standard e-mails, it’s the responsibility of friends and families of service members to safeguard information that could jeopardize the combat operations and lives of coalition forces abroad.

“The enemy aggressively ‘reads’ our open source and continues to exploit such information for use against our forces,” wrote General Peter Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army, in a recent Army Knowledge Online newsletter. “Some Soldiers continue to post sensitive information to Internet Web sites and blogs (with) photos depicting weapon system vulnerabilities and tactics, techniques and procedures. Such OPSEC violations needlessly place lives at risk and degrade the effectiveness of our operations.”

Robert Burch, a training specialist in Fort Benning’s Quality Assurance Directorate, said he thinks the growing OPSEC problems are a result of the “blast of technology” in the last decade. Everybody uses cell phones and everybody has access to the World Wide Web, he said, but no one is controlling the information flow and security measures fall to the wayside.

... Continued on page 4
Continued from page 3...

“The average Soldier doesn’t think anything of sending pictures to his brother, his mother, his wife,” Burch said. “And the Internet is so impersonal, he may think he’s having a conversation with one person, but he doesn’t realize there are so many servers between the sender and receiver and each one of those servers has the eyes and ears of people listening to the conversation.”

“Every time a message drops to a server, it leaves a trail,” Burch said. “It creates a pipeline for hackers. While you’re chatting, somebody else can read your messages and even download cookies that contain your personal information. People use this method for identity theft. The enemy uses the same techniques used for stealing information to find out where a unit is on the battlefield.

“We have a thinking and adaptive enemy,” said Al Harvey, director of Intelligence and Security for the U.S. Army Infantry Center. “They’re well versed in using information that we think is unclassified and globally known to adapt their tactics and techniques. They will change the way they fight based on the information we give them.”

Harvey said all Soldiers and their family members should keep OPSEC in mind when any of the following issues are discussed via telephone or the Internet: current operations, equipment and personnel vulnerabilities, TTPs, and personal data, like social security numbers and even health insurance information.

(Kris Gonzalez writes for the Bayonet newspaper at Fort Benning.)

ARDEC Lists Stryker Firing Tables — The Stryker Firing Table is now available online. Thanks to the U.S. Army’s Armaments, Research, Development, and Engineering Center’s (ARDEC) Firing and Tables Ballistics Division (FTaB), FT 120-F-1 for the RMS6L Stryker can be downloaded from the FTaB Mortar Tabular Firing Tables AKO page. The tables can be found online at https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/139356.

Center Needs Soldiers’ Ideas — The U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center’s Soldier Innovation Initiative is seeking resourceful equipment ideas from Soldiers who have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.

The goal is to discover successful field ideas, prototype the best ones for further evaluation, and potentially influence the development process to field new or improved equipment.

For more information, visit the center’s Web site at www.natick.army.mil.

Soldiers can also take a survey online to help provide valuable information directly to the engineers and researchers who are responsible for Army products. The survey is available at http://nsn.natick.army.mil/feedback/survey/index.htm.

Drill Sergeants Get Trophy at Next Small Arms Championships — The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit has announced that there will be a new trophy awarded at the 2006 All-Army Small Arms Championships to be conducted in March.

The High Drill Sergeant Trophy will be awarded to the top scoring drill sergeant (active or Reserve component NCO on drill sergeant status) at the All-Army Championships, on the condition that at least 12 drill sergeants compete.

The trophy will be awarded to the drill sergeant with the high cumulative aggregate total of individual M-16 rifle and M-9 pistol scores fired in the All-Army matches. M-16s are fired at distances from 25 to 500 yards and the M-9 pistol is shot from 10 to 25 yards. Shooters fire all matches wearing helmet and load-bearing equipment or vest.

Historically, the high cadet is also recognized as the highest-scoring U.S. Military Academy or ROTC shooter. In 2004, All-Army Cadet Champion Donald Skidmore of Texas Tech University was awarded a Secretary of the Army Trophy M-1 Garand rifle. The cadet award is also conditional on at least 12 cadets shooting in the matches.

For more information on the All-Army Small Arms Championships contact Michael J. Behnke, USAMU chief of competitions, at (706) 545-7841 or michael.behnke@usaac.army.mil. A copy of the U.S. Army Small Arms Championship program/schedule is available on the USAMU Web site at www.usamu.com.

Does Your Helmet Fit? — Surveys from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom have revealed that a significant number of Soldiers are not properly wearing the Personnel Armor System, Ground Troops (PASGT) Helmet (also known as the “Helmet, Ground Troops and Parachutists,” the “K-pot” or the “Kevlar”) or the Advanced Combat Helmet (ACH).

Results of a U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory photo survey indicate that roughly half the Soldiers in the field are wearing the ground combat helmets improperly. In cases where the PASGT or ACH helmets are fitted or worn improperly, the Soldier is exposed to increased risk of injury due to ballistic threats (fragmentation) or concussion. The majority of improperly sized/fitted helmets have been found to be too small.

The Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier Web site lists materials for leaders and Soldiers to help ensure helmets fit properly. For more information, visit www.peosoldier.army.mil
Designed to reflect the ever-changing guerrilla tactics now being waged on the battlefield and instill a warrior-first mentality into the Army’s future leaders, the pilot class of Basic Officer Leadership Course, Phase II, graduated August 25 at Fort Benning.

Phase I of BOLC focuses on the basic skills and knowledge necessary for officer leadership. BOLC II is a seven-week, initial-entry, branch-immaterial course in small-unit leadership and tactics.

All new officers receive the same training and instruction for BOLC II regardless if the commissioning comes from the U.S. Military Academy, Officer Candidate Schools or the Reserve Officers Training Corps. From here, the 173 young leaders will go on to BOLC III where they will learn their branch-specific tactics and techniques.

Following one more pilot course at Fort Benning next January, officials said Fort Benning and Fort Sill will begin training all new lieutenants in June.

"I’m into small-unit leadership, getting these leaders ready and developed to go," said Lieutenant General Robert Van Antwerp, commanding general of the U.S. Army Accessions Command.

"I have a son in Mosul right now, and he’ll tell you it’s small-unit leadership. It’s the buck sergeants, the staff sergeants, it’s the young lieutenants who are taking this war on," he said.

"When I went through officer basic in 1972, we hardly went to the field at all. We never operated in anything that looked like a forward operating base," said Van Antwerp, who trained as an Army engineer.

Devised more as a basic framework than a rigid course, the Training and Doctrine Command structured BOLC II as the common core of the Army, gearing future leaders toward the mission and goals of the Warrior Ethos before releasing them to their branch specific training.

"We’re giving them applicable training for today’s contemporary operational environment," said Major Kevin Elder, commander of A Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment.

“You’re looking at the future platoon, company, battalion, and division commanders,” he said. “They get this core warrior training, a core knowledge base that they’ll all have to use to deal with any situation that arises on the battlefield.”

Although Fort Benning is the home of the Infantry and the training focuses on the techniques and tactics taught to Soldiers here every day, the idea of teaching every Army officer core battle skills is relatively new.

“If you were an Infantry Soldier (in 1972), you might’ve done something similar to this when you went through basic in yesteryear,” Van Antwerp said.

“What we’re trying to do is make sure everyone has an underpinning of being a warrior first, being able to engage a target, read a map, conduct a convoy. It’s a lot different, and it’s different for the best,” he said.

(Donna Hyatt writes for the Bayonet newspaper at Fort Benning.)
U.S. Army Family Life Training Graduates Seven

We are a nation and an Army at war, and most Americans today find themselves touched in varying degrees by the ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other hot spots around the world. Army families have long stoically borne the stresses associated with wartime and peacetime separation, but the emotional and marital costs have been high, and in some cases too high, for our Soldiers and their dependents to deal with effectively on their own. For the past decade, Army Chaplains at Fort Benning and Fort Hood have been at the forefront of an initiative to support those on the home front, and to assist our returning warriors in the resumption of their lives. Fort Benning’s Family Life Training Program for chaplains and a similar program at Fort Hood, Texas, train comparable numbers of chaplains each year, and in the 10-year life of the program have sent forth approximately 120 chaplains to meet the needs of America’s service members and their families.

On August 4, the U.S. Army Chaplain Family Life Training Program welcomed seven members into the ranks of those Chaplains who will join Army and Air Force units from Alaska to Italy, and from Louisiana to Germany. In ceremonies at the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC) Chapel, Chaplain (LTC) Thomas C. Waynick, director of the program, hailed this initiative as a tremendous service, and described how it meets the needs of our warriors and their families. Each of the graduates was awarded a master’s degree in community counseling.

Chaplain (MAJ) Jeffrey D. Hawkins, himself a Fort Benning Family Life Chaplain, pointed out that the need for family life chaplains has never been greater than it is today, when America is at war, family members are deployed around the globe, and the moral foundations of our nation are being challenged from many sides. Hawkins cautioned the graduates that they may sometimes face limited support, even less recognition, and experience frustration, but that they are touching lives and are truly making a difference.

The guest speaker, Chaplain (LTC) Glenn S. Davis, USAIC Command Chaplain and a former Armor officer, had recently served at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains and had been involved in the selection of chaplains for this program. He summarized the intent and requirements of the program which the seven graduates had successfully completed. The 15-month program of study and hands-on instruction included theological integration, demanding academic requirements, and enhancement of therapeutic skills. The participants also completed a total of 3,200 hours of clinical work in addition to their classroom instruction and research projects.

The members of the graduating class of 2005 and their next duty stations are:

- Chaplain (MAJ) Tammie Crews — Fort Irwin, California
- Chaplain (MAJ) Juan Crockett — Germany
- Chaplain (MAJ) Rodie Lamb — Fort Lewis, Washington
- Chaplain (MAJ) Shon Neyland — Italy
- Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry Sieg — Fort Richardson, Alaska
- Chaplain (MAJ) David Spears — Fort Wainwright, Alaska
- Chaplain (MAJ) Jimmy Ward — Fort Polk, Louisiana

Pictured from left to right are: (front row) Chaplain (MAJ) Jimmie Ward, Chaplain (LTC) Thomas C. Waynick, Chaplain (MAJ) Tammie Crews, Chaplain (MAJ) Shon Neyland, Chaplain (MAJ) Juan Crockett, (back row) Chaplain (MAJ) David Spears, Chaplain (MAJ) Rodie Lamb, and Chaplain (MAJ) Jerry Sieg.

Army Continues New HMMWV Upgrades

The Army is responding to Soldiers’ requests for new equipment to enhance combat operations and increase safety by installing five upgrades to HMMWVs at forward repair sites in Southwest Asia.

Pentagon officials quickly approved adding: a fire suppression system, improved seat restraints, an intercom system, a gunner’s restraint, and single movement door locks for all HMMWVs in Iraq.

Initially, the upgrades will be installed in HMMWVs, but the Army is adapting some of the new equipment to other medium and heavy tactical vehicles.

Adding intercom systems to tactical vehicles with turret gun mounts will improve Soldiers’ ability to communicate when under fire, officials said.

The entire tactical fleet will receive the fire suppression system. New gunner restraints will be installed on all vehicles with gun-mounted turrets, and most tactical vehicles will receive the new seat restraints.

“These safety initiatives are being implemented to enhance protection and increase survivability for our soldiers,” said Chuck Wentworth, the program manager for tactical wheeled vehicle’s liaison office for Southwest Asia.

As more sets of the safety upgrades are received in theater, technical teams from the U.S. Army’s Tank-automotive and Armaments Command will travel to installation sites throughout the theater to train installers and provide technical expertise on these much needed safety improvements for Soldiers in the field.

Vehicles undergoing repairs or receiving up-armor will automatically receive the new safety upgrades, said Colonel Charles Wilson, commander of the Army Materiel Command’s Field Support Brigade, Southwest Asia.

(Chuck Sprague is AMC’s AFSB-SWA public affairs officer at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.)
The Stryker is filling the Army’s need for a rapidly deployable force to improve the deployability and operational effectiveness of rapid response/early entry forces. This calls for organizing and equipping forces to provide high mobility (strategic, operational, and tactical) yet retain the capability to achieve decisive action through close combat centered primarily on dismounted infantry assault. The U.S. Army requires this force to be equipped with integral capabilities for the successful conduct of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations as well as the ability to fight as part of a larger formation. This force must be capable of being projected anywhere on the globe and be capable of conducting operations immediately upon arrival, in order to dominate and/or defeat the threat. It must also be capable of effective operations in a major theater of war environment with appropriate augmentation.

The Stryker M151 Remote Weapon System (RWS) provides a multifunctional system that can employ a suite of weapons to include the M2 .50 cal machine gun (MG), and MK-19 40mm automatic grenade launcher. The Stryker RWS is a completely integrated system that will accommodate future lethality capabilities and be capable of firing on the move and from static positions.

The M151 RWS is employed on the following variations in the current Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) formation:

- Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) — 127 per SBCT,
- Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV) — 9 per SBCT,
- Command Vehicle (CV) — 16 per SBCT, and
- Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV) — 3 per SBCT.

The core fighting unit within the SBCT that is capable of conducting full range of military operations is the SBCT infantry company. The infantry platoons and squads are the primary means of finishing decisively in the close fight.

The SBCT infantry platoon is currently equipped with .50 cal MGs, MK-19s, and has an organic, light, highly lethal anti-armor capability in the Javelin. While the .50 cal MG and MK-19 can be fired from the M151 Remote Weapon System, the missile currently can only be fired in the dismounted mode. The multifunctional RWS enables mounted and dismounted engagement options. SBCT infantry platoons will face a wide range of threats, to include main battle tanks and light armored vehicles with enhanced reactive armor, and fortified positions including bunkers and buildings.
Further, the M151 RWS accommodates future lethality capabilities and permits the platoon to fire from static positions and on the move. This will allow tactical flexibility during the execution of full range of military operations.

The on-the-move capability is a preplanned product improvement that will be demonstrated 2nd QTR (FY 06) and will be fielded by SBCT 6 (FY 07).

The Accelerated Evolution of the M151 Remote Weapon System (RWS):

2000 — Stryker SBCT requests a remote weapon station for a number of vehicle applications. The KONGSBERG Protector solution is selected in October 2000. (Kongsberg is the Company that makes the RWS, and Protector is the commercial name for the M151 Remote Weapon System).

2001 — The Norwegian Army uses the Protector mounted on M113s for mine clearing in Afghanistan, and Kongsberg is contracted to supply the RWS.

— The first EDU (Engineering Development Unit) was delivered to GM Defense in October. The first six units to be mounted on vehicles were delivered in December the same year.

2003 — Strykers equipped with Protectors are deployed to Iraq.

— The Javelin anti-tank missile, in cooperation between KONGSBERG and AMRDEC (Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center), is successfully fired from the RWS while both stationary and on the move.

2004 — Block 1 Upgrade is ordered. (See Block 1 upgrade section for more information.) Block 1 is currently in production and will be introduced on Stryker Brigade 5 and will be a retrofitted to all existing Protectors delivered to Stryker.

— The Australian Army selects the Protector as an upgrade for their Type 2 ASLAV (8x8) vehicles under a rapid acquisition program for Iraqi Freedom. The first 40 units which are similar to those operational with Stryker BCT are operational in Iraq by September.

— Advanced Crew Served Weapon (ACSW) with 12.7mm is demonstrated on hard-stand in Burlington, VT.

Given its likely operational environment, the SBCT achieves decisive action by means of combined arms dismounted assault at the company level, supported by direct fires from organic weapon systems (M151 RWS, ICV crew-served weapons, MGs, anti-tank systems, and snipers) integrated with indirect fires from artillery, mortars, and joint fires/effects. Although dismounted actions will be the primary means of achieving decision, the high mobility of the SBCTs and its network-based integrated capabilities also allow some immediate actions to be taken without dismounting, enhancing survivability and force effectiveness.

The M151 Remote Weapon System provides overwatch for the rifle platoon and enhances lethality and survivability without additional manpower and with minor equipment modifications.

Figure 1 — SBCT Platoon

Figure 2 — Remote Weapon System
— Protector Lite is presented. This version of the Protector is optimized for low weight and signature and suitable for low recoil weapons such as M240, M249, AC5W, etc.

— The Finnish Army has ordered the Protector for their new Patria AMV (8x8) vehicle.

— Production unit #1000 of Protector is delivered.

— Block II upgrade is planned for production to SBCT 6. (see Block II upgrade section for more information)

— ACSW with 25mm Air Burst capability will be demonstrated on a M151 Remote Weapon System from a Stryker vehicle.

To Date — Approximately 200 systems fielded with SBCTs and other Operation Iraqi Freedom units, have been in theater for two unit rotations and gained more than 1 million hours with a high level of reliability and effectiveness.

M151E1 (Block I) Changes to the Protector Remote Weapon Station

■ New Thermal Imaging Module (TIM) which more than triples the ID range of the original thermal camera and provides two optical fields of view and two electronic fields of view. This improvement leverages the current technology in the Heavy Thermal Weapon Sight program.

■ Integrates the new Small Tactical Optical Rifle Mounted (STORM) Laser Range Finder providing the operator with increased response time and visible and IR pointers to coordinate engagements with ground troops. This system is common with Land Warrior Units and directly interchangeable.

■ Modified Video Imaging Module (VIM) includes a color display which allows for improved situational awareness and coordination with ground troops.

■ Larger ammo can with a low ammo sensor provides longer engagement times between reloads and the low ammo sensor provides a warning when ammunition is getting low.

■ Enhanced Control Grip provides the gunner improved accessibility and easier operation.

M151E2 (Block II) Changes to the Protector Weapon Station

■ Capability to engage targets while moving at speeds of up to 25 mph over various terrains.

■ Increased slew rate which will improve engagement times and provide “hooks” for future enhancements that will leverage sensors and provide automatic slew to target on demand.

The M151 Remote Weapon System future considerations

■ Integrated Javelin capability;

■ Future armament upgrades such as the Advanced Crews Served Weapon;

■ Acoustic and IR sensors to detect and slew to threats; and

■ Far target designation — will lase a target and determine target location (grid coordinates) for hand off to other resources for engagement or situational awareness.

Captain Kevin Cline is currently serving as the assistant TRADOC Systems Manager - Stryker Bradley at Fort Benning. He is a 1997 graduate of the Citadel. CPT Cline has served as an armor platoon leader and staff officer for the 1st Cavalry Division with a tour in Bosnia. He has also served as a company commander and staff officer with the 1st Armored Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Making a Case for the Military Shotgun

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR ROBERT BRIZEE, U.S. ARMY, RETIRED

Our deployed Soldiers have engaged in almost continuous combat operations during their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many of these combat operations have been conducted in urban, “house-to-house” environments. Long gone are the days of entrenched Soldiers exchanging volley rifle fire across several hundred meters of open ground. Today’s Soldiers often face an enemy that appears from behind a vehicle or in a window opening just long enough to fire an automatic weapon or rocket-propelled grenade. The majority of our regular forces face this enemy with one of several versions of the issue M16A2 rifle with which they have zeroed and qualified. The M16 family is a proven series of weapons, but in my opinion our Soldiers are not armed as efficiently as they could be for some close-quarters operations in urban environments. This article will introduce the 12-gauge military riot shotgun as a valuable supplemental weapon for close-quarters urban combat.

The military rifle, carbine (the M4 for example), and the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon are all designed to accomplish offensive and defensive tasks in a variety of situations and terrain. As such, they cannot be perfectly suited to every possible task. The military shotgun, however, is much better suited to urban patrol, checkpoints, and guard mission confrontations that are quite often defensive in nature. Outside of the Special Operations community, the shotgun is rarely used in the offense. The military shotgun has several characteristics that make it the right choice for guard and urban patrol operations. These characteristics include high first round hit probability, reliable lethality within likely engagement range, simple and safe operation, ballistic versatility and high visibility and deterrent value. NOTE: These observations pertain to the military shotgun as a stand alone weapon.

The new Lightweight Shotgun System (LSS) suspended underneath an M4 carbine should be considered a specialized breaching tool. The LSS does not share many of the positive attributes of the conventional military shotgun and in my opinion has yet to prove its worth.

Combat shotgun marksmanship involves simpler skills than those required for the high speed aerial targets of trap, skeet, and sporting clays. The military shotgun is simply pointed from the shoulder, underarm or hip, held firmly, and fired. The high first round hit probability is due in part to the multiple projectiles available in a single round of shotgun ammunition. The projectiles, known as “shot,” are available in many sizes from quite small to well over a quarter-inch in diameter. The bore of the military shotgun
barrel is much less constricted or “choked” than that of civilian sporting shotgun barrels. This openness of choke contributes to the spreading pattern of multiple projectiles. Within combat shotgun distances, arms reach to approximately 30 meters, the average Soldier who keeps his or her eyes open is highly likely to achieve first round hits on a stationary or moving human target. Most military shotguns feature nonadjustable bead sights that are not zeroed to an individual. A given shotgun can therefore be fired with equal effectiveness by multiple Soldiers without concern for the last firer’s “zero.” The latest military shotguns feature an adjustable “ghost-ring” type aperture and post sights. Shotguns equipped with these sights and zeroed initially with the issue ammunition will also shoot to the same point of impact for a variety of firers. A company-size unit could arm their patrols from a pool of shotguns issued as required. Shotguns require only a few rounds of familiarization fire rather than a full qualification. A shotgun familiarization course of fire is easily accomplished on any 25-meter range with full-sized silhouette targets such as the paper M9 pistol target. The short barreled, straight-stocked military pump shotgun when fired with full powered, multiple lead projectile ammunition does offer more significant recoil than the M16A2 or M4 firing ball ammunition. The newest military self-loading shotguns such as the M9200 and the M1014 offer reduced but still noticeable recoil. However, recoil management skills can be easily taught and practiced during the familiarization course of fire.

The military shotgun is safe and simple to operate. With a few exceptions, the majority of U.S. military shotguns for the last 100 years have been slide or pump operated. For those unfamiliar with the slide action shotgun, its operation is similar to that of a trombone. The pump handle doubles as a forward hand grip that surrounds a tubular magazine underneath the barrel. Pulling the hand grip smartly and fully to the rear brings a live round out of the magazine tube, extracts and ejects any round in the chamber, and cocks an internal hammer. Pushing the hand grip fully forward chambers the new round and locks the action closed, ready to fire. The safety may remain in the “ON” (safe) position throughout this process. From port arms or from a firing position, the shotgun with an empty chamber and ammunition in the magazine tube can be made ready to fire in approximately two seconds. The M16A2/M4 weapons with an empty chamber and loaded magazine inserted may be charged as quickly.

However, one hand must be removed from a firing grip to operate the charging handle. With the pump shotgun, both hands maintain a proper firing grip on the weapon throughout the charging process. The newest issue self-loading shotguns are also quite fast and easy to manipulate but require one hand to operate a bolt handle or release the bolt to chamber a live round. Of course, any of these weapons would likely be carried with a round already chambered in a combat environment.

The military pump shotgun features a simple, sturdy design and manual operation that is not dependent upon the performance of the ammunition to function. In the unlikely event of a misfired round, the pump action required to clear a malfunction is the same action required to operate the weapon normally. The malfunction clearing procedure known as “Immediate Action” is therefore easy to teach and learn. The military pump shotgun is a very reliable weapon since it is manually operated. The mechanism is uncomplicated and easy to disassemble quickly for field cleaning. The large diameter shotgun bore does not hold water by capillary action as does a smaller diameter rifle bore. The newest self-loading military shotguns are also quite reliable but remain dependent upon serviceable ammunition as do any other self-loading weapons. The loaded military shotgun averages a few ounces lighter in weight than the loaded M16A2. The exterior of the pump shotgun is relatively free of projections. The only controls other than the trigger are the safety button and a disconnecter button that allows unlocking of the bolt and safe “unchambering” of a live round. Some issue shotguns feature a magazine cutoff button. When activated, the magazine cutoff holds ammunition in the magazine tube while other type ammunition can be manually loaded, fired, and ejected. All controls are within easy reach of the firing hand. Military pump shotguns as well as the M9200 and M1014 self-loaders are devoid of any recoil system in the stock. As such, they can be adapted to special purposes and made more portable with the addition of a folding stock or pistol grip. There are commercial adapters available that allow the fitting of an M4-type telescoping buttstock on the military Mossberg M500/M590 shotguns as well as the military Remington M870. The streamlined exterior and reasonable weight of the shotgun make it a weapon that can be carried during a patrol or guard shift with minimal fatigue and manipulated quickly when needed, even with gloved hands. This
is not to imply that the shotgun is in every way superior to other weapons. For example, the modern M16A2/M4 magazine carries at least 30 rounds of ammunition while the military shotgun carries nine rounds at best. The shotgun magazine tube is also slower to reload because it is not readily detachable. It must itself be reloaded while installed on the shotgun. The most obvious disadvantage of the military shotgun is its limited effective range.

Careful consideration should always be given to any ammunition issued to our Soldiers. The long range and potential penetration of a poorly aimed or accidentally fired round of rifle ammunition can have catastrophic consequences in populated urban combat environments. Excessive range and penetration are not a problem with conventional shotgun ammunition. Shotgun projectiles are usually spherically shaped and made of soft, unjacketed lead. The round lead shot possesses inefficient ballistics and will not travel with the velocity, range or flat trajectory of jacketed military rifle ammunition. Shotgun pellets usually deform and lose energy quickly upon impact with any hard surface. They are much less likely to ricochet for that reason. Stopping an enemy or a dangerous intruder to a guarded area does not necessarily require killing the individual. It may at times be desirable to capture enemy combatants for interrogation. Nonlethal projectile technology has existed in shotgun ammunition for several years. A full powered round of 12-gauge ammunition loaded with a small number of .30 caliber rubber balls or one large rubber projectile will still incapacitate an attacker. The nonlethal ammunition represents an even lower threat to nearby citizens while still maintaining the energy to take the fight out of an attacker at reasonable combat shotgun distances. The most modern military shotguns accept the complete range of this and other special purpose ammunition without a stutter. The magazine cutoff can be used to hold full powered rounds in reserve while special purpose ammunition may be loaded singly, fired and ejected. Modern shotgun ammunition with a high metal base and plastic hull is much more reliable and waterproof than earlier ammunition. The all brass shotgun shell of World Wars I and II would grow verdigris once exposed to moisture. The verdigris would collect dust and cause chambering and extraction failures. The commercial-type paper shotgun shells of the same era would swell with moisture making chambering difficult and allow contamination of the powder charge.

Although the military shotgun enables the trained Soldier to effectively defend against a close-quarters attack, not being attacked in the first place is desirable. The presence of the shotgun on guard or patrol can be a significant deterrent to a violent threat. American police have long since learned that even an enraged attacker will think twice before confronting someone armed with a riot shotgun. The deterrent value to an attacker comes from facing the .72caliber/12-gauge bore with the realization of the devastating wounding potential of a single round of full powered ammunition. It is likely that terrorist threats against our Soldiers on patrols and at checkpoints are preceded by clandestine observation of the readiness posture of our forces. The adoption of shotguns at checkpoints and on patrols would be immediately noticed and interpreted as readiness to engage a threat.

This article did not intend to address all the possible administrative, tactical and logistical issues regarding the selection of weapons for our Soldiers in the arena. The objective was to introduce the many attributes of the military shotgun and to perhaps stimulate further professional discussion of the subject.

Command Sergeant Major Robert “Bob” Brizee, U.S. Army, Retired, spent more than 27 years on active Army service in numerous weapons maintenance, logistics and leadership positions. His assignments include several years as a gunsmith with the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit on Fort Benning and the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. Brizee’s other duty stations include four years in Panama as a small arms repairman and 11 years in Germany as a first sergeant and command sergeant major. He is a graduate of the Sergeants Major Academy and has attended numerous military and civilian armorer’s courses including Heckler & Koch, Smith & Wesson, Glock, Ruger, Feinwerkbau and Hammerli.

Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, prepare to enter a building in Baghdad where insurgents are believed to be hiding.
Recent after action reviews (AARs) and the results of post-combat surveys conducted by the Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Infantry Center, attest to the applied effectiveness and lethality of small arms combat optics in general, and the effectiveness of designated marksmen (DM) during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF).

The Close Fight

The M68 Close Combat Optic (CCO) is the most prolific individual weapon optic that has been fielded in-depth across Infantry formations and now to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) organizations on the brigade and below battlefield. The fundamental advantage of the CCO is rapid, simplified sighting. The CCO’s simple red-dot-on-target replaces the iron sight’s more complex front-sight-on-target and rear-sight alignment procedure, as well as the iron sight’s requirement for consistent, cheek-to-stock placement. Like iron sights, the CCO has no magnification, but the CCO’s parallax-free, unlimited eye relief allows for greater flexibility with cheek-to-stock placement and enables aimed or reflexive fire with a both-eyes-open field of view, thus contributing to improved situational awareness/target acquisition and effective multi-shot/multi-target engagements. The CCO’s lack of magnification, however, limits its utility across all battlefield applications.

The Mid-to-Long Range Fight

The limitations regarding the CCO are primarily associated with rapidly changing operational scenarios with associated multiple target profiles and, at times, engagement distances beyond 300 meters. Target engagements beyond 300 meters with the CCO require the shooter to estimate range and apply an estimated hold-off/hold-over point of aim to effect target hit. Optics with magnification (which may include range estimating reticles) significantly enhance the shooter’s capability to detect, recognize, and engage targets at longer ranges. Additionally, small profile targets such as bunker apertures, sniper loopholes, prone targets and targets that are partially covered or concealed at mid-range distances may also be engaged with a greater probability of hit with the aid of magnified optics. The most common (optic dependant) downsides to using magnified optics include restricted field of view, limited eye relief, and associated one eye vs. two eyes open aiming issues.

Current Small Arms Optics and Designated Marksman Initiatives

Historically (Civil War to present), American combat units as well as individual Soldiers have long recognized the lethal capabilities that magnified optics bring to the fight, and OEF/OIF is no exception. Primarily associated with the designated marksman concept, the Army (Brigade Combat Teams and other tactical Army organizations) has fielded and/or is in the process of procuring an array of optic applications and multi-combination “solutions” that include, but are not limited to the following: variable power scopes bought from local gun shops mounted on M4s and M16s; M14s with variable powered scopes and/or with Advanced Combat Optical Gunsights (ACOGs); match-grade M16A4 conversions; and match-grade M14 conversions; as well as several different optics and accessories issued via the Army’s Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI). Additionally, the use of both 5.56 M855 (green tip) and/or 5.56 M193 262 match-grade ammunition is in use. Designated marksman training has been conducted via mobile training teams (MTTs), new equipment training teams (NETTs), division schools, Sniper School and the U.S. Army Airman First Class Anthony Nelson, Jr., USAF

Private First Class Keith Carter from the 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment scans for enemy activity during an exercise in Alaska.
Marksmanship Unit (USAMU). Based on AARs and post-combat surveys, as well as Department of the Army involvement to address and fund optics and weapon-related Urgent Requirements (UR), Operational Need Statements (ONS), and RFI initiatives, a need was identified to develop a comprehensive (DOTLMPF — doctrine, organization, training, leadership & education, material, personnel and facilities) U.S. Army Infantry Center strategy/path-ahead regarding designated marksman capability requirements.

The DOTLMPF Review

An integrated concept team (ICT) consisting of Infantry School/Center staff representatives was established to formalize a comprehensive DOTLMPF strategy/path-ahead regarding DM application to infantry formations as well as the potential integration of DM capabilities across all Army units.

Soldier Performance and Weapon’s Technical Capabilities

The U.S. Army Soldier Battle Lab (SBL) conducted a DM experiment to provide supporting data and analysis for DOTLMPF refinement. Experiment Soldiers/shooters were provided by 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and technical, instrumented shooting/shooting data was provided by USAMU. During the experiment (after DM training), Soldiers provided with an M4 or M16A4 with ACOG, and bipod and standard M855 “Green Tip” ammunition, were able to achieve a cumulative .50 probability of hit or higher out to 600 meters. Current standard weapons and ammunition provide the technical capability for 600 meters engagements. However, training/trigger time remains the linchpin factor when it comes to exploiting the technology and improving the Soldier’s accuracy/lethality.

Soldiers also fired USAMU modified (accurized) M16A4s equipped with ACOGs and with match-grade Mk 262 ammunition. The experiment results indicate that the modified weapons were technically more accurate with match-grade ammunition, and that shooter performance was improved, particularly at the longest range targets. It should be noted that the experiment results also indicated that both the standard M16A4 and M4 were more accurate than the USAMU-modified M16A4 when all weapons fired standard M855 ammunition. Finally, the DM experiment included standard 7.62mm M14 rifles enhanced with an ACOG and bipod. The M14 was the least effective weapon in all categories that included overall Soldier preference, technical accuracy (USAMU fired) and hit probability (1-30 IN fired) from close quarter battle (CQB) distances to 600 meters.

The pictured targets (Figure 1) provide a visual context regarding the technical capabilities of both accurized (left target) and current standard (right target) 5.56mm weapons and ammunition and further reflect the direction of Small Arms Division, Combat Development initiatives for the improvement of Army individual weapons.
and ammunition capabilities.

**DOTLMPF Recommendations**

The complete DOTLMPF review and recommendations is on file at Small Arms Division/DCD. The summary below provides an outline of the materiel aspects of the DOTLMPF review recommendations and Small Arms Division initiatives.

**Immediate**
- Riflemen/DMs employ squad-common M4 carbine or M16A4 rifle and investigate a polished “drop-in” trigger modification to M4/M16.
- Current M855 ammunition exceeds MilSpec minimum. Issue Mk262 match-grade ammunition if available.
- Continue ACOG and accessories fielding via RFI.

**Near-Term**
- Pursue an ACOG-like capability via the “Spiral Integration” initiative and Magnified Combat Optic (MCO) Soldier Enhancement Program (SEP) and investigate potential application of DM-type capabilities to other-than-Infantry combat, CS, and CSS force structure. The MCO requirement document (in staffing) reflects a basis of issue that includes C, CS and CSS formations.

**Objective**

The Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW) family of weapons systems includes an accurized DM (by design) variant with optics/fire control and accessories.

**Summary**

Small Arms Division’s individual weapons, optics, and ammunition initiatives reflect long range objectives analysis, as well as an institutional recognition and response to post-combat surveys, to AARs, and to initiatives already developed by combat forces during CONUS training and proven effective against threat forces during OIF/OEF. The USAIC path-ahead strategy provides for a basis of issue to current and future combat, combat support, and combat service support formations to enhance lethality across the force.

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**Major Charles Pavlick, U.S. Army, Retired,** was commissioned through OCS. His active duty tours include serving with 5th Special Forces; 1-52nd Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division; 501st Military Intelligence, the Infantry (Test) Board and Infantry Combat Developments. He currently is contracted as a project officer for the Small Arms Division, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAIC.
PARAGRAPH V IN A NETWORK CENTRIC ENVIRONMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON OPERATIONS

CAPTAIN ROB THORNTON

Saber 5: “SSC (Signal Support Cell), are you telling me the commander can’t run a VTC (video teleconference) right now with his battalion commanders?”

Saber 61: “No sir, I’m telling you that at this point if the commander has a VTC it will seriously impact ongoing operations.”

Saber 5: “Oh, you are telling me I can have whatever I want, just not all of it at the same time. When is the next good window and what are my options?”

The above dialogue is not meant to humble maneuver to the signal community, rather it points to the price of enabling distributed operations through a network enabled force. Bottom line is that a “Commander Centric/Network Enabled Force” implies building and maintaining/managing a network that supports it. This article deals with the impacts on staff mission analysis, through all phases of the operation with their branches and sequels, in the context of impacts on the other BOS (battlefield operating systems). The end product should be a Paragraph V or annex in the operations order or operations plan that provides a 70-percent solution before crossing the line of departure (LD). The 70 percent can then be updated with a running estimate that changes in accordance with the conditions. The target audience for this article is not the signal community, but the maneuver community to help account for the constraints and limitations on the battlefield and aid in planning that mitigates risk to maneuver forces.

What is the NCIE, and “So What”? Much like understanding logistics, understanding C4 (command, control, communications, and computers) is not a favorite topic amongst most maneuver folks, but there once was a WWII leader whose remarks on logistics is very applicable. I’ll paraphrase: He said, “I don’t know what this logistics stuff is, but I want some more of it!” In a simpler time, Paragraph V could be boiled down to location of the commander, succession of command, and current CEOI (communications-electronics operating instructions) in effect. With the NCIE (network centric information environment), the importance of Paragraph V and its impact on maneuver takes on a whole new importance, and is a critical enabling event on par with synchronizing fire support or maintaining LOCs (lines of communication) for sustainment.

The emphasis comes with the trades made on other elements of combat power such as information superiority (C2 capability) vs. heavy armor (tied to protection) and large stocks of class V (tied to fire power) in order to create a more responsive and agile force to meet the demand of the contemporary and future operating environments. Information technologies, combined with a higher density of sensors (includes manned and unmanned systems), allow for the “See First” capability (collectively displayed on a screen to the unit), facilitate the “Understand First” and “Act First” capabilities (by enabling us to better communicate and share information and send/receive orders), and finally to “Finish Decisively” (by maintaining information and assessing the effects we’ve employed). This means that a networked force can be assigned a larger battle space, with greater responsibilities and span of control. This is in effect what we are doing with the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), networked modular BCTs and in the future, the Future Combat System Unit of Action (FCS UA).

The resourcing of these technologies implies that we will do more with less. Doing more with less requires greater emphasis on command and control capabilities to manage limited resources. Digital and analog C4 allows staffs to resource and synchronize assets in order to fulfill the commander’s intent and endstate. A large part of this is setting the conditions that account for uninterrupted information superiority throughout the operation. With the competing demands on bandwidth by a myriad of platforms, payloads and leaders, there is a requirement to manage the information (Information Management) to insure that the right information and people have priority when they need it (Information Assurance).

This is not a Future Force problem, but as more sensors and better C4 technologies are filtered into the battlefield at increasingly lower tactical levels, this problem becomes exponential and requires planners to examine BOS impacts and make tough decisions and recommendations about what to use.
where and when. It is a current problem that will be exacerbated with spinout technologies.

Consider how the impact spinout technologies are going to have on the battlefield. Spinout 1 in Fiscal Year 2007 is going to bring increased sensor and battle command capabilities. Intelligent munitions will be able to feed digital information back to the tactical levels. Unattended ground sensors (UGS) will allow for commanders to use economy of force and shape their battlespace better than before. Improvements in the battle command systems means new hardware and software that, like improvements in PC desktop applications, will require more RAM, better microchips and bigger files that relay more information at a single glance. We’ll have visibility at lower levels (in many cases down to Soldier, platform, and payload), and be able to receive diagnostics as to their condition. Spinout 2 in 2010 provides upgrades in all the prior mentioned systems, plus unmanned systems (UMS) that will proliferate the battlefield at the lower tactical levels. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) which currently offer fairly basic sensor payloads will be more technologically mature and offer more options to the platoon, company/troop, battalion/squadron and BCT. Each tactical echelon will have platforms and payloads to meet its ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance) needs. While this is an incredible capability, it is also a draw on bandwidth across all the BOS. These technologies and their use have to be considered by the staff as they allocate resources and develop a concept of the operation.

**Network Centric Culture: Some Philosophical Differences**

Although it is easier to consider a common operating picture (COP) as the graphic layers resident on a computer screen which portray friendly and enemy forces in a battle space organized by imagery and graphic control measures (GCMs), a COP is really a common understanding of the battlefield in both space and time. Commanders can share a COP over a radio conversation or a chat room, or even silently granted they share a common perspective about what they are seeing or hearing. People with common experiences tend to view things more similarly then people with uncommon experiences. Likewise, people who have known each other for a while have an intuitive knowledge of the actions and reactions the other person might have in certain circumstances. The Graphic User Interface (GUI) or the hardware and software providing the visual situational awareness (SA) of blue and red icons is better thought of as a COP enabler.

**The Network: Build It, Bring It, Borrow It, Beg It, or Steal It**

Here, the assumptions are that the joint task force (JTF) commander will apportion bandwidth to subordinate units; and that at least some degree of network coverage will be in place using joint assets. The initial coverage might come from or a combination of: satellites, high altitude airships, joint aircraft with communications relay packages (CRP) payloads, naval surface platforms or subsurface platforms with CRP payloads employed above sea level, or other joint, interagency or multinational assets. As operational lines are extended to accommodate an inland campaign plan, the conditions that allow the information centric force to maintain information superiority must be established.

There are roughly five ways to do this, or any combination thereof that best conforms to the conditions of METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available, civilians). Building a network through range extension might involve:

- Space operations and the required coverage of satellites and near space platforms (NSPs);
- The establishment of a UAS restricted operating zone (ROZ) with a CRP over cleared airspace;
- Doing a terrain analysis for LOS communications then infiltrating manned and unmanned ground assets to extend your network; or
- It could be the emplacement of UGS or intelligent munitions system (IMS) by long range fires that by their presence thicken the network.

Building a network requires forward planning and the committal of limited resources. By default it could also limit future options by committing those resources to accommodate a chosen scheme of maneuver.

Bringing your own network means that every platform in your unit that is supporting your scheme of maneuver from your frontline trace to your rear trace is thickening your network. It can be thought of as a moving bubble. The problem with relying on this as a network solution is that
you lose your ability to shape the fight in front of you with ISR and fires. It also has the risk of breaking one bubble into smaller bubbles as LOS is interrupted during movement, or if platforms are lost to enemy actions.

Borrowing and begging are similar; they refer to either leveraging adjacent unit or joint assets that are in or transiting your AO or that can be requested for a duration from higher when not allocated to other units. Air Force aircraft that transit the AO and thicken the network might be an example in the future, but would require extensive knowledge of their air corridors and the area they would thicken before being relied on to mitigate network risk. There are also the consequences of METT-TC to consider. Begging it can be thought of as the higher echelon committing a reserve. If it were an asset that was OPCON to you, there might be no need to ask for it. This is probably a limited duration asset and as more of the joint force becomes “commander centric enabled by the network,” most echelons will probably place some type of network extending systems in reserve.

Stealing it may be an option in the future. There has been a good deal written about tapping into existing networks. Many nations have a signals intelligence capability in both their law enforcement and militaries. This would be a different take on that by using existing civil communications infrastructure to thicken and advance our own network. While this might be possible in the future, it would require solid knowledge of the target infrastructure for compatibility, as well as an understanding of the consequences. The consequences are much the same as any other type of targeting in examining the positive and negative effects vs. the key effects you’re trying to achieve in the current and future phases of the operation. An example might be the unintended shutting off of safety systems or hospital computers during Phase III major combat operations (MCO) that have a very negative civil military operations (MCO) impact on Phase IV stability and reconstruction operations (S&RO).

Extending your network to enable your actions during all phases of the operations is as critical as the joint fire support plan, the CSS plan and the maneuver plan since it enables all of the BOS in a NCIE. To do any one of the above is probably a gamble or could not be resourced in the operating environments we face today and tomorrow. A mixture provides balance, mitigates risk and takes advantage of joint synergy. It will, however, require solid planning at all component and joint levels.

The C4 Estimate: “Can you Hear Me Now?”

Akin to an intelligence estimate, a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), and a light and weather data chart, this tool would visually illustrate periods of peak network activity based on the operations estimate and mission complexity in order to forecast needs, identify constraints and limitations and resource network “thickening” assets from higher. It would also layout the best areas to extend the network for LOS communications, UAS CRP ROZs, and take into account known information about higher echelon, JIM (joint, interagency, multi-national), indigenous assets that would help to create and extend the network.

The fusion of these two key elements of the C4 estimate would be the product of staff analysis and provide the commander with the facts and assumptions that will provide him options. The information could be tied to decision points that effect maneuver or enable detection, targeting, delivery and assessment of HPTs. It would enable the visualization of the battlefield that becomes the C4 input into COA analysis. The TTP for displaying this product is not as important as the information’s presentation in a manner that the rest of the staff and the commander can say, “Okay, I got it.”

Distributed Operations: Enabling Effective Battle Command in TACs and MCGs (Mobile Command Groups)

A great question was raised by our Signal folks about a force that has such high network requirements: Does the signal plan support the scheme of maneuver, or does the scheme of maneuver conform to the realities of where the best network coverage is? Heresy? Maybe, but it’s a fair question since we already consider simplicity in maintaining lines of communication for support very high on our list of influencing factors for a given course of action.

The truth probably lies somewhere in the manner where we already do business. The mission will come from the higher headquarters and the staff will begin to look at either a directed COA (course of action) from the commander, or receive some planning guidance regarding COA development. During COA development, several things will happen that will impact the maneuver plan. Examples are:

1) An ISR plan will be developed that will shape maneuver (with an information centric force we are going to have to avoid chance contacts and achieve dominant maneuver out of contact to a position of advantage);

2) METT-TC is going to have an impact; negotiable terrain for both initial and follow on forces such as major LOCs may have to be cleared to sustain the campaign; Time may be a factor to achieve the higher echelons key effects; Modularity will have an impact as not all units will have organic the BOS functions (troops) needed to achieve their purpose or effect; civilian infrastructure required for a speedy and successful Phase IV such as communications, banks, or energy may have to be secured en-route.

This will lead the staff to consider facts and assumptions, constraints and limitations, specified and implied tasks, a restated mission, and proposed CCIR that round out the mission analysis. Requests for Information (RFIs) that cover all the BOS, to include those about network quality should shape the final decision about a scheme of maneuver. Some will probably coincide given major ground LOCs in most countries that will support follow on forces happen to be where people and industry converge. Those people have to communicate and the proliferation of wireless communication is only going to increase. The real problems lie with determining who gets how much of the available bandwidth. We already have a doctrinal answer in decisive and shaping/main and supporting, but it is useful to look at other ways to consider bandwidth allocation.

Assigning Priority of Bandwidth During an Event or Phase of the Operation

The increased number of sensors (manned and unmanned) and
the greater distribution of radios (with increased wave form capabilities that enhance the quality of communications — better graphics, imagery, live video, targeting chips, etc.) lead to increased use of a limited resource — bandwidth. Increasing the amount of bandwidth through allocation of satellites or other resources is possible. Compressing the file or transmission to a degree is also possible, but there are limitations to both of these solutions either because of cost or technological capabilities. This leads staffs to have to do the hard work on defining the best uses of bandwidth. Much like priority of fires or support or engineer effort, which also involve limited resources, bandwidth may need to be allocated to ensure the user who needs it most, has it when it is needed.

It could be prioritized by phase of the operation in Paragraph V or the annex, then subdivided by BOS platform, sensor, tactical echelon or subordinate unit. In Figure 1, the four phases of the operation are broken out in reverse order to facilitate general enroute mission planning and allocation of resources. This is also true of bandwidth. By looking at the phases, planners can come up with a general network concept and generate RFIs to the higher headquarters about required resources or network shortfalls that may impact operational capability. A good example might be: the higher HQs has tasked your unit to conduct an operational maneuver (could be vertical, by road march, or by high speed vessel). What conditions are they going to set to establish the required network connectivity for both the JIM environment to give you the kind of reachback to higher echelon assets and forward to your own units as they deploy into your AO?

Each phase of the operation is going to have some special requirements that could call for more or less higher echelon resources. Resources could be platforms, payloads, or skill sets depending on what operational tasks come with that phase. An example of priority of bandwidth (POB) might be: Initial POB might be to command and control so that as elements depart from the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) or seaport of embarkation (SPOE). The commanders and staffs can collaborate using the meat of the available network and bandwidth apportioned to them. Then, based on a defined event, POB would transition to ISR and fires to shape the fight and set the condition for the maneuver force. When conditions have been met to cross the LD with maneuver units, priority might shift to maneuver supported by mobility. The lines between the BOS are not going to be black and white since we’ll use ISR and fires throughout the operation, but it would help shape planning guidance that would allow echelons as to their constraints and limitations. Example, if I know that command and control for planning has priority, then I won’t put up as many UMS. Consequently, if ISR has POB, an option for units continuing to plan might be to set up a fiber optic (or other type of) hot loop in their TAA (total Army authorizations). As mentioned in the preceding section, the other examples of prioritizing bandwidth are more similar to the manner we allocate fires or other types of support.

**Putting the “Command” in Command & Signal**

Enabling the commander to exercise the art and science of command over a networked force, that because of its capabilities has been assigned greater responsibilities and battlespace, requires:

1) The organic command and control capabilities to meet requirements;

2) A responsive network which can facilitate command elements maintaining situational awareness, keep subordinate elements synchronized, and enable the commander to recognize and take advantage of emerging opportunities;

3) Good staff work to examine the critical events within all phases of the operation and determine where the available command posts should be positioned to facilitate the commander’s guidance and where those resources can reduce friction.

Organization design and flexibility should come first. This includes having multiple tactical command posts and/or mobile command groups that can be quickly
set up, made functional, and then displaced to a new location for the next critical event. The design needs to include a rear or main that maintains connectivity to the JIM, keeps the COP (this means bringing the mobile CPs up to date with events that can effect the operation by the best C4 assets available), and that operates out of contact with a staff that can consider branch and sequel options to the different phases of the operation in either sanctuary or at least out of likely contact. If a unit does not have that organic capability, it may need to request it from higher or resource it internally and compromise in other areas. The second comes from anticipating needs based on the concept of the operation, but also from balancing resources and realigning them as the plan is executed and new requirements arise.

The third is what comes out in the “command” portion of Paragraph V. Having the flexibility found in the former attributes will not maximize command and control if assets are employed where they do nothing more then filter or obstruct mission type orders and stifle subordinate unit initiative. It is not necessarily a “use them because you have them” type of asset. Each critical event should be war-gamed in some fashion to determine if the addition of a higher element enables the subordinate unit, or hinders it since it takes resources to position it forward and then maintain it, and potentially displace it to a new location. All of the above can affect the tempo of offensive operations.

Once a decision to commit a CP to an event is made, its command relationship with subordinate units must be framed in an order to ensure clarity for all affected parties. The context of the relationship can be geographical, by event, by task organization or by time. Whatever the command relationship or the context that frames it, the relationship should enable the achievement of a commander’s key effects and reduce the friction for subordinate units. For example, a CP might be tasked with the responsibility for operational movement or key tactical mission of a portion of the force. Within the same echelon, the responsibility might fall to the subordinated CP to handle all Phase IV SARO tasks while the primary CP conducts the operations of Phase III MCO. It might fall to the subordinated CP to handle all shaping operations such as Joint Fires, Psychological Operations (PSYOP), etc., while the primary CP focuses on decisive maneuver. The capability to provide flexible command and control is determined by the staff’s ability to estimate the mission’s conditions then forecast and allocate network resources and leadership to make it happen.

A good analogy to allocating and balancing resources amongst the various headquarters would be amphibious shipping during WWII. Look at the relationship between Admiral Bull Halsey and Admiral Ray Spruance in alternating command of the same group of ships, but redesignating them as each man alternated command; then scope out to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz competing for resources within the same theater; then consider the operational resource requirements for amphibious shipping assets between the Pacific and European Theaters. Then consider the impacts at the strategic levels, the operational levels, and even the tactical levels in terms of making tough decisions about what to bring ashore and when based on what amphibious resources were actually available. While there are other historical and current analogies available, they illustrate the difficult choices to be made in determining the use of limited resources. The work involving allocating network assets to support command and control is going to require staff effort that is driven by achieving the commander’s intent at every echelon, but must be considered against the backdrop of each higher echelon’s mission as well.

The Road Ahead

Recently, the results from a RAND study on the effectiveness of a networked force using the SBCT as a case study showed a significant reduction in casualties (from all types of actions) and an increase in effectiveness. The road ahead promises challenges as we build a military that can fulfill its obligations to the nation’s security strategy by being an implement of foreign policy that is: expeditionary in nature to get to the AOR before the enemy can gain an advantage; of campaign quality so that it can sustain itself through all phases of the operation; is JIM compliant so it can leverage joint, interagency and multi-national synergy; operationally flexible and responsive; and tactically agile. These are all hallmarks of a networked force that allows leadership to share a common operating picture and make good decisions faster then the enemy can react.

One of the biggest challenges will be developing the Soldiers and leaders who can employ the technology to its fullest extent and understand the value of the information they receive. The Office of Force Transformation has a very good Web site at http://www.of.t.osd.mil/ which discusses transformational issues and has significant unclassified information on the NCIE. When talking to many company and field grade leaders today they are often surprised to learn how soon they will be affected and to what scale the NCIE will effect them. These leaders should be our target audience for establishing a military culture that understands both the mass based constraints our Army has to live with, but also the technical requirements our Army is moving to. The increasing importance of Paragraph V is really just one more indication that all planners are going to have to be smarter on the C4 technologies, and their constraints and limitations.

Captain Rob Thornton currently serves as an operations officer in the FCS Unit of Action Experimental Element (UAEE) in the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab (UAMBL) at Fort Knox, Kentucky. He has served as commander of A Company and HHC, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington. Thanks to the Ray Kimball (AVN), Brett Patron, and Ken Kenmerly (Signal) who provided assistance in preparing this article and ensuring we were giving the best possible information to future planners.
The Brigade Aviation Element — organized, equipped, and manned to meet air ground integration and A2C2 needs of the transformed Brigade Combat Team.”

The Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) concept evolved as part of Army Transformation and was identified as a solution for integration after the Aviation Task Force reviewed lessons learned from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, and countless combat training center (CTC) rotations. Across the board, aviation and ground maneuver continued to lack the synchronization desired by all. Historically, Army aviation provided liaison officers for short durations only; these LNOs were outstanding pilots, but lacked the proper equipment, air-ground integration and Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) training, and often the right number of people necessary to perform the required planning.

The BAE was developed to meet the modular needs of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and the Multi-Functional Aviation Brigade (MFAB). The contemporary operational environment (COE) demands well aimed fires, synchronized ground maneuver and integrated aviation operations. The BCT and the MFAB have been redesigned to meet these needs and the Brigade Aviation Element has been established as an organic staff element within the BCT to ensure mission success.

The Army’s senior leadership sought to harness the air-ground integration synergy that existed with special operations forces; where the air and ground relationship is tightly interwoven, resulting in well planned and executed operations. Design analysis also looked at other staff organizations with proven track records. The fire support element found in the infantry brigade had similar capabilities; in turn the BAE was designed to have many of the same attributes that made the Fire Support Element successful.

These attributes include:

- A robust, mature, mission focused staff capable of 24-hour operations.
- A large enough organization to simultaneously conduct current operations and prepare future plans.
- A permanent presence, home station, RSOI (reception, staging, onward movement and integration), combat operations, stability and reconstruction operations, redeployment and regeneration.
- Provide embedded branch specific subject matter expertise capable of coordinating and deconflicting laterally, to higher, and joint.
- Provide Army Battle Command System (ABCS) connectivity and communications to facilitate the common operational picture; and communicate with supporting units.

Mission of the BAE

The BAE provides an imbedded 24-hour operational capability to plan and coordinate aviation operations, UAVS (unmanned
aerial vehicle systems) operations and A2C2 throughout the BCT’s area of responsibility. It helps set the conditions for the BCT’s success through the combined arms integration of aviation into the commander’s scheme of maneuver.

Organization of BAE

The BAE organization consists of a six-man team, with a major as the officer in charge. A captain serves as the plans officer and second in charge, with a trained Chief Warrant Officer 3 tactical operations officer. A 15P (Aviation Operations) sergeant first class serves as the operations NCO, and a 15P staff sergeant is the assistant operations NCO. A 15P operations specialist rounds out the team. These Soldiers represent army aviation as subject matter experts to the brigade combat team.

BAE Staff METL

The BAE staff mission essential task list includes:

- Plan and integrate aviation operations with the ground scheme of maneuver.
- Integrate A2C2 in the BCT area of responsibility.
- Plan and request airspace coordination measures.
- Coordinate and synchronize aviation operations with the MFAB and the higher headquarters.
- Coordinate and de-conflict UAVS operations.

In order to accomplish these essential tasks, the BAE must understand and be able to initiate planning that will be further refined by either the aviation brigade or an aviation battalion task force. Key to success is the BAE’s ability to conduct conceptual planning 96 to 72 hours out, while the aviation brigade or aviation battalion task force (TF) is conducting current operations. It cannot be overstated, the planning conducted by the BAE must be supportable by the aviation task force. This is accomplished by the BAE developing as close of a relationship with the aviation TF as it has with the organic commanders and staffs found in the BCT. The BAE and the aviation organizations it interacts with is a partnership built on collaboration and teamwork.

Based on the wide breadth of knowledge required to plan these operations, the BAE is comprised of officers, NCOs and Soldiers who are experienced, intelligent, and fast learning professionals, ready for the challenge.

BAE Training

As the BAE transformed from concept to reality, the U.S. Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) saw the need for specialized training and doctrine to support the fielding of this new addition to the BCT staff.

First, several references were produced to provide a basis for the BAE’s operations including: Training Circular 1-400, Brigade Aviation Element Handbook; a BAE reference library; and an Army Knowledge Online Knowledge Collaboration Center. To aid in the rapid fielding of a BAE to the 3rd Infantry Division, the Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker developed a mobile training team (MTT) program, with other A2C2 and aviation planners to help train their BAE. Today, the MTT addresses critical training tasks to aid BAEs in learning and performing their duties, it provides immediate assistance to fielded BAEs, and is the interim training solution until a BAE resident course can be established at Fort Rucker. The MTT has supported the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 10th Mountain and the 4th Infantry Divisions, as well as delivering its instruction to the CTCs.

Currently the USAAVNC, in conjunction with the Computer Sciences Corporation, is developing a resident course at Fort Rucker to address all of the training needs of the BAE. This course is intended to provide detailed instruction in air-ground integration, A2C2, joint airspace, targeting; the full spectrum of aviation missions to include: attack, assault, general support, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and UAVS operations; Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS); and Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) instruction. The BAE course development is on track and is expected to be available by next April 2006.

The BAE and the Aviation LNO

The aviation brigade and its subordinate battalions continue to have their own embedded liaison cells. These LNO organizations have not gone away and are still vital in the successful execution of aviation missions. The BAE does not replace this capability. The aviation commander will always have the responsibility to provide liaison to the BCT; but now that there is a BAE, this liaison can be better focused and more productive. Once an aviation task force establishes a relationship with a BCT, the aviation unit must develop a mutually supporting liaison plan for aviation planning and execution.

With this said, both the BCT and the aviation task force must have the same expectations of aviation planning conducted at the BCT, so that planning can be beneficial, meeting the timely needs of the ground commander, while retaining planning flexibility for the aviation TF commander. The BAE was not designed to develop stovepipe plans, but is in place to facilitate collaborative planning between the BCT and the supporting aviation task force.

Equipment

In order to take full advantage of the BAE’s potential, critical equipment was required. The Army Battle Command System that best allows the BAE to effect A2C2 operations is the Theater Integrated Airspace System or TAIS. Prior to transformation, TAIS only existed in air traffic service battalions and companies, as well as some division headquarters and in the Stryker BCT Air Defense Air Management Cells.

The TAIS allows the BAE to:
- Synchronize, visualize, and deconflict airspace;
- Request, process and display airspace coordination measures from the airspace control order;
- Link to joint airspace management processes at the Battlefield Coordination Detachment;
- Interface with other Army and Joint Battle Command Systems; and
- Display air tracks, if appropriate feeds are available.

The BAE and BCT’s ADAM cell, share tactical communications equipment to include SINCGARS, Air and Missile Defense Workstation (AMDWS), Air
Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI) workstation, and the TAIS workstation. This set of systems was conveniently packaged in the TSQ 282 ADAM vehicle. Due to the rapid fielding of the BAE, this equipment solution was necessary to allow the BAE to operate upon fielding.

In the future, additional systems are being considered for issue, to include the VRC-100 ALE HF radio, additional SINCGARS radios, TACsAT 117F, GRC-240 UHF/VHF radio, and an Iridium satellite telephone.

In time, the BAE’s capabilities will increase as equipment becomes available. Aviation mission planning tools are also necessary for the BAE to plan and deconflict both manned and unmanned aviation operations.

To enable the BAE to accomplish these tasks, the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) is being given to BAEs to facilitate their ability to digitally communicate. The planning products from the aviation TFs, as well as subordinate UAV units, will be processed and passed to higher A2C2 authorities via the AMPS for approval and synchronization.

All of these equipment issues are part of the normal growing pains of rapidly fielded organizations. As doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures mature, the BAE’s equipment needs will be better defined and met to allow the BCT to fully exploit the BAE’s capability.

Summary

In the Army today, fully qualified BAEs are present in the transformed brigade combat teams of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne, the 10th Mountain and the 4th Infantry Divisions, and in the 48th BCT of the Georgia Army National Guard. When the Army completes transformation, a BAE will reside in every interim BCT and heavy BCT of the active and reserve components. Currently, the 3rd ID BAEs are the first BAEs deployed for OIF. These teams represent the first of many to bring aviation expertise to the BCTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have played a critical role in the development and success of the BAE concept and will help to further refine its future.

EOD Support in OIF 04-06:

WHEN GS IS MORE THAN DS

MAJOR GERARDO V. MENESES

Just south of Baghdad along Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa:

Sergeant Jones, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team member, guides the Talon 4B Man Transportable Robot System (MTRS) back to the EOD incident control point near Checkpoint 13 along MSR Tampa. The robot hurries along carrying the handset of a long range cordless telephone gingerly in its gripper. Moments ago the telephone was the initiator for an improvised explosive device (IED) linked via a blasting cap to a 155 mm South African HE (high explosive) projectile housing 23 pounds of Comp B High Explosive. Minutes later the Talon is back downrange placing a countercharge on the barely visible 155 mm projectile buried along the shoulder of the road. As soon as the airspace is clear, Sergeant First Class Holman, the EOD team leader, initiates the modern demolition initiator (MDI), and the thunderous crack lets everyone know that the operation is almost over. After ensuring there were no kick-outs and that the area is clear of any other hazards, the TL declares the area “safe;” the team packs up their equipment and reopens the MSR as the inner and outer security cordons collapse around them. Minutes later, the EOD team and their dedicated security element race back towards Forward Operating Base (FOB) St. Michael when the 717th EOD Company command post calls and directs them to another suspected IED...

Army EOD companies, Air Force Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES)/EOD flights and Navy EOD detachments and their subordinate teams are performing emergency response missions like the one above across most of the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) under the command and control of the 184th Ordnance Battalion (EOD). The 184th is a separate battalion in general support (GS) to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) that commands, controls, and task organizes subordinate joint service EOD forces in support of the MNC-I commander’s priorities. The battalion’s EOD teams are trained and equipped to render safe disposal of IEDs, U.S. and foreign conventional and unconventional (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) unexploded ordnance (UXO), designated captured enemy ammunition (CEA), and conduct post blast investigations to gather technical intelligence to target bomb makers.

The Army is currently the only service that has the EOD command and control as well as liaison and support structure integrated into maneuvering forces.
formations from the BCT and select task force (TF) level all the way up to the corps. To provide the most responsive support to the BCTs engaged in dynamic counterinsurgency operations against the anti-Iraqi forces, the battalion employs its companies (as well as flights and detachments) in general support to each of the multi-national divisions or forces (MND/MNF). From here, companies support BCTs on an area basis so that each BCT commander has only one point of contact for EOD planning and response missions. At first, most maneuver commanders and operations officers balk at the idea of GS. There is no doubt that EOD is a critical enabler on today’s battlefield and the “I want my slice” mentality prevails among most supported units. In reality though, most maneuver elements quickly see that the support relationship the EOD companies and teams have with the BCTs and TFs looks a lot like direct support (DS).

According to FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, GS is a support relationship assigned to a “unit to support the force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.” These units are positioned and receive priorities from their parent units. In contrast, DS is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. The field manual goes on to note that a “unit assigned a DS relationship retains it command relationship with its parent organization but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit.” EOD companies and teams across the ITO maintain their command relationship to the battalion, but on a day-to-day basis are positioned and receive their taskings and priorities from the maneuver unit they support. Only in select situations does the battalion exercise its GS authority to reposition units.

A two-to-four-person EOD team, depending on the service and unit strength, is the sole EOD support at more than 20 forward operating bases (FOBs) across the ITO. Other camps and FOBs may be fortunate (read busy) enough to have a HQ element and two to three EOD teams. To those TFs with just one EOD team, the command-support relationship truly looks like DS. The EOD team does not request permission from the EOD company or battalion before responding. The team lives among the TF Soldiers and is literally standing by and ready to go as soon as the TOC receives the UXO/IED 9-Line report. The EOD battalion requires the team to respond within 30 minutes (though typically they are ready in 15) and roll as soon as their dedicated security element is ready. The security element typically consists of three to four M1114s with 10-16 Soldiers that form the inner cordon at the IED site. The EOD team gets all classes of supply (minus CL V and EOD peculiar equipment), life-support, and vehicle maintenance from the TF. In return the TF S3 tasks that team directly, receives back-briefs after every mission is complete and gets the results of the EOD battalion’s intelligence analysis based on all exploited IED components in that AO.

In certain cases the battalion does task organize subordinate EOD teams in direct support to maneuver units. These are usually short duration missions (though some have lasted in excess of eight weeks) with specific objectives that require extensive prior planning, rehearsals and multiple EOD teams. The most common examples include named operations, raids against suspected bomb-makers, mass grave exploitation missions and missions in support of elections. Some examples of these operations in OIF 04-06 include 1st Cavalry Division’s Operation Sacrifice Bunt, 42nd ID’s Operation Attleboro, 1-25 SBCT’s Operation Saber Thrust, and unnamed operations ISO CJSOTF raids in Baghdad. An additional benefit of GS relationship is that when a team goes down, either from a casualty or other reason, the battalion has the flexibility to move a replacement team from a slower sector so that BCT’s do not experience any degradation in support. The 184th OD BN (EOD) rarely task organizes its elements at anything other than a GS role to maintain the operational flexibility necessary to surge assets IAW the corps or division commander’s priorities. Otherwise, the corps would have to write and staff a fragmentary order (FRAGO) before moving, even temporarily, any EOD team that was DS to another unit. In the long run, a DS support relationship would lead to less responsive EOD support.

Though sometimes unpleasant, the EOD battalion in OIF provides GS to the corps and its subordinate units because it allows the most responsive EOD support to counter the AIF’s number one casualty producing weapon system. On a day-to-day basis, EOD companies and teams respond to the maneuver commander as if they were in DS. Occasionally though, the higher commander’s priorities will require the move of a team or even a company to support the main effort. In these instances the GS support relationship presents both the battalion and maneuver commanders with the most efficient and effective way to get the job done. Call it DS minus or GS plus, but anyway you look at it, the joint service EOD teams of the 184th OD BN (EOD) respond at a moment’s notice to render-safe the IED threat anywhere on the battlefield!

Major Gerardo V. Meneses is currently serving as the executive officer for the 184th Ordnance Battalion (EOD), which is currently deployed to Iraq. MAJ Meneses was commissioned in 1992 from the U.S. Army Military Academy at West Point.
From March 2003 until February, 2004, snipers from Task Force Vanguard operated out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Danger in Tikrit, Iraq. The 11-man Sniper Section conducted more than 1,000 sniper missions from as far south as Samarra to Mosul in the north.

The snipers from 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, were used extensively as a force multiplier. The snipers occupied sniper positions and observation posts (OPs), established sniper ambushes, and supported cordon and raid operations.

Most often Vanguard snipers operated in urban environments but also conducted missions in the desert to establish ambush positions at ammunition supply points (ASPs) and along the lines of travel used by insurgent forces and key intersections. They conducted missions along the heavily vegetated banks of the Tigris River to disrupt enemy indirect fire capabilities and to recon possible cache sites.

Sniper teams generally worked in a three-man team consisting of a spotter, a primary shooter, and an RTO (radio-telephone operator). When missions were planned to last more than 48 hours, four-man teams were often used to facilitate a rest plan. Two-man teams were used on occasion for short duration missions. The two-man teams were used in conjunction with other teams that were mutually supporting and capable of direct fires to support each other. The two-man teams were also used in support of squad and platoon operations during SOI (sphere of influence) engagements, dismounted patrols and at traffic control points (TCPs).

Infiltration

In the beginning of our tour of duty, Vanguard snipers operated in Iraq.
Above, Sergeant Robert Crosthwait watches for insurgent activity during a mission in Iraq.

At left, a quick reaction force vehicle prepares to insert a sniper team during a mission in Iraq.

Top right, a sniper team from the 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry scan for insurgent activity.

Below right, Soldiers from the 1-18 Sniper Section practice their marksmanship skills at a range in Iraq.
primarily at night establishing observation posts and sniper positions in the city to enforce curfew and to maintain situational awareness for the commander. By planning carefully, the sniper teams could move about the city dismounted and undetected. This movement gave the snipers a very thorough knowledge of the buildings, homes, businesses, streets and back alleys, greatly reducing the enemy’s home field advantage.

Infiltration techniques were dependent upon the distance to the target area, terrain, and time of day. The most preferred option was to infiltrate by foot into the city. When using this technique, it was imperative to make complete coordination with the quick reaction force (QRF) that was in support of the teams. At a minimum, it is important to cover the routes during infiltration and exfiltration, the target area, most likely position of the team and alternate position, pick up gates for quick exfils, call signs and frequencies, and visual identification signals.

Often, combinations of wheeled and dismounted infiltrations were conducted. When using a mounted patrol to cover the insertion of a sniper team, the patrol should not move through the planned target area. In an urban environment, we generally dismounted a minimum of three blocks away from the proposed position. While working in more rural terrain, the distance moved by foot would be dependent upon the vegetation and terrain but would range from one to six kilometers.

All possible means of transportation were used to facilitate both insertion and extraction of sniper teams. The use of these assets enabled teams to move into remote locations or along the main supply route (MSR) without the threat of compromise that was often experienced when using HMMWVs.

Moving in an urban environment makes it very difficult to avoid being compromised. Getting to the proposed sniper positions involved moving through multiple courtyards, across roofs, and several changes of direction to avoid predictability. The teams were able to infiltrate without compromise through careful planning and coordination.

Compromise

Snipers were a part of the Information Operation campaign; therefore, compromise was not necessarily a bad thing. The populace knew who we were and our capabilities when they saw a small element moving with the “big painted gun” strapped to an assault pack. Compromise during movement would let the population know when snipers were in the city; this added to a higher sense of security and acted
as a deterrent for insurgent activities.

The strength of snipers is their ability to hide from the enemy; therefore, compromise in or near our position was another situation that put the teams at a risk. Intelligence has shown that sniper teams were and continue to be actively hunted by the enemy. Security in a sniper position has to be maintained at all times. Positions were chosen not only for their ability to observe a target area, but also because they are easily defendable. Early warning devices were employed. Battery operated door alarms that were locally purchased, broken glass on the floor, and/or something as simple as boards propped up against a door were used to provide early warning.

Establishing a sniper position included making radio contact with the tactical operations center (TOC), informing them of the location, and establishing a no fire area. Once the position was established, the team members would rotate roles. One sniper would maintain observations in the target area; another would monitor the radio and assist in observation, while the third would maintain security to the rear. Compromise at this stage of the operation gave the sniper team leader a few different courses of action. If the mission was to observe a specific targeted individual or a future raid objective, the team could detain the compromising individual. In such cases, each sniper carried pamphlets and cash. The pamphlets were in Arabic and explained the sniper’s purpose and expressed appreciation for the detainee’s cooperation in supporting a free Iraq. Cash was also given to the detainees to compensate them for their time. Each compromise was treated as an SOI engagement. Compromise during a mission to maintain situational awareness in the city would usually result in moving to an alternate position or extraction by the QRF.

Exfiltration

Exfil is the time when the sniper team is most vulnerable, especially after a compromise. Ambushes have been placed along likely exfil routes and improvised explosive devices (IED) have been discovered in doorways of occupied buildings. Exfil routes should never be the same as the infiltration route. Exfil should also always be conducted as discretely as possible. If time was an issue, exfils were kept relatively short in distance and in conjunction with the QRF. Exfil gates were established as well as emergency extraction points. Occasionally, teams of snipers would operate in unison and use a bounding technique with teams over watching other team’s movement.

Our QRF was a HMMWV section of three or four vehicles from the unit whose sector we were working in. Coordination between the QRF and the sniper team was very important and conducted before every mission. Mission, routes to and from the sniper position, exfil and extraction gates, target area, frequency and call signs, recognition signals, and our communication SOP were covered. Seating for the sniper team must also be planned for. A possible way to do this would be to have the pickup vehicle empty with the exception of the driver, TC, and gunner. This would allow room for two sniper teams. The use of armored HMMWVs did not allow for a quick exfil.

Actions on Contact

When the sniper team initiated contact, QRF would immediately respond to the site of the target. The sniper team would remain in position to over watch the target area and the target. This allowed the team to reduce any other threats in the area and quickly guide the QRF to the site.

Contact was never initiated against us during an infiltration. However, contact was made on a number of occasions during exfil. Contacts during movement were treated as a battle drill. The key is to immediately return fire.

Conventional snipers are a valuable asset to the commander in the asymmetric fight of Iraq. Snipers can be used as a force multiplier to allow platoons and companies to refit and focus operations in mass or in other sectors. Snipers can maintain situational awareness for the commander and provide eyes on the objective — real time intelligence. The psychological effect that our snipers had on the populace was evident in the drop of insurgent activities when snipers were employed. A sniper presence gave the local populace a heightened sense of security and was welcomed by most. Snipers deterred insurgent activities and reinforced the Information Operations throughout the AO.

Task Force Vanguard redeployed to Schweinfurt, Germany, in February 2005. The sniper section is now in the process of rebuilding the section to fill losses from Soldiers that PCSed and ETSed. Physical fitness and expert marksmanship are not the only qualities needed for new snipers. Discipline and intelligence are the most important factors. Discipline, I believe, is what kept my snipers alive. Snipers have to be able to react quickly in the most demanding of situations in accordance with the ROE and commander’s guidance.

Sergeant First Class Michael W. Glancy is currently serving as a platoon sergeant for Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division. He previously served as the sniper section leader for 1-18.
OVERVIEW
The U.S. Army Sniper School offers a five-week long resident course at Fort Benning that trains students in basic sniper skills such as range estimation, stalking, target detection and long-range marksmanship techniques.

PREREQUISITES
A few of the prerequisites for attending the U.S. Army Sniper School include:
- Rank: E-3 through E-7 (All other ranks waiverable through the Course Convening Authority’s approval).
- Psychological evaluation: Within 1 year (non-waiverable)
- CMF: 11B, 11M, and all 18 series (non-waiverable)
- Weapons Qualification: Consistent Expert with M16A1/ M16A2 rifle (non-waiverable)
- GT Score: 100 or higher (Non-waiverable)
- Vision: 20/200 correctable to 20/20 normal color vision (non-waiverable)
- Discipline: No history of drug or alcohol abuse. No history of disciplinary actions (non-waiverable).

A complete list of the prerequisites is available on the Sniper School Web site at https://www.infantry.army.mil/29thInf/courses/sniper.

PRE-SNIPER TRAINING
A trend we are beginning to see here at Sniper School is that students are coming to the course with little to no experience or understanding of even the most basic Sniper skills. While most leaders would not send a Soldier to Ranger School without at least some basic pre-training (if not an extensive division Pre-Ranger Course), some do not hesitate to send a Soldier to Sniper School with absolutely no prior training. This is not setting Soldiers up for success. U.S. Army Sniper School is a difficult and fast-paced course, with an average graduation rate of 62 percent. For a unit to ensure their Soldiers are successful at Sniper School, they need to select the right individuals to attend. Any Soldier selected to attend the course should be intelligent, mature, physically and mentally tough, and capable of handling the increased level of responsibility associated with a Sniper position. Once the right Soldier is selected, it is important to properly prepare him for the course.

An effective pre-sniper course can be conducted at any unit’s home station, with minimal ranges and resources in five days. The course should be run by the senior B4 qualified individual in the unit (most likely the Sniper Section Leader), and focus on the basic fundamentals of sniper operations. This should include range estimation, stalking, target detection, and marksmanship.

Range estimation training should be conducted in order to familiarize your Soldiers on how to accurately range a target using their eyes, binoculars, and scope. This is an important and fundamental skill of all snipers, and is a graded event at Sniper School. Students should receive basic instruction on the concept of range estimation and on the use of the mil dot reticle and the mil relation formula.

Target detection is another fundamental sniper skill Soldiers should be familiar with before they attend Sniper School. Target detection is also a graded and a must pass event at the school. Soldiers should receive instruction on basic observation techniques in addition to receiving hands on training.

Stalking is the last major field craft skill taught at Sniper School. Some individuals feel stalking is an outdated event and should not be taught at the course. What they fail to realize is the skills and concepts stalking teaches apply to any environment, including urban operations. Soldiers planning on attending Sniper School should be given ample time to make their ghillie suits under the supervision of an experienced Sniper, and conduct at least two or three practice stalks before attending the course.

The other major area of instruction that should be covered in any pre-sniper training is, of course, marksmanship. This training should begin with instruction on the operation of the M24 SWS to include detailed classes on the M3A scope and the AN/PVS-10 Night Sight. The M107 Long Range Sniper Rifle should also be covered if time is available.

Additional marksmanship instruction should focus on marksmanship fundamentals and becoming comfortable with the weapon. This can be accomplished with one day of solid shooting on a known distance range, with each potential student firing around 100 rounds.

By implementing this simple, non-resource intensive pre-sniper course, in conjunction with a proper selection process, any unit can properly prepare their Soldiers for Sniper School.

SNIPER NEWSLETTER
The staff of the Sniper School puts out a monthly newsletter addressing various issues that face the sniper community. A link to the newsletter can be found on the Sniper School Web site. Viewers must have an AKO login/password in order to access the newsletters.

For more information on the Sniper School, visit their Web site at https://www.infantry.army.mil/29thInf/courses/sniper or call (706) 544-6006/DSN 784-6006.
Editor's Note: As today’s Soldiers fight as part of an international force to restore stability in a part of the world beset by fanatical insurgents armed with weapons equal to their own, it is worth remembering that the U.S. Army’s 9th Infantry Regiment faced similar challenges a century ago in China. The fight was a costly one for American and Allied units, and the lessons learned in those hot July days of 1900 have contributed to our doctrinal literature as we lead a coalition in the global war on terror. I want to thank Mr. David P. Perrine for his superb work in the research and preparation of this article.

Coalition operations involving nations whose equipment, culture, military skills, and language differ from our own are nothing new to the United States Army. Whether operating under the aegis of the United Nations as during the Korean War, alongside like-minded allies in the Gulf War in 1991, serving as peacekeepers in the Balkans, or leading the way in the global war on terror, our Army has amassed considerable knowledge on what works and what does not. During the Boxer rebellion at the beginning of the last century, American Soldiers fought alongside troops of Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan to restore stability and rescue embattled foreign nationals in China. This was our first coalition war with foreign troops, fighting on foreign soil that was home to a common adversary that vastly outnumbered them. Adding to the difficulties of the operation were the animosities between the coalition partners themselves; the Russians and Japanese refused to serve either under one another or even adjacent to one another, and within five years of this operation they were themselves at war.

As foreign powers expanded their spheres of influence in China, beginning in the 1840’s the Chinese Imperial Court strongly resented their own concomitant loss of control over their own destiny and sought ways to expel those whom they saw as intruders. While not having her own imperialist aspirations, the United States nevertheless saw China as a potential trading partner and had established a legation in the capitol at Peking or Pekin, present-day Beijing (Map 1). The Dowager Empress encouraged the sentiments and actions of a religious society, the translation of whose name varied, but which was most commonly called “The Righteous and Harmonious Fists.” Nicknamed “Boxers” by Westerners, they set about killing missionaries and Chinese Christian converts, burning missions, and destroying property. As the violence grew into massacres, the diplomats, dependents, and civilians attached to the various nations’ legations in Peking barricaded themselves in the city’s Legation Quarter, defended by their respective embassy guards, and before the telegraph line from Peking was cut on June 10, 1900, the British Ambassador requested that a military force be mobilized to come to their aid.

Tientsin lay astride — and hence dominated — the route from the sea to Peking (Map 2). In order for a relief force to reach Peking, they had to go through Tientsin. The British had fought over this area years before, and they knew the countryside could support an attacking army. The Chinese insurgents also knew that a relief force had to get through Tientsin and were determined to deny them the route. Tientsin actually comprised two cities: the rectangular, native Walled City (Map 3) and a much larger city of foreigners surrounding it, which abutted the Pei Ho River to the southeast. Access to the Walled
City was controlled by massive gates on each of the four sides, the walls were thirty feet high, and a water-filled moat surrounded the city. The surrounding terrain was an open plain dotted with many pools and ditches. The foreign settlements were surrounded by a mud wall whose extremities were tied into the Pei Ho River north and south of the city. Chinese defenders had a commanding view of the battlefield, since the city’s walls had countless loopholes for their riflemen and embrasures for their field guns, which maintained an incessant bombardment of the foreigners’ compounds. On June 15, the native city in Tientsin was seized by the Boxers, and foreign legation civilians and military detachments — much as their colleagues in Peking had done — barricaded themselves within their compounds adjacent to the west bank of the Pei Ho River. They now found themselves besieged in a roughly triangular area defined by the West Arsenal, the Railway Station, and the Chinese Military College.

As the situation in China deteriorated, the U.S. War Department directed that all regiments bound for the Philippines be prepared for possible service in China, and that a decision to divert to China would be made when the transport ships arrived in Japan to take on coal. At the same time, U.S. forces in the Philippines were ordered to deploy one infantry regiment to the Chinese port of Taku as rapidly as possible. On June 17, 1900 the 9th U.S. Infantry Regiment received orders to assemble in Manila. The commander of the 9th Regiment was Colonel Emerson H. Liscum, a 39-year veteran who was held in high regard by his officers and men, and who was still recovering from a serious wound received in combat at Santiago. All of the battalion commanders were Civil War veterans who had been with the regiment since the war’s end, while the company commanders’ service ranged from 11 to 28 years.

The Fighting Ninth had spent the last 13 months on the Philippine island of Luzon and had campaigned hard during the summer and fall of 1899. Armed with the .30-40 Krag Jorgenson rifle, which had been adopted as our service rifle only six years earlier, the infantrymen were combat veterans whose marksmanship skills had been honed both on the rifle range and in combat against a tough, determined adversary. But malaria and dysentery had taken their toll on these veterans, and their ranks were thin. Rifle companies authorized 112 men operated with 75 or fewer fit for duty, and only one of three officers was present for duty. Despite these shortcomings, the men of the regiment were proud to have been chosen for the new mission and were eager to serve. Many men lied to get out of hospital to join their comrades in Manila. The regiment was to eventually sail with 32 officers and 1,230 men, but many were far from healthy and only four of 12 company commanders deployed with their men. The last men and support troops closed in on Manila on June 25, 1900, and sailed several days later, the men on board the transport Logan and the baggage, wagons, and horses on the Port Albert. During the crossing to Japan, soldiers further familiarized themselves with their weapons and drilled on deck.

While the ships were refueling and taking on supplies at Nagasaki, Colonel Liscum learned from the U.S. Consul that the legations were in desperate straits and that several of them, including the U.S. legation, had already been burned. He returned to the ship and ordered that it sail as soon as the coal and water were on board, departing just after midnight on July 4, 1900. Meanwhile, the War Department directed that additional troops and artillery be sent to China from the Philippines; on July 18 eight companies of the 14th U.S. Infantry and a battery of artillery
sailed for China. The *Logan* arrived off Taku on July 6, and on the following morning the British Navy arranged to transport two battalions to the inland depot of Tong Ku (Map 2). Despite late arrivals of barges, two battalions of the 9th Regiment came ashore (see photo page 31) joined by a 350-man Marine battalion from the Cavite naval station and advanced on Tientsin, arriving there July 11. The 3rd Battalion of the 9th, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles A. Coolidge, regimental executive officer, was the last to debark.

 Colonel Liscum received orders to postpone the attack until daybreak on July 13, which allowed his men to become more accustomed to their surroundings. Units of other nations — British, French, German, Russian, Japanese — had arrived in the meantime, and the Council of Generals, consisting of the senior commanders of the allied nations assembled to agree on a plan for the assault on the Walled City. Command relationships among the Americans were not simple: the senior U.S. officer on the ground was Colonel Robert L. Meade, commanding the Marine battalion that had arrived after the 9th Regiment, but Colonel Liscum was in command of three battalions. Any joint Army/Marine cooperation would have to be done by mutual agreement, since the overall commander — Army Major General Adna R. Chaffee — would not arrive for two weeks.

 Early on the 12th, Colonel Meade alerted the 9th to occupy the railway station in the Russians’ sector with a 200-man force — later changed to a 100-man force — by dusk, around 8 p.m. The Russians had sustained many casualties in holding this critical terrain, and the station and its adjacent pontoon bridge had to be held. The 1st Battalion’s commander, Major Jesse M. Lee, and the regimental adjutant, Captain Charles R. Noyes, were to position the men at the railway station. At 6 p.m. Colonels Meade and Liscum attended a meeting of the allied generals to receive the following day’s missions. The attack plan was vague and only specified the West Arsenal as the initial objective. Neither Meade nor Liscum was familiar with the terrain, but they did learn that the Americans were to provide a force of 1,000 men, with the 9th providing two-thirds of that number and the Marines the remainder.

 The plan consisted of two independent attacks by the Allies (Map 4). On the east side of the Pei Ho River, the Germans and Russians were to attack at 10 a.m. and seize the Chinese batteries northeast of the city, while a second force of Americans, British, Austrians, French, and Japanese was to attack the Walled City and breach the South Gate. This latter force moved out in three columns, with 600 French infantry on the right flank; 150 Japanese cavalry and 1,500 infantry in the center; and with the largest force consisting of 800 British, 300 Chinese, 30 Austrians, and 1,000 American soldiers and Marines on the left flank. This force was to attack the West Arsenal as an intermediate objective, to divert Chinese combat power away from the Germans and Russians fighting east of the river.

 This attack highlighted a number of difficulties inherent in coalition operations of that era. As each nation was accustomed to its own tactics and standing operating procedures, these were not communicated in detail to allied forces engaged in the fight. When Meade and Liscum came away from the meeting of the allied generals — they had gone unaccompanied by any of their staff — they returned to their units knowing only that the West Arsenal was to be attacked, the time to move out, and the order of march. Since no reconnaissance had been conducted and no terrain information provided, they had no knowledge of the number, type, or restrictions posed by the mud walls and ponds to their front — something that was to prove fateful as the operation unfolded. In fact, Colonel Liscum told Major Lee: “We are to march out at three o’clock to the south and west, following the English Marines and attack the Taku Gate. I have the memorandum of the order to march in that column and that is all I know about it.” He later confided to a reporter that “…he had the uncomfortable feeling of a man who goes into a fight without knowing just what to expect…”

 Liscum had been assured that there would be a meeting of officers on the field just before the fight, when the plan would be revealed, but this never happened. Colonel Liscum was not alone in his concern: Colonel Meade was likewise pretty much in the dark as to what was supposed to happen.

 Before sunrise Liscum positioned 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment between two parallel roads, ready to fall in behind the British Naval Brigade contingent, his assigned place in the order of march. He soon heard the Japanese cavalry, followed by their white-clad infantry, approaching along the far road. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers soon came within earshot on the nearer road, followed by a small colonial contingent from Hong Kong and two battalions of U.S. Marines, with 350 men and an artillery battery. When the British Naval Brigade had not appeared after a few minutes, Liscum’s
units fell into line behind the Marines. Even in the dark, progress was steady until the column swung off the road and began moving across terrain broken by dikes and ditches. Hampered by their field pieces, the Marines found the going difficult but continued with the column on a route that paralleled the city wall (Map 4). The French joined the column at dawn, as did the British Naval Brigade, which entered the column of march ahead of the 9th Inf., as originally planned.

At daylight the march shifted to a more westerly direction along a dirt road, the morning calm was interrupted by desultory firing ahead, as the British encountered and overran some scattered Chinese forward outposts. As the sun rose and the units crested a small rise to their front they could see their final objective, the South Gate of the Walled City lay 3000 yards ahead, with the multinational force arrayed across the landscape. Between them and the city at a range of 1,000 yards was their intermediate objective, the West Arsenal, its 12-foot high mud walls already under small arms fire. The intervening landscape was dotted with mud huts, and the ground was dotted with numerous large waterholes whose depth ranged from two feet to over a man’s head. What the allied force could not see was a broad water-filled ditch, essentially a moat, that paralleled the walls of the arsenal. The U. S. forces drew up on the forward slope of the rise and watched the battle as it unfolded, until they were to be called into action.

By now it was after 5:30 and the British and American artillery opened fire on the Walled City in an attempt to silence the Chinese artillery. They were able to mass the fires of about 30 small field guns and a handful of larger British naval guns against the Boxers. The Japanese spearheaded the attack on the arsenal with the white-uniformed infantry, as Imperial Chinese troops and their Boxer allies engaged the attacking Japanese at long range from the Walled City. The U.S. infantrymen could occasionally see a white-clad soldier fall when hit, but the majority of the small arms fire passed over the heads of the Japanese infantry and plunged into the ranks of the Americans and British arrayed on the forward slope of the hill, where little cover was available. Within the next 45 minutes, one American was killed and eight wounded. Once the arsenal was secured and the fire from it ceased, the men descended the hill and found welcome cover. The battalion surgeon, 1st Lieutenant Charles Marrow, and some corpsmen remained on the hill, treating wounded. A huge explosion was suddenly heard to the northeast, in the Russians’ sector, with the detonation of a large magazine. Lieutenant William Waldron reported that “...a huge bell-shaped cloud of smoke rose over the city. It was followed by a deafening report of an explosion which shattered window glass four miles away.”

Awaiting the final assault Colonel Liscum met with British Brigadier A.R.F. Doward, the senior commander, to discuss the situation. The 9th was to follow the Japanese to the Walled City’s South Gate and join the American Marines and Royal Welsh Fusiliers in supporting their right flank. Enemy artillery fire had by now shifted and concentrated on the troops in and around the captured arsenal, but fortunately most was fired high and overshot its intended targets. Friendly artillery continued to pound away at the Imperial forces until their ammunition ran out, and the artillerymen grabbed rifles and joined their respective units to fight as infantry. The larger British naval guns, however, had much more ammunition, and continued to pour a deadly fire into the city and atop its walls.

At 7:15 a.m. Brigadier Doward gave the signal for the final assault on the city. The Japanese poured out of the arsenal gate and were met with concentrated artillery fire; many were killed and wounded. The 9th, positioned too far to the right, had to move parallel to and behind the arsenal wall in a file of companies until they reached a break in the wall which afforded passage. Directed by a British staff officer to move through the wall, cross the moat, and take up positions to the left of the Japanese, the regiment attempted to do so, but soon ran up against the rear elements of the Japanese and the French, who were now crammed into a small settlement of mud huts. Coordination with the Japanese was futile, as neither side could understand the other. Liscum decided to wait until the Japanese and French had cleared the area. Thirty minutes later, he saw that the Japanese were advancing on the city, but the terrain to their front slowed them down and caused them to drift to the left as they tried to negotiate the enormous ditches. As the 9th Inf. drew closer to the Welsh Fusiliers and the Marines, Liscum realized that he could not possibly maneuver his unit into the space he was supposed to occupy. To compound the problem, the French still remained in the village in small, uncoordinated pockets and showed no inclination to leave the protection of the huts, leaving the Japanese right flank unprotected. Seeing their exposed flank, Liscum reversed the movement of his two units to the center, instead executing a right oblique movement to cover the Japanese right flank.

As these maneuvers were taking place Liscum’s right flank unit, Major Jesse M. Lee’s 1st Battalion, came under fire from their front, and Liscum ordered Lee to proceed to the bank of an elevated road that ran northeasterly toward the city walls. Here the battalion could find good cover and continue to support the Japanese. Lee’s lead company, Company B, quickly closed on the road and took up positions as the other companies filled in on their left. They had no sooner settled in when the entire battalion was hit with heavy, concentrated, and deadly small arms fire from a line of mud huts to their right. The French were to have captured these huts, but had failed to do so because of heavy casualties. Now subjected to enfilading fire, Lee’s battalion began sustaining increasing casualties from long-range small arms fire, largely because the blue uniforms of his soldiers so contrasted with the brown of the mud embankment. Liscum was stunned and realized that to remain there was suicidal. Anchoring his line on B Company, he wheeled them to face the enemy to their east. At this point, Lee’s battalion was on the left flank and Major James Regan’s 2nd Battalion was on the right. The 3rd Battalion had not yet arrived at Tientsin, and Liscum ordered Lee and Regan to advance by rushes until they were within
the 600 yard effective range of their Krag rifles. The allied artillery did not support the 9th during their advance because they were not aware it was taking place, and because their attention was focused on supporting the main attack of the Japanese. The rough, uneven ground offered more cover than the embankment, but the Chinese fire still took its toll among the advancing Americans. Colonel Liscum remained in an exposed position on the elevated road so he could see the maneuvering units and encourage his men. The battalion commanders likewise moved freely among their men, directing and encouraging them. Captain Edwin Bookmiller of G Company was shot through both hips and went down. First Lieutenant Edward Bumpus assumed command and led the unit on.

Up to this time the unit had not fired a shot, but once in range they poured volleys of fire into the mud huts at the base of the wall, where the enemy seemed to be concentrated. The advance of the 9th had slowed due to the exhausting movement across the wet, muddy ground and the increasingly accurate enemy rifle fire as they approached the city wall. In spite of the punishment being inflicted on them, Liscum’s units continued to advance relentlessly, a tribute to the leadership of the officers and NCOs whose ranks were also being thinned by the marksmanship of the Chinese. Liscum was soon joined on the roadbed by Color Sergeant Edward Gorman, holding high the regimental colors.

Through intense volley fire and maneuver, the 9th got within 200 yards of the Walled City, the standard distance at which they would begin their final charge across the battlefield attested to the heroism, discipline, and determination of the 9th Infantry Regiment and her commander. Ammunition was low; some men had but 10 rounds of .30-40 in their belts. Captain Noyes, the regimental adjutant, wrote a quick note to Brigadier Dorward describing the 9th’s situation and location and asked for a volunteer to go back across that fire-swept bog to deliver the note. Unhesitatingly, Private Thomas Caraher of B Company stepped forward and succeeded in getting through to deliver the message. Dorward read the note, wrote a reply, and Caraher again ran the gauntlet of fire to return to his unit. Later in the day, he again made the trip to request additional troops. Noyes recommended him for the Medal of Honor, but the recommendation was not completed until Noyes recovered from his wounds and no one would endorse the request. Instead, Caraher received the Certificate of Merit, the equivalent of today’s Distinguished Service Cross. Dorward had scarcely enough men left to constitute a reserve, but he managed to alert a 100-man company of British soldiers and marines and 60 U.S. Marines to be prepared to move to the aid of the 9th. He also directed a party of Chinese troops to carry ammunition forward to the beleaguered Americans and

sent back to the allied base camp for two companies of Chinese troops with stretches to report to him. Led by First Lieutenant Lawton, the 1st Battalion adjutant, the 160-man relief force moved to the aid of the 9th, but by 1 p.m. was pinned down by heavy fire 200 yards short of the unit they were to relieve. Lawton requested covering fire as the American Marines low-crawled into the right flank of the embattled remains of the 9th. At this point, Lawton was badly wounded in the right shoulder, but two privates dragged him to safety.

Lawton’s return and the arrival of additional troops on the battlefield stirred up a hornet’s nest. The Chinese in the walls and mud huts increased the volume of small arms fire on the Americans. Fearing a possible attack on their right flank, Lee ordered that a few sharpshooters be posted to observe the enemy’s activities and shoot if they had a good target. One of these, Private Robert von Schlick had already been wounded twice earlier and once again fearlessly manned an exposed position, providing covering fire for Lawton’s rescue. Hit yet again, he returned to his position where he continued to fight until he was struck in the face. He was recommended for the Medal of Honor, but the paperwork was lost and it was not until Major Lee, by now a major general, realized the error and reintiated the process. In 1913, the now-disabled Private von Schlick walked to a post office in Syracuse, New York, signed a receipt for a small package, and received his belated Medal of Honor. Even today, official accounts of the Medal of Honor list him as a posthumous recipient.

By now the situation was desperate in front of the Walled City. Leaders redistributed ammunition with the lion’s share issued to designated marksmen who had the best shots at the loopholes and enemy positions. Volunteers went out to retrieve ammunition from the dead and wounded. Later in the day a force of British colonials from Hong Kong was able to venture forward and deliver a resupply of ammunition, but they did so at the cost of several dead, including the captain who led them. The wounded and unwounded lay under the blazing sun, first drinking the last of their water and then the foul, brackish water in which they lay and bled. The Chinese stretcher-bearers ordered by Dorward arrived in mid-afternoon and under the costly, accurate fire of Chinese
sharpshooters managed to evacuate many of the casualties to the aid station at the arsenal. Late that afternoon, Lee received orders that all troops would pull back to the West Arsenal because the Japanese attack had stalled before the South Gate. Determined to blow the Gate early next morning, the Japanese refused to withdraw.

The 9th Infantry Regiment’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Coolidge, arrived at Tientsin with the 3rd Battalion at 10 a.m. on the 13th of July. He could hear the sounds of the heavy firefight and ordered one company to relieve A Company and one to secure the bridge across the Pei Ho River (Map 3). Learning just before dusk that the regiment was to pull back, and ordered to bring all available men with extra ammunition, medical supplies, and water, Coolidge withdrew his companies from the bridge and sped to the arsenal with Companies A, I, and L. Upon reaching the arsenal, Coolidge reported to Brigadier Doward and requested to move his battalion forward to join Lee. Doward refused, telling Coolidge of the extraction planned for the night of the 13th and that his men were to assist their comrades in the withdrawal. With Doward’s permission, however, the battalion adjutant — Lieutenant Harold Hammond — was able to move a small party forward with ammunition without incident. Promptly at dusk, British and U.S. Marines on the left flank were withdrawn piecemeal with only one man wounded. Upon completion of that withdrawal, priority of artillery fire was shifted to the right flank and the withdrawal of the 9th began. With the assistance of the British Naval Brigade, U.S. Marines, and Chinese stretcher bearers, all wounded were evacuated to the arsenal. The rest of the unit began its retrograde at 8:10 p.m. and completed the move to the base camp with only one death, Private Robert Golden of C Company, who was hit seven times. The 3rd Battalion spent the night at the arsenal, ready to participate in the assault on the morning of the 14th. Early the next morning the Japanese blew open the South Gate and poured into the city. They encountered only slight resistance, as the Imperial Army and the Boxers had fled during the night. Elements of the 3rd Battalion participated in the mopping up operation without casualties.

While the 9th and the Marines recovered in Tientsin, additional American troops arrived from the Philippines and America, along with allied units, to prepare for the march on Peking to relieve their embattled legations. It took them almost three weeks to agree on a plan and a start date. In the meantime the 9th’s health deteriorated rapidly, with more than 300 men falling sick diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, and typhoid, due in large part to the filthy water they had drunk and the poor sanitation of the city. Upon his arrival, Major General Adna Chaffee was appalled at the condition of the regiment and decided then and there that their role in the advance on Peking would be a minor one.

The fight for Tientsin cost the coalition force approximately 870 casualties. The Russians and Germans east of the Pei Ho sustained about 120 killed or wounded, while the fighting at the South Gate cost another 750 casualties. The Ninth had its commander and seventeen enlisted men killed and four officers and seventy-two enlisted men wounded. Approximately 21 percent of the regiment was killed or wounded, but we must remember that only wounds requiring hospitalization were reported. Wounds that could be treated on sick call went unreported. The U.S. Marines lost six men killed and 26 wounded. American dead were buried near their compound, but were later disinterred and shipped home to be buried in soldiers’ hometowns or the military cemetery at the Presidio of San Francisco. When some of the U.S. units were transferred from China to stabilize the situation in the Philippines, the Ninth stayed behind to guard the large amounts of supplies that had accumulated there. The following summer, only one reinforced company remained in China when the regiment returned to Manila.

The Boxer Rebellion, seldom mentioned and little remembered a century after that bitter fighting against a tough, determined enemy, has a special place as the defining event in the history of the 9th Infantry Regiment. Many deeds of valor and feats of marksmanship were performed before the Walled City on those July days in 1900. Three men earned the Medal of Honor and 19 the Certificate of Merit. On the battlefield of Tientsin the Manchu regiment coined its motto, “Keep up the fire!” in recalling the dying words of Colonel Liscum, a courageous commander whose last thoughts were for his regiment, his men, and his mission.
Battle captains (BCs) and battle tracking play a critical role in the day-to-day operations of deployed maneuver units operating in a combat theater of operations. A lot is riding on how well battle captains perform the job and how well they maintain situational awareness through battle tracking.

Battle tracking is not an easy thing to do; there is no one-way science to it and it can be best learned mostly by doing. It helps a great deal when battle captains have a system that allows for situational awareness at all times. Since it is nearly impossible to know and remember all things happening at the same time, a tracking system is needed to fill in the gaps and record all events that can be referenced when memory fails. There is not much room for error in battle tracking; precise and complete information is needed to prevent misfortune. The maneuver units and commanders at all levels depend on the battle captain for accurate information; the battle captain must be able to provide near accurate information all the time and be able to provide access to assets that can influence the fight as it develops.

The purpose of this article is to share some of the lessons I learned while serving as a battle captain with Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team) during a deployment to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom III. It must be noted that some of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used may not apply to all units, but the intent is to share the experience so that others may have a frame of reference and can further refine the TTPs that will fit their units’ needs.

Daily Mission Tracker
The daily mission tracker lists all of the day’s events, taskings, missions, and operations. It is the tool used to track what has to happen, when, and where. It makes it easy to track which unit is responsible for what mission and when they have to execute it. The tracker removes the guesswork of when things have to happen and who is responsible for the execution or tasking. It provides details such as:

- Which area within the area of operations (AO) will patrols be going to;
- Where traffic control points (TCPs) will be executed; and
- When and where raids and cordon and search/cordon and knock operations will be conducted.

It basically gives the battle captain a snapshot of the day’s events and the locations in the AO where they will be executed. It provides instant situational awareness and ready access to information with regards to what each maneuver unit will be doing for the day. It is a good way to resolve any conflicting movements within the AO, and also facilitates tasking units with any late, new, or immediate missions.

Daily Mission/Movement Tracker
The daily movement tracker tracks unit movement coming out of the forward operating base (FOB) on any given day, assigning mission numbers to each mission that goes out. It is a key tool that shows which elements are out, the mission commander, their
current mission and their composition. It removes any guess work. Unit movements can be tracked using the FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below), but when there are multiple movements it can be hard to track everything. The daily mission/movement tracker allows battle captains to maintain situational awareness when they temporarily lose sight of who is still out on missions due to other concerns or events. With this accurate picture, battle captains can direct or redirect available combat power as needed anywhere in the AO.

All current missions are highlighted in yellow, completed missions are highlighted in green, and cancelled missions are highlighted in gray. If an incident happens on any of the missions, the mission number is highlighted in red and the type of incident and any battle damage assessments (BDA) are typed into the remarks block as a quick reference.

The daily mission/movement tracker lists all unit movements in the AO, gives an accurate count of patrols or movements during any given day, and lists what type of missions were performed and when they were completed. It is an effective tool to track all unit movement and missions.

**Convoy Tracker**

The convoy tracker tracks all convoys coming through the AO. This is important because it allows battle captains to track all friendly elements in the AO that might affect operations. Maintaining situational awareness of the AO is a paramount concern of a battle captain because of the impact on missions and security. By knowing who is in the AO, a battle captain can also plan contingency support. In our AO, we track all friendly movement and require units to let us know in advance if they have elements coming through the AO. That way, we can update them on the current enemy situation and reinforce as necessary and control/direct fires in our AO in support of any contact against the enemy. It is easy enough to track friendly units that have FBCB2 capability; but problems can arise with those units that do not have this capability. In our particular AO, there are civilian security forces that patrol and operate. We don’t control them, but we track them nonetheless because when they come into contact in our AO, we provide them assistance. Knowing all movements in the AO is key to avoiding any possible conflict in the movement and execution of missions or operations and also in preventing fratricide. All available assets must be in place to avoid fratricide.

**Significant Activity Tracker**

The significant activity tracker tracks all significant activities during the day. It reports when, where and what happened, to whom it happened, how it happened, actions taken, and any BDA, friendly or otherwise. It gives an account of how many enemy attacks happened during the day and the type of attacks. This can provide battle captains with a historical record of the enemy’s pattern or TTPs he is employing in the AO.

This tracker can also make reporting to higher easier by having a ready format that can be sent digitally or by FM. The significant activity tracker can give leaders a point of reference on enemy activity with regard to type and location in the AO that has significant intelligence value. It allows leaders to reference recent or past attacks and pinpoint where and what time of day the enemy conducted these attacks. It can also give a reference point for where the enemy is operating and if he moves to a new location. The worst thing that any unit can do is allow the enemy to control certain terrain in the AO. This provides him with a refuge where he can establish a base of operation and have a sense of security. Denying him this ability is very critical.
Current Operation Tracker or Execution Checklist

The current operation tracker or execution checklist tracks all current operations as reported by the maneuver units. It offers an accurate picture of what happened previously and what is currently happening on any given mission. This is all the more important when there are multiple operations/missions going on simultaneously in the AO, such as during a battalion mission in different parts of the AO executed by different companies and attached assets. The current operation tracker allows anyone to see what happened and what is currently going on. This also allows battle captains to report to higher what is currently happening as reported by maneuver units. As in any battalion mission, sometimes the battalion executive officer (XO) or other controlling officer may get distracted by events in one of the sectors and lose track of the others. They can always look back at the current operation mission tracker and reference anything he might have forgotten or missed. This also helps out when any higher-ranking officers come into the middle of a mission. They can just look up and familiarize themselves with the events as they occurred without requiring the battle captain or BN XO to give him a run down of current events.

This tracker is an effective tool that can be used to reference anything about the current operation/mission. Sometimes maneuver units send reports that are incomplete or the battle captain may have a question on; the current mission tracker or execution checklist will allow him to reference the earlier report and get clarification on any report passed on as the situation develops. This is a useful tool because it paints the unfolding situation on the ground as reported by the maneuver units. The panorama of the operation is tracked in the pages of the current operation tracker or execution checklist. This can also be used for an after action review (AAR) to help identify what went well and what can be improved upon.

FOB Map

The FOB map shows a layout of where everything is on the base. It gives battle captains an accurate point of reference from where they can provide directions or know where the reports are coming from with regards to force protection issues inside the FOB. It allows them to pinpoint the source of the report inside the FOB and direct elements to that location as needed and track their movement. It is a good frame of reference that provides orientation, cardinal direction, and situational awareness when the FOB is too large or complex to accurately know and master. It is easy to take it for granted until the need arrives and leaders realize what a great help the map was in providing directions and tracking movement.

TOC Battle Drills

The TOC battle drills are a series of battle drills used for different events or situations that happen in the AO. It lists all the actions to be performed during certain situations and guides battle captains on what needs to happen or whom they need to inform as the situation develops. These are ready-set drills that BCs follow to cope with certain situations. Sometimes the event is overwhelming and it’s possible to have a momentary lapse; these battle drills allow BCs to act on the situation without having to think about what they have to do. Everything is listed as to what should happen and all they need to do is to make it happen. This
is very effective when dealing with overwhelming or unexpected events. The battle drills list assists battle captains in executing actions that need to happen with regards to the current situation.

**Combat Power Tracker**

The combat power tracker gives an accurate report of what is currently available in terms of vehicles relative to combat power. In a mechanized or SBCT unit, this is critical because it allows BCs to allot combat power where it is needed and assign tasks to units that have available combat power to execute the mission. It also puts to task the units to report accurately what is and is not working and when they are expected to come up and be available for use. This also applies to other equipment in addition to vehicles. Combat power tracking is important to be able to utilize all available support assets to fix or replace non-mission-capable equipment.

As a rule in our battalion, vehicles with deadline deficiencies do not roll out on missions until they are fully mission capable. Allowing vehicles with a deadline deficiency to roll out and participate on missions is assuming great risk that can have a great impact on mission accomplishment and personnel safety. Any vehicle or equipment that is not fully mission capable should not be used until it is fixed or back to fully mission capable status. The consequences are not worth the risk. It is plain irresponsible to endanger lives when you don’t have to. Taking chances works when the required action is up to the individual not his equipment. It is hard enough to execute missions that require bold and decisive actions; a Soldier’s least worry should be that his equipment would fail when it matters most. Maintenance is very important; you have got to allot time for recovery of men, weapons, and equipment; otherwise there is a risk of exacerbating the deficiency. Getting it fixed at the onset allows getting it into the fight in a far shorter time than you would otherwise. It is hard to balance mission requirement and maintenance sometimes. We all want to have our tools of war with us when we execute missions but the choice of getting the equipment fixed or taking a chance on it is never a safe gamble because it’s hard to predict when things will slow down or more importantly when equipment will break down. The difference between failure and success in overcoming an enemy may very well depend on how well your equipment is fixed or back to fully mission capable status. The consequences are not worth the risk. It is plain irresponsible to endanger lives when you don’t have to. Taking chances works when the required action is up to the individual not his equipment. It is hard enough to execute missions that require bold and decisive actions; a Soldier’s least worry should be that his equipment would fail when it matters most. Maintenance is very important; you have got to allot time for recovery of men, weapons, and equipment; otherwise there is a risk of exacerbating the deficiency. Getting it fixed at the onset allows getting it into the fight in a far shorter time than you would otherwise. It is hard to balance mission requirement and maintenance sometimes. We all want to have our tools of war with us when we execute missions but the choice of getting the equipment fixed or taking a chance on it is never a safe gamble because it’s hard to predict when things will slow down or more importantly when equipment will break down. The difference between failure and success in overcoming an enemy may very well depend on how well your equipment...
works. Taking time for the recovery and maintenance of men, weapons, and equipment has direct bearing on morale, welfare, and ultimately mission accomplishment.

Available Combat Assets
The available combat assets list is currently available on any given day to support a mission in terms of combined arms and other assets available within the brigade. The SBCT concept of the combined arms fight is truly effective when the available assets are allotted for the conduct of operations or missions. The combined arms assets are not always available, but when they are it can be truly inspirational to see what can be brought into the fight. This tracker allows BCs to summon the available assets for troops or friendly in contact as needed or requested during any given day when they are available. During planned missions, battle captains can request combined arms assets that they will need for the fight, but also for the time when the need arises during a routine mission. It is good to know what is available to help troops or friendly forces in contact. The available assets that can successfully defeat the enemy on any given day sends the message to the enemy that he may choose the time and place, but he will pay dearly every single time with all the assets available to support and fight the fight.

Current Task Organization
The current task organization lists all elements and attached elements that a battle captain has operational control over. It allows a BC to know who is currently in charge of what task around the FOB and who is currently outside the FOB on fixed sites providing security. It is very important to know at all times where each element is and what they are doing. The current task organization lists what each unit is responsible for and what element is currently at what location. Sometimes it is hard to track who is currently where, especially when reliefs in place occur during a previous shift. This just shows who is where. It is easy to know what company owns what location on steady state operations, but the accurate details of which platoons are currently at which locations are the fine details that BCs are able to know with this tracker. The current task organization tracks short term and the day-to-day steady state of operations as it pertains to companies and attachments. It also shows available combat power that each maneuver unit has at the FOB at any given time. This gives the battle captains ready access to information in order to task sudden missions to companies that have the available combat power to execute them.

Communication
The first rule of reporting is that the first report is almost always wrong. It can pay dividends to wait a bit before sending any report to higher about any particular report that maneuver units sends. Of course, a correction to the report can always be sent, but from my experience the first report is almost always wrong. It may have some grain of truth, but it is almost always incomplete. Communication is the most important thing in battle tracking, and battle captains cannot allow maneuver elements or any attached element to leave the FOB without communication. This may be stating the obvious, but it can happen and it has happened. The absolutely worst thing that could happen to an element is to conduct a mission without communication. For out-of-sector missions that are too far away for FM communication, the minimum requirement for our battalion was FBCB2. Communication is very important because it is the only link to pass on reports or information that have critical importance to the maneuver element. This is the only way to send help when the need arises.

Shift Change Brief
The shift change brief is probably one of the most important things a BC does in the TOC. It helps out to follow a format to ensure that no stone is left un-turned (figuratively speaking) when it comes to passing out all information to the next shift. Battle captains need to inform the next shift of all that has happened, what is currently happening, and what needs to happen. It is critical to transfer all information to the next shift to ensure that no stone is left un-turned (figuratively speaking) when it comes to passing out all information to the next shift. Battle captains need to inform the next shift of all that has happened, what is currently happening, and what needs to happen. It is critical to transfer all information to the next shift to give them full situational awareness. There should be no short cuts on this because this is far too important to just casually go over it without much thought or preparation. The worst thing a BC can do is not to tell everything. The shift change brief is the transition from one to the next. Depending on how many battle captains are working or how many shifts there are, the other shifts have no clue on what happened during or before their shift, that is why it is a must to paint the whole picture.
SHIFT CHANGE OVER: 251230OCT04
CURRENT MISSION:
BDE FRAGO:
BATTALION FRAGO:
TASK ORG:
COMBAT POWER:
CURRENT FRIENDLY SET:
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES LAST 12 HOURS:
DTG
CURRENT MISSIONS:
BN Operations
Counter Mortar Set 7 and 8
Apache (A/1-24)
Maintenance, refit, and prep for combat
Prep for future operations
Bulldog (B/1-24 IN)
Maintenance, refit, and prep for combat
Prep for future operations
VIP Security
Cobra (C/1-24 IN)
Raid
QRF
Hatchet (HHC/1-24 IN)
Maintenance, refit, and prep for combat
Prep
DUE OUTS FROM HIGHER:
LOG PAC:
RANGES SCHEDULED:
MEDEVAC:
KIOWA/APACHE WEAPONS TEAM STATUS:
LESSONS LEARNED:

In Summary
There are no books to read or classes to take that teach the battle captain’s role, duties, and responsibilities. Most of the learning is from experience and the school of hard knocks. Being a battle captain is a pretty daunting task at times. You can learn some pointers from others, but the complexity of the job requires you to learn by experience. It may be a thankless job, but the opportunity to learn makes it a worthwhile enterprise. It gives you a unique perspective on how maneuver units fight, how company commanders employ and fight their companies, how battalion commanders see the battlefield and fight the battalion as a whole. It is truly a unique experience where learning is a by-product, provided you are willing to learn. It gives you insight on how units execute and fight the battle. As a battle captain, you don’t have a full appreciation of what maneuver elements go through during engagement until you experience it yourself. That’s why it is important to go out on some of the missions, experience what maneuver elements do, and see the battle space as maneuver units see it. It will provide you an accurate view of what is out there on the ground. The FM radio and FBCB2 does not provide you the elements that are in the field of battle, it actually sanitizes you from these elements. To fully appreciate and empathize you would have to share in the experience, and this can only be gained by going out of the TOC and participating on missions. Firsthand experience and knowledge of the AO are important for the battle captain to perform his duties.

Figure 6 — Example Shift Change Over
Brief Format

that can provide full situational awareness.

There are different techniques depending on how many personnel operate the TOC. The key is to be able to share the load of work in the TOC; one shift doing all the work or being on station during critical hours of the day will exhaust that shift. Each shift must share in the burden and load. It is hard enough to come in and do the same thing over and over, more so if is it a constant grind. Staffing the TOC is mission and available personnel dependent, but it is critical to allow a periodic break for all individuals in the TOC. It is important to note that even the most motivated individuals will wear out eventually without breaks and a sense of job satisfaction. This is critical if you want keep the individuals working in the TOC motivated. Job satisfaction can only come from three things in the TOC:

1) Contributing to the overall effort to successfully achieve the unit’s mission;
2) Making a difference by supporting
As a result of the Global War on Terrorism, the Army’s Reserve Component (RC) has been tasked in ways unanticipated in the pre-9/11 environment. Prior to September 11, 2001, training support to RC units was determined by a predictable monthly and annual cycle of events encapsulated in the “Training Support XXI” (TS XXI) goal of meeting pre-mobilization readiness objectives. TS XXI programs are now secondary to post-mobilization requirements preparing RC units for imminent deployment to combat theaters. Both RC units and their active component partners in training support brigades and battalions have had to adjust to this new training environment.

This article describes the experience of one training support battalion (TSBn), the 2nd Battalion, 357th Infantry Regiment (TS), in grappling with change and adapting systems to provide support to National Guard units headed to war. Specifically, we’ll detail our experience in urban operations training. Our intent is for other TSBns and RC combat arms units to benefit from the thoughts expressed here, resulting in improved training and training support.

The 2-357 Infantry (TS) is assigned to the 4th Training Support Brigade, headquartered at Fort Lewis, Washington. The battalion’s TDA (table of distribution and allowances) allows for 39 NCOs and seven officers commanded by an infantry lieutenant colonel with an 11-series sergeant major as battalion NCOIC. NCOs and officers are branch qualified at their current grade and designated as observer-controller/trainers (OC/T) in the rank of staff sergeant and above. Most are assigned to a training support battalion from MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) leadership positions and expect to rotate back to a MTOE unit upon completion of their three-year tour. The “observer-controller” part of OC/T takes a back seat to the “trainer” designation — the vast majority of our time is committed to resourcing, planning, and driving training events for our RC counterparts.

As part of the adaptation to a post-mobilization (or pre-deployment) training focus, the 4th TSB commander tasked each of his battalions with training proponency in specific areas, including convoy operations, urban combat, detainee operations, and forward operating base (FOB) procedures.

He tapped the 2-357 for urban combat proponency in November 2003. This entailed the development and sustainment of the brigade’s urban operations (UO) SOP, planning and execution of urban combat live fires, and conduct of team through company
UO collective task training.

While planning and conducting training support, we have had to be sensitive to the reality of RC mobilization: mobilized units will always have too much to do with too few resources and not enough time before deployment. We have accepted this as a condition. With a “One Team” attitude and a feeling of ownership, the TS unit can prove invaluable to the training unit as another supporting headquarters dedicated to mitigating the worst effects of the inevitable scheduling, resource, and equipment conflicts.

Each mobilization exhibits its own unique challenges, but our experience tells us the following list covers the most common competitors for time, resources, and personnel:

- Latest arrival dates (LAD),
- Latest ship dates (LSD),
- Equipment services and repairs,
- New equipment fielding and training,
- Varying levels of leader and unit proficiency on assigned tasks,
- Competition with active duty units for training resources,
- Competing demands on leaders, such as command post exercises (CPXs) and cultural awareness training, and
- Unresolved soldier readiness process (SRP) deficiencies during collective training periods.

Clear command priorities, daily battlefield update briefs, appropriate scheduling, tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs), and leadership professional development (LPD) are just a few ways to meet these training conflicts head-on and get the most of your limited time with the unit.

“What Right Looks Like”

As a TS unit, we know and teach doctrine. Only where doctrine is lacking do we rely on non-doctrinal tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and informal lessons learned distributed in such publications as Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) bulletins. Another critical resource are NCOs and officers who have just rotated out of combat theaters and been assigned to a TSBn. This periodic infusion of “new blood,” combined with doctrinal references and TTPs/lessons learned from in theater, form the solid doctrinal and experiential foundation on which we build our training modules.

Our OC/Ts carry a “WRLL” card for each task trained that day. For example:

Task: Operate as a fire team in a four-man stack configuration.
“What Right Looks Like”
- Team leaders controls movement and fires of team.
- Team members maintain fire control and muzzle awareness.
- Team members execute assigned role as 1,2,3 or 4 man in the stack.

The WRLL technique succinctly defines that point at which we can safely and effectively pass through the next training gate. Given allotted training time, the mobilizing unit will not achieve a trained status in every task or subtask. The official answer is “train to standard” then move on. But it’s just as critical for units to gain exposure to a wide variety of tasks prior to deployment. “WRLL” assists us in achieving a reasonable balance between the depth of proficiency on a given task and breadth of exposure on the many critical tasks each unit requires before deployment.

The intent is not to replace doctrine or subvert the “train to standard” mentality, but rather to focus leaders in a field environment on the critical tasks his or her element must master that day before moving to the next step. It answers the small unit leader’s questions, “What am I accomplishing today and how do I know we’re done?”

Sample Urban Combat Training Module

Each post-mobilization training period has required adjustments to the base plan, but in general, we can define the common urban operations tasks as follows:

- Conduct short-range marksmanship training,
- Conduct individual urban operations skills training,
- Conduct team through platoon battle drill training,
- Conduct company attack and cordon and search operations,
- Conduct fire team and squad urban operations live-fire exercises.

Typically, a battalion-size unit can dedicate from five to 10 days to an urban combat module during pre-deployment operations. We chose an eight-day model as an example of how to organize and implement such a plan. We focus on team through platoon collective training using daily drills, situational training exercises (STX), and live-fire exercises (LFX). The chart below provides a brief summary of a typical program of instruction (POI).

We teach both the strong wall and opposing corners room clearing techniques (both in common use in combat theaters) at the beginning of the module so units understand these two essential methods. For the remainder of the module, the unit employs the strong wall technique only. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages, but time available and safety considerations dictated standardization and proficiency focused on one of the two methods.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Day of TRN</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
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<td>SRM, 4-man stack, PAX/Room Search, Marking</td>
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<td>Squad/Squad</td>
<td>Squad/Platoon</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Team</td>
<td></td>
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Figure 1 — Typical POI for Urban Combat Training
DAY 1:
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper body and weapon position during short range marksmanship drills,
* Proper safety and trigger manipulation on assigned weapon,
* Properly executed four-man stack for room clearing (strong wall technique).

Day 1 sets conditions for success for the entire module. A demonstration team (we call it an OMEGA team) shows the unit what right looks like for all techniques and tactics prior to the unit's execution. The first point of emphasis is establishing the proper body position and weapons handling skills for short-range marksmanship typical of urban combat. The OMEGA team demonstrates how to clear a room with a center-fed door and a corner-fed door. We describe the duties and responsibilities of each man (1-4) in the stack. We also teach points of domination, sectors of fire, verbal commands, and weapon malfunction drills. After demonstrating all techniques, we break the company down into its platoons and conduct glass house drills focusing on the four-man stack (center-fed door and corner-fed door rooms). Once the platoons have become comfortable with these techniques, we conduct another OMEGA team demonstration.

After this demonstration and the unit is comfortable with the four-man stack, the OMEGA team demonstrates clearing hallways, corners, and stairs at team level.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TASK</th>
<th>Rd</th>
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<th>Method</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Controlled Pair</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Meter stationary fires 3 times</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Controlled Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Meter stationary fires 3 times</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Controlled Pair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAM Table 2</td>
<td>Same as Qualification fires 3 times</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled Pair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FAM Table 2:
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper short range marksmanship body and weapon position,
* Proper safety and trigger manipulation on assigned weapon, and
* Properly executed four-man stack for room clearing (strong wall technique).

Day 2 builds on Day 1 techniques under live-fire conditions at a short-range marksmanship (SRM) range. Soldiers execute extensive dry and blank fire drills prior to the first live rounds down range.

Day 3:
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper body position,
* Safety and trigger manipulation,
* Four-man stack executed in accordance with SOP

OC/Ts run concurrent training stations in glass houses where fire teams continue to practice room and hallway clearance techniques from the four-man stack. SRM skills taught include stance, low carry/high carry, controlled pairs vs. double tap, trigger manipulation, SPORTS, walking and shooting, and ready-up drills.
* Team leader maintains command and control.
* Clear room using strong wall technique,
* Fire control and weapons safety enforced,
* TMs proficient in clearing multi-room buildings, and
* Tactical movement between buildings.

Day 3 continues to train fire team fundamentals with the goal of achieving proficiency on tasks listed above. We start the day with a review of the proper SRM techniques, the four-man stack, and room clearing using the strong wall technique. We then teach how to move and maneuver in an urban environment, as well as training how to search a room and personnel. Teams conduct glass house drills and then move into buildings to develop skills with a variety of different room and hallway configurations.

Squad leaders are expected to begin controlling team actions and movement in buildings on Day 3.

**Day 4:**
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper body position,
* Safety and trigger manipulation,
* Four-man stack executed IAW SOP,
* Team leader maintains command and control,
* Clear room using strong wall technique,
* Fire control and weapons safety enforced, and
* Squads proficient in clearing multi-room buildings and
* Tactical movement between buildings.

Day 4 incorporates force-on-force training in the MOUT site at team and squad levels. The training objective is team and squad proficiency in clearing multi-room buildings under dry and blank fire conditions equipped with MILES 2000.

**Day 5:**
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper body position,
* Safety and trigger manipulation,
* Four-man stack executed IAW SOP,
* Team leader maintains command and control,
* Clear room using strong wall technique,
* Fire control and weapons safety enforced, and
* Squads proficient in clearing multi-room buildings under live fire conditions.

Day 5 consists of a team shoot house LFX with teams clearing multiple rooms. Teams conduct this training first in a glass house and then conduct dry, blank and live runs through a shoot house. The team LFX serves as a rehearsal for the squad LFX conducted on Day 6. During the LFX the teams will be required to enter and clear multiple rooms and hallways.

**Day 6:**
What Right Looks Like:
* Proper body position,
* Proper safety and trigger manipulation,
* Four-man stack executed IAW SOP,
* SL maintains command and control,
* Clear room using strong wall technique,
* Fire control and weapons safety enforced, and
* Squads proficient in clearing multi-room buildings under live-fire conditions.

Day 6 capitalizes on the skills acquired on days 1-5 through a challenging squad scheme of maneuver that requires the squad leader to maintain control of two maneuver teams clearing six rooms separated by a long hallway. Squads conduct this training first in a glass house and then they conduct dry, blank and live runs through a shoot house.

**Day 7 and 8:**
What Right Looks Like:
* Team and platoon leaders maintain command and control,
* Fire control and weapons safety enforced,
* Tactical movement between buildings,
* Squad practiced enter and clear a room,
* Platoon practiced at platoon assault a building, and
* Company command post (CP) practiced at planning and controlling CASEVAC (casualty evacuation) and detainee operations.

Days 7 and 8 focus on squad and platoon
maneuver tactics and techniques in the urban environment. We establish squad and platoon-size training lanes in the MOUT site. In order to incorporate training on TLPs, these missions are driven from an OPORD the platoon leader receives from his commander on Day 5. This then allows the platoon a full 48 hours to conduct their TLPs. Although we are prepared to provide the unit a “CTC-like” experience on each lane with civilians on the battlefield (COB), an interpreter, OPFOR play, CASEVAC and detainee operations, we scale the level of intensity and complexity to the training status of the unit.

**Company Commander Leader**

*What Right Looks Like:*

* Company commander and his CP practiced at planning and controlling a deliberate attack in the urban environment,
* Company commander practiced at risk assessments and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the unit and its leadership,
* Company CP practiced planning and executing detainee and CASEVAC operations, and
* Company commander understands the use and integration of interpreters.

Because of the time constraints and the proficiency level of the units, we have found that an achievable proficiency level by Day 8 is platoon-level operations. However, to better prepare the units for future operations we have found it beneficial to conduct at a minimum a TEWT on possible company operations, specifically cordon and search operations.

The focus of the TEWT is to provide the leaders with an understanding of the complexity of the operation and insights on how to control and plan the operation.

**Summary**

At the conclusion of this sample eight-day POI, the unit from individual through platoon level is thoroughly versed on the most critical urban operations combat skills and tasks. Company level leadership understands the complexity and planning considerations involved in offensive operations in the urban environment and has conducted troop-leading procedures for a company attack. Clearly, there are many valid variations to this POI. Unit training objectives, time, and resources available are all determining factors in deciding what your training module looks like. For example, we haven’t trained units on ballistic breaching techniques during our urban ops modules, but this is also a critical skill and worthy of inclusion if training objectives and resources allow.

We have portrayed one example of an effective approach to urban operations during post-mobilization National Guard training, including key considerations during planning and implementation. The units we have supported are hungry for training and laser-focused on meeting their upcoming challenges in combat. The TSBn serves as a key facilitator, helping the unit understand “What Right Looks Like” and how to get there during both pre-deployment and in-theater training time.

**References:**

* RTC 350-1-2
* FM 3-06.11
* CALL Handbook No 03-4, Small Unit Leaders Guide to Urban Operations
* CALL Handbook No 04-16, Cordon and Search

**Lieutenant Colonel Sean M. Callahan** was commissioned through the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1984. He currently serves as the battalion commander for 2nd Battalion, 357th Infantry (Training Support) at Fort Lewis, Washington. His previous assignments have included troop leading and staff positions in the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

**Captain Karl F. Ledebuhr** was commissioned through the Citadel in 1995. He currently serves as the battalion operations officer for 2nd Battalion, 357th Infantry (Training Support) at Fort Lewis. His previous assignments include troop leading and staff positions in 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas, and 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry at Fort Lewis.
The Wisconsin National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment trained and validated at Mobilization Center Shelby (Camp Shelby, Mississippi) this past summer for deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, applying creativity and old-fashioned elbow grease in order to prepare itself in a very short time for war. Based on its mission as a convoy escort battalion, the unit executed a mobilization station plan approximately 60 days in duration. Lessons learned from this experience, perhaps not exactly duplicable to other active or Reserve units, may assist a battalion staff in planning their own mobilization.

There are five major lessons learned by 2-127th staff that may be beneficial to future mobilizing units. These are:

1. How to validate unit leadership,
2. How to shape mob center training based on mission-specific observations from the Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS),
3. How to accomplish the real world mobilization jobs of the S1 and S4 while at the same time allowing admin and logistics staff time to validate on their individual and collective tasks,
4. How to train an HHC, and
5. How best to replicate a theater-specific field environment at the mobilization center.

In my personal experience as a mobilization officer for several units ranging in size from an engineer detachment to an infantry brigade, the validation of unit leadership concurrent with the unit’s line Soldiers has repeatedly been the source of much unit-level frustration. Early on during mobilizations for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, the National Guard Bureau (NGB) recognized leader validation as a problem. Leaders were fully engaged in classes and individual training, limiting their time available to manage, supervise, and lead. NGB’s solution to this dilemma, called “Phased Mobilization,” activated unit leadership ahead of the unit’s main body and sent them to the mobilization center a few weeks early to validate on individual tasks. However, due in part to a shortened time between receipt of mobilization orders and mob station report date, the 2-127th did not have an opportunity to pre-train and validate their leadership in this fashion. Therefore, at Camp Shelby unit leaders spent a large amount of time, especially during the initial individual training instruction, immersed in basic Soldier tasks. While I cannot speak to trends in other recent mobilizations, I urge future mobilizing units to push for the phased mobilization of their leadership and to wisely use that additional early activation time to validate key individuals.

A second lesson learned was the importance of conducting a PDSS early in the mob process to enable key leaders to better understand their mission and to validate mob station training requirements.
Key personnel from the 2-127th — the battalion commander, the command sergeant major, the S4, the S3, and the S2 — conducted this reconnaissance in theater during the unit’s individual training window at Camp Shelby. PDSS is a must and usually creates no scheduling conflict with individual training if leaders have validated prior to mobilization. The PDSS allowed 2-127th’s key leaders to link up with the 1st Battalion, 178th Field Artillery Battalion at CSC Navistar, Kuwait, and begin planning a relief in place/transfer of authority. While the five PDSS personnel learned a great many things that helped in preparing the 2-127th, perhaps nothing was as important to mobilization center activities as the clarification of the scope of the mission the unit would assume. Rather than a traditional infantry role, the 2-127th deployed on an MTOE (modified table of organization and equipment) based on Military Police manning and equipment with uparmored M1114 HMMWVs. The reason for this soon became apparent: 1-178th’s assignment was to escort convoys, both military long-haul and civilian sustainment pushes, from the Kuwait-Iraq border throughout the entire Iraqi theater of operations. Close observation of 1-178th’s mission during the PDSS allowed the battalion commander and S3 to request modifications to Camp Shelby’s standard infantry battalion training package, focusing on mounted training, convoy escort missions, vehicle battle drills, and even in creating a mock-up of the MTS communication platform 1-178th’s vehicles had been equipped to use. While the 2-127th received other important training at Camp Shelby such as urban operations and dismounted movement techniques to ensure they could receive a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to perform in a more traditional role, this modification to Camp Shelby’s training program allowed Soldiers and leaders in the battalion to focus on and prepare for the specific duties of their forthcoming mission.

While a return to the intention of phased mobilization would help somewhat, the S1 and especially S4 leadership and staff face an especially difficult position while mobilizing. They not only must complete all the individual training for themselves and then perform during collective training in a field environment in support of tactical objectives, but they must also accomplish the massive day-to-day business of preparing the unit to deploy. For the S4, this includes:

- Hand-receipting, inventorying, and technically inspecting (TIing) huge quantities of equipment laterally transferred from multiple states or fielded new through the Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) program,
- Decoding the Operational Deployment Document and forming recommendations to the commander on what equipment should be taken and what should be sent back to home state,
- Researching what equipment will be left behind in theater by the outgoing unit as SBE (stay behind equipment),
- Establishing procedures and timelines for packing and shipping,
- Ensuring the unit mess and life-support facilities are adequate during Camp Shelby events,
- Overseeing food service, water, and ammunition resupply to units and portions of units at disparate training sites, and
- Learning — as a light infantry unit — how to perform and report maintenance on vehicles and other new equipment.

For the S1 shop, tracking and supplying filler personnel presented the greatest and most time-consuming challenge. The unit attrited only about 6 percent, which was lower than average and due mainly to medical issues. Still, 6 percent of 620 Soldiers is 38 personnel, not to mention all the changes in unit organization and manning documentation often brought about by the departure of a Soldier. The S1 performed a number of other real-life duties to include management of Red Cross emergencies, tracking and completing a large number of change of rater OERs and NCOERs, and managing the Unit Status Report (USR). These tasks occupied the S4 and S1 personnel at all levels almost exclusively after completion of their initial

Soldiers from Company A of the Wisconsin National Guard’s 2nd Battalion, 127th Infantry prepare for convoy security training at Camp Shelby. The battalion’s mission in Iraq will include convoy security.
block of individual training. The battalion commander largely exempted these personnel from collective training events, not an ideal solution but the best to ensure his staff could complete the primary near-term mission of managing and mobilizing the unit.

The simple recommendation that is logically simple but not so monetarily simple, is to mobilize a second set of S1 and S4 personnel, perhaps not even a full complement, but enough to perform in an OPCON capacity all the real-life business while the unit’s true staff trains. This second set of administrators and logisticians would redeploy to home state at the completion of the unit’s collective training. The monetary difficulty here is that mobilization orders only allow 100 percent of a unit’s strength to mobilize. While Joint Forces Headquarters – Wisconsin (JFHQ-WI) provided teams of S1 and S4 personnel initially, these teams had two other battalions back in Wisconsin preparing to mobilize that were in need of experienced support. JFHQ-WI’s support teams left Camp Shelby within the first few weeks of the unit’s arrival and, while JFHQ-WI provided excellent support pushing material forward and assisting in rear operations in Wisconsin itself, the business of running the battalion’s day-to-day operations in Mississippi was left to the battalion’s primary staff.

Large slices of S1 and S4 personnel involved in real-life missions rather than in collective training created a challenging situation for the battalion’s headquarters company. All companies were required by the mob center to have 85 percent of their personnel at each collective training event in order to validate. In addition to the various administrative and logistical tasks that needed to be accomplished, other staff and leadership were also needed to attend to specific missions that sometimes conflicted with scheduled training: the S2 attending specialized training off-site, the S5 escorting visiting dignitaries and news media, the S6 working to understand and provide training to the battalion’s line companies on newly fielded communications equipment, the XO and S3 shop planning the ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) and preparing operations orders for the unit’s movement overseas. This left available for collective training on any given day from 50 to 80 percent of the HHC’s total strength (73 personnel). While the HHC performed admirably, earning the praise of Camp Shelby’s trainers, and while any basic Soldier skill training cannot be considered a bad thing, these personnel did not have the opportunity to practice their typical MOS skills until the final ARTEP: commo sergeants, tactical operations center (TOC) radio operators, intelligence analysts, maintenance crews. Rather than send these Soldiers through line-unit training in urban operations, individual movement techniques and convoy escort procedures, the HHC would have benefited from MOS-specific schooling, off-site or on-site, and a validation focused on the performance of HHC collective tasks: consolidated maintenance, military decision-making process (MDMP), S1 operations, etc. This specialized training and validation would potentially require additional resources and forethought from the mob center as well as a detailed set of requirements presented initially by the HHC commander, S3 and battalion commander to influence the mob center’s standard training model.

Lastly, training at the mobilization center should occur in and imitate as closely as possible the conditions in which a unit will operate once established at a forward operating base (FOB). Camp Shelby has done an admirable job setting up several FOBs, complete with guard towers, berms, and motorpools. One limitation, however, was that the FOBs did not come equipped with telephone lines or internet connections, which made communication, staff operations, and reporting difficult. The mobilization center should be funded to improve its FOB facilities in regard to data processing and communications. Close replication of today’s modern battlefield environment is necessary to train TOC personnel and to allow unit administrative and logistics personnel to participate in collective validation while also continuing to manage deployment activities.

These lessons learned, while not all inclusive and perhaps not applicable to every unit’s specific circumstances, should assist units in planning for their time at a mobilization center. The 2-127th Infantry’s experience at Camp Shelby was rewarding and positive, and the battalion appreciated the taste of southern hospitality it received in Mississippi.

Wisconsin National Guard Soldiers apprehend a suspected “insurgent” during training conducted at Camp Shelby.

Originally published as Silence Was a Weapon in 1982, this 2004 reprint with its catchy title is especially useful today. Stuart Herrington recounts his days participating in the Vietnam war, as a Military Intelligence officer. After a first Vietnam tour, Herrington returned to Vietnam putting his increased language capability and formal intelligence training to the test.

Herrington worked with the Phoenix program in Military Region III, fairly close to Saigon. The primary goal of the Phoenix program was to attack and dismantle the Vietcong shadow government. Herrington vividly describes the frustrations of advisor life as he develops ties working alongside South Vietnamese troops often disinterested in actual action against the Vietcong. Meanwhile the Vietcong successfully pushed the belief on the North Vietnamese that Americans are using the puppet South Vietnamese government to get the wealth of Vietnam. The inability of American and South Vietnamese troops to provide adequate security lent credence to Vietcong propaganda. The Americans provided only an inadequate security protection for the Deim regime, and the parallels with the current Iraqi war are striking.

Promoted to captain, Herrington introduces some of the personalities of his second Vietnamese tour, such as Nguyen Von Phich, a VietCong defector. Phich served as the executive officer of his VC company. This father of six sacrificed his life as he develops ties working alongside South Vietnamese troops often disinterested in actual action against the Vietcong. Meanwhile the Vietcong successfully pushed the belief on the North Vietnamese that Americans are using the puppet South Vietnamese government to get the wealth of Vietnam. The inability of American and South Vietnamese troops to provide adequate security lent credence to Vietcong propaganda. The Americans provided only an inadequate security protection for the Deim regime, and the parallels with the current Iraqi war are striking.

The heart of this account is CPT Herrington’s learning from another Army officer how to extract information from defectors or captured enemy soldiers. He learned one of the keys to getting captured Vietcong to talk was decent treatment. Decent treatment was the first step to set up those hard core soldiers for intel exploitation. Also, the careful preparation of a case file for each Vietcong source is explained as the only way to get a conviction of alleged insurgents under Vietnamese law. By studying Herrington’s selected use of case studies, a Military Intelligence Soldier could learn how to set up procedures to make the most of captured soldiers. In fact, this account is a good primer for commanders, intelligence officers, and Military Police as well on how to work with the enemy and exploit the information gained.

The successes outlined in Stalking the Vietcong are valuable lessons learned. Ba Tung, a Vietcong who gave himself up, identified 28 enemy cadre members. Tung’s story is a shining example of how skillful handling can result in wrapping up enemy infrastructure. Tung identified 23 of the Vietcong cadre in his area and they were later arrested. These arrests snowballed to more than 300 captured cadre, and many of these subjects were also recruited to work against their former organization.

The failures of the Saigon special police are a direct result of their brutal interrogation methods, which sometimes resulted in deaths. Teaching the special police effective techniques and monitoring their work was the toughest part of Herrington’s job. The success or failure of counterinsurgency intelligence efforts can be directly traced to the ability of advisors to train and persuade their native counterparts to use humane detention and effective interrogation methods.

Stalking the Vietcong is a valuable guide to build a foundation to defeat an insurgency. Every Soldier interested in defeating an insurgent enemy should read and study this book.


In the closing days of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson authorized one of the more curious “expeditions” of his tenure in office. Bowing to pressure from the British, two separate expeditionary forces boarded transport vessels to begin what one military officer has described as “how not to conduct a foreign intervention.” One of the forces was a brigade-sized element from the 31st Infantry stationed in the Philippines, and augmented by Soldiers from California, that would land in Vladivostok. The other was major components of the 85th Division, the “Custer Division” from Camp Custer, Michigan, which would land at Archangel.

While this “Siberian misadventure” was not the only foreign intervention of the Wilson administration — there were somewhere near 19 in all — the parallels between what is described in current military parlance as counterinsurgency operations and urban warfare are striking. Additionally, in the never-ending search for “lessons learned,” a direct connection can be drawn between those lessons the United States Army “learned,” “released,” and “forgot” in comparing current operations and historical examples of armed intervention in Russia. At times, the similarities as well as the differences are alarming.

Willett’s book introduces the reader to the internal and external political reasons for the United States’ intervention in Russia
following the Bolshevik Revolution, however, defers in-depth analysis to works already published. Instead, his impeccable and exhaustive archival research provides the basis to view the intervention through the words, letters, and diaries of the participants.

Russian Sideshow concerns itself with the military operations of the United States Army and Navy in both theaters of war: the Archangel to Murmansk front where the Army Expeditionary Force North Russia (AEFNR) became involved in combat operations, and the Siberian front that encompassed Northern China and Siberia from Vladivostok to the Ural mountains where the Army Expeditionary Force Siberia (AEFS) tried to protect the Trans-Siberian Railroad and the infamous “Czech Legion.”

The intervention for the allied forces, and the Americans in particular, was a recipe for disaster, and it began with the issuance of Wilson’s Aide Memoir in July 1918. American forces were dispatched to conduct defensive operations to protect allied stores and supplies already on Russian docks, to assist the Czech Legion in evacuating their forces from the Siberian interior, and to not interfere in internal Russian affairs. Although they were to be a defensive force, the doughboys quickly found themselves on the front lines conducting offensive operations.

Placed under British command, and issued a hodgepodge of British and Russian equipment, the Americans quickly found that in Archangel, the Canadians and them would face the brunt of combat in many loosely connected, poorly executed engagements. The American commander in Archangel had very little contact with his troops in the beginning of the intervention as their force was dispersed to protect the railroad was paramount to their survival. However, the railroad was the main line of moving troops and supplies from the east into the Siberian heartland. Additionally, the coal mines received American protection as this valuable resource kept the trains running. The Trans-Siberian railroad became the main battleground not only between the Red and White forces, but the loaded eggshells that Graves was warned about. The Whites and their Cossack allies fought for domination of the railroad, often times putting the Americans between them and their Japanese allies. Worse still as the White government started losing control and retreating, the Japanese continued territorial expansion, the Cossacks increased their murderous killing spree against opposition groups and the British departed, leaving the Americans in the middle of this explosive power struggle.

The last straw for the Americans came when Red forces attacked the coal mines killing 24 and wounding another 16. From that point on, the gloves were off. American troops started conducting nighttime raids into the villages, rousting males from houses and detaining them for questioning. Combat patrols focused on destroying bomb-making facilities hidden away in village houses, and there were retribution attacks against population area that harbored what we would call “terrorists” today.

By July 1919, American forces boarded ships for the journey home, ending the North Russia intervention, and by January 1920 the remaining forces departed Vladivostok.

Willett does an exceptional job of explaining the intricate situation the intervening forces were up against. Compounding the United States Army’s difficulties during the two separate and distinct interventions were unclear orders regarding the limits of their involvement from the political administration, a lack of support from the Army Chief of Staff, poor intelligence, maps and battle plans, an unfamiliar chain of command, unfamiliar equipment, and mutiny from the British and French allies that refused to fight following the armistice ending World War I.

Exacerbating an already delicate and precarious balance of power in the region, the Russian people would not support the intervention and the peasants would not join in military operations against the Bolo’s (Bolsheviks or “Reds”) and side with the “Whites” (former Tsarists officers). Most disheartening for the American troops was the desertion of U.S. Soldiers that were handpicked for the intervention because of their language skills. Some of these deserters would lead Bolo forces against the Americans and engage in kidnapping U.S. Soldiers and contracted railroad employees for ransom.

Adding to the confusion for the American soldiers was the dichotomy in distinguishing ally from enemy. In towns and villages, local peasants worked with the “doughboys” during the day and conducted raids against their billets at
night. At other times, the doughboys found themselves protecting the Red forces from the brutal actions of their Japanese allies, the White forces and the lawless Cossack hordes loosely affiliated with both groups.

Russian Sideshow is a fitting tribute to the “Polar Bears” that fought in horrific weather, against an enemy whose motivations, language, customs and traditions were not understood; for Russian allies that were more brutal and repressive than the enemy they were fighting; and with other allies bent on territorial expansion, political intrigue, and mutiny. No greater honor can be paid to these forgotten warriors than a proper acknowledgment of their bravery and sacrifice. Willett accomplishes this through his day-by-day narrative accounting that incorporates every soldier and sailor wounded, missing, and killed in action during the campaign and the individual honors received through courage in action throughout his book.


Christoph Reuter is an international correspondent for the German magazine Stern. He spent eight years moving among the society that produced suicide brigades for the Iran-Iraq War of the ’80s. He reported and interviewed whole communities from Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Palestinian militants to Sri Lankan Tamils, investigating the culture of martyrdom. Originally published in German as Mein Leben ist eine Waffe, it offers insights into the nuances of the justification and conditioning of suicide missions. The book opens by challenging the assumption that suicide bombers fit into neat typical profiles, and the book draws examples of rich and poor, secular and religious, Marxist or jihadist, as well as female and male.

Reuter quotes Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law and cousin Ali Ibn Abi Talib, who rose to become the fourth rightly guided caliph after Muhammad’s death, respected Sunnis and revered by Shiites who said: “The Quran (Islamic Book of Divine Revelation) is but ink and paper; it does not speak for itself. Instead, it is human beings who give effect to it according to their limited personal judgments and opinions.” This is a significant statement for the book highlights that the Quran, if followed literally, contains no theological or judicial system except for 200 clear rules of conduct. Therefore the Quran represents the first building block to an interpretive form of moral and social life. This means that particular aspects of Islam can justify democracy or it can justify outright war against the west. Chapter 1 also argues that Shiite Islam with its core cult of martyrdom, self-sacrifice and being the underdog in Islamic history makes it well suited for war and the author uses Chapter 2 a detailed discussion of the ease by which Ayatollah Khomeini created mass suicide battalions to throw at Iraqi forces.

What is revealing are the methods the Iranian Revolutionary Guards used to basically collect children indiscriminately from schools, and with little training send them to the front. In autumn 1982, Khomeini issued a fatwa (religious edict) declaring that young people need not have the consent of their parents to volunteer in the Iran-Iraq War, and he rejected an Iraqi offer to return Iranian children in an exchange. Another Shiite organization is Hizballah, which is more refined than the Iranian radical mullahs in its arguments and rationale about suicide bombings and exporting Islamist revolution. Hizballah’s clerics believe in exporting their revolution in parts and not in one whole effort, and regarding suicide it developed a corpus of justifications for suicide attacks delineating between those who want to escape life and those who take their own life to inflict harm on an adversary. They have exported their doctrine and even technical expertise to many other organizations including the Sunni-dominated Palestinian terrorist group Hamas and Al-Qaeda affiliates.

Readers will also learn of how one suicide bomber in a crowded café in Israel simply revealed his dynamite belt to the terror of patrons, allowed several to escape, and then detonated himself. The message was not the casualties but simply, you are not safe, flee from here and tell others. As one reflects on the chapter regarding Palestinian suicide bombers, it is the corrosive effect it has on many generations that will make it very difficult for whole communities to integrate into normality once the Palestinians gain their state. Suicide bombing in Palestine has been marketed to such an extent that the young view this is an acceptable and even glorified way of settling major political problems. The author reveals the strong veneer the parents and spouses of suicide bombers put out for the media that disguises their anguish and confusion.

Reuter’s book is recommended for those wanting to expand their understanding of counterterrorism or who engage in the business of force protection. He has a very European point of view that many in America may disagree with or take exception to, however book is recommended as a means of enhancing the debate on suicide bombing.

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For more information, contact Infantry Magazine staff:
Phone — (706) 545-2350/DSN 835-2350
E-mail — Inf.MagazineDep@benning.army.mil
Mail — Infantry Magazine, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005
Web site — https://www.benning.army.mil/magazine (will need AKO login/password)
Private First Class John Anderson from the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, provides security during a civil affairs mission in Reehana, Iraq, September 30.

Paratroopers with the 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, patrol through the French Quarter district of New Orleans September 9.

Soldiers with B Company, 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry Regiment, search an area near Al-Radwnea, Iraq.
In the Next Issue:

Urban Operations:
* Taking the Fight to the Enemy
* Applying Combat's Lessons
* Firing Positions: How We Trained

PIN: 082698-000

Department of the Army
Infantry (USPS 370630)
U.S. Army Infantry School
ATTN: ATSH-ATI
Fort Benning, Georgia 31995-5593

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