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Soldiers with D Company, 155th Brigade Combat Team, clear a building that is known to house insurgents in Al Iskandariyah, Iraq. (Photo by Airman First Class Kurt Gibbons III, USAF)

Soldiers with B Company, 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light) pull security during a mission in Sahjoy, Afghanistan 14 February 2005. (Photo by Specialist Harold Fields.)

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:
Observations and feedback from our combat theaters indicate a requirement for more cultural awareness training and education. We have accumulated a wealth of individual and unit experience that confirms the tremendous impact a friendly, neutral, or hostile civilian populace can have on military operations and our ability to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Unfortunately, a significant amount of our common understanding is the result of mistakes in cross-cultural interaction inherent to stability operations; of which counterinsurgency is a subtype. Our desire to be responsive to the needs of deployed and deploying units has led to some very focused regional studies and resulting products that we are now using across the force to make our Soldiers and leaders more aware and better prepared to adapt to cultural differences in order to facilitate rather than impede mission accomplishment. Despite their usefulness in the near term, these focused products are not the total answer for our tactical level combat leaders. Our real, long term, dilemma is defining the significant military aspects of culture as they might apply in any theater and further determining how these various aspects of culture manifest themselves and might influence tactical operations. The complexity of the contemporary operational environment (COE) demands that we provide our tactical commanders a robust analytic tool and not just a list of cultural dos and don’ts.

Cultural awareness is not a new concept for our Army and we are certainly not alone in our struggle to understand its significance to military operations. During and since the second World War, language, political, and cultural instruction have all been part of the U.S. Army’s preparation for deploying Soldiers, both to prepare them for what they would find in a — presumably friendly — host nation and to help them better understand the motivations, values, and prejudices that drive the enemy. While cultural understanding pays enormous dividends, the lack of it can likewise have dire consequences as the catastrophic mistakes of some of our enemies have shown. Prior to World War II, Japanese leaders failed to understand the resolve of America once attacked or the unifying effect such an event would have on the American people. Likewise, they grossly underestimated both the industrial might of this nation and the speed with which it could be mobilized against anyone who attacked us. More recently, on 11 September 2001, al Qaeda’s attacks costing thousands of American lives and those of citizens of other nations in New York City, in Washington, D.C., and in Pennsylvania ignited responses far different than those which our enemies expected. Two brutally repressive regimes, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, were toppled and replaced by democratically elected bodies, thousands of enemy have been killed, and their leaders are either themselves dead, awaiting trial, or are fleeing for their lives.

As an Army, we bring the elements of combat power to this fight: maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership, and information. Properly applied, our use of combat power is decisive in tactical engagement after tactical engagement. We have proven time and again that our critical analysis and understanding of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time is inherent to successful tactical planning and execution. But the acronym is now METT-TC, and in the COE we must continue to improve our ability to analyze the impact of civil considerations, of which culture is a subset, on tactical operations. Cross-cultural interaction typified our operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and will definitely continue to characterize our stability and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Every side in this struggle needs the population for recruits, information, support, and most importantly legitimacy. In order to win the war, we must win the people first. A hostile population, regardless of our good intentions, undermines every military success. Our actions must never alienate our source for legitimacy and final stability.

Cultural awareness goes far beyond the discussion of customs, habits, taboos, values, and other factors we have historically
associated with getting to know another culture. It includes a comprehensive understanding of the organizations; infrastructure; populations; environmental, economic, and religious issues; and events — contemporary and historical — within the area of operations. The civil affairs personnel and foreign area specialists assigned or attached to our formations can be invaluable in this regard, both for the advice they can offer and the foreign language skills they possess. Do not ignore them. The indigenous population can be supportive, neutral, or hostile to our efforts, and through coordination with our own civil affairs experts we can often influence which of these attitudes the population chooses to follow. The manner in which we employ information is crucial to influencing the population, and timeliness is essential. Correcting misinformation spread by the enemy is far less effective than beating him to the punch with the truth, and psychological operations teams are a combat multiplier, both for the media assets they can employ and their finger on the pulse in the area of operations.

Cultural awareness will not necessarily always enable us to predict what the enemy and noncombatants will do, but it will help us better understand what motivates them, what is important to the host nation in which we serve, and how we can either elicit the support of the population or at least diminish their support and aid to the enemy. Today our adversary has chosen to fight on the urban battlefield, regardless of the collateral cost to the nation’s people and infrastructure. We in turn have gone after him wherever he hides and fights, and are successfully rooting him out from his bunkers and lairs in the classic infantry fight. As we support Iraqi and Afghan civil authorities in the establishment of stable democratic governments and the functional infrastructure to meet the needs of the population, we find that it is often the civilian considerations that define the mission.

We are making steady progress in cultural awareness training at the Infantry School. We are laying the groundwork for this in instruction to students in the Infantry Captain’s Career Course (ICCC), Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC), the Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC) and the Basic NCO Course (BNCOC), and to all personnel deploying from Fort Benning, either through the CONUS Replacement Center or as part of Benning-based unit deployments. Given the immediacy of the present war, we are focusing on the threat posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism and conducting cultural awareness training based on the present geographical area of interest. We recognize the need to present instruction beginning with initial entry training (IET) and continuing throughout the NCO and officer education courses resident at Fort Benning. In order to enable and focus self-development, we will also develop and maintain a subject-specific, prioritized reading list to supplement students’ in-class instruction that complements their formal instruction.

We will further integrate cultural awareness into the instructional fabric of the Infantry School and the Army. To achieve this, we are developing a military cultural aspects model that properly and definitively isolates those components of culture that enables us to interpret, analyze, and evaluate their impact on generating and sustaining combat power. We must make the intangible tangible and define abstract ideas into concrete terms. We are looking for a mental model with the clarity and utility of OAKOC for terrain analysis. Once we have the model, we will integrate it into our doctrinal instruction to define the military aspects of culture and include practical exercises in our teaching scenarios that reinforce the teaching points and learning objectives of the model.

Cultural awareness is too important to be left to chance, and that is why it will remain a part of the Infantry School curriculum. We are refining our considerable and ever-expanding data base of cultural resources, and will infuse it into our programs of instruction. The thousands of Soldiers and leaders who graduate from Fort Benning each year will carry with them the tools they need to defeat the enemy and protect and sustain the establishment of democracy. At the United States Army Infantry Center and School we train for the fight even as we educate for the future. We owe our Nation and the Soldiers who defend her nothing less.

Follow me!
USAIS Reading List Lacks Works on Counterinsurgency

The U.S. Army Infantry School Recommended Reading List, which consists mostly of works on high-intensity, conventional, big unit warfare, signifies an institution still mired in the Fulda Gap. The young infantry leader who makes it through the list will be intellectually superlatively prepared for the type of warfare our nation’s enemies are least likely to do us the favor of fighting. Meanwhile, counterinsurgency, the type of war we have proven ourselves least able to wage successfully, and thus the one our enemies are most likely to choose, is ignored.

I know it is unreasonable to expect to find classic counterinsurgency works like David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare, John McCuen’s The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency, Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency, Jean Larteguy’s novel The Centurions or Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations on the list. They were all written before most of the serving officers at Fort Benning were even born and are difficult to impossible to find. I believe, however, that if the commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq had read and understood these classics when they were at USAIS we might be much further along in those campaigns and with fewer killed and wounded American Soldiers.

What’s wrong with current books, though, like T.X. Hammes’ Slings and Stones or the Army’s own John Nagl’s Eating Soup with a Knife? If “Transformation” is to be more than a buzzword for better ways to get cool new gear to the troops or procurement of the next generation platforms, our Infantry leaders must have the intellectual foundation that comes from serious reading and study.

— Lieutenant Colonel Terence J. Daly, USAR Retired

Editor’s Note:

David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare, John McCuen’s The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War, and Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency are all available in the Amos Library at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at Fort Benning. Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations is available at Fort Benning’s Sayers Memorial Library. T.X. Hammes’ Slings and Stones and John Nagl’s Eating Soup with a Knife? are not presently available in the Donovan Research Library, but will be ordered. John McCuen’s The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency and Jean Larteguy’s The Centurions are out-of-print.

Fort Benning — 35 years later

I have just returned from the last of three visits to Fort Benning, Georgia, that have restored my confidence in the future of the Infantry and the long tradition of honorable service and sacrifice.

My wife and I were able to visit our son at the Infantry Training Brigade on Sand Hill for a Memorial Day/Family Day weekend. The presentation of troops in the Infantry OSUT Company was correct, disciplined and a real impact to parents, friends, and family. Most of these Soldiers had only been allowed a few phone privileges in the past eight weeks and fewer still letters. My first impression of the Soldiers in my son’s platoon was they did not appear as young as I remember from my experience in a training brigade in 1969. They all appeared very fit and stood tall in their Class B uniform with black berets and nearly shaved heads. Parents and family strained then smiled as they recognized their recent civilian prodigies and the transformation their drill sergeants had performed in a few short weeks. The platoon sergeants were stoic and their decorations told of many achievements and distinguished service.

We were quickly united with our son for a fast-paced weekend of relaxation, real civilian restaurant food, and air-conditioned movies. I was able to meet several new friends of my son and was impressed with their purpose, maturity, and attitude. While several Soldiers were recent high school graduates, many had some college or were college graduates seeking something more than they could find in the civilian world. The weekend was soon over and we returned him back to his barracks to resume his training cycle.

In July we returned for the graduation ceremony and “Turning Blue” for successfully earning his infantry blue shoulder braid. The ceremony was preceded by a brief demonstration by Bradley fighting vehicles and the infantry squad. The ceremony itself was memorable in the recitation of the Drill Sergeants’ Creed and Army Values. The opportunity to pin on the Infantry cord was a much appreciated event for those Soldiers with family and friends to participate. Soon another weekend was over and we returned our Soldier to the Airborne holding area.

The third visit was to the Ranger Memorial near Infantry Hall. This time I was returning to “sign for” a recent graduate of Airborne School and the Ranger Indoctrination Program. The morning was cold for Georgia in October. The transformation to wearing the distinctive tan Ranger beret is no small effort and is well deserved by these young volunteers three times over. I was again proud to be present to pin the 75th Ranger Regiment patch on my Ranger that day. The standards and intensity are reflected in the pride and determination that can be seen in these young Soldiers’ eyes and confidence.

— Colonel Glen A. Armstrong
U.S. Army, Retired
Hales Corners, Wisconsin
CLC Now Open to Non-Armor Branch Officers

MAJOR MATTHEW DOOLEY

The challenges of the United States Army’s force modular redesign are upon us, and we are addressing the necessary changes with the grim, professional determination of an Army at war. Our Army’s efforts to make Units of Action (UA) a reality have demanded some fundamental shifts in our thinking about how brigade combat teams are organized and how they are expected to fight. The role of Cavalry has not been spared this reexamination. One of the latest efforts to ensure the Officer Education System at Fort Knox remains current and relevant is the Armor School’s recent redesign of the Cavalry Leaders Course (CLC).

As we change our force structure, so must we also reconfigure our assumptions about who should attend the Cavalry Leaders Course. The combined arms philosophy that underpins the logic behind creating these UAs demands that all officers, regardless of branch, who are assigned to the BCT (UA) planning staffs or assigned to the Reconnaissance Squadrons within these brigades, should understand reconnaissance and security operations. Leaders who attend CLC are provided with the in-depth knowledge of reconnaissance and security, as applied to the new Reconnaissance Squadrons found in the HBCT, IBCT, and SBCTs. The CLC accomplishes its learning objectives through challenging practical exercises that test and hone the students’ understanding of the latest doctrine, TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures), organizations, missions, capabilities and limitations of RSTA and Reconnaissance Squadrons.

The Armor School at Fort Knox encourages CLC enrollment for all Armor officers as well as those leaders serving in Infantry, Field Artillery, Engineers, Aviation, Military Intelligence, and Signal Corps branches, who find themselves assigned as planners or commanders of RSTA/Cavalry organizations within these new UAs. All those in the above categories should seriously consider attending CLC to prepare for their assignments to or in support of RSTA and Cavalry organizations. Attendance at CLC is currently open to graduates of any officer career course with the rank of first lieutenant (promotable) through major. Enrollment is available through ATRRS.

M-7 Pedestal To Boost Convoy Protection

REBECCA A. MONTGOMERY, U.S. ARMY NEWS SERVICE

A new M-7 pedestal now allows Soldiers to mount machine guns and grenade launchers in the rear of their HMMWV’s open cargo bed to improve convoy protection.

The new, sturdier mount provides gunners with a 360-degree range of fire instead of the 180-degree range provided by the M-6 mount in front of the cargo bed. The Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center at Rock Island Arsenal has been contracted to produce 4,500 of the new M-7 pedestals. A total of 485 have already been produced, and officials there said they are ramping up to produce 500 a month.

The M-7 pedestal allows Soldier to mount the M-249, M-240B, and M2 machine guns and the MK-19 grenade launcher in the rear cargo bed of M998 HMMWV.

With the cargo HMMWV being one of the most common convoy vehicles, troops in Iraq had been modifying the existing M-6 machine gun pedestal, officials said. Soldiers began moving the pedestal from its designed and tested position in front of the cargo bed to a rear position between the wheel wells.

This allowed them a 360-degree range of fire instead of the 180-degree range in the front, but created safety and structural issues. This prompted the need to change the M-6 design to better meet the requirement, said officials from the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command.

The improved pedestal has a full bed-width base made of an aluminum armor plate with alternate pedestal mounting locations and standard attaching points. The pedestal also has a more rugged column support configuration which officials said reduces the tripping hazard presented by the M-6 and breaking of the support braces. There is also a depression stop which ensures safe zones of fire when aiming forward, preventing shooting into the cab area.
A mobilized Alabama National Guard Soldier was killed in a motorcycle accident on 12 March in Brundidge, Alabama. The 40-year-old operator (a specialist) was traveling in a residential area. An SUV backed out of a driveway and into the motorcycle’s path. Both the motorcycle operator and passenger received fatal injuries. Both riders were wearing helmets. Speed is undetermined at this time.

There have been 152 Class A-C Army motorcycle accidents from the start of FY04 to this accident, resulting in 34 deaths.

Don’t let this happen in your formation. Consider these actions to prevent POV accidents:

- Prior to operating a motorcycle, ensure Soldiers have completed an Army-approved Motorcycle Safety Course (MSC). (Locations can be found at http://msf-usa.org/)
- Establish an agreement with motorcycle operators regarding responsibilities. Take appropriate action(s) when noncompliance with the agreement is detected or reported.
- During POV inspections, verify motorcycle operator’s license, MSC card, and appropriate PPE.

The U.S. Army Safety Center offers numerous training materials and other items such as POV checklists and sample motorcycle operator agreements. These can be found on the center’s website at www.safety.army.mil. Look for the POV Risk Management Toolbox.

The U.S. Army Marksman Unit (USAMU) hosted the All-Army Small Arms Championships in conjunction with the U.S. Army Infantry School March 12-23 on Fort Benning, Georgia.

A USAMU Soldier triumphed over 123 competitors to take the overall prize in the All-Army Small Arms Championship March 20.

Specialist Sean P. Watson, a USAMU Service Pistol Team member, won the U.S. Army Small Arms Overall Individual Championship, which was an aggregate of the U.S. Army Service Rifle Individual Championship and the U.S. Army Service Pistol Individual Championship. Specialist Craig S. Nelson, a USAMU gunsmith, took second place and Sergeant Robert S. Park II, a USAMU service pistol shooter, came in third.

Other results include:

**Novice Division**
1st place — SSG John M. Buol
2nd place — SSG Russell V. Gerhardt
3rd place — SFC Kevin W. Bittenbender

**Secretary of the Army Pistol Match**
1st place — SFC Mark Benson
2nd place — SSG Jared Van Aalst
3rd place — SGT Thomas Scott

**CSA Rifle Match**
1st place — 1LT Rodney Richmond
2nd place — SSG Jared Van Aalst
3rd place — SSG Jared Van Aalst

**EIC Rifle Match**
1st place — Sniper 1, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment
2nd place — Detachment 3/4, 1st Army
3rd place — Pennsylvania Army National Guard

More results can be found at www.usarec.army.mil/hq/amu.

### CULTURAL AWARENESS CORNER

**GREETINGS** — An Arab will shake hands gently and may pull those he greets toward him and kiss them on either cheek in greeting. Arabs may also hold hands to walk to other locations. If an Arab does not touch someone he greets, he either does not like him or is restraining himself because he perceives the person is unaccustomed to being touched. After shaking hands, the gesture of placing the right hand to the heart is a greeting with respect or sincerity. To kiss a forehead, nose, or right hand of a person denotes extreme respect. Use of appropriate titles such as “Doctor” or “Professor” along with an individual’s first name is common.

**TALKING DISTANCE** — Americans usually prefer to keep at least an arm’s length between them and others. Arabs, however, prefer less space between themselves and others. They will often maintain 12 inches or less during a conversation. An American will tend to back away when an Arab crowds him, but the Arab will merely step forward. If the American continues to back away, the Arab will continue to step closer or wonder if he offended the American.

(Taken from the Department of Defense’s *Iraq Country Handbook*)
‘Don’t Be Seen’
Infantry Scouts Lead the Way

SPECIALIST CHRIS STEPHENS

TWIN BRIDGES TRAINING AREA, Republic of Korea –
When on the front lines with the infantry, there are two kinds of people –
the quick and the dead.

But for infantry scouts, it’s a different story.

“We’re the ones the enemy aims for,” said Specialist Serrano Brooks,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Task Force 2-9, scout. “If they take us out,
then we can’t relay their position or tell our headquarters how many soldiers they
have.”

Infantry scouts have the thrilling task of getting eyes on the enemy.

“We leave before the rest of the unit to go out and find the enemy,” Brooks said.
“We should never be seen by the enemy and we don’t engage the enemy in direct
contact.”

For Brooks and his team, the mission puts a lot of pressure on them.

“It’s a big weight on your shoulders,” said Private First Class Daniel Warner. “A team,
squad, platoon, company, or battalion could be affected by the decisions you make.”

The scouts then inform headquarters of what they see.

“The SALUTE report is a guideline so we can give an exact report on enemy activity,” Brooks said.

For the most part, scouts carry the same equipment as non-scout Soldiers.

“We take the normal stuff a line Soldier would take,” Brooks said. “The only
difference is that when we go out, the only contact we have with headquarters is
through the radio. Other than that, we’re on our own; so it’s important to ensure we have all of our
equipment.”

For the scouts, it doesn’t matter what the Korean weather is like, the mission
still has to be completed.

“Rain, sleet, snow or a clear night, we have to do our job, so the rest of the unit can do theirs,” Brooks said. He said the best part of being a scout is the camaraderie he builds with the three other members of
his team. “We spend a lot of time together, so we get to know all about each other,” he said. “And that’s important, because you want to know the guy next to you is someone you can trust. And after spending enough time with them, I know they have my back, and they
know I have theirs.”

When asked what the most important thing to remember while out on patrol, Brooks had an immediate response.

“Don’t be seen,” he said.
Army Approves Full Fielding of M-107 Sniper Rifle

KATHY ROA

The Army has approved its new long-range .50-caliber sniper rifle, the M-107, for full materiel release to Soldiers in the field. The M-107 program is managed at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, by the Project Manager Soldier Weapons (PMSW) with engineering support provided by Picatinny’s Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center.

The term “full materiel release” signifies that the Army has rigorously tested and evaluated the item and determined that it is completely safe, operationally suitable and logistically supportable for use by Soldiers, officials said.

Product Manager for Crew Served Weapons Lieutenant Colonel Kevin P. Stoddard said that PMSW previously equipped combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other units supporting the Global War on Terrorism, with the M-107 under an urgent materiel release.

The Army expects to complete fielding of the M-107 in 2008, Stoddard said. The M107 was funded as a Soldier Enhancement Program to type classify a semiautomatic .50 caliber rifle for the Army and other military services. It underwent standard type classification in August 2003. A production contract was awarded to Barrett Firearms Manufacturing, Inc., Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the following month.

Compared to the M24 7.62mm sniper rifle, Stoddard said, the M107 has more powerful optics and fires a variety of .50 caliber munitions. “This provides sniper teams greater capability to identify and defeat multiple targets at increased ranges,” he said.

The M-107 is based on the Marine Corps special application scoped rifle, the M82A3. The M-107 enables Army snipers to accurately engage personnel and material targets out to a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 meters respectively, he said. The weapon is designed to effectively engage and defeat materiel targets at extended ranges including parked aircraft, computers, intelligence sites, radar sites, ammunition, petroleum, oil and lubricant sites, various lightly armored targets and command, control and communications.

In a counter-sniper role, the system offers longer stand-off ranges and increased terminal effects against snipers using smaller-caliber weapons. The complete system includes the rifle itself, a detachable 10-round magazine, a variable-power day-optic sight, a transport case, a tactical soft case, cleaning and maintenance equipment, a detachable sling, an adjustable bipod and manuals.

The Army plans to modify the M107 by adding a suppressor to greatly reduce flash, noise and blast signatures.

CROWS Arrive in Iraq to Keep Gunners Out of Sight

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS JEROME BISHOP, ARMY NEWS SERVICE

LSA ANAconda, Iraq – The first group of 35 remotely-operated weapons for mounting on top of Humvees arrived in Iraq recently and the systems were divided among military police, Special Forces, infantry and transportation units.

The Common Remotely Operated Weapon Stations (CROWS) provide crews the ability to locate, identify, and engage targets with better accuracy and improved range, while keeping the gunner inside, protected by the vehicle’s up-armor.

The technology used on the CROWS is a variation of the remote-controlled crew-served weapons system already used on combat vehicles like the Bradley fighting vehicle and the M-1A1 Abrams tank.

“We will be fielding, in the next two years, over 300 systems,” said Major Frank Lozano, the program manager for the CROWS project on LSA Anaconda.

At LSA Anaconda, four CROWS were issued to 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Ar Ramadi and the 155th Brigade Combat Team on FOB Kalsu. Prototypes were installed on vehicles belonging to the 42nd Military Police Brigade in December, Lozano said. Since then, more CROWS have been installed, bringing the total up to nine systems serving troops at LSA Anaconda.

Presently in Iraq, CROWS are only assembled and fielded at LSA Anaconda. Crews are issued the system there and receive training on how to operate it, said Sergeant First Class Jeffrey Januchowski, the project’s training developer.

The nearly $200,000 system is designed to replace the turret gunner on Humvees to improve combat effectiveness, Lozano said. CROWS allows Soldiers to operate successfully from within the safety of the Humvee’s armor, without being exposed to the threat of improvised explosive devices and small-arms fire.

The system incorporates a 15-inch color monitor with live video from cameras in the daytime and thermal imaging cameras in darkness.

Both cameras use a laser range finder, which allows the gunner to zoom on targets, lock onto them and maintain that lock accurately while the vehicle is in motion.
The current Army plan is to equip seven Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT) with the Mortar Carrier Vehicle—B (MC-B). Mortar squads from the 172nd SBCT conducted a live-fire exercise in January 2005 and became the first SBCT equipped with MC-B. The live fire was the culminating event after 120 hours of New Equipment Training (NET) on the MC-B’s unique systems and the Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS). Over the next few months, the 172nd SBCT MC-B crews will refine their individual and collective skills and develop new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The first two SBCTs are currently issued ground-mounted M120 mortars carried in a Stryker platform known as MC-A. Over the next two years the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) and 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT) will turn in their MC-As for conversion to MC-Bs.

The MC-B is based on the common Stryker vehicle and provides immediate, close indirect fire support to the SBCT in the conduct of fast paced offensive operations. The immediate, on-demand fires are critical to the ability of dismounted infantry to rapidly achieve decisive results. Supporting the Infantry in the assault entails close in fire, obscuration, precision strikes and the ability to effectively seal off or canalize an advancing enemy. The mortars provide accurate, lethal, and high volume of indirect fires to support operations in complex terrain and urban environments.

MC-B platform shares the same 14.5mm armor protection and can be upgraded with “slat” armor for rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) protection. Sharing the same drivetrain allows mortar sections and platoons to keep up with the supported force at a top speed of 60 mph.

MC-B shares the same communications systems as the rest of the Stryker family. The SBCT Situational Awareness (SA) enhances the mortar’s accuracy and lethality through the use of the Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS).

**Battalion Mortar Fire Direction Net FM (Voice)**

Forward observers (FO) may use this net to request fires of extreme utility in this environment. FOs may use this net to request fires of the mortars, which are known as the Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS). The MFCS is a critical component of the mortar system, providing accurate and lethal indirect fires to the SBCT. Over the next few months, the 172nd SBCT MC-B crews will refine their individual and collective skills and develop new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). The first two SBCTs are currently issued ground-mounted M120 mortars carried in a Stryker platform known as MC-A. Over the next two years the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT) and 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT) will turn in their MC-As for conversion to MC-Bs.

**Keeping It Simple**

A mortar is a portable muzzle-loading cannon that fires indirect rounds at low velocities, short ranges, and high arcing ballistic trajectories. All of these attributes are in comparison with the mortar’s larger sibling, artillery, which fires at high velocities, long ranges, and low arcs. A mortar consists of a tube into which is dropped a mortar shell onto a firing pin resulting in the detonation of the propellant and the firing of the shell.

Mortars are normally included in infantry units. The advantage a mortar section has over artillery pieces is speed and higher rate of fire. It also has the advantage of being able to be fired from a trench or a defilade, thereby protecting the crew from enemy fire. In these aspects the mortar is an excellent infantry support weapon as it can travel over any terrain and is not burdened by the logistical support and geographical structure needed for artillery.

**Design** — Mortars normally range in size from 60 millimeters (2.36 inches) to 120 millimeters (4.72 inches); however, variations both larger and smaller than these specifications have been produced. An example of the smaller scale is the British 51mm light mortar which is carried by an individual and consists of only a tube and a base plate. Conversely, a large abnormality is the Soviet 2S4 M1975 “Tyulpun” (Tulip Tree) 240mm self-propelled mortar. Aside from these though, most mortar systems consist of three main components: a tube, a base plate, and a bipod. These weapons are commonly used and transported by Infantry-based mortar sections. Ammunition for mortar systems generally come in two main varieties: fin-stabilized and spin-stabilized. The former have short fins on their posterior portion that control their path in flight. The latter use rotational spin (similar to a thrown football) to balance and control the cartridge. These rounds can either be illumination, smoke, or high explosive.

**History** — Mortars have existed for hundreds of years, first finding usage in siege warfare. However, these weapons were huge heavy iron monstrosities that could not be easily transported. Simply made, these weapons were no more than an iron bowl truly reminiscent of the mortar from which they drew their name. Portable mortars were first seen during the Civil War and its resulting railroad mortars. However, it was not until World War I that the modern, man-portable mortar was born. Extremely useful in the muddy trenches of Europe, mortars were praised because of their high angle of attack. A mortar round could be aimed to fall directly into trenches where artillery rounds, due to their low angle of flight, could not possibly go. Modern mortars have improved upon these designs even more offering a weapon that is light, adaptable, easy to operate, and yet possesses enough firepower to provide the Infantry with quality close support.
the battalion mortar platoon. Other stations on the net include the fire support team (FIST) headquarters and the battalion/squadron fire support element (FSE). The battalion mortar platoon or troop FSE is the Net Control Station (NCS).

**Battalion Mortar Fire Direction Net (Digital)**
As necessary, the FIST sends fire missions to the supporting mortar platoon or section using this net.

**Company Mortar Net (Voice)**
Observers or the company/troop fire support officer (FSO) use this net to request fire from the company/troop mortars.

**Direct Support Battalion Fire Direction Net FM (Voice) and Digital**
This net is used for Field Artillery (FA) fire direction. The FIST uses this net to relay calls for fire through the battalion/squadron FSE to supporting artillery assets. The direct support battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) is the NCS. When a Stryker is present, it uses this net to request FA fires. The battery FDC and battalion/squadron FSE also are on this net.

**M95 Mortar Fire Control System (MFCS)** is an automated fire control system that is designed to resolve current mortar deficiencies. The MFCS will be used by mortar platoon and section configurations that include an FDC, mounted 120mm mortar systems tracked (M1064s) and wheeled (M1129A1).

The MFCS will provide the primary indirect fire support for armored and mechanized infantry battalions. It will provide the capability to have self-surveying mortars, digital call for fire exchange, and automated ballistic solutions.

**M95 Commanders Interface (CI)** is a rugged, portable computer fully PC compatible, particularly suited to the requirements of military applications. Highly compact weighing 16 pounds with two batteries. The SMI is mobile, military-tough, die cast aluminum designed specifically for applications requiring the most demanding environmental specifications including Electronic Magnetic Impulse (EMI). The CI is weather sealed, and built to meet the needs of mobile applications. It is particularly suited to the requirements of military applications in wheel/tracked vehicles as well as airborne and helicopter systems. The computer is designed to operate with two rechargeable Nickel Metal Hydride (NiMH) batteries. These batteries are 10.8 volt nominal at 3800 ma/hr. The CI is equipped with a full function detachable sealed keyboard with integral mouse.

**M95 Driver’s Display (DD)** is a segment mapped liquid crystal display (LCD) device that provides the driver with the information necessary to orient the vehicle upon emplacement and assist him in driving to the next firing point. Information is presented in graphical fashion in the case of steering directions and compass orientation, and in numeric form in the case of distance and heading.

**M95 Gunner’s Display (GD)** provides the information that is necessary for the gunner to aim and fire the mortar in a graphical and textual format. Programmable function keys are used to invoke various displays that encompass the gunner’s functional needs for information, status, and reporting.

The Recoiling Mortar System (RMS6-L) is mounted on a turntable and the mortar is adjusted or laid for deflection and elevation with two hand wheels. The recoil system absorbs the shock of a round fired and because of the light recoil can traverse a 4400 mil arc. This allows the crew to engage targets on both flanks of a sector in a matter of seconds without moving the carrier. The RMS6-L can engage targets using direct lay, direct alignment, conventional indirect fire and the hip shoot (See explanation — Mortar Engagements).
Organization
The MC-B Stryker is a battalion, company, or troop asset. The battalion mortar platoon consists of four MC-B vehicles and two HMMWVs. The company and troop mortar section consist of two MC-B. Each MC-B will consist of a squad leader, gunner, assistant gunner, ammo bearer, and driver. The five-man crew will have the military occupational specialty (MOS) 11C and be 120mm and M-95 qualified with a SBCT background.

Mortar Section Sergeant (SSG-11C3O)
The mortar section sergeant is responsible (overall) to the commander for the mortar section. His duties include:
- Advising the commander on employing and positioning the mortar section.
- Assisting the FIST chief in planning fire support for the company/troop.
- Keeping the commander informed of the location of the mortar section and the status of the mortars and ammunition.
- Maintaining a situation map showing all supported units’ locations, mortar positions, maximum range lines, and targets.
- Maintains data in CI.
- Planning, initiating, and supervising the timely displacement of the section.
- Supervising security, resupply, and communications for the section.
- Seeing that preparations are made for special firing techniques, such as direct lay and direct alignment.
- Performing the duties of chief computer.
- Maintaining ammunition records and submitting resupply requests.
- Recommending to the commander when the mortars should displace and controlling their displacement.
- Relaying enemy information from designated observers to the company and others, as directed using FBCB2.
- Performs security with the M240B when carrier is moving.
- Carries plotting board and radio when dismounted.

Mortar Squad Leader (SGT-11C2O)
The mortar squad leader responsibilities include:
- Moving and positioning the mortar as directed.
- Ensuring that the mortar is properly laid.
- Checking camouflage and overhead mask clearance.
- Maintaining a map showing positions, sectors, and targets (needed for independent operations or when displacing by squads).
- Computing firing data for independent operations using M-95.
- Ensuring that ammunition is properly stored.
- Checking rounds for indexing and charges.
- Maintaining communications with the Section Sergeant FDC, when applicable.
- Performs security with the M240B when carrier is moving.
- Carries plotting board and radio when dismounted.

Gunner (SPC-11C1O)
The gunner’s responsibilities include:
- Places the mortar into action.
- Conducts pre fire safety checks.
- Lays the mortar for deflection and elevation.
- Performs direct lay and direct alignment.
- Assists in removing a misfire.
- Maintains the mortar system.
- Takes the mortar out of action.
- Performs security with individual weapon.
- Carries 81mm or 60mm bipod when dismounted.

Assistant Gunner (PFC-11C1O)
The assistant gunner’s responsibilities include:
- Assists the gunner in the performance of his task.
- Loads and fires the mortar.
- Acts as gunner as directed.
- Performs security with individual weapon.
- Carries 81mm or 60mm cannon when dismounted.

Driver (SPC-11C1O)
The driver’s responsibilities include:
- Drives and maintains the mortar carrier.
- Performs mortar position security with individual weapon or M240B.
- Remains with carrier when squad conducts dismount operations.

Ammunition Bearer (PVT-11C10)
The ammunition bearer’s responsibilities include:
- Prepares and passes ammunition for firing.
- Performs security with individual weapon.
- Acts as assistant gunner as directed.
- Carries 81mm or 60mm baseplate and ammunition when dismounted.

NOTE: Duties must be constantly drilled and personnel cross-trained.

Mortar Positions
Based on the mission, terrain and SBCT commander’s guidance, the mortar section leader reconnoiters and selects mortar firing positions. In the battalion mortar platoon, a representative from the base gun and one man from the FDC may help reconnoiter and prepare the new position. A mortar section position should:
- Allow firing on targets throughout the company’s sector or zone, or the supported platoon’s sector or zone. In the offense, one half to two thirds of the range of the mortars should be forward of the lead platoon. This reduces the number of moves needed.
- Be in defilade to protect the mortars from enemy observation and direct fire. Places such as the reverse slope of a hill, a deep ditch, the rear of a building, and the rear of a stone wall are well suited for mortar positions. The reverse slope of a hill may protect mortars from some indirect fire.
- Have concealment from air and ground observation. Vegetation is best for breaking up silhouettes. Vehicles should be positioned in defilade where natural camouflage conceals them. When the location of the firing position provides little concealment, consider the use of a hide position, which provides good cover and concealment and allows the mortar crews to quickly occupy their firing positions when required.
- Have overhead and mask clearance. Check overhead clearance by setting the sight at maximum elevation and looking
along the mortar cannon. Mask clearance is checked the same way, but at minimum elevation.

- Have solid ground that supports vehicle movement and precludes excessive settling of base plates. On soft ground, put sandbags under base plates to reduce settling.
- Have 25 to 30 meters between 60mm mortars, 30 to 35 meters between 81mm mortars, and 35 to 40 meters between 120mm mortars. This reduces the chances of having more than one mortar hit by one enemy round. It also provides proper round spacing without plotting for each gun.
- Have routes in and out. These routes should ease resupply and displacement.
- Be secure. The section may have to provide its own local security. The mortar section has a very limited capability to secure itself. Normally, it collocates with other elements or has a security element attached.
- Avoid overhead fire of friendly Soldiers when possible.

The FDC may be in voice-distance of the squads; however, telephone wire should be laid from the FDC to each squad for security purposes and because battle noise may be so intense that the squads cannot hear the commands.

**Means of Employment**

Mortars displace to provide continuous support and to evade suppression, whether the unit is attacking or defending. The battalion and company mortar carriers carry a dismountable 81mm mortar and 60mm mortar respectively.

The displacement plan and the position of the mortar section in the unit formation should not disrupt the maneuver elements, should be responsive to the commander, and should provide the mortar section with local security. It should also allow the mortars to go into action quickly using the desired method of engagement and should provide ammunition resupply for the mortars. The displacement plan flows logically from other decisions made by the commander, the FSO, and the mortar section leader.

If the commander determines that operations (offensive or defensive) will move slowly enough to stay within mortar range and that continuous indirect fires must be available, he may order the mortars to displace to a suitable support position before the company moves out. In this event, he may not move them again until the unit reaches its next position. The choices available for displacement are displacement by section and displacement by squad:

**Displacement by Section** — The whole section displaces at the same time. This allows the section to mass fires and the section sergeant to keep control of his section. Moving as a platoon or section maximizes the FDC capability. It also is the fastest method of displacement. While the section is moving, its fire support is not immediately available unless it is positioned to fire using the direct lay or direct alignment methods or by conducting a hip shoot (See section on Mortar Engagement). Using any of these methods, the mortar section can be available with only minimum delay.

**Displacement by Squad** — This method allows continuous coverage of at least part of the unit’s sector. It may be the most effective means of infiltrating the mortars. The commander also decides whether to move the mortars as a separate element in the formation or to attach each gun squad to a subordinate element.

**Attached** — The mortars are attached to a subordinate element when the situation requires that task organization (on a patrol or with the support element, for example) or when the mortars need additional control, security, and load-carrying capacity (during an infiltration, for example).

**Separate** — The mortars move as a separate element in the unit formation when the commander wishes to control them directly and keep them together for massed use. When the mortars move as an element, they can displace by section or by squad.

**Mortar Engagements**

There are various engagement methods: direct lay and direct alignment (which do not require a fire direction center), the conventional indirect fire, and the hip shoot. The primary methods of engagement for the 60mm mortar are direct lay and direct alignment.

**Direct Lay** — This method is used when the gunner can see the target. The mortar may be handheld or bipod-mounted. An initial fire command is required to designate the target and, if desired, specify the shell-fuze combination and number of rounds. The gunner then adjusts fire and fires for effect without additional instructions.

**Direct Alignment** — This method allows the mortar crew to fire from full defilade positions without an FDC. It requires that an observer be within 100 meters of the gun-target line and, if possible, within 100 meters of the guns.

**Conventional Indirect Fire** — This method is used when the
mortars have been laid for direction and an FDC established with positions plotted on the M16 plotting board or the M-95 mortar fire control system.

**Hip Shoot** — When a call for fire is received during movement and the target cannot be engaged by either the direct lay or direct alignment method, a hip shoot is initiated. A hip shoot is a hasty occupation of a firing position; it requires both an FDC and an observer. The section leader normally acts as the FDC. The observer’s corrections may be sent over the radio or by a wire net. The platoon or section leader must quickly determine an azimuth of fire by map inspection. He then gives this direction to the mortar squads. The section leader uses the MFCS, the graphical firing scale, or the firing tables to determine the appropriate elevation and charge. He uses either the MFCS or the plotting board to refine the firing data based on the observer’s corrections. The section leader may use the aiming-point deflection method, depending upon the terrain. The second mortar is laid either by sight-to-sight or M2 compass.

**Transportation**
The MC-B Stryker is designed to be air, rail, highway, and marine transportable by the same assets used to transport the Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle.

**Maintenance**
The two levels of maintenance in a two level maintenance system are field and sustainment.

**Field maintenance** is focused on returning a weapon system to an operational status. The field maintenance level accomplishes this mission by fault isolating and replacing the failed component, assembly or module on the weapon system. Field maintenance is characterized as “off system” and “repair rear.” The intent of this level is to replace the failed component, assembly or module that returns the system to an operational status supporting the tactical commander’s needs. The field maintenance level consists of operators/crew, organizational and selected direct support maintenance capabilities. Field maintenance also includes battlefield damage and repair tasks performed by either the crew or support personnel to maintain system in some operational state.

**Sustainment Maintenance** is focused on repairing components, assemblies, modules and end items in support of the supply system. Sustainment maintenance is characterized as “off system” and “repair rear.” The intent of this level is to perform commodity-oriented repairs on all supported items to one standard that provides a consistent and measurable level of reliability. The sustainment maintenance function can be employed at any point in the distribution pipeline. Ideally sustainment maintenance activities would support from the continental United States (CONUS), however, battlefield operations tempo (OPTEMPO) may dictate that sustainment maintenance activities be located closer to the battlefield to improve support.

Immediate, on-demand fires are critical to the ability of an SBCT to rapidly achieve decisive results. MC-B with well trained and fully integrated squads is more than capable of meeting any challenge in all levels of conflict.

**References**
Current doctrinal references used with MC-B are:


**Captain Kevin Cline** is currently serving as the assistant TRADOC Systems Manager - Stryker Bradley at Fort Benning, Georgia. He is a 1995 graduate of the Citadel. CPT Cline has served as an armor platoon leader and staff officer for the 1st Cavalry Division with a tour in Bosnia. He has also served as an instructor for the Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, Airborne Course, Jumpmaster Course, Pathfinder Course, and at the U.S. Military Academy at West Post.

**Command Sergeant Major Miles Rutherford, U.S. Army Retired**, is currently serving as the senior program analyst for TSM-Stryker Bradley at Fort Benning. He has served in every infantry leadership position from squad leader to command sergeant major. He has also served as an instructor for the Infantry Mortar Leaders Course, Airborne Course, Jumpmaster Course, Pathfinder Course, and at the U.S. Military Academy at West Post.
Proper Reporting Procedures Important to Operational Success

CAPTAIN KIRBY R. DENNIS

During combat operations in Afghanistan from 6 April to 20 May 2004, the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, shaped the battlefield environment with reporting procedures that led to operational success and resulted in clear command and control even in the most austere environments. As the Alpha Company executive officer during this time, I witnessed firsthand the positive effects that proper reporting had on operational success.

Reporting and processing intelligence was one of the areas in which 2nd Ranger Battalion heavily focused its efforts during combat operations in Afghanistan. At every level of command, large amounts of manpower and resources were dedicated to the effort of gathering, processing, and acting on intelligence passed forward from the field. Every subordinate unit in the chain of command was expected to meet the information demands of its higher headquarters. To accomplish this, 2nd Battalion required its companies to submit accurate and detailed reports on a regular basis. To meet these demands, strict reporting procedures were instituted throughout the unit, and detailed intelligence products were to be forwarded on a daily basis. Without question, this aspect of combat operations extended the battlefield spectrum for fighting elements to levels not experienced before.

Due to operational requirements and the extended areas of operation in Afghanistan, significant distances separated Ranger rifle companies and rifle platoons. This created an atmosphere that put a premium on leader responsibility to submit timely and accurate reports. Two forms of reporting were used throughout the deployment to meet requirements: Radio (Satellite Communications or SATCOM) and HPW (portable computer). Both of these communication methods greatly facilitated the flow of information and allowed quality command and control in the most difficult environments. However, the need to stay constantly connected often required that the company commander and his command post or assistant command post stay stationary in order to continually pass guidance and process reports coming in from the platoons.

To ensure that information was being passed and collected, multiple methods of communication were implemented. First, the battalion staff published a daily fragmentary order (FRAGO) that was sent to company commanders via HPW. This FRAGO gave the commanders in the field clear guidance on what was occurring in the battalion as well as what was expected of each company during the next 24 hours. Second, daily conference calls occurred via SATCOM between the S2, S3, company commanders, and the battalion commander. During this conference call, each specific staff member/commander summarized significant events that had occurred over the last 24 hours and briefed actions that were to occur over the next 24-48 hours. These conference calls kept potentially confusing situations in synch because the staff and companies always knew what was occurring and how plans were being adjusted. Finally, companies in the field were required to submit daily operational and logistical summaries to the battalion headquarters that included specific information about the area of operation, the atmospherics within that area, and the personnel/logistical status of the company.

While the flow of information primarily came from companies to battalion and vice versa, these procedures required top notch platoon-level reporting since platoons were geographically separated from the company command post for the majority of combat operations. Therefore, in order for the company commander to build and submit accurate and timely reports, the platoon leaders had to be equally vigilant in their collection and processing of data from the field. These forms of reporting were vital to the success of the battalion in terms of synchronizing operations and assets across a large battlefield. Furthermore, these extensive reporting procedures allowed companies to adjust and execute operations on a moment’s notice and act on real time intelligence.

In addition to sending reports, subordinate units were expected to be able to submit tactical plans from the field in the event that intelligence drove them to execute platoon and company missions on short notice. In one instance, a Ranger platoon was operating in an area approximately 50km away from the battalion headquarters and was faced with a situation that required clear and concise long-range communications. During the operation, Rangers from the platoon gathered intelligence that led us to a village that was believed to be the home of several potential anti-coalition personnel. As the executive officer and ground forces
The commander at the time, the platoon leader and I processed the intelligence and reported back to the battalion. Because the intelligence appeared to be legitimate, I recommended that we move to the village to conduct a thorough search and interrogate the inhabitants. For us to conduct a search of the village, I needed to submit a brief tactical plan via HPW to the battalion operations officer. Because actionable intelligence in Afghanistan is rare and often times fleeting, the platoon leader and I believed that we had limited time to act and that the situation demanded an urgency to move. Therefore, we quickly pulled Falconview imagery from our portable computer and added our maneuver graphics to the satellite imagery. Those graphics included the route that we would travel, the objective area broken into quadrants, and phase lines so that we could coordinate our movement with higher headquarters. Within a matter of minutes, I submitted the plan to the battalion headquarters, and the plan was approved. Our ability to do this proved to be important to mission success, as our higher headquarters was aware of our plan and could synchronize assets to assist us in our efforts. In the end, we did not find the anti-coalition personnel we were looking for; however, our extensive search of the village resulted in the detention of one individual as opposed to radio messages because elements did not want to tie up the radio net with long conversations. The fix to this was to send detailed orders and instructions over HPW. There were cases when orders to execute multiple operations, and the necessary guidance to execute those missions, was lost in the HPW traffic sent down to platoon leaders. During several missions, two to three platoons in the company were geographically separated from the company commander by significant distances. The net effect of this was that the company commander would have to pass guidance and issue orders over HPW. While the commander’s guidance was understood and adhered to most of the time, instances occurred where instructions became confused simply because they were not explained as clearly as they would have been with the spoken word. This resulted in platoon leaders executing missions based on intuition and an understanding of the commander’s intent.

On the ever-expanding battlefield of Afghanistan, proper reporting was an absolute necessity for the unit to be successful. Technology enhanced the unit’s ability to communicate over long distances and difficult terrain; however, the leaders and Soldiers’ ability to manipulate and properly use the technology in the field made the difference. In almost every situation that 2nd Battalion encountered, the reporting procedures used provided a vital link between the ground force commander and the battalion headquarters, thus providing a clear picture of the situation on the ground that allowed the separate staff elements to operate on a continuous planning cycle. Instances occurred, however, where poor reporting and an overreliance of digital communications technology resulted in confusion between elements and failure to execute specific tasks. The critical factor for success on the ground is open and clear communication between the executing element and its higher headquarters. By and large, the communication technology and methods employed by 2nd Ranger Battalion resulted in successful combat operations in an extremely difficult area of operations.

Captain Kirby R. Dennis was commissioned in 2000 from the U.S. Military Academy. He served as a rifle platoon leader and executive officer with the 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, and has participated in deployments as part of both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the time this article was written, he was attending the Infantry Captain’s Career Course at Fort Benning. His next assignment is with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team at Fort Carson, Colorado.
Establish a Vision. As a leader, make sure you have a vision of where you would like your unit to be. The vision should be clear, realistic, and well-known throughout your unit. A squad leader’s vision can be much more specific than a battalion commander’s. For example, a squad leader’s vision may entail a certain APFT average and certain training events at a certain frequency. A battalion commander’s vision entails larger blocks of training, but may also include events that affect the individual, such as marksmanship. Often, parts of your vision have been dictated to you by your higher commander’s vision.

The absolute key to success in establishing your vision as leader is ensuring that your Soldiers subscribe to it. If the vision is clear, realistic, and well-known, but no one agrees with it, it will never come to fruition. When taking charge of your unit, communicate the vision in terms that make it attractive to your subordinates. If part of your vision is that all Soldiers will score above 270 on the APFT, it may be beneficial to remind your Soldiers why this unit must exceed the Army standard to such a degree. If part of your vision is that the unit runs itself under your guidance.

Surround yourself with capable people. All successful leaders rely on their subordinate leaders to share the burdens of management. Subordinate leaders are not always in formal leadership positions or are in leadership positions far below their abilities. Sometimes a Soldier who lacks in certain areas is the best Soldier in the unit in others.

Consider the Culture. All units have a culture. Culture is dictated by many variables including job function, ethnicity, religion, age, experience, mindset, and leadership. As the unit leader, you will find it undesirable or impossible to change many of these variables. However, a unit’s culture will change for better or worse, sometimes rapidly, with the right or wrong leadership.

You may find certain aspects of your unit are undesirable and others are exactly what you want. By communicating your vision clearly and seeking that crucial “buy-in” from your Soldiers, you can often change a unit culture almost overnight. For example, a new platoon sergeant might communicate that while he is extremely pleased with the platoon’s APFT average and that they won the land navigation competition earlier, the physical appearance of many of the Soldiers is not what it should be. By explaining why he finds appearance important, the NCO will gain the assent of many Soldiers and the reluctant compliance of a few. In addition to seeing improvements in the appearance of his Soldiers overnight, the platoon sergeant has changed one small aspect of his platoon’s culture into one that seeks excellence.

TAKING CHARGE:
Three Elements of Successful Leadership

CAPTAIN THOMAS A. FIELD

All Soldiers find themselves in leadership positions on occasion. For some, the opportunity to lead is rare. Others have led troops almost constantly. Whether a Soldier commands a battalion, company, platoon or squad, certain elements remain constant. A unit with intelligent leaders who create a cohesive culture should be the goal of any leader.

Establish a Vision. As a leader, make sure you have a vision of where you would like your unit to be. The vision should be clear, realistic, and well-known throughout your unit. A squad leader’s vision can be much more specific than a battalion commander’s. For example, a squad leader’s vision may entail a certain APFT average and certain training events at a certain frequency. A battalion commander’s vision entails larger blocks of training, but may also include events that affect the individual, such as marksmanship. Often, parts of your vision have been dictated to you by your higher commander’s vision.

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Seek individuals who, by their reputations or by their actions, have proven themselves capable of making your vision a success. A platoon leader’s radio operator should be the most intelligent private or specialist he can find. A mechanized battalion commander’s gunner doesn’t have to be the battalion master gunner, but he does have to be able to read a map and speak coherently on the radio. A platoon sergeant can find a very able specialist or sergeant and entrust them with MILES gear operations for the entire platoon. A squad leader can find a computer genius in his squad who can produce forms and checklists that may benefit more than just the squad.

By entrusting these subordinates with shared leadership duties, a leader builds a culture in which success is commonplace because the Soldiers have a stake in unit success. Instead of subordinates, the Soldiers in your unit will become followers, subscribers to a common vision. Instead of running the unit, you will find that the unit runs itself under your guidance.

These three elements of success as a leader are intertwined; each affects the others constantly. The leader’s vision is the driving force of the unit, but only when he establishes a culture that accepts and owns the vision. This is done partially by sharing the burden of the vision with able subordinates, who actively seek excellence with minimal guidance.

Captain Thomas “Andrew” Field, an Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran, is a reservist in his second company command. He has also served as both mechanized and scout platoon leader. An assistant professor of Military Science at Northwestern State University, Field is pursuing a graduate degree in Educational Leadership.
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A TASK FORCE DEPUTY COMMANDER

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT M. MUNDELL

From August 2004 to April 2005, I was afforded an invaluable opportunity to serve as deputy commander for Combined Task Force (CTF) Thunder, a maneuver brigade headquarters forward deployed in Afghanistan as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. CTF Thunder was assigned the Regional Command (RC) East area of operations, a vast and diverse area comprised of 15 provinces, 32 districts, and 19 major cities. In comparison, RC East is about the size of the state of Iowa. The purpose of this article is to share my experiences as the DCO with planning considerations specific to the role.

Background

Combined Task Force Thunder is a maneuver brigade comprised of a headquarters element based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Salerno; one U.S. Marine infantry battalion (3/3 Marine) based at FOB Salerno; one U.S. Army infantry battalion (2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division [Light]) based in Orgun-E; one U.S. Army National Guard infantry battalion (3-116th Infantry) based in Ghazni; and a total of eight Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The task force headquarters is formed around the Division Artillery (DIVARTY) Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division (L) with augmentation from the 125th Military Intelligence Division Intelligence Support Element (DISE) and individual augmentees, ranging from civil affairs officers to public affairs and staff judge advocate officers. The total number of personnel assigned to the task force is in excess of 3,200. I was assigned to the 25th Infantry Division in June of 2004, prepositioned as an infantry battalion commander select. The battalion I was slated to command was forward deployed in Iraq and my command was deferred 12 months. As a result, the DIVARTY commander requested my assignment as the DCO to assist in the tactical employment of infantry and to assist in command and control functions for the task force.

Terms of reference

In May of 2004, prior to my assignment to the division, I was afforded the opportunity to take part in a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Leaders Training Program exercise with the DIVARTY headquarters at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, which was designed to better prepare the unit for the impending deployment. This exercise proved valuable and allowed me to become familiar with the unit and impending mission in Afghanistan. During this exercise, the task force commander provided me with terms of reference that in general terms provided me with a point of departure from which I could focus my daily duties and responsibilities. This document included the following critical areas of emphasis:

**Maneuver Advisor** — Provide advice and guidance pertaining to the tactical employment of the three assigned infantry battalions. Extend my experience as a senior infantryman and provide oversight of the staff planning process and current operations functions.

**MDMP** — Personally assess the feasibility and suitability of concepts developed involving the employment of combat power and ensure effective integration and synchronization. Additionally, ensure operations orders are coherent, complete, and executable.

**Interface with the Task Force S3 and XO** — Coach, teach, mentor, and assist them in their daily duties and responsibilities. Seek out opportunities to apply my experience to better enable staff effectiveness.

**Battlefield circulation** — Periodically, circulate throughout Regional Command East and meet with key leaders and Soldiers in order to better understand the operational environment and factors that impact the task force mission.

**Afghan engagement** — Periodically, assist the commander in interacting with key Afghan leaders within the area of operation in order to facilitate coordination, understand issues that impact populations centers, and achieve synergy between coalition forces and Afghan authorities.

**What really happened**

The above mentioned terms of reference served as a start point for my integration into the headquarters, and throughout the deployment proved valuable in providing focus and direction for my contribution to the headquarters. As in any duty assignment however, a number of factors both tangible and intangible emerged and became central forcing functions that contributed to defining my duties and responsibilities. Of these factors, interpersonal relationships between myself, the commander, the executive officer and operations officer, coupled with experience levels and the complex operational environment of the AO combined to add clarity to requirements. I spent the preponderance of my tour decisively involved in and driving the following functions:

**Staff synchronizer of the deliberate planning process** — Two factors drove this responsibility:

1) The complexity, uncertainty, and intensity of current operations combined with requirements to coordinate with the vast number of other organizations and units operating in our battle space quickly consumed the majority of the operations officer’s time and energy.

2) Similarly, base operations functions and logistical requirements associated with an AO the size of Iowa consumed the XO’s time and energy. As a result, the development and initial synchronization of deliberate plans presented itself as an area in
which I could effectively contribute and lead the staff’s efforts. This became a good news story and in some respects was somewhat synonymous with handing over plans from a J5 type function to a J3 function for final refinement and execution.

Task force CCIR management and decision point refinement — This is another area directly affected by the two factors of influence discussed above. Based on the complex nature and rapidly evolving operational environment we were forced to analyze and visualize our battlefield from the standpoint of seeing the friendly apparatus, seeing the enemy, and seeing the environment. As a result our CCIR took on a classic stability operations form. Within the headquarters, I led a planning group comprised of the brigade fire support officer (FSO), targeting officer, interagency representatives and intelligence planners that on a bimonthly basis refined CCIR and modified task force-level decision points that enabled the commander to visualize, describe and direct operations based on the complex and evolving environment.

Future planning — Again, the pace and complexity of current operations to a degree limited the ability for the operations officer and commander to focus on long range planning. As a result, we were able to put together planning cells and teams to develop concept for future operations. Typically we oriented our future planning two-three months ahead, based on predictive analysis and known emerging operational requirements. Our goal was to achieve a 70 to 80 percent solution from which the staff could then detail and synchronize to enable execution.

Targeting — As a result of the significant assessment requirements associated with our mission, my integration enabled the brigade FSO to focus on the assessment process. This presented another opportunity for me to apply my experience and knowledge with respect to targeting and lead the task force process. We applied traditional targeting techniques such as the decide, detect, deliver and assess methodology to our environment and identified targets and associated systems coupled with guidance to address factors that influenced the operational environment. Our process and methodology sought to integrate both kinetic and non-kinetic requirements to achieve desired effects. Critical to this effort was the integration of interagency representatives into the process, which resulted in the achievement of unity of effort between coalition and interagency operations. Additionally we used techniques such as the CARVER matrix, a joint targeting tool, to identify a high payoff target list that enabled and drove our process. (See figure)

Other areas of emphasis:
In lieu of the commander — The
vastness of our area of operation placed a huge demand on the commander and required him to execute battlefield circulation quite often in order to effectively influence the fight. During his absence, I was presented the opportunity to perform normal and routine type functions ranging from chairing battlefield update briefs, participating in CJTF level commanders update briefs and a myriad of administrative functions. As the senior officer in the task force and on the forward operating base when the commander was away, I also interfaced with the FOB’s leadership and met with local Afghan authorities to discuss operational and administrative issues that required command influence. Additionally, I involved myself in matters of concern with subordinate commanders typically dealt with by the task force commander.

Officer professional development (OPD) — Periodically, we sought to increase the professional development of company grade officers and executed OPDs. These opportunities proved not only valuable for my own professional development and preparation for positions of increasing responsibilities, but likewise enhanced the overall effectiveness and preparedness of our company grade officer population.

Recommendations — As is the case with any circumstance, specific roles and duties associated with a somewhat ambiguous position is largely dependent on personalities, capabilities, and requirements. This fact exemplifies the art of military leadership and requires that application in setting conditions for the integration of a DCO. The terms of reference developed early on by the commander served as a great an effective way ahead. As the mission and time evolved, the command group adapted and opportunities for my involvement and influence became clear. Long range planning and deliberate synchronization are both areas where the experience of a DCO has potential. Targeting requirements in a noncontiguous and uncertain battle also serve as a possibility for application of the DCO. The position facilitates command and control flexibility and allows other key leaders freedom to focus on specific functions and requirements. Finally, with the presence and integration of interagency subject matter experts, another opportunity presents itself. Here the requirement to apply existing doctrinal techniques and procedures to exploit the presence of these SMEs and better enable mission accomplishment present yet another opportunity for employment of the DCO.

My tour as the deputy commander for Task Force Thunder and my role in the command and control BOS, characterizes the emerging nature of the Army’s role in the spectrum of operations inherent in stability type missions. The position adds depth to any similar type organization, but requires patience and time to fully define. I encourage organizations considering the employment of a DCO to use this article as a guide in defining roles and responsibilities. For officer’s being considered or identified as a DCO, I offer these takeaways:

☐ Have an idea on how you believe you can impact the unit and present those ideas to your commander.
☐ Confer with your commander up front pertaining to his expectations and thoughts serves as an invaluable template and a point of departure.
☐ Avoid gravitating to those things that you are comfortable with, as it will most likely cause friction and or conflict between you and the operations officer or executive officer.
☐ Focus on nontraditional roles and functions that require vision and direction to effectively influence the fight.
☐ Finally, be patient and look for windows of opportunity.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mundell is currently serving as the deputy commander of Task Force Thunder, which is forward deployed to Afghanistan (FOB Salerno). His follow-on assignment is as battalion commander of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light).
Understanding how other nations cope with terrorism is an ongoing learning process that has taken on immense importance as the United States pursues the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In 1996, Egyptian Journalist Karam Khabr, of the Arabic intellectual and former leftist magazine Rose-el-Youssef, assisted General Fuad Alam who spent over three decades investigating Islamic militants, rising to Chief of Religious (Militant) Affairs in Egypt’s Interior Ministry, the section of national security investigations. A police officer by training, General Alam has combated violence perpetrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Al-Takfir Wal Hijrah (Excommunication and Migration) and the Gamaa Al-Islamyiah (The Islamic Group aka IG).

His book entitled Al-Sadat Al-Mabahith Wal Ikhwan (translated as Sadat, Investigators and the Brotherhood. Cairo, Egypt; Dar-al-Khiyal Press,1996) offers rare insights into the person Ikhwan leader Omar Al-Tilmissany calls the king of interviewers or interrogators. General Alam considers Tilmissany the long-range strategist of the Muslim Brotherhood, who put forth a 50-year political, economic, and social plan that included infiltrating unions, colleges, and schools to formulate a mass movement against the Egyptian government. Although in Arabic, it offers American military readers an opportunity to draw from Alam’s wisdom in dealing with urban militant movements that have plagued Egypt since the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Egyptian leader Nasser in 1954. It is these urban tactics used in the assassination of Sadat, and the incitement in southern Egypt that followed Sadat’s murder that are employed by Baath loyalists and Islamic militants in Iraq today. Those interested in Islamic militancy must devote time to understanding Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood which is a template used to organize such groups as Hamas, the Sudanese National Islamic Front and many other jihadist organizations.

General Alam served under every Interior Minister the Egyptian Republic has produced, from Zachariah Moheiddine in 1957 to Hassan Al-Alfy in the nineties. In 1963, Interior Minister Abdul-Assem Fahmy dispatched General Alam to Yemen on a 90-day mission to advise two governors in the pacification of their provinces.

Nasser and Islamist Expectations

When the Free Officers Movement took power in June 1952, overthrowing the monarchy of King Farouk, there was an expectation by the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon) that Nasser would create an Islamic government. However, the Egyptian leader knew that the majority of Muslim Egyptians and the Coptic Christians who represent under 20 percent of Egypt’s population would not accept living under the radical Islamist vision espoused by the Ikhwan. He compromised and offered them senior positions in religious affairs but was rebuffed. According to Alam this led to no less than 11 attempts on Nasser’s life from 1954 to 1970. The most infamous was the 1954 assassination attempt in the Manshiah District of Alexandria, which was heard by millions of Egyptians listening to Nasser as he was giving a speech. Nasser retaliated by having seven condemned to death and executing 864 civil cases, 254 military cases and the detention of 2,943 Ikhwan members and affiliates.

Alam discusses several assassination attempts on Nasser that were both creative and sophisticated. In 1965, the Ikhwan was able to recruit a member of the Presidential Security (Police) Unit, Ismail Al-Fayoumi, a sharpshooter, to await Nasser’s arrival at Cairo International Airport and assassinate him as he returned from his trip to Moscow. The discovery of the sniper through informants and the eventual apprehension of Al-Fayoumi did not occur until 30 minutes prior to Nasser’s plane landing.

General Alam feels it was sheer luck that this attempt was foiled.

A second attempt in 1965 included detonating a truck as Nasser’s presidential railcar passed by as he went from Cairo to Alexandria. Upon discovering the bomb, it was determined that the detonation device was radio-controlled. A third attempt involved a sophisticated analysis of bottlenecks in Alexandria, as Nasser’s motorcade went from Mamoora to Ras-El-Tin Palace. This plot involved placing two hit squads at what is now the Sheraton Montazah and a (third) hit-squad at a bottlenecks along Sidi Bishir Boulevard. After the 1967 Six-Day War, an elaborate plot to kill Nasser was discovered as he visited the city of Suez. This attempt involved Egyptian investigators using primitive bugging devices against the perpetrators instead of immediately staging arrests. Although the device malfunctioned, it revealed an elaborate trail in which Egyptians were recruited in Saudi Arabia during their visit to Mecca as they performed the Haj pilgrimage.

Abood Al-Zummur and the Sadat Assassination

It is important for readers to gain an appreciation that Sadat’s assassination on October 6, 1981, (while he was amidst the Egyptian armed forces conducting a pass and review parade) was part of a wider plot to overthrow the Egyptian government. It was also meticulously planned. General Alam focuses on aspects of the events of October 1981 that if successful could have spun out of control after Sadat’s murder. According to the book, as Sadat rode to the reviewing stand, one of the conspirators, Lieutenant Colonel Aboud Al-Zummur (Intelligence Officer), ordered one of his soldiers to provide pastries laced with drugs to a battalion responsible for the security of Defense Minister Abu-Gazala. The soldier was to tell the battalion that Zummur was offering the sweets as he was blessed with a new child. Upon Sadat’s murder a group of
Islamic militants would raid their base and take their weapons and armored vehicles. Alam narrates that it was luck that the pastries were prepared the evening of October 5th and contained high levels of disabling drugs that caused them to taste sour. Only one soldier died as a result of this operation, as other members of the battalion refused to eat the pastries due to their taste.

Al-Zummur knew something was wrong when at an appointed time 30 minutes after the Sadat assassination, the group that was supposed to raid the armory never showed up at Cairo’s Tahreer Square. This was to be the start of a series of takeovers in and around Cairo of the television, radio stations, and key ministries. A prepared revolutionary statement was found with Al-Zummur. Key Cairo mosques were programmed to announce the coming of a new Islamic revolution in Egypt. Upon Sadat’s murder, the Egyptian government enacted Plan 100 to secure Cairo from such a scenario. It involved mobilizing forces to key ministries, protecting key officials, and cordoning off parliament, and Cairo Radio and TV.

Alam recalls some of the lessons learned from the Sadat assassination. He criticizes Interior Minister Nahawi Ismail for not having access to communications at the reviewing stand. He could have directed and commanded police and security forces from the murder site instead of being driven to the Interior Ministry and wasting precious time. The author also notes the warning signs before Sadat’s assassination that included the apprehension of Islamic militants affiliated to EIJ that attempted to rob a safe of the Cairo postal authority. Witnesses were let go and leads not followed up, but Alam believes this group was attempting to secure funds for the attempted coup that followed after Sadat’s murder.

Three hours before Sadat’s murder, Ahmed Mohammed Al-Aswani appeared at the Al-Saahil Investigative Office; this upset the office chief Mohammed Idris, who considered Al-Aswani an important internal source on EIJ and did not want to be seen with him. Aswani informed Idris that Sadat would be killed that day at the reviewing stand. Idris attempted to call Interior Minister Ismail, but he and his staff were incommunicado, either preparing for the pass and review or watching the parade. October 6 is a national holiday in Egypt, commemorating the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Al-Aswani attempted to have it both ways: by turning informant he narrowed escape. His Arabic book _Zawahiri As I Knew Him_, published in 2002, is perhaps the best autobiography of Al-Qaeda’s second in command. Before the end of 1981, Al-Zayat assisted Al-Zummur and his group in their escape from Cairo’s military prison. The plot involved prisoners destroying their beds and using the wood and sheets to manufacture a ladder. Bombs were made using smuggled items like matchboxes, sulfur, razor blades, marbles and nails. These primitive bombs were to be used to hold guards hostage; and the items to make the bombs were indeed smuggled into the military prison. The plan was discovered; amazingly it was not just to set Al-Zummur and his group free, but to proceed to the prison armory and take over weapons, armored vehicles and tanks to foment an Islamic revolution.

**Essam Al-Qamary Group**

Mentioned in Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s 2002 book _Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner_, Lieutenant Colonel Essam Al-Qamary was a tank commander who participated in the 1973 Yom-Kippur War and ended up being an important militant leader in the Islamic Jihad terrorist group. It was Al-Qamary who collected weapons and stored them in several locations in Cairo in preparation for the 1981 revolt that would follow Sadat’s assassination. According to the author, Al-Qamary was stopped and questioned in September 1981; fearing police, he managed to escape, leaving behind his bag which contained weapons and papers that tipped off authorities. Alam writes that Egyptian investigators focused on terrorist operations perpetrated by members of the armed forces and made several attempts to capture Al-Qamary to learn more of what they considered a military conspiracy against the regime.

Officers like Al-Qamary and Al-Zummur used their combat training learned on active duty to train other Islamic militants in Egypt in combat planning, urban guerilla tactics and effective means of destroying objectives. Among the techniques used by Egypt’s counter-terrorism units to catch Al-Qamary:

- Informants and human intelligence gathering.
- The cordonning off of several city blocks, which Al-Qamary narrowly escaped.
- Discovering where Al-Qamary attended his Friday prayers and setting a trap; his followers noted unfamiliar faces praying and alerted him.
- The Al-Qamary case brought with it a closer coordination between Egypt’s General Intelligence Service (EGIS) and Department of Military Intelligence (DMI), which afterwards worked together to catch terrorists.

**Montasser Al-Zayat and the Plot to Break Al-Zummur Out of Military Prison**

Montasser Al-Zayat is a jihadist lawyer who intimately knew Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Today he publicly renounces his former associate and his tactics. His Arabic book _Zawahiri As I Knew Him_, published in 2002, is perhaps the best autobiography of Al-Qaeda’s second in command. Before the end of 1981, Al-Zayat assisted Al-Zummur and his group in their escape from Cairo’s military prison. The plot involved prisoners destroying their beds and using the wood and sheets to manufacture a ladder. Bombs were made using smuggled items like matchboxes, sulfur, razor blades, marbles and nails. These primitive bombs were to be used to hold guards hostage; and the items to make the bombs were indeed smuggled into the military prison. The plan was discovered; amazingly it was not just to set Al-Zummur and his group free, but to proceed to the prison armory and take over weapons, armored vehicles and tanks to foment an Islamic revolution.

**Little known History of the Muslim Brotherhood**

Established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, the Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen began as a social organization that in time would become a mechanism to impose the Salafist brand of Islam on Egypt. Hassan Al-Banna would model his organization along the lines of the Young Muslim Men Association (YMMA) but his motive was to address the dismantlement of the Caliphate in 1924 by Kemal Attaturk (_Read the November-December 2003 edition of Military Review that focuses on the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood_). By 1932, Al-Banna convened his 5th Ikhwan Conference and announced his intent to enter Egypt’s political fray; his organization had to choose whether they would support
the Royalists of King Fuad, or the Wafdists of Saad Zaghlul. This book goes into the crucial period after World War II, in which the Ikhwan politically competed with the Wafid (The Delegation) and Misr-Al-Fatat (Young Egypt) political parties. Al-Banna seemed to support the royalists, at first filling King Fuad with dreams of becoming the next Caliph and Commander of the Faithful, a position occupied by the Ottomans and which was abolished by Kemal Attaturk in 1924. The Ikhwan would only cease its support of the monarchy after the February 1942 incident in which Sir Miles Lampson, atop an armored vehicle and having the palace surrounded by British tanks, gave King Farouk an ultimatum to form a pro-British government.

Alam writes that the Ikhwan began to apply the label of apostasy more freely on Egyptians starting in 1948 as a means of wrestling control from the other political parties in Egypt. The problem of political violence would be exacerbated when the Ikhwan sent a few thousand fedayeens to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War; that polarized the organization, making it more violent and leading to assassinations of Egyptian political figures that ultimately led to the demise of Al-Banna at the hands of Egypt's secret police in 1949. The most revealing aspect of Alam’s book are two pages that implicate Hassan Al-Banna in a plot to kill the 80-year old Imam Yahya of Yemen as a means of establishing an Islamic state with several Yemeni ministers. Their plans were rendered useless when Imam Yahya died of natural causes and was succeeded by his son.

The Brotherhood Splits into Three Factions

After the failed assassination of Nasser in 1954, the Egyptian strongman bore down on the Muslim Brotherhood. Many fled to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and would later reemerge in the 1970s, but those who stayed in Egypt saw the Islamist organization split into three elements. The most violent, the Qutbists named after Sayed Qutb would form an ideological foundation of today’s Islamic militants. The following is the breakdown of the three main factions:

- **Al-Banaeeyun (The Bannaists):** Named after Hassan Al-Banna, the original founders of the Muslim Brotherhood. They advocated the status-quo and social work as a means of attracting Egyptians to their ranks.

- **Al-Hudaiibeeun (The Hudaybeeists):** Named after the Supreme Guide of the brotherhood during Nasser and Sadat’s period, Hassan Al-Hudaiibee. They espoused a new vision of working within the framework of Egypt’s constitution and government system to gain power in parliament, unions and guilds as well as within the universities and schools.

- **Al-Qutbeeyun (The Qutbists):** The new young faction of the Muslim Brotherhood who preached that the Egyptian regime was in an anti-Islamic state of jahiliyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) and that waging jihad on the state was the only means of cleansing Egypt of sin. They were stimulated by the writings of Sayid Qutb and held up his book Maalim (Guideposts) as the strategy the Muslim Brotherhood must adopt.

Alam witnessed 37 court cases that centered on the ideas of apostasy, militancy and intolerance incubated by Sayid Qutb in Cairo’s prisons from 1954 until his execution in 1966. Understanding the divisions within the organization was a priority for Alam so as to sow dissension among the Muslim Brothers and focus efforts on violent factions.

Inside Sayid Qutb

There are a few works that form a central core of ideology for today’s Islamic militants. To truly understand Al-Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and many other radical organizations and personalities it is vital to spend time reading Sayid Qutb’s Maalim Fee Al-Tareeq (Guideposts Along the Road, hereafter referred to as Maalim) and his 15 volume Fee Zhilal Al-Quran (In the Shade of the Quran). As a law-enforcement official who combats Islamic militants in Egypt, Alam devotes large sections of his book to Qutb and has healthy respect for his writings and the violent influence he has had on the Muslim Brotherhood.

Alam’s book assumes that the reader understands the basic philosophy of Qutb, of which most Egyptians have a rudimentary knowledge. Most Islamists have only read his shorter Maalim, not his 15-volume analysis of the entire Quran. As such Alam’s description of the psychological operation campaigns and ideological discrediting of Qutb centers on his smaller book Maalim.

The author writes that sections of Qutb’s writings were smuggled out of prison by his family members and given to Zainab Al-Ghazally, who led the women’s section of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb essentially applied the theories of the 13th century Islamic radical Taqi Bin Taymiyyah who declared that even though the Mongols had accepted Islam they did not practice Islamic law and preferred their own tribal or Yasa laws, and should therefore be declared apostates and subjected to jihad until they accepted Shariah (Islamic law). Qutb applied these theories on the Egyptian government and added a new concept declaring that the state was living in jahiliyah (a reference to pre-Islamic ignorance) and only jihad would save the state. Qutb was also stimulated by the writings of Pakistani jihadist ideologue Abu Ala Al-Mawdudi, who postulated that jihad would establish an Islamic state in India.

Qutb’s writings first found a following among Muslim Brotherhood prisoners and then spread to the young members of the organization who saw in them a call for violent action. Alam writes that Hassan Al-Hudaybee, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, went to see Qutb and warned him that his theories would split the organization. With the encouragement of Egyptian internal security, Al-Hudaybee published a rebuttal to Maalim entitled Duaah Wa Lasna Qudah [Proselytizers and not Judges (of Muslims)]. Qutb had always been involved in conspiracies to overthrow the Egyptian government; in 1953 he allied the Muslim Brotherhood with Wafdists and Communists to form a Revolutionary Reaction Front that came close to ousting Nasser in March 1953. Qutb would spend most of his adult life in Cairo’s prisons, where he undertook the majority of his Islamic radical writings. He would be implicated in another plot to overthrow the government in 1965 and was hanged in 1966. Alam was present at his execution and witnessed a man who believed he was going to his death a great Muslim scholar. Qutb threatened that his execution would cause a revolution in Egypt and the Arab Muslim world. Qutb’s ideology so worried Egyptian authorities, that another Muslim Brotherhood leader, Omar Al-Tilmissany, was approached by authorities to curb Qutb’s violent appeal among the newer generation of Muslim scholars.
Brotherhood members.

Zainab Al-Ghazally, the leader of the female branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was the vehicle used by Qutb to disseminate his notes, 20 pages at a time. She proceeded to Beirut after Qutb’s death and had his writings published in book form in 1974. This is the volume most in use by militants today.

**Mustafa Mahshoor: A Portrait of Violent Action**

Qutb was primarily a proponent of conspiracies and violent ideology. Among the persons who have embraced violence as a means for political or social change is Mustafa Mahshoor. He was the earliest Ikhwan member to form secret military cells for the organization in the 1930s. Coming to the attention of Egyptian police in 1948, it was discovered he was acquiring surplus military hardware from British sources including jeeps for a clandestine Ikhwan Army. It is likely the Ikhwan Fedayeen sent to the first Arab-Israeli war were armed through Mahshoor’s efforts. He believed the only way for the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate the other two political parties (Wafd and Misr Al-Fatat) was through violence. He was among those who planned the assassination of Prime Minister Nookrashi Pasha in 1948.

When the 1952 Revolution toppled King Farouk, there was a brief period in which Nasser’s Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) encouraged its officers to join the Ikhwan. It became clear that the Ikhwan attempted to take control of the revolution and not work with the Free Officers Movement. From 1953 to 1954, the Ikhwan and RCC relationship deteriorated into a battle for control of Egypt through its youth. When imprisoned in 1954, Qutb organized violent prison riots forcing the Egyptian government to move him to an open oasis camp surrounded by desert.

**The Cairo Airport Plot:** Among the boldest plots revealed in Mahshoor’s 1965 trials is an operation eerily similar to September 11th. a plan by Qutbists to draft Egypt Air pilots and use them to crash their planes into Cairo International Airport. The two pilots, Yahya Hussein and Mohammed Ghanaam, were members of the violent faction of the brotherhood and sought to recruit more pilots. A third pilot escaped to Sudan. It is important to pause and realize that Alam’s book was written in 1996, five years before the events of September 11th. Reading this particular passage one cannot help but wonder if Ayman Al-Zawahiri gave this idea to Osama bin Laden.

**Discovery of Mahshoor’s Weapons Stash:** In 1965, 11 years after the 1954 trials ended, investigators uncovered quantities of weapons stored in locations varying from holes in the ground to apartments and warehouses. Authorities found weapons in Ismailiyah, Al-Shamalayah, Mukatam Hills and Hilwan. Some of the weapons were World War II surplus. In one instance, an 8-year-old girl helped Egyptian police uncover the Ismailiyah weapons cache.

**Mahshoor’s Activities After His Release in 1971:** Mahshoor would be released as part of an amnesty granted by Sadat on imprisoned Ikhwan members. He focused his activities on managing the Islamic fundamentalist youth movement and coordinating Ikhwan centers outside Egypt. He would be implicated in the September 5, 1981, weapons smuggling case that preceded Sadat’s murder and would remain in exile outside Egypt, traveling between Ikhwan centers in Germany, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and London. Alam writes that Mahshoor would eventually return to Egypt where he would live during Mubarak’s regime.

**1971: Alam Comments on the Low Point in Egypt’s Internal Security**

Alam is highly critical of Sadat in 1971, the year in which he declared himself Raiees Al-Mumineen (President of the Faithful) and set about distinguishing himself from his charismatic predecessor Gamal Abdul-Nasser. Sadat proceeded to use the Ikhwan as a means of countering Nasserists and Communists who were determined to unseat him from power. Alam and Egypt’s internal security apparatus were reined in as Sadat released dozens of militants, including the violent Mustafa Mahshoor. Police investigators watched and could hardly touch those who called for resistance against authorities.

During this period some Ikhwan exiles of 1954, who lived in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf became millionaires, people like Abdul-Azeem Luqman. Many began to finance terror acts in Egypt and established centers like the Islamic Center in Geneva, Switzerland whose mission was to revive Ikhwan activities in Egypt. Salim Azzam, head of Muslim Brotherhood activities in London, financed the activities of Ayman Al-Zawahiri. The exiles of 1954 pooled massive financial resources from the Persian Gulf and established the Al-Taqwa Bank in the Bahamas that laundered funds and financed terror activities primarily in Egypt. Alam also discusses a meeting many of these exiles had during Sadat’s binge with religiosity which led to these developments. This resulted in a summit during the late ’70s that brought together Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Gamaa Al-Islamiyah, and several Salafist groups. They settled on a detailed plan to rid Egypt of Sadat and proceed with dividing governance amongst themselves.

**Final Comments**

Alam writes that since the 1965 trials of Muslim Brotherhood members and the plot to destroy Cairo airport using Egypt Air commercial planes, Egypt realized that cooperation among defense, interior and the two intelligence agencies (military and general) was needed to combat terrorism. He also warns that this war cannot be fought only through military means and police investigation; an ideological war must occur to reveal the faulty religious logic behind Qutb and other ideologues whose sole purpose is to cause anarchy in order to usurp power and create a theocracy that has little room for the various practices of Islam or, much less, the non-Muslim world at large. Recently published works by retired Arab officials such as General Alam which deal with Islamic militancy should be carefully analyzed. These works discuss and analyze tactics and methods used by terrorists and the possibility of increasing lethality brought about by the information age and potential access to weapons of mass destruction.

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The battle is won before it is ever fought.
— Chinese Art of War

Don’t confuse proximity to the target with importance to the mission.
— Unknown

Warrior in the Iroquois tongue means “one who protects the Sacred Origins.”

This is the man or woman whose honor and duty before God flows from their commitment to protecting the people and the whole web of life that ensures the people’s well-being. The warrior is also one who is capable of being fit for war and fit for life, succeeding in battle and after returning from war. Being fit for war and fit for life are very different skill sets employed for very different objectives. What saves you on the battlefield and enables you to “take the hill,” can kill you in the marriage and vice versa.

A U.S. Army officer was sitting across from me adjacent to his wife of 10 years. She had just sliced his head off with the silken edge of smooth words, articulating her feelings with that special logic of relationship which she wielded with the deftness of a samurai’s blade. She had the equivalent of a black belt in interpersonal relationship skills while her partner, though highly accomplished, physically fit and effective as leader of his combat unit, was essentially an untested white belt. He had just been cut off at the neck so deftly he didn’t realize his head was no longer attached; it just hadn’t fallen off yet. He looked fine outwardly and I asked him, “How are you?”

“Perfectly calm and in control” came the expected answer. When he obliged my request to take his pulse rate, it was over a hundred — clearly in the midst of a major battle as far as his autonomic nervous system was concerned, but in denial back in the rear where the executive branch of his frontal lobes and neocortex were supposed to be functioning. He was effectively undergoing a chemical lobotomy and was now in limbic system fight/flight mode. His options were fast becoming limited to the classic retreat “I’m outta here…” Or if not that, then to advance on his wife and do irreparable damage to the relationship by effectively “neutralizing the target” that was creating so much tension for him. What works on the battlefield in combat destroys the marriage. Why?

Many who succeed in being excellent soldiers rely on strength, logic, will, and “sucking it up” when it comes to any feelings that get in the way. In many cases they do so by not being in touch with the sensation of their own bodies and thus losing the value of their own incredible intelligence — the kind that is honed in life and death situations where soldiers learn to listen to the slightest sound changing around the perimeter or the hair standing up on the back of their necks. In a similar way these same men find they are not very successful in relationships because they haven’t learned to translate the sensations of their own body and feelings into...
information about interpersonal relationships and to articulate this learning into intimacy with their partners. Similar skills are involved but when their physical lives are not at stake and they are not in a war zone or a test of physical survival, the information is used differently and for very different goals.

A combat veteran in charge of a Special Forces unit described how important it was to be able to be present in the heat of a firefight when conditions suddenly change and to be able to make a decision based on new information that allowed for a totally different plan to be executed. Back home working on his marriage, he quickly realized how tuning into the sensation of his body with that same kind of presence of mind and making conscious decisions, allowed him to avoid negative consequences of addictive behavior. He was involved in avoiding painful emotional awareness related to grief over his relationships. Without his conscious presence and rational decision-making based on context and his goals, etc., he was experiencing his feelings as a “threat” to his life, which they weren’t.

Those who haven’t learned to stay present to their sensations and feelings, (or have forgotten this after combat) often do not know how to feel safe when threatened with loss of attachment to a loved one. Or they may feel threatened by shame or a sense of disgrace simply by feeling vulnerable in the presence of the spouse who is asking for emotional accountability and intimacy in the relationship. Either of these contexts can elicit a sense of helplessness which is intolerable and actually can feel threatening to the warrior who has learned to equate such a feeling with imminent threat and danger requiring decisive action. And for others, overcoming threat by force is equivalent to proving oneself a “real man.”

By contrast, the true warrior is someone who has learned the skills and found that being a fully alive human being requires commitment and courage both under fire in the heat of battle as well as under a different kind of fire in the heat of a love relationship. The warrior is willing and able to be faithful to preparing to be effective in both arenas because it is a matter of heart and the reason one depends on the other. This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics between the warrior and the soldier. Those who truly understand and commit to their purpose in each arena and succeed in moving between these two worlds tend to be among the best of the best in either realm.

As Jamie Moran, sub-chief of the Lakota Brave Heart Warrior Society observes, a soldier follows orders and fights because he is told to. He is externally motivated and disciplined by his commanders. The warrior, by contrast, is self-disciplined from within. A warrior knows why he fights because he has searched his own heart’s motives and has consciously and intentionally chosen to pay the price with full awareness of what will be needed off the battlefield when it is over. Although both warrior and soldier may show courage and fortitude in battle, and thereby share in the brotherhood that is forged in war among those who have risked their lives for one another in a common purpose, it is only the warrior whose commitment fits within the larger scheme of life’s purpose and meaning, whereas the soldier may have little if any passion for or understanding of this larger purpose. The soldier follows orders.

But following orders alone is not a guarantee of the kind of moral confrontation that is required to consciously and intentionally kill others when absolutely necessary in defense of the Sacred Origins (our way of life). Killing another human being is something that must be trained into healthy men and women. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman in his book *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society*, killing does not come naturally, and those who kill reactively without having fully examined the moral choice in their hearts often have problems later as a result of their actions. Further, when a war is wrong, for example - when deliberate genocide of another nation (or people) is involved, a deeper wound is incurred by those who fight for their country and those who send them to war in the first place. This is all the more reason for nations to be very sure of their purpose before sending soldiers into war; the damage to soldiers is far greater when the cause is not just.

Soldiers can become mercenaries when they become accustomed to the edgy thrill of war and grow numb to the qualities and skills that are needed to succeed in family and community life. While there are significant differences between a warrior, soldier and mercenary, there is an even greater gulf between the warrior who fights for a purpose and the thug who fights blindly and without purpose, eschewing law, abusing power, and fighting for the sake of fighting itself. The thug is a criminal who actually wages war against the country’s beliefs and values. The thug lacks respect and appreciation for life and is stimulated by abusing power and the destructiveness of rampage, compulsively and reactively entering into fights out of unacknowledged pain, despair, rage and other forms of brokenness. The thug lacks the purpose, skill, measure and free choice of the warrior.

When good men and women return from war without making the efforts to recognize and deal with the effects of the war on their psyche, they are much more vulnerable to inadvertently waging a kind of war on their families, with devastating consequences for the community now and in the future. This is one of the generally unacknowledged costs of war, which is far in excess of what is spent from the budget on the actual war itself. For example, a child’s exposure to his or her father abusing the mother is the strongest factor for transmitting violent behavior from one generation to the next. According to reports from the American Psychological Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family, children who witness domestic
violence between their parents are six times more likely to commit suicide as a result.

This is why it is critical that soldiers be encouraged and trained as true warriors who know what and for whom they fight and why. This must be consciously and intentionally chosen and committed to both on the field of battle and off. The way of the warrior is not simply a job, but a larger life commitment to protecting and being able to enjoy one’s way of life. The warrior’s way cannot be divorced from commitment to being a fully alive man or woman serving both God and country, but this cannot be merely a patriotic foil used to quash dissent or demonize other nations in order to exploit them.

There is also a mission in peace, just as there is a mission in war – to grow and enjoy life. Different skill sets and emphases are needed to be able to intentionally shift between the exigencies of battle and the enjoyment or marriage, family, and community life. Not all combat veterans achieve this.

Traditional societies who valued martial education and were led and defended by their warrior-kings such as the American Indians and Japanese, recognized and valued being fit for war and fit for life. They held in honor those persons who displayed excellence and integrity in both arenas. Ohiyesa, a.k.a. Dr. Charles Eastman, was raised as a traditional warrior in Lakota Sioux society prior to being translated into white society as a young adult. He eventually went on to graduate from medical school and spent his life moving between the two worlds of traditional Indian life and white society. His experience and counsel are valuable in this regard, as he knew both cultures intimately. In his book *Light on the Indian World: The Essential Writings of Charles Eastman*, he makes a very important observation: “As a rule, the warrior who inspired the greatest terror in the hearts of his enemies was a man of the most exemplary gentleness and refinement among his family and friends.”

The difference between the true warrior and others can be clearly seen in those who embody the principles and skills of martial arts. For example, Morihei Ueshiba, the late founder of Aikido, was one of the most highly regarded warriors of his time. Even in his 80s and suffering from cancer, once he entered the dojo and took his place on the mat, continued to defeat men half his age and twice his size, often several at a time. O Sensei had also excelled in military hand-to-hand combat, judo, and street fighting. Yet out of the arena of battle, he was known to be a model citizen who made extreme sacrifices in order to help his people build safe and stable communities that were environmentally harmonious. He was known to be a peaceful and refined man who kept his cool and presence whether under fire in battle or evidencing capacity for the inner stillness needed to steady the hand in the subtle art of Japanese calligraphy back at home. In fact, the art of Aikido came to him in a vision in which he saw that love was the basis of the universe and the most powerful force in existence which could not be defeated by any opposing power. Rather than merely opposing it, love enters into opposition transforming it in the process — something which is demonstrated in the actual movements of the aikidoist who draws closer to the attacker and redirecting the attacker’s own opposing force in order to disable him without injuring him.

This same warrior ethos is found in Jesus Christ, who like Kings Saul, David and Solomon before him, was a leader as well as being a priest and prophet. He united all three of these dimensions in his being and lived them out in his mission. Contrary to many who see his passion as weakness or a form of “pacifism,” it is more correctly understood as far more extraordinary – a warrior’s stance who courageously took upon himself the well-being of his fellows while under fire, incarnating the very essence of Aikido in forgiving his attackers and carrying humanity all the way through hell and out, even when he himself felt abandoned by both God and country. Throughout the most difficult part of the ordeal, he refused any sort of stimulant that would have disturbed the clarity of his intentions and purpose, and he allowed his heart to face the full impact of what he was doing once he had “set his face toward Jerusalem,” which meant his certain death. This is the same kind of warrior ethos that allowed the ancient samurai to face the superior technology of the Western powers’ gatling guns depicted in the recent movie, *The Last Samurai*, even though they knew it meant certain death. Their bodies were defeated, but they retained honor and victory of their spirits before the mystery of the Sacred Origins which they were vowed to defend. They served a calling higher than soldiering, and it began to affect their enemies who were firing the gatling guns to the point that their spirits began to be conquered by the sacrifice they were witnessing. The superior technology of bullets ripped open the samurai’s bodies, but left their spirits unharmed and free to continue the battle.

Of course, the warrior’s way is much more difficult than the soldier’s or mercenary’s. By contrast, the warrior’s way requires the whole man or woman. It requires fully conscious intention, whether in the heat of battle or in the fervent joy and pain of family life in community which faces its own battles of sickness, tragedy, old age, loss of meaning, poverty, and most of all, the call to love to the point of self-sacrifice for the community as epitomized by Christ.

It has been said that an army travels on its stomach, but neither army nor community at home can endure and prevail without heart. We make a terrific mistake when we count the cost of war only in terms of money spent on deployment or in lives lost. This judgment miscalculates the cost to families and communities. It is not enough to be committed to “leaving no Soldier behind” dead or alive on the battlefield. A different war is waged upon return home. Along with the recognition that “war is hell” comes the understanding that no one goes to hell and comes back unscathed. When we deploy Soldiers to war, our plans should include ongoing and follow-up pastoral care and counseling to support the soul-searching and healing that must take place upon their return.

We need support to bring our Soldiers home psychologically, spiritually, and interpersonally so that they are able to again enjoy and contribute to the world of which they are such a vital part. But this is not a
given. Out of three million combatants who participated in the Vietnam conflict, nearly one-third suffered from PTSD at some point after deployment. According to the book *Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body and Society*, even 20 years later, 15.2 percent of veterans continued to suffer from PTSD. (This compares with a two-percent incidence in the U.S. population at large.) Other complications involve loss of capacity for being vulnerable, of enjoying intimacy with one’s spouse and children and a tendency toward various kinds of addictive compensations including drug and alcohol abuse. This is another significant contributor to community problems; the estimated cost of alcohol and drug abuse to American business is $81 billion in one year. $37 billion is due to premature death and $44 billion to illness. Alcoholism causes 500 million lost workdays annually. To the degree that this is continuing damage to veterans who have not yet recovered, it underscores the strategic importance of the Chaplain Corps, both for the war effort and for the return home. Even when known, various aspects of PTSD may not always be “seen” by professionals or admitted to by Soldiers who still see it as a “weakness” or “disgrace” of some sort, rather than part of what everyone to some extent experiences as a result of combat and has the mission to address upon return, in order to reintegrate effectively. Because of the tendency to deny it and its many varied manifestations, it is easy to miss and/or simply to collude with the veteran in ignoring how he or she is being affected. For example, though included as a diagnosis in the DSM-III as early as 1980, a study conducted in 1982 by Bessel van der Kolk of some 300 WWII veterans receiving outpatient treatment in VA systems, 85 percent qualified for the diagnosis of PTSD but not a single one had this diagnosis in his chart.

**Existential and Spiritual Considerations**

When soldiers went out into the desert to hear the preaching of the prophet John the Baptist who called all to repent before God, they asked him “What must we do?” The response was not as might be expected from a “preacher,” that is, “Lay down your arms.” Or “Stop killing.” Rather, it was “Do not abuse your power.” Extrapolating on this, we might also paraphrase, “Learn when and how to use power appropriately to defend our way of life.” Then when the battle is through and the war is over, learn how to set aside the rules of engagement that pertained to war and divest of the use of power and the license and moral decision to kill that are necessary for war. Begin again to use power in the way that allows oneself and others to enjoy life with loved ones and the rest of the community.

The joys of life are not possible when the soul is held in check by fear arising from the PTSD. Wherever this ecstatic dimension of life is missing or blocked, some degree of PTSD is present with its telltale signs of joyless and compulsive addictive compensations, workaholism, and numbness to everyday life whose glories and joys can no longer be felt and appreciated. In its more benign forms, it is a lackluster life of empty work, alternating with soul-numbing entrapment to the television each night after work because one is too exhausted and soul-drained to do anything else. In its more malignant forms, it appears in the various forms of addiction, domestic violence, and self-destructive criminal pursuits.

The problem is that soldiers who do not aim at becoming warriors (and worse, those who become mercenaries or thugs) also tend to be those who do not recognize and master the skills that allow for reentry into the community and family life after the war is over. They are not able to enter into productive work where they can make a contribution to society and often lack the ability to love someone and allow themselves to be loved in return. Even when they are able to endure the battle, they often fail in the mission to be able to once more enjoy life because of the hidden scars that remain within. So for 10 or 20 years — or sometimes an entire lifetime — they still do not know how to “come home from war.” Tragedies of killing one’s spouse, drug addiction, rage and violence or numbing isolation, which are part and parcel of the neurological disturbance inherent to post traumatic stress, are all part of the casualties of war that persist and can invade the soul and community life upon the combat veteran’s return.

On a personal level, the effects of war are many, whether labeled PTSD or not. Interpersonal changes include building a wall of shame that blocks sensitivity and capacity for empathy in normal relationships. Sexual difficulties and obsessions often result from damage to the limbic system of the brain’s fight/flight control center, so that the vulnerability of sex and intimacy become confused with aggression and/or invasion triggering fight/flight defenses set during the combat experiences, increasing reactivity and/or isolation from loved ones and from community. The excuse (all too often true) is that nobody can (or wants) to understand, but the fact of the matter is that generally the “nobody” is first and foremost the psyche of the traumatized person who avoids full contact with his experience which has been walled off, intra psychically just as society denies the price paid by those we send off to war, by ignoring them upon their return home because it is uncomfortable and even frightening to experience their rage, confusion, shame and hurt that is hidden behind the arguments, lack of joy or high risk behaviors that now characterizes their lives in contrast to who they seemed to be before they...
deployed. Loved ones begin to feel “bad” because they interpret the changes in their veteran as being caused by something they are doing and this further stresses already endangered relationships which lack the communication skills necessary to work it through.

Another huge invisible wound kept secretly within the veteran is linked with unresolved conflict from having killed others. Shame and a sense of helplessness, disgrace or dishonor can arise from deep within the person who knows that what he or she did in war would be unthinkable and horrific if it occurred now in the context of the sweetness and joy of marriage and family and life in community. But what one has seen and done before has etched deep places that remain in the psyche. It can seem to the sensitive soul in the aftermath, that to have done such things then, now threatens to make them feel like a “monster,” so it must not even be thought about, walled off, erased from memory if possible, or at least kept in a secret compartment not to be opened except among other vets and then only under the influence of alcohol. But the difficulty of this means only that further failure is involved because the person can’t avoid the nagging memory or if he should in part succeed, it is at the expense of having cut off access to a significant part of their own heart and capacity for joyful passionate relationships.

The intense stimulation of the nervous system at moments when killing occurs can be misinterpreted as a kind of pleasure or fascination, leaving veterans with a horror of feeling not only that they have committed a sin, but that they enjoyed it. The shame of this is intolerable and feels utterly disgraceful. They cannot be still for fear that the darkness will rise up to swallow them or get out of hand and poison or hurt the ones they love. This entails a huge loss of meaning in life and an isolation and loneliness that contribute to forms of antisocial behavior or drugs and alcohol and living on the edge as a means of numbing out awareness of these disgraceful things knocking at the door of the psyche from deep in the heart. This all amounts to a pervasive sense of helplessness which itself is an offense to the soldier whose credo is special problems of clergy and helping professionals, marriage, and the treatment of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

One veteran of the Vietnam conflict came for marriage therapy with his wife of six years. The complaint was that he was having multiple sexual affairs, working overtime and neglecting his wife. It turned out he was trying to avoid the “poison” he felt within himself as if allowing it out would “poison” his wife. The more he grew to love her, the greater was the pressure he felt inside to avoid her which he did through sex with other women and working overtime. He had been running away from the moral guilt he felt from what he’d done in the war coupled with the grief he still held in his heart frozen in time with the bloody body of his best friend who died in his arms…while he survived. What he’d done well and honorably in battle, now became a block to enjoying life with his beloved wife and a source of shame for him which he had to avoid seemingly at all costs to himself and his marriage. When he recognized this and his wife saw that instead of not being loved, she was more loved now than six years before, they had a new place from which to work out a different kind of marriage.

On a societal level the psychological, emotional, and spiritual effects of war are present in some respect for all persons touched by war, just as much as those who suffer from medically diagnosed post traumatic stress disorder. For each and everyone this represents a communal responsibility for justice and healing. We haven’t prepared our Soldiers for war until we have prepared their hearts as well as their minds and bodies. And we cannot rest assured that we have brought our Soldiers home, until they are home spiritually, psychologically, and emotionally. For this reason, it is critical to support the mission of helping Soldiers become warriors who are capable of being fit for war and fit for life. In the end, the final war will be won only by those whose fight is from the heart for the purpose of protecting the Sacred Origins and who are able, after returning from the battle, to enjoy them and preserve them, as Chief Joseph of the Nez Percé said, for the “seventh generation” after them.

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Background

It is impossible to talk about my participation in training the Afghan National Army without mentioning the how and the why behind becoming a trainer and advisor. As a lieutenant in the 10th Mountain Division, I was deployed in October 2001 to Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, as an anti-tank platoon leader with Task Force 1-87 which was attached to Joint Special Operations Task Force North, also known as Task Force Dagger. From Uzbekistan, I was among the first regular ground troops deployed to Afghanistan in late November of 2001.

I had arrived at night, and when I awoke the following morning, I saw the majestic Hindu-Kush Mountains that surrounded Bagram airbase. The beautiful snow white capped mountains, dotted with gray and black rock faces that towered all around the airbase, hid the reality that something so beautiful was in fact one of the most dangerous places in the world.

The primary job of my platoon at Bagram Airbase was as a security element for the Special Operations forces who were also staying at the airbase; this included manning joint checkpoints with the local Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) around the airbase. This was my first interaction with the people of Afghanistan. We did not have interpreters, so most of the conversations were limited to games of charades and trying to express ourselves through hand gestures. I was really taken by the dedication of the Afghan men who were manning these checkpoints with my Soldiers. Most were in their mid to early thirties and were veterans of years of combat.

The local militia commander was a man by the name of Kwani; he showed me the scars he had received from being shot three times and blown up twice. He received the first set of wounds during Afghan fighting with the Mujahideen against the Russians, and he had received the last three sets of wounds fighting against the Taliban as a Northern Alliance fighter. I was very intrigued by him and these people; they had gone through so much and had done it purely out of love for their people and their country, not for money or personal gain.

After a few months of pulling security around the airfield, my Soldiers and I participated in Operation Anaconda. I saw three towns: Marzak, Serkenkel, and Babakhel destroyed by fighting. I was extremely taken by the beauty of the countryside and the great fighting instinct and abilities that these people possessed. I came back to the airfield after that and two subsequent missions and returned to manning my checkpoints with a newfound respect for the people of Afghanistan and the hardships they endured. I left Afghanistan later that month, but I made a promise to myself that I would return if I ever had the opportunity.

That opportunity came in January of 2003 when I was asked if I would delay attending the Infantry Captain’s Career Course (ICCC) to become a trainer for six months with the newly formed Afghan National Army (ANA). The ANA’s first battalion was stood up and completed its initial training period in July 2002, and the Army was starting to stand up its third brigade. I thought about the beauty of the country and the people from my last deployment, but initially I was not attracted to the idea of going
over there purely in the function of a trainer. However, I was then
told I would not only be in a trainer role, but I would also be
taking the trainees out on combat operations. I liked this idea
and had read the books of Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf and
how they had enjoyed doing this same type of mission during the
Vietnam War. So with these grand visions, I jumped on board
and was told that I would be leaving the end of May to become a
trainer.

I learned that my responsibility would be with the weapons
company of the battalion, which included training the officers
and NCOs in combat operations using U.S. Army tactics with
Soviet-era weapons. The weapons company consisted of a scout
platoon, 82mm mortar platoon, and an SPG-9 anti-armor platoon.
My responsibilities included instructing company-level logistics,
range preparation, proper execution of live-fire exercises (LFXs),
walking through the orders process, and finally taking the company
out on combat missions throughout Afghanistan. This could have
been an easy task, but the ANA provided many unseen factors
that I had to take into consideration, to include multiple languages,
ethnic rivalry in the unit, a low literacy rate, and pay issues.

Camp Phoenix and Other Important Areas

I left Fort Drum on 27 May 2003 and flew into Kabul International
Airport (KIA) 31 May in the middle of the night. From the airport, it was a
five-minute trip on a large green German bus to Camp Phoenix.
Camp Phoenix was built for the purpose of housing the trainers and
the support elements of Combined Joint Task Force-Phoenix (CJTF-
Phoenix) until other more fixed compounds were completed. The
significance of the German bus was that it was blown up 800 meters from Camp Phoenix a week later by
terrorists, killing three German peacekeepers and once again
reminding me of the seriousness of the situation.

Camp Phoenix is a small camp that was a truck parking area,
so it is totally paved. There were significant security measures in
place, including a whole wall of Hesco Barriers around the camp
and a more fixed cement wall that had guard mounts and vehicle
search checkpoints that were manned 24 hours a day, seven days
a week by a company of light infantry Soldiers from the 10th
Mountain Division. Inside the camp were many buildings, most
consisting of wood “Sea-Huts” and tents. The camp also had a
huge dining facility (DFAC) and a laundry service, and local
national workers did a variety of jobs around the camp.

Camp Phoenix represented one of the most interesting
conglomerations of nations ever formed. Each of these countries
and contingents was responsible for a school, maintenance, or
training task that would help to benefit the ANA in some way: a
contingent from the Vermont National Guard was responsible for
Basic Training and Range Control; the British were responsible
for training the ANA NCO Academy; the French were responsible
for training at the ANA Officers Academy; the South Koreans
were responsible for maintaining the Troop Medical Center (TMC)
at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC); the Mongolians
were responsible for the training of the field artillery; and the
Romanians and Bulgarians were responsible for maintaining all
the wheeled and mechanized equipment and training the
mechanics in the third brigade.

There are many different training areas, and the locations of
several important camps are important to understanding the
training of the ANA. Camp Phoenix is where all the trainers
initially stayed, and later it became a logistical center. It is located
on the eastern edge of Kabul. The Kabul Military Training Center
(KMTC), located five kilometers east of Camp Phoenix, contained
the Officer School, NCO Academy, Range Control, Central Issue
Facility (CIF), Basic Training, and the Central Corps Headquarters.
It was also where Forward Operating Base (FOB) 31 was located
until the Special Forces left after the relief in place (RIP). Right
across the road from KMTC and FOB 31 is where the Kabul
Multinational Brigade (KMNB) is located, which is part of the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), responsible for
patrolling and maintaining security in Kabul. About 10 kilometers
east is Pol-e-Charki, which contained a lot of the ranges and the 2nd and 3rd Brigades
of the Afghanistan Central Corps. About five kilometers south of this
compound, just past the infamous Pol-e-
Charki prison, are what was called the “brick ranges.” They were located by
an old brick-making factory and
primarily used for live-fire exercises.
The final location of importance is the
Presidential Palace and home of the 1st Brigade,
Central Corps, ANA, where I spent a majority of my
time. The palace is located 10 kilometers east of Camp Phoenix
in downtown Kabul.

A standard Afghan brigade’s table of organization and
equipment (TO&E) consisted of three light infantry battalions and
one brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).
Within these three battalions, there were three light infantry
companies, one weapons company, and a headquarters company.
The three light infantry companies contained three light infantry
platoons and a mortar section, and each of the three light infantry
platoons contained three light infantry squads with nine men each.
The headquarters company consisted of all the staff sections, a
support platoon, a cook section, medical platoon, and a Mullah
(chaplain in the U.S. military). The weapons company consisted of the scout platoon with three squads each; the SPG-9 73mm
recoilless rifle platoon, with three sections or two guns per section;
and the mortar platoon with six 82mm Hungarian mortars or three
sections with two mortars in each section.

The Training Teams

Task Force Phoenix training teams consisted of three brigade
training teams with each team broken down with the same
allotment of trainers. At the brigade level, each team had a
lieutenant colonel, whose counterpart was the ANA brigade
commander, a brigadier general; a major, who was responsible
for the brigade XO; a sergeant major responsible for the ANA
brigade sergeant major; a Transportation captain to cover the ANA brigade motor pool; a Signal captain to cover the communications for the ANA brigade; a Quartermaster captain to help the ANA brigade S-4; and a Military Intelligence captain who would help the ANA brigade S-2 or intelligence officer.

Underneath the command of these brigade training teams, there were three battalion training teams. Each battalion training team consisted of a U.S. Army major who was the mentor and trainer of the battalion commander for which he was responsible. Underneath this major, there was a senior NCO who was the coach, teacher, and mentor of the battalion sergeant major. Then, for each of the companies, a captain and an NCO trainer to help and advise the companies. These captains also had additional duties of helping train one of the staff sections at the battalion level.

I was on the 1st Brigade Training Team (1st BTT), which was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Gallant, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment, Florida National Guard. He was the mentor for the ANA’s 1st Brigade commander, Brigadier General Alim Shah. Underneath LTC Gallant was my immediate boss, Major Mark Kneram, the 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade team chief. He was responsible for the training, coaching, teaching, and mentoring of the battalion commander. In addition, we had First Sergeant O’Brien, who was responsible for the battalion sergeant major, the S-3 or operations sergeant major, and the S-2 or intelligence section. 1SG O’Brien was a veteran of the Vietnam War and more than 50 years old; he brought a lot of experience to the team and was very much liked by the Afghan soldiers and the rest of the training team.

Relief in Place

After getting all of the trainers together from their different units and defining what their jobs would entail, it was time to execute the relief-in-place (RIP) with the Americans currently training the Afghans — Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) Team 321 from 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. The Special Forces (SF) team had been with the 1st Kandak (Dari word for battalion) for only two months but seemed to be more than happy to turn over the mission. The SF Soldiers picked us up from Camp Phoenix the first week of June and took us down to the palace to meet the Kandak and the interpreters who would act as our go-betweens for both the trainers and the ANA.

The first ride to the palace was very memorable. I rode in my Toyota Hilux pickup truck that was issued to me to travel back and forth to the palace. It was amazing driving down Jalalabad Road. Afghanistan had changed so much since the last time I had been there. I saw endless convoys of refugees returning to Kabul from Pakistan, and numerous rock quarries that were crushing rocks to make cement, bricks, and cinder blocks which would help rebuild dilapidated buildings and repair the scars of 25 years of war. It was amazing to see all the traffic and the people walking around; especially amazing was seeing numerous women out walking around without wearing the traditional burka (a long robe that is usually light blue that covers the females from head to toe with a screen like mask for them to see out). Under the oppressive rule of the Taliban, the females would never have walked around without wearing their burkas at the risk of death. I was extremely impressed by the rebuilding that was going on and was amazed by the amount of reconstruction that had gone on in my absence. As we started pulling through the numerous security checkpoints to the palace, I saw a larger-than-life green, red, and black flag flying high above the palace and knew that I had come back for the right reasons.

We pulled to a stop just outside a rather large building that served as the offices and barracks of the 1st Kandak, 1st Brigade, ANA. The building looked brand new, but upon further inspection, it was clear that it had been refurbished and had been standing there for many years. The first people we met were our interpreters, all of them young college students or businessmen. The first one was Zahir, a young college student from Kabul who had been working with the Americans as an interpreter for about six months. The next interpreter was Wahidullah (Wahid), a 24-year-old college student studying literature; he was soft spoken and had a good sense of humor. Tahir, or “Doc” was in his early 30s, spoke impeccable English, and earned his nickname because he was a doctor at the Kabul Military Hospital (KMH). The next interpreter introduced was Hickmat; he was a well-dressed young businessman whose father worked for the Department of Commerce. The last interpreter introduced to us was Zia, a very slight and soft-spoken 27-year-old Afghan who spoke English well but, when pressured, stuttered and was often caught on words when he was nervous. There were some initial introductions made with the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Kareem, and the battalion operations officer, Major Taza Gul.

The palace was very impressive and extremely beautiful with many buildings that were being rebuilt all over the grounds. We first looked at the barracks where the soldiers lived and slept. The barracks were open bays with metal bunk beds and wall lockers lining the walls. All the beds were neatly made, dress right dress, and the solid cement floors were neatly swept. The next thing we were shown was one of the company offices which had a dual role of serving as where the officers of the company slept and as an office where all the paperwork was done. The showers and bathrooms were the next facilities on the tour, and they were very clean and looked to be brand new. We were informed that they had just finished constructing them and that there had been a little bit of a problem when the soldiers initially used them because some of the soldiers were using flat stones for toilet paper and then throwing them into the toilet, causing the toilet to clog. The last item to see was the palace orchard or garden area which was overgrown but looked pretty with all the flowers and trees in full bloom. We were informed that the palace orchard or garden area was where the Kandak did a majority of its squad-level training.

At this point, we returned to where we had parked our vehicles, and the battalion commander invited us to eat lunch with him. We had chicken covered with rice, nan (unleavened bread), and a bowl of beans with a small piece of meat in it. I sat there patiently as the ODA team chief and LTC Kareem chitchatted through an interpreter. Eventually, the conversation ended, and we returned to FOB 31 to receive a briefing on where the Kandak stood in terms of training and leadership.
The battalion was now ready to be taken to new levels. The team had taken the ANA as far as they could in terms of training, responsibility of training the ANA to the regular Army. The SOF team was very apparent why the SOF team was turning over the numbers and the sheer size of the ANA battalion. This also made what the SOF team had been able to cover, considering their small duties and how he had covered his particular tasks. It was amazing the SOF team was very good about linking us up with a counterpart on Russian and Eastern Bloc weapon systems and some training.

The conversation continued over numerous cups of chi, or green tea, and later over a lunch of chicken and rice. He told me how a typical day and week would go in the ANA. The first working day of the week was Saturday. The soldiers would wake up at 0400 for morning prayer, and then at 0500 complete physical training (PT), during which they would run or do calisthenics for about an hour and then would be off until 0900. Being soldiers in a country based on Islam, they pray five times a day, which would cause some difficulty scheduling training around prayer time. The soldiers trained until about 1130 and then were off until 1330 for lunch and prayer. The afternoon usually consisted of more training and classes until about 1600. This schedule would hold true until Thursday, which was a half day and demonstrations. He had a wealth of experience, making it as high as lieutenant colonel with a position of brigade executive officer (XO) under the Soviet puppet regime in the early 1990s. After the overthrow of the government by the Taliban, he went back to his home province and became a money trader. With the defeat of the Taliban by the Northern Alliance and the insertion of Hamid Karzai as president of the country, he heard that the ANA was forming and again volunteered his services to his country.

Initially, I believed that it was very important to learn as much as I possibly could about this man and his culture so I befriended him immediately and told him I would be his advisor and assist in training his company. Through my interpreter Hickmat, he proceeded to introduce me to his executive officer, his platoon leaders, and his first sergeant. The XO of the company was First Lieutenant Abdul Ghafar; he was 33 years old and was also a former company commander with a wealth of combat experience from the same regime of the early 1990s. The first sergeant of the company was 1SG Mostaqim, a former Mujahideen fighter from the Logar province. He was clearly battle hardened from his fighting with the Mujahideen and initially seemed very wary of me. The company currently had two platoon leaders, with the Scout Platoon leader position being open. The Mortar Platoon leader was First Lieutenant Abdul Qadir who had impressed me earlier during a mortar live-fire demonstration that the SOF forces had done for the new trainers. He was also a former company commander under the puppet regime and had numerous scars and wounds to prove it. The SPG-9 (Recoilless Rifle) Platoon leader was First Lieutenant Lotif Khan; he was 37 years old and had been a corps-level staff officer under the former puppet regime. He and his platoon had also impressed me during the earlier demonstration.

After the initial introductions I spoke to Sayeed Mohammed about the current status of the company. He informed me that it had just returned from a deployment to the city of Gardez where it had a lot of success capturing and destroying caches. The platoons had done limited LFXs while there and had been in some minor skirmishes with a local warlord. This particular battalion had been around for almost one and a half years, and Sayeed Mohammed said that he was starting to see attrition among his forces. He said that because it was a volunteer army, the soldiers would occasionally leave, never to return, and that he was currently at about 70 percent strength. He also informed me that a lot of the soldiers were barely literate, and the reason a lot of the soldiers were leaving was that the pay was extremely poor.

The briefing was extremely interesting and informative. The Kandak had done squad level live-fire exercises (LFXs) and had been on multiple combat missions to Khowst and Gardez. The leadership slides were very interesting to me because I had yet to meet my counterpart and was looking forward to seeing a picture of him and seeing if he was a capable leader. His slide finally came up, and I got to see who he was and see what he looked like on paper. Captain Sayeed Mohammed, commander of Weapons Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Brigade, ANA, was 34 years old and half Tajik and half Pashtun from the Parawan province. The Special Forces team assessed him as an exceptional commander. After seeing this slide, I was relieved and looked forward to meeting Sayeed Mohammed and start working with him.

The RIP continued with the special operations forces (SOF) meeting us at the palace every morning. We shadowed the SOF team for the next two weeks, observing several blocks of instruction on Russian and Eastern Bloc weapon systems and some training. The SOF team was very good about linking us up with a counterpart from its team that would give a good brief on the scope of his duties and how he had covered his particular tasks. It was amazing what the SOF team had been able to cover, considering their small numbers and the sheer size of the ANA battalion. This also made it very apparent why the SOF team was turning over the responsibility of training the ANA to the regular Army. The SOF team had taken the ANA as far as they could in terms of training, and the battalion was now ready to be taken to new levels.

**Weapons Company Initial Assessments**

I met CPT Sayeed Mohammed during one of these counterpart meetings. He was First Lieutenant Lotif Khan; he was 37 years old and had been a corps-level staff officer under the former puppet regime. He and his platoon had also impressed me earlier during a mortar live-fire demonstration that the SOF forces had done for the new trainers. He was also a former company commander under the puppet regime and had numerous scars and wounds to prove it. The SPG-9 (Recoilless Rifle) Platoon leader was First Lieutenant Lotif Khan; he was 37 years old and had been a corps-level staff officer under the former puppet regime. He and his platoon had also impressed me during the earlier demonstration.

The author, Captain Charles Di Leonardo, poses for photo with ANA Specialist Ahmadullah Kahn at the Palace in Kabul, Afghanistan.
consisted of a battalion training meeting for company commanders and staff and maintenance for the soldiers. In the afternoon, the soldiers would be off again until Saturday.

After my initial conversation with Sayeed Mohammed, I sat down with SSG Sandoval, and we tried to figure out where the company was and where it needed to go. The SOF team would be with us for about one more week, and then it would be our turn to take over the company. Based on my initial conversations with the SOF team and Sayeed Mohammed, there was one huge problem I could see in terms of the company. The NCOs in the company had no power, and the 1SG was there for making Chi tea and bringing it for the officers. This was also very apparent to SSG Sandoval based on his conversations with the NCOs in the company. We determined that the root of the problem was that the French Officer Academy, being run at KMTC, was training the officers to control all the aspects of the company. There were also trust problems between the officers and the NCOs; in addition to that, the NCOs were not formally trained in their duties and responsibilities. To counteract this problem, the British had begun an NCO Academy that would train the NCOs. SSG Sandoval and I thought we could send NCOs to this school and also manipulate training so as to help the NCOs assume leadership and responsibility in the company.

Another problem we found was that the company had no systems in place, such as training schedules, soldier accountability charts, logistics accounting, or equipment accountability paperwork. The commander did have a piece of paper that he had signed for equipment, but it was not complete and was just a bunch of pieces of paper stapled together. To help the company get their systems in place, I was going to work with the commander and his lieutenants on developing those systems. The biggest problem I saw with soldier accountability was that even though a lot of soldiers had been gone for a long time they were still on the books. So we had to get these soldiers who were gone off the books and then get a true accountability of what each platoon had for soldiers.

The next large problem to address was with the training schedule. There was absolutely nothing in place, and none of the training was planned by the company; it was all being fed to the company by the SOF team. To change this, I decided to first show the commander how to plan training and then how to execute the training. Then the company commander would plan his own training and execute the plan with SSG Sandoval’s and my supervision.

As far as logistics, there were several problems, the biggest of which was there were no combat service support (CSS) units or clear logistical lines in place. The system that the SOF were using was to just buy whatever the Kandak requested, and if the SOF team did have it, they would artificially put it in the supply system by giving it to the S-4. There was a Central Issue Facility (CIF), but it was purely for uniforms and Basic Initial Issue (BII) for the soldiers. It looked to be a daunting task of trying to establish some kind of logistics system for the company. I decided to work this issue solely with the company XO, developing supply requests and range requests and how to go through the process of submitting the requests.

**Additional Duties**

Just before the SOF team left, there was one last duty that it performed that we needed to assume. This was paying the soldiers, and it was no easy task. The responsibility of paying the soldiers fell on the paying agents: me and Captain Phillips. CPT Phillips was responsible for drawing and disbursing the money, and I was responsible for maintaining the records via a computer and paper pay rosters. To do this, I had to be taught how to use a very difficult computer program that had been built specifically for paying and maintaining the records for the Kandak.

The paying process was a gigantic headache that took two days every month to perform. I would bring all of the company commanders together into the Kandak’s S-1 office a few days before the payday. We would scrub the pay roster to make all the necessary corrections to soldiers’ pay in terms of promotions and any other adjustments or errors. After scrubbing the pay roster with the commanders, I would go back to Camp Phoenix and make all the corrections in the database. This was not only time consuming, but it was also a really annoying process. CPT Phillips would then draw the money, in cash, in the amount that the database had worked out to be paid to the Kandak that month.

The process was then to hand out the money to every single soldier in the Kandak. He would sign his name and put his thumb print right next to his picture and his pay information. Undoubtedly there were corrections every time; soldiers who did not receive pay from the month before, soldiers who had been promoted and it had not been reflected on their pay … just all kinds of problems. Initially, I hated payday because of how much time it took, but later on I looked at it as a challenge to see how correct and how quickly I could get it done. The first time we did payday, it took until 2100, and we started at 0900. I eventually got it down to about four hours with two corrections. But for seven months, we went through the exasperating process of paying the soldiers by hand. The lesson learned from this was that this responsibility had to fall on someone else eventually, like a finance team; however, the trainers would still have to be involved to ensure the soldiers were still getting paid the proper amounts. Eventually, I see the responsibility falling on the Kandak S-1 with some oversight from the American trainers to ensure there is no corruption and that everything is done to standard.

**Initial Training**

After determining the status of the company on paper and getting a feeling for the leaders, it was time to see the company in action. I told Sayeed Mohammed to have the soldiers ready to train the following morning. Specifically, I wanted them to set up the mortars and SPG-9s so that they could show me crew drills on the weapon systems. While this was going on, SSG Sandoval would take the scouts and have them show him movement techniques. The next morning, we showed up at 0830, picked up our interpreters, and went to the company areas. Sayeed Mohammed was waiting for us with the company XO. We went through the normal greetings, and he said that the Mortar and SPG-9 Platoons were waiting at their training area and that the Scout Platoon was waiting for SSG Sandoval in the King’s Garden.

Sayeed Mohammed and I walked over to the Mortar and SPG-9 Platoons, and SSG Sandoval went with Abdul Ghafar to the Scout Platoon training area. When I
arrived there, the mortars and SPG-9s were set up, with the officers barking orders to the soldiers and controlling much of the action. I called the platoon leaders over and told them to take the mortars and SPG-9s and run through an immediate setup as fast as they could and to be prepared to fire.

I watched the mortars first. Their platoon leader was controlling the platoon. He was everywhere, yelling at the soldiers to hurry it up and get the mortars set up. I told them to set the mortar with the sight focusing on the top of a large building about one kilometer away. The times were very slow, and the soldiers’ actions were very deliberate, afraid to make a mistake and catch the wrath of their platoon leader who was trying to impress his new American trainer. There were a few things that caught my eye that looked wrong. The first was that not all the mortars were the same; there were three mortars from Czechoslovakia, two from Hungary, and one from China. I knew this would cause problems later based on how mortars are fired and how each different kind of mortar fires differently based on its charts and other factors. The second thing I noticed was that the platoon leader was controlling all the soldiers and that the NCOs would just stand there looking around like overpaid privates. The last problem I observed is that there were no aiming circles or plotting boards; this was extremely bad, as it limited our fires to direct alignment and direct lay. Therefore, there was no way to fire indirectly, and this was not something we could show or teach the platoon without the equipment. This problem was compounded by the fact that there were no compasses, and it was not possible to use American compasses because they use 6400 mils and Russian and Eastern Bloc compasses use 6000 mils, as do the Eastern Bloc mortars. Overall, the motivation and training was there and the SOF team had done what they could with the Mortar Platoon, but it still needed work.

The SPG-9 Platoon was a completely different story: the platoon leader was excellent and the platoon was clearly well-trained. The platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Hafizullah, was exceptional and helped the platoon leader execute the crew drills to the best of his ability. I gave the platoon leader the same directions as the mortar platoon leader: set the guns up as quickly as possible and then put them on target. For this, I gave them a target of a building approximately 600 meters away. The setup and execution were exceptional; the guns were up extremely quickly and all of them were on target. Once again, however, except for the platoon sergeant, there was little NCO involvement and there was a problem with the SPG-9s. The problem was that some of the sights were missing, the SPG-9 has a vehicle and a personnel sight and some of the vehicle sights were missing. Overall, I was pleased with the SPG-9 platoon and knew that it was ready for a greater challenge.

SSG Sandoval’s assessment of the Scout Platoon was similar to my assessment of the Mortar Platoon. The scouts had received limited movement training; they understood the concepts but did not know the battle drills. They also did not understand the concept of a scout platoon as a result of a translation problem of the word scout from Dari to English. In Dari, the word scout translates into intelligence, so they thought they were to go forward and gain intelligence by engaging the enemy. This was a severe problem which would take some time and training to correct, so that they would go forward of the battalion and observe the enemy without being seen. One bright spot in the Scout Platoon was that the platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Ahmadullah, was in charge because the platoon leader had left the unit. SFC Ahmadullah was a former Mujahideen fighter with a wealth of experience and an interesting “can do” type of personality. He had the respect of all the officers and soldiers in the company.

SSG Sandoval and I compared our notes that night and decided to be very aggressive in our training program with the company. This would be affected by a couple of outside taskings which would effect who could train. These taskings were mainly guard posts around the palace and would take a platoon away for that particular week of training. We decided this would work well because we could handle training two platoons, but more than that, initially, would be difficult. Simultaneously, I would take the officers aside and teach them the operations order (OPORD) process and systems. This would free SSG Sandoval to work primarily with the NCOs. This would allow him to develop the NCOs to be leaders and trainers while training them in their battle drills without officer

Members of the ANA SPG-9 Platoon prepares their weapon for firing during a training exercise.
The request was lost there was not enough of them and never made the same mistake several valuable lessons, and he took note had lost the request. The XO learned S-4 shop said the shop did receive it but the American trainer in the S-4 shop lost it and claimed never to have received it. I explained to him that I developed the first three months of training and that I wanted him to develop the training for each subsequent month. I also told him that I wanted all the officers in the office every day for the next two weeks to go through classes with me and to let the NCOs assume responsibility of the soldiers. He agreed that the NCOs needed to assume more responsibility in the company because the officers could not always be there and that the NCOs “needed to start earning their money.”

While I was making all of these plans, the other company trainers were doing the same. The rifle companies were planning marksmanship ranges, and HHC was planning drivers’ training, in conjunction with the ISAF LNO. The staff sections were also learning their jobs better and were putting in better systems for tracking soldiers, supplies on hand, and training schedules for the future. I decided to “piggyback” with the rifle companies on their marksmanship ranges to see where the soldiers stood on basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) and weapons familiarity. I also wanted to see the company XO send up supply requests to the S-4 shop for transportation and ammunition to see how the logistics lines worked. He did an excellent job of requesting the ammunition and vehicles, but he did it on a piece of paper that he handed to the S-4 and did not keep a copy for himself. Of course, the S-4 shop lost it and claimed never to have received it but the American trainer in the S-4 shop said the shop did receive it but had lost the request. The XO learned several valuable lessons, and he took note of them and never made the same mistake again.

The range was a nightmare; because the request was lost there was not enough ammunition initially, but the XO scrambled and found a few cases of ammunition in the arms room. The soldiers were proficient with their AK-47s and could hit the silhouette target; however, there were no adjustment tools for the AK-47s, so no one could zero his weapon. To correct it, we had the Romanians, living on Camp Phoenix, loan us 10 zeroing tools, so that we could zero the soldiers’ weapons. The American trainers ran the range, and we had some problems. We learned we needed zeroing tools and better direct coordination with the Kandak so as to not have the ammunition problem in the future. We also learned that there were things that SOF team had failed to tell us about the weapons, specifically, the need for a zeroing tool.

The lack of zeroing tools, mortar tubes from three different countries, no compasses, SPG-9s missing sights, and having no plotting boards or aiming circles forced me to find where the ANA was getting their weapons from so that I could see if I could find some of these missing pieces and parts. To do this, I had to find the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces, S-4 at KMTC to try to find where the weapons were issued. I found him rather easily, and he directed me to a first lieutenant located in a back room at KMTC. Once I found him, I told him my dilemma, and he said I could bring the ANA company commander, the equipment to be traded, and his property book to KMTC the next day. He said there was a huge cache of donated weapons that were stored in a warehouse on KMTC, and we could see if we could find the equipment we needed.

The next day, the commander and I dug through the warehouse, and we found some brand new Hungarian mortars and SPG-9 sights; however, we found nothing else we needed. We turned in the Czechoslovakian and Chinese mortars and drew out the new mortars and SPG-9 sights. Sayeed Mohammed brought his hand receipt with him, which consisted of a bunch of pieces of paper in Dari and English with items he had signed for in the company. The lieutenant made the proper annotations on a DA 2062 hand receipt to reflect he had turned in the mortars and drew out the new mortars.

I was very wary of this hand receipt, so I directed the company commander to do a 100 percent with his officers the next day, so that we could actually see the equipment he did have on hand. This was pretty much the way it went: every time we would correct one problem, another problem would present itself. In this case, it was receiving all like mortars and discovering the hand receipts for the equipment were sketchy at best. Who was to say that the AK-47s he was supposed to have in the arms room had not been sold at the local market? I was concerned; I knew that Sayeed Mohammed was an honest man, but were the soldiers in his company honest?

The next day we did 100 percent inventory of all equipment and found that not only did he have all his equipment, he...
had extra AK-47s, mortars, and SPG-9s. This was a problem but not that significant compared to the huge problem we discovered in the arms room and supply closets, where we discovered huge caches of extra ammunition. This worried me because my immediate thought was that they were planning a coup or something. It turned out to be quite the opposite; it was for the defense of the palace and the protection of the President Hamid Karzai who lived at the palace. Because of the possibility of a threat from the outside warlords, they believed they needed the ammunition. I agreed with their reasoning to a certain extent, but the amount of ammunition that I saw was excessive, so I decided to use some of it for training in the future.

**Training**

As a training team, we decided to do battalion consolidated PT because all of the companies were lacking in this area. The first day of PT was extremely amusing. The battalion SGM came and greeted us, wearing his ANA-issued all black PTs with green and red pin stripes and Chuck Taylor looking shoes. He went through the normal greetings and then pulled a whistle out and started blowing it in front of the barracks. As he did this, scores of soldiers started coming out of the barracks and forming up in about a thousand different uniforms. The soldiers were wearing their uniforms with sandals, or any other possible combination of issued uniform that one could imagine. This was a problem, so SSG Bivens, who was leading PT that day, pulled the SGM aside and instructed him on the correct uniform to be worn. The SGM informed SSG Bivens that not all the soldiers were issued PT uniforms, again problem solved …another problem becomes apparent. This was easily fixed by taking the soldiers to KMTC and the ANA CIF building and getting the PT uniforms.

The biggest problem noticed was that not one officer showed up for PT! This could not be fixed because the officers lived throughout the city of Kabul, and if they were not present at the battalion for staff duty or sleeping in their offices, they were not going to show up for PT. In addition, only one officer had a car and the rest used buses and other transportation to get to the palace, so we never expected the officers at PT. This and the lack of uniforms had us put off organized PT until we could get the PT uniforms, which ended up taking two weeks.

Once the PT program started, the NCOs started stepping up and demonstrating leadership and accountability for the soldiers. The NCOs were quick learners, and the soldiers could run and road march well, but push-ups and sit-ups needed a lot of work. The benefit of the PT was that the NCOs gained confidence and showed their leadership in all facets of training. The fact that the officers were not there actually helped achieve one of the training goals we had set.

The daily training that SSG Sandoval was doing with the platoons was also starting to pay dividends. I would keep the officers preoccupied in the morning with OPORDs, developing accountability systems, planning ranges, and setting up LFXs. This would free up SSG Sandoval to take the platoons out to train. In the afternoon, I would take the officers down to the training area, and the soldiers and NCOs would show what they had learned that morning. Eventually, it reached the point where SSG Sandoval would name a battle or crew drill or movement formation, and the soldiers would execute.

At this point, several of the key problems we were initially facing had come to resolution. The NCOs were starting to take charge of the soldiers and lead PT every morning, therefore establishing some powerbase. The officers were beginning to understand their administrative role, to include placing numerous systems in place to track soldiers and equipment. With some help from SSG Sandoval and Hickmat we took a tracking chart, translated it into Dari, and then used a plotter to enlarge it and laminate it, making a huge personnel tracking chart that the officers could put on the wall to track soldiers. Sayeed Mohammed and I made adjustments to his hand receipt to make it more accurate and easier to understand and made sure that the S-4 and CIF had a copy. I had also issued the lieutenants two very effective training OPORDs from which they learned how to issue and execute an effective order.

**Ranges**

To test the training the soldiers had received, it was time to execute some ranges with the platoons to continue with the aggressive training plan we had derived. The timing was perfect for these ranges. It was August, and we had entered a tasking cycle in which two platoons would be on guard duty and one would be able to train. The officers and soldiers were really excited to get the training going, and I was excited to see what the soldiers could do and put the officers to the test by putting them in stressful situations to see how they would perform.

I briefed the plan I had made with Sayeed Mohammed to MAJ Kneram and the rest of the trainers and made some minor adjustments based on their input. They all seemed surprised and excited and were anxious to see how the Weapons Company would

Soldiers with the Mortar Platoon adjust their aiming stakes during a range at Pol-e-Charki. Notice the AN/PRC-77 for communication.
perform. I had the finalized plan translated into Dari via Hickmat and made sure all the officers in the company understood the schedule for the training. I then took the XO and commander out to Pol-e-Charki and showed them how to do a range recon and set up the range. The next step was to go to range control and confirm that the ranges were reserved for the training. To do this we went to the fourth floor of the ANA Central Corps HQs where a joint range control, with both Afghan and Americans, were controlling the ranges. I confirmed with the Americans that the ranges were reserved, and I overheard a similar conversation between Sayeed Mohammed and the Afghans responsible for range control. The last preparation for the ranges was for the company XO to confirm the logistics for the ranges. This consisted of his confirming requests he had put through the S-4 for ammunition and to the HHC XO for vehicles. He confirmed these requests and that a few days before the scheduled training, he would pick up the ammunition and augment it with the ammunition we already had at the palace.

The first platoon to run through the training was the Mortar Platoon; however my personal qualifications and lack of experience forced me to bring in my battalion’s Mortar Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Dave Smith, who was a trainer in 3rd Kandak. He was Mortar Leaders Course qualified and had numerous mortar LFXs under his belt, so he was perfect for the job.

The XO had the trucks loaded with all the ammunition and the troops were ready to go when we arrived at the palace. We drove down to KMT and signed for the range and continued down to Pol-e-Charki range 2A. The first classes had the soldiers focus on the basics and consisted of basic range estimation and registering a mortar system. The range estimation class went well, but the mortar registration class did not go that well. There was difficulty understanding the concept. Because we were using direct lay and direct alignment, the troops could see where the mortar was landing, so they would adjust the rounds visually and get the rounds on target. Because of this, LT Smith and I decided to move the mortars down into a wadi where the mortar men could not see where the mortar was landing, and we had one of the scout teams that were out providing security call the adjustment in over the radio. This worked much better; the mortar would be directly aligned with the target, and the platoon leader would call instructions over the radio, using his charts, after estimating the range to the target, using a map. Then, they would fire a round, the scout would call adjustments, and the mortars would fire another round. Once on target, the scout would call fire for effect, the mortar platoon leader would give all the adjustments to the other guns, and then they would fire a 16-round volley or four rounds out of all four tubes. The scout would call target destroyed and then give them another target.

The Mortar Platoon also performed the mortar out of action drill that was really impressive. The drill is performed when a mortar round is dropped into the tube, and it is not shot for any of a number of reasons. The drill was executed with everyone backing off the firing line and the assistant gunner (AG) going up after a few minutes and kicking the tube to try to get the mortar to drop if it was stuck in the tube. If nothing happened, he would come back, and after two minutes, the whole gun crew would go to the gun line, twist the mortar off the base plate and then unhook the tube from the bipod, and tip it forward until the AG could catch the live round. This was a scary drill to watch because it was extremely dangerous, but the mortar soldiers performed it more than 30 times to perfection.

The next drill we did was the mounted hip shoot which went exceptionally well. The platoon would be loaded into the two vehicles with two mortars loaded into each vehicle. They would drive up as if their convoy had just made contact, run off the vehicle, set up the mortars, and fire immediate suppression as fast as possible. We executed the drill five times, and each time the mortars had a faster time than the one before.

The last drill executed was a dismounted movement to a hip shoot. This was interesting to watch and was difficult for the Mortar Platoon, but it was satisfactory in the end. I set the movement up as a five kilometer uphill movement to the mortar firing point, with the soldiers carrying the mortar tubes and a rucksack. Being at 6,500 feet of altitude really took a toll on the soldiers. The platoon leader started the movement with gun sections together and the ammunition bearers (ABs) providing security. He used a huge wadi running off the mountain to cover and conceal his movement to the mortar firing point (MFP). Once he got within 500 meters of the MFP, he popped out of the wadi and did a quick leaders recon with his PSG. While he was gone, things got interesting. Soldiers took off their helmets, boots, and blouses and went to sleep. I made a mental note of this and continued with the training. Once the mortars got into place at the MFP, it was almost as if the soldiers had forgotten everything they had learned; there were all

Captain Sayeed Mohammed conducts an after action review with the officers after completing cordon and search training.
kinds of problems. I decided to have them restart 500 meters back, and this time, they performed well, but I had plenty of comments for the AAR.

Sayeed Mohammed had been on my hip, observing training, and I had taught him the after action review (AAR) process during one of our officer training sessions so I let him lead it, and I would add comments during the AAR. I chastised the soldiers for losing focus while their platoon leader was doing his leader’s recon, explaining to them that whenever they are in a combat environment, their senses always needed to be sharp because that is when the enemy attacks. I also praised them for their improvement since the first time I had seen them go through their drills, and that it was the responsibility of the NCOs to maintain this training by doing the mortar battle drills as often as possible.

One technique I used was that after we would eat dinner, I would take the platoon out for a long foot march to a grid point and establish a patrol base. I demonstrated this for the platoon leader and NCOs the first night and had them execute the second night. It really took advantage of the time they had away from the palace to train, and they enjoyed walking at night when it was much cooler. This gave them an opportunity to work on movement formations and setting up and establishing a patrol base, but most importantly improving their field craft. I did this with every platoon, and it really boosted their confidence and reinforced the training we had done at the palace.

The SPG-9 Platoon was the next platoon to train at Pol-e-Charki and I was most confident in their abilities of all the platoons. The platoon started with digging a standard SPG-9 crew fighting position. This was intended to take a long time to show just how much time it takes to dig the position. Once the position was finished, I had the soldiers practice their SPG-9 crew drills and then conduct dismount and setup drills for the best time; the crew with the best time would be the first to fire from the SPG-9 position. The crew that won did so in an amazing fashion, demonstrating that the crew drill practice was working. The platoon used the rest of the day, engaging tank hulks from the hillside where they had dug the SPG-9 fighting position. That night, I had them do a five-kilometer movement to a wadi and, then the next morning, do an anti-armor ambush on the tanks right as dawn was rising. The SPG-9 platoon lived up to all my expectations, and I was extremely pleased with their range time. Sayeed Mohammed made the same comments during the AAR.

The Scout Platoon was last to go through range training; it only had enough soldiers to actually train two scout teams, but we made the most of it by jamming the schedule with as much training as possible. I first had the scouts practice movement formations and then go through the break contact drill. SSG Sandoval and I had set up some silhouettes inside of one of the wadis, and we had the platoon patrol up to the wadi and make contact or “be seen” by the silhouettes. Then, the scout team would break contact by bounding back, while using suppressive fires. During the crawl phase we did not use ammunition. We did about 10 iterations between the two scout teams, and when they were finished, they looked exceptional. I would AAR every break contact drill right after they performed it and tell them what corrections they needed to make for the next iteration. It was fast and furious, but we never had a single incident where there were any safety issues.

At night, I would take the scouts out and reinforce their stealth abilities by having them observe a nearby village and report back to me what they were seeing. This went really well, and the second night, I had them go out on their own and report back to me via the radio what they observed. In the morning, I would do an AAR and tell them what they did right and what they needed to improve on for the future. Overall, I was pleased with the scouts’ improvement and grasp of the concepts and looked forward to one day maybe seeing them perform their new observation skills.

**Future Operations**

Toward the end of August, word came down that we would assume some missions, working jointly with the Special Forces in Kandahar. The first company to go would be 2nd Company, and then at the end of September, my Weapons Company would assume the mission. SSG Sandoval and I were to go along to be the liaison officers between the SF and my ANA company. Sayeed Mohammed and I realized that we needed to do some light infantry training because we would not be used as a weapons company but rather a light infantry company. To get prepared for this mission, Sayeed Mohammed and I made a training plan where we would do two weeks of training, the first being a round robin training event with three separate stations and the second being platoon LFXs assaulting an objective. This would all be done at the Kamari Brick Ranges. The three separate stations would be establishing a checkpoint to search vehicles, patrolling, and cordon and search operations.

The ranges went very well. The most notable event was the checkpoint which we set up in a real situation on a major road and captured a few weapons just outside Kabul. The LFXs also went well, with each platoon doing two iterations and finishing the LFX with a company seizure of an objective with platoons bounding online after dismounting trucks. After the ranges, the company XO and I started gathering the ammunition and supplies we would need for the mission. Word had come down that we would fly via three C-130 flights to Kandahar in the southeast of the country, but no one had told me what the mission would be or what the ANA soldiers would be doing. Some news finally came when...
a SOF team linked up with me and SSG Sandoval at Camp Phoenix. I met the team sergeant, “Jim,” and he said he would escort us down to Kandahar. He also said that he would tell us our mission when we got down to Kandahar and that we needed to focus on getting the company all set to fly down to Kandahar. This was easy, and the soldiers were excited to get on an airplane because most of them had never flown before in their lives. I was on the last flight with part of the SOF team; the soldiers were exceptionally excited and nervous, but they really enjoyed themselves on the flight.

Once in Kandahar, we stayed for a few days at the American base and ran some local security patrols to let the local people see the ANA. I was a little concerned with the sitting around and the lack of a real opportunity to do some missions, so I kept the soldiers gainfully employed by doing movement to contact drills and running checkpoints. After about three days, we moved by truck to the Zabul province north of Kandahar. Everything went uneventfully, and the soldiers did a superior job of being friendly with the locals while being professional about all their actions.

I still had not received an idea about what our mission was going to be but knew that we were going to be working in the Zabul province as requested by the local governor, Hafizullah Hashami. He wanted to demonstrate and flex the power of the central government because the local Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) had not been doing much to curb the intertribal fighting in the province and the police forces had been ineffectual. In addition, Highway 1 from Kandahar to Kabul was being paved by foreign contractors, and they kept being attacked by vigilantes and robbers. The governor believed that the presence of the troops would stem the violence and help to increase his power base, while at the same time serve notice to the AMF that its days of providing security in this particular region were numbered. I had received this information in Kabul and was looking forward to dinner that night at the governor’s house once we arrived in Qalat (Zabul’s provincial capital).

When we arrived in Qalat we went to the AMF compound in a fortress on top of a hill that overlooked the city. We arranged with local AMF commander, Sher Allahm, for some lodging for the SOF team and the ANA company. Sayeed Mohammed immediately set out security and positioned soldiers all around the fortress as if he had been doing it for years. Sayeed Mohammed, “Chief” (the SOF team leader), and I walked the perimeter and discussed defensive positions and how the ANA company should be arrayed. Chief was extremely impressed by Sayeed Mohammed and the way he had set out security and only made a few adjustments to the perimeter we had established.

After getting established, we had to go down and meet the governor and discuss his ideas of what needed to be done and what issues he had that he would like us to address. The first person I met at the governor’s house was his secretary who seemed to be the person really running the province. He always seemed to know what was going on and would do anything to support our operation. I set up feeding the ANA through the secretary. He would buy the food, supply the cooks, and ensure that everything was good. Governor Hafizullah Hashami was an outsider as far as the locals of Zabul were concerned; especially after he was appointed governor of Zabul after the old governor was fired by President Karzai. He was originally from Kandahar and believed that all of the people in Zabul “were peasant dirt farmers of no consequence.” I spent a few minutes with Chief and Zahir, who had made the trip with me, talking to the governor about any recent security problems in the province. He said that there had been a district police station overrun by the Taliban about six hours north of Qalat, in the town of Saygaz, and there had been rumors of several high ranking Taliban moving through and living in the province. I took what he said and made sure Chief was informed of the information he had provided.

That night, Chief explained our mission to me, which was essentially getting the ANA out into the Zabul province and getting them as much exposure as possible to show the legitimacy of the government. In addition, we were to help secure the workers working on Highway 1 by doing daily patrols along the road. The last mission which Chief said we were to do was hunt for high value targets (HVTs), and this turned out to be the primary focus of the SOF team. It was interesting to hear the intelligence he was giving me and the information he had about the province, but I was not allowed to tell the ANA. I kind of hated how secretive the SOF operators were being about everything, but I understood the team was unsure of me, and they did not trust the ANA.

For the next week, the ANA executed a number of dismounted foot patrols that were very successful. They also established numerous checkpoints along Highway 1 and took down one illegal checkpoint that was taking money from the civilians to let them pass. There were a number of weapons collected from the illegal checkpoint as well as some from the checkpoints that we had established. I was extremely pleased with the execution of both of these operations, and the people responded well to the ANA because of their professionalism and fairness. The local
people were amazed to see all the ethnicities that were working together, that they did so professionally, and that they did not loot or mistreat the civilians. The ANA's presence was definitely paying dividends so much so that the governor came to see me and thank me. I told him to thank Sayeed Mohammed and to give him the credit he deserved.

After a week of doing minor missions around the area, the ANA set out to do a major mission in the De-Chopan District of the Zabul Province. The trip was about eight hours along a very dusty trail. When we reached the village, we did numerous cordons and searches of buildings and worked with the local government officials to help with patrolling the district. I was extremely pleased with the execution of the cordon and search. We had practiced this operation in Kabul, and I was a little wary of the execution. I was also pleased with the treatment of the civilians which was a concern to me because of the many different ethnicities in the ANA. I did not know if a Pashtun civilian would be upset to be searched by a Hazara soldier. Everything seemed to work itself out though, and Sayeed Mohammed and his officers and NCOs were the primary reason. There were numerous other operations that went on in De-Chopan, including multiple joint operations to seize HVTs and other security missions before we returned to Qalat.

When we returned to Qalat, we retrieved all of our equipment, packed up, and took the long road back to Kabul. It was mostly an uneventful trip back to Kabul except for a flat tire. Once we reached the palace, the entire Kandak had lined the streets to cheer us as we arrived at the palace. I shook the battalion commander's hand and returned to Camp Phoenix. At Camp Phoenix, I was greeted by MAJ Kneram who informed me that a Canadian training team was taking over 1st Kandak and that I would be leaving in a couple of weeks. I was disappointed about this but understood it was time to move on.

I could not have been more pleased with the accomplishments of the Weapons Company and believed that the Canadians would receive well-trained soldiers to continue in their training. I said good-bye to Sayeed Mohammed and his officers and NCOs and wished them well. He thanked me and told me I was always a welcome guest in his house, no matter where it was. I took these words to heart and told him at some point I would return to Afghanistan and looked forward to that day. I learned a great deal about myself, soldiers, the warrior spirit, and the strength of man; many of these lessons I will always remember, and I will always volunteer to try to get back and help the people of Afghanistan.

Lessons Learned
To conclude, I would like to focus on some of the most important lessons learned from training the ANA. These lessons are specific to my experiences with the ANA but can be used when training any foreign army.

The most important lesson I learned was the understanding of the culture of the Afghan people. At first, it was very difficult to know what to say and how to act without offending the Afghans. It was a learning process that was more of a trial and error scenario. It is essential that the trainer makes an active effort to learn the most predominant language, the different ethnicities and how they interact, the history of the country, and the many different cultures of the people. It would benefit the trainer to do a country study and have language classes at home station. Unfortunately, none of the trainers had these opportunities before they left, so it was very difficult. I would spend my nights at Camp Phoenix on the internet, reading history of the country and learning the different cultural aspects of the country, but this did not compare to what I learned when interacting with the Afghans during the day. After about four months, I had taught myself enough of the language that I could hold a conversation and not need an interpreter when talking to the Afghans. Another possibility is to have good interpreters teach soldiers as much as possible about the country and the language.

It is very important that the trainers learn about the weapons systems and their capabilities. We had a huge benefit of having the SOF team there, who knew the weapons and were able to train us up on them. This is a very important; it is impossible to train someone how to shoot if the trainer does not understand the weapon system. We commanded immediate respect from the ANA by being able to demonstrate knowledge of the weapons. Once again, if the trainer can get a hold of the weapons at home station, it would be beneficial to shoot those weapons and know all the weapon's capabilities.

Paying the Kandak was exceptionally difficult. The best advice I can give is to have a system and make sure that all money given out has multiple documentations. We had a really good program, but there was nothing that could prepare us for this operation, and it is very difficult to make sure there are always proper documentations, or you will be paying out of your own pocket.

It is important to have clear cut training goals when training a foreign national army. The training should be geared toward a goal or give the soldiers capabilities to operate in the environment to which they are suited. Guidance from higher headquarters on where the unit needs to be or what exercises they need to execute to get where they need to be is always good and helps to develop the training. In all cases, you should try to teach your counterpart what you are doing so that he can assume that leadership responsibility.

Take full advantage of the operational environment for training the soldiers. This will make the jump from doing training exercises to combat missions less significant and get the soldiers used to the stress. I used roads close to where we were training to establish traffic control points and vehicle searches for practice but in a real situation. As a result, when we went out to questionable areas, the soldiers did an exceptional job of establishing these TCPs and had no problem transitioning to doing it realistically in a questionable environment.

Interpreters are key to the success of the trainer. I cannot stress this point enough; although it is a paid position, often times, the interpreters anticipated my answer or already understood what I wanted and it made my job easier. It is exceptionally important to have great interpreters who will help with translation and answer questions that the soldiers have; it saves you a lot of time. If at all possible, choose your own interpreters and make sure they are loyal and have a good grasp for all the languages of the country.

Captain Charles Di Leonardo was commissioned out of Saint Mary College-Leavenworth, Kansas, through the University of Kansas ROTC in May 1999. He was previously assigned to the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry “Polar Bears” and Task Force 1-87 Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division.
There is a small stretch of terrain that forces anyone traveling to or from the village of Gayan or the Luwara district to pass through this area. This piece of terrain stretches about three square kilometers. The terrain is composed of various hilltops, twists and turns, and elevation changes. Also, the area is made up of choke points, ambush sites, overwatch positions, and kill sacks. This little piece of terrain, this inconspicuous location on a military map, is not an area known to anyone working outside of this particular area of operations (AO). But ask anybody who’s been around the area and you will witness a grimace or a tightening of the jaw. What is the name of this place? It is called “Ambush Alley” – an area that has claimed the lives of American and Afghan soldiers. It is an area that doesn’t differentiate between soldier or civilian. When you enter, you enter at your own risk.

As new Embedded Tactical Trainers (ETT) for the Afghan National Army (ANA), Staff Sergeant Jerry W. Redmon and I were assigned this stretch of terrain in the summer of 2004. Once in country, my team was immediately pushed down to the Paktika province in preparation for the Afghan presidential elections. As we moved into our AOR, SSG Redmon and I were tasked the Orgun district. Our Relief in Place (RIP) with the previous team was short, but my predecessor Captain Grubb did tell me one vital piece of information – “if you have to use route Ferrari, dismount and clear Ambush Alley.” I took his advice to heart, and I believe this was my saving grace. During our RIP, CPT Grubb took us through Ambush Alley. He demonstrated his technique as we watched. During our mission, we came across an abandoned defensive fighting position. I had only been in country for 10 days, and as it hit me, I realized that this area could very easily take someone’s life.

Little did I know that eight days later I would be escorting artillery pieces for the Special Forces to the Luwara district through Ambush Alley. Prior to our escort mission, I mulled over CPT Grubb’s method...
for clearing the route. His method was to dismount his ANA, and they would all walk the high ground and rally on the eastern side. This method obviously worked for him, but there were a few changes that I would apply that I felt would maximize security and survivability. I took his advice, and set into motion a new method for Ambush Alley. We would own this terrain. We would own the terrain for as long as we needed it. We would move in, occupy, and guarantee our safety while we were there. My method would be simple. Move the soldiers to the high ground, set observation posts (OPs), and provide overwatch to the soldiers below as they cleared the route.

As I drafted my new method, the day was drawing nearer for our first turn at clearing the route. The day prior, I held a meeting with the ANA senior NCOs and officers. I conducted a rock drill, literally, and explained how we would clear Ambush Alley. The next day, we moved out and conducted our first operation in Ambush Alley. We secured the high ground and took ownership of the area. I made sure that that day would not be the day the enemy insurgents would surprise our convoy.

In the past, word had it that insurgents from Pakistan would filter in from the border (Ambush Alley sits a mere seven kilometers from the border). Insurgents wishing to disrupt coalition operations would place themselves along this route. At any point in time, as coalition forces moved through, the enemy could pick a time and place to attack an unsuspecting convoy. Ambush Alley is made up of two routes. Route Ferrari is the primary route and the route to the south is the alternate. There are no other means of movement through this area except for these two routes, and the enemy knows this.

Because the enemy has been taking a pounding by the coalition forces in this area, it is possible to think that the enemy purposefully sets these ambushes to slow the momentum set by the coalition. Because Ambush Alley was in my AO, various coalition units passed through. Units who coordinated with my team were always informed of this area, followed by my recommendation for clearing it. Those who paid attention passed through safely. Those that did not, took their chances — and sometimes lost.

It was also known that the insurgents had a tendency to hang out at a gas station/hotel on the eastern side of Ambush Alley. Do not build a mental picture of any gas station or hotel you know of — this mud construction resembles nothing of the ordinary. If they observed a convoy coming into the Gayan area, they would collect their weapons, move to an ambush site, and wait for the convoy to RTB (return to base).

As I was advised, I cleared this area every time I passed through. Some units chose not to and took a chance. I always emphasized to those who chose to pass through without clearing, “you may make it through once, twice, maybe more, but if you choose not to clear Ambush Alley, it will bite you.” 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade, ANA, working with the Marines, chose not clear the route and it cost six of their ANA soldiers their lives.

The insurgents typically used small arms weapons such as AK-47s. Another weapon of choice was the PKM-9, a 7.62mm, belt-fed, squad machine gun. It is light and easy to carry. Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were not uncommon nor was the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs had claimed their share of KIAs and RPGs have made several vehicles immobile.

The number of insurgents varied – mostly between four to eight fighters. They would equip themselves with AK-47s and perhaps one PKM. If they planned to set an ambush point, they would move to the desired location, set up, and wait. During one incident where we thwarted an ambush and injured three insurgents, they had an observer using a radio to report that we were coming.
During this engagement, our enemy was of Pakistani origin. They were speaking Urdu, which is indigenous to Pakistan. I’m not saying that all of our enemy in the engagements were from Pakistan — I can only speculate based on intelligence and intercepted radio transmissions that most of our enemy encounters have been of Pakistani origin.

Most ambushes are designed to slow and disrupt coalition missions. They are not intended for Afghan locals. However, during one pass through the southern route coming from Gayan, six unlucky Afghan locals had tucked themselves behind a 1st Battalion, 3rd Brigade convoy. As they passed through without clearing the area, a late IED exploded and killed them. The IED was a remote detonated anti-tank mine. The Toyota pickup they were driving looked like a soda can shot by a shotgun. There were no pieces left any larger than “head” size.

On our mission day, we set up a staging area and waited for our close air support (CAS). We would ensure our first trip through Ambush Alley would not be our last. As the AH-1 Marine Cobras approached, we began our movement. From the staging area, we set up a traffic control point (TCP) to stop all traffic as we cleared. We then moved two squads up the northern and southern ridgelines. These squads consisted of 12-man teams. Their initial move was to secure the high ground at the summit so that we could move up to support their continued move. The OP teams moved with enough soldiers to support themselves in case they initiated an attack from a set ambush point.

Once the OPs were set, we moved the uparmored HMMWV (mounted with a .50 caliber machine gun) and a truck carrying a Russian SPG-9 (a 73mm recoilless rifle) to the summit. From there we were able to overwatch the continued occupation of the patrols on the high ground.

As the soldiers on the high ground occupied the next two OPs, the soldiers clearing the route began their move. The soldiers clearing the route consisted of five teams. The clearing team consisted of three soldiers and an NCO. They were responsible for locating any pressure mines buried on the route. The IED team consisted of two four-man teams on either side of the road. These soldiers were responsible for locating IEDs that may have been set along the side of the road. The terrain team consisted of two five-man teams and they were responsible for locating any close-in ambushes. They patrolled the terrain from 50 to 100 meters off the route. The clearing team moved on line slightly behind the teams clearing the ridgeline and setting OPs.

The uparmored HMMWV followed the movement of the route clearing team to provide support.

This technique continued through Ambush Alley up to the rally point. Here, another TCP was set up, the uparmored HMMWV provided security, and the ANA soldiers secured a perimeter around the RP. At this point, Ambush Alley was secured. There were OPs occupying every piece of key high ground. TCPs were set at both the east and west entrances. The route had been cleared of any mines, IEDs, or ambushes. At this point, the convoy was able to pass through.
Once the convoy had passed through and continued on its mission, we then began closing the corridor, and started collapsing back to the staging area. Basically, we reverse ordered our OPs and started sending the OPs nearest the RP back up the ridgeline to collect the next two OPs. These OPs then fell back to the next OP and so on. This ensured that the OPs moving along the ridgeline moved in numbers as to protect themselves from insurgents that may have moved into the area.

As the soldiers on the ridgeline collected themselves, the route clearing teams mounted up in the 2-and-a-half ton truck that followed the HMMWV, and we moved back to the staging area, in line with the collapsing OPs.

Once back at the staging area, a quick consolidation and accountability was conducted, and we then mounted up and returned to the firebase.

There are probably a hundred different ways to clear a known ambush site. Many tacticians could analyze my method and find a weakness. However, in my four months of operating in the Paktika province and the numerous times my team passed through Ambush Alley, we only came under fire once, and that was because one of my teams moving to the high ground forced the enemy to engage the patrol. There is no doubt in my mind that if we had decided not to clear Ambush Alley and had run through without clearing the high ground, the enemy would have waited and attacked us as we passed through.

While working my AOR, 12 others lost their lives while running the gambit through Ambush Alley. I brought all my soldiers out alive. My ANA unit learned a vital process in clearing a known ambush area. Because of their hard work and dedication, we all returned to Kabul with a few stories to share.

At the time this article was written, Major George B. Inabinet III was serving as the advisor to the Afghan National Army’s Weapons Company, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Brigade. He is currently serving as Team Chief (battalion advisor) to an infantry battalion — the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade. Inabinet was commissioned in 1987 after completing Officer Candidate School through the Palmetto Military Academy in South Carolina. His previous assignments include serving as the G4 for the 263rd Army Air Missile Defense Command and assistant S3 for the 3rd Brigade, 40th Infantry Division.
The Army Substance Abuse Program: A Force Multiplier?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID L. THOMAS II

The Army Substance Abuse Program (ASAP) is a force multiplier of the highest order. Why, you might ask? Well, as we do maintenance on our equipment, we also need to do maintenance on our people – who are the Army’s most valuable resource and the most important battlefield operating system (BOS). ASAP is a comprehensive program that combines prevention education, urinalysis testing, risk reduction, and civilian employee counseling services. These programs are designed to strengthen the overall fitness and effectiveness of a unit and the Army and to enhance the combat readiness of its personnel. If you can’t bring physically fit and ready Soldiers to the battlefield, you have already lost the battle. The Army Substance Abuse Program can greatly assist leaders in this effort.

What is ASAP?
The ASAP is a multifaceted organization that you can find on any Army installation. Army Regulation 600-85 governs the program. The ASAP is not just a program that deals with alcohol and substance abuse. ASAP is responsible for the Risk Reduction Program, which tracks statistics such as the number of domestic violence incidents, alcohol-related incidents, drug-related offenses, crimes against property and persons, traffic violations, and sexually transmitted disease statistics, to name just a few.

The ASAP also provides information, training, and screening for depression. Recently, the ASAP at Fort Benning conducted screenings in conjunction with National Depression Screening Day. Several hundred individuals were screened, and it was amazing the serious problems that were revealed by some of the participants. There were several people who required immediate intervention by trained counselors at the depression screening sites. In addition, the ASAP provides a wide range of alcohol and substance abuse prevention training as well as suicide prevention training and counseling. The ASAP can also provide drug and alcohol abuse prevention classes to military school children as well as provide information on local chapters of Alcohol Anonymous and other organizations such as Narcotics Anonymous, etc.

According to the Centers for Application of Prevention Technology, alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, especially in youth (such as young Soldiers), exact a high toll in local communities. Such substance use and abuse are linked to increased mortality and morbidity through substance-related violence, accidents, and crime. Substance abuse prevention programs not only improve the health of communities, they also save $4-5 in costs for drug abuse treatment and counseling for every dollar invested.

Prevention Is Key
You conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) on your vehicles and equipment, but it will do little good if you don’t perform similar assessments on your Soldiers. In combat, a broken-down vehicle and a Soldier experiencing alcohol withdrawal can both be deadly. Sometimes, too much focus is placed on our vehicles and equipment and not on our people. We take oil samples to see if there is excessive engine wear or other problems and take corrective actions before the engine breaks down, so why don’t we do that with our Soldiers? Why do we wait until the individual gets a DUI or comes up positive on a drug test before we refer him for professional assistance?
According to Yvonne Wilbanks, Alcohol and Drug Control Officer at the Fort Benning ASAP, “There are no short cuts — knowing your Soldiers is the foundation to preventing substance abuse.” Why do we as leaders let it get to that point before we act or are forced to act? We should be taking “samples” of our Soldiers and identifying problems before they negatively impact on the Soldier and the readiness of the unit. Wilbanks goes on to add “great leaders go beyond what is normally expected to provide their Soldiers the knowledge they need to make better choices.”

A Costly Problem

When a Soldier gets a DUI or shows up positive for illegal drugs on a urinalysis, there are a lot of things that must be done. The Soldier is command referred for counseling using a DA Form 8003, completes the intake program and has to attend Rehabilitation Team Meetings (RTMs), has to complete a defensive driving course, has to go to doctor’s appointments, etc. If you were to imagine what the cost in terms of time that takes for just one Soldier, you would find it to be very expensive. Not to mention the fact of how much money has already been spent to bring the Soldier into the military and train him. If a Soldier is hurt because he is drunk or on drugs and winds up requiring medical treatment, it impacts the Army twice — first because of the cost of medical care and second because of lost man hours.

From Army estimates it costs approximately $50,000 to train a Soldier, (depending on MOS and/or schools) from the time they enter a recruiting station until they arrive at their first duty station. If a Soldier is lost due to alcohol or drug abuse, it costs the Army approximately $50,000, right? Wrong. It actually costs the Army about $100,000 because another Soldier has to be brought in to fill the vacated position. That’s a lot of money, but even that is not the most critical problem. The most critical problem the Army has right now is time. We don’t have the time to replace the lost Soldier with another because it takes anywhere from six to nine months to train a Soldier coming into the Army before he gets to his first duty station. Can we afford that cost? How much does six to nine months cost the Army or the unit preparing to go to combat? Does any leader preparing his/her unit for combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan think they can afford to wait another six to nine months for another replacement?

One mistake or lapse in judgment by a Soldier can be very expensive for the military, especially if the individual is seriously hurt or dies. Many do not think in monetary terms when it comes to Soldiers being hurt or killed because of alcohol or illegal (and prescription) substance abuse, but it is there. Imagine trying to run a business with employees (Soldiers) who show up drunk or stoned or who don’t show up at all or call in sick. There is a cost associated with this bad behavior.

One survey found that nine percent of heavy drinkers and 10 percent of drug users had missed work because of a hangover; six percent had gone to work high or drunk in the past year; and 11 percent of heavy drinkers and 18 percent of drug users had skipped work in the past month. Think it doesn’t impact Soldiers in the Army? Think again. The Army is a representative portion of the U.S. population. We have people from all walks of life, different socioeconomic backgrounds, and different cultures. Why would our problems in the Army be any less than American society as a whole? It isn’t. The Army loses productivity, has Soldiers who go on sick call more often, and has those who injure themselves or others because of alcohol and substance abuse.

According to the National Institute on Alcohol and Alcoholism (NIAAA), a nationwide survey shows that more than 40 percent of persons who started drinking before age 15 were diagnosed as alcohol dependent at some point in their lives. Rates of lifetime dependence declined to approximately 10 percent among those who began drinking at age 20 or older. This annual rate of decline was similar for both genders. Although in the past women generally started drinking at later ages than men, more recent survey data shows that this difference has nearly disappeared. Think this is only a civilian population problem? Think that the Soldiers that we get into the Army now did not start drinking at age 15? Think that many of them have no alcohol or drug-related problems when they join the Army? There are just as many problems, if not more, due to the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Soldiers drink extensively when they get back from a deployment. Spouses and family members sometimes drink because they are lonely or depressed when their loved ones are deployed for six to nine months. Yes, it is an Army problem, but not one generally talked about or addressed until the problem becomes serious.

It is not just alcohol that is a problem. According to the Drug Policy Alliance, federal and state governments spent more than $40 billion fighting the drug war in 2000 – a dramatic increase since 1980, when federal spending was roughly $1 billion and the state spending just a few times that. Yet, despite the ballooning costs of the drug war, illicit drugs are cheaper and purer than they were two decades ago and continue to be readily available. According to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

According to the DAMIS Drug Detail Report, in the first quarter of FY 04:

- 204,164 Active Duty Soldiers were tested for drug abuse – the breakdown of illegal substance use is below:
  - 1199 tested positive for THC (active ingredient in marijuana)
  - 520 tested positive for cocaine
  - 224 tested positive for amphetamines
  - 196 tested positive for D-methamphetamines
  - 230 tested positive for codeine (cough syrup, Tylenol #3)
  - 46 tested positive for morphine (narcotic)
  - 21 tested positive for butal (barbituate)
  - 2 tested positive for PCP (Phencyclidine)
  - 3 tested positive for MDA (Methylenedioxyamphetamine)
  - 6 tested positive for Phenobarbital (barbiturate)
  - 79 tested positive for MDMA (methyleneoxy-methamphetamine – Ecstasy)

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nearly 57 percent of the population reported that marijuana is fairly or very easy to obtain. In 2000, 47 percent of eighth graders and 88.5 percent of senior high school students said marijuana is easy to obtain. Additionally, approximately 24 percent of eighth graders and nearly 48 percent of seniors reported powdered cocaine is easy to get. Think this does not impact the Army?

What Should Leaders Do?

There are many ways that today’s Army leadership can deal with this ever growing readiness problem. Some ways are easy; others take a lot of work.

The first thing that should be done is to get those that have problems professional help. The Army Substance Abuse Program on your military installation can assist in this endeavor by providing resources, and if necessary, seeking additional resources through their network of Soldier-oriented military and nonmilitary organizations that can and do help Soldiers and their families improve their quality of life.

The second thing they can do is to identify Soldiers at high risk. Everyone, including the unit leadership, knows who is at risk. They know who the binge drinkers are; they know who the problem drinkers are. They know who the violent drinkers/drug abusers are. Yet, because of the negative perception and career implications that might develop, many turn the other way instead of reaching out or forcing individuals to get the help they need. Some feel it is easier to deal with the problem after it reaches its boiling point instead of seeking to prevent it while it is just simmering. The Army Substance Abuse Program also has a program called ADAPT (Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Training), which is a minimum of 12 hours of instruction that focuses on the adverse effects and consequences of alcohol and other drug abuse. Several categories of personnel may attend an ADAPT class:

✓ Soldiers who are referred, screened, and enrolled in the ASAP treatment program in which education is included as a part of the individualized treatment plan.
✓ Soldiers who have been identified as first time abusers and do not require treatment.
✓ Soldiers referred directly by the unit commander for reasons related to poor performance, safety violations, high-risk behaviors and disciplinary problem.
✓ Soldiers who volunteer for the course, with permission of the unit commander. ADAPT training is permitted and encouraged for civilian personnel and family members, but is limited to a space available basis.

Debbie Manning, Fort Benning ASAP coordinator, said that by the second day of ADAPT many participants remark that the class should be mandatory for all Soldiers before they get in trouble. Participant follow-up, normally six months after a Soldier has attended class, is also an integral part of the ADAPT program. We do a risk assessment before a mission, so why don’t we do one on our people? That way, if they are at “high risk,” we can get them into programs like ADAPT before a more serious incident occurs where we might lose that Soldier.

The third thing leaders can do is to provide additional drug and alcohol abuse training, definitely more than four hours a year. We spend countless hours training Soldiers to use complex weapons systems, yet we only spend four hours a year on drug and alcohol abuse training? This is a very unequal relationship, given the numbers of Soldiers that have drug and/or alcohol problems. We need to go on the offensive against alcohol and drug abuse. We have an internal war brewing in the Army. One that wants Soldiers to be “all they can be,” yet the very culture of the military might suggest to Soldiers that drinking is OK. Commanders need to put more substance abuse and domestic violence training in their training plans. It needs to have a higher priority on the Mission Essential Task List because without the Soldiers being free of substance abuse, a unit’s readiness takes a big hit. The Fort Benning Substance Abuse Program has more than 100 video tapes and other materials that units can come by and pick up to help them conduct additional training and to provide Soldiers with additional information.

The fourth thing they can do is to set the example. Senior NCOs mentoring their junior NCOs in the NCO Club over a drink is not the acceptable method anymore. There are a lot more positive
ways to mentor and to set the example. Alcohol abuse is a very serious American society problem which has provided the military a destructive way of life for many of its Soldiers. Having alcohol at unit functions, backyard barbecues, dining-ins, etc., does not help combat this problem and may give many the mistaken impression that consuming alcohol at these and other events is acceptable. Many cover for individuals that have serious alcohol problems so as to not hurt the individual’s career, yet they are co-assisters who are helping that Soldier down the path towards destruction.

The fifth thing they can do is to find alternative sources of entertainment for Soldiers instead of sitting around and drinking. For example, www.skillsoft.com has more than 15,000 hours of computer courses that Soldiers can download and take in their spare time. The courses cover business courses to complex networking training. Make them aware of the money that they could make through promotions or if and when they leave the Army if they have this important source of computer-based training. Soldiers can obtain college credit for these courses, get promotion points, as well as gain essential training and education that civilian employers are looking for when and if the individual leaves the military. Not only does it benefit the Soldier, it also benefits the Army by creating a smarter, more learned Soldier who can manage multiple priorities simultaneously. What leader would not want smarter Soldiers?

The sixth thing that Army leaders can do is to identify those individuals that have problems and send them for treatment. It used to be a real career ender for someone to get alcohol or drug abuse counseling. Why should it be? Not everyone can withstand the pressures that induce one to use alcohol to anesthetize themselves. Not everyone can successfully deal with the stress of the highly demanding military lifestyle. Many need assistance at some point in their life. Why should we let the problems get so severe that we have to get immediate crisis intervention instead of doing a PMCS on our Soldiers? We need to refer them to the appropriate medical and health professionals before the problems get to a point where we cannot control them and lose an individual that was a valuable member of the team.

The last thing Army leadership can do is to enforce penalties for those with DUIs and drug problems. We need to tell Soldiers what the penalties are and enforce them. We should not tolerate second, third, and sometimes even fourth episodes of drug or alcohol abuse before we look to separate a Soldier from the Army. We owe it to the Soldiers who do not abuse alcohol or drugs. We owe the Soldiers who do what they are supposed to do and take their jobs seriously and professionally. We need to show that drug and alcohol abuse will not be tolerated. If we don’t, we will have a significant breakdown in morale and professionalism.

The Army now has individuals that have been through drug and alcohol counseling several times and has individuals that have several DUIs or positive drug screens. If we spend millions training them, why are we only encouraging them to do it again because the penalty is not harsh enough? I would rather have 75 percent of my authorized strength with Soldiers who can do their job and don’t have an alcohol or drug abuse problem than 100 percent of my authorized strength with 25 percent or more having serious alcohol and/or drug abuse problems. We need to implement and/or enforce high standards if we expect to be successful in our internal war on drug and alcohol abuse.

Army leaders must use all the tools in their toolboxes to fight and win the war on drug and alcohol abuse. How, one might ask? Well, look at the technology that is available today. Soldiers are computer smart. They know how to work complex video and computer games. They are not stupid, just focused in the wrong direction many times. Since Soldiers are more and more computer savvy, the way to get to them is through the computer and its associated applications.

It is highly recommended that commanders use “SMART Testing.” This is a process provided by the Army where biochemical testing is conducted in such a manner that it is not predictable to the testing population. SMART Testing includes: back-to-back testing, weekend/holiday sweeps, pre and post deployment testing, testing at the end of the duty day or testing throughout the month. Oskar Schlömer, Installation Biochemical Test Coordinator, at the Fort Benning ASAP indicates that “urinalysis is a drug deterrent.” Schlömer, a retired master sergeant with two combat tours, adds “SMART Testing is also a combat multiplier ensuring that Soldiers are able to successfully complete their assigned missions.” Using SMART Testing will certainly help curb the use of illegal substances in your unit. If your unit is conducting SMART Testing, then every Soldier should believe that he can and may
be tested on any given day. This certainly puts a crimp in the drug users’ ability to try to “avoid” or “outsmart” the urinalysis testing process.

Researchers from the University of Otago in New Zealand in their article “Brief Online Interventions Reach Young Drinkers – Mail and Computer Efforts Most Effective” may have provided military leaders with a novel and creative way to reach young Soldiers. The article discusses the concern about hazardous drinking among young people, and research indicates that brief intervention methods relying on mail or computers are both appealing and effective among this hard-to-reach population.

The computer-based assessment and intervention tool has been designed to reduce dangerous levels of drinking among university students. For the students, a big plus is there is none of the embarrassment of talking face to face with a health professional; everything is confidential and they are offered feedback on their drinking and advice on changes if necessary. This should also be done with Young Soldiers. There are a lot of parallels with young Soldiers and young college students when it comes to substance abuse. Just recently several students died while abusing alcohol either by drinking too much or by having an accident that would have been avoided had they not been drinking. This is just not a college student problem, but a societal (and Army) problem as well.

Since all Army personnel must have an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) e-mail account, is it possible that frequent information about substance abuse prevention could be sent system-wide to all Soldiers via this medium of communication? Would it be better received than what is provided to Soldiers via other communication methods? It might be worth a try to see if sending pertinent, time-sensitive messages on substance abuse prevention (such as - don’t use illegal substances information), risk reduction (don’t exceed the speed limit, get plenty of sleep if driving a long distance, take frequent breaks, don’t drink and drive) and other types of fact sheets/messages/information might be better received by the computer-savvy Soldier in the 21st century. We must change with the times and if electronic communications are a communications portal we can use to pass out important information, I say we use it. There also runs a problem with overuse of one particular type of communication, like a lecture or training class. We need to keep the message we want them to get short and sweet and sent only enough times as necessary, to avoid the message being automatically deleted by the Soldier.

Researcher Dr. Kypros Kypri said there is compelling evidence that assessment and feedback or advice given by a health professional – known as brief interventions – can be very effective to reduce alcohol consumption and related harm in adults.

“Up until now, however, there has been little research on how brief interventions work with young people. The challenge for us has been to find an acceptable way of intervening with students (or Soldiers) who might be at risk from hazardous drinking.”

What will it take to get a Soldier the help he needs? The first thing that must be done is to inventory your people. Find out who is at risk and get them the help they need. Not only will be helping the Soldier, the Soldier’s family, and the Army community, you will be protecting the investment the Army has made in its Soldiers. It is not only necessary, it is the right thing to do.

In addition to visiting your installation’s ASAP office, the Army Center for Substance Abuse Programs (ACSA) also offers leaders numerous resources regarding substance abuse on its website. In addition to promotional materials like the poster to the right, the website also lists guides and other references which leaders can download and view at their convenience.

A few of these guides include:

“A Combat Leaders Guide - Risk Management of Alcohol and Drug Abuse” — a pocket-sized guide for leaders (squad leader through commander) deploying in conjunction with the Global War on Terrorism. The guide contains basic information on the Army’s drug and alcohol policies, signs and symptoms of substance abuse, command actions and deployment and redeployment checklists.

“Commanders TOP 10 GUIDE to the Army Substance Abuse Program” — a handy pocket or desk reference guide for commanders at all levels. This guide provides commanders with the information that they most readily need to know about the Army Substance Abuse Program.

“ABSOLUTE RESTRAINT... A Leaders Guide to Alcohol Abuse” — a pocket or desk reference for leaders and supervisors at all levels. This guide provide leaders the information that they need to know about alcohol use and abuse.

“The Dangers of Club Drugs – A Guide for Army Personnel” — discusses the dangers of all club drugs and briefly discusses the Rave scene.

The center’s website is www.acsap.army.mil

Lieutenant Colonel David L. Thomas II is a Field Artillery officer with more than 25 years active and Reserve service. He served as a battery commander during Desert Shield/Storm and is also an Operation Enduring Freedom veteran after being recalled to active duty in February 2003. He served nine months in Afghanistan as the director of Information Operations, and is currently assigned to Fort Benning as a special projects officer for the Army Substance Abuse Program. LTC Thomas promotes ASAP’s services as well as educates Soldiers and Leaders on the serious military readiness impacts of substance abuse. In LTC Thomas’ civilian job, he works for the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Regional Office in Atlanta.
When the 3rd Infantry Division deployed to Iraq in January, every squad included a designated marksman equipped with what appears to be a standard M16 rifle. The weapon may look the same on the outside, but underneath the front rail system, a heavier fluted barrel cuts down vibration so the bullet wobbles less as it leaves the gun. The new two-stage match trigger is tuned to the same standards used in competition shooting at the Olympics. The result is sniper-like accuracy for one Soldier in each squad — a Soldier who, on the surface, appears no different than any other to the enemy.

When Soldiers from the 3rd ID shot with the U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) at the Army Championships in the summer of 2003, they returned to their unit convinced that the improved competition rifles met an operational need. Lieutenant Colonel John Charlton, who was the commander of the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 3rd ID at the time, was impressed with the demo rifle his scout platoon leader brought back from USAMU. “Based on my experiences as a battalion task force commander in OIF, I thought these rifles would provide a great capability in combat and that we should begin a test program in 1-15 INF,” Charlton said.

Major General William Webster, commanding general for the 3ID, supported the test program and the unit began sending rifles to USAMU for conversion. USAMU converted 22 rifles, which meant one per rifle squad plus one for each spotter in the battalion sniper section. Based on successful fielding and training in 1-15 INF, the 3rd ID requested fielding across the division. The request went all the way up to the Army G3 and was approved in September 2003. USAMU immediately began building rifles, and a total of 240 went with the 3rd ID when they left for Iraq earlier this year.

The USAMU usually receives publicity for outstanding competition performance. This year the unit won every military rifle event in inter-service competition up through the 1,000-yard matches. They shot against 70 challenging teams from other services to achieve the record and fulfill the first tenet of their mission statement — to win inter-service, national and international competitions. They sent seven shooters to the 2004 Olympics, and the official U.S. Olympic team gunsmith was a member of the USAMU.

Less well-known, but perhaps of greater interest to the infantryman, is the final tenet in unit’s mission statement — to give the war fighter advanced marksmanship training, and perform research, development and prototyping for improving combat weapons.

Research and Development

In accordance with this mission, gunsmiths and machinists in the basement of USAMU’s headquarters at Fort Benning fine-tune firearms for exact levels of accuracy, eliminating every variable possible to improve the performance of the rifles, pistols, and ammunition. Barrels are machined and tooled in the gun shop to tolerances measured in hundredths of an inch. The weapons are handmade with the same materials used in standard Army issue guns, but the care and precision of the fitting and the intricate matching of parts produces a weapon that groups more accurately.

The shot pattern at 600 yards from the rebuilt rifles of the 3rd ID, using match-grade ammunition, was reduced to a quarter of the original shot group. With this degree of accuracy, a shooter aiming at a target has a more reasonable chance of hitting an enemy at twice the distance that Soldiers are normally trained.

“It’s the same rifle, it’s just fitted and better adjusted,” said Lieutenant Colonel David Liwanag, USAMU commander. “It’s almost like NASCAR. All the improvements are under the hood.”

The key combat capabilities Charlton and the 3rd ID were looking for in a rifle were:
- Accuracy to 600+ meters.
- A rifle based on an M16A4 — Soldiers would be familiar with its operation and no specialty parts would be needed.
- The ability to fire standard 5.56mm ball ammo as well as match-grade 5.56mm ammo.
- A multifunction rifle useful in clearing rooms, alleys, etc., yet still able to hit long-range targets.
- A low-power, versatile scope that would support short-range, reflexive shooting as well as long-range precision fire.

The USAMU took lessons learned from competition to build the Designated Marksman (DM) rifle Charlton needed. This
process is nothing new for the USAMU. During the Vietnam War, almost 1,400 competition M14 rifles became Army sniper rifles.

“What we hope is to keep showing that competition improvements can be cordoned and used for direct transfer into combat application. It doesn’t cost the Army anything more because we’re doing this kind of shooting anyway as part of our mission statement,” Liwanag explained.

Designated marksmen Specialist Michael Loveless and Private First Class David Kirk, with B Company of the 1-15 INF, took a 10-day crash course at the sniper school to prepare for deployment with the new DM rifle. “One of my favorite improvements on the weapon is the trigger squeeze,” Kirk said.

The new rifle requires only 4.3 pounds of pressure to fire a round compared to seven pounds on the M16 trigger, allowing the shooter to focus on keeping his weapon steady. “I like it a lot,” Loveless said. “It’s easy to operate, easy to shoot. It’s really exciting to be able to shoot that far.”

After training, Loveless and Kirk returned to their unit at Kelley Hill and began to pass along the techniques they learned to others in the company. They see this as part of their role as Designated Marksmen.

“And the information flow goes up and down,” said Sergeant First Class Earl Wilson of B Company. “Both of these guys have taught me things because I’m not qualified on the weapon.”

In November 2004, the Army G3 tapped the Soldier Battle Lab to Compare the DM rifle with existing Army weapon systems. Test results have not yet been publicly released, but Liwanag feels certain that the DA G3 tests and this rotation to Iraq will validate the importance of the DM rifle.

Charlton said the 3rd ID will collect feedback on rifle performance during their deployment to Iraq and provide that information back to the Infantry School and USAMU. “We believe strongly in the squad-designated rifle concept,” Charlton said, “and are sure that this rifle and the training our Soldiers received will be a tremendous combat multiplier for the 3rd ID and the rest of the Army”

Because the USAMU is not formally in the research and development cycle, Soldiers often learn of the group’s capabilities through seeing their weapons used in competition. Liwanag encourages units to send their Soldiers to the Army championships for exposure to the improved equipment. When a commander determines that the USAMU’s improved weapon fills a shortfall, the unit may submit a proposal, called an operational (or a warfighting) needs statement through the Army G3.

The Division. Master Gunner of the 82nd Airborne Division attended a DM Instructor Course and asked if the rebuilt capability applied to competition guns could be retrofitted onto their carbines.

Would it work on the shorter version necessary for jumping? The new gun designed for the airborne unit has almost the same capability as the longer rifle, but is two inches shorter.

One would expect the capabilities of the USAMU to be in great demand. Liwanag said the unit does not get more requests than they can handle, but they do get more than they can afford. “Unless it comes with resourcing or a check, I cannot fix the weapons for the entire force on my own budget,” he said. “It has to come from the Army, be approved by the Army, but I can make prototypes to show what is possible with off-the-shelf technology.”

The cost for the DM rifles for the 3rd ID with all the modifications and 500 rounds of match-grade ammunition was $1,100 per rifle. The Army paid for all the modifications, and the USAMU completed all of them on budget a month early.

Instruction

USAMU conducts both the Close Quarters Combat Course and DM Course at Fort Benning. It also offers blocks of instruction during Army championships. Courses teach a rifleman to shoot his M16 from seven to 600 yards. Most Soldiers are confident in short- to medium-range shots, but have never been trained or challenged to hit distant targets. In Iraq and Afghanistan they are discovering they can see a lot farther than they can shoot.

Training also focuses on advanced tactics and techniques developed by the USAMU — fighting while mounted in a HMMWV or truck, or engaging the enemy on foot while doing a cordon in search of buildings or homes. Instruction includes how to stay in the fight when a rifle or shotgun has a stoppage by transitioning to a pistol or to an AK-47 that a Soldier might find on the battlefield. The unit owns both Russian AK-47s and Chinese AK-47s — procured from U.S. Customs at no cost to the Army — for training purposes.

At the cost of a week’s absence from their units, Soldiers will
return as trained trainers who will improve the level of marksmanship in their units. Because the USAMU has ammunition allocated for competition and training, in most courses, Soldiers will shoot many more rounds than they would at their home units or in a training platform.

USAMU also sends Mobile Training Teams (MTT) out to deployed units. A five-Soldier team went to Baghdad to give Close Combat Training to the 1st Armored Division. They were in six separate forward camps for three days each, teaching Soldiers accuracy skills that will allow them to survive the first 30 seconds of a gunfire.

The main function of the MTTs, as well as the courses taught at the unit’s home, is not initial training. The unit trains NCOs who will return to their own units to train two or three generations of Soldiers. MTTs have been in Korea, the Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Bragg in recent months. Last year USAMU trained cadets, students in ROTC and JROTC programs, and combat and line units from Fort Benning, Iraq, Fort Lewis, Fort Bliss, Fort Riley, Fort Jackson and Fort Campbell. USAMU would like to send more MTTs to the Soldiers forward in Iraq and Afghanistan for sustainment training to keep them on the edge, but teams go where they are requested.

To receive MTTs, a unit must send a request through their G3 either to TRADOC or to the USAMU. TRADOC then prioritizes where these teams will go. Scheduling also depends on the operations tempo at the home unit, whether the unit is in a shooting season or teaching Close Combat or DM courses.

“Lots of units out there don’t know the marksmanship unit exists at all, or what services we can offer them,” Liwanag says. “There are ways of requesting support directly through the Infantry School, but remember the Infantry School is in the business of providing qualified Soldiers. We provide advanced training above the entry level.”

Doraine Bennett is the editor of the Infantry Bugler, the official publication of the National Infantry Association. She is a 2003 graduate of Columbus State University with a bachelor’s degree in English, Professional Writing.

**BOOK REVIEWS**


“Hell is not a place but a condition,” observes Manny Lawton in his memoir Some Survived: An Eyewitness Account of the Bataan Death March and the Men Who Lived Through It. “Many men ... simply gave up and died. That was painless, while living was terrible.” Terrible is an understatement. Lawton relates the unimaginable cruelty he and fellow prisoners endured at the hands of the Japanese during World War II. Lawton’s story of survival and the compassion exhibited by his fellow prisoners — as they faced death from starvation, dehydration, disease, beatings, and torture — is a testament to the courage, valor, and the intense will to live of these prisoners where “survival was an individual struggle.” Although an individual struggle; hope, friendship, and the compassion of others helped Lawton and others survive as “no man could survive this madness alone.”

From the infamous 65-mile Bataan Death March that claimed nearly 1,000 lives; imprisonment at numerous diseaseinfested Philippine “death camps” like Camp O’Donnell, the Davao Penal Colony, and Cabanatuan; through “slave labor” camps in Japan (Camp #3) and Korea (Inchon); Lawton’s 42 months of captivity graphically and emotionally describe a litany of inhuman atrocities committed against American prisoners of war. Although many former prisoners of war have written their memoirs and provided a collective experience of the “death march” and imprisonment, very few survived the terror and horror of the “hell ships” that were torpedoed and bombed by U.S. forces as part of the campaign against Japanese shipping.

Lawton’s work adds a dimension in the historiography of the Bataan survivors that very few prisoners lived through. Lawton was one of 271 prisoners from a group of 1,619 that survived transport on three of these “hell ships,” (the Oryoku Maru, Enoura Maru and Brazil Maru) that departed from the Philippine Islands in December 1944. In a sad twist of irony, six weeks after Lawton and his group departed Cabanatuan prison for the “hell ships,” U.S. Army Rangers conducted a daring raid to rescue the remaining captives held there.

Tightly packed like cargo in the holds of ships — one that had recently been vacated by horses — each transport vessel intensified the condition of hell for Lawton and his fellow prisoners. Lawton and more than 1,600 prisoners already weakened by starvation, dehydration, dysentery, malaria, and torture following 30 months of captivity, embarked upon their first “hell ship,” the Oryoku Maru.

The atmosphere in the hold was horrific; madness intensified as fights broke out, prisoners slashed other prisoners, drinking their blood to quench their thirst. “Death was a welcome relief,” while others “struggled for life.” One day after boarding, Navy bombers attacked the ship; corpses littered the hold as doctors treated the wounded without medicine or bandages. Prisoners remained on the ship without food or water for another day before abandoning ship. Wounded and healthy prisoners swam 300 yards to shore; many drowned or died as machine guns opened up on them, a few made it ashore through the compassion and heroism of others. On shore at Subic Bay, a new level of cruelty waited the mostly naked prisoners. Placed on a cement tennis court in the blazing Philippine sun, the barely fed survivors added sunburn to their litany of miseries. Water and food, measured by the spoonful, made them “look like baby birds being fed by their mother.” After five days of torture, surviving hunger, thirst, and shipwreck, the prisoners moved to San Fernando. There, the wounded were removed from the group.
and executed as the living marched to the docks to board their second “hell ship,” the Enoura Maru.

For 10 days storms battered the ship. The prisoner’s daily rice ration was laden with flies as they stood “like beggars …barefoot, unshaven, dirty, and befouled with diarrhea.” On January 9, 1944, American fighters near Formosa attacked the Enoura Maru. The prisoners held took a direct hit, leaving dead bodies strewn everywhere. Following the attack, they remained on the ship without food or water for two days before transferring to their third “hell ship,” the Brazil Maru.

Weakened, dazed, and wounded, they walked, crawled, or sat in prepared cargo slings to board the Brazil Maru. Temperatures dropped to 20 degrees during the voyage as winter set in, and pneumonia added its crushing weight to their misery. Starvation, freezing, and dehydration took its toll, as an average of 27 prisoners died each day during the 16-day voyage to Japan. Landing in Moji, Japan after 48 days at sea, 75 percent who started the journey had died. Within 30 days, the number would rise to 84 percent.

Lawton’s book is poignantly graphic as he details man’s inhumane treatment of his fellow man; it is also a work that defines courage, valor, and a Soldier’s compassion for his fellow Soldiers. His recollection of Captain Walter Donaldson, suffering from broken ankles and sprained wrists, crawling on his elbows and knees across barges and up ladders to board another “hell ship” is inspirational. Despite suffering from disease and malnutrition themselves, doctors provided comfort to the wounded, and chaplains ministered to the dead and dying. Both show a deep devotion to duty and a conviction of their faith, even though near death themselves. Others rescued fellow prisoners that were lost at sea from other “hell ships,” determined to survive one more day. Some Survived, like other memoirs from the Bataan survivors, not only deserves to be read, it is an inspirational reminder of the sacrifices so many brave men and women gave in the service to their country.

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Waterloo marked many events: it was the last time English and German troops in so large a number would fight on the same side (for well over a century), in which French and English troops would fight on opposite sides (until 1914). A French emperor would at last be vanquished and English supremacy on European terrain would be unchallenged until a century later (again, 1914).

On the morning of 18 June 1815 English, Dutch/Belgian, German, and, eventually, Prussian forces faced a resurgent army of Napoleon Bonaparte. By about 9 p.m. that day 40,000 men and 10,000 horses would lie dead or wounded on territory surrounding a previously obscure Belgian town. Europe would finally be spared a French hegemony but still faced an uncertain political and military future.

In 1830 General Lord Hill, General Commanding-in-Chief offered to support the construction of a complete topographical model of the field at Waterloo as it appeared at 7:00 pm on 18 June 1815 when the French Imperial Guard made its final attack on Allied positions. Young William Siborne, a British army lieutenant, sought and received a leave of absence to attempt to add to young lieutenant Siborne’s quest to complete his model based upon historically accurate placement of various Allied units.

A fascinating addition to these narratives is Glover’s footnotes on the lives of these various letter writers (and one does wonder how he collected such interesting and detailed information and from where). I cite a typical incidence: the recollections of Ensign Henry Montagu. After Montagu’s recounting of his part in the battle, Glover tells us: “Montagu joined the army as an ensign in 1814. Afterwards he attained the rank of general, commanding the 1st Division in the Crimea. He became Colonel-in-Chief of the Scots Guards in 1875 and died on 25 May 1883.” And another: in an extensively detailed footnote from LTC Henry Murray, Murray’s response runs to more than nine printed pages and is followed by no fewer than 39 historical footnotes by Glover.

Gareth Glover has truly brought forth an exhaustively detailed account of a battle whose specifics may never be fully reconciled, but a battle key to understanding the development of future western political landscapes and military alliances.

Army Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen was the hard-fighting, hard-swearing, unorthodox commander of two infantry divisions during World War II. One officer who served under Allen in North Africa was convinced that, “There’s no question about who was the greatest Soldier in the war, Terry Allen.” This sentiment was echoed by many of Allen’s peers and Soldiers.

Allen was born in 1888, the son of a 1881 West Point graduate and his wife. Allen entered West Point as a member of the class of 1911 but, due to general sloppiness and ill discipline, was turned back to the class of 1912. Academic failure and a possible honor code violation resulted in his dismissal in 1911. Undeterred, Allen graduated from a civilian university and received a Regular Army commission in the cavalry.

Allen served on the Mexican border and as a battalion commander in combat for a few months during World War I. His assignments during the 1920s were routine. In 1931-1932, according to author Gerald Astor, Allen served as an instructor at the Infantry School under the tutelage of Lieutenant Colonel George C. Marshall, the assistant commandant and later World War II chief of staff. This augured well for Allen’s future. With the rapid expansion of the U.S. Army after World War II began in Europe, Allen was promoted to brigadier general in 1940.

During World War II, Allen commanded the 1st Infantry Division, the “Big Red One,” in the landings in North Africa and Sicily and in subsequent fierce combat operations. While many people praised his leadership and his Soldiers seemingly idolized him, others were concerned that the “care” he gave his Soldiers caused ill discipline and misbehavior. While this resulted in Allen’s relief in 1943, he was later given command of the fledgling 104th Division. He led the 104th Division, the “Timberwolves,” in combat in Europe from October 1944, through its link-up with Soviet forces at the Elbe River in April 1945, until its inactivation at the end of 1945. Allen retired from the Army in 1946 and died in 1969, two years after his son was killed in action in Vietnam.

This biography of Allen contains many lengthy extracts from Allen’s own correspondence and other documents and many unattributed quotations, remarkably without a single footnote. This book also contains a number of factual errors, undocumented speculation and inferential leaps written as fact, as well as many annoying examples of incorrect military terminology and abbreviations. These items detract from the credibility and value of this study. Six maps and two dozen photographs supplement the text.

Allen, considered “the greatest Soldier” by many, deserves better.
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