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The challenges facing our leaders engaged in the Global War on Terror dictate that we constantly consider all eleven variables of the contemporary operational environment (COE). In my last note I wrote about cultural awareness and its impact on operations, but culture is only one of many factors and forces being considered by our young leaders in Theater. To help visualize these forces I’ve used a concentric circle diagram (Figure) in the classes we teach to our leaders here for the Career and Pre-command Courses. By diagramming out the forces involved in their Areas of Operation, commanders can see themselves, see the terrain (physical, civil, historical, social, etc.), and see the enemy. Lower tactical level commanders (e.g. platoon leaders and company commanders) are interacting with units, factions, and organizations to an extent unprecedented in our history. Within their battle space, they will interface with the media, coordinate with non-government organizations, and synchronize host nation and coalition efforts, while conducting their full spectrum tactical actions. Strategic considerations are driving changes in our formations as well. Therefore, the dilemmas facing our young leaders today are framed by the Modular Force and Stabilization initiatives on one end and the requirement to operate in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment on the other. With the problem defined, we must now come up with ends, ways, and means to prepare our leaders to cope with factors and forces that confront them in the contemporary operational environment (COE). Furthermore, we must approach the COE in the full context of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF). Therefore, the purpose of this note will be to highlight some gaps we have identified in our current effort to transform our brigades and their leaders.

Thus far, our approach to this challenge has been to focus on the O, M, and P of DOTMLPF. This initial focus is fine; however, we cannot ignore the other key elements of this transformation. As far as the decision to focus on organizational, material, and personnel issues goes, nobody would argue that combined arms formations are not crucial to winning this fight. Nor would anyone argue that our Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) and in theater initiatives by the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) are not saving lives. The use of our Reserves and our 30K plus up of personnel have relieved some pressure on our Army. However, I believe that we have not adequately resourced our concept and doctrine production in both our “How to Fight” and “Training” literature; this creates frustration in the Force. Likewise, our leadership development education and training have not yet fully evolved to prepare our NCO and Officer leadership to grow and maximize the effectiveness of our
modular formations. Finally, we must take a hard look at whether we’ve given our installations and the tenant units the ranges, family support facilities/activities, and training support systems to support their reduced training timelines and continued needs once units have deployed.

First let me address our doctrinal deficit. As we travel with the Infantry Traveling Team and train our Infantry’s next group of battalion and brigade commanders, there is a common request for doctrine on how the units they command, or are soon to command, are to fight. The Army has published a “White Paper” on how a given unit will fight. Moreover, our Combat Training Centers, brand schools, and some recently retired combat experienced leaders have collaboratively developed some principle-based Interim Field Manuals and some initial drafts of our Modular doctrine. However, we still lack a common understanding of how the units will fight under their current configuration in the current environment. Just as we spiral equipment into the force based on what is technologically possible now; we must spiral our doctrine based on current capabilities. Like most of our doctrine, these manuals are principle-based, organizationally focused, and functionally organized. Although these initiatives are valuable, I would argue that we need something more.

Some of us can recall the first Bradley fielding to our organizations. In my opinion we got that fielding right. Along with the equipment came PLL and diagnostics. With the weapon systems came the ammunition and facilities to support and train our Soldiers and leaders. And most importantly, with the new organization came the experts to teach leaders how to train and fight with the supporting literature necessary to sustain that effort. Similarly, I have argued that our Army should invest in its collective training and fighting doctrine by fencing some of our combat experienced brigade commanders from OEF and OIF for a few weeks to write vignettes on how the new IBCTs, HBCTs and SBCTs should train and fight. Nobody knows the “how to’s” any better or has as much credibility.

Secondly, allow me to frame our challenges in training our modular battalion and brigade commanders and staffs. In addition to fighting as a combined arms team, our commanders must now live and train as a combined arms team. Successful transformation begins in the mind of the leader and his Soldiers. The current transformation initiative must be embraced by the entire team and supporting infrastructure. By enthusiastically embracing the concept we can start this transformation in the mind as well as in the motor pool. Therefore, I submit that leader development efforts must open our minds to change. We must make our leaders confident and competent that they can lead these formations. As discussed in my introduction, these commanders are not only dealing with external forces and factors for which they have not been trained, but are also challenged internally to train more diverse formations, maintain more equipment, and develop leaders of disparate skill sets.

To accomplish this, I have asked Fort Benning and the Training and Doctrine Command to partner in preparing the next unit for its deployment and resetting the units as they return. Embedded in the training requirement is the requirement to look at how we train and where we train to ensure realism. Accommodating digital command and control and growing kinetic weapons effects will require more land, better targetry, and realistic simulations, both on the range and in the command posts. Exacerbating our challenges with facilities is the need for our life cycle units to rigorously train individuals, leaders, staffs, and units simultaneously under a reduced timeline. Specifically, life cycle units will have six months to train a unit from individual through “higher level” collective after reset. The unit will have turned over approximately 50 percent of its personnel in the meantime. We must help these commanders with a training strategy template and TADSS to prepare their units for their available cycle. We are working on a live, virtual, and constructive TADSS model and a strategy to do just that. Our team will give commanders a menu of compatible systems to choose from based on their timelines and specific needs.

In conclusion, let me applaud our leaders in the field and in Theater who are training and fighting these new formations every day. Your lessons learned are essential to our efforts as an Army to transform to meet the challenges of today. We want to partner with you to tackle and overcome these challenges. It is a team effort. Follow Me!
Center Needs Soldiers’ Ideas

The Soldier Innovation Initiative (SII) is seeking resourceful equipment ideas from Soldiers who have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

The Natick Soldier Center’s (NSC) Operational Forces Interface Group (OFIG) at the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center began the effort in January 2004 to capture Soldier-modified equipment in the field as well as identify new equipment made from materials available to Soldiers that they have creatively exploited.

The project’s goal is to discover successful field ideas, prototype the best ones for further evaluation, and potentially influence the development process to field new or improved equipment. Ideas are reviewed to determine which technical area within the Natick Soldier Center or Research, Development and Engineering Command can best assess the innovation.

OFIG members, consisting primarily of active-duty and former Soldiers, visit installations throughout the year for the purpose of gathering field feedback, and the Soldier Innovation Initiative piggybacks onto these installation visits to specifically target installations with units returning from Iraq and Afghanistan.

OFIG has been in the business of collecting field feedback for 20 years and has three engineering psychologists who specialize in the development of surveys and in interpreting field feedback. The psychologists developed a survey designed to prompt Soldiers to provide their innovations, creative modifications, field solutions, and newly created or improvised items while deployed.

Soldiers are asked not only to provide information on their ideas but also to provide digital or hard copy photographs to enhance understanding of their ideas. Soldiers are also prompted for contact information so that they can be reached for further clarification.

Project officers conduct a review to determine whether the idea merits further pursuit. They are encouraged to contact the submitter and even invite him to the NSC if this will aid in the prototyping and evaluation process.

After an initial survey round with 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light), and units of the 82nd Airborne Division deployed in Afghanistan, some ideas that have emerged are: map pocket sewn into the inside of a patrol cap, a modified sling that allows the M-4 carbine rifle to hang in a ready position, a commercial earpiece for Soldier Intercom for better integration with helmet, and golf bag straps attached to M-240B assistant machine gunner’s bag to carry the weapon in a ruck configuration.

The NSC believes that the Soldier Innovation Initiative features important differences in process and scope from the Army Ideas for Excellence Program because the initiative employs OFIG to actively solicit creative ideas and solutions from returning combat veterans.

Soldiers whose ideas are determined to be fitting within the Army Ideas for Excellence Program also will be encouraged to do so through this process.

OFIG will continue to solicit ideas from returning units, providing continual new ideas for assessment and possible further development and fielding.

For more information about the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, visit http://www.natick.army.mil.
Mission accomplishment, sustainability, survivability; these three elements are fundamental and essential to our profession, and we see them repeated in our doctrinal literature, in articles published in our branch magazines, and in the hard-won lessons being documented by units deployed in the global war on terror. Our Army and Marine Corps have evolved into the world’s premier land fighting force by learning what works and what does not, and have drawn upon the lessons of our and other nations’ experience to hone our fighting edge. This is a continuing process, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is your link to that accumulated knowledge.

CALL is an organization of military and civilian personnel whose primary mission is to help units deploy, strike hard and decisively, and return to home station with minimal losses in Soldiers and equipment. We can make that claim because we spare no time or effort in collecting the information from those at the tip of the spear. As this article goes to print, CALL has embedded liaison personnel with units in Iraq and Afghanistan, meticulously gathering pieces of information the Army — you and I — can use. As required, CALL also periodically deploys subject matter experts to collect focused information as members of a Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT). One recent CAAT focused on the Stryker brigade in Iraq. All this great knowledge would be useless, however, without the means to rapidly disseminate it, and we use the internet to expedite your access to this critical information. You would be hard pressed to find another location that presents the amount and variety of detailed Soldier friendly information that is available at our two websites, http://call.army.mil for unclassified information and http://call.army.smil.mil for classified material.

However, the most important aspect of CALL is the staff of military and civilian personnel that exists to support you by gathering information and getting it back to the Army and Joint community through the use of the internet or through print media. These same personnel are currently working on ways to be even more responsive to your needs by establishing collaborative websites and responding to your requests for information. While CALL personnel and methodology may not yet provide a surefire solution to counter the many existing or emerging threats to our nation, it is a tool we should use to sustain our overmatch against an implacable and resourceful enemy.

As a result of a high OPTEMPO and the urgency with which we must develop and maintain our proficiency, we must figure out ways to be more efficient with our own and our Soldiers’ time. We are leveraging the internet to both receive and disseminate information, and as you read this someone in Iraq or Afghanistan is learning something new about the enemy and that information will eventually end up in the Army’s repository for observations, insights and lessons learned, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). And all of that information is available to you and your Soldiers.

Remember, a visit to the CALL websites will give you access to a vast supply of tactics, techniques, and procedures — our own and those of the enemy — relevant to what is happening today. You will see information about improvised explosive devices, combat convoy operations, urban operations, deployment preparation, Army transformation, cultural awareness topics, and family readiness group issues, to name only a fraction of the subjects available to you. When you use CALL in conjunction with other critical tasks you already perform such as physical training, medical training, marksmanship and battle drill proficiency, you can better prepare for the challenges you will face on the battlefield. We are here for you. Use us.

NEW LAW TO AFFECT SGLI PAYMENTS, PREMIUMS

Defense and Veterans Affairs officials are ironing out details of programs that will expand benefits provided through Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance.

The legislation signed into law by President Bush May 11 increases maximum SGLI coverage to $400,000 and provides payouts of up to $100,000 for servicemembers with traumatic injuries, explained Stephen Wurtz, the VA’s deputy assistant director for insurance. The increased SGLI coverage will take effect September 1, and the so-called “traumatic SGLI” benefit, December 1. Wurtz said the legislation directs that both benefits will be retroactive to October 7, 2001.

Traumatic SGLI benefits will be retroactive for troops who have lost limbs, eyesight or speech or received other traumatic injuries as a direct results of injuries received during Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom.

Servicemembers enrolled in the SGLI program will notice an increase in their premiums when the increases take effect. The traumatic SGLI benefit will be rolled into the basic SGLI program and will likely cost about $1 a month, Wurtz said. Troops opting for maximum SGLI coverage — $400,000 vs. the current $250,000 - will see their monthly premiums increase from $16.25 to $26, Wurtz said.

(This news brief was taken from an article by Donna Miles of the American Forces Press Service. The complete article can be viewed at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=7346)
The last time the 10th Mountain Division (Light) deployed, the plans and operations officer had to rely on terrain maps for battlefield awareness. It was all they had. The next time 10th Mountain deploys, things will be different. Soldiers will have access to space.

In July 2004, the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) transitioned a Space Support Element (SSE) to the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. The SSE is made up of three space operations officers and one NCO. They are trained in exploiting space-based capabilities to improve battlefield awareness for the warfighter.

“In the past, I kind of bumped around because I did not know where to get this expertise,” said Colonel Michael Coss, 10th Mountain Division plans and operations officer. “When the space operations officers first showed up, I had no idea what they would do. Since they’ve been assigned, we have had four command post exercises and in every case, they have provided me with the kinds of operational capabilities on the battlefield that the UEx Headquarters is charged to do. There is no turning back. We are dependent on technology. It is a tremendous enhancement, but you have to have experts that can keep it up and create workarounds when something is not functional. Our space experts provide us that.”

The 10th Mountain SSE includes Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Brozek, Major Joseph Bolton and Major Brian Seldon, all SMDC-trained space operations officers and Staff Sergeant Lee Rawlins, a satellite maintainer/operator. This is the second of three teams SMDC has transitioned into the new units of employment (UEx). The 3rd Infantry Division received the first team in June 2004. That team is now with 3rd ID to Iraq. Plans are to assign SSEs to all the divisions by 2007.

“I was originally assigned to SMDC’s G-3 (Plans and Operations) in July 2002, straight out of the Command and General

The SSE officers use their expertise to support, no plan for setting up a new section in a new environment. There was no support, no plan for setting up a new section as part of the UEx,” Brozek said. “As we worked through the logistics issues of setting up a new section, I was explaining what the SSE would add to the division.

“We’re all watching the 3rd ID SSE to see how they set up,” Brozek said. “We will be providing the same support within the theater. It won’t be a mirror operation, but it will be the same type of support.”

The SSE officers use their expertise to plan, integrate, and coordinate space mission areas into all aspects of the UEx. The team is involved in anything that goes to, through or from space, such as blue force tracking, satellite imagery, and global positioning systems — position, velocity and navigation of the GPS, Brozek said.

Having an embedded SSE helps the unit understand space, and they communicate what space can do across domains such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, geospatial information and services products, and blue force tracking.

“We talk in terms of two capabilities: space support to lethality and space support to force protection,” said Lieutenant Colonel Rick Dow, SMDC’s command lead for SSE fielding. “Space support to lethality comes from commercial space sources or other sources of targetable information such as ONIR (overhead on-imaging Infrared). Knowing where the targets are and how to get them enhances lethality. Space support for force protection means providing space-based blue-force tracking for situational awareness and understanding.”

“Understand that the SSE relies heavily on reach-back to SMDC because that is where the expertise is,” Brozek said. “We have a SATURN system for communication so that we can talk to the experts to get the answers we need.” SATURN (Space Application Technology User Reachback Node) provides unprecedented global wideband commercial satellite communications to the warfighter.

“I think it is incredibly important for the SSEs to be assigned to the divisions. All the branches of the military — particularly the Army — depend very heavily on space for dependency on satellite communications systems; imagers — both national technical means, government and commercial; and GPS systems,” Brozek said. “The amount of receivers is growing so fast it is incredible. The need for bandwidth is growing at a tremendous rate. We need someone at the division who has the knowledge of how it works and knows who to go to get help. The amount of assets being pushed to the division is growing because space is now down to the muddy
SSE con’t

boot level – to the Soldiers. Without someone to translate that expertise, the Soldiers would not be able to get the information.”

Coss said the key is having the SSE as an in-house conduit to all the space-based capabilities available.

“There is a series of space-based products and services that previously I did not know where to get,” Coss said. “I had no conduit; now I do. I used to go to my terrain guys to see if I could get an image or go to someone else about a satellite communication link that wasn’t working. There are so many things linked to space now, such as GPS and other devices. Having trained space operations officers assigned to the division gives me a staff expert in leveraging space-based products, platforms and services.

“This area has become so important to the way we fight,” Coss said. “We have taken risks with some of our systems by reducing capabilities because we thought we could use joint capabilities to fill the gap. The bridge between the services is sustained by space-based products.”

SMDC started having space operations officers in 1998 when the Army started creating functional areas. The first formal FA24 Space Operations Officer Qualification Course was in 2001. To date 128 space operations officers have graduated from the course. The next class is scheduled to begin in June. Each SSE receives an additional three-week refresher course before being assigned to a division.

“Because this was such a new mission and concept for us, it was good for them to get the refresher training and get updated on the equipment. It changes frequently,” said Lieutenant Colonel Michael Powers, chief of SMDC’s Space Proponency Office.

“The biggest reason they were put into the divisions was to provide that continuous planning capability,” Powers said. “Before we started fielding the SSEs to the divisions, we would send in an Army Space Support Team just in time before deployment. The SSE provides continuous integration so that the SSE is part of the team.”

(Debra Valine is a member of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command’s Public Affairs Office.)

CULTURAL AWARENESS CORNER

FAMILY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

— Arab families are often large and strongly influence individuals’ lives. The family is the basic societal unit. A patriarchal system, the father is the head of the family and is considered a role model. Although the mother’s activities may be limited to housework and child-rearing, she generally exercises considerable influence in the home. Few women work outside the home, though the number has increased with urbanization. Each gender is considered its own social subgroup, interacting only in the home. All activities revolve around family life, and any member’s achievement advances the reputation of the entire family.

The maintenance of family honor is one of the highest values in Arab society. Since misbehavior by women can do more damage to family honor than misbehavior by men, clearly defined patterns of behavior have been developed to protect women and help them avoid situations that may give rise to false impressions or unfounded gossip. Westerners must be aware of the restrictions that pertain to contact between men and women. Arabs quickly gain a negative impression of those who behave with too much familiarity toward people of the opposite sex. A Western male should never approach an Arab woman with the intent of pursuing a personal relationship.

The public display of intimacy between men and women is strictly forbidden by Arab social code, including holding hands or linking arms, or any gesture of affection such as kissing or prolonged touching. Such actions, even between husband and wife, are highly embarrassing to Arab observers.

(Taken from the Department of Defense’s Iraq Country Handbook.)

MEDAL OF HONOR AWARDED FOR OIF ACTIONS

ERIC W. CRAMER

An American Soldier’s family received the highest military recognition, the first Medal of Honor for Operation Iraqi Freedom, from President George W. Bush on April 4.

Bush presented the Medal of Honor to David Smith, the 11-year-old son of Sergeant First Class Paul R. Smith, who was killed April 4, 2003, exactly two years ago, in action outside the then-Saddam Hussein International Airport.

Smith manned the .50-caliber machine gun on top of an armored personnel carrier in order to defend a courtyard while his men from the 11th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, withdrew and evacuated wounded. Late in the action, he died after being struck by enemy fire.

The president quoted a letter Smith wrote to his parents, but never mailed, saying he was willing to “give all that I am” so that his men would return home.

“On this day two years ago, Sergeant Smith gave his all for his men. Five days later, Baghdad fell, and the Iraqi people were liberated,” Bush said. “And today, we bestow upon Sergeant Smith the first Medal of Honor in the war on terror. He’s also the first to be awarded this new Medal of Honor flag, authorized by the United States Congress. We count ourselves blessed to have Soldiers like Sergeant Smith, who put their lives on the line to advance the cause of freedom and protect the American people.”

His Medal of Honor citation and additional information can be found at http://www.army.mil/medalofhonor.

(Eric Cramer writes for the Army News Service.)
The 22nd annual David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition was held April 22-24 at Fort Benning with two 4th Ranger Training Battalion Soldiers claiming the top spot.

After 60 hours of physically and mentally challenging events, Captain Corbett McCallum and Sergeant First Class Gerald Nelson beat out 22 other teams for the coveted title.

This year’s competition focused more on combat-related skills than any in recent history. Thirty-three of the 46 Rangers who started the competition were combat veterans.

Besides traditional events such as the helocast, water confidence course, spot jump and Darby Queen obstacle course, competitors also had to complete a room clearing exercise, casualty evacuation event, run-swim-run event, as well as demonstrate proficiency on an array of weapons. Overall, the competitors had to complete roughly 23 various events. Only 11 teams finished the competition, with a majority of those falling victim to the 21-mile roadmarch at the end of Day 1.

The final results include:
1st place — CPT Corbett McCallum and SFC Gerald Nelson, 4th Ranger Training Battalion
2nd place — CPT Rick Ahern and CPT Marc Messerschmitt, 4th Ranger Training Battalion
3rd place — MSG James Moran and SFC Walter Zajkowski, U.S. Army Special Operations Command
4th place — MAJ Liam Collins and MAJ Frank Sobchak, Command and General Staff College

For more coverage of the Best Ranger competition, visit www.infantry.army.mil/bestrangercompetition.
Clockwise from top — Sergeant First Class Brent Myers takes a stab at the tomahawk throw event of the Day Stakes during Day 2. Staff Sergeant Justin Conner crawls under barbed wire while tackling the Bayonet Assault Course. At right, a competitor floats to the ground during the spot jump on Day 1. Above, Sergeant First Class Gerald Nelson finished up the swim portion of the run-swim-run event on Day 1. Nelson, along with Captain Corbett McCallum, took first place in the three-day competition. The two are from the Ranger Training Brigade’s 4th Ranger Training Battalion.
Bradley Units Ready for Training with Modernized Conduct of Fire Trainer

George A. Moore

In 1980, shortly after the fielding of the M2/M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), the Army fielded each mechanized infantry battalion and cavalry squadron a Conduct Of Fire Trainer (COFT). The COFT is a high fidelity simulator that replicates the BFV turret switches, controls, and weapons systems. Housed in a self-contained shelter, the simulated turret provides a Bradley crew with a virtual battlefield, containing multiple targets and an appropriate environment without the need to deploy to the field. The COFT virtual world is run by an Instructor/Operator (IO); he controls the device and provides the crew with feedback on how to improve their gunnery skills. Training new commanders and gunners would be very costly and potentially dangerous if it had to be accomplished using live ammo. Prior to heading out to the range the IO can get the individual or crew in the COFT and train him/them until they are comfortable in the operations of the turret and crew coordination. Using special purpose exercises, the IO can cover tasks in the Bradley ranging from zeroing the weapon to advanced gunnery skills. The Instructor/Operator is the cornerstone to training; he must be proficient in gunnery skills to coach crews in gunnery techniques needed to be effective. However, the tool he has used for the last quarter of a century is beginning to show its age. Therefore, the COFT is finally getting a long overdue upgrade or Recapitalization (ReCap).

The Bradley has been in service for 25 years, and the COFT has been with units most of that time. While the Bradley has evolved through five variants, the only update to the COFT was to align it with the changes that appeared in the Operation Desert Storm (ODS) version. This occurred in the mid-1990s and added the laser range finder and the Bradley Advanced Matrix (BAM). When the COFT was initially developed, it was cutting edge technology, but today its parts can only be found in computer museums.

In 2002, the Bradley Program Manager assembled a team to assess the condition of the gunnery trainers in the field. They found systems requiring a tremendous amount of man-hours to keep them operational along with a shortfall in parts due to obsolescence. Field Service Representatives (FSR) deserve a note of thanks for the effort they have provided to keep these systems operational through the years, constantly moving from trainer to trainer repairing systems to maintain a 90-percent operational rate. Units were also sharing the burden in upkeep. During a visit to one unit, the IO was found trading printer paper for printer cartridges.

In 2003, the ReCap began with United Defense (UD) removing the 1970's vintage backplane hardware and FORTRAN software and replacing it with PCs and a Window/Linux based operating system. Originally, the COFT required three shelters: one for the training station, one to house the large processing unit and one connecting room that served as an after actions review (AAR) room. Now all of the hardware has been greatly reduced in size and is consolidated in the crew shelter. The IO station has been completely re-hosted with a stack of five PCs, 19-inch flat screen monitors and a laser printer. In addition to being more compact, the COFT is now far more efficient. Previously, the IO needed 20 to 30 minutes to power the COFT and had to move from the IO station to the computer shelter two times during this procedure, watching for indicators that the system was online prior to training. In the new system the IO powers up (two and a half minutes) and shuts down the system from the IO station, reducing preparation time and effort for the IO.

Another ReCap initiative for the COFT is a change to the training subsystem, making it common with the A-3 Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS). Changes in the training subsystem are:

- The preliminary matrix starts the crew with a fully operational system and malfunctions are introduced as they become more proficient.
- Random target generation prevents the same target from repeatedly generating at the same location.
- The IO has the capability to select a variety of target parameters, not just dusk to dawn as before, but rain and fog as well. This selection will cause the laser range finder to give inaccurate returns in the ODS version from...
time to time, more accurately replicating vehicle characteristics in these conditions.

The final upgrade incorporated in the ReCap is record management. The system now allows the IO to print records on a laser printer and store them on a CD, permitting records to be transferred between COFT’s instead of manually inputting each crew when switching systems.

The fielding began in January 2005 and is projected to be completed by midsummer. The majority of initial comments from the first fielded installations at Forts Carson and Hood are positive. Sergeant First Class Montano, a brigade master gunner at Fort Carson said, “Training is more realistic and supports the current missions we face today, which will increase the quality of Bradley crews. Having the ability to set parameters to meet our commander’s overall intent is the key to success. We train crews on proper manipulation of the turret weapons systems with limited resources; and the power up sequence maximizes training time, which helps the quality of the training. Overall, I’m very pleased with the system,” he said.

Montano also noted that making a crew pull forward in a position to fire the TOW needs to be changed to allow firing from the defilade (This change will be implemented in future upgrades).

Another comment was from a brigade master gunner at Fort Hood. Staff Sergeant Grant said, “This is a much needed change to enable our crews to get the training they need prior to deployments. Giving the commander the capability to change target parameters will greatly enhance training. The COFT has been in bad shape for years; it’s a vast improvement.” Grant compared it to the Bradley Advanced Training System (BATS) for ease of use.

Yet more good news for the COFT is that these updates are not the end of the modernization effort. Now that the hardware is up to date, in the next 12 months COFTs will incorporate an Urban Operations (UO) database and several facets of the contemporary operating environment (COE). This will provide the commander the capability to introduce noncombatants, civilian vehicles, and various other unique target types into scenarios. Moving forward, the Program Executive Office for Simulation Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) is pursuing a Common Gunnery Architecture (CGA) for simulators across the Bradley and tank force. This will make changes and updates less costly while maintaining a common standard across the force. The CGA will also provide the capability to edit or create scenario’s beyond using the select by content.

The Bradley COFT has been in the field for a long time and was well overdue for an upgrade. This upgrade and its planned enhancements will provide Soldiers a much needed, new and improved capability. The Bradley will be with us for many years to come, and now the primary gunnery training device will be postured to support Soldiers during the years to come.

George A. Moore is currently serving as the Bradley Training Device Analyst for the TRADOC System Manager Stryker/Bradley. Moore is a retired sergeant first class with 21 years service, who has served in various positions in and out of the Bradley (rifleman to platoon sergeant). He also served as a Master Gunner instructor and as chief of the Bradley Proponency Office.
Army aviators move over. Our infantry brothers now have their own air force in the form of the Raven, a hand-launched SUAV (small unmanned aerial vehicle). Weighing in at approximately four pounds and with a wingspan of only 4.4 feet, the Raven is a down-sized version of the Pointer SUAV which first began operational service with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Afghanistan. The Army has operated approximately 180 Raven systems in Iraq since June of 2004 and plans to field 65 more Raven systems at the battalion level to fill wartime needs.

The entire Raven system weighs in at only 30 pounds but yields an impressive bit of technology. The Raven can carry a high resolution day color camera or a thermal camera for use at night and in overcast conditions. It navigates via GPS waypoints or operator input and is capable of operations at altitudes up to 3,000 feet and at distances of 12 kilometers from its base control unit. With a reported top speed of 90 kilometers per hour, its normal mission profile is 500 feet above ground level at 40 kilometers per hour for approximately one hour. The Raven system is composed of three aircraft bodies, spare parts, a control station, and a video camera for recording imagery. Two Soldiers typically operate the system and can have the Raven airborne in minutes.

The Raven UAV performs a number of reconnaissance and security missions including area and route reconnaissance, forward operating base security, and counter-mortar fire operations. The Raven is particularly useful for missions where stealthy observation is a necessity because it is extremely difficult to detect when flying at altitudes over 300 feet. If a closer look is desired, the operator can cut the throttle and glide the Raven over the objective for a detailed inspection of the site. This technique is particularly useful prior to conducting a raid on an insurgent hideout. For example, commanders can use the Raven’s real-time imagery to detect suspicious conditions on the objective just prior to conducting the raid. Armed reconnaissance helicopters can then be called in once the raid has begun to provide local security to the ground force.

While the Raven system is designed to provide an infantry battalion its own autonomous aerial observation platform, the Raven’s effectiveness is increased when used in conjunction with traditional Army Aviation assets such as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and AH-64 Apache reconnaissance/attack helicopters. The Raven SUAV can also hand over target information to larger UAVs, such as the Army’s Shadow or Hunter UAVs which are typically controlled at higher echelons. By working in concert with other airspace users, the Raven system maximizes its effectiveness and frees up overtaxed manned aviation assets from performing time consuming and resource intensive missions best performed by SUAVs.

For example, an infantry battalion can use its Raven SUAV as...
its Counter-Mortar Quick Reaction Force. In Iraq a typical response time for an OH-58D quick reaction force was 20-30 minutes. A pre-assembled Raven can be launched within minutes of a mortar attack. Using previous points of origin and eyewitness reports, the Raven operator can begin a search for the attackers before reconnaissance helicopters arrive. Once the insurgents are detected, the Raven operator can use its stealth to track them until a target handover is possible with a reconnaissance/attack helicopter team or ground force. A Raven SUAV increases the likelihood of detecting the insurgent mortar team before blending back into the urban sprawl of Iraq’s cities. In this case, the infantry battalion commander has a responsive counter-mortar option at his disposal via integration of the combined effects of multiple aerial and ground systems.

“Failure to conduct airspace coordination prior to SUAV operations may contribute to a mid-air collision resulting in severe injury or death.” (TTP for the Raven SUAV, Draft, 4 June 2004)

Of course, for Army aviators the first concern that comes to mind when operating with battalions flying the Raven SUAV systems is airspace command and control. There has already been one reported mid-air collision between a Raven SUAV and an OH-58D and several reported near misses. Because Raven SUAV and Army helicopters frequently operate in the same airspace and at the same altitudes (0-500 feet above ground level), potential collisions between Raven SUAV and helicopters are serious concerns. Raven operators receive training in A2C2 (Army Airspace Command and Control) requirements and are required to submit SUAV ROZs (restricted operating zones) to be included in the Air Coordination Order (ACO). Raven operators routinely submit their ROZ request through their fire support officer (FSO) or aviation liaison officer for inclusion in the ACO. In addition to establishing Raven ROZs, procedural control measures must be developed and enforced.

The recommended method for establishing unit A2C2 procedures that accommodate the Raven SUAV is to form an A2C2 working group. Recommended A2C2 working group members include the following: G3/ S3 Air, the brigade UAV (Shadow) platoon leader, senior aviation leaders from each supporting aviation brigade/battalion, combat control tower (CCT) personnel (for units operation in controlled airspace), and senior Raven operators from each unit. A common procedural control is for Raven SUAVs to operate between 300 and 500 feet AGL. Helicopters remain below 300 feet AGL and fixed wing traffic is above 500 feet AGL. This method is generally successful at airspace de-confliction among users, but fails to account for the limitations of the Raven’s imaging systems in certain scenarios. The Raven’s camera is unable to zoom in or out on its target requiring the Raven operator to adjust the Raven’s flight level to account for this limitation (i.e. fly lower to zoom in and higher to zoom out). In order to observe significant detail on a target, a Raven operator must occasionally fly below the coordinating altitude of 300 feet AGL. Additional control measures are implemented when

### Raven SUAV

**Features:**
- Small Size
- Light Weight
- Hand Launched
- Auto Navigation
- Auto Land
- RS-232 Interface

**Payloads:**
- CCD Color Video
- 2 CCD Switcher
- IR Camera
- GPS (P-y Code)
- Altimeter
- Compass Heading

**Demonstrated Performance:**
- Maximum Range: 12 km
- Duration: 50 Minutes (Rechargeable)
- Duration: 80 Minutes (Primary)
- Battery Usage: 350 gm/flight hour

**Current Missions:**
- Light Infantry MOUT
- Dismounted Urban Warfare

**Features:**
- Small Size
- Light Weight
- Hand Launched
- Auto Navigation
- Auto Land
- RS-232 Interface

**Payloads:**
- CCD Color Video
- 2 CCD Switcher
- IR Camera
- GPS (P-y Code)
- Altimeter
- Compass Heading
dipping below the coordinating altitude. Battalion TOCs (tactical operation centers) monitoring the operation of their Raven SUAV conduct the necessary coordination to clear the airspace surrounding the target area before allowing their Raven operator to descend below the coordinating altitude. In order to do this safely, control measures must be in place ahead of time to ensure all aircraft in the battalion area of operations are monitoring a common frequency and are aware of the Raven’s location. In Iraq, Joint Operation Areas Restricted Operating Zones (JOA ROZ) are commonly established over areas where combat operations involving division aviation assets are likely to occur. The JOA ROZ is disseminated throughout theater and provides a contact frequency for aircraft desiring to transition through the ROZ. It is the transitioning aircraft’s responsibility to contact the JOA ROZ controlling agency when entering the controlled airspace. The controlling agency, normally a brigade or battalion TOC, monitors the contact frequency and informs the transitioning aircraft of any UAV and fires operations in the JOA ROZ. While this method of control is extremely flexible, it requires a close working relationship among all airspace users within the JOA and a thorough understanding of the JOA ROZ procedures for transitioning aircraft.

“Technology will undoubtedly reduce or combat workload, enhance our ability to see over the horizon and reduce the threat of casualties to our aircrews. Yet the ability of the human eye to see and the brain to detect and discriminate remains better than any sensor.” (BG Michael Vane, deputy chief of staff TRADOC, Defense Information and Electronics Report July 2002)

Army aviators need not worry about their significance on the modern battlefield. Despite the Raven’s enormous capability, it has its limitations. The Raven’s small size and limited speed makes it difficult, if not impossible, to recover from downwind objectives in winds greater than 20 knots. Heavy precipitation and fog obscure the day camera and degrade the performance of the thermal camera. In cold weather operations, snow and ice may obstruct the camera view completely. In hot environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the batteries’ already limited endurance is further reduced. The Raven must also remain in constant line of sight of the ground control unit; otherwise the control signal may be lost. For this reason the Raven is susceptible in urban areas with tall buildings and obstructions. Access to a rooftop launch and control point is ideal in this situation. A significant limitation is the limited field of view of the Raven’s camera. As mentioned earlier in this article the Raven’s camera is unable to zoom in without adjusting altitude. The thermal camera is further limited because the operator must select the Raven’s front look or side look camera prior to launch. At night the front look capability is used for area and route reconnaissance, and the side look camera is generally used for reconnaissance of a specific observation site that the Raven operator plans to orbit.

Of course, the Raven’s most significant limitation is that it is unmanned. A manned reconnaissance helicopter with a proficient crew is able to cover more distance, stay aloft longer, benefit from a larger field of view, and attack targets with its weapons when appropriate. A manned platform is able to react more quickly to changes in the mission environment and is able to interpret the changing conditions common to everyday life in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Raven SUAV is just one system Army aviators will encounter on today’s contemporary battlefield. By establishing adaptable control measures, Army aviators and their unmanned counterparts can safely collaborate on their respective strengths. It is clear that Army aviators are going to work with and among UAVs in all shapes and sizes in the future. The ability of Army aviators to operate with UAVs will continue the remarkable successes Army Aviation is experiencing every day against insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Captain John C. Wagner**’s last operational assignment was with the 4th Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry in Iraq, where he served as an assistant S-3, Battle Captain, and Aviation Liaison Officer. CPT Wagner conducted the initial planning, supervision, and integration of Raven operations into the regiment’s daily operations in June 2004, while serving as an Aviation Liaison Officer, with the 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry in Diwaniyah, Iraq. He is currently a student at the Aviation Officers Career Course, Fort Rucker, Alabama.

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**Recent Missions Highlight Raven**

**MAJOR OLIVER HASSE**

**Reconnaissance/Cordon and Search:** Raven small unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) are routinely used to conduct reconnaissance for future operations. A Raven will fly over a target house taking video and still imagery from different angles to allow the ground tactical commander to better prepare his forces to raid the house. Commanders look for the best ingress and egress routes, locations to emplace the security force, and possible escape routes for the targets. The Raven is also used as part of the “go/no-go” criteria for the mission, by viewing the remote video terminal prior to execution. The commander can also use the Raven during the raid to provide extra security around the target area.

Units can also gather file footage of villages and possible target areas. In areas of operation that have many small villages the Raven can provide aerial view of the village so a commander can access the file footage prior to conducting an operation. This imagery can also be compared to more recent images to provide any changes to the area.

Units also conduct mosque reconnaissance since U.S. forces do not enter the mosques. Units look for weapons being moved into and out of the mosques. If a mosque is suspected of hiding insurgent material, U.S. troops coordinate with the...
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I Iraqi Army to search the mosque. The U.S. Army may provide external security for the mission while the Iraqi forces conduct the raid.

VBIED (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device):
In late January 2005, scouts from the 1st Battalion, 156th Infantry were conducting area reconnaissance missions in western Baghdad. The ground scouts identified a suspicious large black vehicle in the courtyard. The scout platoon requested raven support that was 700 meters away to investigate the compound. The Raven provided positive identification of a Suburban and provided detailed information on the layout of the compound. The Raven remained on station while the ground scouts conducted a hasty cordon and search of the compound. The unit found the Suburban to be rigged as a VBIED, and two of the three insurgents were apprehended with assistance from the Raven. The vehicle had a 300-pound underwater mine, eleven 105mm rounds, and an undetermined amount of nitrate rigged for explosion. The house contained RPKs with ammunition, grenades, mortar tubes with mortar rounds and rockets. Seven Soldiers, including the Raven operators, were awarded Bronze Stars.

IED/Route Reconnaissance:
While conducting route reconnaissance, Raven operators can look for any suspicious digging in the vicinity of roads. Engineers (467th Engineers) conduct main supply route (MSR) IED sweeps with ground vehicles, and then a Raven can fly over the cleared area from a tactical halt to identify any new IEDs being emplaced.

Other battalions patrol main supply routes and note any digging in the vicinity of the road so a ground patrol can investigate the area and question the individual digging. Individuals attempting to emplace an IED usually flee the area with the arrival of coalition forces. Soldiers with the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division (Light) caught insurgents emplacing 155mm rounds along an MSR.

Immediate Raven Support:
While conducting reconnaissance missions, Ravens can be redirected to support an IED struck patrol. The Raven provides aerial coverage to the units that have been struck to search for possible secondary IEDs, and any threat (trigger men) that may influence the struck convoy or security forces that have cordoned off the area.

Troops in Contact:
Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry conducted a ground patrol in a village five kilometers north of the forward operating base. The patrol came under small arms fire in the village and notified the battalion tactical operations cell. The Raven team diverted their ongoing main supply route IED emplacement reconnaissance and flew to the area with troops in contact. The tactical operations cell had live video feed of the Raven footage to provide guidance to the ground tactical commander. The Raven SUAV allowed the ground tactical commander to have situational awareness of adjacent alleyways and visibility of the village’s roof tops, to facilitate the safe movement of ground forces. The Raven provided coverage until relieved by AH-64 helicopters.

BOLO (“Be on the look out” missions):
Raven operators are asked to conduct “Be on the look out” (BOLO) missions to find vehicles for the battalion and higher. These vehicles may be VBIEDs, vehicles carrying known insurgents, or a vehicle that is suspected to be carrying a kidnap victim. During the day the Raven operators are able to identify vehicles and provide this information to ground patrols or rotary wing assets to investigate the suspected vehicles.

Iraqi National Guard Training:
Ravens can conduct overflights of Iraqi patrols and check points. The overflights provide the Iraqi’s with coalition coverage while still allowing to have an Iraqi face on the check point or patrol. The Raven can also view large gatherings or demonstrations. The battalion commander can then make an assessment if Iraq forces have control of the situation or if he needs to deploy a patrol to assist in keep good order.

Counter-Mortar:
Units use target pattern analysis to place the Raven on standby or in the air to investigate points of origin for mortar attacks. The Raven can acquire personnel at night with its infrared white hot mode. Any hot objects identified by the Raven after curfew can be investigated by ground patrols.

Targeting:
Although the Raven does not specify the grid location of the site it may be viewing, Raven operators can use the Falconview with digital imagery to find a good six-digit grid for a target. This data can than be used for ground forces, rotary wing assets or other UAVS to observe the target for prosecution.

Major Oliver Hasse is currently serving as the Raven Integration Training Officer with TRADOC Systems Manager - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
A Guide for Small Unit Commanders on the Media Embed Program

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHILIP F. BATTAGLIA

On March 19, 2003, the United States unleashed the military might it had amassed in the Gulf Region and began combat operations to overthrow the dangerous and brutal Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, in what was dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom. Along with the coalition forces were 775 American and international journalists embedded with the armed forces to report on the operation.

Background
According to the Cantigny Conference Report of 2004, embedding journalists with Soldiers is not a new concept and has a long history that dates back to the Mexican-American War of 1846. However, since the Vietnam War, relations between the U.S. media and the military have been strained and a great deal of mistrust has marked the relationship between these two institutions. In most military operations since the Vietnam War no journalist has accompanied or been embedded with U.S. Soldiers during combat operations. During both the Grenada and Panama operations, reporters were consolidated in a Department of Defense (DOD) National Media Pool (DNMP) and kept away from the fighting. In the book America’s Team, Frank Aukofer from the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and Vice Admiral William Lawrence pointed out that even during Operation Desert Storm lingering concerns within the military, lack of adequate news-media planning, and the brevity of the combat phase prevented Gulf War coverage from being as good as it should have been. Media relations and advance planning improved dramatically during the Somalia and Haiti operations. In these operations, senior military commanders were closely involved in the public affairs planning process and the news media had few, if any, complaints about their treatment and access.

OIF Embed Program
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, all the lessons learned about military and media relations from the past 30 years were successfully applied in the embed program. Unfortunately, tactical unit commanders, the ones charged with making the program work, were not provided with detailed, practical instruction or guidance on how to implement this program. On February 10, 2003, the U.S. military released an official message titled: “Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on embedding media during possible future operations/deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).” The purpose for this message was to provide general guidance, policies, and procedures to both operational level military commanders and the media about the embedding process. This message outlined the respective general responsibilities of senior commanders and media representatives. For example, embedded journalists were not authorized to use their own vehicles, and unit commanders were tasked to provide them with lift and logistical support to and from the battlefield so that the journalists could “tell our story in a timely manner.”

In addition, the message specified categories of releasable information and set the ground rules to balance the right of the media to cover military operations with the military’s necessity for operational security.

Although this message introduced the embed concept to military commanders and provided detailed guidance on releasable information, the message did not discuss any of the specific unit requirements nor did it provide any guidelines to tactical unit commanders on how to implement the program. Tactical unit commanders at the battalion level and below were left on their own to implement the embed program with little practical guidance.

For the most part, the embed program was very successful. An Issue Paper prepared by the Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL) of the U.S. Army War College in October 2003 concluded that “this unique kind of reporting appears to have won the trust and confidence of the American public.” Even now, although much has been written on the embed experience, there have been few lessons learned or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) consolidated and disseminated to tactical unit commanders on how to prepare for and what to expect from an embed reporter. The following guide will attempt to fill this void by providing lessons learned from personal experiences and TTPs derived from various
Guidance for Small Unit Leaders

As a small unit commander, first and foremost you must prepare your subordinate leaders and Soldiers for contact with the media. Schedule a briefing for your subordinate leaders to let them know that a reporter will accompany and live with the unit during the upcoming operation. Most mid-level leaders who have been in the Army for 10 to 15 years are not accustomed to the presence of journalists, hence this briefing is essential to prepare the subordinate leaders.

Explain the function of the reporter and the Constitutional guarantee for freedom of speech and of the press. Further explain the purpose of the imbedded journalist which is to provide impartial reports and inform the public and policy makers. These reports enable elected officials to have a dialogue on the current situation and make informed decisions. With an honest and straightforward briefing, junior leaders will be able to understand and accept the journalist traveling with them, and they will provide access and assistance as necessary. The key to success is command involvement and emphasis.

Next, the unit commander must brief all the Soldiers. Again, the purpose for this briefing is to inform the Soldiers that a journalist will be with them, and provide guidance on dealing with the reporter. The commander must articulate the two “golden rules” of dealing with reporters. The first rule is everything is “on the record;” i.e. don’t say anything that you don’t want mom and dad to read in the paper. The second rule is to “stay in your lane;” everyone should only comment on those topics of which they have firsthand knowledge. Do not speculate about anything which is outside of your area of expertise; rather refer the reporter to the appropriate expert who can provide the information.

The next TTP follows the first, and it is to introduce the journalist to the leaders and Soldiers in the unit. This introduction can take place during a previously scheduled unit formation. The purpose for this introduction is to show the Soldiers that the reporter has support from the senior leadership in the unit and also for the Soldiers to see the journalist so that they can recognize him or her later while deployed. It is also important to familiarize the reporter with the officers and Soldiers who hold key positions in the unit, such as the operations officer, the company commanders, the various staff officers and the senior NCOs. Each of the aforementioned leaders should provide a brief job description and a delineation of responsibilities. This introduction and explanation of roles and functions will help the journalist put into perspective what each leader does and identify the subject matter expert to help clarify or amplify a story for future reference.

Another important lesson learned is to provide the embed reporter with a tour and briefing on the unit structure, tactics, and equipment capabilities. Unit commanders must realize that most journalists only have a very limited knowledge of military organizations, functions, and structures; hence it is imperative that the commander take the time to inform the reporter about his unit. This briefing will help the reporter to understand the unit and help make the reports more accurate. Rick Leventhal, a Fox News reporter who was embedded with the Marine 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) during the opening days of OIF, mentioned during a telephonic interview that an initial tour of the unit, with an explanation of the functions and capabilities, would have been very beneficial to quickly put into perspective his experience with the unit. The Issue Paper by the Army War College likewise identified training for media representatives and knowledge between embeds and units as an area for further discussion.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, military officials decided that media embeds would not be allowed to use their own vehicles. This decision left ground unit commanders with the predicament of deciding where the embed reporter should ride. Accordingly, each unit handled the embed differently. Who can forget the reports from the NBC correspondent David Bloom as he broadcast from the top of an M88 heavy recovery vehicle? Yet, was this the best vehicle to ride in and report from? A recovery vehicle is normally found toward the rear of a unit formation with all the other maintenance and logistical assets and may not provide the journalist with the best vehicle to observe and report on combat operations. A practical policy TTP for unit commanders is to provide the media representative with various options for where he rides. One option is for the journalist to ride with the unit command sergeant major (CSM). A unit CSM normally circulates throughout the battlefield lending his experience and knowledge at critical areas. During combat operations, the CSM is usually far forward coordinating medical evacuations and critical resupply operations. By riding with the CSM, the journalist can get a very broad view of the operation and will normally be at the critical areas on the battlefield. In addition, the CSM regularly stops at the tactical operations center (TOC), which would give the reporter access to the latest tactical and operational information. At the TOC, he would also have access to electrical power sources for his equipment so that he can edit and file stories.

Another option is to circulate the journalist among the
subordinate units for periods of time. This option allows the journalist to live with various units and get a more intimate view of the tactical operations. Rick Leventhal mentioned that he rode with one specific Marine squad of the 3rd LAR through most of the operation. Although Leventhal developed strong bonds and respect for this specific crew, he acknowledges that his view of the operation was framed through the experiences and perspective of this one crew. Clearly there is no approved solution as to where a journalist should ride; however, the tactical commander must be “intimately” involved in the decisions about his embed reporter and he must help facilitate the journalist’s task to report on the operation.

The next technique is to start the embed process as early as possible. Unit commanders will not normally have control over the timing when the journalist joins the unit; however, if the commander is given the opportunity to influence the timing, then he should choose to start the embed program as early as possible. Although caring for a reporter takes precious time and resources, the more time the reporter spends with the unit the greater the chances for a positive experience. A previous Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis J. Reimer, had a motto that “Soldiers are our best credentials.” This saying conveys the message that the American Soldier is the best spokesperson for the Army because Soldiers are able to connect with the American public and tell the Army story. As the embedded journalist spends more time with the unit, he will better understand the Soldiers and begin to form a bond and make lasting relationships with Soldiers. These relationships will help the journalist provide balance and perspective to any given situation, and may even result in a more positive story about the unit and the operation. In addition, the more time the reporter spends with the unit, the better opportunity he will have to get to know the key leaders and the overall mission.

This last guiding principle is directed at the unit commander and stems from the author’s personal experience. As the commander it is imperative to remain neutral. It is also necessary to develop “thick skin.” You must be prepared to be personally criticized and to read a story that may not positively reflect on the unit. All good leaders develop a strong bond and an affinity for their Soldiers and unit. A natural tendency is to protect and defend your Soldiers against personal insults. It is extremely important not to overreact if a negative story about your unit is published. If this happens to you, take a step back and try to impartially assess the situation. First, ask yourself “does the story contain factual inconsistencies?” If this is the case, then calmly approach the journalist and point out the factual inconsistencies. Most reporters are professionals who try to be fair and accurate in their reports. If you point out the inaccuracies, most journalists will acknowledge the discrepancy and will either print a retraction or publish a new story with the correct information. On the other hand, if the story is factual but the journalist has published a negative report about the unit, then there is little that the commander can do to change it. The commander needs to investigate the circumstances surrounding the incident in the story and develop a strategy to avoid future occurrences. The commander should make the reporter aware of the corrective actions and, if appropriate, any punitive measures taken (within the rights of privacy guidelines). The commander should use this opportunity, as well as others, to get the “good news” to the reporter in the hopes that he or she will publish a story. A headline reading “Commander Takes Swift Action To Remedy the Situation” could go a long way toward mitigating the negative impact of the original story. Your embedded reporter will usually tell you that he is filing a specific story. If you know that the story may be negative, first and foremost notify your chain of command and your public affairs officer. Secondly, make sure you make the reporter aware of your intended corrective actions prior to the submission of the story. Above all, do not confront the journalist and demand a new story or try to impede the submission. Don’t forget, the journalist has the right to report the news as he sees it.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the embedded media “reinvention” placed journalists, Soldiers, and Marines in the same environment. By all accounts this program was a success and as the CLS Issue Paper pointed out, “This unique kind of war reporting appears to have won the trust and confidence of the American public.” With such success and confidence it seems certain that this program will be reinitiated in the next conflict. In the mean time, the military services need to capture the lessons learned from this program and incorporate these lessons into future training opportunities. This collection of lessons learned and techniques is one small step in the process that will prepare future tactical unit commanders to integrate and support the embed reporter that will inevitably accompany the unit into battle.

Lieutenant Colonel Philip F. Battaglia is currently serving on the Joint Staff, J5. He previously served as the commander of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, Fighting Eagles, which deployed to Iraq in April 2003. LTC Battaglia graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1983.
Reserve Component Mobilization

Rear Detachment, S1 and S4, Yearly SRPs Important

CAPTAIN BENJAMIN BUCHHOLZ

Reserve component mobilization is transformative by nature and multifaceted and detailed by necessity, but it doesn’t need to produce the overwhelming experience of near failure that is common among many deploying units. Reservists must expect federalization and should, therefore, plan and execute a pre-mobilization regimen designed to prevent the process of activation from becoming, as more than one commander stated, “more difficult and stressful than the actual fighting."

As a reservist mobilized multiple times and as a mobilization officer who prepared a detachment, company, battalion, and very nearly a separate infantry brigade for operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, I refined a set of staff processes and drafted command and control recommendations that will ease a reserve unit’s transition to active duty. I began to gain this experience and develop these processes when the 1-338th Training Support Battalion sent me to assist the 829th Engineer Team during the alert phase of its preparation for OIF 1 in February 2003. My battalion S3 handed me the keys to a GSA vehicle, along with a copy of the Reserve Component Unit Commander’s Handbook (FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, commonly known by its abbreviation RCUCH) and told me to spend the next few days prepping the 829th for in-processing at Fort McCoy. Fortunately, I was accompanied in this duty by Sergeant First Class Ken Nicks, who had mobilized units for OEF the previous year. He and I pored over the RCUCH and developed a plan: he would concentrate on logistics while I validated the unit on as many of the training and administrative requirements as possible. I advocate this same approach today, using the RCUCH as the baseline and dividing the work of validation between expert teams or individuals, preferably external to the unit.

After a successful send-off of the 829th Engineers, my command sent me forward again, this time to assist the 395th Ordnance Company. Shortly thereafter, having become somewhat comfortable with the process, I took on a larger responsibility as mobilization officer for Wisconsin’s 32nd Separate Infantry Brigade. I had realized a unit could develop plans for (if not actually complete) most pre-mobilization tasks; so, I began my new position by evaluating the brigade company by company, teaching and encouraging the full-time staff to track their progress using Annexes G and E of the RCUCH. During this time, and subsequently while mobilizing the brigade’s 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, I honed the recommendations I detail below. These recommendations do not represent a complete list of mobilization best-practices. I cannot cover every RCUCH task in this article. Instead, I discuss three key issues — formation of a rear detachment, command emphasis on S1 and S4, and the need for proper, yearly Soldier Readiness Processing — so that a reserve unit, its command, and the support activities on which it relies might mass their limited resources against the most critical and difficult tasks.

Formation of a Rear Detachment

Arguably foremost among these tasks is the selection and preparation of a rear detachment. Nothing, perhaps with the exception of competent or incompetent leadership, affects morale as much as the state of a Soldier’s family, finances, and feeling of security: his home life. A unit’s rear detachment guards all three. The RCUCH only devotes one bullet to it: Plan to Transfer Facility Responsibility (Task 4-I-11). What does this mean? How and to whom can a unit fairly transfer this responsibility while also allowing enough time to train rear detachment personnel so they might have them ready prior to M-day?

Brigadier General Kerry Denson, deputy Adjutant General of Wisconsin, suggests that the appropriate time to bring the rear detachment on Title 10 status is when the mobilizing unit receives an alert. "The plan, at the beginning of OIF and OEF, was to mobilize a unit at 110-percent strength," said BG Denson. "In that way the usual 6–7 percent attrition at the MOB
station would not bring a unit below 100 percent, and the remainder of the Soldiers above that 100 percent could continue on Title 10 status, returning to their state to serve as the rear detachment.”

This original concept presents multiple problems, most of them more important than funding or determining how to select the extra 10 percent (what would we do with low-density MOSs, send two-thirds or one-fourth of a Soldier?). Most notably: units could not predict by name or MOS the Soldiers composing that margin. These Soldiers could not train in advance on the peculiarities of operating a rear detachment, like how to distinguish and account for installation and MTOE property, how to prepare deployed-status unit status reports (USRs), how to manage derivative unit identification codes (UICs), how to facilitate very active and involved family support groups, how to coordinate the influx of gifts and support from local communities, and how to train an ever-swelling number of new recruits and AIT graduates.

In consequence, BG Denson and Joint Forces Headquarters – Wisconsin (JFHQ-WI) now plan to identify by MOS, civilian skill set, and previous mobilization time a pool of candidates from which to draw the rear detachment. These few would mobilize prior to alert, pass an official SRP at the MOB station, and complete the other administrative requirements necessary for Title 10 status. Then, by alert, these Soldiers could return to their command and begin rear detachment-specific training. To emphasize the importance of having a competent rear detachment at the very moment the unit leaves its armory, BG Denson asks a few simple questions: “Who answers the phone five minutes after the unit leaves? And what will they do the first time the Intrusion Detection System on the vault sounds an alarm?”

**Command Emphasis on the S1 and S4**

Second most important to pre-mobilization planning is to focus command emphasis and assistance on the appropriate areas: S1 and S4. Here a commander must usually muzzle his S3. Any good S3 reads so many TTPs and ponders continually and longingly how best to train for specific deployment scenarios that the temptation to immediately conduct high-speed, hands-on, urban assault night live-fire exercises springs to his mind. Or, perhaps more rationally, he lobbies to spend an extra drill weekend on the range or put emphasis against combat lifesaver certification, good ideas except insofar as they interfere with the main effort.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Dosland, commander of 1-128th Infantry, experienced this. He said, “During pre-mobilization phase, planning and execution of training became a distractor for the command and staff group. We had to develop training plans for drill weekends, as well as a ‘mini-Annual Training’ executed just prior to mobilization. Though I refocused my staff with an S1 and S4 priority, training and MOB station recon requirements from the gaining command contributed additional distracters.”

To allow some greater massing of the battalion’s staff effects, the 32nd SIB S3 section took on a portion of planning the mini-AT. JFHQ-WI allowed direct liaison between 1-128 Infantry, the gaining command, and the MOB station, an economy of force. Teams of 41As and 92Ys from brigade and JFHQ-WI worked both on drill weekends and in a full-time capacity assisting the battalion’s S1 and S4.

The decisive point for this effort, and the point where assistance from all levels of command should concentrate, is in identifying, verifying, and refining the Operational Deployment Document (ODD). Think of the ODD as the provisional MTOE for a mobilized reserve unit. The Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) dictates to National Guard Bureau the contents of this document, based on the requirements of the theater he commands. No reserve unit can begin to mobilize its Soldiers, plan fillers for mismatched MOS’s, decide which equipment it will take, or order equipment new to its configuration until possessing a solid ODD. Receipt of the ODD is the trigger for shifting emphasis from training to personnel and logistics.

In every instance with units I mobilized, we received the ODD too late. Commanders made decisions based on templates, best-guesses, and conversations with strategically placed friends in the Pentagon, the National Guard Bureau, the Reserve Regional Readiness Command, or theater. Needless to say, this guesswork creates rework but, because of the often constricted alert and home station timelines and because units rarely complete their pre-alert tasks to standard, execution must begin based on such structural assumptions.

A new system may soon require more pre-MOB training validation. For now though, emphasizing only S1 and S4 during the alert and home station phases makes sense. Units receive detailed individual and collective training assistance at the MOB Station. Certainly any hip-pocket or planned training, especially in the big four (weapons, commo, CLS, and battle drills), is worth conducting if time permits. But, units unprepared logistically and administratively cannot take full advantage of MOB station, theater-specific training resources and assistance because they continually must fix and devote time to issues with pay, equipment, individual Soldier readiness, and — sometimes also, as mentioned above — their rear detachments.

**Soldier Readiness Processing**

No discussion of key pre-mobilization tasks should end without
mentioning the importance of Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP). While the Rear Detachment and ODD account for only a small portion of tasks in the RCUCH, the SRP — if conducted regularly and to a high standard — covers them nearly en masse. The process of SRP seems redundant to an outside observer and, therefore, a waste, especially as an annual event. In my opinion there are really three different SRPs, each with its own purpose: the ‘check-up,’ the ‘scrub,’ and the ‘trigger.’ The ‘check-up’ is the yearly version. In it, a unit focuses on maintaining a base set of individual files for mobilization. It produces a list of deficiencies against which the unit’s commander can prioritize staff effort. The ‘scrub’ occurs during the alert phase of mobilization. A unit identifies issues which would prevent a Soldier from mobilizing. It allows a commander to backfill before reaching the Mob station and reduces the expected 6-7 percent attrition. MOB Station conducts the ‘trigger’ SRP during the very first days of a unit’s mobilization. I call this the ‘trigger’ because it is the point when unit members really begin their journey down range. If considered separately, these functions no longer seem redundant but build toward mobilization preparedness.

Some TTPs for Soldier Readiness Processing: if alerted, or suspecting an alert, devote a portion of unspent Annual Training (AT) funds to a mini-AT/SRP (a good example of refocusing effort from S3 to S1); ensure adequate resourcing to identify and fix on-site as many problems with Soldier paperwork as possible; send full-time staff and key personnel through the SRP early so they can later manage the process and keep accountability of documents and personnel during the event; and, merge all newly created records immediately into the relevant personnel and medical files, copying them if necessary. A good SRP requires outside support from the unit’s command. A unit can scrub its files on its own but never, in my experience, is it self-critical enough or well enough acquainted with current SRP standards to make such a process worthwhile. A good SRP also requires follow-up from the command to ensure unresolved issues do not malinger.

Lastly, anticipating change to the process of reserve component mobilization increases a unit’s situational awareness and ability to plan and execute a mobilization. Deserving attention: a major revision of mobilization processes may soon occur.

According to BG Denson, “One of the biggest criticisms of the current mobilization process is the lack of predictability. The National Guard Bureau is aware of this and is striving to put our deployment schedule, what they call ‘Expeditionary Force Packaging,’ on a six-year rotation. This increased predictability would be a great thing for Soldier quality of life, for families, and — ultimately — for retention.”

Colonel Danny Nobles, commander of Fort McCoy, explained the rationale and math of Expeditionary Force Packaging. “Now, and in the past, reserve units have not really put together well-focused training programs, certainly not in a manner that meets certification and validation for deployment,” he said. However, except for some theater-specific requirements, units could accomplish and validate most post-mobilization training prior to alert. The six-year schedule would look like this:

**Year One:** Individual Soldier Readiness

**Years Two and Three:** Small Unit Collective Training

**Year Four:** Warrior Exercise (think Warfighter and Exeval)

**Year Five:** NTC (validation)

**Year Six:** Green Ramp (ready to go to war)

Ideally, units would stabilize key staff in Year Five, just prior to NTC, to combat the current transient nature of assignments and allow the staff to grow together before deployment. And, in Year 6, units would maintain a 72-hour readiness posture. Given roughly 360,000 Reservists, and having a sixth of the Soldiers in Green Ramp each year, the Reserves could deploy 60,000 Soldiers in a matter of days. Figuring 39 total days in the standard reserve training calendar, another 60,000 Soldiers could prepare and deploy in 40-60 days, a powerful and a better-trained force.

“The one thing to remember,” said BG Denson, “(is) no matter how we structure this, the enemy gets a say in how often the reserves deploy.”

The Reserves are now no longer just a strategic asset, waiting for the next war. Reserve leadership must focus all efforts to prepare their Soldiers for active service.

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HIZBALLAH: A Discussion of Its Early Formation

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The Global War on Terrorism demands that we focus on what Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called the “A-Team of Terrorism.” Hizballah, which means the Party of God, is a political and social movement that arose among Lebanon’s Shi’a’s in response to the Islamic revolution in Iran. It was formed in 1982 after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and went from a small terrorist group capable of minor skirmishes to becoming one of the world’s most dynamic militant groups in the region.

Over the years, Hizballah created a quasi-state in southern Lebanon and jumped into mainstream Lebanese politics. Today, Hizballah has modern healthcare centers, a satellite channel (Al-Manar), extensive social welfare services, construction engineering groups, and efficient light infantry units—all under the spiritual leadership of Shiite clerics who are backed by an annual budget of approximately $200 million, which primarily comes from Iran, and supported by Syria. This organization has its enemies and detractors within Lebanon and in the Arab world. Assessing direct Arabic sources will introduce U.S. military planners to the complexity of Hizballah and highlight its friends and foe.

“The Wahabis are filth from the manufacture of Satan; we shall take revenge upon the Wahabis, (and) this crime shall not pass without punishment!” This was part of the slogans carried by Shiite crowds in Southern Lebanon after the Taif Accords brokered in Saudi Arabia that ended the Lebanese civil war. In Hizballah lore, the Taif Accords are an example of how a segment of the organization views the Saudi plan as a way to further Sunni hegemony in Lebanon. The interesting part of Hizballah is its ability today to use Syria and Iran to maintain its control of southern Lebanon while expanding its terrorist network throughout the world.

1970s: The Early Seeds of Hizballah

The foundations of Hizballah were laid years before the Iranian revolution, in the ties that bound the Shi’i ulama (religious scholars) of Iran and Lebanon. Many of these ulama were schooled together in the Shi’i theological academies in Iraq, especially in the shrine city of Najaf (the center of Shiie learning and training of clerics). During the late 1950s and 1960s, these academies became active in formulating an Islamic response to nationalism and secularism. Prominent ulama lectured and wrote on Islamic government, Islamic economics, and the ideal Islamic state. In Najaf, the Iraqi ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the exiled Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi Khomeini both subjected the existing political order to an Islamic critique. Lebanese ulama and theological students overheard and joined in these debates.

Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the future mentor of Hizballah, was an exemplary product of Najaf’s mix of scholasticism and radicalism. Fadlallah was born and schooled in Najaf, where his father, a scholar from south Lebanon, had come to study. Fadlallah imbibed the ideas then current in Najaf and went to Lebanon in 1966, where he made his Beirut

husayniyah (a Shi’i congregation house) into a center of Islamic activism. Sayyid Musa al-Sadr dominated the Shi’i scene at the time, and Fadlallah had a modest following. But in the 1970s, Fadlallah received an important reinforcement: Iraqi authorities expelled about a hundred Lebanese theological students as part of a crackdown on Shi’i activism in the shrine cities. The expelled students became disciples of Fadlallah on their return to Lebanon, and later formed the core of Hizballah.

To go a bit deeper in understanding the origins of Hizballah, one must study and learn about Ayatollah Al-Sadr who was expelled from Iraq and returned to Lebanon from Najaf like many of his peers. This in and of itself is revealing since many prominent Shiite like Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Al-Sistani, Ayatollah Fadlallah all received their theological education in Najaf, Iraq, and not in Iran. Iraq is the holiest place for Shiite Islam. Najaf is akin to the Vatican and Karbullah akin to Calvary. In the early ’70s, Ayatollah Al-Sadr preached a combination of religious discipline and Shiite self-sufficiency. He created a group dedicated to aiding Shiite communities and channeling the efforts of young Shiite males. By 1975 military camps for the defense of Shiite villages in southern Lebanon appeared; that year 400 youths were given military training. It is a reverse case of turning plowshares into rifles.

In the late ’60s and early ’70s, Lebanese Shi’a lived mainly in the poorest neighborhoods of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. After the Lebanese civil war started in 1975, many of them migrated to the suburbs of Beirut while others traveled to West African countries like Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire in search of a better life. The imbalance of Sunni Muslims across Lebanon drove the Shiites to support the Christian Maronites in the beginning of the war. Yasser Arafat’s desire to pull them to his side succeeded
when through negotiation he co-opted Ayatollah Musa Sadr by convincing him that armed fronts are the only way to protect Shiite interests and channel efforts to fight both the Lebanese Christians and the Israelis. These discussions led to the creation of Afwaj Muqawamah Al-Libnaneeah/The Lebanese Resistance Brigade (Amal or hope in Arabic). Amal would receive weapons, training and tactics from the PLO but Sadr refused to join Arafat’s cause. As the war raged across Lebanon, Amal’s popularity began to wane because of Sadr’s stance. Many of the hard-liner Shi’a joined the PLO alliance and by the late ’80s Amal began to fracture. Southern Lebanon also became a haven for anti-Shah clerics bent on undertaking the Iranian revolution. Between 1975 and 1979 (The Iranian Revolution) southern Lebanon did the following for the Iranian Islamic Revolutionaries:

- Militarily trained Khomeini’s sons Mustafa and Ahmed.
- Trained 700 members of the Dawa Party in guerilla tactics (the Dawa remains active in Iraq today).
- Arafat and Khomeini are known to have met one another in Najaf to plan strategy.
- The Islamic Republic of Iran’s first Defense Minister Mustafa Shamran received with Fatah, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) minister Mohsen Rafiq Dust.

These revelations are highly significant and represent the importance of Lebanon in the early stages of the Iranian Islamic revolution. It also demonstrates the importance of Iran’s support of Shiites in Lebanon not only as a matter of policy, but also as a means of repaying the debt for the safe-haven granted the anti-Shah Ayatollah’s and militias in Lebanon prior to the 1979 Iranian coup.

From 1976 to 1986, Amal and later Hizballah began a campaign of purchasing blocks of Beirut and settling it with Shiites at the expense of Sunnis and Maronites. Clerics used tithes at first and also Shiites’ remittances from the U.S, Europe, Gulf States, and Africa; it then received outright donations from the Islamic Republic of Iran. It’s important to note that when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 under the leadership of Arial Sharon, Amal saw an opportunity to get rid of the PLO from the southern areas and initially welcomed the Israelis. This was a different story in Beirut where Amal militias were fighting along side the leftist allies against the Maronite Christians. During this time, an Amal officer by the name of Hussein Mussawi broke away from the mainstream Amal and established a splinter faction called Islamic Amal. The group was later supported and trained by Iran and began to slowly resist the new Israeli occupation by carrying out attacks against them and their allies the South Lebanese Army (SLA).

Musa Sadr laid the ground work for what would become Hizballah, but he never survived to see the organization create the quasi-state in southern Lebanon that it is today. In August 1978 he arrived in Libya and disappeared; to Hizballah he went into occultation and attained mythic status in the lore of Shiites Imams who have disappeared to return again and usher in a just society. The accounting of Ayatollah Musa Sadr remains a focal point in Qadhafi’s relations with the Lebanese. Sadr’s occultation and mythology did much to encourage the concept of martyrdom and self-sacrifice. With the disappearance of Musa Sadr and the toppling of Iran’s pro-American monarchy, the late ’70s marked the turning point for Amal. Today, Amal’s leader is a Lebanese born Shi’a from Sierra Leone, West Africa, by the name of Nabih Berri.

Hizballah Overtakes Amal

In Lebanon, both Hizballah and Amal represent Shiite interests but because of Amal’s 1975 charter which states that: “Amal is not a religious movement” Hizballah dismisses the organization as one not truly representing the people. On the surface, relations between Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and Nabih Berri, the head of Amal and Speaker of the Lebanese parliament, appear to be quite cordial. However, tensions between the two militias repeatedly boiled over into bloodletting. In June 2000 both groups rushed into south Lebanon to establish their presence in the former Israeli-occupied zone. On June 5 of that year, Ahmad Haidar Alyane, 18, was seriously injured in a clash with Hizballah.
militiamen that erupted when he and other Amal partisans attempted to remove a yellow Hizballah flag in the Kalawiya district of south Lebanon. In mid-June, five people in Bint Jbeil were injured when the car they were riding in came under fire and two people were reportedly hurt during the course of another clash between the two groups in Jebbain. On June 18, Ghalib Hammadi, 35 years old, was wounded during a fight that broke out between members of the two militias who were hanging pictures of Nasrallah and Berri. The fight lasted all night until a Lebanese army unit intervened. A similar clash broke out in the village of Tura on the same day, but there were no casualties. Because of Amal’s corruption and lack of discipline, Syria sided with Hizballah and continues to support it today.

Although Hizballah honors the founder of Amal, Imam Musa Sadr, and revels in his disappearance in Libya, it talks about the organization in contemptuous terms. Sadr, although a Shiite cleric, seems to believe his organization has to work in the defense of those he calls Tabqa Al-Mahena (the deprived class), irrespective of religious affiliation. This is not what Iran and many other clerics in Lebanon had in mind supporting Amal. What changed the landscape and began the ascendence of Hizballah was the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

It was time to return the favor of supporting Iran’s Islamist opposition to the Shah and the group declared the intent of liberating the Mostadafeen (the dispossessed) and a direct reference to the Muslim victims of the world. Teheran’s earliest experiment at Shiite liberation was the infusion of cash, military advisors and militant clerics into Lebanon. Amal and its more secular outlook could not withstand the cash flow of the petro-economy of the new Iranian Islamic Republic. This is a key point: for policymakers of the free world, does a nation endowed with natural resources, who then uses its massive earnings to support terrorism, pursues nuclear weapons, and radicalizes a region be allowed to continue unmolested by the United Nations and the world’s democracies? Iran dismembered Amal through a variety of means, but the split over the doctrine of secular versus Shiite poor classes was most fervent among Nabih Berri, who represented a more inclusive Amal, and Mahdi Shams-al-Deen, who saw a more radical exclusivist vision of Amal. Another aspect that was crucial to control included:

- Voice of Lebanon Battalions, a radio station controlled by Amal hard-liners, the ancestor of Al-Manar (Hizballah Satellite TV).
- Al-Mahena School that was a core area of training militant brigades and gunmen. This was a key area that the Iranian Republican Guard Corps infiltrated for the benefit of hard-liners.

To say that the Iranians and the Amal hard-liners would splinter into Hizballah and eradicate moderates would be a tactical oversimplification. Arabic sources reveal that the hard-liners needed the moderates in order to interact with the central government in Beirut and to negotiate with other militias and groups like the PLO, the Christian Militias, the Druze, and the Syrians. Many were co-opted or today serve in Amal’s emasculated organization as a minority party in Lebanese politics. It is not always dog eats dog, but subtler, with alliances and tangled webs that feed guerrilla movements and unconventional warfare. The hard-liner Shiites also wanted to lessen their dependence on Yasser Arafat and Fatah, they turned more and more to Iran and by default, geography and logistics to Syria. During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee), the Lebanese President Elias Sarkiss called for a Council of National Reconciliation. Nabih Berri represented Amal and the Shiites; however, Amal’s deep divisions fractured that year into Amal Al-Islamiyah (Islamic Amal) what would be Hizballah in 1982. Iran and Amal Shiite militants did not want reconciliation but to thrive on chaos, until they controlled more of southern Lebanon.

During this political struggle the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) trained a cadre of 2,000 fighters for the more radicalist Shiite agenda in the Bekaa Valley. It is important to note that in the early stages of forming Hizballah, the IRGC used the Iranian embassies in Beirut and Damascus as forward staging areas and command and control centers. This may make planners wonder if Iranian diplomatic missions in Iraq are being used to foment instability against coalition forces. In 1982, radical Shiite strategy in Lebanon focused not on Israeli forces but on ensuring the destabilization of Lebanon’s central government. Their strategy was simple — out of the chaos Shiite rejectionists and militants would use a combination of force and co-optation to supplant the quasi-securalist Amal organization as the dominant Shiite party in Lebanon. During this time the Iranian ambassador Ali Akbar Mohtashami, a hard-liner, would be active in supporting Hizballah and IRGC operations in Lebanon. His reward would be promotion to Interior Minister. This focus on destabilizing Lebanon would eventually lead to a clash between Iran and Hizballah against the multinational peacekeeping forces. Their plan of engagement was methodical and can be broken down into the following phases:

I. Summer 1982 to October 1983: Creating the jihadic climate to fight internal foes like Amal, PLO (which allied with Amal), Druze militia as well as Lebanese Christian and Sunni factions.

II. October 1983 to autumn 1987: Concentrate on attacking U.S. (Bombing of the Marine barracks) and French forces, and then limit encroachment of Syrian forces in Shiite enclaves and the Bekaa Valley.

III. Autumn 1987 to May 2000: Use southern Lebanon, Iranian support, and Syrian containment and cooperation to fight a proxy war against Israeli forces in Lebanon.

When the Israeli Defense Force wore down the PLO, Yasser Arafat fled to Tunisia in 1987 with the bulk of his fighters. This
occurred after the U.S. brokered cease fire which weakened the Amal-PLO alliance and set the stage for Hizballah to dominate Amal. The infusion of Iranian funds as the world withdrew from Lebanon’s civil war made a difference in Hizballah’s power and ability to create a quasi-state in South Lebanon. Strategically, the creation and strengthening of a Shiite enclave in Lebanon served many purposes for the Islamic Republic Of Iran:

- Allowed the export of Khomeini’s Islamist revolutionary ideals in the heart of the Arab world.
- Gave Iran a chance to counter U.S. and French forces in Lebanon as part of its grand strategy of frustrating western policy in the region.
- Lebanon could be a launching pad and base for the support of Islamists wanting to topple despotic and un-elected regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

**Discussions on the Role of the Mosque**

A key component in Hizballah’s control of society can be traced to the manipulation and politicization of mosques and religious schools towards their own radical agenda. Mahdi Shams Al-Deen, a Hizballah clerical leader discusses this concept in an interview in Al-Nahar newspaper in 1987. To Hizballah the mosque serves as a means to isolate members of the flock from the wickedness of society, a mini-migration of sorts from the ills of society. Hizballah argues that the mosque is not only for prayers, but has an educational, social, political and military role. In early Islam in the town of Medina, mosques were used as a rallying point for war against the Meccans, as well as a place to meet and take political decisions as a group and elect leaders. They were schools in addition to being places of prayer. This made sense in Prophet Muhammad’s time as the mosque with its minaret was the central location in which society convened. This is how many Arab universities were established like Al-Azhar in Cairo that today teaches medicine, law, and engineering in addition to religious studies. The difference is that Hizballah and other jihadist organizations emphasize the warfare aspects of the use of the mosque as Prophet Muhammad did to fight the early Meccans. What they do not tell their congregation is that Muhammad indeed used the mosque to rally troops, but projected military power predominately outside Medina. Of Prophet Muhammad’s 27 battles, only the Battle of the Ditch in which the Meccans laid siege to Medina and his battles against Jewish tribes within Medina, involved fighting internally in the city. This is significant as there is no precedence in Prophet Muhammad’s time for engaging in actual fighting or firing of weapons from the mosque itself. It is also important to emphasize that Muslims from the seventh to the tenth century evolved the mosque into great centers of learning, emphasizing the communal and constructive education aspects of the institution, not the counter-productive warfare aspect of the building that Al-Qaeda and Hizballah advocate.

The mosque was also used for early Muslims to express their feelings over governance, discuss ideas, and seek redress of wrongs. This meant not only were leaders engaged in solving problems but members of the entire community; today, the mosque’s debates are dominated by the clerics who control the microphone. Hizballah argues that when mosques ceased to be a focal point for society the Islamic Ummah (community) was lost. This was one way to simplify and bring in the masses to the mosques they control to imbue society with such radical ideas as Khomeini’s revolutionary zeal and not a real discussion of Islamic history and texts that allow for a robust analytical discussion of religion. It just propagates a radical and jihadist agenda.

**How Hizballah Exercised Societal Control through its Mosques**

In the late 1970s, Shiite groups were a clandestine grassroots organization, and four main mosques served as headquarters for their activities. It began when Palestinian militants took over the Rawsha District (Shiite) in West Beirut, terrorizing merchants, hotels, and restaurants:

1. The Imam Bakr Mosque served as a rallying point for Shiite youths wanting to form vigilante groups to protect Shiite businesses from Palestinian and Maronite Christian exploitation. From there these vigilante groups began enforcing morality in their districts, closing bars and forbidding the sale of alcohol in Ramadan. It is interesting to note that in the Rawsha District pitched battles occurred between Maronite Christian militia and Fatah fighters; not tolerating a third militia, they demolished three apartment buildings that contained many Shiite fighters.

2. Imam Al-Sadek Mosque in Beirut’s Hamra district. Note that each mosque is influenced by its neighborhood. What distinguishes the Al-Sadek mosque is its location in the heart of Beirut’s business district. This particular institution specialized in laundering and distributing funds from Iran, with an initial focus of shielding the Shiite community from hyperinflation brought on by the civil war. It also arranged for foreign currency transfers for the Shiite community, ran a printing press and as a secondary mission began a program of depleting this neighborhood of Armenians, Maronites and Sunni Muslims.

3. Imam Hussein Mosque in the Qantari District near Burj-Al-Murr; and

4. Mustafa Mosque at Ain Al-Marissa both used Iranian funding to find housing for Shiite families and settle Druze, Sunni and Christian areas with Shiites.

These mosques organized major Shiite events (Ashoora, Palestine Day, Birth of the Mahdi); they printed and distributed posters with pictures of Shiite martyrs of the Lebanese civil war. Most importantly, from these mosques a good portion of Beirut would be purchased, divided, and controlled by Shiite clerics using Iranian funding. In the Shiite stronghold of Baalbeck in southern Lebanon, the Iranians established a Hawzah (A religious clerical hierarchy that is similar in concept to the apostolate setting up a diocese in a city). There are Hawzah’s in Najaf in Iraq, Qom in Iran, and in Baalbeck, Lebanon. Understanding the hierarchy of the Hawzah and the mosques they control is important to gain a sense of how the society is structured and where radicals can seek asylum, thrive or hold a Hawza hostage, like Muqtada Al-Sadr did with the Najaf Hawza and his
Mahdi Army in Iraq. The Hawza is a Shiite concept of Islam and Sunni militant radicals like the Zarqawi group in Iraq and Usama Bin Laden do not have such a strict religious hierarchy to rely on; although this is changing with the Muslim Ulema Council in Iraq and Zarqawi militants coming together on items of common interest in Iraq. Usama Bin Laden has sought religious endorsements from such radical Wahabi clerics like Safar Al-Hawali.

Creating a Quasi-state through Militant Jihad

The problem of the Hizballah State in Lebanon today is that it is built around militant jihad. This does not mean necessarily that violence created the quasi-state in south Lebanon but that initially the militant formations were created and around this a social support system that today caters to many civilians in south Lebanon. The early ’60s saw Amal focusing on social projects for the welfare of Shiites including the establishment of a sewing school, nursing school, technical school and a major hospital in the impoverished south between 1963 and 1969. But during the Lebanese civil war, the focus was the survival of the Shiites in Lebanon. This birthed the following organizations to support Hizballah’s irregular forces:

■ Shaheed (martyrs) Foundation: Establishes funds, education and benefits for the families of those dying for Hizballah’s objectives. This includes maintaining a $2,500 stipend for families of suicide bombers and martyrs of Hizballah.

■ Medical Establishment: Was created in 1987, through the financing of the Martyrs Foundation, the first hospital was in Al-Hamra, and it is now expanded to nine medical centers, 21 clinics, 13 mobile clinics and employs 360 medical workers and 119 ambulances by 1998. It provides social and medical services to tens of thousands of Shiite Lebanese.

■ Jihad Al-Binaa (Jihad Construction Foundation): This is a novel organization among Islamic radical organizations formed in 1988. It is dedicated for civil engineering projects and construction for the Bekaa Valley and southern Shiite Lebanese villages. This organization digs wells, aids farmers and constructs homes demolished by military action (either by Israelis or other factions). It is important to also think of this Hizballah section as a ready resource for combat engineers that support the military wing of the organization.

Hizballah Media Section: Most of the focus of books on Hizballah has been on their satellite TV channel Al-Manar which the U.S. State Department placed on the Terrorism Exclusion List in December 2004. For its anti-Semitic and anti-American program that feeds conspiracy theories and hatred in the region. Aside from Al-Manar, Hizballah operates three radio stations:

- Voice of the Mustadafeen (Oppressed);
- Voice of Iman (Piety); and
- Voice of Islam.

Hizballah also has several book publishing arms like Dar Al-Illami Printing, also called Ahl-Al-Bait (Community of the Faithful) Printing as well as Dar Al-Adwaa (House of Dawn) Publishing, which prints the latest in Shiite religious, social, and political theory. It also has not neglected the internet with three known websites called Al-Manar, Al-Muqawama (Resistance), and Hizballah. This along with newspapers shows the extent of the information campaign directed against the United States and coalition partners in Iraq.

Conclusion

This discussion of Hizballah has articulated the complex and multifaceted capabilities of this organization. In many ways one can argue that among Islamic radical organizations Hizballah is in a class of its own. In addition, the organization is deeply rooted with Iran’s hard-line clergy and counts among its founding fathers a former Iranian Defense Minister, an Iranian Interior Minister and a cadre of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and diplomats. U.S. military planners from many vantage points (kinetic, information operations and civil affairs), see that the services this organization provides have become entrenched in more than 45 villages, town, and hamlets in southern Lebanon, and that removing this would cause a humanitarian crisis. Yet, it continues to be an antagonist of the United States and U.S. policy objectives for the region.

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Both authors are fluent in multiple dialects of Arabic, and the reading of Arabic sources represents their understanding of the material; any errors or omissions are their own. A complete list of references for this article is on file and available through Infantry Magazine.
Like food, water, and air — sleep is a necessity. When Soldiers don’t get enough sleep, performance suffers and everyone is put at risk. The effects of sleep deprivation sneak up on us. When Soldiers don’t get enough sleep, the ability to judge the impact that sleep deprivation has on their abilities is diminished and performance decreases. Sleep deprivations may lead to:

- Falling asleep at the wheel causing a vehicle roll-over;
- Administering the wrong medicine or the wrong dose;
- Failing to recognize a threat or reacting too slowly to it; or
- Transposing digits while entering coordinates into a fire-control system.

A sleep deprived Soldier may make bad tactical decisions. The bottom line is that sleep deprivation can get Soldiers killed!

### Sleep Deprivation and Performance

The longer Soldiers go without sleep, the poorer their performance on any number of tasks. In general, a person can sustain normal performance without noticeable impairment for about 16 hours after waking up. After 16 hours without sleep, there is a noticeable decrease in performance. After being awake for 24 hours, the reaction time is worse than being legally intoxicated. After 28 hours without sleep, performance becomes significantly impaired with the likelihood of critical errors rising to an unacceptable level.

### Sleep Management

To sustain performance over the long haul, Soldiers need at least six and preferably seven to eight hours of sleep out of every 24. Soldier performance will degrade over time with less sleep than six hours. Getting four to six hours of sleep every 24 hours will keep Soldiers in the Amber zone (where the risk for mission critical errors is increased but still at acceptable levels) for periods of up to several weeks. Getting less than four hours of sleep will keep Soldiers in the Red Zone (where the risk for mission critical errors is unacceptably high).

Sleep doesn’t have to be continuous. It is preferred that Soldiers have uninterrupted sleep time; however, several shorter sleep periods that add up to six to eight hours will likely be adequate.

#### Tips for Sleep Management

**Tips for Soldiers:**

- Don’t sleep in areas where there is regular activity.
- When sleeping, minimize exposure to noise and light — wear ear plugs and use blackout shades.
- Avoid over-the-counter “sleep aids,” which cause grogginess not actual sleep.
- Sleep whenever possible — even a little sleep is better than none. Several “catnaps” can add up quickly.

**Tips for Leaders:**

- Develop a unit sleep management program that gives Soldiers at least six and preferably seven to eight hours to sleep out of every 24.
- Soldiers trying to sleep during the day require longer (or more frequent) opportunities to sleep to compensate for the body’s normal reaction to sleep cycle disruption.
- Never put Soldiers in a position where they must choose between sleep and something else they would enjoy.
- Arrange sleep schedules that give Soldiers opportunities to sleep at a consistent time.

#### If Sleep Loss Can’t be Avoided:

- Use caffeine – drink the equivalent of two cups of coffee (~200 mg of caffeine) every two to four hours. Caffeine use as described above will help maintain performance even in the face of moderate sleep loss.
- Remember … sleep is a necessity.
- Your performance begins to suffer as soon as you start losing sleep.
- If you are struggling to stay awake, then your ability to function is already impaired.

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The U.S. strategy in the war on terrorism is to organize and help lead international efforts to deny terrorist groups systematically what they need to operate and survive, including: safe havens, leadership, finances, weapons, ideological support and access to targets. We think of our actions in the war on terrorism as falling into three categories: 1 — Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks, 2 — Protecting the homeland, 3 — Countering ideological support for terrorism (battle for ideas).”

— Douglas J. Feith
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2004
Military units currently waging war in Iraq may, at first glance, be reinventing doctrine as it has traditionally been understood. Combining combat operations with a focus on counterinsurgency and integrating civil-military operations, while protecting U.S. and host nation assets, appear to be new doctrinal approaches to warfighting. However, given a more studied approach to the war, a deeper appreciation for the “search and attack” as the modern blueprint for stability operations becomes evident.

Army doctrine provides answers for the counterinsurgency fight. Military units in Iraq are employing robust force protection measures, executing area denial missions involving information operations to prevent insurgent influence, using information collected from various sources to target enemy activity and are largely focusing on destroying insurgents and terrorists that seek to destabilize the country. By understanding doctrine, military commanders who use the search and attack technique as their guideline to plan and conduct stability operations may enjoy greater tactical success than those who do not.

**Stability Operations: A Closer Look**

Stability operations are contemporary combat operations that may define military actions well into the 21st century. U.S. Army commanders cannot afford to focus exclusively on offensive and defensive operations, nor can military planners be fixated on stability operations as merely “a transition” in between combat operations. FM 3-0, *Operations*, states that “Army forces conduct stability operations in a dynamic environment and are normally nonlinear and often conducted in noncontiguous areas of operations.” The war in Iraq is dynamic: units fight in a noncontiguous environment against an asymmetric, nonlinear threat. Army commanders need to understand the fluidity of the contemporary operational environment to encompass offensive, defensive, stability operations, and support operations simultaneously.

Stability operations evolved significantly in the aftermath of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Arguably, our forces have executed stability operations to varying degrees since the American Revolution; however, after 1991 and the end of the Cold War, stability operations appeared to become the norm of military employment and enabled operational continuity before, during and after major regional conflicts. Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and, most recently, Afghanistan and Iraq serve as examples of stability operations.

“In ‘cases of important interests,” explained General (John M.) Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “we are willing to use our military power primarily for coercive purposes in support of our diplomacy.”” (Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf. *American Foreign Policy*. Boston: St. Martins Press Inc., 1996, p. 100.) FM 3-0, the Army’s capstone manual for force employment, explains:

**Combatant commanders employ Army forces in stability operations outside the U.S. and U.S. territories to promote and protect U.S. national interests ... stability operations influence the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment.**

Army doctrine quantifies 10 distinct types of stability operations that Army forces may conduct: Peace Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Assistance, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Support to Insurgencies, Counter-drug Operations, Combating Terrorism, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, Arms Control, and Show of Force Operations. Army forces train and execute offensive, defensive, stability operations, and support operations in what has come to be known as full spectrum operations. According to FM 3-0, “Full spectrum operations are the range of operations Army forces conduct in war and military operations other than war.” In essence, full spectrum operations exemplify contemporary combat: employing military units in an offensive role, a defensive role, a stability role, and a support role oftentimes simultaneously within the same geographic area.

Success within full spectrum operations demands attention and analysis of the 11 critical variables that define specific contemporary operational environments: national will, time, technology, physical environment, external organizations, military capabilities, economics, sociological demographics, regional and global relationships, nature and stability of the state, and information contribute to significant analysis for the application of force. “Only by studying and understanding these variables — and incorporating them into its training — will the U.S. Army be able to keep adversaries from using them against it, or to find ways to use them to its own advantage” (FM 7-100, *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*). More so than any other operation, stability operations require a detailed study of the critical variables by commanders to achieve mission success. Stability operations demonstrate full spectrum operations in and of themselves; recent operations in Iraq suggest a greater need for unit commanders to explore and understand their defining characteristics.

**Doctrinal Principles Behind the Search and Attack**

Usually executed by brigade combat teams and below, the search and attack is a technique of movement to contact, one of the four types of offensive operations. Movements to contact are primarily “used in an environment of noncontiguous areas of operation,” according to FM 3-90, *Tactics*. “Commanders conduct movements to contact in general, and searches and attack in particular, when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack” (FM 3-90). Intelligence and time are needed for Army commanders to adequately plan and execute a deliberate attack. Oftentimes, offensive operations are movements to contact, usually culminating in a hasty attack once military forces make contact with the enemy, allowing leaders to focus combat power to destroy him. FM 3-90 describes the search and attack technique as “sharing the characteristics of an area security mission that is conducted by light forces and often supported by heavy forces, when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed elements, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area.” Regarding the search and attack, brigades, battalions and companies traditionally concerned themselves with the destruction of the enemy force, while preserving their own combat power through active and passive force protection. FM 3-90 stipulates that
the search and attack actually comprises four distinct principles:

- **Protect the force:**
  prevent enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.

- **Collect information:**
  gain information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the enemy COA as a result of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process.

- **Deny the area:**
  prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area; for example, in any area he is using for a base camp or for logistics support.

- **Destroy the enemy:**
  render enemy units in the AO combat ineffective.

The purpose behind protecting the force is a combination of passive security measures to preserve combat power and active measures focused on preventing the enemy force from influencing host nation services, civilian authorities, and military operations. Passive measures include: perimeter security, convoy security missions, communications discipline, operational security, and disciplined information sharing. Active measures usually take the form of patrolling, screening host nation authorities, civil negotiations, and establishing limited-duration access control points. Usually blanketed under the term, “security,” commanders oftentimes subordinate force protection in lieu of destroying the enemy in a given area of responsibility.

Army units must collect information in order to establish actionable intelligence on enemy forces. Commanders at all levels receive known intelligence from their immediate higher headquarters, but are still expected to develop their own intelligence estimates and refine what is given to them. Executing tactical interrogations, establishing observation posts, using informants, and questioning the local populace are just some ways military units accomplish this. Oftentimes, commanders employ reconnaissance patrols to gather intelligence from a particular area, route, or zone. These patrols serve a multifaceted purpose of collecting information, as well as denying specific areas and protecting key resources.

Area denial missions serve to prevent enemy influence, both in message and presence, to host nation civilians in general, and to critical infrastructure nodes within the population in particular. Robust use of information operations that target the civilian population serve to promote security and send a positive American message of stability and hope. These information operations take the form of handbills, newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, and televised townhall meetings. Further, they serve to deny negative enemy-created propaganda from influencing the large civilian base. Again, Army patrols also prevent enemy activity and deny their influence against critical areas such as government buildings, industrial plants, and crucial economic areas.

The purpose of enemy destruction when executing the search and attack is obvious: destroy the threat to enable the restoration of stability. Army commanders traditionally trained and focused on the physical human-enemy threat as the defined “enemy.” Whether this entails an insurgent clad in civilian garb or the guerilla fighter hiding in the civilian population, military units have largely focused on destroying the enemy presence within their area of responsibility as their greatest priority. These missions historically take the form of ambushes, raids, sniper missions, and other combat patrols concentrated on finding, fixing, and finishing enemy forces.

Execution of stability operations looks oddly similar to the search and attack. The few exceptions such as U.S. and host nation security force integration, incorporation of civilian contractors, and coordination with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as stricter rules of engagement may traditionally delineate the two. With those noted exceptions, however, current unit employment in Iraq resembles the planning and execution of the search and attack.

FM 3-21.20, *The Light Infantry Battalion*, highlights several missions regarding the search and attack that companies and
battalions can execute. They look strikingly familiar to certain stability missions:
- To locate enemy positions or routes the enemy travels.
- To destroy enemy forces within its capabilities or to fix or block an enemy force until help arrives.
- To maintain surveillance of a larger enemy force through stealth until reinforcements arrive.
- To set up ambushes.
- To search towns, villages accompanied by host nation representatives.
- To secure military or civilian property or installations.
- To act as a reserve.
- To develop the situation in a given area.

Army forces practice extensive active and passive measures to protect their personnel and equipment from enemy attack. Further, they extend security to Iraqi civilians and security personnel to retain support from the Iraqi people. Army signal intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) assets, along with many U.S. civilian clandestine agencies, exercise detailed information collection to target threat activities. Army units concentrate their efforts on area denial to counterinsurgent and terrorist influence against critical infrastructure such as water plants and Iraqi governmental and police headquarters. Area denial includes conducting robust information operations to communicate a positive “American” message and working with key civic and cultural leaders of the population who have proven to be absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment. Moreover, all Army units attempt to destroy enemy insurgents and physically deny them sanctuary inside of cities, towns, and along well-used highways. These units also work to fix broken critical life support systems, which, if left in shambles, contribute to the overall threat to state stability.

Applying Search and Attack Doctrine to Stability Operations

Protect the Force
The ability to protect the force, both U.S. and host nation people and assets, is the number one priority when executing stability operations. Whether establishing forward operating bases, fixing water treatment plants or conducting combat and reconnaissance patrols, units must execute rigid force protection measures to prevent enemy attack and influence. Failures in force protection are often seen as suicide bombings inside of established forward operating bases (FOBs); improvised explosive devices (IEDs) detonated along convoy routes; and vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs); destroying American Soldiers, workers, Iraqi police, and governmental officials. Other failures in security include enemy insurgents who infiltrate legitimate Iraqi authorities and practice extortion and bribery. FM 3-0 defines force protection as the following:

Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease.

Force protection in stability operations involves active and passive measures. Passive measures include hard-targeting military outposts and civilian infrastructure. Active measures seek to disrupt enemy influence over Iraqi media and political institutions. These measures include establishing effective security of its force, alternating convoy and patrol timelines, and embedding military security with even routine civil-military projects such as waste removal and townhall meetings. Army units with first-rate security can accomplish their missions in a stability environment with minimal impact from enemy threats. Moreover, the force protection used in Iraq must also extend to the host nation authorities that U.S. forces are training to govern and enforce the rule-of-law in their own country.

By demonstrating the ability to protect Iraqi security forces and its civilian population, U.S. forces can restore legitimacy and be seen as benevolent protectors and not apathetic occupiers. “This is security from the influence of the insurgents initially … the population is then mobilized, armed, and trained to protect itself,” states FM 3-21.20. The protection enjoyed by the Iraqi people will translate to greater cooperation with U.S. forces and will result in more effective stability missions. Eventually, through detailed training, Iraqi security forces will be able to protect themselves and ensure their own welfare. As FM 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations, indicates, “Effective security allows local political and administrative institutions to operate freely and commerce to flourish.” Proper force protection implemented during stability operations not only protects American forces and Iraqi security forces, but also sends an extremely important message to the easily influenced Iraqi population. In his book Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, Charles Simpson made this point in reference to his Vietnam experience:

In this dirty and dangerous business of revolutionary war the motivation that produces the only real long-lasting effect is not likely to
be an ideology, but the elemental consideration of survival. Peasants will support [the guerrillas] ... if they are convinced that failure to do so will result in death or brutal punishment. They will support the government if and when they are convinced that it offers them a better life, and can and will protect them against the [guerillas] forever.

Enemy insurgents and terrorists seek to win popular support and portray U.S. forces as false protectors. A RAND Corporation paper “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq” adds, “Hence, the insurgent banks on the hope that the disruption caused to daily life and commerce by security force operations countermeasures will further alienate the population from the authorities and create an impression of the security forces as oppressors rather than protectors.”

Many commanders traditionally view the search and attack as merely finding and destroying the enemy. With this understanding in mind, they sometimes fail to respect the needs of the civilian population that they are there to protect, support, and train in the first place. Because of this single-minded enemy focus and insufficient empathy for the civilian communities their unit affects through combat actions, some of these commanders often find themselves bewildered as to why insurgent activity increases, rather than decreases, in their areas of concern. In a counterinsurgency, the “people” are the center of gravity — not the insurgent. Some Army units become more successful at creating more enemies than they do with destroying them.

Properly implemented force protection during stability operations protects Soldiers and civilians alike. It bolsters legitimacy and sets the conditions to gather information, denies areas to insurgent influence, and enables coalition forces to destroy the enemy. Good security is the foundation for effective stability operations and reflects a critical doctrinal principle behind the search and attack.

Collect Information

In the asymmetric environment of stability operations, targeting threat forces requires dedicated reconnaissance and surveillance missions by echeloned collection assets. This includes “top-down” delivered assets to companies and platoons, such as integrating Special Operations Forces (SOF) and SIGINT information from satellite and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) assets. Gathered intelligence from platoons and squads that conduct daily patrols in their areas of responsibility must be analyzed quickly by battalion and brigade headquarters. U.S. forces then develop a pattern analysis for their particular area of operations (AORs) to adequately understand the trends, habits, concerns, and violence that occur within the particular geographic area. Pattern and trend analysis provide Army commanders with the data necessary to protect the civilian populace and achieve empathy for their culture, as well as target, isolate, and destroy the enemy insurgent forces that, as Mao once stated, “swim in the sea of the people.”

Oftentimes, it is the company commander’s analysis in this complex environment that provides the basis of actionable intelligence at the battalion and brigade levels. As author Leonard Wong points out, “the OIF experience is developing in our junior officers the ability to recognize the strategic implications of their actions in a complex moral environment.” This implies a greater need for units to understand their own battle space in terms of culture, economics, and sympathies to adequately gather actionable intelligence of potential threats. As mentioned earlier, understanding the 11 critical variables that encompass a given operational environment is a must for leaders at all levels.

Since limited doctrinal templates exist for an adaptive threat, pattern analysis, which entails the detailed tracking of enemy activity over time to develop threat routines, enables commanders to make predictions commensurate with threat capabilities. As Colonel Joe Anderson, current chief of staff for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) attests, “Intelligence products that facilitate assessments include pattern analysis by week, trend analysis by week and month, incident trackers – which become enablers to identify enemy zones of insurgent and criminal activity – and link diagrams to determine who belongs to which element and how they are interrelated.” Moreover, it is absolutely essential that these enemy patterns be historically recorded and transferred to the next rotational U.S. force to occupy that particular AOR, lest future civil-military campaigns suffer.

Effective and focused targeting processes at all command levels from company to brigade are absolutely critical. Company commanders have proven most effective in Iraq with garnering timely and accurate information. “Mostly lieutenants and captains are in the line units interacting with the local populace, conducting the raids and working with Soldiers,” said Wong. Shared targeting efforts at company, battalion, and brigade levels are the most effective means to understand the threat dimension. This is true when conducting the search and attack, and it is true of stability operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Focused targeting also includes defining human networks for civilian leadership, enemy hierarchies, and information gathering sources. For example, every particular culture and society has leaders and decision makers, as well as educated minorities that are all to willing to share vital information to make change for the better, but lack the power and authority to do so. In Iraq, school teachers, doctors, and shop keepers have little to no influence to make societal decisions but offer Army forces critical information about those who run their society and cause civil instability and corruption. Army leaders who know the cultural decision makers and the people “in-the-know” within their areas of responsibility can better focus their collection assets to target the enemy insurgent and criminal forces.

Units in Iraq actively and passively collect information. They aggressively search for the enemy while providing security and denying enemy activities for their respective areas of operations. Brigades and below actively find and fix enemy insurgents and terrorists by collecting and analyzing myriads of information. The search and attack principle of information collection serves a crucial role in stability operations.

**Deny the Area**

Area denial are those actions that Army units prosecute that physically dissuade enemy activity from key areas and infrastructure, as well as information operations that seek to prevent the enemy “message” from permeating the battle space. Area denial includes active combat patrols to search for enemy Black List personnel and caches. It encompasses reconnaissance patrols that seek to collect information. It also includes route security missions performed by mechanized infantry for convoys and overflights by UAVs to confirm or deny the current operational picture. Robust use of snipers to deliver long-range precision fire against those enemy forces actively constructing IEDs along lines of communication as an economy of force mission is another excellent example of area denial. Commanders who understand the doctrinal rationale behind area denial also understand that doctrine advocates urban operations as a combined arms effort to isolate critical facilities and services from the enemy. By physically establishing a presence within the area of responsibility, commanders deny enemy forces sanctuary and influence in stability operations as they do in the search and attack.

In addition to physically guarding key infrastructure and actively patrolling key lines of communication and supply routes, area denial entails rigorous information operations. Commanders communicate the U.S. message through these operations, in hopes of “winning the hearts and minds” of the local population. Effective information operations as a form of area denial seeks to deny propaganda instigated by enemy forces and minimize what Samuel P. Huntington, in his 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article “The Clash of Civilizations,” described as “the breeding of animosity that interactions among peoples of different civilizations oftentimes cause.” Army forces must be able to execute “information superiority, …or the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the same” (FM 3-07.22).

Information Operations officers identified by unit commanders in Iraq greatly assisted in minimizing the culture clash between Army forces and the host nation. As Anderson further stated:

> You simply cannot be successful in SISO without a means to educate and inform the local public on policies, programs, and news about their community. These activities include: writing scripts for U.S. commander-hosted radio talk shows, weekly newspaper publications, press conferences, community roundtable discussions on the roles of local indigenous political parties, religious tolerance, and the roles of women in society. My Information Operations officer developed infomercials on such topics like trash removal, propane delivery, toy guns, and celebratory gunfire.

Effective information operations are proving their worth by advertising the positive efforts of U.S. involvement in Iraq. News of rebuilt schools, purified water sources, and propane gas availability breeds confidence in the Iraqi population as to the true nature of U.S. intentions. Coupled with aggressive information campaigns to demonstrate the destructive and destabilizing nature of the insurgents, Army forces can prevent the enemy from influencing the Iraqi people.

Army forces must evaluate and destroy the threats in their particular AORs without creating more in the process. “A more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests” is required by U.S. commanders to effectively prosecute their particular missions in a stability operation,” Huntington said. Commanders who fail to do this run the risk of what FM 3-07.22 terms information fratricide: …the result of employing information operations elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that impede the conduct of friendly operations or adversely affect friendly forces.

Anderson’s adaptation in Iraq of the cordon and search termed the “cordon and knock,” sought to respect Iraqi property and civilians by integrating information operations into combat searches that demonstrate restraint. As Anderson points out: cordon and search and cordon and knock – the framework for these two types of operations is exactly identical. You isolate the area, secure the objective, and enter the home. The difference is you announce your intentions on a cordon and knock instead of kicking or blowing the door or gate in. Anderson’s unit used loudspeakers and handbills to announce their intentions.

By respecting Iraqi dignity when executing the stability operation technique of “cordon and knock” with imbedded information operations, Anderson was able to deny enemy influence and restore confidence. His brigade minimized the disruption of Iraqi homes while simultaneously denying sanctuary to Iraqi insurgents and weapons. Iraqi civilians also
understood the purpose behind the U.S. activity and responded positively.

**Destroy the Enemy**

The threat posed in a stability operation is unconventional, asymmetrical, complex, and arguably, harder to destroy. Particularly in OIF, the physical enemy is one of multiple backgrounds, be it frustrated Shia militia, former Baathist Party insurgents, international terrorists, demoralized Iraqi nationalists, and violent criminals. The threat may also be characterized as not only the physical structure of the human dimension, but also as anything that causes instability within the particular area. Lack of an organized local government, a corrupt police force, lack of sanitation, and infectious disease can sometimes cause more instability and unrest than the most determined terrorist cell.

The unique dynamic of the human threat changed significantly in Iraq since “official combat operations” came to a close in May 2003. Since that time, U.S. forces have, in fact, seen more combat during their execution of stability operations. Recently, adaptive enemy forces composed of international terrorists, local criminals, Sunni activist jihadists, and fervently nationalist former Ba’athist insurgents have routinely engaged U.S. forces in Iraq. This type of threat wears no uniform, hastily plans linear operations independent of other enemy forces, functions in small elements, and conducts activities indicative of guerilla warfare. It is a unique variant of a traditional insurgency. The RAND Corporation counterinsurgency article described this new variant as netwar: “...the concept of warfare involving flatter, more linear networks rather than the pyramidal hierarchies and command and control systems (no matter how primitive) that have governed traditional insurgent organizations. Netwar, as defined by the term’s originators, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, involves “small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, without precise central command.”

This netwar insurgency is not easily predictable and requires detailed study and understanding prior to initiating an attack to destroy it. This notion advocates that the insurgent threat in stability operations poses as great a risk to Army forces as do the traditional conventional enemies with offensive and defense operations. Stability operations have, in fact, demonstrated to be more lethal to U.S. forces than recent traditional offensive and defensive operations. As Anderson noted:

*My brigade lost four members of our combat team in the fight from Kuwait to Mosul; however, we lost 31 more after 1 May 2003 when the President declared the end to major hostilities in Iraq...we also awarded close to 300 Purple Heart medals during that same time period.*

Anderson’s experiences in Iraq further underscore the enemy destruction tenet of the search and attack as it applies to stability operations. He employed many different stability missions to seek out and destroy the highly adaptive insurgent threats his brigade encountered. As Anderson continues:

*You will conduct neighborhood surges, which is another term for door-to-door searches for weapons caches and insurgents, traffic control points, security and presence patrols inside of urban areas, quick reaction forces — both by air and ground, anti-demonstration actions, Mosque engagement, and route clearance operations. But I caution you – nothing is ever routine. Never forget that the enemy is always watching and will attempt to hit you when you demonstrate weakness...*

Executing stability missions to destroy the enemy also requires Soldiers to adopt a “steely-eyed killer” look about them with clear understanding of their tasks and purposes. Colonel Kurt Fuller, the commander of the 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, who recently redeployed after 15 months in Iraq, commented that “conducting presence patrols and static TCPs are great ways to get your people killed.” He added that assigning “combat and recon patrols with clear tasks and purposes are the best way to maintain presence, ensure security, and destroy the threat.” Even daily platoon and squad level routine missions need this type of fidelity.

Commanders must train their subordinates to understand the contributing factors to civil unrest, as well as second and third order effects of their actions. The RAND Corporation article also noted that, “considerable progress in Iraq has been made in the political or ‘hearts and minds’ dimension of counterinsurgency in recent months ... such efforts have included improving access to vital services (electricity, water, etc), reopening schools, establishing the Iraqi police forces, restoring the country’s oil production, and generally encouraging normal daily commerce.” Brigade and battalion commanders should allocate combat power...
to their subordinates that allows for the physical destruction of the enemy, as well as the necessary resources to correct unstable conditions such as broken infrastructure and nonexistent essential services. The threat that U.S. forces must destroy in stability operations is a human one and a conditional one. The human one entails terrorists, insurgents, criminals, and anti-coalition nationalists. They comprise what most commanders have traditionally defined as the "enemy." The conditional threat entails nonexistent civil services, lack of civil order, and economic depravity. Commanders who ignore conditional threats run the risk of compounding the physical ones. The human insurgencies, stagnant economic growth, negative media coverage, and inadequate health and human services define the "threat" and contribute to local and state instability. In this regard, "the opposite of war is not peace; rather, it is stability," according to Dr. Carolsue Holland, an International Relations professor with Troy State University. (Comments from an in-class discussion, POL 6601: February 2004.) The "enemy" is anything that causes instability. Commanders who recognized this fact and incorporate multiple threat dimensions to define the "enemy" that they must destroy may enjoy better results at maintaining stability in their areas of responsibility.

So What?

Military professionals and OIF veterans reading this article may conclude that the search and attack, though analogous to various stability operations, doesn't change the conditions and the characteristics of the Iraq War. For example, the OIF "experience" seemingly calls for a greater emphasis on civil-military operations than traditional conflicts involving search and attacks. Many have called for new doctrine to be written to address the seemingly complex nature of the war there. Further, many of these professionals may well believe that the search and attack approach is only applicable to the current conflict in that particular region. In this regard, other military applications against differing threat nations in the Global War on Terrorism would require U.S. forces to take a different approach altogether.

First, the conditions and the variables of the operational environment will, in fact, change from region to region, culture to culture, but the principles of war and the characteristics that reflect combat at the small unit level do not. History, if nothing else, affords studied military professionals a tool in which to view the many forms of combat with unique clarity. That being said, certain absolutes are maintained and have been doctrinally codified. The search and attack clearly emphasizes protection of the civilian population, even though many military professionals oftentimes merely focus on destroying the enemy as the sole ingredient for victory. Current counterinsurgency doctrine demonstrates the need for effective civil-military operations with the host nation to garner mission success. A misunderstanding of current doctrine does not require a reinvention of it.

Second, this fight will last a while. With the understanding that the United States will continue to fight the Global War on Terrorism for an as yet undetermined amount of time, it follows that the nature of the conflict will be one involving fighting insurgencies, combating terrorism, executing foreign internal defense missions, and conducting humanitarian support and peace operations of varying forms. Success will then be gauged by our abilities to destroy the enemy, collect information, deny areas, and promote positive information campaigns selling our vision of freedom and hope. Most importantly will be the military’s ability to protect themselves and its coalition partners and ensure the security of the particular civilian population. After all, civilians are the center of gravity in a low-intensity conflict. It is not merely winning hearts and minds; it is securing the host nation’s trust in the military’s ability to protect it and its interests. It is also the military’s capacity to “work themselves out of a job” soonest, so that the host nation can in fact ensure its own stability.

A counterinsurgency is a movement to contact. Becoming familiar with the principles and doctrine already written and applying them to the stability missions assigned to U.S. Army and coalition forces can ensure positive results in whatever region they find themselves deployed. Doctrine affords success to those who understand it and can apply it.

In Closing

There is not a need to “reinvent the wheel” in Iraq. Those who support the notion that no discernable checklist and “silver bullet” procedure applies in this seemingly new war may misunderstand what is doctrinally advocated or perhaps have not done the research. Arguably, the Army is now relearning the legacy of the search and attack in the stability environment of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Aggressive units that focus on force protection first, then area denial, information gathering, and enemy destruction will enjoy the greatest tactical successes, while preserving their greatest asset: well-trained Soldiers.

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The true test for any concept or system is in the practical application of its intended purpose once the concept and system have been learned and applied through test and evaluation.

Currently, a second Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT), is being employed in actual combat operations. The first SBCT, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (SBCT), was deployed for a year in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. It is important to note thus far what the brigade has been able to accomplish and measure its effectiveness to come up with an assessment that will affect its further refinement to make it even more effective and lethal against the enemy. It is also necessary to evaluate its weaknesses to mitigate any inherent risks associated with its application and use.

It is worthwhile to examine what the 1st Brigade has done so far in its application of the SBCT concept to get a perspective on its effectiveness as employed in the current contemporary operational environment in Mosul, Iraq. The intent here is to get a glimpse of the concept as applied relative to its intended purpose, to shed light on what works and what does not, to find ways to improve on the SBCT concept, and to develop better tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and doctrine in the continuing process of transformation.

Applying the SBCT Concept and Lessons Learned

The primary concept of the SBCT is to use the embedded organic systems to fight the enemy and confront emerging threats. The Stryker vehicle with its different variations is the common platform on which the concept of fighting is focused, with primary emphasis on employing the individual Soldier as the core. Using the Stryker as the platform does not change doctrine (although it does modify some in the process) or battle drills; however, the use of Stryker vehicles and other embedded assets makes the SBCT a more dynamic, versatile, and lethal organization. The Stryker’s mobility, survivability, and lethality make the SBCT a capable and versatile organization that can execute complex missions. The primary lessons learned in the application of the SBCT concept to date include:

- The SBCT as a concept is tailored for urban fighting; the systems embedded in an SBCT add dimensions and capabilities that work against the current threat in the operational environment.
The SBCT units at the battalion level can employ and execute full spectrum combat operations on a daily basis and for sustained durations; they can fight an enemy that employs both conventional and asymmetric capabilities.

The Stryker vehicle is mobile, lethal, and survivable under combat conditions and able to meet the current threat in the contemporary operational environment.

Enablers organic to the SBCT provide up-to-date information on current locations of friendly forces as they are arrayed on the battlefield as well as an accurate picture of what is currently happening across the area of operations (AO). It also allows timely information to be passed between units across the AO.

Aviation, indirect fire, and intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets make for a lethal combination used against the enemy.

The SBCT concept is yet to fully mature to its maximum potential; much more can be learned to make it a truly effective and capable concept.

New lessons learned and TTPs are constantly being developed or updated and are proving their worth in the current fight in Mosul. The hard work of continuously evaluating enemy TTPs is paying off in dividends against a cunning enemy. The streets of Mosul can be very unforgiving;

vigilance and common sense are a Soldier’s constant companions, without which the consequences could be fatal.

Some of the new lessons learned are:

- Flash Traffic Control Points (TCPs) and Tactical Control Zones (TCZs) are effective in limiting enemy movement in the AO.
- The enemy uses multiple ammunition supply points (ASPs) and cache sites to replenish combat loads in their AO, including using a mobile cache with a basic load that’s good for one to two weeks of fighting.
- Constant offensive pressure is key in denying the enemy time to reconstitute and sanctuary to plan attacks.
- The enemy is constantly trying new ways to employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
- Baited ambushes are effective against a mobile enemy.
- The enemy tends to go back to his safe house from time to time.
- Sniper ambushes are lethal against the enemy when employed properly.
- Enemy likes employing shoot (hit) and run tactics against static coalition forces (CF) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
- The enemy is constantly analyzing patterns and trends and adapting to engage ISF and CF. (They often go where CF and ISF go or frequently patrol).
- The enemy uses rental properties as safe houses and staging points to attack CF and ISF.
- A robust S2 section at battalion level is key to winning the fight against the insurgency (Task Org: Detention, Operation, Plans).
- Interpreters are important and should be integrated quickly.
- Foreign fighters are used in suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks against CF and ISF because it requires less training and availability.
- Complex attacks being employed can evolve from CF an ISF TTPs that the anti-Iraqi forces are able to analyze as patterns evolve.

**C4ISR (ENABLERS) AND THE COMBINED FIGHT**

Key components of the Stryker concept are its embedded and attached assets that allow it to fight with readily available resources on any given fight. Digital and analog capabilities, communications platforms, ISR, engineer and logistics assets, aviation (not organic) and indirect fire capabilities are all assets it can employ.

The digital capability includes equipment such as the FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below), which allows for quick visibility of friendly forces as arrayed on the AO. It not only provides an accurate common operational picture (COP) depicting current forces’ disposition and location, but it also provides immediate situational awareness. This facilitates allocation of available forces as needed in the AO. The digital capability also allows units at all levels to provide and pass information in a timely manner.

Indirect fire capabilities embedded at the company, battalion, and brigade levels allow leaders to immediately summon indirect fire. IDF and harassment and interdiction fire are readily available to

![Graphic 1 — A snapshot of daily operations conducted by a battalion-size unit given an area of operation the size of 39x43 kilometers with a dense population in the city and outlying towns.](image-url)
accomplishment and successful missions. The ISR capability aids in mission success and mitigates risk. Surveillance greatly enhances the ability to provide the latest and killing enemy targets of interest relative to current or future missions. The capability to monitor and provide current intelligence on the situation is an incredible asset that allows a unit to attack the enemy where he is vulnerable. You cannot fully appreciate close air support (CAS) until you’ve used it under combat conditions. During training exercises some may get to see CAS in action but from a relative safe distance without the current threat. Seeing CAS assets in action in actual combat gives you an appreciation of their importance. The thought of being on the receiving end of that firepower puts perspective on what you bring to bear in a fight.

ISR assets are also an organic capability that the SBCT has at its disposal. This capability aids in providing ISR and actionable intelligence to units as they plan and execute missions. This allows units access to up-to-date information to develop targets and plan missions, as well as monitor and provide current intelligence on the objective and any area of interest relative to current or future missions. The capability to monitor and pinpoint locations of targets greatly aids in capturing, detaining, and killing enemy targets of opportunity in any given AO. The ability to provide the latest information, reconnaissance, and surveillance greatly enhances mission success and mitigates risk. The ISR capability aids in mission accomplishment and successful operations with no or minimal friendly battle damage assessment (BDA).

CAPABILITIES, MOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND LETHALITY

The Stryker’s mobility has proven itself in the streets of Mosul. The fearsome look of a Stryker going at speeds of 40-50 miles an hour is very intimidating; the Stryker has proven itself mobile enough to navigate in a built up urban terrain and navigate through improved and unimproved roads, streets, alleys and rat lines. It has proven itself capable of moving on any type of roads and terrain. This capability makes it a lethal system able to employ its organic firepower to provide support by fire or overwatch with deadly accuracy. Survivability — the true test for the survivability of the Stryker is to run the gauntlet of enemy fire. The Strykers have proven their survivability through many engagements of direct fire, indirect fire, ambushes by the enemy using varying types of weapons to include improvised explosive devises (IEDs), suicide vehicle improvised explosive devises (SVIEDs), vehicle improvised explosive devises (VBIEDs), and remote control improvised explosive devises (RCIEDs). It has proven itself capable of withstanding direct hits, saving Soldiers’ lives. This is not to say it does not have weak points or that it is perfect in its survivability. On the contrary, it needs major improvement to strengthen some weak areas. The enemy has been able to breach the hull on some Strykers, but the bottom line is that the Soldier’s survivability rate when hit by enemy fire of whatever type is far greater when he is inside the Stryker than in light vehicles. Future improvements to the vehicle by adding more protection will go a long way in making its survivability even greater. The sand bags and blast shields being installed help a great deal in adding force...
protection to Soldiers on air guards. Their exposure and susceptibility to sniper fire, IDF, and IED blasts are greatly reduced.

The Styker has proven its lethality and accuracy. The .50 cal. and MK19 prove deadly against the enemy. The current threat and enemy we face on the streets of Mosul do not require more firepower to confront and defeat than what the Strykers can bring to bear in the fight. The tow missiles in the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) have also been fired on occasion to suppress enemy threat. The combined firepower and capability of the different variations of Strykers have proven their worth in actual combat scenarios, the vision of the combined arms fight comes to reality when the need for it necessitates its use.

FIGHTING AN INSURGENCY IN MOSUL

The current contemporary operational environment (COE) in Mosul has coalition forces and Iraqi Security Forces fighting an insurgency that has both local and foreign roots. The enemy is truly multifaceted in his ability to fight and employs both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. He has proven to be both adaptive and versatile; what he lacks in sophistication he makes up for in cunning and viciousness. This is an enemy whose sole purpose is to wreak havoc and pain at all costs to prevent the organization of a government that will bring about and sustain freedom and democracy in a land long bereft of hope. His methodology can only be defined as evil; the naive concept of evil as being bad does not do it enough justice. The reality of a vicious, hateful, and determined enemy is what we face in Mosul. The enemy knows no compassion and is willing to employ all means of terror to achieve his goal. He knows no neutrality, killing without remorse, burning Christian churches as intimidation, and using mosques as staging point to attack CF and ISF. The insurgents’ willingness to die makes them a potent threat; their reckless disregard for safety makes them capable of anything. This is a cunning enemy able to analyze current trend and adapt, bringing the fight to ISF and CF at the time of his choosing, and fighting with all available assets with little regard for civilian casualties. His terror tactics know no limits.

LETHAL AND NONLETHAL EFFECTS

The combination of lethal and nonlethal targets in the targeting process proves to be valuable in fighting an insurgency. The lethal effects are effective in neutralizing the enemy’s capability to do harm against coalition and ISF forces, but it does not fully eliminate the threat, as other individuals in the organization will move up to assume the mantle of leadership and continue with the fight. It is effective in delaying, but ultimately the enemy will reorganize and fight yet another day. The key is focusing on the nonlethal targets as well, engaging the Muktars, Imams, Sheiks, community leaders, business owners and local government officials. The key to countering the insurgency, whose fighters are mostly foreign nationals coming to Iraq to fight and spread terror, is to engage key local leaders and the populace. Establishing relationships and fostering good will with local leaders and the populace goes a long way in winning hearts and minds. The simple meet and greets, daily combat patrols, and cordon and knock operations with ISF forces go a long way in the building of relationships and in providing security. Not only do these operations help legitimize ISF forces, but they also allow units to engage the population and find out firsthand about the issues and concerns of the locals. Future civil-military operations (CMO) and Information Operation campaigns (IO) can be derived out of these engagements. The value of local leaders, particularly the secular ones, should not be underestimated. Knowing what the Imams are preaching in their mosques can provide good indications of the current threat or situation in a particular neighborhood. It is not uncommon to find out that Imams do not naturally live in the mosque they preach in. They often have “day jobs” and live in a different neighborhood. Knowing the key players in the AO is helpful in getting answers to questions that have a bearing on daily life. Issues such as the availability of electricity, gasoline, and food are common problems leaders might have to address in areas such as Mosul. Showing concern and fixing these issues can have a direct bearing on the overall success of the campaign. There is more than just one aspect to winning the fight against an insurgency. The tactical aspect and lethal responses help in the security aspect, but to win the war you have to succeed in the communication, economic, and governance aspects as well. It all equates to providing hope for the future and the promise of democracy to a people long bereft of hope.

IO/CMO OPERATIONS

There is more to fighting and winning the war against an insurgency than just killing, capturing, and detaining the enemy. The current threat we face in the
contemporary operational environment in Mosul is an insurgency that has direct ties to winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. IO and CMO operations are on equal footing with the tactical aspect. Success depends on these operations as much as any other aspect or phase, sometimes more so than the tactical aspect. Information Operations directed at countering the enemy’s modus operandi bear a lot of weight in the overall scheme of things. IO products such as handbills, posters, billboards, banners, radio talk shows, TV and radio spots and TV shows have been employed and proved to be as effective as killing, capturing, or detaining the enemy. The ability to change the perception of the local populace is very important. Putting messages and themes out to the public proves crucial, especially in the Iraqi culture where perception is almost everything. CMO projects that have an immediate impact on the daily life of the local population have a measure of effectiveness that can be easily seen. Gasoline, electricity, water and food distribution, job/work programs, key infrastructure reconstruction/upgrade, school supplies, heaters distribution, and neighborhood clean up are some of the issues and programs leaders will need to address and implement that will have a desired measure of effectiveness they can easily verify. A combination of all of these have a direct bearing on the overall success. IO campaigns and CMO operations are just as effective if not more effective than the lethal and tactical aspect of the overall plan campaign plan. Success on these aspects is critical towards achieving lasting success. Post-combat operations of IO/CMO are critical in the success of all operations directly influencing the fight.

THE RESULT THUS FAR

The undeniable success thus far is proving the concept of the SBCT to be very effective against the enemy in the current contemporary operational environment in Mosul. The SBCT concept has proven itself capable of accomplishing its intended purpose with great success against the current threat in this contemporary operational environment. The SBCT is proving its mettle against an insurgency that employs both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. Conditions are improving but are far from being secure. However, it does prove to be a good step in the right direction. A lot can still happen between now and the end of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT)’s current deployment. The situation can easily change in a blink of an eye, but the fact remains that the SBCT concept is proving to be just the right concept to employ and fight with, given the current operational environment and threat.

The current success of the SBCT concept and its system is not the end product here. It is the continuing process towards meeting new threats in an ever-changing contemporary operational environment. The continuing changes in the threat and the enemy we face call for an evolving concept that will confront the threat with great success. Change is the only thing constant, and vigilance towards emerging threats and the enemy must be looked at with a keen eye.

Civil-Military Operations

Assessments
- Situational Understanding
- Identify critical needs

Projects
- Rebuild after combat operations
- Renovate
- Meet needs of neighborhood (generators, playgrounds, drainage ditches)

Consequence Management
- Condolence Payments
- Beanie Babies, soccer balls, candy
- “Iraqi Face”
- IA assistance in targeting
- Work through government agencies

Airman First Class Kurt Gibbons III, USAF

A Soldier from the 350th PSYOPS Company hands out flyers and stickers at an Iraqi gas station January 24, 2005.

May-June 2005 INFANTRY 39
Over the past decade the Army has increasingly engaged in lengthy overseas deployments in which mission performance demanded significant interface with indigenous populations. Such interaction and how it affects military operations is important. In fact, engagement with local populaces has become so crucial that mission success is often significantly affected by Soldiers’ ability to interact with local individuals and communities. Learning to interact with local populaces presents a major challenge for Soldiers, leaders, and civilians.

Lengthy deployments to areas with other cultures are not new. The Army has experienced many long lasting operations on foreign soil since the end of World War II. For most long-distance operations, the Army attempts to instill in deployed forces an awareness of societal and cultural norms for the regions in which they operate. While these programs have proven useful, they fall far short of generating the tactile understanding necessary for today’s complex settings, especially when values and norms are so divergent they clash.

Working with diverse cultures in their home element is more a matter of finesse, diplomacy, and communication than the direct application of coercive power. Success demands an understanding of individual, community, and societal normative patterns as they relate to the tasks Soldiers perform and the environment in which they are performed. Cultural education is now necessary as part of Soldier and leader development programs.

During the Persian Gulf War, the United States demonstrated awareness of cultural issues and how they affected military operations. The potential for friction and a clash between ideas, behaviors, values, and norms led to adjusting paradigms for cultural engagement. For example, the significant differences between U.S. and Saudi Arabian cultures caused active isolation of U.S. troops from native populations. The risks over differing or competing cultural norms were too great to overcome.

Cultural friction is certainly a more complex issue today than it was in the past. During the Cold War a bias existed on the part of nations wishing to align themselves with either the East or the West. Siding with one or the other was necessary in a bipolar world in which the major powers’ ideology competed through aligned or nonaligned states. Nations sought identity by becoming more like the Big Brother of their choice.

The end of the Cold War forced a new paradigm on prevailing ideas of national identity. States, individuals, and societies felt free to reconnect with their own cultural and social norms. In addition, U.S. and Western economic and cultural values overshadowed societies based on more traditional or religious values. This basic competition of cultural norms resulted in a retreat from western values in many regions of the world, becoming a source of friction rather than a means of achieving common understanding.

The emerging importance of cultural identity and its inherent frictions make it imperative for Soldiers and leaders — military and civilian — to understand societal and cultural norms of populaces in which they operate and function. They must appreciate, understand, and respect those norms and use them as tools for shaping operations and the effects they expect to achieve.

DEFINING “CULTURE”

The first step in any problem is defining it. Defining “culture” usually consists of describing origins, values, roles, and material
items associated with a particular group of people. Such definitions refer to evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate. Everyone has a culture that shapes how they see others, the world, and themselves. Like an iceberg, some aspects of culture are visible; others are beneath the surface. Invisible aspects influence and cause visible ones.

Ethnography, a qualitative research method anthropologists use to describe a culture, attempts to fully describe a cultural group’s various aspects and norms in an attempt to understand the group. The intent behind military cultural education is to help Soldiers be more effective in the environments in which they must function. They must be culturally literate and develop cultural expertise in specific areas and regions. When balanced with study in potential areas of application, proficiency in cultural literacy and competency aids understanding of cultural factors in areas of operations.

**Cultural Literacy and Competency**

Cultural background is one of the primary sources of our self-definition, expression, and relationships within groups and communities. When we experience a new cultural environment, we are likely to experience conflict between our own cultural predispositions and the values, beliefs, and opinions of the host culture. Cultures often experience alterations in cultural identity, which might create significant insecurity in both interacting cultures, calling into question identity, and in values, which might result in an adversarial relationship.

Culturally literate Soldiers understand and appreciate their own beliefs, behaviors, values, and norms but they are also aware of how their perspectives might affect other cultures’ views. Achieving self-awareness of our own cultural assumptions enables us to use this understanding in relations with others.

Cultural competency, which is more than just a framework for individual interaction, is necessary for managing group, organizational, or community cross or mixed cultural activities and demands a more in-depth and application-oriented understanding of culture than cultural literacy requires. Competency is demonstrated through organizational leadership capable of crossing cultural divides within organizations and establishing cooperative frameworks between communities and groups from different cultures. Competency is about building successful teams with a common vision, effective communications, and acceptable processes that benefit from cultural diversity.

Military leaders are trained to make decisions rapidly with little time available for discussion, debate, or consideration of dissenting views. Events involving potential destruction or violence demand one-minute managers or leaders, but doing so entails rapidly obtaining key facts and essential information, internal processing, and then choosing and implementing an appropriate course of action (COA).

Encouraging participation of a variety of people in all activities is difficult against this backdrop. However, encouraging participation is a key value in the framework of cultural competency. Recognizing differences as diversity rather than as inappropriate responses is a challenge in tactical and operational environments. Cultural competency accepts and creates an environment that allows each culture to contribute its values, perspectives, and behaviors in constructive ways to enrich the outcome.

Cultural literacy is about understanding your individual cultural patterns and knowing your own cultural norms. Understanding how your culture affects someone else’s culture can profoundly affect any COA’s chances for success. Military leaders have an additional challenge; they must understand and appreciate their own military culture, their nation’s culture, and the operational area’s culture.

### Culturally Literate Soldiers —

- Understand that culture affects their behavior and beliefs and the behavior and beliefs of others.
- Are aware of specific cultural beliefs, values, and sensibilities that might affect the way they and others think or behave.
- Appreciate and accept diverse beliefs, appearances, and lifestyles.
- Are aware that historical knowledge is constructed and, therefore, shaped by personal, political, and social forces.
- Know the history of mainstream and nonmainstream American cultures and understand how these histories affect current society.
- Can understand the perspective of nonmainstream groups when learning about historical events.
- Know about major historical events of other nations and understand how such events affect behaviors, beliefs, and relationships with others.
- Are aware of the similarities among groups of different cultural backgrounds and accept differences between them.
- Understand the dangers of stereotyping, ethnocentrism, and other biases and are aware of and sensitive to issues of racism and prejudice.
- Are bilingual, multilingual, or working toward language proficiency.
- Can communicate, interact, and work positively with individuals from other cultural groups.
- Use technology to communicate with individuals and access resources from other cultures.
- Are familiar with changing cultural norms of technology (such as instant messaging, virtual workspaces, E-mail, and so on), and can interact successfully in such environments.
- Understand that cultural differences exist and need to be accounted for in the context of military operations.
- Understand that as soldiers they are part of a widely stereotyped culture that will encounter predisposed prejudices, which will need to be overcome in crosscultural relations.
- Are secure and confident in their identities and capable of functioning in a way that allows others to remain secure in theirs.
To effectively manage the dynamics of differences, leaders must learn effective strategies for solving conflict among diverse peoples and organizations. They must also understand how historic distrust affects current interactions, realizing that one might misjudge others’ actions based on learned expectations.

Integrating information and skills to interact effectively in various cross-cultural situations into staff development and education systems helps institutionalize cultural knowledge. Incorporating cultural knowledge into the mainstream of the organization and teaching origins of stereotypes and prejudices also help.

Diversity might entail changing how things are done to acknowledge differences in individuals, groups, and communities. One must develop skills for cross-cultural communication and understand that communication and trust are often more important than activity. Institutionalizing cultural interventions for conflicts and confusion caused by the dynamics of difference might also be necessary.

With the increase in coalition and multinational cooperative military efforts, cultural competence is a critical leadership requirement. Stability and support operations demand adept leaders who can work with community, international, and private organizations whose members come from widely divergent cultural backgrounds. The Army’s description of the objective force describes the need for conventional forces with Special Forces qualities, including being culturally competent.

The Army has many programs designed to build cultural competency, including multinational and partnership training exercise programs; liaison officers, foreign students integrated into leader education and training programs; and officer exchange programs, to name a few. These programs are useful, but unfortunately, they are mostly crafted around educating the foreign student about U.S. cultural norms and operations rather than the ethnic, religious, or social group regards as typical. Cultural norms include thoughts, behaviors, and patterns of communication, customs, beliefs, values, and institutions. 3

As individuals, groups, and societies we can learn to collaborate across cultural lines. Awareness of cultural differences does not have to divide or paralyze us for fear of not saying the “right thing.” Cultural awareness puts a premium on listening and comprehending the intent behind others’ remarks. Becoming more aware of cultural differences and exploring similarities helps us communicate more effectively. The chart on page 43 shows some aspects of general cultural normative differences between U.S. culture and other cultures. 4

With so many diverse cultures and the enormous amount of study required to become expert on any given one, how do we narrow the field to find the right focus for generating cultural skills in Soldiers? Certainly specific cultures represent states or groups that might be more likely to develop an adversarial relationship with the United States. Perhaps it would be best to learn more about states or cultures with whom we are most likely to form a coalition or participate in a multinational campaign. Unfortunately, history demonstrates the uncertainty of predicting where, when, and with whom Soldiers might be required to operate. Of course, this would not rule out the need to study high-probability cultures. Adopting an approach, at least initially, oriented toward some foundational cultural norms with broader application across a wider range of settings might prove more prudent, however.

**Cultural Differences**

Culture, which is learned and shared by members of a group, is presented to children as their social heritage. Cultural norms are the standard, model, or pattern a specific cultural, race, ethnic, religious, or social group regards as typical. Cultural norms include thoughts, behaviors, and patterns of communication, customs, beliefs, values, and institutions. 3

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**Foundational Cultural Norms**

Foundational cultural norms are normative values and factors having the greatest effect on military operations and the relations of Soldiers with the populations they encounter. Researchers identify four cultural syndromes — complexity, individualism, collectivism, and tightness — that are patterns of beliefs, attitudes,
self-definitions, norms, and values organized around some theme that can be found in every society. Using cultural syndromes as a frame of reference, we can develop foundational normative values having common application across all cultures, which should provide the starting point for a cultural education program.

Cultural norms often are so strongly ingrained in daily life that individuals might be unaware of certain behaviors. Until they see such behaviors in the context of a different culture with different values and beliefs, they might have difficulty recognizing and changing them. Usually, our own culture is invisible until it comes into contact with another culture. People are generally ethnocentric: they interpret other cultures within the framework of the understanding they have of their own. Six fundamental patterns of cultural norms have greatly affected relations between differing cultures: communication styles, attitudes toward conflict, approaches to completing tasks, decision-making styles, attitudes toward personal disclosure, and approaches to knowing.

**Communication styles.** Communicating between two cultures involves generating, transmitting, receiving, and decrypting coded messages or bits of information; it is about much more than language, although language is certainly key to communication and should be a part of any cultural training program. The early focus, however, should be more on effective use and application of language than on making a Soldier a linguist. Someone struggling to communicate in an unfamiliar language cannot communicate complex issues. The goal should be to orient language-skill developmental programs, at least initially, on effectively conveying simple terms rather than on linguistic competence — learning to make the most out of simple meanings. The Army needs to find simple ways of communication that will speak to other cultural norms and that will require listening. Communication is a two-way street.

Common, universal languages are available that almost all cultures understand.

**Comparing Cultural Norms and Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of Culture</th>
<th>Mainstream American Culture</th>
<th>Other Cultures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of self and space</td>
<td>Informal, handshake</td>
<td>Formal hugs, bows, handshakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and language</td>
<td>Explicit, direct communication; emphasis on content, meaning found in words</td>
<td>Implicit, indirect communication; emphasis on context, meaning found around words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress and appearance</td>
<td>“Dress for success” ideal; wide range in accepted dress</td>
<td>Dress seen as a sign of position, wealth, and prestige; religious rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and eating habits</td>
<td>Eating as a necessity, fast food</td>
<td>Dining as a social experience, religious rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and time consciousness</td>
<td>Linear and exact time consciousness; value on promptness, time equals money</td>
<td>Elastic and relative time consciousness; time spent on enjoyment of relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships, family, friends</td>
<td>Focus on nuclear family; responsibility for self; value on youth, age seen as handicap</td>
<td>Focus on extended family; loyalty and responsibility to family; age given status and respect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values and norms</td>
<td>Individual orientation; independence; preference for direct confrontation of conflict</td>
<td>Group orientation; conformity; preference for harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beliefs and attitudes</td>
<td>Egalitarian; challenging of authority; individuals control their destiny; gender equality</td>
<td>Hierarchical; respect for authority and social order; individuals accept their destiny; different roles for men and women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental processes and learning style</td>
<td>Linear, logical, sequential problem-solving focus</td>
<td>Lateral, holistic, simultaneous; accepting of life’s difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work habits and practices</td>
<td>Emphasis on task; reward based on individual achievement; work has intrinsic value</td>
<td>Emphasis on relationships; rewards based on seniority, relationships; work is a necessity of life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

is the degree of importance given to nonverbal communication, including facial expressions and gestures as well as seating arrangements, personal distance, and sense of time. Different norms regarding the appropriate degree of assertiveness in communicating can add to cultural misunderstandings.

Attitudes toward conflict. Some cultures view conflict as a positive thing; others view it as something to be avoided. In the United States conflict is not usually desirable, but people most often deal directly with conflicts as they arise. For example, a face-to-face meeting is a customary way to work through problems. In many Eastern countries, open conflict is considered embarrassing or demeaning. Differences are best worked out quietly. A written exchange might be the favored means to address the conflict. Another means might be enlisting a respected third party who can facilitate communication without risking loss of face or being humiliated.

American military culture deals with problems head on. As in a game of checkers, the intricacies of subtle and indirect moves are more often than not relegated to civilian and military strategists. Many other cultures, however, employ indirect approaches and subtle means as part of day-to-day activity. When Soldiers trained in the direct approach encounter these cultures, communication is difficult and can often lead to profound misunderstandings and miscalculations.

Approaches to competing tasks. From culture to culture, people have different ways of completing tasks. They might have different access to resources, different rewards associated with task completion, different notions of time, and different ideas about how relationship-building and task-oriented work should go together. Asian and Hispanic cultures tend to attach more importance to developing relationships at the beginning of a shared project, with more emphasis on task completion toward the end, as compared with European-Americans. European-Americans tend to focus immediately on the task at hand, allowing relationships to develop as they work together.

Decisionmaking styles. The roles individuals play in decisionmaking vary widely from culture to culture. In America, decisions are frequently delegated; that is, an official assigns responsibility for a particular matter to a subordinate. In many Southern European and Latin American countries, strong value is placed on holding decisionmaking responsibilities oneself. When groups of people make decisions, majority rule is a common approach in America. In Japan, consensus is the preferred mode.

Attitudes toward personal disclosure. In some cultures, it is not appropriate to be frank about emotions, the reasons behind a conflict or a misunderstanding, or about personal information. Questions that might seem natural to you might seem intrusive to others. (What was the conflict about? What was your role in the conflict? What was the sequence of events?)

Approaches to knowing. Notable differences occur among cultural groups when it comes to epistemologies; that is, the ways people come to know things. European cultures tend to consider information acquired through cognitive means, such as counting and measuring, more valid than other ways of coming to know things. African cultures prefer affective ways of knowing, including symbolic imagery and rhythm. Asian cultures tend to emphasize the validity of knowledge gained through striving toward transcendence. Recent popular works demonstrate that American society is paying more attention to previously overlooked ways of knowing.

Obviously, different approaches to knowing can affect how we analyze or find ways to solve a community problem. Some group members might want to conduct library research to understand a shared problem better and to identify possible solutions. Others might prefer to visit places and people who have experienced similar challenges and touch, taste, and listen to what has worked elsewhere.

Specific Cultures to Study

In the future, key powers in a regional or global context will most likely be the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, and Russia, and future alliances, coalitions, and partnerships will most likely be tied to these nations. Key regional powers, whose activities or issues have the greatest possibility for creating global consequences, are most likely to be Indonesia, India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Algeria, and Mexico. In addition, natural resources in the Caspian Basin, off the coast of east-central Africa and in Venezuela will certainly increase those regions’ importance. These nations might offer a good starting point for a program of study of other cultures.

Cultural expertise takes time. Cultural literacy and competency skills will enable us to cope with most any circumstance of cultural difference. Areas of specific expertise deepen those skills and provide context to their application, but programs designed to achieve expertise in a given region or culture must begin early and be continuous. The officer corps should begin training while in precommissioning programs. Prescribed courses in regional studies and some language training would be a great beginning. We could certainly look at expanding summer opportunities for travel and study in specified foreign countries. A program of this nature currently exists within the foreign military studies office involving West Point cadets. We could expand the program to include select Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) students. Branch schools could coordinate with local universities for instructors, course materials, and expertise.

The Army War College’s (AWC’s) country studies program could certainly serve as a model for cultural education at lower levels. Using electronic connectivity between schools and individuals would allow the creation of virtual teams with AWC, CGSC, or advance course students around a specific country or regional area. The AWC students could serve as study directors, orchestrating and facilitating team members’ efforts in other schools.

Another possibility is to leverage business and industry programs for cultural education, making them available through distributed learning. We should also not forget the expertise available from the Special Forces. The bottom line is there are many ways available to achieve our goals if we can agree on the focus and end state.

Three other factors play into cultural differences that influence communication: religion, tribal affiliations, and nationalism. Religion. Religion, one of the most important aspects of cross-cultural conflict resolution, is a powerful constituent of cultural norms and values, and because it addresses the most profound existential
issues of human life (freedom and inevitability, fear and faith, security and insecurity, right and wrong, sacred and profane), it is deeply implicated in individual and social conceptions of peace. To transform current conflicts, we must understand the conceptions of peace within diverse religious and cultural traditions while seeking common ground.8

An exploration of religious cultural norms could take the form of comparisons of foundational cultural values as they apply to the world’s prominent religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Juche).

**Tribal affiliation.** Tribal cultures, prevalent in developing countries, are often the only structure in ungoverned areas. Tribal cultures differ, but at their core, they share a common foundation. They arise from a social tradition that often lacks written histories or philosophies and independent perspectives, and they espouse ideas and beliefs held unanimously by the entire tribe. Tribal leaders are not accustomed to external challenge.

Regardless of region, tribes also share foundational norms with respect to decisionmaking, knowledge, and disclosure. Studying norms for tribal structures might well prove the only way to understand these cultures because of the absence of written material.

**Nationalism.** Studying nationalism is to study cultural norms and values as driving factors. Separated from the context of states, nations embody the importance people place on culture and heritage without respect to geography. Nationalistic movements have common aspects in how they relate to other cultures and how their behaviors are governed. This area of study would be particularly useful in understanding and dealing with transnational organizations, whether they are legitimate, criminal, or terrorist.

### ASSESSING EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

Any educational program requires a way to assess its effectiveness. I am not sure how training would progress across the framework of a Soldier’s career, but every Soldier would at least be at the basic level after completing initial entry training and, at the advanced level, culturally proficient after completing the Primary Leadership Development Course.

Cultural education is not a new subject or issue. Over the years, the Army has introduced internal and external programs to address cultural factors within its organization and during long-duration deployments. The programs effectively created an Army value of cultural acceptance as a standard, but only so long as differing values did not compete with Army values or standards. These same programs, modified and refocused, could serve as the foundation for an expanded cultural education program to create better skills for dealing with other cultures during conflicts, partnerships, or stability operations and support operations. Resources associated with such programs could be the nucleus for a rapid start-up and foundation for expansion.

Cultural education is a growing concern among major businesses operating in the global market. For this reason, there are a wide variety of commercial, academic, and government programs for cultural education. In many cases, coursework is available and training-development work has been completed. Assessing and, where practical, using these programs offers significant cost savings in developing educational materials and courses.

The Army can expand on the educational base by ensuring tactical and operational training programs address cultural factors. At the national training centers, opposing-force role players should be skilled in emulating key cultural norms that might affect military actions and activities. All leaders should be exposed to these factors and receive appropriate feedback on how well they manage differences and accomplish tasks. Perhaps the Army should also consider introducing cultural-awareness training into Battle Command Training Programs and combat training centers where, with allies and partners, command and staffs would be combined to foster development of cultural competency skills.

Models and simulations in support of training and education should begin to include cultural factors as the Army moves to an agent-based construct, which will increase the number of variables and complicate environments so they more closely approximate reality. This program, which is already being worked by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is one we should seek to guide and direct.

In generalized study areas, the Army should educate Soldiers and leaders on foundational cultural norms and values and teach them skills used to understand and bridge cultural differences, looking at religious, tribal, and nationalistic factors in representative and nonrepresentative societies. Over time, specialized study should enable Soldiers to build expertise in specific regions concerning specific societies.

### NOTES

6. A growing perception in many circles is that military cultures are moving toward establishing an artificial or formal language.

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Current situation in Iraq

The enemy’s primary method of attacking coalition forces outside forward operating bases (FOBs) is detonating roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borne IEDs. Insurgents travel down narrow canal roads in small pickup trucks while U.S. forces pursue them in bigger, wider HMMWVs. The enemy then collapses or blocks the road and initiates an IED or rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) ambush. Implementing direct-fire ambushes with AK-47s and RPGs is their secondary form of attack.

Many of these roads don’t have markings or curbs and run parallel to canals and drainage ditches. Many roads in Iraq haven’t been surveyed and often are narrow for Army vehicle operations. Our HMMWVs are about 7 feet wide and offer limited visibility because of either Level I or Level II armor plating. These vehicles also are loaded with radios and additional equipment that further limit visibility.

Units that maintain a continuous presence reduce the number of attacks on coalition forces in their areas of operation. In other words, a unit that patrols their sector continuously forces the enemy to find another area in which to operate. With this goal in mind, units must constantly modify their tactics, techniques, and procedures to keep the enemy from detecting patterns.

According to commanders, leaders, and Soldiers deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom II, about 70 percent of all combat missions are conducted mounted. Of these missions, 50 percent are conducted at night. Thus, units must constantly conduct mounted patrols in their sectors and travel on unfamiliar and narrow roads.

The heightened operations tempo is taking a toll on in-theater vehicle fatalities. From 12 September 2001 to 14 February 2005, the Army suffered 173 HMMWV accidents that killed 53 Soldiers. Our Strykers were involved in 20 accidents during the same period, killing five Soldiers.

Rollover trends

Leaders should incorporate several lessons learned during their pre-deployment training for mounted combat operations in theater. Drivers should be trained to operate their vehicles at faster speeds to avoid IEDs. Drivers, vehicle commanders, and gunners should be taught to function and communicate as a team. Crewmembers must be trained to scan and communicate road hazards with one another and receive instruction on driving, backing, and turning their vehicles on narrow roads. Additionally, units deploying to Iraq should receive their M1114 HMMWVs to train with before deployment. In the past, some units have gotten their M1114s in Kuwait and driven them into Iraq without additional training.

When leaders conduct their risk assessment before combat missions, they update and brief the tactical or enemy risks extremely well but often leave out the accident or hazard-based risks. Leaders must brief locations along the routes where the roads are narrow or have steep drop-offs. Drivers also should know the effects of current weather on driving. In sum, leaders must incorporate Composite Risk Management to account for all potential
hazards encountered on any given mission.

In the past, some commanders have directed their Soldiers not to wear their seatbelts in case they must egress the vehicle quickly. These commanders based their decision on the perceived threat of being trapped in a burning or overturned vehicle with the enemy firing on them. However, being hit with an IED or rolling over in an accident are the primary threats in Iraq. Seatbelts allow Soldiers to remain conscious and in their seats within a violently tumbling vehicle and then exit the vehicle after it stops. Commanders now know that, statistically speaking, it’s better for their Soldiers to wear seatbelts.

Rollover drills must be rehearsed. Without rehearsals, there’s no “muscle memory” instilled in the Soldiers when a rollover does happen. Gunners are crushed because they haven’t physically trained to drop down into the gunner’s hatch. Another problem is that some rollover drills often don’t include procedures for egressing the vehicle through a single door. M1114s don’t have an emergency opening that allows Soldiers to evacuate the vehicle quickly if it’s upside down and the doors are blocked. These factors have caused Soldiers to drown because they were trapped inside their vehicles. Other Soldiers have suffered severe shock and hypothermia while trying to rescue comrades trapped in very cold water.

**Recommendations**

Units currently deploying to Iraq, as well as the ones already there, must train day and night until they achieve proficiency as a team on the following tasks:

- Alerting other crewmembers and other vehicles of upcoming hazardous conditions;
- Recognizing when a road is too narrow and stopping the vehicle;
- Turning and backing the vehicle on a narrow road lined by canals;
- Safely driving through simulated traffic at faster-than-normal speeds to imitate traveling through areas with possible IEDs;
- Driving around cones without hitting them so crews can understand their vehicles’ required clearances;
- Driving the vehicle partially off the road and correctly reentering the road without rolling over;
- Correctly transitioning from blackout drive to service drive, and then back to black-out drive;
- Conducting rollover drills in accordance with Graphic Training Aid 55-03-030, “HMMWV Up-armeded Emergency Procedures Performance Measures” (Available through the Reimer Digital Library at https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/atiadlisecure/view/restricted/20779-1/GTA/55-03-030/5503030_TOP.HTM. You must have an AKO user id and password to access this site.);

- Rehearsing, at a minimum of once a month, rollover drills with the crew egressing out a single door with the combat lock engaged; and
- Training on all the above tasks when the unit receives its M1114s or Stryker slat armor in Kuwait.

Commanders and leaders must conduct a composite risk assessment before every combat operation, including follow-on missions. A composite risk assessment is a running estimate of the situation that must be updated continuously. It combines accidental risk factors such as weather, crew selection, terrain, illumination, or traffic with the tactical risk posed by the enemy.

Additionally, commanders and leaders must ensure all Soldiers wear their seatbelts during mounted combat missions outside the FOB. Leaders should rehearse rollover drills at least once a month, to include evacuating the vehicle through a single door. The Program Executive Officer-Combat Support and Combat Service Support currently is working to modify the HMMWV family of vehicles so Soldiers can egress quickly if they’re upside down in water with all four doors blocked.

Vehicle accidents have claimed far too many of our Soldiers already and continue to kill at an alarming rate. We must do everything we can to turn the arrow down and bring our Soldiers home safe. Operations in Iraq are a whole different ball game from what we’re used to in the United States. Take note of your lessons learned and train your Soldiers right.

**Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Miller** is an infantry officer who currently serves as operations officer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Center.
TIPS FOR A BATTALION S4

MAJOR ERIK KRIVDA

Arriving at a mechanized infantry battalion as a captain with only light infantry experience as a lieutenant, and being assigned as the S4 can be a light fighter’s worst nightmare. However, with a little preparation and prior planning a new captain can still provide valuable support to the rifle companies and the battalion overall.

First and foremost, you as the incoming officer need to get a handle on daily operations. Typically, infantry officers have basic knowledge of the supply realm so it is imperative that you and your NCOIC have an informal closed-door session at the start. In this meeting, ground rules and boundaries need to be established. Daily supply transactions and “50 meter” targets should be handled more by the NCO; his experience in supply operations gives him the ability to work faster and put out the small fires that occur daily faster than you could. Long-term planning for deployments, rail operations, and budget planning should be done by you and briefed to the NCOIC. The NCOIC will be able to provide input on previous experiences, and the closer each event comes to execution, he will take over direct management to allow you to continue to the next set of long term issues.

As the combat arms officer, you must always be thinking of training your shop for war simultaneously to all of the typical garrison missions that occur. It is your duty — not just the HHC commander’s — to ensure your Soldiers are trained for war. You can relieve a lot of the HHC commander’s concerns by assisting him in training your shop whenever possible, and supporting HHC training events and ranges. You and the NCOIC can use each event as a training opportunity for your Soldiers. During HHC ranges each Soldier needs to go and fire his weapon. During sergeant’s time training, you can set up the combat trains command post (CTCP) and conduct tactical operations center (TOC) drills to train Soldiers to not only talk on the radio and set up the CTCP, but you can have your Soldiers rehearse battle tracking and logistical situation reports. A technique that proved successful was to spend the entire sergeant’s time training on setting up and jumping the CTCP to various locations in the local training area and motor pool. This gave the Soldiers the time and experience to develop a battle drill of what need to be packed first, who would monitor the fight during breakdown or set up, and where equipment could be stored in each vehicle. In addition, you can coordinate with the HHC commander to do this jointly and rehearse the CTCP and field trains command post (FTCP) set up and communications in the motor pool to verify SOPs or create SOPs to ensure both command posts are aligned and clearly working together.

Battalion gunnery is also a great opportunity to physically work the logistical channels and get the first sergeants into the training. During gunnery the S4 and HHC commander, with battalion’s approval, can mandate all chow support, personnel entering or leaving the field, and any supply needs move through logistics packages (LOGPACs). A home station gunnery can develop or reinforce the battalion logistical SOPs without having to put the entire battalion into the field. The motor pool can be designated as the FTCP/ UMCP (unit maintenance collection point), the command posts (CPs) for the FTCP and CTCP can simply be the S4 shop and HHC orderly room during Bradley tables V-VIII. This works the logistical muscles of the battalion as a rehearsal and ensures support platoon, S4, and the HHC commander get into a good working relationship prior to the first full blown battalion FTX. During Bradley table XI and XII the battalion TOC, FTCP, UMCP, aid station, and CTCP can deploy to the field to conduct a full rehearsal of all CPs prior to the battalion CTC or FTX ensuring all element understand requirements and reaffirm or develop SOPs.

Finally, as the CTCP, doctrinally you are the alternate battalion TOC, and you must always be prepared to assume this role. By MTOE (modern table of organization and equipment), the CTCP does not have the same amount of radios needed to monitor all the channels the TOC is required to. However, by adding additional OE-254s to your packing list you can quickly turn the fire support officer’s (FSO’s) and battalion executive officer’s (XO’s) HMMWVs into part of your radios for the TOC. The BN XO’s vehicle radio already on CMD NET can be hooked up to an OE-254 to boost its reception, and the same can be done with the FIRES NET in either the FSO HMMWV or simply use the second radio from the BN XO’s vehicle. By monitoring the CMD NET in the BN XO’s vehicle, the CMD NET inside the CTCP can then be used to monitor BN O&I NET. This allows the CTCP to continue to monitor A&D within the M577, and provides a slight separation of the TOC personnel and CTCP personnel to avoid confusion and total chaos that will occur when both the CTCP and TOC are combined.

Entering into a new battalion as the battalion S4 can be seen as an overwhelming leap; however, like anything else having a goal of what you want your shop to be able to accomplish is the key. Although these are only a few tips to assist a new S4, the key to success is knowing the supply system, property accountability, and combat logistical resupply techniques. Following some of these simple tips can help new officers assume the role of battalion S4 focused to train the Soldiers in their section to better support the battalion.

Major Erik Krivda served as a battalion S4 for the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry from November 1997 to April 1998 and again for the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division from November 2000 to May 2002. Krivda was commissioned from Mount Saint Mary’s College and holds a bachelor’s in Business and Finance as well as a master’s in International Relations from the University of Oklahoma. He will attend the Command and General Staff College in August 2005.
An HHC commander soon learns that there is a fine balance between training Soldiers for war and ensuring battalion-level training is carried out without problems in support or resources. Many times Soldiers in an HHC will only do the minimum for weapons qualification, strictly due to lack of time; however, more and more frequently HHC Soldiers are the ones caught in ambushes on the roads of Iraq. Therefore, it is imperative that each Soldier in HHC receives enough training to ensure he is much more comfortable with his weapon and able to kill the enemy as quickly as possible. This deliberate training program should be viewed as a small arms “gunnery” for the low-density MOS Soldiers.

First and foremost, a good PMI (primary marksmanship instruction) should be conducted with all Soldiers before they even head to the range. Many times in an HHC this is not conducted due to time constraints or other support operations that might be going on prior to the range. However, this is a major factor in ensuring the Soldier understands what he is doing. In addition, one NCO or section should be responsible for the PMI to ensure the same level of instruction for all Soldiers in the company. As an infantryman, it is common knowledge after One Station Unit Training (OSUT) on where to aim on pop-up targets at different ranges due specifically to the amount of range time a new 11-series will spend at Fort Benning, but this is typically not the case for other MOS Soldiers. During one PMI after I recently took command, a new cook was asked where to aim on the e-type silhouette and he replied, “Always aim at the head, that’s what my drill sergeant taught me.” This Soldier had not qualified on his weapon since he had arrived to the company from his AIT. After one-on-one instruction that afternoon, he was able to get out on the range and qualify simply by adjusting his point of aim.

Of course PMI alone will not make low density MOS Soldiers more comfortable with their weapon systems; range shooting will. This is why semi annual qualification should be conducted like Bradley or tank gunnery. A standard range progression leading up to standard qualification and beyond should be used instead of one afternoon of shooting at a pop-up range. The range gunnery blocks start with a basic shooting level and work up to an advanced combat qualification scenario. After PMI the day prior, Soldiers should go to the zero range to either confirm or adjust their weapons zero. Either that day, time permitting, or the next day Soldiers move to Table 1 of the gunnery: the known distance range. On this range the Soldiers are given pop-up targets at 100m, 200m and 300m, told the range, when they will be coming up, and given

Figure 1 - M16 Range Stress Shoot
no time limit to engage the target. The standard to pass the range is for a Soldier to hit at least 25 targets out of 40. This allows Soldiers to move on to Table 2: M16 qualification.

The M16 qualification standards do not change from the basic Army qualification system and include the NBC and night familiarization fire. Once the Soldiers complete qualification, they move to Table 3: advanced firing techniques. On this range Soldiers receive instruction on techniques such as steadying the rifle with a sling and how to fire their weapon from kneeling and standing positions. Also Soldiers are instructed on firing the M16 on burst. The advanced range is conducted on a standard M16 pop-up range, and the Soldiers fire from the foxhole on burst, and out of the foxhole in both the standing and kneeling positions. The targets run similar to qualification, ranging from 25 to 300 meters and are timed giving the Soldier a more difficult time to complete his qualification and test his shooting ability. Of course, with Soldiers firing on burst more ammunition is needed, and therefore, depending on your battalion’s authorization, you may have to get creative on how many target exposures should be given for each firer. For our battalion, Soldiers in the burst fire received 12 exposures and were given two, 18-round magazines in the foxhole. In the kneeling, Soldiers were given three magazines with a total of 20 rounds between all three magazines, and were given 20 exposures. This ensures that not only the stress of a new firing position was given, but also that with no added time, Soldiers had to change magazines during the qualification adding more realism. The standing position typically was the hardest for Soldiers, and they were given two magazines totaling 15 rounds to fire at 10 exposures. To qualify on this table Soldiers had to hit 24 out of 48, which is not demandingly difficult; however, after this range Soldiers’ confidence in their rifles skyrocketed.

The final gunnery table was Table 4: the stress shoot. This pitted the Soldier to use all of his skills in a competition. A stress shoot typically is a good event to push the Soldiers both physically and mentally, while still requiring him to use his shooting skills and hit various targets. Our battalion used two different courses: one on a maneuver range, the other on a standard M16 pop-up qualification range. The maneuver range stress shoot was a lane where the Soldiers conducted IMT to move down range approximately 700 meters where numerous target beds were activated depending on the Soldiers position on the range. On the M16 qualification range stress shoot, Soldiers IMT-ed between each firing position on the range while engaging targets down range. This final table gave Soldiers a taste of maneuvering in Kelvar, LBV, and IBA with plates and showed the Soldiers how breathing control, proper weapons handling, physical fitness, and ensuring a good weapon firing position can give a Soldier the edge to kill the enemy. This table was not a pass/fail event, only a must complete to be considered qualified. Soldiers were timed from start to finish, given points on how many targets hit (more points for the further the target), and had points taken away for improper IMT or weapons handling (i.e. failure to close dust cover prior to movement, or not placing weapon on safe before movement). The times and points were then tallied and posted in the company area as a competition. The highest scorers were given Army Achievement Medals and three or four-day passes, similar to BFV or tank crews that shoot distinguished. This final table was a great morale boost to the Soldiers no matter their MOS, and after the first weapons gunnery, it became a ‘rite of passage’ event for new Soldiers during semiannual qualification.

Development of shooting skills for low-density MOS Soldiers is a difficult task in HHC. However, the small arms gunnery technique allows a great base for low-density MOS Soldiers to gain valuable combat skills needed to survive on today’s battlefield. Today’s war on terrorism clearly shows that the basic Soldier fundamentals taught in the Infantry world should truly be the base of knowledge for all Soldiers to ensure Soldier survival in a near ambush. Infantry leaders must never take for granted that all Soldiers are as comfortable with a rifle as 11-series Soldiers, and should always strive to include other MOS Soldiers in their basic skill training in garrison.

Students of the American Civil War are familiar with the ‘Lost Cause Theory’ in which Southerners blamed their defeat on poor leadership, a lack of southern nationalism, and overwhelming odds. This theory was a force in Civil War historiography for the first 100 years or so of the postwar period and still finds many adherents to this day. A similar, although perhaps less prominent, phenomenon exists regarding the Allied victory over Germany in Normandy. According to the authors, many historians attribute this victory to a combination of Allied material advantages and Hitler’s inept meddling in military affairs rather than giving credit to the martial prowess of the Allied Soldier. The authors point to such historians as B. H. Liddell Hart, S. L. A. Marshall, and others as propagators of this idea. One significant element of this theory is that the Allied Soldier prevailed despite being subject to universally poor leadership. This book purports to correct these misperceptions and finally give the common Soldier his due. Regardless of its lofty aims Normandy: The Real Story is an entertaining overview that fails to make the case of what may be a legitimate position.

Historian Terry Copp, who provided a well-written conclusion, joins the late Brigadier General Denis Whitaker, a decorated Soldier who participated in the events portrayed, and his wife Shelagh, a military historian in presenting this book. It is unfortunate that Copp’s conclusions are not better supported by the main text. Readers may wonder if he might have joined the project after most of the work was done, perhaps after the death of Denis Whitaker. His conclusion seems to be an effort to lend clarity to the book.

The narrative is smooth and entertaining but is no more than a loosely connected string of anecdotes rather than a thesis. Although the subtitle indicates that this is to be the story of ordinary Soldiers few junior officers, NCOs, and lower enlisted Soldiers make it into the story other than some tangential mentions. For most readers the term ‘ordinary Soldier’ conjures up ideas of captains, sergeants and privates, but in this book few Soldiers below the rank of lieutenant colonel are specifically noted.


Frank Schaeffer’s world was already upset when his son John joined the Marine Corps in 1998. On February 17, 2003, John Schaeffer turned the family’s world completely upside down with a phone call. John was deploying to Iraq. How does a family deal with a wartime deployment? How does anyone deal with the uncertainty, the stress and the long days and nights when a family member is serving in a combat zone? Frank attempts to answer these questions with his diary covering actually two deployments to Afghanistan (the deployment changed from the original destination of Iraq). The many e-mails and phone calls from family and friends brought a perspective from many angles. Even those friends who do not believe in the war, rallied around the Schaeffer family during the deployment.

Frank draws the reader into the day-to-day struggle to deal with the uncertainties of a loved one facing the unknown dangers in Afghanistan. The ebb and flow of feelings from anguish to relaxed uncertainty are chronicled. Frank Schaeffer’s report of the sleepless nights and the awakenings in the middle of the night with an uncertain feeling strike a common chord in the lives of servicemen’s family members of any branch of the military.

The heart-stopping event of a late night phone call is no longer just a wrong number; it is the dreaded phone call of a problem with a deployed son. The Schaeffer family takes you on a roller coaster ride with each phone call from their Marine and each CNN report of another service member killed. The attitudes of each member of the Schaeffer family are challenged. Firm beliefs move from their rock foundations to floating on water and sometimes drifting off into space. Divergent views are suddenly shoved aside to make room for the unifying single wish and hope of John Schaeffer returning home safely. One thing is certain; the American flag is never observed the same way again.

As a correspondent for the Washington Post with the three published novels, Portofino, Saving Grandma, and Zermatt, the author is probably one of the least likely parents to send a child to war. John changed his father’s view of wartime service forever by surprising everyone by first volunteering for the Marine Corps in 1998, and then deploying to the Iraq war in 2003. Frank and John Schaeffer joined ranks to write Keeping Faith: A Father-Son Story about Love and the United States Marine Corps about joining the military. Faith of Our Sons is the hard-hitting sequel, outlining service during combat operations in the Middle East. Every family support group and unit commander should recommend this book to the families of deployed Soldiers.

Faith of Our Sons is a timely book written straight from the fierce anxiety of a heart squeezed by the day-to-day uncertainty of war. Take a seat on the couch next to Frank and his wife, Genie, as they watch CNN and wonder each time a Soldier

Robert Citino’s *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare* is a superb book, which will appeal to a diverse group of readers. Citino has crafted a book that is informative, well written, and most importantly, makes you think. Simply put, it is a book you will not want to put down.

The author has two distinct objectives in writing the book. First, he wants to provide the reader with a concise, yet highly analytical look at combined arms warfare and the evolution of operational art since the beginning of World War II. Second, with an eye on transformation and current operations, he makes his case for the U.S. Army to maintain a strong heavy force with a doctrine focused at the operational level of war. Certainly, Citino achieves his first objective with a combination of outstanding research, detailed analysis and answering the ‘so what’ that is often missing in books of this genre. In terms of his second objective, I will leave that up to future readers to determine if he made a valid case.

Citino, a professor of history at Eastern Michigan University, is well qualified to pursue his objectives. In essence, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm* is his fourth book in a series focused on warfighting at the operational level of war. The first three books in the series were *Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939; The Evolution of Blitzkrieg Tactics: Germany Defends Itself Against Poland, 1918-1933; and Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe 1899-1940*. Obviously, these books focused on the German Army and events in Europe. However, they do set the conditions for Citino’s latest effort and consequently are highly recommended reading for those interested in *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*.

Although I have not read all of them, the ones I have read shared the same characteristics and strengths as Citino’s current book.

In *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm*, Citino analyzes the operational art exhibited by opposing sides in World War II, the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli Wars, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the Iran-Iraq War, Desert Storm, and briefly touches on Operation Iraqi Freedom. In his discussion and analysis of each, Citino uses the same basic formula that he explains in his introduction. He states, “What is the role of mobility? Is it more or less important than firepower? What sorts of advantages does better, more realistic training bestow? How important is doctrine? What types of command and control mechanisms work best on the modern battlefield? Do victorious campaigns and armies that achieve them, share certain characteristics? The author successfully answers these questions and more throughout his pages. As stated earlier, Citino then uses the above analysis to craft his argument for the future of the U.S. Army. The author is extremely persuasive and his conclusions will make for excellent debate.

As can be surmised from my earlier comments, I found numerous strengths with this book. First, Citino has a very relaxed and readable writing style which can make complex material easy to comprehend. Second, throughout the book, the author not only explains what happened, but more importantly, why it happened and its complication. Third, Citino is not afraid to debate other authors’ conclusions or analyses on particular events or leaders. For example, he questions historian Russell Weigley’s treatment of U.S.Grant in *The American Way of War*. Perhaps, you may disagree with Citino’s opinions (which I did in some cases), but it is refreshing and thought provoking. Finally, and in my opinion the biggest strength is the book’s concluding notes section. Citino devotes almost 60 pages to discussing sources he used in writing his book. He gives his opinions on what books to read and which not to read if the reader wants more information on a particular subject. I found this extremely beneficial.

In summary, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm* is an exceptional read. It should be read by those seeking a better understanding of operational art and those with opinions on the future composition and role of the U.S. Army. I look forward to his next project!
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